## UNITED STATES ARMY COUR T OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before KERN, YOB, and ALDYKIEWICZ Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v. Private E2 CHRISTOPHER B. WILLIAMS United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20110265

U.S. Army Medical Depart ment Center and School Thomas Berg, Military Judge Lieutenant Colonel Randolph Swansiger, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Richard E. Gorini , JA; Captain Richard M. Gallagher, JA.

For Appellee: Pursuant to A.C.C.A Rule 15.2, no response filed.

30 November 2011

---------------------------------- SUMMARY DISPOSITION

---------------------------------- Per Curiam:

A military judge, sitting as a special court-martia l, convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one specifi cation of absence without leave [hereinafter AWOL], one specificat ion of failure to go to his appointed place of duty, one specification of going from his appointed place of duty, two specifications of violation of a lawful genera l order, five specifications of making a false official statement, and one spec ification of wrongful use of cocaine, in violation of Articles 86, 92, 107, and 112a, Uniform Code of Military Ju stice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 892, 907 and 912a [hereinafter UCMJ]. Appellant was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for four months, and reductio n in rank to Private E1. This case is before us for review pursu ant to Article 66, UCMJ.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Specification 2 of Charge II alleges a false official statement to Ms. KM, a civilian nurse at Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC), to wit: “I did not seek
treatment earlier because I ha d been mugged and ki dnapped and they just let me go today,” or words to that effe ct. Specification 3 of Charge II allege s a false officialWILLIAMS

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2 statement to Detective NMD, a San Antonio police det ective, to wit: “I was kidnapped,” or words to th at effect. During the prov idence inquiry, appellant acknowledged the official natu re of the statemen ts. Applying the fa ctors articulated

in United States v. Teffeau , 58 M.J. 62, 68-69 (C.A.A.F. 2003) and United States v. Day , 66 M.J. 172, 174-75 (C.A.A.F. 2008) to the fact s elicited during appellant’s colloquy with the military judge and to the stipulated facts in Prosecution Exhibit 1, both statements qualify as o fficial statements. Notwithstan ding the fact that these
statements were made to ci vilians and did not address a matter wi thin appellant’s line of duty, both statements qualify as “official.”

Regarding Specification 2 of Charge II, the followin g factors sup port finding
an “official statement”: the statemen t was made when ap pellant was not yet suspected of any cr iminal activity ( i.e. , he was the alleged victim of a kidnapping vice an AWOL returnee); th e statement was made on-post in a military hospital; the
statement was made to a nu rse employed by the Army; the question asked by the nurse triggering appellant’s response relate d to the nurse’s offi cial on-post duties; the question about prior treatment or lack th ereof is consistent wi th a line of duty determination notwithstanding the lack of any on going line of duty investigation; Ms. KM, at the time of the questioning, was in the performance of her official Army duties; present during th e questioning was SSG G, ap pellant’s noncommissioned officer (NCO) escort; Ms. KM was aware of appellant’s mil itary status; the statement related to an alleged crime th at occurred on-post and committed by two suspected civilians, an offense of intere st to both civilian a nd military authorities; and appellant’s statement could have and did subject him to crimin al liability in the military justice system for va rious offenses in addition to his false official statement ( i.e. , the statement established his absen ce from his unit subjecting him to prosecution under Article 86 in addition to Arti cle 107). Additiona lly, shortly after the making of the false stat ement to Ms. KM, appellant knew or shou ld have known there would be parallel criminal investiga tions based on his stat ement, because he was interviewed by a civilia n detective as the victim of an alle ged on-post kidnapping by two civilians.

Regarding Specification 3 of Charge II, the followin g factors sup port finding
an “official statement”: at the time appellant was interviewed, he was not a suspect of any offense, but was th e apparent “victim” of a ki dnapping by two unidentified
civilians committed on Fort Sam Houston, an active Ar my installation; present during the questioning was SSG G, appellant’s NCO es cort; Detective NMD was aware of appellant’s military status; the st atement related to an alleged crime that occurred on post and committe d by two suspected civilians, an offense of interest to
both civilian and milit ary authorities; appellant’s statement could have and did subject him to criminal liability in the military ju stice system for va rious offenses in
addition to his false official statement ( i.e. , the statement established his absence from his unit subjecting him to prosecution under Article 86 in addition to Article 107); at the time of the questioning appell ant either knew or sh ould have known that there would be parallel criminal investiga tions based on his stat ement, because heWILLIAMS

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3 was interviewed by a civilia n detective as the victim of an alle ged on-post kidnapping by two civilians.

CONCLUSION

On consideration of the entire recor d, we hold the finding s of guilty and the sentence as approved by the convening au thority are correct in law and fact. Accordingly, the fi ndings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

JOANNE P. TETREAULT E
f C JOANNE P. TETREAULT ELDRIDGE Deputy Clerk of Court FOR THE COURT: