Tactical Nuclear Weapons

and NATO

Editors:

Tom Nichols

Douglas Stuart

Jeffrey D. McCausland

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

and NATO

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO

Tom Nichols

Douglas Stuart

Jeffrey D. McCausland

Editors

April 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-525-9
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CONTENTS

Preface ..........................................................................vii

Tom Nichols

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: 

An Introductory Reminiscence ................................xiii

William F. Burns

PART I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF

 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ............ 1

 1. The Historical Context .............................................3

Richard Weitz

 2. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO 

 and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic 

 Examination ............................................................ 13

Paul Schulte

 3. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and 

 Policymaking: The Asian Experience ..................75

Elbridge A. Colby

PART II. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 

 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ...... 107

 4. Russian Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear 

 Weapons ................................................................109

George E. Hudson

 5. Russian Doctrine on Tactical Nuclear 

 Weapons: Contexts, Prisms, and 

 Connections ...........................................................116

Jacob W. Kipp
iv

 

6. Aspects of the Current Russian Perspective 

 on Tactical Nuclear Weapons .............................155

Leonid Polyakov

7. Influences on Russian Policy and Possibilities 

 for Reduction in Non-Strategic Nuclear 

 Weapons ................................................................175

George E. Hudson and Evgeny Buzhinski

8. Russian Perspectives on Non-Strategic 

 Nuclear Weapons .................................................199

Nikolai Sokov

PART III. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ................227

9. Introduction of European Policies and 

 Opinions Relating to Tactical Nuclear 

 Weapons ................................................................229

Douglas Stuart

10.The Role and Place of Tactical Nuclear 

 Weapons—A NATO Perspective .......................235

Simon Lunn

11. European and German Perspectives ................ 257

Götz Neuneck

12. European Perspectives ....................................... 279

Paolo Foradori

13. Europe, NATO’s Tactical Nuclear 

 Conundrum, and Public Debate: 

 Be Careful What You Wish For .........................301 

Nick Childs
v

PART IV. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ................321

14. American Perspectives on Tactical 

 Nuclear Weapons ................................................323

James A. Blackwell

15. The Role of Non-Strategic Nuclear 

 Weapons: An American Perspective ................327

Jeffrey A. Larsen

16. NATO’s Nuclear Debate: The Broader

 Strategic Context .................................................359

Leo Michel

17. Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO’s 

 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review: 

 Prospects for Change ..........................................375

 Guy B. Roberts

PART V. ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION ...... 401

18. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: 

 Arms Control as an Option ................................403

James M. Smith

19. Arms Control Options for Non-Strategic 

 Nuclear Weapons ................................................411

Steven Pifer

20. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: 

 A Conventional Arms Control Perspective .....437

Dorn Crawford
21. Arms Control after START ................................455

Malcom Chalmers

22. The Conventional and Nuclear Nexus 

 in Europe ..............................................................477

Jeffrey D. McCausland

PART VI. CONCLUSION ........................................505

23. Summing Up and Issues for the Future ...........507

Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and

Jeffrey D. McCausland

About the Contributors ............................................511

vi
vii

PREFACE

The role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in 

Europe are subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international security, primarily because it is 

so often disconcerting to remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an American journalist 

wryly noted that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was “a subject that drives 

the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart”—

a dismissive quip which would have remained true 

right up until the moment World War III broke out. 

The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared 

to the momentous issues that the East and West have 

tackled since the end of the Cold War, the scattering of 

hundreds (or in the Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe seems to be almost 

an afterthought, a detail left behind that should be 

easy to tidy up.

Such complacency is unwise. Tactical nuclear 

weapons (or NSNWs, “non-strategic nuclear weapons”) still exist because NATO and Russia have not 

fully resolved their fears about how a nuclear war 

might arise, or how it might be fought. They represent, 

as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, “the longest deadlock” in the history of arms control. Washington and Moscow, despite the challenges to the “reset” of their relations, point to reductions in strategic 

arms as a great achievement, but strategic agreements 

also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(New START) are lower than at any point in history, 

but they are based on leaving each side a reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each. Inflicting 
viii

this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a 

step no sane national leader would take. But it is here 

that tactical weapons were meant to play their dangerous role, for they would be the arms that provided the 

indispensable bridge from peace to nuclear war. Thus, 

the structures of Cold War nuclear doctrines on both 

sides remain in place, only on a smaller scale. 

How did we get here?

As Major General William Burns notes in his introduction to this volume, the history of the Cold War is a 

nuclear history, centered around each side’s efforts to 

convince the other of a readiness for a war that neither 

wanted. Tactical nuclear weapons were crucial to this 

effort, because they were the link between conventional war in Europe and a central nuclear exchange 

between the superpowers. The Soviets were unlikely 

to believe that the President would risk New York and 

Chicago for the people of Europe, which was the central premise of the short-lived and poorly conceived 

strategy of “Massive Retaliation.” A threat to leap to 

Armageddon because of a scuffle between the Soviets 

and the West Germans was on its face incredible, to 

Moscow as much as to us. 

Tactical nuclear weapons provided the solution, 

such as it was. The West abandoned any hope of matching Warsaw Pact conventional forces man for man or 

tank for tank, and instead placed nuclear weapons in 

Europe, many of them directly in front of the assumed 

axes of Soviet advance where they would assuredly 

be overrun or employed. This warned the Soviets, in 

effect, that if Europe were invaded, the choice to use 

nuclear arms would be forced upon NATO by the successes of the Red Army. Western commanders, faced 
ix

with imminent defeat, would fire their tactical arms 

in desperation at advancing Soviet units, commit the 

whole matter to God, and retreat with as much order 

and bravery as they could muster while hoping either 

that the Soviet offensive would collapse or that the 

United States and its allies could force a cease-fire before things spiraled completely out of control.

This was a terrifying but effective strategy. As we 

now know, the Soviet High Command wrestled with 

this dilemma, since taking a Europe in ashes defeated 

the whole point of invasion in the first place. They 

worked out their own plans for first-use of tactical 

nuclear arms, for massive use of tactical arms, and for 

nuclear retaliation. All of the options led to the same 

dead end of escalation, strategic retaliation, and catastrophe. Combat along the Central Front probably 

would have decayed into a nuclear war sooner rather 

than later, with unimaginable consequences.

Today, the Central Front is gone. The inter-German border where NATO and the Warsaw Pact were 

poised for war has been erased, as has the Warsaw 

Pact itself. Former Soviet satellites are now free participants in the Atlantic alliance. A Russian dash to invade Europe is no longer physically possible; the suffocation of Berlin, which would have taken only hours 

by Soviet troops in the city, would now require battle 

across hundreds of miles of allied Polish and German 

territory. Even if the Russians, for some unfathomable reason, wanted to invade Poland or Germany 

once more, they would have to march across 50 million independent Ukrainians to get there, only to find 

themselves at war with another 26 European nations 

and two North American powers. Tactical nuclear 

weapons make no sense in this environment, and yet 
x

hundreds of U.S. weapons (and thousands of Russian 

battlefield arms) still remain in Europe as dangerous 

souvenirs of Cold War preparation for a showdown 

in Europe. 

This volume is the result of the collaboration of 

scholars and security experts from many disciplines 

and nations who have come together to tackle questions that are long overdue for an answer. 

• What role is left, if any, for tactical nuclear 

arms?

• What are the strategic implications of their 

presence—or their removal?

• How have U.S., Russian, and European views 

evolved on this issue, and how much opportunity is there to bring them into a coordinated 

agreement?

• What does it mean for NATO to be a “nuclear 

alliance?”

• Should arms control processes like the Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaties (START) or conventional arms control include NSNWs, or are tactical nuclear arms so outdated that they should 

be removed from the agenda and reduced unilaterally?

Our authors do not claim to resolve all of these 

dilemmas, but we are hopeful that this analysis is an 

important step toward the further reduction of weapons whose role is no longer clear. NATO has never 

enjoyed such strategic depth and stability so far to its 

East, but the weapons that were meant to help U.S., 
xi

European, and Russian leaders climb Herman Kahn’s 

famous escalatory ladder from crisis to catastrophe are 

still deployed across Europe and still ready for battle.

We are not out of the woods yet.

 

Tom Nichols

Professor, National Security Affairs

Naval War College

Newport, RI

xiii

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO:

AN INTRODUCTORY REMINISCENCE

Major General William F. Burns, USA, Retired

Only since World War II has the United States involved itself—contrary to the advice of leaders beginning with George Washington—in foreign alliances in 

peacetime. This book does not address this question 

in particular. However, it does consider one of the 

keystone strategies that serve as the basis for the cohesion of our longest peacetime alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The deployment 

of tactical nuclear weapons was a major decision not 

reached lightly by ourselves and our allies and continues to be a point of concern to this day. As a preliminary to the chapters to follow, I want to address 

the issues surrounding the deployment and potential 

use of tactical nuclear weapons within NATO from a 

users’ perspective.

My experience coincides roughly with the history 

of NATO. I took my first oath under the Constitution—as an ROTC cadet—when Harry Truman was 

President and General Dwight Eisenhower was the 

first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Now in 

my 80th year, I can look back over the decades and see 

the evolution of the Alliance and its strategies. Principal among these strategies was the employment of 

nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. While strategists at high levels debated the “should” and “could” 

arguments, we at the battery and battalion levels of 

the U.S. Army and the squadron level of the U.S. Air 

Force were more interested in “whether” and “how.”

As a rather junior first lieutenant of field artillery, 

I took command of my first battery at Fort Sill, OK, 
xiv

in 1957 with orders to move to NATO-Europe. Our 

armament was the eight-inch howitzer, a decades-old, 

multi-ton, towed behemoth newly capable of firing a 

nuclear projectile almost 10 miles. Following closely 

on the deployment of the original “atomic cannon” 

that moved rather clumsily and had been designed 

specifically to fire a nuclear projectile, the eight-inch 

howitzer retained its conventional capability. This 

complicated our work at battery level since we were 

required to provide conventional fires on call from VII 

Corps which we supported, and at the same time be 

prepared to fire our nuclear rounds on very short notice. All this, in the Army’s wisdom and during the 

lean years of the 1950s, was to be achieved without 

any special personnel augmentation. 

A further complication was that the eight-inch 

nuclear round required careful assembly in the field 

right before firing. This process of about an hour was 

critical to accurate detonation and required the unit 

to undergo numerous inspections over the year from 

six or seven higher headquarters. Training for these 

inspections and potential use took up about one third 

of the battery’s time—and there was no augmentation 

in time, either!

Computation of firing data also took about an hour 

in the pre-computer era. In order to cause the projectile to detonate in the air over a target, careful measurement of data was necessary. To insure accuracy, 

two white phosphorous “spotting” rounds were fired 

to check data and make corrections. Although these 

were not fired over the actual target, it is safe to say 

that the Soviet side would see such firing as a warning 

of imminent nuclear attack. And we in the firing battery wondered about and speculated on the ultimate 

utility of our nuclear burden.
xv

Security was an additional problem. Long before 

the McNamara era’s permissive action links (PAL) 

and NATO-centralized nuclear weapons storage sites, 

each nuclear-capable field artillery battalion stored its 

atomic weapons more or less as it saw fit. There were 

few economies to be found under this system, and the 

security costs to an already overburdened unit were 

high, but suffice it to say that no weapons were compromised during this period.

I explain all this simply to highlight the complexity 

of NATO’s decision to adopt a strategy of tactical nuclear weapons deployment to offset a perceived conventional forces disadvantage against the Soviet army 

and its allies. There were recognized costs involved 

that limited conventional capabilities in the area of fire 

support. However, NATO’s bet on the utility of tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent apparently paid 

off.

After returning to the United States in the early 

1960s, I found myself undergoing the routine field 

artillery officer’s training and assignments. After the 

Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth, KS, we received a “prefix 5” to our military 

skill identification number, meaning that we were a 

qualified nuclear weapons fires planner equipped to 

analyze a target and deliver a nuclear explosive device according to prescription: maximize target damage, minimize collateral damage, and do not make it 

too difficult for friendly forces—because of tree blowdown or radiation contamination, for example—to 

traverse the damaged territory in a future advance.

The Army then went to Vietnam, Europe was left 

with field artillery units stripped of its officers and key 

noncommissioned officers, and the nuclear mission 

lost its priority. For those who believed—and perhaps 
xvi

still believe—that the then Soviet Union was simply 

awaiting the opportunity to strike effectively, the nagging question should arise, why not then? 

After returning from Vietnam, I was sent to pursue an advanced degree. During this process, I was 

assigned for the summer of 1968 on temporary duty 

to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Nuclear 

Planning Group, my only higher staff assignment up 

to that time. I was immersed in the burning tactical 

nuclear weapons argument of the day: In the event of 

hostilities, should we fire our first nuclear round as 

a warning—as we said, for demonstrative use—and 

not aim at an enemy target? Various NATO partners 

had different ideas of a demonstration—the United 

Kingdom wanted a round fired at sea, West Germany 

wanted a round fired high in the sky by an air defense 

missile, etc. Wisely, in my opinion, the United States 

declined to jump on the demonstrative-use bandwagon, seeing it as a sign of weakness rather than a demonstration of strength.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, I commanded 

two nuclear-capable field artillery battalions, both in 

the United States. Times were lean for nondeployed 

units at the time, but we continued to maintain our 

nuclear readiness. 

After graduation from the Army’s institution of 

higher learning—you might have read of the U.S. 

Army War College in Carlisle, PA—I was assigned to 

the faculty and for a few years had little to do with 

nuclear issues. Counterinsurgency was the relevant 

strategy even as the war in Vietnam was winding 

down. Some, however, raised questions regarding 

how technical innovation was changing the battlefield and how this in turn would affect tactical nuclear 

weapons. This re-look grew in importance as the Army 
xvii

embraced lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli 

War and developed new tactics to counter a possible 

Warsaw Pact attack. 

In the mid-1970s, I returned to Europe as a field 

artillery brigade commander. Three of my four battalions were nuclear-capable, and two of those—Lance 

missile units—were given a conventional capability 

while I was in command. The third nuclear battalion—an eight-inch howitzer unit—had the same rather cumbersome nuclear projectile that I was cursed 

with in the 1950s! The Lance battalions were equipped 

with advanced technology and nuclear explosive devices that required little or no assembly and maintenance. Also, peacetime storage of nuclear weapons 

was centralized. I had the added responsibility for 

NATO Nuclear Site 4 in Giessen, Germany, at which 

were stored several hundred nuclear weapons from a 

variety of units. In an alert, even in peacetime, these 

weapons were generally required to be evacuated to 

delivery units, adding an additional complication to 

route planning and timing.

In the late 1970s, I was assigned for 2 years to head 

our liaison office to the Bundeswehr in Cologne. This 

was an exciting time, during which a number of steps 

were taken to insure cohesion and interoperability 

between the West German and U.S. forces. I came 

to understand the deep-seated wariness of German 

leaders concerning tactical nuclear weapons and their 

employment, even though some German units were 

equipped to deliver U.S.-controlled nuclear devices. 

Not too many years before this, the U.S. Army had 

abandoned its Atomic Demolition Munitions when 

military planners came to appreciate more fully that 

these devices, intended to be implanted in the path 

of advancing Soviet forces and detonated at the ap-
xviii

propriate time, all had to be buried on West German 

soil. As this realization sank in, such weapons were 

quietly retired.

In 1981, after returning to the United States and being selected for promotion to brigadier general, I was 

heading a Department of the Army task force at Fort 

Sill, to determine the requirements for a replacement 

for the Lance battlefield missile. A call from the Army 

Chief of Staff ended all this, and I found myself just 

after Thanksgiving across the table from Major General Yuri Lebedev, my Russian opposite number for 

several years in nuclear arms negotiations.

In 1978, NATO had become alarmed over the beginning of deployment of a new “medium range” missile by the Soviets—the SS-20. This missile delivered 

three nuclear warheads fairly accurately to a range of 

some 4,000 kilometers, a vast improvement over its aging predecessors, the SS-4 and SS-5. NATO’s response 

in 1979 was to offer the Soviet side a choice—either 

abandon the SS-20 deployments or NATO would ask 

the United States to deploy in Europe a countervailing force. The history of our negotiations is of great 

interest but not truly relevant to the present discussions except in one aspect: It demonstrated that the 

Soviet Union was quite competent to play the deterrence game but recognized the advantage that NATO 

would have if the United States could maintain deployment in Europe of a nuclear delivery system of 

advanced technology and superior to anything the 

Soviet side could develop. This insight I gleaned from 

many hours of discussion with General Lebedev and 

my own experiences in Europe in earlier decades.

I retired from the Army in 1988 to assume the directorship of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency at the invitation of President Ronald Reagan. 
xix

I learned here of some of the deep divisions in the political world concerning tactical nuclear weapons. After I left the government in 1989, decisions were made 

to withdraw most of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons 

from Europe and virtually to eliminate U.S. Army 

participation in nuclear armaments. I was called back 

in 1992 to initiate negotiations with the new Russian 

Federation over U.S. help to that fledgling government in eliminating stocks of former Soviet nuclear 

weapons and the nuclear explosive material they 

contained. This has been an eminently successful program in which three of the former nuclear states of the 

Soviet Union have become non-nuclear nations under 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, the 

Russian Federation has greatly reduced its stocks in a 

more or less transparent fashion. 

Those members of my generation have seen the rise 

and demise of the Cold War and the ushering in of a 

new phase of world history that has thus far not been 

christened with a capital-letter name. Nuclear armaments within NATO played an important role in the 

Cold War, and NATO owes a debt of gratitude to the 

soldiers of a number of nations who provided a safe 

and secure tactical nuclear deterrent over the decades. 

The question now is the one for political leaders that I 

broached tentatively at the beginning of my remarks: 

Can NATO retain a tactical nuclear capability for the 

foreseeable future? More importantly perhaps is the 

question, Should it?

1

PART I

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

3

CHAPTER 1

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Richard Weitz

The questions to be discussed include: Why and 

how did we develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) 

and associated doctrines? How have the weapons developed as well as the associated strategies for deterrence and extended deterrence? What meaning does 

this have for the future?

Dr. Tom Nichols of the U.S. Naval War College 

noted in the Preface that the meanings, importance, 

purposes, and consequences of nuclear weapons can 

vary with time and context while the weapons themselves remain unchanged. He argued that since nuclear weapons have never been used since 1945, the 

most important question is what their functions are 

in peacetime: How do different classes and deployments of TNWs affect the psychology and politics of 

friends and potential enemies? TNWs are a subclass of 

military assets intended to reduce adversary military 

confidence and increase friends’ reassurance that they 

would not be the object of attack. 

Nichols described the doctrinal malaise associated with the entire class of TNWs. He argued that 

the weapons’ effects—both military and political—

were their most important characteristics, and that 

the West and the Soviets drew different distinctions 

between them. Whatever their specific characteristics, Nichols argued, nuclear gravity bombs delivered 

from a bomber or fighter-bomber platform from thousands of miles away are more of an offensive strategic 

system than a “tactical” weapon. Many would argue 
4

that a nuclear detonation is a strategic event, politically and militarily, regardless of the yield or the delivery means. Nuclear weapons have an inherent potential for rapid and dramatic destruction, shock, and 

death—regardless of whether they yield one megaton 

or 20 kilotons. Distinguishing between “strategic” and 

“tactical” in that sense is more or less academic. As 

Thomas Schelling once opined, their enormous value 

is in the pure violence that they signal.

Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and the Soviets developed doctrines for limited or graduated nuclear war. The intent was to make 

nuclear war sufficiently costly that local aggression 

would not be worthwhile, but not automatically so 

terrible that any threatened countries or allies would 

shrink from using atomic weapons to defend themselves. NATO saw nuclear weapons simultaneously 

as tools of deterrence, defense, and denial. NATO 

planners soon lost enthusiasm for scenarios involving limited nuclear weapons use, but Soviet planners 

came to see them as just another weapon that could 

facilitate Soviet military operations. Soviet and, recently, Russian military exercises typically involved 

the use of some nuclear weapons. 

Paul Schulte of Kings College and the Carnegie Endowment has reviewed the history of theater nuclear 

weapons in Europe, with a focus on the evolution of 

NATO and Soviet operational policies. He argued 

that the significance and strategic meaning of TNWs 

changed over time. From 1953 onwards, the growth 

of U.S. TNWs in Europe was rapid. In December 1957, 

the North Atlantic Council agreed to stockpile nuclear 

warheads in Europe, and a decade later that stockpile 

peaked at 7,000. There were deliberate attempts to 

construct a public understanding of nuclear weapons 
5

as just another kind of military option for warfighting. 

But despite much talk of “massive retaliation” in the 

1950s, practical policy reflected a much more flexible 

attitude. Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, 

and other strategists developed elaborate scenarios 

for nuclear use short of mutual assured destruction. 

Forward-based ground TNWs were seen as enhancing deterrence through their “use-it-or-lose-it” quality. But for the most part, TNWs became a substitute 

for strategy since their low cost made it easy to simply 

acquire more of them.

During the 1960s, this house of cards began to fold. 

Government officials and civilian strategists increasingly questioned the credibility of using TNWs and 

of the entire doctrine of limited nuclear war. By 1957, 

after exercises like Sagebrush, the U.S. Army had concluded that TNWs did not favor the defense. In addition, NATO exercises made clear that Germany would 

be devastated through the effects of blast and fallout 

following even the limited employment of nuclear 

weapons. NATO governments, experiencing different strategic anxieties from their different geostrategic 

circumstances, disputed when and how to use—or 

threaten to use—these TNWs. U.S. officials generally 

wanted options, firebreaks, and bargaining time; Germany sought to avoid any increase in the possibility 

of any war occurring on German territory by insisting 

that NATO threaten the early use of nuclear weapons. 

TNWs, designed as instruments of reassurance to governments, became symbols of anxiety to large sections 

of their publics. 

By 1960, Kissinger and other analysts had noted the 

failure of the services to develop a coherent doctrine 

for TNWs, fundamental disagreements within NATO 

over them, and the problems for NATO strategy that 
6

resulted from the Soviet nuclear buildup. Indeed, the 

Soviets were beginning to introduce their own TNWs. 

Soviet leaders believed that TNWs added to the overall East-West correlation of forces, whose imbalance 

in their favor could exert pressure, threats, and even 

blackmail. Most Soviet strategists fell into “nuclear 

romanticism,” a form of delusional thinking, we now 

see, regarding how nuclear weapons would allow for 

decisive victory in a war with NATO. 

But they still saw them as weapons of mass destruction and likely sources of escalation to all-out 

exchanges, which could not be used precisely against 

military targets separated from the civilian population. Rather than reducing the need for manpower, 

Soviet experts believed that the prospects of further 

nuclear exchanges required even larger conventional 

forces for use as replacements and reserves for those 

killed or incapacitated. They also noted the desirability of preemption but could never be certain that Soviet 

forces could accomplish this, due partly to the large 

number of NATO TNW targets.

The doctrine of “Flexible Response” developed in 

the John Kennedy/Robert McNamara era was a way 

to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by fielding 

credible levels of conventional forces. The corresponding new NATO MC 14/3 plan intended to raise the 

threshold of nuclear war by deemphasizing nuclear 

weapons and by increasing reliance on conventional 

forces and making conventional defense more feasible. 

Flexible Response essentially confined nuclear weapons to only two roles: deterring a Soviet initiation of 

nuclear war and serving as weapons of last resort, if 

conventional defense failed, to persuade the aggressor 

to terminate the conflict on acceptable terms. But ambiguity was the essence of Flexible Response: without 
7

it, the Allies were unlikely to agree in peacetime over 

the role and timing of TNW use. France’s withdrawal 

from NATO’s integrated military structure, the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), and 

the incorporation of precision-guided munitions into 

NATO plans also facilitated inter-allied agreement. 

Meanwhile, popular opposition cancelled the proposed U.S. Enhanced Radiation Warheads (“neutron 

bombs”), which might have increased the utility of 

TNWs against Soviet armored forces. The Soviet-NATO détente of the 1970s enabled mutual reductions in 

nuclear weapons, and the NATO governments chose 

to relinquish much of their TNW capacity in order to 

lubricate the prospects of modernizing their intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in response to a comparable 

Soviet INF modernization effort, and later to improve 

relations with a rapidly changing Russia. The December 1979 NATO foreign and defense ministers meeting decided to deploy 572 American ground-launched 

cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing 2 intermediaterange missiles, while undertaking arms control negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR). They unilaterally withdrew 1,000 U.S. TNWs 

from Europe. At their October 1983 Montebello meeting, the NPG announced that, without a breakthrough 

in the INF talks, the deployments of Pershing 2 and 

the GLCMs would proceed, but announced that another 1,400 American tactical warheads would be 

withdrawn.

The INF Treaty of December 1987 banned all U.S. 

and Soviet ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles 

with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (km). NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General 

Bernard Rogers recommended that NATO implement 

the second half of the 1983 Montebello decision and 
8

modernize its remaining short-range nuclear forces 

(SNF). It never happened, largely due to West German 

opposition. The Follow On To Lance (FOTL) and the 

U.S./United Kingdom (UK) Tomahawk anti-ship airto-surface missile (TASM) were cancelled.

The United States and Russia unilaterally eliminated many TNWs after the Cold War ended, but the 

NATO cuts were much deeper. Soon after Soviet forces and all nuclear systems were withdrawn to Russia, 

NATO removed most of its remaining 4,000 U.S. warheads, leaving only “several hundred” gravity bombs 

of the B-61 Type II. The resultant TNW asymmetry in 

Moscow’s favor is now long established and hard to 

eliminate. Another asymmetry is in NATO and Russian planners’ views of their remaining TNWs. NATO 

leaders have declared TNWs as weapons of “truly 

last resort” that should ideally be eliminated through 

negotiations with Russia, though some analysts, including Nichols, would be willing to relinquish them 

unilaterally. But Russian policymakers seem to see 

continuing political and military uses of their own 

TNWs. 

According to Schulte, present-day NATO doctrine 

and statements offer many possible reasons for retaining TNWs, but the arguments are all contestable:

• Mechanisms for sharing nuclear functions and 

responsibilities (but with countries that find 

nuclear weapons increasingly distasteful);

• Signaling devices in crises (but which would 

be hard to use given present NATO procedures 

and processes);

• Reaffirming the transatlantic relationship at a 

time when the United States is shifting its strategic attention to the Pacific (but intra-allied 

disputes whenever TNW issues become prominent weaken alliance solidarity);
9

• Assets for future arms control talks (which the 

Russians resist holding);

• Weapons category (which might undermine 

NATO investments in more usable capabilities, 

and that might not be sustainable without renewed commitment to modernize dual-capable 

aircraft (DCA);

• Reassurance for new East European members 

of NATO (but the alliance TNWs are not located in these countries, and could not be moved 

there without provoking a major crisis with 

Russia);

• Symbols of the continuing U.S. nuclear commitment to its NATO partners (Professor Bunn’s 

Wedding Ring Analogy: it does not matter 

whether or not you wear a wedding ring, but it 

does matter a lot if you wear it and then take it 

off); and,

• Means of deterring Iran (but many more operationally plausible nuclear assets exist for 

this, and NATO-wide ballistic missile defense 

(BMD) is becoming the preferred response).

Schulte maintained that, although the nuclear 

weapons complexes cost the United States and the 

Soviet Union trillions of dollars, TNWs specifically 

spared NATO countries the enormous costs of maintaining large standing conventional armies. The compounded economic effects of this have been one factor 

in higher western European living standards. And, 

while contributing to the security dilemma throughout the Cold War, TNWs were not in themselves a major cause of instability: they improved the correlation 

of forces from the NATO perspective and did not lend 

themselves to “bolt from the blue scenarios” because 
10

they were embedded in easy-to-monitor conventional 

forces. 

Elbridge Colby focused on the history of TNWs in 

U.S. strategy toward Asia. At first, the Pentagon saw 

TNWs as a cheap and readily available means of enhancing U.S. regional military power in possible wars 

in Asia. TNWs were integrated as tightly with U.S. 

forces in Asia as they were in Europe. These forces 

were not able to fight a conventional war of any duration without the use of TNWs. These weapons were 

seen as a U.S. advantage over the Soviet bloc and as 

helping deter or defeat Soviet aggression and avoiding another unhappy experience like the protracted 

war in Korea. For example, they were seen as essential 

for countering a People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempt to occupy Taiwan. Lacking long-range ballistic 

missiles, the Pentagon placed TNWs on land as well 

as on forward-based ships and bombers, establishing 

a network of U.S. military bases throughout the world.

Even so, the Kennedy and subsequent U.S. administrations refrained from using them in the Vietnam 

War. In time, the improving accuracy and effectiveness of U.S. conventional weapons, combined with 

the growing nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and 

China, reduced U.S. reliance on TNWs. Today, unlike 

in Europe, U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia are no longer 

relied upon for strictly military purposes. They are designed as means of reassuring key U.S. allies in Asia 

and for deterring Chinese and North Korean threats 

while discouraging the further proliferation of nuclear 

weapons to other Asian countries.

Colby offers several hypotheses as to why the U.S. 

approaches to TNWs have differed in Europe compared to Asia. First, the regional security environ-
11

ments are dissimilar. Whereas Europe has the unitary 

multinational NATO alliance, the United States has to 

manage a diffuse hub-and-spoke alliance system in 

Asia, which makes it more difficult to pool individual 

national military forces into an integrated collective 

asset. 

Second, NATO’s formal role in shaping U.S. nuclear weapons policy, including its dual-key arrangements for forward-based shared TNWs, and the NPG, 

considerably constrained Washington’s nuclear policies. In contrast, the absence of such an alliance in the 

Asia Pacific region allowed the United States much 

more discretion in determining its nuclear weapons 

policy in the Pacific. The Japanese and other allies 

benefiting from U.S. nuclear deterrence guarantees 

declined to probe too deeply into these arrangements 

to avoid highlighting this nuclear dimension to their 

nuclear-allergic publics.

Third, the regional geography is dissimilar. The 

Asia Pacific theater is much larger, and U.S. allies 

are located on the periphery rather than on the Asian 

mainland, thus allowing defense by U.S. air and naval 

forces. In contrast, the United States needed to base 

an enormous conventional force in central Europe to 

defend its NATO allies from the feared Warsaw Pact 

ground attack. The network of U.S. bases in the Pacific 

also made a forward-based strategy relying on standoff air and sea power effective in defending them. 

Fourth, the United States enjoyed a more advantageous conventional balance in Asia than in Europe. 

U.S. naval superiority has meant that the United States 

does not need to rely on nuclear weapons to protect 

most Asia Pacific countries, with the major exception 

of South Korea during the Cold War period. In contrast, the United States did not enjoy conventional su-
12

periority in Europe during the Cold War, so it lacked 

credible conventional deterrence options and had to 

rely on extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.

Fifth, the prospects of further nuclear weapons 

proliferation is much greater in Asia than in Europe. 

India, Pakistan, and North Korea have been the most 

recent states to acquire nuclear weapons, joining Russia, China, and the United States. Japan, South Korea, 

and Taiwan also have the means to acquire nuclear 

weapons fairly easily if they want. Even Burma was 

feared until recently to be considering nuclear weapons options. 

Colby notes how changes in the Asian scene are 

moving it closer to the European pattern. TNWs have 

recently achieved renewed prominence in the defense 

debates in South Korea and Japan. Seeking to balance 

the provocative actions of nuclear-armed North Korea 

and the growing military power of China, strategists 

in both South Korea and Japan are openly discussing 

whether nuclear weapons, either U.S. or possibly indigenous ones, can help them manage both threats. 

The United States has sought to reassure both countries by affirming that the United States will defend 

them against external aggression, including the use of 

nuclear weapons if necessary. 

Although U.S. TNWs no longer play the central 

role in military planning in Asia that they did in the 

1950s, Colby argued that they do have an important 

and possibly growing role in reassuring allies and deterring adversary aggression. He also worried that the 

United States would be at a disadvantage in local conflicts if its adversaries were prepared to use nuclear 

weapons while the United States was not.
13

CHAPTER 2

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO 

AND BEYOND: 

A HISTORICAL AND THEMATIC 

EXAMINATION

Paul Schulte

INTRODUCTION

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) are a U.S. invention deriving from research and development 

decisions taken around 1947-49, and accelerated by 

ominous adversarial moves such as the Soviet nuclear 

test in 1949 and the Korean War in 1950. They became 

the characteristic, and eventually cheaply mass-produced instrument of U.S. deterrence in Europe and 

the Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union also came 

to deploy large numbers of TNWs with quite different operational concepts. From their peak numbers in 

the late 1960s to early 1970s, NATO TNWs declined 

due to doctrinal reevaluation of their utility, the appearance of conventional alternatives, and, in Europe, 

anti-nuclear political feeling which prevented their 

modernization or replacement and portrayed them as 

an obstacle to political change. They remain an important part of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

DEFINITIONS

TNWs pose serious definitional problems. The 

most cited criteria involve a short range (under the 

500 kilometer [km] lower limit established by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty of 1987) and a 
14

low yield. The first TNWs deployed to Europe in 1953-

54 were American gravity bombs, as are the only remaining U.S. TNWs, the variable-yield B-61s. Modern 

fighter-bombers can potentially deliver them across 

hundreds of kilometers—distances overlapping with 

those of weapons previously referred to as Theater 

Nuclear Forces. The only nuclear weapons ever used 

in combat, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, had 

TNW-like yields of only about 15 kilotons (kt), but obviously with a decisive strategic effect.1

A widely employed alternative term for TNWs is 

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), defined as 

all nuclear weapons unaddressed by current nuclear 

arms control arrangements. For example, this definition would exclude U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear 

weapons (SNWs) covered by the various Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaties and U.S. or Russian nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and 

cruise missiles with intermediate ranges, between 500 

and 5,500 km, which are prohibited by the INF Treaty. 

Additional weapons could fall into this category if, as 

is frequently called for, TNWs were brought into U.S.-

Russian arms control negotiations or perhaps covered 

by multinational arms control measures. In newly nuclear-capable states such as Pakistan, India, and North 

Korea, and, perhaps soon, Iran, almost all nuclear 

weapons, even with a short range and restricted yield, 

are regarded as “strategic” due to their strategic intent 

to deter superpower intervention and drive regional 

security developments and due to their unique status 

within a country’s nuclear arsenal.

Yet another formulation is that TNWs are those 

nuclear weapons which are incapable of reaching key 

homeland targets of the Cold War superpowers. However, this would redefine all NATO low-yield gravity 
15

bombs in Europe as strategic weapons—which is why 

Moscow often favors this definitional approach. 

In view of the lack of consensus on what constitutes TNWs, I propose the following working definition as derived from the military functions expected of 

their deployment by NATO, the United States, Britain, 

France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR)/Russia since the 1950s. TNWs are defined as:

nuclear devices and delivery systems with relatively 

short range and low yield by contemporary standards, 

which are intended for employment against conventional, or nuclear, ground, naval, air targets or transport assets, on the battlefield, or across the theater, to 

contribute to total conventional and nuclear campaign 

capability, yet which are not expected to inflict strategically decisive damage to enemy military, economic, 

or regime targets, but whose use would nevertheless 

be an unmistakable signal that the stakes in a crisis 

were regarded as serious enough to transform it into, 

or continue it, as a nuclear conflict, and so, unavoidably, to risk possible escalation to a strategic level.2

CONCLUSIONS AND SCOPE

The main proposition of this chapter is that nuclear 

weapons experience significant change in their strategic purpose and their political and cultural meanings, 

depending on time and historical context. This has 

been true even with little change in the design, production, deployment, maintenance, storage, training 

routines, and targeting of the weapons themselves. 

Their purposes, strategic implications, and political 

meanings have steadily evolved over the decades. 

TNWs have been subject to changes of international 

thinking and national feeling about nuclear weapons, 

and tidal fluctuations in the acceptability and avoidability of early nuclear use. 
16

This chapter concentrates on Europe, with a focus 

on the evolution of NATO operational policies, but 

considers some connected developments in the Warsaw Pact and the Russian Federation, and analogous 

developments on the Korean Peninsula, the other area 

where TNWs have played a strategic role. The chapter 

attempts to suggest useful periodicities, but bounding 

dates should not necessarily be taken as indicating immediate discontinuities, except perhaps for 1989-90. 

Unsurprisingly, history shows early precursors of current policy disputes and intra-Alliance debates, while 

providing illustrations for a wide range of contemporary judgments. Let us proceed with our historical 

and thematic examination of TNWs using the following six periods as our historical frame of reference: I. 

1945-1953; II. 1953-1963; III. 1963-1967; IV. 1968-1983; 

V. 1987-1990; and VI. 1991-2012.

I . 1945-1953. U.S. TNWS TO MEET THE SOVIET 

EXPANSIONARY THREAT: THE 

TRUMAN-STALIN YEARS

The Early Strategic and Moral Promise of TNWs.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, further nuclear 

research led to smaller and smaller weapons, reducing 

average warhead weight from 10,000 to 1,000 pounds 

by 1954.3

 Opponents of the development of a fusion 

device, such as Robert Oppenheimer, favored small 

bombs which could be delivered via aircraft, artillery, or missiles for battlefield effect. It took well over 

10 years after Hiroshima before the future shape of 

nuclear strategy began to clarify. There were expectations—perhaps prompted by moral aspirations—that 

nuclear weapons could develop, in line with previous 
17

experiences of war, in a less morally paradoxical direction, which would not favor the attacker and not 

necessarily involve the destruction of cities.4 This 

uncertainty about how exactly TNWs would be employed in war (or, more accurately, how wars involving TNWs would turn out) has meant that development and deployment of TNWs has been marked by 

various reports and officially endorsed strategies attempting to impose rational order on their use. Such 

doctrines have over time been forced to accept that 

control may be impossible in the nuclear spiral which 

would follow TNW use—and that their deterrent role 

is probably stronger as a result.5

In 1949 General Omar Bradley speculated that 

“the A Bomb in its tactical aspect may well contribute 

towards a stable equilibrium of forces since it tends 

to strengthen the defensive army.” Oppenheimer 

similarly hoped that “battle would be brought back 

to the battlefield.” The U.S. Air Force’s Project Vista, 

conducted in 1951, predicted that synergies between 

battlefield weapons and small conventional forces 

would work to defend Europe against overwhelming 

Soviet forces. 

These calculations were later repeatedly disconfirmed by exercise experiments and analytical work, 

but the efficacy of TNWs was over-estimated owing 

to a number of factors. Staring into the dawning Cold 

War, American strategists concluded in the far-reaching National Security Council (NSC) Paper NSC 68 

that there was no alternative to achieving a “preponderance of power”6

—both conventional and nuclear—

to back the strategy of containment which would otherwise be simply a bluff. Truman signed NSC 68 into 

policy in September 1950. Achieving and maintaining 

this preponderance would require maximum use of 
18

the anticipated long-term, though not permanent, 

U.S. advantage in nuclear weapons of all ranges and 

yields. Among U.S. allies still slowly recovering from 

World War II, there was an appetite for reliance upon 

the marvelous and cost-free guarantee of U.S. nuclear 

firepower. 

The Imperative of the Apparent Soviet 

Military Threat.

In the years after 1945, the Soviet challenge had 

seemed essentially political and economic, but by August 1949, just before the North Atlantic Treaty had 

entered into force, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

expressed deep pessimism to British counterparts 

about whether a Soviet offensive against Western Europe could be defeated, or even whether the planned 

strategic bombing offensive against Russian cities 

could force an early end to such war.7

 The need for 

bolstering Western conventional forces seemed urgent and obvious.8

 In 1949, the first-ever NATO strategy document to receive ministerial endorsement, DC 

6/61, included two major propositions fateful for Alliance strategy and the role of TNWs. NATO would 

plan a forward defense of its territory rather than maneuver to trade space for time in the response to a Soviet attack. Second, NATO would “ensure the ability 

to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means 

possible with all types of weapons without exception.” The persisting sense of acute conventional inferiority meant that NATO would be “loud, stubborn, 

and explicit”9

 in its rejection of any No First Use of 

Nuclear Weapons (NOFUN) undertaking. Compared 

with the repeatedly emphasized, if unverifiable, Soviet No First Use pledge, this rejection created a sinister, 
19

Strangelovian image for NATO in the eyes of peace 

and antinuclear movements, which the USSR was not 

slow to exploit. It also established a political distaste 

for TNWs among several European NATO publics 

which remains today, and is increasingly significant 

for the weapons’ future.

The Imperative of Forward Defense.

Forward defense seemed the indispensable foundation for a large, resilient, and cohesive Alliance, 

given traumatic recent European memories of Nazi 

occupation, coupled with the apparently irrevocable 

consequences of forced assimilation into the Soviet 

bloc. Moreover, Berlin, Germany, a symbolic outpost 

of the Cold War, remained indefensible by conventional means.10 Maintaining the credibility of such an 

inflexible military strategy against larger Soviet and 

East European (after 1955, Warsaw Pact) forces, made 

additional capabilities, such as the nuclear-bolstering 

which TNWs would provide, seem absolutely essential. 

Korea and Rearmament.

The first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the outbreak of 

the Korean War in 1950, and a growing perception of 

armed Soviet expansionist ambitions created anxieties 

which led to the establishment and rapid growth of 

NATO. In February 1952, a NATO meeting in Lisbon, 

Portugal, set 96 divisions as a force goal. This ambitious conventional force level subsequently proved 

unachievable, due to a combination of cost and inefficiency.11
The shock of the Korean War led to plans for the 

rapid deployment of large numbers of U.S. TNWs into 

Europe during 1953-54 (although the first U.S. nuclear weapons deployed to the European theater seem 

to have gone to Morocco in 1953, because there they 

could contribute to the Strategic Air Command [SAC] 

Emergency War Plan untrammeled by Alliance or theater considerations12). But production limitations imposed temporary delays, with the U.S. SAC insisting 

on first access to fissile materials to build up its stocks 

of weapons for the all-out strategic attack on Soviet 

cities which would be the first response to the feared 

Warsaw Pact invasion. 

The Soviet Union lagged in nuclear weapons technology and could not set aside nuclear weapons for 

tactical purposes during this period. Even so, Soviet 

leaders could not ignore the nuclear aspects of NATO’s 

growing capability. While Stalin publicly blustered 

about the relative insignificance of new technology 

compared to the “Permanently Operating Factors” of 

war, he was unrelentingly determined to build up the 

USSR’s own nuclear capabilities and acutely aware of 

the slow growth of the Soviet stockpile. Stalin never 

in fact ordered a war plan for invasion of Western Europe, despite the West’s anxieties about surprise attack which stimulated NATO’s expansion and nuclearization.13 Therefore, the decision to build up nuclear 

deterrent capabilities may not have helped deter a serious military threat in the early Cold War, although it 

may still have been psychologically essential to maintain Western European confidence without crippling 

cost to the postwar recovery.14

20
21

II. 1953-1963. U.S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY: 

EISENHOWER OPTS FOR 

“MASSIVE RETALIATION.”

After assuming office in early 1953, the administration of former General Dwight Eisenhower raised 

U.S. and NATO dependence on nuclear weapons to 

a new level. As a fiscal conservative, Eisenhower saw 

nuclear weapons as a strategically acceptable and decisively cheaper alternative to conventional forces. He 

believed in planning for the long competition between 

liberal democracy and communism by balancing security and solvency. Increasing reliance on the much 

more cost-effective firepower provided by TNWs was 

consequently a key aspect of Eisenhower’s New Look 

strategy, which developed out of U.S. NSC Paper NSC 

162/2 of October 1953.15 (The U.S. doctrine was also frequently referred to as “Massive Retaliation,” although 

Eisenhower himself disliked the term.) Eisenhower 

also judged—probably, it now seems, wrongly—that 

his threats of nuclear use if the peace talks continued 

to stall in Korea had been decisive in persuading the 

Chinese and North Koreas to agree to armistice terms 

a few months later. 

TNWs and the Economics of Massive Retaliation.

When Eisenhower took office, the United States 

had only about 1,000 nuclear weapons. Massive retaliation needed far more. Orders were placed for 

the weapons with the Atomic Energy Commission at 

enormous cost. By the time outlays reached their peak 

during the Eisenhower era, the Commission was consuming some 10 percent of the total federal budget. 

By the mid-1950s, a “nuclear production complex” 
had been created that absorbed 6.7 percent of total 

U.S. electrical power.16 Nonetheless, building up such 

a huge nuclear capability cost only a fraction of what 

maintaining large conventional forces would have. 

Since no escape could be negotiated from the huge 

costs of the global competition between the Soviet and 

NATO blocs, the defense economics of the New Look 

seem convincing in retrospect, especially considering 

the civilian spinoffs from military research and development 17

The long-term effects of lower military expenditure and smaller conscript armies helped generate the 

economic and cultural buoyancy which was such a 

Western competitive advantage in the Cold War.

NATO Takes on the New Look.

Eisenhower’s successor as NATO’s Supreme Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Matthew Ridgway, commissioned a study of the effects of TNWs 

on force requirements. The study controversially concluded that NATO would prevail if it had many more 

TNWs than the Russians and more troops to absorb 

the higher loss rates, and if SACEUR had pre-delegated authority for immediate nuclear use if war broke 

out. The study raised all the questions that would 

dominate NATO TNW debates through the Cold War: 

• Could theater nuclear weapons be used on European territory without destroying the societies they were intended to protect?

• Could the military requirements for early release of nuclear weapons be reconciled with 

the politicians’ desire to wait until events made 

release unavoidable?

22
23

• For what political purposes might nuclear 

weapons be used, and what would determine 

“victory” in a nuclear exchange?18

The incorporation of massive retaliation in NATO 

doctrine and stockpiling was nevertheless immediate 

and encountered little resistance. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed in the autumn of 1953 that 

“special attention should be given to the continuing 

provision of modern weapons of the latest type [i.e., 

TNWs].”19 The following year, Field Marshal Bernard 

Montgomery, Deputy SACEUR, declared, “We at 

SHAPE are basing all our planning on using atomic 

or thermo nuclear weapons in our defence. . . . It is 

no longer ‘they may possibly be used,’ it is very definitely: they will be used if we are attacked.”20 There 

were deliberate attempts to construct a public understanding of nuclear weapons as just another kind of 

military option for warfighting. Official references 

to nuclear response, without differentiating between 

strategic and battlefield use, were designed to increase 

nuclear deterrence by blurring distinctions. The first 

U.S. nuclear artillery pieces arrived in Kaiserslautern, 

Germany, in 1954. The buildup of TNWs accelerated 

after 1956, so that “before long NATO was looking like 

a nuclear porcupine,21 having by 1960 amassed some 

3,000 nuclear weapons.”22 Forward-based ground 

TNWs, despite their short ranges and low yields, were 

seen as particularly enhancing deterrence through 

their “use-it-or-lose-it” quality, and because, with the 

introduction of nuclear shells (“battlefield nuclears”), 

all dual-capable artillery, especially of the widely 

available 155-mm class, would have to be regarded as 

nuclear assets. 
24

The NAC approved MC 14/2 in July 1954 (the MC 

14 series set out the overall strategic concept) and MC 

48/2 (the MC 48 series addressed the measures to 

implement that concept) in 1957. Together, they represented a refined version of the Eisenhower/Dulles 

doctrine of massive retaliation, worded as follows 

(per MC 14/2): 

A. We must first ensure the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counteroffensive by all 

available means and develop the capability to absorb 

and survive the enemy’s onslaught. . . . 

D. Concurrently and closely related . . . we must develop our ability to use our land, sea and air forces for 

defense of their territories and sea areas of NATO as 

far forward as possible to maintain the integrity of the 

NATO area counting on the use of nuclear weapons 

from the outset.23

This was the high point of NATO doctrinal reliance upon TNWs. It seems to have supported a temporary policy of U.S pre-delegation of very short-range 

battlefield nuclear weapons, including Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs), especially on the Central 

Front in Germany.24 Under European pressure, MC 

14/2, MC 48/2, and MC 70 (which followed in 1958) 

were soon reinterpreted by the next SACEUR, General Lauris Norstad, to allow for more differentiated 

reactions than automatic nuclear retaliation. The Hungarian uprising in 1956 showed the need to include 

a local defense scenario, in which nuclear weapons 

would not be used, provided no Soviet forces were directly involved in the border clash.25 These confidential planning moves towards differentiated responses 

paved the way towards the greater flexibility debated 

in the early 1960s and publicly adopted in 1967. The 
25

widely heralded move to flexible response may have 

been less of a change in practice than is commonly assumed.

26

National Attitudes to TNWs.

Quite unlike strategic nuclear forces, TNWs, by 

their forward-based physical presence and likely use 

in defensive combat on or over Allied territory, confront members of alliances like NATO with very concrete choices over potential use. Europeans responded 

in different ways to the deployment of TNWs and the 

dilemmas posed by timing and conditions of their 

employment. For most NATO allies, the inescapable 

choice was between the binary risks of entanglement27

(being caught up, if deterrence failed, in a nuclear 

war, perhaps starting far from Europe and escalating 

faster than they would have chosen) or abandonment

(being left exposed through “decoupling” to the prospect of Soviet intimidation, conquest, or conventionally irreversible seize-and-hold occupation should 

the Americans fall short on their nuclear guarantees). 

The recurrent disputes on Alliance nuclear posture involved cycling between these poles of anxiety. For the 

United States, the concomitant problem of extended 

nuclear deterrence was, and remains, “simply the 

international political problem of credibility of retaliation with potentially suicidal consequences against 

serious, but not inevitably fatal, threats.”28 Reaching 

agreement on the timing and circumstances of the Alliance’s response with TNWs inevitably focused attention on this dilemma, which was logically insoluble, 

yet had to be—and has been—politically managed, 

very largely by creating a common deterrence culture 

within which joint planning for nuclear contingencies 

could be conducted and normalized.
26

Determinants of national attitudes vary. Geopolitical exposure has been critical, with those states most 

directly in the front line of the East-West conflict seeing a clear need for nuclear deterrence. Geography interacted, sometimes unstably, with historically determined national strategic cultures and different degrees 

of determination to preserve national independence.

Britain.

The United Kingdom (UK), facing major financial 

problems after World War II, but anxious to maintain a leading military role in the Alliance and globally, favored nuclear deterrence with tactical as well 

as strategic weapons.29 London constantly sought to 

preserve a special relationship with the United States, 

especially its economically rewarding nuclear cooperation. British possession of a national nuclear strategic 

capability meant the UK was less directly affected by 

decisions regarding TNWs, but London was prepared 

to act as a mediator within the Alliance to prevent divisive differences over their employment, and to resist 

any possibility of strategic decoupling. 

France.

France was located well behind the NATO-Warsaw 

Pact frontline, but Paris prioritized nuclear acquisition 

because it had a large army in Germany and was determined to regain its status in the world and prevent 

a repetition of the traumas of 1870, 1914, and 1940. 

Deploying nuclear weapons to ensure that the French 

homeland would never be subject to occupation again 

appealed to all sectors of French political opinion.30

This hardened into a fixed official national pro-nu-
27

clear sentiment for the Alliance and an insistence on 

achieving and maintaining independent national capability. As a later French nuclear theorist recently encapsulated it: “Every French village displays a memorial to the failure of conventional deterrence.”31 The 

insistent logic of this position, articulately formulated 

and largely unchallenged by the political class, was to 

pursue independent strategic and intermediate-range 

nuclear capability first, but then to begin working on 

French TNWs (tactical bombs and a mobile surfaceto-surface missile [SSM], Pluton). A few years after its 

first nuclear test in 1960, France was emphasizing an 

independent and unconstrained “pre-strategic” use 

of its national TNWs, using gravity bombs, surfaceto-surface missiles, and later air-to-surface missiles, 

to give a last warning before resorting to the use of 

France’s national strategic forces.

Germany.

West Germany was the fulcrum and decisive prize 

of the Cold War confrontation, and faced the most 

politically complex set of choices. Its geopolitical predicament as a narrowly truncated country right up 

against the East-West fault line of the inner-German 

border, left it reliant on the threat of early use of U.S. 

intermediate-range and strategic-range nuclear forces 

to prevent loss of national territory and widespread 

devastation, preferably by avoiding any war. This idea 

clashed with German strategic culture which, mindful 

of the wry observation that “the shorter the (nuclear) 

range, the deader the Germans,” was skeptical and 

fearful of nuclear provocation or mistakes, yet which 

also rejected non-nuclear alternatives such as fixed 

fortifications and barrier defenses because they would 
28

present obstacles to eventual German reunification. 

The Third Reich experience left a strong residue of 

antimilitarism, which mutated into fears of “a global 

Auschwitz” or “Atom-Fear.”32 Moreover, it combined 

with left-wing suspicions of U.S. motives and thereby 

increased receptiveness to the peace and antinuclear 

movements. Since both Germanys would be the major battlefield in a third World War and the target for 

TNWs from both sides, Germany’s atomic allergy 

merged with the conviction that Germany should not 

be victimized.33 Yet, Konrad Adenauer’s new Federal Republic of Germany resisted Soviet expansion, 

worked for eventual reunification, and insisted on 

forward defense of its narrow country at the innerGerman border if war came. Adenauer sought a Politik 

der Starke (position of strength) from which to pursue 

reunification.34 From this perspective, he considered 

TNWs as “practically normal weapons.”35

The resulting controversy led to the signing of the 

Göttingen Manifesto by leading scientists, which crystallized a lasting aversion to nuclear weapons in German universities. Franz Josef Strauss, the German Defense Minister, determined to force through German 

nuclear rearmament, told an American audience that 

these weapons are “the symbol and even the characteristic aspect of the decisive criterion of sovereignty.”36

But due to persistent pressure from the Soviet Union 

and other countries, Germany was denied a national 

nuclear weapons option, and even from inclusion in 

the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), which 

the State Department proposed to create in the hope 

of giving European allies shared control over nuclear 

weapons as an alternative to their creating individual 

national nuclear forces.
29

Nevertheless, Germany understandably continued to seek to exercise control over nuclear decisions 

within the Alliance that could affect how a war was 

fought on German territory.37 Germany demanded 

that it should not be “singularized,” that there should 

be no zones of differential security, that an attack on 

any member of the Alliance must trigger an automatic 

and immediate reaction from all others, and that other 

measures be adopted to avoid any increase in the possibility of war occurring on German territory. To these 

ends, it insisted that NATO threaten the early use of 

nuclear weapons. German officials often acted in a “silent but positive partnership” with the British within 

the Nuclear Planning Group,38 but TNWs (which due 

to their short range allowed for the possibility of a 

nuclear war being fought only on German territory) 

remained a more anxiety-provoking but inevitable irritant for Germany than for other Alliance members.

Smaller Nations.

Smaller, exposed countries faced their own particular nuclear difficulties and sought to maintain characteristic choices within the Alliance. Norway repeatedly rejected proposals to station nuclear weapons on 

its soil in peacetime, as well as refusing permanently 

stationed foreign troops and restricting Allied exercises in the border region, as a reassurance strategy to 

manage its relations with the Soviet Union. However, 

Norway still participated in preparations and training for Snowcat, the TNW-driven, all-out air offensive 

scenario which dominated NATO air force planning. 

This was an example of an ally pursuing policies of 

both integration and screening: maximizing the Alliance’s security guarantee through close cooperation, 
30

while limiting the extent of Allied presence or infringement.39 Similarly, Denmark, while resisting Russian pressures for neutrality, also refused to accept the 

stationing of TNWs in peacetime.40

The USSR.

Like Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev emphasized 

nuclear rather than conventional forces, viewing them 

as modern, decisive, and cheap. Unlike Joseph Stalin, 

Khrushchev determined that Soviet forces should 

develop extremely detailed offensive nuclear war 

plans.41 As they began to acquire their own TNWs, 

Soviet leaders believed that they naturally added to 

the overall East-West correlation of forces, in which 

an advantageous overall balance would almost automatically and “scientifically” produce aggregating 

psychological effects, thus undermining the influence 

of “warmongering” factions in the West, increasing 

inducements for them to accept the legitimacy of the 

Central European Communist states, and generally 

encouraging them to seek accommodation with Soviet 

positions.42 But the Soviets still saw TNWs as weapons 

of mass destruction and likely incitements to escalation which could not be used precisely against military targets separate from the civilian population, and 

which could not plausibly be held back in any limited 

nuclear war. Rather than reducing the need for manpower, Soviet experts judged that the high attrition 

rates produced by nuclear exchanges would require 

even larger conventional forces as replacements and 

reserves. Despite the USSR’s ritually repeated NOFUN 

pledge, “Soviet strategic thought placed considerable 

emphasis on preemption; if the Soviet Union was sure 

that the enemy was about to attack, it should strike 
31

first in order to break up his forces.”43 The growth of 

NATO TNWs did not cause the Soviet General Staff 

to abandon its underlying belief that only a ruthless 

military offensive could secure victory for the USSR. 

Revelations after the fall of communism, Warsaw Pact 

exercises, and doctrine indicate that Soviet Marshals 

fell into a state of “nuclear romanticism,”44 consistently planning on the assumptions that early (but 

never, they insisted, even to themselves, first) nuclear 

strikes of intermediate-range missiles and tactical 

weapons, combined with mass conventional air attack and armored offensives, would cancel out NATO 

TNWs, shatter Alliance cohesion, and carry Warsaw 

Pact forces to the Channel before the Americans could 

send over sufficient forces to stop them. This seems 

in retrospect delusional. While the nuclear emphasis 

later became diluted in favor of paralyzingly rapid 

conventional advances, not until 1987 did the Warsaw 

Pact adopt a military doctrine that clearly excluded 

any nuclear attack option.45

The Consequences of Projected Full-Scale Tactical 

Nuclear Use in Europe during the Cold War.

East German papers from the military archive documenting Command Post Exercise Buria in October 

1961 reveal the huge scale, rapidity, and destructiveness of the anticipated nuclear war. It was the first major command post exercise carried out under nuclear 

conditions and is consistent with the highly influential 

reference work Military Strategy published in 1962 by 

Marshal V. D. Sokolovski. Warsaw Pact officers were 

assigned an exercise scenario based on the assumptions that, if the Soviet Union signed Khrushchev’s 

threatened peace treaty with the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR), ending Berlin’s special status, 

NATO would try to advance to West Berlin and, when 

blocked, would launch a nuclear first strike. All-out 

Warsaw Pact reprisal attacks would then follow to establish a favorable balance of forces. Soviet operational 

calculations of the results of TNW employment were 

grimly similar to those in previous NATO exercises. 

The Exercise Buria scenario postulated a Warsaw Pact 

force numbering over one million men, with more 

than 350 SCUD and FROG launchers, 1,500 fighter 

planes, and 1,000 bombers and fighter-bombers. Of 

these aircraft, 100 were nuclear-capable. The NATO 

force had 682,000 troops when combat commenced, 

including 300 nuclear-capable artillery pieces and 334 

missile launchers (Honest Johns, Lacrosses, Corporal/

Sergeants, and Redstones); air forces of 1,314 fighters, 

1,550 bombers, and fighter-bombers (800 nuclear-capable, with 36 air-launched nuclear cruise missiles). It 

assumed that more than 2,200 nuclear weapons would 

be employed, 1,000 by the Soviets, 1,200 by NATO, 

though total megatonnage would be about the same.46

Here quoted at length is Matthias Uhl’s depiction of 

the unfolding campaign’s horrendous results:

In their first “strategic” nuclear strike, Warsaw Pact 

forces would attack a total of 1,200 stationary NATO 

targets (422 in West Germany) within 30 minutes with 

approximately 400 nuclear attacks on mobile targets 

such as troop concentrations or nuclear weapons. The 

political and military leadership of the Federal Republic would be paralyzed for 8 to 10 days. 70% of TNW 

and 90% of the radar stations and airfields in West 

Germany would be immediately destroyed. Nuclear 

weapons would kill or incapacitate 40% of the troops 

they were used against. Losses of weapons and equipment would be up to 60%. NATO would detonate 68 

surface explosions of nuclear weapons behind War32
33

saw Pact lines to interdict strategic reserves. Overall, 

140,000 km2 would suffer radiation of at least 100 

Roentgens per hour. Enormous numbers of dead, injured and radiation diseased civilians would confront 

military and civilian medical services with insoluble 

problems. Nevertheless, after this decisive initial exchange, Warsaw Pact troops would storm on to Paris 

and reach Calais on the 10th day.47

OPERATION SNOWCAT

Similar operational calculations would likely have 

been made in NATO, but there are no detailed declassified scenario casualty calculations. An indication of 

similarly extraordinarily high anticipated loss rates 

can however be gained from the high-intensity air 

operations scenario for the opening of nuclear war in 

Europe, which required coordination of the Alliance’s 

non-nuclear aircraft across the theater. This was designated SNOWCAT: “Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Attacks.” It would also have 

taken into account the Alliance’s considerable conventional and tactical nuclear naval air capabilities. 

(The SNOWCAT plan still exists, but its details are 

classified and it is probably now planned on a much 

smaller scale.) Winning the initial nuclear exchange in 

SNOWCAT took priority over air defense of national 

territory, so that, for example, non-nuclear Norwegian 

fighter-bombers were expected to be held back to attack enemy air control systems throughout the northern Warsaw Pact so as to assist NATO nuclear strikes, 

even though SNOWCAT missions in the early 1960s 

had been privately predicted to be “suicidal” by the 

Commander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe 

(CINCNORTH).48
34

Nuclear Command and Communication Chaos.

Communications problems would have added to 

the difficulties on both sides of the nuclear battlefield 

because of jamming, fears of near instant identification and location by enemy direction finders, and extensive Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) effects after each 

nuclear explosion, which would endanger communications over a wide area. All this would interfere with 

requests for nuclear release and arrangements for secure dispersal and controlled delegation. Even as late 

as 1987, NATO had “failed to develop a comprehensive 

system integrating conventional and nuclear C3 . . .

that would tie together major headquarters, responsible political officials, and the relevant military commanders down to at least the divisional level.”49 Command and control in the Warsaw Pact is unlikely to 

have been any more efficient under nuclear conditions 

(except that communications were more standardized), but since their plans rested on rapid offensive 

movement, the physical obstacles created by nuclear 

strikes would have been even more significant.

TNWs in Early Atomic Crises.

The impact of the threat of TNW use, or lack of it, 

can now be traced in some of the nuclear crises which 

characterized the early antagonisms of the Cold War. 

The French, secretly and much too late, requested U.S. 

TNW strikes to save Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam, in 1954 

which were rejected.50 The Eisenhower administration 

later openly—and riskily—threatened their use in 

1954-55 if the Chinese Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy or Matsu were invaded by Communist China, 

and again in 1958 to deter any invasion of Taiwan.51
35

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) had no nuclear capability or firm allied nuclear commitment to back any renewed aggression on its 

part after 1953, but levels of hostility remained high 

and U.S. TNWs were introduced into the Republic of 

Korea (ROK) around 1957-58. The buildup which followed, as in Europe, was part of the global forward 

deployment of nuclear weapons implied by the massive retaliation doctrine. By the end of the 1960s, the 

number of TNWs in the ROK reached approximately 

900, including 100 Lance surface-to-surface missiles, 

alongside 100,000 U.S. troops. Repeated consideration 

was given to nuclear use against North Korea, China, 

and Russia. According to Peter Hayes: 

For most of the Cold War, nuclear deployments in Korea were primarily aimed at the Soviet-Chinese bloc, 

initially treated as a single set of targets in the sixties; 

and later, with the deepening Soviet-Chinese antagonism . . . aimed primarily at the former Soviet Union, 

and only secondarily against North Korea itself.52

During the 1961 Berlin crisis, President John Kennedy called on his countrymen to learn what to do 

to protect their families in case of nuclear attack and 

announced a major increase in the U.S. defense budget and a call-up of the reserves.53 Intelligence reports 

reaching Khrushchev from the Russian secret police 

(KGB) lent weight to this public signaling. They indicated that if the access routes to Berlin were blocked, 

the NATO allies intended to respond robustly, using 

economic and military measures “that could threaten 

the security of the Soviet Union.”54 A report from East 

German intelligence was more detailed and alarming. 

It stated that if conventional forces were unsuccessful 

in reopening the access routes to West Berlin, NATO 
36

would use TNWs.55 This seems to have been a reflection of discussions between officials from the three occupying powers, which had not yet crystallized into a 

military plan, but was entirely in line with Kennedy’s 

sentiments.56 It seems that the disclosure of NATO discussions of TNW use in a territorially circumscribed 

crisis, involving a highly symbolic location to which 

a U.S. President had tied his credibility, had a sobering and stabilizing effect. Although Soviet forces had 

been intermittently blocking the autobahns to Berlin 

in August 196157 when Khrushchev backed Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the GDR, in building the Berlin 

Wall, he gave up his ultimatum for the Allies to sign a 

peace treaty with the GDR and end the special status 

of Berlin. The paradoxically stabilizing effect of the 

unintended transparency of NATO nuclear plans and 

deployments to Warsaw Pact espionage networks, 

however, continued for years.

In September 1962, Khrushchev sent to Cuba 80 F 

KR1 nuclear cruise missiles, with an anti-ship range 

up to 150 km, nine warheads for Frog/Lunar battlefield missiles, plus six atomic bombs for short-range 

Ilyushin-28 bombers, to support the 40 intermediaterange ballistic strategic missiles already secretly introduced into Cuba. The military purpose of the TNWs 

seems to have been to strike possible U.S. invasion 

forces, or to attack the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo, as the crisis deepened. The TNWs were neither 

announced nor detected at the time by U.S. intelligence, prompting a shocked response from former 

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara when told of 

their deployment decades later, that if the U.S. forces 

had come under attack from TNWs, the likely result 

would have been general nuclear war. General Issa 

Pliyev, the senior Soviet commander in Cuba, was not 
37

given release authority by the Soviet General Staff,58

but it is unknowable whether they or he would have 

ordered the launch of TNWs had he faced being overrun by the Americans, given the still-enormous Soviet 

inferiority in overall nuclear capability. Yet keeping 

these TNWs secret, presumably because of the highly 

clandestine nature of the whole deployment, also deprived the Soviets of any stabilizing deterrent effect 

in territorial protection. The TNWs remained in Cuba 

until early December despite Khrushchev’s assurance that all nuclear weapons had been removed from 

Cuba in November. “Had U.S. intelligence uncovered 

this fresh deception, the crisis might have restarted 

amid irresistible pressure for an invasion.”59

This incident also emphasizes the sheer difficulty 

of detecting (and therefore verifying) TNWs, even 

during the most intense local surveillance. Russia has 

since frequently emphasized its opposition to the deployment of any country’s nuclear weapons on the territory of other countries. Potentially the most serious 

failure of crisis management during the Cuban affair 

was the unauthorized U.S. depth-charging of Soviet 

submarines near the U.S. quarantine line. The Americans did not know that those submarines had nucleartipped torpedoes aboard and conditional authorization to use them. It was only much later revealed that, 

but for the intense personal intercession of 2nd Captain Vasily Arkhipov, the commander of B59 might 

have used a nuclear torpedo against an American 

destroyer.60 At the height of the Cuban crisis, on October 27, 1962, a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft from 

Alaska accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace over 

the Chukotski Peninsula and radioed for assistance. A 

USAF F-102, armed with a nuclear air-to-air missile,61

was scrambled from Alaska and headed towards the 
38

Bering Sea, while Soviet MiGs took off to intercept the 

U-2. Fortunately, it managed to exit Soviet airspace 

without shots being fired.62 In these three widely 

separated cases, TNWs came close to unauthorized or 

unexpected firing in fast-moving, unanticipated, unplanned, and unrehearsed situations. Their use would 

have surprised the other side and threatened the tight 

central control that both Washington and Moscow attempted to exercise during the Cuba crisis.

British Tactical Nuclear Out-of-Area Deployments.

Alongside the United States, the UK provided 

extended nuclear deterrence in behalf of the Central 

Treaty Organization (CENTO) from 1955 to 1979, covering the Middle East. Canberra and later Vulcan aircraft of the UK Near East Air Force, equipped with Red 

Beard and later WE177 bombs, based on the sovereign 

base areas in Cyprus from about 1961 until 1975, were 

tasked with missions primarily in the USSR’s Central 

Asian Republics. 

Similar arrangements applied in the Far East. Canberras with Red Beards (later, WE177s) of the UK Far 

Eastern Air Force were deployed in Tengah, Singapore, from the early 1960s until the British withdrawal 

from east of Suez in 1970-71. Their task was to provide 

support for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO, 1954-77), primarily against possible Chinese 

aggression. By October 1963, with the intensification 

of the Second Indochina Conflict, the Americans began asking the British to “take on targets in Burma, 

adjacent parts of China and in Hainan.” Naval aircraft 

from UK carriers in the Indian Ocean would have 

been fully integrated into nuclear strike planning.63

These nuclear deployments were kept secret from the 

Cypriot and Singaporean government at the time.64
39

III. 1963–1967. EMERGING DOUBTS 

CONCERNING TNWS—PROMULGATION 

OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 

During the late 1950s, doubts about reliance on 

TNWs began to accumulate. Soldiers, officials, and 

civilian strategists increasingly questioned the credibility of using TNWs and the feasibility of theories 

which relied on them for graduated or limited war.65

By 1957, after exercises like Sagebrush, the U.S. Army 

had concluded that TNWs did not favor the defense. In 

addition, NATO exercises Carte Blanche in 1955 and 

Lion Noire in 1957 confirmed that Germany would be 

devastated through the effects of blast and fallout following even implausibly limited employment of nuclear weapons. Partly because the conclusions reached 

in these exercises were publicly leaked in the West, 

NATO TNWs became objects of anxiety to significant 

sectors of Western public opinion.

During the 1960 U.S. presidential election campaign, Kennedy criticized Eisenhower for the inflexibility and riskiness of massive retaliation. Kennedy 

evinced a willingness to push for higher conventional 

Alliance spending in the interests of strategic stability. McNamara made repeated visits to NATO to 

persuade allies of the desirability of increasing conventional forces to more credible levels so that early 

recourse to TNWs could be avoided and overall deterrent strengthened. He stressed the need to give the 

President nuclear options, firebreaks, and bargaining 

time.66 His message was not warmly received because 

it both called for increased expenditures, and could 

be interpreted as a prelude to U.S. decoupling from 

the allies. NATO debates in this period were particularly vexing, because the State Department persisted 
40

in pushing its cherished MLF proposal in the face 

of Russian and French opposition until 1965. French 

President Charles de Gaulle’s very different attitude 

towards nuclear strategy was causing problems for 

intra-alliance consensus, culminating in France’s exit 

from the integrated military structure and joint nuclear planning in 1966.

The limited pre-delegation of nuclear release for 

certain forward-deployed and vulnerable U.S. TNWs, 

which seems to have been allowed at the end of the 

1950s, was reversed by McNamara’s insistence on 

centralized control. In a similar vein, the United States 

also began to apply great efforts to ensure that securely coded Permissive Action Links (PALs) were fitted 

to all U.S. nuclear weapons throughout the Alliance.67

(As nearly 50 years of further technical ingenuity have 

now been devoted to the development of PALs, it 

must be doubtful whether the B-61s, which have been 

extensively reworked and redesigned as America’s 

sole remaining TNWs, could be detonated if seized by 

terrorists or special forces.)

Flexible Response: MC 14/3.

The eventual 1967 compromise adaptation of flexible response was as much an exercise in creative 

ambiguity as a way to raise the threshold of nuclear 

war by finally fielding credible levels of conventional 

forces which would enable the Alliance to respond to 

any attack at an appropriately calibrated level. NATO 

would no longer plan to use its nuclear weapons 

for fighting a war, but for war termination. The aim 

would be to drive home to the Soviet leadership the 

seriousness of the situation so they would halt their 

offensive. Ambiguity had to be the essence of flexible 
41

response: without it, the Allies were unlikely to agree 

in peacetime over the role and timing of TNW use. 

Here, Sir Michael Quinn describes the tactic of deliberate ambiguity:

NATO’s public declarations were carefully worded 

for Soviet consumption. . . . We rightly believed Soviet 

intelligence would obtain accounts of the policy discussions that had taken place behind closed doors, so 

we tried to ensure that two key messages got through 

to Moscow—first, NATO had faced up to the tough 

issues of nuclear use; and second, NATO would not 

take provocative or hasty action.68

General Hans Steyning von Sandrart, Commander 

of NATO Central Front, elaborated: “We had one great 

advantage. . . . Despite all its knowledge of NATO, the 

Soviet General Staff could never be certain of the exact 

circumstances in which we would ‘go nuclear’ for the 

simple reason that the members of NATO themselves 

did not know.”69 The convenient official formulation 

was to say that NATO would use TNWs “as late as 

possible, but as early as necessary.”70 This was deterrence as much by default as design.71

Creation of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) grew out of 

the McNamara Special Committee on Nuclear Consultation in 1965-56.72 Its major prospective advantage was Soviet acquiescence. The Soviet Union had 

indicated that, unlike its strenuous objections to Germany’s membership in the MLF, Moscow would not 

object to Germany’s accessing nuclear decisionmaking through the NPG, and would therefore not use 

this issue to block negotiations on the Nuclear Non-
42

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) then being drafted.73 The 

NPG’s charter was initially confined to planning, but 

it was to become the main generator of NATO’s common nuclear deterrence culture. 

The NPG oversaw the development of NATO 

nuclear-sharing arrangements, which were initially 

secret and remained so during the negotiation of the 

NPT, which was completed in 1968. Under NATO’s 

nuclear-sharing arrangement, the nuclear weapons 

that the United States provides to allies remain under 

U.S. ownership, secured in peacetime by U.S. special 

weapons custodial forces (numbering at their maximum 10,000 to 25,000 troops) until, in war or extreme 

crisis, a presidential order passes their command to 

the relevant NATO commanders and the necessary 

operating codes are given to allies.74

Historically, the shared nuclear weapon delivery 

systems covered most forms of U.S. TNWs, including 

very large numbers of tactical bombs and U.S. 155 milimeter (mm) nuclear artillery rounds. Surface-to-surface missiles such as Corporal, Sergeant, Honest John, 

and Lance were widely shared. Greece, Italy, Turkey, Belgian, Dutch, and Greek forces also operated 

nuclear-tipped Nike-Hercules missiles. Canada had 

both Bomarc nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles and 

the AIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air missile. The 

UK, although a nuclear power in its own right, used 

U.S. surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear artillery 

until 1992. Since all NATO states are NPT members, 

NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements involve giving 

conditional access to nuclear weapons to countries 

that have accepted the official legal status of NonNuclear Weapons States (NNWS) under the NPT (i.e., 

all NATO members except Britain, France, and the 

United States). The nonaligned movement and vari-
43

ous arms control groups argue that this violates Articles I and II of the NPT and have applied diplomatic 

and legal pressure to terminate these agreements.75

NATO remains adamant that nuclear-sharing was legally “grandfathered” in the drafting of the NPT. Its 

position is that control of the nuclear weapons would 

not be transferred to the NATO NNWS until an actual 

conflict occurred, at which point the NPT is no longer a constraint, and that nuclear-sharing is a valuable 

barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation in behalf of 

which pressures might otherwise build up within the 

industrially advanced member states of the Alliance.76

IV. 1968-1983. TNWS DURING DÉTENTE AND 

NATO-SOVIET WEAPONS MANEUVERING AS 

PRELUDE TO THE SOVIET COLLAPSE

Improving political relations between NATO and 

the Warsaw Pact generally raised European public 

skepticism about the strategy of nuclear deterrence, 

of which TNWs were the most concrete, local, and 

targetable symbols. The peace movement, which had 

existed since the 1950s, became an increasingly important factor for NATO governments to consider. The 

activists developed and promulgated a critique claiming that the superpowers had “overdosed” on deterrence, which had in turn “poisoned their relationship. 

. . . [Yet] they interpreted the tensions and crises that 

followed as evidence of the need for even more deterrence. . . . The strategy of deterrence was self-defeating; it provoked the kind of behaviour it was designed 

to prevent.”77 From this perspective, nuclear-dependent flexible response was almost as objectionable as 

massive retaliation. Another implication of improved 

East-West relations for TNWs was the new promise 
44

and possibility of arms control in Europe. Bloc-tobloc Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 

negotiations to reduce conventional military forces in 

Central Europe to equal but significantly lower levels 

began in Vienna in October 1973. Despite being hailed 

by West Germany leader Willi Brandt as “a proving 

ground for détente,”78 the talks were stultified by numerous disagreements, especially over actual numbers. No substantive progress was made, although the 

process itself, despite its protracted frustrations, was 

judged by many to have been worthwhile in facilitating strategic dialogue between East and West and laying some of the ground for the subsequent and more 

successful Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE) Treaty.

To break the deadlock, NATO made an offer, Option 3, in December 1975 as a sweetener to its earlier 

proposals, offering to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 nuclear-capable aircraft, and 36 Pershing short-range ballistic missile launchers in exchange 

for withdrawals of Soviet armored forces. This offer 

achieved no greater success than any other proposal 

within the MBFR process, which was formally terminated in 1989. However, it was the first suggestion that 

NATO could envisage its TNWs becoming counters to 

be thrown into a reciprocal process intended to reduce 

military numbers and suspicions on both sides. It also 

indicated that the NATO stockpile was large enough 

to accommodate large reductions without significant 

military risk. 
45

Why Did NATO Keep So Many TNWs For So 

Long?

The U.S. stockpile size was maintained within the 

7,000 to 8,000 range during most of the 1970s.79 Critics like Richard Rhodes see this as simply a failure of 

strategic imagination in the long stalemate of the Cold 

War because, once the massive U.S. nuclear weapons production complex had been built, U.S. nuclear 

weapons became relatively cheap, eventually dropping in price to $250,000, “less than a fighter bomber, 

less than a missile, less than a patrol boat, less than 

a tank.”80 In September 1967, McNamara, soon after 

his Vietnam-induced retirement as Defense Secretary, 

also denounced the “mad momentum” of nuclear 

weaponry: “If something works . . . there are pressures 

from all directions to acquire those weapons out of all 

proportion to the prudent level required.”81

By 1983, studies by the RAND Corporation concluded, 

One thing is certain: the present stockpile is primarily a legacy of the weapon systems and warheads 

accumulated in the largely haphazard manner in the 

1950s and 1960s and while the result may not be incompatible with the requirements of flexible response, 

it has not been tailored to meet the specific needs of 

the strategy.82

Incremental TNW additions seemed to add to security, if only by dissuading the other side from expecting that it could achieve any decisive advantage 

through a nuclear buildup. The TNW component of 

the correlation of forces remained stable, even if at constantly higher levels, but this meant that the numbers 

grew because NATO and the Warsaw Pact each had 
46

to anticipate a huge immediate nuclear counterforce 

duel, in which nuclear assets and command systems 

throughout Europe would be targeted by conventional air attack and TNWs. The huge number of nuclear 

assets, and the unthinkable scale of the consequent 

destruction if they were ever used, became in itself a 

source of reassurance. TNWs were also an emblem of 

U.S. commitment:

The stockpile size for land-based weapons was pegged 

at “around 7,000 warheads” by McNamara in 1966 

and “was maintained within the 7,000 to 8,000 range 

by policies of retirement and progressive replacement 

during most of the 1970s” since the stockpile level itself became a political symbol of American coupling 

and the political sign of multilateral participation in 

nuclear use planning and decision-making, the most 

important of Alliance functions....Regardless of 

NATO’s military requirements, the nuclear weapons 

stockpile could not be reduced without appearing to 

diminish political commitment to the Alliance.83

Development of a Shared NATO Nuclear Culture.

The NPG with its subordinate committee, the High 

Level Group (HLG), became an instrument which the 

United States used to persuade Europeans of the imperatives of nuclear strategy and which Europeans 

used to persuade the Americans to give them more 

information regarding the deployment and contemplated use of these weapons on their own territory. 

NATO’s notorious security leakiness made American 

caution understandable, but it had originally applied 

even to bilateral contacts at the highest level. When 

de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, the French 

President asked the SACEUR whether U.S. forces in 
47

France were equipped with nuclear weapons. When 

Norstad replied that to his very great regret, he could 

not answer, de Gaulle responded icily, “That is the 

last time . . . a responsible French leader will allow 

such an answer to be made.”84 His humiliation and anger contributed to his 1966 decision to turn all foreign 

forces out of France.85 In 1962, the West Germans did 

not even know how many U.S. nuclear weapons were 

deployed on their soil, nor at the end of the year, when 

atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) were furnished 

to Europe, especially on the Central Front, were the 

Germans told what the U.S. plans were for these 

ground-burst weapons with their extremely high fallout and contamination potential.86

Thanks to necessary American tolerance of “an 

impressive degree of anti-hegemonic behavior on 

the part of its Allies,”87 this situation changed markedly over the next years. U.S. nuclear deployments 

in peacetime were by 1987 “governed by a series of 

closely held bilateral agreements, known as Programs 

of Co-Operation,” between the United States and individual Allied governments:

At the minimum . . . the agreements cover 3 areas: a 

general statement on the exchange of classified information about weapons; an agreement specifying the 

numbers and types of warheads that the US will be earmarking for the Allies forces; and the stockpile agreement covering storage for national use in any other 

storage on national soil for other NATO forces. All are 

subject to scrutiny by the US Congress. In 1967, following Flexible Response and French withdrawal, the 

US agreed to provide an annual deployment report to 

each host country. The Defense Minister of each country is thus officially aware of the type, quantity, yield, 

location, and appropriate and projected delivery systems for weapons stored in national territory . . . also 

general control and security procedures at each site.88
48

Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) for the 

Initial Defensive. 

Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons. Preliminary AngloGerman operational studies presented in the HealeySchröder Report to the NPG in May 1969 considered 

draft guidelines for employment of TNWs within the 

flexible response framework. The report concluded 

that most existing alliance doctrine on TNWs was 

politically unacceptable and militarily unsound, that 

it would not be possible for NATO to gain the military advantage by using them, and that their initial 

use should therefore be essentially political, that is, to 

re-create a state of deterrence by convincing the adversary of the risks of continued military action. The 

report essentially saw NATO TNWs as having a political signaling function rather than being designed 

to assure a battlefield victory. Compromise formulations accepting this were agreed to at the NPG meeting in Washington in September 1969. But there was 

no agreement about follow-on use.89

Nuclear Softening. Further NATO studies followed, 

leading to slow amendments of Alliance doctrine as 

assisted by the further development of conventional 

alternatives to nuclear weapons use. By about 1973, 

“due above all to German pleading,” NATO gave up 

the option of inflicting ground bursts on NATO territory, thus contributing to the elimination of ADMs in 

the early 1980s. The maximum yield of weapons that 

might be used above NATO territory was limited to 

10 kiloton (kt). In 1974 SACEUR Goodpaster was instructed that all NATO nuclear targets should be military, with their selection “based on the twin criteria of 

achieving essential military objectives while minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage.”90 This 
49

slowly changing deterrence ethos was a politically 

irreversible move away from the stern nuclear warfighting assumptions of the 1950s.

Hidden Consequences of Nuclear Disillusion within 

the Warsaw Pact. There was no equivalent ferment 

within the Warsaw Pact, where all nuclear weapons 

were retained under the direct control of KGB detachments, and where the nearest to an alliance debate 

was a single Czechoslovak request in 1983 for an unprecedented Warsaw Pact training schedule devoted 

to an actual Warsaw Pact defense—before practicing 

the inevitable counteroffensive in Exercise Shield 84.91

But there were slow, intangible, and sometimes covert 

consequences for planning exchanges of weapons as 

fateful as TNWs in such an atmosphere. The intensely 

risky offensive orientation which Russian strategies 

imposed led to a demotivated and fatalistic view 

among minor Warsaw Pact allies, aware of the inevitable scale of losses in the scenarios for which they 

trained. One Polish officer in Warsaw Pact headquarters, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, became a defector-inplace (later called “the First Polish Officer in NATO”) 

partly because of his concern over the ruthless and 

entirely offensive nature of Warsaw Pact plans, which 

would unhesitatingly sacrifice Polish blood on “a Red 

Altar.” NATO’s conventional inferiority would force 

it to respond to a Warsaw Pact invasion with TNWs, 

which would leave Poland a wasteland.92 To avert that 

future, he became an immensely valuable early western intelligence source on the strategy of deep operations which the Soviets began planning from the late 

1970s to mid-1980s. His revelations, along with those 

provided by the equally disillusioned Russian General Dmitri Polyakov, were crucial to NATO’s early 

recognition of and answer to that strategy.93
50

Mini-Nukes and Enhanced Radiation Weapons: 

The Strengthening Veto of Public Opinion.

The NATO TNW stockpile had become an established, though largely classified, part of the strategic 

landscape by 1968. It changed little, except by unilateral reductions, until 1983. Political attention and 

agitation focused instead on proposed new technical developments. The first such development was 

the possible introduction of “suppressed radiation 

weapons,” that is, small “clean” warheads which 

could destroy hard targets while reducing collateral 

fall-out damage. The largely hypothetical prospect of 

U.S. development and introduction of “mini-nukes” 

was discussed at a NATO conference, then leaked and 

denounced in 1973 as threatening to blur the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons. This 

resulted in a mini furor indicating an increased public 

sensitivity to newly enhanced tactical nuclear warfighting capabilities.94

It further complicated President Jimmy Carter’s 

abortive attempt 4 years later to introduce TNW Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW). These would have 

replaced existing nuclear rounds in artillery shells and 

were designed to offset the Warsaw Pact’s armored 

advantage by eliminating tank crews through instant 

doses of radiation, while causing less collateral damage than other nuclear devices. The Germans, at great 

political cost, 95 had given qualified support to their 

deployment, but the story was prematurely leaked in 

Washington, and ERW were relabeled as the “Neutron Bomb,” and denounced as “the ultimate capitalist 

weapon” that would kill people but leave buildings 

standing. The neutron bomb dispute further incited 

and strengthened Europe’s antinuclear movement 
51

through widespread protests, openly supported by the 

Soviet government and clandestinely backed by KGB 

“active measures,” such as the tacit financing of peace 

movements and the provision of disinformation to 

the Western news media. President Carter capitulated 

to multiple pressures and delayed the ERW program 

indefinitely, though secretly ordering production of 

components that could be assembled in 48 hours and 

airlifted to Europe.96 The conclusion drawn from this 

affair by one scholar was that determined leadership 

within NATO (usually the United States) is indispensable for making such decisions since the “modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe cannot be managed 

by a pluralist approach to decision making.”97

TNWs and the Euromissile Crisis, 1977-1987. The 

ERW debacle raised still further the political costs of 

any NATO nuclear modernization. The Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis is a separate and complex 

subject, but had important interactions with TNWs. 

The anxieties over the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicled (MIRV) Soviet SS-20s, capable 

of striking anywhere in Europe from within the Soviet 

Union, were very much connected with the risk that 

the immediate escalatory response option represented 

by SS-20s would negate NATO use of TNWs, then still 

its main deterrent capability against a Warsaw Pact attack. This prospect would create not only a military 

weakness but resultant possibilities of intimidation 

during periods of tension short of war. The crisis that 

followed focused all of NATO’s political attention as 

the Soviets continued to deploy SS-20s while NATO 

committed itself to a dual-track decision to deploy 

new, intermediate-range systems while attempting 

to negotiate reductions with Moscow, despite intense 

political opposition.
52

In general, NATO calculations of the strategic balance in Europe were carried out largely as part of a 

military “net assessment” process. The judgments of 

the Soviet leadership involved more complex correlation of forces analysis based on the psychological 

and political impacts of nuclear deployments. By the 

1970s, NATO allies began to realize that the Soviets 

were not seeking a stable military balance to facilitate 

further détente, but instead were exploiting East West 

rapprochement as a means of undermining support 

among Western Alliance members for its defense policies, especially as to nuclear weapon types, holdings, 

and doctrine.98 But while Soviet calculations were 

more sophisticated and multidimensional, their theories turned out to be inadequate empirical guides to 

achievable politico-military outcomes.

The politics of this so-called targets crisis brought 

the first significant change to the TNW stockpile, 

flowing from the 1979 NATO ministerial decision in 

Brussels, Belgium, to introduce two INF systems, the 

Pershing IIs and the Gryphon ground-launched cruise 

missiles (GLCMs), while simultaneously seeking an 

arms control agreement that would limit the overall 

INF category. Equivalent numbers of U.S. Pershing 

1As and Nike Hercules were withdrawn, together 

with 1,000 surplus U.S. Honest John warheads, decreasing the NATO nuclear stockpile to around 6,000, 

certainly a less politically significant number.99

The use of TNWs as symbols of good faith, the lubricating small change of nuclear arms control, was 

repeated in Montebello in October 1983, when NATO 

Ministers reaffirmed their determination to persist 

with the dual-track decision, despite Soviet obduracy 

in the Geneva talks, which would close in the next 

month. This time NATO opted to give up 1,400 TNWs, 
53

although it decided that the remaining short-range 

systems, as well as conventional forces, should be 

modernized. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 

would soon collapse, ending the Cold War, so this decision was never carried out.

NATO-Soviet Doctrinal Jousting. The long-term 

background process which made it militarily acceptable to withdraw so many TNFs was NATO’s eventual improvement of its conventional capabilities that, 

spurred by Warsaw Pact equipment improvements 

and doctrinal innovations, resulted from Western 

technical and, especially American, electronic advantages. While continuing to expand their theater nuclear capabilities, the Soviet General Staff, led by Marshal 

Nikolai Ogarkov, seems to have concluded in the late 

1970s that their most effective option against NATO 

would be conventional but extremely rapid deep operations conducted, after massive aerial surprise attacks, by operational maneuver groups. A tactical nuclear exchange could only slow this offensive down, 

as well as carrying the obvious risk of total nuclear 

war. As Catherine Kelleher described the Soviet perspective, “Ogarkov knew that many in NATO doubted that their political leaders would agree quickly to 

use nuclear weapons.”100 The Soviets would fight and 

pace “the war in such a way as to delay NATO taking 

the decision to use nuclear weapons until it was too 

late for them to be able to influence the outcome of 

the war.”101 Ogarkov advertised the forces developed 

for this strategy as part of the military propaganda 

surrounding Exercise Zapad 1981, by which time of 

course NATO had to take account of the additional 

inhibitive effect of the SS-20s discussed earlier.

NATO sought to frustrate that Soviet strategic vision, whose operational details had been fully trans-
54

mitted to the Alliance by Kuklinski and Polyakov by 

1981. The subsequent NATO revolution in military affairs, implemented through programs such as the Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative (CDI) and 

the Conceptual Military Framework (CMF), involved 

the introduction of widespread precision-guided and 

“assault breaker” bomblet munitions coordinated in 

a “reconnaissance strike complex.” The U.S. AirLand 

Battle concept adopted in 1981 involved integrated 

conventional and nuclear air attacks on second and 

third echelon targets. High-technology and improved 

tactical concepts culminated in NATO’s non-nuclear 

Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept adopted in 

1985—“an intellectual framework in which the latest 

American technology could be adapted to the realities of European battlefield.”102 FOFA’s expected effectiveness very largely negated the Soviet conventional 

option, thus introducing the necessity for agonizing 

NATO ministerial decisions on when and whether to 

employ TNWs. The newly arrived enhancements of 

NATO forces were deliberately shown off to Warsaw 

Pact observers in Exercises Bold Sparrow and Certain 

Strike in 1987.103 The case for large TNW numbers also 

diminished as a result.

TNWs and the Able Archer Scare of 1983.

In notable contrast to the preceding years of détente, President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, his 

fierce anti-Communism, and the huge military buildup that he initiated, led to sharply increased tensions 

with the Soviet Union, which some observers at the 

time labeled the Second Cold War. At the height of the 

Euromissile crisis, the Soviet leadership began to fear 

a surprise U.S. nuclear attack (code-named Ryan) to 
55

be concealed by the regular annual NATO November 

command post exercise, Able Archer. Key Warsaw 

Pact units went on heightened alert as the exercise 

approached. NATO was unaware of these fears until 

informed later by the British spy, Oleg Gordievsky, a 

senior KGB officer in London. The seriousness of the 

incident remains unclear, but it caused an unnerving 

shock within NATO over the unsuspected risk of inadvertent war. 

What we have since learned, however, is that Soviet military intelligence was not concerned. Soviet and 

East German agents regularly drove round Western 

Europe looking for warning indicators. Consequently, 

as Ogarkov’s deputy explained in later interviews:

We had confidence in our knowledge of when NATO 

was preparing to launch nuclear weapons. We would 

detect mating of warheads to missiles and uploading of nuclear bombs and artillery. We listened to 

the hourly circuit verification signal and believed we 

would recognize a release order.104

In this case, any crisis based upon fears of surprise 

attack using aircraft and short-flight-time missiles 

within Europe would have been ill-founded. The size 

of the NATO TNW infrastructure (estimated in the 

later 1980s at around 100 nuclear storage sites in at 

least seven European countries105) and its openness to 

Warsaw Pact espionage made it impossible to conceal 

large-scale attack preparations, and so represented in 

fact an unavoidably stabilizing and confidence-building factor. 

Filling in the Blanks: NATO’s General Political Guidelines, 1986. During the decade after the PPGs, intraAlliance differences had made it impossible to achieve 

consensus on “follow-on use.” The Glenneagles meeting of the NPG in October 1986 finally approved the 
56

General Political Guidelines (GPGs), which stated that 

initial use of nuclear weapons would occur mainly on 

the territory of the aggressor, viz., the Soviet Union. 

The principal purpose would be to signal NATO resolve to escalate to the strategic level if necessary. The 

GPGs shifted the weight of targeting options from the 

battlefield itself toward deep strikes on Warsaw Pact 

territory, thus abandoning any notion of demonstrative use as mentioned in the PPGs. It was now accepted that the initial signal had to be militarily effective. 

But the NATO allies did not resolve the difference between the persistent U.S. preference for battlefield use 

of TNWs to achieve well-defined military objectives 

while limiting escalation, on one hand, and the West 

German insistence on deep strikes precisely to emphasize the risks of escalation. The GPGs were described 

as shifting further towards signaling and away from 

warfighting, but they covered every contingency and 

ruled out none.106 However, within a very few years 

these disputes over the development of flexible response would be obsolete.

TNWs in Korea. On the Korean Peninsula, the 

worldwide reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons was 

especially complicated. The serious direct threat from 

reckless DPRK aggression, as well as China’s military 

buildup, promoted interest on the part of U.S. allies 

in achieving their own independent nuclear weapons 

capability, which Washington opposed. 

TNWs could be used as a signal and a reminder of 

deterrent realities. In 1975, when DPRK leader Kim Il 

Sung appeared to be emboldened by the U.S. weakness apparently demonstrated by the fall of Saigon, 

U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger decided that 

“we had to stop him in his tracks. I broke a long-established practice and declared we had nuclear weapons 

in South Korea and would use them if necessary.”107
57

However, concerned by the post-Vietnam perception of U.S. unreliability, the rapidly industrializing 

ROK is understood to have examined the possibility of 

acquiring its own nuclear weapons in the early 1970s 

after Richard Nixon withdrew 24,000 U.S. troops from 

South Korea and recognized the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC). (Discovery of this ROK interest also 

seems to have strengthened Kim Il Sung’s determination to achieve a DPRK nuclear capability.108) But 

ROK President Park Chung Hee was dissuaded by 

Kissinger’s direct threat to withdraw U.S. forces completely and terminate the ROK-U.S. alliance if South 

Korea pursued its own nuclear weapons. South Korea 

consequently acceded to the NPT in April 1975 and 

signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency later that year. 

Concerns over the terms of the ROK-U.S. alliance were 

soon revived when President Carter subsequently announced a nearly complete withdrawal of TNWs (and 

troops) from South Korea in 1977. This announced 

withdrawal was reversed by 1978, largely because 

South Korea could plausibly threaten to resume its 

own nuclear weapons program. 

V. 1987-1990. TNWS AND THE WARSAW PACT 

COLLAPSE: THE AFTERMATH

Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival as General Secretary 

unfroze the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks, leading to 

the signing of the INF agreement in December 1987. 

This treaty banned all U.S. and Soviet ground-based 

ballistic and cruise missiles globally with ranges of 

500-5,500 km. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 

also gave up its 72 Pershing 1 missiles. The agreement 

was denounced by retired SACEUR Bernard Rogers 
58

as removing NATO’s qualitative deterrent edge and 

so helping the USSR “to intimidate, coerce, blackmail, 

and neutralize Western Europe without calling troops 

out of barracks.” He therefore called—and in this was 

representative of wider opinion—for the rapid implementation of the second half of the 1983 Montebello 

Accords, i.e., the modernization of short-range nuclear 

forces (SRNF). Those plans envisaged that some older 

systems like artillery munitions and Lance would be 

withdrawn, but a number of possible new TNW systems under development would be introduced, including better nuclear artillery shells with increased 

range, the Follow On To Lance (FOTL), an improved 

surface-to-surface missile which could be fired from 

existing NATO Multiple-launch rocket systems, and 

a supersonic Tomahawk anti-ship air-to-surface missile (TASM) to improve the penetrability of tactical 

aircraft (some 389 had been planned to be placed in 

vaults in European airfields).109

Political opposition made this proposed modernization impossible. Anti-nuclear campaigners discovered NATO plans more rapidly than at previous TNW 

decision points and were able to mount effective opposition in the news media, denouncing the proposed 

package as “like trading in 2 pistols for an assault rifle 

and calling it arms reductions.” The plans needed 

to be resisted particularly strongly at that historical 

moment, according to the antinuclear campaigners, 

because “by keeping alive the traditional NATO doctrine of flexible response, the TASM could slow the 

process of change in Europe.”110 The Cold War was 

not yet conclusively over, and after visiting Europe, 

the new U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, had concluded that “modernization [of SNF] would indeed 

show the Alliance’s resolve, yet it would simultane-
59

ously create a public and, above all, nuclear symbol 

that the Kremlin could use with Western European 

people against their governments.”111 German political resistance was also predictably adamant, and the 

modernization never occurred.

Negotiations in Vienna, Austria, began to move 

toward signing of the CFE Treaty, aimed at introducing transparency and confidence-building measures, 

and eliminating many of the most threatening offensive combat assets. The CFE (signed in November 

1990) greatly reduced future dangers of surprise conventional attack. In the summer of 1990, the political 

necessities of securing German reunification involved 

promises to Mikhail Gorbachev to conduct a comprehensive strategy review, and as the NATO summit approached, a package of measures which would signal 

reduced nuclear reliance within the Alliance (while 

still resisting No First Use), and also signal a general 

move away from early nuclear use. NATO nuclear 

weapons would “truly become weapons of last resort.” This wording was initially challenged by French 

President Francois Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, but, after intense debate at 

the NATO heads of government meeting in London 

on July 5, 1990, the wording was preserved. U.S. proposals to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells from 

Europe were accepted, and it was agreed that there 

would be reviews to consider new strategic principles 

replacing forward defense and flexible response. The 

London Communiqué, according to Michael Wheeler, 

represented the end of Cold War nuclear strategy.112
60

VI. 1991- 2012. THE RUSSIAN PREPONDERANCE 

IN TNWS: POLITICAL STASIS

In 1991 and 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush 

and Boris Yeltsin both announced unilateral though 

unverified TNW reductions. These parallel reductions, which came to be known as the Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives, were seen as preludes to negotiations aimed at elimination of TNWs after the Cold 

War ended. Those negotiations never occurred, and 

would have posed enormous verification problems 

even if they had. Soon after Soviet forces withdrew 

to Russia with all their nuclear weapons, NATO removed most of its remaining TNWs, leaving only 

“several hundred” B-61 gravity bombs. The United 

States proceeded to eliminate nuclear artillery and 

short-range surface-to-surface nuclear missiles from 

its global stockpile. (It has removed all TNWs from 

the ROK). The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly 

sought to reduce the salience of U.S. nuclear weapons, 

and President Barack Obama is a vigorous supporter 

of Global Zero. 

For various reasons the Russian Federation has not 

found it expedient to make comparable TNW reductions.113 The resultant TNW asymmetry in Moscow’s 

favor is now long established and probably impossible to eliminate in the near term, particularly because, 

in view of its shrunken military capabilities, the Russian Federation has abandoned the Soviet Union’s 

NOFUN posture. Its military doctrine seems to rely 

significantly upon the deterrent provided, especially 

at sea, by its remaining TNWs, which may number in 

the low thousands. In its 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO 

gave up forward defense as a defining principle and 

flexible response as a nuclear strategy. Alliance lead-
61

ers have repeatedly reemphasized that NATO regards all nuclear weapons as truly weapons of last 

resort, though always adding that NATO will remain 

a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

NATO has sought to treat Russia as a partner rather 

than a potential antagonist, but the Russian government has found NATO membership enlargement into 

former Warsaw Pact countries and the former Soviet 

republics threatening, and insists on the continuing 

necessity for deterrence as a basis of the relationship. 

In such ambiguous political circumstances, the role of 

NATO TNWs cannot be expected to clarify.

CONCLUSION: THE CONTESTED AND 

CONTRADICTORY SIGNIFICANCE OF NATO 

TNWS IN 2012

The foregoing examination of the historical background of TNWs reveals the complexities underlying current disputes over NATO’s nuclear posture. 

Arguments for and against continued deployment of 

TNWs mostly involve crosscutting themes and disagreements recurrent in the historical record.

The present combination of U.S. B-61 bombs and 

dual-capable aircraft (DCA) seems to represent:

• Devices to signal commitment during tension, 

which appear to have been stabilizing in some 

past crises but which could be hard to use in 

the future, since “available evidence does not indicate that consultation will be smooth or timely.”114

The difficulties in obtaining consensus within 

NATO on nuclear weapons can be expected 

to increase now that the NATO countries in 

the frontline of potential military threats have 

become fewer and smaller, while the fear of 
62

entanglement is growing stronger than fear of 

abandonment among the now geopolitically 

sheltered allies.

• Weapons arrangements that do not lend themselves to permanent territorial occupation by 

an attacking force and imposition of an alien 

regime. Thus those arrangements do not pose 

such a degree of risk that a side would be willing to accept horrendous casualties and destruction in order to avoid that risk.

• Affirmative symbols of moral burden-sharing 

based on common values—the schiksalsgemeinschaft,

115 or shared community of fate—within 

the transatlantic relationship, this at a time 

when the United States is announcing its shift 

of strategic attention to the Pacific (but Alliance 

solidarity may be further weakened by the predictable intra-allied disputes which have been 

seen to occur whenever TNW issues become 

prominent).

• Devices for sharing nuclear functions and responsibilities, but with countries that find 

the prospect of an injection of what Thomas 

Schelling called “pure violence,”116 which is 

the distinctive, irreducible, strategic function 

of nuclear weapons, increasingly distasteful 

within their national strategic cultures. So, at 

worst, Alliance nuclear-sharing may become 

less the proudly-displayed wedding ring of a 

happy couple than the suspiciously indiscernible band of gold of an increasingly ill-matched 

NATO marriage.

• A class of weapons that was introduced largely 

because of the extreme cost effectiveness of its 

firepower, and the powerful deterrence it was 
63

judged to generate (but which may now disappear from Europe because the costs of making minor aircraft modifications to make them 

nuclear-capable will be financially vetoed by 

parliaments).

• Bargaining chips for future comprehensive 

arms control talks, which NATO has repeatedly sought (but which the Russians have repeatedly insisted could include TNWs only if all 

U.S. TNWs were first withdrawn from Europe).

• A strategically high-visibility, but politically 

high-maintenance weapons category that is 

internationally and—in many countries domestically—controversial (and which might 

therefore detract from the urgency of NATO 

improvements in more usable conventional capabilities). TNWs will not be indefinitely sustainable without governmental willingness to 

modernize DCAs in the face of parliamentary 

opposition. The abandonment of these weapons might seem to some a tempting reassurance strategy to improve Alliance or bilateral 

national relationships with Russia.

• Important emblems of reassurance for new 

East European members of NATO, which probably fear, but do not publicly speak of, abandonment in crisis from European allies and 

resent any move which might appear to reduce 

U.S. defense commitments (yet the history of 

NATO expansion means that neither American 

nor U.S.-supplied Alliance TNWs are located 

in these countries, and could not be moved 

there without provoking a major dispute with 

Russia).
64

• Symbols of the continuing U.S. nuclear commitment to its NATO partners117 (any changes 

in nuclear posture theoretically relevant only 

to those military crises serious enough to make 

nuclear use imaginable—albeit hypothetical 

and unlikely—would rapidly feed back into 

current political atmospherics within the Alliance and the perceptions of neighbors).

• A means of deterring historically novel potential threats from a reckless nuclear Iran and an 

unstable, proliferation-prone Middle East (but 

this anxiety has not entered official public discourse; Turkey, which would be most closely 

affected by it, prefers to avoid any official mention of it; many operationally plausible U.S. 

strategic nuclear assets exist to offset it; and 

NATO-wide ballistic missile defense is becoming at least the publicly preferred Alliance response).

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. This has been appreciated for a long time: the extract is 

from the Healy/Schroeder Report presented to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in May 1969 and incorporated into 

the NATO Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) for the Initial 

Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons agreed later that year. 

Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy, 

Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 188.

2. Author’s own definition.

3. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Encyclopedia of the Cold War, 

Ruud Van Dijk, ed., London, UK: Routledge, 2008.

4. Lawrence Freedman,The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: 

Basingstoke, UK, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 

pp. 62-66.
65

5. “The position we have reached is one where stability depends on something that is more the antithesis of strategy than 

its apotheosis on threats that things will get out of hand, that we 

might act irrationally, that possibly through an inadvertence we 

could set in motion a process which in its development and conclusion would be beyond human control and comprehension.” 

Ibid., p. 458.

6. Gordon S. Barras, The Great Cold War: A Journey through a 

Wilderness of Mirrors, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

2009, pp. 63-64. Barras was an intelligence insider throughout 

much of the Cold War. His account is often based on personal 

knowledge of events and detailed interviews with participants.

7. Michael O. Wheeler, “NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949-90,” 

Gustave Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO the First 50 Years, Vol. 3, 

Basingstoke, UK, and New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 122.

8. But the estimates of Russian military power were almost 

certainly very seriously exaggerated. See the impressive list of references compiled by Vojtech Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe,” 

in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger, 

eds., War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in 

the East and West, London, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2006, 

p. 16, n. 1.

9. Stephen E. Miller, “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the 

Strategy of No First Use,” Pugwash Conferences on Science and 

World Affairs, 2002.

10. “It is essential to our policy that we shall have to use nukes 

in the end; all else fails to save Berlin and it is fundamental that 

the Russians understand this fact.” J. F. Kennedy to General Lucius Clay, October 8, 1961, quoted in Robert J. McMahon, “US 

National Security Policy, Eisenhower to Kennedy,” in Melvin P. 

Leffler and Odd Arnie Wested, eds., The Cambridge History of the 

Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 

Press, 2010, p. 309.

11. Raymond Aron, On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy, London, UK: Secker and Warburg, 1958, p. 36. 
66

12. And probably unknown to the French colonial authorities. 

See James J. Heaphey, Legerdemain: The President’s Secret Plan, the 

Bomb and What the French Never Knew, New York: History Publishing Company, 2007.

13. “The weight of the fragmentary evidence [about Soviet 

strategy during the Stalin years] lends support to its defensive 

rather than offensive character. . . . The 1951 operational plan 

of the Polish Army [mentioned] only defensive operations. The 

same was true about contemporary Czechoslovak plans.” Vojtech 

Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, and 

Wenger, eds., 2006, p. 16.

14. Based upon newly available archival documentation from 

Eastern Europe, “The Western strategy of nuclear deterrence . . .

appears . . . irrelevant to deterring a major war that the enemy 

did not wish to launch in the first place.” Mastny, “Introduction,” 

Mastny, Holtsmark, and Wenger, 2006, p. 3.

15. McMahon, pp. 288-297.

16. Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear 

Arms Race, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007, p. 79.

17. Charles S Maier, “The World Economy and the Cold War 

in the Middle of the 20th Century,” in Leffler and Wested, eds., 

2010, p. 64.

18. Wheeler, p. 126.

19. Ibid., p. 127.

20. Freedman, p. 203.

21. Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey Through 

the Hall of Mirrors, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 112. 

22. Ibid.

23. Wheeler, p. 127.
67

24. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the 

European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 146-200, quoted in Beatrice Heuser, “Alliance 

of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, 

and Wenger, eds., 2006, p. 25.

25. Heuser, 2006, p. 206.

26. Beatrice Heuser, “The Development of NATO’s Nuclear 

Strategy,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1994, p. 

45.

27. This analytical terminology was not used at the time but 

later developed by Glenn Snyder.

28. Walter Slocombe, “Extended Deterrence,” Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1984, p. 94.

29. In fact, the British Chiefs of Staff produced a paper as early as 1952 to persuade their American counterparts to rebalance 

Alliance strategy more economically on greater dependence on 

nuclear retaliation. It was not, initially, welcomed. Freedman, pp. 

75-76.

30. Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs 

in Britain and France and the FRG, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 

Press, 1998, p. 99. 

31. Bruno Tertrais, “The Trouble with No First Use,” Survival, 

October-November, 2009, p. 23.

32. Heuser, 1998, pp. 180-205. 

33. Bluth, p. 38.

34. Ibid., pp. 18, 22.

35. Ibid., p. 38.

36. Ibid., p. 37.

37. Ibid., pp. 301-305.
68

38. Heuser, 2006, p. 225.

39. Kjell Inge Bjerga and Kjetil Skogrand, “Securing Small 

State Interests,” Mastny, Holtsmark, and Wenger, 2006, p. 233.

40. Jonathan Soborg Agger and Trine Engholm Michelsen, 

“How Strong Was the Weakest Link?” Mastny, Holtsmark, and 

Wenger, 2006, pp. 250-251. 

41. Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe,” Mastny, Holtsmark, 

and Wenger, 2006, pp. 19-25.

42. For a full discussion of this central concept in Marxist strategic analysis at its intellectual height, see Richard E. Porter “Correlation of Forces: Revolutionary Legacy,” Air University Review, 

March-April 1977.

43. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983, p. 57.

44. What former Soviet General Valentin V. Larionov retrospectively dubbed the “romantic” period of naive belief in the 

nuclear arms’ capacity to “achieve any political or military objective, even the most extreme ones.” Mastny, “Imagining War in 

Europe,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, and Wenger, eds., 2006, p. 25.

45. Matthias Uhl, “Storming onto Paris,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, and Wenger, 2006, p. 65.

46. Ibid., pp. 52-58.

47. “One point is clear, however: at the peak of the second 

Berlin crisis, the military leadership of the Warsaw Pact believed 

that nuclear war could be fought, and, in fact, saw nuclear war as 

the key instrument of destroying the supposed enemy.” Ibid.

48. General Sir Horatius Murray, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe (CINCNORTH) 1958-61, quoted by 

Kjell Inge Bjerga and Kjetil Skogrand, in Mastny, Holtsmark, and 

Wenger, 2006, pp. 228-229.
69

49. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “NATO Nuclear Operations” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbrenner, and Charles A. 

Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations, Washington, DC: The 

Brookings Institution, 1987, p. 460.

50. Martin Windrow, The Last Valley, London, UK: Cassell, 

2005, pp. 568-569.

51. Robert J. McMahon, “US National Security Policy from 

Eisenhower to Kennedy,” The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 

Volume 1: Origins, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 

2010, p. 297.

52. Peter Hayes, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Global Abolition, and Korea,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, December 

2009, available at japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3268.

53. Derek Leebaert, The 50-Year Wound: How America’s Cold 

War Victory Shaped Our World, Boston, MA: Little Brown Company, 2002, p. 270.

54. Barrass, p. 132.

55. Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of 

Communism’s Great Spy Master, pp. 96-97, quoted in Barrass, 

p. 133. 

56. Barrass, p. 133.

57. Leebaert, p. 270.

58. Barrass, p. 143.

59. James G. Hirschberg, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Melvin P. Leffler and Odd Arnie Westad, eds., The Cambridge History 

of the Cold War, Vol. 2, Crises and Détente, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 83.

60. Peace Magazine, January-March, 2003, p. 31; Hirschberg, in 

Leffler and Wested, eds., 2010, p. 84.

61. Presumably the 1.5 kt AIR-2 Genie, which was in service 

between 1958 and 1985. Three thousand were produced.
70

62. Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluth, The Cuban Missile 

Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, New 

York: New Press, 1998, p. 388.

63. Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945, Vol. 3, October 

1964-June 1970, Basingstoke, UK, and New York: Palgrave, forthcoming, pp. 107-108.

64. Richard Moore, “British Nuclear Weapons Overseas,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January-February, 2001.

65. Freedman, pp. 89-113.

66. Richard Weitz, descriptive summary of the decisionmaking activity within NATO, in McMahon, pp. 303-305; and Wheeler, pp. 129-130.

67. Kelleher, p. 449.

68. As quoted in Barrass, p. 194.

69. General Hans Steyning von Sandrart, Commander of 

NATO Central Front, quoted in Barrass, p. 195.

70. Barrass, p. 195.

71. Ibid. 

72. Wheeler, p. 131.

73. Ibid.

74. Kelleher, p. 455.

75. Statement by the Honorable Syed Hamid Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, on behalf of the group of nonaligned states parties to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons at the general debate of the 2005 review conference 

of the parties to treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, New York, May 2, 2005, available from www.un.org/en/conf/

npt/2005/statements/npt02malaysia.pdf.
71

76. Joseph F. Pilat and David S. Yost, “NATO and the Future 

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defence College Research Paper, 2007, available from www.ituassu.

com.br/op_21_FULL.pdf.

77. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the 

Cold War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 360.

78. John N. Hochelson, “MFR: West European and American Perspectives,” in Wolfram Hanrieder, ed., The United States 

and Western Europe, Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1974. 

p. 257.

79. Kelleher, p. 449.

80. Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear 

Arms Race, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007, p. 101.

81. Robert McNamara, speech in San Francisco, CA, September 18, 1967, quoted by Barrass, p. 162.

82. J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO 

Strategy of Flexible Response, Santa Monica: RAND, 1983, p. 75.

83. Kelleher, pp. 448-449.

84. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal 1958-1962, 

1971, pp. 257-258, quoted in Barrass, p. 158.

85. Heuser, 2006, p. 201.

86. Ibid., p. 202.

87. Ibid., p. 198.

88. Kelleher, pp. 452- 453.

89. Bluth, pp. 185-191; and Heuser, 2006, p. 210.

90. Ivo Daalder, “The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response,” quoted in Heuser, 2006, p. 211.
72

91. Heuser, 2006, p. 212. 

92. In November 2005, the Polish Foreign Minister Radek 

Sikorski displayed a Warsaw Pact exercise plan from 1977, titled 

“7 Days to the River Rhine” showing very large scale Soviet nuclear strikes against Western Europe (except Britain and France), 

following a posited NATO nuclear first strike. He emphasized 

that “the objective [was] to take over most of Western Europe. . . .

This is crucial to educating the country on the way Poland was 

an unwilling ally of the USSR.” He called it “a personally shattering experience” to see maps showing Soviet bloc commanders 

assuming that NATO tactical nuclear weapons would rain down 

along the Vistula to block reinforcements arriving from Russia. 

“About two million Polish civilians would have died in such a 

war, and the country would have been all but wiped off the face 

of the earth.” It was scenarios like this, developed within a onesidedly Soviet dominated military organization, which seem to 

have changed Kuklinski’s loyalties and presumably had a wider 

emotional effect, percolating through the millions of conscripts 

who passed through the Polish Armed Forces and may have contributed to their perceived unreliability towards the end of the 

Cold War. Nicholas Watt, “Poland Risks Russia’s Wrath with Soviet Nuclear Attack Map,” Guardian, November 26, 2005.

93. Barrass, pp. 213-214.

94. Bluth, pp. 210-211.

95. Ibid., p. 234.

96. Barrass, p. 216.

97. Sheri L. Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A 

Study in Alliance Politics, New York: Praeger, 1983, p. 134, quoted 

in Jeffrey A. Larsen, The Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for NATO: Drifting Toward the Foreseeable Future, Rome, Italy: NATO Defence College, 2006.

98. Barrass, p. 193.

99. Kelleher, p. 449.
73

100. Corroborated by Catherine Kelleher: “Available evidence through exercises or historical experience does not suggest 

that wide political consultation will be smooth or timely. Some 

simulations have involved 3 days at a minimum to get a clear decision,” Kelleher, 1987, p. 464.

101. Philip Petersen, “One of the leading experts on Soviet 

strategy in the Defense Intelligence Agency,” quoted in Barrass, 

pp. 213-214.

102. Diego Ruiz Palmer, quoted in Barrass, p. 338.

103. Ibid., pp. 339-341.

104. Barrass, pp. 297-301.

105. Kelleher, p. 453.

106 . Bluth, pp. 261-262.

107. Barrass, p. 191.

108. “It seems probable that the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations 

were triggered at least in part by the South Korean program,” 

Joshua D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea Nuclear Weapons and International Security, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 2011, p. 80.

109. Dan Plesch of the British American Security Information 

Council, in the Guardian, London, UK, May 3, 1990.

110. Ibid.

111. Quoted in Wheeler, p. 137.

112. Wheeler, pp. 138-139.

113. Alexander Pikayev, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” available from icnnd.org/Documents/Pikayev_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons.

doc.
74

114. Kelleher, p. 464.

115. The term “Westintegration” is associated with the Austrian Social Democrat thinker, Otto Bauer, especially in his National Question and Social Democracy, Vienna, Austria, 1907. It was 

applied in the German rhetorical struggles of the earlier Cold War 

to emphasize the moral and ideological significance of the Federal 

Republic’s integration with the Atlantic Community.

116. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 17.

117. See the discussion in George Perkovich: “Wedding 

Rings or Euros?” available from carnegieendowment.org/files/nato_

nukes.pdf.
75

CHAPTER 3

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND 

POLICYMAKING:

THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Elbridge A. Colby

The author would like to thank Brad Glosserman, 

Michael McDevitt, George Packard, and Richard 

Weitz for their incisive and helpful comments. Errors 

and omissions remain the author’s own.

While U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe have long 

been an object of intense study and scrutiny, the role 

of U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia has received less attention. Yet U.S. nuclear weapons have played an important and at times central part in U.S. strategy and 

in the history of the East Asian region.1

 Largely driven 

by the nature of Washington’s overarching strategy in 

the region and its perception of the military balance, 

the United States has relied on its nuclear forces to extend deterrence on behalf of its allies and partners and 

to assure those allies of the effectiveness of that deterrence. This has ensured that U.S. nuclear weapons 

have continued to play a continuing foundational role 

in Washington’s strategic posture in the region since 

their introduction in the 1940s, even as their relevance 

has waxed and waned. As the strategic environment 

in East Asia grows more uncertain and potentially 

dangerous for the United States and its allies, it is 

likely that U.S. nuclear weapons will reemerge as a 

consideration for Washington and its allied capitals. 
76

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY IN EAST 

ASIA

The roots of U.S. nuclear weapons policy in East 

Asia lie in Washington’s decisions of the early years 

of the Cold War to commit to the defense of select 

nations in maritime and littoral East Asia. Following a period of hesitancy after World War II regarding the extent of its global commitments, a series of 

perceived Communist aggressions culminating in the 

Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the 

North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 

persuaded the U.S. Government that the Communist 

bloc was mounting a coordinated global effort to undermine the “free nations,” an effort that appeared to 

Washington to require a vigorous and comparably coordinated response on the part of the anti-Communist 

world. This shift catalyzed a major militarization of 

U.S. policy against Communist ambitions around the 

world, but especially in Europe and Asia. As a consequence, over the course of the late 1940s and 1950s, 

Washington committed to the defense of Japan, South 

Korea, Taiwan/Republic of China (ROC), Australia, 

New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand.2

 Other 

countries, such as South Vietnam and Singapore, received more implicit security guarantees. U.S. defense 

expenditures turned sharply upward as Washington 

dispatched hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to 

repel the Communist invasion of South Korea, deployed naval forces to protect the Nationalists on 

Taiwan from invasion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and, more broadly, decided that an 

assertive, engaged military posture was necessary to 

protect U.S. interests in the Far East, even as Washington also committed to the defense of Europe through 
77

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 

to parts of the Middle East through the Baghdad Pact. 

The tremendous growth in requirements on U.S. 

military forces implicit in these new obligations coincided with the early stages of the nuclear revolution, and the combination of these factors led to the 

thoroughgoing integration of nuclear weapons into 

the U.S. military posture in Asia and throughout the 

world. Judging that the Communist bloc possessed a 

superiority in manpower and a steely willingness to 

suffer casualties to achieve its objectives, an assessment fortified by the Communists’ prolongation of the 

war in Korea, the United States elected to employ its 

advantages in the size and technology of its nuclear 

arsenal to balance the mass and fervor of the Communist bloc. Beginning in 1953, the Dwight Eisenhower 

administration, in order to ensure the conservation 

of the United States as a free market society, further 

accentuated U.S. emphasis on nuclear weapons as it 

sought to reduce the burden of military expenditure 

and to avoid enmeshment in costly conventional 

ground wars like Korea.3 These decisions were enabled by the fact that, beginning in the early 1950s, 

nuclear weapons were becoming plentifully available 

to the U.S. military.4

 In combination, these factors led 

to a dramatically increased reliance on nuclear forces 

by the United States, with the result that the United 

States deployed nuclear weapons on a large scale, integrating them into nearly every facet of U.S. military 

doctrine and with U.S. forces throughout the world.5

The U.S. public posture and warfighting doctrine also 

reflected reliance on nuclear weapons, as throughout 

the Eisenhower administration the United States held 

to a policy of “massive retaliation,” both threatening 

and planning to escalate to a massive nuclear strike 
78

against the Communist bloc in response to Communist aggression.6

In light of this policy, U.S. naval forces deployed 

with nuclear weapons aboard in the Western Pacific, and U.S. ground and air elements based nuclear 

weapons onshore in South Korea, the Philippines, and 

Taiwan, as well as components for nuclear weapons 

delivery in Japan.7

 U.S. ground, air, and naval forces 

all planned to employ nuclear weapons as a matter of 

course in the event of war with the Communist bloc. 

During the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954 over 

the Nationalist-held islands off mainland China, U.S. 

Pacific Command’s forces slated to defend Taiwan 

were prepared for the execution of a war plan involving the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, to a large extent U.S. forces designated for the defense of Taiwan 

were incapable of conducting sustained non-nuclear 

operations. This situation remained true during the 

Second Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, when U.S. forces 

delayed even preparing a non-nuclear option for defense of Taiwan until several months into the crisis.8

The same held true in Europe, where, if the Warsaw 

Pact blockaded or attacked Berlin, Germany, U.S. 

forces intended to attempt a conventional relief using 

a relatively small conventional force. If this failed, the 

United States planned to “resort to general war.”9

This thoroughgoing reliance on nuclear weapons 

also played a major role in shaping the nature of the 

alliances and political relationships into which Washington entered and in determining the footprint of the 

U.S. military presence abroad. Because in the early 

Cold War era U.S. military power relied primarily 

upon nuclear weapons and especially upon the threatened implementation of a general nuclear attack, the 

requirements of nuclear command and control and 
79

delivery exercised a dominant influence on the formation of the U.S. global basing network in Asia and 

throughout the world.10 Due to the range and other 

technical limitations of the U.S. military systems of the 

era, U.S. bases were constructed around the world as 

necessary to support the execution of the U.S. nuclear 

war plan against the Soviet Union and China. U.S. 

bombers, for instance, required forward bases from 

which to stage or refuel, or to recover to in the wake of 

a strike; similar range constraints dictated the need for 

deployment of U.S. missiles and basing of U.S. vessels 

nearer to the Soviet Union and China than U.S. territory could provide.11

However, in the 1960s, this policy of overweening reliance on nuclear weapons began to change. 

The “massive retaliation” doctrine’s threat to resort to 

nuclear weapons early and inflexibly in response to 

a whole range of provocations always seemed somewhat suspect at the lower level of escalation. But the 

looming advent of an assured Soviet strategic-range 

nuclear capability and increasing attention to the difficulties of controlling escalation in a nuclear war began 

to make such heavy reliance on nuclear weapons seem 

unconscionably dangerous and decreasingly credible 

during the later 1950s and 1960s, and a resort to massive retaliation seem potentially suicidal. As a result, 

calls grew louder to focus more on the strengthening 

of non-nuclear forces, especially in light of the relative 

neglect such forces had suffered during the 1950s.12

With the entry of the John Kennedy administration 

to office in 1961, this shift away from nuclear weapons 

became U.S. policy. U.S. strategy in all theaters therefore began a gradual transition from declared reliance 

on nuclear weapons towards emphasis on non-nuclear 

forces, though nuclear forces remained central in U.S. 
80

strategy throughout the Cold War, especially in areas 

where the United States and its allies perceived themselves as weaker than their Communist adversaries. 

Indeed, due to the nature of the strategic balance in 

Asia and the character of the threat in the region, the 

shift away from reliance on nuclear forces progressed 

more rapidly and completely in Asia than in Europe. 

One reason for this swifter and fuller shift was 

that in Asia, unlike Europe, the United States faced 

potential conflicts more evidently suitable only for 

conventional warfare than in Europe, where any conflagration seemed likely to involve nuclear weapons. 

Asia, rather, presented the challenge of dealing with 

so-called “brushfire” conflicts, limited struggles for 

which it was becoming broadly accepted that nuclear 

use was wholly inappropriate. This principle was amply demonstrated during the war in Vietnam, when it 

became clear that the United States would almost certainly not use nuclear weapons in situations short of 

imminent catastrophe, a point proved in particular by 

the decision not to use nuclear weapons to break the 

siege of Khe Sanh, Vietnam, in 1968.13 Short of general 

war with the Soviet Union or China, by the 1960s it 

was becoming increasingly apparent to U.S. decisionmakers that U.S. military forces needed to fight better 

conventionally, above all in Asia. This placed substantial downward pressure on the requirements for U.S. 

nuclear weapons in the region. 

The particular geographical nature of the Pacific 

theater and the strategic balance in the region also enabled the move away from reliance upon nuclear forces. On the European continent, the United States and 

its allies were consistently outmatched at the conventional level, necessitating an uninterrupted reliance 

on nuclear weapons to compensate for Warsaw Pact 
81

conventional strength.14 In the Pacific, however, the 

United States enjoyed the conventional upper hand.15

This advantage stemmed from the combination of its 

substantial superiority over its Communist rivals in 

naval and air power with the geographical situation of 

U.S. allies, which were mostly island and peninsular 

nations. As a consequence, throughout the Cold War 

and after, U.S. naval forces could operate with near 

impunity throughout the Pacific Basin. Thus, even 

as U.S. Communist opponents in China, Vietnam, 

and the Soviet Union generally held the advantage in 

ground forces in Asia, these forces were of no import 

against U.S. allies in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, 

and Singapore absent some method of projecting force 

across large bodies of water, a capability the Communists effectively lacked through most of the Cold War. 

The failures of U.S. land forces in successfully projecting sustained power deep into the Eurasian landmass—as with the fate of U.S. aid to the Kuomintang 

before 1949, the repulsion of United Nations (UN) 

forces from the Yalu in 1950-51, and the outcome of 

the war in Vietnam—thus had a limited impact on the 

security of insular and peninsular U.S. allies because 

within its main defense perimeter encompassing maritime East Asia, the United States was able to minimize reliance on ground forces. The only significant 

exception to this rule was the U.S. ground presence in 

South Korea. Moreover, U.S. air and maritime conventional superiority in Asia became even more secure 

when China left the Soviet camp just as Soviet naval 

forces appeared to begin to pose a serious threat to 

U.S. power in the Pacific. This superiority meant that, 

once the United States began to seek ways to reduce 

its reliance on nuclear weapons, conventional military 

power could responsibly assume a greater role in the 

Pacific than it could in Europe.16
82

This trend towards greater reliance on non-nuclear 

forces was accentuated and enabled by the marked 

qualitative improvements in U.S. conventional forces 

that began in the early 1970s with the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs.” The exploitation of this 

sea-change in technology promised to arm U.S. and 

allied conventional forces with capabilities in: precision delivery of munitions; command and control of 

forces and weapons; and, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance that would vastly improve the 

lethality and effectiveness of non-nuclear forces, considerably narrowing the missions for which nuclear 

weapons would be required.17 To illustrate, 1950s- and 

1960s-era U.S. technology had suffered from delivery 

accuracies too modest for conventional weapons, and 

had thus required the destructive radii of nuclear 

weapons to destroy targets, especially but not exclusively at longer ranges. With advances in technology, 

however, weapon accuracies greatly improved, allowing military missions previously allocated to nuclear 

forces to be replaced by highly accurate and therefore 

much less destructive conventional munitions. These 

advances allowed the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons to a degree not widely anticipated in the 1950s. 

Thus, beginning only gradually in the 1960s and 

then progressing more rapidly through the 1970s and 

into the 1980s, U.S. forces in the Pacific theater outside 

of Korea sought to dispense with nuclear weapons as 

a planned warfighting tool in contingencies short of 

large-scale war with the Soviet Union or the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC). As a result, the arsenal of 

U.S. nuclear weapons in the Pacific theater decreased 

by over half, from a peak of 3,200 in the late 1960s to 

1,200 by the late 1970s.18 While U.S. forces maintained 
83

the capability to employ such weapons, and continued storing them aboard naval vessels and with air 

wings and ground formations, the weapons’ salience 

declined significantly in these decades. Even in South 

Korea, where U.S. strategy dictated continuing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in the face of the still 

formidable North Korean threat, the numbers of such 

weapons declined by approximately 80 percent from 

their peak in the late 1960s to their mid-1980s level.19

Combined with the steady advances in technology 

that enabled U.S. nuclear weapons and their delivery 

platforms to operate at considerably greater ranges—

and thus from U.S. territory—these reductions also 

enabled the United States to withdraw the great bulk 

of its nuclear forces from allied territory, with significant implications for the complexion of the U.S. forward military presence in Asia. Thus, from a posture 

in which nuclear weapons had been stored at bases 

throughout Asia in the 1950s and 1960s for a great variety of contingencies, by the 1970s these weapons had 

been withdrawn from storage at bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan and, with the exception of 

South Korea, consolidated on U.S. territory.20

Thus, by the latter stages of the Cold War, while 

U.S. forces in Asia retained a substantial nuclear 

weapons capability, their salience had receded considerably from the peak of their importance in the 1950s. 

U.S. nuclear weapons had evolved from an integral 

and invaluable component of U.S. warfighting plans 

in the 1950s to a means by the late 1980s which the 

United States could normally use to deter adversaries from exploiting any seams in deterrence created by 

the unwillingness of the United States to resort to general nuclear war. While U.S. strategic nuclear forces 

deterred escalation to general war, U.S. forward-de-
84

ployed tactical nuclear weapons in particular offered 

U.S. forces the option of at least putatively selective 

and restrained employment of nuclear weapons in a 

limited conflict. While U.S. planners struggled in Asia 

as much as they did in Europe to develop plausible 

and sensible limited-strike options, the ability to use 

nuclear weapons in a relatively tailored and militarily effective fashion was seen to add to deterrence 

because such strikes were viewed as more plausible 

since they were at least notionally more proportional 

to the stakes and intensity of a limited conflict.21

Even as their military role declined, however, U.S. 

nuclear weapons grew in importance as methods for 

assuring allies. This role became increasingly salient in 

the 1970s as Washington grew more concerned about 

the problems posed by the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons even as South Korea and Taiwan, motivated 

by Washington’s insistence that allies shoulder more 

of their defense, explored acquiring nuclear weapons 

capabilities of their own.22 Forward-deployed forces, 

including nuclear weapons, were seen to help allay 

allied concerns about abandonment that could drive 

them to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically accelerated the U.S. military’s shift away from reliance 

on nuclear weapons. Already diminished in their salience by the growth of Soviet nuclear forces and the 

strengthening of U.S. conventional forces, U.S. nuclear weapons were essentially marginalized in U.S. 

planning for strictly military purposes by the collapse 

of the only nation that had threatened U.S. pretensions to global military preeminence. In response to 

these developments, the George H. W. Bush administration sharply cut the arsenal and curtailed the 

modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, eliminating all 
85

ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons, ceasing deployment of nuclear weapons on naval surface 

vessels and attack submarines, and withdrawing the 

vast bulk of U.S. weapons from Europe and all U.S. 

nuclear weapons from South Korea.23 While U.S. strategic nuclear forces on ballistic missile submarines 

and at missile and air bases in the United States still 

covered targets in Asia, these steps had the effect of 

completely removing U.S. nuclear weapons from visibility in Asia. 

In the years following 1991, U.S. nuclear weapons 

played only the most subdued role in Pacific security dynamics. Other than North Korea, which could 

threaten the United States and its allies only through 

asymmetric methods and by exploiting the leverage 

it enjoyed because it had so much less to lose than its 

prospering rivals, the United States and its allies faced 

no serious near-term threat in Asia during the 1990s 

and 2000s. Especially after the U.S. armed forces’ performance in Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. military 

superiority was so evident in the 1990s and the 2000s 

that there was no plausible contingency in Asia in 

which the United States would need to rely on nuclear 

weapons for strictly military purposes. The overarching deterrent effects of nuclear weapons could be sustained, in the meantime, by the strategic forces of the 

United States.24

In the latter half of the 2000s, these trends began to 

abate, if not reverse. North Korea’s persistent pursuit 

of a nuclear weapons capability and advanced missile programs, and its aggressive and provocative behavior in sinking the South Korean ship Cheonan and 

shelling Yeongbyeong Island, rattled both Seoul and 

Tokyo. Meanwhile, capitals throughout the Western 

Pacific, above all Tokyo, were becoming increasingly 
86

unsettled by the rapidity, sophistication, and scale of 

China’s military buildup. These concerns intensified 

in 2009-10 as China brazenly flexed its muscles, browbeating Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands and 

becoming increasingly assertive about its territorial 

claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, the 

less stellar outcome of the second war with Iraq and 

the economic slump that afflicted the United States after the financial crisis of 2008 began to sap confidence 

in the solidity of the American security guarantee. 

Even as the United States pledged under both 

the Bush and Barack Obama administrations to seek 

ways to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons still 

further by fielding advanced conventional weapons 

and missile defenses, these anxieties led to a rejuvenation of interest in nuclear deterrence, including tactical nuclear weapons, among key U.S. allies.25 In South 

Korea, some credible voices began calling for the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons on the peninsula 

to menace North Korea and provide a bargaining chip 

in negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear program.26 In 

Japan, meanwhile, the threat posed by North Korea 

and, ultimately more importantly, by a rising China 

strengthened the cohort calling for an independent 

Japanese nuclear weapons capability, though such 

voices continued to encounter substantial opposition 

from the prevailing anti-nuclear sentiment in Japanese public life.27 While these recommendations were 

not heeded, Asian allied governments did make clear 

that they still regarded the nuclear guarantee as central and indispensable and pressed Washington to redouble its nuclear umbrella guarantees.28

By the early 2010s, then, while U.S. nuclear weapons had receded to the background of active U.S. se-
87

curity policy in Asia, and U.S. military planning and 

coercive diplomacy came to rely predominantly on 

non-nuclear capabilities, these weapons nonetheless 

continued to play a foundational and elemental role in 

U.S. and allied strategy in Asia, providing a basic deterrent against significant escalation, assuring allies, 

and generally backstopping U.S. conventional power, 

which appeared to be less herculean in its ability to 

shape strategic outcomes than some had envisioned in 

the aftermath of the Cold War. 

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICYMAKING 

IN EAST ASIA

The history of U.S. nuclear weapons policy in East 

Asia did not take place in a political vacuum, however. Rather, the history of U.S. nuclear weapons in the 

region has also been a history of U.S. nuclear weapons 

policymaking. Indeed, this latter history is in important respects considerably more distinctive than the 

actual policy itself, which has generally been of a piece 

with broader trends in U.S. defense policy. It is particularly illuminating to compare policymaking on these 

matters with the situation in Europe, the other region 

in which U.S. nuclear weapons have been brandished, 

but where nuclear policymaking was markedly different. 

As a rule, U.S. nuclear weapons policy in Asia has 

been substantially more subject to U.S. discretion, 

within certain bounds, than it has been in Europe. 

Indeed, until very recently, there has existed no formalized mechanism for allies’ participation or input 

regarding nuclear planning decisions, and U.S. nuclear operations and deployments have been conducted 

far more opaquely than has been the case in Europe.29
88

During the Cold War, U.S. allies such as Japan and 

South Korea were effectively excluded from any significant role in U.S. nuclear policy and deployment 

decisions that directly affected them. Indeed, Japanese 

and Korean governments were often unaware even of 

the disposition of U.S. nuclear weapons within or near 

their territory. In one particularly notorious example, 

the Ronald Reagan administration authorized U.S. 

negotiators on the disposition of U.S. and Soviet intermediate nuclear forces in Europe to propose that the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) simply shift 

all their threatening SS-20 intermediate range ballistic 

missiles (IRBMs) beyond the Urals—right into range 

of U.S. allies in Northeast Asia. Only after angry protestations at high levels by the Japanese government in 

particular did Washington revise its negotiating position.30 In effect, as long as U.S. nuclear forces were not 

openly visible to Asian populations—an objective that 

most Asian allies and the United States came to share 

during the Cold War—there were few constraints on 

U.S. policy on nuclear weapons in Asia. 

This set of relationships differed markedly from 

U.S. relations on nuclear weapons policy with its allies 

in Europe, where the United States dealt with its highly 

advanced and developed allies through NATO, a multilateral alliance operating—often cumbersomely—on 

the basis of consensus. Though the United States was 

the primary power in Western Europe, it operated in 

a highly constrained context, one in which U.S. nuclear weapons policies received significant scrutiny 

from its allies. Moreover, European allies were progressively integrated into NATO nuclear planning, 

and serious consideration was even given during the 

middle of the Cold War to the creation of a Multilateral Force and to deliberate proliferation to NATO al-
89

lies.31 At the strategic and political level, mechanisms 

such as the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) ensured allied participation in U.S. nuclear policy decisions, and, given NATO’s integrated structure, allied 

military officers participated conjointly in the NATO 

Supreme Allied Commander’s nuclear planning and 

deliberations. At the operational level, NATO allies 

were expected to deliver U.S.-owned tactical nuclear 

weapons as part of NATO’s war plans. No such collective decision mechanisms or programs of cooperation 

existed in Asia. 

The primary reason for the far more unilateral nature of U.S. nuclear weapons policymaking in Asia 

lay in a pair of broader factors relating to the power 

balance and to Washington’s perception of its allies 

in Asia: to wit, Washington could retain discretion 

over its policy in Asia in a way that was infeasible in 

Europe; and Washington also thought it needed to do 

so in light of U.S. policymakers’ deep concerns about 

its East Asian partners as “rogue allies.” As a result, 

U.S. alliance relations in Asia as a whole developed 

in a considerably more hierarchical fashion, arranged 

in a hub-and-spoke model in which Washington dealt 

bilaterally and from a position of strength with each 

allied government rather than collectively through a 

single multilateral alliance.32 This decisively shaped 

the nature of U.S. relations with these allies on nuclear 

weapons issues. 

A basic reality characterizing the development of 

U.S. relations with its allies was the stark power imbalance between them. In the wake of Japan’s total 

defeat and the collapse of the European Asian colonial empires, not a single strong indigenous government remained in the Far East. Infant or simply weak 

governments in Seoul, Korea; Taipei, Taiwan; Manila, 
90

the Philippines; Singapore; Bangkok, Thailand; and 

Saigon, Vietnam could not deal with the behemoth 

United States as anything like equals, and the occupied government in Tokyo had little leverage or desire to pursue a more independent military course.33

Largely impoverished, struggling for legitimacy, and 

challenged by internal and external threats, primarily 

Communist in nature, these governments were in no 

position to gain insight into or influence over an issue 

as sensitive as Washington’s nuclear weapons policy. 

Moreover, there was little sense of cohesion among 

the nations of East Asia, and in some cases outright 

hostility prevailed, as between South Korea and Japan. Individual allies were also situated in markedly 

different geographies, sharply distinguishing their 

perceptions of the nature of the threat.34 These factors 

prevented meaningful cooperation among U.S. allies 

in the region, but even collectively they would have 

been outweighed by the United States at the zenith 

of its relative strength. Washington thus enjoyed tremendous leverage over its Asian allies, and could easily ward off attempts to influence matters as sensitive 

as its nuclear weapons planning.35

But the rationale for Washington’s policy of preserving discretion did not lie simply in its ability to 

conduct such a policy. Rather, unlike in Europe (with 

the exception of Germany), Washington saw many of 

these putative allies as not only weak and vulnerable, 

but also as very possibly dangerous and thus requiring 

restraint if they were to receive potentially emboldening security guarantees. For much of the Cold War, 

Washington feared that Seoul or Taipei might, for parochial reasons of their own, provoke large conflicts 

which the United States strenuously wanted to avoid; 

Washington also feared Tokyo’s ambitions in the im-
91

mediate postwar period. Washington’s response was 

to seek to restrain these allies. With Tokyo, Washington’s response was to ensure the substantial demilitarization of the nation, with the United States assuming 

responsibility for Japan’s security interests beyond its 

immediate territory. Though after the beginning of the 

Korean War, Washington did encourage the development of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to aid in the 

defense of the Home Islands. As Japan enthusiastically 

embraced its pacification, concerns about a belligerent 

Japan receded but the model held, convenient for both 

parties. With often truculent South Korea and Taiwan, 

the United States sought to retain sufficient control 

over their military activities to ensure that they did 

not provoke an unwanted war in Asia. To this end, the 

United States, in Victor Cha’s description, “fashioned 

a series of deep, tight bilateral alliances with Taiwan, 

South Korea, and Japan to control their ability to use 

force and to foster material and political dependency 

on the United States.”36 Ensuring exclusive U.S. control over nuclear weapons policy was of a piece with 

this larger approach. 

But the approach was not purely a product of 

Washington’s insistence. Rather, Asian allies did not 

challenge and in some respects even insisted on the 

maintenance of a hierarchical alliance relationship 

with Washington. The case of Japan is illustrative, 

where the “see no evil, hear no evil” posture of the 

Japanese Government with respect to U.S. nuclear 

weapons became as much a consequence of Tokyo’s 

preferences as Washington’s. In the wake of the devastating war with the United States that had concluded 

with incendiary and atomic attacks on the Home Islands, Japan elected to pursue the “Yoshida Doctrine” 

of unitary focus on economic growth and unswerving 
92

forbearance of any significant military development. 

Relying on the protection of the American security 

umbrella, Japan could pursue growth without any 

serious investment in military forces, a policy that 

satisfied both the material ambitions and idealistic 

impulses in the Japanese body politic. Security was 

effectively outsourced to the United States, relieving 

Japan of the economic, political, and moral burdens 

of providing it for itself.37 With this background, it is 

little surprise that successive governments in Tokyo 

continued to tolerate a highly unequal security arrangement with the United States, one in which they 

willfully overlooked the entry of U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons to Japanese ports, a practice 

Tokyo governments publicly decried but privately 

tolerated.38 Indeed, at key junctures Japan appears to 

have knowingly forsworn deeper involvement and insight into defense and nuclear planning so as to avoid 

further implication in U.S. security alliance membership.39 South Korea, meanwhile, remained weak and 

acutely threatened throughout the Cold War, while 

Taiwan, of course, had little choice but to cleave to the 

United States, especially once Washington shifted its 

diplomatic recognition to Beijing. 

The upshot of this environment was that, for the 

duration of the Cold War, the United States could 

and was actually expected to maintain a freer hand 

in Asia, including but not exclusively in the nuclear 

weapons field, than it was permitted in Europe. Thus, 

despite the Japanese public’s neuralgia over the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan and public commitment by the Japanese government to refuse to allow 

U.S. nuclear weapons into the country, Tokyo turned 

a blind eye towards the transit through and docking 

in Japan of U.S. naval forces carrying nuclear weap-
93

ons throughout the Cold War and adopted a similar 

approach towards indications of U.S. nuclear-related 

activities on Okinawa in the 1960s and early 1970s.40

In the Republic of Korea (ROK), meanwhile, only the 

nation’s president knew where U.S. nuclear weapons 

were located in the country, and open discussion of 

U.S. nuclear weapons on the peninsula was considered potentially seditious.41 As Army Chief of Staff 

General Edward Meyer rather impoliticly remarked 

about planning for limited nuclear operations while 

in Korea in January 1983, “It’s far simpler here than 

in Europe where consultations have to be made with 

fifteen different sovereign nations.”42 Consequently, 

policies such as the U.S. intention to reduce its reliance on nuclear forces could proceed with far less obstruction in Asia than in Europe, where the initiative 

ran headlong into the Europeans’ vocal fear that the 

Americans were simply seeking to make superpower 

war safe for the European continent. 

In Asia, therefore, governments have historically 

been far less interested in seriously challenging U.S. 

nuclear weapons policy, remaining largely unaware 

of actual U.S. planning and deployments, and until 

relatively recently, lacking the wherewithal to bring 

pressure on Washington. Moreover, even despite the 

narrowing of the power imbalances between Washington and its Asian allies, the fundamentally hierarchical nature of U.S. alliances with its Asian partners 

has persisted. Indeed, U.S. Asian allies have at times 

continued to insist in important ways that such a hierarchical relationship endure. The right-leaning Lee 

Myung Bak administration in Seoul, for instance, in 

2010 successfully pressed to delay implementation of 

the plan to withdraw South Korean forces from wartime U.S. control in a peninsular war, a totemic issue 
94

that the left-wing government of Roh Moo-Hyun had 

trumpeted.43 Successive governments in Japan, meanwhile, have resisted building up their military forces 

to take a more equal role in the alliance and have thus 

far refused to alter the alliance treaty to commit Japan 

to the defense of the United States, leaving the relationship a unilateral commitment by Washington to 

defend Japan. 

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FOR U.S. NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS POLICY IN ASIA

The Asian nuclear landscape is changing, however.44 Allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are pressing to gain greater insight into and even 

influence on the U.S. nuclear weapons policymaking 

process and, ultimately, posture. In recent years, the 

Japanese government, for instance, has broken from 

its hands-off tradition on U.S. nuclear weapons policy 

to importune the United States to reaffirm the nuclear 

element of its security umbrella both during the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission of 2008-09 

and during the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review of 2009-10, specifically—though unsuccessfully—pushing for the retention of the nuclear variant 

of the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM-N) for 

attack submarines.45 The Lee administration in South 

Korea, meanwhile, insisted that the United States emphasize the nuclear aspect of its security guarantee to 

the ROK after the resurgence in provocative North 

Korean behavior that began in 2009.46 In response the 

United States has jointly established bilateral committees with Japan and South Korea on nuclear weapons 

and related strategic issues, and has sought to institutionalize trilateral and quadrilateral forums on these 

matters, though with less success.47
95

These shifts are the products both of the changing 

threat perception among Asian allies and of the greater wealth, strength, and stature of the Pacific nations. 

The failure of efforts to restrain North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons and ballistic missile programs and its aggressive behavior in recent years has resulted in Seoul 

and Tokyo cleaving closer to Washington and pressing harder for a strong stance against the Kim regime. 

More significantly, especially for Japan, Australia, and 

the Philippines, the rise of China, its rapid and barely 

concealed military buildup, and its more assertive 

behavior since the financial crisis of 2008 have stoked 

fears of a domineering behemoth. This more muted 

but deeper and more substantial anxiety, now more 

openly discussed, was leading allied governments in 

Tokyo; Canberra, Australia; Manila; and elsewhere to 

look to a strengthening of the U.S. strategic position 

in the region, and to a greater degree of insight into 

and influence over Washington’s decisions in this regard.48 Greatly adding to this pressure is the fact that 

East Asia is now acknowledged to be the cockpit of 

global economic growth. U.S. allies like South Korea 

that were impoverished agrarian societies in the 1950s 

are now first-world economies at the forefront of global socio-economic development. Washington thus no 

longer retains anything like the degree of leverage it 

enjoyed in the early 1950s, when these alliances were 

formed. 

The confluence of these pressures and the recognition of Asia’s central role in the future of the global 

economy began to tell on U.S. policy particularly in 

2010 and 2011, when Washington, responding to aggressive Chinese movements on a variety of territorial 

disputes in the East and South China Seas, embarked 

on a policy to reinvigorate its position in the Pacific.49
96

In the conventional military arena, among other efforts this took the form of the joint U.S. Navy-Air 

Force AirSea Battle effort, designed to develop credible conventional military plans and capabilities to 

defeat the anti-access/area-denial threat becoming increasingly available to potential U.S. adversaries, and 

of a very public U.S. commitment to station Marines 

in Darwin, Australia.50 At the nuclear level, even as 

it reaffirmed its nuclear umbrella over its Asian allies 

and acknowledged the continued foundational role 

of nuclear weapons in U.S. extended deterrence guarantees, Washington hoped to continue the post-1950s 

trend towards reducing reliance on nuclear weapons 

despite facing significant military challenges in the 

Western Pacific.51

Yet the rise of China; the continuing, accumulative 

proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, 

and advanced conventional weaponry; and the stern 

budgetary austerity likely to follow from the economic 

constraints the United States faced in the early 2010s, 

make such aspirations to maintain the striking U.S. 

advantage in non-nuclear arms look, if not hubristic, 

then at least inordinately ambitious.52 The U.S. posture 

in the Pacific, which has traditionally relied on the essentially unchallenged operation of U.S. naval and air 

forces throughout maritime Asia, seems increasingly 

under strain as China builds what will be a daunting 

array of capabilities to target U.S. ships, bases, aircraft, 

satellites, and other systems, and as North Korea and 

other rogue countries seek to exploit seams in the U.S. 

approach to warfare.53 Of course, the United States 

and its allies are not helpless—their efforts to shore 

up their conventional forces can mitigate, if not entirely relieve, this pressure. But the most influential 

determinants will be the growth of Chinese military 
97

power and the proliferation of nuclear and advanced 

conventional weaponry in the hands of potential U.S. 

adversaries. Barring the abrupt cessation of China’s 

military buildup, this trend looks certain to make U.S. 

conventional naval and air operations in the Western 

Pacific at the very least more contested and perhaps in 

certain contexts prohibitively difficult.54

These dynamics point to the likelihood that U.S. 

nuclear weapons, while still generally absent from 

overt policy consciousness and deliberation in East 

Asia in the early 2010s, will grow in salience in the 

coming years. U.S. extended deterrence commitments 

are fundamentally highly ambitious, encompassing 

most of maritime Asia. In an era of technologically 

and politically unchallenged U.S. military supremacy, 

such commitments could safely be wholly entrusted 

to the purview of U.S. conventional military forces. 

As U.S. conventional military superiority comes under increasing challenge, however, the United States 

and, more insistently, its allies will be compelled to 

choose between appeasing those rising powers that 

enjoy leverage gained from the diminishment of U.S. 

conventional superiority, on one hand, and threatening to impose unacceptable costs upon an aggressor 

that seeks to exploit such leverage, on the other hand. 

If it is to be the latter, the threat to resort to nuclear 

escalation is the logical terminus and the most doubtlessly formidable rung on the ladder of such threats.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. This chapter examines the history of U.S. nuclear weapons 

policy and doctrine in Asia since 1945. It does not focus on the 

issue of the attempted uses of such weapons for political advantage, an extremely important and well-documented history. For 

more on this, see, e.g., Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987. 
98

2. A peace treaty with Japan was finalized in 1951, entered 

into force in 1952, and was revised in 1960. The year 1951 saw 

the signing of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). The U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense continued after the 1953 armistice, with major U.S. forces 

remaining on the peninsula. In response to People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) saber-rattling in 1954, Washington signed a mutual 

defense pact with the Kuomintang (KMT) government in Taipei 

in 1955 pledging to come to the island’s aid (though not necessarily to the defense of the disputed offshore islands). The year 

1954 saw the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO), which included the Philippines and Thailand. These alliances, Washington believed, would strengthen the resolve and 

coherence of the anti-Communist effort while also increasing the 

effectiveness of U.S. forces, particularly through the ability to use 

forward bases located on the territory of its allies. For a history of 

this period, see, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A 

New History, New York: Penguin Press, 2005, chaps. 1-2.

3. For Eisenhower’s explication of his logic, see Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, 

New York: Signet, 1965, pp. 543-544. See also Aaron L. Friedberg, 

In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its 

Cold War Grand Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

2000. 

4. For an account of this period and the interrelationship of 

the perception of the Soviets as a clear and present threat and the 

increasing availability of nuclear weapons, see Ernest R. May et 

al., History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense Historical Office, 1981, esp. 

pp. 104-152. 

5. See David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International 

Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, Spring 1983, esp. pp. 29-31. 

6. See David A. Rosenberg, “Nuclear War Planning,” in Michael Howard et al., eds., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare 

in the Western World, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994, 

pp. 171-173.
99

7. Robert S. Norris et al., “Where They Were,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, p. 30, citing the 

declassified Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

(Atomic Energy), History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons, July 1945 through September 1977, February 1978, excerpts of which are available from www.nukestrat.com/us/1978_

Custodyex.pdf. 

8. Peter Hayes et al., American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, 

New York: Penguin Books, 1986, pp. 57-59. Hayes and his coauthors cite the reminiscences of then-U.S. Commander-in-Chief, 

Pacific (CINCPAC) Harry Felt and an Air Force history of the 

1958 crisis for this assessment. 

9. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the 

European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 257, citing statements of intent by President 

Eisenhower in closed meetings, and pp. 287-89, citing comparable 

statements by President Kennedy. 

10. See Andrew Krepinevich and Robert O. Work, A New 

Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007, 

pp. 97-138. For a contemporary analysis, see Townsend Hoopes, 

“Overseas Bases in American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, October 

1958, esp. pp. 69 and 71. 

11. For a classic analysis of this point, see Albert Wohlstetter, 

“The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1958. 

12. See Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York: 

Harper & Brothers, 1960. 

13. For a history of the consideration of nuclear weapons in 

relation to breaking the siege of Khe Sanh, see William C. Yengst 

et al., Nuclear Weapons That Went to War, Report prepared for the 

Defense Special Weapons Agency, Washington, DC, October 

1996, pp. 204-226. 

14. See NATO MC 14/3, “Overall Strategic Concept for the 

Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Area,” January 
100

16, 1968, pp. 14-15. See also NATO Information Service, The North 

Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1949-1989, Brussels, Belgium: NATO 

Information Service, 1989, p. 218. 

15. For a similar view, see Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The 

Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, New York: 

HarperCollins, 1999, pp. 25-77. 

16. Tellingly, U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons to its naval 

forces in the Pacific was considerably more modest than in the Atlantic, where North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies 

would face the main onslaught of the Soviet Navy. See Norris et 

al., “Where They Were,” p. 32, citing declassified History. 

17. For an assessment of this phenomenon, originally written in 1991, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Military-Technical 

Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002. 

18. Norris et al., “Where They Were,” pp. 30-31, citing declassified History. 

19. See Hans M. Kristensen, “A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea,” September 28, 2005, available from www.

nukestrat.com/korea/koreahistory.htm. See also citations in Keith 

Payne et al., U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Northeast 

Asia, Fairfax, VA: National Institute of Public Policy Press, 2010, 

notes 21, 44. 

20. Hans M. Kristensen, Japan Under the Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. 

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War Planning in Japan During the Cold 

War, Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, 1999, pp. 26-29, citing 

declassified U.S. Government documents. A contemporaneous 

declassified CINCPAC Command History named only U.S. and 

South Korean locations for U.S. nuclear weapons as of 1976. See 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command 

History 1977, Vol. II, September 1, 1978, p. 431, available from 

oldsite.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/foia/Japan/CINCPA

C77IIp431.PDF; Hayes et al., American Lake, pp. 224-225. 

21. For more on this topic, see Elbridge A. Colby, “The United 

States and Discriminate Nuclear Options in the Cold War,” in Jef-
101

frey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, eds., Limited Nuclear War 

in the 21st Century (forthcoming). 

22. See Jonathan Pollock and Mitchell B. Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” 

and Derek J. Mitchell, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, 

Abandonment, and Honor,” both in Kurt M. Campbell et al., eds., 

The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear 

Choices, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp. 

254-313. For discussion of the “Guam Doctrine,” see Henry A. 

Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 

1979, pp. 222-225. 

23. See President George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Reducing U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Weapons,” in Jeffrey A. 

Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds., Controlling Non-Strategic 

Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, Colorado Springs, 

CO: U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2001, 

p. 275. For the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from 

South Korea, see USCINCPAC Command History, Vol. I, 1991, pp. 

91-92, available from www.nukestrat.com/korea/CINCPAC91p90-93.

pdf. The decision to withdraw all nuclear weapons from South Korea due to the collapse of the Soviet Union suggests how limited 

their role had become by the late 1980s in defense of the Republic 

of Korea (ROK) from a purely North Korean attack. 

24. For a similar view, see Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction: 

Investigating Nuclear Weapons in a New Era,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st 

Century Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 

23-25. 

25. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010, pp. viiix. 

26. See Monitor 360 Report, “Findings from SME Crowdsourcing in East Asia,” Report prepared for the Concepts and 

Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) effort, June 1, 2011, p. 41. 

27. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
102

28. See Richard Halloran, “Nuclear Umbrella,” Realclearpolitics.com, June 21, 2009, available from www.realclearpolitics.com/

articles/2009/06/21/nuclear_umbrella_97104.html; and Richard Halloran, “Doubts Grow in Japan Over U.S. Nuclear Umbrella,” Taipei Times, May 27, 2009, p. 9. 

29. See David S. Yost, “U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO 

and North-East Asia,” in B. Tertrais, ed., Perspectives on Extended 

Deterrence, Paris, France: Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, 2010, p. 28. 

30. Discussions with former Department of Defense official. 

Even the official U.S. delegation sent to allay Japanese anxieties 

was relatively junior in rank. 

31. For a history of the Allies’ role in theater nuclear force 

planning, see David S. Yost, “The History of NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1992, pp. 245-248. 

32. For analyses of the reasons why U.S. relations with Asian 

allies developed in this fashion, see Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, 

Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/2010, pp. 158-196; and Christopher 

Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in 

Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 

2002, pp. 575-607. 

33. Australia and New Zealand were different cases but small 

strategic actors in any case. 

34. Peninsular South Korea, for instance, worried primarily 

about a land attack across the armistice line by North Korean and 

possibly Chinese forces; archipelagic Japan focused on the threat 

to the northern islands from Soviet forces in the Russian Far East; 

and insular Taiwan focused on the peril posed by military coercion or an amphibious attack by the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) across the Straits. Once China shifted to the anti-Soviet 

camp in the 1970s, it saw its main threat as the Soviet forces arrayed across the long Sino-Soviet border. U.S. allies in the region 

thus lacked the consistency of focus that NATO states possessed, 

where the majority of the NATO countries were packed into or 
103

near Central Europe and therefore were focused on the peril of a 

Warsaw Pact land invasion along the Central Front. This gave a 

coherence and collective quality to the concerns of the European 

NATO nations. 

35. The fact that the U.S. Navy was the only military force 

among the allies that could range across this vast expanse of territory also added to U.S. autonomy and leverage. In the nuclear 

weapons arena, these dynamics strengthened U.S. proclivities towards discretionary and opaque decisionmaking, dynamics that 

were compounded by the U.S. ability to store and operate these 

weapons from U.S. naval vessels and sovereign U.S. territory. U.S. 

sovereign territory included Pacific islands such as Guam but also 

included territorial concessions granted after World War II on the 

historical territory of allies, such as Subic Bay in the Philippines 

and Okinawa in Japan. 

36. See Cha, pp. 163,168. For a similar point of view, see Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International 

Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 29-36. 

37. See George R. Packard, “The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, 

No. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 92-103. This reliance was explicitly 

nuclear. For instance, after the shock of China’s first nuclear test 

in October 1964, a substantial number of powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders approached Prime Minister Sato Eisaku 

of Japan with a proposal that Japan should create its own nuclear 

arsenal. Sato let this be known to Ambassador Reischauer who 

immediately told Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and when Sato 

arrived for a summit meeting with President Johnson in Washington in January of 1965, he received assurances that the United 

States would extend its “nuclear umbrella” over Japan, thus obviating Japan’s going nuclear itself. This situation continues to this 

day. The author thanks George Packard for this insight. 

38. For the Japanese government’s revelation of the existence 

of so-called “secret agreements” between Tokyo and Washington permitting US transit of nuclear weapons through Japanese ports and waters and the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa after the island’s reversion to Japanese control, 

see Jeffrey Lewis, “More on U.S.-Japan ‘Secret Agreements,’” 

Armscontrolwonk.com, March 11, 2010, available from 
104

lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2660/more-on-us-japan-secretagreements. For documentary evidence of these agreements and 

how they were practiced, see Robert A. Wampler, “Nuclear Noh 

Drama: Tokyo, Washington, and the Case of the Missing Nuclear 

Agreements,” National Security Archive Briefing Book, October 

13, 2009, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb291/

index.htm. The Japanese government continues to deny that it secretly gave the United States permission in 1969 to use bases on 

Okinawa to store nuclear weapons in the event of war. See George 

R. Packard, Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 318, n. 105. 

39. See Hans M. Kristensen, Japan Under the Nuclear Umbrella: 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War Planning in Japan During the 

Cold War, Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, 1999, p. 19, citing 

declassified State Department cables. 

40. See the collection of declassified U.S. Government documents contained in Wampler. 

41. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 

U.S.: Basic Books, 1997, p. 259. 

42. Quoted in Hayes et al., American Lake, p. 231. 

43. “U.S., S. Korea Delay OPCON Transfer Until 2015,” Stars 

and Stripes, June 27, 2010, available from www.stripes.com/news/

pacific/korea/u-s-s-korea-delay-opcon-transfer-until-2015-1.108947. 

44. For an analysis of the current Asian nuclear landscape, see 

Christopher P. Twomey, “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: 

Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers,” Asia Policy, No. 11, 

January 2011, pp. 51-78. 

45. “Japan Lobbied for Robust Nuclear Umbrella Before Policy Shift,” Kyodo News, November 23, 2009, available from www.

breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9C54D680&showarticle=1&catnum=0. 

46. “Obama Pledges Nuclear Umbrella for South Korea,” Korea Times, June 17, 2009, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/

news/nation/2009/06/116_46976.html. 
105

47. Available from armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?

File_id=10a50d6f-ece1-475f-bb5e-00ab478aefdb. For an analysis of 

some of the issues involved in developing such a committee, see 

Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” October 

19, 2010, available from lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3057/

extended-deterrence-policy-committee. 

48. See Thom Shanker, “U.S. Won’t Become Isolationist, Gates 

Tells Worried Asian Leaders,” The New York Times, June 3, 2011, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/world/asia/04gates.

html. For the speech, see Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 

Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute of 

Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 3, 2011, available from www.

defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4831. 

49. See Abraham Denmark, “Crowded Waters,” Foreign 

Policy, June 7, 2011, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/

2011/06/07/crowded_waters. 

50. See, for instance, Richard Halloran, “AirSea Battle,” Air 

Force Times, August 2010, available from www.airforce-magazine.

com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810battle.aspx; 

and Jackie Calmes, “A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates 

China,” The New York Times, November 16, 2011, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand

-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all. 

51. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010, pp. v-ix. 

52. See Paul K. Davis and Peter A. Wilson, Looming Discontinuities in U.S. Military Strategy and Defense Planning, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011; and Andrew Krepinevich et al., 

The Challenges to U.S. National Security, Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008. 

53. See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, esp. pp. 28-32. 

54. See Jan van Tol, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010. 

107

PART II

RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON TACTICAL 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

109

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON TACTICAL 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

George E. Hudson

The principal question the panel was assigned to 

address concerned the current force structure, doctrine, and strategy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Discussion, however, ranged beyond this 

topic to others that concerned the historical, political, 

and geographical contexts of the Russian perspective 

on TNWs. A matter of concern became the definition 

of what constitutes TNWs, since there is no commonly 

accepted definition.

As became clear from the presentations on the Russian perspective, even the term “tactical nuclear weapons” is not the one that the Russians prefer. Rather, 

the term “non-strategic nuclear weapons” (NSNWs) 

far better fits the Russian conception of this category 

of weapons, reflecting a difference in how the Russians view them compared especially to an American 

perspective. But as one participant put it during the 

discussion, all NSNWs are “strategic” in the sense that 

they will wreak destruction and radiation damage 

on a wide scale among populations and urban centers just as a larger weapon would. Some have yields 

much larger than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki, Japan. Generally, Russians believe that 

NSNWs are those nuclear weapons not covered in the 

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 

and those that are dismantled or on the verge of being dismantled. Given the power of these devices, 

participants wondered whether it would make sense 
110

for Russians to consider using them at all in a future 

conflict, since they might have to be used on Russian 

soil, particularly in a possible conflict with China, or 

could have effects on the Russian populations living 

near “tactical” nuclear strikes in Eastern Europe.

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY-STRATEGIC 

PERSPECTIVE

Perceived weakness in the conventional military 

balance in Europe conditions Russian thinking about 

NSNWs in part. Russia is faced with a panoply of 

conventional assets from the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) side, including conventional 

precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The result is 

that Russia wishes to keep its huge superiority of 

NSNWs—there is a ratio of about 3,000-6,000 Russian 

NSNWs, a portion of which are deliverable now, to 

about 180 NATO NSNWs that could be employed 

in the European theater—to counterbalance NATO’s 

conventional superiority. In other words, the Russian 

perspective on NSNWs stresses the deterrent utility 

they possess and, therefore, the existing threat, however remote, that they could actually be used in a conflict. 

The objective military balance in Europe may place 

Russia in one of two positions, according to participants. The first is stasis. Some Russians believe that 

the situation as it exists currently is acceptable for the 

time being. During an undetermined period, Russia 

will be able to hold off any real military threat from 

nations of the West just by possessing NSNWs and 

using them as deterrents until such time as Russia is 

able to develop its own alternatives to them, particularly the construction of PGMs and drone aircraft. The 
111

Russian Navy would be particularly happy with this 

situation—especially in the Northern theater—since 

it relies so much on NSNWs as part of its weapons 

cache. Moreover, to the extent that the small stockpile 

of U.S. NSNWs in Europe keeps the United States 

linked to NATO and therefore ensures a more predictable NATO decision structure and U.S. stake in European affairs, Russia will want to keep its own NSNWs 

to ensure a stable “balance” of these weapons and to 

make the United States aware that any military aggression against Russia resulting from a NATO decision would produce a Russian strategic strike on U.S. 

soil. NSNWs are a kind of “crutch” that the Russians 

are leaning on until reforms, somewhere in the future, 

can take place. This status quo position, purposely or 

not, adds a Cold War veneer to their arguments and 

rhetoric.

The second position appears more active and reformist, involving the pursuit of arms control talks 

while seeking quicker change in the structure of the 

Russian armed forces. Like the first view, it desires 

an eventual transformation to PGMs in the future, 

but is more willing to accede to negotiations both to 

buy time for Russian military reform and to link a 

number of issues to negotiations on the reduction of 

NSNWs. In other words, there is a greater potential 

in this position for reducing NSNWs in the near to 

medium term than in the first.1

 NSNWs become a bargaining chip, used to exact concessions on issues that 

Russia believes the United States ignores in assessing 

Russian security concerns. Thus, Russians taking this 

stance would like to link discussions about the reduction of NSNWs to other outstanding issues, such as 

the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, particularly a renegotiation of the Conventional Forces in 
112

Europe (CFE) agreement; ballistic missile defense; and 

the inclusion of all states possessing nuclear weapons 

in the negotiation forum, instead of just a U.S.-Russia 

bilateral format. Moreover, the resumption of talks 

could lead to confidence-building measures (CBMs) in 

the short term to reduce the military threat and to reduce political tensions in Europe. CBMs could include 

greater transparency, among other matters, resulting 

in a final resolution of just how many NSNWs NATO 

and Russia possess.

THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Arms control talks are, of course, as political as 

they are military. Merely pursuing arms control talks 

with the United States can have political payoffs internationally and domestically by reaffirming the importance of Russia as a key player in the international 

system. President Vladimir Putin, for instance, pursued strategic arms reduction with the United States, 

resulting in the Treaty of Moscow (also known as the 

Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty or SORT) in May 

2002, in part as a way to score a foreign policy victory 

early in his term. 

There are also a number of important political-economic-demographic issues that influence the Russian 

perspective on NSNWs. These include key domestic 

elements, such as the elimination of corruption in the 

military modernization process, which stymies rapid 

progress toward reform; the efficient allocation of resources to develop PGMs; the production of sufficient 

oil and gas to generate income in the face of declining 

oil and gas prices and projected declining production 

of oil and gas; and the numerical decline of the Russian 

population, which simultaneously means fewer work-
113

ers to produce income from Russian foreign trade and 

to make high-tech weapons for the Russian military.

International factors overlay these domestic ones 

in helping to determine Russian perspectives on 

NSNWs. One of the most important factors concerns 

relations with China, what some might refer to as the 

“elephant in the room,” when it comes to dealing with 

NSNWs in the European theater. The Russian view 

may be labeled uniquely “Eurasian,” using the term 

of one colleague, having to take simultaneous account 

of Russia’s security situation in both Europe and 

Asia. No other nation is so positioned and so potentially vulnerable. With huge population discrepancies 

across the Russian-Chinese border, the modernization 

of China’s military, and China’s possession of longrange nuclear weapons, it makes sense that Russia 

would rely on NSNWs to deter a Chinese conventional 

attack. Their use would be limited because of potential 

damage to Russia and its population. In an actual war, 

they might use three or four NSNWs before launching 

strategic weapons on China. This helps to underline 

the limited utility they have, should they actually be 

used, and reinforces the notion that Russia needs to 

develop PGMs as quickly as possible—weapons that 

could actually be used somewhat more liberally without excessive collateral damage to Russia itself. 

Another international factor, which has a significant domestic component to it, is somewhat spectral: 

Russia’s place in the international system and how 

Russian political elites conceive of it. This element 

is extremely hard to measure as it relies so much on 

subjective judgment, but the recognition that other 

nations give to Russia’s power and the prestige that 

Russian elites feel thereby are in a sense the starting 

point for Russian willingness to engage in negotia-
114

tions about what to do with their NSNWs. Thus Russia’s self-image can and does have an impact on many 

other aspects of military thinking.

CONCLUSION

While Russia’s perspective on NSNWs deals significantly with military questions, then, it also has to 

take account of important political factors. Of those, 

elite perceptions are very important, because it is elites 

who make foreign and military policies.2

 Although 

Russia’s political system, by design and by culture, 

is more centralized than most declared democracies, 

it still matters to Russian leaders what their populace 

thinks of them—the only explanation for why leaders 

go so far out of their way to engage the public in discussion or draw the public’s attention to their courageous exploits. With approval ratings of between 88 

percent and 57 percent since 2008—at least prior to the 

recent highly publicized popular protests—both former President Dmitry Medvedev and newly elected 

President Putin possess significant political capital to 

spend on Russian foreign and military policies.3

 As the 

Russian presidential election of March 2012 recedes, it 

is well to remember that the Russian leader will lead 

from his domestic strength.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Most participants agreed that no negotiations could commence until after the U.S. presidential elections, putting off efforts 

to 2013 at the earliest. 

2. In most nations, including in the United States, the audience for foreign and military policies is much smaller than that 

for domestic policies. 
115

3. These are the results of polls of the Levada Center, the last 

one of which was taken in October 2011. Since September 2008—

the height of public euphoria over the Georgian-Russian war—

the tendency has been downward for both leaders, but no lower 

than 57 percent for Medvedev and 61 percent for Putin. These are 

figures most current Western politicians would be envious of. See 

www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_performance_trends.php

#190 and www.levada.ru/08-11-2011/reitingi-odobreniya-pervykh-lits

-polozheniya-del-v-strane-elektoralnye-predpochteniya.
116

CHAPTER 5

RUSSIAN DOCTRINE ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS:

 CONTEXTS, PRISMS, AND CONNECTIONS1

Jacob W. Kipp

The attention given to tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) has undergone a rather rapid 

metamorphosis since November 2011. Up to that time 

discussions of reductions in tactical nuclear weapons 

(TNWs) were tied to progress towards Global Zero 

and seen as a logical follow-on to the U.S.-Russian 

strategic arms reduction treaty (START III) agreement 

reducing strategic nuclear offensive systems.2

 Russia 

was demanding the withdrawal of U.S. TNWs—the 

B-61 bombs—from Europe as part of a campaign to 

bring all TNWs back within the states that own them. 

At the same time, Russia was demanding that the 

United States provide “legally-binding statements” 

that the European missile defense system being developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) to deal with the ballistic missile threat from 

certain rogue states would not evolve into a system 

threatening Russian offensive ballistic missiles and 

undermine deterrence. Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant 

Secretary Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and 

Compliance, had laid out the U.S. position on negotiations on TNWs, calling for Russia to provide an 

inventory of its arsenal prior to the start of such negotiations, a position rejected by the Russian Foreign 

Ministry.3
117

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE 

FEAR OF A NEW NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

What has changed is, first, the collapse of U.S./

NATO and Russian conversations on missile defense. 

On October 21, 2011, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 

speaking on the radio station Golos Rossii (Voice of 

Russia) said that Russia saw no evidence of progress 

on NATO-Russia cooperation on European missile 

defense because the United States had declined to 

provide any legally binding statement on the European missile defense system disavowing deployment 

against Russia.4

 For the next 10 days, the Russian government in one forum or another repeated its warnings 

about lack of progress on a Russia-NATO agreement 

on European missile defense. On October 25, Robert 

Bridge reported that President Dmitri Medvedev had 

warned that failure to make a deal on missile defense 

would lead to a new arms race: “In the coming decade 

we face the following alternatives. . . . Either we reach 

agreement on missile defense and create a full-fledged 

joint mechanism of cooperation, or . . . a new round 

of the arms race will begin.”5

 A week later Lavrov repeated his statement that no progress had been made 

on Russia-NATO cooperation in missile defense. 

Within the next few days, the Russian press was full 

of accounts of the beginning of that very arms race. 

Lavrov declared: “The situation is serious and we will 

certainly raise this question during the coming contacts on the level of presidents of Russia and the U.S. 

and the leaders of the leading NATO member states.”6

Medvedev’s arms race view became common 

knowledge just a day before Lavrov’s statement. It 

began with a story out of the United Kingdom (UK) 

carried by The Guardian, which proclaimed that a new 
118

nuclear arms race was already underway. The British government as part of its austerity program has 

been cutting defense spending while trying to find the 

means to maintain its nuclear submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces. As an essential element of 

the assessment process, the British American Security 

Information Council (BASIC) had created the Trident 

Commission to provide input on the debate about UK 

nuclear weapons policy, specifically, Trident renewal. 

The BASIC Trident Commission enjoyed the support 

of former senior defense experts from all major British 

parties. Its first working paper by Ian Kearns called attention to the accelerated expenditures of other nuclear powers. The United States and Russia plan to spend 

$700 billion and $70 billion, respectively, on nuclear 

weapons and delivery systems over the next decade. 

The report also made the key point that some powers, 

notably Russia and Pakistan, were shifting their nuclear posture and strategy toward weapons and delivery systems that went beyond strategic deterrence and 

into warfighting. Others, especially the United States, 

were pursuing conventional deep-strike strategic systems.7

 Kearns declared that a new nuclear arms race 

was already underway: “If anything, the evidence 

points to new nuclear arms races and a huge amount 

of money (hundreds of billions of U.S.$) being spent 

over the coming decade.”8

The Russian news media picked up the report immediately after its release. One day after the appearance of press coverage of the BASIC report, the Russian press was already analyzing the report’s message 

to conclude that the world had embarked upon a new 

round of the nuclear arms race, with the United States 

leading the race because of its planned investment 

in such armaments over the next decade. Looking at 
119

Russia’s anticipated spending of $70 billion over the 

next decade, the author pointed to investments in new 

mobile, solid-fueled missiles of the Lars class and in 

naval strategic nuclear systems, especially development of the Bulava solid-fueled missile and the Lainer 

liquid-fueled, heavy missile, and construction of eight 

Borei class ship submersible ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs). The author further noted the long-range 

development of the Russian PAK DA nuclear-capable 

bomber, and a major investment in nuclear-capable, 

short-range Iskander missiles, which will number 10 

brigades by 2020.9

Recent articles have explored other aspects of this 

new nuclear arms race. On November 1, 2011, Lenta.

Ru addressed the reasons for the British report, placing it in the context of defense austerity and the rising costs of maintaining Britain’s own triad of nuclear 

forces. The article examined the six major conclusions 

contained in Kearn’s paper: first, the trend toward 

reduction in nuclear arsenals, which began in the 

1980s, has stopped and members of the nuclear club 

are now increasing their arsenals; second, long-term 

modernization programs are leading to a new nuclear 

arms race; third, all the states that have strategic nuclear arms see these as the necessary and vital means 

to achieve national security; fourth, the programs of 

other nuclear powers are driving the modernization 

programs of others such as Russia, with U.S. ballistic 

missile defense and conventional global strike systems pushing Russian nuclear modernization; fifth, 

the greater attention given to non-strategic nuclear 

forces by states with weaker conventional forces is a 

means of compensation for such weakness; and sixth, 

START III was a significant diplomatic achievement 

by the United States and Russia, but it did not resolve 
120

a host of issues and will not serve as a brake on the 

developing nuclear arms race. The author concluded 

that Kearn’s report contained no surprises, but it did 

address the main trend lines in force development 

among the nuclear powers.10

Victor Litovkin reported on the BASIC Trident 

Commission paper but then added comments from 

Aleksei Arbatov, which put a very different interpretation on the nuclear arms race. Arbatov characterized 

both U.S. and Russian policy as modernization of arsenals of reduced size and stated that China was the 

only state with the economic and technological means 

to radically recast and expand its nuclear arsenal. 

Litovkin did note that the British debate was about extending the life of the U.S. Trident D5 missiles on Britain’s four SSBNS, which was a form of international 

cooperation on ballistic missile development. Litovkin 

asserted that Britain and U.S. cooperation put them 

in violation of the “International Code of Conduct 

against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.”11 Litovkin followed this article with a second 2 days later. This time 

Arbatov’s observations were nowhere to be seen, and 

the title emphasized a race in nuclear warheads. Now 

Litovkin stated that the British specialists had asserted 

that many members of the nuclear club were engaged 

in a race to perfect new nuclear weapons and delivery 

systems. Litovkin did see the United States and Russia 

as the leaders in nuclear force modernization and outlined what each was doing to extend the life of their 

existing arsenals and to add new nuclear capabilities. 

Litovkin called attention to new ballistic missiles in India, China, and Israel. The British report about foreign 

nuclear developments was supposed to contribute 

to Britain’s own debate over Trident renewal, which 

depended on U.S. and UK cooperation.12 The nuclear 
121

arms race was on, and TNWs would be an important 

part of the Russian response.

On November 17, General Nikolai Makarov, the 

Chief of the Russian General Staff, speaking before 

Russia’s Public Chamber on the condition of the armed 

forces, warned about “the sharp rise” in the threat of 

armed conflicts along Russia’s borders, which could 

turn into a real nuclear war: 

The possibility of local conflicts practically along the 

whole periphery of our borders has increased sharply. 

. . . Under certain conditions I do not exclude the possibility that local and regional armed conflicts could 

turn into major wars, including the employment of 

nuclear weapons.13

The response of Moscow’s mass media to these remarks was, to a certain degree, hysteria: “The General 

Staff is preparing for nuclear war.” Such reporting 

took Makarov’s remarks out of context and missed his 

point entirely, which was the progress being made in 

the modernization of the Russian armed forces and the 

challenges that remained.14 The conclusion of this article on Moscow’s media response to Makarov’s speech 

was a pledge from the paper’s editors: “Our paper has 

stated many times that without the support of civil society no reform, including those in the area of defense, 

can avoid failure. On this position we stand now.”15

Viktor Baranets, the defense correspondent for 

Komsomol’skaia Pravda (Komsomol Truth), had exactly 

that understanding of Makarov’s remarks as expressed 

by the editors of Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie (Independent Military Survey). There was nothing new about 

the possibility of nuclear war along Russia’s borders. 

That has been a part of Russian military doctrine. But 

Makarov had given the prospect a different context by 
122

referencing the progress made on the modernization 

of Russia’s conventional forces under the “New Look” 

reforms undertaken after the Russo-Georgian War, 

which, as George Hudson and Evgeny Buzhinsky explain in their chapter in this volume, had revealed so 

many deficiencies. At the same time, Makarov called 

attention to the obsolete or obsolescent Soviet equipment still used by the Russian armed forces and noted 

the inferiority of new Russian-built equipment in 

many areas to models produced abroad. He called attention to new structures that would ensure greater 

coordination in the Russian military-industrial complex. Noting the shortage of conscripts fit for military 

service, Makarov said that the armed forces would 

be staffed by contract soldiers. “We will conduct this 

matter in such a way so that our army will gradually 

become professional.”16

On November 23, President Medvedev issued 

a sharp statement on the lack of progress towards a 

NATO-Russia agreement on a joint approach to European missile defense, complaining that the hopes 

stimulated by President Barack Obama’s initiatives 

in 2009, which had prepared the stage for the reset 

of U.S.-Russian relations and laid the foundation for 

START III, had come to naught. Medvedev outlined a 

series of measures that Russia would take in response 

to the U.S. failure to provide a legally binding declaration that the system was not intended to undermine the combat stability of Russian offensive nuclear 

forces. These Russian measures included putting the 

air and missile defense radar complex in Kaliningrad 

Oblast on alert status; investment in a system of aero-space defense to protect strategic nuclear forces; 

improvement of Russian land and sea-based ballistic 

missiles to penetrate missile defenses; improved war-
123

heads; and improved capacity to use radio-electronic 

warfare to disrupt information systems supporting 

missile defense forces. If these measures are not sufficient, Russia will deploy to the west and south side 

of the country modern strike systems, including moving Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. If no progress is 

made in dealing with the U.S. missile defense system 

in Europe, Russia will abandon all efforts at arms control and even leave START III.17 Some commentators 

treated the statement as mere pre-election posturing 

and saw little effect on long-term relations.18 Highlyplaced sources in the Kremlin and the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs have confirmed that the tough line in 

relations with the United States will continue if Washington does not make any concessions. The next step 

would be for Vladimir Putin, as President of Russia, to 

refuse to attend the NATO Summit in Chicago, IL, on 

May 20, 2012, although he would attend the parallel 

G8 Summit, also being held in Chicago.19 This source 

did not seem to appreciate the irony of speaking of 

“President” Putin’s actions before he had been elected 

President.

The combination of the BASIC Trident Commission paper, the hysteria over Makarov’s remarks 

in Russian mass media, and Medvedev’s statement 

about measures to counter the U.S.-NATO missile defense system, created a high degree of anxiety among 

the policy elite in Russia. In response to this situation, 

several commentators were quick to applaud Medvedev’s moves as measured and intended to exert pressure but not to break off relations. Andrei Kokoshin, 

the former First Deputy Minister of Defense, judged 

them “completely adequate” to the current situation, 

but warned that further developments in the area of 

missile defense would need close watching and could 
124

demand additional actions of a political-military and 

military-technical nature. At the same time, Kokoshin 

asserted that Russia is willing, as in the past, to seek a 

“constructive resolution of problems if the other side 

will be prepared to do so.” He put the current problem 

over missile defense in the context of many decades 

earlier when missile defense periodically complicated 

U.S.-Russian relations.20 He was clearly saying that 

this crisis would also pass.

Tactical nuclear weapons figured prominently in 

Medvedev’s rhetoric. Unlike missile defense, they 

have not, however, been an intense topic of negotiations between the United States and Russia until recently. At the end of the Cold War, both sides made 

pledges to reduce their tactical nuclear arsenals. In 

1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed 

the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 

that banned each side’s intermediate-range nuclear 

forces and broke the intermediate linkage between 

battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic ones. Their 

militarized confrontation in Europe disappeared in 

1989 with the Velvet Revolutions. Both the United 

States and the Soviet Union (and then Russia) had 

good reasons to reduce their existing tactical nuclear 

arsenals. Two decades later, attention has returned to 

U.S. and Russian TNWs in a very different geopolitical and military-technical context.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Then and Now.

How one looks at the TNWs of the Russian Federation depends very much on the prism and the connections made between these weapons and Russia’s 
125

national security strategy. Current Western interest in 

Russia’s residual arsenal after 2 decades of significant 

reductions in that arsenal reflect an increased attention 

to such arms in the aftermath of START III, and the increased attention to Global Zero as a long-range objective of U.S. national policy. They also became part of 

a sharpening political debate in the United States over 

the success of the reset in U.S.-Russian relations and 

the assessment of Russia as a challenge to the EuroAtlantic community, especially NATO. Western policymakers seem united in the desire to induce Russia 

to reduce its tactical nuclear arsenal that faces west. 

They might disagree on what concessions the West 

might offer to get Russian reductions.

The semi-official Russian position on any arms 

control agreement relating to TNWs was stated several years ago in the context of the increased tensions 

associated with the deployment of missile defense 

forces in the Czech Republic and Poland. In that context, TNWs were described as Russia’s “trump card.” 

Colonel-General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, then Chief of 

the 12th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and 

charged with the storage of nuclear weapons, stated in 

2007 that Russia could begin discussion with the United States on the reduction of TNWs only under the 

condition that two other powers possessing TNWs, 

France and Great Britain, took part. Verkhovtsev went 

on to point out that, in his view, the United States and 

Russia were in quite different geopolitical situations: 

along Russia’s borders, as distinct from the America’s, 

“There are other nuclear powers and therefore, for 

Russia, TNWs are a deterrent factor in case of aggression against it.”21

There is, of course, no common agreement about 

what TNWs or NSNWs are exactly, except by nega-
126

tion; namely, they are all the other nuclear weapons 

that are not strategic. Beyond that, there are no limits 

on their yield—less than a kiloton, or in the range of 

a few kilotons but not excluding weapons of larger 

yields with specific tactical or operational targets. Nor 

are these limits on their means of delivery—shortrange ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, gravity bombs, 

mines, depth charges, torpedoes, air defense weapons, 

and artillery rounds. 

In 1998, Voprosybezopasnosti published an extensive article on the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of Russian TNWs. The article addressed the 

nomenclature of tactical nuclear systems, their general 

number, the actions taken to execute the unilateral reductions announced in 1991, the distribution of TNWs 

by type (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles of various 

types, nuclear mines/explosives, nuclear artillery, 

nuclear bombs, torpedoes, and warheads for missile 

defense systems). TNWs are divided into those kept 

on combat alert and those kept in storage. They can 

also be classified by the branch of service that controls 

them. This includes speculation about “nuclear suitcases” under the control of spetsnaz units belonging 

to the Russian secret police (KGB) and/or the Russian 

special forces (GRU). As to exact numbers of Russian 

TNWs, the article discussed only external speculations by U.S. Department of Defense and Green Peace, 

claiming a rough minimum and maximum number of 

3,100 to 10,000. No official numbers were released by 

the Ministry of Defense on the size of its arsenal. The 

article concluded with a lengthy discussion of command and control of tactical nuclear weapons in terms 

of preventing unsanctioned launch and positive control to guarantee that warheads and delivery systems 

could be brought together rapidly for employment in 

a warning period before the outbreak of conflict.22
127

On April 23, 1999, Viktor Nikolaevich Mikhailov, 

First Deputy Minister for Nuclear Energy and Chair 

of the Scientific Council of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, published an article on prospects for the technological development of nuclear weapons, which 

surveyed existing programs in the United States and 

called upon the Russian government to invest in the 

renewal of Russia’s nuclear infrastructure. Given the 

ban on test-firing nuclear weapons, Russia had to invest in the technology that would permit the computer simulation of such tests of new weapons. Mikhailov 

concluded: “The plans of Russian arms makers are 

clear and well-founded. Now it is necessary to bring 

about their realization. History will not forgive us if 

we do not act.”23

Sixth Generation Warfare and De-Escalation.

On April 29, 1999, during the NATO bombing 

campaign against Yugoslavia, the Russian Security 

Council, under the Chairmanship of President Boris 

Yeltsin and with its Secretary Vladimir Putin in attendance, reviewed the current status and perspectives 

for future development of the nuclear weapons complex to 2010. Two sealed decrees were issued regarding the concept for the development and employment 

of NSNWs.24 Yeltsin asserted that the renewal of all 

the links in the Russian nuclear weapons complex 

was a top priority of the military, scientific elite, political leadership, and defense industry. It was Putin 

who, after the session, spoke of the two degrees and 

the adoption of a program, which “authorized the 

conception of the development and utilization of nonstrategic nuclear weapons” as part of the policy of nuclear deterrence.25 Media sources began to speculate 
128

on the role of NSNWs in Russian defense policy. Pavel 

Felgengauer, citing well-placed sources, wrote on Minatom’s plans for a whole new generation of TNWs, 

but went on to say that the weapons would not be just 

for battlefield use but would affect both tactical and 

strategic nuclear weapons with the goal of making 

limited nuclear war possible.26

What this emphasis on the development of 

NSNWs meant in terms of force development was not 

immediately apparent. What was immediately apparent was an overt shift in the policy governing nuclear 

first use. In June 1999, as the conflict over Kosovo was 

ending, the Russian Ministry of Defense and General 

Staff conducted the first large-scale military exercise 

since the end of the Cold War. Zapad 99’s scenario 

involved a defense against an attack on Belarus by 

western forces and the first use of nuclear weapons to 

de-escalate that conflict. The bombers employed to deliver the simulated strikes over the Atlantic Ocean and 

along the coast of Norway carried cruise missiles and 

were supposed to strike operational targets to bring 

about the end of a local war before it escalated into a 

general war with risks of strategic nuclear exchange. 

The political intent in the aftermath of the NATO air 

campaign over Yugoslavia was to give the West a 

warning concerning the risks of local war to strategic 

stability.27

Since 1999, the Russian government has remained 

mum on the exact size, deployment, and modernization of its tactical nuclear arsenal. In 2004 when the 

U.S. Government raised the issue of Russia’s fulfillment of its “obligations” to reduce this arsenal in 

Europe, the Foreign Ministry raised objections to the 

word obligations as used in the question: 
129

First of all, the word “obligations” in this particular 

context is not correct. We are speaking about onesided initiatives of 1991-1992, which were “strictly a 

matter of good will” on Russia’s side. These measures 

looked not only to the reduction of tactical nuclear 

weapons but to a whole series of measures in the area 

of disarmament.28

The Foreign Ministry statement went on to say 

that the initiatives have been fulfilled and that one 

can speak of the liquidation of “more than 50% of the 

nuclear weapons for the navy’s tactical missiles and 

aviation, air defense missiles, and aerial bombs” from 

their total quantity, which went unstated. The statement affirmed that Russia was fulfilling its self-imposed responsibilities in this area and then noted that 

Russia’s TNWs were deployed only in Russia proper, 

unlike U.S. TNWs that were stationed in Europe.29

There were very few official comments on the status of TNWs, further reductions, or the development 

of new delivery systems and more advanced TNWs 

over the next few years. But the press did carry analytical works relating to these issues. The current role 

of TNWs, which emerged as an operational concept in 

the late 1990s in association with increased tensions 

between Russia and NATO, reflects a clear assumption that Russian conventional forces at that time 

and even today have limited combat utility in case of 

general aggression against Russia or one of its allies. 

This is due to both the reduced size of the force and 

its technological obsolescence in conjunction with the 

“informatization of warfare” and the possibilities created by deep, precision-strike conventional systems 

that have been demonstrated in local wars from Operation DESERT STORM to NATO’s air operations 

against Libya. Russian military theorists, particularly 
130

the late General Vladimir Slipchenko, categorized this 

transformation as a “sixth generation of warfare,” 

which is in the process of superseding the fifth generation, that is, nuclear war, which had become both 

politically and militarily untenable. Slipchenko even 

held out the prospect of conducting major wars as 

“no-contact” conflicts, when the forces and concepts 

driving this transformation have reached maturity.30

Current efforts at the reform of the Russian Army under the direction of Minister Dmitri Serdiukov and 

Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, 

which began in late 2008 after the Russo-Georgian 

conflict, are based upon the modernization of Russia’s 

conventional forces and include a shift to a brigadebased combat structure and enhanced command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), associated 

with the concept of network-centric warfare. 

But U.S. advanced conventional systems were not 

the only concern for the Russian General Staff. Commenting on U.S. research on using an isomeric form 

of hafnium to create a nuclear weapon that did not 

require critical mass, Russian analysts noted the interest in the Pentagon in the development of a new generation of advanced TNWs that could be transformed 

into precision-strike nuclear weapons of various 

types. These were described as weapons occupying 

a place between advanced conventional systems and 

traditional nuclear weapons.31 First Deputy Chief of 

the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri 

Baluevsky was reported to have said: “Shouldn’t we 

review our own nuclear strategy? I think, yes.” Baluevsky did not go on to say that Russia should pursue 

such weapons directly, but remarked only that Russia 

would not reduce its arsenal of TNWs.32
131

By 2004, a young scholar, Aleksei Fenenko, took 

on the task of redefining sixth generation warfare, recasting it to include a place for a new generation of 

TNWs. The concept of “sixth generation warfare,” as 

formulated by Major General Slipchenko, had anticipated the gradual decline of the role of strategic nuclear forces until their only function would be to deter 

other strategic nuclear forces, leaving the possibility 

of decisive operations conducted by the new means 

of warfare, especially deep, precision-strike systems. 

Aleksei Fenenko, however, brought into sixth generation warfare the possibility of creating a new generation of nuclear weapons with low yields but very 

high accuracy that could be used for counterforce and 

counter-elite warfare without the risk of crossing the 

threshold leading to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Such weapons would include effects based on 

new physical principles and delivered with great precision. Fenenko discussed U.S. developments in these 

areas and then proposed that the Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty be recast to incorporate limitations on six new classes of weapons: “cruise 

missiles, self-guided bombs, weapons using depleted 

uranium, directed-energy weapons, EMP [electromagnetic pulse] weapons, and hafnium warheads.”33

What in the early 1980s Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov had 

speculated about as “weapons based on new physical 

principles” as part of a Revolution in Military Affairs, 

were now transforming warfare. 

Fenenko expanded upon this theme in an article 

devoted to the contemporary understanding of strategic stability in the West. In his conclusion, he argued 

that the old definition of strategic stability based upon 

mutual assured destruction no longer applied. The 

new weapons were making it much easier to cross the 
132

nuclear threshold to achieve more limited objectives, 

which could bring about the end of enemy resistance:

The development of military strategy has brought 

about a new global situation in which a limited strike 

with “near-nuclear” means will be looked upon as an 

“ordinary”combat situation not involving a general 

nuclear collapse but only a serious loss for the enemy’s 

military-economic infrastructure. The nuclear threshold will be broken to the extent that employment of 

missile defenses, hafnium bombs, as well as the destruction of bunkers and caves by strikes with one-two 

kiloton weapons become feasible.34

Regarding Russia’s nuclear arsenal today there 

is good news and bad news. The good news is the 

claimed radical reduction of the arsenal that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, estimated in excess of 

25,000 warheads in 1991, to a figure one-quarter of that 

size, as mentioned by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 

Lavrov: “Presently, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear capability is not more than 25% of the Soviet capability 

in 1991.”35 That is, Russia has eliminated a major portion of its tactical nuclear arsenal, which was created 

to support large-scale theater-strategic operations by 

conventional forces involving multiple fronts and 

strategic echelons. This reduction, of course, reflects 

the reduced tensions of the post-Cold War world and 

Russia’s deliberate decision to reduce its conventional 

forces as part of an effort to revive its national economy. Preparing for mass industrial war contributed 

to the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. The bad 

news is that, as the BASIC Trident Commission report 

made clear, the Russian government sees TNWs as 

playing a major role in conflict management and deescalation under certain circumstances. At the same 
133

time, it seems to believe that, in the absence of effective conventional forces, low-yield nuclear weapons 

with special effects can be used to disrupt precisionstrike attacks and de-escalate a local war before it can 

become a general war leading to the use of strategic 

nuclear forces. The decision announced in April 1999 

to develop new TNWs remains unexplained and 

opaque because of the lack of transparency in this and 

other areas of Russian defense policy. 

The Russian view of its tactical nuclear arsenal 

involves a very different geo-strategic context, which 

can best be described as Eurasian. It takes into account 

Russia’s geo-strategic positions and involves the calculations of a great power in a complex geo-strategic 

environment with multiple and diverse sources of security challenges and threats. Russia’s avowed primary objective is strategic stability, and Russia continues 

to see strategic nuclear weapons as both the technical 

and political manifestation of strategic stability. Andrei Kokoshin has made this clear in an article celebrating the detonation of RDS-37, the Soviet Union’s 

first thermonuclear device, in November 1955. It was, 

according to Kokoshin, the very foundation of nuclear 

deterrence and strategic stability. Russia is perfectly 

willing to engage in strategic arms reductions insofar 

as they do not call into question existing strategic stability. In response to Global Zero, Sergei Karaganov 

said a polite “no thank you” to any developments that 

would undermine strategic stability. Nuclear weapons to Karaganov become that force which Goethe 

used to describe Mephistopheles in Faustus and Bulgakov subsequently cited at the beginning of his 

novel Master and Margarita: “I am part of that power 

which eternally wills evil and eternally works good.” 

The immorality of nuclear weapons is unquestioned, 
134

but their power imposes restraint upon the actions of 

princes by holding out the prospect of Armageddon: 

They are an effective means of preventing large-scale 

wars and mass destruction of people—something that 

humanity has engaged in throughout its history with 

surprising perseverance, destroying peoples, countries, and cultures.36

Humanity has not yet created any other means to 

prevent such general wars, and so Karaganov sees 

nuclear weapons as the only existing check on such 

destruction: “The world has survived only thanks to 

the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over it.”37

Karaganov makes two related points regarding strategic stability and nuclear weapons that are particularly 

relevant to our discussion of TNWs. First, strategic nuclear weapons can have useful secondary impacts for 

other powers. He asserts that China’s relative freedom 

of action in the post-Cold War world was conditioned 

by the existence of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, which served to inhibit actions by other powers 

against China, making its economic transformation 

and political recognition as a major global power possible:

One can hardly conceive China’s skyrocketing economic upturn, if there had been no Russian-U.S. nuclear parity in the world,which makes any full-blown 

war inadmissible due to the possibility of its escalation. I will remind [the reader] that big-time players 

have been suppressing China’s development militarily for about 150 years. At present, this kind of policy 

appears unthinkable.38

Karaganov’s interpretation of the international 

system during the Cold War identifies nuclear deter-
135

rence as the chief factor that limited conflict and prevented a general war. The nuclear arsenals of the two 

superpowers had what he calls a “civilizing effect” because they strengthened the hands of pragmatists set 

on avoiding nuclear war and who guarded cautiously 

against allowing local wars to turn into major conflicts 

with their risks of escalation. He doubts that the new 

nuclear powers will be willing to give up their arsenals without a fundamental shift in what he refers to 

as the “moral environment,” a shift he sees as forthcoming. But in looking at the decades since the end of 

the Cold War, Karaganov sees a dangerous transition 

in NATO from a defensive alliance into an instrument 

for out-of-area intervention. In the context of Russian 

weakness, NATO intervened against Yugoslavia in 

1999 over Kosovo. But with Russia’s recovery, such 

a course of action is now unlikely: “Now that Russia 

has restored its capability such a move would be unthinkable.”39 Instead, NATO is now involved in more 

distant out-of-area operations, which carry their own 

risks of escalation.

Against what Karaganov labels as “antinuclear 

mythology,” he posits a hard-headed realism. He rejects the idea that nuclear arms reductions by the major powers would entice lesser nuclear powers to give 

up their nuclear arms or convince other states threatened by outside powers or internal instability to forgo 

nuclear weapons. Such arrangements might be in the 

interests of the two powers, but some supposed moral 

transcendence cannot justify them. States must act in 

their own interests in the absence of an international 

regime preventing the intervention of other powers. 

That Libya gave up nuclear weapons after the U.S.-

led coalition’s campaign against Iraq did not protect 

Libya from external intervention in what had become 
136

a civil war. The presence of nuclear weapons imposes 

restraint. Their presence restrained the Soviet Union 

when it enjoyed conventional superiority in Europe 

during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, it 

has been the compensation for Russia’s weakness in 

conventional forces in the west and east:

Were it not for the powerful nuclear (especially tactical) armaments, many in Russia would be alarmed 

over the growing potential of the Chinese general-purpose armed forces, and the specifics of certain military 

exercises whose scenarios include offensives stretching to hundreds and even more than one thousand 

kilometers.40

What Karaganov describes here is the geo-strategic concept underlining Russia’s current position in 

Eurasia. Russian strategic nuclear weapons deter the 

United States and NATO from adventures at Russia’s expense and provide China with an element of 

security that permits it to play the role of economic 

engine of Asia without the risk of American military 

intervention against it. But at the same time, Russia’s 

TNWs deter China from intervention in the Russian 

Far East and Siberia. This view certainly can be seen as 

providing Russia with some immediate security and 

even some leverage on its periphery. But it does not 

deal with a future in which nuclear weapons might 

lose their deterrent capability in the face of more advanced conventional weapons. This was the prospect 

that Nikolai Spassky had mentioned in June 2009 

in conjunction with the development of strategic, 

conventional-warhead, precision-strike systems. The 

further development of missile defense systems and 

their further modernization raise questions about the 

long-term value of Russia’s strategic forces and call for 
137

their modernization as a response. The conventional 

modernization of Chinese forces has raised questions 

about Russia’s deterrent capabilities in Siberia and the 

Far East. These issues were the subjects of the Vostok 

2010 exercise against a hypothetical enemy, which 

many observers concluded represented both China 

and U.S.-Japanese forces in different parts of the theater.41

Russia’s Eurasian Threat Environment.

The core challenge to strategic stability in Russia’s 

TNWs lies in the military-political relationship between strategic nuclear weapons and TNWs in Russian military doctrine. Karaganov, in defining strategic nuclear forces as the core of strategic stability, was 

right to invoke the lines from Goethe and Bulgakov, 

but it is important to note the differences between 

Mephistopheles in Goethe’s Faustus and in Wolandin 

Bulgakov’s novel. In Faustus, Mephistopheles is the 

agent of the Devil who tempts Faust in every way. 

But Divine Grace saves Faust because of his striving 

for meaning and fulfillment. Mephistopheles’ evil actions are, in the larger scheme, a part of God’s divine 

activities. But in Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita, 

Woland and his gang of petty demons (melkiebesy), 

including witches, vampires, and Begemot—a gigantic talking cat, black as a raven and with outrageous 

cavalryman’s whiskers—are actors in their own right. 

These little demons perform their own pranks. Unlike 

Faust, Bulgakov’s Master is not saved by his striving, 

but liberated by Woland and his gang who tempt and 

punish the wicked, actively administer justice, and 

consciously want to act as deliverers. Karaganov’s 

metaphor about strategic stability and nuclear deter-
138

rence seems more like Bulgakov’s world where the 

little demons have their own active role in bringing 

good. Tactical nuclear weapons in the Western view 

are only cogs in the linkage to nuclear escalation and 

assured destruction, which ensure deterrence. But in 

the Russian view, the little demons are the very instruments that would prevent a local war from becoming 

a general war leading to strategic nuclear engagement. 

They would do this by forcing a pause to bring about 

political de-escalation of the conflict. How good triumphs over evil in each case is based on very different 

assumptions, especially regarding the threats against 

the state and the role of nuclear weapons in dealing 

with them. The evolution of TNWs seems to make the 

equation even more ambiguous.

In this regard, it is worth considering what threats 

and challenges Russian national security strategy is 

designed to manage. Certainly, Russian statesmen 

consider threats and challenges from the West to have 

been the greatest challenge for most of Russia’s modern history. In the last 20 years since the end of the Cold 

War, Russia has faced a relatively benign security environment, with threats of internal instability and possible external intervention along Russia’s western and 

southwestern periphery as the chief concerns. Because 

of the nature of the collapse of the Soviet Union, some 

Russians have put greater emphasis upon ideological 

threats from the West that would lead to unrest and 

anti-Russian governments. But most Russians do not 

see conflict with the United States and NATO as imminent, and they consider the risk of general nuclear 

war to be remote. The primary concern in this period 

has arisen from NATO’s commitment to and execution of out-of-area operations in local conflicts with 

the associated risks that such interventions will occur 
139

in areas affecting Russian national interests. There 

could be serious risks that such local conflicts would 

evolve into local wars and even threaten a general war 

involving Russia. In the absence of conventional forces 

capable of dealing with such crises, Russia has seen fit 

to expand the role of its tactical/non-strategic nuclear 

forces to include the mission of crisis de-escalation by 

first use. 

Until very recently, Russian military analysts 

spoke of three distinct threats on three distinct axes. 

The first, coming from the West, was U.S.-NATO outof-area intervention with a military built around precision-strike technology and advanced C4ISR capabilities. Russian TNWs/NSNWs were intended here 

for de-escalation by disrupting the West’s capacity 

to conduct tactical and operational combat in theater 

warfare. Every Western out-of-area intervention has 

led to long discussions in Russia on how a force might 

counter such an opponent. Following the invasion of 

Iraq, intense debates occurred between those who saw 

“no-contact” warfare as the dominant trend in future 

war and those who looked upon the invasion as a 

reversion to operational art, with the addition of advanced technologies. After a brief romantic tryst with 

partisan warfare among some, the consensus among 

analysts shifted back to dealing with no-contact operations designed to achieve rapid and decisive defeat 

of the enemy. Russian attention focused on conventional force modernization.42

The author who most directly addressed the evolution of operational art under conditions of sixth generation warfare was General-Major Viktor Riabchuk, 

a veteran of the Great Patriotic War and professor of 

operational art at the former Frunze Combined Arms 

Academy. General Riabchuk sought to apply military 
140

systematology to operational art in the epoch of deepprecision strikes.43 Riabchuk emphasized the increased 

role of knowledge management in command and control and spoke of making the command and control 

of combat the cardinal skill of the commander. It demands of him the capacity to manage information to 

ensure a systemic understanding of the environment, 

his own forces, and those of the enemy. In this manner, 

power can be effectively deployed against critical subsystems of the enemy and bring about collapse without having to engage in annihilation.44 His approach 

would target key sub-systems for disruption and depend on the creation of robust mathematical models 

of complex systems. It requires that the commander 

have the necessary skills to appreciate their application and to draw conclusions from them. The objective 

is not the annihilation of enemy combat forces but the 

disruption of their C4ISR to bring about operational 

paralysis. Riabchuk did not, however, discuss the use 

of TNWs/NSNWs to achieve these effects.45

The Russian Navy has also embraced sixth generation war, but its focus has been upon the threat posed 

by U.S.-NATO forces to Russian strategic nuclear 

forces. Retired Admiral Ivan Matveyevich Kapitanets 

has written on this mission, noting that by year 2010, 

Russia would not possess the conventional means to 

counter such an attack by U.S. naval forces employing 

conventionally-armed cruise missiles against the bastion areas of the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. In the 

absence of its own advanced conventional precisionstrike weapons, Kapitanets stated that in that time 

frame Russia would have to respond to the threat of 

such an attack with its own preemptive nuclear strike, 

with all the associated risks of further escalation.46

Kapitanets laid out a number of scenarios covering 
141

armed struggle at sea for the period 2010-20, in which 

the U.S. Navy would pose the primary threat to Russia from the sea. The emphasis is upon precision-strike 

systems, including cruise missiles launched from submarines that could otherwise mount a disarming attack against Russian strategic nuclear systems. Kapitanets argued that the only means that Russia would 

have to counter this threat in this period would be nuclear weapons, and that such a response would lead to 

“the complete political isolation of Russia in the world 

arena.” Instead, he called for the creation of a “metasystem of non-nuclear deterrence of aggression.”47

The Russian Navy was, however, also pursuing 

a nuclear response to counter the threat Kapitanets 

outlined. In 2009, Chief of the Main Naval Staff Vice 

Admiral Oleg Burtsev, asserted that naval strategic 

nuclear forces in the future will remain a part of the 

nuclear triad of the Russian armed forces. The role of 

multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines will expand. 

Burtsev declared: 

There is a possible future for tactical nuclear weapons. 

Tactical nuclear weapons are getting greater range and 

more accuracy, which makes it possible to dispense 

with more powerful warheads and go to less powerful ones that could be deployed on existing models of 

cruise missiles.48

In early November 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir 

Putin signed a contract with the Unified Shipbuilding Corporation for follow-on construction of five 

Lasen’-class multiple-purpose nuclear attack submarines after the completion of the first ship of the class, 

the Severnodvinsk.

49 However, as Aleksandr Khramchikhin has made clear, Russia’s Arctic naval frontier 

is quite indefensible now. It is precisely in this area 
142

where cruise-missile-armed surface ships and attack 

submarines can attack Russia’s strategic nuclear forces on land and at sea with conventional means, while 

Aegis-equipped warships can intercept the surviving 

Russian ballistic missiles launched in retaliation.50 Khramchikhin has been a persistent critic of Russian reactions to U.S. -NATO plans for missile defense, writing 

a three-part article for Voenno-promyshlennyikur’er (The 

Military-Industrial Currier) in October and November 

2011. Khramchikhin asked, “Who Is Against European Missile Defense?”51 He concluded that the building of the U.S.-NATO missile defense system without 

Russian cooperation did not pose a threat to Russian 

strategic nuclear forces in the absence of a Russian attack upon Europe or the United States. Khramchikhin 

did recommend a prudent investment in maintaining 

Russia’s offensive nuclear forces to keep them at the 

limits provided by START III and proposed the creation of an aero-space defense system. Khramchikhin 

concluded: “Finally, A[ero] S[pace] D[efense] will 

serve us very well in case of war with China, which, in 

distinction from a war with NATO, is quite likely. But 

that is another topic entirely.”

That other topic relates directly to Russian tactical 

nuclear forces, as Karaganov made clear. Karaganov 

and Khramchikhin might argue about the likelihood 

of a Russo-Chinese war. Russia’s political leadership 

simply does not speak of a military threat from China. But Russian defense analysts are broadly agreed 

that Chinese defense modernization has turned a 

mass-industrial army into a force for the information 

age. Aleksandr Kondrat’ev, one of Russia’s leading 

commentators on the U.S. approach to the informationalization of warfare, in March 2010 provided an 

in-depth analysis of the Chinese approach to network-
143

centric warfare. Citing both Chinese and U.S. sources, 

he addressed how the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has followed and responded to 

the development of network-centric warfare in the 

United States. The leadership understands the importance of information flow for advanced C4ISR and 

has set out to develop a common picture of the entire 

battlespace, which includes five dimensions (land, 

air, sea [surface and sub-surface], cosmic, and electromagnetic. The PLA has emphasized the development 

of what is called “integrated information-electronic 

warfare.” Kondrat’ev concludes that the United States 

and China are engaged in a high-tech arms race in information systems and means. In China, that has led 

the PLA to emphasize the human factor in employing 

such systems and to promote increased professionalism in the armed forces. What this article poses is the 

real prospect that Russia will face two technologically 

sophisticated potential adversaries in Eurasia.52

As alluded to earlier, in the summer of 2010 the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff conducted 

a major strategic exercise against a “hypothetical opponent” in Siberia and the Russian Far East under the 

name “Vostok 2010.” The exercise underscored the existing geo-strategic isolation of Russia in that region, 

even as the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff 

evaluated Russia’s “new look” conventional military. 

Roger McDermott, a prominent Western commentator on the “new look” reforms of the Russian military, 

offered an excellent overview of Vostok 2010 as an 

operational-strategic exercise. McDermott correctly 

pointed to the role of the exercise in testing concepts 

associated with the “new look” reforms of the Russian 

armed forces, calling attention to the exercise’s testing 

of the speed of deployment of brigades, their combat 
144

readiness, their capacity to engage in combined arms 

combat in an air/land battle, and their logistical support for sustained combat actions. He also noted that, 

while the scenario dealt with a wide range of combat 

actions, including anti-piracy and counterterrorism, 

the senior military leadership, including the Chief of 

the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, emphasized that the opponent was hypothetical and the exercise was not aimed against “any one country or bloc.” 

McDermott, however, concluded that the actual objective of the exercise was a test of the defenses of Siberia 

and the Far East from attack by the PLA. McDermott 

spoke of the very threat about which the Russian political and military elite could not speak openly.53 To 

understand this reticence one needs to understand the 

political-military context of this exercise. 

Anyone who has been involved in the construction of a scenario for a war game or exercise knows 

that the creation of the documents for conduct of such 

operational-strategic exercise includes a road to war, 

which portrays the emergence of a conflict between the 

contending sides. They are usually labeled “red” and 

“blue” forces in the case of Russian war games—with 

“blue” being the color associated with the aggressor 

forces against which Russian “red” forces defend. In 

the case of the current Vostok-2010, the Russian forces 

involved in the exercise are facing a “hypothetical opponent” (uslovnyiprotivnik). At a press conference at 

the start of the exercise, General Makarov stated that 

this exercise is not directed against any country or 

military alliance: 

First I would note that this particular exercise, like last 

year’s, is not directed against any concrete nation or 

military-political bloc. It has a strictly defense orien-
145

tation to maintain security and defense of the state’s 

national interests along its Far Eastern borders from a 

hypothetical enemy.54

When asked about the opponent that drove these 

vignettes, General Makarov replied: 

We did not look at any particular country and did not 

look at any particular enemy. We are talking about 

what direction we will create our own operationalstrategic situation in the course of which somewhere 

a group of terrorists or large group of separatists are 

active, which is quite characteristic for low-intensity 

conflicts. For instance, we selected such scenarios.55

Looking at the various episodes that made up the 

scenario for Vostok 2010, one could conclude that the 

Eastern strategic direction has its own peculiar risks 

for Russia. The refugee scenario pointing at North 

Korea highlights the instability of that regime and the 

likelihood of conflict developing from its disintegration or from its desperate acts to sustain its position. 

Fear that a U.S.-Chinese conflict in the wake of the 

collapse of North Korea would impose difficult strategic choices upon Moscow has been a regular theme 

of press commentary on Korea. The sharp exchange 

between Moscow and Tokyo over the exercise in the 

disputed Kuril Islands highlights the troubled state of 

Russo-Japanese relations and brings into strategic calculations the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.56 Just as President Medvedev was 

visiting the nuclear cruiser PetrVelikii (Peter the Great) 

to observe a mock naval battle and amphibious landing, naval officers there informed the news media that 

the tactical problem of the exercise was the destruction of “an American squadron” and that the probable 
146

enemy would remain unchanged. Commenting on the 

meteorological conditions at the time of this naval exercise, which involved heavy mist and low visibility, 

the author described Vostok 2010 as “covered in fog,” 

a characterization which would better fit the confused 

military and political signals being sent.57 Finally, the 

air and ground exercises near Chita and Khabarovsk 

make no sense except as responses to some force 

threatening the territorial integrity of Eastern Siberia 

and the Far East. The only forces with the military potential to carry out air and ground attacks that deep 

into Russian territory are the PLA in support of the socalled separatists identified in the scenario. Reflecting 

on the vignettes that made up Vostok 2010, Aleskandr 

Khramchikhin concluded that the hypothetical opponent in these ground and air operations was, indeed, 

Russia’s probable opponent, the PLA. He stated in his 

assessment of the exercise that “the probable opponent 

will defeat us in a serious conflict.”58 [author’s italics]

The one branch of the Russian military not involved in direct combat operations during Vostok 

2010 was the Strategic Rocket Forces, which carried 

out no operational launches. Its only role was defense 

of its bases from terrorist attacks. However, according 

to press reports, the exercise did end with a tactical 

nuclear strike. As Khramchikhin noted, such a strike 

was hardly in keeping with a fight against separatists 

and bandits.59 This seems to suggest that conventional 

forces could not handle such a challenge to the territorial integrity of the Russian state in so vulnerable 

a region as the Far East. However, the scenario had 

left open the intervention of a powerful hypothetical 

opponent in support of the separatists after their defeat on the Onon River. Tactical nuclear weapons are 

therefore expected to play the same de-escalating role 

against China in the case of a local war. 
147

PROSPECTS FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN TREATY ON 

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In May 2011, Vladimir Kozin, Chief of the Section 

of Analysis and Forecasting of the Department of AllAsian Problems of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

outlined five obstacles to a U.S.-Russian treaty limiting TNWs. Kozin, a frequent commentator on strategic arms negotiations, European missile defense, and 

TNWs negotiations, sees limiting TNWs as a complex 

issue that satisfactory progress in the other areas affects. Kozin declared: “Russia should not, by any 

means, permit an erosion of its position.”60 This hardline view did not promise much room for negotiations.

The five obstacles mentioned by Kozin included, 

first, defining what is meant precisely by tactical systems, the absence of any preceding arms control regime for such systems, and the fact that the tactical 

arsenals of other major nuclear powers (Great Britain, 

France, and China), and de facto nuclear powers (Israel, India, and Pakistan) will have to be part of the negotiations process on such tactical nuclear systems.61

Second, Kozin sees the asymmetric deployment postures of U.S. and Russian forces as an inhibiting factor to negotiations. U.S. forces are deployed in allied 

states in Europe, and the United States maintains a 

theater infrastructure to support such weapons. As 

Foreign Minister Lavrov has pointed out, negotiations 

on TNWs cannot begin until U.S. TNWs and infrastructure are removed from Europe. Russia will not 

respond positively to pressure from NATO states or 

others to de-nuclearize Kaliningrad Oblast.62 The third 

major obstacle is the issue of prescribed accounting of 

TNWs. The United States wants this done in advance 
148

and by international experts to increase transparency, 

according to Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of 

State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. Russian experts favor a more limited exchange 

of data on delivery systems and warheads, seeing no 

reason to agree to exchange data before the start of 

negotiations. This has not been past practice in arms 

control negotiations.63

The fourth obstacle Kozin describes as the integration of a negotiated tactical nuclear agreement into a 

complex web of other arms control and security issues.64 Smaller strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals 

should have as their goal strengthening strategic stability, but lower strategic and tactical nuclear force 

levels could create incentives for the development of 

space-based systems, a direction in which Washington appears to be moving. And this would undermine 

strategic stability.65 Fifth, there is the issue of modifying the CFE Treaty. The United States and NATO 

enjoy both quantitative and qualitative superiority in 

the five classes of weapons counted in the treaty, even 

as NATO has improved its position by its expansion, 

including states that were once part of the Warsaw 

Treaty Organization. NATO also engages in the deployment of its forces in combat roles outside of the 

territory of alliance members and conducts sustained, 

high-intensity combat operations that keep these forces on a wartime footing. U.S. plans for the development of a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe offer 

one further complication to negotiations on limiting 

TNWs. Kozin concludes that there is little prospect for 

successful negotiations on limiting TNWs. The need 

for parallel decisions on a series of other strategically 

important problems affecting the regional and global 

balance of forces, including Washington’s plans to 
149

build a missile defense system in southern and eastern 

Europe and maintaining its TNWs in Europe, make 

successful negotiations unlikely.

The difficulties associated with negotiating these 

issues foreshadowed the crisis of November 2011. Negotiations on TNWs will have to wait for the current 

crisis of U.S.-Russian relations to pass, which means 

sometime after the 2012 presidential elections in Russia and the United States. A successful approach will 

have to take into account the complexity of the political-military challenges, dangers, and threats as Russia’s government sees them in Eurasia. That may create too complex a geopolitical forum for the conduct of 

actual negotiations because Russia will not join them if 

it sees them seeking to put Russia in a position where 

it will have to choose between the Euro-Atlantic world 

and that of a Far East dominated by China. By every 

means possible, Russia will seek to avoid the dilemma 

of choice here. As long as Russia’s government considers its own conventional forces insufficient and/or 

ineffective in the defense of Russia’s periphery, TNWs 

will remain the means of choice to de-escalate such 

conflicts. It is, of course, not altogether clear here that 

the Russian Woland can avoid being drawn into an 

expanding conflict because of the actions of his “little 

demons.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. This chapter is a continuation of work by this author which 

began a decade ago after Zapad-99 and has continued with greater 

intensity over the last 2 years. The chapter draws upon that body 

of work and extends the analysis. The relevant works include: 

“Asian Drivers of Russia’s Nuclear Force Posture,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, August 2010; “Russia’s Nuclear 

Posture and the Threat That Dare not Speak Its Name,” Stephen 
150

Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present and Future, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, 2011, 

pp. 459-504; Russian Nuclear Posture and Policies at a NATOEstonian Ministry of Defense Conference on Adapting NATO’s 

Deterrence Posture: The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept and Implications for Nuclear Policy, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament, in Tallinn, Estonia; and “Russia’s Future Arms Control 

Agenda and Posture,” Paper delivered at Conference on Russia, 

sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, September 26-27, 2011. 

2. “Ktokhitree: Mir vstupil verugonkiiadernykhvooruzhenii,” 

Lenta.Ru, November 1, 2011. 

3. “U.S. wants to step up dialogue with Russia on non-strategic weapons,” Russia Today, January 20, 2011, available from 

rt.com/politics/russia-usa-arms-control/. 

4. “No ABM Cooperation without Guarantees–Lavrov,” RIA 

Novosti, October 21, 2011. 

5. Robert Bridge, “NATO gives Russia ‘nyet’ on missile defense,” Russia Today, October 25, 2011.

6. “Lavrov states no progress in Russia-NATO talks on ABM,” 

ITAR-TASS, October 31, 2011.

7. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Nuclear Powers Plan Weapons 

Spending Spree, Report Finds,” Guardian.co.uk, October 30, 2011; 

for the text of the BASIC Trident Commission paper, see Ian Kearns, “Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear 

Armed States,” BASIC Trident Commission, October 30, 2011.

8. Ian Kearns, “Beyond the UK: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States,” British-American Security Information Council, Trident Commission, 2011, available from www.basicint.org/

publications/dr-ian-kearns-trident-commission-consultant/2011/

beyond-uk-trends-other-nuclear-armed-s.

9. “Britanskievoennyeekspertyuvereny: Mir uzhevstupil v 

novuiuiadernuiugonku,” Trud, October 31, 2011. 
151

10. “Ktokhitree: Mir vstupil v erugonkiiadernykhvooruzhenii,” Lenta.Ru, November 1, 2011. 

11. Viktor Litovkin, “V mire nachalsianovyivitokiadernykhvooruzhenii,” Nezavisimaiagazeta, November 2, 2011. 

12. Viktor Litovkin, “Gonkinaiadernykhboegolovkakh,” Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie, November 4, 2011. 

13. “Pressfakt,” Zvezda, November 18, 2011. 

14. “Khotiat li russkievoiny? Posleslovie k osveshcheniiumoskovskimi SMI vystupleniianachal’nikaGeneral’nogoShtaba v Obshchestvennoi palate,” Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie, November 

25, 2011. 

15. Ibid.

16. Viktor Baranets, “Genshtab ne iskliuchaetiadernoivoiny,” 

Komsomol’skaia Pravda, November 18, 2011.

17. “Koe-chto PRO iskander” Rossiiskaiagazeta, November 24, 

2011. 

18. “Russia Says U. S. Imposes Missile Shield on Europe,” Reuters, November 23, 2011. 

19. Aleksandr Gabuev, “Strategicheskieiadernyesoobrazheniia,” Kommersant, November 24, 2011.

20. Vladimir Kuzar’, “OtvetnaEvroPro,” Krasnaiazvezda, November 25, 2011.

21. “Takticheskiiyadernyikozyr’,” VremiaNovostei, September 

17, 2007.

22. “TIaORossii: kolichestvennyeikachestvennyeparameterygruppirovki,” Voprosybezopasnosti, November 1, 1998.

23. Viktor Nikolaevich Mikhailov, “Perspektivynovykhtechnologii v razrabotkeiadernogooruzhiia,” Nevzavisimoevoennoeo

bozrenie, April 23, 1999.
152

24. “Iadernyivekotkryldverinovomuperoduistorii,” Voennoistorciheskiizhurnal, No. 1, January 2000.

25. Vitalii Denisov, “V sovetebezopasnosti: OsnovavoennoimoshchiRossiii,” Krasnaiazvezda, April 30, 1999.

26. Pavel Fel’gengauer, “Ogranichennaiaiadernaiavoina? Pochemu net!” Segodnia, May 6, 1999. 

27. Vladimir Grigor’ev, “Koridoryvlasti: Uprezhdaiushchiiiadernyiudar,” Profil’, July 12, 1999; and Rossiiaplaniruet brat’ Zapadnaispug, Kommersant, July 10, 1999.

28. Press-Tsentr: Otvetofitsial’nogopredstavitelia MID RossiinavoprosRossiiskikh SMI na press-konferentsii v RIA ‘Novostiotnositel’noinitsiativRossiiposokrashcheniiutakticheskogoiadern

ogooruzhiia, 7 Oktiabria,” Diplomaticheskiivestnik, November 30, 

2004. 

29. Ibid.

30. V. I. Slipchenko, Beskontaktnyevoiny, Moscow: Izdatel’

skiidom: Gran-Press,” 2001. On the Russian debate over this concept, see Makhmut Gareev and V. I. Slipchenko, Budushchaaiavoina, Moscow: Polit.Ru OGI, 2005.

31. “Izomor,” September 22, 2003, Kompiutera Online, November 26, 2011, available from xn--80ajoijhiap3hwa.xn--p1ai/xterra/

homo/29344/.

32. Nikolai Dzis’-Voinarovsky, “Votiadernaiapolia poletela, 

iaga. . . ,” Lenta.Ru, March 23, 2003.

33. Aleksei Fenenko, “Voinyshestogopokoleniia,” Mezhdunarodnaiazhizn’, No. 2, February 29, 2004, pp. 31-43.

34. Aleksei Fenenko, “Problematikaiadernoistabil’nosti v 

sovremennoizarubezhnoipolitologii,” Mezhdunarodnyeprotsessy, 

No. 6, 2004.

35. Sergei Lavrov, “The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the Global Security Matrix: The Political Dimension,” International Affairs, No. 4, 2010, p. 18. 
153

36. Sergei Karaganov “Global Zero and Common Sense,” 

Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2, 2010, p. 28. 

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 28. 

39. Ibid., p. 29

40. Ibid., p. 30. 

41. Jacob W. Kipp, “Asia Drivers of Russian Nuclear Force 

Structure,” Washington, DC: The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2010.

42. Makhmut A. Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko. Budushchaiavoina, Moscow: OGI, 2005. 

43. V. D. Riabchuk et al., Elementyvoennoisistemologiiprimentel

’no k resheniiu problem operativnogoiskusstvaitaktikiobshchevoiskovyk

hob’edinenii, soedineniiichastei: Voenno-teoreticheskikhtrud, Moscow: 

Izdatel’stvoVoennoiAkademiiimeni M. V. Frunze, 1995. 

44. V. D. Riabchuk, Teoriiaurpavleniiaboem: Nauchnovedcheskiiimetodicheskiiaspekty, Moscow: AgenstvoPechatiNauka, 2001, pp. 

42-54. 

45. V. D. Riabchuk., “Elemеntyvoennoisistemologiisukhopu

tnykhvoisk,” in V. D. Riabchuk, Upravlenie, effektivnost’, intellect, 

Moscow: Agitiplakat, 2001, pp. 269-278. 

46. I. M. Kapitanets, “Flotv voinnakhshestogopokoleniia,” 

Moscow: Veche, 2003, pp. 436-459. 

47. Ibid., pp. 426-458. 

48. “VMF: Zatakticheskimiadernymoruzhiem - budushchee

Rossii,” Rossiiskaiagazeta, March 23, 2009.

49. Dmitrii Petrov, “Rossiiskiivoennyiflotzhdetmasshtabnoeperevooruzhenie,” Vesti.Ru, November 14, 2011. 

50. AleksandrKhramchikhin, “KholodnaiavoinanakryvaetArktiku,” Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie, No. 44, November 18, 2011. 
154

51. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “ProtivkogoEvroPRO?” Voennopromyshlennyikur’er, Nos. 41-43, October 19-November 2, 2011.

52. A. Kondrat’ev, “Nekotoryeosobennostirealizatsiikontsept

sii’setetsentricheskaiavoina’ v vooruzhennykhsilakh KNR,” Zarubezhnoevoennoeobozrenie, No. 3, March 2010, pp. 11-17.

53. Roger McDermott, “‘Virtual’ Defense of the Russian Far 

East, Vostok 2010,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, Vol. VII, No. 129, July 

6, 2010.

54. “Vostok-2010 bezkonkretnykhprotivnikov,” Interfax, June 

28, 2010). 

55. “Opiat’ bezprotivnika?” Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie, July 

2, 2002. 

56. “V khodeuchenii ‘Vosstok-2010’ RossiiskievoennyeobideliIaponiiu s osobymrazmakhom,” NEWSru, July 7, 2010. 

57. Aleksandr Kolesnichenko, “Ucheniia, ukrytyetumanom,” 

Novyeizvestiia, July 5, 2010.

58. Aleksandr Khramhikhin. “Neadekvatnyivostok,” Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie, July 27, 2010.

59. Ibid.

60. Vladimir Kozin, “Piat’ prepiatstviinaputisokrashcheniiaTIaO,” Nezavismoevoennoeobozrenie, May 27, 2011. 

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid

65. Ibid.
155

CHAPTER 6

ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT RUSSIAN 

PERSPECTIVE

ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Leonid Polyakov

After a successful conclusion of the ratification 

process for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START III) in January 2011, further progress in the 

cooperation of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with Russia on issues 

of nuclear weapons control and reduction is very important for the security of all countries of Europe and 

beyond. Meanwhile, it appears from the outset that 

the most frequently addressed next step in this process as insisted upon by the U.S. Congress—the start 

of negotiations over tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) 

with Russia—will not be easy at all, and the chances 

for success so far seem very uncertain. 

In the absence of trust and good faith between Russia and NATO, the Russian perspective looks quite 

logical in its increasing reliance on relatively inexpensive TNWs as a kind of “equalizer,” which compensates for many existing or potential security shortfalls 

of Russia. The prevailing mood at the moment reflects 

the point that, 

possession of the nuclear forces allows Russia to 

maintain its military might at the level necessary to 

deter from launching a massive attack the potential 

aggressor, who may pursue the most decisive goals, 

including the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. This allows providing for the defense of the state 

under a significantly smaller amount of defense ap-
156

propriations, which is very important due to the current economic situation in Russia.1

Many, if not most, Russian politicians and experts 

still look at NATO as an aggressive bloc, capable of 

attacking Russia. In their view, Russia should be on 

the alert to preclude attempts to make it vulnerable 

through supposedly benign calls for nuclear disarmament. It may thus be much more difficult for the United States to negotiate TNWs with Russia than it was 

to conclude the recent START III treaty on strategic 

nuclear weapons. The greater number and complexity 

of factors at play have raised the threshold at which 

mutual agreement becomes likely. Indeed, the sheer 

number of conditions which Russian politicians and 

arms experts link to the issue of TNW reduction suggests that TNWs are for Russians the only realistic answer to the myriad of security challenges facing them. 

RUSSIAN MILITARY SECURITY CONCERNS

First of all, issues related to the role of TNWs in the 

military context look much more security-sensitive to 

Russia than to the United States and NATO. Indeed, 

there may be some good reasons for such a Russian 

perspective. Thus negotiations on TNWs and, correspondingly, on all related aspects may not start soon. 

The Russian official position at the moment rests on 

the very sensitive demand for the withdrawal of all 

TNWs to national territories of their owners as a precondition for the start of any negotiations related to 

those weapons. This ultimatum is aimed at the essentially symbolic number (if compared with the nuclear 

deployments during the Cold War) of U.S. nuclear 

gravity bombs—about 200 or fewer—located in five 
157

NATO countries. During the last 2 years, this position 

has been declared on numerous occasions by the Russian Minister of Foreign Relations, Sergey Lavrov, and 

other officials.2

Russian experts insist that Russia, unlike the United States and many NATO countries, is located within 

the range of nuclear weapons of all nuclear states, 

which elevates the TNW role in Russia’s security calculus to a much higher level than the tactical. In addition, long Russian borders ensure a large number of 

security-sensitive areas. Such half-encirclement could 

progress even further to become a full circle around 

Russia because of the future competition for resources 

in the Arctic. According to one typical opinion: 

After even a quick glance at the geography of conflicts, it is impossible to avoid the . . . conclusion that 

Russia is surrounded by a half-circle of conflicts. This 

half-circle will be closed soon—after the start of the 

process of competition for the resources of the Arctic 

Ocean shelf.3

This situation, in the view of Russian commentators, increases the importance of TNWs to Russia as 

a factor in national security and deterrence. Hence, 

Russians argue, calls for parity in numbers of TNWs 

between the United States and Russia are irrelevant. 

Moreover, since Russia failed to modernize its national economy successfully, it cannot compete with 

the West in research, development, and production 

of expensive high-speed, high-precision, long-range 

conventional systems, which can potentially serve as 

a counterweight to TNWs. These sub-nuclear conventional weapons systems of NATO constitute just one 

of the many factors that Russians want to put on the 

table during negotiations on TNW reduction. There 
are other security factors that Russians link to the issue of TNWs, such as NATO’s overall conventional 

superiority, European missile defense, and American 

plans to deploy certain systems in space. 

As for NATO’s overall conventional superiority, 

Russians continue to stick to a post-World War II perspective of the defense policies of the United States 

and NATO. Conventional wisdom tells both Russia 

and NATO that they are not enemies anymore, that 

real world threats for both of them will almost certainly come from a third party, and that they have common security interests and should seek to establish a 

firm basis for cooperation. But the psychology of the 

Cold War still prevails in most of their estimate: In the 

Russian view,

Washington does not take into account the established 

balance of forces in the European and other strategic 

regions adjacent to the Russian borders, as well as the 

comparative capabilities of the sides to provide for 

national security, including . . . the manifold de facto

superiority of NATO over Russia in the quantity of 

conventional weapons and total superiority in their 

combat potentials.4

While the degree of NATO’s conventional superiority differs in assessments by Russian experts, they 

were unanimous in assigning TNWs the key role in 

providing a counterbalance to NATO’s conventional 

potential. According to Dr. Alexey Arbatov, a respected expert in the field of nuclear arms, 

Russia considers its advantage in TNW as compensation for NATO’s superiority in conventional forces—

especially under the condition of the Conventional 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty deadlock, as well as a 

possible answer to the one-sided creation of NATO 
159

ballistic missile defense (BMD), and to the U.S. superiority in non-nuclear precision-guided weapons.5

As for ballistic missile defense (BMD), it has already caused and continues to cause a great deal of 

suspicion and irritation for Russia. In the middle of 

the last decade, when the first notion about U.S. plans 

to deploy BMD sites close to Russian borders in the 

Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Turkey was 

made public, Russia responded by threatening to deploy additional numbers of tactical missiles capable 

of delivering TNWs near the Russian-Polish border 

in Kaliningrad Oblast. Owing to this NATO anti-missile defense plan, which did not presuppose Russian 

participation, Russian strategic planning was inevitably impacted, with Russians immediately suspecting a major anti-Russian trend in NATO policy. Such 

thinking remains dominant today, and it is naturally 

present in the discussion over the possibility of U.S.-

Russian TNW negotiations: 

Washington could have cancelled its plans to deploy 

national BMD systems in Eastern and Southern Europe, which would have unavoidably undermined the 

Russian potential for nuclear deterrence. . . . Even in 

the case of a minimal preservation in the numbers of 

U.S. SNW [strategic nuclear weapons] and TNW, even 

the possibility of their application by Washington on 

its own will, during a first strike under the cover of the 

“anti-missile shield,” negatively influence the national 

security of Russia.6

Comments on the issue of BMD at the moment are 

probably more emotion-laden than other subjects in 

the context of nuclear arms. Russians tend to see in 

the relevant U.S. and NATO plans numerous negative 
160

consequences for Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy, 

regularly issuing warnings about their likely measures 

in response. In the logic of Russian experts, TNWs may 

play a decisive role in Russian plans for countermeasures against BMD in Europe by posing a hypothetical 

threat to the sites of the BMD system’s missiles and 

radars. A recent comment by Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff and Head of the Main Operational 

Directorate General Andrey Tretiak, on the plans for 

a gradual buildup of U.S. BMD in Europe, once again 

demonstrates deep dissatisfaction in Russia: 

The possibility for the destruction of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles becomes a reality. If the implementation of 

NATO plans on creating a BMD system, on the basis 

of a four-stage adaptive approach, continue without 

taking into account Russian opinion—and more so, 

without Russian participation—we will not be able to 

accept this threat to a key element of our national security, the strategic deterrence forces. It will compel us 

to adopt measures in response that would compensate 

for the negative influence of the NATO BMD system.7

Russian concern over the consequences to the strategic balance present in the linkage among NATO, 

BMD, and Russian TNWs is understandable, as are the 

reasons why Russians link the possibility of deployment of U.S. weapons in space and Russian TNWs. 

They would be very much interested to know to what 

extent the United States is ready to discuss the space 

system’s deployment in the context of TNWs: “The 

problem lies in the fact that deployment of weapons 

in space, even while reducing the levels of [strategic 

and tactical nuclear weapons] between Russia and the 

U.S., may fundamentally undermine the global strategic stability.”8
161

Meanwhile, the factor of China (with its large population and its suspected veiled claim on Russian eastern territories) may appear to be a more important and 

more realistic security concern than NATO for Russia 

in the context of TNWs. It is thus quite likely that the 

latest amendments in Russian military doctrine that 

allow for the possibility of using nuclear weapons 

against conventional attacks are not accidental. 

In spite of the traditional political rhetoric about 

a strategic partnership between China and Russia, 

in both countries there is a common opinion among 

scholars and both societies that the two countries cannot trust each other. With continuous growth in China’s political, economic, and military weight, China 

has become a leading trading partner for the United 

States and for the European Union (EU). China consistently projects its economic interests not only to Africa, but also to the regions that border Russia and that 

have for centuries been considered by Russians to be 

in their sphere of vital interests. They stretch from the 

countries of Central Asia to Belarus. The routine publication in recent years of scholarly studies and news 

media articles about problematic relations between 

Russia and China may indeed be a reflection of the 

growing tensions between the two countries.9

In addition to the major military security concerns 

related to the TNW issue as discussed above—Russia’s geographical vulnerability, NATO conventional 

superiority, European BMD deployment, American 

weapons in space, and the challenge of China—Russian experts also talk about many narrower problems 

dealing with terminology, effectiveness of control, 

and other peripheral issues. Russian experts discuss at 

length the criteria for classifying nuclear weapons as 

“tactical” and the prospects for establishing and main-
162

taining effective verification mechanisms. They insist 

on the necessity to take into account during negotiations not just U.S. and Russian TNWs, but the nuclear 

arsenals of other countries of the region as well: 

Russia’s position should be based on the evident fact 

that TNW is a weapon of regional deterrence, and, 

consequently, during the process of defining the parameters of the Russian TNW arsenal for the purpose 

of negotiations, the nuclear weapons of France, Great 

Britain, Israel and Pakistan should be taken into account.10

RUSSIAN LINKAGE BETWEEN POLITICS AND 

TNWs

As of this writing in 2012, the issue of reducing 

TNWs is too politically sensitive for both sides, with 

the Russian presidential election only just completed, 

and the U.S. presidential election coming up in November. Russia is falling significantly behind its two 

major competitors—the United States and NATO—in 

economic and technological areas and behind China 

in terms of population and industrial potential. It is 

therefore drawn in foreign policy matters to TNWs 

as a political weapon, threatening to deploy tactical 

nuclear-capable missiles in response either to NATO 

enlargement to the East or to plans for BMD in Europe. 

Furthermore, it is important to remember that the 

nuclear weapon is one of the few or, many argue, the 

only remaining credential supporting the superpower 

status of Russia. Moscow almost lost this status after 

the collapse of the Soviet Union. Psychologically, it is 

still a very important prop for Russians generally and 

for the Russian leadership: 
163

Today, in fact, only the nuclear umbrella can provide 

Russia with a stable peaceful environment allowing it 

to conduct and successfully finish the process of internal reforms in the state and in the armed forces, in 

particular. Besides, nuclear weapons provide a high 

international status for our country, justify its membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, 

and allow us to define the rules of the game in the 

nuclear sphere.11

Indeed, Russia still demands to be treated as a superpower, acting on its own as equal to NATO, declaring zones of special privileged interests, and organizing security alliances. This great power pose is central 

to modern Russia’s national identity and is unlikely to 

be relinquished any time soon. It works against possible disintegrative processes in the federation and 

acts as a glue to hold the national ethos intact. 

Such perceptions and prejudices make Russian experts very suspicious of American proposals, which 

they traditionally interpret as attempts to undermine 

the Russian state. Russians are very much worried by 

the thought that America wants to be the only military superpower capable of delivering an unpunished 

strike against Russia or any other opponent. They 

suspect that the true U.S. and NATO intention behind 

proposals for nuclear disarmament is to achieve global hegemony for themselves: 

On the surface, the first version of the U.S. motivation 

is its desire to broaden the possibilities for external institutional control over Russia. It means the focused 

limitation of the range of Russia’s possible responses 

to global processes, including via destabilizing events 

in the military-political sphere. Such limitation may be 

realized by entrapping Russia into a system of international agreements that channelize the processes in the 
164

military-technical sphere toward the preferential (for 

the West) channel.12

Another hypothesis suggests a more subtle U.S. 

strategy—the so-called “Chinese gambit,” whereby 

America gains Russia’s concurrence on substantial 

bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons, leading to a 

weakening of Russia’s global position. It would downgrade Russia to sixth or seventh place in the geostrategic hierarchy. As one commentator states, “In this case 

conditions will appear for channelizing the aspirations 

of . . . China in a northern direction, thus making it 

clash with Russia. As a result, two major geopolitical 

competitors (Russia and China) would supposedly be 

out of action for the foreseeable future.”13

According to yet another suspicion, Americans 

are suggesting the exchange of numerical data and 

subsequent concentration of TNWs in a few centralized depots as a ruse for gathering data to support 

U.S. first-strike targeting. This idea is quite prevalent 

among Russian military commanders. Similarly, in 

their view, the real purpose of BMD in Europe is to 

deny Russia a retaliatory capability in the event of 

a nuclear attack from the West. The more authentic 

concern of western arms control experts is that, owing 

to the wide dispersal and lack of guaranteed security 

of TNW warheads, terrorists may acquire them. Such 

an eventuality does not worry Russian strategists as 

much as imagined American “treachery.” In the same 

vein, western reservations concerning the amended 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty are allegedly rooted in a barely hidden and one-sided desire to 

maintain NATO conventional superiority, especially 

in high-precision weapons.
165

By the same logic, preventing a potential arms race 

in space and maintaining strategic stability are not the 

only reasons for Russia to link the issues of TNWs and 

space. There is concern in Russia that the United States 

might have in mind the same “trick” it pulled with the 

Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s—exhausting 

the Russian economy (as happened with the Soviets in 

the 1980s) by pushing it to spend huge sums of money 

on expensive space countermeasures. 

On the western side, many experts argue that while 

American nuclear weapons in Europe have essentially 

only a symbolic military role, they do possess a significant political role—to demonstrate Euro-Atlantic 

solidarity and to preserve the U.S. commitment to 

European security.14 Those who support maintaining 

the U.S. TNW presence in Europe suspect that Russia’s demands that the remaining American bombs in 

Europe be withdrawn, constitute a covert attempt to 

deepen American isolationism and undermine EuroAtlantic solidarity. 

But are U.S. TNWs the only viable symbol of the 

solidarity of NATO nations? Would the withdrawal 

of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe 

truly have a damaging effect? Are there any alternative (perhaps non-nuclear) symbols that could potentially substitute for this symbolic role of U.S. TNWs? 

The logic of the Cold War, which is probably still 

driving Russia’s linkage between the withdrawal of 

U.S. bombs and the start of negotiations, is evident 

in Russia’s stated position. What is not clear yet is 

whether the United States and its NATO partners will 

find a way to delink this issue and how Russia would 

react if the bombs were withdrawn. 

At the moment, Russians offer a token nod to the 

western fear that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, 
166

but in contrast to U.S. and NATO concerns, they trust 

the security of their national stockpiles of TNWs and 

discount western worries about the possibility of Russian tactical weapons falling into terrorist hands in the 

near time frame. 

GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

The dispute seems to be stalemated, with both 

sides, especially the Russians, unlikely to take the first 

big step forward. On both sides, there are too many 

factors and too many interests linked to TNWs to allow for a bold move any time soon. Some Russian experts describe the situation in stark terms: the start of 

negotiations on TNWs between the United States and 

Russia is unlikely in the near future. For instance, one 

of the most authoritative Russian experts, Anatoliy 

D’yakov, who is a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Director of the Center 

for Studies of Problems of Disarmament, Energy, and 

Ecology at Moscow’s Physical-Technical Institute, 

recently opined that “at the moment negotiations on 

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) have little 

prospect of starting.”15

Thus further present attempts to persuade Russia 

to start negotiations on significant overall reductions 

of its TNW arsenal and the number/location of their 

storage sites, without major quid pro quo, have a distinctly low probability of success: 

In light of the continued decrease in NATO TNWs 

and strong public support for eliminating the remaining [NATO] weapons, some Russian analysts could 

plausibly anticipate that European governments 

might at some point request their removal regardless of Moscow`s response. This perception naturally 
167

diminishes still further Russian interest in making 

TNW-related concessions without compensation in 

other areas.16

The chance to achieve progress still exists, however. Despite many evident difficulties, the officially 

acknowledged Russian concern about at least two 

common security threats may serve to lay the groundwork for future negotiations: (1) the threat of nuclear 

weapons proliferation, which could increase the probability of nuclear war, accident, or a related catastrophe; and (2) the threat of nuclear terrorism, which 

could lead to the same dire consequences for Russia.

At the moment, these are broad background issues 

both for Russia and for NATO, with future agreement 

on them more likely than on the present sticky details 

of TNWs. With TNWs, there are just too many divergent opinions on the specifics of location, terminology, transparency, storage, risk calculations, internal 

politics, multilateralism, and intertwining of TNW issues with U.S. weapons in space, the CFE Treaty, and 

European ballistic missile defense, to name just a few. 

As a result, both sides are seeking symbolic and 

confidence-enhancing acts that may permit preliminary consultations on the working level and keep the 

TNW discussion alive. This will also allow the parties to understand each other’s positions better and to 

consolidate argumentation in the hope that, with time, 

when the political environment becomes more conducive, Russian, U.S., and NATO experts will have accumulated enough sound proposals to find a militarily and politically acceptable formula to start serious 

negotiations. 

As to official consultations and exchanges of data 

prior to the start of negotiations, Russian experts have 
168

rather divergent opinions. Some argue that these actions can be legitimate as an initial step, but only after 

an official agreement on the conduct of negotiations. 

But others, such as the earlier-mentioned academician, Anatoliy D’yakov, go a bit further: 

Russia, the U.S., and NATO could have agreed on coordinated transparency measures....In particular, it is 

possible to exchange information on the numbers and 

places of storage of operational nuclear warheads and 

take the obligation to keep these warheads in declared 

places only, as well as to have no plans of transferring 

the warheads from reserve to operational status.17

The history of nuclear disarmament in Europe 

tells us that practical measures to reduce TNWs are 

possible even without formal agreements (see Table 

6-1). Twenty years ago, in the late 1980s and early 

1990s, the American and Soviet leaderships were able 

to adopt major unilateral decisions in the interests 

of common peace and security in Europe. Today the 

situation is different. In Russia, disappointment over 

the dissolution of the Soviet Union prevails, a mood 

of distrust of the West is widespread, and harsh Cold 

War rhetoric creeps in: “Alas, under Gorbachev the 

Russians stopped believing in universal human values. Russians became used to seeing dirty tricks and 

detecting double standards. And in recent years, the 

Americans have regularly provided reasons [for our 

suspecting deceit].”18
169

Source: “Arms Control and Disarmament: The U.S. Commitment,” Washington, DC: U.S. Information Agency, 1998, pp. 33-

35.

Table 6-1. History of American-Soviet Reductions 

of TNWs in Europe.

1989 —April 12

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR 

FORCE NEGOTIATIONS

The Soviet Union proposes short-range (less than 500 kilometers) nuclear forces (SNF) negotiations between that country and the United States.

1989 —May 11

SOVIET UNILATERAL SNF 

REDUCTIONS 

General Secretary Gorbachev informs U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that the Soviet Union 

intends to announce a unilateral cut of 500 short-range nuclear weapons.

1991 —September 27

U.S. UNILATERAL

WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

President Bush announces a major unilateral withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons: “I am...

directing that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched shortrange, that is, theater, nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery 

shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, insure that we preserve an 

effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe.

“In turn, I have asked the Soviets...to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater 

nuclear weapons....

“Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape, the United States 

will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, attack submarines, as well as 

those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means removing all 

nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs 

aboard aircraft carriers.”

1991 —October 5

SOVIET RESPONSE

President Gorbachev responds to President Bush’s unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons by calling for the elimination of air-based weapons and announcing that:

•	 “All nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles shall be eliminated.

•	 “Nuclear warheads for air defense missiles shall be withdrawn from the troops and 

concentrated in central bases, and a portion of them shall be eliminated. All nuclear mines 

shall be eliminated.

•	 “All tactical nuclear weapons shall be removed from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. These weapons, as well as nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation, shall be 

stored in central storage sites and a portion shall be eliminated.

•	 “Moreover, we propose that the United States eliminate fully, on the basis of reciprocity, all 

tactical nuclear weapons of naval forces. In addition, on the basis of reciprocity, it would be 

possible to withdraw from combat units on frontal (tactical) aviation, all nuclear weapons 

(gravity bombs and air-launched missiles) and place them in centralized storage bases.”

1991 —October 17

NATO REDUCTION OF 

TACTICAL NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS 

NATO agrees to remove all but 400 to 600 nuclear bombs from Europe.

1992 — February-May

TRANSFER OF TACTICAL 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO 

RUSSIA

On February 1, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces that the transfer of tactical nuclear 

weapons from Kazakhstan was completed in January. On April 28, Belorussian Defense Minister 

Pavel Koszlovsky announces that all tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus have been transferred 

to Russia/On April 28, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk confirms that all tactical nuclear

weapons have been transferred to Russia except for those on the ships and submarines of the 

Black Sea Fleet.
170

Despite Russian hopes about the effectiveness of 

pressure on the United States and NATO from European public opinion, time may be running out more 

quickly for the Russians than for NATO. There is a 

growing disparity between the Russian ability to maintain its TNW arsenal in safe and ready condition and 

U.S./NATO overall strategic dominance. However, it 

would be risky for the United States and NATO to bet 

on gradually exhausting Russia to force a reduction of 

its TNWs and agreement to more cooperative security 

relations and arrangements. Such a reactive approach 

could increase the risk of nuclear warheads falling in 

the hands of terrorists. This risk already looks quite 

real to specialists in the West: 

Arms control experts worry that many Russian TNW 

are dispersed at remote, hard-to-defend storage facilities and that the weapons appear to lack strong electronic locks that would preclude their unauthorized 

use by terrorists.19

On the other hand, it should be taken into account 

that despite the dominant anti-Western trend, some 

sober voices in Russia are heard. Again, Dr. Arbatov 

states: 

In contrast to the current popular opinion in Russia, 

under certain conditions Moscow should be more interested in negotiations than the U.S. and NATO....A 

connection with negotiations on TNW may help to 

push ahead the problems of the CFE Treaty and to 

stimulate progress on European BMD and U.S. strategic non-nuclear systems. And vise-versa—a deadlock 

on TNW will lead neither to the withdrawal of U.S. 

nuclear weapons from Europe nor to progress on the 

CFE Treaty, BMD, and precision guided weapons, 
171

where Russian interest is higher than Western....A 

package of agreements on TNW-CFE-BMD may be 

promising in order for deep strategic substance to fill 

the Russian idea about a new architecture of Euro-Atlantic security, which so far remains “the shell without 

the filling.”20

Whatever the logic in linking negotiations about 

TNWs with other issues, in some way Russia may be 

setting a kind of trap for itself. Ironically, by connecting the TNW issue to so many different problems, 

Russia could forfeit the leverage they confer. That is, 

when trying to negotiate these other concerns, Russians could hear in response western insistence on discussing TNWs as a precondition for the others.

CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the current Russian perspective on 

TNWs suggests that the issue of trust between Russia, on one hand, and the United States and NATO, 

on the other, is still very much at stake. The Russian 

demand for a U.S. nuclear withdrawal from Europe 

may be packaged as an attempt to achieve a more 

equal position before the start of negotiations and 

even to squeeze out a greater return for their future 

concessions. Many Western politicians and commentators, however, see it more as an attempt to further 

isolate America from Europe by driving a wedge between the United States and leading regional powers 

like Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The West is 

thus attempting to persuade Russia, if not to formalize the TNW reduction process, at least to increase the 

transparency of Russian TNW-related issues and the 

stakes involved. Many Russians, in their turn, see this 

attempt as one more ploy for undermining Russian 

positions in Europe and the world.
172

It is evident that the two sides have divergent positions and interests regarding the problem of TNWs. 

There should therefore be no illusion that formal negotiations on TNWs will be simple to initiate in the near 

term. However, Russian concerns over so many issues 

connected to the TNW problem favor Russia’s eventually becoming more cooperative. There is thus still a 

good chance to find a way out, a good chance that the 

two sides will ultimately find a middle ground—if not 

through the traditional negotiation process seeking 

big splashy solutions, then through modest consultations and low-order, coordinated, unilateral steps. 

Much patience and courage will be required from the 

political and military leaderships of all sides. Recent 

history proves that when political will rises at last to 

a critical mass, it is then quite possible to achieve real 

progress.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Vladimir Kozin, “Five obstacles on the way to reduction of 

TNW,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, May 27, 2011, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-05-27/1_tjao.html.

2. Sergey Lavrov, “Tactical nuclear weapons should not be 

located in the third countries,” Vzgliad, available from www.vz.ru/

news/2010/3/26/387383.html.

3. Kozin, “Five obstacles.”

4. Varfolomey Korobushin and Viktor Kovalev, “Tactical 

move with tactical weapons,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye,

March 18, 2011, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-03-18/1_

tactic.html.

5. Alexey Arbatov, “Non-strategic nuclear weapons: dilemmas and approaches,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, May 

20, 2011, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-05-20/1_nuclear.

html.
173

6. Kozin, “Five obstacles.”

7. Sergiy Zgurets, “Patriot Games,” Mirror Weekly, Ukraine, 

No. 37, October 14, 2011.

8. Kozin, “Five obstacles.”

9. See, e.g., Audrey Piontkovsky, “China’s threat to Russia,” 

Project Syndicate, September 3, 2007, available from www.inosmi.

ru/world/20070903/236371.html; Alexandr Khramchikhin, “Millions of soldiers plus modern weapons,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye, October 9, 2009; and Vladislav Inozemtsev, “China is 

a threat to Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 1, 2010, available 

from www.rg.ru/2010/10/01/valday-site.html.

10. Arbatov, “Non-strategic nuclear weapons.” 

11. Alexandr Radchuck, “Big Nuclear Game in the XXI Century: Disarmament or War?” Security Index, Vol. 1, No. 92, 2010, 

p. 30.

12. Korobushin and Kovalev, “Tactical move.” 

13. Ibid.

14. Kori Schake, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time to Reaffirm 

NATO Solidarity,” Central Europe Digest, August 2, 2010, available from inosmi.ru/europe/20100803/161824622.html.

15. Vasiliy Belozerov and Elena Lebedkova, “Tactical nuclear 

weapons—trump card of Russia,” June 10, 2011, available from 

nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-06-10/1_taktical.html. 

16. Richard Weitz, “NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemmas,” 

Second Line of Defense, June 13, 2011, available from www.sldinfo.

com/nato%E2%80%99s-tactical-nuclear-dilemmas/.

17. Belozerov and Lebedkova, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons.”

18. Vadim Koziulin, “To take the gun back from dictator,” Security Index,” Vol.. 3, No. 86, 2008, p. 44.
174

19. Richard Weitz, “NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemmas.”

20. Arbatov, “Non-strategic nuclear weapons.” 
175

CHAPTER 7

INFLUENCES ON RUSSIAN POLICY AND 

POSSIBILITIES

FOR REDUCTIONS IN NON-STRATEGIC 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

George E. Hudson and Evgeny Buzhinsky

Russian perspectives about general military policy as well as the narrower subject of tactical nuclear 

weapons (TNWs), also called non-strategic nuclear 

weapons (NSNWs), are conditioned of course by the 

foreign policy context. Students of international politics and security policy recognize the main foreign 

policy determinants as: the globalization of international relations, interactions with other countries, the 

exigencies of domestic politics, and the lasting historical/geographical factors that always come into 

play in helping to determine national interests. This 

admixture is given emotional moment as they are filtered through belief systems that often, apparently 

irrationally, crop up in leaders’ foreign and military 

policy statements. This chapter will attempt in its first 

section to link some of the context mentioned above 

(domestic politics is more fully covered in the chapter 

by Nikolai Sokov) to the more substantive discussion 

about reducing NSNWs contained in the second section. In the end, it should appear evident why the Russian position on the reduction of their TNWs differs 

from and often collides with U.S. and other western 

views.
176

THE CONTEXT FOR NON-STRATEGIC 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Globalization.

