THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ’S SHI’ITE CLERGY:

PARTNERS OR ADVERSARIES?

W. Andrew Terrill

February 2004
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

The author states: I would like to thank Ms. Sarah E. Peter, Dr. Larry Goodson, 

Dr. Steven Metz, Dr. Conrad Crane, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Baker, U.S.A.R., 

Dr. Jeffrey Record, and Captain David M. Burke, USAF, for useful comments on 

earlier drafts of this work. My friend, Dr. Sami G. Hajjar, also provided his wise 

insight and suggestions. My thanks also go to Colonel Brian Kerns, USAF, Defense 

Attache in the United Arab Emirates, and Major James Overstreet, Assistant Air 

Attaché in Amman, Jordan, in 2003. Both of these fi ne offi cers gave a great deal 

of their time to help me with my research while I was in the Middle East. I also 

thank Bart Gatrell, who served as my very able research assistant on this project. 

All mistakes associated with this work are, of course, my own.

*****

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to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes 

Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the 

Publications Offi ce by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at 

Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

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Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://

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ISBN 1-58487-153-9
iii

FOREWORD

The U.S. military presence in Iraq is currently in a transitional 

phase. Either the anti-U.S. insurgency will be brought under control 

and security will be provided to those forces involved in nationbuilding; or the insurgency will expand, and U.S. goals in Iraq will 

be undermined by increasing civil unrest. It is imperative that the 

former objective be accomplished while the later fate be avoided. 

To ensure this outcome, U.S. policymakers must understand the 

internal dynamics of Iraq, including the role of Iraq’s Shi’ite clerics.

This monograph by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill helps to address the 

critical need to gain the cooperation or at least the passive tolerance 

of the Shi’ite clerics and community. Such an effort could become 

more challenging as time goes on, and one of the recurring themes 

of this monograph is the declining patience of the Shi’ite clergy with 

the U.S. presence. By describing the attitudes, actions, and beliefs 

of major Shi’ite clerics, Dr. Terrill underscores a set of worldviews 

that differ in important ways from those refl ected in U.S. policy. Key 

Shi’ite clerics’ deep suspicion of the United States is exemplifi ed by 

conspiracy theories. These suggest that Saddam’s ouster was merely 

a convenient excuse, allowing the United States to implement its 

own agenda. Other clerical leaders are more open-minded but not 

particularly grateful for the U.S. presence, despite their utter hatred 

for Saddam and his regime.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

as a contribution to the national security debate on this important 

subject as our nation grapples with a variety of problems associated 

with the U.S. presence in Iraq. This analysis should be especially 

useful to U.S. military strategic leaders as they seek to better 

understand Iraq’s largest sectarian community.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies Institute 

in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle East specialist. Prior to his 

appointment, he served as a senior international security analyst for 

the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a 

Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on assignment from 

LLNL. He is a former faculty member at Old Dominion University 

in Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of other 

colleges and universities. He is a U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant 

colonel and a Foreign Area Offi cer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has 

published in numerous academic journals on topics including 

nuclear proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, 

Middle Eastern chemical weapons, and ballistic missile proliferation, 

terrorism, and commando operations. Since 1994, at U.S. State 

Department invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the Middle 

Eastern Track 2 talks, which are part of the Middle East Peace Process. 

He holds a B.A. from California State Polytechnic University and an 

M.A. from the University of California, Riverside, both in Political 

Science. Dr Terrill also holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from 

Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California. 
v

SUMMARY

Clerics are one of the most important forces guiding and directing 

Iraqi Shi’ite public opinion. Many of Iraq’s secular leaders were 

sullied by their collaboration with the Saddam Hussein regime or 

were tainted by their prolonged absence from Iraq, and thus do not 

have the potential power of the religious establishment to mobilize 

popular opinion. Moreover, many Shi’ite clerics are emerging as 

important spokesmen for their communities. Iraqi Shi’ites have 

been denied power proportionate with the size of their community 

since Iraq was established in 1920 and are determined not to be 

disenfranchised again. Their actions toward the United States are 

often calibrated with this goal in mind. 

All of Iraq’s major Shi’ite clerics are critical of the U.S. military 

presence. Some are deeply critical and may choose to support 

anti-coalition violence should the U.S. forces remain in Iraq for an 

extended period of time. Those who do cooperate with the U.S. 

presence usually are careful to explain to their followers that they do 

so reluctantly and only in recognition of overwhelming U.S. power. 

The leading Shi’ite clerics in Iraq at this time are Grand Ayatollah 

‘Ali Sistani and his four colleagues who control the Najaf Hawza, a 

Shi’ite religious seminary and center of religious scholarship. The 

Hawza clerics have had a tradition of staying distant from politics, 

but this tradition now seems to be eroding. Sistani publicly treats the 

U.S. presence as illegitimate, but also engages in tacit cooperation 

with U.S. authorities. His continued cooperation with the United 

States will be vital for U.S. forces now in Iraq, but his patience is not 

assured. 

A potentially important leader seeking to compete with the Hawza

is the young and militant Muqtada al Sadr, a junior cleric whose 

father was Iraq’s most senior cleric in 1999 when he was murdered 

by Saddam’s agents. Sadr is backed by the deeply radical and antiSemitic Grand Ayatollah Kazem Ha’eri, an Iraqi exile in Iran and a 

believer in a variety of hateful conspiracy theories about the United 

States. Sadr hopes to develop a strong following among the young 

and impoverished dwellers in Shi’ite slums. 
vi

Shi’ite political parties with an Islamic agenda also are emerging 

as signifi cant players in post-Saddam Iraq. The most important of 

these is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 

(SCIRI), which has a long history of collaboration with Iran. SCIRI 

currently is cooperating with the United States on the grounds that 

Shi’ite interests must be strongly asserted, or they will be ignored. 

Nevertheless, SCIRI publicly stresses its strong distrust of the United 

States and unhappiness with the U.S. presence in Iraq. The smaller 

Da’wa and Iraqi Hizb’allah parties likewise stress the need for the 

United States to leave Iraq as soon as possible. None of these parties 

publicly call for violence against the United States at this time, 

although one of Da’wa’s sources of spiritual inspiration (Sheikh 

Fadlallah of Lebanon) has hinted that violence may be appropriate. 

While none of Iraq’s leading Shi’ite clerics is friendly to the United 

States, some are more tolerant than others of the U.S. presence. None 

seem to trust the United States or assume that the United States has a 

benevolent agenda in the region. The ouster of Saddam thus earned 

the United States surprisingly little credit with a clerical leadership 

that suffered unspeakable oppression under the ousted tyrant. The 

dangers of militant Shi’ites committing acts of terrorism against 

U.S. forces in the foreseeable future thus are real and pressing. The 

likelihood and potential scope of such attacks will probably increase 

so long as the U.S. military presence continues. 

In examining the above questions, the author has included a 

glossary at the back of this monograph for individuals who are less 

familiar with some of the titles, honorifi cs, names, and concepts 

within Twelver Shi’ite Islam.
1

THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ’S SHI’ITE CLERGY:

PARTNERS OR ADVERSARIES?

Every day, we receive dozens of requests from Iraqis asking us to issue 

a fatwa against the Americans, and we say no. But this “no” will not last 

forever.

Spokesman for Grand Ayatollah Sistani1

If Sistani calls for a holy war, it will happen.

 

Ayatollah ‘Ali al Wahid2

No to America. No to the Devil.

Chant at Muqtada al Sadr rally3

Introduction.

When the U.S.-led military forces took control of Iraq in early 

2003, they assumed control of a country with a short but extremely 

complex religious, ethnic, and social history. As the future of postSaddam Iraq unfolds, the attitudes and behavior of the Shi’ite 

Muslim Arabs are emerging as critical factors for Iraq’s future. This 

community, traumatized by years of Iraqi government brutality, 

forms 60-65 percent of the Iraqi population. Currently, the majority 

of its members appear determined not to return to their former 

status as an oppressed majority ruled by minority Sunni leaders. 

At the time of this writing, U.S. military forces in Iraq are facing 

serious ongoing casualties in their confrontation with predominantly 

Sunni Muslim Arabs, some of whom are supporters of the previous 

regime. The Shi’ites, in contrast, while showing strong signs of 

impatience with the U.S. military presence, have not yet joined in 

the guerrilla war at any signifi cant level. So long as they continue 

to remain outside of the fi ghting, the United States may have a 

reasonable chance of succeeding in the rehabilitation of Iraq. The 

Iraqi situation will, however, become vastly more complex should 

Shi’ite leaders call upon their followers to resist the U.S. military 

presence. 
2

If the majority of Shi’ites are currently not clear U.S. supporters, 

neither have they yet chosen to take up arms against U.S. forces in 

signifi cant numbers. Consequently, a strong effort must be extended 

to win their cooperation and avoid pressing them into becoming 

enemies, while still seeking good relations with Iraq’s non-Shi’ite 

citizens. If the Shi’ite Arabs of Iraq do rise in signifi cant numbers to 

oppose the U.S. presence, the result will be a radicalizing experience 

for them and increasing casualties for the U.S. armed forces. Any 

Iraqi political system emerging from such a crucible can be expected 

to be hostile to the United States and potentially destabilizing for the 

region. Correspondingly, U.S. sacrifi ces of blood and treasure made 

during and after the invasion of Iraq will have yielded few, if any, 

tangible results.

Under these circumstances, it is important to consider the current 

and emerging leadership of Iraq’s Shi’ite community. Much of the 

current leadership can be found among religious leaders. Although 

these individuals and their organizations may yet be displaced by 

more secular elites, they are the most powerful forces in the Shi’ite 

community at present. The Shi’ite community’s religious hierarchy, 

current leaders, possible strategies, and future aspirations, therefore, 

deserve serious consideration by U.S. policymakers and military 

leaders.

The Iraqi Shi’ites: Beliefs and Practices.

To understand Iraq’s current political and sociological situation, 

one must consider Islamic beliefs as practiced by the Iraqi Shi’ites. 

It is also important to discuss briefl y the history of Iraq’s Shi’ite 

community. Iraqi Shi’ites are a diverse group, comprising both 

religious and secular elements. A wide degree of differing opinion 

exists on the proper role of the clergy in politics within Iraq, as well as 

in the wider global Shi’ite community. The idea that decent people, 

and especially clerics, stay far away from government has a strong 

tradition in Shi’ite Islam, although this concept has been greatly 

weakened in the last 30 years with the rise of activist clerics in Iran 

and Lebanon. The quietist view also confl icts with many mainstream 

Islamic views which consider religion and politics inseparable.
3

Iraq is one of the two great centers of Shi’ite life and theology 

in the world (Iran being the other).4 Shi’ites represent 60-65 percent 

of the total Iraqi population and around 80 percent of Iraq’s Arab 

population.5 Despite this majority, all Iraqi governments have been 

dominated by the less numerous Sunni Arabs. The Sunnis initially 

were more willing to cooperate with the post-World War I British 

colonial power, and later were able to dominate the institutions of 

national power, as well as the military and internal security forces. 

Shi’ite Arabs are numerically dominant in southern Iraq, and 

the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf are important centers of Shi’ite 

religious learning.6 In addition to the Shi’ites of the south, at least 

two million Shi’ites also live in a large slum area of eastern Baghdad 

once known as Saddam City. The inhabitants of this district now 

call it either Sadr City (after a religious leader murdered in 1999 

by Saddam’s agents) or Revolution [Thawra] City, its name in preSaddam times. Other Shi’ites live in more prosperous areas of 

Baghdad and have thus altered the demographic balance of this 

traditional seat of Sunni dominance. Some estimates suggest that 

at least half of the population of Baghdad is now Shi’ite.7 It might 

also be noted that Sunni/Shi’ite intermarriage is both reasonably 

common and socially acceptable in Iraq, and thus perhaps holds 

some potential for defusing intercommunal confl ict in the future.

The vast majority of Iraqi Shi’ites are Twelvers, who believe 

that the twelfth Imam (leader of the Islamic community) who went 

into hiding in 873 (never dying or emerging but rather entering 

“occultation”) will return as a messiah to restore justice to the 

world.8 Twelvers are the majority faction in Shi’ite Islam. The Shi’ite 

communities of Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon 

are comprised almost entirely of Twelvers. The disappearance of 

the twelfth Imam and his anticipated return as a messiah help to 

create a mental framework whereby many devout Shi’ites view 

contemporary governments as corrupt in a way that will eventually 

be rectifi ed by a redeemer acting for God. 

Shi’ites, like other Muslims, believe in the Koran as well as the 

documented sayings and traditions of the Prophet Mohammad 

adhered to by Sunni Muslims. Nevertheless, and despite some 

contrary Shi’ite claims, there are important differences in doctrine 
4

and worldview. All practicing Muslims view Muhammad as the 

world’s most perfect man and look to his example, even in the 

routine details of daily life, to help guide them in their own actions. 

