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72–478 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–338 

AGRO–DEFENSE: RESPONDING TO 

THREATS AGAINST AMERICA’S AGRICULTURE AND 

FOOD SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

LISA M. POWELL, Majority Staff Director 

JESSICA K. NAGASAKO, Professional Staff Member 

RACHEL R. WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

JENA N. MCNEILL, Professional Staff Member 

AARON H. WOOLF, Chief Clerk 

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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Moran .................................................................................................. 33 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

Colonel John T. Hoffman (Ret.), Senior Research Fellow, National Center 

for Food Protection and Defense, University of Minnesota .............................. 3 

Paul Williams, DVM, Director of Agriculture, Food and Veterinary Programs, 

Division of Homeland Security, Georgia Emergency Management Agency .... 5 

Lisa Shames, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 16 

Doug Meckes, DVM, Director of Food, Agricultural, and Veterinary Defense 

Division, Office of Health Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 18 

Ted Elkin, Director, Office of Food Defense, Communication and Emergency 

Response, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug 

Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ................. 20 

Sheryl K. Maddux, Deputy Director, Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination, U.S. Department of Agriculture, accompanied by John 

R. Clifford, DVM, Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer for 

the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service .............................................. 22 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Elkin, Ted: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

Hoffman, Colonel John T. (Ret.): 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Maddux, Sheryl K.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79 

Meckes, Doug: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Shames, Lisa: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Williams, Paul: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses for the record from: 

Dr. Meckes ........................................................................................................ 92 

Mr. Elkin ........................................................................................................... 95 

Ms. Maddux ...................................................................................................... 102 

Background .............................................................................................................. 108 

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AGRO–DEFENSE: RESPONDING TO 

THREATS AGAINST AMERICA’S AGRICULTURE 

AND FOOD SYSTEM 

TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room 

SD–628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka and Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management (OGM), the Federal Workforce, 

and the District of Columbia to order. I want to welcome our witnesses. Aloha and thank you so much for being here. 

Today the Subcommittee will examine the Federal Government’s 

progress in implementing the Nation’s food and agriculture defense 

policy. Specifically, we will look at our readiness to respond to and 

recover from a terrorist attack and natural disasters affecting food 

and agriculture, and we will be reviewing a new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on that topic. 

Protecting agriculture is critically important to the well-being of 

Americans. The U.S. agriculture and food sector annually generates more than $300 billion worth of food. One in 12 American 

jobs is in this sector. Agro-terrorism, such as the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases, poses a critical threat to both 

public health and the world economy. 

The agricultural and food system is particularly vulnerable because relatively unsophisticated methods could produce tremendous 

damage. For instance, foot-and-mouth disease is a highly contagious disease affecting cattle and certain other animals. It can 

easily be transmitted by aerosol, clothing, and shoes. 

The impact of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak could be devastating to our country’s economy. The 2001 outbreak in the United 

Kingdom (UK) resulted in the slaughter of approximately 7 million 

animals, and financial losses of $8 billion to agriculture, tourism, 

and other sectors. In 2002, documents from an al-Qaeda training 

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camp showed that the terrorist group had researched how to compromise U.S. food supplies. 

As we mark the 10-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001, 

attacks, we may not be facing a specific agro-terror plot, but we 

must remain vigilant. 

I would like to highlight several issues that particularly concern 

me. The Government Accountability Office will testify that there is 

no centralized coordination to oversee the Federal Government’s 

progress in implementing Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

(HSPD) 9 which spells out our Nation’s agro defense policy. This 

means we cannot be sure of the effectiveness of agencies’ efforts. 

Additionally, I am concerned about how well Federal agencies 

are working with each other and their State, Tribal, local, and industry partners. No single agency has the ability to address these 

threats and challenges alone. All levels of government, industry, 

and citizens need to work together to limit the consequences if an 

attack occurs. We will look at different areas where coordination 

and collaboration is critical, such as information sharing, surveillance, and disaster assistance. 

I am also concerned about the Federal veterinarian workforce 

and its ability to respond to major animal disease outbreaks, such 

as the bird flu or foot-and-mouth disease. Federal veterinarians 

perform critical food safety research and public health functions. 

I held a hearing in 2009 on this topic, where GAO identified several challenges, including troubling veterinarian shortages at numerous agencies involved in food safety inspections and responding 

to these disease outbreaks. Since that hearing, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has established a council that brings 

Federal agencies together to work on this issue. I look forward to 

hearing about what progress the agencies here today have made in 

this area. 

Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, we have taken steps to 

prepare for an attack on our food or agricultural systems, but I remain concerned that America is not ready to effectively respond 

and recover from an agricultural food event. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this afternoon and to a productive discussion with you. 

I look forward to hearing from our first panel and welcome you 

here today. Colonel John Hoffman, who is the Senior Research Fellow at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense 

(NCFPD), at the University of Minnesota, and Dr. Paul Williams, 

the Director of Agriculture, Food, and Veterinary Programs at the 

Georgia Emergency Management Agency. 

As you know, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses, and I would ask both of you to stand and raise your 

right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do. 

Dr. WILLIAMS. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. It will be noted for the record that 

the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

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1The prepared statement of Colonel Hoffman appears in the appendix on page 34. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statements will be part of the record, and I would also like to remind 

you to please limit your remarks to 5 minutes. Colonel Hoffman, 

will you please proceed with your statement? 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL JOHN T. HOFFMAN (RET.),1 SENIOR 

RESEARCH FELLOW, NATIONAL CENTER FOR FOOD PROTECTION AND DEFENSE, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 

Colonel HOFFMAN. Chairman Akaka, I am honored to represent 

the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence (COE), 

to provide my perspective on the progress and continuing needs in 

the effort to defend the Nation’s food supply infrastructure from intentional attacks and catastrophic failure. 

We believe the global integration and overall complexity of the 

food supply chain requires that we continue to improve our extensive food safety system and aggressively deploy and mature our 

food defense capabilities. 

The availability of sufficient and safe food is key to the health 

and stability of any Nation. Food is the one infrastructure you cannot opt out of. The dual mission of safety and defense, collectively 

referred to as food protection, must have the same standing and 

dedication of resources as protecting any other infrastructure. 

Despite the significant progress in food protection resulting from 

Homeland Security President Directive (HSPD)–7 and HSPD–9, 

and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), sector-specific plans under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and the impending 

implementation of the new FDA Foods Modernization Act, much 

remains to be done. 

Thousands die and hundreds of thousands are sickened each year 

by food-borne illness. Dr. Robert Scharff estimated in his article on 

health-related costs from food-borne illness in the United States, 

that the cost to the Nation is at least $152 billion. Some contend 

it is closer to $1.4 trillion once private sector costs are included. 

Given the current level of food-borne illness in the United States, 

the concentration of supply chains, our growing reliance on food 

imports from Nations with suspect food safety standards, and the 

increasing frequency of economically motivated adulteration events, 

how will we know an actual terrorist attack has taken place, as opposed to another routine food-borne illness event. 

In fact, it may not take weeks, but months to recognize that an 

intentional attack on our food system is unfolding. Recent events 

such as the contamination of green peppers with Salmonella St. 

Paul from Mexico, and this summer’s bean sprout contamination 

with E. coli in Germany demonstrate the large geographic footprint, the potential for extensive casualties, substantial financial 

burden, and political cost where only a small quantity of one product in international trade is involved. 

This has not been lost on our potential adversaries. For example, 

the following is a translation provided by the Counter Agro Terrorism Research Center (CATRC), in Israel of a recent post to a 

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Jihadist internet forum: ‘‘I say, and may Allah help us to success, 

the qualities of the E. Coli, as well as the ability to develop it into 

biological weapon, bio-engineered in a laboratory, make the E. coli 

a most attractive candidate and a significant element in biological 

warfare, spreading violently, and killing silently, irritating the enemies and tearing their guts apart.’’ Chilling to hear. 

Key provisions of HSPD–9 have been implemented with varying 

degrees of success. Functional information surveillance, deployment 

of preventive controls, and mitigation strategies have all suffered 

from distributed responsibilities across government, gaps in overlaps and agency authorities and their capabilities, and concerns 

about unintended consequences. 

The variability of food safety governance from local to State to 

Federal is another key problem in deploying and maturing an effective food defense system. Simply put, there is no single, coherent, 

clearly delineated line of authority over our Nation’s food defense 

efforts. 

The various and not insignificant challenges are further complicated by concerns over proprietary information protection, liability issues, and the difficulty of implementing an effective system 

that does not unnecessarily drive up the cost of food. The unfortunate truth is that we as a Nation lack effective surveillance for 

emergent high consequence food borne illness events, domestic and 

global. 

At present, our primary detection capability is the emergency 

room. This limits us to a detect to respond capability. Relying primarily on a response-focused detection system is expensive, both in 

terms of human suffering and economic impact. 

While we can start in many places, what we need most is to expand surveillance and detection to include points much earlier in 

these events’ time lines. This would enable mitigation strategies or 

preventive controls to be informed by surveillance and detection. 

There are two detection modes that need to become our objective 

capabilities, both of which are envisioned in the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). First and more reasonably developed, with 

commitment, appropriate senior leadership emphasis and some 

moderate resourcing is detect to protect. This capability detects and 

identifies serious emergent events closer to the first casualties so 

as to intervene and protect more of the population that might otherwise be exposed. 

Ultimately, we need to move to a detect to prevent policy, where 

surveillance detects contaminated adulterated products before they 

are consumed and emergent events in foreign countries are detected before they reach the United States. Such capability, combined with new risk assessment, event modeling, diagnostic tools, 

and improved mitigation and response capabilities could render our 

food supply chain a less attractive target for our adversaries. 

From many perspectives, the Food Modernization Safety Act may 

place too much of the early intentional threat identification task on 

the private sector where there is only limited capability to fulfill 

this role. As a result, we may be blindsided by an intentional foodbased attack on this Nation some time soon. 

Such an event could deal a devastating blow to the psyche of the 

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1The prepared statement of Dr. Williams appears in the appendix on page 43. 

omy, productivity, national security, and our own food security. 

Successful implementation of the FSMA, which recognizes the risk 

covered in the spectrum of biological to chemical to radiological, 

will certainly reduce incidents of food borne illness, but a lot remains to be done. 

Aligning government authorities, supporting an increasingly 

complex nature of responsibilities across government and industry, 

and averting criminal and terrorism-related contamination events 

without unduly increasing the price of food is a daunting challenge. 

As many in the food and agriculture sector have stated, food is the 

ultimate weapon of mass distribution and agriculture is the ultimate weapon of mass unemployment. 

Failure to effectively deploy a national food and agricultural defense capability represents a major strategic risk to the Nation. 

This risk begs additional focus, new approaches to our food system, 

preventive controls, surveillance, and early event detection. We ignore these at our peril. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Colonel Hoffman. Dr. Williams, please proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL WILLIAMS,1 DVM, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD, AND VETERINARY PROGRAMS, DIVISION 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, GEORGIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

Dr. WILLIAMS. Senator Akaka, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and give you an overview of the State’s perspective to the implementation of HSPD–9 and the Emergency 

Support Function (ESF–11). From the State’s perspective, the entire concept of ESF–11 and integrated agriculture emergency management did not begin with September 11, 2001. It began in the 

1990s as a result of natural disasters. 

In 1994, Georgia, Florida, and Indiana became the first States in 

the Nation to have an ESF–11 in the State Emergency Operation 

Plan. In 1995, the National Institute of Animal Agriculture comprised of the Nation’s largest agribusinesses, recommended that 

the Federal Government install an ESF–11 in the Federal Response Plan (FRP). 

In 2001, the National Emergency Management Association 

(NEMA) contracted with the Georgia Emergency Management 

Agency (GEMA) to write a model ESF–11 to be added to the Federal Response Plan. In 2002, the Gilmore Commission recommended to the White House Advisory Council to the President 

that the intent of the model be placed in the new National Response Plan. This is the genesis of ESF–11. 

The concept of Animal Health Emergency Management (AHEM) 

and Agriculture and Food Defense has for the most part been a capability that has found its leadership, direction, and energy at the 

State level. Federal agencies have, for the most part, participated 

with a reluctant acceptance. 

In the broad context of Food Defense and Critical Infrastructure, 

there is a reluctance to provide the same level of commitment as 

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though having statutory responsibility for all elements of the National Response Framework (NRF), including Critical Infrastructure, frequently abdicate their responsibility for leadership and 

oversight to the sector specific agencies that view these responsibilities ‘‘as other duties.’’ 

States have grown increasingly frustrated with the lack of a comprehensive strategy for coordination and implementation of a State, 

regional, and national Agriculture and Food Defense Risk Reduction Plan that addresses the elements of national critical infrastructure. 

Preliminary assessments done by each State demonstrate that as 

much as two-thirds of what their citizens consume came from another State. Food defense requires State, regional, and national coordination. To accomplish regional capabilities, States have begun 

to organize. Ten southern States formed the State Animal and Agriculture Disaster Response Alliance (SAADRA). In the Midwest, 

12 States formed the Multi-state Partnership to begin work on food 

defense issues. 

In 2009, these two regional Alliances met to discuss common 

goals and objectives. We identified early on a major problem. Six 

years after HSPD–9, the Government Coordinating Council (GCC) 

had yet to develop a definition of a National Agriculture or Food 

Critical Infrastructure Site. As a result, for 6 years after HSPD– 

9, there were no such sites identified in the United States except 

for Federal buildings. 

In January 2010, over 100 representatives from 30 States met 

with the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Infrastructure Threat Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC). After 3 days of meetings, HITRAC accepted the States’ recommendation for a definition. By June 2010, over 1,400 Level 2 Agriculture and Food National Critical Infrastructure Sites had been identified and validated by HITRAC. 

Training and exercise has changed little since 2005 and does not 

address the measure of effectiveness of our capability as required 

by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 

In 2009, Georgia hosted and conducted a full scale, live agent exercise at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). 

Over 300 participants from 60 local, State, Federal, and private 

sector agencies and organizations participated. The scenario, a 

chemical attack on the U.S. food supply, created 80,000 illnesses 

and 40,000 deaths in an unmitigated attack. 

In the exercise, a consequence model, funded by the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), tracked the 14 target capabilities exercised and the consequence reduction of each. At the end 

of the exercise, it could be demonstrated that the actions taken by 

the participants reduced the number of illnesses to 27,000 and the 

number of deaths to 12,000. 

States have demonstrated the ability to advance the capabilities 

necessary for true agriculture and food defense. This requires funding. From 2003 to 2007, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) reported that the Agriculture and Food Sector received approximately one percent of the State Homeland Security 

Grant Program funds. 

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Recently, the U.S. Animal Health Association (USAHA), through 

a resolution, requested funding for a regional exercise and training. 

FEMA denied this request, stating that from 2007 to 2011, the Agriculture and Food Sector had received 20 percent of the State 

Homeland Security Grant Program funds. The States refute this 

amount following a polling of States by the SAADRA group. All 

States report no increase in funding to the agriculture and food 

sector from 2007 to 2011. 

We must continue to measure the effectiveness of our capability. 

A list of accomplishments to be checked off as done does not answer the question, ‘‘are we safer today than we were before? ’’ Understanding the Agriculture and Food System as Critical Infrastructure will allow us to prioritize response so that each natural 

disaster does not carve away another piece of our economic viability that does not return. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Williams, and thank 

you both for your testimony. 

Colonel Hoffman, you testified that there is little doubt that 

those who want to do us harm will study disease and food-borne 

illness events and that agro-terrorism presents substantial risks to 

the United States. I would like to hear more from you about the 

threat. 

Would you please discuss why you believe terrorists may be attracted to using food as a weapon, and what economic and social 

costs a serious food-based attack could have nationally and globally? 

Colonel HOFFMAN. Well, Senator, at the beginning you mentioned 

the foot and mouth disease (FMD) risk. As was demonstrated in 

the U.K. in 2001, the impact on society, the cost to the Nation, in 

this case Britain, to deal with an event like that went far beyond 

anybody’s expectations. And, in fact, the full appreciation of the impact on the country socially, economically from a trade standpoint, 

and just everyday life, was not fully appreciated for years afterwards. 

This is not lost on our enemies. They recognize this, as was demonstrated in the records that were found at Tarnak Farms in Afghanistan. Obviously they had been thinking about this because we 

found written evidence that was the case. These events were horrendous and they had tremendous impact. 

Food, for the human side, is simply the fastest way to make 

things happen. This quote that I provided to you is actually an extract from a much larger translation from a blog in a Jihadist 

forum where they actually discuss why food makes a good weapon 

or a modality to deploy a weapon, and how effective even common 

pathogens can be. 

And I think, while we have given appropriate focus to what we 

call select agents, the more virulent, more dangerous pathogens, 

these common everyday pathogens like E. coli, which surface in our 

food supply system with unnerving frequency anyway, could be easily weaponized and the systems for deploying it are demonstrated 

with every one of these food outbreaks. And the cost of these food 

outbreaks, as with Salmonella St. Paul, where 44 States were impacted and many, many people were made ill. 

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This is documented in the media. They can study the media, they 

can see what happened, they can see very clearly how the event 

unfolded, and they provide what we call die studies for somebody 

to look at it and examine how one of these events may occur. 

I am not suggesting this would be easy to do, but I am also suggesting it would not be difficult for somebody with determination 

and some very limited resources. So I believe that the risk is there. 

I think that implementing the various defense plans that have 

been promulgated already by the agencies, but also fully implementing, fully resourcing the Food Safety Modernization Act would 

help go a long way toward making defense a reality. 

But I am also concerned about accountability and how we make 

that happen and how we hold people accountable to make sure 

those defense plans are put in place. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you Colonel Hoffman. You testified that 

even if the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act is funded and regulations are put in place, that there still remains the challenge that 

there is no single authority in charge of all aspects of the system. 

Will you please elaborate on why you believe it is important to 

have one authority in charge of food defense? 

Colonel HOFFMAN. I think the simplest way to describe that need 

is that it is very difficult to bring to bear, if you will, the majority 

of their resources to effectively focus your resources on a critical 

need when the use of those resources and accountability for those 

resources if fragmented across numerous agencies. 