The term “globalization” has several meanings. 

Probably the most well-known in the United States 

has been coined by Thomas Friedman, New York Times 

columnist, in his well-known books, The Lexus and the 

Olive Tree and The World Is Flat. Basically, Friedman argues that the falling costs of and advances in information technology have created an international system 

that is fundamentally different from the previous one, 

since the new communication systems give notice and 

sometimes power even to small nations and groups 

that previously could not attain voice, notice, or power. Friedman defines globalization as “the inexorable 

integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies 

to a degree never witnessed before . . . the spread of 

free-market capitalism to virtually every country in 

the world.”1

 One could not be blamed for thinking 

that globalization in this sense is being equated with 

Americanization or, at the very least, westernization, 

since Friedman also notes that the United States, as 

the “dominant superpower,” is the chief proponent 

of this trend and maybe even its chief enforcer. While 

some writers like Joseph Stiglitz criticize this view of 

globalization as “accepting triumphant capitalism, 

American style,” they do tend to view it in the context 

of U.S. relations with developing nations as almost a 

kind of neo-imperialism.2

The view of globalization as Americanization has 

not been well received in Russia. It has been challenged 

in a way that has had a strong impact on how Russia 

has viewed the context of international relations in 
177

general and its own position in the international system, particularly concerning relations with the United 

States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO). It has formed the conceptual framework in 

which the Russian government has approached the 

topic of reductions in NSNWs. The concept of globalization has been recast to reflect a different view of 

what it means. 

No Russian whom the present writers know challenges the fact that globalization, in the sense of increasing national interdependencies, has occurred; 

many note that the catalyst for this fundamental 

change in the international system began, not with 

technological change so much, but rather with the fall 

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and 

the unchallenged rise of the United States as a global 

hegemon. Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of 

Russia in Global Affairs, notes that:

throughout history, this territory [Russia] sometimes 

found itself on the periphery and sometimes at the 

center of world politics. Its collapse was a momentous 

event in terms of its impact on the structural stability 

of the international system, especially in the second 

half of the 20th century when the Soviet Union was 

not just an influential regional power, but one of the 

two pillars on which the entire world order was based. 

Therefore, its collapse was not just a matter of national 

self-perception, but also a radical change in the foundation of the world order.3

When one pillar of a bipolar international system 

collapses, the remaining pillar—in this case America—tends to occupy its place, creating a unipolar system. In the face of advances in telecommunications, 

including the internet and, probably more important, 
178

the ability to conduct huge quantities of international 

monetary transactions at the speed of light and to 

project military power to any part of the earth, the 

United States was for a while able to make globalization equate to Americanization. As Lukyanov says, 

“Moscow was ready to assume a subordinate status,” 

in this U.S.-dominated international system at least 

for the first half of the 1990s.4

Such a status raised the hackles of Russian policymakers, particularly Evegeny Primakov, who briefly 

became Prime Minister under President Boris Yeltsin 

and who had a more wary outlook than many others 

about U.S. intentions. Indeed, promised economic assistance to Russia from the United States did not occur, and instead NATO started—from the Russian 

perspective—to advance toward and threaten Russia’s 

borders. As Russia continued to suffer economically 

and to undergo various hyper-capitalistic economic 

experiments that at first enriched only a few individuals, a counter-reaction inevitably occurred in which 

traditional Russian fears about a diminished place in 

the international system surfaced. 

These international and domestic conditions took 

place in the context not only of a globalized (Americanized) system based on the soft power of technology, but also of an assertive NATO and United States 

utilizing the hard power of the military. A sea change 

in Russian attitudes occurred in March 1999, when 

talks on the status of Kosovo broke down and NATO 

bombed Serbian troops, forcing hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee the area during 78 days of 

fighting. A final settlement occurred after that, eventuating in Kosovo’s independence by February 2008 

with a constitution approved in June. Moscow was 

incensed from the beginning of the operation, with a 
179

rare show of unanimity from nearly all Russian quarters condemning NATO’s “aggressive” behavior.5

There is not much doubt that this outcome, combined 

with NATO’s movement eastward, has introduced a 

serious retrogression in Russian-U.S. relations. This 

trend was accentuated during the presidencies of 

Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush, in spite of a new 

strategic arms control treaty signed in May 2002. The 

invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq strengthened the 

Russian view that globalization, as proclaimed by the 

West, meant American and NATO domination.

New thinking started to be formulated at this time 

about what globalization meant from the Russian perspective. Not so surprisingly, it rejected American and 

other western views. “Globalism,” one analyst stated, 

“benefits America at the expense of everyone else.”6

Instead of this version of globalization, Russians began to accept the idea of multipolar globalism, the 

idea that there is a true interdependence among nations and that there can be no single global hegemon 

by definition.7 This notion fits Russian foreign policy 

proclivities very well in rejecting U.S. dominance. A 

probable new era of Russian policy began with the 

address of then President Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. In part, he 

stated that:

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And 

this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, 

then military, political and economic resources would 

not suffice. What is even more important is that the 

model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and 

can be no moral foundations for modern civilization.8
180

He then continues to condemn the predilection 

for use of force prevailing at the time (read: Iraq and 

Afghanistan), notes that trade is expanding the range 

of interdependencies, and proclaims that “there is no 

reason to doubt that the economic potential of the 

new centers of global economic growth [the BRIC nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China] will inevitably be 

converted into political influence and will strengthen 

multipolarity.”9

It seems clear that the Russian shift in thinking to 

multipolar globalism both reflects new realities and 

represents the preferred line of Russian foreign policy 

today. Even the “reset” in Russian-American relations 

is a symbol of that, recognizing as it does the importance of Russian power to the United States and the 

consequent need for Russian cooperation in a world 

that is quickly becoming multipolar. The new line has 

been ratified most recently in the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) document and also in the 

progress of Russia toward membership in the World 

Trade Organization (WTO)—which Russia both wants 

and needs and which the United States strongly supports. The new line also finds Russia arguing strongly 

for a multilateral approach to agreements on the reduction of NSNWs, as we shall see in the latter part 

of this chapter. The relative decline of American power 

“in which the power resources of other states grow 

greater or are used more effectively,” has helped to 

advance the new multipolarity and interdependence. 

This scenario does not reflect the absolute decline of 

the U.S., but rather, as Joseph Nye reminds us, “the 

loss of ability to use one’s resources effectively.”10 The 

United States is probably stronger than it used to be 

just looking at the power resources—both economic 

and military—that it could bring to bear internation-
181

ally; it is just that others are accelerating faster. Nor 

does Russia find itself on a steady power gain relative 

to other nations. It, too, has to deal with realities and 

weaknesses that help to inform its stance on NSNWs 

in addition to globalism.

GEOGRAPHY, POPULATION, AND MILITARY 

MALADIES

No paper on Russian strategy or geopolitics can 

ignore a factor that will be only briefly mentioned 

here: Russia’s geographical position. The subject is 

covered more thoroughly in the contributions by Leonid Polyakov and Jacob Kipp in this section of the 

book, but it must be noted here that Russia borders 

on many nations—14 in all—and has strong historical 

interests in at least five more in the Southern Caucasus and Central Eurasia. No other nation has such a 

similar complex and troubling geographic situation. 

How easy the United States has it from this perspective, with only Mexico and Canada as bordering countries! Russia’s geography profoundly affects its strategic and geopolitical views and pushes it naturally to 

a more multilateral approach to international politics 

today—especially under the conditions more fully 

discussed below. This is one factor only, of course, but 

it profoundly influences Russian foreign policy, making it sensitive to challenges from the south and west.

A second factor, stemming from the domestic side, 

is the Russian population “bomb,” or the matter of 

the decrease in Russia’s population. It links closely 

to Russia’s perception of threats to national security 

because it has a direct impact on maintaining a one 

million-man army, discussed below, and on Russian 

economic production, two factors normally associated 
182

with measures of power in international relations. 

The latest version of Russia’s national security strategy was released in May 2009; it points directly to this 

threat in its section called “Raising the standard of 

living of Russian citizens.” It addresses population in 

part by stating that:

Reducing the level of social and property inequality 

among the population, the stabilization of the population size in the medium term, and, in the long term, 

the basic improvement of the demographic situation 

constitute the strategic goals for guaranteeing national 

security in the realm of raising the quality of life of 

Russian citizens.11

It then continues to list a number of other issues 

such as housing, the crisis of world and regional banking, the domestic production of high quality pharmaceuticals, and a better system of protecting human 

rights.

The United Nations (UN) has long published 

population projections for Russia that do not yield 

optimism for reversing population decline. According to the UN medium projection, Russia will shrink 

from 143 million in 2010 to 126 million by 2050—a 

drop of nearly 12 percent. In comparison, the United 

States will grow in the same period from 310 million 

in 2010 to 403 million by 2050, an increase of 30 percent.12 Moreover, the number of Russian conscripts in 

2012 will be only one-half of what it was in 2001, and 

some of these will not be fit for military service because of medical reasons.13 This is not a good situation 

for a nation that needs to meet minimum recruitment 

numbers for its one million-man force. Certainly, it 

has a negative long-term impact on Russian strategies 

for national security and foreign policy. It continues 
183

to direct Russian toward multilateral solutions to its 

security.

The third and most directly related factor underlying the Russian position on NSNWs relates to what we 

might call the military maladies of the Russian armed 

forces. As we saw above, new efforts on military reform began following the 2008 war with Georgia. This 

is probably no accident, and so Russian activities in 

the so-called 5-day war provide a good example of a 

number of things related to the Russian military. For 

instance, even though Russian forces had been stationed in the Northern Caucasus and had engaged in 

military exercises prior to August 2008, the Russian 

military still appeared to be caught by surprise when 

the Georgians attacked on August 7. Russian analyst 

Fyodor Lukyanov puts the blame squarely on inconsistencies in Russian policy, which, taken together 

with other factors listed below, served to cause hesitation and to limit what the Russians could actually do 

once the war began. As Lykyanov noted at the time of 

the war:

Ever since the disruption of the status quo that had 

been maintained in the conflict zones for about 10 

years, Russia’s policy has been getting increasingly 

contradictory. The desire to simultaneously play the 

role of a neutral mediator/peacekeeper and a protector/guarantor of security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been detrimental to both the former and 

the latter status. At some point, Moscow essentially 

stopped trying to help bring about a political settlement, placing its stakes on expanding cooperation 

with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi and forestalling any 

outbreaks of tension. At the same time, Russia tried 

to formally stay within existing legal bounds, and the 

longer this went on, the more it came into conflict with 

reality.14
184

In other words, the pursuit of a military solution 

(guaranteeing the security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) subverted Russian diplomacy (the peacekeeping role) and placed Russia in the position of being 

manipulated by all parties in the conflict, including 

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia. It made war almost inevitable. So, in spite of apparent good military 

planning, Russia was poorly prepared politically. This 

resulted in a lack of preparedness overall.

Poor political preparation reflected itself in the 

questionable state of Russian military equipment. 

Decisions were not made at the top levels of the 

political/military structure to ensure that Russian 

troops could achieve victory in the shortest possible 

time, using the best equipment. This reflected overconfidence, bad acquisition procedures, and confusion 

about how far Russia wanted to go to achieve its 

objectives. Certainly Russia could not simply go 

in and take over the Georgian territory under these 

conditions. Nor could it overthrow the government of 

President Mikheil Saakashvili.

Probably the best military analysis of the 2008 war 

has been done by a group of Russian academics in a 

work that first appeared as Tanki Avgusta in the original and, as translated into English later as, The Tanks 

of August. This work contains some searing critiques 

of Russian military failures, mostly dealing with poor 

equipment and poor battle execution. For instance, 

while the authors note that the Northern Caucasus 

42nd Rifle Division was the “only division in the entire Russian Army fully deployed under a wartime 

manning chart and staffed only with professional soldiers” and had combat-ready regiments ready to fight 

in 24 hours, it was poorly equipped, having ancient 
185

armor, like T-62 tanks and old BMPs.15 The result was 

equipment breakdowns during the war, resulting in a 

longer conflict.16

The Russians also experienced “one of the biggest surprises” of the 2008 war in their loss of aircraft 

against an enemy who, while not defenseless, could 

not be expected to sustain combat against the betterequipped Russians. Georgian air defenses accounted 

for only two of Russia’s six downed airplanes, while 

three suffered from friendly fire and one was shot 

down by unknown causes.17 The friendly fire casualties demonstrate significant command-and-control 

problems in implementing the battle plan, according 

to one specialist. But the high ratio of those to the 

Georgian-caused downings also calls into question 

notions of effective Georgian air defenses.18 At any 

rate, the Russians seem to have wrought more havoc 

upon themselves than did the Georgians.

It should be no surprise that military reform efforts 

began soon after the conclusion of the 5-day war with 

Georgia. The process of reform is ongoing. It includes, 

as mentioned, plans to reduce the military’s size to 

one million soldiers and also to increase the number of 

noncommissioned officers. Generally, it comprises a 

three-tier plan, according to Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, that is to last from 2011 to 2020. The 

first stage is being conducted now, he claims, with the 

previously mentioned staff issues. The second stage 

will include “social issues,” possibly hazing and the 

care of troops, while the final stage will deal with 

acquiring more modern armaments. As Serdyukov 

states, the final stage will be the most difficult: 

Armament supplies are quite a long process. We have 

divided it into two parts. At the first stage, which will 
186

last until 2015, modern armaments in our army must 

comprise no less than 30% while this figure must increase to 70% by 2020. . . .19

Such long-term growth in hardware is very expensive overall and has to be evaluated within the context 

of expected declines in Russian gross domestic product (GDP), as projected by the Bank of Finland, which 

sees a growth of 5 percent in 2012, down from 8.1 percent in 2007.20 Five percent growth is still good, especially in comparison with the anemic growth rates of 

western nations, and should provide some margin at 

least for the military to grow more quickly—but it will 

demand sacrifices in other areas of the budget. 

In fact, of all categories in the projected budget that 

are scheduled to grow between 2011 and 2013, only 

two, defense and debt servicing, are scheduled to increase their share of gross domestic product (GDP). 

Debt servicing is scheduled to increase from 1.8 to 1.9 

percent of GDP in that period, and defense from 2.9 to 

3.3 percent: in other words, defense will increase by 

nearly 14 percent and debt servicing by 5.6 percent. All 

other broad budget categories—including health care, 

social measures, and education—would suffer declines as a percentage of GDP, and most (except social 

policy) will experience absolute declines in funding. 

These figures can be interpreted to mean that military 

spending is scheduled to gain strength in the Russian 

economy after a lapse and that, if the plan works out, 

by 2020 Russia will have what it wants in military 

hardware—possibly the necessary precision-guided 

munitions to take the place of NSNWs. Such an eventuality will likely affect Russian negotiating positions 

in any talks directed at the reduction of NSNWs. 
187

Reducing Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.

The issue of deep reductions of NSNWs, particularly Russian ones, has been discussed very actively 

lately. The so-called disparity between western nonstrategic nuclear arsenals and the greater Russian 

stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons has been 

reflected, first, in the new Strategic Concept of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted in Lisbon, Portugal, in November 2010,21 and, second, in the Resolution on Advice and Consent regarding the ratification 

of the New U.S.-Russian START Treaty adopted by 

the U.S. Senate in December 2010. The latter document calls in part, 

upon the President to pursue, following consultation 

with allies, an agreement with the Russian Federation 

that would address the disparity between the tactical 

weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the 

United States and would secure and reduce tactical 

nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.22

Western concerns as regards Russian NSNWs are 

based on the following factors:

• reductions by the United States and Russia of 

their strategic nuclear arsenals will increase 

the Russian advantage in nuclear weapons as a 

whole;

• in case of a serious military conflict, TNWs belonging to the general purpose forces may be 

employed at an early stage of the conflict with 

a high degree of nuclear escalation;

• NSNWs are believed not to be equipped with 

the same highly reliable systems preventing

unauthorized use as are strategic nuclear weapons, which makes the possibility of an unauthorized nuclear strike much higher;
188

• NSNWs, especially of older types, are believed 

to be less protected by various blocking devices, have smaller weight and size characteristics, 

and are tempting objects for terrorists.

Russia does not concur in any of the arguments 

mentioned above, except perhaps the second one. 

Taking into account the relative weakness of the Russian general-purpose forces, the Russian high command may be tempted in case of a major conflict to use 

TNWs to compensate for the numerical or technological superiority of the attacking enemy. As to the third 

and forth arguments, they may not be considered as 

well-founded since now all Russian TNWs are kept in 

safely guarded central storage sites and are equipped 

with highly reliable blocking devices which prevent 

their unauthorized use. The fact that there is not a single proven instance of loss or theft of a piece of nuclear 

ammunition testifies to their security.

Since there is no agreed definition of NSNWs, for 

the purpose of this chapter we shall consider to be nonstrategic all nuclear weapons except for the following: 

(1) strategic nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear bombs and air-launched 

cruise missiles for strategic bombers as defined by 

New START; and (2) nuclear weapons that have been 

retired from the stockpile, are no longer functional, 

and are in the queue for dismantlement. Although no 

official data on Russian stockpiles of tactical nuclear 

weapons was ever published, Russia is believed to 

have at its disposal an estimated 3,700-5,400 nonstrategic nuclear warheads, of which some 2,000 are 

deliverable. These include cruise missiles of various 

ranges, gravity bombs, torpedoes, and depth charges. 
189

The Russian inventory has been reduced by at least 75 

percent since 1991, down from an estimated 15,000-

21,700 weapons at the time. In the 1990s, all of Russia’s remaining non-strategic weapons were placed in 

central storage, in the sites operated by the 12th Main 

Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and 

are not deployed with delivery vehicles.23 The chapter 

by Nikolai Sokov provides a more detailed discussion 

on the numbers of Russian NSNWs.

The status of NSNWs in Russian military strategy 

is critical. Under the present circumstances they are 

practically the only means of guaranteeing Russia’s 

independence and territorial integrity. As Chief of the 

Russian General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov 

said at the annual meeting with foreign military attaches accredited in Moscow, Russia (December 2008), 

“We consider NSNW as a deterrence factor for the 

huge amount of conventional and highly precision 

arms in possession of NATO countries in Europe.”24

According to Russian military strategy, nuclear 

forces have two types of missions: traditional strategic deterrence, which relies primarily on strategic 

weapons, and limited-use nuclear forces in response 

to a large-scale conventional attack. Both missions 

are reflected in the Military Doctrine of the Russian 

Federation which says that nuclear weapons may be 

used: (1) “in response to the utilization of nuclear and 

other types of weapons of mass destruction against it 

and (or) its allies,” and (2) “in the event of aggression 

against the Russian Federation involving the use of 

conventional weapons when the very existence of the 

state is placed under threat.”25

The main reason for Russia’s need for longer-range 

NSNWs is that long-range precision-guided conventional weapons provide a key advantage for the Unit-
190

ed States and NATO. To counter this, Russia is working hard to acquire similar long-range conventional 

strike assets and, in the meantime, relies on limited 

nuclear use, employing nuclear weapons of comparable ranges. 

The Russian Navy attaches particular importance 

to NSNWs since, according to the Naval Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020, the 

Navy is tasked “to protect the territory of the Russian 

Federation from the sea [and] guard and secure state 

naval borders of the Russian Federation and air space 

above them.”26 Its reliance on NSNWs is understandable, considering that, numerically, the Russian Navy 

was reduced considerably since the beginning of the 

1990s. Moreover, in all the latest military conflicts, the 

main strikes were delivered by cruise missiles from 

surface warships and submarines as well as naval 

aviation.

Russian and U.S./NATO rationales for maintaining NSNWs differ. U.S./NATO see their value largely 

in political terms; that is, providing a security link 

between the United States and Europe and serving 

as an element of NATO’s nuclear capability. Russia 

attaches more military significance to its NSNWs. It 

sees those weapons as offsetting conventional force 

disadvantage vis-à-vis its neighbors, serving as a 

force enhancer should conventional defense fail, and 

offering possibilities for escalating or to controlling 

escalation. Moreover, Russia considers its TNWs as a 

counterbalance to the nuclear forces of third countries, 

the nuclear capabilities of practically all of which are 

able to reach the territory of Russia. The reduction of 

Russian strategic nuclear potential in accordance with 

the bilateral treaties with the United States relatively 

increases the role of Russian TNWs for the purpose of 

containing the nuclear countries of Eurasia. 
191

Under present conditions, the range of options 

for the West in dealing with Russia’s NSNWs may 

include (1) negotiated force limitations and reductions provided some conditions are met; and (2) confidence-building measures. Both options would have a 

potentially large impact on Russia, since it maintains 

a larger number of NSNWs. Reciprocity may be difficult given different interests and stockpile structures.

Concerning the numbers of weapons, the disparity between the United States and Russia, mentioned 

earlier, is quite problematic. Given the estimate that 

the United States in the near future will have only 

about 500 NSNWs compared to Russia’s 2,000, any 

limit around 500 would result in reductions only on 

the Russian side, which is unacceptable to Moscow. 

On the other hand, any limit above 500 would leave 

Russia with a de facto numerical advantage, assuming 

the United States was unlikely to increase the number 

of its NSNWs. That situation, surely, would be unacceptable to Washington. 

THE REDUCTION OF NSNWs AND NONDEPLOYED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Before going into detail about weapons reduction, 

it should be noted that owing to the reasons mentioned above, Russia’s attitude to reductions remains 

cool. Thus, if western nations want Russia to make 

some concessions on NSNWs issues, they should be 

receptive to progress concerning other issues on the 

Russian-U.S./NATO agenda, including the weaponization of space, non-nuclear strategic offensive 

weapons, missile defense, and conventional forces in 

Europe. It is a long-standing and oft-repeated position of the Russian government that progress on those 
192

questions could facilitate progress on NSNWs. The 

last time Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey 

Lavrov reiterated such a position was at the Plenary 

meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, on March 1, 2011. He said that: 

the Russian position on nuclear disarmament . . . is 

defined by the key principle of indivisibility of security. We insist that there is a clear need to take into 

account the factors that negatively affect strategic stability, such as plans to place weapons in outer space, 

to develop non-nuclear armed strategic offensive 

weapons, as well as unilateral deployment of a global 

BMD system. Nor could we ignore the considerable 

imbalances in conventional arms, especially against 

the background of dangerous conflicts persisting in 

many regions of the world. These factors [and their 

interrelationships] must be taken into account in the 

course of discussion on prospects for cuts of tactical 

nuclear weapons.27

There are at least three conditions for the start of 

negotiations on NSNWs that are part of Russia’s official approach to the issue. First, in Russia’s view, 

all nuclear powers should deploy their TNWs only 

on their national territories. Overseas storage infrastructures should be destroyed. Justification of this 

demand from the Russian viewpoint is very simple. 

In the past, when Warsaw Pact conventional superiority was obvious, NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons 

might be considered a means of deterrence. Now with 

the alliance’s obvious conventional superiority, they 

may be considered a means of offense. Second, Russia 

must complete the program of reequipping its armed 

forces and sharply reduce its lag behind the world’s 

leading powers in high-precision weapons. Third, 

negotiations on the limitation and reduction of NSN-
193

Ws should be multilateral, with the participation of 

at least all de jure nuclear states, namely, the Russian 

Federation, the United States, the United Kingdom 

(UK), France, and China.

There is one more interesting aspect of the possible 

negotiations on reductions of TNWs. Back in 2000, the 

United States introduced the concept of “operationally deployed warheads”28 into the strategic offensive 

weapons-reduction negotiations, thus changing the 

whole context of the NSNW problem. According to 

the provisions of the New START Treaty, operationally deployed warheads are those deployed on ICBMs 

and SLBMs. Air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) 

and bombs in heavy bombers are not counted, since 

in peacetime they are kept in storage. Driven by the 

same logic, all tactical nuclear warheads (at least Russian) are not operationally deployed since they are 

also kept in storage. In this connection, it is rather difficult to imagine how the idea—discussed by Steven 

Pifer in Chapter 19 of this book—of a single limit covering all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads (strategic 

and non-strategic, where each side is free to choose 

its own mix of strategic and non-strategic nuclear 

warheads) may be realized. The main problem for the 

United States with such an approach is that, if all nondeployed strategic warheads are counted, the overall 

disparity between Russia and the United States in 

nuclear weapons may disappear. 

As to reductions of nondeployed strategic nuclear 

weapons (warheads and means of delivery), they will 

be carried out in a natural way within the framework 

of implementing the New START Treaty. Since the 

Treaty limits the number of means of delivery, there 

is no practical sense in storing an excessive number of 

nuclear warheads. They would be militarily neutralized and too expensive to maintain.
194

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 

REGARDING NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS 

There are a number of possible confidence-building 

measures (CBMs) intended to create transparency and 

build trust between Russia and the West that could be 

agreed upon in a future agreement on NSNWs:

Greater Transparency. Both Russia and the United 

States have a good idea of the locations where the other 

stores its nuclear warheads, but less solid information 

on numbers. Transparency is desirable by itself and 

essential for any negotiated limits. As one significant 

step, Russia and the United States might agree to disclose publicly the total number of their non-strategic 

nuclear warheads in storage and the number of warheads in the dismantlement queue.

“Demating” Warheads from Delivery Systems. 

Russia has demated nuclear warheads from other nonstrategic delivery systems. The sides might consider as 

a CBM formal statements affirming that nuclear warheads have been demated from their non-strategic delivery systems, and, as a matter of policy, declare that 

there is no intention of mating non-strategic nuclear 

warheads with delivery systems in the future.

Security of Nuclear Warheads. Russia and the 

United States, drawing in part on their Cooperative 

Threat Reduction experiences and working through 

the NATO-Russia Council, could conduct a joint threat 

assessment of the risk of terrorists penetrating a storage site and gaining access to nuclear weapons; partake in a joint security assessment of how site security 

might be improved to guard against such risks; and 
195

continue the practice of conducting recovery exercises 

in which Russia and U.S./NATO forces work together 

to recover stolen nuclear weapons or fissile material.

No Increase Commitment. As a minimal step, 

Russia and the United States might consider announcing that each will not increase the number of its nonstrategic nuclear warheads.

NATO’s Strategic Concept pledged to seek the relocation of Russian nuclear weapons away from NATO 

territory. Such a move on the part of Russia is not 

practical, however, since it would be too costly and 

could reduce the operational capabilities of the Russian armed forces, especially of the Russian Northern Fleet. But the previously listed CBMs on NSNWs 

could by themselves build trust and momentum for 

broader progress on a much wider range of political 

and security issues. 

There is one sensitive issue that must be resolved 

if U.S.-Russian agreement on CBMs regarding TNWs 

is to be reached. Transparency on this issue is very important to some European states. In all the informal 

discussions concerning the question of transparency 

of NSNWs, it is presupposed that the United States is 

going to share information on Russian TNWs with its 

NATO allies. But such an approach is contrary to the 

Russian official position based on reciprocity. Thus, as 

with possible limitations and reductions of NSNWs, 

with regard to CBMs, Russia will definitely insist on 

French and UK involvement in the process or even 

discussion of NATO’s nuclear potential as a whole.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: 

Ferrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, p. 8. 
196

2. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, New York: 

W. W. Norton & Company, 2002, p. 5. 

3. Fyodor Lukyanov, “Russian Dilemmas in a Multipolar 

World,” Columbia Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, 

Spring-Summer, 2010, p. 19. 

4. Ibid., p. 26. 

5. See, for instance, Valentin Romanov’s comments in “V 

stremlenii uiti ot kontrolia OON,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,

No. 26, July 9-15, 1999, p. 4. 

6. Mikhail Molchanov, “Russia and Globalization,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4, 2005, 

p. 414. 

7. This term is adapted from research done by one of Hudson’s students, Lacey Davidson, and is embodied in her unpublished paper, “The Shift in Globalization and Its Impact on 

Russian-American Relations,” 2011, p. 8. She coins the phrase 

“Multipolarity globalism.” Others have dealt with the idea, of 

course. For instance it is the topic of the Doha Round of World 

Trade Organization trade talks where it is called “Multipolarity at the Globalization Age.” See saopaulo2011.ipsa.org/paper/

doha-round-multipolarity-globalization-age.

8. Available from wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/646. 

9. Ibid.

10. Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs, 

2011, p. 155. 

11. Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 

2020 goda, May 12, 2009, para. 45, available from www.scrf.gov.ru/

documents/99.html. 

12. Available from esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp. 

13. The Military Balance, 2010, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 211, cites Russian Chief of 
197

the General Staff Nikolai Makarov on the one-half figure; health 

issues among recruits are discussed on p. 209. 

14. Fyodor Lukyanov, “After Tskhinvali,” Vremya novostei, 

August 11, 2008, p. 1, as translated in Current Digest of the Russian 

Press, Vol. 60, No. 32, September 2, 2008, p. 4, available from dlib.

eastview.com/browse/doc/20437948. 

15. Anton Lavrov, “Timeline of Russian-Georgian Hostilities 

in August 2008,” in Ruslan Pukhov, ed., The Tanks of August, 

Foreword by David Glanz, Moscow, Russia: Center for Analysis 

of Strategies and Technologies, 2010, p. 40. 

16. See also The Military Balance, 2009, London, UK: 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 210-212, for an 

analysis of Russian military performance. 

17. Anton Lavrov, “Russian Air Losses in the Five-Day War 

Against Georgia,” in Pukhov, The Tanks of August, pp. 99, 104. 

Lavrov also notes that supposed “Georgian” aircraft shown as 

shot down on Russian television were actually Russian ones. 

18. Ibid., pp. 99, 105.

19. Sergey Guneev, “Russia to reform its armed forces by 

2020—defense minister,” as reported in RIA Novosti, available 

from en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101031/161152980.html. 

20. Russian Analytical Digest, No. 88, November 29, 2010, p. 4. 

Bank of Finland data. 

21. See www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. 

22. See p. 25, www.senate.gov/general/search/search_cfm.cfm?

q=REsolution+on+Advice+and+Consent&x=16&y=9&site=default_

collection&num=10&filter=0. 

23. All figures concerning Russian tactical nuclear stockpiles 

are expert estimates. 

24. “Tovarishchi potentsial’nye protivniki—Nachal’nik rossiiskogo Genshtaba rasskazal inostrannym voennym attache o re-
198

forme armii,” Vremia novostei, No. 230, December 12, 2008, available from www.vremya.ru/2008/230/4/218862.html. 

25. Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, February 5, 2010, 

para. 22, available from news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461. 

26. Morskaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 

goda, July 27, 2001, Section I-1, available from www.scrf.gov.ru/

documents/34.html. 

27. Available from www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/

cdindex.html. 

28. Statement of the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001, available from www.armscontrol.org/

factsheets/sort-glance#Note3.
199

CHAPTER 8

RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STRATEGIC

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nikolai Sokov

Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) 

remain a hot issue in U.S.-Russian relations, in North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russian relations, and in transatlantic and intra-European relations. The reason they figure so prominently is simple: 

Russia has many more NSNWs than the United States. 

Since the United Kingdom (UK) and France no longer 

have NSNWs, the European balance in that category 

of nuclear weapons is massively skewed—an estimated 180 B-61 nuclear bombs the United States still 

keeps in Europe vis-à-vis several thousand Russian 

weapons, variously estimated to be between 2,000 and 

7,000. A significant—but unknown—share of these is 

deployed in the Asian part of Russia, but usually estimates of the Western-Russian balance proceed from 

the totality of the Russian NSNW arsenal. 

On top of this imbalance, there are also concerns 

about the safety and security of NSNWs in Russia. 

Many believe that these weapons are highly vulnerable to theft or diversion and that some of them lack 

permissive action links (PALs) and thus could be used 

by unauthorized persons. These concerns, which were 

quite valid in the 1990s (the present author has written 

about them in the past), should probably no longer occupy our attention. Older weapons that lacked PALs, 

which could have remained part of the arsenal 15 or 

so years ago, have likely been eliminated or at least refurbished and equipped with protection against unau-
200

thorized use. The massive shuffle of weapons, which 

took place in the first half of 1990s, has long been over, 

and there is no reason to believe that some are still 

lying around unaccountable. Security of storage sites 

has been increased as well, often with U.S. assistance. 

Finally, there is concern about possible security 

threats associated with the large number of Russian 

NSNWs. These include several rather different problems. First, some states in NATO (the Baltic states, 

in particular) are troubled that Russia has deployed 

short-range (tactical) nuclear weapons (TNWs) close 

to their territories and plans to deploy more in Kaliningrad Oblast, an exclave of Russian territory between 

Lithuania and Poland. This concern has once again 

heated up acutely after President Dmitri Medvedev in 

November 2011 threatened to deploy Iskander tactical 

missiles in that region in response to American plans 

to station missile defense assets in Europe1

 (a previous threat, in 2008, was withdrawn after the Barack 

Obama administration revised earlier plans for missile defense formulated under President George W. 

Bush). 

Other worries are more theoretical and have to do 

with the nature of TNWs, which militaries generally 

intend to embed with conventional forces during war. 

Specifically, there is fear that such weapons could be 

released to troops in time of crisis and that authority to 

use them could be delegated to combatant commanders. In this case, any acute crisis could easily result in 

the early use of nuclear weapons, especially if commanders in the field fear losing such weapons to a first 

strike by the United States and NATO. This apprehension is understandable, given not only the overwhelming qualitative superiority of U.S. conventional assets, 

but also the fact that the Russian military appears to 

ascribe to them almost mystical capabilities.
201

Yet these concerns are most likely poorly founded. 

First, there is no reason to believe that Iskander missiles are equipped with nuclear warheads. They certainly could be, but so far there have been no indications that the Russian military assigns them nuclear 

roles. Instead, they fit well the decade-long effort to 

develop high-precision conventional capability. There 

are also no reasons to believe that the ground forces 

have nuclear weapons. This point will be developed 

in detail later in this chapter, but it is sufficient to 

note here that, according to available information, all 

nuclear weapons that were previously assigned to the 

ground forces have been withdrawn and either eliminated or are awaiting dismantlement. Hence, worries 

about early use appear highly exaggerated. As in the 

previous case, such concerns had certain grounds in 

the 1990s, but hardly 15 years later. 

The majority of these trepidations (except those 

that pertain to safety and security of the NSNW stock) 

follow traditional logic, which proceeds from two key 

assumptions: (1) if weapons with certain capabilities 

and in certain numbers exist, there is a political and 

military decision behind that fact, and (2) weapons exist to support one or more missions either in the context of deterrence (suasion through credible threat) or 

in the context of offensive operations. These assumptions have an important corollary: from known facts 

(that is, concerning an arsenal with reasonably known 

parameters) one can derive political decisions and 

military strategy. This logic was widely used during 

the Cold War for analysis of Soviet nuclear strategy. 

It has one, but critical, drawback: the existing arsenal 

can be the result of many other factors—for example, 

of unrelated decisions, inertia, and research and development (R&D) failures. 
202

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the existing 

stockpile of Russian NSNWs, which is but a remnant 

of the Soviet stockpile, does not reflect any conscious 

military and political decisions. Instead, it is a residuum of inertia and lacks a discernible mission. Moreover, Russian resistance to any dialogue on NSNWs 

is a result of domestic politics rather than a desire to 

protect a valuable asset. 

NUMBERS

The size of the Russian NSNW stockpile is notoriously difficult to assess. This author has previously estimated the active stockpile at around 2,000 warheads 

with perhaps as many as double that number slated 

for elimination.2

 That figure closely corresponds with 

the assessment of Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris.3

While Russia has not provided any official numbers, 

it has disclosed that the NSNW force was reduced by 

75 percent since the adoption of Presidential Nuclear 

Initiatives (PNIs) in 1991.4

 If one accepts the high-end 

estimate of the Soviet NSNW arsenal in 1991 as almost 22,000,5

 the figure for the late 2000s should be 

5,000 warheads, which closely matches the Sokov and 

Kristensen-Norris estimates of the entire stockpile, including weapons waiting to be dismantled. It is also 

possible that the number of weapons slated for dismantlement might be even higher.

Perhaps more important than sheer numbers is 

the breakdown of the stockpile into categories, which 

taken together define the non-strategic nuclear posture. Speaking in 2007, General Vladimir Verkhovtsev 

disclosed that Russia had completed elimination of 

warheads assigned to the ground forces, which had 

been promised in 1991 through PNIs by George H. W. 
203

Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. It is not clear whether 

dismantlement had been completed or these weapons 

were only slated for elimination; the latter is probably 

the case given the large numbers of weapons in question. Verkhovtsev also indicated that Russia no longer 

deployed tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs, used as a 

synonym for NSNWs) on surface ships and submarines, but “if necessary . . . could deploy them [and] 

no one should doubt that.”6

 To the extent that one can 

tease the current NSNW posture out of the available 

data, it seems to be as follows:

• Weapons assigned to aircraft. These are the only 

weapons that belong to the “deployed” category under PNIs, although the precise meaning of 

that designation is unclear as bombs and shortrange missiles are not deployed on aircraft in 

peacetime anyway. This category consists of 

two subcategories, the difference being potentially very significant. One is bombs assigned to 

tactical aircraft—the element that is very much 

the same as the United States has in Europe. 

The second subcategory is weapons assigned 

to the medium bomber Tu-22M3. This is certainly not a tactical force by any definition and 

should be more properly classified as an intermediate-range force. The future of these assets 

is unclear since the Tu-22M3 is nearing the end 

of its service life. Which aircraft might assume 

its nuclear roles (and whether any will) is still 

unclear. The most obvious candidate, the Su-24 

and Su-34, have a significantly shorter range. 

There are also plans (quite remote, it seems) to 

develop a new medium bomber.

• Weapons assigned to ships and submarines. 

These are in the “nondeployed” category, 
204

but by most accounts are kept at naval bases 

ready to be loaded aboard on short notice. This 

group includes a variety of weapons—shortand intermediate-range; anti-ship; and those 

designed to destroy targets on land. Although 

they can be employed from surface ships, it is 

strike submarines, especially the new class of 

strike submarines now emerging in Russia, that 

serve as the main platforms of these weapons.

• Weapons assigned to air defense and missile 

defense. The roles of these weapons are unclear, and it is difficult to fathom why Russia 

still retains them. Warheads for the Moscow 

missile defense system in particular do not 

have a discernible role except for various flavors of psychological manipulation. No one in 

Russia seems enthralled by the idea of high-altitude nuclear bursts over Moscow for purposes of defense, but the system apparently cannot 

function without nuclear warheads (work on 

advanced non-nuclear missile defense assets, 

the S-500, is still in the early stages), so one 

could conclude that the retention of nuclear 

warheads for missile defense is a formality. In 

any event, all warheads in that category are reportedly kept separate from delivery vehicles, 

meaning that neither the missile defense nor 

the remaining nuclear-capable air defense assets are operational on short notice.

• Warheads for the ground forces. They have apparently been removed from the active stockpile, but there is probably a fair number of 

those that still await dismantlement; whether 

there are any warheads that remain usable 

(i.e., were refurbished relatively recently) is 
205

anyone’s guess. As mentioned above, there 

has been a strong foreign concern, especially in 

the Baltic states, that the deployment of shortrange Iskander missiles signifies a new nuclear 

deployment, but so far there has been no indication that these missiles are equipped with 

nuclear warheads or that a stockpile of nuclear 

warheads is readily available for them. At least 

one well-placed independent expert, Igor Korotchenko, raised the prospect that Iskanders 

might be equipped with nuclear warheads,7

 but 

the meaning of his statement is unclear: first, it 

seems to suggest that today Iskanders are not 

nuclear; second, it might represent just another 

instance of a scare tactic as Moscow tries to persuade NATO to reach accommodation on missile defense.

• Nuclear mines and portable nuclear mines. All 

have reportedly been eliminated.

Even the very limited available data about the Russian NSNW stockpile allows us to draw several important conclusions about longer-term trends:

• The arsenal is clearly dwindling. Verkhovtsev noted, in the above-referenced interview, 

that reductions were deeper than in those prescribed by the PNIs—75 percent compared to 

the required 64 percent. The 75 percent statement was made in 2005. Since then, Russia 

has continued to report the 75 percent figure, 

but that most likely reflects a reluctance to go 

through a complicated interagency process to 

ascertain and get approval for updated figures.

• All available data suggest that the arsenal will 

continue to dwindle, albeit at a slow pace, most 
206

likely determined by the limited capacity of 

warhead dismantlement processes. It is impossible to determine what the end goal is or 

whether Russia even has a clear-cut development plan for the ultimate size of the NSNW 

force. It appears possible that no such determination has yet been made. Reductions proceed 

in a piecemeal fashion, much as the United 

States gradually reduced its NSNW force in 

Europe over the last 2 decades.

• The changes in the composition of the NSNW 

arsenal hint at the degree of utility assigned 

to different categories. Clearly, the naval warheads represent the most valuable element of 

the arsenal while the ground forces no longer 

need them (at least the military and political 

leaderships do not see value in nuclear missions for these forces). The same might be true 

for the missile defense and air defense NSNWs, 

although information about these categories 

is very sketchy. Non-strategic missions for the 

Air Force seem to occupy the middle ground 

between these two extremes.

Evolutionary trends of the NSNW arsenals will 

be treated in greater depth in the next section. At the 

moment, the most important conclusion is that the 

NSNW arsenal will continue to shrink, and the gap 

between the American and the Russian NSNW forces 

will slowly narrow on their own accord without extraordinary action on the part of the United States and 

NATO.
207

STRATEGY

Russian NSNWs attracted international attention 

in the mid-1990s, when Russian government, military, 

and nongovernmental experts were discussing options 

for a response to the increased perceived-threat level 

as a result of NATO enlargement.8

 At that time, some 

regarded enhanced reliance on short-range assets as 

an attractive way to balance the perceived new threat. 

The advantages of that response seemed convincing: 

the arsenal was ready at hand, the military could use 

existing manuals and doctrines, and the limited-use 

option appeared more credible than a response solely 

with strategic weapons. 

Such discussion did not translate into policy, however. The Boris Yeltsin government opted for a political 

solution (the NATO-Russia Charter), so that NSNWs 

remained in limbo for a few more years. In 1997 and 

1998, the Russian government issued a series of policy 

documents—“The National Security Concept” (December 1997) and several decrees signed by Yeltsin in 

July and August 19989—which stipulated a single mission for nuclear weapons, that of strategic deterrence 

(that is, the use of nuclear weapons was confined to the 

one mission of global war). The only tangible result of 

the NSNW discussion preceding the Yeltsin decisions 

was greater attention paid to NSNWs, including making them a target for early deep reductions.

The game-changer for Russian nuclear strategy 

was the war in Kosovo in 1999. The war was widely 

regarded in Russia as evidence that the United States 

and NATO were prone to use force whenever they 

could not obtain what they wanted through diplomacy. The fact that the war was launched without authorization by the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
208

was particularly troubling, as Russia had regarded its 

right of veto there as an important tool ensuring its 

immunity to foreign interference in its sphere of influence. It was obvious to everyone that a new round of 

the war in Chechnya was not far off (in fact, it had 

started in the fall of 1999, with the incursion of Chechens into neighboring Dagestan; but even without 

that, a new Russian campaign to restore control over 

Chechnya was almost inevitable in the next year or 

two). Moscow came to be seriously concerned about 

the possible interference of the United States and 

NATO in that next war—the situation being almost 

identical to the conflict in Kosovo. 

Little wonder, then, that even before the war in 

Kosovo ended, the Russian Security Council (Vladimir Putin chaired the first meeting in the capacity of 

Secretary) commissioned the development of a new 

military doctrine as the fundamental blueprint of the 

country’s defense policy. From the very beginning 

nuclear weapons were assigned a prominent place. To 

deter the numerically and qualitatively superior U.S. 

and NATO conventional forces, the new Military Doctrine of 2000 proposed the concept of “de-escalation”—

the threat of a limited nuclear strike in response to a 

large-scale attack that exceeded the defense capability of Russian conventional forces.10 Essentially, this 

meant that nuclear weapons were assigned a second 

mission in addition to deterring a global war. 

Many elements of the new doctrine were not developed in detail until subsequent years. The t’s were 

crossed and i’s dotted in 2003, in a document titled 

“Current Tasks for the Development of the Russian 

Federation’s Armed Forces.”11 While the 2000 document replaced the traditional criterion of “unacceptable damage” to the enemy with a narrower one, “tai-
209

lored damage” (zadannyi ushcherb), the 2003 document 

for the first time defined “tailored damage” to mean 

“damage, subjectively unacceptable to the enemy, 

which exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to 

gain as a result of the use of military force.” Tailored 

damage is particularly associated with the mission of 

de-escalation: a limited response with limited damage 

in response to a limited attack would, it was hoped, 

de-escalate the crisis. 

The 2003 document also provided vital clues to 

the role of various elements of the Russian nuclear 

forces. The section on the nature of contemporary 

wars and armed conflicts emphasized, in particular, 

that the United States and its allies demonstrated the 

pattern of using long-range strike weapons, including 

airborne delivery systems and submarine-launched 

cruise missiles (SLCMs), at an early stage of wars in 

the 1990s. It also noted that victory was assured by 

the ability of the United States and NATO to achieve 

domination at the early stage of conflict. Accordingly, 

the new document postulated: 

the utmost necessity of having the capability to strike 

military assets of the enemy (long-range high-precision 

weapons, long-range air forces) outside the immediate 

area of conflict. To achieve this, [we] need both our 

own long-range high-precision strike capability and 

other assets that enable [us] to transfer hostilities directly to enemy territory.12

By implication, then, the limited nuclear strike had 

to be executed at an early stage of the conflict. 

These provisions left little role for short-range 

nuclear weapons. Exercises held since the adoption of 

the 2000 military doctrine simulated limited nuclear 

use against airbases and aircraft carriers from which 
210

the United States was expected to fly missions against 

Russia, as well as against command and control centers. Targets featured in these simulations were located throughout Europe, the Pacific, South-East Asia, 

Indian Ocean, and even the continental United States. 

Short-range weapons (such as tactical land-based missiles or tactical aircraft) could not reach these targets. 

Instead, simulations featured medium and heavy 

bombers carrying gravity bombs, short-range missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

Nuclear warheads for submarine launched cruise 

missiles of various ranges, which are stored in 

12th Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony 

(GUMO)13 facilities at naval bases, appear to be another 

component of the forces Russia could use in a conflict 

with NATO. Russian naval commanders admit that 

they simply cannot confront the U.S. Navy—in the 

case of a direct clash between Russia and the United 

States—without reliance on these assets. Accordingly, 

crews of surface ships and submarines have reportedly trained to mate warheads to SLCMs and launch 

them.14 In fact, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev, deputy 

chief of the Navy’s Main Staff, declared that the role of 

TNWs on attack nuclear submarines would increase. 

“The range of tactical nuclear weapons is growing, as 

is their accuracy. They do not need to deliver highyield warheads; instead it is possible to make a transition to low-yield nuclear warheads that could be 

installed on the existing types of cruise missiles,” he 

asserted.15

The 2010 Military Doctrine did not change these 

provisions. The mission of de-escalation was apparently not even discussed in depth, at least not at the 

public level; attention was concentrated almost exclusively on the new attempt at military reform. The only 
211

intrigue pertaining to nuclear weapons concerned the 

proposal to expand de-escalation to one more category 

of conflicts: the 2000 document had assigned nuclear 

weapons only to “global” and “regional” wars,16 but 

in 2009 there was a proposal to also assign them to “local wars.”17 This proposal would have applied nuclear 

weapons to situations like the war with Georgia in 

2008 and was finally rejected. Where non-strategic nuclear assets are concerned, the failure of the proposal 

to expand the role of nuclear missions to a new type 

of conflict only confirmed that there were few, if any, 

targets in the immediate vicinity of Russia. 

Thus, the Russian strategy regarding use of nuclear 

weapons for purposes of deterrence has not changed 

since 1999 (or 2000, the year of its formal adoption). 

The place of NSNWs in this strategy is not straightforward. It appears that Russia continues to rely on 

longer-range air- and sea-based NSNWs as well as 

on shorter-range anti-ship and anti-submarine naval 

NSNWs. The other NSNWs do not appear to have a 

discernible role. In fact, Moscow is clearly not concerned about the traditional Cold War-style largescale invasion using traditional conventional armies. 

Hence, it does not need TNWs for roles like NATO 

assigned to them during the Cold War (deterrence of 

tank armies). The broad assertion about Russia needing NSNWs to compensate for weakness of its conventional forces misses an important point: it is a different 

type of conventional forces that Russia is concerned 

about, forces with technologically enhanced capabilities, hence the assets it needs to confront them are also 

different.

Short-range weapons are also believed to have 

another role—that of deterring Chinese conventional 

forces.18 The logic is similar to that underlying the com-
212

mon belief about the role of TNWs vis-à-vis NATO: if 

the opponent has superior conventional forces, Russian needs to rely on nuclear weapons. While Russia 

faces a conventional force in the European theater that 

is technologically superior, in the Eastern theater Chinese superiority is numerical, hence the role of NSNWs 

should be the same as the one NATO assigned to them 

during the Cold War. 

It is difficult to judge whether such reasoning is 

the real view; rumors about simulated use of a tactical nuclear weapon in the Far East during large-scale 

maneuvers seem to confirm it. In the Far East, Russia 

does face somewhat the same situation confronting 

NATO during the Cold War—nuclear weapons would 

be used on its own territory and against densely populated and relatively economically developed areas. 

Yet, Russia does not have the same opportunity that 

NATO had: while NATO could use TNWs against Soviet/Warsaw Pact troops and military infrastructure 

on the latter’s side of the border, Russia does not have 

this advantage in the Far East because there are few 

valuable targets on the Chinese side of the RussianChinese border. In the absence of sufficiently reliable 

information about nuclear planning for the Eastern 

theater, and given General Verkhovtsev’s statement 

that all land-based TNWs have been removed from 

the active stockpile, one can rely only on what seems 

most reasonable. It seems that if NSNWs have a role 

vis-à-vis China, they should be employing air-based 

delivery systems that have longer ranges than landbased ones. 

Confidential interviews with high-level Russian 

military officials indicate that the nuclear weapons 

assigned to deter China are the strategic and intermediate-range ones, that is, the weapons capable of 
213

reaching political, military, and economic targets deep 

inside China. The logic here is similar to that applied 

in the military doctrine for deterrence of the United 

States and NATO: the emphasis is on long-range assets. This makes sense. The quantitative preponderance of China is extremely high while the qualitative 

gap now favoring Russia is narrowing quickly (perhaps it has already disappeared); thus any deterrence 

of China can only be strategic in nature if it is to be 

effective. 

DOMESTIC POLITICS

If NSNWs do not have an authentic role in Russian 

military strategy, at least where NATO is concerned, 

an obvious question is why Moscow remains so sensitive to even the mildest proposals dealing with the 

transparency of its NSNW arsenal, to say nothing 

about proposals for reductions. The answer to this dilemma seems to lie in the realm of the internal politics 

of Russia rather than its military policy. It is a complex 

mix of domestic and bureaucratic politics, (mis)perceptions, and idiosyncrasies. 

“No More Unreciprocated Concessions.”

Western attempts to convince Russia to reduce 

its sizable NSNW arsenal emphasize reason and fairness: if Russia does not need these weapons, if it has 

massive superiority in that category, it should accept 

reductions. To a large extent, this view hearkens back 

to the late 1980s, during the Gorbachev-Eduard Shevardnadze time, when the Soviet Union would sometimes make what Shevardnadze once called “concessions to common sense.” But this is not how the 
214

majority of Russians (even those opposed to Putin/

Medvedev government) think today. Among broad 

sections of the public and elite, the late 1980s and the 

1990s are associated with unreciprocated concessions 

that actually undermined the interests and security of 

the Soviet Union and later Russia. Proponents of this 

view cite the enlargement of NATO and the refusal 

of the United States to include navies under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as examples 

of Western perfidy. Russians also turn the argument 

around, saying there is no justification for even a limited number of U.S. TNWs in Europe since NATO is 

much more powerful than Russia—these weapons 

should have been withdrawn. 

Within this dominant political framework, therefore, any Russian advantage, no matter how illusory, 

should be either preserved or exchanged for Western 

concessions in areas of interest to Russia. Furthermore, 

persistent attempts to persuade Russia to reduce its 

TNWs or at least disclose their location, numbers, and 

other information, tend to be regarded with reflexive 

suspicion, without serious thought about the reasoning behind the proposals. Instead, such attempts are 

seen as “proof” that these weapons are truly valuable. 

Hence, the “asking price” rises even higher. The bottom line is simple: Russia will likely turn deaf ears to 

Western entreaties on its NSNWs under any foreseeable leadership configuration whether Putin-Medvedev, Putin, Medvedev, or any realistically electable 

member of the opposition.
215

Inertia. 

The longer this position is maintained, the more 

entrenched it becomes. The key elements of the current Russian position have remained unchanged for 

over a decade. Changing it without manifestly cogent 

reasons might seem to the other party to be an unjustified concession. Such a dynamic can be changed only 

with a radical leadership change (as happened when 

Gorbachev assumed the highest office in the Soviet 

Union) or with a sea change in the environment. Neither is present or appears on the horizon today. 

“CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING”

The Russian elite, including the military leadership, acutely feels the uncertainty of the international 

environment. The main threat is still associated with 

the United States and its allies, but other potential 

threats are emerging (China in particular), and the 

Russian military is reluctant to part with any assets 

it has at its disposal. In 2005-07, similar arguments 

were made in favor of Russia’s withdrawal from the 

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, rationalized by the possession or impending development of intermediate-range missiles by “other states.” 

Although specific states were never mentioned, the 

culprits were obvious—China, India, Pakistan, Israel, 

Iran, and perhaps even North Korea. What emerged 

was the concept of “capabilities-based planning,” 

which favors maintenance of all available assets as 

insurance against unforeseen (and unforeseeable) 

threats. 

Moreover, Russian efforts to develop a modern 

conventional capability have been very slow and 
216

should be judged as largely unsuccessful. Strong nonnuclear capability will hardly emerge before the end 

of this decade and will more likely be well into the 

next one. Consequently, nuclear weapons retain potentially high value, not only in the eyes of the military 

but also in the eyes of the public, the latter mostly for 

psychological reasons. The military will be reluctant 

to sacrifice even assets that are seemingly unnecessary 

until such time as the new military posture becomes 

clearer and the outcome of the ongoing stage of military reform can be reasonably well anticipated. 

Parochial Group Politics.

The current Russian position on TNWs can also be 

attributed to a peculiar alignment of relevant interest groups within the military. As was noted above, 

NSNWs do not figure prominently in the current 

nuclear strategy, but this generalization does not apply equally to all parts of the military. The Navy is interested in keeping TNWs as a “just-in-case” option,19

especially vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy. In contrast, the Air 

Force appears much less interested in TNWs except 

for weapons assigned to Tu-22M3 medium bombers. Other groups such as the ground forces, having 

all but lost them, probably have even less interest in 

TNWs. While the majority of the forces have limited 

interest in NSNWs and could, with the right set of inducements, support reductions, they will not take the 

lead in investing political resources to support such a 

policy. Thus, outside the Navy, support for NSNWs 

can be characterized as “a mile wide, but a foot deep.” 

The Navy, however, has a strong and focused interest in maintaining NSNWs. In the absence of a strong 

opposing constituency, its interest inevitably prevails.
217

In a similar vein, the Foreign Ministry, another 

important player in the arms control “game,” is also 

reluctant to push for a change of the Russian position: 

it has many other more pressing items on its agenda, 

and apparently seeks to exploit NSNWs as a lever to 

achieve diplomatic goals. In other words, the present 

lineup of interest groups within the Russian government strongly favors the continuation of the current 

position. It can be changed only in response to a strong 

push from above, from the political leadership. The 

alternative is some sort of package deal that includes 

major western concessions. Over the years, however, 

the “asking price” has become so high that NATO 

concessions on the scale needed to win the national 

majority to the side of NSNW reduction, or even serious transparency, appear unlikely.

ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES 

Russian ambivalence with regard to NSNWs might 

also reflect the challenges of crafting a verifiable treaty. 

The traditional approach, according to which nuclear 

weapons are accounted for and neutralized through 

verifiable reduction of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, is inapplicable to TNWs. New accounting rules 

and verification procedures need to be designed for 

these weapons. This endeavor, in turn, involves much 

more intrusive verification at military bases and, for 

the first time, at one of the most sensitive categories 

of nuclear-related facilities—storage sites for nuclear 

weapons. While such procedures are not, in principle, 

unthinkable, it would require a huge investment of 

political resources to overcome entrenched resistance 

and political opposition.
218

Paradoxically, transparency itself does not elicit 

much opposition, especially among the professional 

military. Resistance seems rather to reflect embarrassment at publicly announcing very high figures 

(and possibly confirming that unofficial estimates of 

the Russian NSNW arsenal are reasonably accurate). 

This putative embarrassment was probably the main 

reason why Russia did not divulge official data about 

its nuclear stockpile following the U.S. example in the 

spring of 2010 at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

Review Conference. Unofficially, members of the Russian delegation indicated that Moscow would soon 

do the same and even expressed irritation that Washington went ahead with its announcement without 

coordinating it with Moscow. Almost two years later, 

however, the figures have still not been published. 

The third popular Western proposal—the withdrawal of NSNWs away from the border with NATO 

appears the most broadly acceptable, except to the 

Navy. As a rule, the Russian military responds with 

the question, How far from the border? It appears 

reluctant to withdraw NSNWs to an area beyond the 

Urals because China could interpret that as a hostile 

move. On the other hand, the military seems quite relaxed about withdrawal by a shorter distance (beyond 

the Volga, for example). The Navy is an exception here 

again—the bulk of its NSNWs are at the bases of the 

Northern Fleet right across the border from Norway. 

These weapons cannot be moved because the Navy 

does not have bases further east, so it also argues 

against proposals involving withdrawal.
219

THE RUSSIAN NSNW POSITION: LIMITS AND 

CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION

The Russian position on TNWs appears very static 

and also very stable. The rationale for keeping a relatively large arsenal of such nuclear weapons appears 

relatively weak: short-range weapons do not have a 

role while retention of intermediate-range assets enjoys limited support in the Air Force, with only the 

Navy appearing to be a die-hard advocate of keeping 

them. Of greater importance is the fact that support 

for the reduction of sub-strategic weapons does not 

exist at all. While the reasons for that alignment of 

interests and positions are political and more often 

than not psychological, their strength should not be 

underestimated. Hence, again, it is difficult to expect 

a major shift in the Russian attitude toward NSNWs in 

the near future.

The current Russian position, which conditions any 

dialogue on NSNWs in the context of a proposed withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from Europe, has a certain logic 

behind it, as discussed earlier (since NATO has conventional superiority over Russia, it does not need nuclear weapons). More important, the Russian position 

is calculated to avoid discussion of Russian NSNWs.

Moscow has calculated—correctly—that NATO would 

not be able to agree on complete withdrawal. Difficult 

deliberations within the Alliance during the last several years (in the run-up to the Tallinn, Estonia, ministerial meeting, continuing to the Lisbon, Portugal, 

summit, and now in the context of NATO’s upcoming 

Defense and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) have 

confirmed the validity of this calculation. 

If anything, the Russian position has only toughened. During the New START ratification hearings, 
220

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared on the subject of NSNWs that negotiations cannot be held on 

just one element of the strategic balance because that 

balance includes many other elements, such as conventional strategic weapons, space-based weapons, 

missile defense, and imbalance in conventional forces 

(in that order).20 The piling up of additional conditions 

reflected perhaps the perceived Russian fear of stronger U.S. pressure on Moscow with regard to NSNW 

negotiations and of the possibility that the Obama 

administration might actually offer a complete withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from Europe as part of a proposed package (there was widespread belief in 2009 

that withdrawal was on the agenda of the new White 

House team). 

Complete withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from Europe 

remains perhaps the only option to force Russia to start 

discussion of NSNWs: Russia has promised to do so 

and, whether it wants to or not, it will not have much 

choice. This option appears closed for the moment, 

however, since NATO is unlikely to abandon the Lisbon consensus in the near future. Paradoxically, complete withdrawal of U.S. NSNWs from Europe might 

be regarded in Moscow as less than a positive development because it would force Russia to do something, 

while the domestic lineup is clearly in favor of doing 

nothing. It seems that Moscow would be satisfied if 

the current international debate on NSNWs comes to 

naught, as have previous discussions of the topic. One 

is forced to question the very existence of any Russian interest in the issue of U.S. NSNWs in Europe that 

could be leveraged by the United States and NATO.

Given that situation in Moscow, prospects for 

control, reduction, and/or transparency of NSNWs 

appear bleak. Of late, the Russian military has gravi-
221

tated to what it calls an “integrative” assessment of 

the Russia-NATO military balance, which includes all 

elements of the equation and seems to point to a very 

comprehensive package that would be required to 

achieve movement on this one element. Other chapters 

in the present book also point this out as a key Russian 

approach. The package would include all elements 

listed by Lavrov in the statement referenced above: 

conventional forces—probably within the framework 

of Adapted CFE; space-based weapons (it remains 

unclear exactly how Russians define them); certainly 

missile defense; and long-range conventional assets. 

Within that list, most items are a no-go for NATO. 

The Alliance has not been able to agree on the withdrawal of TNWs—owing to a large extent to the 

position of some East/Central European members. 

Now, even the erstwhile proponents of that move, 

the Germans, seem to have accepted the consensus 

position, which foresees reductions on both sides 

under the assumption that some number—probably 

a smaller number—of U.S. TNWs would remain in 

Europe. Progress on the Adapted CFE is blocked by 

the continuing controversy about the status of Russian 

troops in Transdniestria, the would-be break-away region from Moldova (Moscow claims their troops do 

not constitute a base, but rather a small contingent 

of peacekeepers), as well as the presence of Russian 

troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow 

now regards as independent states to which the original 1999 Istanbul agreements would be inapplicable. 

It should be noted, however, that long-range conventional strike assets probably represent the only 

truly valid concern for Russia. It was noted above that 

the key security issue for the Russian military is the 

repetition of what has come to be regarded as stan-
222

dard American strategy—inflicting severe casualties, 

even near defeat, on the enemy during the opening 

stage of any military campaign using precision-guided weapons launched from long distances. It was also 

noted that Russian “de-escalation” strategy foresees 

limited use of nuclear weapons against bases, aircraft 

carriers, and command and control centers involved 

in such a campaign. 

Seen from that perspective, the unfavorable balance of traditional conventional forces in Europe, 

which are subject to the CFE Treaty (as well as to the 

Adapted CFE) are not much of a concern for Moscow. 

They expect that an attack, if it took place, would not 

involve these forces. Hence, one could, under the right 

set of circumstances, easily drop CFE issues from the 

package advocated by Moscow. Missile defense could 

also be discussed separately, in the context of the strategic balance. 

Tackling NSNWs and long-range strike assets 

within the same agreement would be highly uncomfortable and unconventional. Yet, if we cannot agree 

on the complete withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from 

Europe, this approach is something to think about. 

Ukrainian researcher Polina Sinovets proposed in a 

recent paper that a ratio of one NSNW per an agreed 

number of conventional strike assets could be established to achieve at least some reduction of Russian 

NSNWs and a set of transparency measures covering 

both classes of assets in Europe.21 This would not be 

an easy package to negotiate, but at least it would attempt to meet Russian concerns. At the moment, unfortunately, the U.S./NATO position certainly does 

not force Moscow to negotiate, nor even tempt it to 

do so.
223

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. “Zayavlenieprezidenta v svyazi s situatsiei, kotorayaslozhilasvokrugsistemy PRO stran NATO v Evrope” (Statement of the 

President with Respect to the Situation that has Emerged Around 

the Missile Defense System of NATO Countries in Europe), November 23, 2011, available from president.kremlin.ru/news/13637.

2. Miles Pomper, Willian Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing 

and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 

CNS Occasional Paper, December 2009.

3. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear 

Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 67, 2011, 

available from bos.sagepub.com/content/67/3/67.full.pdf+html. 

4. “Prakticheskie Shagi Rossiiskoi Federatsii Oblasti Yadernogo Razoruzheniya” (“Practical Actions of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Disarmament”), Report presented at 

the 7th NPT Review Conference, 2005, slide 13, available from 

www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/10aa6ac6e80702fc432569ea003612f0/526da0

88ef7526e3c325700d002f81c7/$FILE/Presentation-Russian.pdf; “Rossiya Perevypolnila Plany po Sokrashcheniyu Yadernogo Oruzhiya” (“Russia Has Overfulfilled the Plan for Reduction of Nuclear 

Weapons”), RIA-Novosti, June 22, 2005, available from www.rian.

ru/politics/20050622/40566772.html. 

5. Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and De-Alerting: A Russian 

Perspective,” The Nuclear Turning Point, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 320. 

6. Nikolai Poroskov, “Takticheskii Yadernyi Kozyr” (“A Tactical Nuclear Ace”), Vremya Novostei, September 7, 2007. 

7. Igor Korotchenko is a member of the “Public Council” of 

the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—a body similar in status and 

function to an advisory board. It consists of public figures selected by the MOD and advises/consults with the military on a 

variety of issues. The impact on decisions made by the military 

leadership is apparently barely discernible, but membership on 

the council provides some public stature, and Korotchenko in 

particular seems often to serve as a conduit for announcements 

that the military does not want attributed to itself. 
224

8. For details of the debates on the TNW role in Russia in the 

mid-1990s, see Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step for Arms Control,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 

4, Winter 1997, pp. 17-27.

9. The text of the 1997 National Security Concept can be 

found at the Internet site of the Russian Security Council, available from www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/snconold.htm. The 1998 

decisions included the decree by Boris Yeltsin titled “On urgent 

measures toward reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian 

Federation” (July 1997), and two Security Council documents: 

“The Concept of Development of Nuclear Forces until 2010” and 

“The Foundations (Concept) of State Policy in the Area of Defense Development until 2005” (July-August 1998). The texts of 

these documents are classified, but their general thrust could be 

gleaned from newspaper publications. See “Sovet Bezopasnosti 

RF Reshil Sokhranit Trekhkomponentnyi Sostav Strategicheskikh 

Yadernykh Sil,” Interfax, No. 4, July 3, 1998; “Russia to be Major 

Nuclear Power in 3d Millennium—Official,” ITAR-TASS, July 3, 

1998; Ivan Safronov and Ilya Bulavinov, “Boris Yeltsin Podnyal 

Yadernyi Shchit,” Kommersant-Daily, July 4, 1998; Yuri Golotuyk, 

“Yadernoe Razoruzhenie Neizbezhno,” Russkii Telegraph, July 11, 

1998; Yuri Golotuyk, “Moskva Skorrektirovala Svoi Yadernye Argumenty,” Russkii Telegraph, July 4, 1998; Anatoli Yurkin, “Perspektivy Voennogo Stroitelstva,” Krasnaya Zvezda, August 5, 1998, 

pp. 1, 3; Oleg Falichev, “Vpervye So Vremeni Miluykovskikh Reform,” Krasnaya Zvezda, August 18, 1998, pp. 1-2. 

10. For an analysis of nuclear policy-related elements of the 

2000 National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, see Nikolai 

Sokov, Russia’s New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle, 

January 2000; and An Assessment of the Draft Russian Military Doctrine, October 1999.

11. “Aktualnye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF” 

(“Current Tasks for the Development of the Russian Federation’s 

Armed Forces”), Report of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, October 2, 2003. 

12. Ibid., p. 32.
225

13. The 12th Main Department of the Ministry of Defense 

(GUMO) is in charge of handling nuclear weapons from the moment they are received from a production facility and until they 

are returned to the nuclear complex for refurbishment or dismantlement. The 12th GUMO has storage facilities where nuclear 

weapons are normally kept to be released to troops in case of 

emergency; weapons are serviced only by 12th GUMO personnel. 

One partial exception is the weapons permanently deployed on 

strategic delivery vehicles, but even then personnel of Strategic 

Forces or the Navy do not handle them—deployment, removal, 

and servicing are performed by 12th GUMO personnel, and spare 

warheads are kept at 12th GUMO storage facilities attached to 

military bases. This system, which was created in the early days 

of the Soviet nuclear program, is supposed to ensure that operational commanders cannot have control of nuclear weapons. 

14. Interviews with Russian officials (who requested anonymity). 

15. “Rol Takticheskogo Yadernogo Oruzhiya na Mnogotselevykh APL Vozrastet – VMF” (“The Role of Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons on Multipurpose Submarines Set to Grow—the Navy”), 

RIA-Novosti, August 23, 2009, available from www.rian.ru/defense_

safety/20090323/165742858.html. 

16. The notion of global war is self-explanatory; the category 

of regional wars pertains to the situation when Russia faces a coalition of states, some from out of the area and/or some of them 

nuclear. The example the drafters of the 2000 Military Doctrine

had in mind was escalation of the war in Chechnya through direct military involvement of the United States and its allies. The 

doctrine also included two other categories: (1) “local war” (in 

which Russia faces one or more neighboring states that have limited goals); (2) and “military conflict,” which means fighting with 

nonstate actors (such as the war in Chechnya). 

17. “Menyaetsya Rossiya, Menyaetsya i ee Voennaya Doktrina” (“As Russia Changes, its Military Doctrine Changes Too”), 

Izvestiya, October 14, 2009. 

18. See, for example, Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and DeAlerting: A Russian Perspective,” p. 321.
226

19. It is ironic that confidential interviews conducted in 1991-

92 among U.S. officials attributed the rejection by George H. W. 

Bush of the Russian proposal to start negotiations on a legally 

binding and verifiable treaty on TNWs of the U.S. Navy, which 

was reluctant to allow on-site inspections of ships and submarines to confirm the absence of nuclear warheads. 

20. “Stenogramma Vystupleniya Ministra Inostrannykh Del 

Rossii S.V. Lavrova na Plenarnom Zasedanii Gosudarstvennoi 

Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii npo Novomy 

Dogovoru o SNV,” Moscow, Russia, January 14, 2011.

21. Polina Sinovets, “Minimal Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability: How Much is Enough?” Paper commissioned by 

Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) to be published by POSSE in the spring of 2012.
227

PART III

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

229

CHAPTER 9

INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN POLICIES 

AND OPINIONS

RELATING TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Douglas Stuart

The four chapters in this section provide readers 

with excellent surveys of the positions taken by European governments on the question of whether tactical 

nuclear weapons (TNWs)—or non-strategic nuclear 

weapons (NSNWs), as they are frequently referred to 

in the present book—should be retained by the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Readers will 

also come away with a good sense of European public opinion relating to this complex issue. What they 

are not likely to take away from these chapters is a 

sense of optimism or a sense of policy direction. The 

European debate over TNWs is, in the words of one 

influential report, “at an impasse,” for four reasons.1

The first factor that confounds debate on TNWs is 

a lack of consensus on the role that they can and do 

play. On the one hand, there is widespread agreement 

that TNWs are of little or no military value. On the 

other hand, the European allies disagree on the political and psychological value of these weapons. Some 

governments continue to view TNWs as an important 

symbol of Washington’s Article 5 commitment to the 

security of its NATO allies, while others are less convinced of, or less concerned about, the contribution 

that TNWs make to America’s extended deterrence 

guarantee. 

The fact that the NATO allies cannot agree on the 

purpose or value of tactical nuclear weapons in Eu-
230

rope is illustrative of a more fundamental problem of 

strategic incoherence that plagues both NATO and the 

European Union (EU). Both institutions have engaged 

in sophisticated forms of obfuscation in order to reconcile the multiple interests and concerns of their 

member states and preserve maximum policy flexibility. For example, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept drops 

the specific commitment of its predecessor (the 1999 

Strategic Concept) to maintain the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that serve as the delivery systems for the 

forward-deployed TNWs. This kind of commitment 

avoidance makes sense from a diplomatic point of 

view, but it is at the expense of the Alliance’s strategic 

clarity.

The second factor that contributes to the impasse 

over the future of TNWs is fundamental disagreement within NATO about the removal or retention 

of these systems. At the core of this disagreement are 

the positions taken by the two leading nations of the 

EU. France, which still celebrates its force de frappe 

as a source of status and security, is opposed to the 

removal of TNWs from Europe, or any significant 

change in NATO’s strategic doctrine, because such 

action might make it harder for Paris to maintain its 

own nuclear posture. This position has placed France 

in direct conflict with Germany, which has taken on 

the role of leader of the Alliance’s pro-nuclear disarmament wing. All other European NATO members 

have staked out positions between these two poles, or 

avoided making commitments. The chapters by Paolo 

Foradori and Götz Neuneck in this section provide 

readers with information on where most of the major 

European NATO allies are located on this continuum.

The third barrier to progress is the role played by 

Russia in the evolving debate over TNWs. Or perhaps 
231

it would be more accurate to refer to the “non-role” 

played by Moscow. NATO governments continue to 

hope that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons can 

be resolved through negotiations with Russia. This 

has made it easier for all NATO members to defer 

decisions relating to TNWs. But, as discussed earlier 

in this volume, there is little reason to expect much 

cooperation from Moscow unless the issue of tactical 

nuclear weapons can be folded into some larger negotiation involving conventional forces, missile defense, 

strategic systems, and perhaps space systems.

 The fourth complicating factor is the mixed messages sent by the Alliance leader, the United States. 

Washington could break the logjam on the issue of 

TNWs either by unilateral removal of these systems 

or by taking an assertive position on some other approach in Alliance deliberations. It has chosen not to 

do so largely out of concern for Alliance cohesion. At 

the same time, however, the Barack Obama administration has contributed to the growing pressure for nuclear disarmament in Europe by its negotiation of the 

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 

in 2010 and by the President’s “Global Zero” speech 

in Prague, the Czech Republic, in 2009. It would be 

relatively easy for Washington to press the case for the 

removal of the remaining TNWs from Europe as the 

next logical step in this campaign.

A strong argument can be made for doing so, because the risks associated with the current impasse 

are greater than the risks of unilateral or negotiated 

removal of these militarily obsolete weapons. The 

first risk is that the current situation will resolve itself by “disarmament by default.” This could occur 

as, one by one, the European nations that currently 

host TNWs fail to provide the necessary support for 
232

maintaining these weapons or their associated DCA. 

This scenario would probably lead to a new and acrimonious burden-sharing debate at a time when all 

allied governments are facing intense economic problems, when public support for the Alliance is soft, and 

when the United States is becoming increasingly preoccupied with the Asia-Pacific region.2

 A second, and 

perhaps related, risk is that NATO governments will 

lose control of the issue of TNWs in Europe as a result 

of political or extra-political actions by anti-nuclear 

movements. The chapter by Nick Childs in this section should alert readers to how vulnerable European 

governments are to this type of scenario.

The issue of TNWs in Europe is one of those rare 

cases in international politics where the process by 

which a decision is made is probably more important 

than the specific decision itself. If the current impasse 

could be sustained indefinitely, then NATO would 

have little reason for concern. But a number of factors 

are converging to undermine this prospect. NATO policymakers, who are currently drafting the Deterrence 

and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) to address (among 

other things) the future of tactical nuclear weapons in 

Europe, are very aware of the potential risks associated with political mismanagement of the TNW issue. 

But as Simon Lunn observes in his insightful analysis of the DDPR in this section, “The key differences 

over nuclear policy that required the compromise in 

the first place have already resurfaced, making both 

progress and the final outcome difficult to foresee.”3

Hopefully the NATO representatives who are drafting this document are approaching their task with the 

appropriate sense of urgency.
233

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, “Withdrawal 

Issues: What NATO Countries Say About the Future of Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Report by IKV Pax Christi, Netherlands, March 2011, p. 2.

2. The German Marshall Fund’s 2011 Transatlantic Trends 

survey finds that 62 percent of the public in 12 European countries still see NATO as “essential,” but this figure must be tested 

against the willingness of European publics to contribute financially to the Alliance, available from www.gmfus.org/publications_/

TT/TT2011_final.pdf. Regarding the issue of financial support, 

see the important speech by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in which he noted that only four of 26 European allies 

were exceeding the agreed-upon NATO defense contribution of 

2 percent of gross domestic product. Gates warned of the “real 

possibility of collective military irrelevance” if this trend were to 

continue. The Secretary also notified his listeners that there was a 

“dwindling appetite and patience” within the U.S. Congress and 

among the American people for a situation in which the United 

States carried a disproportionate amount of the financial burden 

for NATO’s collective defense, available from www.defense.gov/

Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839.

3. Simon Lunn, “The Role and Place of Tactical Nuclear Weapons—A NATO Perspective,” Chap. 10, Tactical Nuclear Weapons 

and NATO, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2012, p. 1. 

235

CHAPTER 10

THE ROLE AND PLACE OF TACTICAL 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS—A NATO PERSPECTIVE

Simon Lunn

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons have always occupied a special 

place in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

affairs as the ultimate deterrent to aggression and also 

the symbol of the U.S. commitment to the defense of 

its NATO allies. Finding the right mix of capabilities 

to prove this commitment has been a major challenge 

for U.S. and NATO policymakers; and the question 

of whether or not to deploy U.S. nuclear warheads 

in Europe has provided a perennial source of debate. 

The initial deployment in Europe of short-range tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)1

 had a clear operational 

purpose, although their value was rapidly diminished 

by the evident consequences of their use on the home 

territory. Despite these problems, they remained in 

substantial numbers as part of NATO’s strategy of 

flexible response until the end of the Cold War. With 

the end the Cold War, NATO substantially reduced 

the number and types of TNWs in Europe, leaving a 

few hundred warheads for the use of allies on dualcapable aircraft (DCA). The operational application 

of these systems gradually faded from view, and they 

assumed a primarily political function in terms of ensuring linkage and the participation of the Allies in 

NATO’s nuclear affairs.

Attention was again drawn to NATO’s nuclear 

posture by the decision to develop a new NATO Stra-
236

tegic Concept and the increasingly pressing question 

of DCA modernization. Expectations of a change in 

NATO nuclear policy and posture were reinforced 

by the demand of the German coalition for the withdrawal of U.S. warheads from German territory and 

the growth of support for the Global Zero initiative. 

However, these expectations were to be disappointed. 

The Lisbon, Portugal, Summit was unable to achieve 

agreement on key aspects of nuclear policy, including 

the pressure for a specific review of NATO’s nuclear 

posture. Reconciliation of these differences was effectively deferred to a review of NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture (DDPR) to be undertaken 

by the NATO Council in permanent session.

The DDPR is now underway, and it is expected 

that the review of nuclear forces will provide the centerpiece. Not surprisingly, the key differences over 

nuclear policy that required the compromise in the 

first place have already resurfaced, making both progress and the final outcome difficult to foresee. This 

chapter will provide an overview of the debate from 

a “NATO perspective” and a brief assessment of the 

national agendas which underpin it.

A NATO PERSPECTIVE

Based on an Alliance of independent and sovereign nations, a “NATO perspective” is literally the 

collective view of the 28 members that emerges from 

the policy and decisionmaking process founded on 

the principle of consensus. While attention is always 

drawn to the final decision or policy, the real story lies 

in the process itself and the various twists and turns 

that are necessary in order to achieve the agreement of 

all members. Each member brings to the table national 
237

positions, preoccupations, and priorities. The following are examples relevant to the current discussions of 

nuclear policy: French sensitivity to any development 

that could be seen as weakening the role of nuclear 

weapons, nuclear deterrence, and its own national deterrent; German insistence that arms control and disarmament should play a greater role in the search for 

security and stability; and the continuing suspicion of 

members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) towards Russia.

Sometimes these positions are of such importance 

that they become red lines through which the country concerned can move only with difficulty or as the 

result of compromises and concessions achieved in 

other areas. Achieving consensus involves responding to and finding a balance between these different 

and frequently conflicting national priorities.

The process also has to accommodate the groupings of countries who meet informally from time to 

time and whose consultation outside the formal 28-nation framework can play a significant role in identifying the route to consensus. These groupings would include the three nuclear powers (the United States, the 

United Kingdom [UK] and France); the big four (or 

Quad—the United States, UK, France, and Germany), 

whose agreement is an essential basis for eventual 

consensus; and the grouping of countries interested 

in promoting arms control and disarmament, known 

in the trade as “the usual suspects,” normally comprising Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, 

and Canada, with others associated from time to time. 

This latter grouping provides what they see as an important balance to the influence of the nuclear members. These and other informal groupings which are 

frequently created in response to circumstances con-
238

tribute importantly to the deliberations from which 

NATO policy is developed

By its very nature, the process of consensus lacks 

transparency and is frequently impenetrable for those 

outside of the formal policy process. This lack of transparency explains why the decision that emerges often 

disappoints the expectations of those who are in favor 

of change. The weakness of the process is that the final 

decision often represents the lowest common denominator; its strength is that it represents a position to 

which all members will adhere. An additional consideration, however, is that the need to find compromises 

that massage national positions means that the final 

language is often open to multiple interpretations. 

The language in the new Strategic Concept was hailed 

by some as the first instance of NATO leaders endorsing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons; others, however, pointed to the qualifying words “create 

the conditions for” as indicating something rather less 

than a full endorsement of the goal.2

It is also important to note that nuclear affairs are 

rarely featured very high on NATO’s agenda. Because 

of the sensitivity associated with nuclear weapons, 

there is frequently a reluctance on the part of officials 

to discuss nuclear matters and a tendency to leave 

these discussions to those who, for reasons of technical, operational, or policy expertise, are regarded as 

experts. These factors and the obvious distraction of 

other events mean that nuclear issues frequently do 

not occupy the position of importance many believe 

they should.

In gaining an understanding of the current debate on NATO’s nuclear policy, there are two further 

considerations: the role of the United States and the 

significance attached to the maintenance of NATO 
239

cohesion and solidarity. As the principal provider 

of nuclear deterrence, the United States has always 

played a dominant role in NATO’s nuclear affairs. But 

the United States has also been careful to consult and 

inform the NATO allies to whom it extends nuclear 

deterrence and to be responsive to their concerns. This 

has not always been easy, because the signals from the 

Allies are frequently mixed. As a result, the United 

States is called upon from time to time to exercise its 

leadership role. This was the case at the informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn, Estonia, on 

April 22, 2010. Attempting to head off a potentially 

divisive situation caused by the growing interest of 

several members in changing NATO’s nuclear policy, 

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton introduced five 

principles which it was agreed would constitute the 

basis for the further development of NATO nuclear 

policy:3

1. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will 

remain a nuclear alliance;

2. As a nuclear Alliance, sharing nuclear risks and 

responsibilities widely is fundamental;

3. A broad aim is to continue to reduce the role 

and number of nuclear weapons while recognizing 

that in the years since the Cold War ended, NATO has 

already dramatically reduced its reliance on nuclear 

weapons;

4. Allies must broaden deterrence against the range 

of 21st-century threats, including by pursuing territorial missile defense; and,

5. In any future reductions, our aim should be to 

seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on 

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Europe, 

relocate these weapons away from the territory of 

NATO members, and include NSNWs in the next 
240

round of U.S.-Russian arms control discussions alongside strategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons.

It would seem that for the United States during 

this period, the maintenance of NATO cohesion took 

precedence over other considerations.4

 This emphasis 

on cohesion was also reflected in the parallel agreement at Tallinn that members would not take unilateral actions, and that decisions on NATO’s nuclear 

policy would be taken by the Alliance as a whole. This 

agreement, which was alluded to by most Ministers in 

their statements, indicates the importance attached by 

all members to NATO solidarity and cohesion. This 

agreement to ensure that the relevant decisions on 

nuclear policy are taken collectively also represents a 

considerable constraint on the various national policies and one that could run counter to domestic pressures, particularly from parliaments.

THE DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE 

(DDPR)

There were expectations before Lisbon that the 

adoption of a new Strategic Concept provided the opportunity for NATO to reassess its nuclear strategy 

and demonstrate support for the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In the event, the Lisbon documents left key aspects of nuclear policy and posture 

unanswered—including the purpose of nuclear weapons, the nuclear posture, the role of missile defense, 

and the role of disarmament. When the pressure by 

several members for a specific review of the nuclear 

posture was resisted by others, a compromise was 

found by broadening the review to include all elements of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture, re-
241

ferred to by the now familiar term “appropriate mix 

of capabilities.”

As is inevitable with all compromises, the Review 

did not please everyone, and its implementation is 

viewed by members with varying degrees of enthusiasm. One national official’s comment that the DDPR 

resembles the blind man’s elephant reflects the general uncertainty about the nature and the expected 

outcome of the Review.5

 Furthermore, and equally 

inevitably, the very differences that required the compromise have reemerged, making progress difficult 

and the final outcome hard to predict.

Deterrence and Defense Posture Process.

An initial period of reflection comprising seminars with outside experts is to be followed by inputs 

from the four primary areas considered most relevant 

to the appropriate mix of forces: conventional forces, 

nuclear forces, missile defense, and arms control and 

disarmament. Guidance on what questions should be 

addressed in each field was provided by the NATO 

Council (NAC) in the form of what are termed “taskings.” The difficulty in agreeing on the wording of 

these “taskings”—so that they did not prejudge the 

outcome—gave an indication of the problems that lie 

ahead. The NAC has emphasized that it wants options 

rather than conclusions or recommendations, which 

are the prerogative of the NAC itself. The final document is to be endorsed at the next NATO Summit in 

Chicago, IL, on May 20, 2012.

