ÜSDA

RADIOLOGICAL

MONITORING

HANDBOOK

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE • U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURE HANDBOOK NO. 246
USDA

RADIOLOGICAL

MONITORING

HANDROOK

Agricultural Research Service

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Agriculture Handbook No. 246

This Handbook supersedes unnumbered publication, USDA Radiological Monitoring Program, May 1961.

Washington, D.C. Issued July 1963

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfiSee, Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 30 cents
PREFACE

By Executive Order of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture has

been assigned certain responsibilities for preparedness for any national

emergency. One of these responsibilities is, in case of a nuclear attack, the

monitoring of radioactive fallouit affecting agricultural and forest lands, water

used for agricultural purposes, meat and poultry, commodities stored or harvestable on farms and ranches, and livestock.

Radiological monitoring includes identifying radiation, measuring its intensities, interpreting radiological data, and helping to develop defense plans

that will prevent or alleviate damage and injury from excessive radiation.

This handbook provides radiological monitors of the U.S. Department of

Agriculture with information, procedures, and guidance in conducting emergency monitoring services.

It should be emphasized that the levels of radiation intensity and radioactive contamination associated with fallout from nuclear weapons testing

are relatively low—so low, in fact, that civil defense instruments now available

for this monitoring are unable to measure accurately the resulting degree of

contamination,

n
Page

PREFACE-. II

PART I.—INTRODUCTION 1

Assignment of Defense Responsibilities to USDA__ 1

Establishment of Radiological Monitoring Service

Within USDA 1

Need for Radiological Monitoring 1

PART II.—RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM OF USDA 3

Training of Instructors in Radiological Monitoring. 3

Training of Radiological Monitors 3

Information and Refresher Courses 3

Reports on Radiological Defense Training 3

Monitoring-Kit Equipment 4

Property Accountability 4

Radioactive Source Sets 4

Storage Points of Cobalt 60 Source Sets 4

USDA Radiological Safety Handbook 5

Personnel Radiation Exposure Records 5

PART III.—RADIOLOGICAL MONITOR REPORTS 7

Coverage 7

Exchange of Monitor Reports 7

Dose Rate Reports 7

PART IV.—FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN RURAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING 11

