IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-01754-COA
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AND DELORIS ROY APPELLANTS

v. BRIAN RUNNELS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/21/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CAROL L. W HITE-RICHARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: SUNFLOW ER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ANTHONY LOUIS SCHMIDT JR. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: BRIAN RUNNELS (PRO SE) NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: APPEAL DISMISSED - 02/26/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Brian Runnels was housed i n the Mississippi State Penitentiary serving a sixteen-y ear
sentence f

or arm ed robbery , a twenty -y ear sentence f or m anslaughter, and a one-y ear
sentence f

or possession of contrab a nd in prison. 1 On Septem ber 8, 2015, Runnels f

iled a grievance through t he Mississippi Departm ent o f Corrections’ (MDOC) Adm inistrative
Rem edy Program (ARP). The basis f or his grievance w as the i ssuance o f two Rule Violation
R e p orts (RVRs), f

or which he was f

o und guilty b y the M DOC hearing of f icer. RVR N o
. 01615668 alleged Runnels blocked the cell door of a prisoner who was being assaulted by

1 R u n n els w as co n v i cted f o r arm e d ro b b ery an d m an slau g h ter in A p ril 1 9 9 5

. H e w as su b seq u en tly co n v icted o f p o ssessio n o f co n trab an d b y th e S u n f lo w er C o u n ty C ircu it C o u rt.other prisoners, and RVR N o. 01615822 c laim ed Runnels went into an unauthorized area of

the prison. His punishm ent was a r e-classif i cation and loss of privileges. The MDOC denied his request to have the RVRs expunged. ¶2. Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 45

- 5

- 8 0 7 ( Rev. 2015), Runnels f iled a

com plaint with the Sunf

lower County Circuit Court on Decem ber 9, 2015, seeking judicial review. He asserted that the MDOC f a iled to conduct a n y investigation or record the hearing, and he r equested that the court expunge his RVRs f rom the f iles. The circuit court af

f irm ed the MDOC’s decision. ¶3. Runnels f

iled a m o tion to vacate the j ud g me n t u n d e r M i s s i s s i p p i Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing no evidence had been presented to support the RVRs’ f indings. A hearing was held on A ugust 17, 2016, wherein the State argued that Runnels was “ try ing to relitigate t h[ e] m atter” and had not “presented a ny new evidence or a n y thing that would f

all
f or grounds f

or r elief under Rule 60[ .]” On Septem ber 21, 2016, the circuit court ordered the

two RVRs (01615668 and 0 1615822) be e xpunged f rom Runnels’s prison r ecord because the
MDOC had f

ailed to show “where any of f icer identif

ied Runnels as a perpetrator of the acts alleged in the RVRs.” 2 The court determ ined:
In light of the f

a ctors to be considered under M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), this [ c]ourt f inds that Petitioner Runnels is not attem pting to use this m otion as a substitute appeal a nd that he tim ely f iled said m otion (approxim ately a m onth af ter e ntry of judgm ent )

. T h i s [ c]ourt previously concluded that M DOC’s decision f inding Petitioner guilty of both R VRs w as based on substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious. Af t er conducting a hearing into this m a tter, this [ c]ourt h as concluded th at its previous ruling w as wrong. Respondent

2 T h e circu it co u rt d en ied R u n n els’s m o tio n i n p a r t w ith resp e ct to h is req u ests to b e aw ard ed atto r

n ey ’s f ees an d to d em o te D elo ris R o y f r o m h er cu rren t p o sitio n
. 2f

ailed to presen t any

thing during t he hearing h eld by this [ c ] ourt to demo nstrate that any evidence was actually presented during Petitioner’s disciplinary hearings upon which the heari n g o f fi c e r ’ s decision could be based. This [ c]ourt f

i n d s t h a t in order to f

ully achieve justice, its o rder entered on March 21, 2016 should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of M.R.C.P.
T h e S t ate appeals, claim ing that the MDOC’s decision was supported b y substantial evidence and t hat the circuit c ourt abused its discretion in granting Runnels relief u nder Rule 60(b). 3
Th e State alternatively argues Runnels’s due-process rights were not violated because the punishm ent was m erely

re-classif ication and loss of

privileges. ¶4. Because Runnels has been released on parole since the f iling of this appeal, we f

ind that these issues are m oot and dism iss the appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5. In revi e w i n g a c ircuit court’s decision regarding an agency ’s action, we apply the

sam e standard of review as the circui t c o u r t , which is to determ i ne “whether the ad m i n i s t rative agency ’s order ‘(1) was unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) was arbitrary

or capricious, (3) was bey ond t he power of the adm inistrative agency to m a ke, or (4) violated

som e s tatutory or constitutional right o f the aggrieved p arty .’” Clincy v. A t wood , 65 So. 3d 327, 331 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Clay v. Epps , 19 So. 3d 743, 745 (¶7) (Miss.
Ct. A pp. 2008)). “A rebuttable presum ption e x ists that f

avors t he d ecision of the agency , and the challenging party bears the b urden of proving the c ontrary .” Id