It still being too early to foresee outcomes, what 

follows is a brief overview of each area, with a specific focus on nuclear affairs because they will be the 

centerpiece of the Review. It should be noted that one 
242

of the aspirations for the DDPR is that in defining the 

mix the Review will establish the relationships between the various components and knit them together 

in a coherent package that reflects NATO’s political 

aims and the economic resources available with which 

to work.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

It can be expected that the input on conventional 

forces will reflect the ongoing work of the traditional 

defense planning cycle and the challenges which defense planners are currently facing—the balance between expeditionary forces and those for territorial 

defense, the commitment to Article 5, and most significantly the severe decline in defense budgets which 

has led to yet another search for the most effective 

ways to spend defense dollars. This search, now marketed under the rubric “smart defense,” will inevitably involve familiar recipes based on the self-evident 

proposition that effectiveness and efficiency lie in doing things together. It remains to be seen whether the 

new language and the severity of the economic situation will at last persuade countries to give precedence 

to collective solutions over those dictated by national 

considerations.

Missile Defense.

Missile defense is proceeding on two tracks. The 

first is the implementation of the NATO system and 

its integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). There are expectations that an initial 

operating capability (IOC) of the NATO project will 

be announced at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. 
243

The second track is an effort to develop a cooperative 

partnership with Russia. This track is handled in the 

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) where it would appear 

that little progress has been made in agreeing on even 

the basic parameters of cooperation. This work in the 

NRC has no input into the DDPR. However, whether 

there is success or failure in this cooperation is crucial 

to other areas of the DDPR because Russia has made 

clear that it regards cooperation in missile defense as 

a condition for cooperation in other areas.

Arms Control and Disarmament.

The work of the new Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Control and Disarmament Committee (WCDC) is still 

in its early stages, and, while its exact terms of reference remain ill defined, the battlelines have already 

been drawn. Several countries would like NATO to 

adopt a more positive approach towards arms control 

and disarmament in support of the Prague agenda 

and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). 

They are looking for ways to enhance the salience of 

the Alliance in this field. This goal is problematic, as 

arms control agreements fall within the competence 

of national governments. Other countries are opposed 

to this emphasis on disarmament, which they consider inappropriate for a defense alliance and which 

in their view risks distracting attention from, and at 

worst weakening, the primary purpose of the Alliance. France is firmly opposed to a higher profile for 

disarmament and against extending the duration of 

the Committee.

There is general agreement, however, that if and 

when the United States and Russia resume arms control negotiations that include sub-strategic systems, 

the WCDC Committee would provide a forum for the 
244

United States in consulting with its Allies, thus performing a function similar to that of the Special Consultative Group (SCG) for the negotiations on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in the 1980s.

NUCLEAR FORCES

In considering what language should be chosen 

to describe the purpose of NATO’s nuclear weapons 

and the range of options for the nuclear posture, the 

DDPR will have to balance and reconcile very different national interests, concerns, and priorities. It is always difficult to generalize about national views, but 

interviews with a range of national representatives 

at NATO during the past 18 months have revealed 

certain broad trends of thought. These may evolve 

over time as a result of internal and external developments. Views of NATO’s nuclear policy vary widely, 

depending on the degree of nuclear involvement of 

the country concerned. In some countries, views differ 

depending on whether the individuals represent the 

Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs, each with its 

different priorities.

Assessments also need to take account of the fact 

that, as previously mentioned, for many members 

the nuclear issue is not high on their list of priorities. 

Needless to say, views on nuclear policy vary depending on the degree of involvement. Some countries—

principally the more recent members—continue to 

support the presence in Europe of U.S. warheads; 

others would not be sorry to see them go; others are 

ambivalent. Opinions are stronger among those who 

support the status quo than those who seek to change 

it. Two factors are common to all members: the relevance of Russian sub-strategic systems and the need 

to maintain Alliance unity. 
245

The United States.

The traditional leadership role of the United States 

in NATO’s nuclear affairs and the complicated dialogue on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe have already been discussed. The situation facing U.S. policymakers today is different in two senses. 

First, as a result of NATO enlargement, there are now 

several members who are very clear on what they 

want—they feel strongly that the warheads are an important symbol of the U.S. commitment and that to 

remove them at this time would be sending the wrong 

signal. Second, the endorsement by President Barack 

Obama in his speech in Prague, Czech Republic, of 

the goal of a world without nuclear weapons has created uncertainty in the minds of the Allies about U.S. 

priorities. Since the Prague speech, Allies have been 

asking what role this endorsement will play in U.S. attitudes to NATO’s nuclear posture. On the one hand, 

the Prague commitment, together with the concerns 

of many U.S. officials over the security and safety of 

nuclear storage sites—and the associated costs—suggests the need for change. On the other hand, the 

possibility that such a change could create divisions 

within NATO argues for maintenance of the status 

quo. For the Obama administration, therefore, the 

wish to make progress on the Prague agenda has to be 

measured against the priority of maintaining Alliance 

solidarity and cohesion. The evidence for the moment 

is that solidarity and cohesion have won the day.
246

The United Kingdom.

The UK’s independent nuclear deterrent has always been committed to NATO, and the UK has been 

consistently supportive of firm language on NATO’s 

nuclear posture. It is a reasonable assumption that 

this position will continue. Conservative governments 

have normally adopted what could be termed a robust approach to the question of defense, including 

the retention of the nuclear deterrent. The renewal of 

the Trident system provides an interesting backdrop 

to NATO’s discussions. British officials note that in 

the DDPR discussions, they may well find themselves 

as the “honest broker” trying to find middle ground 

between the conflicting views of France and Germany 

on the significance of disarmament.6

France.

French nuclear forces have always been independent of NATO, and France has stayed outside all 

discussions of NATO’s nuclear weapons. However, 

French officials do participate in the drafting of language on NATO strategic policy in key documents. 

Despite its return to NATO’s defense planning and 

military structures and to NATO’s defense planning 

system for conventional forces, France remains outside the High Level Group (HLG) and the Nuclear 

Planning Group (NPG). This means that French officials are present at the discussion of general strategic 

guidance in the NAC with all 28 members, but absent 

from more detailed discussions and consultations on 

nuclear policy in the HLG and NPG which meet with 

27 members. The Declaration accompanying the Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon explicitly states that 
247

the nuclear discussions apply only to nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.7

 While there were quibbles 

over the choice of the term “assigned,” it is clear that 

this excludes French forces and that France will not 

participate in the discussions of NATO’s nuclear arrangements in the HLG and NPG working groups. 

However, the French Ambassador will participate in 

the NAC discussions that will produce the final DDPR 

document. These arrangements imply a separation 

between the purpose and the operational implementation of nuclear weapons that is not always easy to 

achieve and could be a source of confusion.

In its general approach, France can be said to 

be firmly in the camp of those who are opposed to 

change and will resist any move that could be seen as 

weakening nuclear deterrence, including any change 

to declaratory policy. French officials usually refrain 

from commenting on the specific issue of NATO’s 

sub-strategic systems as being none of their business. 

However, French officials are known to support the 

existing arrangements, among other reasons as a way 

of avoiding their own singularity in terms of having 

nuclear weapons on continental European territory. 

Their position on NATO force posture is best described 

as standing on the sidelines but making encouraging 

noises to those who participate in the mission.8

New NATO Members.

The more recent NATO members are against 

change, as for them the presence of U.S. nuclear warheads unambiguously couples the U.S. nuclear deterrent to Europe and symbolizes the link with the 

United States—which were the driving forces behind 

their desire to join NATO. Some are willing to consid-
248

er reductions but only if Russia undertakes reciprocal 

measures. Proposals to provide additional Article 5 

reassurance through contingency planning and exercises are welcomed, but with an equal insistence that 

they cannot substitute for the deterrence provided 

by the presence of U.S. warheads. One such national 

representative revealed his scepticism of alternative 

forms of reassurance when he remarked that the allies 

would “remove the warheads and [then] not do the 

exercises.”9

The development of a NATO missile defense system for the defense of territory has been welcomed by 

the new members of the Alliance as strengthening the 

transatlantic link and bolstering deterrence. However, 

several members insist that missile defense performs 

a different function in deterrence and should not be 

seen as a replacement for the existing arrangements. 

One national representative described missile defense 

as “a flimsy substitute”10 for these arrangements, particularly in view of the impending reductions of U.S. 

ground forces in Europe.

For these members, the general uncertainty in the 

strategic environment and in relations with Russia 

means that this is not the moment for NATO to make 

changes to its strategy and that to do so would in fact 

be sending the wrong message—in several directions. 

It is sometimes said that Poland is prepared to be more 

flexible on this issue than other CEE members; some 

observers see this merely as part of a less confrontational relationship with the Big Neighbor. Polish concerns have focussed on the need to do something about 

Russian sub-strategic systems, a concern shared by all 

members. This has meant an emphasis on the need 

for a dialogue with Russia and initial steps aimed at 

creating greater transparency of these systems, again 
249

supported by other members. However, whether this 

focus means that Polish views are more congenial to 

the eventual withdrawal of NATO’s own systems is 

difficult to say. Moreover, given the conditionality of 

such reductions, they are hardly relevant to discussions today. Furthermore, NATO officials note that 

the so-called “warming” in relations with Russia was 

brief and that Polish statements on the need for Alliance solidarity remain as robust as the others.

However, several Alliance members believe that, 

on the contrary, this is an opportunity for NATO to 

change its nuclear policy and posture. This is a variable-geometry grouping depending on the types 

of changes sought. Several members, including the 

United States and the UK, would support adjusting 

NATO’s declaratory policy, both for consistency and 

also as a political signal. Others, including the “usual 

suspects,” would go further in diminishing the role 

for nuclear weapons by reducing and eventually eliminating NATO’s sub-strategic systems; they also insist 

on a higher profile for arms control and disarmament 

in NATO security policy.

The Dual-Capable Aircraft States.

The DCA arrangements are frequently criticized 

as being militarily useless and therefore having no 

deterrent value. This is a complicated argument. The 

DCA are operationally capable. The more pertinent 

question is how likely is it that they would be used 

given the other U.S. assets available and the complexity of NATO decisionmaking. The DCA countries 

themselves accept the mission, but for the most part 

without great enthusiasm. Views in these countries 

on the value of the mission vary—often according to 
250

the familiar dichotomy of whether the official asked 

comes from the Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs. Some argue that it provides the host country additional status within NATO and a useful means of 

demonstrating unity of commitment. Others maintain 

that the mission represents a waste of scarce resources 

and a missed opportunity for NATO to demonstrate 

its seriousness about reducing its reliance on nuclear 

weapons.

 Turkey’s role in the Alliance and its regional 

situation mean that Turkish views carry a particular 

significance. It is also host to U.S. nuclear warheads, 

and Turkish aircraft continue to have DCA status at a 

lower level of readiness. Turkish officials also say that 

they would prefer a continuation of existing arrangements, but they are quick to refute suggestions that 

changes to NATO’s nuclear policy could lead to their 

own nuclear aspirations. In this respect, some observers claim that potential instability in the Middle East 

provides an additional rationale for a continuation of 

the Turkish DCA role as representing a crisis response 

tool for NATO. However, critics point out that the 

same arguments concerning the lack of credibility of 

DCA operational use—and therefore deterrent utility—apply equally to this situation.

The High Level Group.

The input to the DDPR on NATO’s nuclear policy 

will be provided by the HLG which was created in 

the 1970s to ensure that nuclear issues received highlevel political attention. Chaired by the United States, 

it comprises senior officials from national capitals. The 

major task for the HLG and thereafter the NAC will be 

to reach agreement on what NATO says and does con-
251

cerning its nuclear posture. On the issue of declaratory policy, several members insist that NATO declaratory policy should be consistent with the language in 

the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). As previously 

discussed, France has been firmly opposed thus far to 

any change in the existing language on the purpose of 

nuclear weapons, believing that such a change could 

suggest a diminution of the role of nuclear deterrence. 

A senior NATO diplomat noted the irony of the situation in which French nuclear forces are outside of 

NATO, but France continues to influence what NATO 

says about NATO’s nuclear forces.11 Bridging the current differences on declaratory policy will require 

imaginative drafting, and in the view of many NATO 

officials the sensitivities involved mean that this issue 

will have to be decided at the highest level.

With regard to NATO’s nuclear posture, the HLG 

completed a review of nuclear requirements in 2009 

based on the guidance in the 1999 Strategic Concept. 

Since the Strategic Concept called for the presence of 

U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe, it is not surprising 

that the review confirmed the continuing relevance of 

the DCA as the most appropriate means of deploying 

them. As NATO’s new Strategic Concept contains no 

reference to the presence in Europe of U.S. nuclear 

warheads, it is assumed that the HLG will pose the 

fundamental questions concerning the requirements 

for extended deterrence and the continuing need for 

the deployment of these warheads. According to officials, in responding to the tasking set by the NAC, the 

HLG has developed a range of options which include 

the status quo but also the possibility of reducing the 

number of warheads or adjusting the DCA missions.
252

Two other factors will be important in the HLG’s 

considerations. First, the new Strategic Concept appears to attach high importance to burden-sharing by 

calling for the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defense planning on nuclear roles, in 

peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in consultative 

and command and control (C3) arrangements. Even 

allowing for different interpretations of this formulation and efforts to find new ways to give it content, it 

would appear nevertheless to hint strongly at a continuation of existing arrangements. 

Second, the condition that further reductions must 

be accompanied by reciprocal actions by Russia also 

constitutes a substantial obstacle to changing the existing arrangements. Thus far, Russia has shown no 

interest in such discussions. Among several initiatives 

to secure progress, a “non-paper” was circulated by 

Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland at 

the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin, Germany, on April 14, 2011. This “non-paper” urged a 

number of steps to increase the transparency of U.S. 

and Russian non-strategic weapons.12 The U.S. development of an arms control negotiating position with 

Russia in which sub-strategic systems are included 

will take time. It also assumes Russian cooperation. 

Moreover, a U.S. decision to negotiate these systems 

will have to be made in consultation with the NATO 

allies, which makes the work of the HLG in deciding 

NATO’s requirements even more relevant.

The conditionality of further reductions on reciprocity with Russia is a consensus position which, in 

the absence of sustained political engagement at the 

highest level, represents a formidable obstacle to progress. In order to overcome this impasse, Senator Sam 

Nunn, a respected authority on NATO and an influen-
253

tial expert on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, has 

proposed that as part of a new and deepened dialogue 

with Russia on the full range of Euro-Atlantic security 

issues, NATO should decide to withdraw unilaterally 

its sub-strategic systems within a period of 5 years.13

While the target for completion is 5 years, the final timing and pace would be determined by broad political 

and security developments between NATO and Russia. This proposal will certainly encounter objections. 

However, independent of its intrinsic merits, the proposal is an example of the imaginative initiative required if the current deadlock is to be circumvented.

Prospects.

The task of the DDPR is to ensure that the various 

components of the mix relate to each other in a coherent 

package that reflects the political goals of the Alliance 

and the economic resources available. In today’s economic climate, there is every incentive to get the balance right and to ensure that scarce defense resources 

are being spent in the most efficient and cost-effective 

way. In the nuclear field, there are major fault lines to 

be crossed: on the purpose of nuclear weapons, on the 

nuclear posture required, and on the appropriate role 

for arms control and disarmament. Ideally, the DDPR 

process itself should contribute to narrowing the differences and finding common ground. The problem is 

that progress depends on, and is effectively hostage 

to, Russian reactions. The proposal by Senator Nunn 

shows one way to confront this problem, but it is unlikely to win universal support. It nonetheless demonstrates the need for imaginative thinking unfettered 

by traditional constraints and for high-level political 

engagement, particularly by the United States.
254

Expectations for the DDPR are modest, with the 

final document possibly amounting to no more than 

keeping the process moving and the door open. Much 

will depend on the priorities assigned in NATO capitals and the inevitable distraction of other developments, including the prospects of elections in several 

key countries. In the end, as with all NATO processes, 

imaginative drafting, and the traditional give and 

take at the last minute will produce a document that 

accommodates national differences but leaves their 

reconciliation for further elaboration. At some stage, 

NATO will have to come to terms with its nuclear dilemmas, but this can happen only under the leadership of the United States.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. The expression “tactical weapons” is used here to reinforce 

the fact that they were deployed with the expressed intent of being used to alter the conflict on the battlefield. In today’s discussions, the term “tactical” is no longer used, and these weapons are 

normally referred to as non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs).

2. The new Strategic Concept is available from www.nato.int/

lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

3. For a more complete discussion of the meeting in Tallinn, 

see Simon Lunn, “Reducing the Role of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons—Where Do We Stand after Tallinn?” RUSI Briefing Note, 

June 2010. 

4. Ibid.

5. Interviews conducted by the author, November 2011.

6. Ibid.

7. NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, para. 30, November 20, 

2010.
255

8. This is reminiscent of the position adopted by French President Francois Mitterand during the “Euromissile” crisis of the 

1980s when he spoke in favor of the deployments despite the fact 

that France was not involved.

9. Interviews conducted by the author at NATO during the 

period 2010-11.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Six other NATO allies—Belgium, the Czech Republic, 

Hungary , Iceland, Luxemburg, and Slovenia—also supported 

the paper, which, among other moves, recommended the use of 

the NATO-Russia Council as the primary framework for transparency and confidence-building concerning tactical nuclear 

weapons (TNWs) in Europe.

13. Sam Nunn, “The race between cooperation and catastrophe,” in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams, eds., Reducing 

Nuclear Risks in Europe, Report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 

Washington, DC, November 2011.

257

CHAPTER 11

EUROPEAN AND GERMAN PERSPECTIVES

Götz Neuneck

Non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are remnants of the 

Cold War. During the bipolar confrontation, both the 

United States and the Soviet Union deployed thousands of TNWs in different theaters of war on various 

platforms such as naval vessels, aircraft, and missiles. 

Different categories such as tactical nuclear warheads 

on short- and medium-missiles, mines, and artillery 

shells were intended to be used in support of troops 

in the field during actual war. There was a direct link 

to conventional forces in regions of conflict and assurances given to allies by the possessors of these weapons. 

TNWs in Europe, although very high in numbers 

and locations, had lower visibility in the public eye 

than long-range strategic nuclear weapons. The reduced number of tactical nuclear warheads on European soil today has not been subject to any arms 

control treaty at all. An important starting point was 

in 1987, when the United States and the Soviet Union 

signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 

Treaty and began eliminating medium and intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles which were intended for use on the European battlefield. Although 

the United States and Russia addressed TNWs in some 

arms control talks, most of their efforts focused on 

negotiations related to strategic nuclear arms. French 

and British nuclear forces were not included in any 

arms control arrangements concerning Europe. From 
258

a London or Paris perspective, their nuclear arsenals 

are seen as “strategic.” The issue of TNWs was also 

discussed during the 2000, 2005, and 2010 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences. In the Final 

Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the 

nuclear weapon states were called upon to “address 

the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their 

type or their location as an integral part of the general 

nuclear disarmament process.”1

 In the pages to follow, we shall discuss the history of efforts to remove 

TNWs; the complex distinction between strategic and 

TNWs, their current numbers, and their deployment; 

the debate in Europe about reducing or removing the 

remaining warheads; and the arms control prospects 

in Europe in the aftermath of the New Strategic Concept. 

ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN THE PAST

In 1991, President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced that they would 

remove from active service most of their TNWs 

worldwide and eliminate many of them unilaterally. 

In the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991 

and 1992, both the United States and the Soviet Union 

acknowledged that these weapons were no longer 

useful for warfighting. In particular, the United States 

withdrew its tactical munitions to its own territory 

and eliminated all TNWs for ground forces, including 

those from Europe and South Korea. The Soviet Union 

eliminated TNWs for ground forces and removed tactical nuclear warheads to central storages. One reason 

was the growing concern about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons at a time of increasing 

unrest on its territory. Between 1994 and 1995, the 

two superpowers set up a Joint Working Group to 
259

“consider steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear weapons.” In 1997, President Bill 

Clinton and Russia ́s President Boris Yeltsin signed 

a “Framework Agreement” at the Helsinki, Finland, 

summit that included the obligation to address measures related to “non-strategic nuclear weapons” in a 

possible Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) III. 

U.S. and Russian experts were expected to explore, as 

a separate issue, possible measures relating to “tactical nuclear systems, to include confidence-building 

and transparency measures.” Unfortunately, the previous treaty version, START II, was never activated 

due to the controversy over the U.S. withdrawal from 

the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002, and 

subsequently START III itself was never negotiated. 

When the New START treaty was signed on April 

8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, 

it became clear that the definition of TNWs vis-à-vis 

strategic weapons would be an important issue for 

the follow-on agreement which is intended to include 

TNWs. As will be discussed below, today it is estimated that about 150-200 U.S. B-61 nuclear gravity bombs 

are still deployed in five European North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) countries: Germany, 

Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey. Russian 

numbers of active TNWs are much higher, about 2,000 

or more, but they are not deployed. Also, Russia has 

produced and retained many different types of TNWs. 

Most of them are likely stored in the European part of 

Russia with warheads separated from their delivery 

systems.

The 2009 Final Report of the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States makes it clear that introducing TNWs in the arms control process might 

become a complicated matter.2
260

One of the most important factors will be the imbalance of non-strategic nuclear weapons. In support 

of its arms control interests and interest in strategic 

stability more generally, the United States should pursue a much broader and more ambitious set of strategic dialogues with not just Russia but also China and 

U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

How Many Tactical Nuclear Weapons Exist Today 

in Europe?

The distinction between strategic and TNWs is not 

easy to make because the weapon purposes (such as 

targets and missions) and the technical characteristics 

(such as range, yield, and deployment) as between 

the United States and Russia are different in many 

cases, reflecting differences in their geographical, 

strategic, and political postures. Early on, the Soviet 

Union and the United States came to consider nuclear 

weapons based on their own territory that could be 

delivered with long-range missiles or bombers against 

the enemy’s homeland as “strategic.” Consequently, 

one simplifying approach has been to define tactical 

nuclear weapons as all nuclear warheads which are 

not covered by strategic nuclear arms control treaties. 

But certainly other operational characteristics (such as 

deployment status, weapon readiness, proximity to 

delivery system, etc.) are also important for future reduction talks. Despite the fact that both Russia and the 

United States have reduced their TNW stockpile more 

than envisaged under PNIs, neither has disclosed 

exact data about the numbers, status and location of 

these weapons. 
261

In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Barack 

Obama administration underlined the reduced role 

of nuclear weapons in regional security architectures 

and stressed America’s increased reliance upon “forward U.S. conventional presence and effective theater 

ballistic missile defense.”3

 The NPR also makes clear 

that “any changes in NATO ́s nuclear posture should 

be taken only after a thorough review within—and 

decision by—the Alliance.”4 The document calls for 

retaining the capability for forward-deployed U.S. 

nuclear weapons to be delivered by tactical fighterbombers and heavy bombers.5

 The United States 

also plans to continue with a life-extension program 

for the B-61 bomb, which is deployed in Europe for 

delivery by dual-capable aircraft (DCA). It has been 

estimated that the United States has reduced its total 

TNW stockpile from 11,500 to some 500-800 and has 

retained a smaller capability for forward deployment. 

Under NATO sharing arrangements, as mentioned 

earlier, experts assume that the United States still 

deploys between 150-200 U.S. TNWs in five NATO 

member states (see Table 11-1). These weapons remain 

under U.S. control during peacetime, but in a war situation some of the TNWs can be transferred to allies 

for delivery by their own dual-capable systems. This 

nuclear-sharing formula in the event of war was developed during the Cold War to maintain a close coupling between European NATO Allies and the United 

States and to ensure shared decisionmaking. The 2010 

New Strategic Concept retains the option of nuclear first 

use, even against a non-nuclear attack, although with 

the condition that the circumstances calling for such 

an event are “extremely remote.” Many political and 

military experts declare that such a nuclear mission 

has no military value. General James Cartwright, for-
262

mer Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, went 

so far as to declare that there is no military mission the 

TNWs could perform that could not be carried out by 

conventional or strategic weapons.6

Table 11-1. U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011.7

Typical arguments for maintaining TNWs within 

NATO stress Alliance solidarity, discouraging NATO 

members such as Turkey from acquiring their own 

nuclear forces, and using TNWs as bargaining chips in 

negotiations designed to convince the Russians to reduce or eliminate their own TNW stockpiles. The 2010 

New Strategic Concept asserts that for any future reductions NATO ́s aim should be “to seek Russia ́s agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons 

and relocate these weapons away from the territory of 

NATO members.”8

The existing assessments from different sources 

of the Russian TNW stockpile are based on different 

methodologies, with results that are vague and varying.9

 Russia might have reduced its TNW stockpile 

Country Airbase Dual-Capable 

Aircraft

Estimated 

Number of B-61 

Warheads 

Belgium Kleine Brogel Belgian F-16 10–20

Germany Büchel German Tornado 10–20

Italy Aviano U.S. F-16 50

Ghedi Torre Italian Tornado 10–20

Netherlands Volkel Dutch F-16 10–20

Turkey Incirlik U.S. Fighter 

Aircraft (rotating) 60–70

Total 150–200
263

from an estimated 22,000 to some 2,000 deployable 

TNWs.10 Deployed warheads are operationally usable, but separated from their delivery systems. Tactical warheads “in reserve” are stored in depots and 

are either earmarked for dismantlement or no longer 

routinely maintained. Andrei Zagorski estimated that 

the total number of the Russian TNWs is between 

5,000 and 6,500, that some 2,000 of them are active 

but not deployed, and that the rest remain in reserve.11

Officially, all land-based TNWs have been removed 

from active service and have been destroyed. The new 

Iskander short-range ballistic missile nevertheless

might have a nuclear capability. The remaining Russian TNWs are assigned to the Russian Navy and Air 

Force and might be stored in depots at Air Force or 

Navy bases for quick deployment. The Russian Navy 

might possess 700 TNWs and the Air Force 650 in storages close to military harbors and airfields (see Table 

11-2). It has retained longer-range capabilities, e.g., 

the TU-22M aircraft capable of carrying nuclear air-tosurface missiles (ASM) and gravity bombs against naval aircraft carrier groups. There are also 700 tactical 

warheads allocated for missile and air defense weapons such as surface-to-air missiles SA-5B and SA-10 

for combating enemy aircraft or cruise missiles. Another category of naval armaments is general purpose 

naval weapons such as the submarine launched cruise 

missiles: SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-21, and SS-N-22, plus 

nuclear torpedos and depth charges.
264

Table 11-2. Estimates of Operational Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons in Russia, 2010.

It is reported that the Russian government has reduced its nuclear storage sites from 500 (in the 1990s) 

to a total of 48. There exist two main categories of 

TNW storage sites: The first consists of 13 storage sites 

solely for TNWs, nine of them located in the European 

part of Russia and four located beyond the Urals, either in Siberia or the Far East. The second category 

consists of 18 national-level nuclear weapons storage 

sites at which both strategic and tactical warheads are 

stored. Of these sites, 10 of them are in the European 

part, four in the Urals region, and four in Siberia and 

the Far East.12 For future verification arrangements, 

this complex and distributed pattern makes inspections very difficult. 

In the Russian view, TNWs are still regarded as 

compensating for the weaknesses of Russian conventional forces in the European region. Other justifications for retaining these systems include: insurance 

against further NATO enlargement; a cushion against 

a possible shortfall in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; added protection in the event of 

Armed Service Number of 

warheads Delivery Systems

Air and missile 

defense ~700 SA-5B and SA-10 & SH-8/11 ABM interceptors

Air force 650 TU-22M; SU-24

Navy ~700 TU-22M; SU-24; IL-38; SLCM, 

torpedos, and depth charges

Total ~2,000
265

a buildup of forces in China; and a response to a future ballistic missile defense capability in Europe and 

worldwide.13 Another factor is the growing U.S. military-technological superiority in long-range ballistic 

and cruise missiles, some of which are armed with 

munitions guided from space. Andrei Zagorski in a 

recent study came to the conclusion that ”there are 

virtually no significant Russian constituencies with a 

vested interest in reducing or limiting TNW.”14

France and Great Britain, which are nuclear weapon states under the NPT, have developed their own 

deterrence arsenals. France has 300 strategic warheads 

on long-range delivery systems, including airborne 

standoff weapons which can also be used as tactical 

(“prestrategic”) weapons. The French government has 

announced a one-third cut in its nuclear arsenal, and 

has closed its nuclear test site along with its plants for 

the production of fissile material for weapons. Great 

Britain has 160 operational strategic warheads. The 

two Western European nuclear powers each have four 

nuclear submarines with seaborne missiles, maintaining one submarine always at sea.

The Debate in NATO Countries on the Removal of 

TNWs from Europe.

In his Prague “Global Zero” speech on April 5, 

2009, U.S. President Obama declared that America 

was committed “to seek the peace and security of a 

world without nuclear weapons.” He then emphasized that “thinking in terms of the Cold War must 

come to an end.” The debate was triggered by two oped features written by former U.S. Secretaries of State 

George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense 

Secretary William J. Perry, and former Senator Sam 
266

Nunn in 2007 and 2008.15 This Gang of Four argued 

in their 2007 article for the elimination of short-range 

nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. In 

their subsequent article a year later, they proposed to: 

start a dialogue, including within NATO and with 

Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting 

for them and their eventual elimination. These smaller 

and more portable nuclear weapons are, given their 

characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist 

groups.16

Another cross-party quartet from Germany—composed of former chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former 

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former 

President Richard von Weizsäcker and retired Minister 

of State Egon Bahr—called for steps toward a nuclearfree world and for drastic nuclear reductions.17 They 

wrote that “all short-range nuclear weapons must be 

destroyed” and asserted that “all remaining American U.S. nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from 

German territory.” They also called for a renunciation 

of the “first-use” option by NATO and Russia: 

Relics of the period of confrontation are no longer adequate for our new century. . . . Partnership fits badly 

with the still-active NATO and Russian doctrines of 

nuclear first use even if neither side is subject to a nuclear strike. A general non-first-use treaty between the 

nuclear-weapon states would be an urgently-needed 

step.18

The American and German quartets were supported and bolstered by op-eds from high-ranking 

former politicians from Great Britain, Italy, Norway, 

the Netherlands, Poland, France, and Belgium.19
267

These contributions reflect the debates in important NATO member states.20 In Germany, the population and the current government are arguing for the 

removal of NATOs TNWs from German territory. In 

October 2009, the new Conservative-Liberal government in Germany formed by the Christian Democratic 

Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) 

released its “coalition treaty,” stating that it “will 

advocate within NATO and towards our U.S. allies 

a withdrawal of remaining nuclear weapons from 

Germany.”21 At the Munich Security Conference in 

February 2010, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle 

declared that “the last remaining nuclear weapons in 

Germany are a relic of the Cold War. They no longer 

serve a military purpose.”22 Former Secretary-General 

of NATO, the former Belgian Foreign Minister Willy 

Claes, together with other former Belgian politicians, 

stated that “U.S. NSNW in Europe have lost all military importance.”23 The Dutch and Belgian governments also advocated removal of U.S. TNWs from 

Europe. Together with Germany, Norway, and Luxembourg, these governments sent a letter in February 2010 to the NATO Secretary-General, asking him 

to put the withdrawal on the agenda of the informal 

NATO meeting of the foreign affairs ministers in Tallinn, Estonia, in April 2010. At that meeting, a policy 

rift opened among NATO members. U.S. Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton responded with a statement of 

five principles, including the declaration that “as long 

as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear 

alliance.”24 But she did not rule out further reductions 

or the development of confidence-building measures 

in cooperation with Russia.

France stands alone in Western Europe in its rejection of further nuclear disarmament and is blocking 

reform of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy. Paris fears 
268

that the debate on a nuclear-free world could weaken 

the significance of its own nuclear deterrent. France 

is the only NATO member that does not participate 

in the Nuclear Planning Group. This French policy 

is supposed to demonstrate the independence of the 

French nuclear deterrent, but it also limits opportunities to influence NATO’s nuclear weapons policy.25

The Central and Eastern European states, as well 

as the Baltic states, are also quite reluctant to push 

for the removal of TNWs from European soil. They 

feel threatened by Russia’s conventional forces and 

tactical nuclear weapons. The Georgian war, Russian maneuvers in the Baltic region (during which the 

deployment of nuclear weapons was practiced), and 

Moscow’s threat to counter the stationing of U.S. missile defense components with deployment of shortrange missiles in Kaliningrad, have all contributed to 

concerns about Russia’s military policy, particularly 

in the Baltic states. The Central and Eastern European 

countries, because of their geographical situation and 

history, are interested primarily in maintenance of 

a credible NATO security guarantee.26 On the other 

hand, in February 2010, two acting foreign ministers 

(Radek Sikorski from Poland and Carl Bildt from 

Sweden) called for the reduction and ultimately elimination of European TNWs unilaterally or by negotiations.27 In northern Europe, there is a special interest 

in reducing the Russian TNW stockpile in Kaliningrad 

and the Kola peninsula.

Turkey’s attitude to the Alliance’s future deterrence and defense posture is ambivalent. Turkish 

Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s government 

is performing a difficult balancing act. On the one 

hand, Turkey has advertised the priority it accords to 

NATO membership by participating in the Alliance’s 
269

nuclear-sharing program. This is viewed as a symbol 

of transatlantic burden-sharing.28 On the other hand, 

Turkey is endeavoring to defuse conflicts in the Middle East and establish itself in the region as mediator 

between Western and Islamic states.

The New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon, 

Portugal, Summit in November 2010, states that “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and 

conventional capabilities, remains a core element 

of [NATO’s] overall strategy.” The leaders of the 28 

NATO members have also agreed to conduct a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) covering the 

right balance between nuclear and conventional forces as well as missile defense in NATO’s future defense 

posture. The consultation phase of the DDPR has already ended, and NATO members are now engaged 

in drafting a report which will be adopted at the May 

20, 2012, summit in Chicago.29

The DDPR is necessary because the future role of 

nuclear weapons in NATO was not specified in the 

New Strategic Concept. The document merely states 

that “the circumstances in which any use of TNWs 

might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.” 

Moreover, the U.S. NPR is not in line with the NATO 

nuclear policy. The U.S. NPR renounces the threat 

or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 

weapon states that are parties to the NPT and are in 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. 

Furthermore, the procurement of new DCA in Europe 

and the delivery aircraft life-extension program in 

the United States are looming on the horizon. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, there would be 

no public support for acquiring new delivery systems 

such as fighter aircraft capable of nuclear missions. 

While some members (Norway and Germany) want to 
270

modify the Alliance’s nuclear posture in order to synchronize it with the U.S. NPR, others such as France 

want to avoid spelling out the conditions under which 

NATO would use or not use nuclear weapons.

At the same time, a new arms control group, the 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Control and 

Disarmament Committee (WCDC), has been established within NATO. The WCDC was created at the 

insistence of Germany and in spite of opposition from 

France. NATO agreed on the WCDC mandate to examine possible “reciprocal measures aiming to reinforce and increase transparency, mutual trust, and 

confidence with Russia.” There is some disagreement 

whether the WCDC will continue to exist beyond the 

2012 summit. 30 Four countries, with support of six 

other NATO members, have proposed a set of transparency and confidence-building measures to break 

the arms control deadlock on TNWs with Russia. But 

NATO member states are deeply divided on what 

kind of relations the Alliance should have with Russia. The United States and some western European 

countries would like to pursue a strategic partnership 

with Russia, while some Central and East Europeans 

are unwilling to accommodate Russian security interests. This fundamental difference in approaches has 

hampered NATO’s efforts to develop and pursue a 

coherent arms control policy towards Russia. NATO 

also hopes to link any reductions in its TNW holdings 

to reciprocal Russian cuts. In the conventional arena, 

NATO insists on implementation of the adapted CFE 

Treaty, which is built on the assumption of strategic 

parity between the East and West. Russia and Belarus 

have signed the adapted CFE Treaty, but the Western 

bloc has not. Russia suspended the CFE data exchange 

in 2007, and NATO followed suit at the end of 2011, 
271

leaving a trail of confusion as to the way ahead for 

conventional arms control in Europe.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL 

IN EUROPE

A recent report by the German Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH) analyzed the challenges and prospects for arms control in 

Europe.31 The study noted that 20 years after the end 

of the Cold War, the military balance in Europe has 

been reversed, in favor of NATO. The Alliance now 

has many more member states than in 1989. NATO’s 

conventional military capabilities are vastly superior 

to Russia’s, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 

The number of heavy weapons exceeds that of Russia 

two- or threefold. Russia’s equipment is much older 

and procurement expenditures over the past decade 

are only 16 percent of that of the European Union (EU) 

NATO countries. Military superiority is particularly 

marked with regard to military research and development (R&D). In dollar outlays for R&D, NATOEurope has an overall 4:1 superiority, as well as a 7:1 

superiority in military spending and a 6:1 advantage 

in procurement. This imbalance is unlikely to change 

in the foreseeable future, despite Russian increases in 

defense spending. Nevertheless, in some regions such 

as the Baltic states, Russian forces still have a regional 

superiority. This imbalance is viewed with alarm by 

the states in this region, and it poses a formidable challenge for future conventional arms control. The only 

other defense category in which Russia is superior in 

terms of numbers is TNWs.

Thanks to the Obama administration, there has 

been a revival of interest in arms control in the last 3 
272

years. Signs of progress include the entry into force 

of the New START Treaty, the successful 2010 NPT 

Review Conference, and statements by the Russian 

and U.S. Presidents in support of a world free of nuclear weapons. In spite of these encouraging signs, 

however, the prospects for successful arms control in 

Europe are looking rather dim. The CFE Treaty was 

suspended by Russia in December 2007 and is likely 

to lapse completely in the near future. Despite several 

attempts to resolve the deadlock, a solution has not 

yet been found. The CFE Review Conference in September 2011 did not bring any progress. Following its 

negotiation in 1989, the CFE Treaty made a historic 

contribution to the establishment of a safe and peaceful milieu in Central and Eastern Europe. It helped to 

frame the unification of Germany, the dissolution of 

the Warsaw Pact, and the fall of the Soviet Union.32

A new basic framework has not yet been found. Sufficiency instead of parity, a mechanism for addressing 

sub-regional disparities, and preservation of rules for 

verifiable transparency, are vital desiderata for a new 

treaty that provides important sources of predictability and reliability in Europe.

Russia links further progress in arms control to reductions of the imbalances of conventional forces and 

other armaments. Moscow is worried about the buildup of ballistic missile defense capabilities in Europe, 

the U.S. investment in precision-guided long-range 

carrier-based systems, and the use of outer-space 

for conventional warfare, which could undermine 

Russia ́s nuclear deterrent in the future. Prompt Global Strike (PGS) is a U.S. program to enable accurate 

strike options against high-value targets worldwide 

within 1 hour. Some new U.S. long-range delivery 

systems with high accuracy for preventive strike are 
273

of special concern to Russia and also China. These include:

• Conventional precision munitions onboard

bombers (B-1/52, F-15/16/18);

• Refitted Ohio class submarines with approximately 600 conventional Tomahawk cruise 

missiles;

• Modification of two of 24 nuclear-equipped 

Trident missiles for PGS missions;

• Development of hypersonic missiles and glide 

vehicles; and,

• Potential development of anti-satellite and 

space weapons.

For all of these options and developments, there 

exist no arms control framework or regime.

Any improvement of NATO-Russia relations is 

likely to be incremental. To the degree possible, NATO 

and Russia should therefore try to untangle the different linkages between political and military aspects of 

their relationship. According to the IFSH report, four 

parallel strategies to strengthen arms control could have 

a positive impact on overall relations:

• Both sides should restrict themselves in areas 

where they have clear military supremacy, 

such as conventional combat forces on NATO’s 

side and TNWs on the Russian side;

• Both sides should engage in a process of confidence- and security-building which focuses on 

those military weapon systems that have a reduced relevance for strategic stability, such as 

TNWs;

• NATO and Russia should support a continuation of treaty-based arms control by agreeing 
274

on a modified CFE regime and a follow-on accord to the New START treaty; and,

• Both sides should reach an understanding 

about which areas, for the time being, will not 

be subject to arms control or restrictions. The 

list might include conventional strategic weapons such as submarine launched cruise missiles 

or PGS systems.

In the short term, progress on arms control will 

hinge on the willingness of NATO and Russia to 

agree on a joint approach to ballistic missile defenses 

(BMD). The stakes are high, yet NATO’s commitment 

to develop an Alliance-wide system and Russia’s insistence on becoming an equal partner in the undertaking appear to have set both sides on a collision 

course. NATO would be well-advised to allow more 

time for consultations with Moscow because there 

is no urgent military requirement to deploy missile 

defenses in Europe. Russia, on the other hand, needs 

to recognize that it will not become NATO’s equal 

partner in missile defense, but that BMD cooperation 

allows further steps to establish common missile defense early warning and data-sharing. Establishing a 

data exchange center with NATO could be a decisive 

confidence-building step forward to enhance cooperation on BMD in Europe.33

While they are trying to improve their own bilateral relationship, NATO and Russia also need to reach 

out to China since agreements between Russia and 

NATO have a potential impact on security in Asia. 

Beijing’s experience with arms control is extremely 

limited. To draw China further into the arms control 

and confidence-building process, NATO could for example propose to intensify discussions among the five 
275

permanent members of the United Nations Security 

Council on nuclear confidence-building and transparency. Involving China—and eventually the other 

nuclear-armed states India, Israel, and Pakistan—in 

an arms control dialogue could also go some way towards addressing the long-term problem of preserving the strategic balances under conditions of nuclear 

disarmament. In the end, the real challenge will be to 

assure others that regional military imbalances and 

U.S. conventional supremacy are no threats to international stability and security.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Final Document of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2010/50, 

Vol. I, New York, 2010.

2. William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of the 

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “Executive 

Summary,” Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2009. 

3. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010, p. xiii.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. James Cartwright, Meeting on Nuclear Posture Review, 

Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010. 

7. Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, 

No. 1, 2011, pp. 64ff.

8. NATO New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Lisbon, Portugal, November 2010.
276

9. See Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, 

Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons 

in Europe, Monterey, CA: The James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2009; World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 2008, pp. 373-375; Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, 

“Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations,”Russia ́s 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Stockholm, Sweden: FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2005.

10. Alexei Arbatov, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” in 

NATO-Russia Relations: Prospects for New Security Architecture, 

Nuclear Reductions, CFE-Treaty, Moscow, Russia: IMEMO RAN, 

2010, pp. 28-40.

11. Andrei Zagorski, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics and Arms Control, Hamburg, Germany: Institut für 

Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität 

Hamburg, 2011.

12. Ibid., pp. 18-21. 

13. See in detail the study by Michael Brzoska, Anne Finger, 

Oliver Meier, Götz Neuneck, and Wolfgang Zellner, Prospects for 

Arms Control in Europe, Berlin, Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 

November 2011.

14. Zagorski, p. 6.

15. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, 

and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street 

Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15; and “Toward a Nuclear-Free 

World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13.

16. See George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. 

Drell, and James E.Goodby, Reykjavik Revisited. Steps Toward a 

World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 

Press, pp. 482-483.

17. Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr, 

and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Für eine atomwaffenfreie Welt,” 

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 9, 2009, p. 10.
277

18. Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr 

and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World: 

A German View,” Original Version published on January 9, 

2009 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, available from www.

nytimes.com/2009/01/09/opinion/09iht-edschmidt.1.19226604.

html?pagewanted=all.

19. See Götz Neuneck, “Is a World without Nuclear Weapons 

Attainable? Comparative Perspectives on Goals and Prospects,” 

in Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds., Getting to Zero—

The Path to Nuclear Disarmament, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 43-66.

20. See Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO ́s Lisbon Summit: Why 

Their Withdrawal is Desirable and Feasible,” Cambridge, MA: 

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

May 2011; Johan Bergenäs, Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and 

Nikolai Sokov, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-Strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?” Monterey, 

CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, The James Martin 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2010.

21. The Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU, and 

FDP, “Growth, Education, Unity”, Berlin, Germany, October 26, 

2009, p. 170, available from www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091215-koalitionsvertrag-2009-2013-englisch.pdf.

22. Speech by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle at the 46th 

Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010.

23. Willy Claes, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Louis Michel, and Guy 

Verhofstadt, “Het is Nu of Nooit,” De Standaard, February 19, 

2010. An unofficial Translation is available from www.pugwash.

org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-free-statements/NWFW_statements_

Belgium.htm.

24. Sauer and van der Zwaan, p. 13.

25. See Paul Zajac, “NATO’s Defense and Deterrence Posture 

Review: A French Perspective on Nuclear Issues,” Nuclear Policy 
278

Paper, No. 7, Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, British 

American Security Information Council, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), 

2011.

26. Jacek Durkalec, Reductions of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in 

Europe: Unbinding the Gordian Knot, Warsaw, Poland: The Polish 

Institute of International Affairs, Strategic File #16, May 2011.

27. Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, “Next the Tactical Nukes,” 

The New York Times, February 2010.

28. Mustafa Kibaroglu, Turkey, NATO and Nuclear Sharing: 

Prospects after NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Washington, DC: Arms 

Control Association, British American Security Information 

Council, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the 

University of Hamburg (IFSH), May 2011.

29. Oliver Meier, “NATO Revises Nuclear Policy,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 40, No. 10, 2010, pp. 28ff.

30. Oliver Meier, ”NATO Sets Up Arms Control Committee,” 

Arms Control Today, Vol. 41 No. 3, 2011, pp. 32ff.

31. See Michael Brzoska, Anne Finger, Oliver Meier, Götz 

Neuneck, and Wolfgang Zellner, Prospects for Arms Control in Europe, Berlin, Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2011.

32. See Wolfgang Zellner, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, and Götz 

Neuneck, eds., Die Zukunft konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa (The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe), BadenBaden, Germany: Nomos, 2009.

33. See Ivanka Barzashka, Timur Kadyshev, Götz Neuneck, 

and Ivan Oelrich, “How to Avoid a New Arms Race,” Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists, July 25, 2011.
279

CHAPTER 12

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Paolo Foradori

Any discussion of European perspectives on the 

presence, role, and future of U.S. tactical nuclear 

weapons (TNWs) must begin with the caveat that Europe (or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] 

Europe) is not a unitary actor. Europe is a heterogeneous ensemble of countries with different histories, 

capabilities, international statuses, and ambitions 

and with specific security cultures and threat perceptions. This structural differentiation within the Alliance must be considered for a full appreciation of 

the convoluted dynamics of consensus-building that 

characterize NATO decisionmaking. The expansion of 

NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries has 

added further elements of complexity to the Alliance’s 

institutional and political architecture. Therefore, this 

analysis will sometimes refer to NATO Europe as a 

whole and will sometimes differentiate between specific continental, regional, and national positions.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the 

first section, I argue that a widespread consensus exists within Europe that the strictly military value of 

TNWs is now negligible, and that there are no realistic 

scenarios in which TNWs could be employed. In the 

second section, I argue that the European position is 

largely shaped by and must be contextualized in the 

increasing international support for nuclear disarmament. With one main exception (France), TNWs have 

lost their attractiveness as symbols of power, status, 

and prestige. Moreover, their further reduction and 
280

eventual elimination are considered important contributions to the objective of nonproliferation and 

the longer-term objective of Global Zero. In the third 

section, I argue that, despite the prevailing post-Cold 

War thinking in most of NATO Europe, different security threat perceptions exist among the allies, and 

some of the new members in Central and Eastern 

Europe (CEE) continue to attribute residual political 

and symbolic importance to the physical presence 

of TNWs on European soil. However, the status quo 

position of these members does not seem entirely intransigent, especially when balanced by a NATO/U.S. 

commitment to their defense by other (i.e., non-nuclear) means. Indeed, the issue of TNW forward deployment in Europe is, to a great extent, a proxy for lack 

of confidence in the future of the U.S. commitment 

and the diminished solidarity within the Alliance that 

these countries have experienced. 

NATO leaders are well aware of this complex dialectic within the Alliance and of the risk that decisions 

that are not unanimous may weaken the solidarity and 

indivisibility of Atlantic security. NATO has therefore 

opted to prioritize the Alliance’s cohesion—on which 

its credibility as a security provider depends—in any 

decision about the presence, role, and future of TNWs, 

which are widely regarded as having little intrinsic 

value for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century.

WEAPONS OF LITTLE (OR NO) MILITARY 

VALUE

There is widespread consensus within Europe that 

the strictly military value of TNWs is negligible, and 

there are no realistic scenarios in which they could be 

employed. Tactical weapons are believed to be poorly 
281

suited to countering the main international threats to 

Euro-Atlantic security, and serious credibility problems are raised by their low operational readiness, 

their vulnerability to surprise attacks, and the limited range of dual-capable aircraft.1

 The most explicit 

manifestation of this point of view was proposed by 

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who 

conditioned his support for Angela Merkel’s coalition 

government after the elections of November 2009 on 

its definite commitment to eliminating TNWs, which 

he described as “a relic of the Cold War . . . [that] no 

longer serves a military purpose.”2

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse 

of the archenemy against whom the U.S. bombs in 

Europe were first deployed, the original purpose of 

TNWs has vanished, and their current military role 

appears ill-defined at best.3 NATO itself declares that 

its “nuclear forces no longer target any country”4

because it “does not consider any country to be its 

adversary.”5 The Alliance’s present ability to defuse 

a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, if 

needed, to mount a successful conventional defense, 

has significantly improved. Although an appropriate 

combination of nuclear and conventional capabilities 

remains a “core element”6 of NATO’s current deterrence strategy, “the circumstances in which any use of 

nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are 

extremely remote.”7

 In the words of the 2010 NATO 

Strategic Concept: 

Since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically 

reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in 

Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO 

strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.8
282

In the post-bipolar international system, TNWs 

are of little military value to counter the main threats 

to the Alliance’s security, which include terrorism, 

low-intensity and asymmetric warfare, transnational 

crime, piracy, cyber-warfare, migration pressures, energy shortages, contagious diseases, and natural and 

man-made disasters. In the words of Polish Foreign 

Minister Radek Sikorski and his Swedish counterpart, 

Carl Bildt, “We still face security challenges in the 

Europe of today and tomorrow, but from whichever 

angle you look, there is no role for the use of nuclear 

weapons in resolving these challenges.”9

The admission to NATO of most of the former Warsaw Pact countries has further decreased TNW utility. The “three no’s” policy, which commits NATO to 

not deploying TNWs (or establishing nuclear weapon 

storage sites) on the territories of the new members, 

has placed nearly all of the weapons (except possibly 

those hosted in Turkey)10 far from Russia and other 

potential enemies and far from the alliance borders, 

where they might act as tripwires.11

The shift of conventional superiority from the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)/Russia to 

NATO adds an extra element to the reduced credibility of TNWs as an effective means of defense, raising 

doubts about the need for these politically and morally difficult-to-use weapons at a time when NATO is 

regarded as the strongest conventional military alliance ever created, with no rivals.

In most, if not all, conceivable present and future 

scenarios, there are much better alternatives to the use 

or threat of nuclear gravity bombs dropped by shortrange dual-capable aircraft, which are vulnerable to 

modern air defense systems and require refueling to 

reach distant targets. Both conventional and noncon-
283

ventional alternatives are operationally and politically preferable. Modern conventional weapons have 

become extremely accurate and powerful, and these 

are deemed capable of efficiently responding to most 

threats to the security of the Alliance. In the words of a 

senior official at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

“I cannot think of any mission that cannot be accomplished with other means. The value of these weapons 

is today essentially political.”12 It is difficult to envisage a realistic scenario in which all NATO members, 

including Germany and the Scandinavian countries, 

could reach consensus on employing nuclear weapons against any target. Indeed, even in a worst-case 

scenario that requires the actual use of nuclear capabilities, it is difficult to imagine that NATO—and, 

especially, its strongest member, the United States—

would resort to TNWs hosted in Europe when faster, 

more accurate, longer-range U.S. strategic nuclear 

weapons based at sea or on American soil are available and ready to launch.13

TNWs thus appear short on credibility as weapons 

of any real military value. If this is the case, their deterrent potential is also seriously compromised. Furthermore, adding the French and UK nuclear arsenals 

to that of the United States, NATO would remain a 

formidable nuclear alliance even if the few hundred 

remaining TNWs were withdrawn from Europe. 

Supporting Nonproliferation and Disarmament.

The debate about the forward deployment of 

U.S. tactical weapons must be seen in the context of 

the increasing international support for the program 

of nuclear disarmament, which is finding adherents 

throughout Europe.14 Despite caveats and different 
284

levels of enthusiasm, most European countries are 

genuinely committed to nuclear abolishment, and it 

can be cogently argued that the current debate about 

TNWs would not have emerged without the global vision for “a world free of nuclear weapons” endorsed 

by U.S. President Barack Obama.15

With the main exception of France, which continues to attribute great value to its nuclear arsenal and 

remains explicitly against any change in the Alliance’s 

nuclear posture,16 in most of Europe, nuclear weapons 

have not only been drastically devalued as effective 

military instruments but have also lost their attractiveness as symbols of power, status, and prestige. With 

the end of the Cold War, a process of delegitimization of 

nuclear weapons began. The utility of these weapons 

was gradually devalued and disparaged, thereby reducing and eventually annulling any positive evaluation of their efficacy, legitimacy, and authority.17 Even 

among the more conservative, status-quo-prone countries of CEE, support for U.S. nuclear forward deployment is not ideological and absolute; rather, it is qualified, pragmatic, and negotiable, as will be discussed in 

the next section.

Within this general context, in many NATO European nations, tactical weapons are increasingly regarded as weapons of little or no intrinsic value per se

and as negative symbols that weaken the credibility 

of Western countries’ commitment to the nonproliferation objectives of Articles I and II of the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the disarmament 

objective of Article VI.18 The forward deployment of 

U.S. nuclear weapons on the territories of countries 

that are signatories of the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states raises issues of compatibility with the spirit 

(if not the letter) of the Treaty.19 This is more than a 
285

legal issue, it is a political one: if the strongest military 

alliance in the history of the world maintains that 200 

or so nuclear gravity bombs are necessary to preserve 

peace and prevent coercion, it is only reasonable that 

other nations with less powerful military forces will 

decide that they also need to acquire nuclear arsenals 

for their security. 

But the fact is that the further reduction and eventual elimination of TNWs are considered important 

contributions to nonproliferation and disarmament. 

Interestingly, the 2011 Strategic Concept expressed, for 

the first time, NATO’s commitment “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty.”20

Finally, in some European host countries, there is 

growing concern about the security risks connected 

with the presence of TNWs and the possible danger 

of unauthorized use, sabotage, or theft of these weapons.21 This is especially true after a Blue Ribbon Review

conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 2008 highlighted 

deficiencies in the custody of American weapons at 

European bases. The report disclosed that the majority of the bases did not meet the security standards 

established by the U.S. Department of Defense, and 

the reduced military salience of these weapons has 

led to diminished attention by base personnel and to 

waning expertise.22 This issue is particularly relevant 

in Belgium, where much of the discussion of TNWs is 

kept alive by bombspotting actions by the peace movement that showcase the vulnerability of the Kleine 

Brogel air base, which is believed to host TNWs.23
286

DIFFERING THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND 

ALLIANCE COHESION

As observed at the outset of this article, NATO 

Europe is not a unitary actor but rather a heterogeneous alliance system whose internal differentiation 

and complexity have increased since the membership 

accession of several former Warsaw Pact countries beginning in the 1990s. Although the type of post-Cold 

War thinking described in the previous section is 

widespread in present-day NATO Europe, this thinking is not shared by all members of the Alliance. In addition to the French nuclear exceptions, a number of 

new NATO members in CEE perceive security differently and continue to place greater value on the physical and visible presence of U.S. TNWs in Europe.24

Historical events, both recent and distant, help to 

explain these countries’ security assessments, which 

place a much stronger emphasis on prudent, worstcase-scenario-based defense planning. These countries’ memories of the dramatic events of the 20th 

century are still vivid. The new allies joined NATO 

because of its collective defense value in avoiding possible repetition of past events when their very existence was threatened, first by Nazi Germany and later 

by the Communist USSR. Even if, after half a century 

of peace, Western European members of NATO believe that their security is not threatened, the positions 

of CEE members are much more cautious: they do not 

feel as secure, and they remain concerned about the 

threat from Russia.

The new NATO members consider U.S.-led NATO 

to be the ultimate guarantee of their territorial integrity and political independence. Hence, they share a 

grave concern about any change that may weaken the 
287

U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and transform the classical Article V hard-security mission of 

the Alliance into a license for out-of-area interventions 

or, worse, transform NATO into an organization with 

a constant identity crisis.25

For these CEE countries, tactical nuclear weapons 

still possess a residual political-symbolic value to enhance the credibility of the security guarantees made 

by the United States to its allies.26

For reasons rooted in the different strategic cultures 

and the disparities in military might between Western Europe and the United States, Central Europeans 

believe that their successful defense requires direct 

U.S. military involvement. So they tend to associate 

any weakening of the transatlantic link with erosion 

of their own security.27

TNWs are considered a test of U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense and of Europe’s interest in keeping the 

transatlantic link strong.28

The issue of TNW forward deployment is entirely 

political and symbolic for the new NATO members in 

CEE. At its core, it is a proxy for the lack of confidence 

felt by these nations in the future of the U.S. commitment and concern about the diminished solidarity 

within the Alliance.29 In addition to the historical reasons for the apprehension felt by the new NATO members (highlighted above), their insecurity has grown 

in recent years with the dismaying realization that 

the reinforcement of conventional forces and the upgrade of infrastructure for their defense, which NATO 

had promised these countries when they acceded to 

NATO, would never materialize. The new NATO Allies were also alarmed by the feeble response of the 

United States to the invasion of Georgia by Russian 
288

troops in 2008 and by the decision of U.S. President 

Barack Obama in 2009 to modify the plans for the deployment of components of a missile defense system 

in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The perspective of the new NATO members on 

TNWs does not seem completely intransigent, however. It is likely to be negotiable, especially if balanced 

by a credible NATO commitment—essentially, a U.S. 

commitment—to their defense by other means.30 Indeed, according to Tomas Valasek, “The [tactical nuclear] weapons are a potent symbol of the transatlantic bond, but not necessarily the only, or irreplaceable, 

symbol.”31

As has been rightly argued, it is primarily the nonnuclear dimension of the deterrence policy of NATO 

that must be improved to increase the importance of 

the collective defense and deterrence function of the 

Alliance.32 NATO, and especially the United States, 

could consider alternatives to or compensations for 

the forward deployment of TNWs, such as an increase 

in conventional forces (“boots on the ground”) or the 

deployment in the region of substantial components 

of Obama’s redesigned “Phased Adaptive Approach” 

to missile defense, to meet the new NATO members’ 

need for reassurance.

Undoubtedly, the issue must be addressed with 

great caution because it is difficult to reach agreement 

on perceptions and symbols, especially in the current 

period of profound transformation and reorganization of Euro-Atlantic security.33 Decisions that are not 

shared risk weakening the cohesion of the Alliance on 

which the credibility of NATO depends. The priority 

on both sides of the Atlantic is to avoid casting doubt 

on the principle of indivisibility in the Alliance’s security. Consequently, the debate on TNWs is widely per-
289

ceived as subordinate to the more relevant objective of 

maintaining NATO’s stability and cohesion. As such, 

and because intermediate options between maintaining TNWs and withdrawing them completely are not 

easy to envisage,34 a final decision on nuclear forward 

deployment can be temporarily postponed.35

In this respect, the position of Italy on the presence, role, and destiny of the U.S. TNWs on its soil 

is telling and exemplifies the general perspective of 

NATO Europe on the issue.36 On the one hand, Italy 

has dramatically devalued TNWs and considers the 

transatlantic link strong, regardless of the presence of 

a few B-61 bombs. On the other, with its deeply rooted 

strategic culture that prioritizes multilateralism over 

every form of unilateralism, Italy continues to assign 

paramount value to the cohesion of NATO, seeking 

to prevent rifts that could compromise its solidarity. 

To that end, Rome is willing to slow down or postpone the elimination of tactical weapons from its territory if necessary, although it considers these weapons 

not only of little intrinsic significance but also a hindrance to the program of nuclear disarmament that it 

supports.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, the military and political value of 

U.S. tactical nuclear forward deployment in Europe 

has dramatically decreased. Most NATO members 

genuinely support global nuclear disarmament and 

are amenable, in principle, to further reductions in the 

number of TNWs, and even to their complete withdrawal. However, some NATO members—particularly the new members in CEE—continue to attribute residual symbolic significance to TNWs, with the result 
290

that NATO as a whole is willing to delay or postpone 

the elimination of these weapons for the sake of the 

Alliance’s cohesion. 

NATO remains Europe’s primary hard security 

provider. Because the credibility of an organization 

like NATO depends on solidarity among its members, 

a widely shared priority on both sides of the Atlantic 

is to avoid jeopardizing the principle of indivisibility 

of the Alliance’s security. The prevailing trend of devaluing TNWs, therefore, is offset by a cooperative 

approach to allied security that considers the perceptions of all partners, including those who feel the need 

for continuing nuclear reassurance. 

At the same time, NATO is called to be coherent 

with its regard to commitment to reducing reliance 

on nuclear arsenals and to nuclear disarmament. Engaging in earnest and with greater coherence to fight 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation is 

in the strategic interest of the Alliance. Eliminating the 

remaining few scarcely useful TNWs deployed in Europe would serve this purpose well and at very little 

cost. Sooner or later, the fundamental rationale for the 

forward deployment of TNWs in Europe must be addressed in unambiguous terms. 

The discussion, without taboos of any sort, must 

be pragmatic, non-ideological, and guided by four 

propositions. First, in the present and foreseeable 

future security scenario, TNWs have no clear mission, and alternative means of ensuring security exist; second, NATO is currently a truly conventional 

hyper-power with no rivals; third, NATO can remain 

a nuclear alliance even without forward deployment 

of U.S. TNWs, counting among its members three nuclear-weapon states; and fourth, TNWs today retain 

a residual (though replaceable), symbolic importance 

for only a few NATO member states.
291

If the wider concerns of those countries regarding 

the allied commitment to their defense can be suitably addressed, progress on further reduction in the 

numbers of TNWs and on softening NATO’s nuclear 

posture might be possible.37 In the final analysis, one 

cannot exclude the possibility that a properly tailored 

and strengthened “Asian model” of extended deterrence, whereby the U.S. nuclear umbrella can continue 

to function credibly without forward basing, could, in 

principle, be applicable to the European context.38

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. According to NATO, the readiness posture of dual-capable 

aircraft (DCA) has been greatly reduced since the mid-1990s, from 

minutes to weeks. In 2002, the readiness requirements for these 

aircraft were further reduced and are now measured in months. 

See NATO, “NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment,” January 24, 2008, available from www.nato.int/nato_

static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_Nuclear_Forces_in_the_New_

Security_Environment-eng.pdf.

2. Speech by Guido Westerwelle at the 46th Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010, available from www.security

conference.de. Similarly, Willy Claes, former Belgian Foreign Minister and former NATO Secretary General, stated, “The Cold War 

is over....US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have lost all military importance.” See “Ex-NATO chief joins call for no US nuclear 

arms in Europe,” Agence France Presse, February 19, 2010, available from www.spacewar.com/afp/100219103611.ezoyfew3.html.

3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) are designed to perform 

specific military functions that support operations on the ground. 

They are intended for use in combat to achieve circumscribed 

(i.e., tactical) objectives in a limited nuclear war. With regard to 

NATO, the “flexible response” doctrine that was introduced in 

the 1960s foresaw the use of TNWs on European battlegrounds to 

counter Soviet conventional superiority and hamper or halt a Red 

Army advance on allied territory. The definition of TNWs and the 
292

distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons remain 

controversial. For a thorough discussion, see Harald Müller and 

Annette Schaper, “Definitions, Types, Missions, Risks and Options for Control: A European Perspective,” in William C. Potter, 

Nikolai Sokov, Harald Müller, and Annette Schaper, eds., Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons Options for Control, New York: United Nations 

Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, pp. 19-51; Andrea Gabbitas, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Definition,” 

in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds., Controlling 

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, USAF 

Institute for National Security Studies, Collingdale, PA: Diane 

Publishing Co., pp. 39-63.

4. NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the 

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” November 19, 

2010, para. 64, available from www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategicconcept-2010-eng.pdf. 

5. NATO, Strategic Concept 2010, para. 16.

6. Ibid., para. 17.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., para. 26.

9. Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, “Next, the Tactical Nukes,” 

New York Times, February 1, 2010.

10. It is worth recalling that Turkey hosts B-61 TNWs on its 

territory but has no DCA. Its air forces participate in NATO exercises as non-nuclear air defense escort units, rather than a nuclear 

strike force (Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Reassessing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 40, No. 5, June 

2010, pp. 8-13). Despite its drastically reduced and today minimal 

role in nuclear matters, Turkey is openly against the withdrawal 

of TNWs from Europe. In the eyes of Ankara, TNWs are important 

political weapons to strengthen the link with the United States, 

which is considered indispensable for the country’s defense in an 

international environment perceived as highly uncertain, also in 

consideration of the geopolitical co-location of the country next to 

the volatile Middle Eastern region (where the Iranian nuclear pro-
293

gram is seen with growing apprehension). In addition, Turkish civilian and military authorities view Turkey’s NATO membership 

as a potent symbol of the country’s belonging to the West and 

the U.S. TNWs as an emblem of the country’s privileged status 

within the Alliance which must be preserved. Mustafa Kibaroglu, 

“Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO’s 

Lisbon Summit,” Nuclear Policy Paper No. 5, Arms Control Association , British American Security Information Council, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of 

Hamburg (IFSH), April 2011, p. 3. In short, especially after the reluctance and sluggishness of some NATO members to respond to 

Turkey’s concerns in the context of the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, 

Turkish officials are not confident that the extended deterrence 

of the Alliance would work effectively without the physical presence of U.S. forward-deployment on its soil (Ibid.). As correctly 

observed by a former British secretary of state for defence, TNWs 

are not important to Ankara because of the weapons themselves 

or their military value but because the relationship between Turkey, the United States, and the other NATO members is strained 

for other reasons, including the perception that Turkey’s national 

security priorities are poorly understood by the allies, the damaging experience of the Bush administration, and the perceived 

failure of the United States to help Turkey in its struggle with the 

Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). If Ankara’s wider concerns can 

be addressed, further reduction in TNW numbers might be possible. See Des Browne, “Current NATO Nuclear Policy,” in Paul 

Ingram and Oliver Meier, eds., Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy 

Debate, ACA and BASIC Report, May 2011, p. 7.

11. With the main aim of addressing the Russian concerns 

about the effects of NATO enlargement on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). NATO has declared that it has “no 

intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on 

the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect 

of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy.” See Founding Act 

on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the 

Russian Federation, May 27, 1997, available at www.nato.int/cps/en/

natolive/official_texts_25468.htm.
294

12. Author’s interview with a senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy, September 10, 2010 (name 

withheld by request). This argument closely mirrors the position 

that was recently expressed by James Cartwright, Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, according to whom 

there are no missions calling for TNWs that cannot be carried out 

with American conventional or strategic nuclear weapons. See 

James Cartwright, “Meeting on Nuclear Postures Review,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, available 

from www.cfr.org/publication/21861/nuclear_posture_review.html. 

13. Indeed, the 2010 Strategic Concept admits, “The supreme 

guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic 

[emphasis added] nuclear forces of the Alliance. . . .” The TNWs 

are not mentioned in this context. See NATO, Strategic Concept 

2010, para. 18.

14. The current debate on the total abolition of nuclear 

weapons was prompted by an appeal by U.S. statesmen George 

Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn published in “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. Interestingly, one of their recommendations 

was to eliminate “short-range nuclear weapons designed to be 

forward-deployed” as a concrete step toward a nuclear-weaponsfree world. The appeal of the Four Horsemen—as Schultz and his 

associates are often called—has been followed by similar press 

initiatives worldwide, including the following NATO Europe 

countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 

and the United Kingdom (UK).

15. See Obama’s landmark Prague speech, Office of the Press 

Secretary, “Remarks by the President Barack Obama,” Hradcany 

Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available from 

www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

16. Indeed, France was the main force opposing any change 

to NATO nuclear policy during the Lisbon summit that approved 

the new Strategic Concept. See Oliver Meier, “NATO Revises Nuclear Policy,” Arms Control Association, December 2010, available 

from www.armscontrol.org/print/4590. France maintains a conservative nuclear policy and continues to consider its nuclear arsenal 
295

as an essential element of its security and defense policy as during 

the Cold War. For Paris, the potential threats to the country’s survival, sovereignty, independence and “vital interests” have not 

disappeared, and the United States guarantees through NATO 

are not seen as more credible than in the past. French leaders and 

strategists emphasize the element of high uncertainty of the present international system, and hence deem it prudent to maintain 

and modernize a national nuclear deterrent. This latter is also valued as a guarantee for pursuing an active and independent foreign policy, limiting the risk of being subject to blackmail or coercion (Bruno Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France’s 

Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007). 

Three main features characterize “French nuclear exception”: 1) 

strong and lasting political and public support for continuing current national nuclear policy; 2) a deeply rooted strategic culture 

which emphasizes independence and nuclear sufficiency; and, 3) 

an evolving and ambivalent approach to nuclear disarmament—

based on non-ideological security considerations, a fairly restrictive interpretation of NPT disarmament commitments, but also 

on a policy of nuclear restraint—combined with proactive commitment to nonproliferation (Camille Grand, “France, Nuclear 

Weapons, and Nonproliferation,” in Camille Grand et al., eds., 

U.S.-European Nonproliferation Perspectives. A Transatlantic Conversation, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, April 2009). For interesting remarks on the conservative 

position of France in relation to the specific issue of U.S. TNWs 

assigned to NATO, see also Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, Withdrawal Issues: What NATO countries say about the future of 

tactical weapons in Europe, IKV Paz Christi, March 2011, pp. 21-22.

17. On the concept of nuclear weapons delegitimization, see 

Berry Ken, Lewis Patricia Pélopidas Benoît, Sokov Nikolai, and 

Wilson Ward, Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the validity of nuclear deterrence, Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, 2010.

18. The grand bargaining underpinning of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) calls for non-nuclear-weapon states 

not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons (Art. II) on the basis of 

the solemn promise by the nuclear-weapon states to negotiate in 

good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament (Art. VI).
296

19. NATO’s argument is that the United States maintains control of the weapons, and there is no transfer of the weapons or 

their control except in war, in which case the NPT ceases to apply. 

In addition, it is maintained that the NPT was ratified after the 

countries of deployment had signed the (classified) agreements to 

host nuclear weapons on their territory, arrangements that were 

known to other signatories to the Treaty at the time of signing. 

20. NATO, Strategic Concept 2010, para. 26. Moreover, it 

should be noted that, on Germany’s initiative, the Lisbon Summit 

strengthened NATO’s role in the fight against the proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and agreed to establish a 

new arms control committee charged with providing advice on 

WMD control and disarmament in the context of the Alliance’s 

review of its deterrence and defense posture.

21. On this point, former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn recently 

stated, “To persist in maintaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons 

in Europe for another decade—in the absence of any real military 

or political utility—is more of a security risk than asset to NATO, 

given the nontrivial risk of a terrorist attack against a NATO base 

with nuclear weapons.” Sam Nunn, “The Race Between Cooperation and Catastrophe,” in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Willams, 

eds., Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011, p. 20.

22. See “Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons 

Policies and Procedures,” Polly A. Peyer, chair, February 8, 2008, 

available from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/usaf/BRR-2008.

pdf. See also the analysis by Hans M. Kristensen, “USAF Report: 

‘Most’ Nuclear Weapons Sites in Europe Do Not Meet U.S. Security Requirements,” Federation of American Scientist, Strategic 

Security Blog, June 19, 2008, available from www.fas.org/blog/

ssp/2008/06/usaf-report-“most”-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-donot-meet-us-security-requirements.php.

23. See Global Security Newswire, “Peace Activists Trespass 

at Belgian Base Housing U.S. Nukes,” available from www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100217_5906.php.

24. It is worth noting that this group of states is not unitary 

either, and different internal assessments exist. Whereas the small 
297

and militarily weak Baltic states feel vulnerable and fear abandonment (and therefore are very much pro-status quo), Poland seems 

more self-confident as a medium-sized European power and is 

more prepared to discuss the issue and conditions of withdrawal, 

especially as a bargaining chip to encourage Russia to reduce its 

nuclear weaponry based near Central Europe.

25. Lukasz Kulesa, “Polish and Central European Priorities 

for NATO’s Future Nuclear Policy,” in Ingram and Meier, p. 16.

26. Similar dynamics were at work among the “old” NATO 

members at the height of the Cold War, when, in the words of 

historian Michael Howard: 

The American military presence was wanted in Western 

Europe, not just in the negative role of a deterrent to Soviet 

aggression, but in the positive role of a reassurance to the 

West Europeans; the kind of reassurance a child needs from 

its parents or an invalid from his doctors against dangers 

which, however remote, cannot be entirely discounted. 

See Michael Howard, “Reassurance and deterrence: Western defense in the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1982-83, p. 309. 

If Charles de Gaulle was uncertain about American willingness to 

sacrifice Washington or New York to save Paris, today there are 

even more reasons to wonder whether the nuclearization of an 

American city is an acceptable consequence of defending Vilnius 

or Tallinn.

27. Tomas Valasek, “Central Europe and NATO’s Nuclear 

Deterrent,” in Malcolm Chalmers and Andrew Somerville, eds., 

If the Bombs Go: European Perspectives on NATO’s Nuclear Debate, 

Westminster, UK: RUSI, Whitehall Report, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 21.

28. Ibid.

29. As previously seen, similar dynamics are at work in the 

case of Turkey. 

30. At the same time, the new NATO members believe strongly that TNWs should not be further reduced or withdrawn unilaterally, and they see the need to engage the Russians to reciprocate 

with their much larger tactical arsenal.
298

31. Valasek, p. 24.

32. Lukasz Kulesa, p. 16.

33. On the concept of security perceptions, see Emil Kirchner 

and James Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing 

Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, London, UK: Routledge, 

2007.

34. Intermediate options, such as the consolidation of TNWs 

in one or two countries, would be politically unpalatable for any 

host country after TNWs are withdrawn from any of the five current host countries.

35. Even Germany, whose Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 

taken a strong position in favor of change in the months leading 

to the 2010 Strategic Concept, now seems to have adopted a more 

moderate stance and seeks consensus without breaking ranks 

with the allies. 

36. According to open-source data, Italy hosts approximately 

50 B-61 bombs at U.S. Aviano Air Base and 20-40 at Italy’s Ghedi 

Torre Air Base. Italy possesses 69 nuclear-capable Tornado IDS 

aircraft. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear 

Notebook: US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, January/February 2011, pp. 

64–73. For a thorough analysis of the Italian case, see Paolo Foradori, “Tactical nuclear weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2012 (forthcoming).

37. The 2010 Strategic Concept maintains a conservative stance 

on the purpose of NATO’s conventional and nuclear mix and 

does not change its first-use policy, even against a non-nuclear attack. Paragraph 19 of the Strategic Concept states in unambiguous 

terms, “We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety 

and security of our populations” (emphasis added). It is worth 

noting that this statement creates an important discrepancy between the NATO position and that elaborated by the 2010 Nuclear 

Posture Review of the United States, which commits Washington 
299

“not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance 

with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” See “Nuclear 

Posture Review Report,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Defense, April 2010, page 27, available from www.defense.gov/npr/

docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf, p. 15.

38. This possibility is discussed in Karl-Heinz Kamp, 

“NATO’s Nuclear Posture Review: Nuclear Sharing Instead of 

Nuclear Stationing,” Research Paper, Rome, Italy: NATO Defence 

College, May 2011, p. 68.

301

CHAPTER 13

EUROPE, NATO’S TACTICAL NUCLEAR 

CONUNDRUM, AND PUBLIC DEBATE:

BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR1

Nick Childs

There is bad news and good news for the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the current 

state of affairs over its “tactical” nuclear weapons in 

Europe. In some instances, however, differentiating 

which is which may prove difficult. The bad news for 

NATO is that it has got itself into a bit of a mess over 

the issue. The good news is that hardly anyone in terms 

of the general public has noticed yet, certainly as far 

as most of European opinion is concerned. Inasmuch 

as the issue has been aired recently, the controversy 

that has been provoked has been relatively muted and 

confined, and has not yet really resonated as an issue 

of public policy concern. But the Alliance cannot rely 

on that remaining to be the case.

Here is where one of the differentiation questions 

comes in straight away. From the outside looking in, 

many might argue that NATO needs to lift the veil of 

behind-closed-doors deliberations and be more transparent in its decisionmaking. Some in the Alliance 

might even say that the lack of public resonance is bad 

news, as it reflects a general lack of public awareness 

of or indeed interest in where things stand on NATO 

nuclear strategy. What is needed, so this strand of argument goes, is public debate, education, and engagement on the matter. However, as the saying goes, be 

careful what you wish for.
302

While the populace in most European NATO countries may have quietly forgotten about, or stopped 

worrying about, Alliance nuclear weapons strategy or 

forward-deployed nuclear bombs on European soil, 

once reminded of them they are likely to be as sensitive to these issues as they have ever been. The potential “fallout” from such a reminder may be highly unpredictable. In the current information environment, 

with short memories and attention spans, for populations and the news media suddenly to be reminded 

that there are some 150-200 elderly U.S. nuclear freefall bombs scattered around Europe could have quite 

a shock effect. Part of the problem for the Alliance, 

including even those within it who might welcome 

a wider public debate, is that it might well not be at 

NATO’s time of choosing, or on its own terms, that the 

issue suddenly grabs the public and media consciousness. That has not happened yet. Yes, debate has been 

revived on the future of NATO’s nuclear posture, but 

so far only up to a point, and not really much beyond 

a relatively limited policy elite. Even so, the airing of 

disagreements has set off official alarm bells and encouraged NATO governments to try to put a lid on 

these discussions.

To understand how public flare-ups can occur, one 

only has to look back to the public anguish and rancor that accompanied the effort in the 1980s to deploy 

cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe as part of the 

intermediate nuclear force stand-off with the Soviet 

Union. The recent flurry of discussions has not yet 

come close to spilling over into public agitation in the 

same way. But it could have the potential to be at least 

as divisive.

In the circumstances of a renewed public engagement with the nuclear weapons issue, a NATO that has 
303

not reached a clear consensus on what these weapons 

are now for, whether and how they might be retained 

or even modernized, or why and in what manner they 

might be dispensed with—unilaterally or through 

negotiation—would be seriously disadvantaged, and 

could find events and opinion spinning rapidly out 

of its control. Certainly, in a situation in which consciousness of and attachment to the continued presence of nuclear weapons in Europe has been slight, 

reporting of any public debate will inevitably latch on 

to what remain, at this stage anyway, some awkward 

paradoxes and inconsistencies in the arguments surrounding these weapons.

A large part of the problem for NATO is that the 

status quo appears unsustainable for anything more 

than the very short to medium term because of the 

obsolescence of the weapons and the dual-capable 

aircraft (DCA) that are assigned to carry them. However, any initiative to try to change that status quo 

risks shining that oh-so-unpredictable public spotlight 

on the matter. Some within NATO who back retention 

of the nuclear capability argue that, with a bit of deft 

strategic communication to prepare the ground and 

opinion, it might be possible to finesse this problem. 

But this is probably a forlorn hope when it is not clear 

what the message will be, or even to whom it should 

chiefly be aimed.

The lessons of the debate over missile defense as 

it evolved in Europe illustrate the difficulties of framing a case for even a relatively modest future capability when there is instinctive popular suspicion 

and skepticism, no consensus or agreed perspective 

around Europe, and an opportunity for Russia to sow 

division through hostility and opposition—feigned or 

real. Admittedly, the George H. W. Bush administra-
304

tion approach to a missile defense shield in Europe, 

which involved cooking up bilateral arrangements 

with a couple of key allies while the rest of NATO observed somewhat peevishly from the sidelines, may 

have maximized the diplomatic hurdles. But even the 

Obama administration’s “reset” campaign with the 

Phased Adaptive Approach, which was more easily 

digestible by NATO skeptics and Russia, may have 

bought only a certain amount of extra time and room 

for maneuver. The recent renewed rumblings from 

Russia suggest that the whole scheme may still be very 

much hostage to the fortunes of U.S.-Russo relations, 

and that in turn could still affect NATO perspectives.

There was a time when NATO’s residual forwarddeployed nuclear weapons formed part of a much 

larger arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe that was a perfect recipe for the Cold War. They 

provided “glue” for the Alliance, ensuring the credibility of the notion of extended nuclear deterrence, 

while spreading out the risks, and at the same time 

answering the conundrum of how to make up for the 

massive Soviet conventional superiority when no one 

in the Alliance was ready to foot the bill for doing so 

by conventional means.

However, it is not a world now in which NATO 

can draw on any credit for the fact that it has already 

removed the vast bulk of that arsenal. Memories are 

short. What is past is past in that sense, and also in 

the sense that the origins of the remaining weapons 

stem from that bygone era. The 150-200 bombs, and 

their associated U.S. and allied aircraft and air crews, 

in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and 

Turkey, resemble a hangover from the Cold War at 

a time when the world has, arguably, moved beyond 

the post-Cold War era to a post-post-Cold War age. 
305

In an environment in which there is not the strategic 

imperative of the Cold War, populations are likely, 

if asked to think about it, to be at least as hostile to 

the continued hosting of such weapons as some were 

then. In this environment, an argument for their retention based chiefly on politics, to keep NATO together, 

is unlikely to prove durable, especially in the absence 

of a consensus that these weapons still have a credible 

and vital military role and rationale. Furthermore, it 

is a troubling paradox for NATO that touting tactical 

nuclear weapons (TNWs) as continuing symbols of Alliance cohesion and solidarity, when raising a debate 

on their future or even highlighting their continued 

presence, represents a potential risk to that cohesion.

Basing the retention of TNWs in Europe on the 

need to address a potential proliferation cascade in 

the rest of the world seems equally problematic from 

a public opinion perspective. It is doubtful whether 

this argument will really have much traction in most 

of Europe; that is, unless there is a sudden shocking 

turn of events in the long-running Iran stand-off, 

which is, of course, not beyond the realm of possibility. Unfortunately, absent such a development, the 

proliferation issue, the specter of more and more menacing nuclear weapons states or groups, could very 

well be perceived in the minds of much of European 

opinion as an argument in favor of NATO stepping 

up its disarmament agenda, and throwing the TNWs 

into that pot as a positive indication of the Alliance’s 

disarmament commitment. In fact, such an outcome is 

just as likely as the Alliance’s hope that public opinion 

will favor tactical nuke retention as a hedge against an 

uncertain world. In the current climate of public opinion in Europe on matters nuclear, the plausibility of 

forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons as a counter 
306

to nuclear threats emerging from the Middle East or 

South or East Asia must be open to serious doubt. For 

such a scenario, the U.S. strategic arsenal will continue 

to look like a much more obvious option. 

As has been said elsewhere, the use of TNWs as 

arms control bargaining chips would also be a challenge, and not just because there is such an asymmetry in numbers now between NATO’s stockpile and 

that of Russia. It is hardly a happy starting point for 

a negotiation when different NATO member states 

see different rationales for retaining these weapons, 

including some that have nothing to do with Russia, 

and others see no enduring military rationale for them 

at all.

And what kind of party in any potential negotiations would Russia be? Not one, perhaps, inclined to 

help NATO out of its own difficulties on the matter. 

From any arms control perspective, there may be significant challenges to pursuing isolated negotiations 

purely on TNWs. In fact, this could simply produce 

increased friction and acrimony within NATO, particularly among its European members. But, equally, 

a more comprehensive, multi-track approach—with 

tactical nuclear weapons merely part of a grander 

bargain—may also be unachievable given the current 

preoccupation of NATO members with other issues. 

These are among the many challenges for the Alliance 

on this issue, simply when viewed from the standpoint 

of presenting the subject for public consideration.

But for the fact that the actual weapons themselves, 

and the aircraft that would deliver them, are getting 

old and wearing out, the debate surrounding the Alliance’s remaining forward-deployed nuclear weapons 

may in some ways be characterized as an accidental 

one. It could be said to have stemmed from a misread-
307

ing of signals within the Alliance. The most misread 

of those signals within Europe may have been the 

speech on the future of nuclear weapons delivered by 

President Barack Obama in Prague, Czech Republic, 

on April 5, 2009. The speech was certainly noteworthy 

for the President’s assertion of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” What seemed to be so quickly 

overlooked were the caveats that “this goal will not 

be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime,” and 

“make no mistake. As long as these weapons exist, the 

United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, to deter any adversary, and guarantee the 

defense of our allies.”2

It was in the wake of this, plus other nonproliferation and disarmament developments and initiatives, 

as encouraged by a belief that elements within the 

Obama administration might favor the withdrawal of 

the Europe-based bombs that the renewed debate on 

their future got going. The German coalition government—spurred by the Free Democratic Party—stated 

that it would pursue the withdrawal of the remaining 

nuclear weapons from Germany. This received a qualified endorsement from others, and led to Germany, 

the Benelux countries, and Norway collectively calling for an open discussion of ways of further reducing 

the role of nuclear weapons in NATO. While many in 

the arms control community and among disarmament 

advocates applauded the opening this joint initiative 

presented, others were far from complimentary. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and former senior Pentagon official Franklin Miller accused 

Germany of lifting the lid of Pandora’s box,3

 and essentially of wanting to throw off the burden of nuclear 

deterrence but still share in its benefits.
308

What it further highlighted is the simple fact that 

there is no unitary European perspective on this issue, 

but rather an assorted and antagonistic array of different views on the continuing utility of, and reasons for, 

these weapons. As is now widely acknowledged, the 

views range from: 

• Southeast Europe (Turkey), where the proliferation concern is right on the doorstep,

• through Eastern and Central Europe and the 

northeast, where NATO and particularly U.S. 

guarantees—including the nuclear one—remain a very “live” concern in the face of what 

many perceive as a still-looming Russia, and 

where reassurance appears at a premium in the 

light of the missile defense wobble,

• to the northwest, where states do not share the 

same wariness of Russia or see another looming direct threat for which a link to an American nuclear riposte in readiness is the answer.