Shi’ites, however, also look to the life and example of ‘Ali, the 

Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and the fourth Caliph, as a source 

of inspiration, especially for dealing with injustice, victimization, 

and suffering. 

Moreover, suffering and victimization were a fundamental part 

of ‘Ali’s life. After prevailing in a long struggle to become Caliph, 

‘Ali was murdered with a poisoned dagger because his support from 

the lower classes frightened numerous members of the Islamic elite. 

‘Ali’s son, Hussein ibn ‘Ali, then took up his father’s struggle and 

was killed in 680 during a hopelessly unequal battle on the plains 

of Karbala after refusing to subordinate himself and pay tribute to 

Mu’awiya, the rival Caliph in Damascus. Hussein was subsequently 

lionized by Shi’ites as the ultimate example of noble martyrdom, 

while his more compromising brother, Hassan, is often treated with 

embarrassed silence in Shi’ite religious texts.9

The Shi’ite focus on their own lamentations, victimization, 

suffering, and martyrdom is often described as the “Karbala 

complex,” referring to the death of Hussein ibn Ali. This outlook 

remains striking in a contemporary context, and numerous scholars 

of Islam refer to Karbala as the core of Shi’ite history.10 Karbala 

has also been described as providing the Shi’ites with a proclivity 

towards defeatism as well as a belief that government is often 

(perhaps usually) corrupt and oppressive. In Iraq, this view was 

strongly reinforced by Saddam’s years of misrule. 

Shi’ite religious leadership, and especially that of the Twelvers 

such as the Iraqis, also is quite different from that found in Sunni 

Islam. The Shi’ite hierarchy is organized in a complex pyramid 

structure unheard of in Sunni Islam. Consequently, the guidance 

offered by senior clerics is vital. According to Shi’ite doctrine, 

believers are bound by the fatwas (or religious declarations) of the 

clerics they choose to follow so long as those clerics are alive. The 

high rank of a cleric and the size of his following often are key 

guideposts for predicting the seriousness which will greet any fatwas

that he chooses to issue. 
5

Many Iraqi Shi’ite clerics, prior to the rise of Iranian clerical 

leader Ruhollah Khomeini, remained aloof from political matters 

after the failure of a 1920 revolt organized with the support of Shi’ite 

clerics against a British occupation force. Traditional Shi’ite Islam 

has been a faith of submission and lamentation, whereby the just 

often live a squalid life waiting for the twelfth Imam to reappear 

and provide divine restitution for their suffering.11 This approach 

seemed reasonable to most Iraqi clerics, but their worldview was 

challenged by events in Lebanon and Iran during the 1970s. The 

militant activities inspired by Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran and Musa 

Sadr in Lebanon at this time sometimes are described as the “Shi’ite 

awakening.”

The highest clerical rank in Shi’ite Islam is normally grand 

ayatollah (ayatollah ‘uzma) or “great sign of God.” Directly below 

this rank is ayatollah or “sign of God” followed by hojat al islam or 

“authority on Islam.” Lower ranks in descending order are mubellegh 

al risala (“carrier of the message”) then mujtahid (a graduate of a 

religious seminary, although the entire clergy is sometimes referred 

to as the mujtahids) and fi nally at the lowest rung, talib ilm (a religious 

student).12 In the past, there have been, generally, no more than fi ve 

grand ayatollahs throughout the Shi’ite world at any one time. This 

situation has now changed. Now there are at least seven grand 

ayatollahs throughout the Muslim World, with one Beirut newspaper 

suggesting that there are 14 grand ayatollahs in Iran alone.13 The 

most exalted of the clerics are often viewed as the Marja al Taqlid 

or “Source of Emulation” by followers who chose to be guided by 

their advice and example. Correspondingly, Shi’ite Muslims have 

a variety of senior clerics they may choose to follow, ranging from 

activist to quietist clerical leaders. 

Promotions to the highest grades in the Shi’ite clergy are usually 

based on factors such as the authorship of important Islamic tracts 

and the establishment of a following of promising students. Yet, 

these factors often prepare one for a quiet life as a scholar rather than 

a leader of political movements. Iraq’s most senior current cleric, 

Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani, is widely viewed as a brilliant Islamic 

scholar who may not have the skills to be an effective political 

leader. An additional complication exists in assessing the leadership 
6

potential of various senior clerics. Promotions traditionally have 

been decided upon by the religious establishment, although in 

Saddam’s Iraq the last few appointments to grand ayatollah were 

made by the government, which nevertheless was forced to choose 

among a very few highly qualifi ed candidates.14

The Shi’ite Clergy in Pre-Saddam Iraq.

Iraq was created out of territory taken from the Ottoman Empire 

as a British class A mandate in the aftermath of World War I.15 Like 

many colonialist states, Britain sought a weak minority-based client 

regime which would fear being overwhelmed by the remainder 

of the population should the country achieve independence. The 

choice of the Sunni Arabs as a junior partners in the administration 

of Iraq was thus a natural one since they were clearly outnumbered 

by Arab Shi’ites within the borders of the new state.

Nevertheless, the British decision to work with Sunni rather 

than Shi’ite Arabs was partially forced upon them. Following World 

War I, Iraq’s Shi’ite clergy took angry exception to the concept of 

the British mandate, and was prepared to resist it to an extent that 

did not occur in the Sunni community. The preeminent Shi’ite cleric 

Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Shirazi issued a fatwa that “none 

but Muslims have a right to rule over Muslims.”16 This declaration 

was followed by a call to jihad against the British forces issued by 

the Shi’ite clergy from the holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq.17

Initially, Iraqi irregulars did quite well against British forces, but the 

tide turned after the Government of British India sent signifi cant 

numbers of reinforcements and supplies to Iraq. By February 1921, 

the resistance had been broken, and British authority was restored to 

the country, albeit with nearly 2000 British casualties, including 450 

dead.18

Britain’s suppression of Iraq’s 1920 revolt easily was placed 

within the Shi’ite psychological framework of unjust leaders taking 

control of an honest, pious, but defeated, people. It also caused most 

Shi’ites to retreat back into familiar patterns of submission that 

continued throughout the British Mandate (1920-32). Moreover, in 

the aftermath of the revolt, the British were unwilling to bring many 
7

Shi’ites into government administration. Rather, they depended 

on Sunni Arabs and other minorities working under the client 

Hashemite King, Feisal, whom they installed in Iraq.19

Shi’ite patterns of resigned acceptance of government authority 

continued through a series of post-mandate regimes led by Sunni 

Arabs. Prior to Saddam Hussein’s rise to power, Iraq’s Shi’ite clerics 

had already developed what one scholar calls a “live and let live 

relationship” with the Iraqi government.20 Najaf’s long serving 

preeminent cleric, Grand Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim, committed only 

two major political actions in his lifetime. These were to issue a fatwa

in 1960 forbidding Shi’ites to join the Communist Party due to its 

offi cial atheism, and to support the Da’wa Islamiya Islamic political 

party openly before this group was outlawed.21 Hakim died in 1970 

just 2 years into the era of Ba’th party rule.

Nevertheless, even before Hakim’s death, traditional approaches 

to clerical thought and behavior were increasingly challenged. The 

arrival of exiled Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Najaf in 

1964 brought an important politically militant senior cleric to Iraq, 

perhaps for the fi rst time since the 1920s. From his new home at 

Najaf, Khomeini spoke to other Shi’ite religious leaders about the 

need for an assertive clergy willing to rally the masses against 

un-Islamic (in his words “satanic”) governments such as those of 

the Iranian shah and secular Iraqi strongmen, including Saddam 

Hussein.22 Khomeini, however, did not publicly challenge the Iraqi 

government, since such actions would have resulted in deportation, 

imprisonment, or execution. His later rise to power in Iran was, 

nevertheless, viewed as a staggeringly important achievement for 

Islamic activism. Likewise, the rise of another activist Shi’ite cleric, 

Musa al Sadr, in Lebanon further challenged the quietist approach. 

Sadr, who was born and educated in Iran, was able to mobilize the 

deeply oppressed but also quiescent Shi’ites of southern Lebanon into 

demanding greater political rights. He disappeared in 1975 during 

a trip to Libya and is widely assumed to have been murdered by 

Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi .23 Lebanon, nevertheless, 

remained a center of Shi’ite political activism after Sadr’s death.
8

Saddam and the Shi’ite Clergy.

The Iraqi Ba’th party came to power for the second time in 1968 

(having previously ruled from February until November 1963), 

serving as the vehicle for Saddam Hussein’s rise to undisputed power 

by 1979. While initially appearing as nothing more than the latest in 

a series of Iraqi dictatorships, there were important differences from 

earlier regimes. The more sweeping authoritarianism of the Ba’th 

leaders quickly became apparent in their relationship with Iraq’s 

already battered Shi’ite religious establishment. In particular, the 

Ba’thists sought to end the autonomy of Shi’ite theological centers 

and also to restrict the activities of the Da’wa Islamiya (Islamic Call) 

political party, which had been formed in 1958 to fi ght atheism 

and communism.24 The harassment of the clergy escalated and led 

to the closure of previously fl ourishing theological institutes. The 

number of young men interested in preparing for theological careers 

correspondingly declined.

After taking power, Saddam also carefully observed the activities 

of the Shi’ite clergy, taking care to eliminate or co-opt anyone that 

appeared to have a potential to challenge the regime. The 1979 

experience of neighboring Iran was perhaps especially troubling 

to Saddam when the secular shah was overthrown by militant 

Shi’ites who then established an Islamic government under clerical 

leadership. Saddam was also horrifi ed by Iranian revolutionary 

zeal and Tehran’s interest in exporting its system of government 

throughout the region. While the collapse of the Iranian monarchy 

eliminated an important enemy with strong ties to the West, the 

alternative of a neighboring Islamic Republic began to appear 

worse.

When war broke out between theocratic Shi’ite Iran and secular 

Sunni-dominated Iraq in 1980, Iraq’s Shi’ite clerics became even 

more suspect to the regime. This fear appeared well-founded since 

some Iraqi clerics were openly sympathetic to Iran, leading to their 

imprisonment, torture, and assassination by the regime.25 One 

particularly signifi cant case was that of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 

Baqir al Sadr, a leading Iraqi scholar and religious leader of the Shi’ite 

community. Ayatollah Sadr was much more politically active than 
9

most Iraqi clerics, and Iranian radio broadcasts in Arabic referred 

to him warmly as the “Khomeini of Iraq.”26 Sadr was executed on 

April 8, 1980, on charges of treason. Also, during the Iran-Iraq war, 

excessive displays of piety by ordinary Iraqis could provoke the 

always harsh wrath of the regime. 

The Iran-Iraq War ended in August 1988 with a ceasefi re on 

terms favorable to Iraq. Iraqi Shi’ites had shown themselves to 

be largely unreceptive to Iranian propaganda and fought with 

determination against Iranian forces. Saddam’s persecution of the 

clerical establishment, nevertheless, continued after the war had 

ended, and the Shi’ites did not receive a greater share of political 

power within the country despite their loyalty. Saddam, at this time, 

continued to view Islamic radicals as his greatest enemies, although 

this would change in August 1990 as the United States confronted 

Iraq over Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.

The invasion of Kuwait led to Iraq’s military defeat at the hands of 

a U.S.-led multinational coalition in February 1991. In the immediate 

aftermath of this confl ict, the Shi’ites moved to the forefront of Iraqi 

politics when a number of southern cities rebelled against Ba’th party 

rule. These uprisings appear to have been provoked by the retreat of 

hundreds of thousands of defeated, mostly Shi’ite, soldiers fl eeing 

from the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Angry and humiliated, a 

number of Shi’ite soldiers moved against individuals and symbols 

representing Ba’th party authority. This rebellion was joined by 

Shi’ites in the south and was also supported to a limited extent by 

the Iranians. According to various sources, Iranian irregulars and 

Iranian-trained Iraqi exiles crossed the border to help overthrow the 

Saddam regime and replace it with an Islamic Republic.27

In a move to undermine Shi’ite support for the rebellion, Saddam 

appeared on television in a friendly conversation with Grand 

Ayatollah Abu al Qassim Kho’ei. Much as his 1990 televised effort 

to appear friendly to a young British hostage, Saddam’s action was 

viewed with horror by substantial numbers of the viewers.28 Many 

(probably most) Shi’ites assumed Kho’ei was coerced, and the action 

of hauling the elderly cleric before the television cameras was widely 

viewed as grotesque. Moreover, Saddam’s forces savagely attacked 

the Shi’ites and killed many of their leaders in the aftermath of the 
10

1991 rebellion. Again, the government viewed the clergy as at least 

partially responsible for instigating the uprising. This was a fairly 

accurate understanding of the situation. Although returning soldiers 

initiated the challenge to the government, many clerics did support 

the uprising once it had been ignited. In response to the revolt, 

thousands of clerics were arrested, and hundreds were executed.29

Following the savage repression of the 1991 uprising, Saddam 

retained his policies of repression but also sought to place a more 

pious face on the regime. His goal at this point was not to suppress 

Islam completely but rather to reshape it into a tool of the regime. 