. ( citing Clay , 19 So. 3d

at 746 (¶7)). Our review of a circ u i t c o u r t ’ s g rant of a Rule 60(b) m otion is lim ited to whether the court’s decision is an abuse of discretion. Dean v. Slade , 164 So. 3d 468, 470

3 D elo ris R o y , o n e o f t h e ap p ellan ts, is a co rrectio n al o f f icer em p l o y e d b y th e M D O C

. T h e ap p ellan ts w i ll co l lectiv ely b e ref erred to as th e “S tate.” 3(¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
DISCUSSION

¶6. Because Runnels a sserted i n his appellee’s brief that he is a “f ree m an,” indicating to the Court that h e is no longer in MDOC’s custody , we requested supplem ental brief ing f rom the State on whether the issu e s r a i s e d on appeal are m o ot. In response, the State acknowledges that R

unnels was paroled on June 9, 2017, but argues t hat R unnels’s release

s h o u ld not be considered by this Court because this inf o rm ation is not in the r e c o r d

. We

r e j ect the State’s argum ent, particularly considering that the State h as recently argued i n f avor of f inding that a p etitioner’s appeal o f an MDOC’s A RP decision was rendered m oot due the petitioner’s release f rom custody , even though there was no evidence in the record
of said release. S

ee, e.g. , Brief o

f Appellees at 2 1-22 , Turner v. Hall , 2017-CP-00800-COA,
2017 W L 9287279 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2017); 4 W illiams v. State , 228 S o. 3d 381, 382 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 017); a nd H unt v. Miss. Dep ’ t. of Corrections , 217 So. 3d 789, 791 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). ¶7. The Mississippi Suprem e Court has held: A case is m oot so long as a judgm ent o n the m e rits, if rendered, would be of no practical benef

it to the plaintif

f or detrim e n t to the d ef

endant. This Court h a s no authority to entertain an appeal where there is no a ctual controversy

. Cases in which an actual controversy existed at tr i a l b ut the controversy h as expired a t the tim e of review, becom e m oot.

. . . [ T ] h e r e v i e w procedure should not be allowed f o r the purpose of settling abstract or a c adem ic questions, and that we have no power to issue advisory opinions.

4 In T u rn er , t h i s C o u rt en tered a n o rd er, req u estin g t h at th e A p p ellees su p p l em en t th e reco rd w ith “d o c u m e n tatio n to su p p o rt th eir assertio n th at T u rn e r ’s ap p eal h as b eco m e m o o t.” In th is in s tan ce, s in ce n eith er p arty d isp u tes th at R u n n els h as b een released , w e f i n d su ch su p p lem en tatio n to th e reco rd u n n ecessary
. 4Fails v. Jefferson Davis Cty. Pub. Sch. Bd. , 95 So. 3 d 1223, 1225 (¶10) (Miss. 2 012) (internal

citations and internal q

u otation m arks om itted). The State adm its that “ o rdinarily , an inm ate’s a p p eal o f RVRs w ould be m oot if t he inm ate was released.” However, the State contends that “ in this situation, MDOC has appealed the e xpungem ent o f RVRs in which the
wrong standard was used[ ,] w hich could have a detrim ental ef f ect o f the discipline process in MDOC’s prisons.” The State f urther claim s t hat “the presence o f RVRs in Runnels’s history could af

f ect the level of classif

ication in a risk assessm ent and his current supervision plan while released” and “ if R unnel s i s r e v oked o r com m its a new crim e , t he past RVRs could im p act his classif

ication level which could af f e c t his ability to r eceive earned tim e and privileges.” (Em

phasis added). T he S tate’s argum ents against m ootness require this Court
to indulge in speculation of p otential f uture consequences to R

unnels; theref

ore, we f ind any f indings on the m erits of the appeal would not be of any p ractical benef it to Runnels or detrim e n t t o t h e S t ate a nd, instead, would be “f or t he purpose of settling [ an] abstract or academ ic question.” 5 ¶8. Additionally , the State claim s that this a p peal f al l s u n d e r o n e o r m o r e o f t h e exceptions to t h e mo o t ness d o ctrine. A case w ill not be considered m oot i f the action “is capable of repetition y et evading review, m eaning that ‘ (1) [ t]he challenged action was in its