In the middle of all this is a rather agitated France, 

perhaps fretting about what complications a debate 

leading to the departure of U.S. weapons would add 

to its own continued status as a nuclear-weapons state. 

Then there is Britain, more ambivalent perhaps about 

what it all might mean for its own arsenal, but concerned primarily about Alliance, and especially transatlantic, cohesion. These twisted sinews of argument 

offer rich pickings for potential political, diplomatic, 

and journalistic dismemberment.

Since they nudged the door ajar on the issue of 

tactical nuclear weapons, NATO members have seemingly recoiled after glimpsing the potential confusion 

on the other side of the door. But they cannot, and 

maybe should not, close the door again completely. 
309

NATO foreign ministers, led by U.S. Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton, steadied matters for a while at their 

informal meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, in April 2010, affirming that there would no unilateral action by any 

member to alter the status quo. The Clinton/Tallinn 

formula served to clarify the Washington position. It 

also affirmed NATO’s retention of nuclear status, in 

the context of shared responsibilities, while promising 

to work towards reducing the role of nuclear weapons. 

It was thus able to paper over what had clearly been 

revealed to be deep cracks in the European stance.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the 

Lisbon, Portugal, Summit in November 2010, stated 

that the Alliance will “maintain an appropriate mix of 

nuclear and conventional forces,” and will “ensure the 

broadest possible participation of Allies in collective 

defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control, and 

consultation arrangements.”4

 But the fact was that the 

Strategic Concept steered clear of any more specific refashioning of NATO’s nuclear posture, and for good 

reason. That refashioning would instead be entrusted 

to a separate review. Again, it was a reflection of the 

concerns in Washington and certain other European 

capitals that this review was formulated as a Defense 

and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR), to avoid isolating the nuclear issue. But the mood music from this 

review has developed into a steady beat of lowered 

ambitions and expectations. Reflective of the pitfalls 

across Europe and from Europe across the Atlantic, 

the chances that it will offer anything definitive on the 

future of forward-deployed nuclear weapons seem 

significantly diminished. Even talk of offering at least 

a path towards a reduced nuclear role in future NATO 

strategy via a reworking of the Alliance’s declaratory 
310

stance on nuclear weapons use seems likely to hit the 

buffers of French misgivings.

In part, if there is renewed reluctance to press the 

issue, it stems from the fact that the world has moved 

on in the last couple of years since the debate was revived. It would hardly have been surprising to see the 

political appetite to take on this issue diminish as soon 

as the diplomatic pitfalls in doing so manifested themselves. Beyond that, the onset of economic crisis in Europe has sharply redirected political attention and priorities. If refashioning NATO’s nuclear posture was 

not in the top 10 of most people’s priorities before, it 

will have sunk even lower subsequently. Even within 

the circles of those for whom this remains a live issue, 

the picture has become more blurred. Quite apart from 

anything else, it is impossible to divorce the shape of 

NATO’s future from the economic upheavals going 

on all around. 

In addition, the nuclear issue—and the specific 

matter of those “tactical” bombs—can never be divorced from the broader question of NATO’s future 

identity and orientation, which is still a work in progress. The new Strategic Concept may have been greeted 

with fanfare and applause in November 2010, but it 

may yet turn out to have been nothing more than a 

holding operation, embracing the more defensive preoccupations of some members, the more long-range, 

out-of-area perspective of others, and the more uncertain challenges of the future, such as cyber defense. 

The economic crisis and its potential security implications in and around Europe, Libya and the lessons 

of that intervention, the unfolding of the transition in 

Afghanistan, a newly unpredictable political atmosphere in Russia, the ongoing Arab Spring, the chronic 

Iranian headache, and a host of other questions may 
311

mean that the strategic landscape in the run-up to the 

Chicago, IL, summit has a very different topography 

from that anticipated even in the immediate aftermath 

of Lisbon.

Talking of topography, in a European context 

the main nodes in this debate have been Bonn, Germany, and the other host capitals, Paris, France, and 

the Baltic states. An overlooked, or at least relatively 

uncharted reference point, has been London, United 

Kingdom (UK). Partly, that is because it is to the UK 

government’s liking. While it is one of three acknowledged nuclear weapons states in NATO, it has tended 

to pursue a pragmatic approach to the issue. As has 

been mentioned, the key driver in London is concern 

about Alliance cohesion, and especially the transatlantic bridge, with a particular wariness about the potential fallout in the U.S. Congress of any argumentative 

flare-up in Europe that could be portrayed as a further 

example of Europeans being reluctant to do their bit 

to shoulder the security burden. For all these reasons, 

London is likely to encourage—or at least not to find 

unwelcome—any trends that extend the status quo 

and keep the debate off the boil prior to Chicago.

There is, of course, an underlying concern in London about any momentum that might start to build 

towards Europe becoming a nuclear-free zone. There 

may be a worry in Paris, and even a certain paranoia and a little exasperation, that the British do not 

view these things with quite the required robustness. 

Maybe France does feel the pressure more acutely, as 

potentially the only continental European power in 

NATO with nuclear weapons and a continuing belief 

in nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically, a reduction to 

zero of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in the current European host countries could actually increase 
312

the potential value of British weapons in any extended deterrence linkage, as the British weapons are—in 

contrast to the French arsenal—declared to NATO. It 

could also increase the potential value of Britain to the 

United States as a strategic partner if the UK were to 

remain a willing host of U.S. weapons in certain contingencies. Many in Washington still remember when 

the British government of Margaret Thatcher, in 1986, 

allowed U.S. forces to use British bases and airspace 

to launch (albeit conventional) air strikes against 

Libya, when no other European ally would. In addition, nuclear weapons cooperation is one area where 

the much-vaunted (on the British side at least) “special relationship” really is special. But the dynamics of 

any move to denuclearize the other European NATO 

members could also have an impact on the nuclear 

weapons debate—such as it is—in Britain.

Britain has long since given up its own tactical nuclear weapons. The WE177 munition was taken out of 

service with the Royal Navy in 1992, and withdrawn 

from service with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1998. 

The country’s only remaining nuclear weapon is the 

submarine-based Trident strategic system. Strictly 

speaking, the issues of the future of NATO’s tactical 

weapons and that of the UK strategic force are entirely separate. Yet the fortunes of the former could 

have some ripple effect on the prospects for the latter. Britain’s Trident force is currently based on four 

Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines. While the 

British government is especially secretive about many 

aspects of its nuclear weapons capabilities, it (like the 

United States) has moved ahead of NATO in certain 

aspects of transparency and declaratory policy. In 

May 2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat 

coalition government revealed that the UK’s nuclear 
313

weapon holdings did not exceed 225 warheads in the 

overall stockpile, with up to 160 operationally available warheads. It also announced that it would reexamine the circumstances under which the UK might 

use its nuclear weapons.5

 Then, in October 2010, the

Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) announced 

the aim of a further reduction in declared holdings, to 

an overall stockpile of not more than 180 warheads, no 

more than 120 operationally available warheads, and 

with the number of warheads carried on each submarine on patrol reduced to just 40 on eight operational 

missiles.6

But Britain is also in the throes of early work to 

renew its nuclear force with a new generation of submarines. While the coalition government committed 

to replacing the current force, differences between the 

coalition partners have affected aspects of the process. 

While the Conservatives back a new submarine-based 

ballistic missile force, the Liberal Democrats have 

questioned the need for a like-for-like replacement. As 

a result, a final decision to go ahead with new submarines has been delayed until 2016, by which time there 

will have been a new general election in Britain. So the 

in-service date of the first new submarine, if indeed it 

is built, has also been delayed from 2024 to 2028. To 

accommodate Liberal Democrat policy, a new review 

of the options for replacement is under way, which 

should be completed by the end of 2012.

These various developments, plus more question marks over whether the UK Ministry of Defence 

(MoD) will be able to afford the expected £15-20 billion price tag, have led some to believe that a whole 

new debate could now take place on the decision to 

renew the Trident system, perhaps in the context of 

the next UK general election. Those who advocate it 
314

argue that there was no serious debate when the original decision to go ahead with a renewal of the Trident 

force was made by the previous Labour government 

under Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2006. Whether 

such a debate is a realistic possibility may be open 

to doubt, since it is questionable whether any of the 

mainstream UK parties would be willing to take it on. 

But were it to start simmering, the current British government may become a little nervous if there were to 

be an ongoing and potentially quite fractious debate 

under way within NATO about the future of nuclear 

weapons in the rest of Europe.

The underlying UK government rationale for pursuing a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons is 

as an insurance policy and a hedge against the uncertainty of what the threats will be in the decades ahead. 

In that sense, it remains wedded to the fundamentals 

of nuclear deterrence. But some even within the British military establishment have questioned whether 

the cost of what is being contemplated for the future is 

proportionate to the likely risk. That argument could 

find echoes in how NATO contemplates the cost of 

retaining forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. Quite simply, do the potential risks justify the 

potential scale of future budgetary commitments?

At the same time it is keeping faith with the nuclear 

deterrence rationale, the British government has also 

been interested in exploring how to renew the broad 

application of deterrence to conventional capabilities 

in the modern world, in part to help sustain the rationale for continuing to invest in certain aspects of 

its conventional armed forces. How these two strands 

of future deterrence will be balanced has a bearing 

not only on the shape and character of the UK armed 

forces in the long run, but also possibly on London’s 
315

attitude to how nuclear weapons will figure in overall 

NATO strategy, and indeed on how that strategy itself 

evolves.

More broadly, the tenor of debate over NATO as 

a whole has been shifting in ways that will affect the 

attitude in Europe towards the nuclear element of Alliance policy. First, there has been the reopening of the 

debate over burden-sharing more generally, not just 

nuclear, and especially the perception in Washington 

of European shirking. This was highlighted most publicly by the scolding parting shots of the then outgoing 

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates.7

 Europe might 

respond positively to some of the criticism. But beyond renewed efforts to make “smart procurement” 

and the pooling of resources genuinely work better, 

there is no chance of Europe collectively—in the current circumstances—increasing the resources that it 

devotes to defense. Quite the reverse, in fact. Against 

that background of transatlantic frictions, added to 

even more pressure on European conventional capabilities, the arguments over the nuclear umbrella as 

an ultimate guarantor of security—and the place of 

forward-deployed TNWs as a part of that—could be 

significantly affected.

Then there is Libya. The outcome (inasmuch as it 

is yet possible to be definitive about it) has been portrayed as a success story for the Alliance, and more 

particularly for the leading European members of it. 

There were indeed significant and impressive military 

capabilities deployed that were ultimately applied 

successfully. The politics of it seemed to work as well, 

in the sense that the Alliance agreed collectively to 

take on command and control of the mission. But it 

was not, despite its code name Operation UNIFIED 

PROTECTOR, an entirely united effort in terms of the 
316

level of commitment among NATO member states. 

There was particular attention focused on the lack 

of German participation. There was also quite a high 

level of absenteeism from key aspects of the operation. 

So, while formally a NATO operation, it was in reality more a collection of 15 NATO members who took 

part. This only added ammunition to the locker of 

those wondering whether the “alliance” is not, in fact, 

devolving to a loose assemblage of pick-and-choose 

members.

Clearly, any new stirrings of concern on that front 

will play into the nuclear debate. So too the fact that, 

from the perspective of Washington, while Operation 

UNIFIED PROTECTOR was meant to be a Europe-led 

operation, the United States still ended up not only 

committing more resources than any other nation, but 

also providing capabilities which—while they may 

have been perceived in Europe as simply supportive 

and enabling—actually made the difference between 

sustaining the operation and not. In an atmosphere 

in which the renewed perception in Washington is of 

a Europe failing the burden-sharing tests, there is a 

danger for the European allies that nuclear burdensharing will become the test of last resort.

As has been emphasized, the fact is that there is no 

collective “European perspective” on these questions. 

Perceptions of what amounts to security, and where 

the threats to security lie, remain in a state of continuing development. In addition to a legacy of historical 

perspective and geography, it is also being shaped by 

the different experiences of member states in the new 

age of austerity. The dynamic of the slow extraction 

from Afghanistan, and evolving judgments on the 

costs and benefits of that mission, will shape attitudes 

toward NATO and what it is for. The lessons of Af-
317

ghanistan will also help to determine—along with the 

lessons from Libya—what appetite there will be for 

any kind of future entanglements, or “wars of choice,” 

and therefore ultimately for what sort of requirements 

there might be for future nuclear weapons capabilities as a possible defense or deterrent. The trauma of 

economic upheaval will affect the appetite and ability 

to make defense provisions in Europe, and possibly 

what has been described as a “race to the bottom” 

among European defense budgets, especially with the 

spectacle of the U.S. Government also joining in the 

process.8

 It is also going to have an impact on perceptions of where the real threats to stability in Europe 

will lie in the medium term, and what role—if any—

NATO should play in tackling them. Thus NATO, at 

Chicago or after, may have to adjust again if it wants 

to remain relevant to most Europeans. Having spent a 

decade trying to make NATO forces more deployable 

and better able to tackle the tasks of nation-building, 

the Alliance partners are likely to shift the focus again. 

In the context of evermore-squeezed budgets, the priority concerns may become more to do with internal 

stability and cohesion and less with military threats 

even from the near neighborhood, let alone further 

afield. That eventuality could also see a recalibration 

of the arguments over nuclear weapons, especially 

if austerity becomes increasingly prolonged and the 

question of the need to reinvest in the infrastructure 

to support the forward-based weapons starts to intrude more urgently. The fallout from austerity also 

impinges on the issue of reassuring NATO’s eastern 

European members. Reduced European conventional 

capabilities, plus the specter of further U.S. conventional drawdowns in Europe, reduce Alliance willingness to address additional non-nuclear contingencies.
318

Of course, the evolving European position on the 

provision of missile defenses for the Alliance will have 

a bearing on how nuclear weapons fit into the portfolio of defense and deterrence options. The issue over 

the extent to which these options were alternative or 

complementary approaches was part of the discussion 

from early on in the debate. Positions on this issue are 

likely to evolve as the missile defense architecture in 

and around Europe starts to mature. Clearly, all the 

potential sensitivities surrounding this discussion are 

mixed up with lingering concerns about the Alliance’s 

adaptability and continuing relevance more broadly, 

or else the NATO approach to the matter up to now 

would have been more categorical and confident. 

Might NATO have avoided some of the potential pitfalls if it had been more transparent historically about the enduring role of nuclear weapons in 

its arsenal in Europe? Clearly it suited the Alliance to 

deemphasize that role over a long period, indeed not 

to talk about the weapons at all, and that is in part 

responsible for the low level of public awareness and 

understanding of the matter now. A greater continuity of debate might have made the dilemmas now less 

acute. The actual state of affairs is such that whatever 

arrangement NATO chooses for now is likely to provoke some degree of controversy, with or without a 

continuing role for the U.S. B-61 bombs.

The reality that Germany, a salient Alliance voice, 

appears to have retreated from its initial position is 

perhaps the most significant element in shaping how 

NATO will proceed. As well as second thoughts on 

the issue itself, it now has its hands full with a host 

of other more pressing problems. Bonn now seems to 

have settled on accepting NATO’s identity as a nuclear alliance, but without requiring nuclear weapons on 
319

German territory. On the other hand, Germany has 

accepted the principle that there will be no unilateral 

change. So Bonn probably hopes that nuclear weapons will not in the end be a dominating or defining 

issue in Chicago even as it continues to worry that it 

will remain hostage to that possibility.

Germany’s troubled attitude may ultimately be 

shared by most of the European members of NATO 

as well. So what seems to be in the offing is continuing compromise, an elaboration perhaps, but no more, 

on the Clinton/Tallinn formula. The problem is that 

this compromise will not satisfy either side in the debate. For those attached to a “nuclear zero,” it will be 

a missed opportunity. For those who see an enduring 

role for the weapons, it will presage continuing danger to NATO’s cohesion and nuclear posture, and all 

the more so given that, with the current public mood, 

there is no realistic possibility of the Alliance’s European members accepting the idea of stationing updated nuclear weapons on their territory.

In these circumstances, what is really a political 

issue may, by the choice of the political leaderships, 

spiral down to a technical matter and be dealt with 

by default. Again, the principal focus is on Germany 

and the lack of any dual-capable successor to its current Tornado strike aircraft. But there is also lingering 

uncertainty for those current B-61 hosts, the Netherlands, and Italy, whose future combat aircraft choice, 

the F-35 Lightning, may have been designed with dual 

capability in mind but which as a project may yet face 

an uncertain future.

However the tactical nuclear debate unfolds in the 

run-up to the Chicago summit and beyond, there is 

still a palpable sense that it has only just begun.
320

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. The author’s arguments do not necessarily represent the 

views of the BBC.

2. President Barack Obama, speech on nuclear weapons, 

Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.

3. Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, Germany Opens Pandora’s Box, London, UK: Centre for European Reform (CER) briefing note, February 8, 2010.

4. NATO Strategic Concept, Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 

Lisbon, Portugal, November 2010.

5. Statement by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, House 

of Commons, May 2010.

6. Strategic Defence and Security Review, London, UK: HM Government, October 18, 2010.

7. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Reflections on the 

Status and Future of the Transatlantic Alliance,” speech to the 

Security and Defence Agenda group, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 

2011.

8. Tomas Valasek, “Race to the bottom,” London, UK: Centre 

for European Reform, August 24, 2011.
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PART IV

AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

323

CHAPTER 14

AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON TACTICAL 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

James A. Blackwell

In the 21st century, the United States is challenged 

by a growing need to extend deterrence beyond the 

scope of that which can be accomplished by strategic 

systems reserved for retaliation to a massive nuclear 

strike on the continental United States. Two distinguished analysts, Leo Michel and Jeffrey Larsen, provide perspective on how America views the contribution that U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe can make 

to U.S. security through extended deterrence in an 

increasingly complex global security environment. 

Then Guy Roberts, tapping his extensive arms control 

experience at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), takes a prospective look at the upcoming North Atlantic Council review in Chicago, IL, of 

the Alliance’s deterrent and defense posture (DDPR), 

with particular attention to the U.S. connection.

The challenges of extended deterrence begin with 

the question of the nature of security interests the 

United States has in Europe and how those interests 

are related to its interests in other regions as well as 

to its position in the international security system. 

The relationship with Russia may have been “re-set,” 

but the nature and longevity of any resulting change 

are uncertain. Russia remains the only nuclear-armed 

state capable of destroying the United States and its 

European Allies, maintaining perhaps thousands of 

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) (formerly 

known as tactical nuclear weapons) matched to mis-
324

siles and aircraft that place all of NATO within their 

reach. New nuclear threats to the security of Europe 

loom on the horizon, some of which will require selfinterested U.S. deterrence capabilities as well as those 

necessary for mutual security among Allies.

 It is apparent that the United States has embarked 

on substantial reductions in resources allocated to 

national security—a cyclical feature of the American 

political culture that follows every major war with 

about a decade of decline in dollars spent on defense of roughly 30 percent from the wartime peak. 

A world characterized by continuing pressures for 

nuclear weapons proliferation is a world in which 

medium and smaller nuclear-armed states may see 

their nuclear roles change as well. Some long-time experts wonder if the United States were to remove its 

nuclear weapons from Europe, would France or the 

United Kingdom (UK) find itself with newfound influence, responsibility, and burden. The role of U.S. 

nuclear weapons in Europe will thus, inevitably, be 

reexamined.

While acknowledging the pressure on resources 

and despite the retirement of the U.S. Navy’s nucleartipped, attack submarine-launched Tomahawk Land 

Attack Missile (TLAM-N), the authors point to expressed commitments by the United States to continue to maintain a Triad of nuclear weapon capabilities 

for central deterrence and to maintain and modernize both fighters and bombers capable of delivering 

nuclear weapons for extended deterrence. The Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) also expresses intent to conduct 

a full-scope life extension on the B-61 nuclear bomb 

explicitly to sustain its capacity for deployment in Europe. Neither author agrees with the notion that missile defenses could supplant the function performed 
325

by U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Larsen argues 

that missile defenses cannot do so until the arrival of 

a technology and weapons regime in which the defense is superior to offense—an eventuality not yet 

on the foreseeable horizon. Michel argues that missile 

defenses cannot provide sufficient confidence for Europeans confronted by so many Russian NSNWs and 

by strident Russian objections to missile defenses in 

Europe. 

Despite the political and budgetary pressures for 

defense reductions, the authors articulated the continuity of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence 

in Europe as expressed by the Barack Obama administration in various national security pronouncements. 

But Michel points out that the Schlesinger Task Force 

Report of 2008, apparently for the first time in so public a manner, revealed some of the internal disagreements within the U.S. military on whether the country 

should continue to bear the cost of this burden. Larsen 

notes that, while the 2010 NPR reinforces the American commitment to the classic burden-sharing deal of 

NATO nations hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, the NPR 

also announces U.S. plans to modernize its nuclear 

long-range strike capabilities and to work toward replacing the deterrence function of nuclear weapons 

with conventional and missile defense capabilities. 

Some analysts wonder whether the United States 

might take the kind of approach to extended deterrence in Europe that it has already taken in Asia—removal of the nuclear weapons themselves but regularly exercising the capability to employ them in the 

region as a visible reminder to potential adversaries 

and assurance to existing allies. Both authors suggest 

that removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe is 

not likely, at least not in the near future. The deploy-
326

ment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe will continue 

to serve as a deterrent against any Russian temptation 

to exploit the presence of its NSNWs to threaten, intimidate, or coerce NATO allies or others, especially 

in crisis. The continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe will provide Allies with sufficient assurance to deter them from developing their own nuclear 

weapons capabilities. So far as the DDPR in Chicago is 

concerned, Roberts expresses the view that when the 

dust has settled, “the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe 

[will be] affirmed.”

The circumstances under which nuclear weapons 

might be employed in a European crisis or conflict 

have changed dramatically with the end of the Cold 

War. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, invoked 

in response to the September 11, 2001, strike on the 

United States, remains very much in force. Russia has 

promulgated a new first-use doctrine for its non-strategic nuclear weapons as a means to “de-escalate” a 

conflict or crisis that it considers to be a threat to Russia and its people. It has practiced this doctrine in exercises; some speculate that it does so to compensate 

for its inferiority in conventional military capabilities. 

In stark contrast to the Cold War discussions of how 

“Flexible Response” might play out in the face of a 

Warsaw Pact attack, the kinds of contingencies under 

which NATO might employ its nuclear weapons today attract few discussants. Perhaps this reticence is 

the result of the underlying reality that NATO nuclear 

weapons are in fact “used” every day that they deter 

others from employing them against NATO members.
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CHAPTER 15

THE ROLE OF NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS:

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Jeffrey A. Larsen

INTRODUCTION

The ultimate purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons 

today remains the same as it has been since the late 

1940s: to deter an armed attack against the U.S. homeland, its forces and interests abroad, and its friends 

and allies. For more than 60 years, this mission has 

been associated in the public mind with deterrence of 

an adversary’s use of its own atomic weapons, and, 

more recently, of any weapon of mass destruction 

(WMD). Nuclear weapons have been thought of primarily as a tool—one of many available to a nationstate, including political, diplomatic, and economic 

efforts, conventional forces, and active and passive 

defenses—to prevent aggression of any kind against 

America’s vital national interests. 

This chapter argues that the denomination of certain U.S. nuclear weapons as “non-strategic” is not 

likely to continue much longer. The small number of 

weapons of this type will remain in the U.S. inventory, 

of course, but the name of the category itself will fall 

into disuse as a relic of the Cold War. Instead, today’s 

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) will be absorbed into the manned bomber leg of the Triad comprising what are now referred to as strategic weapons. This is due to the growing recognition that any

nuclear use would have strategic consequences, and 
328

that these weapons still have a role to play in assuring 

allies through extended deterrence guarantees. In addition, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) created 

a “new Triad” that included all nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities in one category, so that in essence dual-capable aircraft (DCA)—fighter-bombers 

that can deliver either conventional or NSNWs—and 

B-61 tactical nuclear bombs have already been part of 

the larger matrix of nuclear forces for more than 10 

years.1

 This implies that in the future, the entire U.S. 

nuclear arsenal will serve the needs of extended deterrence in Europe through off-shore guarantees, as 

it already does for America’s allies in East Asia. The 

United States has global interests, and its military has 

global responsibilities. Nuclear weapons—all U.S. 

nuclear weapons—will continue to play a vital role as 

the ultimate guarantor of the nation’s security for the 

foreseeable future. 

Multiple studies have come to the conclusion that 

nuclear weapons are here to stay. Regardless of national objectives calling for a nuclear-free world, such 

weapons are likely to remain a part of the global security environment, and will continue to play a central 

role in U.S. security policy. Even if the United States 

were to take the lead in nuclear disarmament, some 

argue, it may nevertheless find itself one day facing an 

adversary that has nuclear weapons and believes they 

provide a measure of value to their national power. As 

a counterbalance, the United States needs to maintain 

a robust, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear force structure.2

America’s attitude toward NSNWs historically has 

been that they are valuable political tools for reassuring allies, both in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in other regions. This reassurance 
329

has rested upon their operational value as warfighting 

tools against the threat of invasion by a neighbor. But 

their current value appears to be diminishing, indeed, 

some analysts and politicians even see them as impediments on the road to Global Zero. Yet the United 

States is caught in the challenging position of having to continue guaranteeing security to other states, 

while facing uncertainty over the future of weapons 

that have traditionally served to show such a commitment to its friends and partners. In short, NSNWs 

may be obsolete, but at this point they still serve some 

modest purposes that argue against their elimination 

in the short term. In fact, as consensus builds for the 

proposition that any nuclear use would have strategic significance, thus rendering inappropriate such a 

term as “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons and their delivery systems may come to be seen 

in the future simply as one implement in the strategic 

forces toolbox available for a president’s use in crises 

or conflicts. 

BACKGROUND

The United States has adopted a defense-in-depth 

security concept since the dawn of the nuclear age. 

In simple terms, this means that when dealing with 

the possibility of nuclear attack by some nation-state 

or of nuclear terrorism by some nonstate actor, the 

United States will first attempt to prevent the spread 

of dangerous materials and know-how to other states 

via nonproliferation policies. If, despite our best nonproliferation efforts, a potential adversary succeeds in 

arming itself with nuclear weapons, the United States 

will attempt to persuade the other party that it has no 

chance of winning a war with the United States even 
330

with nuclear weapons, and that it would be foolhardy 

and cost-prohibitive to even contemplate such an effort. Should dissuasion fail, U.S. policymakers may 

consider taking preemptive military action to destroy 

the threat before it can materialize. Such efforts are categorized as a type of counterproliferation. Simultaneously, it has long been U.S. policy to deter that adversary from considering taking military action against 

the United States, its interests, or its allies through 

sowing fear, that is, through the threat of unacceptable 

retaliation in response to such an attack. This concept 

will surely remain a cornerstone of U.S. policy. Some 

anti-nuclear commentators go so far as to suggest that 

deterring nuclear use by an adversary may be the only 

legitimate purpose of such an arsenal. Should deterrence fail, however, the United States would rely on 

active defenses to intercept and blunt an attack, and 

on passive defenses to protect the homeland and the 

population from the effects of nuclear weaponry. Finally, should a strike reach the American homeland 

anyway, the concept of consequence management 

takes over, encompassing clean-up, response, attribution, and retribution for the attack.

Nuclear weapons, like all military force, can serve 

a number of purposes. In particular, they can be used 

for actual combat operations in their warfighting role, 

or they can be used to convince an adversary that he 

cannot achieve his objectives or will face devastating retaliation if he tries. If this latter purpose is pursued successfully, it would obviate the use of nuclear 

weapons in anger. This is what we call deterrence, the 

prime purpose of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of 

most nation states that possess them today.3

 Unfortunately, there are some states and nonstate actors in the 

world today that may decide to pursue nuclear weap-
331

ons for their ostensible military value, hence the need 

to maintain U.S. forces to ensure deterrence. 

President Barack Obama highlighted this continuing requirement for nuclear weapons in his April 2009 

Prague, Czech Republic, speech in which he laid out 

a vision of a nuclear-free world at some future point. 

While highlighting the vision, he also emphasized 

the flip side: that while the United States would take 

“concrete steps towards a world without nuclear 

weapons,” he recognized that the world was still a 

dangerous place. Accordingly, he said, “As long as 

these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a 

safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”4

As a sovereign, independent nation-state, the primary U.S. national security goal must be the protection of its own people, territory, and interests. This is 

a core security requirement, and the deterrent value 

of America’s nuclear arsenal is unquestioned in this 

realm. But as the President reminded us, the United 

States has also promised to protect many of its friends 

and allies around the world. It does this by extending its 

nuclear and conventional “umbrella” over more than 

30 states. The concept of extended deterrence simply 

means that one state will provide security for another 

state through the threat of punishment against a third 

party that may wish to attack or coerce the second 

state. It is a logical extrapolation of deterrence theory, 

and is a promise not given lightly, nor to everyone. 

Extended deterrence commits the United States to the 

possibility of going to war with another great power 

if necessary in order to protect a more vulnerable allied state.5

 It is a policy that extends the protection of 

America’s military, typically its nuclear umbrella, to 

friends and allies far from North America and the U.S. 
332

homeland. The traditional U.S. rationale for extended 

deterrence has been to attempt to address the danger 

as far as possible from its shores, fighting, if necessary, 

an “away game.” Of course, flexible extended deterrence does not have to be accomplished with nuclear 

weapons. During the Cold War, however, the two 

concepts were nearly always synonymous, and many 

of today’s analyses still conflate the two ideas. In any 

case, when the United States chooses to give a security guarantee to another state, that commitment will 

include all measures of defense up to and including 

nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. Cold War 

historian John Lewis Gaddis called this type of commitment “active deterrence” because it took a willful 

decision by the nuclear state to make such a guarantee.6

The purpose of extended deterrence during the 

Cold War was to provide security for America’s allies. This required the United States to convince potential adversaries—meaning primarily the Soviet 

Union—that U.S. security commitments were genuine, and that they would be carried out if necessary. 

In addition, extended deterrence served a number of 

additional purposes. It induced caution among the 

nuclear players on the world stage; it discouraged adventurism, not only by the nuclear states but by those 

protected by the guarantee; and it may have helped 

to prevent nuclear proliferation among the allies. This 

latter point was part of the grand alliance bargain that 

the United States struck with its European allies (except France and England, of course): in return for a security guarantee, they agreed not to pursue their own 

nuclear capabilities.7

 This same bargain was in place 

in Northeast Asia for the purpose of keeping allies 

such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan nuclear-free. 
333

In Asia, the United States has long-standing security commitments to Japan through the U.S.-Japan 

Security Pact.8 Both sides have always assumed that 

this meant the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons to 

protect Japanese territorial sovereignty against potential aggression, Japan’s anti-nuclear stance in its constitution notwithstanding. In 2009, the U.S. Secretary 

of State during a visit to Japan publicly proclaimed 

that the solemn U.S. commitment to defend Japan was 

not only firm, but did include the ultimate weapon.9

South Korea is also the recipient of a U.S. nuclear security guarantee though U.S. nuclear weapons stationed 

in South Korea until 1992, when they were removed 

and returned to storage in North America.10

The question at hand is whether those guarantees 

to other nations still reflect the vital national interests 

of the United States today, or, conversely, whether 

they actually decrease America’s security by tying it 

to the defense of other countries. Even if the United 

States determines that continuing to provide a security guarantee to its allies is still a vital interest, it 

needs to ask whether extended deterrence requires 

forward-based nuclear systems. This was believed to 

be the case during the Cold War, but today there is 

another model that may prove instructive. Unlike the 

European situation, Northeast Asia and some states 

in the Middle East benefit from American security 

guarantees without having any U.S. weapons on their 

soil. Nor would such a guarantee necessarily require 

nuclear weapons—perhaps conventional forces, or, 

as some argue, robust multinational missile defenses 

could fill that requirement. Deterrence, after all, is essentially psychological, working on the perceptions 

of the potential adversary. Deployed weapons may 

not be required to assure allies or deter adversaries. 
334

However, if the United States were to move toward 

an Asian model for Europe, it would certainly require 

greater emotional and psychological nurturing and 

more robust assurances to its allies that America was 

still there when and if needed. 

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

The 2010 NPR may not have gone as far toward 

radical reductions or policy changes as some had 

hoped following President Obama’s Prague speech, 

but it did serve as an important statement that laid 

out the administration’s goals and made some modest 

moves in the direction of reduced reliance on nuclear 

weapons.11 It emphasized the foundational concept 

that “the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, 

which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our 

allies, and partners.”12 It stated that the United States 

will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities 

and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring 

non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of “making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our 

allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear 

weapons.” In the new global security environment, 

the United States will consider the use of nuclear 

weapons only “in extreme circumstances to defend 

the vital interests of the United States or its allies and 

partners.”13

The NPR focused on five key objectives of U.S. 

nuclear weapons policies and posture:

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;

2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in 

U.S. national security strategy;
335

3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at 

reduced nuclear force levels;

4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and,

5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal.14

It is the fourth objective on this list that we normally think of when we consider the role of NSNWs. The 

NPR stated that the United States is “fully committed 

to strengthening bilateral and regional security ties 

and working with allies and partners to adapt these 

relationships to 21st century challenges. Such security 

relationships are critical in deterring potential threats, 

and can also serve our nonproliferation goals.”15 Nonproliferation is served by dissuasion—“demonstrating 

to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear 

weapons will only undermine their goal of achieving 

military or political advantages”—and by reassurance 

to America’s non-nuclear allies and partners, assuring 

them “that their security interests can be protected 

without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities.”16

For nearly 60 years, the United States has provided 

a nuclear umbrella over its allies through a combination of means—the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, 

NSNWs deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-

based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. As the 

NPR makes clear, the mix of deterrent means has varied over time and from region to region.

This long-standing tangible commitment to U.S. 

allies in Europe, however, has been somewhat attenuated since the end of the Cold War by the reduction 

in the number, location, and visibility of forwarddeployed U.S. nuclear weapons. Still, a small number 
336

(estimated, to be 150-200) of U.S. nuclear weapons remain in Europe. The NPR reiterates the standard Alliance claim that: 

although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO 

members is at an historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear-sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear 

members participate in nuclear planning and possess 

specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons—contribute to Alliance cohesion and 

provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel 

exposed to regional threats.17

In this sense the Obama administration is paying 

homage to the status quo in Europe, despite the President’s visionary Prague speech. 

The United States keeps a limited number of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, plus, as 

the NPR said, “a small number of nuclear weapons 

stored in the United States for possible overseas deployment in support of extended deterrence to allies 

and partners worldwide.”18 The NPR concluded that 

in the near term the United States will: 

• “Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. 

nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers 

and heavy bombers, and proceed with full 

scope life extension for the B-61 bomb including enhancing safety, security, and use control.

• Retire the nuclear-equipped submarine launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).

• Continue to maintain and develop long-range 

strike capabilities that supplement U.S. forward military presence and strengthen regional 

deterrence.
337

• Continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners to address 

how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness 

of the U.S. extended deterrent. No changes in 

U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be 

made without close consultations with our allies and partners.”19

• “Conduct a full scope B-61 (nuclear bomb) Life 

Extension Program to ensure its functionality 

with the F-35 and to include making surety—

safety, security, and use control—enhancements to maintain confidence in the B-61. These 

decisions ensure that the United States will retain the capability to forward deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance 

commitments.”20

In addition to its forward-deployed tactical nuclear 

forces, the United States has also relied on non-nuclear 

elements to strengthen regional security architectures, 

including a forward U.S. conventional presence and 

effective theater ballistic missile defenses. The role of 

those elements of extended deterrence, said the NPR, 

will increase:

As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national security strategy, these non-nuclear elements 

will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. 

Moreover, an indispensable ingredient of effective 

regional deterrence is not only non-nuclear but also 

non-military—strong, trusting political relationships 

between the United States and its allies and partners 

[as well as] enhancing regional security architectures.21

Strengthened regional security architectures include, according to the NPR, “effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional pow-
338

er-projection capabilities, and integrated command 

and control—all underwritten by strong political commitments.”22

KEEPING U.S. OPTIONS OPEN

Specifically addressing the continuing importance 

of extended nuclear deterrence, the NPR made it clear 

that the United States will retain the capability to 

forward-deploy nuclear weapons on tactical fighterbombers and heavy bombers. In addition, the Obama 

administration decided to proceed with a full-scope 

life-extension program for the remaining B-61 bombs, 

including safety, security, and surety enhancements. 

The B-61 will be deliverable by the F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter and the B-2 bomber.23

Moving beyond Europe, the NPR stated that:

in Asia and the Middle East—where there are no multilateral alliance structures analogous to NATO—the 

United States has maintained extended deterrence 

through bilateral alliances and security relationships 

and through its forward military presence and security guarantees.24

 The United States withdrew its forward-deployed 

nuclear weapons from the Pacific region at the end of 

the Cold War. This included removing nuclear weapons from naval surface vessels and general purpose 

submarines, as well as from bases in South Korea. 

Since then, the United States has relied on “its central 

strategic forces and the capacity to redeploy non-strategic nuclear systems in East Asia, if needed, in times 

of crisis.”25 The Obama administration is:
339

pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies and partners in East Asia and the Middle East to determine 

how best to cooperatively strengthen regional security 

architectures to enhance peace and security, and reassure them that U.S. extended deterrence is credible 

and effective.26

Despite a 20-year declaration by the United States 

and NATO that U.S. NSNWs would be kept up to date 

as necessary and deployed in Europe, and that these 

weapons provided an essential military and political 

link between Europe and North America, the 2010 

NPR dropped this critical phrasing.27 So did NATO’s 

new Strategic Concept that was approved in the Lisbon, 

Portugal Summit in November 2010.28 These changes 

in phraseology, while not highlighted by U.S. or Alliance leaders, nevertheless represent a significant departure from the standard post-Cold War deterrence 

formula, and leave the door open for a future Alliance 

decision to remove the remaining U.S. warheads located in the European theater.

CURRENT U.S. NSNW FORCE STRUCTURE AND 

MODERNIZATION PLANS

The George W. Bush administration emphasized 

the possible role for nuclear weapons in regional contingencies in its 2001 NPR. At the same time, however, 

it pointed out that the United States had reduced its 

reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing the role of 

missile defenses and precision conventional weapons 

in the U.S. deterrent posture.29 Similarly, the Obama 

administration, in its 2010 NPR, indicated that the 

United States would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. regional deterrence strategies by increasing its reliance on missile defenses and precision con-
340

ventional weapons. Unlike the perception many held 

of the Bush administration’s goals in the 2001 NPR, 

however, the Obama administration did not seek to 

acquire new nuclear weapons capabilities—in fact, the 

2010 NPR was quite clear regarding which upgrades 

or improvements were allowed, and which were not, 

when dealing with modifications to the nuclear stockpile.30 Nor did it automatically extend U.S. nuclear deterrence to threats from nations armed with chemical 

or biological weapons.31 The administration pledged 

to retain and modernize the B-61 warheads. It moved 

away from the apparent strategy during the Bush administration of strengthening deterrence by making 

nuclear weapons appear more usable in a warfighting 

mode.32

According to open sources, the United States currently has the option of using the following weapons 

delivery systems for its remaining tactical bombs. The 

B-61 gravity bomb is the sole remaining tactical nuclear 

weapon for use by the F-15, F-16, and Tornado DCA in 

NATO burden-sharing arrangements. The B-61 Model 

11 is an earth-penetrating version that can be carried 

by the B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers. First deployed 

in 1968, the B-61 is a family of weapons, with multiple variants (Models 3, 4, 7, and 11).33 That the B-61 is 

the only remaining U.S. NSNW can be inferred from 

the NPR’s call for the elimination of the TLAM-N.34 A 

full-scope life extension program for the B-61 was approved in early 2010 and announced in the NPR. Plans 

are to have the renovated weapons ready about the 

same time as the DCA version of the F-35 becomes operational, in 2017 or 2018. According to open sources, 

the bomb will be based largely on the B-61 Model 4 

design, but with upgraded safety, security, and surety 

features, and will be called the B-61-12.35 According to 
341

open sources, there are currently some 500 B-61s in the 

U.S. inventory.36

The United States uses several manned aircraft to 

deliver the B-61 to its target. The F-16C/D Falcon is 

a single-seat fighter that entered the U.S. inventory 

in 1979 and is widely used, flown in the NATO Alliance by the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Turkey, 

and Poland. The F-15E Eagle is even older, having first 

entered the inventory in 1974, although the two-seat 

E model fighter-bomber entered service life more recently. It is flown by the United States, Japan, and Israel. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is beginning to enter the 

inventory, with a DCA nuclear variant expected to be 

operational by 2018. A fifth-generation fighter, it is the 

designated replacement for the F-16. The F-35 Block IV 

will be nuclear-capable. Other DCA states planning to 

buy some variant of the stealthy F-35 include Italy, the 

Netherlands, and Turkey. It is uncertain, however, if 

those versions will be of DCA design. Finally, the B-2 

Spirit is a two-man strategic stealth bomber that can 

carry some models of the B-61, including the Model 11 

earth penetrating version. 

The Congressional Research Service (CRS), citing 

unclassified reports, has stated that during the past 

decade the United States reduced the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the number of 

facilities that house those weapons. Reports indicate 

that the weapons were withdrawn from Greece, Great 

Britain, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany, between 

2001 and 2005.37 According to the CRS Report, “the 

United States now deploys 150-200 bombs at six bases 

in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.” This number is a significant reduction from the 

125 bases where U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were 

stored in Europe in the early 1980s,38 nor are there 
342

any U.S. NSNWs deployed or stored in any bases in 

the Pacific theater. This has been the case since the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in 

1992, and was made permanent with the retirement 

of the TLAM-Ns beginning in 2010.39 Finally, there are 

apparently no longer any reserve DCA forces based in 

the United States upon which the alliance can call.40 In 

the future, the F-35 will presumably provide the United States with an expeditionary dual-capable vehicle 

in regional contingencies, but those plans are yet to be 

determined. 

THE ROLE OF NSNWs IN NATO POLICY AND 

ALLIANCE STRATEGY

During the Cold War, America’s extended deterrence commitments were commonly equated with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons alone do not ensure 

the credibility of deterrence, but they may be indispensable to achieving that goal. The level of commitment and credibility required for extended deterrence 

to work has very little to do with how the United States 

feels about that commitment. It is the mind of the protected partner that must be assured of America’s commitment, and the mind of the potential adversary that 

must be similarly convinced of America’s capabilities, 

and will. 

Some analysts have questioned whether the United States needs to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe. After all, they say, it has been 20 years 

since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of 

the Soviet Union; surely these weapons are no longer 

needed to ensure peace in a Europe whole and free. 

Yet official NATO policy still views NSNWs as a deterrent to any potential adversary, and they also serve 
343

as a link among the NATO nations, through shared 

responsibility for nuclear policy planning and decisionmaking. They also still serve as a visible reminder 

of the U.S. extended deterrent and assurance of its 

commitment to the defense of its allies. But as the CRS 

has written: 

If the United States and its allies agree that this assurance can be provided with either conventional capabilities or strategic nuclear weapons, the need for 

forward basing in Europe may diminish. Some argue 

that because these weapons play no military or political role in Europe, they no longer serve as a symbol 

of alliance solidarity and cooperation. Others, however, including some officials in newer NATO nations, 

have argued that U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons 

in Europe not only remain relevant militarily, in some 

circumstances, but that they are an essential indicator 

of the U.S. commitment to NATO security and solidarity.41

Political trends in Europe may accelerate these 

changes to U.S. forward deployments of NSNWs. A 

number of factors appear to be driving the Alliance toward ending the nuclear mission—or at least removing the remaining U.S. warheads.42 Russia has had a 

strategy for years of applying diplomatic and political pressure against the United States and its allies in 

Europe to remove the remaining U.S. warheads. The 

European allies are suffering from two generations of 

military and particularly nuclear malaise, with some 

seeming unwilling to continue this effort given the 

political and economic costs of buying a next generation of DCA. The technical expiration of the service 

life of both the warheads and their delivery systems 

dictates that a decision be made as to whether or not 

to continue the NATO nuclear deterrence mission. Or-
344

ganizational changes in recent years within the U.S. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as NATO’s 

Nuclear Policy Directorate and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Nuclear Planning 

office, have already marginalized the nuclear mission 

to a considerable extent. The U.S. Air Force has never 

liked this mission, and has little in the way of U.S.-

based DCA to back up mission requirements in Europe or Asia. For example, recognizing the changed 

international security environment, as well as these 

organizational and operational changes, several years 

ago NATO increased its minimum response time for 

alert aircraft from minutes, as it was during the Cold 

War, to weeks.43

Finally, there are various schools of thought within elite U.S. circles as to the value, role, and future of 

NSNWs in Europe. These range from traditional supporters, to believers in selective engagement, to proponents of arms control, to disarmament advocates. 

Professor David Yost has recently reviewed these distinctive views and abstracted some of the key questions under debate.44

Any of the factors urging the elimination of the remaining U.S. weapons in Europe could be accelerated 

by more dramatic and immediate events, such as a 

nuclear accident or incident in Europe involving U.S. 

weapons, a decision to arbitrarily end the U.S. mission 

(by either the United States/NATO or one or more of 

the host nation allies), or a decision to use the remaining NSNWs as bargaining chips in arms control negotiations with Russia. Any of these events would precipitate a much more drastic and publicly supported 

termination of the U.S. forward-deployed mission. To 

do little or nothing, kicking the can down the road, 

will allow the Alliance to maintain the status quo for a 
345

few more years, but with the ultimate long-term result 

of a slow withering-away of the mission. One analyst 

has called this possibility “disarmament by default.”45

At their meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, in April 2010, 

NATO’s foreign ministers sought to balance the views 

of those nations who sought the removal of the weapons with those who argued that these weapons were 

still relevant to their security and to NATO’s solidarity. At the conclusion of the meeting, Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton said that the United States was not 

opposed to reductions in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, but that the removal of these 

weapons should be linked to a reduction in the number of Russian NSNWs. The foreign ministers also 

agreed that no nuclear weapons would be removed 

from Europe unless all 28 member states of NATO 

agreed.46

Others have raised the question whether the United States and NATO might benefit from the removal 

of these weapons from bases in Europe for reasons of 

safety and security, as well as cost-saving. Some analysts have suggested that, in response to these concerns, the United States might consolidate its nuclear 

weapons at a smaller number of bases in Europe. According to another study, officials at U.S. European 

Command have argued that weapons deployed outside of Europe could be just as credible as deterrents 

to attack on NATO as forward-deployed weapons 

are.47 In fact, some observers now argue that reducing 

or eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would 

not only address the Air Force’s operational and security costs associated with their deployment, but also 

could serve as a signal to Russia of NATO’s nonaggressive intentions.48
346

It is unrealistic to believe, as some analysts and 

certain NATO allies argue, that in the near-term missile defenses could supplant the function performed 

by U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, either in terms 

of providing deterrence or in serving as a military or 

political substitute for the existing Alliance nuclearsharing function. Missile defenses would be inadequate substitutes until the arrival of a technology and 

weapons regime in which the defense is superior to 

the offense. The transition to such a defense-dominant 

world, one in which, as President Ronald Reagan envisioned, nuclear weapons had become “impotent 

and obsolete,” does not appear to be likely anytime 

soon, despite President Obama’s call for a nuclear-free 

world.49

The NATO Alliance has several big questions that 

it needs to address during its ongoing Deterrence and 

Defense Posture Review (DDPR). These also have political implications for the United States and its force 

structure decisions. For example, does the Alliance 

believe that it still needs nuclear weapons stationed 

in Europe to survive as an alliance? How low can the 

number of U.S. forward-deployed weapons go and 

still provide assurance to the allies? Will the Alliance 

actually make a strategic decision regarding its nuclear future, or will it allow the capabilities to atrophy 

by default? And if the Alliance makes the decision to 

retain this mission, is there any structure as good for 

nuclear-sharing as the current DCA construct? 

AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

The United States has a number of national interests that may require the use, or threatened use, of 

nuclear weapons. First is homeland defense. The U.S. 
347

Government must ensure the continued safety and security of its homeland and population against attack. 

The question is whether extended deterrence, and 

NSNW commitments to allies, can help achieve this 

goal. Some would argue that making commitments to 

overseas friends and allies against potential adversaries actually makes the United States more susceptible 

to threats, blackmail, or the risk of involvment in a 

conflict. 

Second, the United States wants to continue assuring its allies of their security, maintain its alliances 

around the world, and provide a stabilizing presence 

where needed. But it must weigh those desiderata 

against the possibility that anti-nuclear or even antiAmerican attitudes could arise within allied societies 

if it were to choose to retain or modernize its forwarddeployed nuclear forces in Europe. On the other side 

of the world, the United States faces the exact opposite 

dilemma: allied concerns in East Asia may be raised by 

a perceived diminution of U.S. guarantees, as evinced 

by a lack of will or lack of the visible wherewithal 

to provide extended deterrence. In either case, the 

Obama administration faces the possibility of frustrating key allied states in order to follow through on its 

Prague vision and the NPR’s commitments. Moreover, 

convincing allies of U.S. resolve may not be possible in 

any case simply by pointing to existing capabilities.50

Alliance cohesion is a fragile thing, and could be jeopardized by U.S. missteps even on the level of nuance. 

Third, the U.S. Government also wants to manage 

change in the international system to avoid potential 

downsides. Downsides might include a loss of global 

influence, diminished security (particularly if rogue 

states or nonstate actors become more empowered as 

a result of diminished U.S. influence), or a loss of face 

in the event our commitment to President Obama’s 
348

Prague agenda with its goal of global nuclear zero 

should fall flat. Another potential downside could be 

that France takes on more of the nuclear leadership 

role in NATO. This may or may not be a bad thing, 

but it would certainly represent a stark change from 

the Alliance’s comfortable security assumptions since 

the late 1960s. 

Fourth, the West may decide to keep its remaining NSNWs as potential bargaining chips with Russia 

in future arms control negotiations. For example, U.S. 

nuclear warheads may be useful in obtaining a Russian commitment to reduce its numbers, to consolidate 

its weapons in more centralized facilities, to increase 

transparency, to de-mate the warheads from the delivery systems, to sharing security efforts, or simply to 

undertake no further increases.51 Reductions may include on entire series of steps, such as setting discrete 

limits on the number of NSNWs warheads, establishing a single limit on all nuclear warheads (including 

non-strategic and nondeployed), limiting NSNWs to 

national boundaries, limiting declared storage facilities, or linking NSNW reductions and conventional 

limits or cuts. The challenge may be a lack of incentive for Russia to agree to any of these steps, given the 

huge disparity between its NSNW stockpile and that 

of the United States. 

Fifth, given the U.S. nonproliferation agenda, it 

needs to weigh the possibility that if it removes its 

remaining forward-deployed weapons from Europe, 

one or two NATO allies may decide that they need 

to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. 

They may choose this path if the United States were to 

remove its extended deterrence guarantee, or if they 

no longer felt assured that the United States would 

come to their aid when necessary, or if the United 
349

States and the other nuclear powers actually began to 

make significant progress toward their avowed goal 

of a nuclear-free world. If this last eventuality came to 

pass, it could potentially diminish the nuclear aspects 

of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee. Moreover, 

if any ally or other state feels threatened by another 

party that is not committed to the goal of Global Zero, 

it may decide that its vital national interests require it 

to violate its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

pledge and pursue nuclear weapons for reasons of 

national security. The ally most often linked to such 

potential behavior is Turkey. 

Sixth, the United States does have real security interests in Europe, as well as in Asia and the Middle 

East. It maintains broad and deep cultural, historical, 

and economic ties to its European allies. Those interests might be threatened by a more aggressive or revanchist Russia, by a nuclear-armed Iran, or even by 

the rise of multiple nuclear states in the Middle East 

(perhaps in response to a nuclear Iran). There may 

also be well-founded military reasons for deploying 

a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons and their 

delivery vehicles in Europe for possible use in other 

regions. Obviously forward deployment of military 

forces does not apply merely to extended deterrence; 

it applies to many operational contingencies.

Seventh, it is important to keep in mind that the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal has a number of qualitative characteristics that give it a unique character and set of 

mission capabilities. This is an important variable 

to consider when determining future force size and 

structure in order to meet the multiple mission sets 

that nuclear weapons are asked to perform. The three 

most important and broadly-based categories of missions for nuclear weapons are to deter, to prevail in 

conflict, and to assure allies. Each of those missions 
350

has a different set of critical qualitative characteristics 

associated with it. As the U.S. stockpile gets smaller, 

both in terms of actual numbers as well as in the variety of warhead types remaining, it will behoove U.S. 

arms control negotiators and force planners to tread 

carefully when it comes to radical changes or reductions, as the adverse ripple effects on handling future 

threats or responsibilities may be severe.52

CONCLUSION

As President Obama observed in his strategic guidance to the U.S. military on January 5, 2012, “Our nation is at a moment of transition.”53 He was referring 

to the end of the Iraq War and budgetary issues, but 

his observation was equally true for the coming decisions the United States will have to make regarding its 

remaining non-strategic nuclear forces. The primary 

missions of the U.S. armed forces will continue to include deterring and defeating aggression, and must 

therefore be “capable of denying the objectives of—or 

imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor.”54 While this mission can be conducted using 

various types of military force, the language of “unacceptable costs” has for three generations served as 

code for “nuclear weapons.” Another of the military’s 

continuing missions will thus be to maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. As the 2010 

NPR, 2011 NATO Strategic Concept, and 2012 Strategic 

Guidance have all declared: 

As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the 

United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal . . . that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable 

damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to as-
351

sure U.S. allies and other security partners that they 

can count on America’s security commitments.55

America has enduring national security interests, 

with nuclear weapons remaining a vital part of ensuring that security. As the U.S. security focus shifts from 

Europe to the Middle East and the Pacific Rim over 

the coming decades, the country may find that today’s 

NSNWs will continue to play a similar role in assuring allies in those regions as they do and have done 

for generations of Europeans. They may no longer be 

called “non-strategic,” and they may find themselves 

lumped together with other nuclear warheads, bombs, 

and strategic delivery systems that have deterrence 

and extended deterrence responsibilities. But even if 

no longer a discrete category of weapons, the political 

and military need for such weapons will continue to 

exist for the foreseeable future. 

The United States today maintains the smallest arsenal of nuclear weapons since the 1950s, and the numbers continue to get lower. There is less concern over 

central nuclear war with a major global adversary. Yet 

as the President said in Prague and the NPR reiterated, ”The threat of global nuclear war has become 

remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.”56

Therefore we can expect the United States (as well as 

the other nuclear powers of the world) to maintain at 

least a small but robust inventory of nuclear weapons 

for years to come. They will continue to serve as they 

always have: as the ultimate guarantor of U.S. resolve, 

power, and national security.
352

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15

1. Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002, available 

from www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/NPRSpecial.htm.

2. For a good presentation of these perspectives, see U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and 

Requirements, Final Report, Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, with the Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, July 1998. A newer, nonpartisan study is William J. 

Perry and Brent Scowcroft, chairs, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 

Independent Task Force Report No. 62, New York: Council on 

Foreign Relations, 2009. 

3. An excellent overview of deterrence is Austin Long, Deterrence From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND 

Research, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008. See 

also Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security 

Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects,” CRS Report for Congress, 

RL34226, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 30, 2008; U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting 

it Right, Washington, DC: The New Deterrent Working Group, 

July 2009; and Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure,” CRS Report for Congress, 

RL31623, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

January 27, 2006.

4. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” 

Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, 

available from www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-ByPresident-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

5. For more reading on extended deterrence, see Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War; also Thomas Scheber, “Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence,” unpublished 

paper for National Institute of Public Policy, Washington, DC, 

2009; Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “Summary of Findings 

and Recommendations from June 3, 2009, Workshop on Extended 

Deterrence,” unpublished PPT presentation, Washington, DC, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 4, 2009; 
353

and Steven Pifer et al., “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: 

Considerations and Challenges,” Brookings Arms Control Series 

No. 3, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, May 2010.

6. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History 

of the Cold War, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989.

7. With two notable exceptions, of course: Great Britain and 

France. For the rationale behind that decision, see Thomas Devine, 

“Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Lessons 

from European and East Asian Regimes Applied to the Middle 

East,” Collection of Papers from the 2011 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, Nuclear Scholars Initiative: Project on Nuclear Issues, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 

2011, pp. 33-43.

8. Officially the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 

between Japan and the United States of America,” signed January 1960, available from www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/

ref/1.html. 

9. According to news reports, the Secretary of State told the 

Japanese Foreign Minister that “Japan is a treaty ally of the United 

States, and . . . reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of 

Japan, including nuclear deterrents.” Jim Garamone, “Secretary 

of State Clinton Meets Japanese Leaders on First Leg of Asian 

Tour,” Military News, February 18, 2009.

10. “The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from South 

Korea,” The Nuclear Information Project, available from www.

nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm. 

11. For further examination of the development of the NPR, 

see David Hoffman, “Obama’s Atomic Choices: Inside the Making of U.S. Nuclear Policy,” Foreign Policy online, April 28, 2010. 

12. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report 

(NPR), April 2010, p. vii. 

13. Ibid., pp. viii-ix.

14. Ibid., p. iii.
354

15. Ibid., p. xii.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 32.

18. It is unclear if the wording in the NPR was referring to 

the soon to be retired Tomahawk Land Attack Miissle - Nuclear 

(TLAM-N) in storage in the United States, or more broadly to other NSNWs, including B-61 bombs. 

19. NPR, p. xiii.

20. Ibid., p. 27. 

21. Ibid., p. xiii.

22. Ibid., pp.32-33.

23. The NPR made clear that “these decisions do not presume 

what NATO will decide about future deterrence requirements, 

but are intended to keep the Alliance’s options open and provide 

capabilities to support other U.S. commitments.” Ibid., p. 35.

24. Ibid., p. 32.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. 

27. Examples of the previous phrasing, which has appeared 

in every NATO document since 1990 through 2010, including the 

1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, include the following: “the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe, committed to NATO, 

reinforces the political and military link between the European and 

North American members of the Alliance” (NATO/OTAN Handbook, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, 

2001, p. 56); this exact wording was duplicated in the 2006 version of the Handbook. The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, repeating 

the nuclear paragraphs from the 1991 version of that document, 

included this phrase: “The presence of United States conventional 
355

and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America.” See 

“The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” April 24, 1999, para. 42, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 

28. “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept 

for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organisation,” adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, Portugal, November 19, 2010, available from 

www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. 

29. Amy Woolf, “Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons,” CRS Report for Congress No. RL32572, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, February 2011, p. 14 ; also see James J. Wirtz 

and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. 

Nuclear Doctrine, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. The New 

Triad has three legs: offensive military strike options, which included all three legs of the original Triad, but could also include 

non-nuclear strike systems; strategic defenses; and a responsive 

defense infrastructure. 

30. See 2010 NPR, pp. 38-39.

31. While reducing the ambiguity in the U.S. negative security 

assurance offered to other nations, the Obama administration’s 

2010 NPR does state, however, that “in the case of countries not 

covered by this [negative security] assurance—states that possess 

nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear 

non-proliferation obligations—there remains a narrow range of 

contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role 

in deterring conventional or CBW [chemical and biological warfare] attack against the United States or its allies and partners.” 

NPR, p. 16. 

32. For more on the Bush administration’s approach, see Roger Speed and Michael May, “Assessing the United States’ Nuclear 

Posture,” Chap. 7, in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba, eds., Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006, pp. 248-296.

33. James N. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An 

Illustrated History, Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 1996; Robert S. Norris and 
356

Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces 

2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2010, available from 

bos.sagepub.com/content/66/3/57.full.pdf; and Robert S. Norris and 

Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads 1945-2009,” Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2009, pp. 72-80.

34. NPR, p. 27; and Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 

“U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2011, available from 

bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf. 

35. See, for example, “B-61 Mod 12 LEP,” Arms Control 

Wonk, October 13, 2008, available from lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/

archive/2060/B-61-mod-12-lep; also see “The National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan: Making the World a Better 

Place,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, May 2011.

36. Steven Pifer, “The United States, NATO’s Strategic Concept, and Nuclear Issues,” Perspectives and Proposals on the 

NATO Policy Debate, Arms Control Association, and BritishAmerican Security Information Committee, May 2011. 

37. Woolf, NSNW, pp. 15-16, from Norris and Kristensen, 

“U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe 2011.” 

38. Ibid.

39. Woolf, NSNW, p. 15; NPR, p. 32; and Norris and Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons 1945-2009. 

40. During the Cold War, two U.S. air bases in the United 

States—Cannon, NM, and Seymour Johnson, NC—had responsibilities to train for and support the dual capable aircraft (DCA) 

role in Europe. That is no longer the case. 

41. Woolf, NSNW, p. 24. Also see Simon Lunn, Chap. 1, 

“NATO Nuclear Policy—Reflections on Lisbon and Looking 

Ahead,” The NTI Study on Nuclear Weapons and NATO, draft May 

6, 2011, forthcoming; and Paul Shulte, “Is NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy a Relic of the Cold War?” Policy Outlook, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 

17, 2010. 
357

42. For representative arguments about the European social 

situation and NATO nuclear policy, see Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Future Options for NATO Nuclear Policy,” Issue Brief, The Atlantic 

Council, August 2011, available from www.acus.org/publication/

future-options-nato-nuclear-policy; Jeffrey A. Larsen, “The Future of 

U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for NATO: 

Drifting Toward the Foreseeable Future,” Final Report from the 

2005-06 Manfred Wörner Fellowship, Brussels, Belgium, NATO 

Headquarters, December 2006, available from www.nato.int/acad/

fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf; Lunn, “NATO Nuclear Policy”; and Bruno 

Tertrais, “Extended Deterrence: Alive and Changing,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy online, February 

2, 2011, available from www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/02/02/

Extended-Deterrence-Alive-and-changing.aspx.

43. “NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment,” NATO Issue Brief, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters 

June 2004. 

44. David S. Yost, “The U.S. Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, 2011, pp. 1401-1438.

45. Steven Pifer, ”NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control,” Arms Control Series No. 7, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, July 2011. 

46. Woolf, NSNW, p. 25.

47. Ibid., p. 26. 

48. Ibid.

49. Reagan SDI speech. 

50. See James Acton, “Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VIII, Issue 5, December 2009. 

51. See Steven Pifer, “The Next Round: The United States and 

Nuclear Arms Reductions after New START,” Brookings Foreign 

Policy Series, Paper 4, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, December 2010. 
358

52. See Jeffrey A. Larsen and Justin V. Anderson et al., Qualitative Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons at Lower Numbers and Implications for Arms Control, SAIC paper prepared for A5XP, Air Force 

Strategic Plans and Policy Division, November 2011. 

53. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 

Century Defense,” Washington, DC: The White House, January 

2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 

54. Ibid., p. 4.

55. Ibid., p. 5. For more discussion on the international challenges facing the Obama administration, particularly with respect 

to nuclear policy and forces, see Christopher F. Chyba and J. D. 

Crouch, “Understanding the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate,” The Washington Quarterly, July 2009, pp. 21-36; also Keith 

B. Payne, “Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2011, pp. 

13-29; and National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010. 

56. 2010 NPR, p. iv; also see Obama Prague speech, April 5, 

2009.
359

CHAPTER 16

NATO’S NUCLEAR DEBATE:

THE BROADER STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Leo Michel1

What purposes are served by U.S. non-strategic 

nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Europe? If those weapons were reduced in number, consolidated in a smaller number of Allied basing countries, or eventually 

withdrawn altogether, what would be the effects on 

Alliance solidarity? Would the resources necessary 

to maintain U.S. NSNWs and dual-capable aircraft 

(DCA) in Europe, along with the capabilities of certain 

non-nuclear European Allies to carry out nuclear missions with their specially configured aircraft, be better spent on maintaining or upgrading other military 

capabilities? 

As explained elsewhere in this book, such interrelated questions are at the core of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s (NATO) debate over the future of NSNWs in Europe. But they also are linked to 

broader strategic preoccupations within NATO headquarters and most Allied governments. For despite 

concerted efforts by top officials and eminent wise 

men, the Alliance is still grappling with dilemmas 

that were not resolved by the new Strategic Concept

and Lisbon Summit Declaration unveiled in November 2010. Put simply, these concern differing threat 

perceptions among the Allies, the demonstrated reluctance of some to accept the risks and burdens of certain operational roles, and the need for Allies to make 

hard choices on capabilities during what promises to 

be an extended period of defense budget austerity. 
360

Hence, whatever course the Allies set regarding NSNWs in their Defense and Deterrence Posture 

Review (DDPR), which likely will be completed by 

NATO’s Chicago, IL, Summit on May 20, 2012, they 

cannot afford to treat the subject in isolation. Solidarity on this sensitive topic will not guarantee solidarity 

on other challenges facing the Alliance. However, a 

perceived failure to achieve a substantial (versus superficial) consensus on the future of NSNWs could 

certainly deal a heavy blow to the Allies’ ability to cooperate across the board.

DIFFERING THREAT PERCEPTIONS

NATO has been the primary guarantor of Europe’s 

defense from armed attack since 1949. With the end of 

the Cold War, NATO assumed new roles: building defense and security partnerships with new democracies 

in Central and Eastern Europe that prepared many for 

Alliance membership; offering dialogue and cooperation on political-military issues to Russia, Ukraine, 

and other states of the former Soviet Union; and leading complex military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. At the same time, NATO has 

performed the vital job of promoting intra-European 

as well as transatlantic collaboration on threat assessments, political-military strategy, defense planning, equipment standards and interoperability, and 

training and exercises. Still, as memories of the Cold 

War have faded and the Alliance has enlarged to 28 

members, it is not surprising that the Allies have had a 

difficult time in developing common assessments and 

priorities regarding a range of 21st-century threats. 

For many Americans, NATO’s solidarity and effectiveness will be decided in the caldron of Afghanistan, 

where (as of early 2012) non-U.S. Allies and partners 
361

contribute approximately 37,000 of the 130,000 troops 

(including some 90,000 Americans) in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). European, 

Canadian, and American leaders broadly agree that, 

if Afghanistan were to become a failed state, terrorist 

networks would reestablish themselves there, posing 

an increased threat to European and American interests. But for some Allies, a desire to demonstrate solidarity with the United States (to ensure, among other 

things, that American commitments to European security remain strong) has motivated their participation in ISAF as much, if not more, than any perceived 

threat emanating from Afghanistan itself. Not surprisingly, public support for the ISAF mission is generally 

lower and eroding faster in Europe than in the United 

States, where memories of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 

remain sharp. Moreover, the precarious situation in 

Pakistan could heighten friction among the Allies, especially if some conclude that U.S. pressure against 

extremist sanctuaries is hindering more than helping 

chances for an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan 

with or without a regional settlement.

Differing threat perceptions surrounded NATO’s 

role in Libya, as well. Germany’s abstention on United 

Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 

which authorized member states to take “all necessary 

measures” to protect Libyan civilians, roiled its relations with many Allies—especially the United States, 

France, and the United Kingdom (UK).2

 While Germany subsequently joined the NATO consensus to launch 

military operations pursuant to Resolution 1973, the 

Merkel government’s decision to withdraw German 

crews from NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control 

System aircraft participating in Operation UNIFIED 

PROTECTOR signaled Berlin’s desire to distance it-
362

self from the conflict. Of course, Germany was not the 

only Ally with reservations concerning the Libyan operation; several other Allies showed little enthusiasm 

for the operation in part because of their fatigue with 

the political, budgetary, and personnel demands of 

expeditionary efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

Meanwhile, Russia’s behavior has contributed to 

renewed attention to NATO’s collective defense role. 

To be sure, Russia does not represent the type of immediate threat posed by the Soviet Union, and no 

Allied government advocates a return to Cold War 

models of territorial defense. Still, Russian actions in 

Georgia (especially during the August 2008 conflict) 

and elsewhere in the former Soviet space, combined 

with menacing statements—recall, for example, President Dmitry Medvedev’s vow “to protect the life and 

dignity of [Russian] citizens, wherever they are”3

—

sparked particular concern among Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Allies. Indeed, some divine a deliberate Russian strategy that extends from actions to 

discourage investments in southern energy pipelines 

to intimidating Ukraine and other neighbors in the 

“near abroad” with substantial populations of ethnic 

Russians. Such concerns recently were heightened by 

Medvedev’s threat that Russia will take military countermeasures (to include deploying short-range Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad) to defeat NATO missile 

defenses if they are deployed without “legal guarantees” sought by Moscow.

Other Allies seem to assess Russian strategy and 

behavior in less threatening terms. Some are inclined 

to see Georgia as a one-of-a-kind action—an opportunistic show of force to destabilize a weak but impetuous neighbor and prevent further NATO enlargement. 

Similarly, noting examples of Russian cooperation 
363

with NATO (for example, Moscow’s agreement in 

2010 to expand use of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of nonlethal NATO supplies to 

ISAF), some Allies tend to play down Russian leaders’ criticism of NATO missile defense, attributing it 

to posturing for internal political reasons.

Differing Allied threat assessments extend beyond 

Afghanistan, Libya, and Russia. As the Group of Experts on NATO’s New Strategic Concept noted in their 

May 2010 report,

The global nuclear nonproliferation regime is under 

increasing stress; incidents of instability along Europe’s periphery have revived historic tensions; innovative modes of gathering, sending, and storing 

information have brought with them new vulnerabilities; the security implications of piracy, energy 

supply risks, and environmental neglect have become 

more evident; and a worldwide economic crisis has 

spawned widespread budgetary concerns.4

Potential instability in the Western Balkans remains a leading worry for neighboring Allies. The 

United States and some Allies arguably are more 

worried than others about Iran’s suspected nuclear 

weapons programs and ballistic missile capabilities 

or the possible spillover of Syria’s internal unrest into 

Turkey. Still others give relatively high priority to resource, environmental, and maritime security issues 

in the Arctic region.

RESURGENT “BURDEN-SHARING” DEBATE

Contentious discussions among the Allies over 

how to share equitably the risks and burdens of Alliance membership are nothing new. However, such 
364

arguments by and large did not weaken the Alliance 

during its first 4 decades due to the Soviet Union’s 

perceived existing threat to transatlantic security. 

With the end of the Cold War, NATO’s enlargement 

to 28 members, and its progressively greater involvement in a range of operational activities, the burdensharing debate arguably has gained in prominence 

and intensity.

The Bosnian and Kosovo interventions, beginning in 1995 and 1999, respectively, provided a taste 

of what was to follow. In the latter case, for example, 

U.S. pilots flew the overwhelming majority of missions throughout the 78-day campaign, although the 

participation of a small number of non-U.S. Allies increased toward the end of the operation. While these 

missions and subsequent post-conflict stabilization efforts by ground forces were not risk-free, no NATO 

military personnel were reported killed in combat. 

In contrast, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, especially since ISAF expanded into Talibancontrolled areas in 2006, has at times exposed serious 

tensions among the Allies related to burden-sharing. 

European Allies and Canada have suffered about onethird of the combat deaths among ISAF forces, with 

several suffering higher losses per capita than the 

United States. But NATO has had to cope with “caveats”—that is, restrictions imposed by some Allied governments or their parliaments on how and where their 

forces can be employed—and these have provoked 

both transatlantic and intra-European recriminations. 

For example, most of the nearly 4,700 German troops 

are effectively barred by the Bundestag from operating outside the northern region, and Turkey allows its 

1,800 troops to operate only in or near Kabul. Some 

Allied troops are prohibited from conducting night-
365

time or offensive missions. A top French military chief 

once called caveats a “poison for multinational operations,” and his British counterpart at the time insisted 

publicly that other Allies take a larger role in combat.5

The prevalence and impact of caveats reportedly 

have diminished in recent years, but they have not 

disappeared altogether. Moreover, as ISAF gradually passes the lead for security operations in selected 

provinces and districts to Afghan forces, pressure will 

build within several troop-contributor nations now 

deployed in those areas (mostly in the north and west) 

to withdraw their forces entirely rather than allow 

their shift to training and mentoring functions, which 

are not risk-free tasks. The danger is that during the 

planned transition to an Afghan lead in 2014, the combat burdens and risks might fall even more disproportionately on those U.S. and other Allied forces now 

deployed in the more volatile southern and eastern 

regions.

NATO’s experience in Libya confirmed that burden-sharing remains an issue in more limited operations, as well. While most Allies contributed militarily in some fashion, only eight (including the United 

States) participated in air strikes. On the positive side, 

the distribution of strike sorties among these countries 

was undoubtedly an improvement over the Kosovo 

air campaign. As Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 

noted in October 2011: 

After the United States employed its unique assets 

in the first week of the conflict to destroy key regime 

military targets and air defense capabilities, Europeans took over the brunt of operations. France and the 

United Kingdom engaged on a large scale, flying one 

third of the overall sorties and attacking 40 percent of 

the targets. Their deployment of helicopters was criti-
366

cal to the later stages of this campaign. . . . Meanwhile 

Italy made valuable contributions to the air-ground 

mission and served as an indispensable base for Allied operations. Smaller countries also punched well 

above their weight. Denmark, Norway, and Belgium 

together destroyed as many targets as France . . . Canada, as always, contributed its fair share—and that was 

substantial.6

At the same time, NATO’s Libya operation depended on the United States to provide key enabler 

capabilities. The latter included an estimated 80 percent of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) assets; the lion’s share of aerial refueling aircraft; 

hundreds of targeting specialists; and precision-guided munitions and other supplies for some of the striking nations whose relatively small stockpiles were 

rapidly depleted.

This mismatch of burden-sharing in operations 

results, in part, from underlying and growing disparities between U.S. and non-U.S. defense spending 

within the Alliance. As then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out in June 2011, the U.S. share of 

all military spending by NATO Allies has gone from 

about 50 percent during the Cold War to more than 75 

percent today. Put differently, while the United States 

spends over 4 percent of gross domestic product 

(GDP) for defense, the average for the rest of NATO 

is barely 1.4 percent. Even allowing for a bulge in U.S. 

spending associated with its 2003 invasion of Iraq, 

which several Allies opposed, these trends are unsustainable. As Secretary Gates put it: 

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the 

American body politic writ large—to expend increas-
367

ingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources 

or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense. . . . Indeed, if current 

trends in the decline of European defense capabilities 

are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider 

the return on America’s investment in NATO worth 

the cost.7

As Secretary Panetta warned the following October: “Many might assume that the U.S. defense budget 

is so large it can absorb and cover Alliance shortcomings—but make no mistake about it, we are facing 

dramatic cuts with real implications for Alliance capability.”8

PRIORITIZING CAPABILITIES

Differences in Allies’ threat assessments and their 

willingness to assume certain operational and budgetary responsibilities make it harder to agree on the priority of capabilities that need to be preserved, much 

less the new capabilities that must be developed. To 

date, NATO has been better at launching high-profile 

capabilities initiatives—recall, for example, the 1999 

Defense Capabilities Initiative and 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment—than delivering credible 

results. (As this chapter is written, the 2010 Lisbon 

Critical Capabilities package appears somewhat more 

productive than its predecessors.) Meanwhile, the 

overall financial and economic prospects for most Allies have degraded further since the NATO Secretary 

General outlined his “Smart Defense” concept in February 2011.
368

The fundamentals of Smart Defense are relatively 

straightforward. In an era of defense austerity, Allies 

should find more ways to cooperate multilaterally to 

make available the type, quantity, quality, and capabilities necessary for the Alliance as a whole to meet 

the level of ambition as set by its political leaders—

that is, the set of contingencies ranging from major 

combat operations to smaller stabilization missions 

that NATO should be prepared for. Such multilateral 

cooperation could include, for example, “pooling and 

sharing” arrangements, joint procurement, and role 

specialization. Top NATO civilian and military officials are trying hard to implement the concept and 

have assigned a leading role to Allied Command 

Transformation to facilitate the process by which nations will identify new cooperative projects, select 

lead nations and partners, and (hopefully) implement 

their collective efforts. 

Not surprisingly, however, Smart Defense will 

face the same challenges described hitherto as faced 

by NATO and other multinational efforts. For example, Allies that are more worried by proximate potential threats, whether to their territories or information 

systems, may be less inclined toward cooperative 

projects that seem directed to expeditionary and/or 

stabilization operations. Allies that share an expeditionary strategic culture, such as the UK and France, 

may favor bilateral cooperation over wider projects 

involving Allies believed to be excessively risk averse. 

Sovereignty issues remain an important consideration 

in many areas, even if they are given different weights 

depending on the size, capabilities, and political/

strategic culture of the individual Allies. In particular, 

those who seek to preserve some capability to act alone 

or in small coalitions of the willing outside NATO if 
369

their national interests so dictate, may be disinclined 

to invest in cooperative programs in the absence of 

assured access to those capabilities in the event of a 

crisis. In other words, they will be loath to join and/or 

fund cooperative projects on capabilities if one Ally or 

more can block consensus to permit their use.

Moreover, Smart Defense will not be a panacea 

for the capabilities shortfalls that likely will bedevil 

the Alliance for years to come. European pooling and 

sharing of its sparse ISR assets, for example, will not 

appreciably lessen Europe’s overall dependence on 

U.S. systems, especially in the event of high-intensity 

conflicts. Yet European investment to develop major 

new ISR capabilities would be very costly, making it 

an unlikely (or, at best, highly selective) option in the 

predicted economic and financial environment. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NSNW DEBATE

With Alliance solidarity under strain from so many 

different directions, NATO and member government 

officials will need to tread carefully in framing any 

next steps on NSNWs. What might such caution mean 

in practice? Here are a few (admittedly modest) suggestions:

• Allies should avoid denigrating the threat perceptions of others. Those favoring a go-slow approach—for example, seeking agreement with 

Russia on meaningful transparency measures 

rather than proceeding directly to changes in 

NATO declaratory policy or negotiated reductions—are not necessarily paranoid vis-à-vis 

Moscow’s (or perhaps Tehran’s) longer-term 

intentions.9

 Conversely, those who question 

the specific contributions of NATO NSNWs to 
370

deterrence and defense are not necessarily antinuclear pacifists.

• In the wake of demanding operations that have 

exposed rifts among Allies over the equitable 

sharing of risks and burdens, approaches that 

shift responsibilities for maintaining NATO 

NSNWs to a smaller and smaller number of Allies are bound to chip away at a sense of solidarity. Hence, if reductions in overall NATO 

NSNW capabilities are contemplated, it might 

be preferable to fashion so-called horizontal or 

salami-slicing cutbacks (that is, spreading reductions over several basing countries) rather 

than vertical ones (whereby some Allies drop 

out of nuclear roles entirely, effectively shifting 

all their burden to others).

• Smart Defense will be hard enough to apply to 

conventional capabilities; applying it to nuclear 

burden-sharing may be too difficult to achieve 

in the present political climate. Given sovereignty and assured-access issues, the achievement of multinational cooperation appears 

more difficult the closer the project comes to 

affecting combat capabilities versus functions 

such as logistics, maintenance, training, and 

professional military education. Hence, while 

the concept of creating a multinational, dualcapable air unit to assume the role now played 

by European Allies with national dual-capable 

forces may seem attractive in theory, the political and practical obstacles to realizing such 

a project should not be underestimated.

• The hard realities of defense austerity will not 

disappear anytime soon. Thus, it is legitimate 

for Allies to ask themselves and each other 
371

whether the resources necessary to maintain 

and/or modernize NATO’s NSNWs could be 

better used for conventional capabilities, such 

as the gaps in enablers highlighted by the Afghanistan and Libyan operations. The key here 

is to keep the debate honest. This means, for example, that the added cost of equipping future 

multirole aircraft (or extending the service life 

of a relatively small number of current aircraft 

inventories) with features necessary to maintain nuclear as well as conventional capabilities 

should not be exaggerated.10 At a minimum, 

any cost savings from shedding dual-capable 

roles must be applied to other high-priority defense capabilities.

• Finally, in NATO’s nuclear debate, respect for 

the unwritten consensus rule for decisionmaking will be vital. The consensus rule represents 

more than a mechanistic decisionmaking procedure. It reflects the NATO structure as an alliance of independent and sovereign countries, as 

opposed to a supranational body, and exemplifies for many the “one for all, all for one” ethos 

of the organization’s collective defense commitment. NATO decisions are the expression of 

the collective will of its member governments, 

arrived at by common consent. Under the consensus rule, no Ally can be forced to approve a 

position or take an action against its will. This 

Alliance reality is especially important for decisions on the potential use of military force, 

which are among the most politically sensitive 

for any ally. But it is arguably as important for 

dealing with issues, such as NSNWs, which remain at the core of the Article V commitment.
372

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16

1. These are Mr. Michel’s personal views and do not necessarily reflect official policy of the Department of Defense or any other 

agency of the United States Government.

2. United Nations S/RES/1973 (2011), Security Council Resolution 1973, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting on March 17, 2011, available from www.un.org/News/Press/

docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.

3. “Russia Marches into South Ossetia,” Spiegel Online 

International, August 8, 2008, available from www.spiegel.de/

international/world/0,1518,570834,00.html.

4. “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. 

Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a 

New Strategic Concept for NATO,” May 17, 2010, available from 

www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf.

5. Interview of General Jean-Louis Georgelin, Chief of Defense, 

France, on Europe 1 Radio, September 22, 2008, available from www.

defense.gouv.fr/ema/le-chef-d-etat-major/interventions/interviews/

22-09-08-interview-du-cema-sur-europe-1.

6. Text of speech of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Carnegie Europe, Brussels, Belgium, October 5, 2011, available from 

carnegieeurope.eu/events/?fa=3392.

7. Text of speech of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011, available from www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581.

8. Panetta speech.

9. Three American experts have proposed that, as a foundation for future talks on nuclear forces, the United States and Russia should “disclose, on a reciprocal basis, the location, types, and 

numbers of tactical nuclear weapons that remain. This should pose 

few problems for the United States and its allies; well-informed 
373

accounts of deployed American weapons have been around for 

years. But disclosing such data might prove difficult for Russia, 

given its penchant for secrecy and the political risks of confirming 

that it does indeed possess a far greater number of these weapons.” See Frank Klotz, Susan Koch, and Franklin Miller, “Unfinished Business,” The New York Times, December 13, 2011.

10. For the United States, this also implies continued implementation of the B-61 Life Extension Program. 

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CHAPTER 17

ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO’S

DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE 

REVIEW: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Guy B. Roberts1

I do think the principles of the NATO discussion [on 

NATO’s nuclear posture] are already clear: first, that 

no Ally will take unilateral decisions; second, that as 

long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO 

will need a nuclear deterrent.2

—NATO Secretary General 

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) revealed it was going to issue a new Strategic Concept for the 21st century at the 2010 Lisbon, 

Portugal, Summit, there was much anticipation that 

is would announce deep cuts in the numbers of U.S. 

nuclear weapons based in Europe or at a minimum a 

major policy shift entailing a significantly reduced role 

for nuclear weapons in ensuring the common defense 

and security of the Alliance. Instead, the new Strategic Concept echoed the language of the 1991 and 1999 

Strategic Concepts in stating that to protect and defend 

against the full range of today’s security threats, the 

Alliance will “maintain a mix of conventional and 

nuclear forces.”3

 Recognizing, however, the complex 

and changing security environment involving new 

threats (cyber-attacks for example) and new capabilities (missile defense), the heads of state tasked the 

North Atlantic Council (NAC) to undertake a review 

of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture (hereinafter referred to as the DDPR) and provide a report at 

the next NATO summit scheduled for May 20, 2012. 
376

While many disarmament advocates see this occasion as another opportunity to remove U.S. nuclear 

weapons from Europe for the reasons and factors discussed below, it is highly unlikely that there will be 

any substantive changes in either the posture or the 

policy. The DDPR process is deliberately designed in 

such a way as to ensure and reaffirm that NATO has 

the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and 

defend against any threat to the safety and security of 

the Alliance. However, while the DDPR will examine 

all capabilities, this chapter will limit its discussion to 

the nuclear dimension of that review, fully recognizing that the intent is to have an appropriate mix of 

conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces as 

well as defenses against relatively new threats such as 

cyber-attacks. 

THE ENVIRONMENT

Before discussing in detail the DDPR process and 

likely outcome, it is important to understand the environment in which this review is being undertaken. 

Several points are relevant. 

An Increasingly Dangerous and Proliferating 

Security Environment.

According to NATO’s most recent intelligence assessment, the security environment for the Alliance 

remains dangerous and uncertain, with the range and 

variety of potential risks and dangers facing the Alliance ever increasing and less predictable. These range 

from the continuing conflict in Afghanistan, unrest in 

the Balkans, the recent Libya operation, on-going efforts to stop piracy and terrorism, and the challenges 

of addressing new threats such as cyber-attacks. 
377

Two of the greatest enduring threats to Alliance 

safety and security in the next 10 to 15 years are weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism and WMD 

proliferation. As the U.S. WMD commission report 

states,4

 and as likewise reflected in NATO’s Comprehensive Strategic Level Policy for Preventing the 

Proliferation of WMD, proliferation of such weapons 

is inevitable, presenting increased risks to Allied security and strategic interests. We can slow and impede 

WMD proliferation, but it will happen. This will in 

turn increase the likelihood of WMD terrorism. And 

of course we face the prospect of ballistic missile proliferation, as in Iran and North Korea.

