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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

2014 REPORT ON FOREIGN POLICY-BASED EXPORT CONTROLS

U.S. Department of Commerce

Bureau of Industry and Security

Table of Contents

Number Page

Chapter 1 Introduction 2

Chapter 2 Crime Controls/Human Rights Controls 12

Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls 17

Chapter 4 Anti-Terrorism Controls 28

Chapter 5 Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls 35

Chapter 6 Toxic Chemicals, Chemical Precursors, and Associated

Equipment, Technology, and Software Controls 57

Chapter 7 Biological Agents and Associated Equipment and Technology 

Controls 65

Chapter 8 Missile Technology Controls 72

Chapter 9 Encryption Controls 78

Chapter 10 Significant Items: “Hot Section” Technology Controls 82

Chapter 11 Nuclear Nonproliferation Controls 85

Chapter 12 Surreptitious Listening Controls 89

Chapter 13 Entity List 93

Appendix I Summary of Public Comments on Foreign Policy-Based Export 

Controls 98

Appendix II Multilateral Export Control Regimes in 2013 100

Appendix III Selected Rules Published by the Department of Commerce in 2013 102
Chapter 1 Introduction

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes require annual extension according to the 

provisions of Section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended1(the EAA). 

Section 6(f) of the EAA requires the President to submit a report to Congress to extend the 

controls. Authority to submit the report has been delegated to the Secretary of Commerce.2 

Section 6(f) of the EAA requires the report to specify the determinations or considerations of the 

Secretary (as delegated by the President) with respect to the criteria set forth in Section 6(b) of 

the EAA established for imposing, extending, or expanding foreign policy controls. This report 

complies with all of the requirements set out in the EAA for extending, amending, or imposing 

foreign policy-based export controls. 

The Department of Commerce is acting under the authority conferred by Executive Order 13222 

of August 17, 2001 (Executive Order), as extended most recently by the Notice of August 18, 

2013 (78 FR 49107 (Aug. 12, 2013)). In Executive Order 13222, the President, by reason of the 

expiration of the EAA, invoked his authority, including authority under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), to continue in effect the system of controls that had 

been maintained under the EAA. Under a policy of conforming actions under the Executive 

Order to those under the EAA, the Department of Commerce is following the provisions of 

Section 6 of the EAA with regard to extending foreign policy-based export controls. 

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Department of Commerce extends with this 

report all foreign policy export controls described in this report for the period from January 21, 

2014, through January 20, 2015. BIS takes this action pursuant to the recommendation of the 

Secretary of State. As further authorized by the EAA, foreign policy export controls remain in 

effect for replacement parts and for parts contained in goods subject to such controls. The 

controls administered in accordance with procedures established pursuant to Section 309(c) of 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 similarly remain in effect. 

Each Chapter of this report describes a particular category of foreign policy controls and 

delineates modifications that have taken place over the past year. Although this report covers the 

2013 calendar year, the statistical data presented in the report is based on fiscal year 2013 export 

licensing statistics, unless otherwise noted. BIS generates this data from the computer system it 

uses to process and track export license activity. The data included may over count a small 

number of licenses because the computer system has some limitations in tabulating the 

occasional license application listing more than one Export Commodity Classification Number 

(ECCN) or country of destination. In addition, BIS bases the data in this report on values 

contained in issued export licenses. Such values may not represent the values of actual 

 

1

50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000). 

2 Executive Order 12002 (July 7, 1977) (as amended).
Chapter 1 Introduction

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

shipments made against those licenses because an exporter ultimately might not export all the 

items described in an application. 

Some goods, technology, and software described in this report require licenses to export for 

national security purposes in accordance with Section 5 of the EAA. 

Part I: Highlights from 2013 

Regional Stability

As part of Export Control Reform, less sensitive items, such as parts and components for 

munitions list items, are being transferred on a rolling basis from the U.S. Munitions List to the 

Commerce Control List. Once on the Commerce Control List, these items will be controlled 

within the “600 Series.” All “600 Series” items will be controlled for Regional Stability reasons 

(RS Column 1). Each application for export and re-export of 600 series items will be reviewed 

on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the transaction is contrary to the national security 

or foreign policy interests of the United States. The majority of these less sensitive items will be 

officially transferred from the USML to the CCL on a rolling basis throughout FY2014, 

beginning with controls relating to certain aircraft and gas turbine engines, which were 

transferred to the CCL on October 15, 2013.

Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls

On July 23, 2013, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration 

Regulations (EAR) to implement a limited waiver of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 

Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (the SAA), published by the Secretary of State on June 12, 

2013. The waiver authorized BIS to issue licenses on a case-by-case basis for the export or reexport of certain commodities, software, and technology necessary for the support of the Syrian 

people. 

On August 2, 2013, the United States determined that the Syrian government had used chemical 

weapons against its own nationals and imposed several sanctions on Syria, including a 

prohibition on exports of national security-sensitive goods and technologies, as required by the 

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (“the CBW 

Act”). However, the United States also determined that it was essential to national security to 

partially waive sanctions required under the CBW Act vis-à-vis activities in furtherance of 

United States policies regarding the Syrian conflict. Following a major use of chemical weapons 

against Syrian civilians on August 21, 2013, the United States and Russia negotiated a 

framework for dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons program on an expedited basis, which was 

embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 and a special decision of the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council on September 27, 

2013.
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Toxic Chemicals, Chemical Precursors, Biological Agents and Associated Equipment, 

Technology, and Software

On January 28, 2013, the Australia Group (AG) published on its website a statement of concern 

regarding the continuing conflict in Syria and the failure of the Syrian government to eliminate 

concerns about the prospect of use of chemical weapons. AG member countries noted that Syria 

continues to be a country of proliferation concern. AG member countries re-affirmed their 

agreement on the importance of increased vigilance with regard to dual-use exports to Syria and 

also agreed to subject exports to Syria to particular scrutiny. On June 7, 2013, the AG published 

on its website participants’ concerns about the mounting evidence of chemical weapons use in 

Syria. AG members urged all parties to the Syrian conflict to renounce chemical weapons and 

again emphasized the need for all countries to exercise increased vigilance and particular 

scrutiny with regard to dual-use exports to Syria. These agreements by the AG support existing 

United States sanctions against Syria.

On June 5, 2013, the Department of Commerce published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 

FR 33692) to implement the understandings reached at the 2012 Plenary and Intersessional 

meetings of the AG. The rule amended Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 1C351, 

1C354 and 1C360 to reflect the changes to the AG “List of Biological Agents for Export 

Control.” Specifically, ECCN 1C351 (Human and zoonotic pathogens and “toxins”) was 

amended to add botulinum neurotoxin producing strains of Clostridium argentinese; Clostridium 

baratii; and Clostridium butyricum. ECCN 1C351 was also amended to clarify controls on 

Rickettsia prowazekii and Escherichia coli. ECCN 1C354 (Plant pathogens) was amended to 

add three pathogens previously controlled under ECCN 1C360 that now appear on the AG “List 

of Plant Pathogens for Export Control” (Peronosclerospora philippinensis; Sclerophthora 

rayssiae var. zeae; and Synchytrium endobioticum); as well as Tilletia indica and Thecaphora 

solani. ECCN 1C354 was also amended to clarify controls on Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri; 

Ralstonia solanacearum; Colletotrichum kahawae; Puccinia graminis; Magnaporthe grisea; and 

Andean potato latent virus. This rule also amended ECCN 2B352 to add certain spray-drying 

equipment that now appears on the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment and 

Related Technology and Software.” Finally, this rule also removes ECCN 1C360 (Select agents 

not Australia Group controlled) following interagency agreement to consolidate biological 

entries and to mirror Select Agent Regulations by removing ten former select agents not listed on 

the AG “List of Biological Agents for Export Control” from the CCL (Central European tickborne encephalitis virus, Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1, Flexal virus, Akabane virus, Bovine 

spongiform encephalopathy agent, Camel pox virus; Malignant catarrhal fever virus; Menangle 

virus; Erhlichia ruminantium; and Xylella fastidiosa pv. citrus variegated chlorosis) and to move 

three agents to ECCN 1C351.b (certain reconstructed forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza 

virus) and ECCN 1C354 (Rathayibacter toxicus and Phoma glycinicola).

On August 12, 2013, Mexico formally became the 42nd member of the AG. In welcoming its 

newest member, the AG recognized Mexico’s steadfast efforts to bring its export control system 

fully into line with the AG common control lists and guidelines, as well as its determination to 

contribute to the global effort to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

With its admission into the AG, Mexico demonstrated the will to implement rigorous controls of 

high standards in international trade, its capacity to adapt its national regulatory system to meet 

the necessities of its expanding economy, and its readiness to act in close cooperation with all 

members of the AG. 

The Department of Commerce also collaborated with the Department of the Treasury in 

clarifying and streamlining the export of medical items to Iran under the Iranian Transactions 

and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR 560).3 BIS provided technical expertise to support 

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in developing a “List of Basic Medical 

Supplies” that are eligible for export to Iran under a general license (31 CFR 560.530(a)(3)(ii)). 

Treasury published this list on July 25, 2013. In conjunction with this rulemaking, the 

Department of Commerce updated its web-based guidance to provide consistent and streamlined 

guidance for such transactions.

Missile Technology Controls

The annual Plenary of the Missile Technology Control Regime was held in October 2013 in 

Rome, Italy, where MTCR Partner countries continued to discuss the wide range of missile 

nonproliferation issues, and expressed concern with developments in ongoing missile programs 

in regions of tension. The Partners also discussed the importance of using all of the tools in the 

nonproliferation toolkit to inhibit missile proliferation, noted the importance of placing greater 

focus on intangible technology transfer (ITT) issues, as well as brokering, transit, and 

transshipment, and agreed to conduct further outreach activities in order to fulfill the Regime’s 

objectives. An Information Exchange (IE) and a Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting 

(LEEM) were also held in conjunction with the Plenary. 

Two Technical Experts Meetings (TEM) were held in 2013, one in May 2013 in Bonn, Germany, 

and one in conjunction with the Rome Plenary, to discuss changes to the MTCR Equipment, 

Software, and Technology Annex. Between these two meetings, there were 13 agreements 

reached on proposed changes to the Annex, which were subsequently adopted by the Plenary in 

Rome. Changes to the MTCR Annex will necessitate modifications to the EAR, including the 

definition of “payload” for space launch vehicles, the addition of “electronic transactions” to the 

General Software Note, alteration of test conditions for jet engines in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A101, replacement of the defined term “use” in two entries, and 

changes to the text in ECCNs 1B102, 1B117, and 6A107. 

Entity List 

 

3 On October 22, 2012, Treasury issued a final rule that renamed the Iranian Transactions Regulations as the Iranian 

Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and amended and reissued them in their entirety. See 77 FR 64664 (Oct. 22, 

2012). 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

On January 16, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 3317) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to remove two persons located in France from the Entity 

List, as the result of a request for removal submitted by the two persons. In addition, on the basis 

of the annual review conducted by the ERC, this rule removed two entries from the United Arab 

Emirates (U.A.E.) because neither of the persons continued to meet the criteria for inclusion on 

the List. Finally, this rule modified two existing entries, one in Finland and the other in Russia, 

to correct the scope of those entries, including removing a redundant entry that was inadvertently 

added in a previously published final rule.

On March 8, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 14914) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to add three entries for one person to the Entity List 

because the ERC had determined that the person had engaged in activities contrary to the 

national security or foreign policy interests of the United States on the basis of Section 744.11 

(License requirements that apply to entities acting contrary to the national security or foreign 

policy interests of the United States) of the EAR. Specifically, the ERC determined that this 

person was engaged in military procurement activities, including the development of computers 

for military end-uses and the production of computers for use in nuclear research. This company 

is listed on the Entity List under Germany, Russia, and Taiwan.

On March 28, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 18808) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to add eighteen persons to the Entity List under nineteen 

entries. These persons were added to the List because the ERC believed they had engaged in 

activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States on the 

basis of Section 744.11 (License requirements that apply to entities acting contrary to the 

national security or foreign policy interests of the United States) of the EAR. The specific 

activities engaged in by these persons include the export of military items to a country on the 

State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list, assisting persons already included on the 

Entity List with shipments of U.S.-origin items to Iran, the attempted procurement of U.S.-origin 

items for shipment to Iran, and the provision of U.S.-origin equipment to a Chinese entity in 

violation of Section 744.3 of the EAR. The eighteen persons are listed on the Entity List under 

China, Germany, Hong Kong, Ukraine, and United Arab Emirates. This rule also revised one 

entry under Germany to clarify the scope of the entry by providing two additional alternate 

addresses for the listed person. Finally, this rule removed one entry under Canada as the result 

of a successful removal request submitted by the person.

Effective Enforcement of Controls

BIS conducted a number of enforcement actions regarding noncompliance with export controls. 

The following five cases are among the most significant.

Corezing International Pte. Ltd

Components shipped to Iran for IEDs in Iraq 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

On October 25, 2011, an indictment was unsealed which charged Corezing International Pte. 

Ltd. (Corezing), a company in Singapore that maintained offices in China, as well as Lim Kow 

Seng (Seng), an agent of Corezing, and Hia Soo Gan Benson (Benson), a manager and director 

of Corezing, with conspiracy to defraud the United States, smuggling, illegal export of goods to 

Iran, illegal export of defense articles, false statements and obstruction of justice. The 

indictment alleged that the defendants participated in a conspiracy that caused 6,000 radio 

frequency modules to be illegally exported from the United States to Iran via Singapore, at least 

16 of which were later found in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq, where they were 

being used in remote detonation devices. On September 20, 2013, Seng and Benson were 

sentenced to 37 months and 34 months in prison, respectively, for their roles in plots to illegally 

export 55 military antennae from the U.S. to Singapore and Hong Kong. On June 26, 2013, Seng 

and Benson pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by violating the Arms Export 

Control Act. This was a joint investigation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Additional actions taken by the Commerce Department 

included the issuance of a temporary denial order against Corezing to prevent future violations 

and alert the exporting community.

Computerlinks, FZCO

Internet surveillance software to Syria

On April 24, 2013, Computerlinks FZCO, a United Arab Emirates-based distributor of 

information technology and internet security products, was assessed a civil penalty in the amount 

of $2,800,000, and is required to complete three external audits of its export controls compliance 

program. According to the Final Order, on three occasions between October 2010 and May 

2011, Computerlinks FZCO engaged in transactions or took actions with intent to evade the 

Export Administration Regulations in connection with the unlawful export and re-export to Syria

of equipment and software designed for use in monitoring and controlling Web traffic. The 

items, valued at approximately $1,400,000, are classified under Export Control Classification 

Numbers 5A002 and 5D002, respectively, and are controlled for National Security and AntiTerrorism reasons and as Encryption Items. 

XVAC

Vacuum Pumps to Iran

In March 2013, Amirhossein Sairafi was sentenced to 41 months in prison in connection with the 

export of vacuum pumps to Iran. On July 6, 2011, Jirair Avanessian was sentenced to 18 months 

in prison, a $10,000 criminal fine, and forfeiture of the proceeds of his criminal activity. 

Between December 2007 and November 2008, Avanessian, the owner and operator of XVAC in 

California, purchased and exported at least seven shipments of high-dollar vacuum pumps and 

pump-related equipment to Iran through a free trade zone located in the United Arab Emirates. 

The vacuum pumps and related equipment have a number of applications, including uranium 

enrichment. Avanessian purchased the goods on behalf of Farhad Masoumian in Iran, and 

arranged to ship the goods to the United Arab Emirates. Sairafi would then send the same goods 

from the location in the United Arab Emirates to Iran. As part of the conspiracy, Masoumian, 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Avanessian and Sairafi re-labeled and undervalued the contents of the shipments in order to 

mask the true contents and to avoid interception by U.S. officials. Avanessian was indicted on 

December 30, 2009 and arrested in January 2010; he pled guilty in July 2010. Sairafi was 

arrested in January 2010 in Frankfurt, Germany, by German law enforcement authorities based 

on a provisional arrest warrant from the United States. Sairafi was extradited to the United 

States in September 2010, and pled guilty on November 30, 2010. Masoumian remains a 

fugitive and is believed to be in Iran. In coordination with the criminal actions, on September 

27, 2012, BIS issued an order denying the export privileges of Jirair Avanessian as a result of his 

conviction until July 6, 2021. This case was the product of an investigation by the Export and 

Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement (EAGLE) Task Force in the Central District of 

California, which includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, the Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the 

Diplomatic Security Service. 

Mohammad Reza Hajian 

Diversion of high end computers and parts to Iran

On October 18, 2012, Mohammad Reza "Ray" Hajian was sentenced to 48 months in prison,

plus 12 months of supervised probation, and forfeited $10 million in connection with a 

conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian 

Transactions Regulations. Hajian pled guilty on July 11, 2012. Three of his companies, RH 

International LLC, Nexiant LLC, and P&P Computers LLC, pled guilty on the same date, and on 

October 18, 2012, each was sentenced to one year of probation. According to court documents, 

between 2003 and 2011, Hajian conspired with others to unlawfully export sophisticated, 

enterprise-level computer and related equipment from the United States to Iran, in violation of 

the U.S. embargo. In an effort to conceal their activities, Hajian and his co-conspirators caused 

the shipment of the items, as well as the payments for them, through the United Arab Emirates. 

They employed fake identities, fake end-users, and coded language. Hajian shipped 

approximately $14.85 million worth of computer and related equipment during the conspiracy. 

In coordination with the criminal actions, on March 21, 2013, BIS issued orders denying the 

export privileges of RH International LLC, Nexiant, LLC, and P&P Computers LLC until 

October 18, 2022.

Yahor Osin

Thermal Imaging Scopes and Cameras to Belarus 

On August 21, 2013, Ernest Chornoletskyy was sentenced to 15 months in prison, 36 months of 

probation, and a $3,000 criminal fine for violations of IEEPA and conspiracy to violate IEEPA. 

Chornoletskyy was part of a Belorussian proliferation network headed by Yahor Osin, which 

involved the illegal export of night vision optics and infrared devices to Eastern Europe without 

the required BIS and Department of State licenses. Numerous other individuals have been 

indicted, arrested, pled guilty, and been sentenced to related violations. On July 18, 2013, 

Aliaksandr Belski was sentenced to 57 months in prison, 24 months of probation, and a $3,000 

criminal fine for conspiracy to export defense articles with a license, to violate IEEPA, and to 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

launder monetary instruments. On February 28, 2013, Aliaksandr Stashynski was sentenced to 

six months in prison, 36 months of probation, and a $3,000 criminal fine for conspiracy to 

violate IEEPA. On February 14, 2013, Vitali Tsishuk was sentenced to 24 months in prison and 

24 months of probation for conspiring to export defense articles in violation of the Arms Export 

Control Act and IEEPA. Additionally, on February 6, 2013, Volha Dubouskaya was sentenced 

to six months in prison, 36 months of probation, and a $3,000 criminal fine for conspiracy to 

violate IEEPA. The defendants were found guilty of conspiring, from January 2008 to early 

August 2011, to illegally export to Belarus numerous defense articles, including THOR 2 

Thermal Imaging Scopes, AN/PAS-23 Mini Thermal Monoculars, and Thermal-Eye Renegade320s without obtaining a license from the State Department. During this period, the defendants 

were also convicted of conspiracy to illegally export Commerce-controlled items to Belarus, 

including L-3 x 200xp Handheld Thermal Imaging Cameras without a Commerce Department 

license. This case was a joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Saeed Talebi

Industrial Equipment to Iran

On February 13, 2013, Saeed Talebi, an Iranian national, was sentenced to 12 months in prison 

in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. On September 26, 2012, Talebi 

pled guilty to conspiring to illegally export parts and goods designed for use in industrial 

operations from the United States to Iran in violation of IEEPA. On numerous occasions 

throughout 2010 and 2011, Talebi worked with others to ship industrial parts and goods through 

a company located in the United Arab Emirates to various petrochemical companies in Iran. In 

the course of his scheme, Talebi also caused money to be wired to the United States, including 

over $300,000 that was sent to a bank account in Manhattan.

Part II: Format of Analysis Used in Chapters 2-13 of this Report 

Chapters 2-13 of this report describe the various export control programs maintained by the 

Department of Commerce for foreign policy reasons. Each of these programs is extended for 

another year. The analysis required for such an extension is provided in each chapter in the 

format described below. 

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

This section defines the export controls maintained for a particular foreign policy purpose that 

were imposed or extended for the year 2013. Each of the following chapters describes the 

licensing requirements and policy applicable to a particular control. 

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Act 

Section 6(f)(2) of the EAA requires that the Secretary of Commerce describe the purpose of the 

controls and consider or determine whether to impose, expand, or extend foreign policy controls 

based on specified criteria, including consultation efforts, economic impact, alternative means, 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

and foreign availability. For each control program, the Department of Commerce’s conclusions 

are based on the following required criteria: 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

This section provides the foreign policy purpose and rationale for each particular control. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

This section describes the Secretary’s determinations and considerations regarding the following 

criteria: 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. Whether such controls 

are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose in light of other factors, including the 

availability from other countries of the goods or technology subject to control, and whether the 

foreign policy purpose can be achieved through negotiations or other alternative means. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. Whether the controls are compatible with 

the foreign policy objectives of the United States and with the overall U.S. policy towards the 

country or the proscribed end use that is subject to the controls. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. Whether the reaction of other countries to the extension of 

such export controls by the United States is likely to render the controls ineffective in achieving

the intended foreign policy purpose or to be counterproductive to other U.S. foreign policy 

interests. 

4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. Whether the effect of the controls on the 

export performance of the United States, its competitive position in the international economy, 

the international reputation of the United States as a reliable supplier of goods and technology, or 

the economic well-being of individual U.S. companies exceeds the benefit to U.S. foreign policy 

objectives.4 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. Whether the United States has the ability to enforce 

the controls. Some enforcement issues are common to all foreign policy controls. Other 

enforcement issues are associated with only one or a few controls.

C. Consultation with Industry 

This section discusses the results of consultations with industry leading to the extension or 

imposition of controls. In a September 5, 2013, Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the 

 

4 Limitations exist when assessing the economic impact of certain controls because of the unavailability of data or 

because of the influence of other factors, e.g., currency values, foreign economic activity, or foreign political 

regimes, which may restrict imports of U.S. products more stringently than the United States restricts exports. 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Department of Commerce solicited comments from industry on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign 

policy-based export controls. In addition, comments were solicited from the public via the BIS 

website. Comments from the Department’s seven Technical Advisory Committees are solicited 

on an ongoing basis and are not specific to this report. The comment period closed on October 7, 

2013, and two comments were received. A detailed review of the public comments can be found 

in Appendix I. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

This section reflects consultations on the controls with countries that cooperate with the United 

States on multilateral controls and with other countries as appropriate. 

E. Alternative Means

This section specifies the nature and results of any alternative means attempted to accomplish the 

foreign policy purpose, or the reasons for extending the controls without attempting any such 

alternative means. 

F. Foreign Availability 

This section considers the availability from other countries of goods or technology comparable to 

those subject to the proposed export control. It also describes the nature and results of the efforts 

made pursuant to Section 6(h) of the EAA to secure the cooperation of foreign governments in 

controlling the foreign availability of such comparable goods or technology. In accordance with 

the EAA, foreign availability considerations do not apply to export controls in effect prior to 

June 12, 1985, to export controls maintained for internationally recognized human rights and AT 

reasons, or to export controls in support of the international obligations of the United States. 
Chapter 2 Crime Control/Human Rights Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

CHAPTER 2

Crime Controls/Human Rights Controls

(Sections 742.7, 742.11, 742.17)5

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

As required by Section 6(n) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (EAA), the 

United States controls the exports of crime control and detection items in support of human 

rights throughout the world. As set forth in the EAR, the U.S. Government requires a license to 

export most crime control and detection instruments, equipment, related technology, and 

software to all destinations, except Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and members of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, a license is required to export certain crime 

control items, including restraint type devices (such as handcuffs) and discharge type arms (such 

as stun guns), to all destinations except Canada. Specially designed implements of torture (such 

as thumbscrews), which are included in the crime control category, require a license for export to 

all destinations. In addition, the U.S. Government maintains concurrent export license 

requirements for certain crime control items in furtherance of the Inter-American Convention 

Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and 

Other Related Materials. 

Licensing Policy

The U.S. Government considers applications for most crime control items favorably, on a caseby-case basis, unless there is civil disorder in the country or region of concern, or there is 

evidence that the government may have violated human rights. The judicious use of these

controls is intended to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses,

distance the United States from such abuses, and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country 

or region. The U.S. Government maintains a general policy of denial for specially designed 

implements of torture, regardless of the intended destination.