Correspondingly, the words, “‘Allah Akbar” (God is great) were 

added to the Iraqi fl ag, and study of the Koran became compulsory in 

Iraqi schools. In 1996 serving alcohol was banned in Iraqi restaurants 

in accordance with Islamic sensitivities.30 Moreover, by the mid1990s, Saddam begun to celebrate his birthday by inaugurating 

a new Mosque each April 28. In a particularly crude example of 

Saddam’s use of propagandistic art and architecture, he ordered the 

“Mother of All Battles Mosque” to be built in the mid-1990s with 

four minarets shaped like Scud missiles and another four shaped 

like machine gun barrels.31

Saddam’s increased interest in Islam may have resulted from 

a shift in enemies, with the United States replacing Iran as Iraq’s 

most dangerous foe. He may also have seen Islam as a “safety 

valve” whereby impoverished Iraqis living under United Nations’ 

sanctions could assuage their unhappiness through prayer rather 

than anti-regime activity. With Saddam’s stranglehold on the clergy 

remaining in place, religion thus devolved into another instrument 

for use in controlling the society. 

Shi’ite Responses to the U.S.-Iraq War of 2003 and Its Aftermath.

In March 2003 a U.S.-led coalition initiated military operations 

against Iraq with the stated purposes of eliminating the Saddam 

Hussein regime and disarming Iraq of all weapons of mass 

destruction. U.S. forces were overwhelmingly successful in their 

efforts to push forward, quickly overcoming whatever resistance 

was placed in their path. In response to the U.S. military advance, 
11

large elements of the Iraqi conventional military forces melted into 

the civilian population. On May 1 President Bush declared the major 

combat stage of the war over within 6 weeks of initiating the confl ict. 

Saddam Hussein, by then, had gone into hiding but was eventually 

captured on December 13, 2003, by U.S. forces. 

In 2003, the U.S. administration was especially hopeful that 

Iraqi Shi’ites would rally to support the U.S. invasion due to the 

oppression that they had suffered under Saddam’s regime. Instead, 

the Shi’ites displayed caution. In early April, Iraq’s leading Shi’ite 

cleric, Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali al Sistani of Najaf, was widely reported 

to have issued a fatwa, instructing fellow Shi’ites not to oppose the 

U.S.-led invasion.32 Sistani was then the only Grand Ayatollah in Iraq 

and as such served as the highest ranking Shi’ite religious authority 

in that country. Spokesmen for Sistani subsequently denied issuing 

this fatwa, which became controversial in the postwar period.33

Additionally, while the Shi’ite clergy was content to stand aside 

as U.S.-led forces ousted Saddam, they displayed no interest in 

allowing the United States to dominate Iraq. Rather, a variety of 

Shi’ite religious leaders sought to assume power themselves and 

limit the U.S. role in governance. Grand Ayatollah Kazem al Ha’eri, 

a leading Iraqi Shi’ite authority in exile in Iran, even went so far as to 

issue a fatwa demanding that local clerics assume as much authority 

as possible as Saddam’s rule unraveled and power vacuums 

developed. Following the defeat of Saddam loyalists in the south, 

Shi’ite clerics rapidly moved to establish themselves as the center of 

local government for the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.34

Shi’ite clerical efforts to dominate local government in the 

southern cities of Kut, Najaf, and Karbala, along with surrounding 

villages and towns, were carried out with remarkable speed and 

effectiveness. Clerics did this in many cases by assuming control 

of essential services, including neighborhood security, garbage 

collection, fi refi ghting, education, and hospital administration. They 

also appointed administrators and imposed curfews, while offering 

civic protection, jobs, health care, and fi nancial assistance to the 

needy.35 In addition, clerics opened their own newspapers and other 

media outlets across Iraq. Clerical ability to assume these tasks was 

a direct result of organizational, communications, and fund-raising 
12

skills honed through years of religious activity and charity work, as 

well as limited efforts at dissent.36

In moving to take control of key aspects of local government, 

the clerics had a key advantage of being one of the groups least 

compromised by participation in Saddam’s crimes. Saddam, as a 

secular leader, did make an effort to include Shi’ite technocrats in 

some high visibility positions, but had little interest in working with 

Shi’ite clerics, beyond bribing or cajoling them into publicly praising 

the regime. Conversely, a number of Shi’ite leaders openly were 

murdered by the Ba’th regime or disappeared under suspicious 

circumstances when they appeared too independent or perhaps 

too capable of establishing a mass following. A few, as noted, were 

publicly executed for openly supporting the Khomeini regime in 

Iran.37

The Shi’ites also choose not to wage any immediate postwar 

armed struggle against the coalition forces despite their unhappiness 

over the disruption of services and some coalition security policies on 

issues such as searches and arrests. The most serious departure from 

this relatively peaceful approach occurred when British soldiers in 

the town of Majar al Kabir in southeastern Iraq attempted to disarm 

the population, provoking strong armed resistance and leading to 

six British deaths in one incident.38 Subsequently, comprehensive 

efforts to disarm Shi’ites in southeastern Iraq were discontinued.

Competition for religious leadership, and in some cases political 

power, rapidly materialized among clerics as the postwar situation 

unfolded. Occasionally, the followers of leading clerics sought 

to suggest that they were more anti-American than their rivals, 

apparently viewing this approach as a key asset in appealing to 

the Shi’ite masses.39 Nevertheless, the newly empowered religious 

personalities and organizations still are fi nding their way in the new 

Iraqi political system. Some are still making decisions about the 

relationship between the mosque and future governance. Leading 

Iraqi organizations, movements, and individuals therefore need to 

be examined in order to ascertain possible future directions of Iraqi 

politics.
13

The Religious Establishment: Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the 

Najaf Hawza.

In the aftermath of Saddam’s 2003 ouster, the Najaf-based 

Islamic seminary Hawza al ‘Ilmiya, (circle of the ‘ulama or learned 

Islamic scholars) which is formally headed by Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali 

Sistani, emerged as the key voice of the Shi’ite clerical establishment 

in the postwar era. This seminary, at the heart of the Shi’ite religious 

establishment, is led by four senior clerics, all of whom have 

distinguished records of Islamic scholarship, but uncertain political 

skills. Other senior clerics associated with Sistani in the Hawza

include Ayatollah Mohammed Ishaq Fayad, Ayatollah Muhammad 

Said al Hakim, and Ayatollah Basheer al Najafi .40

The Hawza emerged as an extremely important institution in 

Iraq almost immediately after Saddam’s removal. At that time, 

mosques throughout the mostly Shi’ite south and the Shi’ite areas of 

Baghdad declared their allegiance to the Hawza.

41 However, it is not 

clear if they were declaring their allegiance to Sistani and his senior 

colleagues, affi rming clerical rule, or simply acknowledging their 

willingness to receive guidance, support, and public services from 

the Shi’ite leadership in Najaf.

Sistani’s emergence as an important Iraqi leader follows 5 years 

of house arrest in his Najaf home. His emergence from isolation in 

Spring 2003 was a striking introduction to the political world marked 

by death threats from fellow Muslims. In April, shortly after the fall 

of Baghdad, an angry mob encircled Sistani’s house and demanded 

that he leave Iraq on penalty of death.42 This action sometimes is seen 

as anger over his supposed defeatism in the face of the U.S. invasion, 

but is more usefully explained as part of the rivalries within the 

Shi’ite community. The assailants in this instance were followers 

of a radical young cleric, Muqtada al Sadr. Sadr, who is now an 

aspiring force in Iraqi politics, would have benefi ted enormously 

from a Sistani decision to leave the country. Instead, Sistani merely 

increased his security measures. He also eventually attempted to 

improve relations with Sadr.

At the time of this writing, Sistani has consistently refused to meet 

with U.S. offi cials, including U.S. administrator Paul Bremmer.43 He 
14

apparently fears such meetings could compromise his standing 

as an Iraqi nationalist and spokesman for the Shi’ite community. 

Not surprisingly, Sistani occasionally is described as reclusive and 

often speaks through his son and spokesman, Mohammed Rida 

Sistani.44 This way of operating, nevertheless, goes beyond security 

or protecting his reputation and may also be designed to enhance the 

dignity of his activities and statements. Moreover, Sistani is skilled 

at making his opinions known through spokesmen despite any 

reclusive tendencies and was quick to establish an offi cial internet 

web site devoted to his views at www.sistani.org. Other Iraqi clerics 

soon established web sites as well.

Sistani’s role as Iraq’s senior Shi’ite cleric makes him a natural 

choice as the spokesman for his community, but, as noted, he has 

rivals and detractors. In challenging Sistani’s leadership, critics 

note that Sistani was born in Mashad, Iran, and speaks Arabic 

with a Persian accent (sometimes described as heavy). Some of his 

adversaries have suggested his Persian birth makes it inappropriate 

for him to serve as the head of Iraq’s religious community because 

he is not a true Iraqi.45 Some detractors also challenge his lack of 

militancy in asserting Iraqi rights to the occupation authorities. 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani often is described in the Western press as 

a nonpolitical cleric. There is some validity to this observation since 

Sistani comes from the conservative or “quietist” Shi’ite tradition 

of remaining remote from power. Nevertheless, any misgivings he 

previously might have held about this approach would be diffi cult 

to gauge due to a long-standing need to avoid Ba’thist ire. Sistani 

throughout his life has witnessed Saddam’s brutality toward the 

clergy, including the murder of his immediate predecessor, Grand 

Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al Sadr. Saddam’s climate of oppression 

was hardly a conducive environment to clerical experimentation 

with political activism. 

Following the ouster of Saddam’s regime, Sistani became 

more willing to intervene in the political process. In May 2003, 

for example, Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqi Muslims not to 

join or take part in activities sponsored by political parties because 

the agenda of those parties were not yet clear.46 Presumably this 

prohibition will be relaxed over time as party agendas become more 
15

clear, but Sistani’s willingness to ban political parties also suggest 

that the Hawza may be interested in containing the infl uence of both 

secular and religious parties as competition for Iraqi leadership. This 

is hardly a nonpolitical act.

Sistani is also willing to confront the United States over its 

policies in Iraq. On July 1 he went expressed “great unease” about 

U.S. involvement in deciding Iraq’s future and demanded that the 

Iraqis be allowed to rule themselves as soon as possible.47 Also in 

July, Sistani issued a fatwa opposing U.S. plans to set up a council 

of handpicked Iraqis to draft a new Constitution and instead called 

for general elections to choose delegates to such a convention.48 In 

a subsequent statement to the Iranian Students News Agency, he 

stated that “No one should look towards foreigners or seek their 

help,” apparently referring to the United States.49 Over time, Sistani 

has shown no inclination to soften this view, and he has consistently 

reiterated that there can be no substitute for a general election to 

choose delegates for a convention to draft a new constitution.50

Sistani’s awakening interest in political activity may have 

some advantages for the United States as well as the already 

noted drawbacks. Despite his Iranian heritage, Sistani is likely to 

be unreceptive to Iranian infl uence on important issues. He is a 

towering fi gure within the religious hierarchy of Shi’ite Islam, and 

his achievements are in stark contrast to those of Ayatollah ‘Ali 

Khamenei, the faqih, or Supreme Religious Guide (or jurist), of Iran. 

Khamenei achieved his Constitutional position of faqih as result of 

his political activism rather than because of his scholarship, and 

therefore is held in contempt by many of the more senior Shi’ite 

Islamic scholars. Indeed, Khamenei was only promoted from hojat al 

Islam to ayatollah by the Iranian government on the eve of his taking 

offi ce as faqih. Khamenei has never written any major Islamic tracts 

and never developed a strong student following while teaching at 

an Islamic seminary. Next to Sistani, Khamenei appears completely 

undistinguished, and the idea of Sistani receiving guidance from 

him would be viewed as ludicrous. Moreover, some of Iran’s leading 

grand ayatollahs, such as Hussein ‘Ali Montazeri, with whom Sistani 

may identify, have been treated poorly by the Iranian regime despite 

their elevated religious credentials.51
16

Less is known about some of the other senior Hawza clerics, 

although they do occasionally speak out, often against the U.S. 

presence in Iraq.52 Ayatollah Najafi appears to be the most 

prominent cleric in the Hawza after Sistani. He usually agrees with 

Sistani on major issues but also seems to express himself in harsher 

language. Najafi refers to the Western forces in Iraq as the “U.S.-

led infi del coalition” and cites Koranic verses about avoiding the 

council of unjust people when referring to coalition authorities.53

Najafi , like Sistani, limits his interaction with the public, but he also 

makes his son available to elaborate on his political and theological 

ideas. Except for Najafi ’s more colorful way of expressing himself, 

the four senior ayatollahs of the Hawza seem to maintain remarkable 

solidarity on key issues. Disagreement, when it occurs, seems to take 

place in private. The public solidarity of Iraq’s four leading clerics 

naturally supports the legitimacy of any fatwas they might issue.