5 C itin g Wilso n v. T

erh u n e , 3 1 9 F .3 d 4 7 7 , 4 7 9 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ), th e S tate arg u es t h at w h ere a p arty c an sh o w “co l lateral co n seq u en ces” f lo w in g f ro m th e a ctio n , th e case w o u ld n o t b e m ad e m o o t u p o n t h e i n m ate’s release. H o w ev er, th e N i n t h C ircu it o f th e U n i ted S tates C o u rt o f A p p eals d eclin ed “to ap p ly th e p resu m p t io n o f c o l l a t e r a l co n seq u en ces to p riso n d iscip lin a ry p ro ceed in g s.” Id

. at 4 8 1

. Wilso n also d id n o t c o n c e r n an in m ate’s release; th e issu e w as m o o t b e c a u s e h e h ad co m p leted h is p u n ish m en t, an d t h e ap p ellate co u rt f o u n d th at th e ad v erse co n seq u e n ces a l leg e d b y th e p etitio n er w o u ld b e “eith er v ag u e an d u n su p p o rted o r u n related to th e d iscip lin ary co n v ictio n .” W

ilso n , 3 1 9 F .3 d at 4 8 2

. 5duration too short to be f ully l itigated prior to its c essation or expiration, and (2) [ t]here was

a reasonable expectation that t he sam e com plaining party would b e subject to the sam e action again.’” Barrett v. City of Gulfport , 196 So. 3d 905, 912 (¶22) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Strong

v. Bostick, 420 S o. 2d 1356, 1359 (Miss. 1982)). W e f ind no m erit to the State’s claim that
Runne l s ’ s h e a r ings and judicial review were of short duration and not f ully litigated. Runnels com

pleted his punishm ent, and he f ully litigated the issuance of the RVRs through the appropriate ad m inistrative and judicial r eview processes. The State cites Al-Khidhr v. King , 245 So. 3d 552, 554 (¶¶9-10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), a case in which we considered the

me r i ts of the petitioner’s claim although he had been released, noting “we m ay addr e s s appeals considered m oot where the m atter is capable of repetition y et evading review.” That

case, however, i nvolved the calculation of the prisoner’s pre-sentence jail tim e, not a prison disciplinary proceeding as in t h e p r e s e nt case. 6 Because we f ind there is no r easonable expectation that Runnels could be subject t o the s am e action (RVR) i n the f uture, we f

ind it does not m eet the exception to the m ootness doctrine. ¶9. “ I n a d d i t i o n , this C ourt will review an otherwise m oot issue ‘when t h e q u e s t i o n

concerns a m atter of such a nature that it would be distinctly detrim ental t o t he public interest
that there should be a f

ailure b y t h e d i s missal to declare and e nf orce a rule f

or f uture conduct.’” Barrett , 196 So. 3d at 912 (¶22) (qu o t i n g S a r t i n v
. Barlow ex r el. Smith, 196
M i s s
. 1 5 9 , 16 So. 2 d 372, 376 (Miss. 1944)). The State claim s “[ t]he issue o f pro p e r l y

6 T h e S t ate f

a ils to n o te t h at in a seco n d ap p eal, A l-K h i d h r v. K in g , 2 0 1 8 WL 5 2 6 2 6 2 2 , 2 0 1 7 -C P -0 0 2 6 9 -C O A at * 3 (¶1 0 ) (M iss. C t. A p p
. O ct. 2 3 , 2 0 1 8 ), th is C o u rt f o u n d K i n g ’s ap p eal w as m o o t b ecau se h e h ad b een released f ro m cu sto d y

less th an tw o m o n th s p rio r to f ilin g th e ap p eal. 6disciplining prisoners f or crim inal actions while i n prison is one of prof ound p ublic interest

to ensure justice is d one and to protect s ociety ,” and the c a se is of “public interest” because
it could inundate the courts with “f rivolous lawsuits” and put the RVR process in “jeopardy .” Prisoners have a statutory right t o judicial review of an MDOC decision under s e ction 45-5-
807. The evidence needed to support an RVR m u st be decided on a case-by -case basis.
W h ether t he prisoner’s claim s are “f rivolous” is a m atter f

or t h e t r i a l c ourt. This Court
cannot see how our review o f the court’s f inding on whether substantial e v idence existed to support R

unnels’s t wo i n d i vidual RVRs, which the State adm its only subjected him to reclassif ication and loss of

privileges, is a m atter of

“public interest.” ¶10. A ccordingly , due to R unnels’s release f

rom MDOC custody , we dism iss the appeal

as m oot. ¶11. APPEAL DISMISSED.
C A R L T O N AND J. W ILSON, P.JJ., G R E E N L E E , W E S T B R O O K S , T I N D E L L , McDONALD, L AWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR. C. W ILSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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