IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 17, 2020 Session 

BRADI M. BAKER-BRUNKHORST V. GEOFFREY B. BRUNKHORST

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Madison County

No. 75616 Kyle C. Atkins, Chancellor

No. W2020-00154-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The matter in controversy concerns an attorney’s 

fee lien and abstract of suit filed and recorded by the wife’s former counsel following the 

entry of the divorce decree. In pertinent part, the decree required the husband to pay the 

entire equity in jointly owned real property to the wife contemporaneous with the wife 

quitclaiming her interest in the property to the husband; however, the husband died prior 

to the conveyance or the payment. Thereafter, the wife’s former counsel filed a motion to 

perfect and enforce its attorney’s lien on the property, and the court granted the motion. 

The administrator of the husband’s estate filed a motion to release the attorney’s lien, and 

the court ruled that the lien was valid and enforceable because neither party performed their 

respective obligations under the divorce decree. The administrator for the husband’s estate 

then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend on the grounds (1) there was 

no legal basis for allowing the wife’s attorneys to file a charging lien against property

awarded to the husband and (2) the lien was not valid because the attorneys based the lien 

on the wrong section of the statute. The court denied the Rule 59.04 motion to alter or 

amend, and this appeal followed. The singular issue in this appeal is whether the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying the Rule 59.04 motion. Because the administrator’s 

motion was not based on a change in controlling law, previously unavailable evidence, or 

a clear error of law, see In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), we hold 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. Therefore, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., joined.

William H. Shackelford, Jr., Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, the Estate of Geoffrey 

B. Brunkhorst.

02/22/2021
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Susan A. Hinsley, Tiffany Taylor Bowders, and Anne B. Davis, Memphis, Tennessee, for 

the appellee, Butler Sevier Hinsley & Reid, PLLC.

OPINION

Bradi M. Baker-Brunkhorst (“Wife”) filed for divorce from Geoffrey B. Brunkhorst 

(“Husband”) in Madison County Chancery Court on June 2, 2017, after less than five years 

of marriage. Husband filed an answer and counter complaint on July 10, 2017, and Wife 

filed an answer to Husband’s counter complaint. 

After Wife’s attorney withdrew from the case in September 2018,

1 Wife retained

the law firm of Butler, Sevier, Hinsley & Reid (“BSHR”). The employment agreement 

provided that BSHR had a right to place a lien on “all property, money, assets, alimony or 

things of value that are recovered, obtained, preserved, or protected” in the divorce action 

to satisfy the attorneys’ fees. 

Following mediation, the parties entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement 

(“MDA”). The MDA addressed the division of two properties located in Jackson, 

Tennessee and owned by Husband and Wife as tenants by the entirety—1287 Hollywood 

Drive and 1305 Hollywood Drive (“the Hollywood Drive properties”). The MDA provided 

that Wife “shall sign a Quit Claim Deed prepared by the Husband’s counsel within thirty 

(30) days of executing this document waiving all right, title and interest in and to said 

properties,” and “Husband shall pay to Wife $115,000 (One hundred fifteen thousand 

dollars and no/100s) representing the entirety of the equity in both parcels of real property.”

Husband’s payments were to be made in installments, with the first payment due on or 

before December 21, 2018.2 On December 14, 2018, the court entered a Final Decree of 

Divorce incorporating the MDA and ordering Husband and Wife to pay their own 

attorneys’ fees.3

Husband died on April 8, 2019.4 As of the date of Husband’s death, Husband had 

not remitted any of the required installment payments to Wife, and the spouses remained 

 

1 BSHR was the third law firm to represent Wife in the divorce proceedings.

2 More specifically, the court ordered the installments to be paid as follows: (1) $15,000 on or

before December 21, 2018; (2) $25,000 on or before April 30, 2019; (3) $25,000 on or before July 31, 2019; 

and (4) balance due on or before December 31, 2019.

3 BSHR filed a motion to withdraw as Wife’s counsel on January 2, 2019, and the court granted 

the motion in July 2019.

4 Wife was arrested and incarcerated for allegedly killing Husband outside of his home at 1287 

Hollywood Drive; she was incarcerated in the Madison County Criminal Justice Complex.
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owners of record of the Hollywood Drive properties because Wife had not quitclaimed her 

interest in the properties to Husband.

On April 15, 2019, BSHR filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien and Abstract of Suit in 

accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-1025requesting that an attorney’s lien attach 

against the Hollywood Drive properties to satisfy Wife’s attorney’s fees in the amount of 

$8,385.46. The Registrar’s Office for Madison County, Tennessee, recorded the lien in 

Book L65, Pages 1464–1467. 

On April 22, 2019, BSHR filed a Motion to Perfect and Enforce Attorney’s Lien 

claiming an additional $1,401.25 in attorney’s fees since filing its Notice of Attorney’s 

Lien for a total of $9,786.71 in attorney’s fees. The trial court heard BSHR’s motion to 

perfect and enforce the lien on April 29, 2019. In an order entered on July 1, 2019,

6

the 

court awarded BSHR a judgment in the amount of $9,786.71 against Wife for its attorney’s 

fees and granted BSHR’s motion to perfect and enforce the lien.