The Muqtada al Sadr Movement.

In opposition to Sistani and the leading Hawza ayatollahs for 

control of the religious establishment is the Sadr movement 

(sometimes called the Militant Hawza or the Sadr-2 movement), 

which is led by Sayyid Muqtada al Sadr, the son of Grand Ayatollah 

Muhammad Sadiq al Sadr, Sistani’s immediate predecessor as the 

leader of the Hawza. More than any other Shi’ite political leader, 

Muqtada al Sadr has sought to defi ne the United States as an 

enemy of Iraq which needs to be confronted and driven from the 

country. Sadr’s anti-American approach has emerged partially 

out of ideological conviction, but also as a way of challenging the 

quietist ayatollahs and establishing an issue upon which to defi ne 

his leadership. Muqtada’s actions must be understood as an effort 

not only to oppose the United States, but also to trump Iraqi rivals 

whom he will paint with the brush of collaborationism. Should Iraqi 

Shi’ites ever rise against the occupation, Muqtada will seek to serve 

as the leader who anti-American elements can rally behind.

Many of the basic details of Sadr’s life are diffi cult to establish 

due to the wide variance between his supporters and detractors 

on such simple issues as his age and theological rank.54 Most 
17

Western journalistic accounts have now settled on the idea that 

he is 30 years old, but previously he was described in a variety of 

sources as younger, including as young as 22. Sadr’s detractors 

apparently hoped to undermine any claim to community leadership 

by suggesting he was too young and inexperienced to be taken 

seriously as a theological leader. On the basis of his appearance, one 

would assume Sadr is 30. 

Likewise Sadr’s rank in the Islamic hierarchy is diffi cult to 

establish with certainty, although he is clearly junior within the 

clerical structure. Ayatollah ‘Ali al Baghdadi, a Sadr critic, has 

described him with almost certain accuracy as a “simple student” 

(talib) at the lowest end of the religious hierarchy.55 Occasionally, 

Sadr’s allies, including the radical Grand Ayatollah Kazem al Ha’eri, 

will refer to him as a hojat al islam, but this designation appears to 

be a serious misrepresentation of his credentials.56 Sadr himself has 

hinted that the title is legitimate simply because a grand ayatollah

(Ha’eri) has referred to him as a hojat al islam, but under pressure 

Sadr will say titles are not important (a staggering misstatement for 

a Shi’ite cleric). He has also tried to overcome his problems with 

status by being publicly appointed as the representative of Grand 

Ayatollah Ha’eri, the radical Islamist friend of Muqtada’s father. At 

the time of this writing, Ha’eri was still living in Iran, although an 

unconfi rmed report exists that he visited post-Saddam Iraq on one 

occasion in June.57

Sadr, like his mentor Ha’eri, favors the Iranian concept of clerical 

rule (Velayet-e Faqih) and would like to see the concept applied to 

Iraq.58 Additionally, Sadr and his supporters are moving forward 

with a strong Islamic social agenda. These efforts may appeal to 

Iraqis who fear the imposition of western culture, but they might also 

alienate those who fear a system of overbearing theocratic intrusions 

on daily life such as one fi nds in Iran. Sadr is also known to be 

ruthless, and has been accused of being involved in the high profi le 

murder of a returned Shi’ite exile leader Abdul Majid al Kho’ei, the 

son of Grand Ayatollah Abu al Qasim Kho’ei.59 Kho’ei had lived in 

exile in London and returned to Iraq following Saddam’s ouster. 

Kho’ei appears to have been relatively pro-American and was a 

serious emerging power who would have threatened Sadr’s ability 
18

to mobilize a signifi cant following. His death may represent a lost 

opportunity for U.S. policymakers seeking to reconstruct Iraq. 

Sadr’s reputation as a fi rebrand has alienated him from many 

moderate Iraqi Shi’ites, but his youth, toughness, radical agenda, 

and confrontational style may be useful assets in appealing to angry 

young men in the Shi’ite slums. It would therefore be a mistake to 

dismiss Sadr’s potential for leadership. High clerical rank, while 

helpful, is not an indispensable requirement to lead a Shi’ite mass 

movement. In Lebanon, for example, a currently middle-aged cleric, 

Hassan Nasrallah (born in 1960) has for some time served as the 

Secretary-General of the militant Hizb’allah party with the backing 

of senior religious leader Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. Sadr, who 

is viewed as approaching power the same way, is sometimes called 

“Iraq’s Nasrallah.”60

Moreover, a minority school of thought in Shi’ite Islam suggests 

that political activism can sometimes substitute for theological 

accomplishments. Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei, the current faqih of Iran, 

and his supporters naturally favor this school of thought since it 

provides some justifi cation for Khamenei’s leadership role in Iran. 

Khamenei, as noted, currently holds the most senior position in the 

Iranian government, but he is not an accomplished Islamic scholar. 

Muqtada al Sadr also benefi ts tremendously from his late father’s 

popularity, prestige, and the circumstances of his death. Grand 

Ayatollah al Sadr was murdered by Saddam’s agents in February 

1999 after his speeches became increasingly popular and showed 

some independence from government censorship.61 Several of Grand 

Ayatollah al Sadr’s older sons were murdered as well in the incident. 

The popularity of Grand Ayatollah al Sadr only started to become 

apparent with Saddam’s ouster when a Shi’ite slum of 2 million was 

renamed Sadr City by clerics living there. The courage of Grand 

Ayatollah al Sadr, along with his martyrdom and that of several of 

his sons, has conferred considerable legitimacy on Muqtada al Sadr 

as the surviving son of a heroic family. Additionally, Muqtada is 

currently raising the six children of his slain brothers, adding to his 

image as having picked up the torch for his heroically decimated 

family.62

 As noted, Muqtada al Sadr has also arranged to have himself 

designated as the representative of Grand Ayatollah Kazim al Ha’eri, 
19

an Iraqi exile in Qom, Iran. This appointment has allowed Sadr to 

speak with considerable religious authority despite his youth and 

lack of theological standing. Some Sadr supporters even suggest that 

Ha’eri’s ruling effectively gives Sadr more authority than Sistani 

since they claim Ha’eri is the more renowned Islamic scholar.63 This 

claim is dubious, but it does allow Sadr some leeway in dealing with 

senior clerics who may consider denouncing his activities as unIslamic. 

Ha’eri is deeply anti-American and remains comfortable referring 

to the United States as the “Great Satan,” an Iranian expression 

of derision that has otherwise declined in usage in recent years.64

Correspondingly, Ha’eri, like Sadr, is virulently opposed to the U.S. 

military presence in Iraq and has repeatedly warned the Iraqi public 

that U.S. forces are occupation troops and not liberation forces.65

According to Ha’eri, Saddam Hussein was actually an American 

agent for many years, but God “caused the fi re of disagreement 

and war to erupt among the unjust themselves, namely between the 

masters of global arrogance [the United States] and their most vicious 

agent [Saddam Hussein].”66 This theory of Saddam as an American 

agent has a great deal of salience in the conspiracy-oriented politics 

of the Arab World, although it is not yet clear how prevalent it is in 

Iraq.

In another strange and disturbing departure from reality, Ha’eri 

issued a June 2003 fatwa maintaining the Iraqis must not sell land to 

Jews on the grounds that they are seeking to displace Iraqi Arabs so 

that they can create a new Israeli-type Jewish state in Mesopotamia.67

Although such fulminations are extreme to the point of being 

madcap to Westerners, they have a way of becoming popular 

among radical circles in the Middle East. Thus Ha’eri and Sadr 

must not be dismissed as fringe fi gures incapable of generating a 

popular following. Indeed, Ha’eri’s school of thought on Jews is not 

fundamentally different from that of Iranian leader, Imam Ruhollah 

Khomeini, who routinely referred to Jews as “satanic.”68

The relationship between Sadr and Ha’eri is clouded by 

uncertainties, and it is not entirely clear who benefi ts most from it. 

Sadr is well-served so long as Ha’eri remains a distant legitimizing 

authority fi gure who does not intervene in daily events or interfere 
20

with Sadr’s efforts to advance his own agenda. Ha’eri is, nevertheless, 

a grand ayatollah in his 60s and may not be fully comfortable serving 

as the tool of a 30-year-old cleric with student status, regardless of 

the prominence of his family. There are thus constant rumors that 

Ha’eri will be returning permanently to Iraq “soon.” These rumors 

have as yet come to nothing, but the threat looms for Muqtada. 

Moreover, while Ha’eri is in Qom, the Iranians can be expected to 

maintain infl uence over him and, by extension, the Sadr movement. 

The Iranians, therefore, probably favor Ha’eri’s continued presence 

in their country. 

Sadr, not surprisingly, also maintains signifi cant links to Tehran, 

but he is not under Iranian control. In June 2003, Sadr traveled to 

Tehran and met with a number of senior leaders there including 

Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Religious Guide, and ‘Ali 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s former president and the head 

of the Iranian government’s powerful Council for the Discernment 

of Expediency. Rafsanjani apparently had a role in attempting to 

repair differences between Sadr and the Iranian-supported Supreme 

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).69 SCIRI has been 

especially close to the Tehran government for decades, but it has not 

maintained good relations with the Sadr movement. 

Early into the occupation, Sadr called for the boycott of U.S.-

sponsored institutions such as the transitional Governing Council 

and the U.S.-supported Iraqi Media Network (IMN). He has urged 

Iraqis to ignore the Council and to refer political and social issues 

to the religious establishment for resolution.70 Sadr has also made a 

strong effort to infl uence regional and international media outlets. He 

and his supporters give a large number of interviews to numerous 

regional media outlets. He also has sought news coverage for events 

that underscore support for his activities. In mid-July, for example, 

4,000 of his supporters staged an anti-American rally in Najaf. 

This publicity-seeking strategy is not always well-received. Sadr’s 

continuing policy of busing in large numbers of loud and unruly 

crowds of slum dwellers to listen to his sermons at the Kufa Mosque 

near Najaf apparently has alienated a number of Najaf residents.71

In August 2003, Sadr created a militia loyal to him, which he calls 

the Imam al-Mahdi Army.72 At various times, Sadr has claimed that 
21

this force is currently unarmed, but this is not the case. Al Mahdi 

Army members do carry weapons and have resisted efforts to 

disarm them by closing roads and other such actions.73 The force, 

nevertheless, remains small, and its value as a fi ghting force is 

subject to considerable doubt. Sadr is also reported to be having 

trouble funding this force, and this situation may be especially 

problematic for its future.

In October 2003, Sadr went a step beyond establishing his militia 

by creating an alternative government designed to undermine 

and replace the U.S.-sponsored Governing Council. Sadr created 

ministries for his new government and appointed offi cials to lead 

them in what was widely viewed as a preparatory step for declaring 

an Islamic Republic. He also appealed for large scale popular 

support, which he did not receive. The new “government” quietly 

dissolved, with Sadr stating “there have been no demonstrations of 

public support for this government, and therefore I cannot create 

it.”74 Again, funding problems may also have been important in 

Sadr’s decision to back down. 

In his public pronunciations, Sadr has thus far stopped short of 

calls for violent resistance to U.S. and coalition forces. He justifi es 

this restraint on the grounds that a fatwa calling for resistance has not 

yet been issued by higher religious authorities.75 Nevertheless, by 

October 2003, the nonviolent aspect of the Sadr movement seemed 

to be slipping. Two U.S. soldiers were killed in an ambush in Sadr 

City on October 9 in an encounter with guerrillas presumed to be 

supporters of Muqtada al Sadr. A car bombing of an Iraqi police 

station occurred the same day in Sadr City and may have been 

related.76

While Sadr’s commitment to Islamic government has defi nitely 

produced adherents, he also appears to have offended a number 

of Iraqis and created legions of enemies by his transparent 

interest in seizing power. Sadr’s supporters also have had diffi cult 

relationships with some important Sunni clerics due to his efforts 

to control as many Islamic institutions as possible.77 Sadr vigilantes 

are also known to be overbearing and offensive, for example, 

occasionally demanding that all women wear veils, even Christian 

women.78 Sadr’s supporters further have had violent confrontations 
22

with assertively secular Iraqis such as the communists and others 

who oppose religious rule. All of these problems suggest that Sadr 

is likely to develop a limited but committed following that will be 

diffi cult to expand. 