GOD Assistance 11

Local Government's Responsibilities 11

USDA Local Representative's Responsibilities 11

Organization of Local Government for Radiological

Defense 11

Operational Plans in Joint USDA and Local Functions 12

Food and Drug Administration's Role 12

Cooperation in Aerial Monitoring 12

PART v.—OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES

OF USDA MONITORING STATIONS 13

Care of Instruments 13

Batteries 13

Calibration 13

Operability Reports 13

Repair of Monitoring Equipment 13

Procedure When Attack Is Imminent 13

Procedure When Emergency Occurs 15

Time Conversion 15

PART VI.—PERSONNEL PROTECTION 17

Safety of Monitors 17

Protective Measures Before Monitoring Mission. 17

Protective Measures for Postattack Mission 17

Monitoring for Personnel Protection 18

Calculated Risk of Personnel Exposure "to Radiation 18

PART VII.—AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

SERVICE: INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES 21

Animal Disease Eradication Division 21

Radiation Effects on Livestock 21

Monitoring of Livestock for Fallout 22

Medication for Animals 22

Decontamination of Cattle 22

Livestock Protection 22

PART VIL—Continued Page

Meat Inspection Division 24

Decontamination of Livestock and Meat Products 24

Evaluation of Animals for Food 25

Critical Status of Food Stocks 25

Protection of MID Employees 25

Nature of Radiation Injury to the Food Animal. 25

Processing Facilities and Storage of Salvaged

Meat 25

Antemortem Monitoring of Animals 25

Primary Concerns When Slaughtering Contaminated Animals 26

Precautions When Washing Contaminated Animals 26

Precautions When Dressing Contaminated Animals 26

Effect of Maximum Radiation Level in Meat

Plants 27

Monitoring of Meat and Meat Food Products. _ 27

10-Day Consumption Period for Human Food.. 27

Reducing Meat Contamination 27

Postemergency Monitoring 28

Salvaging Contaminated and Damaged Food 28

Radioactivity in Intestinal Contents of Animals. 29

PART VIII.—AGRICULTURAL MARKETING

SERVICE: INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES 31

Poultry Division 31

Monitoring Responsibilities of Poultry and Egg

Products Inspectors 31

Monitoring of Poultry and Poultry Products 32

Decontamination of Live Poultry 32

Decontamination of Poultry Product Containers. 32

Processing Contaminated Poultry 32

Grading 33

Eggs and Other Poultry Products 33

Food Products of Commodity Credit Corporation

and USDA 33

CCC Stored Food Products and Containers 33

Protecting Food Stocks from Radioactivity 34

Procedures for Avoiding Contamination of

Stored Food 34

Decontamination Procedures for Food and

Containers 34

Monitoring Procedures for Human and Animal

Food 35

Personnel Protection 35

PART IX.—FOREST SERVICE: INSTRUCTIONS

AND PROCEDURES 37

Organization for FS Radiological Monitoring 37

Training of FS Monitors 37

Monitoring for FS Operations 37

Monitoring for Personnel Protection 37

Monitoring Lands for Field Activities 37

Monitoring for Fire Control 37

Monitoring for Timber Management 38

Monitoring for Watershed Management 38

Monitoring for Grazing and Wildlife 38

Monitoring for Forest Land Management 38

Monitoring for Other FS Activities 38

in
Page

PART X—SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE:

INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES 39

Organization and Training of SCS Monitors 39

Personnel Safety 39

Protecting Instruments from Contamination 39

Reconnaissance Surveys 39

When To Conduct a Reconnaissance 39

How To Conduct a Reconnaissance 39

Using Reconnaissance Information 40

Monitoring Agricultural Land 40

IV

PART X.—Continued ^«««

Effects of Fallout on Land Use 41

Specific Responsibilities of SCS 41

Contamination by Radioactive Materials 4i

Recommending Denials in Land Use 41

Exchangeable Calcium Content of Soil 42

Alternative Land Uses 42

Remedial Measures Against Fallout 43

Monitoring Agricultural Water 43

Monitoring Stored Crops 44

Monitoring Unharvested Crops 44

Advising on Livestock Safety 44
USDA Radiological Monitoring

Handbook

PART I.—INTRODUCTION

The President of the United States has issued

Executive Orders assigning emergency preparedness functions to a number of Federal Departments and Agencies. These orders direct the departments and agencies to make plans in their

areas of responsibility "designed to develop a state

of readiness * * * with respect to all conditions

of national emergency, including attack upon the

united States."

These emergency preparedness responsibilities

are to be regarded as basic functions of the agencies and are to be integrated completely with other

agency programs.

Assignment of Defense Responsibilities to

USDA

Executive Order 10998 statesin part :

Section 1. Scope. The Secretary of Agriculture * * *

sliaU prepare national emergency plans and develop preparedness programs covering * * * defense against biological warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological fallout pertaining to agricultural activities * * *

* * *

Section 4. Cooperation with Department of Defense.

In consonance with national civil defense plans, programs,

and operations of the Department of Defense, under

Executive Order No. 10952, the Secretary shall :

* * *

Develop plans for a national program, direct Federal

activities, and furnish technical guidance to State and

local authorities concerning * * * protective measures,

treatment and handling of livestock, including poultry,

agricultural commodities on farms or ranches, agricultural

lands, forest lands, and water for agricultural purposes,

any of which have been exposed to or affected by radiation. Plans shaU be developed for a national program and

direction of Federal activities to assure the safety and

wholesomeness and to minimize losses from * * * radiological effects, and other emergency hazards of livestock,

meat and meat products, poultry and poultry products

in establishments under the continuous inspection of the

U.S. Department of Agriculture, and agricultural commodities and products owned by the Commodity Credit

Corporation or by the Secretary.

Establishment of Radiological Monitoring

Service Within USDA

In keeping with the Executive Order, the Secretary of Agriculture issued on February 7,1963,

Memorandum No. 1489, Kevised, Assignment of

Defense Responsibilities in USDA. In this memorandum he assigned to Agricultural Research

Service (AßS) responsibility for these pre-emergency and emergency operations :

Organization and direction of a system of radiological

monitoring, including (1) arrangements with OCD-DOD

for the acquisition, use, and disposition of monitoring

equipment; (2) training of instructors in the use of

monitoring equipment and general assistance to agencies

of the Department in coordinating radiological training ;

(3) development and formulation of guidelines for use

in determining the most eflQcient countermeasures for production, processing, and distribution of agricultural commodities. These guidelines are the results of research

studies conducted in cooperation with other Federal departments, including the Department of Defense, the

Atomic Energy Commission, and the Department of

Health, Education, and Welfare.

Maintaining a capability for radiological monitoring at

meat slaughtering and processing plants and stockyards

subject to continuous ARS inspection.

Administrative functions on behalf of the Secretary

relating to radiological safety within the Department.

Three other Department agencies were assigned

responsibilities for radiological monitoring in

their areas: Agricultural Marketing Service

(AMS), Forest Service (FS), and Soil Conservation Service (SCS). Specific responsibilities

are discussed in parts VII, VIII, IX, and X.

The Department agencies shall, with the overall coordination of ARS, utilize the assistance of

other Department agencies and cooperating agencies where location and capability make that practicable. For this purpose, other agencies are

authorized to designate and make available for

training such of their personnel as may be needed

for the Department's radiological monitoring

services.

All monitoring activities will be closely coordinated with activities of State and local governments.

Need for Radiological Monitoring

Radiological monitoring includes identifying

damaging radiation, measuring radiation intensities, interpreting radiological data, and helping

to develop plans that will prevent or alleviate

damage and injury from excessive radiation.

After a nuclear attack, radiological monitoring

is required in order to obtain information upon
which to base decisions and operations of defense

programs concerning protection, survival, recovery, and rehabilitation, as well as appraisal, evaluation, and assessment of agricultural resources.

The presence of radiation, its intensity and hazardous effects may be determined only by the

proper use of monitoring instruments. Without

this capability, there would be little or no factual

information upon which to base any required

action. Trained radiological defense monitors are

therefore essential for this protective service.

Monitoring services will be needed not only

immediately after a nuclear attack but also until

radiation levels from fallout decrease to a point

where activities can be conducted without significant diinger to the inhabitants of the area.

Radiological monitors will determine the degree

of contamination of personnel, objects, facilities,

food, and w^ater; specify the particular area or

areas in which decontamination is required; and

test the effectiveness of decontamination measures.

This information will be acquired by USDA to

help determine its ability to conduct its field

operations.

Administrative guidance and direction on the

Department's emergency radiological monitoring

program ha^ e been provided the USDA State and

County Defense Boards. Chapters 13 and 10,

''USDA Radiological Monitoring in an Emergency," of the USDA State and County Defense

Operations Handbooks, respectively, contain this

information.
PART IL—RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE TRAINING PROGRAM OF USDA

Those USDA agencies with delegated responsibility in radiological monitoring must: (a)

develop and provide adequate numbers of qualified radiological instructors, the number being determined by the field organization of the agency ;

(b) provide, to the extent practicable, a minimum

of four trained monitors for each Department installation where Department personnel work ; and

(c) provide operational capability and knowledge

within the field forces to perform the assigned

responsibilities outlined in Secretary's Memorandum No. 1489, Eevised. All of the above objectives should be established and maintained within

the regular field forces.

Training of Instructors in Radiological

Monitoring

Instructors for the training programs will be

developed in the following manner :

In compliance with requirements of the Atomic

Energy Commission (AEC), instructors must

attend an established and recognized 5-day course

in radiological monitoring for instructors. Such

courses are conducted by the Office of Civil Defense, Department of Defense (OCD-DOD), at

the following locations :

Office of Civil Defense Staff College, Battle

Creek, Mich.

OCD Civil Defense Training Center, Brooklyn 35, N.Y.

OCD Civil Defense Training Center, Alameda, Calif.

The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) has

permission from AEC and OCD to conduct 5-

day training courses for radiological monitoring

instructors for Department personnel only.

Candidates who successfully complete either the

OCD or ARS 5-day course qualify as instructors

of monitors and also qualify for AEC licensing,

if required, to handle radioactive materials for

training purposes.

Training of Radiological Monitors

Radiological monitors normally will be trained

by their own agency. The course of instruction

should generally follow the suggested agenda for

a 2%-day course outlined in the USDA Radiological Training Manual.^ Subject lectures, visual

aids, and sources of visual aids and other instructional materials are listed in the manual.

^ AGRICULTUBAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE, USDA RADIOLOGICAL TRAINING MANUAL, 232

pp. Revised July 1961.

Information and Refresher Courses

Atomic energy and radiological defense are

dynamic fields, with new findings being continually developed from observations, investigations, and research studies. To keep agricultural

personnel informed, these new findings and information will be distributed as they become

available. Refresher courses will be essential to

provide training and information on current research findings and their application to radiological defense and countermeasure programs.

These courses should include discussions on revisions in monitoring techniques, operational

procedures, new or improved countermeasures,

protection standards, policies, and inspection and

review of monitoring instruments. Such refresher courses should be of 1 to 2 days' duration,

and should be conducted when required and

appropriate.

The general orientation course, given in 1 day,

can be used for general information to selected

groups on the subject of atomic energy, radiation,

and its effects on agriculture. Such a suggested

course is also outlined in the training manual.

Reports on Radiological Defense Training

An annual report will be made bv Department

agencies covering radiological defense training

and operational capability to include:

1. A list of names and addresses of instructors

trained.

2. The number of monitors trained during

the year, and total to date.

3. A list of radiological monitoring stations

attaining operational status during reporting

period, including complete address. Changes

in locations previously reported will also be a

part of this report.

Reports are due in the Washington offices of

the Agricultural Marketing Service, Agricultural

Research Service, Forest Service, and Soil Conservation Service on January 1.

Form AD-295, "Record of Formalized Training," will be completed for each employee qualified as instructor or monitor. A copy of the form

for instructors will be forwarded to the Washington offices of the USDA agencies. (See ARS

Administrative Memorandum 440.2 of November

28, 1960; FS Manual 6191.23; AMS Instruction

380-3 dated January 16, 1961 ; or SCS Personnel

Handbook, chapter on Training.)
Monitoring-Kit Equipment

The current complement of instruments in the

CD V-777 Operational Mon.tormg Kit is:^^^_^^^^

Item e /-h \ 1

CD V-700 Geiger counter (O-50 mr/ùr).

CD V-710 Survey meter (O-fO r/hr) or J

CD V-715 Survey meter (0-500 r/br)-- 1

CD V-720 Survey meter (0-500 r/hr) or _- 1

CD V-717 Survey meter (0-500 r/hr), remote 1

CD V-730 Dosimeter (0-20 r) and ^

CD V-740 Dosimeter (0-100 r)

or 2

QD v-742 Dosimeter (0-2(X) r)

CD V-750 Dosimeter charger

' In future procurement of OCD instruments, the V-710

survey meter will be replaced by the y-715 survey meter^

' In future procurement of OCD instruments, the V-720

survey meter will be replaced by the y-717 s^^vey meten

'In future procurement of OCD instruments, the y-730

and V-740 dosimeters will be replaced by the V-74Z

dosimeter.

Property Accountability

Approved methods for developing and establishing property records will be maintained by

each agency possessing monitoring instruments

and equipment furnished by OCD. Records

should be maintained by location, instrument

type, model, and serial number.

Radioactive Source Sets

The Department, through its AEC license,

authorizes qualified personnel to possess or use

OCD 30-millicurie cobalt 60 radiation source sets

for training purposes. Individuals having custody of a radioactive source set are named on the

Department's license from AEC. Those who

will merely use radioactive source sets, on a temporary basis, receive letters of authorization from

the Department's Radiological Safety Officer

under the Department's AEC license.

Trainees attending OCD courses for instructors

may obtain from the Department's Radiological

Safety Officer a letter of authorization to handle

radioactive materials. The written request for

this authorization should be directed through the

Washington office of the agency concerned.

Requests for authority to possess cobalt 60

source sets for training purposes will be made to

the Department's Radiological Safety Officer by

the Washington offices of the agencies with

assigned training responsibilities. Authorization

to possess or handle radioactive source materials

will be sent directly to the individuals, with copies

to the agency's Washington office.

Storage Points of Cobalt 60 Source Sets

Information on the location of the cobalt 60

ÍTQA^^^ fP^rce sets for USDA is given below.

? • 1?^ ^^^ IS to restrict the number of source

sets withm the Department to a minimum. Source

sets from other departments and agencies should

be utilized wherever possible.

CALIFORNIA :

Dr. F. R. Thorndike

Meat Insi>ection Division

Agricultural Research Service, USDA

Room 225

180 New Montgomery Street

San Francisco 5, Calif.

GEORGIA : Mr. Gaylord A. Knight

U.S. Forest Service

50-7th Street NE.

Atlanta 23, Ga.

ILLINOIS :

Dr. Robert A. Moody

Meat Inspection Division

Agricultural Research Service, USDA

211 Stockyards Station

4101 South Halsted Street

Chicago 9, in.

MONTANA:

Mr. Dallas W. Beaman

U.S. Forest Service

Federal Building

Missoula, Mont.

NEBRASKA :

Dr. Robert C. Buie

Meat Inspection Division

Agricultural Research Service, USDA

709 Livestock Exchange Building

Omaha 7, Nebr.

NEW MEXICO : Mr. Raymond R. Busby

U.S. Forest Service

New Federal Building

517 Gold Avenue SW.

Albuquerque, N. Mex.

OREGON : Mr. Clarence E. Edgington

U.S. Forest Service

Post Office Box 4137

Portland 8, Oreg.

SOUTH CAROLINA :

Dr. Herbert Racoff

Animal Disease Eradication Division

Agricultural Research Service, USDA

Post Office Box 1771

Columbia, S.C.

TEXAS:

Dr. Ted Rea

Animal Disease Eradication Division

Agricultural Research Service, USDA

Box 2384, Capitol Station

(Office : 402 West 13th Street)

Austin 11, Tex.

One standard Cobalt 60 Source Set (CD V784), consisting of 6 sealed metallic capsules totaling 30 millicuries, is stored or will be stored at each

location shown above. Tliis material may be used

by only those individuals designated as users iii

a current Byproduct Material License issued by

the Atomic Energy Commission. Any questions

concerning the care and handling of this material

may be referred to the Radiological Safety Officer,

Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Beltsville, Md.

Tlie custodians shown above have been designated as users under Byproduct Material License

No. 19-915-3 (A65).

The possessor of a radiation source set is responsible to the Depaitment's Radiological Safety
Officer for safe storage, use, and maintenance, and

is subject to AEC inspection. The possessor also

assumes responsibility for labeling and leak-testing of OCD sources. He will, immediately upon

receipt and thereafter at intervals not to exceed

every 6 months, conduct the leak test as described

in Procedures am.d Regulatlcms for the Care and

Use of the OOD CD V-778 Radiation Traln'mg

Source Set (dated April 15, 1963). Records of

leak tests must be maintained by the possessor of

the source set. Findings of all leak tests will be

reported to the Radiological Safety Officer.

USDA Radiological Safety Handbook ^

All USDA instructors in radiological defense

have been furnished the Department's Radiological Safety Handbook, All qualified personnel

utilizing radiation sources must be thoroughly

familiar with the contents of that handbook and

the procedures to be followed in the transportation, use, and storage of radioactive material.

The Safety Handbook is provided at the same

time as the authorization for handling radioactive

material.

Those USDA agencies having custody of a

radiation source set may loan it for training purposes to USDA personnel who possess the appropriate letter of authorization signed by the USDA

Radiological Safety Officer. Loans to personnel

other than USDA may be made on proof of possession of a valid AEC license to have custody

and use of OCD CD V-784 source sets for training purposes. Radiation source sets from other

departments or State and local civil defense

^UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTUBE. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY HANDBOOK. 29 pp. July 1, 1961.

agencies may be obtained by presenting the Department's letter of authorization and proper

identification.

Moving of radiological source sets must te in

compliance with the State and local laws and

regulations, usually found in the State Health

Department, and USDA radiological safety requirements. The Department's Radiological

Safety Officer should be notified in advance (by

at least 2 weeks) if a source set is^to be moved for

training purposes across State lines. He has on

file, for those States requiring them, the registration or reporting forms which govern the introduction of sources of radiation into the several

States.

Personnel Radiation Exposure Records

USDA Radiological Safety Handbook, Section

3, ''Rules Affecting Personnel/' will be rigidly

applied. Paragraph 3.3 of that section requires

a Persomiel Radiation Exposure Report (Department Form OA-22) for training programs, or

other exposures as shown in figure 1. This report

should be sent to the Department's Radiological

Safety Officer, Agricultural Research Service,

Plant Industry Station, Beltsville, Md., immediately after each training session or inspection of

source set.

Exposure records must be kept both for instructor and for trainees. The dosage received

by one trainee can be applied to all trainees present. In addition, instructors or custodians of

source sets must maintain a cumulative record of

exposure of individuals for use in preparing OA22 reports and for AEC inspection.

Unauthorized persons will be kept a safe distance from source material to prevent exposure.

686996 o—63-
U. s. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete in duplicate. Forward original

to the Radiological Safety Officer, Radiological Safety Committee Plant Industry Station, Beltsville, Maryland.

4. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY COMMITTEE

IDENTIFICATION

NAME

8. SOURCE

BADGE

OR METER

IDENTIFICATION

B

WORN '/

C

1. AGENCY

2. DIVISION, BRANCH AND SECTION

3. ADDRESS

«. PERIOD OF REPORT (From - To)

TYPE OF USE

D

2/

TOTAL

HOURS

OF

USE

E

EXPOSURE

REPORTED

(MiiUtoentgenm)

F

7. REMARKS

g. SIGNATURE

USE CODE: 1/ Worn: W-WAIST

2/ Type of uset C-CALIBRATION

OA Form 22

May 1959

10. DATE

C-CHEST

F-FIELD

A-ANKLE

L-LABORATORY

OTHER ^Specify;

OTHER (Specify)

FIGURE 1.—Example of form for reporting personnel radiation exposure (OA Form 22).
PART III.—RADIOLOGICAL MONITOR REPORTS

Coverage

The USDA State Defense Boards should agree

with State and local governments on the types

of monitoring information essential to food and

agriculture and rural fire defense, and how such

information should be obtained and made available in an emergency.

The monitoring information from all sources

will help support allocations of food from areas

of surplus to areas of shortage, provide protection of USDA employees and facilities, determine

the best use of agricultural lands, disposition of

agricultural commodities, and care or disposition

of livestock. The monitor reports will also provide an important source of information to be

used by the Federal Extension Service and other

USDA agencies to advise the farm population,

in accordance with policy, regarding precautions

to minimize the effects of harmful radiation. In

addition, monitoring information will also be useful in determining when and where rural fire

defense forces can be used with reasonable personnel safety. This information will be made

available to USDA representatives and others

through prescribed channels.

Exchange of Monitor Reports

Monitor reports prepared by USDA personnel

in the county will be submitted to the Chairman

of the USDA County Defense Board, who in turn

will transmit the reports to local government.

Local government will provide the Chairman

with composite monitor reports which would be

helpful to agriculture. He will see that all monitor reports received are available to USDA agency

representatives at the county level, so they can

be used in evaluating effects of attack as a basis

for determining necessary protective actions and

certain other program activity. As communications permit, the Chairman will transmit the significant conclusions from monitor reports to the

USDA State Defense Board.

Figure 2 indicates graphically the prescribed

flow of monitoring information from the local to

the national level.

The USDA State Defense Board will make the

monitoring information received available to State

government and will^ in turn, receive from State

government composite monitor reports which

would be useful to USDA. The monitor reports

will be made available to USDA agency representatives at the State level so they can be used in

evaluating the effects of attack as a basis for necessary program actions.

The USDA State Defense Board will make estimates of effects of attack available to the USDA

Regional Defense Boards and to USDA national

headquarters whenever communications pennit.

Dose Rate Reports

Dose rate reports will be prepared in the following format :

ddtttt LLLrrr

where

dd is the day of the month;

tttt is the time in Greenwich Meridian Time

(see table 2, Time Conversion, page 15) ;

LLL is the agency designation and monitoring station location ; and

rrr is the observed dose rate to the nearest

whole number, measured in roentgens per

hour.

(The agency designation AMS, ARS, FS, or

SCS will replace the 3-letter code designators used

in the past.)

This is an example of a dose rate report or

message :

290300 SCS-Merced-280

where :

29 indicates that the fallout observation was

taken on the 29th ofthe month ;

0300 indicates the observation was taken at

0300 hours GMT;

SCS-Merced indicates the agency and location of the monitoring station—in this case,

the Soil Conservation Service office at Merced, Calif. ; and

280 indicates that the observed dose rate was

280 roentgens per hour.

See page 15 for further examples of monitor

reports, or flash reports, and page 13 for monthly

operability reports.

Dose rates will be reported in roentgens per hour

(r/hr) as a 3-digit number.

For readings of less than 100 roentgens

per hour, the first digit will be zero. A reading of 75 roentgens per hour will be reported

as075 (zero-seven-five).

If the reading is less than 10 roentgens

per hour, there will be two zeros followed by

the reading. Example : A reading of 5 roentgens per hour will be reported as 005 (zerozero-five) .

Dose rates which equal or exceed 1 roentgen per hour will be reported to the nearest
00

RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE REPORTING (COMMUNICATIONS) SYSTEM

State Primary Stations

State Secondary Stations

State Mobile Monitoring

MÜltary (D.O. D.)

Monitoring Stations

Federal Agency ^

Monitoring Stations

Local or Municipal

Monitoring Stations

OCD National

Headquarters

OCD Regional

Headquarters

I

State Control

Center

Sub-State Level

County Control

Center

Local or Municipal

Control Center

^Exchange ^

of Data

USDA Regional

Defense

Representative

Exchange

of Data

Exchange

of Data

of Data

USDA National

Headquarters

T

n

USDA State

Defense Board

"5

USDA County

Defense Board

I

USDA Radiological

Monitoring Stations*

In Rural Areas

USDA Radiological

Monitoring Stations*

In Municipal Areas

]

* USDA agencies represented are ARS, AMS, FS and SOS.

FIGURE 2.—^Plan for flow of radiological defense reports.
whole roentgen per hour. Example : A dose

rate of 1.4 roentgens per hour will be reported

as 001. A dose rate of 1.5 roentgens per hour

will be reported as 002.

Readings below 1 roentgen per hour will

be expressed in tenths, hundredths, or thousandths of roentgens per hour as required.

Example: ^ roentgen per hour will be reported as .100 (point-one-zero-zero) ; 50 milliroentgens per hour as .050 (point-zero-fivezero).

The agency designation and monitoring

station location should always be reported.

This will identify the source of the message.

A marked increase of dose rate following a

period of decay indicates the arrival of additional

fallout. This information is valuable in planning

survival operations; the maximum dose rate observed and the time of occurrence should be noted

on the record form. Also, whenever a marked

increase of dose rate is ol)served, a new series of

observations should be undertaken.