People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

Following the 1989 military assault on demonstrators by the PRC government in Tiananmen 

Square, the U.S. Government imposed constraints on the export to the PRC of certain items on 

the CCL. Section 902(a)(4) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-

1991, Public Law 101-246, suspends the issuance of licenses under Section 6(n) of the EAA for 

the export of any crime control or detection instruments or equipment to the PRC. The President 

may terminate the suspension by reporting to Congress that the PRC has made progress on 

 

5 Citations following each of the foreign policy control programs refer to sections of the Export Administration 

Regulations (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, that describe the control program.
Chapter 2 Crime Control/Human Rights Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

political reform or that it is in the national interest of the United States to terminate the 

suspension. The President has not exercised his authority to terminate this suspension. 

NATO 

Certain crime control and detection instruments, equipment, related technology, and software 

may be exported to Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and members of NATO without a specific 

license, consistent with Section 6(n) of the EAA. 

Organization of American States Member Countries 

In April 1999, the Department of Commerce published a rule implementing the provisions of the 

Organization of American States (OAS) Model Regulations for the Control of the International 

Movement of Firearms. The Department of Commerce designed these regulations to harmonize 

import and export controls on the legal international movement of firearms among OAS member 

states and to establish procedures to prevent the illegal trafficking of firearms among these 

countries. 

Under these provisions, the Department of Commerce maintains foreign policy controls on 

exports of Commerce-controlled firearms, including shotguns with a barrel length of 18 inches or 

over and certain parts, shotgun shells and parts, and optical sighting devices to all OAS member 

countries, including Canada. Items subject to these controls are identified by “FC Column 1” in 

the “License Requirements” section of the corresponding ECCN. In support of the OAS Model 

Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, the U.S. Government 

requires an Import Certificate (IC) for the export to OAS member countries of those items 

affected by the regulations. In general, the Department approves license applications for the 

export of firearms to OAS member countries if the applications are supported by ICs. The 

Department denies applications that involve end uses linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, 

international organized crime, and other criminal activities.

Other Licensing Considerations 

The Department of State annually compiles the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 

The Department of State prepares these reports in accordance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) 

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for submission to Congress. The factual information 

presented in these reports is a significant element in dual use export licensing recommendations 

made by the Department of State. In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the 

Department denies license applications to export crime control items to any country in which the 

government engages in a consistent pattern of violations of internationally recognized human 

rights. 

Applications to export crime control items to countries that are not otherwise subject to 

economic sanctions or comprehensive embargoes, but that are identified by the Department of 

State as human rights violators, receive additional scrutiny in the license review process. The 
Chapter 2 Crime Control/Human Rights Controls

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Department of State reviews all license applications for these countries on a case-by-case basis 

and makes recommendations to Commerce as it considers appropriate. Additionally, targeted 

sanctions maintained by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC) are currently imposed against certain countries and individuals.

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) calls upon the President to take 

diplomatic or other appropriate action with respect to any country that engages in or tolerates 

violations of religious freedom. IRFA provides for the imposition of economic measures or 

commensurate actions when a country has engaged in systematic, ongoing, egregious violations 

of religious freedom accompanied by flagrant denials of the rights to life, liberty, or the security 

of persons, such as torture, enforced and arbitrary disappearances, or arbitrary prolonged 

detention. For such countries, IRFA provides that the Department of Commerce, with the 

Department of State’s concurrence, shall restrict exports of items on the CCL for reasons of 

crime control or detection, and require export licenses for items that are being used, or are 

intended for use, directly and in significant measure, to carry out particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom. In addition, IRFA requires that countries engaging in particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom be designated as Countries of Particular Concern. The Secretary 

of State has currently designated eight countries as Countries of Particular Concern: Burma, the 

PRC, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. These countries are 

subject to the limitations of the IRFA for exports of crime-controlled items. 

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

These controls seek to ensure that U.S.-origin crime control equipment is not exported to 

countries where governments fail to respect internationally recognized human rights or where 

civil disorder is prevalent. Denial of export license applications for crime-controlled items to 

such countries helps to prevent human rights violations and clearly signals U.S. concerns about 

human rights in these countries. The license requirements for most destinations allows close 

monitoring of exports of crime control items that could be misused to commit human rights 

violations. Controls on implements of torture similarly help to ensure that such items are not 

exported from the United States. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose and that 

the foreign policy purpose cannot fully be achieved through negotiations or other alternative 

means. The lack of complementary controls over all of these items by other producer nations 

limits the effectiveness of these controls in preventing human rights violations, though some 

countries – notably those of the European Union (EU) – control exports of implements of torture 

or of lethal items. However, U.S. unilateral controls restrict human rights violators’ access to 

U.S.-origin goods and provide important evidence of U.S. support for the principles of human 
Chapter 2 Crime Control/Human Rights Controls

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rights. In addition, stringent licensing requirements for crime control items enable the U.S. 

Government to closely monitor items that could be used to violate internationally-recognized 

human rights. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that crime 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives and that the extension of this control 

program will not have significant adverse foreign policy consequences. This control program is 

fully consistent with U.S. policy in support of internationally recognized human rights, as 

expressed by successive Administrations and by Congress. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. These controls are unique, 

serve a distinct foreign policy purpose, and arise out of deeply-held convictions of the U.S. 

Government. Currently, other countries do not have completely equivalent controls, but many 

have restrictions on exports of lethal products to areas of civil unrest. 

4. Economic Impact on U.S. Industry. The Secretary has determined that any detrimental

effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the competitive 

position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the benefit to U.S. 

foreign policy objectives. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 5,310 export license applications for 

crime control items, which were valued at nearly $900 million. Another 551 applications for 

crime control items were returned without action, valued at nearly $200 million, and an 

additional 26 applications were denied, with a total value of over $3 million.

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. Crime control items and implements of 

torture are easily recognizable and do not present special enforcement problems related to 

detecting violations or verifying use. However, enforcement cooperation with other countries 

generally is difficult in cases involving unilaterally controlled items such as these, and often 

depends on the type and quantity of goods in question. The U.S. Government conducts postshipment verifications to ensure that the listed end-user has received the exports and to confirm 

that the end-user is using the controlled items in a way consistent with the license conditions. 

C. Consultation with Industry

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623) the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. In addition, comments were solicited from the public via the BIS website. 

The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all public comments 

received can be found in Appendix I. 
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The Department of Commerce consults with the Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory 

Committee, one of seven technical advisory committees that advise BIS, in preparation for 

publication of major regulatory changes affecting crime controls. In addition, the Department of 

Commerce has consulted with exporters of crime control items and with human rights groups 

concerned about the potential for misuse of such items in various parts of the world. BIS has 

frequent consultations with exporters about specific items proposed for export to specific end 

users and for specific end uses.

D. Consultation with Other Countries

Most other countries that supply crime control and detection items have not imposed similar 

export controls. The United Kingdom and Canada maintain controls similar to U.S. controls on 

certain crime control commodities. Certain European Union member states prohibit or impose 

an authorization requirement on the export of dual-use items not covered by the multilateral 

export control regimes for reasons of public security or human rights considerations. 

E. Alternative Means

Section 6(n) of the EAA requires the Department of Commerce to maintain export controls on 

crime control and detection equipment. Attempting to achieve the purposes of the crime control 

restrictions through negotiations or other alternative means would not meet this requirement. 

The U.S. Government does, however, use diplomatic efforts, sanctions, and other means to 

convey its concerns about the human rights situation in various countries.

F. Foreign Availability

The foreign availability provision does not apply to Section 6(n) of the EAA.6 Congress has 

recognized the usefulness and symbolic value of these controls in supporting U.S. Government 

policy on human rights issues, foreign availability notwithstanding.

 

6

Provisions pertaining to foreign availability do not apply to export controls in effect before July 12, 1985, under 

Sections 6(i) (International Obligations), 6(j) (Countries Supporting International Terrorism), and 6(n) (Crime 

Control Instruments). See the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law No. 99-64, Section 

108(g)(2), 99 Stat. 120, 134-35. Moreover, Sections 6(i), 6(j), and 6(n) require that controls be implemented under 

certain conditions without consideration of foreign availability.
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

CHAPTER 3

Regional Stability Controls

(Section 742.6)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

Regional Stability (RS) controls ensure that exports and re-exports of controlled items support 

U.S. foreign policy objectives and do not contribute to the destabilization of the region to which 

the items are destined. These controls traditionally cover items “specially designed” or modified 

for military purposes and certain dual-use items that can be used to manufacture military 

equipment. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy 

RS Column 1 

Section 742.6 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) requires a license for RS reasons 

(RS Column 1 on the CCL) to export certain image-intensifier tubes, infrared focal plane arrays, 

certain imaging cameras incorporating image-intensifier tubes and infrared focal plane arrays, 

certain software and technology for inertial navigation systems, gyroscopes, accelerometers, 

micro and millimeter wave electronic components, as well as items not listed elsewhere on the 

CCL, to all destinations except Canada. These items are included in Export Control 

Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 0A521, 0B521, 0C521, 0D521, 0E521, 0A919, 3A982, 

3D982, 3E982, 6A002.a.1,6A002a.2,6A002a.3,6A002c, 6A003.b.3,6A003b.4, 6A008.j.1, 

6A998.b, 6D001, 6D002, 6D003.c, 6D991, 6E001, 6E002, 6E991, 7A994, 7D001, 7E001, 

7E002, 7E101, 9A610, 9A619, 9B610, 9B619, 9C610, 9C619, 9D610, 9D619, 9E610, and 

9E619. 

The U.S. Government reviews all license applications for these items on a case-by-case basis to 

determine whether the export could contribute, directly or indirectly, to a country’s military 

capabilities in a manner that would destabilize or alter a region’s military balance contrary to 

U.S. foreign policy interests. See the discussion below for special RS control provisions for 

thermal imaging cameras (6A003, 0A919) and items not listed elsewhere on the CCL (0Y521).

RS Column 2

In addition, Section 742.6 of the EAR imposes a license requirement for RS reasons (RS Column 

2 on the CCL) to export explosives detection equipment and related software and technology, 

military-related items (e.g., searchlights, bayonets, certain vehicles and trainer aircraft), 

concealed object detection equipment, and certain commodities used to manufacture military 

equipment to all destinations except member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. These items are described on the CCL under 

ECCNs 0A918, 0E918, 1A004.d, 1B018.a, 1D003, 1E001, 2A983, 2A984, 2B018, 2D983, 
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

2D984, 2E983, 2E984, 9A018.b, 9D018, and 9E018. The U.S. Government will generally 

consider applications for such licenses favorably, on a case-by-case basis, unless the export 

would significantly affect regional stability. For explosives detection equipment and related 

technology classified under ECCNs 2A984, 2D984, and 2E984, license applications are 

reviewed with a presumption of approval when destined for a government end-user in Austria, 

Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Malta, Mexico, Singapore, or Sweden. 

RS Controls for Certain Exports to Iraq

In addition, there are RS controls in place for certain items when exported or re-exported to Iraq 

(or transferred within Iraq). These items are covered under the following ECCNs: 0B999 

(specific processing equipment such as hot cells and glove boxes suitable for use with 

radioactive materials); 0D999 (specific software for neutronic calculations, radiation transport 

calculations, and hydrodynamic calculations/modeling); 1B999 (specific processing equipment, 

such as electrolytic cells for fluorine production and particle accelerators); 1C992 (commercial 

charges containing energetic materials, not elsewhere specified); 1C995 (certain mixtures and 

testing kits); 1C997 (ammonium nitrate); 1C999 (specific materials, not elsewhere specified); 

and 6A992 (optical sensors not controlled under ECCN 6A002). The licensing policy for these 

items is set forth in Section 746.3 of the EAR, and is consistent with the broader controls 

maintained on Iraq. These controls are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this report.

RS Controls for Certain Thermal Imaging Cameras 

Special RS Column 1 requirements apply to certain thermal imaging cameras classified under 

ECCN 6A003b.4.b. Export and re-export license requirements and license review policies for 

these products vary depending on certain technical specifications of the cameras as well as the 

proposed end uses. Almost all cameras controlled by ECCN 6A003.b.4.b are controlled under 

Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and require an export or re-export license for all destinations 

other than Canada. Cameras classified under ECCN 6A003.b.4.b are subject to a more favorable 

licensing policy, however, if they are packaged for civil end use and destined only for Albania, 

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 

Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, or the United 

Kingdom. A license is required to export or re-export to Hong Kong any item classified under 

ECCN 6A003.b.4.b.

Cameras controlled by ECCN 6A003.b.4.b that fall below certain technical thresholds are 

controlled at the lower Regional Stability control level (RS2) when fully packaged for use as a 

consumer-ready civil product. Applications to export or re-export these cameras will be 

considered favorably unless there is evidence the export or re-export would contribute 

significantly to the destabilization of the region to which the camera is destined or is otherwise 

not authorized by U.S. law.
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

There is also a license requirement on re-exports of military commodities produced outside the 

United States that incorporate one or more cameras controlled under ECCN 6A003.b.4.b. These 

products are controlled in ECCN 0A919 and are subject to RS Column 1 controls. Re-exports of 

these military commodities requires a license to all destinations except Canada, unless the 

military commodities are being re-exported as part of a military deployment by a unit of the 

governments of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the 

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 

Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 

Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, or the United States. Applications for reexports of these military commodities will be reviewed applying policies for similar 

commodities that are subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR parts 120-

130).

RS Controls for ECCN 0Y521 Items

ECCNs 0A521, 0B521, OC521, 0D521 and 0E521 are items subject to the EAR that are not 

listed elsewhere in the CCL, but which the Department of Commerce, with the concurrence of 

the Departments of Defense and State, has determined should be controlled for export because 

the items provide a significant military or intelligence advantage to the United States or other 

foreign policy reasons justify such a control. While an item is temporarily classified under 

ECCN 0Y521, the U.S. Government will work to adopt a control through the relevant 

multilateral regime and to determine an appropriate longer-term control over the item. Items 

classified under an ECCN 0Y521 must be reclassified under another ECCN within one year 

(with the possibility for extension while multilateral controls are being sought). Items in ECCN 

0Y521 are subject to Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) controls. 

Summary of 2013 Changes

As part of Export Control Reform, less sensitive items, such as parts and components, are being 

transferred on a rolling basis from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. Once 

on the Commerce Control List, these items will be controlled within the 600 series. All “600 

Series” items will be controlled for Regional Stability reasons (RS Column 1). Applications for 

exports and re-exports of 600 series items will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine 

whether the transactions are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the 

United States. The majority of these items will be transferred from the USML to the CCL on a 

rolling basis throughout FY2014, beginning with controls relating to certain aircraft and gas 

turbine engines, which were officially moved to the CCL on October 15, 2013. 

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act

A. The Purpose of the Controls
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Regional Stability controls provide a mechanism for the U.S. Government to monitor the export 

of controlled items, to restrict their use in instances that would adversely affect regional stability

or the military balance within a region, and to protect the national security and foreign policy 

interests of the United States.

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, although 

most of these items are increasingly available from abroad. The Secretary has also determined 

that the foreign policy purpose cannot fully be achieved through negotiations or other alternative 

means, and that some of the items subject to these controls are also controlled, as a result of 

international negotiations, by U.S. partners in the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Regional stability controls contribute to U.S. national 

security and foreign policy objectives by enabling the United States to restrict the use or 

availability of certain sensitive U.S.-origin goods and technologies that would adversely affect 

regional stability or the military balance in certain areas. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives and that the extension of these 

controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. Regional stability 

controls are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals to promote peace and stability and prevent 

U.S. exports that might contribute to weapons production, destabilizing military capabilities, or 

acts of terrorism.

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. A number of other 

countries limit exports of items and technologies with military applications to areas of concern, 

recognizing that such items and technologies could adversely affect regional stability and 

military balances. For example, each member country of the Wassenaar Arrangement has its 

own national controls on the export of certain night vision devices. All members of the MTCR 

maintain controls on software and technology related to missile guidance and control devices. 

Although other countries may object to new unilateral RS controls, allies and partners of the 

United States support U.S. efforts against regional conflict and terrorism and appreciate the need 

to keep certain equipment and technologies from those who could misuse the items to destabilize 

countries or regions.

4. Economic Impact on U.S. Industry. Although the Secretary has determined that the 

detrimental effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the 

competitive position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the 

benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives, the controls on cameras controlled by ECCN 6A003, 

which exceed the controls on similar products imposed by other producing countries, have 

significantly and adversely affected the competitiveness of this industry sector. Cameras 
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

controlled by ECCN 6A003 account for a large percentage of RS-controlled exports. Items 

controlled for RS reasons generally require licenses for export to all destinations except NATO 

countries, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. However, certain RS-controlled items, including 

those controlled concurrently for Missile Technology reasons as well as cameras controlled 

under ECCN 6A003, require licenses for export to all destinations except Canada. 

RS Column 1 Controls

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 703 license applications for items 

controlled for RS1 reasons, with a total value of $180.4 million. Most of the licensing volume 

and value for RS1-controlled items is accounted for by exports of thermal imaging cameras in 

ECCN 6A003 (508 licenses valued at $121.6 million). There were 13 license applications 

rejected for items controlled for RS1 reasons, with a total value of $1,875,408. These included 

denials for exports of items in ECCNs 0A919 (3 applications), 3A982 (3), and 7A994 (3). 

The table that follows lists the total number and value by ECCN of export licenses that the 

Department of Commerce issued for regional stability (RS1) during fiscal year 2013:

Table 1a: Regional Stability Applications Approved, Fiscal Year 2013

RS Column 1 Controls

ECCN Description Number of 

Applications

Dollar Value

0A521 Commodities Not Subject to the E.A.R., 

which provide a significant military or 

intelligence advantage

8 $37,570

0B521 Commodities Not Subject to the E.A.R., 

which provide a significant military or 

intelligence advantage

0 0

0C521 Materials Not Subject to the E.A.R., which 

provides a significant military or 

intelligence advantage

0 0

0D521 Software Not Subject to the E.A.R., which 

provides a significant military or 

intelligence advantage

2 $51,000

0A919 Military commodities produced outside the 

U.S. incorporating 6A003b.4.b cameras 

31 $939,158

3A982 Micro or Millimeter Wave Components 20 $253,211

3D982 Software for development or production of 

3A982

0 0
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

ECCN Description Number of 

Applications

Dollar Value

3E982 Technology for development or production 

of 3A982

0 0

+6A002.a.1, 

a.2., a.3, c, e

Optical detectors and direct view imaging 

equipment incorporating image intensifier 

tube or focal plane arrays

19 $8,547,267

+6A003.b.3, 

b.4

Imaging cameras incorporating image 

intensifiers or focal plan arrays

508 $121,563,251

6A008.j.1 Space-qualified LIDAR equipment 0 0

6A998.b Space-qualified LIDAR equipment for 

meteorological observation

0 0

6D001 Software for development/ production of 

RS-controlled items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, 

c; 6A03.b.3 and 6A008.j

0 0

6D002 Software for the use of 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, 

c; 6A03.b.3 and 6A008.j

0 0

6D003.c Software for cameras with focal plane 

arrays

0 0

6D991 Software for development/ production/use 

of 6A002.e or 6A998.b

0 0

6D994 Software for cameras with focal plane 

arrays

0 0

+

6E001 Technology for the development of RScontrolled items in 6A002, 6A003, and 

6A008

18 $32,399,788

+

6E002 Technology for the production of RScontrolled items in 6A002, 6A003, and 

6A008

20 $16,101,197

6E991 Technology for development/production/ 

use of 6A998b

0 0

7A994 QRS-11 Sensors 23 $314,730

+

7D001 Software for the development or production 

inertial navigation systems

3 $102

+

7E001 Technology for the development of inertial 

navigation systems, inertial equipment and

specially designed components for civil 

aircraft

26 $22,120
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

ECCN Description Number of 

Applications

Dollar Value

+

7E002 Technology for the production of inertial 

navigation systems, inertial equipment and 

specially designed components for civil 

aircraft

8 $6

+

7E101 Technology for the use of inertial 

navigation systems

17 $125,905

TOTAL 703 $180,355,305

NOTES: (1) For ECCNs marked with “+”, only a portion of the ECCN is subject to RS1 

controls, but the total number of licenses and dollar value for the complete ECCN are given. In 

most cases, the subcategories under these ECCNs that are not controlled for regional stability 

reasons are minimal. 

RS Column 2 Controls 

Explosives detection equipment in ECCN 2A983 and military trainer aircraft and vehicles in 

ECCN 9A018 account for the bulk of licenses controlled for RS2 reasons. In fiscal year 2013, 

there were 715 total approved licenses for RS2 controlled items with a total value of $314.4

million. Eight licenses were denied for RS2 controlled items in fiscal year 2013: 5 for ECCN 

9A018 items and 3 for 2B018 items, with a total value of $2,519,775.

The table that follows lists the total number and value by ECCN of export licenses that the 

Department of Commerce issued for regional stability (RS2) applications during fiscal year 

2013:

Table 1b: Regional Stability Applications Approved, Fiscal Year 2013

RS Column 2 Controls

ECCN Description Number of 

Applications

Dollar Value

0A918 Military Equipment not on the Wassenaar 

Munitions List

6 $1,334,604

0E918 Technology for the development, 

production or use of bayonets

0 $0

*1A004.d Protective and detection equipment 0 0
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

ECCN Description Number of 

Applications

Dollar Value

1B018.a Equipment for production of military 

explosives

3 $2,557,900

*1D003 Software for equipment for production of 

military explosives

0 0

*1E001 Technology for equipment for production 

of military explosives

0 0

2A983 Explosives detection equipment 134 $155,418,246

2A984 Concealed object detection equipment 0 0

2B018 Equipment on the Wassenaar Munitions 

List

15 $565,575

2D983 Software for equipment in 2A983 102 $10,277,237

2D984 Software for equipment in 2A984 0 0

2E983 Technology for equipment in 2A983 54 $563,142

2E984 Technology for equipment in 2A984 0 0

8A918 Marine boilers 0 0

+

9A018.a, 

b

Military trainer aircraft and vehicles 

designed or modified for military use

342 $142,797,198

+

9D018 Software for the use of items in 9A018.a.,b 0 0

+

9E018 Technology for the development or 

production of items in 9A018.a.,b

51 $924,275

TOTAL 707 $314,438,177
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

NOTES: (1) For ECCNs marked with “+”, only a portion of the ECCN is subject to RS2 

controls, but the total number of licenses and dollar value for the complete ECCN are given. In 

most cases, the subcategories under these ECCNs that are not controlled for RS reasons are 

minimal. (2) For ECCNs marked with “*”, a majority of the licensing volume is accounted for by 

items not controlled for RS reasons; it is not possible to separate out the RS-controlled portion 

for statistical purposes.

With regard to the special regional stability controls in place for Iraq, BIS licensed a total of 46 

applications valued at $299.2 million in fiscal year 2013. The majority of these applications 

were for oil well perforators (ECCN 1C992), with 23 licenses valued at $286.0 million. There 

were also 19 applications for ECCN 1B999 special processing equipment, with a value of $14.0 

million. There were no denials for RS controlled items for Iraq in fiscal year 2013.

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. Image intensifier tubes, infrared focal plane 

arrays, certain software and technology for inertial navigation systems, gyroscopes, and 

accelerometers, and other items controlled for RS purposes are almost all subject to multilateral 

controls for either National Security (NS) or Missile Technology (MT) reasons, though in these 

instances the RS control is redundant.

Other RS controls cover items of lower level technologies that have been de-controlled by the 

multilateral regimes and are widely available from other exporting countries. The Department of 

Commerce effectively enforces RS controls by focusing on preventive enforcement, using 

regular outreach efforts to keep businesses informed of U.S. concerns, and gathering leads on 

activities of concern. Additionally, exporters are required to report to BIS on exports of thermal 

imaging cameras decontrolled by the May 2009 regulatory change, enabling BIS to verify that 

the cameras continue to be sold to appropriate end users and that the changes in controls are not 

jeopardizing U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Given the enhanced anti-terrorism 

and national security efforts of the U.S. Government, it is expected that industry will continue to 

support enforcement efforts. 

BIS conducted a number of enforcement actions regarding noncompliance with these export 

controls, including the following:

Yahor Osin

Thermal Imaging Scopes and Cameras to Belarus 

On August 21, 2013, Ernest Chornoletskyy was sentenced to 15 months in prison, 36 months of 

probation, and a $3,000 criminal fine for violations of the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (IEEPA) and conspiracy to violate IEEPA. Chornoletskyy was part of a Belorussian 

proliferation network headed by Yahor Osin, which involved the illegal export of night vision 

optics and infrared devices to Eastern Europe without the required BIS and Department of State 

licenses. Numerous other individuals have been indicted, arrested, pled guilty, and been 
Chapter 3 Regional Stability Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

sentenced to related violations. On July 18, 2013, Aliaksandr Belski was sentenced to 57 months 

in prison, 24 months of probation, and a $3,000 criminal fine for conspiracy to export defense 

articles with a license, to violate IEEPA, and to launder monetary instruments. On February 28, 

2013, Aliaksandr Stashynski was sentenced to six months in prison, 36 months of probation, and 

a $3,000 criminal fine for conspiracy to violate IEEPA. On February 14, 2013, Vitali Tsishuk 

was sentenced to 24 months in prison and 24 months of probation for conspiring to export 

defense articles in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and IEEPA. Additionally, on 

February 6, 2013, Volha Dubouskaya was sentenced to six months in prison, 36 months of 

probation, and a $3,000 criminal fine for conspiracy to violate IEEPA. The defendants were 

found guilty of conspiring, from January 2008 to early August 2011, to illegally export to 

Belarus numerous defense articles, including THOR 2 Thermal Imaging Scopes, AN/PAS-23 

Mini Thermal Monoculars, and Thermal-Eye Renegade-320s without obtaining a license from 

the State Department. During this period, the defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to 

illegally export Commerce-controlled items to Belarus, including L-3 x 200xp Handheld 

Thermal Imaging Cameras without a Commerce Department license. This case was a joint 

investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement.