Sadr sometimes seems to fear that he will at some point be 

detained and imprisoned by U.S. occupation forces or by the 

Iraqi Governing Council. In such a case, Sadr will probably seek 

to borrow a page from imprisoned Palestinian militant Marwan 

Barghouthi who is on trial for murder and incitement in Israel.79 He 

will use imprisonment and trial in an effort to boost his popularity 

and bolster nationalist credentials. Barghouthi, however, has wide 

appeal across the Palestinian territories. Sadr, with his more limited 

appeal, may have diffi culty generating the same popular sympathy. 

Nevertheless, Sadr’s arrest could frighten other clerics who may fear 

a larger crackdown. Such fears could produce a signifi cant reaction 

on Baghdad’s streets.

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 

and the Badr Corps.

Another organization that seeks to infl uence the future of Iraq is 

the SCIRI. It is a political party known for its long exile in Iran, where 

the organization developed a reputation for being a puppet of Tehran. 

This reputation was conferred for good reason. SCIRI supported the 

Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War by making innumerable antiSaddam/pro-Iran radio broadcasts directed at Iraqi citizens and 

soldiers. While SCIRI claims to welcome all Muslims into its ranks, 

it nevertheless is composed almost exclusively of Shi’ites. SCIRI’s 

military arm is the Badr Corps (or Badr Brigade), which has been 

organized and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 

(IRGC), and thus has previously maintained strong links to Iranian 

hard-liners.

Until his assassination in August 2003, SCIRI was led by the 65-

year-old Mohammad Bakr al Hakim. Hakim was born in Najaf, but 

fl ed Iraq in the 1980 due to persecution by the Saddam regime.80

Hakim’s followers called him ayatollah, but it is unclear that his 

credentials were actually that exalted.81 If Iran had been able to 
23

defeat and overrun Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, it is possible and 

perhaps even likely that Hakim would have been installed as a client 

ruler acting as Tehran’s surrogate in conquered Baghdad. Hakim 

also remained virulently anti-Ba’thist throughout the last decades 

of his life, denouncing Saddam and his supporters with absolute 

contempt and hatred.

Mohammad Bakr al Hakim was murdered in August 2003 by 

unknown assailants using car bombs outside of Najaf’s holiest shrine. 

At least 80 other people also died in this attack. In the aftermath of 

the attack, Hakim’s brother and chief aide, Hojat al Islam ‘Abdul 

‘Aziz al Hakim, assumed leadership over SCIRI. ‘Abdul ‘Aziz has 

favored policies that largely are indistinguishable from those of 

his assassinated brother. He had also spent decades in exile and 

therefore must overcome the danger of being seen by Iraqis as an 

outsider.

Currently, it is unclear if the majority of Iraqis can forgive 

SCIRI’s wartime collaboration with Tehran due to the organization’s 

hostility to Saddam. Many Iraqis, who are anti-Saddam, have no 

wish to be dominated by the Iranians and saw the war as an Iranian 

attempt to overrun and subjugate Iraq. It is, however, uncertain if 

Tehran will continue to dominate SCIRI now that the organization 

is seeking a power base outside of Iran. Some SCIRI members have 

indicated that they accepted Iranian dominance only because they 

had no other way to resist the Saddam regime.82

Collaboration with the Iranians, nevertheless, is only one aspect 

of the Hakim brothers’ background. The Hakim family has an 

uncompromising history of opposition to the Saddam Hussein 

regime, and the SCIRI leadership clearly hopes to capitalize on 

this record. A number of Hakim family members were killed by 

Saddam’s regime after Mohammad Hakim failed to heed Iraqi 

warning to cease subversive broadcasting from Iran during the IranIraq War. Other members of the family ranging in age from 76 to 9 

remained under arrest, with many of them believed to have died 

under deplorable conditions in regime prisons.83

Ayatollah Mohammad Hakim returned to Iraq in May 2003 after 

living in exile in Iran for 23 years. His brother, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, had 

returned slightly earlier. Aware of his reputation as an Iranian client, 
24

Mohammad Hakim immediately attempted to reassure the United 

States and the Iraqi population by refusing to call for an Islamic 

Republic in Iraq along the Iranian model. Instead he stated, “We 

want a democratic government, representing the Iraqi nation, the 

Iraqi people, the Muslims, Christians and all minorities.”84 He also 

stated that “We do not want an extremist Islam.” As part of its effort 

to project an image of moderation, the SCIRI leadership remains 

publicly committed to this claim.

SCIRI claims to be part of the Hawza as well, although it was not 

initially accepted as such by either Hawza’s senior Najaf leaders, 

including Sistani, or by Muqtada al Sadr’s movement.85 Later, both 

Sistani and Sadr began treating SCIRI as a part of the Hawza. This 

tendency became especially pronounced after Mohammad Hakim’s 

assassination, when all of Iraq’s leading clerics were attempting to 

express outrage, and Muqtada al Sadr especially was interested that 

the Baghdad rumor mill did not link the crime to his followers. Sadr 

is known to be cold-blooded and to have maintained poor relations 

with SCIRI, but no direct evidence links him to the assassination.86

Offi cially, SCIRI blames ex-Ba’thists and other regime remnants. 

SCIRI has also criticized the United States for failing to provide 

proper security that would have prevented the assassination.87

Sadr’s concerns that he might be under suspicion are not 

surprising. While SCIRI is not interested in a showdown with Sistani, 

it has been harsh in its description of Muqtada al Sadr, and SCIRI 

representatives have publicly accused Sadr of being responsible 

for the murder of Majid al Kho’ei.88 They also continuously have 

condescended on Sadr’s credentials to lead an important Islamic 

movement. Iranian leaders, as noted, intervened in June 2003 to ask 

the two groups to show more cooperation with each other, but with 

few results.89 SCIRI leaders view Sadr as an upstart without any 

claim to the leadership of the religious movement in Iraq. 

SCIRI has also chosen to participate in the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi 

Governing Council, with Hojat al Islam ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al Hakim as 

the SCIRI representative. ‘Abdul ‘Aziz assumed this role while 

his brother Mohammad was still alive, and has continued on the 

Council after Mohammad al Hakim’s assassination. In making 

this decision, SCIRI leaders, including both the late Ayatollah 
25

Mohammad al Hakim and Hojat al Islam ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al Hakim, 

repeatedly have told their followers that the Shi’ites must avoid 

repeating past historical mistakes associated with the 1920 revolt 

against the United Kingdom, when Shi’ite resistance paved the way 

for subsequent exclusion from civil government and offi cer corps 

positions.90 In accordance with this approach, SCIRI leader Hakim 

has attempted to play a constructive role on the Governing Council. 

SCIRI sometimes takes credit for bringing the more radical group, 

al Da’wa, into the Governing Council and for moderating the views 

of the formerly Tehran-based Islamic Action Organization.91 SCIRI 

leader ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Hakim has also served as an intermediary 

between the Governing Council and Sistani.92

The SCIRI leadership nevertheless has made frequent and 

caustic comments about the U.S. military presence in Iraq, despite 

the organization’s willingness to collaborate with U.S. authorities. 

In October 2003, for example, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Hakim told an Iranian 

audience that the United States is an “enemy” that seeks to turn 

Iraq into a colony.93 Despite such remarks, SCIRI rhetoric has also 

opposed guerrilla operations against U.S. forces. This view was 

fi rst articulated by Mohammad al Hakim and unhesitatingly has 

been reiterated by his brother, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz.94 Rather, the SCIRI 

leadership maintains that the United States must leave Iraq as soon 

as possible, but it is not appropriate to consider armed resistance 

against these forces at this time. The SCIRI leadership also describes 

the current armed resistance as being dominated by Saddam 

regime remnants rather than Iraqi nationalist or patriots. The SCIRI 

leadership therefore is harsher in its description of the insurgents 

than the mainstream Arab media in neighboring countries. SCIRI 

detests the former Ba’thists and is not troubled by the idea of U.S. 

soldiers hunting them down and killing them.

The military arm of SCIRI is the Badr Corps (or Badr Brigade). 

This group is comprised of around 10,000 militiamen trained by 

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).95 The Badr Corps 

was fi rst assembled during the Iran-Iraq War and drew heavily from 

Iraqi POWs in Iranian hands. It subsequently was reinforced by Iraqi 

Shi’ites who fl ed that country in 1991 after the failed Shi’ite uprising 

against Saddam Hussein. Some individuals may have joined the Badr 
26

Corps out of conviction, but many from both the Iranian prisoner of 

war camps and the refugee centers may have had little choice. The 

Badr Corps has been infi ltrating back into the Iraq since the 2003 war 

broke out. Several thousand Badr Corps members were able to enter 

the country and are now giving Hakim an important advantage in 

providing trained militia for the preservation of security in Iraqi 

cities, towns, and villages.96

SCIRI’s leadership has initiated and maintained a strong effort 

to convince both the Iraqi public and the U.S. occupation authorities 

that the Badr Corps is not a threat to Iraqi security. Both Hakim 

brothers have claimed that the Badr Corps must transform itself 

from a military organization to a security organization in the 

aftermath of Saddam’s defeat. It is not totally clear how SCIRI 

defi nes the difference, although this distinction does suggest that 

heavy weapons are no longer necessary. In possible support of a 

more peaceful image, then-SCIRI leader Mohammed Bakr al Hakim 

announced on May 31, 2003, that the Badr Corps had given up its 

heavy weapons to focus on the political struggle. This claim was 

false, but clearly indicated that Hakim wished to reduce the profi le 

of the Badr Corps, appear cooperative to the United States, and 

avoid a confrontation with coalition forces.97

In May 2003, U.S. military authorities accused SCIRI of using the 

Badr Corps to participate in an attack on U.S. forces.98 SCIRI leaders 

emphatically denied the charge, which contradicts their strategy of 

cautious cooperation with the occupation. While SCIRI units may 

have been involved in this effort, they were probably operating 

without the SCIRI leadership’s authorization. SCIRI, at this time, 

seemed totally committed to cooperation with the occupation 

authorities as a matter of political strategy.

Since the May incident and also since ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al Hakim’s 

assumption of SCIRI leadership in August, SCIRI has continued to 

assert the importance of not confronting the U.S. occupation forces 

with force until all political and diplomatic means for ending the 

occupation have been exhausted. Like his brother, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz 

refers to the Iraq resistance fi ghters as “terrorists” and even corrects 

interviewers who use more neutral words to describe them.99 He also 
27

is quick to point out that anti-coalition fi ghters have killed a number 

of Iraqis in their operations, which he maintains underscores the 

need to defeat them.

In September 2003, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz renamed the Badr Corps as the 

Badr Organization as a way of indicating its movement away from 

military functions.100 Nevertheless, most Iraqis continue to call the 

organization the Badr Corps. SCIRI leaders often slip and use the old 

name, although they continue to present the message that the Badr 

Corps is being demilitarized. In an October 2003 interview with al 

Jazirah satellite television, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz stated that the Badr Corps 

had “turned into a civil organization and will play a role in the 

restoration of security and the reconstruction and building of a new 

Iraq.” Also, in something of a contradiction, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz maintains 

that Badr Corps members should be included in the new Iraqi armed 

forces along with members of other existing Iraqi militias.101

The Da’wa Islamiyah and Iraqi Hizb’allah.

An organization with a long, tragic, and disturbing history in 

Iraq is the al Da’wa Islamiyah (the Islamic Call) group. Al Da’wa was 

founded in 1958 and is the oldest Shi’ite Islamic opposition party in 

Iraq. The party began legally as a traditional political party, founded 

primarily to struggle against communist and anti-religious trends 

in Iraqi society. Such trends were of special concern during the 

presidency of Brigadier ‘Abdul Karim Qassim (1958-63)because 

of his strong reliance on the support of the then-powerful Iraqi 

Communist Party.102

In the 1970s the Da’wa was popular in the large Shi’ite section of 

Baghdad, then known as Thawra City (later Saddam City and then 

Sadr City). Thawra City was described by Da’wa literature as the 

“stronghold of heroes.”103 Da’wa’s combination of a religious agenda 

and a potential power base was therefore of considerable concern to 

the Ba’thists. Da’wa leader Mohammad Baqir al Sadr was arrested in 

1972, 1974, 1977, and for several days in 1979. Each arrest seemed to 

add to his popularity.

The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 radicalized the Da’wa and also 

increased their interest in armed strikes against the Saddam regime.104
28

In 1979 the Da’wa began a serious assassination campaign directed at 

Ba’thist offi cials, and on April 1, 1980, they unsuccessfully attempted 

to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz. On April 5, more 

Da’wa terrorists attacked the funeral procession of security offi cials 

who had died in the attack against Aziz. Saddam responded by 

making membership in Da’wa a crime punishable by death and 

executed hundreds of members. Sadr was arrested and on April 9 

was executed.105 Repression against the Da’wa continued to be brutal 

throughout the war and the party was further radicalized as a result 

of this process. The Da’wa also has been accused of participation in 

international terrorism in the 1980s, and may have been involved in 

attacks against Americans in Kuwait and Lebanon.106 It was gravely 

crippled by 1982, and the party that exists now may have little 

continuity with the party of 1958-82. 