In addition to the enduring challenges of such 

proliferation, uncertainties about the future relationship with Russia continue to worry eastern European 

members of the Alliance. While no nation is considered an adversary of the Alliance, the proliferation 

threat is real and growing, and future conventional attacks against NATO forces or territory cannot be ruled 

out. 

While some NATO Allies continue to press for 

finding a path to “global nuclear zero” (more on that 

later), press reports in Russia state that it will triple 

its strategic missile production between the years 2011 

and 2015. Russia is deploying new silo-based and mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a 

new ballistic missile submarine with an advanced missile. By 2018, Russia plans to deploy a new “heavy” 

ICBM, which reportedly can carry 10-15 nuclear warheads. New advanced warheads are being deployed 

on other weapons, including those of low yield. Russia today enjoys more than a 10-1 advantage in tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) over 

the United States. While the United States pushed the 

“reset” button with Russia on cooperation and part-
378

nership, Russian military doctrine identifies NATO as 

a primary danger. Further, while Western countries 

are cutting military spending to deal with the global 

financial crisis, Russia plans to spend 20 trillion rubles 

($611 billion) on defense through 2020. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based think tank, Center 

for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), 

issued this glum assessment: 

The Russian authorities understand the country is 

doomed to be the kind of power that needs military 

might. ‘Soft power’ doesn’t work for us. We need people to be afraid of us, and we seem to be unable to find 

a proper substitute for military power.5

The Chinese nuclear and conventional buildup is a 

distant but growing concern. China is deploying two 

types of new mobile ICBMs and developing multiple 

warhead ICBMs and submarines to carry new sea 

launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Recent reports 

indicate a massive tunnel system—possibly up to 

5,000 kilometers (km) long—for building, deploying, 

and possibly launching nuclear-armed missiles. One 

is tempted to ask, “What are the potential long-term 

consequences for the West of watching as Russia and 

China modernize their nuclear arsenal while it sits 

back and simply maintains the status quo?” Worse, 

will the West continue to cut its nuclear forces out of 

a misguided notion that reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal will motivate others to stop their modernization 

and building program?

Ballistic missile proliferation remains a continuing 

concern, with over 30 nations now possessing ballistic 

missiles. North Korea, Iran, and India are developing 

ICBMs. The Iranians are expected to test their Kavoshgar 5 rocket with a 628-pound capsule carrying 
379

a monkey to an altitude of 120 km (74 miles). A new 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report is 

expected early in 2012 detailing Iran’s continued determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Almost 3 years 

after President Barack Obama offered an “extended 

hand” to Iran, tensions rose further in 2011 as Washington accused Tehran of being behind an alleged plot 

to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. Assuming this is true, one wonders whether Iran now 

believes that the relative decline and over-extension of 

American military power make it possible to commit 

such outrages against the United States and its allies 

with impunity.

State-sponsored and other terrorist groups continue to pursue acquiring WMDs. A video on Al Jazeera 

TV in February 2009, shown more than 100,000 times 

on various websites, featured a Kuwaiti professor 

openly talking about bringing four pounds of drypowdered anthrax to Washington, and killing several 

hundred thousands of Americans. Anders Breivik, 

who killed over 70 campers on an island in Norway, 

spoke of his using anthrax weapons.6

A. Q. Khan, the “father” of the Pakistani nuclear 

weapons program, masterminded an international 

network of suppliers of materials, equipment, plans, 

and technical assistance to countries clandestinely 

seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons in 

violation of international treaties and legal norms. 

We have no idea of how many A. Q. Khan Networks 

may be operating today, but we do know there is a 

strong demand and those willing to meet it. Pakistan 

is continuing to build up its nuclear weapons program 

amid continued security concerns, and Prime Minister 

Singh has called for building up further India’s nucle-
380

ar arsenal due to concerns over other nuclear weapon 

states and the possibility of nuclear terrorism.7

Disarmament by Default? 

While defense budgets have generally increased 

world-wide, that is definitely not the case in Europe. 

Partly in reaction to the deepening Eurozone financial 

crisis but also reflecting a trend that has been going on 

for some time, European Allies’ defense budgets are 

in free fall. The average annual defense outlay is well 

below 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 

and it will get worse. Potentially in 2012, nine nations 

will spend less than 1.0 percent of GDP on defense. 

While the markets frequently express optimism 

that Euro leaders have “fixed” the Eurozone crisis, 

uncertainties persist. Many analysts believe that a financial catastrophe awaits the Eurozone. Greece with 

a government debt some 143 percent of the size of its 

economy may soon default. Italy, with a debt some 120 

percent the size of its economy, now looks like it will 

follow Greece. Spain’s credit rating was downgraded 

in October 2011, and Portugal and Ireland continue to 

teeter on the brink. The debt contagion long feared is 

now fact as the cost of borrowing continues to increase 

for governments that have resolutely refused to make 

the reforms necessary to balance the books. Indeed, 

Allied governments have routinely obscured their actual debt levels, and complicit western European leaders have for too long simply hoped for a miracle. In 

the face of these realities, one would be hard pressed 

to find anyone who will predict that defense spending 

will grow or even manage to hold the line. It is now 

projected that the high-performance aircraft that key 

NATO Allies intend to procure, the Joint Strike Fighter, 
381

including a “dual capable” (nuclear) variant, will cost 

more than $130 million a copy.8 Based on current and 

projected defense budget figures, one wonders how 

Allies who have pledged to buy the craft, such as the 

United Kingdom (UK) and Italy, will be able to do so.

While the Barack Obama administration welcomed the willingness of our European allies to take 

the political and military initiative in Libya, allowing 

the United States to “lead from behind,” it was the 

shrinkage of allied capabilities that caught most of the 

attention of the U.S. Congress and policymakers. Libya showed that while the United States. took a back 

seat—its aircraft were not involved in the air strikes—

the allies that did participate in Operation UNIFIED 

PROTECTOR were forced to rely on U.S. planes for 

refueling and intelligence-gathering operations. During the Libya operation, the United States. made it 

abundantly clear that it expects its European allies to 

take the lead when crises erupt in their own backyard. 

In a well-publicized speech in June 2011, then 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated frankly that 

many countries were not taking part in the Libyan 

campaign because they could not; that those that were 

involved were running out of munitions; and that 

NATO had become a two-tiered Alliance in which 

only some members had combat capabilities, while 

others enjoyed the benefits of membership while refusing to pay the costs. 

The blunt reality is,” he said, “that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress . . . to 

expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be 

serious and capable partners in their own defense.
382

Gates also recognized, however, that the fall in Europe’s defense spending “was highly unlikely to 

change.”9

For the last 60 years Europe has assumed that the 

United States will rush to its aid in any crisis. Circumstances would suggest that such an assumption is a 

risky one to hold. Europe seems so far to have ignored 

U.S. warnings that it will not be business as usual. Ignoring Secretary Gates’s warning, most European nations are continuing to slash defense spending. Many 

still have forces that are not deployable. Indeed, as the 

new UK Defense Minister warned, 

Too many countries are failing to meet their financial 

responsibilities to NATO, and so failing to maintain 

appropriate and proportionate capabilities. Too many 

are opting out of operations, or contributing but a 

fraction of what they should be capable of. This is a 

European problem, not an American one. And it is a 

political problem, not a military one.10

Despite NATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s attempt to put a happy face on this gloomy picture by 

urging nations to pool resources—“smart defense” he 

called it—the fact is that defense spending will decline 

for some time to come. Allies have been unwilling to 

increase defense spending amid the economic crisis, 

so Rasmussen is now calling on NATO members to 

eliminate “redundancies” and sign agreements consolidating and integrating their capabilities, including 

arms purchases. As Rasmussen pointed out in a recent 

article in Foreign Affairs, the European allies continue 

to retreat on their political promise to spend 2 percent 

of GDP on defense. Far from that, their commitment 

to defense continues to shrink, much to the consternation of the United States:
383

By the end of the Cold War, in 1991, defense expenditures in European countries represented almost 34 

percent of NATO’s total, with the United States and 

Canada covering the remaining 66 percent. Since then, 

the share of NATO’s security burden shouldered by 

European countries has fallen to 21 percent.11

In the U.S. Congress, the budget knives are out, 

and the failure of U.S. European allies to demonstrate 

a willingness to shoulder their fair share will in all 

likelihood make it even more challenging to keep U.S. 

weapons and forces in Europe.

Conventional Forces Continue to Shrink.

For those who argue that the nuclear deterrence 

posture of the Alliance as anchored by U.S. nuclear 

weapons in Europe can be replaced with an overwhelming deterrent posture anchored on a strong U.S. 

conventional force presence, the news from Europe is 

troubling. In May 2010, the United States withdrew 

the last Army division from Europe and announced 

that one and probably two infantry brigade combat 

teams (IBCT) will also be withdrawn. Under current 

defense cuts already proposed, another IBCT is likely 

to be withdrawn next year. U.S. forces in Europe remained well over 200,000 until the early 1990s. Under 

current plans, European-based troops will be reduced 

from 42,000 today to 37,000 by 2015, with the numbers 

likely to be reduced well below the current 2015 target 

figure.12
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The United States Is the Only Major Nuclear Power 

That Is Not Modernizing Its Nuclear Weapons. 

But it gets worse. As part of the proposed $450 

billion cut in U.S. defense spending over the next 10 

years, House and Senate subcommittees have proposed cuts of $400 to $500 million in the $7.1 billion 

request for maintaining U.S. nuclear infrastructure. 

This will put in jeopardy life-extension programs for 

the W-76, W-78, and B-61 bombs.

On October 11, 2011, Congressman Ed Markey (DMass.) sent a letter to the Joint Select Committee on 

Deficit Reduction, signed by 65 lawmakers, that was 

clear and to the point: 

The Berlin Wall fell. The Soviet Union crumbled. The 

Cold War ended. Yet 20 years later, we continue to 

spend over $50 billion a year on the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This makes no sense. These funds are a drain on 

our budget and a disservice to the next generation of 

Americans. We are robbing the future to pay for the 

unneeded weapons of the past.13

They recommended cutting $200 billion from the 

estimated $700 billion planned for nuclear weapons 

and related programs over the next 10 years.14

While the U.S. nuclear infrastructure decays and 

Congress dithers over whether to fund the much 

needed modernization programs necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent, Russia 

and China continue to modernize and upgrade their 

own nuclear weapons and infrastructure. While Russia has tested and is deploying new ICBM and SLBM 

systems, U.S. replacements for the aging Trident D-5 

and ground-based Minuteman systems remain on the 

drawing board.15
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U.S. Focus and Interest Shift to Asia. 

Hillary Clinton, in an article in the November 2011 

issue of Foreign Policy titled “America’s Pacific Century,” characterized the Asia-Pacific region as a “key 

driver of global politics” and called for a “substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.”16 A 

new survey shows that Americans view Asian countries, not European ones, as the most important partners for the United States. Moreover, a partisan divide 

has emerged in attitudes toward the relationship. A 

majority (57 percent) of Republicans now believe that 

the United States should take a more independent approach vis-à-vis Europe, a plurality of Democrats (42 

percent) still supports closer ties with Europe, and independents are divided on the issue. As Americans 

turn away from Europe, they are turning toward Asia. 

A majority (51 percent) now see China, Japan, and 

South Korea as more important than the nations of 

Europe for U.S. national interests. Europeans should 

be particularly concerned that a strong majority of 

Americans under the age of 45 now see Asia as more 

important than Europe.17 The Americans who most 

value Europe are rapidly disappearing from the stage.

The Global Nuclear Zero Movement. 

Energized by President Obama’s speech calling 

for a world free of nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech 

Republic in 2009, the movement has brought renewed 

pressures on one of the fundamental aspects of NATO’s security posture and resulted in new initiatives 

for unilateral disarmament despite the threats dis-
386

cussed above. Indeed, the very concept of nuclear deterrence is now dismissed as a Cold War relic. Many 

in the disarmament movement reject the very notion 

of deterrence. They downplay or ignore the many 

other important and complex roles nuclear weapons 

play in ensuring the collective security of the Alliance. 

Former Secretary of State George Schultz at the Global 

Zero meeting in California asked, “How good of a deterrent is a nuclear weapon anyhow? What threat are 

they deterring? I don’t see much usefulness myself.”18

Some “Global Zero” advocates have singled out the 

extended worldwide deterrence commitment of the 

United States, calling it, in the words of Barry Blechman, “a concept that served a vital purpose during the 

Cold War, but whose time has come—and gone. The 

first step towards nuclear abolition is eliminating reliance on nuclear deterrence.”19

While the effectiveness of deterrence remains difficult to prove other than through anecdotal examples, 

Kenneth Waltz pointed out in his classic study, Man, 

the State, and War (1959), that:

deterrence arises from a logical and a moral necessity. Because men are not angels, because states can be 

malevolent, and because the international system of 

states is itself a jungle, without an all-powerful world 

government to enforce order, something like deterrence is required. Deterrence is reason’s attempt to 

check the perpetual temptation of evil.20

And, as Edmund Burke warned: “The only thing 

necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to 

do nothing.”21 This evil includes the assumption that 

men will lie, cheat, and betray. Since the search for 

perfect security is a fool’s errand in a world inherently 
387

beset by conflict, deterrence seeks to build security 

on the firmer foothold of a realistic view of human 

nature vice utopian. The realistic view is one seeing 

that the most reliable human motive is the preservation of things one holds most dear—particularly one’s 

own life. 

Those who argue for the abolition of nuclear weapons and indeed all weapons lose sight of the fact that 

war—not weapons—is the real villain. As the socialist 

Salvador de Madariaga, a key figure in the League of 

Nations disarmament efforts, presciently noted:

The trouble with disarmament was (it still is) that 

the problem of war is tacked upside down and at the 

wrong end. . . . Nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they 

distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on 

fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go 

undressed in winter. . . . Disarmers would avoid wars 

by reducing armaments. They run to the wrong end of 

the line. The only way . . . consists in dealing day by 

day with the business of the world . . . the true issue is 

the organization of the world on a cooperative basis.22

Our deterrence posture is such that we believe no 

regime, no matter how aggressive and risk-inclined, 

would be so foolish as to attack the Alliance, a move 

that would yield little advantage, and thereby incur 

an attack’s clear consequence—utter destruction. Taken together, the empty commitments made towards 

a global nuclear zero and calls by the strategicallyilliterate to remove the last U.S. nuclear forces from 

Europe, make the world’s nuclear future more dangerous, not less so. 

In 2010 certain officials from Belgium, Germany, 

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway proposed 
388

removing European-based U.S. nuclear warheads 

from Europe.23 Other than being a feel-good gesture 

to burnish their disarmament credentials again, one 

wonders what end such a step would serve, particularly in view of the threatening international security 

environment discussed above. How would such a step 

enhance their security? These very same countries are 

also drastically cutting their respective defense budgets, and some are trying to neuter missile defense. 

This is strategic illiteracy of breath-taking proportions.

Those Europeans who want to get rid of U.S. nuclear weapons (and what about British and French 

systems?) should for a moment take a strategic view, 

realizing that in this anarchic, realpolitik world, 

empty unilateralism is as dangerous as uncontrolled 

proliferation. A world without nukes might be even 

more dangerous than a world with them. I am convinced that the advent of the nuclear age is the primary reason major powers have, since 1945, refrained 

from waging war with each other. It is very difficult 

to explain the absence of war among the major powers in the last 65 years without taking into account the 

consequences of nuclear weapons. If, by some miracle, 

we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons at some 

point, what we would have is a number of countries 

sitting around with breakout capabilities, or rumors 

of breakout capabilities—for intimidation purposes—

and eventually a number of small clandestine nuclear 

stockpiles. This would make the United States and her 

Allies more, not less, vulnerable. The nuclear genie is 

now out of its aged and cracked bottle, and there is no 

way to put him back. “Are we actually going to see 

a world without nuclear weapons?” former Defense 

Secretary James Schlesinger rhetorically asked a Deterrence Symposium organized by the U.S. Strategic 
389

Command in 2010. He continued: “This is the vision 

of many people, and I remind you that the dividing 

line between vision and hallucination is never very 

clear.”24

THE DDPR PROCESS

NATO’s core business, its raison d’etre, is to protect 

our territory and our populations. . . . And in a world 

where nuclear weapons actually exist, NATO needs a 

credible, effective, and safely managed deterrent.25

—Secretary General General Rasmussen,

 April 22, 2010

Undoubtedly these issues will have a significant 

impact on the DDPR process as it moves forward towards the May 20, 2012, Summit in Chicago, IL. Nevertheless, as confirmed by the new Strategic Concept, 

NATO remains a collective security alliance whose 

purpose, as embodied in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, is to defend the territorial integrity of 

all of its member states. To do so, NATO theoretically 

maintains military capabilities (1) to deter any attack, 

and, in the event deterrence fails, either (2) to defeat 

such an attack if it occurs, or (3) to convince the aggressor that it has miscalculated and that the costs of 

war far exceed any possible gains, thereby causing the 

aggressor to abort his attack. 

In many respects the DDPR process reflects a continuation of a constantly transforming NATO which 

began, in my view, with the end of the Cold War and 

continues today. Consistent themes are evident from 

past Strategic Concepts, namely “security, consultation, 

deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership.”26
390

At the November 2010 Lisbon summit, the Alliance declared that:

NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces. Missile 

defense will become an integral part of our overall 

defense posture. Our goal is to bolster deterrence as a 

core element of our collective defense and contribute 

to the indivisible security of the Alliance.27

At the 60th anniversary summit in 2009, the Alliance reaffirmed that “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.”28 NATO 

Allies affirmed the necessity of deterrence, so that is 

supposedly not an item for discussion in the DDPR. 

However, the “right mix” of NATO’s strategic capabilities would be examined. More specifically, 

We have tasked the [North Atlantic] Council to continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring 

and defending against the full range of threats to the 

Alliance, taking into account changes in the evolving 

international security environment. This comprehensive review should be undertaken by all Allies on the 

basis of deterrence and defense posture principles 

agreed in the Strategic Concept, taking into account 

WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and ballistic 

missile proliferation. Essential elements of the review 

would include the range of NATO’s strategic capabilities required, including NATO’s nuclear posture, and 

missile defense and other means of strategic deterrence and defense.29

This review will also include a new assessment on 

threats and the security environment. It will include a 

review of what contributions to security are provided 
391

by arms control and nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives. It will also assess emerging security 

challenges (cyber, energy security) as well as the enduring security challenges of terrorism and WMD. 

Ultimately, the report will recommend “the right 

balance” or “mix” between deterrence, defense, and 

missile defense, with the purpose of strengthening the 

Alliance posture.

The consultation and reflection phase of the DDPR 

was completed in July 2011. Four “scoping papers” 

were discussed and the North Atlantic Council held 

sessions with experts to discuss the costs and benefits of making changes to either declaratory policy or 

force posture. The NATO Deputies Committee will 

draft the report with the assistance of experts—the 

High Level Group or Nuclear Planning Group Staff 

Group on nuclear issues. During the DDPR process, a 

number of questions will need to be addressed. These 

include, but are not limited to the following:

• How can NATO best demonstrate Alliance solidarity and maintain a credible Alliance nuclear 

posture in its common commitment to war prevention?

• How can Allies ensure that the nuclear elements of their deterrence posture remain visible, credible, and effective?

• How should the political-military utility of the 

nuclear elements of the posture be assessed?

• Does such a requirement necessitate the current 

balanced mix of nuclear forces, or could it be 

satisfied solely with so-called strategic nuclear 

forces provided by the NATO Nuclear Weapon 

States (NWS)?

• Is the stationing of U.S. nuclear “substrategic” 

weapons in Europe still required, and is the 

maintenance of “dual capable aircraft (DCA)” 
392

in their roles fulfilling high readiness requirements (i.e. training, exercises, certification etc.)?

• Do U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe and 

committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European 

and the North American members of the Alliance?

• If not, what role do they play? What other factors should the Alliance stress to emphasize 

and demonstrate the strength of the trans-Atlantic link?

• Are the DCA nations committed to continue 

their current role in Alliance nuclear strategy? 

If not, what would they substitute for their contribution to deterrence?

• Can Alliance burden-sharing be visibly provided by other means?

NATO nuclear burden-sharing, including the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, is perceived 

by many allies as the most tangible manifestation of 

the nuclear element of NATO’s collective security 

guarantee. Some have questioned the continued utility of that presence and have raised concerns about the 

security of these weapons, the cost of modernization, 

and the implications for disarmament and nonproliferation if they are retained. 

Reflecting improvements in the security environment, NATO has reduced the number of U.S. nuclear 

weapons stationed in Europe by over 95 percent.30

As part of the process of continually reviewing our 

nuclear deterrence posture and following consultations within the Alliance, further steps in adjusting 

the configuration of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture, including further reductions, should (1) take 
393

into account the disparity between NATO and Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons; (2) be 

considered in the context of U.S.-Russian arms control 

negotiations; and (3) weigh the countervailing political effects within the Alliance and in the minds of potential adversaries. In that regard, the impact on the 

proliferation of WMD within and without the Alliance 

as a result of changes in the deterrence posture should 

also be considered.

Additionally, considering the importance of burden-sharing and consultation in the Alliance, Allied 

participation in the nuclear mission also lends credibility to their voice on the future of NATO’s nuclear 

policy. Finding innovative ways to expand the sharing 

of risks and responsibilities among Allies will increase 

the credibility of the deterrent and manifest alliance 

solidarity, ultimately providing more leverage in negotiating reductions in U.S.-Russian non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe. The importance of sharing the 

risks and responsibilities of maintaining U.S. nuclear 

weapons in Europe and a robust consensus-based 

nuclear posture cannot be over-emphasized. In every 

discussion regarding the future of NATO’s nuclear 

policy and potential changes to it, burden-sharing was 

considered the most important criterion by the Allies.

The Alliance continues to believe that a fundamental aspect of NATO’s collective security posture 

is maintaining sufficient capability to meet the full 

spectrum of current and future threats and challenges 

from a position of strength. The Romans said it best: 

Sic vis pacem, para bellum (if one wants peace, prepare 

for war), and certainly the nature of mankind in that 

regard has changed little since Roman times. We entrust our security to our leaders, not to others. As former President Teddy Roosevelt said at the beginning 
394

of the last century; “There [can] be no greater calamity than for the free peoples, the enlightened, independent, and peace-loving peoples, to disarm while 

yet leaving it open to any barbarism or despotism to 

remain armed.”31 In that era (circa 1908), the Hague 

Peace conference had concluded, Andrew Carnegie 

was making plans to build the Peace Palace in The 

Hague, the Netherlands, many were writing that there 

would be no more wars. At the dedication of the Peace 

Palace in 1913, Carnegie predicted that the end of war 

was “as certain to come, and come soon, as day follows night.”32 Of course, less than a year later Europe 

was plunged into a catastrophic world war. 

Who would have predicted what the next 40 years 

would bring? There is no case that I know of in history 

where a nation has been made secure by pursuing a 

policy of vulnerability. The tragic arc of history has 

demonstrated that such is a sure path to destruction 

and enslavement. 

As stated in the Strategic Concept, “Deterrence, 

based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our 

overall strategy.”33 I believe NATO will maintain its 

nuclear deterrent at the minimum level sufficient to 

preserve peace and stability consistent with and in response to the shifting and hopefully increasingly benign international security environment. The goal of 

the DDPR is to bolster or strengthen our security, not 

to maintain the status quo or diminish it. In this same 

context, the Alliance will continue to examine innovative ways to maintain and sustain a credible nuclear 

deterrent as one part in NATO’s larger defense posture consistent with the principles of fair burden-sharing, the indivisibility of security, and maintaining a 

strong transatlantic link. 
395

Furthermore, the United States and its NATO Allies will have to reconcile their DDPR conclusions with 

their interest in arms control and confidence-building 

measures intended to enhance transparency, particularly with regard to their relationship to Russia. Unfortunately, to date the Russians have demonstrated little 

interest in arms control or transparency with regard to 

non-strategic nuclear forces and have suspended their 

obligations for reporting and transparency under the 

Conventional Forces in Europe treaties. They continue 

to refuse to discuss transparency regarding their nonstrategic nuclear weapons until all U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from European soil, and they have 

insisted that future discussions should include British 

and French nuclear weapons, a position rejected out 

of hand by both of these nations. Even those nations 

that are the strongest advocates of disarmament agree 

that any further reductions should be undertaken in 

the context of arms control negotiations with the Russians.

Finally, the most important and difficult task is 

to change the underlying security circumstances that 

lead nations to seek nuclear weapons. To that end, 

direct negotiations involving positive incentives (economic, political, and security arrangements) for states 

willing to abandon nuclear weapons aspirations, as 

well as cooperation with others to impose sanctions 

against recalcitrant actors, are essential. These are concrete actions, analogous to the Marshall Plan, to take a 

historical example, not mere gestures like the KelloggBriand Pact of 1929, which “outlawed war.”34

Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play 

an important deterrent role and cannot be eliminated. Foreign policy must be based on this reality. The 

DDPR will reflect the Alliance desire to remain strong 
396

with a posture that lowers the risks of the spread of 

nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of 

nuclear weapons use. What we need today is a new 

kind of surge—an intellectual, policy, and political 

countersurge to both the Global Zero movement and 

those who insist that defense budgets be cut irrespective of its impact on Alliance security. We need a new 

impetus to challenge the statements and assertions of 

groups like the Global Zero Movement. 

In sum, I see the end result of the DDPR as one 

where the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is affirmed. 

There are too many proven political and psychological benefits of the long-standing extended nuclear 

deterrence posture to justify change now and no real 

incentive to do so in light of the security environment. 

The weapons serve to deter aggression, persuade the 

nonpossessing Ally that there is no need to develop 

nuclear weapons himself, and are a visible and viable 

symbol of the transatlantic link between the United 

States and European Allies. There may be some minor 

adjustments in numbers, which should remain classified, but not many because of their potential for use 

as an arms control quid pro quo in U.S.-Russia negotiations. I do not see any changes in NATO’s declaratory 

policy for a couple of reasons but most simply because 

the French will never go along with it. A NATO nuclear deterrent can play a significant and far-reaching 

role demonstrating Alliance solidarity in the face of aggression with WMD, and not just nuclear weapons. As 

I have often stated, the Alliance uses nuclear weapons 

every single day. They daily play an important political role in demonstrating solidarity, burden-sharing, 

and the incalculable consequences of aggression.

The weapons we have invented cannot be uninvented. We must live with them. They are an inevi-
397

table price human beings must pay to live in the age 

of technology. Living with destructive technologies is 

our lot, the debt we bear in behalf of progress. They 

are, after all, the ultimate guardian of our safety. 

Foreign policy must be based on this reality; and the 

United States should work with its Allies and strategic 

partners on those achievable objectives that lower the 

risks of the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

NATO is the world’s most successful and longestlived collective security organization. At the end of 

the day, I am optimistic that the Alliance will make 

the right and best choices in the difficult and challenging security and economic environment of today. As 

Bismarck allegedly observed, “If you like the law and 

sausage, you should see neither one of them being 

made.”35 So too with NATO’s deterrence and defense 

posture.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 17

1. The views expressed here are my own. 

2 Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Monthly Press 

Conference, April 19, 2010.

3. See 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept, para. 39; 1999 Alliance 

Strategic Concept, para. 46; and the 2010 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of NATO, para. 19. See also the 2010 

NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, para. 30, available from www.

nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.

4. “World at Risk: Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism,” published December 

3, 2008, available from www.cfr.org/terrorism/world-risk-reportcommission-prevention-wmd-proliferation-terrorism/p17910. 
398

5. Thomas Grove, “Analysis: Russia feeds arms addiction as 

soft power fails,” October 11, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2011/10/11/us-russia-military-idUSTRE79A2CB20111011.

6. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/anders_behring_breivik.

7. Srinvas Laxman, “PM Singh Hints At Strengthening of 

India’s Nuclear Weaponization Program,” Asian Scientist, October 14, 2011, available from www.asianscientist.com/topnews/

indian-prime-minister-manmohan-singh-strengthen-nuclearweaponization-program-102011/.

8. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing To Receive Testimony on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program in Review 

of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and 

Future Years Defense Program, May 19, 2011, Washington, DC, 

available from armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2011/05%20

May/11-43%20-%205-19-11.pdf.

9. Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’s Speech on 

NATO’s Future, June 10, 2011, available from blogs.wsj.com/

washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-onnatos-future/.

10. Viola Gienger, “Obama Returns to Bush Plan for Cutting 

Troops,” Bloomber.com, January 5, 2012.

11. Anders Rasmussen, “The Atlantic Alliance in Austere 

Times” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011.

12. David Rising and Desmond Butler, “US Military Forges 

Ahead with European Force Cuts,” San Francisco Examiner, May 

21, 2011.

13. A copy of the letter is available from markey.house.gov/

press-release/oct-11-2011-super-committee-freeze-nukes-fund-future.

14. Ibid.

15. “Russia creates new mega-powerful ballistic missile,” 

August 9, 2011, Pravda, available from english.pravda.ru/russia/

economics/09-08-2011/118691-ballistic_missile_russia-0/.
399

16. See www.tradereform.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Foreign

-Policy-Americas-Pacific-Century-by-Sec-Hillary-ClintonNovember-2011.pdf.

17. Judy Dempsey, “Survey Shows Americans Now Considering Asia More Important Than Europe,” New York Times, 

September 15, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/

world/survey-shows-americans-now-considering-asia-moreimportant-than-europe.html. 

18. George Schultz, “Let’s Get Rid of Nuclear Weapons So 

We Can Win One More for the Gipper,” October 12, 2011, available from yubanet.com/usa/George-Schultz-Let-s-Get-Rid-of-NuclearWeapons-so-We-Can-Win-One-More-for-the-Gipper.php. 

19. Barry Blechman, “Extended Deterrence: Cutting Edge of 

the Debate on Nuclear Policy,” August 13, 2009, available from 

nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/extended-deterrencecutting-edge-of-the-debate-on-nuclear-policy/.

20. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

21. Letter to William Smith, January 9, 1795, as quoted in John 

Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 14th Ed., Boston: Little, Brown and 

Co., 1968, p. 454.

22. Salvador de Madariaga, Morning without Noon, Farnborough, UK: Westmead, Saxon House, 1973, pp. 48-49.

23. In actual fact, they simply proposed discussing the possibility as part of a Foreign Minister’s meeting. See “Five Nations Ask 

Syg To Put ‘NATO’s Nuclear Policy’ On Tallinn Agenda,” available from www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10USNATO87.

24. Global Security Newswire, August 17, 2010, available 

from www.nti.org/gsn/.

25. Speech, “On Alliance Solidarity in the 21st Century,” Tallinn, Estonia, April 22, 2010.

26. See “NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance endorsed 

by heads of state and government,” para. 2, November 29, 2006, 
400

available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.

htm.

27. See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?

mode=pressrelease.

28. Declaration on Alliance Security, 60th Anniversary Summit 

at Strasbourg/Kehl, Press Release 43, April 4, 2009, available from 

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease.

29. North Atlantic Council, Lisbon Summit Declaration, 

para. 30, November 20, 2010, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/

natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.

30. The Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD 

Nuclear Weapons Management, December 2008, states that deployed nuclear weapons in Europe “have been reduced by more 

than 97% since their peak in the 1970’s,” p. 59.

31. Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, December 5, 1905, available from www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/tr26/speeches/

tr_1905.htm.

32. Andrew Carnegie, “The Palace of Peace,” Address delivered at the Hague, the Netherlands, August 29, 1913, available from www.accesspadr.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/

acamu-acarc&CISOPTR=1376&REC=6.

33. 2010 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the 

Members of NATO, para. 19.

34. Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris, July 24, 1929. This 

pact renounced war as an instrument of national policy and was 

ratified by 63 nations.

35. While many sources attribute this quotation to Otto von 

Bismarck, recent research attributes it to lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe, who is quoted by the Daily Cleveland Herald, March 29, 

1869, as stating that “laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect 

in proportion as we know how they are made.” Fred Shapiro, 

“Quote Misquote,” New York Times, July 21, 2008, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html.
401

PART V

ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION

403

CHAPTER 18

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO:

ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION

James M. Smith

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were introduced into 

Europe based primarily on their military utility but 

with the strong secondary purpose of ensuring alliance solidarity. They were introduced in the theater 

under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

umbrella, with an equally strong burden-sharing role. 

Today, the military utility is legitimately questioned, 

their burden-sharing dimension is indeed a burden on 

economically challenged Alliance members, and only 

the political role remains strong and central. U.S. nuclear weapons remain in NATO for the political purposes of general assurance and NATO solidarity, and 

to give continued relevance to NATO nuclear policy 

as long as the members impute a nuclear dimension 

to the Alliance.

As these weapons have transitioned to primarily 

political roles, arms control has presented itself as a 

political answer to questions of how to manage further nuclear drawdowns and the possibility of eventual complete removal of the American weapons from 

the theater. Arms control is an established political 

process between Russia—with a substantial remaining strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal found particularly worrisome to the newer alliance members— 

and the United States, which has always undertaken 

its side of the bilateral negotiations with a keen eye to 

NATO positions and sensitivities. It is a process that, 

with thoughtful adaptation, offers significant prom-
404

ise as a vehicle for regulating and verifying nuclear 

weapon numbers, movement, and status as regarding 

the NATO area of operations.

This brief overview addresses arms control as an 

established process of arms regulation; summarizes 

major threads and issues raised in the chapters of this 

Part; and suggests an arms control agenda as a way 

ahead for addressing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons 

(TNWs) in NATO.

ARMS CONTROL AS A “WAY” OF ENHANCING 

NATIONAL SECURITY

Arms control developed as a practical offshoot 

from traditional approaches to disarmament, seeking 

regulation, reciprocity, and transparency in limiting 

numbers and capabilities of nuclear systems as opposed to near-term elimination of those systems. The 

international security environment of the Cold War 

dictated strategic reliance on nuclear weapons, and 

neither of the major nuclear powers and their associated alliances could guarantee their security without 

that set of nuclear capabilities. Arms control offered 

a systematic and verifiable process to lower the risks, 

costs, and consequences of potential conflict within a 

cooperative niche in the otherwise contentious EastWest relationship. 

Today the foundational situation has changed, 

resulting in an end to the intensely adversarial relationships prevalent during the Cold War, and a fundamental alteration of the alliance structure in Europe. Today NATO stands alone as the sole strategic 

security alliance on the continent, and Russia is not 

denominated as an enemy. In fact, cooperative mechanisms and efforts exist between NATO and Russia on 
405

several fronts. However, the sheer numbers of nuclear 

weapons remaining in the Russian inventory and the 

siting of many of those weapons in close proximity 

to NATO member states dictate that NATO seek options for systematized reduction and relocation of 

those weapons, and for a continuing deterrent posture 

while those reductions are still in process.

Thus, the November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept

adopted at Lisbon states in part:

Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear 

and conventional capabilities, remains a core element 

of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which 

any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.1

However, it later records the following qualification:

NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level 

of forces. Arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation contribute to peace, security, and stability, and 

should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance 

members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament 

of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass 

destruction, as well as nonproliferation efforts.2

Arms control is embraced as a primary vehicle to 

enable the systematic and verifiable reduction of the 

residual Russian nuclear arsenals and other security 

factors related directly to the maintenance of that 

nuclear posture. Specifically, NATO embraces stability- and security-enhancing nuclear reductions both 

in general and in Europe—both Russian and NATO 

nuclear weapons in theater—as well as conventional 
406

arms control to address the perceived lack of stability that is prompting Russia both to retain its nuclear 

capabilities (particularly its large inventory of tactical 

nuclear weapons) and to elevate its doctrinal reliance 

on those weapons in the event of any major conflict 

scenario. Both Russia and NATO seek security and 

stability; the relationship between them has transitioned from adversarial and military to more broadly 

cooperative and political; and arms control offers a 

political process through which to address residual 

military dangers.

ARMS CONTROL THREADS AND THEMES 

Thus, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept as well as 

the authors in this Part have endorsed arms control as 

one primary vehicle by which to address both residual 

security challenges in Europe and the specific issues 

surrounding U.S. (and Russian) tactical nuclear weapons in theater. However, the authors also pointed out 

that this new arms control process must be broadened 

and adapted to best fit the new realities of the present 

environment. Issues, even objections, were raised concerning individual goals or forums for arms control, 

but consultative and cooperative approaches—here 

termed arms control writ large—were suggested for 

a wide range of regional security issues and concerns.

Interestingly, none of the authors chose U.S. tactical nuclear weapons as their singular focus in addressing the issues surrounding those systems. They 

instead addressed the issues from such departure 

points as conventional force issues; shifts in the global 

strategic environment and resulting regional implications; strategic force issues and control efforts; and 

common political, economic, and force modernization 

concerns of nations. The authors saw the multidimen-
407

sional context as the important focus in framing tactical nuclear weapons issues for analysis.

Conventional force balances, the suspended Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) framework, and 

overall military concerns were central to one author, 

and they were mentioned by the other authors as major factors for framing tactical nuclear weapons issues. 

Certainly Russia’s concerns about its entire frontier, 

as well as regional balances, drive its tactical (and 

strategic) nuclear force posture and doctrine. Efforts 

to reinstate conventional forces transparency and 

cooperation in Europe were seen as fundamental to 

expanding the discussion toward addressing Russian 

nuclear weapons and positioning.

Shifts in the global strategic environment toward 

the Far East were suggested as altering national security resource decisions and affecting strategic forces 

considerations, particularly for Russia, but also for the 

United States and European states. In view of this altered environment, suggestions were made for changing the basis for strategic arms control discussions 

toward a comprehensive approach to nuclear weapons and toward consideration of European security issues based on the resulting enlargement of bargaining 

breathing room.

Aligned with some of those ideas, a comprehensive discussion of U.S.-Russia strategic engagement 

was presented as a framework for addressing tactical 

nuclear weapons issues. Several options were presented and assessed, along with bilateral conditions 

necessary to move forward on these fronts, with particular attention to composite limits on the full range 

of nuclear weapons, allowing each side flexibility in 

how it constitutes and postures its forces. U.S. nuclear 

weapons in Europe would be included in this com-
408

posite discussion within the context of overall as well 

as regional stability.

Against this multifaceted backdrop, the discussion turned to the hard reality of national political and 

economic imperatives as these confront force modernization decisions associated with maintaining the 

nuclear status quo in NATO. The point was made that 

national and Alliance confidence and assurance are 

key within today’s environment, and nonthreatening 

alternatives take on added salience. Thus such less 

bellicose factors as stability, emphasis on defense, and 

engagement itself may become more important than 

aggressive-seeming military capabilities in shaping 

this stability and assurance.

ARMS CONTROL TAKEAWAYS AND A WAY 

AHEAD

One primary takeaway from the Dickinson College workshop underpinning the present book is that 

an adapted arms control process can act as a central 

vehicle with which to address the core issues surrounding TNWs in Europe. Arms control and cooperative security present one avenue for addressing 

these issues, and it may be the preferred avenue given 

its vector toward transparency, cooperation, reciprocity, and stability. However, the traditional bilateral, 

security-focused, and formal arms control of the Cold 

War must be adapted to the new realities of Europe in 

order to be truly relevant.

Arms control must be balanced. It must move to a 

more consultative process that takes note of the range 

of national, regional, and sub-regional concerns. It 

must be aimed toward attaining assurance of regional 

stability within which nations do not have to place 
409

exaggerated emphasis on security in ordering their 

individual and collective agendas.

Arms control must be bundled. It cannot focus 

solely on TNWs, nor on strategic nuclear weapons, 

nor on conventional forces. Stability concerns address 

all of these as linked military implements. Today, missile defenses and conventional strategic systems are 

also linked into the equation, particularly by Russia. 

Consultative and cooperative approaches to each and 

all of these security issues must be incorporated into 

the broadened process for achieving regional stability.

Arms control must be backed. Nations cannot opt 

out. They cannot free ride. Whether the ultimate format selected is unilateral/reciprocal, bilateral, multilateral, or some mixture of these, the Alliance must 

be engaged, and the region must be engaged, if true 

stability is to be attained. In addition, those states with 

internal consultative mandates must engage those 

domestic processes so as to present a legitimately national position in the larger consultations. Participants 

must carry the long-term view into the process so that 

long-term stability can be the outcome.

Arms control, then, should be a primary vehicle by 

which NATO and its member states address the issues 

surrounding security assurance, stability, U.S. nuclear 

weapons in Europe, and NATO as a nuclear alliance.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 18

1. Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for 

the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State and Government 

at Lisbon, Portugal, November 19, 2010, p. 4.

2. Ibid., p. 7.

411

CHAPTER 19

ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS FOR

NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Steven Pifer

INTRODUCTION

Arms control agreements negotiated between 

Washington and Moscow over the past 50 years have 

focused on strategic offensive nuclear arms. Aside 

from the 1987 treaty banning intermediate-range 

nuclear force (INF) missiles and related unilateral 

steps, non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) have 

remained outside of arms limitation efforts. Following conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (New START) in April 2010, however, President Barack Obama called for including NSNWs in 

the next round of negotiations. This chapter provides 

background on NSNWs, reviews U.S. and Russian 

views on limiting such weapons, and outlines options 

for dealing with them in arms control arrangements. 

These options include confidence-building measures, 

unilateral steps, and negotiated legally binding limits.

The New START Treaty, which entered into force 

in February 2011, requires that the United States and 

Russia reduce their strategic offensive forces so that 

no later than February 2018, each has no more than 

700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles—that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; no more than 800 deployed and 

nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and nuclearcapable heavy bombers; and no more than 1,550 de-
412

ployed strategic warheads. The INF Treaty eliminated 

all ground-launched missiles and launchers for missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

The term “non-strategic nuclear weapon” is used 

here to include nuclear warheads for all delivery systems not limited by New START or banned by the INF 

Treaty. This category of nuclear warheads includes 

gravity bombs for aircraft other than nuclear-capable 

heavy bombers, nuclear warheads for naval cruise 

missiles and torpedoes, and nuclear warheads for 

anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and air defense systems. 

The NSNWs term would also capture any nuclear 

warheads for surface-to-surface missiles with ranges 

less than 500 kilometers and nuclear artillery shells, 

should such weapons remain in the arsenals.1

 NSNWs 

are also referred to as tactical or sub-strategic nuclear 

weapons.2

As a result of its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 

the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it 

would retire and place in the dismantlement queue 

the nuclear warheads for its sea-launched cruise 

missiles. This leaves the U.S. non-strategic nuclear 

arsenal consisting solely of B-61 gravity bombs. The 

Russians maintain a larger and more diverse non-strategic nuclear inventory, including gravity bombs plus 

nuclear warheads for torpedoes, sea-launched cruise 

missiles, ABM, and air defense systems, and possibly 

other kinds, totaling as many as 3,700-5,400 warheads. 

Many of those may be old and nearing retirement; the 

“nominal” load of Russian non-strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is believed to be around 2,100 warheads.3
413

U.S. AND RUSSIAN NON-STRATEGIC

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The United States plans to conduct a life-extension 

program for its B-61 bombs over the coming decade, 

which will take the three non-strategic variants and 

one strategic variant of the weapon and produce a 

single variant, the B-61-12.4

 (This will have the effect of blurring the distinction between strategic and 

non-strategic nuclear warheads.) Russian nuclear 

warheads generally have a shorter shelf life than their 

American counterparts, and the Russian practice is 

to retire old warheads and build new ones to replace 

them. While Moscow has not disclosed plans for its 

future non-strategic arsenal, some experts believe the 

Russians will replace their aging non-strategic nuclear 

warheads at a less than one-for-one rate, which would 

lead over time to a reduction in the overall size of their 

non-strategic nuclear stockpile. (See Table 19-1.)

Table 19-1. U.S. and Russian Non-Strategic 

Nuclear Weapons.6

Of the 500 U.S. B-61 gravity bombs, some 200 are 

believed to be deployed forward at six air bases in 

Europe: one each in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey and two in Italy. These weapons 

are designated for use by the U.S. Air Force and, unWeapons U.S. Russia

Air- Delivered 500 800

ABM or Air Defense 0 700

Ground-Based 0 ?5

Naval 0 600

Total 500 ~2100
414

der programs of cooperation, the Belgian, German, 

Dutch, and Italian air forces, which have dual-capable 

aircraft (DCA) that can deliver conventional or nuclear weapons.7

 There is no unclassified breakdown of 

the number of NSNWs in the European part of Russia, though Russia has national-level nuclear storage 

sites plus naval and air force nuclear storage sites on 

its European territory, including some sites situated 

close to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

allies such as the Baltic states and Norway.

Most, if not all, Russian non-strategic nuclear warheads are believed to be “demated” or separated from 

their delivery systems. U.S. non-strategic weapons are 

also demated in that no U.S. B-61 bombs are deployed 

on aircraft, though in Europe they are reportedly 

stored in warhead vaults in hangars that can house 

U.S. or allied delivery aircraft.

U.S. Views on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.

President Obama in his April 5, 2009, speech in 

Prague called for reducing the number and role of 

nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, a 

view echoed 1 year later in the Nuclear Posture Review. 

When signing the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010, 

the President noted, “As I said last year in Prague, this 

treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going 

forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia 

on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, 

including nondeployed weapons.”8

Were the Russians to agree, this would mean that, 

for the first time, the United States and Russia would 

be negotiating on all nuclear weapons in their arsenals 

with the exception of those retired and in the queue 

for dismantlement. The rationale for bringing NSNWs 
415

into the discussion is that it would be difficult in a 

new agreement to reduce deployed strategic nuclear 

warheads to a level below the New START limit of 

1,550 without addressing the thousands of NSNWs 

(and nondeployed strategic warheads) in the sides’ 

arsenals. Indeed, a primary critique of New START 

during the 2010 Senate ratification debate was that it 

failed to deal with non-strategic weapons; the treaty’s 

ratification resolution required that the administration 

seek within 1 year of New START’s entry into force to 

initiate negotiations to reduce the disparity between 

the United States and Russia in such arms.

Anticipating possible new negotiations with Russia, the administration in February 2011 set up interagency working groups to explore options for addressing NSNWs and to examine the kinds of verification 

measures that would be necessary to monitor limits 

on them. On March 29, 2011, U.S. National Security 

Advisor Tom Donilon said that reciprocal transparency on the “numbers, types, and locations of nonstrategic forces in Europe” should be an initial step in 

getting ready for negotiations on such systems.9 U.S. 

officials raised the subject of NSNWs in consultations 

with their Russian counterparts over the course of 

2011, but there was no indication of an agreement to 

address these in a more formal negotiation. 

NATO considerations will factor heavily in the 

U.S. arms control approach on NSNWs. The November 2010 NATO summit produced a new Strategic 

Concept, which reaffirmed the importance of nuclear 

deterrence for Alliance security. It also noted that 

NATO would “seek to create the conditions for further reductions [of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe] in the future,” adding that the Alliance should 

“seek Russian agreement to increase transparency 
416

on its nuclear warheads in Europe and relocate these 

weapons away from the territory of NATO members. 

Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range 

nuclear weapons.”10

NATO leaders also agreed to launch a Deterrence 

and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which is to examine the “appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional, 

and missile defense forces for the Alliance. The review 

is to be concluded by the May 20, 2012, NATO summit 

in Chicago, IL.

NATO allies hold a range of views on the need for 

American nuclear weapons deployed forward in Europe. Some allies, such as Germany, the Netherlands, 

and Belgium, see no territorial threat to the Alliance 

that requires U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. The 

German air force is replacing its Tornado aircraft with 

Eurofighters—which will not be wired to carry nuclear 

weapons—and thus will lose its nuclear role when the 

Tornadoes are retired. The German decision could have 

a major, if not decisive, impact on Dutch and Belgian 

decisions about whether to retain a nuclear role for 

their air forces, which could in turn affect Italian and 

Turkish views on maintaining nuclear weapons on 

their territory. If decisions by individual NATO members lead to the abandonment of DCA, NATO could 

find itself disarming by default.

Other allies, including the Baltic states and countries in Central Europe, see a continued need for U.S. 

nuclear weapons in Europe as a means of underscoring the U.S. security commitment to NATO. Their 

view is shaped by concern that Russia might still 

pose a threat to their security. Russian statements on 

missile defense such as the one by President Dmitry 

Medvedev on November 23, 2011, threatening to tar-
417

get missiles on NATO countries hosting U.S. missile 

defense elements, fuel this concern.

It is doubtful that the DDPR will resolve the differences among Alliance members regarding threat 

perceptions and the need for U.S. nuclear weapons, 

and doubtful as well that it will go on to produce a 

final decision on whether or not U.S. nuclear weapons 

should remain deployed in Europe. It is more likely 

that the review will defer difficult questions—the DCA 

issue could be kicked down the road as the Tornado

will remain in the German inventory until 2020-25—

and include language, building on that in the Strategic 

Concept, linking measures on U.S. NSNWs to steps by 

Russia regarding its non-strategic arsenal.

Such an outcome may be desirable for preserving 

flexibility for U.S. negotiators in a future negotiation 

with the Russians. If NATO were to decide at the 

Chicago summit to remove some or all U.S. NSNWs 

from Europe, that would reduce the bargaining chips 

in the U.S. negotiators’ hands. If the Alliance were alternatively to decide that some U.S. nuclear weapons 

must remain in Europe for the foreseeable future, that 

would make it difficult for U.S. negotiators to explore 

what Russia might offer for removal of the B-61 bombs.

Russian Views on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.

Although President Medvedev committed along 

with President Obama in April 2009 to a step-by-step 

process aimed at reducing, and ultimately eliminating, nuclear weapons, the Russians in 2011 showed 

little enthusiasm for engaging in early negotiations on 

further nuclear arms reductions of any kind. Instead, 

Moscow linked further reductions to concurrent or 

prior steps on a range of other questions. On March 1, 
418

2011, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared at the 

United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament in 

Geneva:

We insist that there is a clear need to take into account 

the factors that negatively affect strategic stability, 

such as plans to place weapons in outer space, to develop non-nuclear arms strategic offensive weapons, 

as well as unilateral deployment of a global BMD [ballistic missile defense] system. Nor could we ignore 

the considerable imbalances in conventional arms, 

especially against the backdrop of dangerous conflicts 

persisting in many regions of the world.11

Other Russian officials have reiterated this linkage 

but have not painted a clear path forward for untangling the bundle of questions. This may reflect uncertainty in Moscow as to where to go next on nuclear 

arms reductions. Russian officials have indicated privately that, before proceeding too far on a new negotiation, Moscow would want to know who will occupy 

the White House after the November 2012 U.S. election.12

The one specific position that the Russians have 

put forward on NSNWs is to call for their removal to 

national territory as a precondition for any negotiation 

on such weapons. Moscow likely understands that 

Washington will not accept that as a precondition. 

Part of the Russian uncertainty about next steps on 

nuclear reductions undoubtedly stems from their concern about perceived disadvantages vis-à-vis NATO 

and Chinese conventional military forces. Russian 

conventional force capabilities declined dramatically 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and 

Russia lags the United States particularly in the area 

of high-tech, precision-guided weapons. Russian of-
419

ficials have announced a major 10-year rearmament 

program aimed at refitting the military with more advanced arms by 2020, along with an ongoing program 

of military reforms, but many analysts doubt that 

Moscow will fully achieve its ambitious goals.13

Given their conventional force weaknesses, the 

Russians may believe that they must rely more on nuclear forces—including NSNWs—than in the past (in 

much the same way that NATO during the Cold War 

depended on nuclear weapons to offset conventional 

force imbalances vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact). The 2010 Russian military doctrine stated:

The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize 

nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction 

against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the 

use of conventional weapons when the very existence 

of the state is under threat.14

It remains unclear, however, what rationale the 

Russians have for maintaining such a large number of 

NSNWs. NATO regards its non-strategic weapons as 

almost solely political in purpose; in a conflict, their 

use would aim primarily to signal the danger of escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange. Even if the 

Russian military regards its NSNWs more in military 

than in political terms—as it probably does—the number in their arsenal remains difficult to justify. In what 

plausible scenario would Russian military planners 

envisage the use of hundreds of non-strategic nuclear 

warheads? 
420

General Arms Control Considerations.

If and when the United States and Russia discuss 

arms control for NSNWs—be it confidence-building 

measures, parallel unilateral steps, or legally binding negotiated limits—several considerations likely 

would apply. First, in contrast to New START, which 

constrains deployed strategic warheads and deployed 

strategic delivery vehicles such as ICBMs, the sides 

likely would focus on non-strategic nuclear warheads 

themselves and not seek to limit the delivery vehicles 

for such warheads. Neither the U.S. nor Russian militaries would want to reduce or constrain delivery systems that have primarily conventional missions and 

roles.

Second, the sides would have to decide whether to 

take a global or regional approach. While the NATO 

Strategic Concept might be read to imply a regional approach, the transportability of non-strategic nuclear 

warheads argues for global limitations. For example, 

an agreement limiting the number of non-strategic 

nuclear arms in Europe could be readily undercut by 

the ability of the United States to move warheads into 

Europe from bases in the United States and of Russia 

to move them from the Asian part of Russia.

Moreover, U.S. allies in Asia, particularly Japan, 

would object strongly to an agreement that had the 

effect of pushing Russian nuclear weapons out of Europe to Asian sites east of the Ural Mountains, which 

could increase the nuclear risk to them. During the 

INF negotiations in the 1980s, the Japanese government not only insisted that an agreement not increase 

the threat in Asia, it pressed for reductions of Soviet 

INF missiles in Asia proportional to the cuts being negotiated for Soviet INF missiles in Europe (in the end, 
421

the INF Treaty banned all INF missiles, regardless of 

location). Japanese diplomats have already raised this 

point with U.S. and NATO officials, and Washington 

likely will be sensitive to Tokyo’s concern.

Third, any agreement limiting non-strategic nuclear arms would have to include de jure equality of 

limits for the United States and Russia. Any disparity in Russia’s favor in a legally binding treaty would 

not be ratifiable in the U.S. Senate. For its part, Russia 

would likewise insist that it have equal rights with the 

United States.

Fourth, limits on NSNWs would require new 

verification provisions. The verification challenge 

posed by these weapons is that most or all are separated from delivery systems, which as noted above 

the sides would not wish to limit. Counting deployed 

strategic warheads under New START is made easier 

by their association with deployed strategic delivery 

vehicles, such as ICBMs and SLBMs, which can be located using national technical means of verification. 

But monitoring treaty limits on NSNWs would almost 

certainly require the negotiation of measures allowing 

the counting and inspection of nuclear warheads in 

storage facilities. This is not an insoluble problem—

Washington and Moscow have accepted increasingly 

intrusive verification steps over the past 50 years—but 

it would mean breaking new verification ground.

Even with the design of new verification measures, 

there still may be a question regarding monitoring 

confidence. The U.S. military and intelligence community believe that the New START limit on deployed 

strategic warheads can be monitored with high confidence. This stems in large part from the association 

of deployed strategic warheads with deployed strategic delivery vehicles. Absent an “anytime, anywhere” 
422

inspection regime—which neither side likely could 

agree to at present—the sides would have less confidence in their ability to monitor limits on non-strategic 

nuclear warheads, which could be hidden much more 

easily than could ICBMs or SLBMs. 

ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

Confidence-Building Measures.

This chapter breaks down arms control options 

for NSNWs into three categories: confidence-building 

measures, unilateral steps (including parallel unilateral steps), and negotiated legally binding limits of a 

kind suitable for a treaty. Confidence-building measures include transparency steps, demating warheads, 

and relocating and consolidating warhead storage 

sites.

Transparency. Transparency would be one confidence-building measure. National Security Advisor 

Donilon proposed transparency regarding the “numbers, types, and locations” of NSNWs in Europe. An 

April 14, 2011, paper prepared by Poland, Norway, 

Germany, and the Netherlands, and endorsed by 10 

NATO permanent representatives, called additionally 

for transparency regarding the command and control 

arrangements and operational status, concluding:

Initial exchanges on conditions and requirements 

for gradual reductions of tactical nuclear weapons 

in Europe could be initiated as part of the process of 

enhancing transparency. In a first phase it would be 

useful to clarify the number of weapons that have already been eliminated and/or put into storage by the 

U.S. and the Russian Federation as a result of the PNIs 

[presidential nuclear initiatives] of 1991-1992.15
423

Others have also suggested that transparency regarding the implementation of the presidential nuclear initiatives (PNIs) could be a relatively simple initial 

step, since this would require the sharing solely of historical data.16 Some Russian officials have suggested 

in private that transparency would be a logical first 

step on NSNWs.

Greater transparency regarding non-strategic 

weapons could be useful for several reasons. It 

would allow U.S. and Russian officials to shape better informed proposals for any formal negotiation 

and would provide, were a treaty to be concluded, 

the foundation for a data base that would likely be an 

essential element of the agreement. Greater transparency could also give the sides confidence that other 

confidence-building measures or unilateral steps were 

being implemented.

Demating. A second confidence-building measure 

would be for the sides to demate or separate nonstrategic nuclear warheads from delivery systems. Removing the warheads would mean that it would take 

more time for them to be prepared for use. Since this 

may already be the operational practice on both sides, 

such a confidence-building measure would merely 

codify that practice. It could build confidence, though 

the military utility of such a measure would be less to 

the extent that nuclear warheads continued to be colocated on bases with their delivery systems.

Relocation/Consolidation. A third confidence-building measure would be to relocate and consolidate nonstrategic nuclear warheads. In its Strategic Concept, 

NATO called for Russia to move its nuclear weapons 

away from the NATO-Russia border. This appears to 

be a particular concern for the Baltic states, and the 
424

Poles remain wary of past suggestions by Russia that 

it might deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad on the 

northern Polish border. If, as some analysts believe, 

Russia will be reducing the number of its NSNWs, relocation and consolidation might be possible on the 

Russian side. (As noted above, Japan would be concerned about measures that relocated nuclear weapons to sites east of the Urals, but Russia has nuclear 

storage sites in the European part of Russia that are 

well away from NATO member states.) Russia likely 

would not be willing to remove non-strategic (or strategic) warheads from the Kola Peninsula, but ending 

the storage of warheads close to the Baltic states could 

have a useful political impact.

Relocation and consolidation would be a more difficult proposition for the United States and NATO. 

Consolidation of warheads at fewer sites in Europe 

could end U.S. nuclear deployments in one or more 

countries. This could prove problematic for European 

governments: the basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in 

Germany and Belgium, for example, makes it easier 

for the Netherlands to host U.S. nuclear weapons, 

and vice versa. If the weapons were to be withdrawn 

from Germany, political pressure in the Netherlands 

and Belgium for a similar withdrawal would grow. 

U.S. and NATO officials worry that it would not be 

feasible to consolidate the weapons from locations in 

five countries to four because the reduction would not 

stop there—it could go instead from five to two, and 

perhaps to one or zero.

Unilateral Measures. A second set of arms control 

options is unilateral measures, perhaps conducted in 

parallel. Possible unilateral measures include a U.S./

NATO decision to unilaterally withdraw U.S. nuclear 

weapons from Europe, a unilateral no-increase commitment, and parallel unilateral reductions. As an ex-
425

ample of the latter, in 1991 Presidents George H. W. 

Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced their presidential nuclear initiatives, a series of unilateral steps 

that eliminated thousands of nuclear weapons on both 

sides, including dramatic reductions in the two nonstrategic nuclear arsenals.

U.S. Nuclear Withdrawal from Europe. One unilateral 

measure would be for the United States and NATO to 

agree unilaterally to withdraw some number of—but 

not all—B-61 bombs from Europe. Those weapons are 

seen as having virtually no military utility in the context of the full array of nuclear and conventional arms 

maintained by the U.S. military; their primary value 

is political, symbolizing the U.S. security commitment 

to Europe. If the primary rationale for the weapons is 

political, there may be nothing magic about the current number of 200. Indeed, even officials of NATO 

allies that wish a continued nuclear presence see the 

possibility for some reduction.

A more radical unilateral measure would be the 

removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, in 

which case the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent would 

be based on the Asian model, i.e., extended deterrence 

for countries such as Japan and South Korea as provided by U.S. strategic nuclear forces and forward-deployable non-strategic nuclear weapon systems based 

in the United States. Such a move, however, would 

likely encounter opposition from a number of NATO 

allies who, under current circumstances, continue to 

value an American nuclear presence in Europe. It likely would also prove controversial in the U.S. Congress, 

which has expressed doubts about unilateral measures 

and would be sympathetic to views in the Baltic states 

and Central Europe. Moreover, it is unclear at this 

point whether such a unilateral U.S. move would elicit 

a quid pro quo from Russia other than an agreement to 
426

negotiate. While some U.S. officials believe the United 

States should size its overall nuclear arsenal strictly 

according to its calculation of deterrence needs, other 

U.S. officials would not support unilateral withdrawal 

even if deterrence was not degraded, believing that it 

would sacrifice a potential bargaining chip in any future negotiation with the Russians.

No Increase Commitment. A second unilateral measure which the sides might adopt in parallel would 

be a policy of avoiding an increase in the number of 

NSNWs. The United States has no plans for any such 

increase, and Russia presumably has no need to, given its large current arsenal. Such a measure might be 

relatively easy to adopt, but given its minimal practical impact, its political effect or contribution to confidence-building would be small.

A no-increase commitment might be matched 

with a commitment not to modernize non-strategic 

weapons, which would appear to be a more robust 

measure. Any commitments in this regard, however, could be difficult to square with the U.S. B-61 

life-extension program and the Russian practice of 

building new warheads to replace old weapons. It is 

unclear, moreover, how the sides could be sure that 

a no-modernization commitment was being observed. 

Neither likely would be prepared to extend transparency to cover life-extension or production programs 

for nuclear weapons.

Parallel Unilateral Reductions. Another unilateral 

measure would be parallel unilateral reductions, under which the United States and Russia would each 

announce separate policy decisions to reduce its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal, as was done by Presidents 

Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. One such possibility 

would be for Washington and Moscow each to state 

that it would reduce the number of its NSNWs by a 
427

certain percentage, say 50 percent. Given the large 

disparity in U.S. and Russian arsenals, the outcome 

would be unequal and thus not appropriate for incorporation in a formal treaty, but such a measure might 

be a positive interim step.

Negotiated Legally Binding Limits.

Negotiated legally binding limits in a treaty could 

take several forms. The limits might apply just to nonstrategic nuclear warheads, or they might cover nonstrategic warheads along with all nuclear warheads in 

a single group. Other possible limits could constrain 

non-strategic nuclear warheads to declared storage 

sites or to national territory. A more ambitious approach would be to fold U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear warheads into a negotiation that also 

involved conventional forces.

Separate Limit. One approach would be to negotiate 

a limit that applied only to U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear warheads, that is, all nuclear warheads 

except for those captured by the New START Treaty. 

Although this would be the most straight-forward 

way to limit non-strategic warheads, the huge numerical disparity between the U.S. and Russian arsenals—

Russia holds an advantage ranging from four-to-one 

to ten-to-one, depending on how Russian weapons are 

counted—would make negotiation of a de jure equal 

limit very problematic, if not impossible.

Even were Washington and Moscow able to agree 

to an equal limit, the de facto outcome would likely 

generate criticism on one side or the other, if not both. 

For example, a limit of 1,000 non-strategic nuclear 

warheads could produce criticism in the U.S. Congress 

for its codification of a two-to-one Russian advan-
428

tage, since the United States has no plans to increase 

its non-strategic arsenal above 500 warheads. Critics 

in Moscow, on the other hand, would complain that 

the agreement forced only Russian reductions while 

allowing the United States the latitude to double its 

non-strategic arsenal.

Single Limit on All Nuclear Warheads. An alternative 

approach would be to negotiate a single limit covering all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads: deployed 

strategic warheads, nondeployed strategic warheads, 

and non-strategic nuclear warheads, everything in the 

inventory except for those warheads that have been 

retired or are awaiting dismantlement (these might 

be limited under a separate regime). This single limit 

could be combined with a sublimit on the number of 

deployed strategic warheads. For example, the approach could constrain the United States and Russia 

each to no more than 2,500 total nuclear warheads, 

with a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads (the latter would amount to a reduction 

of about 35 percent from New START’s level of 1,550 

deployed strategic warheads).

The primary advantage of this approach is that it 

could create an important bargaining possibility. The 

United States under New START will have a significant advantage in nondeployed strategic warheads, 

and most, if not all, of its ICBMs and SLBMs will have 

been “downloaded,” i.e., they will carry fewer warheads than their capacity. That allows the possibility 

to “upload” or put additional warheads back onto 

the missiles. The Minuteman III ICBM has a capacity of three warheads, but the U.S. Air Force plans to 

deploy each missile with only a single warhead. The 

Trident D-5 SLBM, which can carry as many as eight 

warheads, will have an average load of four-five war-
429

heads. Nondeployed strategic warheads will be stored 

and could, if New START broke down, be returned 

to missiles. The Russians appear to be implementing 

their New START reductions by eliminating missiles; 

the missiles remaining in the force will carry mostly 

full loads and thus could not be uploaded with additional warheads.

This gives the United States a numerical advantage 

in a category of strategic nuclear warheads to offset 

the Russian numerical advantage in non-strategic 

nuclear warheads. Assuming the United States and 

Russia each made full use of its permitted 1,000 deployed strategic warheads under the sublimit, the 

overall limit of 2,500 would allow each to choose its 

preferred mix of nondeployed strategic warheads and 

non-strategic nuclear warheads to make up the additional 1,500 warheads. The U.S. military might prefer 

to keep more nondeployed strategic warheads, while 

the Russian military chose to keep more non-strategic 

nuclear warheads. This approach would create a bargaining opportunity that would not be possible were 

strategic and non-strategic warheads addressed and 

limited separately. While letting each side keep more 

of its preferred warhead type, both would have to reduce their numbers to well below current levels.

Limit to Declared Centralized Storage Sites. Some 

nonofficial Russian experts believe that negotiating a 

numerical limit and associated verification measures 

to apply to non-strategic nuclear warheads would 

be too challenging and time-consuming. They therefore suggest that the sides instead negotiate a regime 

that would limit non-strategic nuclear warheads to 

declared centralized storage sites that would be located at some distance from non-strategic delivery 

systems.17 Verification measures could be applied to 
430

confirm that warheads were not removed from these 

sites and perhaps to confirm the absence of nuclear 

warheads at emptied storage sites, but the measures 

would not seek to confirm the total number of warheads for purposes of a numerical limit in a treaty.

While the separation of non-strategic nuclear warheads from their delivery systems would be a positive 

step, the warheads would continue to exist and constitute a latent nuclear capacity that could augment 

deployed strategic warheads. As noted earlier, it may 

be difficult to reduce the New START limit of 1,550 

deployed strategic warheads without negotiating 

numerical reductions in and limits on the large existing stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear warheads (and 

nondeployed strategic warheads).

Such an approach furthermore would be difficult 

for NATO to implement if the United States continued 

to maintain B-61 bombs in Europe. The locations where 

U.S. nuclear weapons are currently stored reportedly 

are all at military air bases, so an approach limiting 

nuclear warheads to declared centralized storage sites 

would require construction of a new site(s) for holding those weapons. That could prove costly and very 

difficult politically.

Limit to National Territory. Were the United States 

and Russia to get into serious negotiations on NSNWs, 

Moscow almost certainly would insist, as an element 

of any agreement, on a provision requiring that all 

nuclear warheads be based on national territory. That 

would require the removal of U.S. B-61 bombs from 

Europe. The United States should be prepared to consider this in the context of the right treaty. In private 

conversations, U.S. officials do not exclude this as a 

possible outcome, depending on the other elements of the 

agreement. NATO reactions would likely figure heav-
431

ily in Washington’s judgment, and those reactions—

like the reactions of U.S. officials—would be shaped 

by what the Russians in the overall agreement were 

prepared to offer in return.

A variant of this approach would be to require that 

all nuclear warheads be based on national territory 

but allow for their temporary deployment overseas. 

New START offers a precedent: Article IV requires 

that all strategic delivery vehicles be based on national territory with the proviso that heavy bombers 

may deploy temporarily outside of national territory 

with notification to the other side. Assuming that the 

necessary infrastructure was maintained at some European air bases, such a provision in a new agreement 

would allow the theoretical possibility to return U.S. 

non-strategic nuclear warheads to Europe in a crisis, 

which might have some political value for assurance 

within NATO. The notification requirement presumably would pose no problem, since the principal point 

of returning the weapons would be to send a political 

signal regarding U.S. support and the risk of further 

escalation. However, such a scenario might prove implausible politically; most analysts doubt that in such 

a crisis NATO would be able to find consensus on a 

proposed response that would be seen by some allies 

as a risky and provocative move.

Negotiate in Broader Format. Finally, one further negotiated approach for dealing with U.S. and Russian 

non-strategic nuclear warheads would be to fold them 

into broader NATO-Russia or European negotiations 

along with conventional military forces. The logic 

here would be that, to the extent that Moscow believes 

its requirement for non-strategic nuclear warheads is 

driven by its conventional force disadvantages, such 

a negotiation could trade off nuclear reductions for 
432

conventional force cuts. In the Mutual and Balanced 

Force Reduction Talks that preceded the negotiation 

on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 

Treaty, NATO at one point offered to withdraw 1,000 

U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe in return for Soviet removal of a number of tank divisions from Central Europe.

While this approach has some logic, Moscow suspended its observance of the CFE Treaty in early 2008, 

and NATO and Russia have not succeeded in finding 

a way to restore the conventional forces arms control 

regime. The United States and United Kingdom announced in November 2011 that they were suspending certain CFE Treaty obligations with regard to Russia. Dealing with non-strategic nuclear warheads in a 

nuclear arms reduction agreement would be difficult 

enough even without bringing in the added complications raised by conventional force questions.

Negotiating Prospects.

The near-term prospects for addressing non-strategic nuclear warheads, either in a negotiated agreement or parallel unilateral measures, appear limited in 

2012. Moscow is uncertain about next steps in nuclear 

force reductions and, in any event, likely will not take 

dramatic new steps until the Russians know the winner of the November 2012 U.S. presidential election. 

To the extent that the White House worries that arms 

control might become an issue in the U.S. presidential 

campaign, the administration probably will not offer 

major new ideas either.

Should President Obama be reelected, he has already indicated his desire to address non-strategic 

nuclear weapons. The specific view of a possible Re-
433

publican president is less clear at this point. Many 

Republicans appear skeptical of the benefits of negotiated arms control, though one of the primary Republican criticisms of New START was that it did not address NSNWs.

On the Russian side, there may well be incentives 

in the medium term for negotiations on non-strategic 

nuclear arsenals. Under New START, the U.S. military will have little difficulty maintaining its full allotments of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles 

and 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. According to 

the September 2011 New START data exchange, Russia is already well below the 700 limit, with just 516 

deployed strategic delivery vehicles. Some analysts 

have predicted that Russian deployed strategic delivery vehicles will fall to as low as 400, with only 1,250-

1,350 deployed strategic warheads.18 Alexei Arbatov 

believes the warheads could fall to as low as 1,000-

1,100.19 This situation could lead Moscow to decide to 

build back up to its New START limits. Alternatively, 

the Russians could seek to negotiate the limits down. 

Russian officials are also concerned about the U.S. advantage in nondeployed strategic warheads and upload capacity. These questions give U.S. negotiators 

leverage that—along with Moscow’s desire to see U.S. 

NSNWs withdrawn from Europe—could be used to 

get Russia to reduce its overly large stock of non-strategic nuclear arms.

U.S. officials hope to hold increasingly substantive consultations with their Russian counterparts in 

2012, which might prepare the ground for more serious engagement. But formal proposals and structured 

negotiations that might include non-strategic nuclear 

weapons likely will not get underway until sometime 

in 2013 at the earliest.
434

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 19

1. The Russian presidential nuclear initiatives in 1991 included elimination of all ground-launched tactical warheads, but 

there have been questions as to whether some of these warheads 

may remain in the Russian inventory.

2. There is no agreed terminology between the United States 

and Russia on categorizing these weapons.

3. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Russian Nuclear 

Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 

2011, pp. 71-73.

4. Hans M. Kristensen, “B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear 

Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 15, 2011, available from www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/06/

b61-12.php. 

5. It is unclear whether the Russian Iskandr surface-to-surface 

missile has a nuclear warhead.

6. Kristensen and Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2011.”

7. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 1, January 2011, pp. 64-73.

8. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama 

and President Medvedev of Russia at New START Treaty Signing 

Ceremony and Press Conference, Prague,” Washington, DC: The 

White House, April 8, 2010.

9. Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President, “The Prague Agenda: 

The Road Ahead,” Washington, DC: The White House, Carnegie 

International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 29, 2011.
435

10. “Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the 

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” adopted by 

Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, Portugal, November 

19, 2010.

11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 

Information and Press Department, “Statement by Mr. Sergey 

Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 

at the Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland, March 1, 2011,” available from www.In.mid.ru/

bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2de66a92e764

dbb8c3257846004dfd44!OpenDocument. 

12. Conversations with senior Russian officials in Moscow 

and Washington, May and August 2011.

13. For a more detailed discussion of how Russian conventional force weaknesses may shape their views on nuclear forces, 

see Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Military Weakness and Substrategic Nuclear Policy,” Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

Foreign Military Studies Office.

14. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” approved by Russian Presidential Edict on February 5, 2010.

15. “Non-Paper submitted by Poland, Norway, Germany, 

and the Netherlands on Increasing Transparency and Confidence 

with Regard to Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” April 14, 

2011.

16. See Madeleine Albright and Igor Ivanov, “Moving Ahead 

on Reducing Nuclear Arms,” International Herald Tribune, April 7, 

2011.

17. See, for example, Alexei Arbatov, “Gambit or Endgame: 

The New State of Arms Control,” The Carnegie Papers, Moscow, 

Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, March 2011, pp. 31-33; and 

Anatoliy S. Diakov, “Verified Reductions in Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Moscow, Russia: Center for Arms Control, Energy 

and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute for Physics and 

Technology, February 18, 2011, available from www.armscontrol.

ru/. 
436

18. See, for example, Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear 

Forces, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” available from www.

russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml. 

19. Alexei Arbatov, “Gambit or Endgame,” pp. 13-14.
437

CHAPTER 20

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO:

A CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL 

PERSPECTIVE

Dorn Crawford

Discussion about nuclear weapons in the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) necessarily occurs on a European landscape. This puts the conversation in sharp contrast to the customary context of 

nuclear arms control: a dialogue between two global 

superpowers on how best to manage, and perhaps 

limit, their inventories of strategic weaponry, and 

thus reduce the risks of mutual destruction. Traditional frames of reference, terminologies, matters of scale, 

planning factors, and force structure issues do not 

make an easy transition to the theater environment.

The conventional arms control experience, on the 

other hand, arises primarily out of the European security dialogue. In contrast to the above, this body of 

work focuses on objectives and issues of a multilateral 

and regional character, and thus deserves consultation as a potential source of insights on how security 

concerns have been addressed in this context.

Tactical (or theater, or non-strategic) nuclear weapons (TNWs) have often been observed as constituting 

an essential rung in the escalation ladder between 

conventional and strategic nuclear forces. If that is 

the case, it is fair to contemplate the relative merits of 

treating their discussion either as a strategic nuclear 

topic stepped down, or as a theater conventional topic 

stepped up—with the truth, as usual, probably lying 

somewhere in between. The present effort offers a 
438

brief overview of current themes of conventional arms 

control, seeking threads that may inform our perspective.

OBJECTIVES

The most prominent products of the European 

conventional arms control effort—the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Vienna 

Document on Confidence- and Security-Building 

Measures (VDoc), and the Open Skies Treaty—all 

have as their fundamental premise the obligation to 

refrain from the threat or use of force in the mutual 

relations of the parties. Each has evolved in its own 

way to meet the changing needs of the post-Cold War 

security environment. The essential steps: build on 

maturing political relationships; apply new technology; and incorporate lessons learned and document 

best practices.

Perhaps because it represents the “hard arms control” end of the spectrum, with legally binding limits 

on holdings and robust verification measures—and, 

not coincidentally, is at the greatest present risk of 

unraveling—the CFE regime has probably undergone 

the most extensive conceptual retooling of the lot. The 

original objectives expressed in its mandate were of 

Cold War vintage: 

• establish a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels;

• eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and 

security; and,

• eliminate the capability for launching surprise 

attack and initiating large-scale offensive action.1
439

Most of the attempted adaptation and further 

elaboration of the CFE construct has represented a 

struggle to morph from its bloc-to-bloc origins to a 

truly multilateral character, in which imbalances and 

disparities are Sisyphean realities that can never be 

absolutely resolved but only continuously managed 

by collaborative effort. 

The VDoc has emerged in some thinking as an 

azimuth for future conventional arms control efforts, 

with its principal orientation on military activities 

rather than military equipment holdings. Like CFE, 

the VDoc includes an extensive annual exchange 

of military information. But while CFE seeks to account for the entire military force structure (including 

higher headquarters, combat service support units, 

storage and maintenance depots, training establishments, airfields, and any other organization or facility holding, or likely to hold, equipment subject to the 

Treaty), VDoc focuses on field formations and combat 

units. By the same token, CFE verification provisions 

aim principally at intrusively inspecting military garrisons and their occupants; VDoc, while including 

limited opportunities to “evaluate” units in peacetime 

locations, has prominent components for inspection 

and observation of specified military activities in the 

field—and requirements to provide advance notification of such activities to other parties.

The Open Skies Treaty, while oriented on neither 

military facilities nor activities per se, still provides 

additional opportunities to observe such facilities 

and activities through the conduct of quota-based 

overflights of treaty parties’ territories with sensorequipped aircraft.
440

It seems fair to observe that whereas CFE’s main 

aim is limitation, and verification of compliance with 

limits, VDoc and Open Skies instead emphasize transparency and predictability. The distinction is important—although similarities in the mechanics of the 

regimes, particularly between CFE and VDoc, have 

sometimes served to inhibit rather than promote the 

further development of one or the other. In the early 

days of their implementation, for example, the specter 

of “harmonization” was an all-too-convenient bogeyman for keeping a bright line between the two—not 

least by the couple of dozen participants in VDoc who 

are not party to CFE. In turn, after CFE adaptation became mired in unfulfilled Istanbul commitments, circa 

2002, and particularly after Russia’s 2007 “suspension” 

of its fulfillment of Treaty obligations, prospects for 

enhancing the VDoc regime were repeatedly derailed 

by fears of making it a substitute for CFE. Conversely, 

after the United States and most other Treaty parties 

took reciprocal CFE measures against Russia in late 

2011, Russian officials prominently pronounced their 

satisfaction with relying on VDoc instead.

There may indeed be some fungibility at work here; 

but collateral efforts to revive CFE, on the one hand, 

and enhance VDoc and Open Skies, on the other, suggest that more fundamental environmental shifts may 

be in play as well. Some hypotheses derived from observing these processes:

• For a variety of reasons, standing force levels 

have declined so much that limits may be less 

important in enhancing security.

• Doctrine and force structure have changed 

enough that, even if legal limits remain useful, 

holdings of heavy equipment may not be the 
441

right metric (and things are still enough in flux 

to leave uncertainty about what is).

• Economic and budgetary constraints are playing an increasingly prominent role in planning—not just in force sizing, but in development and implementation of arms control 

measures themselves as well (i.e., not just arms 

on the cheap, but arms control on the cheap).

In this environment, some general objectives can 

be discerned from contemporary efforts to update the 

conceptual model for conventional arms control:

1. Promote European and regional security by 

building confidence and reducing uncertainty.

• In a post-bloc environment, building confidence is principally a function of knowing the 

character and limits of others’ forces. There 

being no formal “balance” to be struck, actors 

acquire confidence from the stability and predictability resulting from an agreed system of 

limitations (of some sort), and seek what other 

security arrangements they find necessary beyond the arms control regime itself.

• Uncertainty is reduced by obtaining detailed 

information on the disposition of others’ forces, 

both static and dynamic, and conducting visits, 

evaluations, and inspections to verify the information supplied.

2. Maintain operational flexibility and operational 

security.

• Given the continuing flux of force structure, 

doctrine, and technology, parties will tend to 

resist any obligations or constraints that may 
442

turn out to be inconsistent with military requirements.

• States must sustain both unitary sovereign commitments to territorial defense, and, at least for 

NATO Allies, collective commitments.

• NATO members and aspirants must be prepared to field credible forces to meet out-ofarea contingencies.

3. Reduce costs in an environment of increasing fiscal 

austerity.

• Parties are compelled economically to seek and 

sustain minimum levels of forces to meet legitimate defense needs.

• Resources will be difficult to find for new or 

more robust arms control implementation measures unless they can demonstrate a compelling 

security payoff.

Many readers may be surprised by the absence

from the foregoing list of the following objective: “Establish a secure and stable balance of conventional 

armed forces.” This was such a dominant theme of the 

original CFE negotiation that it is still heard from time 

to time, despite its manifestly Cold War formula for 

literally balanced opposing forces. But with the notion of such a “balance” amounting to a mathematical 

equation with no feasible contemporary solution, it 

seems clear that future successes in conventional arms 

control efforts will depend heavily on a final passage 

from the scene of the mindset behind this term.

KEY ISSUES

How might the three broad objectives inform discussion of the disposition of non-strategic nuclear 
443

weapons (NSNWs)? A look at the key issues that have 

helped shape these objectives may provide some insights.

Military Issues.

Modernization. Several components of this issue 

have helped define the course of the conventional 

arms control experience.

• New Systems. To the extent an arms control 

agreement enumerates the specific types and 

models of weapon systems it addresses, its viability depends heavily on the means it provides 

to incorporate changes over time. This has 

proven a major detriment to the operation of 

the CFE Treaty, which limits five major categories of equipment (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, attack helicopters, 

and combat aircraft), and lists what specific 

types and models are included in each category 

in a “Protocol on Existing Types.” This Protocol was meant to be updated regularly and routinely as the parties declared the introduction 

of new types into their inventories—but quickly bogged down in disputes over types an inspecting party observed in the field and judged 

should be listed, while the owning party had 

elected not to declare it based on its own judgment of Treaty definitions. The Treaty provides 

no means to resolve such disputes other than by 

consultation; consequently, despite mammoth 

investments of time and effort by the interlocutors, the Protocol has been updated only once, 

provisionally, over the entire life of the Treaty. 

The VDoc contains no such enumeration, but is 
444

widely understood to rely on CFE definitions 

and types for its inventory, and has thus been 

indirectly impacted as well. This is a pitfall to 

be avoided in future constructs if at all possible.

• New Categories. At the next level of generality, prospects of new systems entering service 

that do not fit comfortably into categories of 

equipment addressed by a conventional arms 

control regime are not easily anticipated. The 

CFE Treaty would require formal amendment, 

and the VDoc a corresponding change in its 

provisions, to accommodate developments like 

aerial drones, now commonly held by many of 

the parties, that would be awkward to classify 

in an existing category.

• Pace of Change. Obviously it is difficult to conclude an agreement on matters in flux, though 

on balance the CFE Treaty and VDoc were remarkably successful in doing so at the end of 

the Cold War. Still, with reducing uncertainty 

and enhancing predictability at the forefront of 

arms control goals, anticipation of and accommodations to change must feature prominently 

in the development of any NSNW agreement.

Arms control dialogue has seldom progressed far 

without entertaining questions of “quality vs. quantity” in determining the metrics of an agreement, including closely associated counting rules. Discussions 

underpinning conventional forces talks have touched 

on issues of force structure, doctrine, and equipment 

differences that can be striking among negotiating 

parties. Nevertheless, no weighting formula to score 

the potency of one model of weapons system over 

another, or of one category of equipment against an-
445

other, has ever gained serious consideration in this 

dialogue, conventional or nuclear. In the end, a tank 

is a tank, and a warhead is a warhead, and counting 

rules for limitation and verification have had to proceed on that basis.

Are numerical limits meaningful? Is there an alternative? The persistence of questions like these testifies 

to the enduring concerns of participants that qualitative factors may increasingly outweigh quantitative ones in threatening stability and security. While 

NSNWs may not presently appear to be a hotbed of 

technological innovation, it would be wise to consider 

prospective developments in weighing the parameters of any agreement.

Mobilization. What roles do reserve forces and 

equipment stockpiles play in contemporary planning 

and operations, and how have they changed for the 

key players? Cold War scenarios for European conventional conflict relied heavily on assumptions about 

fleshing out, equipping, arming, and moving lowstrength Soviet units, on the one hand, and redeployment of U.S.-based units, while drawing equipment 

from forward storage depots, on the other. By contrast, while scenarios like these have faded from the 

conventional scene, NSNW cases still rely on storage 

considerations, but on grounds of safety and security 

rather than mobilization. Can demating of NSNW systems perform a role similar to conventional storage in 

inhibiting potential for surprise attack? Conversely, to 

the extent that familiar themes of nuclear deterrence 

like survivability and retaliatory capacity still apply, 

deliberate storage measures, and especially transparency of the locations involved, may prove very difficult to achieve.
446

Mobility. Are modern forces sufficiently mobile 

as to render territorial constraints no longer appropriate? This is an increasingly compelling question 

in the case of modern conventional maneuver forces 

whose mobility is fundamental to contingency missions for which distance and duration may be hard 

to predict. For NSNWs that are air-delivered, mobility 

is primarily a function of the demating/storage provisions outlined above; once reconstituted, territorial 

constraints/locations of these highly mobile assets 

seem to have little practical consequence, though the 

signaling effect of basing schemes oriented on specific 

intent and concrete threat assessment may have political significance. Ground- and sea-launched systems 

similarly oriented on updated threats and deterrence 

calculations would share such import, of course, but 

also add practical utility to the retaliatory threat they 

would represent.