C. Consultation with Industry

On September 5, 2013, the Department of Commerce solicited public comments in the Federal 

Register (78 FR 54623) on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy-based export controls, 

including controls on RS items. The comment period on the Federal Register notice closed on 

October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all public comments received can be found in Appendix I. 

In addition, comments were solicited from the public via the BIS website. Comments from the 

Department’s seven Technical Advisory Committees are solicited on a regular basis but are not 

detailed in this report. In particular, the Department holds quarterly consultations with the 

Sensors and Instrumentation Technical Advisory Committee (SITAC). The SITAC frequently 

addresses the RS controls on thermal imaging cameras and related items and technology. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries

Wassenaar Arrangement member countries hold extensive consultations, and certain member 

countries hold bilateral discussions regarding items on the Wassenaar control list. During 2013, 

the U.S. Government engaged in extensive consultations with its Wassenaar partners. 

Wassenaar participating states incorporate the Wassenaar Dual-Use Control List into their own 

national export controls to prevent exports that could contribute to destabilizing buildups of 

conventional arms. In particular, the U.S. sought multilateral controls on the items in newly 

created ECCNs 3A982, 3D982, and 3E982 (high electron mobility transistors and monolithic 

microwave integrated circuits and related software and technology) through the Wassenaar 

Arrangement.

E. Alternative Means
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The United States has undertaken a wide range of actions to support and encourage regional 

stability and has specifically encouraged efforts to limit the flow of arms and militarily useful 

goods and other special equipment to regions of conflict and tension. U.S. regional stability 

export controls remain an important element in U.S. efforts to enhance regional stability. The 

United States opposes the use of U.S.-origin items to destabilize legitimate political regimes or 

fuel regional conflicts, notwithstanding the availability of such items from other sources. 

Accordingly, there are no alternative means to achieve this policy objective.

F. Foreign Availability

Some military vehicles and other military-type equipment that are controlled for RS purposes

may be obtained from foreign sources. Software, technology, chemicals, low capability sensors, 

and other items controlled for RS purposes are widely available. However, in some cases there 

are overlapping multilateral NS controls on many RS-controlled items. Some of the 

commodities, related software, and technology controlled for RS purposes are also subject to 

multilateral controls for either NS or MT reasons under multilateral regimes. In these cases, the 

RS controls are redundant. Therefore, controls imposed by multilateral regime members restrict 

foreign availability of these items.

Manufacturers of imaging cameras controlled in ECCN 6A003 have voiced concern to the 

Department of Commerce that there is considerable foreign availability of these items from 

Europe, Japan, and China. This foreign availability and differences in licensing practices were 

major factors that led to the decision to revise RS controls on certain thermal imaging cameras in 

the regulation published on May 22, 2009 (74 FR 23941). This regulation eliminated licensing 

requirements for certain cameras when exported to 37 countries and has reduced the licensing 

volume significantly. 
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CHAPTER 4

Anti-Terrorism Controls 

(Sections 742.8, 742.9, 742.10, 746.2)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The U.S. Government controls exports of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations 

(EAR) for Anti-Terrorism reasons under Sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 

of 1979, as amended (EAA). Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the EAA, the Secretary of State has 

designated four countries—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—as nations with governments that have 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism and has designated these countries 

as state sponsors of terrorism.7 Controls imposed for Anti-Terrorism reasons are identified in the

EAR as Anti-Terrorism (AT) controls. Additionally, the United States maintains broad controls, 

and in some cases comprehensive sanctions, on exports and re-exports to Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 

Syria. The broader controls applicable to such countries are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report. 

Since December 1993, the U.S. Government has reviewed license applications involving the 

export or re-export of the following five categories of dual-use items to military, police, 

intelligence, and other sensitive end-users within countries designated as terrorist-supporting 

countries in accordance with the criteria set forth in Section 6(j)(1)(B) of the EAA:

 all items on the CCL subject to national security controls; 

 all items on the CCL subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls; 

 all items on the CCL subject to missile proliferation controls; 

 all items on the CCL subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls; and 

 all military-related items on the CCL (items controlled by CCL entries ending with the 

number 18). 

Specifically, on December 28, 1993, the Acting Secretary of State determined that items in these 

categories, if exported or re-exported to military, police, intelligence organizations, or to other 

sensitive end-users in a designated terrorist-supporting country, could make a significant 

contribution to that country’s military potential or could enhance its ability to support acts of 

international terrorism. As a result, any export or re-export of an item in these categories is 

subject to a 30-day congressional notification period prior to approval. 

 

7Although the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism was rescinded on October 11, 2008, BIS 

continues to maintain AT controls on the country. Moreover, additional export control requirements under the EAR 

apply to exports and reexports to North Korea on the basis of other laws and regulations, and in accordance with 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (UNSCR 1718 of October 14, 2006). 
Chapter 4 Anti-Terrorism Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

The United States controls exports and re-exports of such items to other, non-sensitive end users, 

as well as exports and re-exports of certain other CCL items to all end users, in designated state 

sponsors of terrorism for foreign policy purposes under Section 6(a) of the EAA, which provides 

the general authority for foreign policy controls. Such transactions are also reviewed against the 

Section 6(j) standard on a case-by-case basis. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy 

Pursuant to the 1993 determination of the Acting Secretary of State and subsequent action 

consistent with it, exports and re-exports of items in the five categories described above to 

certain sensitive end users in terrorist-supporting countries are controlled for AT reasons 

pursuant to Section 6(j) of the EAA. In accordance with Section 6(a) of the EAA, the 

Department of Commerce requires a license for the export and/or re-export of items in these five 

categories to non-sensitive end users and certain items on the CCL to all end users in designated 

terrorist-supporting countries for AT reasons. The applicable controls are contained in the 

relevant EAR sections pertinent to each country. 

The Department of Commerce refers all license applications for items controlled for AT reasons 

to the Department of State for review. With respect to items controlled pursuant to Section 6(a) 

(including exports or re-exports of items on the CCL to non-sensitive end-users), an initial 

determination is made whether the requirements of Section 6(j) apply. If the Secretary of State 

determines that the particular export or re-export to a state sponsor of terrorism “could make a 

significant contribution to the military potential of the destination country, including its military 

logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international 

terrorism” pursuant to Section 6(j)(1)(B), a license will be required and the Departments of 

Commerce and State must notify the appropriate congressional committees 30 days before 

issuing one, consistent with the provisions of Section 6(j)(2) of the EAA. Transactions that do 

not rise to the Section 6(j)(1)(B) standard are generally reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 

Pursuant to Section 6(a) of the EAA, the Department of Commerce requires a license for the 

export and/or re-export of certain items on the CCL to all end users in all designated terroristsupporting countries for AT reasons. The applicable controls are contained in the relevant EAR 

sections pertinent to each country. All applicable controls currently maintained for AT reasons 

pursuant to either Section 6(j) or Section 6(a) of the EAA continue in force. 

Moreover, as described further in Chapter 5, the United States maintains additional controls on 

exports and re-exports to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. As a result, the U.S. 

Government reviews license applications for exports and re-exports of most AT-controlled items 

to these countries under a general policy of denial, with limited exceptions. 

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 
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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Anti-Terrorism controls are intended to prevent acts of terrorism and to distance the United 

States from nations that have repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism and from 

individuals and organizations that commit terrorist acts. The controls demonstrate U.S. resolve 

not to trade with nations or entities that fail to adhere to acceptable norms of international 

behavior. The policy provides the United States with the means to control U.S. goods or services 

that might contribute to the military potential of designated countries and to limit the availability 

of such goods or services for use in support of international terrorism. U.S. foreign policy 

objectives are also furthered by ensuring that items removed from multilateral regime lists 

continue to be controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries on an alternative basis. 

With respect to exports and re-exports to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, AT controls 

are maintained as part of broader U.S. sanctions discussed in Chapter 5. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light 

of several factors, principally distancing the U.S. from designated terrorist-supporting countries. 

The Secretary has also determined that the foreign policy purpose cannot be achieved through 

negotiations or other alternative means. Although widespread availability of comparable goods 

from foreign sources limits the effectiveness of these controls, the controls restrict access to 

U.S.-origin commodities, technology, and software, and demonstrate U.S. determination to 

oppose and distance the United States from international terrorism. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are generally compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives and specifically with U.S. 

policy toward the designated terrorist-supporting countries. The Secretary has also determined 

that the extension of these controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy 

consequences. These controls affirm the U.S. commitment to restrict the flow of items intended 

for material support to countries, individuals, or groups for terrorist purposes. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective; nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. Most countries are 

generally supportive of U.S. efforts to fight terrorism and to stop the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction and the export and re-export of sensitive items to governments that have 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. 

4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. The Secretary has determined that the 

detrimental effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the 

competitive position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the 

benefit to United States foreign policy objectives. While U.S. industry has reported that AT 

controls have had a detrimental effect, the Secretary has determined that the effect has been 

modest, especially when viewed in relation to U.S. foreign policy and national security 

objectives.
Chapter 4 Anti-Terrorism Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined the United States has 

the ability to enforce these controls effectively. Because of the well-publicized involvement of 

these countries in acts of international terrorism, there is public knowledge of and support for 

U.S. controls, which facilitates enforcement. However, the large number of items exported in 

normal trade to other countries, including some aircraft items and consumer goods that have 

many producers and end users around the world, creates numerous procurement opportunities for 

brokers, agents, and front companies working for the designated terrorist-supporting countries. 

In addition, differences in export laws and standards of evidence for violations complicate law 

enforcement cooperation among countries. 

Notwithstanding these challenges, the Department of Commerce has developed effective 

mechanisms to enforce these controls, which serve vital U.S. foreign policy objectives. The 

Department of Commerce views these controls as a key enforcement priority, and uses outreach 

efforts and other programs to keep businesses informed of concerns and their obligations. BIS 

gathers leads on activities of concern and conducts end-use checks and Sentinel visits to verify 

the end use and end-users of U.S.-origin licensed goods and technology. Sentinel teams assess 

the suitability of foreign end users to receive U.S.-origin licensed goods and technology, assess 

prospective end-users on pending license applications for diversion risk, and conduct educational 

outreach to foreign trade groups. The Department addresses procurement by or for designated 

terrorist-supporting countries through a variety of means, including enhanced agent training, a 

targeted outreach program to familiarize U.S. businesses with concerns, and close cooperation 

with lead agencies working on terrorism issues. 

BIS conducted a number of enforcement actions regarding noncompliance with these export 

controls, including the following:

Corezing International Pte. Ltd

Components shipped to Iran for IEDs in Iraq 

On October 25, 2011, an indictment was unsealed which charged Corezing International Pte. 

Ltd. (Corezing), a company in Singapore that maintained offices in China, as well as Lim Kow 

Seng (Seng), an agent of Corezing, and Hia Soo Gan Benson (Benson), a manager and director 

of Corezing, with conspiracy to defraud the United States, smuggling, illegal export of goods to 

Iran, illegal export of defense articles, false statements and obstruction of justice. The 

indictment alleged that the defendants participated in a conspiracy that caused 6,000 radio 

frequency modules to be illegally exported from the United States to Iran via Singapore, at least 

16 of which were later found in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq, where they were 

being used in remote detonation devices. On September 20, 2013, Seng and Benson were 

sentenced to 37 months and 34 months in prison, respectively, for their roles in plots to illegally 

export 55 military antennae from the U.S. to Singapore and Hong Kong. On June 26, 2013, Seng

and Benson pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by violating the Arms Export 

Control Act. This was a joint investigation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Additional actions taken by the Commerce Department 
Chapter 4 Anti-Terrorism Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

included the issuance of a temporary denial order against Corezing to prevent future violations 

and alert the exporting community.

Mohammad Reza Hajian 

Diversion of high-end computers and parts to Iran

On October 18, 2012, Mohammad Reza “Ray” Hajian (Hajian) was sentenced to 48 months in 

prison, 12 months of supervised probation, and forfeited $10 million in connection with a 

conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian 

Transactions Regulations. Hajian pled guilty on July 11, 2012. Three of his companies, RH 

International, LLC, Nexiant LLC, and P&P Computers LLC, pled guilty on the same date and on 

October 18, 2012, each was sentenced to one year of probation. According to court documents, 

between 2003 and 2011, Hajian conspired with others to unlawfully export sophisticated, 

enterprise-level computer and related equipment from the United States to Iran, in violation of 

the U.S. embargo. In an effort to conceal their activities, Hajian and his co-conspirators caused 

the shipment of the items, as well as the payments for them, through the United Arab Emirates. 

They employed fake identities, fake end-users, and coded language. Hajian shipped 

approximately $14.85 million worth of computer and related equipment during the conspiracy. 

In coordination with the criminal actions, on March 22, 2013, BIS issued orders denying the 

export privileges of RH International LLC, Nexiant LLC, and P&P Computers LLC until 

October 18, 2022.

Chan Heep Loong and Tysonic Enterprsises

GPS Engines and Power Meters to Iran

On July 21, 2013, BIS issued a final order denying the export privileges of Chan Heep Loong 

(Loong) until July 29, 2023, in connection with exports to Iran in violation of the Iranian 

Transactions Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations. On October 8, 2013, BIS 

issued a related persons order denying the export privileges of Tysonic Enterprises until July 29, 

2023. In February 2005, Loong, a Singaporean national, exported GPS engines to Iran via his 

Singapore-based company, Tysonic Enterprises; the items were controlled for anti-terrorism 

reasons. In May 2005, Loong exported a peak power meter to Iran via Singapore; this item was 

also controlled for anti-terrorism reasons. Loong instructed a U.S. company to ship the items 

from the United States to Tysonic in Singapore. Following arrival in Singapore, the items were 

forwarded to Iran.

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all 

public comments received may be found in Appendix I. The Department continues to engage in 

an ongoing dialogue with the Regulations and Policy Technical Advisory Committee (RPTAC) 
Chapter 4 Anti-Terrorism Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

concerning items controlled only for AT reasons. The RPTAC has asserted that many such items 

are widely available from foreign sources, and therefore has questioned the effectiveness of the 

controls. The RPTAC also has stated that every country currently subject to AT controls is also 

subject to comprehensive sanctions or embargoes. The RPTAC, however, has not disputed 

either the importance of the controls to United States foreign policy or the effectiveness of the 

particular enforcement mechanisms used by the Department. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

The United States continues to consult with a number of countries, both on a bilateral and a 

multilateral basis, regarding activities of designated terrorist-supporting countries. In general, 

most countries are supportive of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts but do not implement export control 

programs comparable to that of the United States. However, the continued maintenance of 

sanctions by many other countries limits foreign availability for some destinations. 

E. Alternative Means 

The United States has taken a wide range of diplomatic, political, and security-related steps, in 

addition to economic measures such as export controls, to persuade certain countries to 

discontinue their support for terrorist activities. The methods that the United States uses against 

a country, terrorist organization, or individual vary and are dictated by the circumstances 

prevailing at any given time. In general, the United States believes that maintenance of AT 

controls is an appropriate method to encourage the designated terrorism-supporting countries to 

act against terrorist elements within their jurisdiction or control. See also Chapter 13 for a 

discussion of the Entity List, a list set forth in the EAR of foreign persons to which license 

requirements apply based on criteria that include support for terrorism.

F. Foreign Availability 

The foreign availability provision does not apply to items determined by the Secretary of State to 

require control under Section 6(j) of the EAA.8 Congress specifically excluded AT controls 

from foreign availability assessments otherwise required by the EAA, due to the value of such 

controls in emphasizing the U.S. position on countries whose governments support international 

terrorism. However, the Department of Commerce has considered the foreign availability of 

items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under Section 6(a) of the EAA. 

Although there are numerous foreign sources for items similar to those subject to control, the 

continued maintenance of sanctions by many other countries limits foreign availability for some 

 

8

Provisions pertaining to foreign availability do not apply to export controls in effect before July 12, 1985, under 

sections 6(i) (International Obligations), 6(j) (Countries Supporting International Terrorism), and 6(n) (Crime 

Control Instruments). See the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99-64, section 

108(g)(2), Stat. 120, 134-35. Moreover, Sections 6(i), 6(j), and 6(n) of the EAA require that controls be 

implemented under certain conditions without consideration of foreign availability. 
Chapter 4 Anti-Terrorism Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

destinations. In addition, the U.S. Government’s AT controls serve important foreign policy 

interests. 
Chapter 5 Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Chapter 5

Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls

(Sections 744.8, 744.12, 744.13, 744.14, 744.18, 744.20, 744.22, 746.2, 

746.3, 746.4, 746.7, 746.9, and General Order No. 2 (Supplement No. 1 to Part 736)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

This Chapter discusses the Department of Commerce’s implementation of comprehensive and 

partial embargoes and sanctions programs, and other special controls maintained by the U.S. 

Government pursuant to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), either unilaterally or to 

implement United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions. Specifically, the U.S. 

Government maintains either partial or comprehensive economic and trade sanctions on Cuba, 

Iran, Sudan, Syria, and certain designated terrorist persons. The U.S. Government also maintains 

certain special export control programs, including programs relating to Iraq, North Korea, and 

certain other countries, consistent with international obligations. Finally, the U.S. Government 

maintains special controls on certain persons, including those engaged in the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. See also Chapter 13 for a discussion of the Entity List. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy 

Certain Designated Persons 

The Department of Commerce requires a license for the export or re-export of all items subject to 

the EAR to Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), Specially Designated Terrorists 

(SDTs), and Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), and a general policy of denial applies to all 

applications for such exports or re-exports. SDGTs, SDTs, and FTOs are identified with the 

bracketed suffixes [SDGT], [SDT], and [FTO], respectively, on a list of designated persons 

maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of the Treasury, 

in Appendix A to 31 CFR Chapter V. Exports and re-exports made by U.S. Persons to SDGTs 

and SDTs that are authorized by OFAC generally do not require separate Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS) authorization; this rule does not apply to FTOs. 

Furthermore, the Department of Commerce requires a license for exports and re-exports of all 

items subject to the EAR to persons designated in or pursuant to Executive Order 13382 of June 

28, 2005 (Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and their Supporters), and a general policy 

of denial applies to all applications. The persons whose property or interests in property are 

blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 are identified by OFAC in Appendix A to 31 CFR 

Chapter V with the bracketed suffix [NPWMD]. Exports and re-exports made by U.S. Persons 

to NPWMDs that are authorized by OFAC generally do not require separate BIS authorization. 

In addition, the Department of Commerce requires licenses for exports, re-exports, and incountry transfers to persons whose property and interests in property are blocked in response to 

the conflict in Burma pursuant to Executive Order 13310 of July 28, 2003, Executive Order 

13448 of October 18, 2007, and Executive Order 13464 of April 30, 2008, and a general policy 

of denial applies to all applications. These license requirements apply to all items subject to the 

EAR other than agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices designated as EAR99 
Chapter 5 Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

that are destined for persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any 

of the Executive Orders. All persons listed in or designated pursuant to Executive Orders 13310, 

13448, or 13464 are identified by OFAC in Appendix A to 31 CFR Chapter V with the bracketed 

suffix [BURMA]. Exports, re-exports, or in-country transfers made by U.S. Persons to persons 

designated in or pursuant to these Executive Orders that are authorized by OFAC generally do 

not require separate BIS authorization. 

Cuba

The Department of Commerce requires a license for export or re-export to Cuba of virtually all 

commodities, technology, and software subject to the EAR, with a few narrow exceptions for 

items generally authorized by a License Exception such as: 

 food, and certain items to meet basic human needs; 

 certain types of personal baggage; 

 certain foreign-origin items in transit from Canada through the United States; 

 items for U.S. Government personnel and agencies, and agencies of cooperating 

governments; 

 certain donated consumer communications devices; and

 gift parcels containing items normally exchanged as gifts between individuals (and in 

quantities normally exchanged between individuals), including food, medicine, clothing, 

and certain consumer communications devices, provided that the value of non-food items 

does not exceed $800.9

The Department of Commerce generally denies license applications for exports or re-exports to 

Cuba. However, the Department considers applications for a few categories of exports, 

including the following, on a case-by-case basis when the exports are intended to provide 

support for the Cuban people or the transactions would be consistent with the foreign policy 

interests of the United States: 

 exports from third countries of non-strategic, foreign-made products containing 

20 percent or less U.S.-origin parts, components, or materials, provided the exporter is 

not a U.S.-owned or controlled foreign firm in a third country; 

 exports and re-exports of items necessary to provide efficient and adequate 

telecommunications links between the United States and Cuba, including links 

established through third countries, and including the provision of satellite radio or 

satellite television services to Cuba;

 exports of certain commodities and software destined to human rights organizations or to 

individuals and non-governmental organizations that promote independent activity; 

 exports of certain commodities and software for U.S. news bureaus in Cuba; 

 

9 An individual donor does not require a license to send a gift parcel addressed to an individual recipient. A gift 

parcel consolidator who exports multiple parcels in a single shipment for delivery to Cuba does require a license. 

(See note to Section 740.12(a) of the EAR.) 
Chapter 5 Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

 exports of certain agricultural items not eligible for License Exception Agricultural 

Commodities (AGR); and 

 exports of certain vessels and aircraft on temporary sojourn to Cuba. 

The Department of Commerce reviews applications for exports of donated and commercially 

supplied medicine or medical devices to Cuba on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to the provisions 

of Section 6004 of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. The United States will generally approve 

such exports, except in the following cases: 

 to the extent Section 5(m) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (EAA) 

or Section 203(b)(2) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 

would permit such restrictions; 

 when there is a reasonable likelihood the item to be exported will be used for purposes of 

torture or other human rights abuses; 

 when there is a reasonable likelihood the item to be exported will be re-exported; 

 when the item to be exported could be used in the production of any biotechnological 

product; or 

 if it is determined that the U.S. Government is unable to verify, by on-site inspection and 

other appropriate means, that the item to be exported will be used only for its intended 

purpose and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. This exception does not 

apply to donations of medicine for humanitarian purposes to non-governmental 

organizations in Cuba. 

The Department authorizes exports and certain re-exports of agricultural commodities to Cuba 

under License Exception AGR, pursuant to section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and 

Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA). Under License Exception AGR, an exporter must 

submit prior notification of a proposed transaction to the Department of Commerce. The 

exporter may proceed with the shipment when the Department confirms that no reviewing 

agency has raised an objection (generally within 12 business days), provided the transaction 

meets all of the other requirements of the License Exception. This expedited review includes the 

screening of the ultimate recipient of the commodities to ensure that it is not involved in 

promoting international terrorism. 

Iran

The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA), authorizes the imposition of a licensing-related sanction on 

persons designated for sanctions by the Secretary of State for conducting certain prohibited 

activities related to Iran. If the Secretary of State selects this sanction from the ISA’s menu of 

twelve available sanctions, BIS is prohibited from issuing any specific authorization to export or 

re-export items subject to the EAR to the sanctioned person absent a waiver from the Secretary 

of State. The Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) requires the Secretary 

of State to choose at least five ISA sanctions from the menu that includes this licensing-related 

sanction that BIS administers. 
Chapter 5 Embargoes, Sanctions, and Other Special Controls

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2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

OFAC administers the U.S. Government’s comprehensive trade and investment sanctions against 

Iran. No person may export or re-export items subject to the EAR if such transaction is 

prohibited by OFAC’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations10 and not authorized by 

OFAC. Virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons, wherever located, 

are prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Certain trade activities by 

non-U.S. persons, including some re-exports, are also prohibited by OFAC under these 

regulations. 

The Department of Commerce imposes license requirements for exports and re-exports to Iran of 

most items on the CCL. The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992 

(IIANPA) requires BIS to deny licenses for items controlled to Iran for national security (Section 

5 of the EAA) or foreign policy (Section 6 of the EAA) reasons. License applications for exports 

or re-exports of these items are subject to a general policy of denial, absent contract sanctity or a 

Presidential waiver of restrictions under IIANPA. In some cases, the EAR impose license 

requirements on items designated as EAR99 that are (1) destined to end-users listed in OFAC’s 

list of SDNs, or (2) destined to end uses or end users prohibited by Part 744 of the EAR. 

Because they are not specific to Iran, the license requirements for items designated as EAR99 are 

listed in either this Chapter’s description of controls on certain designated persons or in Chapter 

13’s discussion of the BIS Entity List. 

Notwithstanding Department of Commerce license requirements and licensing policies, OFAC is 

the primary licensing agency for exports and re-exports to Iran, and BIS does not, in practice, 

receive or process license applications for transactions involving Iran except under the following 

circumstances: (1) the license is for the release (deemed export) of technology or source code on 

the CCL to Iranian nationals in the United States or of the release (deemed re-export) of such 

technology or source code to Iranian nationals located abroad; or (2) the license is for the export 

or re-export of EAR99 items to certain end users or for certain end uses in Iran that are 

prohibited pursuant to provisions of the EAR that are not specific to Iran (e.g., Part 744 enduse/end-user controls). 

BIS takes enforcement action against violators of the Iran-related provisions of the EAR. It is a 

violation of the EAR to export or re-export to Iran any item that is subject to the EAR –

including items designated as EAR99 – if such transaction requires authorization by OFAC 

pursuant to the Department of the Treasury’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and 

such authorization has not been obtained. 

Iraq

 

10 On October 22, 2012, OFAC issued a final rule that renamed the Iranian Transactions Regulations as the Iranian 

Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and amended and reissued them in their entirety. See 77 FR 64664 (Oct. 22, 

2012). 
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The Department of Commerce requires a license for the export or re-export to Iraq, or in-country 

transfer within Iraq, of the following: 

 any item controlled on the CCL for National Security (NS), Missile Technology (MT), 

Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP), Chemical Weapons Convention (CW), Chemical & 

Biological Weapons (CB), Regional Stability (RS), Crime Control (CC), Encryption 

Information (EI), Significant Items (SI), or Surreptitious Listening (SL) reasons; 

 any item controlled on the CCL for UN reasons;

 items on the CCL controlled for RS reasons under the following ECCNs: 0B999, 0D999, 

1B999, 1C992, 1C995, 1C997, 1C999 and 6A992; 

 any item subject to the EAR if, at the time of the export, re-export or transfer, it is known 

the item will be, or is intended to be, used for a military end use or by a military end-user. 

As defined specifically for Iraq, a military end user is any person or entity whose actions or 

functions are intended to support “military end uses” and who is not recognized as a legitimate 

military organization by the U.S. Government. “Military end use” is the incorporation of an item 

into a military item described on the USML (22 CFR Part 121, ITAR), or the Wassenaar 

Arrangement Munitions List (WAML); or use, development, or deployment of military items 

described on the USML or the WAML. The Department reviews license applications destined to 

such end users under a policy of denial. 

The Department of Commerce also reviews license applications for the following items under a 

general policy of denial: 

 items destined for use in Iraqi civil nuclear or military nuclear activity (except for use of 

isotopes for medical, industrial, or agricultural purposes);

 machine tools controlled for NS reasons, machine tools controlled for NP reasons, any 

item controlled for CC or UN reasons, or any item controlled under an ECCN ending in 

the number “018,” if such item would make a material contribution to the production, 

research, design, development, support, maintenance, or manufacture of Iraqi weapons of 

mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or arms and related materiel; and 

 items controlled for RS reasons under ECCNs 0B999, 0D999, 1B999, 1C992, 1C995, 

1C997, 1C999, or 6A992 that will not contribute to the building of Iraqi civil 

infrastructure. 

The Department of Commerce additionally requires a license for exports, re-exports, or incountry transfers of any item subject to the EAR to persons listed in the Annex to Executive 

Order 13315, as amended (“Blocking Property of the Former Iraqi Regime, Its Senior Officials 

and Their Family Members, and Taking Certain Other Actions”), as well as persons 

subsequently designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to that Executive Order. U.S. 

persons are not required to seek separate BIS authorization for an export, re-export, or in-country 

transfer to a designated person that has already been authorized by the Department of the 

Treasury; however, license applications for such transactions are subject to a general policy of 

denial by the Department of Commerce. 
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North Korea 

North Korea is subject to sanctions based on its nuclear and ballistic missile activities, 

engagement in proliferation and other illicit activities, and commission of human rights 

violations. Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and as set forth in 

Section 746.4 of the EAR, BIS requires a license for the export or re-export to North Korea of all 

items subject to the EAR, except food and medicine designated as EAR99. Other controls on 

North Korea are located in Section 742.19 of the EAR.11 

Pursuant to Section 746.4 of the EAR, applications for items requiring a license for export or reexport to North Korea are subject to case-by-case review, except as follows: 

 Applications to export or re-export luxury goods are subject to a general policy of denial. 

 Applications to export or re-export arms and related materiel; items specified by UN 

documents S/2006/814, S/2006/815 and S/2006/853; and other items that the UN 

Security Council or the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to UN Security 

Council Resolution 1718 has determined could contribute to North Korea's nuclearrelated, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs, 

are subject to a general policy of denial. 

 Applications to export or re-export items controlled for nuclear nonproliferation (NP) and 

missile technology (MT) reasons (except ECCN 7A103 items) are subject to a general 

policy of denial. 

 Applications to export or re-export items controlled for chemical and biological weapons 

(CB) and national security (NS) reasons, as well as applications to export or re-export

many items only controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons, are subject to a general 

policy of denial. 

 Applications to export or re-export humanitarian items (e.g., blankets, basic footwear, 

heating oil, and other items meeting subsistence needs) intended for the benefit of the 

North Korean people; items in support of UN humanitarian efforts; and agricultural 

commodities or medical devices that are determined by BIS, in consultation with the 

interagency license review community, not to be luxury goods are subject to a general 

policy of approval. 

Persons Sanctioned by the State Department 

Pursuant to Section 744.20 of the EAR, the Department of Commerce may impose, as foreign 

policy controls, export and re-export license requirements and set licensing policy with respect to 

certain entities that have been sanctioned by the State Department. State Department-sanctioned 

entities upon which export and re-export license requirements have been imposed under Section 

744.20 of the EAR are included on the Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Section 744 of the EAR. 

Not all entities sanctioned by the State Department are incorporated into the Entity List. 

 

11 Although the Secretary of State rescinded North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism on October 

11, 2008, Section 742.19 of the EAR maintains anti-terrorism export controls with respect to North Korea.
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Sudan 

The U.S. Government requires a license for the export and re-export of nearly all items on the 

CCL to Sudan. Many items controlled on the CCL to Sudan may require a license from both the 

Departments of Commerce and the Treasury. License applications may be submitted to both 

agencies concurrently. 

The Department of Commerce reviews, under a general policy of denial, applications for the 

export and re-export of all items controlled for chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear 

proliferation reasons, military-related items controlled for national security or regional stability 

reasons (CCL entries ending in the number 018), and certain items controlled for national 

security or foreign policy reasons, such as aircraft, cryptologic items, and explosive device 

detectors, for all end users in Sudan. Other non-military-related items that are controlled to 

Sudan for national security or foreign policy reasons are subject to a general policy of denial for 

military end users or end uses, and case-by-case review for non-military end users or end uses. 

Syria

The Department of Commerce requires a license for the export or re-export to Syria of all 

commodities, technology, and software subject to the EAR, except food and medicine designated 

as EAR99, and “deemed exports” or “deemed re-exports” to Syrian nationals of technology or 

source code designated as EAR99. Additionally, certain categories of items are authorized for 

export or re-export to Syria under License Exceptions: 

 Personal baggage for individuals leaving the United States; 

 Items for the use of the news media under certain conditions; 

 Exports for U.S. Government personnel and agencies; 

 Certain operation technology and software, sales technology, and software updates; and 

 Temporary sojourn of certain civil aircraft re-exported to Syria. 

The Department of Commerce generally denies license applications for exports or re-exports to 

Syria. However, pursuant to the President’s exercise of waiver authority, the Department 

considers applications for the following on a case-by-case basis: 

 Items in support of the Syrian people, including, but not limited to, items related to water 

supply and sanitation, agricultural production and food processing, power generation, oil 

and gas production, construction and engineering, transportation, and educational 

infrastructure.

 Items necessary to carry out the President's constitutional authority to conduct U.S. 

foreign affairs and as Commander-in-Chief, or in support of U.S. Government activities; 

 Medicine on the CCL and medical devices; 

 Parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of 

commercial passenger aircraft; 
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 Aircraft chartered by the Syrian Government for the transport of Syrian Government 

officials on official Syrian Government business; and

 Telecommunications equipment and associated computers, software, and technology to 

enhance the free flow of information, including items for general academic, 

administrative, business, and personal use; items in support of UN operations in Syria.

In addition to these waivers, on June 12, 2013, the Secretary of State exercised authority 

delegated to him under Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 

Restoration Act of 2003 (the SAA) and Executive Order 13338 to waive certain sanctions on 

Syria. BIS implemented this additional limited waiver by amending the Export Administration 

Regulations (EAR) on July 23, 2013 (78 FR 43972). 

This limited waiver authorizes BIS to issue licenses on a case-by-case basis for the export or reexport of certain commodities, software, and technology necessary for the support of the Syrian 

people. 

This limited waiver authorizes review of license applications on a case-by-case basis for the 

export or re-export of certain commodities, software, and technology, including, but not limited 

to, those related to water supply and sanitation, agricultural production and food processing, 

power generation, oil and gas production, construction and engineering, transportation, and 

educational infrastructure, as a means of helping to address the critical needs of the Syrian 

people and facilitating reconstruction. These exports are necessary to support a political 

transition, restore stability, and counter destabilizing influences in the region, and are therefore 

essential to the national security of the United States. This amendment also allows BIS to export 

items that support UN Security Council Resolution 2118 requiring the verification and 

destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. 

United Nations Security Council Arms Embargoes 

Pursuant to Part 746.1(b) of the EAR, the Department of Commerce requires a license for the 

export or re-export of items controlled for “UN” reasons to countries subject to United Nations 

Security Council arms embargoes, including the Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan. 

Summary of 2013 Changes

On July 23, 2013, The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement a limited waiver, published by the Secretary of 

State on June 12, 2013, of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 

2003 (the SAA). The waiver authorized BIS to issue licenses on a case-by-case basis for the 

export or re-export of certain commodities, software, and technology necessary for the support of 

the Syrian people. See Syria section, above, for a discussion of this waiver. 
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On August 2, 2013, the United States determined that the Syrian government had used chemical 

weapons against its own nationals and imposed several sanctions on Syria, including a 

prohibition on exports of national security-sensitive goods and technologies, as required by the 

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (“the CBW 

Act”). However, the United States also determined that it was essential to national security to 

partially waive sanctions required under the CBW Act vis-à-vis activities in furtherance of 

United States policies regarding the Syrian conflict. Following a major use of chemical weapons 

against Syrian civilians on August 21, 2013, the United States and Russia negotiated a 

framework for dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons program on an expedited basis, which was 

embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 and a special decision of the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council on September 27, 

2013.

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

Certain Designated Persons 

The purpose of controls on designated terrorist persons (natural persons, entities, and groups) 

and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters is to restrict exports of 

items that would be useful in enhancing the capability of these persons to undertake activities 

that support terrorism or contribute to the development of WMD. 

Burma

The purpose of controls on political and military leaders and other persons in Burma that 

contribute to civil unrest and suppression of basic rights and freedoms in that country is to 

prevent these persons from acquiring items that could be used to carry out activities that are 

detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests. 

Cuba 

The United States imposed an embargo on Cuba five decades ago because Cuban Government 

actions posed a serious threat to the stability of the Western Hemisphere and the Cuban 

Government expropriated property of U.S. citizens without compensation. In March 1982, the 

Secretary of State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the EAA. 

The purpose of the controls is to restrict exports that would allow Cuba to act as a destabilizing 

force and/or to support terrorism. The controls demonstrate the United States’ resolve to 

maintain stability in the region and to actively work against the threat of terrorism and those who 

support it. At the same time, U.S. support for the export of food, gift parcels, and other 

humanitarian items, such as medicines and medical devices, ensures that the Cuban population is 

not deprived of basic supplies. 

Iran 
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The purpose of the controls is to restrict exports of items that could enhance Iran’s terrorismsupporting capabilities and to address other U.S. and international foreign policy concerns, 

including nonproliferation, human rights, and regional stability. By restricting the export of 

items that could have a military use, the controls demonstrate the resolve of the United States not 

to provide any direct or indirect military support for Iran and to support other U.S. foreign policy 

objectives. The United States’ support for exports and re-exports of food items, medical 

supplies, and medical equipment is designed to ensure that U.S. export controls on Iran do not 

prevent the Iranian population from receiving what it needs for humanitarian purposes. 

Iraq 

The purpose of the controls is to restrict exports that might adversely affect the security situation 

in Iraq. 

North Korea 

The purpose of the controls is to restrict certain exports and re-exports to North Korea to comply 

with the United States’ obligations as a member of the United Nations, and to demonstrate the 

United States’ concern over North Korea’s development, testing, and proliferation of nuclear 

weapons, missiles and missile technology, and other weapons of mass destruction. 

Persons Sanctioned by the State Department 

The purpose of the controls is to restrict exports to persons engaged in activities that are contrary 

to the foreign policy interests of the United States or who have violated U.S. export control laws. 

These controls demonstrate the United States’ opposition to activities of concern as well as its 

resolve to actively work against the diversion of sensitive items to unauthorized end users or end 

uses. 

Sudan 

The U.S. sanctions and export controls remain in place against Sudan due to its continued 

support for international terrorism. The controls maintained by BIS pursuant to the EAR support 

the broader sanctions maintained by OFAC pursuant to several Executive Orders and consistent 

with other applicable laws. 

Syria 

The Government of Syria engages in widespread acts of violence against its own citizens 

including the use of chemical weapons in heavily populated areas. Additionally, Syria’s ongoing 

internal conflict significantly contributes to the destabilization throughout the region. Syria hosts 

various terrorist organizations and provides political and material support to Hezbollah in 

Lebanon. Moreover, the Syrian Government allows Iran to resupply Hezbollah through Syrian 

territory . The U.S. Government also remains concerned about Syria’s interference in the 

internal affairs of Iraq as well as Lebanon, and Syrian nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological 

programs. U.S. export controls reflect U.S. opposition to these activities. The controls also 

promote other U.S. foreign policy interests, including the protection of human rights, the 

encouragement of regional stability, and the safeguarding and destruction of chemical and 

biological weapons. 
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United Nations Security Council Arms Embargoes 

The United States maintains export controls in accordance with the UN Security Council arms 

embargoes and partial embargoes on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 

Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that the controls described in this Chapter are likely to achieve the intended foreign 

policy purpose, in light of other factors, including foreign availability from other countries. She 

has further determined that the foreign policy purpose cannot be achieved through negotiations 

or alternative means. For each of the controls described in this Chapter, the Secretary has 

determined that such restrictions have denied the targeted countries and persons access to 

resources for use in activities that are contrary to the foreign policy of the United States. The 

controls described in this Chapter seek to have the targeted entities or governments modify their 

actions. In addition, the applicable controls may reduce the potential for conflict. 

Certain Designated Persons 

The Secretary has determined that foreign policy controls will help thwart the access that these 

persons have had to U.S.-origin items that could support terrorist operations, WMD proliferation, 

or other restricted activities. 

Cuba 

The Secretary has determined that the sanctions will help to bring about a peaceful and stable 

transition toward democracy and a free market economy in Cuba while providing for the basic 

human needs of the Cuban people. 

Iran 

The Secretary has determined that foreign policy controls will restrict Iran’s access to specified 

U.S.-origin items that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons development program and 

Iranian support of terrorism and promotion of regional threats to U.S. interests. 

Iraq 

The Secretary has determined that foreign policy controls will restrict the ability of terrorists and 

insurgent groups to obtain and use U.S.-origin items to attack U.S. forces or to destabilize the 

current Government of Iraq. 

North Korea 

The Secretary has determined that the foreign policy controls will meet U.S. obligations under 

relevant UN Security Council resolutions and impede North Korea’s development, testing, and 

proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons and other WMDs, and may help to persuade it 

to eventually abandon its nuclear weapons program. 
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Persons Sanctioned by the State Department 

The Secretary has determined that foreign policy controls will thwart the access that these 

persons have to U.S.-origin items and their ability to divert such items to unauthorized end users 

or end uses. 

Sudan 

The Secretary has determined that foreign policy controls will restrict the Government of 

Sudan’s ability to obtain and use U.S.-origin items in support of military activities. The controls 

are also likely to impede terrorist activities in Sudan and support international efforts to end the 

humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

Syria

The Secretary has determined that foreign policy controls will impede the further development of 

Syria’s Weapons of Mass Destruction programs and restrict the Government’s ability to commit 

acts of violence against its own people while allowing the provision of aid and other material to 

support the Syrian opposition. The Secretary has also determined that foreign policy controls 

will contribute to the Government of Syria ending its support of terrorist groups in Lebanon and 

elsewhere and its abuse of the human rights of its citizens. 

United Nations Security Council Arms Embargoes 

The Secretary has determined that the foreign policy controls will meet U.S. obligations under 

the relevant UN Security Council arms embargoes and partial embargoes on the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, 

Somalia, and Sudan. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives, and that the extension of these 

controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. The controls 

complement U.S. foreign policy and other aspects of U.S. relations with these persons and 

countries. They encourage these persons and governments to modify their actions with the goal 

of improving conditions in their region. These controls are consistent with U.S. foreign policy 

goals of promoting peace and stability, and preventing weapons proliferation and human rights 

abuses. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective and that any adverse reaction by 

other countries would not be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. Notwithstanding 

the fact that most countries have not imposed embargoes as comprehensive as those of the 

United States, and that some countries have challenged certain U.S. controls as unwarranted 

extraterritorial measures, the overriding foreign policy objective of maintaining these controls 

outweighs negative foreign reactions. Opposition to U.S. foreign policy-based controls by many 

of our major trading partners, including some close allies, continues to be a point of contention. 

This reaction has led some foreign firms to “design out” U.S. components or to cite the lack of 

their own national sanctions as a marketing tool to secure business contracts that might have 
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gone to U.S. companies. In some instances, foreign governments have instructed foreign firms 

to ignore U.S. re-export controls. However, in certain areas, such as the nuclear threat posed by 

Iran and North Korea, the Government of Syria’s egregious abuses of human rights and use of 

chemical weapons, including the use of violence and torture, arbitrary arrests, detentions and 

executions of peaceful civilians, and the genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, the United 

States has received broader international support for its sanctions policies from other countries. 

Certain Designated Persons 

Many countries support U.S. efforts to ensure that exports and re-exports of U.S.-origin items are 

not used in terrorist activities, the development of WMD, or by entities or foreign governments 

that are perpetrating or promoting civil unrest in their own or other countries. The Department 

of Commerce promotes these shared objectives by blocking designated groups and individuals 

from acquiring items that could aid or assist these groups in committing future acts deemed to 

support these activities. Although some countries are considering restrictive legislation, very 

few maintain export controls similar to those implemented by the United States. Many countries 

have imposed controls on entities specifically designated in UNSCRs.

Cuba 

Although most countries recognize the right of the United States to determine its own foreign 

policy and security concerns and share U.S. concerns regarding Cuba, many countries continue 

to oppose controls on trade between the United States and Cuba, and an annual United Nations 

General Assembly resolution condemning the embargo passes each year with overwhelming 

support, with only the United States and Israel voting against it. Although many nations support 

greater freedoms and economic reforms in Cuba, they refrain from overt criticism of the Cuban 

Government. 

Iran 

Other countries share U.S. concerns regarding Iran’s support of terrorism, human rights abuses, 

and attempts to acquire WMD. This is especially the case in the nuclear context, where 

international concerns with Iran’s intentions vis-à-vis its nuclear program have led to the 

unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran pursuant to 

Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The member states of the Group of Eight, the European Union, 

the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other multilateral bodies have joined the 

United States in expressing their concern over Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and 

have called on Iran to cooperate fully and transparently with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA). In general, however, U.S. controls on commercial goods to Iran are more 

stringent than most other countries’ controls. 

Iraq 

In accordance with its obligations as a member of the United Nations, the United States 

continues to impose an arms embargo on military end users not under the authority of the Iraqi 

Government. 

North Korea 
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The United States maintained a comprehensive trade embargo against North Korea for over 50 

years, until June 19, 2000. During that time period, U.S. allies largely acted in concert with the 

United States to deny North Korea strategic equipment and technology. Similarly, the easing of 

U.S. sanctions toward North Korea and the removal of some U.S. controls in June 2000 were 

echoed by other countries. However, as a result of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in 

2006 and 2009, the United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCRs 1718 and 1874, 

respectively, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea and demonstrating international 

disapproval of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities. North Korea’s 

subsequent missile testing and activity on April 13, 2012 and December 12, 2012 was also 

condemned by most nations, and in January 22, 2013, UNSCR 2087 passed unanimously 

condemning North Korea’s December 12 launch as a violation of the UN ban on North Korean 

ballistic missile tests. North Korea’s nuclear testing on February 12, 2013 was likewise 

condemned, and on March 7, 2013, UNSCR 2094 passed, also unanimously, condemning the

tests and imposing additional sanctions on North Korea. Pursuant to these UN sanctions, and on 

the basis of other relevant laws and regulations, the Department of Commerce continues to apply 

sanctions on North Korea which other countries generally support. 

Persons Sanctioned by the State Department 

Although other countries share U.S. concerns regarding the diversion of goods to unauthorized 

end users or end uses, few countries maintain controls similar to those implemented by the 

United States. 

Sudan 

The United States maintains sanctions on Sudan because of its continued support for 

international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and because of 

the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom 

to the population of the country. Sanctions against Sudan have not been modified because Sudan 

has not taken sufficient steps to resolve the conflict in Darfur. The United States continues to 

consult with other countries regarding the humanitarian crisis in Darfur bilaterally and 

multilaterally, including through the United Nations. 

Syria 

The United States maintains controls in response to Syria’s attacks on its own citizens, its use of 

chemical weapons against its own citizens, its continued support for terrorist groups, its failure to 

interdict the flow of foreign fighters destined for Iraq, its interference in Lebanon’s internal 

affairs, and the ongoing abuse of the human rights of its citizens. Many other countries concur 

that Syria’s regional activities are destabilizing, and a small but growing number of countries 

maintain controls similar to, but less comprehensive than, those implemented by the United 

States. The European Union, for example, has implemented prohibitions on the provision of 

certain goods and services to Syria.

12

 

12 EU Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP (OJ L 319, 2.12.2011, p. 56), December 1, 2011 as amended.
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United Nations Security Council Arms Embargoes 

The United States maintains controls in accordance with the UN Security Council arms 

embargoes and partial embargoes on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 

Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan. These controls 

are compatible and consistent with the controls adhered to by the 41 participating states in the 

Wassenaar Arrangement, and with the controls imposed by other UN member states as a result of 

the UN Security Council arms embargoes. 

4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. The Secretary has determined that any 

adverse effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the 

competitive position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the 

benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Certain Designated Persons

The Department of Commerce did not review any license applications for the particular persons 

designated by the Treasury Department in fiscal year 2013. The economic impact of these 

controls is consequently likely minimal. The Department of the Treasury maintains restrictions 

on activities of U.S. persons involving designated terrorist entities, proliferators, and those 

involved in civil unrest and suppression of basic rights and freedoms in Burma, which the 

Department of Commerce’s controls augment. 

Cuba 

The U.S. Government requires authorization in the form of either a license or an Agricultural 

License Exception confirmation for the export or re-export to Cuba of most U.S.-origin 

commodities, technology, and software subject to the EAR. The number of licenses and 

confirmations that the Department of Commerce issued for exports or re-exports to Cuba 

increased significantly from 1998 through 2002, due to changes in U.S. export policies made 

during the late 1990s. There has been a general decline in the number of licenses and 

confirmations issued since that time. U.S. export sanctions on Cuba have had some impact on 

U.S. industry. However, the authorized export of large volumes of agricultural commodities has 

somewhat reduced this impact. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 310 license applications for exports 

and re-exports to Cuba, valued at nearly $1 billion. Also during fiscal year 2013, the Department 

issued 109 confirmations of authorization under License Exception Agricultural Commodities 

(AGR) valued at approximately $3.7 billion. The Department of Commerce and reviewing 

agencies had no objections to the License Exception AGR notices submitted during that period. 

The number of approved licenses and confirmations totaled 419, valued at nearly $4.7 billion. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department returned without action 108 license applications for exports 

and re-exports to Cuba, valued at over $400 million, and denied seven Cuba license applications, 

valued at over $18,000. Errors and deficiencies were the primary reasons for the number of 

returned applications. The Department did not revoke any previously validated licenses during 

this period. 
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According to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook, Cuba imported an 

estimated $13.72 billion in commodities in 2012 (the most recent year for which statistics are 

available), down from $14.02 billion the year before. Leading Cuban imports included 

petroleum, food, machinery and equipment, and chemicals. Cuba’s leading suppliers were 

Venezuela (36.4 percent), the People’s Republic of China (10.5 percent), Spain (8.7 percent), 

Brazil (5.1 percent) and the United States (4.2 percent). Cuban imports from the United States 

increased, however, by 1.5 percent in 2012 compared to 2011. 

Iran 

The U.S. Government maintains a policy of denial for license applications for exports and reexports of items on the CCL to Iran, consistent with the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms NonProliferation Act of 1992 and the U.S. trade and investment embargo of 1995. 

Consistent with the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), the 

U.S. Government authorizes exports and re-exports of food, agricultural equipment, medicine, 

and medical supplies and equipment to Iran. According to the U.S. Census Bureau statistics, 

total U.S. exports to Iran were valued at $251 million in calendar year 2012, an increase from 

$229 million in 2011. The top U.S. commodities exported to Iran in 2012 were agricultural 

commodities, medical equipment, and pharmaceutical preparations. 

Since 1997, the Department of the Treasury has had primary jurisdiction for the export and reexport of items subject to the EAR to Iran, and the Department of Commerce has sole 

jurisdiction for deemed exports or deemed re-exports (releases of U.S. technology or source code 

subject to the EAR to Iranian nationals in the United States or abroad). The Department of 

Commerce approved 168 deemed export licenses for Iranian nationals during fiscal year 2013. 

Deemed export and re-export licenses represent a nominal value of technology and source code 

released to Iranian national employees or students.

Prior to the sanctions, the United States competed with Iran’s major trading partners in exports of 

industrial machinery, motor vehicles and auto parts, power generating machinery, measuring and 

controlling devices, computers, plastics and resins, and industrial organic chemicals. According 

to the CIA World Factbook, Iran imported an estimated $67 billion worth of industrial supplies, 

capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and technical services in 2012. Iran’s 

leading suppliers were the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (32.2 percent), People’s Republic of 

China (13.8 percent), Turkey (11.5 percent), South Korea (7.4 percent), Germany (4.8 percent) 

and Turkey (4.2 percent). 

The U.S. sanctions on Iran, while necessary to add pressure for Iran to comply with its nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations, have had a detrimental effect on U.S. industry. Immediately prior 

to the sanctions, U.S. exports to Iran totaled close to $2.2 billion; however, the sanctions resulted 

in a substantial decline in U.S. exports to the country. 
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Iraq 

Although the security situation in Iraq continues to be of concern to the United States, the United 

States also fully supports Iraq’s reconstruction and economic revival. Current licensing policy 

and requirements reflect the complexity and challenges of doing business in Iraq. 

U.S. export controls specific to Iraq have had little impact on U.S. industry, because the primary 

focus of those controls is on arms sales to non-coalition forces. Since licensing jurisdiction for 

Iraq was returned to the Department of Commerce in 2004, the majority of license applications 

received have been for equipment in support of or for use in reconstruction of Iraq and training 

activities for its police and military. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department approved 116 license applications for Iraq, valued at over 

$829 million. The Department returned 19 license applications without action in 2013, valued at 

over $155 million, primarily due to exporters submitting applications for transactions that did not 

require licenses. In 2013, the Department did not deny any license applications for Iraq. 

According to the CIA World Factbook, Iraq imported an estimated $56.9 billion in commodities 

in 2012 (the most recent year for which statistics are available), up from an estimated $53 billion 

in 2011. Leading Iraqi imports included food, medicine, and manufactured goods. Iraq’s 

leading suppliers were Turkey (27.8 percent), Syria (15.9 percent), the People’s Republic of 

China (12.6 percent), the United States (5.2 percent) and South Korea (4.8 percent). 

North Korea 

A BIS license is required for the export or re-export to North Korea of all items subject to the 

EAR, with the exception of food and medicines designated as EAR99 (i.e., medicines subject to 

the EAR but not listed on the CCL). As a result of the small size of the North Korean economy, 

U.S. export sanctions on North Korea have had a minimal impact on U.S. industry. Agricultural 

products and humanitarian goods are the primary U.S. exports to North Korea. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department approved 14 license applications, valued at $14 million. The 

Department of Commerce returned without action 16 license applications in 2013. Applications 

were returned without action most often because the applicants accidentally selected North 

Korea instead of South Korea in the application system. The Department did not deny any 

license applications or revoke any previously validated licenses for North Korea. 

According to the CIA World Factbook, North Korean imports totaled $4.3 billion in 2011 (the 

most recent year for which figures are available) with primary imports including petroleum, 

coking coal, machinery and equipment, textiles, and grain. North Korea’s leading sources of 

imports in 2011 were the People’s Republic of China (61.6 percent), South Korea (20 percent), 

and the European Union (4 percent). 
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Persons Sanctioned by the State Department 

The impact on U.S. industry of these controls is minimal as they target only certain persons listed 

on the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the EAR). 

Sudan 

The United States imposed sanctions on Sudan in 1997 in response to the Government of 

Sudan’s support for international terrorism, efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and 

the prevalence of human rights violations. Both the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury 

maintain license requirements for certain exports and re-exports to Sudan of items subject to the 

EAR. As a general matter, the Department of Commerce issues export licenses for items on the 

CCL. The Department of the Treasury is solely responsible for licensing the export of 

agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical items that are not listed on the CCL under the 

provisions of the TSRA and is also responsible for licensing other items not listed on the CCL 

(items designated as EAR99). As noted above, licenses may be required from both agencies for 

the same transaction.

U.S. unilateral export sanctions on Sudan have had a minor impact on U.S. industry. Sudan was 

not a significant export market for the United States before sanctions were imposed in 1997. 

Moreover, a large proportion of exports to Sudan prior to the imposition of sanctions involved 

items designated as EAR99, which do not require a Department of Commerce license for export 

to Sudan. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 60 license applications for Sudan, 

valued at over $31 million. The Department returned 33 license applications without action in 

2013. The Department of Commerce denied three license applications, valued at $521,526.

According to the CIA World Factbook, Sudan’s total imports from all sources were valued at 

$6.2 billion in 2012. Leading suppliers to Sudan were Macau (18 percent), India (8.8 percent), 

Saudi Arabia (7.9 percent), Egypt (6.7 percent), and the U.A.E. (5.2 percent). Leading imports 

were foodstuffs (including wheat), manufactured goods, refinery and transport equipment, 

medicines and chemicals, and textiles. 

Syria

The U.S. Government requires a license for the export and re-export to Syria of all U.S.-origin 

commodities, technology, and software subject to the EAR except for food and certain medicine 

designated as EAR99. U.S. export sanctions on Syria have had a minimal impact on U.S. 

industry. Medical items, humanitarian goods, and exports in support of the Syrian opposition 

and the Syrian people are the primary U.S. exports to Syria. 

During fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 223 licenses. Also during fiscal 

year 2013, the Department returned without action 43 license applications, and denied 1 license 

application for the temporary sojourn of a corporate aircraft. 
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Department of Commerce licensing reflects an increase in humanitarian aid, support for Syrian 

democracy activists, and support for Syrian opposition forces. The Department issued 153 

licenses in fiscal year 2013, valued at $65.7 million, in support of these U.S. foreign policy 

priorities, the majority of which was funded by the United States Department of State. These 

values do not reflect Department of State expenditures for food or medicine provided to Syria as 

a result of various U.S. Government-supported programs or of items purchased abroad, that were 

not subject to the EAR. 

According to the CIA World Factbook, Syria imported an estimated $10.8 billion in 

commodities in 2012. Leading Syrian imports include machinery and transport equipment, 

electric power machinery, food and livestock, metal and metal products, chemicals and chemical 

products, plastics, yarn, and paper. Syria’s leading suppliers in 2012 were Saudi Arabia (21.2 

percent), the UAE (10.4 percent), Iran (7.7 percent), the People’s Republic of China (7 percent), 

Iraq (6.3 percent), Ukraine (6.3 percent), and Egypt (4.3 percent). 

United Nations Security Council Arms Embargoes 

The UN currently maintains embargoes, or partial embargoes, on the export of certain arms and 

related materiel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, 

Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan. 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to effectively enforce these controls. Controls on exports to embargoed and 

sanctioned countries and persons, including those discussed in this Chapter, raise a number of 

challenges. These include the need to concentrate limited resources on priority areas, develop 

new strategies to limit re-export violations, strengthen the cooperative relationship with other 

law enforcement agencies in the United States and overseas, and maintain a consistent outreach 

effort to help limit U.S. business vulnerability. Overall, the sanctions are generally understood 

and supported by the U.S. public. Voluntary cooperation from most U.S. exporters is common. 

The Department conducted a number of enforcement actions regarding noncompliance with 

these export controls, including the following:

Saeed Talebi

Industrial Equipment to Iran

On February 13, 2013, Saeed Talebi, an Iranian national, was sentenced to 12 months in prison 

in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. On September 26, 2012, Talebi 

pled guilty to conspiring to illegally export parts and goods designed for use in industrial 

operations from the United States to Iran in violation of IEEPA. On numerous occasions 

throughout 2010 and 2011, Talebi worked with others to ship industrial parts and goods through 

a company located in the United Arab Emirates to various petrochemical companies in Iran. In 

the course of his scheme, Talebi also caused money to be wired to the United States, including 

over $300,000 that was sent to a bank account in Manhattan.

James Allen Larrison
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Camera Control Boxes and Electronics to Iran

On January 14, 2013, BIS issued an order denying the export privileges of James Allen Larrison 

until January 14, 2018. The denial was issued in connection with the attempted export of Hitachi 

JU-Z2 Junction Units (camera control box, 8-port multiple television camera control delegation 

switch) to Iran without first obtaining the required U.S. Government authorization. On June 

2011, James Allen Larrison was convicted of violating IEEPA and sentenced to 24 months of 

probation.

Seyed Amin Ghorashi Sarvestani

Satellite Equipment to Iran

On August 14, 2013, Iranian national Seyed Amin Ghorashi Sarvestani was sentenced to 30 

months in prison for conspiring to export satellite technology from the United States to Iran in 

violation of IEEPA. Seyed A.G. Sarvestani was the owner of and served as managing director of 

two related companies based in the United Arab Emirates. In that capacity, he worked with 

others to export electronic equipment used for satellite communications and data transfer, as well 

as other items, from the United States to Iran, without U.S. Government authorization. 

Iman Kazerani

Electronics to Iran

On September 19, 2013, BIS issued an order denying the export privileges of Iman Kazerani 

until January 30, 2018. On January 30, 2013, Iman Kazerani, an Iranian national, was sentenced 

in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to a $10,000 criminal fine and 36 months of 

probation. Kazerani pled guilty in September 2010 to violating IEEPA in connection with the 

export of computers and electronics to Iran, through the United Arab Emirates, without the 

required U.S. Government authorization.

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all 

public comments received may be found in Appendix I. Comments from the Department’s 

seven Technical Advisory Committees are solicited on a regular basis and are not specific to this 

report. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

The U.S. Government has made reasonable efforts to achieve the purposes of the U.S. embargoes 

and sanctions through negotiations with other countries, through international fora, and through 

the United Nations, as outlined in the specific country descriptions that follow. 
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Certain Designated Persons 

The United States cooperates with allies and partners and shares information on the activities of 

designated terrorist entities. It is expected that strong international support for the U.S. fight 

against terrorism will further facilitate dialogue on foreign export control expansion. 

Cuba 

The U.S. Government has worked diligently with other nations, especially countries in Europe 

and Latin America, to resolve disputes that arise as a result of the U.S. embargo. Differences 

remain between the United States and other countries concerning the best method to encourage 

democracy and human rights. However, many nations share with the United States the ultimate 

goal of a free, peaceful, democratic, and market-oriented Cuba. 

Iran 

The United States has an ongoing dialogue with its allies and partners on Iran’s activities, 

particularly the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany 

(P5+1), as well as other members of the United Nations Security Council, the IAEA Board of 

Governors, and like-minded countries. The United States continues to work with other states to 

prevent Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by pursuing a dual track strategy that 

includes pressure on Iran to comply with its international obligations and offers of engagement. 

The United States is also working with the IAEA to ensure that the agency has the capabilities it 

needs to verify Iran’s compliance with its safeguards agreement, work with Iran to resolve the 

outstanding questions and issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and monitor UN Security 

Council requests that Iran suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as required in UN 

Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929. The IAEA Director General released 

a very detailed report on the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iranian nuclear program in 

November 2011, which prompted the IAEA Board of Governors to overwhelmingly adopt a 

resolution expressing deep concern over the PMD issue and Iran’s lack of cooperation with the 

IAEA and failure to comply with its international nuclear obligations. 

Iraq 

The United States continues multilateral and bilateral discussions with several countries 

concerning effective implementation of the United Nations arms embargo. 

North Korea 

The United States continues multilateral and bilateral discussions with various countries, 

including the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and 

Russia on the ongoing issues concerning the nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities of 

North Korea. The United States is working with these and other countries to ensure effective 

implementation of sanctions under UNSCRs 2087and 2094, and will continue to work with these 

countries to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

Persons Sanctioned by the State Department 

The United States consults on a regular basis with other countries on proliferation and 

trafficking-related issues. Although other countries share U.S. concerns regarding the diversion 
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of goods to unauthorized end-users or end uses, few countries maintain controls similar to those 

implemented by the United States, beyond those entities included in UNSCRs. 

Sudan 

The United States continues to consult with the United Nations, in addition to other countries and 

entities in both bilateral and multilateral forums, regarding the internal conflict in Sudan and to 

address the humanitarian needs of the population. 

Syria 

The United States is in constant communication with other countries regarding the elimination of 

Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons; Syrian nuclear, missile, and biological programs; the 

Syrian Government’s interference in Lebanon and its support for terrorism; the flow of foreign 

fighters through Syria destined for Iraq; and its abuse of its own citizens. Additionally, although 

the U.S. Embassy in Syria has closed for security reasons, the United States continues to 

communicate its concerns to the Government of Syria directly and forcefully through the Syrian 

Ambassador in Washington and other diplomatic channels. 

United Nations Security Council Arms Embargoes 

Most countries support international efforts to stabilize affected countries in order to prevent 

further ethnic conflict and regional instability, including through compliance with the United 

Nations arms embargoes.
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CHAPTER 6

Toxic Chemicals, Chemical Precursors, and Associated Equipment, Technology, and 

Software Controls

(Sections 742.2, 742.18, 744.4, 744.6, and 745)13

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The U.S. Government maintains export controls on certain chemicals, equipment, materials, 

software, technology, and entire plants to further U.S. foreign policy and prevent the 

proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The U.S. Government implements these controls in 

coordination with the Australia Group (AG), an informal forum of 42 nations and the European 

Commission that is dedicated to halting the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. 

(See Appendix II for a complete list of AG members.) Also, the United States fulfills its 

obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or the Convention) by maintaining 

controls on certain chemicals.14 

Australia Group Controls 

The AG was formed in 1985 when the United States and 14 other nations agreed to enhance and 

harmonize controls on chemicals that could be used to produce chemical weapons. Since then, 

the AG has expanded its membership and has expanded its export control list to cover toxic 

biological agents and dual-use chemical and biological production related equipment and 

technologies. Member countries use the AG common control list and guidelines as a basis for 

developing and imposing their domestic export controls. The AG has a “no-undercut” policy, 

which requires consultation with another AG partner that had previously denied an AGcontrolled item if a proposed transaction is essentially identical.

License Requirements and Licensing Policy for AG Controls

The licensing requirements for chemicals, equipment, materials, software, technology, and entire 

plants imposed in accordance with AG commitments are noted below. There are 20 entries on 

the CCL that are subject to chemical controls.

The U.S. Government requires a license for the export to all destinations other than AG member 

countries of chemical weapons precursor and intermediate chemicals, as identified on the AG 

 

13 Chapter 7 of this report addresses U.S. biological controls. 

14 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 

and on their Destruction (the “Chemical Weapons Convention” or CWC) was ratified by the United States on April 

25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. 
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common control list, technology for the development, production, and disposal of such items, 

relevant process control software, and the facilities designed to produce such chemicals. 

The U.S. Government also requires a license for the export to all destinations, other than AG 

member countries, of certain chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment, toxic gas 

monitoring systems and detectors that can be used in the production of chemical warfare agents, 

and the technology for the development, production, and disposal of such items. The countries 

to which these licensing requirements apply are listed in Column CB2 of the Commerce Country 

Chart, Part 738, Supplement No. 1 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These 

licensing requirements also apply to the export of these items to designated terrorist-supporting 

countries. 

In addition, the U.S. Government also controls all items subject to the EAR because of chemical 

weapon end use or end-user concerns as part of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative 

(EPCI). 

 The U.S. Government requires a license for the export of any commodity, technology, or 

software to all destinations, worldwide, including to AG member countries, when the 

exporter knows that it will be used in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or 

use of chemical weapons. In addition, the U.S. Government may inform an exporter or 

re-exporter that a license is required due to an unacceptable risk that the items will be 

used in, or diverted to, chemical weapons proliferation activities anywhere in the world. 

 No U.S. person may knowingly support such an export, re-export, or in-country transfer 

without a license. “Support” is defined as any action, including financing, transportation, 

or freight forwarding that facilitates the export, re-export, or in-country transfer of these 

items. 

 In addition, no U.S. person may, without a license, perform any contract, service, or 

employment knowing that it will directly assist the design, development, production, 

stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons in, or by, any country or destination worldwide. 

The Department of Commerce, in coordination with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and 

State, reviews applications for licenses to export AG-controlled items on a case-by-case basis to 

determine whether the export would make a material contribution to the design, development, 

production, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons. For licenses to export AG-controlled items 

to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Section 742.2 of the EAR imposes an additional 

review standard – whether the items will make a direct and significant contribution to China’s 

military capabilities. When the Department of Commerce determines, after interagency review, 

that an export will make a contribution meeting these criteria, the Department will deny the 

license. 

Trade Restrictions under the Chemical Weapons Convention 
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The CWC, which entered into force in April 1997, bans the development, production, 

acquisition, stockpiling, retention, use, or transfer of chemical weapons, and establishes an 

extensive verification regime. The CWC Annex on Chemicals groups specified chemicals, 

including toxic chemicals and chemical precursors, into three “Schedules.” Chemicals are listed 

in a schedule based on factors specified in the Convention, such as the level of toxicity and other 

properties that enable their use in chemical weapons applications. 

The toxic chemicals and precursors on Schedule 1 were previously developed, produced, 

stockpiled or used as chemical weapons, or pose a high risk to the object and purpose of the 

CWC based on the dangers identified in the Convention and have little, if any, use in legitimate 

commercial applications. The toxic chemicals and precursors on Schedule 2 pose a significant 

risk to the object and purpose of the CWC, in light of the dangers identified in the Convention, 

and are not produced in large commercial quantities for legitimate purposes. The toxic 

chemicals and precursors on Schedule 3 have been produced or used as chemical weapons or 

pose a risk to the object and purpose of the CWC, based on the dangers identified in the CWC, 

and are produced in large commercial quantities for legitimate purposes. 

The Department of State, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), controls 

exports of the chemical warfare agents deemed to have military application, which by their 

ordinary and direct chemical action produce a powerful physiological effect. The Department of 

State controls all CWC Schedule 1 chemicals, except ricin and saxitoxin, which are under the 

control of the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce controls all Schedule 2 

chemicals, except six chemical precursors that are controlled through the ITAR and therefore fall 

under the jurisdiction of the Department of State. All Schedule 3 chemicals are controlled by the 

Department of Commerce.

License Requirements and Licensing Policy for CWC Controls 

The following is a summary of the export restrictions and licensing requirements for chemicals

subject to the EAR that are imposed to fulfill CWC treaty obligations, as set forth in Section 

742.18 of the EAR: 

A. CWC Schedule 1 chemicals may only be exported or re-exported to CWC States Parties, 

and a license is required. Additionally, there are advance notification and annual reporting 

requirements for such exports. A license is also required for the export or re-export of Schedule 

2 chemicals to countries that are not States Parties to the CWC. Exports of Schedule 3 chemicals 

destined to States not Party to the CWC require a license. Re-exports of Schedule 3 chemicals 

require a license when they are re-exported from a State not Party to the CWC to any other State 

not Party to the CWC. 

B. Export license applications for Schedule 1 chemicals to CWC States Parties are reviewed 

on a case-by-case basis. The Department of Commerce approves exports of Schedule 1 and 

Schedule 2 chemicals to CWC States Parties only for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. 

This is the underlying basis for the policy of denial for applications to export Schedule 1 and 
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Schedule 2 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC. Additionally, there is a policy to deny 

applications to export Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC unless the importing 

country provides an End-Use Certificate. In addition, the U.S. Government reviews exports and 

re-exports of technology related to the development and production of mixtures containing 

perfluoroisobutene, phosgene, cyanogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide on a case-by-case basis. 

Summary of 2013 Changes

On January 28, 2013, the AG published on its website a statement of concern regarding the 

continuing conflict in Syria and the failure of the Syrian government to eliminate concerns about 

the prospect of use of chemical weapons. AG member countries noted that Syria continues to be 

a country of proliferation concern. AG member countries re-affirmed their agreement on the 

importance of increased vigilance with regard to dual-use exports to Syria and also agreed to 

subject exports to Syria to particular scrutiny. On June 7, 2013, the AG published on its website

participants’ concerns about the mounting evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria. AG 

members urged all parties to the Syrian conflict to renounce chemical weapons and again 

emphasized the need for all countries to exercise increased vigilance and particular scrutiny with 

regard to dual-use exports to Syria. These agreements by the AG support existing United States 

sanctions against Syria.

On August 12, 2013, Mexico formally became the 42nd member of the AG. In welcoming its 

newest member, the AG recognized Mexico’s steadfast efforts to bring its export control system 

fully into line with the AG common control lists and guidelines, as well as its determination to 

contribute to the global effort to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. 

With its admission into the AG, Mexico demonstrated its will to implement rigorous controls 

with high standards in international trade, its capacity to adapt its national regulatory system to 

meet the necessities of its expanding economy, and its readiness to act in close cooperation with 

all members of the AG. 

The Department of Commerce also collaborated with the Department of the Treasury in 

clarifying and streamlining the export of medical items to Iran under the Iranian Transactions 

and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR 560). The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) provided 

technical expertise to support Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in developing 

a “List of Basic Medical Supplies” that are eligible for export to Iran under a general license (31 

CFR 560.530(a)(3)(ii)). The Department of the Treasury published this list on July 25, 2013. In 

conjunction with this rulemaking, the Department of Commerce updated its web-based guidance 

to provide consistent and streamlined guidance for such transactions.

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

The purpose of these controls is to support the efforts of the AG to halt the development and 

production of chemical weapons and to comply with international obligations under the CWC. 
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In addition, these controls implement certain measures specified in Executive Order 12735 of 

November 16, 1990, its successor, Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, and the EPCI 

announced on December 13, 1990. In so doing, the controls provide the U.S. Government with 

the authority to regulate the export or re-export of any item from the United States when there is

a significant risk that it will be used for chemical weapons proliferation purposes. 

The AG works to further nonproliferation objectives through harmonizing export controls, 

exchanging information, and other diplomatic means. In addition to furthering the objectives of 

the AG, these controls support U.S. compliance efforts with the CWC. To ensure that States 

Parties to the Convention do not transfer chemicals that could assist other states to acquire 

chemical weapons, the CWC requires that States Parties restrict the export of certain chemicals 

listed in the CWC’s Annex on Chemicals. The controls also support the goals of the 1925 

Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other 

Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light 

of other factors, including AG membership of other producing countries, and that the foreign 

policy purpose cannot fully be achieved through negotiations or other alternative means. Many 

of the items covered by these controls have commercial uses and are widely available from 

foreign sources. Some of the major sources of these items are located in industrialized countries 

that are members of the AG and States Parties to the CWC. Although it is not expected that 

export controls alone can prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, these controls 

strengthen U.S. and like-minded states’ efforts to stem the spread of such weapons and continue 

to be a significant part of the overall nonproliferation strategy of the United States.

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives and that the extension of these 

controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. The U.S. 

Government has a strong interest in remaining at the forefront of international efforts to stem the 

proliferation of chemical weapons. These controls are compatible with the multilateral export 

controls for chemicals and related equipment and technology agreed to by the AG. Moreover, 

the U.S. Government has binding international obligations under the CWC: to refrain from 

developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, using or engaging in military 

preparations for the use of chemical weapons; to refrain from assisting, encouraging or inducing 

anyone to engage in prohibited activity; preventing anyone from engaging or assisting in 

prohibited chemical weapons activities; and implementing national legislation to penalize 

prohibited activities and to control certain chemical exports. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective; nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. The U.S. Government 
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continues to discuss chemical export controls with countries outside of the AG to advance the 

goals of nonproliferation. The governments of some developing countries claim that AG export 

controls discriminate against less industrialized nations by depriving them of goods and 

assistance in the field of chemical technology. The United States considers that these assertions 

are incorrect. In fact, in international forums, the U.S. Government has sought to dispel this 

perception by clarifying the purpose of the controls and by demonstrating that the U.S. 

Government denies few export license requests for shipment to developing countries.

4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. The Secretary has determined that any 

detrimental effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the 

competitive position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the 

benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 3,550 license applications, valued at 

$3,727,207,733, for the export or re-export of chemical precursors, equipment, and related 

technology. The majority of the value of these approvals (86 percent) was for precursor 

chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350, which are chemicals that have many commercial uses. 