Da’wa claims to have lost 77,000 members killed in its struggle 

against Saddam.107 In recent years, a weakened Da’wa focused 

heavily on assassinating members of the Saddam regime since 

provoking an uprising or engaging in serious military strikes 

remained beyond the group’s capabilities. In this regard, Da’wa has 

claimed responsibility for a December 12, 1996, attack on Saddam 

Hussein’s oldest son, Uday, in which he was severely wounded 

and two of his companions were killed.108 Other individuals and 

organizations attempted to take credit for this attack as well, and it 

is diffi cult to discern the truth on this incident.109 Currently, Da’wa

claims to have several thousand fi ghters under arms, although the 

organization is also reported to be deeply fragmented.110

Da’wa has close ties to radical Lebanese Shi’ites, including the 

Lebanese Hizb’allah (party of God). Moreover, many individuals 

within Da’wa are believed to look to the Lebanese Hizb’allah spiritual 

guide, Mohammad Fadlallah, as a marja al taqlid from which they 

draw inspiration and guidance.111 This linkage could be a problem 

for U.S. forces at some later point. Fadlallah, whose organization is 

deeply involved in the confl ict with Israel, has strongly asserted that 

the United States invaded Iraq on behalf of the Israelis, who viewed 

Saddam as a threat. In an interview with Lebanese television, he 

maintained, 
29

The Americans want a dismembered, fragmented, and divided Iraq. 

They want to draw up the political map of the region accordingly. 

The Israelis do not only want Iraq to be split into mini-states and 

communities. The Israelis also want to see Iraq destroyed, scorched, and 

slaughtered with blood spilled at the door of every house.112

Fadlallah has also expressed his hope that the Iraqi people will 

make “the occupier’s stay in Iraq diffi cult and uncomfortable.”113 It is 

not clear that this is a call for violence, although it could be interpreted 

as such. Most Arab newspapers that cover Fadlallah suggest that he 

has not called explicitly for violence against the occupation troops. 

It would probably be unwise to do so since various U.S. political 

fi gures have called for attacking Hizb’allah as part of the Global War 

on Terrorism.114 Even if Fadlallah’s statements were interpreted as 

calls for violence, it is not clear the Da’wa would honor them since 

Fadlallah is in Lebanon and cannot be assumed to be familiar with 

local conditions. The Da’wa publishes a weekly newspaper with the 

same name as the party itself. This publication routinely criticizes 

the United States but stops clearly short of incitement against the 

U.S. presence.115 The group does not seem to want to be pushed into 

a confrontation at this time.

Da’wa also claims to have good relations with SCIRI. Like SCIRI 

and with SCIRI encouragement, Da’wa has opted, at the time of this 

writing, to participate in U.S.-sponsored governing institutions. 

Dr. Ibrahim al Ja’fari, who has previously served as Da’wa’s chief 

spokesman was selected from the Iraqi Governing Council to be the 

fi rst of nine people to serve 1-month rotations as the Iraqi President. 

His term began in August 2003.116 The leader of the party itself is 

Sheikh Mohammed Naseri. 

In the years following Ayatollah Baqir al Sadr’s execution, 

Da’wa became factionalized, and one breakaway faction formed the 

Iraqi Hizb’allah (party of God), which claims to have been founded 

in 1981 and, like Da’wa, looks to the example of Grand Ayatollah 

Muhammad Baqir al Sadr. 117 Thus far, Iraqi Hizb’allah appears to be 

a small party, but it may be growing. Iraqi Hizb’allah has published 

at least two newspapers since the ouster of the Saddam regime. 

Also, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the Secretary-General of 

Iraqi Hizb’allah recently has declared loyalty to Sistani rather than 
30

to Fadlallah.118 This move may place some pressure on Da’wa itself 

to do the same, creating a somewhat diffi cult situation if Sistani 

and Fadlallah diverge on any important issue. To date, these two 

major Shi’ite fi gures appear to have at least some views in common. 

While Fadlallah can not be called a quietist, he does not support 

clerical rule. Hizb’allah leaders also claim not to support the concept 

of clerical rule, stating it is an Iranian idea that does not apply to 

Iraq.119

Another organization that may have links to Iraqi Hizb’allah

is the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Iraq (SCLI; not to be 

confused with SCIRI). While apparently quite small, SCLI is also a 

deeply radical organization, and its newspaper was closed down 

for incitement by U.S. authorities.120 SCLI is now publishing a new 

newspaper called Sada al Ummah (Echo of the Nation).121 SCLI has 

organized demonstrations against the United States and threatened 

“dire consequences” if one of its leaders was not released.122

Secular Shi’ites in Postwar Iraq.

The clergy is, of course, not the only power in the Shi’ite 

community, and the possibility of secular leadership developing and 

even overshadowing the clergy must also be examined. Most Iraqi 

Shi’ites are believed to be respectful of the clergy, and those with 

“believing minds” predisposed to accepting religious authority may 

be especially loyal to them. Shi’ite tradition states that the clergy 

are not only morally infallible men, but also masum, not subject to 

error. Such vanities appear anachronistic to educated Shi’ites but 

can be very real to important elements within the urban and rural 

poor.123 Many ordinary Shi’ites often tend to place more trust in 

their religious leaders rather than the secular elites for both religious 

reasons and because of the reluctance of many clerics to collaborate 

with Saddam beyond the limits required to survive. 

Nevertheless, it is not clear that all or even most Iraqi Shi’ites 

view the clerics with a reverent sympathy. Clerical preoccupations 

with scholarship and aloofness from worldly matters sometimes 

have raised the question of Shi’ite religious institutions becoming 

inadequate to modern needs, even “hopelessly obsolete.” Moreover, 
31

nagging suspicions sometimes strike all but the most committed 

believing mind that the clergy may not always live up to its image of 

self-sacrifi ce. For example, in his discussion of the Shi’ites of Lebanon, 

Shi’ite scholar Fuad Ajami maintains, “In a world of scarcity, there 

was always the suspicion that the cleric was a parasite, that he lived 

off the toil of other men.”124

Within this context, the future infl uence of secular and especially 

Western-educated Shi’ites in the emerging Iraqi government 

is uncertain. Currently, there is no secular counterpart for the 

structured, hierarchical, and pervasive Shi’ite religious organizations 

in Iraq. Should secular Shi’ites wish to infl uence a future democratic 

Iraqi government, a natural approach would be to form viable 

and effective mass-based political parties. Building viable political 

parties is, however, a highly problematic enterprise in contemporary 

Iraq. During the Saddam era, the only legal political party was the 

Ba’th, and it had functions that had nothing to do with advancing 

the values of its members within a democratic setting. Other political 

parties in Iraq’s history have been rigid and ideological (such as the 

Iraqi Communist Party or the Da’wa Islamiya party). 

Moreover, political parties, to be effective, must manage their 

disputes with the framework of formal governmental institutions. 

These institutions have not yet been established in post-Saddam 

Iraq, and it is not clear that they will be respected once they are. Nor 

is it clear that any future constitution will be respected as legitimate 

by the majority of Iraqis. Constitutions not only create institutions, 

they also allocate power. Those communities that feel cheated by a 

new constitution are hardly likely to respect it.

Many Arab political parties, like those elsewhere in the 

developing world, are based on tribes, sects, and ethnicity. This 

pattern is likely to be emulated in Iraq, although probably less so 

in urban Iraq, where citizens of various tribes and ethnicities may 

encounter similar problems and favor nontribally based solutions. 

Another problem is that emerging Iraqi political parties are ensuring 

their security through the formation of militias. Most political leaders 

have an understandable reluctance to trust their future to the respect 

their opponents have for the as yet undeveloped institutions of civil 

society. The two major Iraqi political parties that currently exist in 
32

the Kurdish areas have militias and have fought against Saddam as 

well as each other. 

There is also resistance to the concept of political parties. Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani, as noted, even issued a fatwa in May 2003 asking 

people to refrain from joining political parties, although presumably 

this fatwa is temporary, pending the parties’ full explanations of 

their agendas.125 Moreover, Sistani’s action may not have been 

directed solely against secular parties. Sistani is also worried about 

the power of Islamic parties with leaderships returning from exile 

and emerging from underground. As he becomes more comfortable 

dealing with these parties, he may relax his opposition.

Beyond the problem with parties, no secular Shi’ite leaders hold 

any sort of stature equivalent to that of the leading members of the 

clergy. Some prominent Shi’ite leaders such as Ahmad Chalabi have 

spent most of their lives as exiles and may have diffi culty organizing 

a popular following.126 Moreover, at least some of the most promising 

secular Shi’ites previously had made their peace with the Saddam, 

and attempted to work for themselves and their community within 

the framework of the regime. The fate of Dr. Saddoon Hammadi is 

interesting in this regard. 

Saddoon Hammadi has served as Iraq’s Foreign Minister, 

Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister, and most recently Saddam’s 

last Speaker of the Assembly. He has a Ph.D. in economics from 

the University of Wisconsin and has been described as having 

a “thoughtful and scholarly demeanor.”127 He also is the author 

of a number of academic articles on Arab affairs and political 

philosophy.128 Hammadi has favored economic and political 

liberalism in the past, and was presented to the world as a reform 

Prime Minister after the 1991 Gulf War. He apparently took his 

reform charter a little too seriously for Saddam and was removed in 

semi-disgrace after 7 months in power.129

Hammadi nevertheless had value for Saddam as a regime 

“democratic ornament.”130 An articulate, respected Shi’ite 

intellectual who appeared in high profi le/high prestige positions 

gave Saddam’s government the appearance of broad-based Iraqi 

support across ethnicities. Saddam thus presented Hammadi with 

the option of being co-opted and in return gaining a few crumbs 
33

of power for himself and some economic assistance for his Shi’ite 

supporters. This Faustian bargain occasionally was made available 

to Western-educated intellectuals, but it was never an option for the 

clergy. Formal clerical participation in the Ba’thist government was 

less acceptable to Saddam even on this limited scale. Certainly no 

ayatollah would hold any of the positions Hammadi held.

The question remains as to how sullied some secular Shi’ite leaders 

have become through their association with Saddam’s government. 

On the one hand, any effort to obtain favors and concessions from 

the government involved working with Saddam and his regime. 

Saddam was, after all, the head of state and working with his regime 

a concession to reality. On the other hand, Saddam led a criminal 

regime, and the requirement to look the other way was excessive. 

The dilemma for the future of Iraq is how to treat Western educated 

and other secular Shi’ites who were not involved in the military, 

security, or intelligence fi elds. These people may fi nd support in 

Iraq even if they did collaborate with the Saddam Hussein regime. 

Hammadi, himself, was arrested by U.S. troops in early June. His 

son and members of his al Karakshah tribe stringently protested the 

arrest on grounds that he did not take part in any crime against the 

Iraqi people.131 While he is likely to be released at some future time, 

Hammadi will probably always be tarnished by his collaborationism, 

as will other secular leaders who followed his path.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations.

The United States, through its military presence in Iraq, has 

found itself in a position whereby its civilian and military leaders 

must understand the internal dynamics and activities of the 

Shi’ite clergy within larger Shi’ite and Iraqi societies. While this 

clergy may not actually rule Iraq, it is likely that it will be highly 

infl uential in determining Iraq’s future. Moreover, any breakdown 

in relations between the United States and the Shi’ite clergy during 

the occupation could threaten grave consequences for U.S. troops 

remaining in Iraq. With this situation in mind, the following policy 

recommendations are made.

1. U.S. leaders need to recognize the non-American values of most 

of the Shi’ite clergy and correspondingly understand that Shi’ite clerical 
34

cooperation with U.S. forces remains largely tactical. This does not 

mean that most of the Shi’ite clergy has a short-term anti-American 

agenda, but neither does it mean that the Shi’ite clergy is trustworthy 

or should be considered as a long-term ally. None of the major 

Shi’ite clerical leaders are comfortable appearing too close to the 

occupation. All have criticized the U.S. presence, and some have 

done so in odious and incendiary ways.

2. U.S. policymakers must correspondingly maintain the subtlety to 

recognize that Shi’ite clerics are now legitimate long-term and important 

political actors in Iraqi politics. A dialogue between the U.S. and 

major Shi’ite groups, therefore, remains essential. Nevertheless, 

the clergy does not speak for all Iraqi Shi’ites, and this must also be 

understood. 

3. U.S. policymakers may have to gamble on continued cooperation with 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the Hawza and even with SCIRI. U.S. leaders 

are not always comfortable with Shi’ites, and especially Shi’ite clerics, 

perhaps due to decades of problems with Iran. Nevertheless, Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani, for all his diffi culties, is not someone who can be 

ignored or marginalized. To treat him as an enemy could make him 

into an enemy. 