On May 9, 2019, Angela Snider, counsel for Husband, filed a Suggestion of Death. 

On May 23, 2019, William H. Shackelford, Jr. (“Administrator”) was appointed 

Administrator of Husband’s estate. On July 12, 2019, Administrator, acting on behalf of 

Husband’s estate, filed a Motion to Enforce Final Decree of Divorce, Marital Dissolution 

Agreement, Declare Rights in Real Property, and Motion to Release Abstract of 

Suit/Attorney’s Lien. Administrator asked the court to enter an order declaring that the 

Hollywood Drive properties vested in Husband’s estate in accordance with the final 

divorce decree and to release the attorney’s lien from the properties. 

BSHR filed a response contending Wife was not divested of her interest in the 

properties because neither Husband nor Husband’s estate performed his obligations under 

the MDA, and Wife had not executed the quitclaim deed. Thus, the attorney’s lien was 

proper.

 

5 Whether it was a typographical error or not, BSHR’s lien is based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-

103, not -102, because BSHR did not begin the suit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-102 states, “Attorneys and 

solicitors of record who begin a suit shall have a lien upon the plaintiff’s or complainant’s right of action 

from the date of the filing of the suit.” (Emphasis added). However, Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-103 states,

“Any attorney or solicitor who is employed to prosecute a suit that has already been brought in any 

court of record shall have a lien upon the plaintiff’s right of action from the date of the attorney’s or 

solicitor’s employment in the case[.]” (Emphasis added).

6 Angela Snider, the attorney who represented Husband in the divorce, and Tiffany Bowders, 

attorney for BSHR, approved the order for entry.
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The court held a hearing on August 19, 2019, and, in an order entered on September 

11, 2019, the court found that neither Husband nor Wife performed his or her obligations 

under the MDA—Husband did not pay Wife the equity in the Hollywood Drive properties, 

and Wife did not transfer her interest in the properties to Husband. Based on those findings, 

the court ruled as follows: 

Therefore, this Court enforces the Marital Dissolution Agreement and Final 

Decree of Divorce, and, due to the death of Husband, orders title of said 

properties be placed in the name of the Estate of Geoffrey B. Brunkhorst and 

the Personal Representative shall be vested with authority to execute any and 

all documents to sell and dispose of the above mentioned properties with 

haste at the best price possible and Wife shall be paid for her interest in the 

properties, up to the amounts ordered in the Final Decree of Divorce and 

Marital Dissolution Agreement, following the payment of all encumbrances, 

liens, and expenses related to the sale.

Furthermore, the Court finds that the Abstract of Suit filed on the 12th day 

of July, 2019, by the law firm of Butler Sevier Hinsley & Reid PLLC, is a 

valid and enforceable lien against said real properties, entitled to satisfaction 

as any other encumbrance against the properties at sale.

The property located at 1305 Hollywood Drive sold at a foreclosure sale for 

$30,000, conducted by an attorney, Brad Sigler, on behalf of the first lien-holder. After 

payment of the first lien and costs of sale, approximately $10,300 remained.7 The 

remaining funds were placed in Mr. Sigler’s escrow account. 

Administrator filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment 

requesting that the court reconsider its ruling that the attorney’s lien was valid and 

enforceable. Administrator first argued the attorney’s lien was not valid because BSHR 

based its attorney’s lien on the wrong statutory authority. Specifically, Administrator 

contended that, in BSHR’s Notice of Attorney’s Lien and Abstract of Suit, BSHR 

incorrectly cited to Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-102, which applies when an attorney initiates

the suit on behalf of the plaintiff, rather than citing to § 23-2-103, which applies when the 

attorney is retained after the suit is initiated. Administrator also argued the attorney’s lien 

was not equitable because the Hollywood Drive properties were awarded to Husband in 

the final divorce decree, and the parties were ordered to pay their own attorneys’ fees.

BSHR filed a response contending Administrator’s motion was improper under 

Rule 59.04 because Rule 59.04 “contemplates altering or amending a judgment on the basis 

 

7 The 1287 Hollywood Drive property was also sold at a foreclosure sale; however, there were no 

net proceeds after the satisfaction of the existing mortgage and costs of the sale.
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of newly discovered evidence, when the controlling law changes before a judgment 

becomes final, or to correct a clear error of law.” Because Administrator did not base his 

motion on any of those conditions, BSHR argued the court should deny it.

The court held a hearing on December 6, 2019, and entered an order on January 1, 

2020, denying Administrator’s motion. The court found that Administrator “presented no 

newly discovered evidence or facts not already known or presented to the Court” during 

the hearing on the motion to enforce the divorce decree and release the attorney’s lien. 