The bulk of the remaining value of these approvals (12 percent) was for chemical processing 

equipment controlled under ECCN 2B350. The Department denied 7 license applications valued 

at $13,204,157, and returned without action 273 license applications valued at $636,191,153. 

The primary reason for returning applications was for insufficient information about the 

transaction. The actual trade in these controlled commodities is significantly greater than the 

value of the license applications submitted because exporters may export many of these 

commodities to AG member countries without a license.

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. The size, dispersion, diversity, and 

specialized nature of the dual-use chemical industry make detecting and investigating potential 

violations challenging for enforcement personnel. Challenges include distinguishing commercial 

procurement from chemical weapons-related transactions, and establishing appropriate 

commodity thresholds for targeting and tracking exports and re-exports for verification of end 

uses and end users. It is also difficult to detect and investigate cases under the “knowledge” 

standard set by the EPCI “catch-all” provision and some countries have different standards for 

“catch-all,” which complicates law enforcement cooperation. In addition, enforcement officers 

may be exposed to personal safety risks when seizing and inspecting chemical materials.

To meet the challenge of effective enforcement of these controls, the Department of Commerce 

has directed resources toward preventive enforcement, in addition to continued efforts to pursue 

all leads on activities of concern provided by intelligence, industry, and other sources. Also, the 

Department of Commerce’s extensive outreach program educates companies about export 

controls related to chemical products and helps prevent the illegal export of dual-use products 

that can be used to make chemical weapons. In cases where unlicensed shipments of chemical 

materials have already taken place, the Department of Commerce has found that, as in other 
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export control enforcement cases, analysis of commercial shipping documentation can lead to 

successful investigations and prosecutions.

Violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR)

There are no CWCR violations to report for fiscal year 2013. 

C. Consultation with Industry 

The Department of Commerce interacts with the chemical industry in a number of ways, 

including with individual companies seeking export licenses, through technical advisory 

committees (TACs), and through trade associations. BIS consults regularly with exporting firms 

on proposed export transactions and marketing plans to facilitate the thorough, yet prompt, 

review of export license applications. Through the TACs, the Department of Commerce keeps 

industry representatives abreast of proposals for the review of items on the CCL and gives them 

the opportunity to provide technical input. Comments from the Department’s seven TACs are 

solicited on an ongoing basis and are not specific to this report. 

The Department of Commerce works with chemical industry associations, including the 

American Chemistry Council and the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates, and 

with government agencies such as the Departments of State, Defense, Energy and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, to gain valuable input regarding CWC implementation and to meet the 

United States’ CWC responsibilities. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

These controls are consistent with the multilateral export control criteria of the AG, which 

includes many of the world’s major chemical producers and traders. As such, the controls have 

been agreed through negotiations with the member countries of the AG. In addition, a number of 

non-AG countries, including Russia and China, have taken steps to adopt AG-type controls. An 

important element of the AG’s efforts to curb the development of chemical weapons is 

encouraging non-members to observe similar export controls. The U.S. Government continues 

to encourage harmonization of export control provisions among AG participants to ensure a level 

playing field for U.S. exporters. 

E. Alternative Means 

The U.S. Government continues to address the problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons 

on a number of fronts. Direct negotiations with countries intent on acquiring chemical weapons 

are not likely to prevent the use of controlled materials in such activities, nor are such 

negotiations likely to affect the behavior of these countries. 

Alternative means to curtail the acquisition and development of chemical warfare capabilities, 

such as diplomatic negotiations, do not obviate the need for controls. Examples of additional 
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means that the U.S. Government has used and will continue to use, in an attempt to curb the use 

and spread of weapons of mass destruction, include: 

 Sanctions: U.S. laws such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 

Elimination Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-182, Title III, Dec. 4, 1991, 105 Stat. 1245), the 

Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-484) (Title XVI), and the 

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Pub. L. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787, 50 

U.S.C. § 1701 (note)) provide for the imposition of sanctions on foreign entities and 

countries for certain kinds of chemical and biological weapons-related activity. The U.S. 

Government has imposed sanctions under these authorities on certain entities for 

chemical weapons-related activities. 

 Universality of the CWC: The CWC imposes a global ban on the development, 

production, stockpiling, retention, and use of chemical weapons by States Parties and 

prohibits States Parties from assisting, encouraging, or inducing a non-State Party to 

engage in such activities. The CWC also prohibits the direct or indirect transfer of 

chemical weapons, restricts trade in certain chemicals to States that are not States Parties 

to the CWC, and has created an international organization to monitor the destruction of 

chemical weapons and the production, use, and trade of toxic chemicals and chemical 

precursors in and among States Parties to the CWC.

As part of its CWC implementation activities, the Department of Commerce also collects 

industry reports regarding the production, processing, consumption, import, and export of toxic 

chemicals and chemical precursors for purposes not prohibited by the CWC (e.g., industrial, 

agricultural, and other peaceful purposes), which are forwarded to the Organization for the 

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as part of the U.S. declaration. The Department of 

Commerce also acts as the lead, host, and escort for OPCW inspection teams as they inspect 

certain U.S. chemical facilities to verify that activities are consistent with the information 

provided in the U.S. declaration. 

F. Foreign Availability 

Past reviews conducted by the Department of Commerce revealed that a wide range of AG 

chemical precursors and production equipment are available from non-AG countries. Non-AG 

suppliers of precursors and related production equipment include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, 

China, South Africa, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. However, almost all non-AG suppliers 

have become States Parties to the CWC and will take steps under this treaty to prevent chemical 

weapons development and production. Moreover, successful outreach by AG countries has led 

most non-AG suppliers to adopt export controls that closely mirror the AG’s. As such, the U.S. 

Government has made efforts through its membership in both the AG and CWC to secure the 

cooperation of foreign governments to control the foreign availability of chemical precursors and 

production equipment. 
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CHAPTER 7

Biological Agents and Associated Equipment and Technology Controls

(Sections 742.2, 744.4 and 744.6)15

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The U.S. Government controls the export of certain microorganisms, toxins, biological 

equipment, and related technology to further U.S. foreign policy interests in opposing the 

proliferation and use of biological weapons. The U.S. Government implements these export 

controls multilaterally in coordination with the Australia Group (AG), a forum of 40 nations and 

the European Commission, cooperating to halt the proliferation of chemical and biological 

weapons. The U.S. Government also supports international efforts to secure a total ban on 

biological weapons in compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 

Destruction (BWC).16 

Australia Group Controls 

The AG was formed in 1985 when the United States and 14 other nations agreed to enhance and 

harmonize controls on chemicals that could be used to produce chemical weapons. Since then, 

the AG has expanded its membership and its export control list to cover toxic biological agents 

and dual-use chemical and biological production related equipment and technologies. AG 

member countries use the AG common control list and guidelines as a basis for developing and 

imposing their domestic export controls. The AG has a “no-undercut” policy, which requires 

consultation with another AG partner that previously denied an AG-controlled item if a proposed 

transaction is essentially identical. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy

The licensing requirements for biological agents, related equipment, and technology, imposed in 

accordance with AG commitments, are noted below. There are 12 entries on the CCL that are 

subject to biological controls. 

A. The U.S. Government requires a license for the export to all destinations of certain 

human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and 

plant pathogens, and the technology for the production and disposal of such items. 

 

15 Chapter 6 of this report addresses U.S. chemical controls.

16 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) was signed in 1972 and ratified by the United 

States in 1975. 
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The U.S. Government requires a license for export to all destinations, other than AG member 

countries, of certain dual-use equipment and materials that can be used to produce biological 

agents and related technology. The countries for which this licensing requirement applies are 

those indicated in Column CB2 (Chemical and Biological Weapons, Column 2) of the 

Commerce Country Chart, Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of the Export Administration 

Regulations (EAR), as well as the sanctioned destinations identified in Part 746 of the EAR. 

The U.S. Government requires a license for the export of medical products identified in Export 

Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C991.d. The countries for which this licensing 

requirement applies are those indicated in Column CB3 (Chemical and Biological Weapons, 

Column 3) of the Commerce Country Chart, Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR), as well as the sanctioned destinations identified in Part 746 

of the EAR.

The U.S. Government requires a license for the export of medical products identified in Export 

Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C991 (all paragraphs except d). The countries for 

which this licensing requirement applies are those indicated in Column AT1 (Anti-terrorism, 

Column 1) of the Commerce Country Chart, Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR), as well as the sanctioned destinations identified in Part 746 

of the EAR

The U.S. Government also controls items subject to the EAR because of biological end-use or 

end-user concerns. These controls are part of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative 

(EPCI), announced by President George H.W. Bush on December 13, 1990. 

 The U.S. Government requires a license for the export of any commodity, technology, or

software when the exporter knows that it will be used in the design, development, 

production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons in, or by, any country anywhere in 

the world, including AG member countries. In addition, the U.S. Government may 

inform an exporter or re-exporter that a license is required due to an unacceptable risk 

that the items will be used in, or diverted to, biological weapons proliferation activities 

anywhere in the world. 

 No U.S. person may knowingly support such an export, re-export, or in-country transfer 

without a license. “Support” is defined as any action, including financing, transportation, 

or freight forwarding that facilitates the export, re-export, or in-country transfer of these 

items. 

 In addition, no U.S. person may perform, without a license, any contract, service, or 

employment knowing that it will directly assist the design, development, production, 

stockpiling, or use of biological weapons in, or by, any destination or country anywhere 

in the world. 
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B. The Department of Commerce, in coordination with the Departments of Defense, Energy, 

and State, reviews applications for licenses on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the 

export would make a material contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling, 

or use of biological weapons. When the Department of Commerce determines as a result of an 

interagency review that an export will make such a contribution, it will deny the application. For 

licenses to export AG-controlled items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Section 742.2 

of the EAR imposes an additional review standard – whether the items will make a direct and 

significant contribution to China’s military capabilities. When the Department of Commerce 

determines, after interagency review, that an export will make a contribution meeting these 

criteria, the Department will deny the license. 

Summary of 2013 Changes 

On January 28, 2013, the AG published on its website a statement of concern regarding the 

continuing conflict in Syria and the failure of the Syrian government to eliminate concerns about 

the prospect of use of chemical weapons. AG member countries noted that Syria continues to be 

a country of proliferation concern. AG member countries re-affirmed their agreement on the 

importance of increased vigilance with regard to dual-use exports to Syria and also agreed to 

subject exports to Syria to particular scrutiny. On June 7, 2013, the AG published on its website 

participants’ concerns about the mounting evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria. AG 

members urged all parties to the Syrian conflict to renounce chemical weapons and again 

emphasized the need for all countries to exercise increased vigilance and particular scrutiny with 

regard to dual-use exports to Syria. These agreements by the AG support existing United States 

sanctions against Syria.

On June 5, 2013, the Department of Commerce published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 

FR 33692) to implement the understandings reached at the 2012 Plenary and Intersessional 

meetings of the AG. The rule amended ECCNs 1C351, 1C354 and 1C360 to reflect the changes 

to the AG “List of Biological Agents for Export Control.” Specifically, ECCN 1C351 (Human 

and zoonotic pathogens and “toxins”) was amended to add botulinum neurotoxin producing 

strains of Clostridium argentinese; Clostridium baratii; and Clostridium butyricum. ECCN 

1C351 was also amended to clarify controls on Rickettsia prowazekii and Escherichia coli. 

ECCN 1C354 (Plant pathogens) was amended to add three pathogens previously controlled 

under ECCN 1C360 that now appear on the AG “List of Plant Pathogens for Export Control” 

(Peronosclerospora philippinensis; Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae; and Synchytrium 

endobioticum); as well as Tilletia indica and Thecaphora solani. ECCN 1C354 was also 

amended to clarify controls on Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri; Ralstonia solanacearum; 

Colletotrichum kahawae; Puccinia graminis; Magnaporthe grisea; and Andean potato latent 

virus. This rule also amended ECCN 2B352 to add certain spray-drying equipment that now 

appear on the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and 

Software.” Finally, this rule also removes ECCN 1C360 (Select agents not Australia Group 

controlled) following interagency agreement to consolidate biological entries and to mirror 

Select Agent Regulations by removing ten former select agents not listed on the AG “List of 

Biological Agents for Export Control” from the CCL (Central European tick-borne encephalitis 
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virus, Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1, Flexal virus, Akabane virus, Bovine spongiform 

encephalopathy agent, Camel pox virus; Malignant catarrhal fever virus; Menangle virus; 

Erhlichia ruminantium; and Xylella fastidiosa pv. citrus variegated chlorosis) and to move three 

agents to ECCN 1C351.b (certain reconstructed forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus) and 

ECCN 1C354 (Rathayibacter toxicus and Phoma glycinicola).

On August 12, 2013, Mexico formally became the 42nd member of the AG. In welcoming its 

newest member, the AG recognized Mexico’s steadfast efforts to bring its export control system 

fully into line with the AG common control lists and guidelines, as well as its determination to 

contribute to the global effort to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. 

With its admission into the AG, Mexico demonstrated the will to implement rigorous controls of 

high standards in international trade, its capacity to adapt its national regulatory system to meet 

the necessities of its expanding economy, and its readiness to act in close cooperation with all 

members of the AG. 

The Department of Commerce also collaborated with the Department of the Treasury in 

clarifying and streamlining the export of medical items to Iran under the Iranian Transactions 

and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR 560). The Bureau of Industry and Security provided 

technical expertise to support Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in developing 

a “List of Basic Medical Supplies” that are eligible for export to Iran under a general license (31 

CFR 560.530(a)(3)(ii)). The Department of the Treasury published this list on July 25, 2013. In 

conjunction with this rulemaking, the Department of Commerce updated its web-based guidance 

to provide consistent and streamlined guidance for such transactions.

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

The controls described above are intended to prevent a U.S. contribution to the proliferation and 

illegal use of biological weapons and to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives that seek to 

inhibit the proliferation of biological weapons. The controls also provide the regulatory 

authority to stop the export of any item from the United States when there is a significant risk 

that it will be used for biological weapons purposes. In addition, the controls implement certain 

measures directed in Executive Order 12735 of November 16, 1990; its successor, Executive 

Order 12938 of November 14, 1994; and the EPCI, announced on December 13, 1990. 

The U.S. Government implements these controls in coordination with the AG. The AG works to 

accomplish multilateral objectives through harmonizing export controls, exchanging information, 

and other diplomatic means. In addition, these controls demonstrate the commitment of the 

United States to its obligation under the BWC not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or 

retain biological agents, weapons, equipment, or the means of delivery for warfare purposes, or 

to assist others in such activities. The controls also advance the goals of the 1925 Geneva 

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases and of 

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol). 
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B. Considerations and/or Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light 

of other factors, including availability of relevant items from other countries, and that the foreign 

policy purpose cannot fully be achieved through negotiations with its partners in the AG and in 

the BWC. The Secretary has made this determination despite the existence of certain factors, 

including availability of these items from other sources, which challenge the full achievement of 

foreign policy goals. These controls affirm U.S. opposition to the development, proliferation, 

and use of biological weapons and serve to distance the United States from such activities. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives and that the extension of these 

controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. The U.S. 

Government has a strong interest in remaining at the forefront of international efforts to stem the 

proliferation of biological weapons. Also, these controls are compatible with the multilateral 

export controls for biological materials agreed to by the AG. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. The U.S. Government 

continues to discuss biological export controls with countries outside of the AG to advance the 

goals of nonproliferation. 

4. Economic Impact on U.S. Industry. The Secretary has determined that any detrimental 

effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the competitive 

position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the benefit to United 

States foreign policy objectives. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 1,086 license applications valued at 

$42,623,393for the export or re-export of biological agents, vaccines and equipment. The 

majority of the value of these approvals (82 percent) was for biological processing and handling 

equipment controlled under ECCN 2B352. The bulk of the remaining value of these approvals 

(8 percent) was for human pathogens, zoonoses, and toxins controlled under ECCN 1C351. The 

Department denied four license applications valued at $379,168 and returned without action 73 

license applications valued at $4,742,403. The primary basis for returning applications was 

insufficient information about the transactions. 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined the United States has 

the ability to enforce these controls effectively. Enforcing controls on biological weaponsrelated materials poses challenges similar to the enforcement of chemical controls, but with 

additional factors. Biological agents are microscopic organisms that require technical expertise 
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and specialized facilities to identify and to handle. Because of their size, biological agents can 

often be concealed and transported with ease. 

To meet the challenge of effectively enforcing these proliferation controls, the Department of 

Commerce focuses resources on preventive enforcement. Commerce personnel conduct an 

extensive, ongoing outreach program to educate industry about export controls. The program is 

designed to increase industry’s awareness of suspicious orders for products or equipment that 

could be used for biological weapons proliferation. In cases where unlicensed shipments of 

biological materials have already taken place, the Department of Commerce has found that, as in 

other export control enforcement cases, analysis of commercial shipping documentation can lead 

to successful investigations and prosecutions.

C. Consultation with Industry

Biological products exporters include commercial firms as well as academic and government 

entities. The Department of Commerce maintains ongoing interaction with individual exporters, 

TACs, and trade associations to discuss proposed export transactions and marketing plans to 

facilitate the thorough, yet prompt, review of export license applications. Through the TACs, the 

Department keeps industry representatives abreast of licensing proposals for items on the control 

list and gives them the opportunity to provide technical input. Comments from the Department’s 

seven TACs are solicited on an ongoing basis and are not specific to this report. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

Recognizing that multilateral coordination of export controls and enforcement actions is the most 

effective means of restricting proliferation activities, the U.S. Government coordinates its 

controls on biological items with other countries in the AG. 

The U.S. Government continues to address the problem of biological weapons proliferation 

through a variety of international forums and urges other AG members to pursue export control 

cooperation with non-members on a bilateral or regional basis. 

E. Alternative Means 

The U.S. Government continues to address the problem of biological weapons proliferation on a 

number of fronts. Direct negotiations with countries intent on acquiring biological weapons are 

not likely to prevent the use of U.S.-origin materials for such activities and negotiations are 

unlikely to affect the behavior of these countries. 

Alternative means to curtail the acquisition and development of biological warfare capabilities, 

such as diplomatic negotiations, do not obviate the need for controls. The following examples 

demonstrate additional means that have been, and will continue to be, used in an attempt to curb 

the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction: 
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 Regulations issued by the Public Health Service (42 CFR Part 72) pursuant to the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Sec. 511 of Pub. L.104-132, 

April 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1214) place additional shipping and handling requirements on 

laboratory facilities that transfer or receive select infectious agents capable of causing 

substantial harm to human health. 

 The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 

(Pub. 102-182, Title III, December 4, 1991, 105 Stat. 1245), the Iran-Iraq Arms 

Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-484) (Title XVI), and the Iran, North Korea, 

and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Pub. L. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note) 

provide for the imposition of sanctions on foreign persons or countries for certain kinds 

of chemical and biological weapons-related activity. The U.S. Government has imposed 

sanctions under these authorities on certain entities for chemical and biological weaponsrelated activities. 

 In accordance with the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002, the Select Agent Regulations are administered by the U.S. 

Departments of Health and Human Services (42 CFR Part 73) and Agriculture (7 CFR 

Part 331 and 9 CFR Part 121). These regulations list biological agents and toxins that 

potentially pose a severe threat to public health and safety (“select agents and toxins”) 

while placing additional restrictions on their possession, use and transfer. As amended 

on October 5, 2012 (77 FR 61084 and 77 FR 61056), the select agents and toxins most 

likely to be misused are designated as Tier 1 Select Agents and require additional 

enhanced security measures.

The negotiations and alternative means undertaken by the U.S. Government demonstrate that it 

has made reasonable efforts to achieve the purposes of the controls; however, these actions have 

not had results that are as effective as the maintenance and renewal of the controls. 

F. Foreign Availability 

Most of the AG-controlled biological agents, and related equipment to produce them, are 

available from many sources. (Biological agents are, in fact, endemic.) Notwithstanding the 

difficulties related to controlling these items effectively, the United States and its AG partners 

consider it necessary to maintain controls in order to stem shipments to potential weapons 

developers. Foreign availability is a factor considered by the AG member countries in their 

coordination of controls, though many non-AG suppliers model their own export controls on the 

Australia Group’s export controls. 
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CHAPTER 8

Missile Technology Controls

(Sections 742.5 and 744.3)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The U.S. Government maintains export controls on certain equipment, materials, software, and 

technology to further the U.S. foreign policy of stemming the proliferation of missiles capable of 

delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.S. Government implements these 

controls in coordination with the members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 

an informal political arrangement of 34 nations that cooperate to halt the proliferation of such 

missiles. (See Appendix II for a complete list of MTCR members.) Of note, several other 

countries, including India, Israel, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia, unilaterally adhere to the 

MTCR Guidelines. 

Section 1512 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 permits the export 

to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of “missile-related equipment or technology,” as 

defined in Section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act, only if the President certifies to Congress 

that (1) the export is not detrimental to the United States space launch industry and (2) the 

equipment or technology to be exported, including any indirect technical benefit that could be 

derived from the export of the items, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch 

capabilities of the PRC. In 2009, the President delegated the authority to make such 

certifications to the Secretary of Commerce. See Presidential Determination No. 2009–31 of 

September 29, 2009 (74 FR 50913 (Oct. 2, 2009)). Assessments of whether the criteria for such 

certifications is met continue to be made on an interagency basis. 

Missile Technology Control Regime Controls 

On April 16, 1987, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United 

Kingdom created the MTCR to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear 

weapons. Since that time, the number of MTCR Partners has increased to 34 countries. Member 

countries agreed to further expand the MTCR controls in 1993 to include missile delivery 

systems for all types of WMD. The MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex lists 

missile-related items controlled pursuant to the MTCR Guidelines. It is divided into two 

categories. Category I items include complete missile systems, complete subsystems, production 

facilities, production equipment, and associated software and technology for missile systems 

capable of delivering at least a 500 kilogram (kg) payload to at least a 300 kilometer (km) range. 

Category II items include materials, components, and production and test equipment associated 

with Category I items, as well as missile systems, major subsystems, production facilities, and 

production equipment for missile systems with a range equal to or greater than 300 km, 

regardless of payload. 

License Requirements for MTCR Controls 
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The Department of Commerce is responsible for administering controls on manufacturing 

equipment for Category I items and all dual-use items in Category II. The MTCR Guidelines 

and the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex form the basis for U.S. missile technology 

controls, providing guidance for licensing policy, procedures, review factors, and standard 

assurances on missile technology exports. 

Approximately 120 entries on the CCL are subject to missile technology controls. License 

applications for Category I items are subject to a strong presumption of denial regardless of 

purpose, and license applications for the export, re-export or transfer (in-country) of production 

facilities for Category I items will be denied. The Department will approve the export of 

Category II items only after a case-by-case review consistent with U.S. law, policy, and 

regulations, as well as international nonproliferation commitments. The United States observes 

the multilateral commitment to honor the denial of licenses for MTCR Annex items by other 

MTCR members and to support such denials through a “no undercut” policy. This policy 

enhances efforts to prevent missile proliferation and helps to establish a level commercial 

playing field within the regime. 

In summary, the licensing requirements and policy for missile technology controls described in 

Sections 742.5 and 744.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are as follows: 

 The U.S. Government requires a license for the export or re-export to all destinations 

except Canada of dual-use items specifically identified on the CCL as controlled for 

missile technology reasons. 

 The U.S. Government also controls items subject to the EAR due to end-use or end-user 

concerns related to the proliferation of certain rocket systems and unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs). The U.S. missile catch-all policy meets U.S. nonproliferation 

objectives and is consistent with the MTCR Guidelines. The Department of Commerce 

reviews applications for licenses on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export 

would make a material contribution to the proliferation of certain rocket systems or 

UAVs. If the Department of Commerce determines that an export will make such a 

contribution, the application will be denied. 

Summary of 2013 Changes 

The annual Plenary of the MTCR was held in October 2013 in Rome, Italy, where MTCR 

Partner countries continued to discuss the wide range of missile nonproliferation issues, and 

expressed concern with developments in ongoing missile programs in regions of tension. The 

Partners also discussed the importance of using all of the tools in the nonproliferation toolkit to 

inhibit missile proliferation, noted the importance of placing greater focus on intangible 

technology transfer (ITT) issues, as well as brokering, transit, and transshipment, and agreed to 

conduct further outreach activities in order to fulfill the Regime’s objectives. An Information 
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Exchange (IE) and a Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM) were also held in 

conjunction with the Plenary. 

Two Technical Experts Meetings (TEM) were held in 2013, one in May 2013 in Bonn, Germany, 

and one in conjunction with the Rome Plenary, to discuss changes to the MTCR Equipment, 

Software, and Technology Annex. Between these two meetings, there were 13 agreements 

reached on proposed changes to the Annex, which were subsequently adopted by the Plenary in 

Rome. Changes to the MTCR Annex will necessitate modifications to the EAR, including the 

definition of “payload” for space launch vehicles, the addition of “electronic transactions” to the 

General Software Note, alteration of test conditions for jet engines in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A101, replacement of the defined term “use” in two entries, and 

changes to the text in ECCNs 1B102, 1B117, and 6A107. 