4. The U.S. Government will have to expect that Iran will continue 

to compete with the United States for infl uence in Iraq on a more or less 

permanent basis. Iran, nevertheless, does not have so much to offer 

the Iraqi Shi’ites that its infl uence cannot be contested effectively. 

Moreover, tensions between Iraqis and Iranians will not disappear 

now that Saddam has been removed from power. Additionally, any 

clear or borderline Iranian incitement against U.S. troops must be 

treated as much more serious than merely competing for infl uence 

in Iraq.

5. The U.S. Government needs to be particularly wary of Muqtada 

al Sadr and his movement, but should try to avoid a direct confrontation 

with them if possible. Muqtada al Sadr has behaved like a clear 

enemy of the United States on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, 

Sadr is such a divisive fi gure internally that he may not have any 

chance of seizing power. Sadr is often on bad terms with other 

important Shi’ite leaders, including Sistani and Hakim. He also has 

substantially antagonized Sunni Muslims, and his heavy-handed 
35

Islamic vigilantism is deeply offensive to secular Iraqis and religious 

minorities such as Christians. The U.S. forces must therefore be 

certain that they take no action that will force Iraq’s major clerics 

to support Sadr, unless such action is indispensable for the safety 

of coalition forces or Iraqi civil society. Knowing where to draw the 

line on these issues will have to involve discussions with Hawza and 

perhaps SCIRI. 

6. U.S. policymakers cannot depend on the defeat of the current Sunnibased insurgency to quiet Shi’ite criticism of the U.S. presence in Iraq.

The defeat of the current insurgency and the destruction of Saddam 

remnants sometimes are viewed as the magic bullet to allow all 

Iraqi citizens to begin expressing gratitude for the U.S. intervention. 

Ironically, the fi nal destruction of Saddam remnants may empower 

Shi’ites to oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq in a more assertive 

manner. At that point, they will not need the United States to help 

destroy their Ba’thist enemies. Once the United States is no longer 

performing the useful function of killing their enemies, the U.S. 

presence will be much more unwelcome.

7. U.S. Army forces in Iraq must understand that virulent anti-U.S. 

propaganda is emanating from Shi’ite sources as well as Sunni mosques 

and publications. Careful attention must be directed at these sources 

to detect efforts at incitement against U.S. forces and their Iraqi 

partners. In some cases, U.S. authorities in partnership with the 

emerging Iraqi leadership will have to continue closing radical 

Shi’ite newspapers, radio stations, and news magazines. They must 

remain aware that incitement can sometimes occur in subtle ways.

8. U.S. forces must also emphasize their concern about Iraqi Shi’ite 

groups, which may seek to coordinate with outside radicals such as those 

in Lebanon. While it may be impossible to prevent Da’wa and Iraqi 

Hizb’allah from seeking theological inspiration from radical Lebanese 

clerics, the formation of any kind of operational ties should be of 

grave concern to the United States. 

9. Finally and most importantly, the United States needs to consider 

withdrawing its forces from Iraq as soon as a stable government is in 

place, so that anti-American feelings in the Shi’ite community do not 

grow unmanageable as the United States potentially wears out its 

welcome. Most Shi’ite clerics feel the need to treat the United States 
36

as an entity with either no legitimacy or only the most conditional 

legitimacy for remaining in Iraq at this time. Many clerics also have 

their own conspiratorial and sometimes bizarre explanations for 

why the United States intervened in the fi rst place. The longer the 

United States stays in Iraq, the more pressure will be placed on that 

tolerance. Should an explosion occur among the Shi’ites, it may well 

become unmanageable.

ENDNOTES

1. As cited in “Iraq: The Occupation Undermined,” Middle East International, 

September 12, 2003, p. 5.

2. Monica Preto, “Ali al Wahid: The Americans are Busy Stealing Oil,” El 

Mundo (Madrid), October 21, 2003, as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (hereafter FBIS), October 21, 2003, internet.

3. Pamela Constable, “Cleric Calls for ‘Islamic Army,’” Washington Post, July 19, 

2003, p. A-12.

4. Some scholars suggest that Iraqi Shi’ite scholarship substantially outshines 

that of Iran. See Nicholas Birch, “Iraqi Shiite renaissance could spill over the 

border to Iran,” The Daily Star (Beirut) August 8, 2003, internet edition. 

5. Most Iraqi Kurds are Sunni and therefore alter the statistical ratio for the 

Sunnis, although these Kurds feel little solidarity with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. See 

David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 

2000.

6. For background on the development of Najaf and Karbala, see Yitzhak 

Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1994, 

Chapter 8.

7. Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, July/

August 2003, p. 18.

8. Heinz Halm, Shi’a Islam: From Religion to Revolution, Princeton, New Jersey: 

Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997, pp. 28-29.

9. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, Ithaca 

and London: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 139-141. For a discussion of more 

sympathetic Shi’ite views of Hassan, see Ibid., pp. 7-8.
37

10. Ajami, p. 138.

11. On the origins of these concepts, see Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab 

Peoples, New York: MJF Books, 1991, pp. 36-37.

12. For a discussion of this hierarchy, see Mohammed Heikal, Iran: The Untold 

Story, New York: Pantheon Books, 1982, p. 83 and Vartan Gregorian, Islam: A 

Mosaic, Not a Monolith, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003, p. 21.

13. Nicholas Birch, “Iraqi Shiite renaissance could spill over the border to Iran,” 

The Daily Star, August 8, 2003, internet edition. 

14. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 

p. 173.

15. David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, New York: Henry Holt and 

Company, 1989, pp. 449-454. Note that Class A mandates comprised those states 

that the League of Nations considered needing only a short time to prepare for 

independence. 

16. Ajami, p. 38.

17. On the concept of Jihad, see Sami G. Hajjar, “Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring 

that the War on Terrorism is not perceived as a War on Islam,” in Colonel John R. 

Martin, Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, January 2002, pp. 17-20.

18. Fromkin, pp. 452-453; and Efraim Karah and Inari Karsh, Empires of Sand: The 

Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923, Cambridge: Harvard University 

Press, 1999, pp. 297-298. 

19. Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, pp. 314-325.

20. Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

1999, p. 143.

21. Ibid., p. 144.

22. Ibid., p. 143

23. Ajami, p. 182-188. Note that Qadhafi strongly denies the charge of murdering 

Musa al Sadr. 

24. Communism was a powerful force in Iraq during the late 1950s, reaching 

what one scholar called its “high-water mark” in 1959. See Majid Khadduri, 
38

Republican Iraq, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 117; and Joyce N. Wiley, 

The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi’as, New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, pp. 

36-37; and Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity, London: Frank Cass, 

1995, pp. 134-136.

25. Chibi Mallat, “Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad 

Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm,” Third World Quarterly, April 1988.

26. Hanna Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics, 

Causes, and Prospects,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, Autumn, 1981, p. 590; and T. 

M. Aziz, “The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shi’i Political Activism in Iraq 

from 1958 to 1980,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 25, No. 2, May 

1993, p. 207.

27. Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 189-196.

28. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab 

World, New York: Norton & Company, 1993, pp. 96-97.

29. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Confl ict 1990-1991, 

Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 419.

30. Kim Ghattas, “Iraqis seek refuge in religion,” British Broadcasting 

Corporation News Online, April 25, 2002, internet.

31. On the Mother of all Battles Mosque, see Ibid. 

32. David R. Sands, “Top Cleric Urges Shi’ites not to Resist Allies,” Washington 

Times, April 4, 2003, p. 1.

33. “Ayatollah Sistani and the Political Future of Iraq,” Tehran Mardom Salari, 

July 2, 2003, as quoted in FBIS, July 3, 2003, internet.

34. Associated Press, “Shiite clerics rise to power in Iraq’s holy cities,” Jerusalem 

Post, April 17, 2003, internet.

35. Ibid.

36. In some cases, coalition forces have shared municipal duties with Shi’ite 

forces, for example, jointly guarding a food warehouse with Hawza forces. OCPA, 

Situation Report, 2000Z, June 11, 2003.

37. T. M. Aziz, p. 207.
39

38. “Coalition investigates Iraq Attacks,” CNN.Com, June 25, 2003, internet.

39. Craig S. Smith, “In a Hotbed of Shiite Passion, Clerics Jockey for Leadership,” 

New York Times, April 23, 2003, p. 1.

40. International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Shiites under Occupation, Baghdad/

’Brussels, September, 9, 2003, p. 7; Charles Clover, “Shia Leaders Feel Heat of 

Peoples Anger,” London Financial Times, July 2, 2003, p. 7; Trudy Rubin, “Before 

the Window Shuts,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 2, 2003, internet.

41. “The Shi’ite Clergy steps into the Gap,” Middle East International, May 2, 

2003, p. 4.

42. Magan K. Stack, “Shiites Push for Political Power in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 

April 29, 2003, internet.

43. Robert Collier, “Shiite Support for U.S. Occupation Appears Tenuous,” San 

Francisco Chronicle, July 16, 2003, p. 10.

44. Anthony Shadid, “Iraqi Shiite Leader Uneasy with U.S. Role, Washington 

Post, June 23, 2003, p.1

.

45. Tarik Kafala, “Profi le: Ayatollah Ali Sistani,” BBC News Online, June 30, 

2003, internet.

46. Amy Waldman, “Cleric Wants Iraqis to Write Constitution,” New York 

Times, July 1, 2003, internet.

47. Shadid, p. 1.

48. Juan Cole, “Sistani Throws down a Gauntlet,” The Daily Star, July 4, 2003, , July 4, 2003, 

internet; and “Iraq Cleric Condemns U.S. plans,” BBC World News, June 30, 2003, 

internet.

49. Tehran Iranian Students News Agency, “Grand Ayatollah Sistani Says 

is Worried About Situation in Iraq,” July 2, 2003, as cited by FBIS, July 2, 2003, 

internet.

50. Hamza Hendawi, “Shiite Cleric Warns of Too Many Guns,” Philadelphia 

Inquirer, October 21, 2003, internet.

51. Roy P. Mottahedeh, “Shi’ite Political Thought and the Destiny of the Iranian 

Revolution,” in Iran and the Gulf: The Search for Stability, Jamal S. Al Suwaidi, Abu 

Dhabi, eds., The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996, pp. 73-

74.
40

52. Voice of the Muhahidin, October 10, 2003, as cited in FBIS, October 10, 2003, 

internet.

53. Baghdad Al Dawah, “Iraqi Shiite Clerics Express Views on Constitution, 

Dealing with Occupiers,” August 11, 2003, p. 1, as quoted in FBIS, August 12, 2003, 

internet.

54. Joshua Hammer, “Murder at the Mosque,” Newsweek, May 19, 2003, p. 34.

55. Liz Sly, “Challengers Jockeying for Shiite Hearts,” Chicago Tribune, May 1, 

2003, internet.

56. Catherine Philp, “Cleric Raises Shai Militia to Defend Faith and Defy 

America,” London Times, August 5, 2003, internet.

57. Baghdad Al Khalid, “SCIRI Pledges Allegiance to Al Sistani to Evade Iranian 

Hardliners Pressure,” November 8, 2003, p. 1, as cited in FBIS, November 8, 2003, 

internet.

58. “Shi’ite Radicalism and the Future of Iraq,” The Daily Star (Beirut), May 5, (Beirut), May 5, 

2003, internet.

59. “The Death of Abd al-Majid Khu’i,” Middle East International, April 18, 

2003, p. 27; and Qasim Qasir and As’ad Haydar, “The Islamic Al-Da’wah Party 

Regroups in Iraq,” Al Mustaqbal, (Beirut), April 16, 2003, in Arabic, as cited by 

FBIS, April 16, 2003, internet.

60. Fatimah al Samadi, “Muqtada al Sadr,” Al Arab al Yawm, (Amman), October 

23, 2003, pp. 4-6 ,as quoted in FBIS, October 22, 2003, internet.

61. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, London and New York: Routeledge Press, 

2001, p. 173.

62. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “In Key Shiite City, Son of Slain Cleric Urges 

Islamic Rule,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 5, 2003, internet.

63. Liz Sly, “Challengers Jockeying for Shiite Hearts,” Chicago Tribune, May 1, 

2003, internet.

64. Nazila Fathi, “As Iraqi Clerics Go Home, Talks of Schism with Shiite HardLiners in Iran,” New York Times, April 28, 2003, internet.

65. Baghdad, Al Mustaqilla, “Al-Ha’iri’s Statement on Zionist Scheme in Iraq: 

Coalition Troops Occupation, not liberation forces,” July 7, 2003, as cited in FBIS, 

July 4, 2003.
41

66. Baghdad, Al-Ahd al-Jadid, Statement by Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha’iri on 

“forfeiting the blood of Iraqi Ba’thists,” July 23, 2003, p. 1, as cited in FBIS, July 24, 

2003.

