2018 UT App 178

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

YAN ROSS AND RANDI WAGNER,

Appellees,

v.

DOUGLAS R. SHORT,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20151055-CA

Filed September 20, 2018

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable John Paul Kennedy and Ryan M. Harris

No. 070915820

Douglas R. Short, Appellant Pro Se

John H. Bogart, Attorney for Appellees

JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DAVID N.

MORTENSEN concurred.

HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Douglas R. Short appeared as an attorney for 

an intervenor in supplemental proceedings to enforce a 

judgment. Short has faced multiple sanctions based on his 

improper conduct as an attorney in those proceedings. This 

appeal concerns the most recent sanctions imposed by the 

district court, ordering Short to pay the attorney fees that 

Appellees, Yan Ross and Randi Wagner, incurred in responding 

to a series of motions that lacked a legal or factual basis or were 

submitted for an improper purpose. Short appeals the district 

court’s final judgment awarding sanctions totaling $27,981.07, 

plus interest, as well as the denial of his subsequent motions to 

vacate that judgment. We affirm and award Appellees the costs 

and attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal.
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20151055-CA 2 2018 UT App 178

BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2009, Ross and Wagner moved for a writ of 

execution to enforce a judgment against Global Fraud Solutions 

(GFS). Michael K. Barnett, the general manager of GFS, 

intervened, claiming that he personally owned the assets subject 

to the writ. Short appeared as legal counsel for Barnett.

¶3 On December 30, 2014, as a result of Short’s performance 

as counsel in these proceedings, the district court granted Ross 

and Wagner’s motion for sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure (the Sanctions Order). In an attempt to 

“compensate [Ross and Wagner] as well as deter Mr. Short,” the 

district court directed Ross and Wagner’s attorney to submit “an 

affidavit of attorney fees and a proposed order . . . detailing the 

amount incurred in responding to the subject motions.” The 

court imposed the sanctions under rule 11 and its “‘inherent 

power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their 

conduct thwart the court’s scheduling and movement of cases 

through the court.’” (Quoting Maxwell v. Woodall, 2014 UT App 

125, ¶ 6, 328 P.3d 869.)

¶4 As directed, Ross and Wagner’s attorney, John H. Bogart, 

filed a declaration (the Bogart Declaration) regarding attorney 

fees within ten days. Short filed no opposition, and Ross and 

Wagner moved to submit the matter for decision. The district 

court found that the attorney fees were reasonable, granted relief 

in the amount requested, and invited Ross and Wagner to 

submit a proposed order reflecting the ruling.

¶5 Ross and Wagner served Short with a proposed order 

regarding the fees request. Again, Short filed no objection to the 

proposed order, and Ross and Wagner submitted the order for 

signature once the time for filing objections had passed. On 

February 9, 2015, the court entered the final order as proposed, 

awarding attorney fees in the amount of $27,981.07 (the Fees 

Order).
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20151055-CA 3 2018 UT App 178

¶6 Short failed to pay the award, and Ross and Wagner 

moved for entry of judgment. They served Short with a 

proposed, final judgment assessing interest on the original 

award. Once Short’s deadline to file an objection had passed, 

Ross and Wagner moved to submit the motion for entry of 

judgment. That same day, Short moved for an extension of time 

to file an opposition. The court granted a two-day extension. 

When Short failed to file an opposition within that timeframe, 

Ross and Wagner again submitted the matter for signature. The 

district court entered the judgment as proposed on July 2, 2015 

(the Judgment).

¶7 On September 30, 2015, Short filed two motions to vacate 

the Judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. On November 12, 2015, the district court denied both 

motions by order. Short then filed a motion to vacate the 

November 12 order. On November 30, 2015, the district court 

denied that motion as well.

¶8 Short filed this appeal challenging the Judgment and both 

the November 12 and 30 orders denying his motions to vacate.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9 Short raises three issues on appeal. First, Short argues that 

the district court should have granted his rule 60(b) motion for 

relief from the Judgment. “We review a Rule 60(b) motion for 

abuse of discretion.”1 Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 2010 

UT App 258, ¶ 3, 241 P.3d 371.

 

1. The time to appeal the Judgment was not tolled by Short’s rule

60(b) motion, because it was filed more than twenty-eight days 

after the Judgment was entered. See Utah R. App. P. 4 (b)(1)(e). 

Because he did not file an appeal within thirty days of the 

(continued...)
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20151055-CA 4 2018 UT App 178

¶10 Second, Short contends that the district court improperly 

refused to reconsider its prior decisions. “As long as the case has 

not been appealed and remanded, reconsideration of an issue 

before a final judgment is within the sound discretion of the 

district court.” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 

UT 73, ¶ 27, 196 P.3d 588. Accordingly, “[w]e review a district 

court’s decision to reconsider an earlier decision for an abuse of 

discretion.” Jordan Constr., Inc. v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 

2017 UT 28, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 296.

¶11 Third, Short argues that the Judgment is void because the 

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose 

sanctions against him. “The determination of whether a court 

has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law[.]” Wasatch 

County v. Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT App 221, ¶ 4, 217 P.3d 270 

(quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Vacate

¶12 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Short’s rule 60(b) motions to vacate the Judgment. Rule 60(b) of 

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to “set aside a 

final judgment for reasons such as mistake, newly discovered 

evidence, or fraud.” Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 87, 342 P.3d 182. 

Short argues that the court should have granted the motions on 

two grounds: (1) the Judgment was not final, because “[t]here 

 

(...continued)

Judgment, see id. 4(a), we have jurisdiction to review only the 

denial of the rule 60(b) motion. Reisbeck v. HCA Health Services of 

Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, ¶ 5, 2 P.3d 447 (“Failure to file a timely 

notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction over the 

appeal.”).
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20151055-CA 5 2018 UT App 178

are several missing Rule 7(f)(2) orders” and (2) the Judgment 

was based on fraud or mistake. The district court acted within its 

discretion in rejecting both arguments.

A. Finality

¶13 Short argues that the district court should have granted 

him relief from judgment under rule 60(b) because the Judgment 

was “not a final appealable judgment.” Short argues that “there 

are several missing Rule 7(f)(2) orders” and that “[a]ll 

Rule 7(f)(2) orders must be entered for the ‘Judgment’ to be 

final.” Short does not connect this argument to rule 60(b) or 

explain why it would entitle him to relief from the Judgment. 

Even assuming that failure to comply with rule 7(f)(2) 

constitutes a “mistake” or “other reason justifying relief” under 

rule 60(b), the district court correctly ruled that the Judgment 

complied with rule 7(f)(2).

¶14 Under the version of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 

effect at the time, rule 7(f)(2) provided:

Unless the court approves the proposed order 

submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless 

otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 

party shall, within 21 days after the court’s 

decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed 

order in conformity with the court’s decision. 

Objections to the proposed order shall be filed 

within 7 days after service. The party preparing the 

order shall file the proposed order upon being 

served with an objection or upon expiration of the 

time to object.

Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) (2014). Both the Fees Order and the 

Judgment fully complied with this rule. Both proposed orders 

were served on Short and he was afforded time to respond. He 

failed to file an objection to either proposed order, even after 
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20151055-CA 6 2018 UT App 178

obtaining an extension with respect to the Judgment. After the

expiration of the time to object, Ross and Wagner filed motions 

to submit, and both orders were entered in the form in which 

they were proposed. Neither order left any issues open for 

resolution, making them both final, appealable orders. See Cheves 

v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 52, 993 P.2d 191 (explaining that 

postjudgment orders are subject to their own test of finality 

based on the substance and effect of those orders).

¶15 Although the Judgment fully complied with rule 7(f)(2) 

and was otherwise final and appealable, Short argues that the 

Judgment was not final, because the Sanctions Order “clearly 

was not a final Rule 7(f)(2) order.” But the Sanctions Order did 

not purport to be a final order. As the district court noted in 

denying Short’s rule 60(b) motion, the order “expressly state[d] 

that one thing remained to be completed—a declaration 

requesting fees to be filed for counsel for [Ross and Wagner].” 

Once this contemplated action was accomplished, the district 

court entered a final judgment. Short offers no authority for his 

argument that the Sanctions Order had to be reduced to a rule 

7(f)(2) order before the Judgment could be considered final.

¶16 Relatedly, Short argues that the Judgment was not final, 

because there were no final orders issued on what he 

characterizes as “precursor motions,” or, put differently, rulings 

he believes “must be finalized before one could logically and 

properly conclude that Counsel has violated Rule 11.” Again, 

Short cites no authority for this proposition. Not only is his 

argument unsupported, it runs contrary to the doctrine of 

merger of judgments. Under this doctrine, “once final judgment 

is entered, all preceding interlocutory rulings that were steps 

towards final judgment merge into the final judgment and 

become appealable at that time.” Butler v. Corporation of President 

of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2014 UT 41, ¶ 24 n.6, 

337 P.3d 280 (quotation simplified).
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20151055-CA 7 2018 UT App 178

¶17 Short has not identified any mistake in the Judgment or 

any other reason for granting relief. Consequently, he cannot 

establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his rule 60(b) motion based on lack of finality.

B. Fraud or Mistake

¶18 Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied relief from the Judgment on the grounds of fraud 

or mistake. Short argues that the Bogart Declaration misstated 

the amount of attorney fees incurred because it included fees 

associated with litigating the rule 11 motion for sanctions. The 

Sanctions Order granted attorney fees incurred in responding to 

the “subject motions,” which Short interprets to mean only the 

underlying motions found to be in violation of rule 11.

¶19 In denying the rule 60(b) motion, the district court found 

that the Bogart Declaration was not misleading, because it 

reflected a reasonable reading of the Sanctions Order. The court 

had directed Bogart to submit “an affidavit of attorney fees and a 

proposed order . . . detailing the amount incurred in responding 

to the subject motions.” The district court found that Bogart 

reasonably interpreted the Sanctions Order as encompassing the 

“costs and fees incurred in preparing and arguing the motions 

for sanctions and otherwise responding to [Short’s] improper 

and abusive filings.” Therefore, the court found that “there was 

no misrepresentation or fraud in Mr. Bogart’s Declaration.”

¶20 Because rule 60(b) relief is subject to the court’s discretion, 

the district court also considered “the fairness of providing the 

requested relief.” The court noted that Short did not file any 

objection to the Bogart Declaration despite ample opportunity to 

do so. In fact, the district court noted that it “waited an extra two 

weeks after the Fee Request was submitted to allow for any 

objections,” but “[n]one was filed.” The court concluded that the 

requested relief was inappropriate when “Short had every 
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20151055-CA 8 2018 UT App 178

opportunity to oppose the Motions for Sanctions and the Fee 

Request and did not oppose either of them.”

¶21 “A trial court has discretion in determining whether a 

movant has shown rule 60(b) grounds, and this court will 

reverse the trial court’s ruling only when there has been an 

abuse of discretion.” Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, ¶ 19, 

183 P.3d 1052 (quotation simplified). Here, the district court 

determined that the Judgment was not a product of fraud or 

mistake, because the Bogart Declaration was a plausible 

interpretation of the Sanctions Order. In addition, the court 

determined that granting the requested relief would be 

inappropriate where Short waited until after the final judgment 

was entered before claiming that the declaration was misleading. 

Short has not established that either determination amounted to 

an abuse of discretion. Because Short failed to show grounds for 

relief from the Judgment, we affirm the court’s denial of the 

rule 60(b) motion.

II. Reconsideration of Prior Decisions

¶22 Short contends that the district court improperly refused 

to reconsider prior decisions made by a predecessor judge. This 

same argument was raised in the companion appeal, Ross v. 

Barnett, 2018 UT App 179, which we also decide today. For the 

reasons fully set forth in that opinion, the district court acted 

well within its discretion in declining to reconsider issues 

already decided against Barnett. Id. ¶¶ 37–41. In any event, Short 

has not explained why he would have standing to challenge 

adverse decisions relating to his client in this separate appeal 

challenging rule 11 sanctions against him personally.

¶23 The only argument Short makes relevant to this appeal is 

that the district court had an obligation to retry the motion for 

sanctions and make its own findings of fact and conclusions of 

law as to why each of Short’s challenged filings lacked an 

adequate factual or legal basis. Short raised this issue in his 
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20151055-CA 9 2018 UT App 178

motion to vacate the Judgment when he argued that the 

predecessor judge had not made adequate findings to support 

the imposition of sanctions, leaving that task to the new judge. 

See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3) (“When imposing sanctions, the court 

will describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of 

this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.”).

¶24 The district court properly declined to revisit the 

adequacy of the findings because a final order had been entered 

on that issue. “Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider 

and change their position with respect to any orders or decisions 

as long as no final judgment has been rendered.” Brookside Mobile 

Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 968. But the 

district court expressly found that a final judgment had been 

entered regarding the rule 11 sanctions. As the district court 

correctly observed, “[i]n the context of post-judgment 

proceedings, orders may become final and subject to appeal 

seriatum. So long as the order fully disposes of the matter(s) to 

which it is addressed, it is final for purposes of appeal.” See

Barnett, 2018 UT App 179, ¶ 20. Although the Sanctions Order 

itself “expressly state[d] that one thing remained to be 

completed—a declaration of fees to be filed by counsel for 

Plaintiffs,” the Fees Order left no issues unresolved and 

constituted a final, appealable order. Short failed to file a timely 

appeal and was not entitled to bypass the appellate process by 

asking the district court to review a prior decision that had been 

reduced to a final, appealable order.

III. Authority to Impose Sanctions

¶25 Finally, Short challenges the district court’s authority to 

enter the Judgment. Short’s principal argument rests on the 

faulty premise that the district court lacked “jurisdiction to 

adjudicate any question of ownership between Barnett and GFS 

in these supplemental proceedings.” Therefore, Short argues, the 

district court had no “inherent or rule 11 authority to sanction 

counsel in proceedings it ha[d] no judicial authority to conduct.” 
Ross v. Short

20151055-CA 10 2018 UT App 178

For the reasons set forth in Ross v. Barnett, 2018 UT App 179, the 

district court had jurisdiction over these supplemental 

proceedings in which Barnett elected to intervene. Id. ¶¶ 25–32.

¶26 In any event, the district court’s authority over an 

attorney appearing before the court is not dependent on the 

court’s jurisdiction over the underlying action or over the party 

the attorney represents. Under rule 11, any attorney or party 

who files a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court 

is subject to sanctions for violating the rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 

11(b), (c). In addition, the court has “inherent power to control 

the conduct of attorneys and litigants whose actions interfered 

with the administration of justice and resulted in wasted time 

and effort by opposing counsel.” Maxwell v. Woodall, 2014 UT 

App 125, ¶ 7, 328 P.3d 869 (quotation simplified). 

¶27 For the same reasons, we reject Short’s argument that the 

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a 

judgment against him because he is not a “party” to the case. 

Short’s argument ignores the language of rule 11, which 

expressly authorizes courts to impose sanctions, not just against 

parties, but against attorneys who violate the rule. See Utah R. 

Civ. P. 11. It also ignores the court’s well-established inherent 

authority and power to sanction attorneys:

The summary jurisdiction which the court has over 

its attorneys as officers of the court is inherent, 

continuing, and plenary and ought to be assumed 

and exercised not only to maintain and protect the 

integrity and dignity of the court, to secure 

obedience to its rules and process, and to rebuke 

interference with the conduct of its business, but 

also to control and protect its officers, including 

attorneys.

Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 13, 985 P.2d 255 (quotation 

simplified). In light of this authority, Short’s contention that a 
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20151055-CA 11 2018 UT App 178

court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment of sanctions against 

an attorney is baseless.2

IV. Attorney Fees

¶28 Ross and Wagner request their attorney fees incurred in 

responding to this appeal. Under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, if the court determines an appeal taken “is 

either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 

may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 

reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.” Utah R. App. 

P. 33(a). An appeal “interposed for the purpose of delay is one 

interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause 

needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 

benefit only the party filing the appeal.” Id. R. 33(b).

¶29 We agree with Ross and Wagner that this appeal is not 

simply meritless but part of a “long-standing pattern of abusive 

and obstructive conduct.” The never-ending and duplicative 

filings in this case, including the filing of seven separate appeals, 

appear designed to make this litigation prohibitively expensive. 

And we cannot escape the conclusion that this particular appeal 

is an effort by Short to gain time while he avoids paying the 

sanctions ordered by the district court.

¶30 We thus grant Ross and Wagner’s request and remand to 

the district court to calculate the reasonable amount of attorney 

fees and costs that they incurred in connection with this appeal.

 

2. Short also contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

order him to pay a nonparty attorney directly. While the Fees 

Order directed Short to “pay to [Bogart’s law firm] the amount 

of $27,981.07,” the Judgment does not contain such a directive. 

Instead, the Judgment from which Short appeals orders that 

“Plaintiffs recover from Douglas R. Short $27,981.07,” plus 

interest.
Ross v. Short

20151055-CA 12 2018 UT App 178

CONCLUSION

¶31 The district court acted within its discretion in denying 

Short’s motions to vacate the Judgment and in declining to 

reconsider its prior decisions. We also reject Short’s challenge to 

the district court’s jurisdiction given the court’s well-established 

authority to impose sanctions against attorneys appearing before 

it. Accordingly, we affirm and remand for an award of attorney 

fees and costs incurred by Ross and Wagner in defending this 

appeal.