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

These controls curtail the availability of goods and technology and other support that could 

contribute to missile proliferation. U.S. export controls on specific types of missile-related 

equipment and technology, in coordination with those of other supplier countries, limit the 

proliferation of missile systems and related technology. These controls complement U.S. and 

international nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation efforts by blocking the 

development of unmanned delivery systems for WMD. Also, these controls provide U.S. 

support to the collective effort of the MTCR to address mounting international concern regarding 

missile proliferation. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light 

of other factors, including the limited foreign availability of items controlled for Missile 

Technology (MT) reasons, and that the foreign policy purpose cannot fully be achieved through 

negotiations or other alternative means. The controls at issue have been in part achieved through 

international or multilateral negotiations. Although some controlled items are available from 

other countries, cooperation among the United States, its MTCR Partners, and other like-minded 

countries, many of which are major producers of the items under control, has hindered the efforts 

of proliferators to develop or acquire militarily effective missiles. The Secretary has determined 

that extending these controls is likely to limit the spread of missile delivery systems. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives and that the extension of these 

controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. Halting the spread of 

missiles and related equipment and technology worldwide is a key U.S. national security and 

nonproliferation objective. Missile technology export controls are consistent with, and 
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contribute to, achieving this objective. U.S. membership in the MTCR complements existing 

nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation policies by curbing the spread of missile 

technology and equipment for the delivery of WMD. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. The United States is 

confident that other members of, and unilateral adherents to, the MTCR, many of which are also 

the leading suppliers of missile-related technology, will continue to support and strengthen this 

control regime. MTCR Partners share information regarding denials of Annex items and are 

committed to a “no undercut” policy. MTCR Partners also share information about potential 

activities of missile technology proliferation concern and have cooperated to interdict specific 

shipments. The number of non-MTCR countries willing to cooperate with the regime has 

increased over the past several years. Finally, the United States and its MTCR Partners are 

actively engaged in an outreach program to encourage additional countries to adhere to the 

Guidelines and implement effective export controls on MTCR items. 

4. Economic Impact on U.S. Industry. The Secretary has determined that any detrimental

effect of these controls on the U.S. economy, including on the competitive position of the United 

States in the international economy, does not exceed the benefits to U.S. foreign policy 

objectives. Only a narrow list of items is subject to missile controls, and the effect on overall 

U.S. trade is limited. The commitment by MTCR to a “no undercut” policy helps ensure that no 

member obtains an unfair commercial advantage in the international marketplace. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 957 applications, valued at 

$2.18 billion dollars, for the export or re-export of missile technology-controlled items. In 

addition, the Department rejected 11 applications valued at $1.7 million and returned without 

action 68 applications valued at $164.2 million. Comparatively few licenses for missile 

technology items are denied because: (1) exporters do not generally pursue transactions they 

understand will be rejected (based on the applicable licensing policy); and (2) most of the 

applications involve exports to destinations, and for end uses, that do not pose missile 

proliferation concerns. 

Under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) control related to missile technology 

(15 C.F.R. § 744.3), the Department of Commerce approved 2 applications, valued at $437,000, 

denied 4 licenses valued at $83,145, and returned without action 10 applications, valued at $1.34 

million. In these applications, EPCI missile concerns were the basis for the license requirement. 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. Multilateral controls on missile technology 

provide a strong framework for cooperative enforcement efforts overseas. However, there are 

challenges for the enforcement of controls on dual-use goods related to missile development. 

First, it is difficult to detect and investigate cases under the “knowledge” standard set forth in the 

EPCI “catch-all” provision. Second, some countries have different standards for “catch-all,” 
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which complicates law enforcement cooperation. Third, identifying illegal exports and reexports of missile-related goods requires significant investigative resources. 

To enforce these controls effectively, the Department of Commerce continues to focus on 

preventive enforcement, including an outreach program to educate companies about export 

controls and to increase awareness of “red flags” that may indicate a risky transaction. This 

program is an important component of the Department of Commerce’s efforts to prevent illegal 

exports of dual-use products or equipment that could be used to make missiles. 

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all 

public comments received may be found in Appendix I. In addition, comments were solicited 

from the public via the BIS website. 

The Department of Commerce holds discussions with industry representatives on issues related 

to the MTCR Annex through the Transportation Technical Advisory Committee and other 

relevant technical advisory committees (TACs) as appropriate. Comments from the 

Department’s seven TACs are solicited on an ongoing basis and are not specific to this report. 

The Department of Commerce also participates in interagency working groups that review 

proposed changes to the Annex, and engages in discussions of the proposals with companies that 

have relevant expertise. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

Consultation with other MTCR members is a fundamental element of U.S. missile technology 

control policy. Consultations with non-MTCR countries also are essential to U.S. missile 

nonproliferation policy. The U.S. Government exchanges information with other countries about 

activities of missile proliferation concern and seeks to cooperate with them to prevent or stop 

certain transactions. The United States also shares denial information with its MTCR Partners, 

who are committed to the Regime’s “no-undercut” policy. 

MTCR member countries cooperate with non-member countries to limit the spread of WMD 

delivery systems by encouraging all countries to apply the MTCR Guidelines on a national basis. 

The MTCR’s outreach efforts have included workshops and seminars, at which MTCR members 

and invited non-members share experiences in an effort to improve prevention of missile 

proliferation. 

E. Alternative Means 

The missile sanctions provisions in Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act and Section 11B 

of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (EAA), provide for the imposition of 
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export, import, and procurement sanctions on foreign entities engaged in certain kinds of 

activities relating to the transfer of MTCR Annex items to non-MTCR adherent countries. In the 

past, the United States has imposed missile sanctions on entities in Egypt, India, Iran, 

Macedonia, Moldova, North Korea, Pakistan, China, Russia, South Africa, and Syria. Missile 

sanctions are used to encourage the governments of the sanctioned entities to adopt responsible 

nonproliferation behavior and to send a clear message about the United States’ strong 

commitment to missile nonproliferation. Discretionary sanctions pursuant to the Iran, North 

Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Pub. L. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note) 

may be applied to entities engaging in transfers of missile equipment and technologies. 

The United States and its MTCR Partners are continuing their diplomatic efforts to encourage 

additional countries to adhere unilaterally to the MTCR Guidelines. Such efforts are aimed at 

encouraging non-MTCR members to implement and enforce effective missile technology export 

controls. Although the United States has an obligation to maintain and renew its export controls 

based on its membership in the MTCR, it also has pursued alternative means to achieve the 

purposes of the controls through its consultations with non-MTCR countries. 

F. Foreign Availability 

Possible suppliers of missile technology that are not MTCR Partners include, but are not limited 

to, China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, and Taiwan. Some of these countries, such as 

India and Israel, adhere unilaterally to the MTCR Guidelines. The United States continues to 

approach other nations, including those that produce MTCR Annex-controlled items, to urge 

their vigilance in applying MTCR Guidelines to help prevent missile proliferation. 
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CHAPTER 9

Encryption Controls

(Section 742.15)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The U.S. maintains export controls on encryption items to protect and preserve national security 

and foreign policy interests. Encryption items may be used to maintain the secrecy of 

information, and therefore may be used by persons abroad to bring harm to U.S. national security 

and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Government has a critical interest in ensuring that the 

legitimate needs for protecting important and sensitive information of the public and private 

sectors are met, and that persons seeking to damage U.S. national security and foreign policy 

interests are not able to conceal hostile or criminal activities. 

When dual-use encryption items were transferred from the United States Munitions List (USML) 

to the Commerce Control List (CCL) in 1996, foreign policy controls were imposed on these 

items. A license is required to export or re-export Encryption Items (EI) (classified under Export 

Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 5A002, 5D002, and 5E002 on the CCL) to all 

destinations except Canada. All items controlled for EI reasons are also controlled for National 

Security (NS) reasons. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy for Encryption Controls 

Most EI-controlled items are eligible for export and re-export to non-government end-users 

under the terms and conditions of License Exception Encryption Commodities, Software and 

Technology (ENC) after self-classification by the exporter or classification by the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (BIS) and the National Security Agency, and many items are also eligible 

for export and re-export to government end-users under this License Exception. 

License applications to export or re-export EI-controlled items are subject to case-by-case review 

for consistency with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. EI-controlled items are 

also eligible for Encryption Licensing Arrangements (ELAs), which authorize exports and reexports of unlimited quantities of encryption commodities or software to state, provincial and 

local governments for civil use, in all destinations, except countries listed in Country Group E:1. 

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls

Encryption products can be used to conceal the communications of terrorists, drug smugglers, 

and others intent on harming U.S. interests. Cryptographic products and software also have 

military and intelligence applications that, in the hands of hostile nations, could pose a threat to 
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U.S. national security. The national security, foreign policy, and law enforcement interests of

the United States are protected by export controls on encryption items. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that U.S. export controls on encryption items restrict the export of encryption items 

in situations that would be contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. The 

Secretary has determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy 

purpose in light of other factors, including the availability of encryption items from other 

countries, and that the foreign policy purpose cannot be achieved solely through agreements with 

the participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement or through alternative means. This 

determination with due consideration for the continuing growth of electronic commerce and 

Internet use, as the emergence of new security protocols for, among other things, short-range 

wireless communications, and the growth in the number of countries with the technology to 

produce highly sophisticated, dual-use encryption products. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these 

controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives, and that the extension of these 

controls will not have significant adverse foreign policy consequences. The controls are 

consistent with the U.S. foreign policy goal of preventing U.S. exports (and subsequent reexports) that might contribute to the capabilities of international terrorists or criminals. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that the continued 

implementation of U.S. encryption export controls is generally accepted in the international 

community, and that any adverse reaction to these controls is not likely to render the controls 

ineffective, nor are they counterproductive to the foreign policy interests of the United States. 

Other countries, particularly the Wassenaar participating states, recognize the need to control 

exports of such products for national security reasons. 

4. Economic Impact on U.S. Industry. The Secretary has determined that the continued 

implementation of encryption regulations that are periodically updated will allow U.S. industry 

to maintain a leadership position in the global market for encryption products and that the effect 

of encryption controls on export performance do not exceed the benefit to U.S. foreign policy 

objectives.

In fiscal year 2013, approximately 1,450 companies filed encryption registrations. This activity 

continues to reflect the expanding trade in encryption items and the wide commercial 

applicability of such items. The Department of Commerce processed approximately 1,500 

classification requests for controlled encryption products, components, toolkits, and source code 

items classified under ECCNs 5A002, 5B002, 5D002, 5E002, 5A992, 5D992, and 5E992. 

Additionally, during fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved approximately 

1,930 license applications for encryption-related deemed exports and “restricted” encryption 
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items, such as high-end routers and other network infrastructure equipment, and technology. In 

fiscal year 2013, there were 14 denials of license applications, almost all of which were for 

deemed exports to Iranian and Sudanese foreign nationals. There were no denials of encryption 

items based on issues specific to encryption-related licensing policy. 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. Detection of some encryption transactions is 

challenging because encryption components are often incorporated into other products and 

encryption software can be transferred over the Internet. 

BIS conducted a number of recent enforcement actions regarding these controls, including the 

following: 

Computerlinks, FZCO

Internet surveillance software to Syria

On April 24, 2013, Computerlinks FZCO, a United Arab Emirates-based distributor of 

information technology and internet security products, was assessed a civil penalty in the amount 

of $2,800,000, and is required to complete three external audits of its export controls compliance 

program. According to the Final Order, on three occasions between October 29, 2010 and May 

26, 2011, Computerlinks FZCO engaged in transactions or took actions with intent to evade the 

Export Administration Regulations in connection with the unlawful export and re-export to Syria 

of equipment and software designed for use in monitoring and controlling Web traffic. The 

items, valued at approximately $1,400,000, are classified under Export Control Classification 

Numbers 5A002 and 5D002, respectively, and are controlled for National Security and AntiTerrorism reasons and as Encryption Items. 

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. In addition, comments were solicited from the public via the BIS website. 

The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all public comments 

received can be found in Appendix I. 

The U.S. Government regularly consults with U.S. industry, including BIS’s Information 

Systems Technical Advisory Committee and other technical advisory committees as appropriate, 

regarding encryption policy. The objective of these consultations is to develop policies that 

assist law enforcement, protect U.S. national security, ensure continued U.S. technological 

leadership, and promote the privacy and security of U.S. firms and citizens. Such consultations 

have proven successful, as evidenced by the increasing number of encryption items submitted for 

technical review and constructive industry input on matters of regulations and policy. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 
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The U.S. Government participates in global efforts to prevent international criminals, terrorists, 

and designated state sponsors of terrorism from acquiring sophisticated encryption products. 

One such effort is the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established to 

enhance regional and international security by developing standards and norms for conventional 

arms and dual-use goods and technology transfers. Participating states seek, through their 

national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or 

enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to 

support such capabilities. Encryption items are included under the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 

Basic List of dual-use goods and technologies, with controls based on the encryption strength 

(e.g., key length) and use of specified dual-use items. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 

Cryptography Note provides for release from national security controls of “mass market” 

encryption items otherwise covered by the Wassenaar control list. U.S. encryption policy 

reflects this consultation with other participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Also, the 

United States government encourages major industrial and trading partners to adopt and maintain 

export controls on encryption equipment and technology in bilateral meetings.

E. Alternative Means 

EI foreign policy controls are coextensive with national security controls placed on encryption 

items. Therefore, if EI controls on encryption items were removed, national security controls 

would remain in place. National security controls are also maintained cooperatively with the 

other members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. 

F. Foreign Availability 

The United States recognizes the ongoing adoption and widespread use of encryption worldwide, 

and the continued development of foreign-made encryption hardware and software. The U.S. 

Government continues to monitor global IT marketplace and encryption policy developments so 

that updated U.S. regulations will enable American companies to maintain their technological 

leadership in a manner that safeguards U.S. national security and public safety interests. The 

U.S. Government consults with other governments to secure cooperation in controlling the 

availability of encryption items. 
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CHAPTER 10

Significant Items: “Hot Section” Technology Controls

(Section 742.14)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy

Certain technology transferred from the USML to the CCL is subject to “enhanced control.” 

This technology is designated by the acronym “SI,” which stands for “Significant Items.” The 

technology controlled for SI reasons is “hot section” technology for the development, 

production, or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines, components, and systems. Technology 

controlled for SI reasons is classified under various paragraphs of Export Control Classification 

Number (ECCN) 9E003 (specifically ECCN 9E003.a.1 through a.8, and 9E003.h, .i, and .j). The 

SI controls supplement the national security controls that also apply to this technology. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy for Significant Items 

The licensing policy for “hot section” technology is as follows: 

 A license is required for exports and re-exports to all destinations, except Canada. 

 The United States reviews license applications for “hot section” technology on a case-bycase basis to determine whether the proposed export or re-export is consistent with U.S. 

national security and foreign policy interests. 

Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls

This control provides a mechanism for the United States to monitor closely the export of this 

technology to prevent its use in a manner that would adversely affect U.S. nonproliferation goals 

or the military balance within a region. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that this control is likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, 

notwithstanding various factors, including the availability of these SI-controlled items from other 

countries, and that the foreign policy purpose has only been partially achieved through 

negotiations on export controls with the participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that this 

control is compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives, and that the extension of this control 

will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. The control is consistent with 
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U.S. foreign policy goals to promote peace and stability and to prevent U.S. exports that would 

contribute to inappropriate military capabilities abroad. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

this control is not likely to render the control ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by other 

countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. “Hot section” technology for 

commercial jet engines is subject to dual-use export controls by other allied countries through the 

Wassenaar Arrangement. These countries also recognize the desirability of restricting goods that 

could compromise shared security and foreign policy interests. 

4. Economic Impact. The Secretary has determined that any detrimental effect of this 

control on the economy of the United States, and on the competitive position of the United States 

in the international economy, does not exceed the benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved 145 licenses for technology 

controlled under ECCN 9E003. Most of the 145 licenses approved involved the export of “hot 

section” technology, of which 31 involved deemed exports (i.e., the transfer of “hot section” 

technology to a foreign national in the United States). The total dollar value of the items subject 

to the licenses approved was $37,071,006 in fiscal year 2013. No license applications involving 

engine “hot section” technology were rejected in fiscal year 2013. In addition, 27 applications 

involving items valued at a total of $146,620 were returned without action. 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce this control effectively. The U.S. Government does not experience any 

unusual problems in enforcing this control. Manufacturers and intermediary companies are 

familiar with U.S. controls on these products and technologies. With the exception of “hot 

section” technology currently used in civil derivatives of military engines controlled on the 

USML (ECCN 9E003.i), all of these items also are subject to multilateral controls. Therefore, 

cooperation from foreign government enforcement agencies is useful in preventing and 

punishing violators. 

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all 

public comments received may be found in Appendix I. 

The Department of Commerce consults with the Transportation Technical Advisory Committee

(TransTAC) about SI controls. Although there are no major changes anticipated regarding this 

control on the CCL, comments from the Department’s seven TACs are solicited on an ongoing 

basis and are not specific to this report. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 
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The United States leads international efforts to stem the proliferation of sensitive items, urging 

other supplier nations to adopt and apply export controls comparable to those of the United 

States. The major industrial partners of the United States maintain export controls on almost all 

of this equipment and technology and control them as dual-use commodities. Pursuant to their 

agreement to establish a regime for the control of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use 

goods and technologies, the participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement have agreed to control 

these items (with the exception of items subject to ECCN 9E003.i noted above, which the United 

States has not sought to control in Wassenaar) and to ensure that transfers of such items are 

carried out responsibly and in furtherance of international peace and security. 

E. Alternative Means 

The U.S. Government has undertaken a wide range of diplomatic endeavors, both bilateral and 

multilateral, to encourage proper control over these items, and has been successful in reaching 

multilateral agreement in the Wassenaar Arrangement to control most of these items. The 

United States has specifically encouraged efforts to prevent the unauthorized use or diversion of 

these items to activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns. However, 

these efforts do not replace the continued need for the additional control. 

F. Foreign Availability 

Although the United States has been the world leader in this technology, other countries produce 

“hot section” technology. Most countries that are producers of “hot section” technology are 

participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement and control these items (with the exception of items 

controlled under ECCN 9E003.i noted above) as dual-use items in accordance with their national 

licensing policies. The commitment of the U.S. Government and its Wassenaar partners to 

maintain controls reflects the cooperation among governments to reduce foreign availability. 
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CHAPTER 11

Nuclear Nonproliferation Controls

(Sections 742.3 and 744.2)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The U.S. Government maintains controls on exports of nuclear-related items under the authority 

of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) to further the United States’ nuclear 

nonproliferation policy. Because these controls are primarily based on the NNPA and not the

Export Administration Act (EAA), they are not subject to this report. However, BIS has 

included information on nuclear nonproliferation controls because they usually are grouped with 

other nonproliferation controls that are subject to this report. In addition, controls based on 

nuclear end uses and end-users are maintained under the authority of Section 6 of the EAA as 

part of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). EPCI controls for other 

proliferation end uses are described in detail in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of this report. The Entity 

List, maintained in Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations 

(EAR) and discussed in Chapter 13 of this report, also prohibits certain transactions involving 

end users and end uses involved in nuclear activities described in section 744.2 of the EAR. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Controls 

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime controls support U.S. international nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations, particularly with relation to its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC). The United States is a member of the 46-

member NSG, which sets forth guidelines for the export of items that are either specially 

designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special nuclear material or are 

nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies (see Appendix II for a complete list of regime 

members). These controls also reflect U.S. membership in the ZC, a multilateral nuclear export 

control group that was formed to interpret Article III, paragraph 2, of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty. Like the NSG, the ZC establishes and maintains a list (“Trigger List”)

of nuclear-related equipment and materials subject to export controls along with guidelines 

concerning the export of nuclear equipment and material. 

Licensing Requirements and Licensing Policy 

The Department of Commerce requires a license for the export of the following items: 

 commodities, related technology, and software that could be of significance for nuclear 

explosive purposes (i.e., the Nuclear Referral List (NRL) included in the CCL); and 

 any commodity, related technology, or software that the exporter knows, or has reason to 

know, will be used directly or indirectly in any of the following activities: 
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– nuclear explosive activities including research on, or the development, design, 

manufacture, construction, testing, or maintenance of nuclear weapons or nuclear 

explosive devices; 

– unsafeguarded nuclear activities, including research on, or the development, 

design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any nuclear 

reactor, critical facility, facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel, facility for the 

conversion of nuclear material from one chemical form to another, or separate 

storage installation where there is no obligation to accept International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the facility or installation, when it contains 

any source of special fissionable material, or where any such obligation is not 

met; or 

– safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear activities, including research on, or the 

development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of the 

following facilities, or components for such facilities: (i) facilities for the 

chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear or source materials; (ii) facilities 

for the production of heavy water; (iii) facilities for the separation of isotopes of 

source and special nuclear material; or (iv) facilities for the fabrication of nuclear 

reactor fuel containing plutonium. 

The Department of Commerce may inform the exporter that a license is required for any item 

subject to the EAR when there is an unacceptable risk of use in, or diversion to, any of the 

activities described above. 

Factors considered in reviewing applications for licenses include: 

 the stated end use of the item; 

 the significance for nuclear purposes of the particular item, including whether the item is 

to be used in research on or for the development, design, manufacture, construction, 

operation, or maintenance of any reprocessing or enrichment facility; 

 the types of nuclear nonproliferation assurances or guarantees given in a particular case; 

and 

 the nonproliferation credentials of the recipient country. 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls, including controls on nuclear-related items. The comment period closed 

on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all public comments received can be found in 

Appendix I. In addition, comments were solicited from the public via the BIS website. 

Moreover, comments from the Department’s seven Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) are 

solicited on a regular basis, but are not detailed in this report. 
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Analysis of Controls as Required by Law17 

Section 17(d) of the EAA and Section 309(c) of the NNPA provide that: (1) nuclear 

nonproliferation controls do not expire annually and determinations to extend them are thus not 

required; and (2) the criteria and other factors set forth in Sections 6(b) through 6(f) of the Act 

are not applicable to these controls. The Department of Commerce is, therefore, notifying 

Congress that these controls continue in effect. These controls further the nuclear 

nonproliferation policy of the United States and have made it more difficult for other nations to 

acquire sensitive nuclear technology or equipment. 

The Departments of Commerce and Energy, in consultation with the Departments of State and 

Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, regularly review and revise the NRL 

pertaining to U.S. dual-use items controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons. The NRL is 

used to meet the United States’ NSG commitments with respect to nuclear dual-use items. 

The 2013 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary, Consultative Group (CG), Information 

Exchange (IEM) and Licensing and Enforcement Experts (LEEM) meetings were held in Prague, 

Czech Republic, during the week of June 10-14, 2013. Outgoing NSG Chair, ISN/NESS Director 

Richard Stratford opened the Plenary and welcomed the new Chair, Ambassador Veronika 

Kuchynova Smigolova, of the Czech Republic. Czech Republic First Deputy Prime Minister and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg welcomed the Group and expressed his 

government's strong support for NSG activities, noting the significant contribution of NSG 

efforts to counter ever-evolving nuclear threats thereby substantially reinforcing the spirit and 

purpose of the NPT. The Plenary endorsed 28 amendments to the control lists recommended by 

the CG as proposed by the Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE), thus successfully 

concluding a three year review initiated at the 2010 Christchurch Plenary. The Plenary also 

approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for a new Technical Experts Group (TEG) which will 

continue the review of the control lists as needed under the guidance of the CG. Vigorous and 

detailed discussions took place in the CG and the Plenary regarding membership for India led by 

a strong intervention in the CG by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central 

Asian Affairs, Geoffrey Pyatt, and the UK presentation of a well-drafted paper on elements to be 

considered regarding Indian membership. In the Plenary, Participating Governments (PGs) took 

note of Outgoing Chair Stratford's reports on NSG activities in the past year, including outreach 

with non-members including India, Pakistan and Israel and endorsed his recommendations with 

respect to outreach and engagement with India. In response to Ireland’s request (on behalf of the 

EU), supported by Japan and the United States, for more information regarding China’s decision 

to supply Chasma III & IV to Pakistan, China again stated that the decision was based on an 

agreement signed in 2003 prior to joining the NSG in 2004 and is therefore grandfathered. 

Mexico and Serbia were welcomed as new members at their first Plenary.

 

17 The analysis, required by law, differs for nuclear nonproliferation controls. It is governed by the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). Therefore, the headings under this section differ from the rest of the report.
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BIS conducted a number of recent enforcement actions regarding these controls, including the 

following: 

XVAC

Vacuum Pumps to Iran

In March 2013, Amirhossein Sairafi was sentenced to 41 months in prison in connection with the 

export of vacuum pumps to Iran. On July 6, 2011, Jirair Avanessian was sentenced to 18 months 

in prison, a $10,000 criminal fine, and forfeiture of the proceeds of his criminal activity. 