And this is by no means a criticism of those agencies. They are 

doing what they think are their priorities, their mandates, and 

what their leadership views needs to be done. But the simple truth 

is, this results in gaps and overlaps. And lacking that clear line of 

authority and accountability for steps that have been taken, the 

preparation for a defense is going to leave gaps. 

It is going to leave those overlaps in place. We will not effectively 

use the limited resources we have, and in today’s economy, that is 

unacceptable. We have to do a better job of effectively using the resources we have, applying them in the most effective manner, and 

achieving the greatest level of defense we can with the modest resources available. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Williams, you raised concern 

about the lack of leadership and commitment from the Federal 

Government on a comprehensive strategy for agriculture and food 

defense. Will you please elaborate on these concerns? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. The concerns that we have at the State 

level are, I think, vastly different than some of the concerns that 

you see at the Federal level. We, at the State level, have to deal 

with this issue from a situation where it is in our backyard. In 

other words, every incident occurs in someone’s county, someone’s 

municipality that type of issue. 

And so, the capability that we have has to be driven down to that 

particular level, and there is no coordination currently to really accomplish that. I mentioned in my testimony the issue of not having 

the ability to identify critical infrastructure sites in our States and 

in our counties. 

An ag and food critical infrastructure site is a site that, if compromised, could cause 10,000 or more casualties, affect five or more 

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States, and could take longer than a year to recover. That is a 

Level 2 national critical infrastructure ag and food site. 

As I mentioned, up until 2010, we did not have any of those sites 

identified at the State and local level so that we could even begin 

preparedness to prepare for any type of mitigating actions for those 

particular sites. We did not know they existed. Today we know that 

they exist. 

But one of the things that we have to do to manage those types 

of assets at the State and local level is to be able to identify them, 

place them in what is called the Automated Critical Asset Management System that is operated by the State and local law enforcement, where we begin at that grassroots level to be able to provide 

the type of security that we need for those types of sites. 

We cannot protect everything, but we have to begin to protect 

those things that can be most injurious to us if we are attacked. 

And we have had really no leadership or direction for how to actually do that. The States have been doing it by ourselves, more or 

less, as I mentioned, through some of those compacts. 

We have over 30 States right now that are part of regional compacts and we are adding States every day. The testimony that I 

gave to you earlier was not just my opinion. Thirty States reviewed 

my testimony before I submitted it to you. And so, it is a general 

consensus of what we are all seeing out there. 

And so, we are looking for ways to begin to develop a State, regional, and national comprehensive food defense capability and we 

do not have that right now. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Williams, according to your testimony, FEMA reports that from 2007 to 2011, the agriculture and 

food sector received approximately 20 percent of State Homeland 

Security Grant Program funds. You refuted that number, indicating that in 2003 to 2007, FEMA reported that only one percent 

of these funds went to the agriculture and food and that the States’ 

you surveyed reported no increase in funding from FEMA. 

Have you been able to determine the source of this discrepancy? 

Also, what impact has low funding levels had on preparing for a 

food and agriculture incident? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. The States did refute that amount of 20 percent, 

and I can certainly supply you with all of the reports from 2003 

to 2007 where FEMA stated that the States had received one percent of the State Homeland Security Grant Program funds, which 

is really how States develop their preparedness. 

Each State, based on population and risk and various and sundry 

other types of triggers, receive X amount of dollars. And out of 

that, the States determine what they actually are going to fund. As 

we have formed these regional alliances, we began to share information as to how much funding we were actually getting to develop 

preparedness for food defense, and we have a lot of data that I 

could share with you that shows each State’s allocation for those 

actions from 2003 forward. 

We were unaware that there was any discrepancy being reported 

until the U.S. Animal Health Association requested funding for 

training and exercise and were denied, and in the denial letter, 

FEMA reported, at that time, that there was from 2007 to 2011 

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there was 20 percent going to the ag and food sector at the State 

level. 

We refuted that and we have sought to be able to validate the 

discrepancy by polling each State, and from 2003 to—excuse me— 

from 2007 to 2011, we have a spreadsheet that shows how much 

each year each State actually got for those purposes. Where the 20 

percent came from we do not know. 

Now, we have asked FEMA to supply us where those figures 

came from and they have refused to give us that information. So 

why there is a discrepancy I am not really sure. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I would like to call on the 

Senator from Kansas, Mr. Moran. Thank you so much for being 

here and for any opening remarks you may have and questions. 

Senator MORAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I 

would just express—I will submit my opening statement for the 

record, other than to express my appreciation to you for hosting 

and holding this hearing. 

Senator AKAKA. It will be included in the record. 

Senator MORAN. This is a significant issue, certainly for our 

country. As a Kansan, this is a significant issue for us. Food safety 

and cultivation agriculture is a significant component of our economy and just the rumor of a contaminant has dramatic consequences upon the agricultural industry and certainly upon the 

prices received. 

And so, I want to make certain that we, as a Congress, and the 

Department of Homeland Security and others involved in this topic 

are doing the necessary things to protect our food supply. 

In that regard, let me just ask a broad question, and maybe I 

will start with you, Dr. Williams. Your sense of the commitment by 

the Department of Homeland Security is, is food and agricultural 

safety a priority, a focus of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. I think it is a concern of Homeland Security. One 

of the worst things that we did following September 11, 2001, was 

to coin the term agro-terror. The moment that we did that we 

stovepiped ourselves as something different. 

If you actually look at an attack on agriculture, whether it be 

foot and mouth disease or avian influenza or any of those types of 

things, it actually is a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

and Explosive (CBRNE) attack. It is an attack using a chemical, 

biological, or radiological agent on the food supply, whether it is to 

impact economically, agriculture or food, or whether it is to use the 

agriculture and food supply as a method of disseminating a chemical, biological, or radiological agent. 

CBRNE, going back to the question about the FEMA funding, 

from 2003 to 2007, FEMA reported that there were five target capabilities that received 56 percent of all the State Homeland Security Grant Program money. One of those was critical infrastructure, which is one reason we are desperate to be in the critical infrastructure game. 

The other one was CBRNE. That was one of the five most funded 

target capabilities. And so, we are beginning to look at those attacks on the food supply as a CBRNE event, rather than an agroterror event. I am not sure if that answers your question, but—— 

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11 

Senator MORAN. And the result of that distinction is what? What 

does that mean in practical terms? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. In practical terms, that means that we were not 

at the funding table, and States—— 

Senator MORAN. So the categorization matters as far as the priority or emphasis, at least in funding, that comes from the Federal 

Government? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. Absolutely. I actually work for the State Administrative Agency in my State. We are the ones that actually manage 

all of the State Homeland Security Grant Program funds, and my 

area of expertise is ag and food defense. And I, on a weekly basis, 

tried to make a point that we needed funding for the ag and food 

sector for various reasons, for CBRNE and for especially critical infrastructure. 

And I was told for over 6 years that until we have a definition 

of an ag and food critical infrastructure site, we are not eligible for 

any of those funds. So there were 6 years lost in my State, in your 

State, and in every State. 

Senator MORAN. Is there an understanding within the security 

community as to where a contamination might most likely occur? 

What is the distinction between plant agriculture and livestock agriculture? Is it more clear that we are more susceptible or our 

vulnerabilities lie on the livestock side? 

And in addition to the production side of agriculture, then is it 

more likely that something happens in production agriculture 

versus something that happens as the food is processed in the food 

chain? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. That is a complicated question. 

Senator MORAN. Where are the greatest risks, is my question, I 

guess. 

Dr. WILLIAMS. Well, I think the greatest risk for economic damage probably comes in the production agriculture side, from the introduction of a foreign animal disease or something of that nature. 

Senator MORAN. And it is on the animal side? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. On the animal side. If you are looking at the ability to kill people, it is obviously in the processing side of things so 

that you are actually creating a product that is going to be directly 

consumed by the public. It is also those things that are going to 

be consumed rapidly, in other words, things that are either packed 

on ice or stored not in cans, things of that nature. 

Things that are going to sit on a shelf for a long period of time 

are not as attractive as something like seafood, for instance, that 

is going to be disseminated and eaten by the public within literally 

72 hours. Those are particularly vulnerable and particularly dangerous areas. 

Senator MORAN. Is our focus more on prevention or upon containment? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. I think our focus is primarily on response. I think 

something happens, we respond. There is not enough effort being 

made to prevent these things from happening at all. I mean, let us 

face it. There is going to be less consequences if it never happens. 

And one of the things that we are challenged with, and that is 

one of the reasons that the critical infrastructure piece is so important, is that one of the things that we are forced to do in complying 

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with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, is to look at critical nodes, and then when we to look at those critical nodes from 

where are their supply chains, what are their distribution footprints, and we begin to develop a picture of what that system or 

subsystem begins to look like in a State, in a region, and across the 

country. This helps define risk. 

I had actually met with the Federal Bureau of Investigations 

(FBI) last week with our Fusion Center folks and one of the things 

that they brought up is that intelligence is bits and pieces of information. And people describe that as a piece of a puzzle. Well, one 

of the FBI agents said something that I thought was particularly 

good in describing our situation. 

A puzzle comes in a box with a picture of what the puzzle looks 

like on the top. We are forcing our intelligence people to take bits 

and pieces of the puzzle and put it together with no picture of what 

the puzzle even looks like. 

And through our efforts of painting that picture through critical 

infrastructure, we are able to begin to describe what that picture 

of the puzzle looks like. And we have a better chance of interdicting 

and preventing some of these things from happening to begin with. 

Senator MORAN. When you say our focus is more on the containment side, do we have the necessary scientific and technological 

base of information to know what the response is to be? Is our 

science sufficient to respond? As you indicate, the most likely attack or introduction of an agent would be on the side of livestock. 

Do we have the scientific basis to know what to do when that occurs or is there research yet to be done? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. I think that we have a good capability to respond. 

It is not an accident that we have not had foot and mouth disease 

in this country since the 1960s or 1950s possibly. Good surveillance, good programs to control and eradicate those types of things, 

import/export rules and regulations, those all protect us from those 

types of events. 

I think we have the ability to identify an incident after it has occurred and to respond to it reasonably well. One of the things that 

we saw—and I hate to keep giving a historical perspective—but one 

of the things that we started seeing in the mid-1980s was a depletion of the agriculture and food response community as far as people are concerned. 

We have fewer and fewer people available at the State and field 

level to respond to one of these types of incidents. And that was 

one of the reasons that we developed Animal Health Emergency 

Management and Agriculture Emergency Management, is because 

we were able to dip into the emergency management community to 

get the resources that we no longer had in the ag and food community. 

And that is still true today. Even though there has been some 

improvements in the workforce, we still do not have enough boots 

on the ground to be able to respond to a major event without utilizing the entire emergency management system. 

Senator MORAN. Doctor, thank you very much. Colonel, I did not 

intend to ignore you, although I finally, in visiting with Georgia, 

I can understand. Appreciate the conversation, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much. 

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Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let me start a second 

round of questions. Colonel Hoffman, you raise concerns that the 

intelligence community does not focus adequately on emerging dangers within the global food and agriculture sector. You stated that 

this could result in us being blindsided by the next event. 

Would you please describe what you believe the appropriate level 

of assessment would look like? 

Colonel HOFFMAN. I would be happy to. 

Senator AKAKA. Also, what steps need to be taken to achieve 

this? 

Colonel HOFFMAN. I would be happy to do that. I think it would 

be useful to start with an example of one of the shortcomings, because I believe that our intelligence folks do a great job in many 

areas, but I do not believe that they have sufficient mandate or instruction for actually collecting the kind of information that we 

need. 

I would start with the example of melamine in wheat gluten. 

When that event occurred, that product was brought into the 

United States as a supposedly human food grade product. It was 

purchased by one company from another company through a commodity brokerage arrangement. The broker went out and found the 

product in a foreign country, imported it into the United States, 

and sent it to the company that ultimately used it in pet food, fortunately. 

Well, the reality is that the situation was actually understood by 

others in the international community and we seem to have been 

totally blindsided by that event. 

For example, the Chinese entities involved had already been 

caught putting melamine in products like that in other countries. 

All right? Two specifically were Australia and the European Union 

where they had been banned from importing those products because of their tendency to do that. 

Yet, that information was not readily available to our industry, 

was not known by various agencies in the U.S. Government or the 

State governments that was the case. The product was allowed to 

come into the country without inspection and forwarded directly to 

that firm and put into the marketplace. 

We need to fix that. We need to create a capability, establish requirements and collection plans, if you will, in the intelligence community to begin to identify when there are changes or shifts in 

commodity actions in other countries or where there are players 

who may be cheating on the system. 

And there are indicators out there if we are tuned to watch 

them, and I am afraid we are not, and I believe that this level of 

surveillance and detection that I have been referring to needs to 

move beyond the traditional that we are doing looking for indicators of biologic events for human disease. 

But actually out into the agriculture community, the food production community around the world to watch for indicators that there 

are nefarious players, there is somebody preparing to or conducting 

economically motivated adulteration, or somebody worse may be 

planning to exploit the food supply chain. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Williams, as you may know, my 

home State will be hosting the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

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(APEC) meeting this fall which Secretary Napolitano has designated as a national special security event (NSSE). I understand 

that you were a member of an advisory committee for a previous 

NSSE event. 

What are some of the things that we should be focusing on to ensure a safe and secure event in regard to food? 

Dr. WILLIAMS. A national special security event is a challenge. 

My first exposure to one was actually the 1996 Olympic games, but 

most recently, the 2004 G–8 Summit that was held in Sea Island, 

Georgia. And the thing that was obvious to us in developing a food 

defense plan for the Group of 8 and all 30 heads of State that also 

attended, was they were all fed in congregate feeding areas. In 

other words, there were areas that were secured so that they could 

have their luncheons and their dinners and so forth. 

It takes at least 6 months, preferably a year, of preparation to 

put together a food defense plan that is adequate. So planning 

ahead of time is really important. It is not rocket science. In doing 

the G–8 Summit, we basically met with the White House food staff 

and we met with the venue that was actually going to be preparing 

all the food for the Group of 8. 

And we questioned them and we found that they were customarily getting food from over 60 vendors that supplied the various 

types of food that would be prepared for the President and the rest 

of the Group of 8. 

We looked at those vendors and many of those vendors did not 

have the ability to secure their food that we felt was adequate. 

Now, we, being the State of Georgia, both public health and agriculture and emergency management and USDA and FDA, and it 

was a very good partnership in preparing for that particular event. 

An FDA team was responsible for the Group of 8. There were 17 

other congregate feeding stations for first responders and other 

people that were part of those delegations. The responsibility for 

those other 17 congregate feeding areas fell upon the State, as it 

would in your State, as far as public health and agriculture, to secure the food that would go into those congregate areas. 

What we actually did is we simply reduced the number of vendors from 60 to about three vendors that we could actually provide 

adequate food security and defense for. Most of those three companies actually had the ability, as a company, to provide the level of 

security that we actually thought necessary. 

All of the food that was purchased for the event, with the exception of a few perishable products, was actually purchased months 

ahead of time and put in refrigerated warehouses where they had 

24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week armed law enforcement. And the 

food that went to the Group of 8 actually moved to those sites in 

sealed trucks with a law enforcement escort. 

Like I say, it is labor-intensive, but it is not particularly rocket 

science. It is just figuring out what it is that you can protect that 

will provide the most security for those that are attending the 

event. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I would like to give both of you an 

opportunity to provide any final statements or comments. Dr. Williams, let me call on you first. 

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Dr. WILLIAMS. Actually, you have asked me to talk a lot today 

and I certainly appreciate the opportunity. Actually, for those of us 

at the State level, this is a particularly unique opportunity to say 

in front of a group like this the concerns that we actually have. 

Today at 11 o’clock, a conference call with the SAADRA, States, 

the southern States, and the Midwest Multi-State Partnership, 

took place and there was great excitement that we were actually 

going to get an opportunity to have our view of this actually heard. 

I appreciate the opportunity for doing that. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Colonel Hoffman. 

Colonel HOFFMAN. I would simply like to say that I very much 

appreciate the opportunity to come and be a part of an effort like 

this. This seems to me, like a step toward re-invigorating the process of getting food defense established as a priority and funded 

here in the United States. I thank you very much for the opportunity and commend you for holding the hearings. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Senator Moran, do you 

have any further questions? 

Senator MORAN. Mr. Chairman, just one additional question. You 

mentioned Australia and another country in regard to knowing 

something that we did not know and prohibiting the information 

did not become available or we were not aware. Are there countries 

out there that are role models for us, Colonel Hoffman? Are there 

things that other countries are doing better that we ought to look 

at? 

Colonel HOFFMAN. Well, first I would say nobody is doing it perfectly, and that is evidenced by the events that occur in those countries. But I think there are lessons to be learned. Australia is a 

good example of how they handle imports, how they monitor food 

and agriculture products coming into their country, and the focus 

that they put on early detection and prevention at the border. I 

think we can learn from that. 

I think in partnership with the EU, there is a lot we can do to 

improve our ability to prevent port-shopping and the kinds of 

things that nefarious players do to try to get things into our countries. So I think this is going to have to be a partnership with other 

countries, just as it has to be a partnership with government and 

industry to solve it. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Moran. I want to 

thank our first panel. Your testimonies have been valuable to us 

this afternoon and I want to again thank you for your point in trying to focus on this agro-terrorism here in our country. Thank you 

very much. 

I would like to ask the second panel now to come forward. I want 

to welcome our second panel. Ms. Lisa Shames, who is the Director 

of Natural Resources and Environment at the Government Accountability Office; Dr. Doug Meckes, Director of Food, Agricultural, and Veterinary Defense Division at the Office of Health Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Ted Elkin, Director of the Office of Food Defense, Communication and Emergency Response at the Food and Drug Administration at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); Ms. Sheryl 

Maddux is the Deputy Director, Office Homeland Security and 

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1The prepared statement of Ms. Shames appears in the appendix on page 47. 

Emergency Coordination at the Department of Agriculture, and she 

is accompanied by Dr. John Clifford, who is the Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer for the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Dr. Clifford is not providing a 

statement, but is available to respond to questions. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses 

and I would ask you to please stand and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 

this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Ms. SHAMES. I do. 

Dr. MECKES. I do. 

Mr. ELKIN. I do. 

Ms. MADDUX. I do. 

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let the record show that all witnesses responded in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statements will be made a part of the record and I would also like to 

remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. Ms. 

Shames, please proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENT OF LISA SHAMES,1 DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. SHAMES. Thank you. Chairman Akaka, Senator Moran, I am 

pleased to be here today to discuss the defense of this country’s 

food and agriculture system. Senator Akaka, as you observed in 

your opening statement this is an especially timely issue in observing the tenth anniversary of September 11, 2001. 

As one could imagine, any natural or deliberate disruption could 

present a serious threat. My testimony today highlights GAO’s key 

findings from a report that was requested by Senator Akaka and 

is being released today. GAO’s overall message is twofold. First, 

there is no centralized oversight of the Federal Food and Agricultural Defense policy, and second, USDA faces challenges in implementing its responsibilities. 

Regarding GAO’s first key finding, that there is no centralized 

oversight, we found that food and agriculture defense responsibilities cut across several Federal agencies. For this reason, centralized oversight is critical to help ensure an effective response. 

At one time, DHS and the White House Homeland Security 

Council collected information from agencies about their various activities, but that has ceased. Because there is no centralized oversight, it is unclear if efforts to protect food and agriculture are 

well-designed and can reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to and the 

impact of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 

GAO’s second key finding is that USDA does not have a departmentwide strategy for implementing its food and agriculture defense responsibilities. Such a strategy is essential to guide progress 

in achieving national security goals. Instead, USDA has delegated 

these responsibilities to its agencies. 

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Although these agencies have taken steps to implement the Department’s response and recovery responsibilities, they face challenges. For example, the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS), was 

developed to respond to the 17 most damaging animal diseases 

such as a highly pathogenic avian influenza. Positively, critical 

supplies have been acquired, guidance has been developed, and a 

full-time liaison was hired to help the States. 

However, there are still complex implementation challenges. In 

particular, vaccines and diagnostic test kits for certain diseases 

have either not been developed or may be too costly for purchase. 

Also, some vaccines could take longer than the required 24 hours 

to deliver to the States. And finally, there may be missed opportunities with HHS to leverage resources with the Strategic National 

Stockpile which contains medical supplies for human health emergencies, and as such, may be useful for responders in animal emergencies. 

Repeating your opening statement that responding to an outbreak of a highly contagious disease, Senator Akaka, you mentioned specifically foot and mouth disease. It also presents challenges as we have seen in the recent outbreaks in Japan, Korea, 

and the United Kingdom. 

In particular, animals infected with foot and mouth disease 

should be disposed of within 24 hours. But USDA has told us that 

it could take as long as 80 days to depopulate a single feed lot. 

While burial has been the preferred disposal method, USDA officials told us that this may not be feasible on a large scale, and 

could have public health consequences if done incorrectly. 

Positively, USDA’s draft response plan for foot and mouth disease considers other approaches such as vaccines for at-risk animals that could help mitigate these concerns. 

USDA also faces challenges coordinating the Federal food and 

agriculture response for natural disasters, including hurricanes, 

floods, and winter storms. There have been 28 in the last 5 years. 

Positively, State officials we met with said that having a single 

USDA coordinator facilitated communication and contributed to a 

successful response. 

However, State officials also told us that because multiple Federal agencies become involved, responsibilities are not always clear 

and could delay a response. These delays could pose a public health 

risk. In one case during Hurricane Ike, water surges washed cattle, 

horses, and poultry 15 to 20 miles inland, leaving dead livestock in 

backyards, in front of hospitals, and on highways. We were told 

that time was lost because it was unclear if USDA or the Corps of 

Engineers was to carry out the disposal. In the end, it was USDA 

that carried it out. 

In addition, we found that USDA has not consistently prepared 

after-action reports. These are documents that summarize what 

went well and what needed improvement during an emergency. 

Without a more consistent and comprehensive reporting process, 

USDA managers may not have the necessary information to identify gaps and address them through corrective actions to help ensure that past mistakes are not repeated. 

In our report, we are making numerous recommendations to help 

ensure that the Federal Government can effectively implement a 

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1The prepared statement of Dr. Meckes appears in the appendix on page 57. 

food and agriculture defense, and adequately respond to and recover from emergencies affecting food and agriculture. All the agencies we evaluated concurred with our recommendations. 

This concludes my prepared remarks and I would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Shames. Now I will 

call on Dr. Meckes. Please proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENT OF DOUG MECKES,1 DVM, DIRECTOR OF FOOD, 

AGRICULTURAL, AND VETERINARY DEFENSE DIVISION, OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. MECKES. Thank you, Chairman Akaka, Senator Moran. My 

name is Dr. Doug Meckes and I am the Branch Chief for the Food, 

Agricultural and Veterinary Defense Branch of the Office of Health 

Affairs (OHA) at the Department of Homeland Security. Thank you 

for the opportunity to speak to you regarding DHS’s efforts to defend our Nation’s agriculture, food, human and animal health in an 

all-encompassing one-health approach. 

A central tenet of the DHS mission is protecting the Nation’s agriculture, food, human and animal health in the face of all hazards. 

DHS works to complement the efforts of our partners, including 

other Federal agencies, that focus on food and agriculture safety to 

protect our agriculture and food systems which are critical to our 

public health and to our economic well-being. 

Homeland Security President Directive-9, Defense of the United 

States Agriculture and Food, establishes national policy to defend 

the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, natural 

disasters, and other emergencies. DHS is responsible for coordination of the overall national effort to protect critical infrastructure 

and key resources of the United States. 

OHA is specifically charged by the Secretary of DHS with providing oversight and management of DHS’s implementation of 

HSPD–9, and coordinating those efforts with other Federal departments and agencies, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, and the private sector. 

While much remains to be achieved, DHS has approached 

HSPD–9 tasks and responsibilities in the spirit of collaboration and 

coordination. With the release of HSPD–9 in February 2004, the 

Secretary of DHS was identified as the lead and co-lead for specific 

tasks within HSPD–9. Today I will provide an overview of DSH activities, initiatives, and progress with regard to several of these 

tasks. 

One of OHA’s primary responsibilities is to mitigate the consequences of biological incidents through early detection. Within 

DHS, OHA operates, manages, and supports the Department’s biological defense and surveillance programs. The BioWatch Program 

provides for the detection of aerosolized biological agents and the 

National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) provides the 

means to develop and maintain an integrated, real-time, multi-discipline surveillance picture. 

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In order to develop resources capabilities related to agriculture 

and food, State and local governments must integrate the agriculture and food interests into their emergency planning efforts. To 

facilitate this integration, OHA partnered with the National Center 

for Food Protection and Defense to develop the Food Sector Food 

and Agriculture Readiness Measurement Toolkit. 

This tool allows the States to self-assess the strengths of their 

food emergency resources plans. Four States are currently testing 

the FARM toolkit. 

OHA also partnered with the Center of Excellence for Emerging 

Zoonotic and Animal Diseases (CEEZAD) to develop a partner page 

on the lessons learned, information-sharing portal where emergency providers and Homeland Security officials can access an online network of content related to lessons learned, best practices, 

innovative ideas on food, agriculture, and veterinary defense. 

A standardized, unified response plan is imperative for effective 

incident management. The Food Emergency Response Plan (FERP) 

template assists States with the development of a food-related 

emergency response plan, which can be integrated into existing allhazards response planning. OHA partnered with the National Association of the States’ Department of Agriculture to revise and update the Food Emergency Response Plan template to align it with 

the national response framework. 

With 20 percent of the United States gross national product coming from agriculture, the importance of the private sector in defending our food supply and keeping our economy strong is critical. 

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides a unifying 

structure for a public/private partnership model to enhance the 

protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

For the food and agriculture sector, DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the sector-specific lead agencies, USDA 

and FDA, co-chair the Government Coordinating Council which developed a sector-specific plan to advance security. The GCC acts as 

the counterpart and partner to the private industry-led Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) to plan, implement, and execute sufficient 

and necessary sector-wide security programs for the Nation’s agriculture and food sector’s critical assets. 

DHS’s Science and Technologies (S&T’s) Office of University Programs taps the expertise of our Nation’s colleges and universities 

to address pressing homeland security needs through the Centers 

of Excellence Program. The Centers of Excellence engage the academic community to enhance the Department’s Homeland Security 

capabilities for the agriculture and food sector. 

In addition to the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, at Minnesota and CEEZAD at Kansas State University, OUP 

has created the National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic 

Disease (FAZD) Defense at Texas A&M. 

Senators Akaka and Moran, I have touched briefly on just a few 

aspects of DHS engagement in the agriculture and food sector, and 

I am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Meckes. Mr. Elkin, 

would you please proceed with your statement? 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Elkin appears in the appendix on page 66. 

STATEMENT OF TED ELKIN,1 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOOD DEFENSE, COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, 

CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, 

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Mr. ELKIN. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka and Senator 

Moran. I am Ted Elkin, Director of the Office of Food Defense, 

Communication and Emergency Response for the Center for Food 

Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) at the Food and Drug Administration, which is part of the Department of Health and 

Human Services. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our food 

defense activities. 

Food safety and food defense continue to be top priorities for 

FDA. A terrorist attack on the food supply could have both severe 

public health and economic consequences, while damaging the 

public’s confidence in the food we eat. 

FDA is the Federal agency that regulates all the food we eat except for meat, poultry, and processed egg products which are regulated by our partners at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

FDA’s primary mission is to protect the public health. Ensuring 

that FDA regulated products are safe and secure is a vital part of 

that mission. While performing our mission, we play a central and 

a leadership role in the Nation’s defense against acts of intentional 

contamination. It is FDA’s goal, working closely with other government and private sector stakeholders, to reduce the likelihood that 

an FDA-regulated product could be used to poison or otherwise 

harm Americans. 

We also help ensure that the Nation’s public health system is 

prepared to deter a potential threat and is ready to respond to an 

act of intentional contamination, including terrorism. FDA has 

been working closely with DHS, USDA and other Federal agencies 

to implement the Homeland Security Presidential Directives. HHS 

and USDA exercise key responsibilities as food sector-specific agencies and serve as co-leads for the food sector within the Government Coordinating Council. 

The GCC is charged with coordinating agriculture and food defense strategies, activities, and communication across government 

and between the government and private sector partners. The Food 

and Agriculture Sector is a public/private partnership that combines expertise from several Federal agencies, as well as that of 

State, local, tribal, and territorial officials, and the private sector, 

including more than 100 trade associations and individual firms 

participating. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to describe FDA’s other food defense activities. FDA’s risk-based approach to food defense helps 

the Agency determine where to focus its resources. As part of its 

efforts to anticipate threats to the food supply, FDA has conducted 

extensive scientific vulnerability assessments of different categories 

of food, determining the most serious risks of intentional contamination with different biological or chemical agents during various 

stages of food production and distribution. 

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Results of these updated assessments are being used to develop 

technology interventions and mitigation strategies, identify research needs, and provide guidance to the private sector. FDA has 

made available vulnerability assessment software for the food industry to determine the vulnerability of individual food facilities to 

attack. 

FDA has also developed and made available other tools to help 

our stakeholders implement and enhance food defense measures. 

The Food-Related Emergency Exercise Boxed Set released in July, 

is a compilation of five scenarios based on intentional and unintentional food contamination events, which was developed in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and USDA. The 

Food Related Emergency Exercise Boxed (FREE-B), is designed to 

assist government regulatory and public health agencies in assessing food emergency response plans, protocols, and procedures. It 

provides stakeholders with a variety of options to test and improve 

their capabilities to respond to food-related human or animal 

health emergencies. 

The Food Defense Mitigation Strategy Database launched in 

March 2011 is a new resource outlining preventive measures designed for companies that produce, process, store, package, distribute and/or transport food or food ingredients. 

Two additional training tools that FDA has developed are Employee FIRST and ALERT to educate front-line food industry workers and managers about how to lower the risk of intentional food 

contamination. 

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly mention 

the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, which will provide further 

protections for American consumers from both intentional and unintentional contamination. FSMA gives FDA a modern mandate 

and toolkit to improve the safety of the country’s food supply. It 

shifts our food safety focus from reaction and response to prevention, so that prudent prevention measures will be systematically 

built into all parts of the food system. 

Specifically to address the threat of intentional contamination, 

FSMA directs FDA, in consultation with DHS and USDA, to issue 

regulations to require appropriate science-based mitigation strategies or measures to protect certain high-risk foods against intentional contamination. Previously, FDA could recommend, but not 

require, implementation of such food defense measures. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, due to the enhancements being made 

by FDA and our food defense partners, the United States food defense system is stronger than ever before. Although we have made 

progress, we are continuously working to improve our ability to 

prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist threats and other acts of 

intentional contamination. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our food defense activities. I would be pleased to respond to any questions. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Elkin. Ms. Maddux, 

would you please proceed with your statement? 

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22 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Maddux appears in the appendix on page 79. 

STATEMENT OF SHERYL K. MADDUX,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY COORDINATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN R. CLIFFORD, DVM, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR AND CHIEF, VETERINARY OFFICE FOR THE ANIMAL 

AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE 

Ms. MADDUX. Chairman Akaka and Senator Moran, I want to 

thank you for holding the hearing today on the important topic of 

responding to threats against America’s agriculture and food system. On the heels of the 10-year anniversary of the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, we are reminded of the need for improved vigilance and the importance of partnership and collaboration at all levels of government and with the private sector. 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture considers defense of the food 

and ag sector a critical component of our mission to provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues 

based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management. 

The sector is composed of a complex system and has the capacity 

to feed people within and beyond the boundaries of our Nation. 

These systems, which are almost entirely under private ownership, 

operate in a highly competitive global market, strive to operate in 

harmony with the environment, and provide economic opportunities and improve quality of life for the rural and urban citizens of 

the United States and others around the world. 

The sector is dominated by small businesses that employ the majority of the food industry workforce and account for roughly onefifth of the Nation’s economic activity. Further, the sector supply 

chain operates at the international level with more than 20 percent 

of all U.S. imports being food products. 

My knowledge in the area of agriculture and food defense is comprehensive because for the past 9 years, I have been on the Department’s career managers most closely and deeply involved in the Department of USDA’s plans and operational programs. 

As Branch Chief of the Disaster and Emergency Operations at 

the U.S. Forest Service headquarters in Washington, DC, when the 

events of September 11, 2001, occurred, I was the highest ranking 

USDA career civil servant engaged with these issues based on my 

21-year career as a U.S. Forest Service employee and program 

manager. 

The events of September 11, 2001, propelled the Department and 

myself with it into the rapids of change unleashed by these attacks. 

I served personally on the ground, both in New York at Ground 

Zero, and at the Pentagon. I was hand-picked by the Secretary of 

Agriculture in 2002 to develop USDA’s internal plan, and also to 

represent USDA in joint efforts with the White House Homeland 

Security Council, and other Federal departments and agencies. 

Thus, I have played a major role in interpreting the principles, 

practices, regulations, and laws governing homeland security, 

emergency preparedness, continuity of operations of government, 

and the process of actually designing, implementing national level 

strategies and action plans to protect the safety and security of the 

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23 

Nation’s food supply, research facilities, materials, and USDA employees. 

USDA has made significant progress in ability to defend the agriculture and food systems since the events of September 11, 2001. 

USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), Animal and Plant 

Inspection Service, and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture enhance security through programs aimed at inspecting native and foreign agricultural products, conducting vulnerability assessments, and maintaining laboratory networks capable of rapidly 

identifying disease and pests that could have drastic consequences 

on our economy. 

Likewise, the Agriculture Research Service operates laboratories 

and funds research in the United States and abroad that seek to 

advance our ability to identify, remediate, and even prevent harmful pathogens that threaten the food and agriculture industry. 

Our USDA team has collaborated closely with Federal partners 

as well as State, local, tribal, and territorial and private partners 

to address critical components of the government’s food defense 

plan. For example, in response to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive–7 and in close collaboration with FDA and DHS, 

USDA helped to establish the Food and Agriculture Government 

and Sector Coordinating Councils. 

We are currently participating in the Sub-Interagency Policy 

Committee led by the National Security staff to develop a national 

strategy for biosurveillance. In addition, USDA has formed a One 

Health Working Group to augment the respective missions and 

participating USDA agencies and offices. USDA agencies continue 

to develop and implement monitoring surveillance programs in collaboration with the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial and 

private sector partners. 

We actively participate in the National Biosurveillance Integration, Interagency Working Group, and in addition, FSIS has a fulltime liaison working at the DHS National Biological Integration 

Center. APHIS also participates in that activity by routinely providing subject matter expertise and information sharing on animal 

health situational awareness on both the domestic and international issues. 

These and other issues in the area of surveillance, detection, response, and recovery are central to the ongoing work we are doing 

to increase our capability and our capacity to respond to an emergency. As the quick overview has shown, USDA plays a critical role 

in the Nation’s security. Even in the current economic environment, it is critical that the agriculture industry continue to maintain and advance its capability and capacity to protect the U.S. 

food supply. 

Threats assume many forms, from natural hazards or acts of terrorism, that would inevitably cause losses in productivity that 

could decrease food availability for United States consumption, increase commodity prices, decrease exports, harm the national and 

international confidence in United States products, force smaller 

farms and ranches out of business, and additional monetary losses 

on a large scale recovery effort. 

USDA will continue to push forward in its effort to build a strategic and efficient approach to improving the safety and security of 

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the Nation’s food supply. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I am joined today by Dr. John Clifford who is the Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer for APHIS’s Veterinarian 

Services Program. So we would be happy to answer any questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Maddux. 

I want to ask Ms. Shames, as you stated in your testimony, GAO 

found no centralized coordination to oversee governmentwide 

progress in implementing the Federal Food and Agriculture Defense Policy. Would you please elaborate on the implications of the 

findings? 

Ms. SHAMES. What we found when we conducted this review was 

that at one time, the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, and 

the Homeland Security Council had collected information on what 

the various agencies’ activities were, but interest waned a couple 

of years ago and we found that sort of oversight ceased. 

It has not started again. It is something that we recommended 

that both DHS and the Homeland Security Council resume. In particular, we recommended that there be an interagency process established, that agencies be encouraged to participate in that process, and the agencies, DHS and the Homeland Security Council 

staff agreed with that. 

The implications, of course, are that it puts the country at risk 

if we do not know what agencies are doing, and it puts us at risk 

that we cannot have a coordinated response if there were a food 

and agriculture emergency. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Meckes, GAO recommended that 

the Department resume its efforts to coordinate agencies’ overall 

HSPD–9 implementation efforts. What steps will the Department 

take to implement GAO’s recommendation? 

Dr. MECKES. Senator Akaka, as Ms. Shames mentioned, the Office of Health Affairs, DHS, had previously engaged in a 

benchmarking of HSPD–9 performance across the interagency. 

During 2007 and 2008, early 2009, we had literally a champion 

within the Homeland Security Council that supported us and 

worked with us to gather information and track the implementation of HSPD–9. 

As was mentioned, in 2009, our champion departed the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and then the National Security Council (NSC) was formed with the merger of NSC and HSC. The interest waned in the agriculture and food sector and the implementation of HSPD–9. At this point, we stand ready to support the National Security staff in whatever manner or fashion is deemed appropriate for DHS to participate in renewed efforts to monitor implementation. 

Senator AKAKA. The next question is a followup for Mr. Elkin 

and Ms. Maddux. GAO’s report states that White House National 

Security staff indicated that they are looking to re-engage on 

HSPD–9 oversight. My question for you is, what interaction have 

you had recently with the White House on food and agriculture defense issues? Mr. Elkin. 

Mr. ELKIN. I am not aware of that many White House activities 

that we have had from the perspective, if I could, in terms of the 

questions that you were asking earlier. For the Department, for the 

FDA and our partnership with the USDA, I mean, that is very 

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25 

much an engaged effort. When we train for exercises, we certainly 

try to have our Office of Crisis Management coordinate these activities higher and further through other agencies. I do not know 

exactly what the quote was in regard to White House involvement, 

but I will try to flesh that out. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Maddux. 

Ms. MADDUX. I think what we have to look at, even though they 

have not had someone that was assigned as their food and agriculture coordinator that they have had in the past, they have continued to look into dealing with food and agriculture throughout 

their other interagency policy committees. So the Domestic Resilience Group that I sit on, a lot of the activities, even though they 

are not directly related to food and ag, they do touch on different 

aspects of how we would look at recovery through the type of response. 

Most recently, through the new Presidential Policy Directive–8 

with the new preparedness goal that we are working on, that will 

have to also be folded into anything that we would do in ag and 

the food defense with HSPD–9. So even though we do not have a 

regular person looking on, there are aspects, if you break down 

HSPD–9 into the different taskings that are there that get picked 

up, it is just that it is the overall coordination of how they are looking at it is not put there. 

We continue to emphasize it within the Department because we 

still meet with all of our agencies on a monthly basis and do a 

monthly report. So we know how folks are doing on their HSPD– 

9, and then we also work with our partners as we put that information into the Annual Sector Report. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Meckes, like I mentioned during the first 

panel, Hawaii will be hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit 

meeting in November of this year. What steps has the Department 

taken to ensure a safe and secure event in regard to agro defense? 

Dr. MECKES. Chairman Akaka, we have not been privy to any of 

those activities thus far. I am certain that the National Special 

Event team is working that issue, but we provide consultation to 

them in regards to specific questions that might arise. So should 

those come to pass, I will certainly provide that information. But 

at the present time, we have not been involved in any of those 

planning efforts, or the Food and Agriculture been in any defense. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much. Let me call on Senator Moran for any questions he may have. 

Senator MORAN. Chairman Akaka, thank you very much. I appreciate the testimony this afternoon. I do not know who exactly 

to direct this question to. Perhaps it is the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Homeland Security. 

Have there been known attempts to introduce foreign animal diseases to our agricultural food safety system? How serious are the 

threats? And what analysis has been done to suggest that this is 

a real threat to our food and agriculture system? Dr. Clifford. 

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator. There have not, to my knowledge, been any actual known attempts for introduction. I think as 

Colonel Hoffman had stated, we were aware of those reports earlier, post-September 11, 2001, that those types of things have been 

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26 

discussed by terrorist groups. But to our knowledge, there has not 

been any attempt. 

Now, having said that, our work at USDA is to protect American 

agriculture, both plant and animal, from any introduction regardless of whether it is intentional or not intentional, and our response would be the same to either event. So we prepare for the 

event regardless. 

Senator MORAN. That is a good point. Even though it may be intentional or it may not be intentional, the consequences could be 

very similar and very devastating. Is that true? 

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, and it also is dependent upon the agent that 

they are introducing. So I would also add that in our preparedness, 

we do pathway analysis. We look at risk analysis on most likelihood of introduction of different types of diseases. 

Now, other than the terrorist threat, the most likely way for 

these types of diseases to enter the United States today is through 

accidental introduction, not through intentional introduction. Our 

import requirements are stringent, they are not zero risk-based. 

We do not close our borders, but they are a risk-based approach to 

minimize the introduction of foreign animal diseases into the 

United States. 

And as previously stated, we actually have not had a case of foot 

and mouth disease in this country since 1929. We have had an introduction in the last probably 8 to 10 years ago of exotic 

Newscastle disease in California. That in itself was a very devastating event for us, which we were able to respond to and address appropriately. 

Senator MORAN. I mentioned this earlier, but I would reiterate, 

even the rumor of the disease introduction, whatever disease it is, 

has had tremendous consequences in market prices. But particularly even today, we are fighting to get our export markets back 

from really the rumor of BSE, for example. So the threat is certainly something to be concerned about, but in the absence of an 

actual introduction, other countries use this to their advantage, 

certainly to our—to their advantage economically. 

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir, they do, and especially in a number of 

areas. I think, BSE is an issue that we have appropriately addressed throughout the world. It is a disease that is on a decline, 

but it is still used politically to block trade. 

With regards to diseases like foot and mouth disease, I think it 

is important, as noted in the GAO report. If we get foot and mouth 

disease into the United States, in certain parts of the country, it 

could be very devastating. 

But as an organization that is looking at the best interest for the 

livestock industry in the United States, we have to take a new approach, a new look to the way we address these diseases today. We 

cannot just have a scorched earth-type policy where we go out and 

kill and destroy millions and millions of animals, like we saw in 

the U.K. with burning carcasses. 

So we have to look at the development of new technologies, new 

vaccines to be able to address these in a more practical way where 

we minimize the amount of the animals that we are putting down 

and the destruction, and also, at the same time preventing spread 

of that disease from one herd to the next. 

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27 

Senator MORAN. That is a segue to a line of a couple of questions 

that I wanted to followup, but it is also in line of my question to 

the gentleman, the previous witness from Georgia about prevention 

versus reaction or containment. You are suggesting that we need 

to have a greater emphasis or we are emphasizing more the prevention through vaccines and, I assume, other methods as compared to simply—it is not simple, but killing cattle after the fact. 

Mr. CLIFFORD. Correct. And I would agree. The best approach is 

prevention, and prevention comes through early detection and that 

means you have to have good strong surveillance systems to be 

able to detect that. So those are the types of approaches we need 

to take. 

At USDA, one of the things that we are doing is we used to approach diseases from a standpoint of pulling samples on animals to 

test for a single or maybe two diseases. We are looking at implementation of a comprehensive surveillance approach and the first 

species we are looking at doing this for is swine, where we are 

looking at multiple disease issues with a single sample. So that we 

are doing the rights types of surveillance for multiple surveillance 

streams. 

But the thing is, those things do not always get the attention or 

the resources because they are not the issue today that is on the 

front page. It is a prevention issue. It is not a response and reaction issue. 

Senator MORAN. Well, in addition to surveillance and, Dr. 

Meckes, your testimony talks about food and agricultural research, 

and you talk about the potential of a vaccine scheduled for completion based upon approval of APHIS and the regulatory process, in 

2012. 

Do we have the scientific—let me say it this way. Through 

science and research, do we have the ability to develop the necessary vaccines and antivirals, the diagnostic capabilities to reduce 

the damaging economic and health consequences from the introduction of animal disease? 

Dr. MECKES. Senator Moran, as you are well-aware, the threat 

of foot and mouth disease to your State of Kansas is always on the 

mind of those of us involved in agriculture. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you. 

Dr. MECKES. And certainly, the development of a vaccine has 

been one of the foremost efforts at Plum Island Animal Disease 

Center off the coast of New York. We are, in fact, in concert with 

the USDA, APHIS, and USDA Agricultural Research Service 

(ARS), close to developing a vaccine that will be available for foot 

and mouth disease. 

As to the specifics of the disease, the nature of it, I would ask 

that I could provide you with additional followup from the Science 

and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security that is working toward that end. 

Senator MORAN. Well, that would be fine, sir. Let me ask a broad 

question which is, is that the hope for the future, is that we can 

develop the necessary capabilities through science and research so 

that the consequences of the introduction of one of these diseases 

is minimized so that really no terrorist ever decides, This is the 

way to attack the United States because the economic and lifeH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

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threatening consequences of that introduction no longer are significant? Are we headed to that point? Is that a goal? 

Dr. MECKES. Absolutely, and I would suggest that it is not only 

a goal for all the critters in the country, it is a goal for folks as 

well, and the efforts that are ongoing at Plum and potentially 

NBIF, once the construction is complete there, will go a long ways 

toward, as Dr. Clifford said, preventing the disease and thereby 

eliminating it as a threat to our country. 

Senator MORAN. Secretary Napolitano testified this morning in a 

full Committee hearing and indicated that we have a ways to go— 

this is my summary of what she said—in preparedness on agro bioterror and that NBIF, the facility needs to be built. What opportunities—and again, the Department of Agriculture or Department of 

Homeland Security, what expanded opportunities for research and 

vaccine development would be available with a Biosafety Level 4 

facility that would reduce the risk to agriculture and humans? 

And in your testimony, Ms. Maddux, you talk a lot about that 

bio and agro defense facility. 

Dr. MECKES. Dr. Clifford, go ahead. 

Mr. CLIFFORD. I think it is very important for us to have stateof-the-art facilities to be able to do our work in foreign animal disease diagnostics and research, which means not only having biosafety level 3 (BSL–3) capabilities, but the BSL–4 capabilities that 

you are responding to, to be able to work on diseases of concern 

that have not just an animal health concern, but human health 

concern, and can be worked with safely in these laboratories. 

We do not currently have that capability at Plum Island to do 

that type of work. That facility is reaching the end of its life span 

and so, it is very critical that we be able to have a state-of-the-art 

facility, to be able to do this type of work in. 

Senator MORAN. Dr. Meckes. 

Dr. MECKES. Absolutely, Senator Moran, we concur. There is a 

crying need for a facility of this nature in this country at this time. 

Thank you. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. We will have a second round of questions. Dr. Meckes, HSPD–9 directs the DHS to work with its Federal partners to enhance our ability to detect an attack through biological threat awareness. In response, DHS created the National 

Biosurveillance Integration System. However, in 2009, GAO found 

that NBIS was not fully equipped to carry out its mission because 

it lacked data and personnel from its partner agencies. 

Will you please discuss coordination and any other challenges the 

Department has faced in carrying out this responsibility? 

Dr. MECKES. Chairman Akaka, as a member of the Office of 

Health Affairs, like so many of my fellow members, we are deeply 

committed to the idea of a National Integrated Biosurveillance Program within the country, and we work closely with our colleagues 

at the NBIS and at the Center to provide updates on a daily basis. 

As a matter of fact, one of my staff is currently detailed to NBIS 

to provide food and agriculture expertise for their daily operations. 

We support their efforts. I think Colonel Hoffman spoke to this 

idea of detection to protect and even detection to prevent, and it 

is only through the capability of biosurveillance, gathering data, inH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

29 

tegrating data, analyzing data, and characterizing data will we 

ever have that capability. 

Senator AKAKA. I would like to give the FDA and USDA an opportunity to discuss their efforts to coordinate with DHS on NBIS. 

Mr. Elkin. 

Mr. ELKIN. Our role in NBIS is that of support. We have our directed information sharing to efforts like Food Shield and HSIN, 

which are their networks, but our role in NBIS, I think, has been 

just to provide the information sharing support and data that we 

could. But I do not know that we have an ongoing detail in that 

regard. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Maddux 

Ms. MADDUX. USDA has been involved with NBIS since the very 

beginning. We have had members on the NBIS interagency working group. I have been the representative to the NBIS Interagency 

Oversight Council. We have done a lot of work, realizing that it is 

challenging when you are looking at all of the data that they are 

looking at coming into the integration center. 

And so, they have listened to the interagency partners and we 

have moved forward in that we updated, recently updated the charter that we had when the NBIS project first took place, to where 

now all the partners are signatories on that charter versus just 

DHS being a signatory to it. 

We are in the process of creating an NBIS strategic direction 

which will help us, as partners, know exactly, and define what we 

are looking at, where we wanted to head for the future, the gaps, 

the areas we need to examine. And that should be ready to go to 

the Interagency Working Group in October. 

And we are also, working, as I mentioned, with the National Security staff on the National Strategy for Biosurveillance. So I feel 

that the folks over at the National Biosurveillance Integration Center and the individuals that are managing NBIS have really listened to the partners and taken some steps to where I think as we 

move forward, even though it is going to be a challenge, that we 

are going to end up where we need to be in the future. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I have a question for Ms. 

Shames and I would like Dr. Clifford to respond to Ms. Shames’ 

comments. Ms. Shames, your testimony states that although agencies have taken positive steps on veterinarian workforce issues 

such as creating the Advisory Council, they still need to evaluate 

the veterinarian workforce needed during a catastrophic event. Will 

you please elaborate on this? 

Ms. SHAMES. Yes, I can. This was a report that you asked us to 

do, Senator, and we were pleased to testify on the results a couple 

of years ago. Basically we found challenges at two levels. First of 

all, the Office of Personnel Management did not really have a governmentwide understanding of the Federal Government’s veterinarian capacity and we know that it is a mission-critical position 

throughout the government. 

We also found that several agencies, including HHS and USDA, 

had not done a workforce plan, again, for veterinarians which were 

considered mission critical for them to fulfill their strategic goals. 

Based on what we have found in our updates, OPM has looked govH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

30 

ernmentwide, has developed this interagency forum, and has developed a strategic workforce plan. 

However, on the agency front with HHS and USDA, they have 

not yet completed their workforce plans. And as you mentioned, in 

a catastrophic event, veterinarians play a key role. One thing in 

particular that we found at USDA that underscores the need for a 

departmentwide approach is that we found that veterinarians were 

entering USDA through the slaughter plants because it is not a 

very pleasant job, it has a chronic issue of vacancies, and as soon 

as these veterinarians were able, they moved on to other parts of 

USDA. 

So we found that in USDA, the left hand did not know what the 

right hand was doing and that is why we thought that such a departmental approach was especially important. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Your response to her comments, Dr. Clifford. 

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We do agree with 

the GAO report that there is an issue and concern about the veterinarian workforce, and it is not the number of graduates, per se, 

coming out, but it is the number of graduates that are going into 

food animal-type medicine and have an interest in that area. 

Having said that, with regards to the Food Safety Inspection 

Service through new hiring authorities, using incentives such as repayment of student loans, incentives for hiring and working for 

them, have been able to reduce their vacancy rate from about 15 

percent to about 7 percent. 

Also, with regards to veterinarian workforce plans, I do not know 

about the departmental level. I know that within APHIS, Veterinary Services, we have a workforce plan for our needs with regards 

to veterinarians based upon our current resources. 

We also do things like the National Animal Health Emergency 

Response Corps (NAHERC). We have to utilize this—we are not 

going to be able to employ—the Federal Government is not going 

to be able to employ enough veterinarians to be able to handle all 

types of situations. So it is important for us, and through our Veterinary Accreditation Program, to call upon the private sector and 

other sectors to assist us in those events, not just utilizing the resources within the Federal Government, from other government 

sectors such as FSIS, who is the largest employer of veterinarians, 

in APHIS Veterinary Services, who is the second largest employer 

of veterinarians in the Federal Government, but the private sector. 

We have over 600 private veterinarians that are signed up for 

that activity in case of a national emergency, and we have over 900 

animal health technicians to assist in that area. In addition, other 

things that we’re doing is that during an event, an occurrence, in 

a response, things that we would have traditionally done and assigned with veterinary oversight, we are finding new ways of handling that oversight to free up our veterinarians to be able to address the specific disease issues. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let me call on the Senator from 

Kansas, Senator Moran, for any further questions. 

Senator MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no additional 

questions and I know that a vote has been called at 4:17. So I apH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

31 

preciate the opportunity to join you here today and appreciate the 

testimony of our witnesses. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you Senator Moran. I would like to thank 

all of our witnesses for being here today. This is a very important 

issue that deserves our utmost attention. 

It is clear that we have made some good progress to improve our 

food and agriculture defenses since the establishment of HSPD–9. 

However, more work needs to be done. I look forward to working 

with the Administration and my colleagues in the Senate to make 

sure we have robust capabilities to defend against both intentional 

and natural threats to the food and agriculture systems. 

The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for additional 

statements or questions other Members may have for you. So the 

hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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72478.038
71 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.039
72 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.040
73 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.041
74 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.042
75 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.043
76 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.044
77 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.045
78 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.046
79 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.047
80 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.048
81 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.049
82 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.050
83 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.051
84 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.052
85 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.053
86 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.054
87 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.055
88 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.056
89 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.057
90 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.058
91 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.059
92 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.060
93 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.061
94 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.062
95 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.063
96 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.064
97 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.065
98 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.066
99 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.067
100 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.068
101 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.069
102 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.070
103 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.071
104 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.072
105 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.073
106 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.074
107 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.075
108 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.076
109 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.077
110 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.078
111 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.079
112 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.080
113 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.081
114 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.082
115 

Æ 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


72478.083