67. Miqdam Muhammad Ali, “Iraqi Shiite Cleric Issues Fatwa Sanctioning 

Killing Jews Buying Land in Iraq,” Baghdad Al Hadath, June 25, 2003, p. 2. as 

quoted by FBIS, June 26, 2003, internet; and “Beirut al Manar Television Service, 

“Shiite Cleric Issues Fatwa Prohibiting Selling Land, Houses to Jews,” June 15, 

2003, as quoted by FBIS, June 16, 2003.

68. Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 

1981.

69. David Rohde with Nazila Fathi, “Power Moves May be Uniting Hard-Liners 

in Iraq and Iran,” New York Times, June 24, 2003, internet.

70. “Iraq: Al-Sadr Calls for Setting Up Army, Al-Hakim Warns Against 

Sectarian Strife,” Al Jazirah Satellite Television Channel, July 18, 2003, as cited by 

FBIS, July 18, 2003, internet.

71. Anthony Shadid, “Cleric Risks a Backlash with Anti-US Rhetoric,” 

Washington Post, July 28, 2003, p. 12.

72. “Iraqi Shiite Figure calls for Forming Alternative Governing Council, 

Army,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, July 17, 2003, as quoted by FBIS, 

July 18, 2003, internet.

73. Doha al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, “Muqtada al-Sadr’s Supporters 

Protest Against ‘Attempt’ to ‘Disarm Guards’,” October 13, 2003, as quoted in 

FBIS, October 13, 2003, internet.

74. “Jockeying for Power in Iraq,” Middle East International, October 24, 2003, p. 

5.

75. “Muqtada al-Sadr Says Armed Resistance Requires Fatwa, al Jazirah Satellite 

Television,” August 9, 2003, as reported by FBIS, August 9, 2003, internet. 

76. Vernon Loeb, “In Shiite Slum, Army’s New Caution, Washington Post, 

October 22, 2003, p. 1.

77. “Sunni Muslims Reportedly Regain Control over Al-Awqaf Directorate 

in Al-Basrah,” London Al Hayah, July 19, 2003, as quoted in FBIS, July 19, 2003, 

internet.
42

78. British Broadcasting Corporation News, “Iraqi Women Forced to Veil,” July 

13, 2003, internet edition.

79. Fatah Chief Challenge Right of Israeli Court to try Him,” Jordan Times, May 

5, 2003, internet.

80. Jim Muir, “Iran Mourns Shia Leader,” BBC News, August 30, 2003, internet.

81. Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq: Country Report, June 2003, p. 16.

82. Neil Macfarquhar, “Iraqis in Iran: Unwanted in Both Countries,” New York 

Times, June 12, 2003, internet. 

83. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley and Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, p. 107.

84. “Iraq’s Top Shiite Leader returns home from Exile,” Jordan Times, May 11, 

2003, internet.

85. Ewen MacAsill, “Shia Clergy Push for Islamist State,” The Guardian, May 3, 

2003, internet.

86. Some anonymous coalition offi cials are quoted in the U.S. press expressing 

their belief that Sadr is responsible for the attack. See Drew Brown, “Shiite Cleric 

Blamed in Attacks, Philadelphia Inquirer, October 15, 2003, p. 1.

87. “Thousands Bid Cleric Farwell,” BBC Online News, September 2, 2003, 

internet.

88. “Interview with Dr. Hamid al Bayati, UK representative of the Supreme 

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, May 

2003, p. 1.

89. Tehran, Iranian News Agency, (IRNA) “Rafsanjani Tells Iraqi Cleric U.S. 

Should not set up ‘Puppet’ state in Iraq,” June 8, 2003, as quoted in FBIS, June 8, 

2003, internet.

90. Neil MacFarquhar, “After Cleric’s Assassination, Fear for the Future,” New 

York Times, September 2, 2003, internet.

91. “Interview with Muhammad al Haydari, head of the Culture and 

Information Bureau in the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq by 

Isam al-Amiri in Baghdad,” Beirut Al-Mustaqbal, October 4, 2003, as cited by FBIS, 

October 4, 2003, internet.
43

92. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq,” Washington 

Post, November 26, 2003, p. 1

93. Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic, October 10, 2003, as cited by FBIS 

October 10, 2003, internet

94. “Interview with Abd-al Aziz al-Hakim, Chairman of the Supreme Council 

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq by Ibrahim Humaydi in Damascus,” London, al 

Hayah, October 16, 2003, as quoted in FBIS, October 16, 2003, internet.

95. Shaila K. Dewan, “Militia Trained in Iran Controls a Tense Town,” New York 

Times, June 27, 2003, internet.

96. Ibid.

97. Ed Blanche, “Iran: Friend or Foe?” The Middle East, July 2003, p. 17.

98. Charles Clover, “Iran Link to Attack Against US Troops,” London Financial 

Times, June 6, 2003, p. 11.

99. Interview with Abd-al Aziz al Hakim, President of the Supreme Council for 

the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,” Riyadh al Riyad (internet version), November 10, 

2003, as quoted in FBIS, November 11, 2003, internet.

100. Amir Nu’il Dawud, “Abd al Aziz Hakim: Saddam and his Allies are behind 

Al-Hakim’s Assassination; Badr Corps Name Changed to Badr Organization,” 

Baghdad al Dustur al Dustur, September 13, 2003, as quoted in FBIS, September 14, 2003, , September 13, 2003, as quoted in FBIS, September 14, 2003, 

internet.

101. “Guest and Dialogue with Jawad Kazim—Interview with Abdul Aziz al 

Hakim,” Dubai Al Arabiyah Television, October 28, 2003, as cited by FBIS, October 

28, 2003, internet edition; and interview with Abd-al Aziz al Hakim.

102. Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassim: A Political History, 1958-1963, New York: 

Praeger, 1969.

103. Batatu, p. 183.

104. Ibid., p. 590.

105. Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, Harrisonburg, VA: 

Bloomsbury, 2000, pp 184-185.

106. Christopher Dickey and Colin Soloway, “Friends or Foes?” Newsweek, 

December 23, 2002, pp. 38-42. For a spirited defense of Da’wa against charges 
44

of international terrorism, see A. William Samii, “Shia Political Alternatives in 

Postwar Iraq,” Middle East Policy, Vol. X, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 95-96.

107. “A Look at New Iraqi Leaders,” Baltimore Sun, July 16, 2003, internet.

108. John Mintz and Dana Priest, “Shiite Demands for Control in Iraq Challenges 

U.S. Plans,” Washington Post, April 16, 2003, p. 33.

109. Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection 

of Saddam Hussein, New York: Harper Collins, 1999, pp. 251-256.

110. Mintz and Priest, p. 33.

111. David Ignatius, “A Muslim Cleric’s Advice to Bush,” The San Diego Union 

Tribune, May 30, 2003, p. B-8.

112. “Speech by Hizballah leader Eulogizes Al-Hakim, Criticizes US, Israel, 

Libya,” September 1, 2003, Beirut al Manar Television, as reported by FBIS, 

September 1, 2003, internet.

113. “Fadlallah: Syria and the United States are Heading toward extraordinary 

relations,” Beirut Al Nahar Al Nahar, April 25, 2003, as reported by FBIS, April 25, 2003, , April 25, 2003, as reported by FBIS, April 25, 2003, 

internet.

114. For an analysis of these statements, see Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah 

Be Next?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 54-66. 

Also see Sami G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or Menace? Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2002, pp. 

27-28.

115. FBIS Media Aid, “Baghdad’s ‘Al-Dawah’ criticizes Coalition, Advocates 

Islamic State,” July 16, 2003, internet.

116. Steven R. Hurst, “Shi’ite Picked to Be Iraq’s First President,” Washington 

Times, July 31, 2003, p. 1.

117. Hajjar, p. 6.

118. Interview with Al-Haj Hasan al-Sari, Secretary General of the Hizballah 

Movement in Iraq,” Baghdad al Qabas, November 8, 2003, p. 2, as cited in FBIS, 

November 8, 2003, internet.

119. Robert Collier, “Everyone Casting Suspicious Eye on Iraq’s Hezbollah,” 

San Francisco Chronicle, December 29, 2003, p. F1.
45

120. Voice of the Mujahidin, June 17, 2003, as quoted by FBIS, June 17, 2003, 

internet. Also please note that I was able to confi rm the closing of this newspaper 

with Sarah E. Peter, who was in Iraq at this time doing fi eld research. 

121. FBIS Media Aid, “Media Available in Iraq as of 23 October,” internet.

122. Doha Al Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, July 30, 2003, as quoted by 

FBIS, July 30, 2003, internet.

123. Ajami, p. 48.

124. Ibid., p. 74.

125. Amy Waldman, “Cleric Wants Iraqis to Write Constitution,” New York 

Times, July 1, 2003, internet.

126. “Banker, Schmoozer, Spy,” Newsweek, May 12, 2003, p. 29.

127. Christine Moss Helms, Iraq Eastern Flank of the Arab World, p. 91.

128. Ibid., p. 106. 

129. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf War, London , London 

and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 50-51; Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 258.

130. On the concept of a democratic ornament, see Heribert Adam, Modernizing 

Racial Domination: South Africa’s Political Dynamics, Berkley: University of Calfornia 

Press, 1972.

131. Doha Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, “US Troops Ignored Tribe’s 

Request for Release of Hammadi,” July 5, 2003, as reported by FBIS, July 5, 2003.

47

GLOSSARY OF SHI’ITE TERMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 

AND PERSONALITIES

Ayatollah: A senior clerical rank in Shi’ite Islam. To obtain this title 

and status, a mid-level cleric normally must write a major tract on 

Islam and develop a signifi cant student following.

Badr Corps/Badr Legion: The military arm of SCIRI. Named after 

the Prophet Mohammad’s fi rst military victory in 624.

Da’wa Islamiya: A religious political party in Iraq founded in 1958. 

The party was formed as a legal organization, but was later outlawed 

and driven underground.

Faqih: The Supreme Religious Guide or jurist under the Iranian 

system of government.

Fatwa: A religious ruling issued by a senior Shi’ite cleric. A fatwa 

is considered binding on the followers of that cleric, so long as the 

cleric is alive.

Grand Ayatollah: (Ayatollah ‘Uzma Ayatollah ‘Uzma) Normally the most senior rank 

in Shi’ite Islam, although two pivotal recent historical leaders have 

been referred to by the more exalted title of Imam. (See Imam) 

Hakim, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz: The current leader of the Supreme Assembly 

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He assumed power after his 

brother was assassinated in August 2003.

Hakim, Mohammad: Founding leader of SCIRI. Known for his 

strong association with Iran. 

Hawza al ‘Ilmiya: Literally translated as circle of scholars. The phrase 

refers to the circle of scholars that comprise the leadership of the 

Shi’ite seminary in Najaf and hence are the highest Iraqi authorities 

on Shi’ite Islam.
48

Hizb’allah: Party of God (Hizb= party; ‘Allah =God or the God). A 

powerful political movement in Lebanon; there is also an Iraqi 

Hizb’allah, which is much smaller and less signifi cant. Other 

Hizb’allah organizations exist either legally or illegally in a variety of 

Middle East countries.

Hojat al islam: Literally: Authority on Islam. A mid-range to senior 

cleric ranking just below ayatollah. 

Imam: The leader of an often small Islamic Community (“a village 

Imam”). Sometimes the title also is used to suggest an individual 

who stands at the pinnacle of the entire Shi’ite Islamic community. 

In recent decades, the title has been applied by followers to Musa 

Sadr of Lebanon and Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran.

Khamenei, Ali: The current supreme religious guide (faqih) of Iran.

Khomeini, Ruhollah: The father of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Marja al Taqlid: Source of Emulation. Title given to a cleric by his 

followers when his life and thoughts are taken to be the model for 

good conduct and his statements are taken as authoritative.

Mubellegh al risala: Literally: carrier of the message. A mid-level 

clerical ranking in Shi’ite Islam.

Sadr, Muqtada: Firebrand cleric and son of Grand Ayatollah Sadiq 

al Sadr.

Sadr, Musa: A Iranian-trained cleric who became the head of the 

Shi’ite community in Lebanon in the 1970s. Sadr is one of the early 

models of an activist Islamic cleric.

Sayed: Roughly translated as “the honorable.” An honorifi c denoting 

the holder as a supposed descendant of the Prophet Mohammad. 

Clerical holders of this title, such as Muqtada al Sadr and Iran’s 

Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, wear black turbans.
49

SCIRI: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 

Currently a major Shi’ite political party. Sometimes translated as 

SAIRI, the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

SCLI: Supreme Council for the Liberation of Iraq. A small and radical 

organization with possible ties to Iraqi Hizb’allah.

Sistani, ‘Ali: The leading cleric in Iraq at the present time. Leader of 

the Najaf Hawza.

Talib: (plural: Taliban) A religious student preparing to be a cleric.

Velayet-e Faqih: The rule of the jurist. This concept is the basis for the 

current institutions for clerical rule in Iran.