Between December 2007 and November 2008, Avanessian, the owner and operator of XVAC in 

Glendale, California, purchased and exported at least seven shipments of high-dollar vacuum 

pumps and pump-related equipment to Iran through a free trade zone located in the United Arab 

Emirates. The vacuum pumps and related equipment have a number of applications, including 

uranium enrichment. Avanessian purchased the goods on behalf of Farhad Masoumian in Iran, 

and arranged to ship the goods to the United Arab Emirates. Sairafi would then send the same 

goods from the location in the United Arab Emirates to Iran. As part of the conspiracy, 

Masoumian, Avanessian, and Sairafi re-labeled and undervalued the contents of the shipments in 

order to mask the true contents and to avoid interception by U.S. officials. Avanessian was 

indicted on December 30, 2009 and arrested in January 2010; he pled guilty in July 2010. Sairafi 

was arrested in January 2010 in Frankfurt, Germany by German law enforcement authorities 

based on a provisional arrest warrant from the United States. Sairafi was extradited to the United 

States in September 2010, and pled guilty on November 30, 2010. Masoumian remains a fugitive 

and is believed to be in Iran. In coordination with the criminal actions, on September 27, 2012, 

BIS issued an order denying the export privileges of Jirair Avanessian as a result of his 

conviction until July 6, 2021. This case was the product of an investigation by the Export and 

Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement (EAGLE) Task Force in the Central District of 

California, which includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, the Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

Diplomatic Security Service.
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CHAPTER 12

Surreptitious Listening Controls

(Section 742.13)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy 

The United States maintains controls on surreptitious listening items to prevent the unlawful 

interception of oral, wire, or electronic communications by terrorists and others who may use the 

information for unlawful purposes or in ways contrary to the national security and foreign policy 

of the United States. Surreptitious Listening (SL) items are devices used for the surreptitious 

interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications and are controlled under Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 5A980. Export controls extend to related software and 

technology through ECCNs 5D980 (software) and 5E980 (technology). On June 20, 2013, the 

Department of Commerce published a rule incorporating control list changes agreed by the 

Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2012. Wassenaar decided to add a control on interception 

equipment and software designed for the extraction of voice or data, transmitted over the air 

interface to Category 5 part 1 of the control list. The Department of Commerce has imposed SL 

controls on these items as well as national security controls. 

License Requirements and Licensing Policy 

A license is required for the export or re-export to any destination of any electronic, mechanical, 

or other device primarily useful for surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic 

communications. The Department of Commerce will generally approve applications for the 

export and re-export of items controlled for SL reasons other than to destinations for which a 

license is also required for AT reasons, and where the end users are providers of wire or 

electronic communication service acting in the normal course of business; or to officers, agents, 

or employees of, or persons under contract with, the United States, a State, or a political 

subdivision thereof, when engaged in the normal course of government activities. License 

applications from other parties will generally be denied. 

The license requirements set forth in the EAR are independent of the requirements of section 802 

of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (18 U.S.C. 2512). 

These controls do not supersede, nor do they implement, construe, or limit the scope of any of 

the statutory restrictions of section 18 U.S.C. 2512 (section 802 of the Omnibus Crime Control 

and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended) that are enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act 

A. The Purpose of the Controls 

The purpose of surreptitious listening controls is to: prevent the unlawful interception of oral, 

wire, or electronic communications by terrorists and others who may put the information gained 
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through intercepted communications to an unlawful use; promote the protection of privacy of 

oral, wire, or electronic communications; and protect against threats of terrorism around the 

world. The controls also distance the United States from nations that have repeatedly supported 

acts of terrorism and from individuals and organizations that commit terrorist acts. 

B. Considerations and Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce 

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that the surreptitious listening controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign 

policy purpose, notwithstanding the availability of these controlled items from other countries, 

and that the foreign policy purpose cannot be achieved through negotiations or other alternative 

means. 

Sending or carrying the devices in foreign commerce is already subject to independent criminal 

sanction.18 Nevertheless, the imposition of foreign policy-based controls on these devices and 

related software and technology will enhance the probability of achieving the intended foreign 

policy purposes. 

Although the availability of comparable goods from foreign sources limits the effectiveness of 

the surreptitious listening controls, these controls restrict access to U.S.-origin commodities, 

technology, and software, and demonstrate U.S. determination to prevent the unlawful 

interception of communications, to promote privacy protection, and to oppose and distance itself 

from international terrorism. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that the 

imposition of these controls is consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States 

and will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. The imposition of 

surreptitious listening controls will enhance the U.S. Government’s ability to stop the supply of 

U.S.-origin items to persons engaged in, or supportive of, unlawful uses of intercepted 

communications, privacy violations, and acts of terrorism. The imposition of these controls is 

also compatible with overall U.S. policy towards Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 

The U.S. Government intends to promote privacy protection and aid in deterring criminal 

activities, including terrorism, through these foreign policy-based controls. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to 

the imposition of surreptitious listening controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective, 

nor will any adverse reaction by other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy 

interests. Most countries are generally supportive of U.S. efforts to prevent unlawful uses of 

intercepted communications, including uses of intercepted communications by terrorists or states 

that support international terrorism. 

 

18 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (18 U.S.C. 2512).
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4. Economic Impact on U.S. Industry. The Secretary has determined that any detrimental

effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including the competitive position 

of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the benefit to U.S. foreign 

policy objectives. Because sending or carrying the devices in foreign commerce is already 

subject to independent criminal sanction, the imposition of foreign policy-based controls on the 

devices and related software and technology will not have a discernible economic impact. 

In fiscal year 2013, the Department of Commerce approved four applications for the export or reexport of SL controlled items. In addition, the Department returned without action seven 

applications. No applications were rejected. During the same time period, the Department 

completed two commodity classification determinations for items described in ECCNs 5A980, 

5D980, or 5E980.

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. The U.S. Government can effectively 

enforce these controls by focusing on preventive enforcement, using regular outreach efforts to 

keep industry informed of the license requirements and prevent inadvertent exports, and 

gathering leads on activities of concern. 

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. In addition, comments were solicited from the public via the BIS website. 

The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all public comments 

received can be found in Appendix I. 

The Department of Commerce consults with the Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory 

Committee (RPTAC), one of seven such committees that advise the Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS), in preparation for publication of major regulatory changes affecting foreign 

policy controls. 

D. Consultation with Other Countries 

The United States continues to consult with a number of countries, both on a bilateral and a 

multilateral basis. In general, most countries are supportive of measures designed to prevent the 

unlawful use of intercepted communications, protect privacy, and combat terrorism, but do not 

implement strict export controls on these items similar to those imposed by the United States. 

The United States will consult with other countries as necessary regarding these changes in order 

to ensure compliance and encourage other countries’ efforts to deter terrorism and other criminal 

activity through controlling surreptitious listening devices. 

E. Alternative Means 
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The U.S. Government continually reviews the means by which it can curtail privacy violations 

and terrorism and has taken a wide range of diplomatic, political, and security-related steps to 

support this effort. Imposing these foreign policy-based controls enhances these efforts in order 

to prevent terrorist-supporting countries from acquiring items subject to U.S. export control 

jurisdiction. In addition, these controls underscore the United States’ commitment to prevent 

criminal activity worldwide. 

F. Foreign Availability 

The commodities subject to these controls are likely available from foreign suppliers. The 

Department of Commerce is aware that these controls will not prevent the shipment of such 

foreign-origin items from other countries, but the regulation minimizes the risk of diversion of 

U.S.-origin devices and related software and technology primarily useful for surreptitious 

interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications to end-users without a legitimate 

commercial need for such devices. 
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CHAPTER 13

Entity List

(Supplement No. 4 to Part 744)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy

To protect and advance the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, the 

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has adopted foreign policy-based end use and end user 

controls that focus on entities that pose or could pose a threat to U.S. national security or foreign 

policy interests, and BIS has taken steps to provide additional information to the public about 

these entities of concern. The Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR)) provides notice to the public that certain exports, re-exports, 

and transfers (in-country) to the foreign persons identified on the Entity List (including 

businesses, research institutions, government and private organizations, individuals, and other 

types of legal persons) require a license from BIS and that the availability of License Exceptions 

for such transactions is limited. 

Established in 1997, the Entity List was created to help inform the public of entities that have 

engaged in activities that could result in an increased risk of the diversion of exported, reexported and transferred (in-country) items to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, 

such as nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons activities (see Sections 744.2, 744.3, 

and 744.4 of the EAR). Among other things, the Entity List prohibits unlicensed exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of items subject to the EAR to certain persons in Russia, 

persons acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, 

and persons sanctioned by the Department of State (see Sections 744.10, 744.11 and 744.20 of 

the EAR). Entity List entries specify the license requirement and license review policy imposed 

on each listed entity. These license requirements are supplemental to any license requirements 

imposed elsewhere in the EAR.

The End-User Review Committee (ERC) implements revisions to the Entity List; entities are 

added to the List by majority vote, while removals or other changes to the List are implemented 

by unanimous vote. The ERC conducts an annual review of all persons on the Entity List and 

revises and updates the list as necessary. Persons on the Entity List may request removal from 

the List or a modification of their status on the List under Section 744.16 of the EAR. The ERC 

is chaired by the Department of Commerce and is composed of representatives of the 

Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and – where appropriate – the Treasury. 

Summary of 2013 Changes 

On January 16, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 3317) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to remove two persons located in France from the Entity 

List, as the result of a request for removal submitted by the two persons. In addition, on the basis 
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of the annual review conducted by the ERC, this rule removed two entries from the United Arab 

Emirates (U.A.E.) because neither of the persons continued to meet the criteria for inclusion on 

the List. Finally, this rule modified two existing entries, one in Finland and the other in Russia, 

to correct the scope of those entries, including removing a redundant entry that was inadvertently 

added in a previously published final rule.

On March 8, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 14914) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to add three entries for one person to the Entity List 

because the ERC had determined that the person had engaged in activities contrary to the 

national security or foreign policy interests of the United States on the basis of Section 744.11 

(license requirements that apply to entities acting contrary to the national security or foreign 

policy interests of the United States) of the EAR. Specifically, the ERC determined that this 

person was engaged in military procurement activities, including the development of computers 

for military end-uses and the production of computers for use in nuclear research. This company 

is listed on the Entity List under Germany, Russia, and Taiwan.

On March 28, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 18808) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to add eighteen persons to the Entity List under nineteen 

entries. These persons were added to the List because the ERC determined they engaged in 

activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States on the 

basis of Section 744.11 (license requirements that apply to entities acting contrary to the national 

security or foreign policy interests of the United States) of the EAR. The specific activities 

engaged in by these persons include the export of military items to a country on the State 

Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list, assisting persons already included on the Entity 

List in making shipments of U.S.-origin items to Iran, the attempted procurement of U.S.-origin 

items for shipment to Iran, and the provision of U.S.-origin equipment to a Chinese entity in 

violation of Section 744.3 of the EAR. The eighteen persons are listed on the Entity List under 

China, Germany, Hong Kong, Ukraine, and United Arab Emirates. This rule also revised one 

entry under Germany to clarify the scope of the entry by providing two additional alternate 

addresses for the listed person. Additionally, this rule removed one entry under Canada as the 

result of a removal request submitted by the person.

On December 12, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 75485) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to add thirty-six persons under forty-six entries to the 

Entity List, revise three existing entries, and remove one entry. These persons were added to the 

List because the ERC determined they engaged in activities contrary to the national security or 

foreign policy interests of the United States on the basis of Section 744.11 (License requirements 

that apply to entities acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the 

United States) of the EAR. The activities engaged in by these persons include purchasing items 

subject to the EAR from U.S. companies and shipping the items to Iran in violation of the 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations and the EAR, acting

as procurement agents for Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA), an 

entity that has been on the Entity List since May 2001, and the development and operation of 

an illicit aviation procurement network designed to evade the U.S. Government’s sanctions 
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against Iran. The thirty-six persons are listed on the Entity List under Armenia, Canada, China, 

Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. 

This rule also revised one existing entry under Sweden to correct the entry by providing an 

address for this listed person under the destination of Estonia, and revised two entries in Canada

to provide updated address information for each entry. Finally, this rule removed one entry

under Russia as the result of a successful removal request submitted by the person. 

On December 31, 2013, BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 79600) that 

implemented the decision of the ERC to remove one person from the Entity List as the result of a

successful removal request submitted by the person. Specifically, the ERC removed TPlatforms, an entity with entries in Germany, Russia and Taiwan, from the Entity List after a 

successful review of its appeal. 

Licensing Policy

For each person placed on the Entity List, the ERC specifies a license requirement and a license 

review policy. The requirement and review policy vary from person to person and are described 

within each person’s listing on the Entity List.

Analysis of Controls as Required by Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act

A. The Purpose of the Controls

The purpose of the Entity List and its related controls is to protect and advance the United States’ 

national security and foreign policy interests by demonstrating U.S. resolve to restrict trade with 

persons that fail to comply with U.S. export control laws and regulations, fail to adhere to 

acceptable norms of international behavior, or whose conduct threatens U.S. interests. The 

Entity List informs the public of entities that have engaged in activities that could result in an 

increased risk of diversion of items for use in weapons of mass destruction programs or in other 

activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests and to prevent diversion 

of items subject to the EAR by imposing additional license requirements, often with a 

presumption of denial, to ensure U.S. government review of proposed exports, re-exports, and 

transfers of items to listed entities. The majority of additions to the Entity List in recent years 

have consisted of persons engaging in activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign 

policy interests. 

B. Considerations and/or Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce

1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has 

determined that imposing foreign policy-based controls as part of the licensing requirements 

imposed on persons added to the Entity List is likely to achieve the intended national security 

and foreign policy purposes. 
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Although the United States regularly negotiates with other countries on how best to achieve 

export control goals, these negotiations may not achieve those U.S. export control objectives that 

are focused on individual persons. In cases where U.S. interests are at stake, the United States 

retains the authority to impose controls that reflect unilateral foreign policy objectives. 

The United States seeks to prevent the use of U.S.-origin items in connection with actions that 

are detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals. To that end, the license requirements that apply to 

entities placed on the Entity List are intended to prevent the acquisition of certain items by 

persons who might engage in activities contrary to U.S. interests. The Entity List enables BIS to 

target specific persons with export license requirements, thereby avoiding the imposition of 

overly broad license requirements on numerous items destined for many destinations. 

2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that 

imposing these controls is compatible and consistent with the national security and foreign 

policy objectives of the United States. Specifically, these controls are consistent with the U.S. 

policy of prohibiting exports, re-exports, and transfers (in-country) when specific and articulable 

facts provide reasonable cause to believe that the parties to whom the items will be provided are 

involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United 

States, or pose a significant risk of becoming involved in such activities. Additionally, the 

Department of State’s representation on the ERC assures that the decisions based on this rule 

will be compatible with U.S. foreign policy interests. The Secretary has further determined that 

these expanded controls will not have significant adverse foreign policy consequences. 

3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that although other 

countries may raise objections to the Entity List, any adverse reaction to the expansion of the 

Entity List is not likely to render the Entity List ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by 

other countries be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy interests. Further, the Department of 

Commerce coordinates with the Department of State to consult with countries affected by 

changes to the Entity List. These consultations are completed in advance of any changes to the 

List. In addition, some countries use the Entity List as a screening tool for their exports. 

4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. The Secretary has determined that the cost 

to industry resulting from the maintenance of these controls does not exceed the benefit to U.S. 

foreign policy. These controls provide an effective alternative to imposing additional and overly 

broad end use or geographic license export control requirements. The identification of persons 

through publication in the Entity List also reduces uncertainty for U.S. industry. Thus, these 

controls minimize the economic impact on industry while allowing BIS to achieve U.S. foreign 

policy objectives through strengthened U.S. export controls. Additionally, interagency 

representation on the ERC provides reasonable assurance that additions to the Entity List will 

reflect significant U.S. foreign policy concerns. 

5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States 

has the ability to enforce these controls effectively. By imposing license requirements on clearly 

identified persons via the Entity List, the U.S. Government facilitates the identification of actual 
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and potential violations of the EAR. Publication of the Entity List helps U.S. industry and 

foreign companies to identify restricted parties, thereby reducing inadvertent violations of the 

EAR and increasing compliance with the export controls.

C. Consultation with Industry 

In a September 5, 2013 Federal Register notice (78 FR 54623), the Department of Commerce 

solicited comments from industry and the public on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policybased export controls. The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. A detailed review of all 

public comments received can be found in Appendix I. In addition, comments were solicited 

from the public via the BIS website. Comments from the Department’s seven technical advisory 

committees are solicited on an ongoing basis and are not specific to this report.

D. Consultation with Other Countries

The United States continues to consult with a number of countries, on both a bilateral and 

multilateral basis, regarding the persons on the Entity List. These consultations are based on 

specific and articulable facts that provide reasonable cause to believe that the parties pose a 

significant risk of becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign 

policy interests of the United States and other countries. Most countries are supportive of U.S. 

export and re-export controls and enforcement. 

E. Alternative Means

The United States continually reviews its means to curtail activities that are contrary to U.S. 

interests. The United States has taken a wide range of diplomatic, political, and security-related 

steps to support this effort. 

F. Foreign Availability 

The Department of Commerce is aware that these controls will not necessarily prevent the 

acquisition of sensitive commodities, software, or technologies not subject to the EAR by 

persons listed on the Entity List. However, by publishing the Entity List and imposing penalties 

for violations of the licensing requirements on the Entity List, the United States is sending a 

strong message that may deter suppliers from participating in transactions with persons known or 

suspected of violating the EAR or acting contrary to U.S. interests. Additionally, the United 

States cooperates with other governments to curtail transactions by other (third-country) 

suppliers. 
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APPENDIX I

Summary of Public Comments 

On Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) requested public 

comments on existing foreign policy-based export controls maintained under Section 6 of the 

Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (EAA), and on the Entity List (Supplement 

No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)) through a Federal Register

notice published September 5, 2013 (78 FR 54623). In addition, comments were solicited from 

the public through the BIS web page. Comments from the Department’s seven Technical 

Advisory Committees are solicited on an ongoing basis and are not specific to this report. 

BIS requested comments on how existing foreign policy controls have affected exporters and the 

overall public. The notice invited public comments about issues such as: the effectiveness of 

controls when foreign availability exists; whether the goals of the controls can be achieved 

through other means such as negotiations; the compatibility of the controls with the overall U.S. 

policy toward a country in question; the effect of controls on U.S. economic performance; and 

the ability to enforce the controls. 

The comment period closed on October 7, 2013. BIS received two comments, one from a trade 

association and one from a company. BIS has made these comments available for review in the 

BIS Freedom of Information Act Reading Room available on the BIS web page. BIS also makes 

comments available for public review upon request. This Appendix summarizes the comments 

received. 

Industry Comments 

BIS reviewed and considered the comments received from (1) the American Chemistry Council

(ACC), a trade association for American chemical companies; and (2) E.I du Pont de Nemours & 

Co. (Dupont), a company.

Both ACC and Dupont submitted comments about foreign policy-based controls on chemicals 

and chemical equipment. The ACC and Dupont assert that the U.S. government's current 

execution of its Australia Group obligations in the form of Chemical and Biological controls in 

the EAR undermines the ability of U.S. chemical companies to compete globally, by overly 

restricting these widely available chemicals and chemical equipment, in particular, chemicals 

currently classified under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C350.d and certain 

equipment classified under ECCN 2B350. The ACC and Dupont request that the U.S. 

Government continue to meet its Australia Group obligations by implementing a two-step 

process. Both commenters propose that BIS begin by creating a “positive” list of countries, 

which participate in the Australia Group (AG), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 

and/or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The ACC and Dupont then recommend that 

BIS create a list of widely available chemicals and chemical equipment, to be controlled on the 
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Commerce Control List (CCL) (Part 774 of the EAR), under Chemical and Biological Controls, 

Column 3 (CB3), in a revision of the CCL. This would allow BIS to process license requests for 

commodities controlled under CB3 to the destinations on this positive list in an expedited 

manner. 
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APPENDIX II 

Multilateral Export Control Regimes in 2013

WASSENAAR AG MTCR NSG

Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina

Australia Australia Australia Australia

Austria Austria Austria Austria

Belarus

Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium

Brazil Brazil

Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria

Canada Canada Canada Canada

Croatia Croatia Croatia

Cyprus Cyprus

Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic

Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark

Estonia Estonia Estonia

European Commission European Union 

(Observer)

Finland Finland Finland Finland

France France France France

Germany Germany Germany Germany

Greece Greece Greece Greece

Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary

Iceland Iceland Iceland

Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland

Italy Italy Italy Italy

Japan Japan Japan Japan

Kazakhstan

Latvia Latvia Latvia

Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania

Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg

Malta Malta Malta

Mexico Mexico Mexico

Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands

New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand

Norway Norway Norway Norway

People’s Republic of 

China

Poland Poland Poland Poland

Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal
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WASSENAAR AG MTCR NSG

Rep. of Korea 

(South Korea)

Rep. of Korea (South 

Korea)

Rep. of Korea (South 

Korea)

Rep. of Korea (South 

Korea)

Romania Romania Romania

Russian Federation Russia Federation Russian Federation

Serbia

Slovak Republic Slovak Republic Slovak Republic

Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia

South Africa South Africa South Africa

Spain Spain Spain Spain

Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden

Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland

Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey

Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine

United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom

United States United States United States United States

AG: Australia Group; MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime; NSG: Nuclear Suppliers 

Group
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APPENDIX III

Selected Rules Published by the Department of Commerce in 2013

Publication

Date

Federal 

Register

Citation

Rule

Delegation of License Requirements Determination and Licensing 

Responsibility to a Foreign Principal Party

Export Administration Regulations: Editorial Clean-up of References to 

Foreign Trade Regulations

10/04/13 78 FR 61873 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) To Make the 

Commerce Control List (CCL) Clearer

10/03/13 78 FR 61743 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Initial Implementation of 

Export Control Reform; Correction

09/11/13 78 FR 55664 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Unverified List 

(UVL)

09/06/13 78 FR 54752 Addition and Revision to the List of Validated End-Users in the People's 

Republic of China

08/09/13 78 FR 48601 Time Limit for Completion of Voluntary Self-Disclosures and Revised Notice 

of the Institution of Administrative Enforcement Proceedings

07/25/13 78 FR 45026 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of 

Military Electronic Equipment and Related Items the President Determines 

No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML)

07/23/13 78 FR 43972 Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations: Implementation of 

Limited Syria Waiver for Reconstruction Assistance

07/16/13 78 FR 42430 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based on the 2012 

Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Agreements

07/10/13 78 FR 41291 Additions to the List of Validated End-Users in the People's Republic of 

China: Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. and Advanced MicroFabrication Equipment, Inc., China

07/08/13 78 FR 40891 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Military Vehicles; 

Vessels of War; Submersible Vessels, Oceanographic Equipment; Related 

Items; and Auxiliary and Miscellaneous Items That the President Determines 

No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List

07/03/13 78 FR 39971 Implementation of the Understandings Reached at the 2012 Australia Group 

(AG) Plenary Meeting and the 2012 AG Intersessional Decisions; Changes to 

Select Agent Controls-Correction

06/20/13 78 FR 37371 Wassenaar Arrangement 2012 Plenary Agreements Implementation: 

Commerce Control List, Definitions, and Reports

06/05/13 78 FR 33692 Implementation of the Understandings Reached at the 2012 Australia Group 

(AG) Plenary Meeting and the 2012 AG Intersessional Decisions; Changes to 

Select Agent Controls

06/03/13 78 FR 32981 Addition, Removals, and Revisions to the List of Validated End-Users in the 

People's Republic of China

05/24/13 78 FR 31431 Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Spacecraft Systems 

and Related Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control 

Under the United States Munitions List (USML)
Appendix III Selected Rules Published by the Department of Commerce in 2013

103

2014 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls

Publication

Date

Federal 

Register

Citation

Rule

04/19/13 78 FR 23472 Amendments to Existing Validated End-User Authorizations: CSMC 

Technologies Corporation in the People's Republic of China (PRC)

04/16/13 78 FR 22659 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Initial Implementation of 

Export Control Reform

03/28/13 78 FR 18814 Amendment to the Export Administration Regulations: List of Items 

Classified Under Export Control Classification 0Y521 Series-Biosensor 

Systems

03/28/13 78 FR 18808 Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List; Removal of Person From the 

Entity List Based on Removal Request; Implementation of Entity List Annual 

Review Changes

03/08/13 78 FR 14914 Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List

02/28/13 78 FR 13463 Editorial Corrections to the Export Administration Regulations

01/31/13 78 FR 6750 Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Articles the 

President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the U.S. Munitions 

List That Are Related To Launch Vehicles, Missiles, Rockets, and Military 

Explosive Devices

01/16/13 78 FR 3317 Removal of Persons From the Entity List Based on Removal Request; 

Implementation of Entity List Annual Review Changes; and Implementation 

of Modifications and Corrections to the Entity List