Political Issues.

Defense needs: What’s the threat? As noted above, a 

central challenge to the adaptation and further elaboration of the CFE construct has been overcoming the 

bloc-to-bloc context in which it originated. A fundamental retooling was achieved in the adapted CFE 

Treaty, formulated in strict terms of individual national and territorial constraints and flexibilities. Still, 

concerns about “imbalances,” usually between Russia 

and NATO, continue to be heard—most often, but by 

no means exclusively, from Russian representatives.

With no similar adaptive mechanism in play, discussions of NSNWs almost always take this cast, as 

if the only measure of merit is the numerical balance 

between NATO and Russia (with apologies to those 
447

who occasionally address other theaters that may be 

of interest to the United States). This perspective and 

its underlying threat assessment yield little room for 

forward thinking about current and projected military 

requirements. 

Is there a credible case to be made for NSNWs 

that does not rely on a Cold War, East-West calculus? 

Certainly the efforts expended on Mideast scenarios 

to urge the fielding of a European theater missile defense system (and, for that matter, NATO out-of-area 

conventional operations) suggest that there should be 

such a case, provided only that a retaliatory component remains an essential element of a robust deterrence strategy. If so, we should be recasting our conversation about the continuing role of these weapons 

in these terms; if not, we should be seeking expedient 

means to reduce or eliminate them.

By the same token, we can and should reject Russian arguments that co-opt the onetime NATO posture of using NSNWs to compensate for conventional 

disadvantage. As amusing as such arguments are for 

their irony, they rely on the same fundamental premise of escalation from a massive NATO conventional 

attack that we have already dismissed in conventional 

arms control forums, as much for its laughability as 

for its quaintness.

Sovereignty.

What rules and limits should apply to the stationing 

of forces outside national territory? Inside? Complementary issues of what constraints are appropriate on 

where forces may be located have occupied much of 

the conventional arms control dialogue. On the one 

hand, the principle of inhibiting threatening concen-
448

trations of forces led to the original CFE Treaty’s geographic structure of limitation, to the adapted Treaty’s 

national and territorial construct, and to the VDoc’s 

thresholds for notifying and observing, and its constraints on conducting military activities—including 

stationing and activities within national territory. On 

the other hand, basic principles of honoring national 

sovereignty were embedded in the CFE Treaty, and 

reinforced in its Adaptation Agreement, in the form of 

requiring formal host nation consent for the stationing 

of forces outside national territory.

In the first instance, the parties have accepted 

limits on their own sovereignty by adopting ceilings 

on the amounts of forces they may hold in the area 

of application, and, derivatively, where those forces 

may be located, by zone or territory. In a couple of 

cases of disproportionately large geography and force 

size (i.e., Russia and Ukraine), zonal and territorial 

boundaries cut across national boundaries to establish 

further sublimits on force concentration in sensitive 

areas. Enter the enduring “flank” debate, whereby 

Russia has perennially chafed at these sublimits as an 

infringement on its sovereignty—which of course it is, 

like all the other provisions of the Treaty (and treaties 

in general)—hence the need for its agreement, signature, and ratification. Nevertheless, the debate goes 

on, and has loomed large in Russia’s “suspension” of 

its CFE obligations since December 2007.

Looming even larger, in the second instance, is the 

issue of host nation consent, hung up on the residual 

Russian presence in Georgia and Moldova, which 

combined with the flank issue essentially to derail the 

CFE Adaptation Agreement, resulting eventually in 

Russia “suspending” its participation, and in turn the 

reciprocal countermeasures recently undertaken by 
449

most of the other parties. Russia’s 2008 incursion into 

Georgia, and subsequent stationing of forces in the 

breakaway provinces it has recognized as sovereign 

entities, have set very difficult roadblocks in the way 

of resolving this issue.

Analogous concerns could arise in discussing the 

disposition of NSNWs, with NATO members’ present 

hosting of warhead storage sites a matter of both escalation guarantee and burden-sharing. In Russia, the 

principle of sovereign prerogative could again complicate efforts to arrange provisions for an unfocused 

withdrawal of forces within national territory. The notion of reorienting these forces on an updated threat, 

however, following the missile defense scenario, could 

give some shape and motive force to this prospect in 

both cases—and help guide not only location decisions, but revised (presumably reduced) requirements 

for holdings of NSNW assets as well.

Frozen Conflicts.

What can arms control regimes do to dampen, manage, 

or resolve persistent regional tensions? For most of the 

life of the CFE Treaty, interlocutors have struggled 

to find mechanisms to address the concerns of parties to these regional tensions, reinforcing principles 

of national sovereignty and the legitimacy of its monopoly of force, delegitimizing weaponry controlled 

by nongovernmental groups or outside parties, and 

exhorting governments to assert control of such assets, usually given the rubric “UTLE” (unaccounted, 

or uncontrolled, Treaty-limited equipment). There is 

little evidence to suggest that these efforts have borne 

much fruit in the Caucasus or Moldova, aside from 

continuing to draw attention to their problems.
450

By the same token, an NSNW regime is unlikely 

to play a significant role here, unless by the indirect 

route of stationing in these areas forces or facilities 

whose own security needs may increase the urgency 

of resolving regional tensions (e.g., the Gabala radar 

array in Azerbaijan as a potential component of a cooperative missile defense system).

Role of Alliances.

How do alliance relationships affect treaty participation? The CFE Treaty very carefully and purposefully 

reiterates the rights of the parties “to be or not to be” 

members of alliances. Obviously this has not kept 

NATO from being judged by its collective holdings 

as a source of security concerns (or reassurances) by 

those still determined to seek a “balance” of European 

forces. Indeed, the slowness of NATO to undertake 

major reductions in its collective CFE equipment ceilings was a prominent reason offered by the Russians 

as motivating their “suspension” of Treaty participation.

As noted earlier, this perspective seems even more 

prominent in the NSNW dialogue, which seldom escapes a NATO/Russia orientation. Refocusing threat 

assumptions to follow contemporary theater missile 

defense scenarios seems, once again, the appropriate 

and consistent course correction.

The “Reset.”

How can arms control promote Russia dialogue and 

integration? Its troubles notwithstanding, CFE, not to 

mention VDoc and Open Skies, has provided a regular and intensive venue for dialogue and discussion of 
451

security concerns and prospects for cooperation. One 

step the Russians conspicuously did not take in the 

course of their CFE “suspension” was to discontinue 

participation in the Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group, 

which meets weekly in Vienna to discuss Treaty-related concerns and seek solutions. Analogous bodies 

associated with VDoc and Open Skies provide similar 

consultative venues. The verification centers that conduct implementation activities for all three regimes 

foster extensive working-level contacts and dialogue 

as well.

These are all standard mechanisms associated with 

arms control agreements, so it is reasonable to assume 

than an NSNW accommodation would include similar provisions for implementation and consultation. 

Not drivers of the “reset,” to be sure, but vehicles to 

exploit and facilitate it. 

THREADS, SEAMS, AND GAPS

Overlaying a conventional arms control template on a dialogue about the role and disposition of 

NSNWs is an exercise in exploring potential threads 

of continuity and discontinuity, and considering lessons and leverages that might improve prospects for 

a successful outcome. From this perspective, a number of influences seem apparent. What happens with 

NSNWs has a:

• Substitution effect. The roots of NSNWs have 

commonly been traced to efforts to overcome 

deficits in conventional forces—initially by 

NATO, more recently by Russia. In an environment of mounting fiscal constraints and fragile 

economies, this logic may seem, if anything, to 

be growing in force. Certainly there is the risk 
452

of old arguments about “defense on the cheap” 

reasserting themselves in these conditions. But 

in the end, the existing question remains the 

same: what deficit needs to be compensated 

for? If the only measure of merit is to strike a 

“balance” between Russia and NATO, then 

perhaps (1) rumors of the demise of the Cold 

War were premature, and (2) our fiscal situation 

is not so dire after all. Even more importantly, 

given the resources already being applied to a 

revised threat assessment in the form of a European missile defense system, it certainly seems 

appropriate to apply forces already in the field 

to the same end.

• Collateral effect. Components of defense strategy seem to work best when consistent and complementary. U.S. conventional forces have long 

since been reoriented from a focus on a heavy 

central European campaign to flexible contingencies in the Mideast, Southwest or Northeast 

Asia, or elsewhere. A ballistic missile defense 

initiative at the center of present European collaborative defense efforts aims to counter prospective Mideast threats. If such core concepts 

as the continuity of the deterrence escalation 

ladder continue to apply, then a corresponding 

reorientation of NSNW assets to align with the 

strategy underpinning these conventional and 

missile-defense initiatives certainly seems an 

appropriate next (if not antecedent) step.

• Spillover effect. It is a well-worn diplomatic 

principle that arms control (and other diplomatic) successes can generate momentum in related deliberations. They may sometimes supply direct or indirect trade-offs to help balance 
453

objectives and outcomes—or simply improve 

the atmosphere for dialogue. Conversely, 

failures, or just a lack of successes, can weigh 

heavily on prospects elsewhere. This is little 

more than an application to social dynamics of 

Newton’s first law (a body at rest tends to stay 

at rest, while a body in motion tends to stay 

in motion). In the most recent case, efforts to 

capitalize on the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) have 

been openly and undisguisedly applied to the 

CFE impasse—though without apparent effect 

to date. The Senate’s conditions for ratification 

of New START instruct a similar derivative 

effort in controlling NSNWs—which, having 

arguably suffered more from inattention than 

disagreement, may be more fertile ground, at 

least for now. And, as the intermediate rung 

on the deterrence ladder, there may be some 

appeal in the logic of addressing it first, in the 

course of advancing more vigorously from the 

successful strategic nuclear case to the deadlocked conventional one. Obviously other political considerations (like election cycles) may 

affect specific timing, but a road map remains 

in order.

CONCLUSIONS

A conventional arms control perspective offers a 

number of implications for approaches to the issue of 

NSNWs in NATO. The most salient (and urgent) of 

these seems to be an updated threat assessment for 

NSNW planning, providing a logical model for both 
454

deployment and force-sizing. Such an assessment 

could:

• promote consistency and complementarity in 

defense strategies, assuming such an assessment would conform to those already in use for 

planning conventional forces and theater missile defenses;

• through a joint reorientation of NSNWs by 

NATO and Russia, even if undertaken as parallel unilateral measures, pave the way for improved collaboration on missile defense;

• reduce costs, not by substitution of NSNWs for 

conventional forces, but by a coherent reassessment to determine minimum needs; and,

• set the stage for generating renewed momentum in related areas of security concern like 

CFE and VDoc.

As timing and tactics permit, considerations like 

these may be of use in charting the way ahead in a 

complex and difficult post-Cold War setting.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 20

1. ”Mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe,” Agreement by the representatives of the 23 

negotiating states, initialed in Vienna, Austria, January 10, 1989.
455

CHAPTER 21

ARMS CONTROL AFTER START

Malcolm Chalmers

Since the end of the Cold War, with little political controversy, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons 

in Europe has been reduced by 95 percent. This trend 

might have continued further. But political controversy has ensured that it has now been brought, at least 

temporarily, to a halt. The renewed focus on nuclear 

disarmament signaled in President Barack Obama’s 

Prague speech on April 5, 2009, followed in October 

2009 by the formation of a new German government 

committed to removal of nuclear weapons from its 

territory, provided encouragement for disarmament 

advocates throughout Europe, while raising alarms 

among supporters of the nuclear status quo. Old and 

familiar arguments seemingly forgotten after the end 

of the Cold War were dusted off. Countless conferences and seminars were initiated. After years of absence 

from the agenda, nuclear issues began to be debated 

once more at senior levels of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Alliance. 

The basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe does 

not excite the public passion of the 1980s, on either side 

of the debate. But echoes of that time remain apparent within the political elite of many NATO member 

states. They are particularly evident in those countries 

that were on NATO’s front line facing the Warsaw 

Pact in the 1980s, but were also at the forefront of public protest against new NATO nuclear deployments. 

Opposition to nuclear deployments has remained an 

important element in their domestic politics, even as 
456

the previous rationale for deployment—the need to 

counter the Soviet Army deployed in the heart of Germany—has long since disappeared. 

As in the 1980s, insistence on withdrawal of U.S. 

nuclear forces on European territory is not driven primarily by a belief in the likelihood of reciprocation, 

either by Russia or by non-nuclear nonaligned states. 

Rather, it is rooted in a belief that nuclear weapons 

are inherently distasteful and dangerous, and are, at 

best, a temporary necessity when faced by evident 

and immediate threats. The lack of any openly-argued 

operational role for these weapons is, from this point 

of view, a clear argument for their withdrawal. In 

contrast to those who point to the importance of U.S. 

nuclear weapons in Europe as symbols of transatlantic burden-sharing and reassurance, these critics put 

more emphasis on the symbolic importance of demonstrating NATO’s commitment to disarmament. 

In the absence of major new threats to European security, and in light of the opposition to continuing nuclear deployment in key hosting countries, it appears 

likely that these weapons will have to be withdrawn 

at some stage over the next decade or so. But this will 

not happen without a fight. Supporters of the existing 

arrangements have been vocal in expressing concern 

that nuclear withdrawal could undermine the credibility of NATO’s commitment to nuclear deterrence 

more generally, and would be especially damaging 

if carried out without substantial reciprocation from 

Russia. They view anti-nuclear feelings in Germany, 

in particular, as part of a broader European reluctance 

to share security burdens that, in their view, are being 

borne disproportionately by the United States. They 

have powerful allies in NATO’s new member states 

(especially in the Baltic republics) who view nuclear 
457

withdrawal as part of a wider disengagement trend 

that could undermine the credibility of NATO’s collective defense commitments. Their concerns are also 

shared by France, which has been consistently sceptical of the Obama administration’s commitment to 

global nuclear disarmament. 

As this debate continues, the primary concern of 

most NATO member states has been to find a consensus on this contentious issue in order to be able to focus on other risks—the problems in Afghanistan, the 

uncertainties in the Arab world, the security implications of the financial crisis—that are of more pressing 

concern to the Alliance. The central theme that has 

emerged from these efforts at consensus-building—

and was reflected in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept—

has been the desirability of finding ways in which 

the future of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe can be 

addressed as part of a process of mutual reductions 

with Russia. Those governments that would prefer the 

removal of these weapons are, at least for now, willing to explore whether it is possible to get something 

from Russia in return. And those who support their 

continuing presence view the commitment to reciprocation as a way to head off the prospect of further 

unilateral reductions.

With key basing countries reluctant to commit to 

hosting U.S. weapons in the longer term, there are 

questions about how much can realistically be obtained from Russia in return for their removal. As long 

as confrontation with the United States and NATO is 

seen to be fulfilling a useful domestic political role, 

Russia’s government may be unwilling to enter into 

any new agreement—whether on nuclear arms control 

or on missile defense cooperation—that would signal 

a reduction in this tension. As long as Russia sees it as 
458

in its interest for NATO to be divided on this question, 

moreover, it may be less inclined to agree to a process 

that would allow the Alliance to unite around a new 

approach. 

Recent political unrest in Russia, however, suggests that it may be too soon for NATO to abandon 

the search for accommodation. A now reelected, but 

weakened, President Vladimir Putin might come to be 

convinced—perhaps in response to growing economic 

weakness—that it was in Russia’s interests to resume 

and deepen the “reset” process. If he does so decide, 

a renewed attempt to achieve mutual reductions in 

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) might not be 

a bad place to start. 

It might be easier to achieve agreement on NSNW 

reciprocation than on missile defense, the primary focus of NATO/Russia efforts over the last year. NATO 

Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is right to 

believe that agreement on missile defense cooperation 

would be a “game-changer,” opening up the path to a 

fundamental restructuring of relations between Russia and the Alliance.1

 But, precisely because this is the 

case, such an agreement would also have to involve 

some fundamental changes in strategic approach by 

both Russia and the United States, the conditions for 

which may not yet exist. Russia is still very reluctant 

to agree on a cooperative approach that could give political legitimacy to the wider U.S. missile defense program, fearing that this would hasten the day in which 

its own strategic missile force came under threat. The 

United States, for its part, is unwilling to provide binding assurances that it will not develop missile defense 

capabilities that could threaten Russia’s long-range 

missiles. Even if the current administration were to 

do so, Russia could not be confident (given its expe-
459

rience with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty) 

that future administrations would abide by such a 

commitment. It is precisely because missile defenses 

are believed—by many in both the United States and 

Russia—to have the long-term potential to change the 

future strategic balance that agreement to cooperate in 

their operation is so difficult. 

In the case of NSNWs, by contrast, the technical 

characteristics of the systems in question are wellknown and unlikely to change fundamentally. Support for Russian NSNW deployment is reported to 

be strong in the Russian Navy, which relies on TNWs 

to offset U.S. naval superiority and defend its strategic missile submarines. Like NATO in the Cold War, 

moreover, Russia believes that it may need a significant 

sub-strategic arsenal in order to offset the weakness of 

its conventional forces in the event of an invasion. But, 

as in NATO, Russian air and ground forces may be 

increasingly reluctant to devote substantial resources 

to maintaining an asset that cannot be used in more 

limited conflicts. Moreover, in contrast to NATO, the 

very size of Russia’s arsenal—estimated at several 

thousand—should permit significant reductions to be 

made before reaching whatever minimum force levels its services now believe are needed. On the other 

hand, the heightening of the political saliency of these 

weapons within NATO may have made it harder for 

Russia to make unilateral reductions in its own forces 

without an expectation of getting something in return.

BROADENING START

Serious progress in efforts to make reciprocal 

NSNW reductions will depend on there being political 

circumstances, in both Russia and the United States, 

which favor such a process. If such conditions were 
460

to develop, however, the form in which reciprocal reduction was pursued would be critical in determining 

whether progress could be realized. There are, broadly speaking, two possible ways forward: inclusion of 

NSNWs in treaty-based arms reductions, or reciprocal 

reductions outside a treaty framework. 

The main proposal currently being discussed under the first heading is for the next round of bilateral 

arms reductions to include limits on the total warhead 

stockpiles of both Russia and the United States. All 

nuclear weapons, it is now being argued, are “strategic” in their effects. NSNWs should therefore be included in any future agreement to reduce stockpiles. 

One of the advantages of this approach is that it 

provides a way to address the problem of negotiating 

reductions in NSNWs when there is a large numerical 

disparity between U.S. and Russia forces in this category. Within an overall ceiling, the United States and 

Russia could separately decide the mix of weapon systems that they chose to maintain. Russia might decide, 

for example, to maintain more short-range NSNW 

warheads. The United States, by contrast, might prefer to keep a greater capability to “upload” its strategic missiles or bombers. Such an approach, since it 

would set global limits, would also avoid the adverse 

reaction from America’s Asian allies that could be anticipated were an attempt made to limit the scope of 

any new treaty to U.S. and Russian NSNW arsenals 

in Europe. Both Russia and the United States would 

still retain the option of shifting nuclear forces from 

Europe to Asia. But they would not be given a treatybased incentive to do so. 

There are, however, some drawbacks to the allinclusive treaty approach. First, it would mark an important dilution of the attention hitherto given to the 
461

strengthening of first-strike stability as an objective of 

strategic arms control. Like previous bilateral nuclear 

treaties, the main focus of the New START is the limitation of ballistic missiles and warheads deployed on 

these missiles. Because of this concern, the Treaty undercounts warheads deployed on strategic bombers, 

each of which is assumed (for treaty purposes) to be 

deployed with only a single warhead. This asymmetry in counting rules makes sense if one’s objective is 

to focus restrictions on those systems—ballistic missiles—that are most suited to a disarming first strike. 

Were a successor treaty to focus on total warhead 

numbers, however, one stockpiled nuclear artillery 

shell would count as much as one warhead deployed 

on a long-range missile. This may make sense from a 

U.S. point of view. Given trends in Russian forces, together with the relative invulnerability of U.S. ballistic 

missile submarines, the United States can be relatively 

comfortable about its forces’ ability to survive a first 

strike, even at much lower numbers. But Russian decisionmakers may be less sanguine, especially when 

account is also taken of growing U.S. conventional 

capabilities for long-range strike and ballistic missile 

defense. 

Second, the assumption that NSNWs would be included in a legally binding treaty brings other problems. It is possible that the next few years could see 

some mutual reductions in the systems limited by the 

New START Treaty, with budgetary pressures providing an incentive for reductions in missile numbers 

in particular. In return for a further round of legally 

binding reductions in offensive forces, however, Russia seems certain to seek assurances on future U.S. deployments of strategic missile defense systems. Yet it 

is difficult to imagine the U.S. Senate being willing to 
462

ratify a treaty that would place legally binding limitations on U.S. missile defenses. Nor does it currently 

appear likely that U.S. technology development will 

be at such a slow pace that Russia will no longer need 

to worry about where this might lead by the 2020s. 

Third, even if the issue of missile defenses can be 

resolved, the proposal that New START’s successor 

treaty should include limits on warhead stockpiles 

will involve formidable verification challenges. One 

of the main reasons why the current Treaty limits only 

numbers of missiles and deployed warheads is that it 

is possible to verify declared numbers of these systems 

with a high degree of assurance. But no techniques are 

available to provide a comparable degree of assurance 

for declarations of stockpiled warheads. A more limited level of confidence can be provided through mutual declarations on numbers of warheads stored (or 

at least based) at designated storage sites, with some 

attached inspection procedures. But it is likely to take 

significant effort to develop these procedures in ways 

that do not compromise warhead design information. 

And neither party to a treaty can be sure that the other 

does not have additional, undeclared, warheads in 

storage. 

FALLING TOGETHER, BUT SEPARATELY

There is therefore a considerable potential for 

deadlock involved if NATO’s leaders were to see New 

START’s successor as the only possible means for limiting NSNWs in Europe. As a result, NATO’s Strategic 

Concept was careful not to limit itself to this option:

In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek 

Russian agreement to increase transparency on its 

nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weap-
463

ons away from the territory of NATO members. Any 

further steps must take into account the disparity with 

the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear 

weapons.2

The Strategic Concept’s focus on the location of 

Russian weapons should make a reciprocal process 

of reductions, and/or withdrawals, easier to achieve. 

As NATO has made clear, its greatest concern is with 

those NSNWs which are deployed in positions whose 

location strongly suggests that they have a specific 

role in relation to neighboring NATO member states. 

Russia, for its part, views U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe (for both historical and geographical reasons) as 

being deployed primarily to counter its own forces. 

The European location of both Russian and American weapons may not be very relevant in operational 

terms. Aircraft-launched weapons, in particular, could 

quickly be relocated to Europe in times of crisis. Despite this, however, significant political gains might 

still be achievable were the two countries to undertake 

reciprocal withdrawal from their forward locations, 

even if not all the warheads involved were dismantled. There would be concerns in Japan were Russia 

to move the weapons in question to its eastern borders, just as there might be Chinese complaints were 

the United States to redeploy its NSNW warheads to 

Guam or Australia. It would therefore be important 

for both countries to make clear that no such redeployment would take place. 

Such a mutual withdrawal would be likely to 

work best, and be more sustainable, in the context of a 

broader set of confidence-building measures between 

NATO and Russia. These might include, for example, 

measures to demilitarize Kaliningrad, limit the size of 
464

exercises near each other’s territory, and increase mutual transparency at military bases near the NATO/

Russia frontier. 

Whether or not specific confidence-building measures—nuclear or conventional—are undertaken, it 

seems certain that the U.S. conventional troop presence in Europe will be reduced in coming years as a 

result of the combined effect of budget cuts and the 

relative priority being given to preserving U.S. conventional capabilities in the Asia Pacific. Similar factors could also lead to further reductions in Russia’s 

Europe-based forces, as it seeks to maintain adequate 

capabilities against potential threats to its south and 

east. NATO’s European member states are also planning to reduce their conventional forces, whether or 

not there is any agreement with Russia to do so. In 

the absence of a new conventional forces agreement, 

American and Russian withdrawal from Europe could 

still be reversed over a period of months in the event 

of a new and protracted European security crisis. But 

the very fact that neither country feels that Europe is 

a priority for its conventional forces suggests that neither believes that such a crisis is likely. This broader 

context—mutual, but uncoordinated, reductions in 

conventional forces—may make it easier to achieve 

parallel progress in nuclear arms. 

NUMBERS AND VISIBILITY

As in the case of conventional forces, therefore, 

reciprocal reductions in Europe-based nuclear forces 

may not take the form of a single all-encompassing 

process. They could, instead, involve some combination of gradual reductions and increased transparency. 

While both have an important role to play, however, it 
465

is the relationship between them that is critical. Thus, 

for example, all three NATO nuclear weapon states 

recently announced the total size of their nuclear 

weapon stockpiles (France in 2008, the United States 

and United Kingdom [UK] in 2010). In each case, these 

transparency announcements were accompanied by 

commitments to make further reductions (in the cases 

of France and the UK) or confirmation of large recent 

reductions (in the case of the United States).

This is a good model for future transparency announcements. NATO is therefore right to ask Russia 

to announce the total size of its arsenal, following the 

example of France, the United States, and the UK. But 

it would not be a confidence-building step were Russia to announce the size of its nuclear arsenal without 

any accompanying promises of reductions. If such an 

announcement were to confirm that Russia’s arsenal 

was bigger than that of the United States, moreover, 

it could be seen as an act of defiance, reinforcing the 

perception that Russia is unwilling to enter into a serious process of trust-building. 

While transparency on its own is therefore a mixed 

blessing, it does play a critical role in reinforcing the 

value of reductions that do take place. The decisions 

made by the UK and France to publicize the size of 

their arsenals, despite the lack of any accompanying 

verification, has enabled them to gain credit for the 

substantial post-Cold War reductions that both have 

made. By contrast, one of the reasons for the lack of 

follow-on to the 1991 U.S./Russia Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (authorizing large reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals in both countries) was Russia’s 

failure to provide sufficient confirmation (such as relevant stockpile numbers) that it had fulfilled its own 

commitments. 
466

This suggests that, if Russian leaders do decide 

that they want to pursue confidence-building steps in 

relation to their NSNWs in Europe, some combination 

of transparency and numerical reductions is likely to 

be needed. Were Russia to announce that it was removing a further 1,000 NSNWs from its stockpile over 

the next period, for example, and accompanied this 

with an offer to match the current levels of transparency of NATO’s nuclear weapon states in relation to 

its total stockpile, it could make two important points. 

First, it would show that it was listening to concerns 

over the size of an NSNW arsenal that seems well in 

excess of the level that could plausibly be needed for 

self-defense, even allowing for Russia’s conventional 

inferiority. Second, it could help revive the process of 

mutual information-sharing, begun by the establishment of arms control and confidence-building treaties 

signed in the 1980s, but now increasingly under threat. 

A parallel argument can be made in relation to the 

much smaller stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons in 

Europe. In unofficial analyses based on publicly-available U.S. government documents, the United States 

still deploys around 150-200 warheads in Europe, all 

of which are B-61 free-fall bombs,3

 but there has been 

no official statement confirming this fact. Nor has 

the United States (as of this writing) updated its announcement on the total size of its arsenal, first given 

at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010. A U.S. announcement that confirmed the total size of its deployments in Europe for 

the first time, if accompanied by a historical account 

of the reduction in this arsenal over time, could give 

added credibility to its claim to have a good record on 

disarmament since the end of the Cold War. As in the 

cases of France and the UK, such an announcement 
467

would have added credibility were it accompanied by 

further measures to reduce the size of its arsenal in 

Europe. The size and nature of such a reduction could 

be calibrated depending on whether it was taken in 

parallel with, or independent of, parallel measures by 

Russia. 

There are several options for such a reduction. 

Even if all six warhead storage locations are kept, the 

United States could decide to reduce the average number of warheads per location from 30 to, for example, 

10 or 20. It could also decide to reduce the number of 

facilities, for example, by closing one of the two Italian bases or one of the three north European facilities. 

Or, if it is judged that Russian reciprocal measures are 

sufficient to meet the criteria set out in the Strategic 

Concept, it could decide to withdraw all weapons from 

Europe, with or without a formal announcement to 

this effect. 

A combination of parallel reduction and transparency measures, along the lines outlined above, could 

go some way towards building mutual confidence, 

while avoiding the complexities involved in subsuming these weapons within a global arms control regime. It might also include further detailed exchanges 

of information (for example, on locations of major 

storage sites) that could further build confidence in 

total arsenal declarations.4

 No regime currently exists that is able to verify warhead stockpiles with the 

degree of accuracy achieved in relation to deployed 

missiles, and it is hard to imagine that such a regime 

can easily be developed, given the ability of states 

to conceal warheads (and warhead components) in 

nondeclared locations. Given this, together with continuing transparency in relation to the most sensitive 

(START-counted) delivery systems, the steps outlined 
468

here may be as much as can be expected in the next 

phase of confidence-building. Were the security of 

either side after reductions dependent on a reliable 

accounting of the arsenal of the other, such unverified transparency would not be appropriate. For the 

purposes of confidence-building in relation to weapons whose primary purpose is symbolic, however, 

it offers the most feasible way forward. Neither side 

would have anything to gain from concealing weapons that would, in any case, be surplus to operational 

requirements. This calculus would change were the 

United States and Russia to seriously consider much 

deeper cuts in the sizes of their arsenals (for example 

to prevailing UK and French levels). Given current circumstances, however, it may make sense to accept a 

more limited level of transparency in return for making progress in down-sizing arsenals. 

WIDENING START

If there is progress on reciprocal U.S./Russia 

NSNW reductions, it may be most likely to start with 

a package along the lines outlined here. But such 

a package should not be considered in isolation. It 

would affect, and be affected by, wider processes of 

arms reductions, both between the United States and 

Russia, and involving a wider group of countries. 

Given the difficulties that were involved in getting 

the U.S. Senate to ratify the New START Treaty, the 

prospects for a follow-on treaty during the next U.S. 

presidential term are not high. Whether Senate objections were primarily motivated by strategic or party 

political considerations, the reality is that it is now 

very difficult to conceive of a new treaty that would 

be able to satisfy two-thirds of the U.S. Senate while 
469

still making a substantial contribution to wider security objectives. 

That being said, it may still be possible to achieve 

significant further reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals within the framework of the existing 

treaty. Both countries are currently planning to spend 

significant amounts on modernizing their strategic 

forces (including new missiles and submarines) over 

the next 10-15 years. If some of this expenditure could 

be reduced or postponed as a result of cuts below New 

START ceilings (especially those for delivery vehicles), 

leaders in both countries may have an opportunity to 

make further mutual reductions, even without agreement on a new treaty. By the end of the decade, it is 

therefore possible that levels of both START-countable 

deployed delivery vehicles and warheads (currently 

700 and 1,550 respectively) could be reduced substantially. The political plausibility and extent of such reductions are likely to be greater, however, if they take 

place in parallel with a process of mutual reductions 

and increased transparency in NSNWs.

Further significant reductions in American and 

Russian arsenals may also require some greater assurance that other nuclear weapon states continue to 

restrict their own arsenals at relatively low levels. The 

position of China is likely to be of particular importance. Given the concern that both the United States 

and Russia have about how China’s growing power 

might affect their own security, both countries—and 

Russia in particular—will be nervous about removing 

one of the components where they still retain a significant edge. 

As in the case of other nuclear weapon states, Chinese steps towards greater transparency would be 

more likely to contribute to confidence-building were 
470

they to be combined with commitments to restraint or 

reduction in capabilities. One recent estimate of China’s nuclear arsenal, drawing primarily on U.S. Government sources, suggests that it has a total stockpile 

of around 240 warheads.5

 If this were to be confirmed 

officially, thereby placing China’s arsenal at a level 

comparable to those of the UK and France, it should 

make it easier for the United States and Russia to reduce their own arsenals. The effect of such Chinese 

transparency would be significantly increased if it 

were also to announce that it had no plans to increase 

its arsenal above this level. 

Such an announcement need not reveal any information on the location or readiness state of China’s 

nuclear arsenal, any more than recent announcements 

by France, the United States, and the UK have done 

so. But it would still help reassure those who believe 

that China might be concealing a larger stockpile; and 

it would be a strong signal that China might be prepared to play a part in future mutual restraint regimes. 

Given uncertainties about the future missile defense 

capabilities of the United States, China seems unlikely 

to be willing to give an unconditional “no increase” 

commitment. Even so, greater Chinese transparency 

could be a useful contribution to confidence-building 

at a time when there is growing concern that U.S./

China strategic competition may intensify dangerously over the next decade. 

Were China to join the other recognized nuclear 

weapon states in making a stockpile declaration, together with offering some assurances on future plans, 

it would place pressure on India and Pakistan to consider confidence-building measures of their own. Even 

more than in the cases of Russia and China, however, 

it would be important to manage carefully the rela-
471

tionship between transparency and restraint for the 

two acknowledged non-NPT nuclear-armed states. 

Because of the difficult strategic situation in which it 

finds itself, Pakistan will be tempted to see increased 

transparency measures primarily as a means to further strengthen the deterrent value of its nuclear force. 

It might, for example, use a transparency announcement as an opportunity to overstate both the size of its 

arsenal (e.g., through the way it enumerates weapons) 

and its future plans for increasing it further. If this 

were to occur, there would be a danger that mutual 

transparency between Pakistan and India could fuel 

the risk of competitive nuclear buildups. 

THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL

A process of mutual reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals could have a range of effects 

on current understandings of extended deterrence 

and burden-sharing within NATO, with potentially 

wider implications for alliance politics. For example, 

if the gap between the arsenals of the large and small 

nuclear-armed states does narrow, then alliances—including NATO—could become a more important element in shaping the structure of international nuclear 

stability. NATO, which refers to the strategic forces of 

the Alliance as providing the “supreme guarantee” of 

the Alliance’s security, already acknowledges that the 

nuclear forces of the UK and France “contribute to the 

overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”6

NATO and other U.S. alliances have another, probably more important, effect. The Nuclear NPT has 

been the central legal pillar in international efforts to 

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But it would 

not have been possible to persuade key U.S. allies in 
472

Europe and East Asia to sign the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states without the willingness of the United States to extend nuclear deterrent guarantees to 

them. Given the inherent risks involved in such guarantees, however, allies still worry about whether U.S. 

promises would be bankable in times of war. Those 

European allies who believe that they are most at risk 

have therefore historically placed a high premium on 

evidence that the U.S. guarantee is credible, including 

the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Were the United States, along with Russia, to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal to a level closer to 

those of the smaller nuclear weapon states, it would 

not necessarily require an end to forward deployment 

of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. It would be hard to 

justify retaining the current level of such forces, which 

(at 150-200 warheads) is comparable to the total arsenal of the UK. If it were thought desirable to do so as 

a signal of extended deterrence credibility, however, 

the retention of a much smaller force (say 10 or 20 

warheads) would be compatible in principle with a 

smaller overall U.S. arsenal.

If Russia were to make steep reductions in its 

own nuclear force, however, support for maintaining 

even a small U.S. nuclear force in Europe is likely to 

diminish, even among the more “exposed” alliance 

members such as Poland and the Baltic republics. It 

is possible to imagine a scenario in which deep cuts 

in U.S. and Russian global forces still left a few U.S. 

weapons in Europe. It is more likely that European 

NATO members will see such cuts as an opportunity 

to overcome their divisions on this difficult issue, and 

end this deployment entirely. 
473

NATO WILL SURVIVE—WHATEVER HAPPENS 

TO NSNWS

The politics of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are 

now as much about reassuring the United States that 

its non-nuclear allies are not taking advantage of its 

generosity as about reassuring its allies that the United 

States will come to their aid if required. Indeed, these 

two requirements are closely interrelated. Were the 

United States to conclude that it was no longer worth 

offering protection to its allies because those allies are 

unwilling to do enough for their own defense, then the 

alliance would be damaged beyond repair. In this context, some in the United States argue, demands from 

European countries for the removal of nuclear weapons from their territory risk undermining support for 

NATO within the United States. Why should the United States risk its own cities in the event of a major war 

in Europe, they suggest, if European governments are 

not prepared to bear the political costs of basing U.S. 

nuclear forces on their territory? Nor is this seen as a 

uniquely nuclear phenomenon. European opposition 

to U.S. nuclear forces on their territory is often seen 

as part of a wider process of demilitarization, evident 

also in the lower levels of spending on conventional 

forces by European governments. 

Yet NATO is stronger than some of its American 

critics believe. Its European members have been prepared to deploy significant numbers of their armed 

forces to Afghanistan, despite widespread public 

opposition to the war at home. They have done so, 

primarily, in order to show solidarity with the United States. In turn, the United States was prepared to 

make a vital contribution to NATO’s recent campaign 

in Libya, where France and the UK played the leading 
474

role in pushing for United Nations (UN) and alliance 

action. Neither operation suggests an alliance in terminal crisis or decline. 

The argument that the United States is about to 

abandon its interest in Europe in order to focus entirely on the Asia Pacific, is similarly overblown. After a 

decade in which the U.S. military has been focused on 

fighting difficult ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

some rebalancing is both inevitable and desirable. But 

it is far from clear that U.S. interest in Europe’s restive neighborhood—the Mediterranean, the Middle 

East, and sub-Saharan Africa—is about to decline. 

Confrontation with Iran remains a central element in 

U.S. strategy, bringing with it an intensification of relationships with Iran’s Arab rivals on the other side 

of the Gulf. U.S military involvements in Africa—for 

example, in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda—are deepening, not declining. Irrespective of what its European 

allies do, the United States, for good or ill, seems to 

be committed to remaining a major military power in 

Europe’s backyard. 

Concerns over the impact of the NSNW debate on 

NATO’s future are also at risk of being overblown. 

While there may be a temptation to draw comparisons 

with the 1980s Euro-missile debate, the current nuclear 

discussion within NATO is a pale echo of that period. 

Taking place in the shadow of worsening Soviet/U.S. 

relations, and with mass anti-nuclear demonstrations 

taking place across Europe, the Euro-missile crisis of 

the 1980s was rightly a central focus for intra-alliance 

concern. Today, in a Europe where major war is no 

longer the central security concern, and where the 

continuing presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the 

continent had been almost forgotten until recently, 

apathy is a more common reaction than antagonism. 
475

As in the past, the most likely causes for severe divisions within NATO are likely to come as a result of 

U.S. military adventures (such as Vietnam and Iraq) 

which most Europeans are not willing to support, but 

for which the United States will believe it needs allies. 

By contrast, and however the issue is resolved, the future of U.S. NSNWs in Europe is not likely to become 

an issue of comparable divisiveness.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 21

1. Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, England, June 

15, 2011, available from www.rusi.org/events/.

2. NATO Strategic Concept, para. 26, Brussels, Belgium. 

3. See, for example, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 

“US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe 2011,” Bulletin of Atomic 

Scientists, January/February 2011, pp. 64-73.

4. Ten European NATO member states, led by Germany, the 

Netherlands, Norway, and Poland, submitted a “non-paper” to 

NATO in April 2011 with detailed proposals for mutual transparency in this area. See Federation of American Scientists, Strategic 

Security Blog, available from www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/04/natoproposal.php. 

5. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese nuclear 

forces, 2011,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/ December 

2011, pp. 81-87.

6. NATO Strategic Concept, para. 18, November 2010.

477

CHAPTER 22

THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR NEXUS 

IN EUROPE

Jeffrey D. McCausland

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States 

was a party to a variety of nuclear and conventional 

arms control agreements, from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) to the “Moscow Treaty” 

on strategic nuclear weapons. Many of the agreements 

focused on Europe, which had been central to the 

East-West confrontation. Others were global. Some 

were bilateral with the Soviet Union and the Russian 

Federation as its successor state under international 

law. Several were multilateral and involved all of 

the states of Europe or had a more global focus. But 

with the disappearance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what little agreement there was 

among American policymakers about the central role 

and purpose of arms control in the post-Cold War period dissipated rapidly. As a result, arms control has 

not played an important role in policy discussions in 

the United States or Europe—except when it emerged 

from political disagreements over controversial systems like missile defenses or space weapons.

With the election of President Barack Obama, arms 

control appeared once again to be a viable policy option, but for a very different international security environment. By the middle of 2010, the Obama administration had published a revised Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR), signed a follow-on agreement to the Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United 

States and the Russian Federation, and conducted a 
478

summit on the effective control of nuclear material. 

The administration also came to regard the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with renewed importance as 

a means to retard the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But this renewed commitment to arms control 

occurred in the absence of a grand strategy regarding 

the control of both nuclear and conventional weapons. 

It focused largely on the one area—strategic nuclear 

weapons and their delivery systems—which are arguably the “easiest” for the United States and Russia 

to find common ground. With this in mind, it is clear 

that a successful arms control strategy must better integrate and update existing agreements while seeking 

new accords that advance American national security 

interests broadly across the spectrum of nuclear and 

conventional weapons. 

FROM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO 

NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Many in the United States believed that the need 

for improved relations between the United States and 

the Russian Federation had become increasingly important owing to the nature of the emerging security 

environment. Moscow and Washington had experienced serious disagreements over the previous decade, and at the onset of the Obama administration 

bilateral relations were perhaps in a worse state of 

repair than at any time since the end of the Cold War.1

Consequently, early in the new administration, President Obama called for hitting the “reset button” in the 

relations between the two countries. Despite serious 

differences, the two sides were able to negotiate the 

so-called “New START” agreement by the spring of 

2010, as previously mentioned. This measure was sub-
479

sequently ratified by the United States Senate as well 

as the Russian Duma before the end of the year.

The Senate resolution ratifying New START also 

called on the administration to “seek to initiate, following consultations with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] allies,” negotiations with Moscow “to 

address the disparity” in Russian and American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), or what were 

formerly called tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). The 

Senate further directed that this process be commenced 

within 1 year after New START’s effective date early 

in 2012.2

 In March 2011 during a speech to the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Tom 

Donilon, the President’s National Security Adviser, 

underscored the desire of the administration to begin 

such negotiations. Donilon noted that Russian NSNWs 

would be a “priority” for any future discussions. He 

further observed that such discussions would occur in 

concert with negotiations with Washington’s NATO 

allies on the role and number of American NSNWs 

forward-deployed on their territory.3

Washington’s European allies showed clear support for these policies. NATO’s New Strategic Concept

adopted in November 2010 affirmed an Alliance goal 

to “seek Russian agreement to increase transparency 

on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these 

weapons away from the territory of NATO members.” It further requested that steps be taken to account for the disparity between NATO’s and Russia’s 

short-range or non-strategic nuclear stockpiles.4

 Efforts to enhance transparency and reduce the number 

of these weapons would seem a logical step from the 

perspective of both American and NATO interests. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States had 

dramatically reduced the number of NSNWs forward-
480

deployed to Europe to approximately 200. These were 

scattered across NATO military bases in Belgium, 

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The Soviet Union (and subsequently the Russian Federation) 

had also unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear 

stockpile as part of the so-called Presidential Nuclear 

Initiatives in the early 1990s, but it still retained a huge 

preponderance over the U.S. numbers. 

Unfortunately, the Russian Federation displayed 

little to no interest in entering talks to reduce its 

NSNWs following the release of the Alliance Strategic 

Concept despite Alliance efforts to raise this issue in 

the NATO-Russia Council.5

 Moscow argued that these 

weapons could not be viewed as an isolated issue or 

a simple matter of U.S.-Russian arms control parity. 

Rather, they were part of a more complex security environment. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 

emphasized this point during New START confirmation hearings in the Duma in January 2011. Lavrov 

observed that it was impossible to divorce such weapons from a wider discussion of “strategic parity.” He 

added that such discussion must include such issues 

as “conventionally armed long-range strategic weapon systems, the weaponization of outer space, ballistic 

missile defense, and the disparities in conventional 

forces.”6

Many Russian experts have echoed Lavrov’s last 

concern about Russian conventional inferiority with 

respect to NATO and a corresponding need to maintain NSNWs as a hedge.7

 It is widely believed that 

Moscow had as many as 20,000 non-strategic nuclear 

warheads in its stockpile at the end of the Cold War. 

The United States also deployed thousands of these 

weapons to Europe during the Cold War owing to 

NATO’s perceived conventional inferiority in compar-
481

ison to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. They were 

seen as the escalatory link between forward-deployed 

conventional forces and American strategic nuclear 

forces. Consequently, policymakers considered them 

as an integral part of Washington’s policy of extended 

deterrence. 

While the number of these weapons has dropped 

significantly on both sides, it is still believed that Russia maintains between 2,000 and 4,000 NSNW warheads. The exact number is unknown, as is the distribution between naval, air, and air defense forces.8

Correspondingly, the Russian military doctrine published in 2000 expanded the circumstances under 

which Moscow might use nuclear weapons. Russian 

military planners argued that such weapons could 

be used “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the 

national security of the Russian Federation.”9

 General 

Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, 

declared in late 2011 that “local and regional conflicts 

may develop into a full-scale war involving nuclear 

weapons.” Makarov further commented that Moscow 

placed increased reliance on its nuclear deterrent due 

to the decline in its conventional forces.10 Indeed, in 

the aftermath of a major exercise by the Russian Army 

in early 2011, NATO officials are reported to have 

concluded that in actual war Russia would depend on 

its NSNWs.11 A further complication was Moscow’s 

decision in 2007 to suspend theretofore required reporting and inspections measures in accordance with 

the Treaty on CFE. This suspension occurred less than 

1 year prior to a conventional war with neighboring 

Georgia. 

This disparity of views on reduction of NSNWs 

raises several important questions for American and 
482

NATO policymakers. How can a broader policy approach for both NATO and the United States be crafted that addresses the linkage between NSNWs and 

conventional weapons? It is interesting to note in this 

regard that the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept also 

seeks to “strengthen the conventional arms control 

regime in Europe.”12 Therefore, can progress in conventional arms control possibly be linked to proposed 

efforts to reduce NSNWs, all as part of a broader effort 

to stabilize the overall security situation among the 

United States, Europe, and Russia? And with this in 

mind, what is now the status of the CFE Treaty as the 

largest and most ambitious conventional agreement 

ever signed? 

The linkage between nuclear and conventional 

forces had always been clear to Western and Russian 

strategists. Although nuclear weapons took pride of 

place in arms negotiations, talks on both strategic 

nuclear as well as conventional arms control negotiations have always sought to reduce the possibility 

of conflict at any level that might escalate to a major 

nuclear exchange. As a result, both sides made adjustments to their respective nuclear and conventional 

forces, either to account for changes by the other or to 

compensate for perceived inferiorities. Still, throughout the Cold War (and even in its aftermath) negotiations over nuclear and conventional weapons were 

conducted in separate forums. This approach was to 

some degree due to do the vast size of the respective 

conventional and nuclear stockpiles. Now in the aftermath of New START, with the changing security 

environment and the drawdown in conventional forces, neither side may enjoy the “luxury” of examining 

these issues separately. Thus, success in finding a way 

to negotiate with Moscow about NSNWs may depend 
483

on resolving the long dilemma over CFE and seeking 

other means to provide assurances about conventional as well as nuclear forces. At a minimum, progress 

in conventional arms discussions could improve the 

prospects for finding a resolution to the NSNW issue.

THE “ORIGINAL” CFE TREATY AND ITS 

ADAPTATION

In order to consider how conventional arms control might contribute to finding a solution to the problem posed by NSNWs, it is important to understand 

how the CFE Treaty came into being and many of 

the underlying issues that have been addressed over 

the past decade. The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris, 

France, on November 19, 1990, between members of 

NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It established limits on 

the aggregate total of conventional military hardware 

for the two blocs, required substantial reductions in 

each nation’s conventional arsenal, and created an intrusive regime of inspections and verification. At its 

signing, many analysts hailed it as “the cornerstone 

of European security,” and it is clearly the most ambitious and far-ranging conventional arms control 

treaty in history. It underscored a transformation of 

European security that is still in process and whose 

end state is unclear.13

The events that framed this transformation have 

been both largely peaceful and remarkable. Only a 

year before its signing, the Berlin Wall, which had 

served as perhaps the primary symbol of the Cold 

War for nearly 40 years, was breached. Six weeks 

prior to the Paris signing, Germany formally reunified into a single nation. The 22 nations that signed 

the CFE agreement have subsequently increased to 34. 
484

One of the alliances, the Warsaw Pact, has dissolved 

and the other, NATO, has enlarged. A key signatory 

to this agreement, the Soviet Union, has disappeared 

and been replaced by a host of successor states. Finally, the nations that convened in Paris did so under the 

overall auspices of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This organization has now 

grown to 56 members and become the Organization 

for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an entity now matured into an international organization. 

An adapted treaty that reflects many of these political changes was signed on November 19, 1999 at the 

OSCE Summit held in Istanbul, but has not yet been 

ratified by a majority of the states involved. 

The initial treaty talks commenced in January 1988, 

with the following mandate agreed upon to guide 

these negotiations:

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen 

stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional 

armed forces, which include conventional armaments 

and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the 

elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability 

for launching surprise attack and for initiating large 

scale offensive action.14

The final agreement required alliance or “group” 

limitations on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters—known 

collectively as Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)—in 

an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural 

Mountains. Each bloc accepted the weapon limits 

shown in Table 22-1.
485

Treaty Limited Equipment Group Limit

Tanks 20,000

Artillery 20,000

Armored Combat 30,000

Vehicles (ACVs) 

Attack Helicopters 2,000

Combat Aircraft 6,800

Table 22-1. TLE Limits.

Subsequent national limits for each treaty signatory were determined during negotiations among the 

members of the two respective alliances. Following 

the demise of the Soviet Union, the successor states 

(within the area of treaty application) determined 

their respective limits from the total allocated to the 

Soviet Union in May 1992. The three Balkan states 

(Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) did not participate in 

the negotiations to determine national limits for the 

“successor” states of the Soviet Union. They argued 

that their nations were not “successor states” but had 

been “occupied territory.” Consequently, their territory was no longer part of the treaty’s area of application. Still, following their entry into NATO, all have 

indicated a willingness to accede to the adapted CFE 

Treaty once it enters into force. 

Bloc limitations for NATO and the former Warsaw 

Pact were further restrained by a series of five geographic nesting zones for land-based TLE with limits for each zone. These restraints were imposed to 

prevent destabilizing concentrations of conventional 

military armaments in critical localized areas. A fourzone area commences with a central region consisting 

of Germany, the Benelux, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
486

Hungary, and Slovakia. The term “nesting” signifies 

that, beginning with this initial zone, each successive 

zone subsumes all the preceding zones, plus adjacent 

states and military districts. Cumulative limits are assigned on holdings of treaty-limited ground-based 

equipment in each zone. This construct has the effect 

of permitting free movement of equipment and units 

away from, but not towards, the central European region, which thus inhibits surprise attack in the area 

deemed, during the Cold War at least, to be the most 

vulnerable.

The Soviet Union (and subsequently the Russian 

Federation) further accepted a fifth zone, the so-called 

“flank zone.” This portion of the agreement places 

limits on ground-based systems in the Leningrad and 

North Caucasus Military Districts in the Russian Federation. Norway is part of the northern portion of the 

flank zone, while the north Caucasus states (i.e., Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova) are in 

the southern portion. Limitations on helicopters and 

attack aircraft apply only to the entire area of application due to their ability to reposition rapidly.

One year after the signing of the initial agreement 

and as treaty implementation was commencing, Russian leaders began arguing for adjustments to their 

equipment limits. They began pressing concerns 

about Russia’s equipment limitations, particularly in 

the flank region, and Moscow undertook a campaign 

to alter those limits. A final compromise was achieved 

at the first Review Conference in May 1996 that permitted Russia higher force levels in the flank zone, 

established a May 1999 deadline for Moscow to meet 

these adjusted levels, and reduced the overall size 

of the flank zone. Still, the problem of Russian force 

levels in this area has continued to be a major issue. 
487

It was exacerbated by Russian military operations in 

Chechnya (which is in the flank region) and the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Concurrent 

with these events, treaty signatories had begun (as 

agreed at the 1996 CFE Review Conference) to embark 

on a “modernization” of the treaty, in order to adapt it 

more broadly to the changed European security architecture, one without a Soviet Union or a Warsaw Pact.

As previously mentioned, on November 19, 1999 

(the ninth anniversary of the CFE Treaty), 30 national 

leaders signed an “adapted treaty” at an OSCE Summit held in Istanbul. The 19 NATO members accepted 

lower cumulative national limits. All signatories accepted the new structure of limitations based on national and territorial ceilings, consistent with the principle of host nation consent for the presence of foreign 

forces on any country’s territory. The agreement also 

provided enhanced transparency through increased 

quotas for mandatory on-site inspections, operational 

flexibilities to exceed ceilings temporarily, and an accession clause that would allow additional states to 

join the treaty regime.

The parties also adopted the “CFE Final Act.” This 

document contained a number of political commitments related to the Adapted Treaty. These included: 

(1) reaffirmation of Russia’s commitment to fulfill existing obligations under the treaty to include equipment levels in the flank region; (2) a Russian commitment to exercise restraint in deployments in its 

territory adjacent to the Baltic; (3) the commitment by a 

number of Central European countries not to increase 

(and in some cases to reduce) their CFE territorial ceilings; and (4) Moscow’s agreement with Georgia and 

Moldova on the withdrawals of Russian forces from 

their territories. President Bill Clinton noted in his 
488

statement at the conclusion of the Istanbul, Turkey, 

summit that he would not submit the agreement for 

review by the United States Senate until Russia had 

reduced weapons to the flank levels set forth in the 

Adapted Treaty to include removing its forces from 

Georgia and Moldova.

The most important agreed change in this Adapted 

Treaty was that the parties deleted the old treaty arrangements from the Cold War framework—eliminating the bloc construct and reflecting the new reality of a 

Europe no longer divided. The original treaty’s group 

limits were replaced by national and territorial limits 

governing the TLE of every state. The treaty’s flank 

limits were adjusted for Russia, providing Russia considerably more flexibility for deployment of armored 

combat vehicles (ACVs) in the Northern and Southern 

portions of the flank than it had under the original 

treaty. Corresponding transparency measures, which 

apply equally to Russia and all other parties, were a 

crucial part of this deal. Having taken the group structure out of the treaty to reflect that Europe was no 

longer divided, Allies and other states committed to 

lowering their ceilings in the Adapted Treaty. These 

ceilings became more explicit in the Adapted Treaty 

text and were then codified in Istanbul. Actual conventional force levels are currently well below those 

agreed ceilings and, in the case of NATO members, 

well below the original group limits. 

Other provisions were adopted to reflect the new 

security environment. Russia’s concerns about the 

three Baltic republics achieving NATO membership 

were addressed in two ways. First, the accession clause 

that was part of the Adapted Treaty was coupled with 

these states’ readiness to enter the agreement once 

the Adapted Treaty took effect. Second, it was em-
489

phasized that the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act 

contained the following key sentence that addressed 

Russia’s concerns about stationing Alliance forces on 

the territory of new member states:

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable 

security environment, the Alliance will carry out its 

collective defense and other missions by ensuring the 

necessary interoperability, integration, and capability 

for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent 

stationing of substantial combat forces.15

Throughout this period of the 1990s the treaty signatories also dealt with a raft of other implementation 

issues—the flank, destruction of Russian equipment—

and reached, for the most part, a successful resolution 

of these concerns. 

THE RUSSIAN “SUSPENSION”

On December 12, 2007, the Russian Federation officially announced that it would no longer be bound by 

the restrictions of the 1990 CFE Treaty, and suspended 

participation.16 Moscow attributed this action to the 

fact that the 22 NATO members bound by the 1990 

agreement had not ratified the 1999 Adapted Treaty. 

During a specially-called conference in June 2007, it 

provided a detailed list of “negative effects” of the 

conduct of NATO states that caused it to take this action.17 These included overall NATO force levels, the 

flank limits, and other unspecified Alliance demands 

for additional transparency. In addition to these concerns, it was clear that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 

and Russian leaders in general were angry over a series of issues, including NATO enlargement, the independence of Kosovo, and plans to install American 
490

anti-ballistic missiles on Polish territory. Nonetheless, 

Moscow reassured the other treaty signatories that it 

did not intend to dramatically increase its force levels in the territory adjacent to their borders. Russian 

President Medvedev underscored Russia’s seriousness about its Treaty concerns when he described the 

existing agreement as both “unfair” and “non-viable.” 

At the same time, Russian leaders have been quick to 

describe treaty contributions as valuable, and to reinforce the spirit of trust and cooperation it has engendered.

So far as ratification is concerned, NATO members have argued since the Istanbul Summit in 1999 

that their ratification remained contingent upon Russia complying with the commitments it freely made 

when the Adapted CFE Treaty was signed. Clearly, 

the most contentious obligations were the full removal 

of all Russian military forces from the territory of the 

former Soviet republics Georgia and Moldova. Russia has adamantly denied this linkage, and Russian 

Prime Minister Putin publicly argued that “there is no 

legal link” between the Adapted CFE Treaty and these 

commitments.18

Still, it is interesting to note that despite these statements Russia has never formally “withdrawn” from 

the treaty but rather announced that it had “suspended” certain of its treaty commitments. Senior American officials have noted that Prime Minister Putin not 

only has an excellent understanding of the treaty’s 

provisions but also rejected a proposal by the Russian 

Ministry of Defense to withdraw from the agreement. 

Even President Dmitri Medvedev seemed to indicate 

his preference for avoiding the treaty’s “complete and 

final collapse” as he noted during a speech in 2007.
491

In response, NATO initially endorsed a “parallel 

actions package” in March 2008 in an attempt to avoid 

the treaty’s demise. The package represented a serious shift in the NATO position, as it called for NATO 

countries to begin the ratification process (which is 

some countries such as the United States might take 

several months) while Russia commenced its force 

withdrawals. Once the forces had been removed from 

Georgia and Moldova, NATO countries would strive 

to complete ratification of the Adapted Treaty quickly. 

NATO members also pledged to address many Russian security concerns once the Adapted Treaty was 

in place. For example, all new NATO members that 

are not treaty signatories (Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, 

and Lithuania) agreed to accede to it. NATO also 

announced that following final ratification it would 

be willing to discuss Russian concerns about future 

weapon ceilings and limitations placed on Moscow in 

the so-called “flank zones” that border Turkey, Norway, and the Baltic Republics.19

Unfortunately, the initiative made little to no progress. The effort was largely undermined by the deteriorating relations between NATO countries and the 

Russian Federation in the aftermath of the conflict in 

Georgia in the late summer of 2008. In fact, one expert 

observed that Russia’s conduct in this conflict violated 

the principles contained in both OSCE documents as 

well as the preamble to the CFE Treaty. These documents call for parties to refrain from “the threat or use 

of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,” and commit the signatories 

to peaceful cooperation and the prevention of military 

conflict anywhere on the European continent.20 The 

Georgia situation was further complicated by Moscow’s subsequent decision to recognize South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia as independent nations. 
492

Following the meeting of OSCE foreign ministers 

in June 2009, the so-called “Corfu Process” began to 

examine European security challenges. By early 2010, 

an effort was undertaken in the CFE Joint Consultative 

Group to develop a framework document that would 

simply contain principles of conventional arms control which all nations could agree upon. It was hoped 

that this would serve as a basis for new negotiations, 

and in the interim offer each state the option of complying either with the existing CFE Treaty or the list 

of specific requirements described in the framework 

document.

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, 

the Alliance reaffirmed its continued commitment to 

the CFE Treaty regime and all associated elements. 

The Final Communiqué noted that although agreement had not yet been achieved, progress among 

the participating states was encouraging. The Allies 

further underscored the indivisibility of security for 

all parties and urged continued “efforts to conclude 

a principles-based framework to guide negotiations 

in 2011.” They further stated that this process should 

build “on the CFE Treaty of 1990, the Agreement on 

Adaptation of 1999, and existing political commitments.” While the ultimate goal remained, that is, to 

insure the continued viability of conventional arms 

control in Europe and strengthen common security, 

member states further recognized (as noted at the previous Summit) that “the current situation, where the 

NATO Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does 

not, cannot continue indefinitely.”21

Despite these lofty goals, little progress was realized in achieving a framework document. This was 

largely due to Russian insistence on disallowing any 

language in the framework document recognizing 
493

“host nation consent” for stationing of foreign forces 

that included the phrase “within internationally recognized borders.” Such insistence was obviously because of Russian recognition of the former Georgian 

provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued presence of Russian forces on their territory. 

By the summer of 2011 the Russian Deputy Foreign 

Minister Aleksandr Grushko declared that the negotiations had “ended up in an impasse” and blamed the 

West for this development.22

The failure to achieve agreement on the framework 

document prior to the September 2011 Review Conference, with the 4th anniversary of the Russian suspension of participation in the agreement now rapidly receding, has left Washington and its NATO allies with 

few choices. On November 22, 2011, the United States 

announced that “it would cease carrying out certain 

obligations” under the treaty with regard to the Russian Federation.23 NATO allies quickly followed suit 

with similar announcements.24 In addition, the United 

States and its allies argued that sharing of sensitive 

data by treaty signatories with the Russian Federation should be considered a compliance violation as 

the data is supposed to be provided only to “active” 

participants in the agreement. 

It does, however, seem clear that American and 

NATO policymakers do not wish to terminate the 

treaty or argue that the Russian Federation is in “material breach.” This is clear in a number of ways. First, 

the announcement reaffirmed the U.S. willingness to 

implement the treaty and carry out all obligations with 

the other signatories. Second, it offered to resume full 

implementation with Moscow should it decide to return to compliance. Finally, the United States declared 

that in the spirit of transparency it will “voluntarily 
494

inform Russia of any significant change” in American forces in Europe.25 Thus the November 22, 2011, 

announcement appears simply to acknowledge that, 

after 4 years, the United States and its NATO partners 

could not continue to fulfill treaty obligations absent 

some reciprocity from Moscow. But this U.S. reaction 

may offer an opportunity to bypass the logjam that has 

occurred for the past 4 years. It could clear the agenda 

and allow negotiations to commence that consider 

other areas of mutual interest between Russia and 

NATO as well as other conventional arms proposals.

The failure to find a solution that would have allowed the Adapted CFE Treaty to enter into force was 

clearly a disappointment. Still American and European policymakers can take some solace from the fact 

that during the 4-plus years since the Russian Federation suspended its participation, the Alliance has been 

able to maintain internal unity on the issue. It seems 

clear in retrospect that the Russian Federation firmly 

believed that over time some NATO members would 

in fact “break ranks” and seek to ratify the Adapted 

CFE Treaty. At a minimum, the Federation hoped that 

the issue would cause increased friction among alliance members. Clearly this did not occur. Of course, it 

is important to realize that the Russian war with Georgia did serendipitously serve to enhance NATO unity. 

It is also important to realize that the partial cessation of U.S. and its Allies’ participation may complicate efforts to begin a new round of negotiations. 

A few states may need to terminate the existing CFE 

Treaty in order to begin discussions of a new agreement in order to comply with domestic legal requirements. Some legal experts believe that this could be 

accomplished by reopening the Adapted Treaty negotiations while maintaining the existing number of 
495

participating parties at 29 (absent the Russian Federation). This could also help to restrain an increase in 

forces in volatile subregions like the North Caucasus. 

THE WAY AHEAD

In seeking a way ahead several cautions are in order. First, the historical record is clear that arms control can never be an “end” or objective of policy in 

itself. An arms control accord is neither good nor bad 

when examined in isolation. Each treaty or agreement 

has value only insofar as it provides a “way” to mitigate concerns over or threats to national security and 

thus reduce the possibility of conflict or limit its consequences. Consequently, a resurrection of the CFE 

Treaty or creation of a new agreement de novo must 

be consistent with both American and NATO security 

interests. 

Second, at its very core any arms control agreement 

depends upon a harmony of interests among the signatories. This “harmony” is based on careful analysis 

by all potential parties that the benefits to be gained 

from entering the arms control regime outweigh the 

risks associated with the measures such a regime 

might require. These might include reducing military 

forces or accepting high levels of transparency that 

allow exchanges of sensitive data, verification, and 

inspections. One does not get something for nothing.

Third, it is often easy to dismiss the success of arms 

control since we lose sight of its focus. A successful 

agreement is one that contributes to the prevention of 

conflict and enhances stability. But measuring the efficacy of an arms control agreement is like trying to 

determine the success of a contingent condition like 

“deterrence.” Arms control regimes, like deterrence, 
496

are difficult to correlate completely with causes and 

effects of policies, because their ultimate metrics are 

for events that we do not want to happen (wars, arms 

races, increased tensions, and so on). Thus apparently 

successful arms control, like apparently successful deterrence, can come crashing down in a heartbeat.

If the Alliance is to use conventional arms control 

to achieve it stated goals, what are some of the elements that might be contained in a future arms control 

strategy? First, every effort should be made to maintain firm ceilings on conventional forces, particularly 

in volatile areas such as the North Caucasus and Balkans. This must occur even if the CFE Treaty is discarded, and new negotiations to limit conventional 

weapons are commenced. Second, any negotiation 

must include the Baltic and Balkan states as potential 

signatories to a future agreement. Third, the inspection 

regime associated with any future agreement must be 

simplified. This would seem logical based on today’s 

reduced possibility of a major conflict. Still there will 

be particular concerns over Russian concentrations of 

forces on the part of those states that share borders 

with the Russian Federation. Consequently, limitations could be negotiated on the movement and concentration of forces in geographically defined zones 

within such frontier areas (i.e., the Baltic States and 

Leningrad Military Districts). This would limit, but 

not prohibit, the deployment of any nation’s forces on 

its own territory as well as the stationing of foreign 

forces even with a host nation’s consent. 

Fourth, every effort must be made to integrate efforts in conventional arms control with other arms 

control treaties and agreements in order to achieve 

the synergy of a comprehensive approach. This must 

include the Vienna Document (focused on confidence- 
497

and security-building measures) and the Open Skies 

Treaty. These agreements provide an existing level 

of reassurance concerning conventional forces that 

should not be discounted. This is particularly true in 

the current security environment where the prospects 

of a major conflict in Europe seem remote. Still both 

can be strengthened and improved. The Vienna Document has not been changed or even tweaked since 

1999, despite Russia’s indication of interest in new 

proposals.26 But it is still critical to remember that ultimately these agreements, while important, may not be 

a full substitute for an agreement that includes legally 

binding limits, information exchanges, and a verification regime.27

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

Arms control negotiations do not occur in a vacuum but rather are part of the ongoing political process 

within and between states. Consequently, prospects 

for success in conventional arms control and reductions in NSNWs may be limited in 2012 owing to both 

Russian and American national elections. In the meanwhile, it may still be possible to pursue cooperative 

security efforts between NATO and Russia concerning NSNWs. 

This eventuality may, however, require a new paradigm for thinking about arms control when dealing 

with such weapons. Policymakers need to consider 

that the dramatic reduction in tensions has greatly 

reduced the possibility of a conflict between NATO 

and Russia. Consequently, NSNWs may actually pose 

a greater common threat to both sides based on the 

possibility that they could fall into the hands of a terrorist group and be used against either Russia or the 
498

West. President Obama noted such a possibility in his 

remarks at the opening plenary session of the Nuclear 

Security Summit held in Washington, DC, in April 

2010. He noted that “the single biggest threat to U.S. 

security, both short-term, medium-term, and longterm, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.”28

Nonofficial Russian experts have offered some 

ideas on this subject focusing primarily on enhanced 

transparency measures and consolidation of nuclear 

stockpiles. For example, Alexi Arbatov has argued 

that trying to limit the overall number of Russian and 

American NSNWs in Europe is clearly too hard at this 

moment. He has proposed that both sides consolidate 

their arsenals in their own centralized storage sites. 

These sites should be separate from air or naval bases 

to insure that the weapons could not be quickly combined with appropriate delivery systems. Both sides 

could then monitor any movement of the warheads 

without necessarily having specific information on 

how many warheads were stored at any site. Another 

expert, Anatoliy Diakov, has also urged Washington 

and Moscow to implement detailed transparency 

measures and data exchanges.29

Many of these ideas are consistent with suggestions 

made by the National Academy of Sciences in its report entitled Global Security Engagement—A New Model 

for Cooperative Threat Reduction (2009). This report recommends a renewed effort by American policymakers 

to create a new comprehensive threat reduction (CTR) 

program.30 Such an approach would seem to be a logical extension of United Nations (UN) Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 1540—“Enforcement of Effective 

Measures Against Proliferation.” This resolution was 

proposed/adopted because of the joint efforts of the 
499

United States and Russian Federation. UNSCR 1540 is 

the first obligation binding on all UN member states 

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One of its requirements is that all states take and enforce effective 

measures to control nuclear weapons and materials 

in order to reduce the possibility of proliferation or 

their acquisition by terrorist organizations.31 Hence it 

would seem to be a clear point of reference for Washington and Moscow in determining policy. 

A FINAL WORD

During the course of the CFE negotiations, a Western arms control expert once remarked that he felt like 

he was watching 300 years of European hostilities unfold. Critics of this process frequently become so enmeshed in the technical details of definitions, counting rules, stabilizing measures, inspection regimes, 

etc., that they overlook the connection between these 

small points and the larger security issues. Still, while 

the devil may well lie in the details, the CFE accord is 

rooted in the collective attempt of over 30 sovereign 

states to improve their respective security. National 

fears and historical antagonisms may complicate the 

flow of negotiations, but they also contribute to the 

agreement’s enduring value. It is thus important to 

keep such apparent untidiness in proper perspective 

as Europe gropes its way to reducing the possibility of 

conflict through a new architecture based on cooperative security. 

The search for a new arms control strategy that 

addresses the question of non-strategic nuclear forces 

must seek to both extend and become a part of exist-
500

ing agreements. It must also combine our past experiences from both conventional and nuclear arms control. Finally, even as we profit from lessons of the past, 

we must also acknowledge the new realities that will 

govern the security environment of the future. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 22

1. Dmitri Trenin, “Thinking Strategically About Russia,” 

speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2008, p. 1. 

2. Steven Pifer, “The United States, NATO’s Strategic Concept, and Nuclear Issues,” Nuclear Policy Paper Number 6, Washington, DC: Arms Control Association and British American Security Information Council, April 2011, p. 4.

3. Tom Donilon, “The Prague Agenda: The Road Ahead,” 

speech at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, 

Washington, DC, March 29, 2011. 

4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, Lisbon, Portgual: NATO Press Office, November 2010, pp. 7-8. 

5. Simon Lunn, “NATO Nuclear Policy—Reflections on Lisbon and Looking Ahead,” in The NTI Study on Nuclear Weapons 

and NATO, Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011, p. 

20.

6. Andrei Zagorski, “Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics, and Arms Control,” Book 156, Hamburg, Germany: 

Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, February 2011, p. 34. 

7. Ian Kearns and Simon Lunn, NATO’s Nuclear Policy after 

Lisbon—the Summit Documents and the Way Ahead, Brussels, Belgium: European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear 

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, January 25, 2011, p. 15. For 
501

a detailed discussion of the state of Russian conventional forces, 

see Margarete Klein, Russia’s Military Capabilities, Berlin, Germany: Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik, October 2009. 

8. Dima Adamsky, Russian Regional Nuclear Developments,

Washington, DC: Long Term Strategy Group, Department of Defense, September 2010, pp. 21-22. See also Amy F. Woolf, Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons, Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, August 2009, pp. 17-18.

9. Ibid., Woolf, pp. 14-15. See also Simon Saradzhyan, Russia’s 

Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and 

Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability? Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, Belfer Center, January 2010. 

10. “Russian Military Chief: War Risks Have Grown,” Associated Press, November 17, 2011. 

11. “NATO: Major Exercise Shows Weakness of Russian 

Army,” Baltic News Service, February 14, 2011.

12. NATO, Strategic Concept, p. 8. 

13. Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE)—A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of State, March 2009, p. 2. 

14. Ibid., p. 5. 

15. NATO, The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, France: NATO Public Affairs Office, May 27, 1997.

16. Zdzislaw Lachowski, “The CFE Treaty One Year After 

Its Suspension: A Forlorn Treaty?” SIPRI Policy Brief, Stockholm, 

Sweden: January 2009, p. 1. 

17. Ibid., p. 4. 

18. Wade Boese, “Russia Unflinching on CFE Treaty Suspension,” Arms Control Today, May 2008. 
502

19. Ibid.

20. Lachowski, p. 5.

21. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Press Release—Lisbon Summit Declaration,” Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Affairs, November 20, 2010, p. 9. 

22. “Russia Says Consultation On Talks On Conventional 

Forces Treaty In Impasse,” Interfax, July 4, 2011. 

23. Victoria Nuland, “Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” Washington, DC: Office of 

the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, November 22, 2011.

24. “UK Halts Military Data Sharing with Russia,” Ria Novosti, London, UK, November 25, 2011, available from en.rian.ru/

world/20111125/169036481.html. 

25. Nuland. 

26. “Talking Points by Mr. Mikhail Uliyanov, Director of the 

Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament of the Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs of Russia, at the Annual Security Review Conference,” Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE), July 1, 2011. 

27. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, “Statement 

at the Annual Security Review Conference in Vienna, Austria,” 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, July 1, 2011. 

28. Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Ally From 

Hell,” The Atlantic, December 2011, p. 50. See also President 

Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Opening Plenary Session of the Nuclear Security Summit,” Washington, DC: Office of 

the Press Secretary, the White House, April 13, 2010.

29. Steven Pifer, “NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control,” Arms Control Series, Paper 7, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, July 2011, p. 27. 
503

30. Committee on International Security and Arms Control 

Policy, National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement—A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction, Washington, 

DC: The National Academy of Sciences Press, 2009, pp. 1-4. 

31. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), 

New York: UN Secretariat, April 28, 2004.

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PART VI

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER 23

SUMMING UP AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

Tom Nichols

Douglas Stuart

Jeffrey D. McCausland

The authors and analysts who participated in this 

conference set themselves a difficult task: to consider 

the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in the North Atlantic alliance. 

Their answers cover a range of views, but at least two 

salient conclusions emerge from this volume. First, it 

should be evident that in the more than 2 decades since 

the end of the Cold War, the problem itself—that is, 

the question of what to do with weapons designed in 

a previous century for the possibility of a World War 

III—is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome 

than their strategic siblings, carry significant security 

and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate with their importance. 

Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these 

arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time 

for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

to make more resolute decisions, a coherent strategy, 

and more definite plans about its nuclear status.

These decisions are fundamental to the identity of 

NATO. The United States and its closest allies must 

define what, exactly, the Alliance believes constitute 

its greatest threats in the future, and in doing so must 

clarify NATO’s identity, purpose, and corresponding 

force requirements. So far, NATO remains a “nuclear 

alliance,” but it is increasingly hard to define what 
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that means. Today, this seems to be more a description 

of a situation rather than a strategic concept, denoting 

only that the United States maintains a small stock of 

tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and continues to 

declare a tie between European NATO’s security and 

the U.S. strategic arsenal. 

During the Cold War, this was enough. But does 

the continuation of a “nuclear alliance” now mean that 

America’s extended deterrent in Europe is operative 

against threats from any source, and not just Russia? 

Indeed, does the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent represent an underlying belief 

that Russia is still NATO’s chief adversary? If not, is 

NATO even an “alliance” anymore, or is it now a collective security arrangement meant to keep the peace 

in Europe and—as in the case of Libya—other theaters 

as well? If the Atlantic Alliance is going to find a new 

future as a collective security or peacekeeping organization, this in turn raises the question of whether it 

needs nuclear weapons at all.

What remains on the agenda in the wake of this 

report? Specifically, three issues need to be addressed 

in the near future.

1. Do TNWs or NSNWs have a role in U.S. defense 

planning at all? This is the logically prior question to 

determining NATO’s future as a nuclear alliance. 

Since the advent of nuclear parity with the Soviet 

Union in the 1960s, American nuclear doctrine has 

continually, and sometimes intentionally, wavered on 

what the United States sees as the essential purpose 

of nuclear weapons. Specifically, Cold War deterrence 

conflated (again, sometimes intentionally, but also at 

times from confusion) two seemingly contradictory 

propositions, namely, that nuclear weapons exist only 

to deter the use of similar weapons against the United 
509

States and its allies, and that nuclear weapons provide 

a military capability that makes them usable as actual 

instruments of war. The most recent U.S. overview of 

nuclear policy, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 

recapitulated this ambivalence in its conclusions by 

noting that America’s preference would be a world in 

which nuclear weapons serve only as a deterrent, but 

that the time had not yet arrived to declare deterrence 

to be the sole purpose of the U.S. arsenal. Without a 

determination on this overarching issue, the future 

of tactical weapons in Europe will remain unclear as 

well.

2. Does NATO need to counter only Russia, or does it 

need to retain nuclear abilities for other uses? The United 

States, Canada, and Europe need to decide what role 

NSNWs play in Atlantic security. It may well be pointless to try including the Russians in this conversation. 

Increasingly, Russia’s thinking on nuclear weapons 

is driven by internal Russian beliefs and problems 

rather than actual threats from NATO or anyone else. 

The Alliance will have to decide how much Europe’s 

security is threatened, if at all, by Russian foreign policy. In any case, the deployment of NSNWs in Europe 

should reflect potential threats to NATO’s security 

rather than the haphazard distribution of forces left in 

the wake of the Warsaw Pact’s collapse.

3. Do TNWs need to remain in Europe itself? Even if 

the United States and its European allies decide that 

NATO should maintain a capability to conduct substrategic nuclear strikes, it does not logically follow 

that NSNWs need physically to remain in Europe—

especially if Russia is no longer the main security concern. The basing of TNWs presents significant security 

and maintenance challenges, as is the case with any 

installation where nuclear weapons are present. On a 
510

more prosaic level, the presence of tactical arms scattered about Europe occasionally generates needless 

political problems, as evidenced by Germany’s aboutface on the issue, at first advocating for the removal 

of NSNWs, and then insisting they should remain for 

the foreseeable future. The Alliance, with the Americans leading on this issue, needs to make a clearer 

distinction between tactical weapons and the ability to 

engage in tactical strikes, whether in Europe or outside 

the NATO area. This is particularly important due to 

the costs not only to maintain the weapons but also to 

procure future aircraft and train crews that can employ theses weapons if directed to do so. 

The role of nuclear weapons in Western security 

is an equation with multiple variables, each affecting 

the other. NSNWs are only a part of that equation. For 

nearly 5 decades, however, these weapons were a crucial link binding Europe’s freedom to the American 

promise to wage nuclear war to defend that freedom 

as part of a common and allied endeavor. It will be 

difficult, but not impossible, to find greater clarity on 

this one issue. But it is imperative to do so, not only 

because of the importance of nuclear weapons themselves, but because the dilemmas raised by the presence of tactical nuclear weapons are central to the 

question of NATO’s future. 
511

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

JAMES A. BLACKWELL is a Special Advisor to 

the Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and 

Nuclear Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force 

(USAF), Washington, DC. Dr. Blackwell is responsible for providing expertise and intellectual leadership 

on developing the organization while posturing the 

USAF during policy, strategy, planning, and budgeting reviews as well as engaging in arms control processes. 

WILLIAM F. BURNS, Major General, U.S. Army 

(Retired), was the 9th Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In 1992, he was President Bush’s special envoy to Russia and other states of 

the former Soviet Union to negotiate the terms of U.S. 

assistance to dismantle former Soviet nuclear weapons. Later, Major General Burns served as chairman of 

the National Academy of Science’s 1997 study on the 

future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and co-chairman of the 2005 study on monitoring and verification 

of nuclear weapons reduction agreements.

EVGENY BUZHINSKI, Lieutenant General, Russian Army (Retired), served as an officer in both the 

Soviet and Russian Armies. His assignments abroad 

included the assistant military attaché to Cyprus and 

Turkey. Lieutenant General Buzhinski also served as 

Chief of the International Treaties Department.

MALCOLM CHALMERS is Director of Research 

and Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at 

the Royal United Services Institute in London, United 

Kingdom (UK). He is also Visiting Professor of De-
512

fence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War 

Studies, Kings College, London. Professor Chalmers 

was a member of the UK Cabinet Office consultative 

group for the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and was previously a Special Adviser to Foreign 

Secretaries Jack Straw and Margaret Beckett. 

NICK CHILDS is a World Affairs Correspondent 

with BBC News, based in London. Before that, he 

was the Defence and Security Correspondent for BBC 

World Service. In 2002, Mr. Childs became the BBC’s 

inaugural Pentagon correspondent, covering the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the 

conflict in Afghanistan, the buildup to the Iraq invasion, and the subsequent insurgency there and its aftermath.

ELBRIDGE COLBY is a research analyst at the 

Center for Naval Analyses, where he focuses on national security strategy, deterrence, proliferation, and 

related issues. From 2009 to 2010, he served as policy 

advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s representative for 

the follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 

serving both on the delegation in Geneva and then 

as a Department of Defense point man for the Treaty 

ratification effort. Mr. Colby previously served as an 

expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture 

Commission, as special assistant to the Chief of Staff 

in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

as a staff member on the President’s Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, and with the 

Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and the State 

Department. 
513

DORN CRAWFORD, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. 

Army (Retired), serves as a consultant in political-military affairs and policy analysis for the Bureau of Arms 

Control, Verification, and Compliance for the U.S. 

Department of State. Lieutenant Colonel Crawford’s 

current efforts focus principally on implementation, 

review, and modernization of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and follow-on 

security frameworks, and on related components of 

the U.S. arms control program. 

PAOLO FORADORI is an Assistant Professor in 

International Politics at the University of Trento (Italy). From 2009 to 2011, Dr. Foradori was Marie Curie 

Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, and at the Managing the Atom 

Project, Harvard Kennedy School. His research interests include: international relations theory, European 

security and defense policy, and nuclear proliferation.

GEORGE HUDSON is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Russian and Central Eurasian 

Studies Program at Wittenberg University. Dr. Hudson is editor of Soviet National Security Policy under Perestroika and co-editor (with Joseph Kruzel) of American 

Defense Annual.

JACOB W. KIPP currently is an Adjunct Professor 

at the University of Kansas and a weekly columnist on 

Eurasian Security of the Jamestown Foundations. Dr. 

Kipp served for many years at the Foreign Military 

Studies Office (FMSO) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS.
514

JEFFREY A. LARSEN is a Senior Scientist with 

Science Applications International Corporation and 

President of Larsen Consulting Group. He also serves 

as Adjunct Professor in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Adjunct 

Professor at Northwestern University; and as Adjunct 

Faculty at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. A 

retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, Dr. Larson holds 

a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University.

SIMON LUNN is an Associate Fellow RUSI London, Senior Fellow DCAF Geneva, Senior Fellow ELN 

London, and a consultant with NTI, Washington, DC. 

Mr. Lunn was Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly from 1997 to 2007 following 8 

years as the Deputy Secretary General. 

JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND is a Distinguished 

Visiting Professor of Research and the Minerva Chairholder at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. 

He also serves as a Visiting Professor of International 

Security at Dickinson College and a senior fellow at the 

Clarke Forum. He is a Senior Associate Fellow at the 

Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. 

He is also a Senior Fellow at the Stockdale Center for 

Ethical Leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy and the 

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs in 

New York. Dr. McCausland serves as a national security consultant for CBS Radio and Television.

LEO MICHEL is a Distinguished Research Fellow 

at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) 

(National Defense University), concentrating on 
515

transatlantic defense and security issues. Before joining INSS in July 2002, Mr. Michel served as Director, 

NATO Policy Office, within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense.

GÖTZ NEUNECK is Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Dr. Neuneck is also Head of the 

Interdisciplinary Research Group for Arms Control 

and Disarmament. 

TOM NICHOLS is a Professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and an adjunct professor in the Extension and Summer Schools at Harvard 

University. Dr. Nichols is currently a Senior Associate 

of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 

Affairs in New York City and a Fellow of the International History Institute at Boston University. 

STEVEN PIFER, Ambassador, U.S. Department of 

State (Retired), is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Center on the United States and Europe and Director of 

the Brookings Arms Control Initiative. He focuses on 

arms control, Russia, and Ukraine. Ambassador Pifer 

has offered commentary regarding Russia, Ukraine, 

and arms control issues on CNN, Fox News, National 

Public Radio, and Voice of America. 

LEONID POLYAKOV is the Chairman of the Expert Board, Center for Army Conversion and Disarmament Studies in Ukraine. Previously he served as 

an External Consultant to the Parliamentary National 

Security and Defense Committee. Mr. Polyakov also 

served as the Vice Minister of Defense for three years.
516

GUY B. ROBERTS was until recently NATO’s 

Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Policy, and Director Nuclear Policy, 

NATO (2005-11). Mr. Roberts advised the Secretary 

General and the North Atlantic Council on nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament issues. 

PAUL SCHULTE is a Non-Resident Senior Associate of the Nuclear Policy Programme of the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Schulte also 

serves as a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies at Kings College London, the School of 

African and Oriental Studies, and at the UK Defence 

Academy.

JAMES M. SMITH is Director of the U.S. Air Force 

Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) located 

at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Dr. Smith is also Professor of Military and Strategic Studies at the Air Force 

Academy.

NIKOLAI SOKOV is a Senior Fellow at the Vienna 

Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Dr. 

Sokov previously worked at the Ministry for Foreign 

Affairs of the Soviet Union and later Russia, and participated in START I and START II negotiations. 

DOUGLAS STUART is holder of the J. William and 

Helen D. Stuart Chair in International Studies at Dickinson College. Dr. Stuart is also an Adjunct Research 

Professor at the U.S. Army War College.

RICHARD WEITZ is a Senior Fellow and Director 

of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. Dr. Weitz’s current research includes 
517

regional security developments relating to Europe, 

Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign, defense, 

and homeland security policies.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

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Dr. Douglas Stuart

Dr. Jeffrey D. McCausland

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