Thus, the court upheld its ruling that the attorney’s lien was valid and enforceable. 

Administrator appealed.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Administrator’s Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment.8

We review a decision to grant or deny a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend a 

judgment under the abuse of discretion standard. Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 

479, 487 (Tenn. 2012). The abuse of discretion standard of review does not permit a 

reviewing court to substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Lee Med., Inc. v. 

Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). Nevertheless, the abuse of discretion standard 

of review does not immunize a trial court’s decision from any meaningful appellate 

scrutiny. Id.

[R]eviewing courts should review a [trial] court’s discretionary decision to 

determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported 

by evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly identified and 

applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and 

(3) whether the [trial] court’s decision was within the range of acceptable 

alternative dispositions. When called upon to review a lower court’s 

discretionary decision, the reviewing court should review the underlying 

factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard contained 

in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) and should review the [trial] court’s legal 

determinations de novo without any presumption of correctness.

Id. at 524–25 (internal citations omitted).

 

8 We acknowledge that the parties raised other issues in their briefs. We, however, have determined 

that the other issues are rendered moot by our decision.
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A Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend a judgment provides “the trial court with an 

opportunity to correct errors before the judgment becomes final.” In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 

at 895 (citation omitted). A trial court should grant the motion “when the controlling law 

changes before the judgment becomes final; when previously unavailable evidence 

becomes available; or to correct a clear error of law or to prevent injustice.” Id. “A Rule 

59 motion should not be used to raise or present new, previously untried or unasserted 

theories or legal arguments.” Id. (citations omitted).

A charging lien, like the one here, is premised “on a lawyer’s equitable right to have 

the fees and costs due for the lawyer’s services in a particular action secured by the 

judgment or recovery in that action.” Starks v. Browning, 20 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1999) (citations omitted). Tennessee Code Annotated § 23-2-103 provides that “[a]ny 

attorney or solicitor who is employed to prosecute a suit that has already been brought in 

any court of record shall have a lien upon the plaintiff’s right of action from the date of the 

attorney’s or solicitor’s employment in the case.” An attorney’s lien “attaches to any 

proceeds flowing from a judgment, as long as the lawyer worked to secure the judgment 

for the client.” Starks, 20 S.W.3d at 651 (citations omitted).

Administrator argues on appeal that the trial court erred because there was no legal 

basis for allowing Wife’s attorneys to file a charging lien against properties awarded to 

Husband in the final divorce.9 Accordingly, as BSHR notes, Administrator did not base his 

motion on a change in controlling law or previously unavailable evidence. Thus, the 

question is whether there was a clear error of law. See In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d at 895 (A 

trial court should grant a Rule 59.04 motion “to correct a clear error of law.”).

The facts are largely undisputed. Wife signed a contract allowing BSHR to satisfy 

its claim for attorney’s fees by placing a lien on any property, money, or assets recovered 

in the divorce. Although Wife was to convey her interest in the Hollywood Drive properties 

to Husband and Husband was to pay Wife the equity in the properties, Husband died before 

Wife conveyed her interest in the properties to him. Thus, Husband and Wife still owned 

the Hollywood Drive properties as tenants by the entirety at the time of Husband’s death,

and Husband still owed Wife the equity in the properties. Moreover, although each had a 

contractual duty that survived Husband’s death, upon Husband’s death, Wife continued “to 

own the whole in fee simple.” See Bryant v. Bryant, 522 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tenn. 2017). 

Accordingly, Wife owned the Hollywood Drive properties when BSHR filed and recorded 

its Lien and Abstract of Suit.

 

9 Administrator also contends on appeal that the lien was not valid because BSHR based its 

attorney’s lien on the wrong statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-102 instead of -103, because BSHR did not

begin the suit. We have determined this issue was waived because it was raised for the first time in 

Administrator’s Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. See In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d at 895

(“A Rule 59 motion should not be used to raise or present new, previously untried or unasserted theories or 

legal arguments.”)
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It is undisputed that BSHR secured for Wife the equity in the Hollywood Drive 

properties and that Husband failed to remit any of the installment payments required by the 

MDA and final divorce decree. Moreover, Wife remained an owner of the properties at all 

material times. As previously stated, an attorney’s lien “attaches to any proceeds flowing 

from a judgment, as long as the lawyer worked to secure the judgment for the client.” 

Starks, 20 S.W.3d at 651. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that BSHR secured for 

Wife the equity in the Hollywood Drive properties and that neither Husband nor Husband’s 

estate paid the equity in the properties to Wife. 

Having found that the Administrator’s Rule 59.04 motion was not premised on a 

change in controlling law, previously unavailable evidence, or a clear error of law, we find 

no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

motion to alter or amend the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to 

deny Administrator’s Rule 59.04 motion.

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded with costs 

of appeal assessed against the appellant, William H. Shackleford, Jr., Administrator of the 

Estate of Geoffrey B. Brunkhorst.

________________________________

 FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.