Reports of ''no fallout'' are just as important

for survival operations as are reports of specific

dose rates. According to the above general instructions, monitoring stations will not begin to

report dose rates until the observed dose rate equals

or exceeds 0.5 roentgen per hour. However, if the

dose rate does not reach 0.5 roentgen per hour,

field station« of USDA should report this fact

once each 12 hours during the first 48 hours after

attack. No additional reports need be filed thereafter unless the dose rate equals or exceeds 0.5

roentgen per hour, in which case the previously

described routine of reporting procedures will be

followed.
PART IV.—FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN

RURAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING

OCD Assistance

The Office of Civil Defense is supporting USDA

in those specifically assigned functions which can

best be performed by the Department's field personnel, through the loan and transfer of radiological equipment. However, radiological information will be required for many purposes at each

level of government and, to the extent feasible,

must be supplied by a comprehensive system.

Operational capability is being developed by

OCD, through the issuance of operational monitoring kits k) Federal, State, and local monitoring stations that can qualify. The objective is

150,000 monitoring stations. The USDA has approximately 4,500 monitoring stations.^

To avoid duplication of equipment, training,

and personnel requirements, the following division of responsibilities should be observed.

Local (îoverninent's Responsibilities

The local government has the responsibility :

1. In agreement with State plans and specific

guidance, to establish local procedures for monitoring and reporting that are necessary for

evaluating and controlling radiation exposure of

the rural population, rural fire defense forces,

livestock, and poultry.

2. In conjunction with representatives of

TJSDA, to establish local procedures for the

radiological monitoring and reporting (or mapping) of contamination of privately owned (1)

farmland and (2) agricultural commodities.

3. To establish monitoring and reporting

systems to supply the information necessary for

short- and long-range protection of the lives and

property of rural people. Appropriate monitoring information should be made available to

the local government and to USDA representatives. (See figure 2, p. 8.)

4. To perform other appropriate radiological

defense functions as directed in the OCD guidance for State and local civil defense.

USDA Local Representative's

Responsibilities

The USDA local representative has the responsibility :

The locations of aU USDA operational monitoring

stations as of January 1, 1963 are listed in "USDA

Radiological Monitoring Stations," February 1963.

1. In conjunction with the local civil defense

office, to apply USDA guidance and directives

in establishing local procedures for the radiological monitoring and reporting (or mapping) of

contamination of privately owned (a) farmland

and (b) agricultural commodities (stored or

harvestable).

2. Based upon local monitoring information

and USDA guidance, to recommend appropriate (a) use of agricultural lands, (b) use or

disposition of agricultural commodities, and (c)

care or disposition of livestock.

3. In conjunction with the local civil defense,

to advise the farm population on precautions to

take to minimize radiation exposures associated

with important farm work; i.e., denial time,^

shielding required, shelter, and protection of

food, feed, and water.

4. To develop area monitoring required for

rural fire defense. The Forest Service will provide area monitoring for fire-control personnel

on national forest protection areas; other Federal, State, and local rural fire-protection

agencies will be expected to have area radiological capability on lands for which they are

responsible. A radiological monitoring plan

should be developed to provide for use of radiological information from other agencies having

area monitoring capability. This information

will be needed by fire-control forces during the

critical fire emergency immediately following a

nuclear attack.

5. To perform other radiological defense

functions as assigned by Executive Order, and

mutual agreements between State and county

USDA representatives and civil defense organizations.

Organization of Local Government for

Radiological Defense

The organization of local government varies

significantly from State to State. In most States,

however, the county is quite active in administering agricultural programs. For that reason it is

expected that local aspects of radiological defense

* Denial time is that period when persons are prohibited

from entering a contaminated area or leaving shelter in

such an area because of radiation intensity. Also, the

period of time croplands are prohibited from use for designated agricultural products because of radioactive contamination, or milk prohibited from human consumption

because of radioiodine content.

11
for a^cultural areas will be organized and administered primarily by county SOJ^^''^]^^^^^^

In those States where organizat on ot political

subdivisions or local conditions make it necessary

agricultural radiological defense may be centered

in government organizations other than the

""To attempt is made to present a detailed staffing

pattern. However, the folowing personnel will be

among those concerned with the joint responsibility for local agricultural radiological detense:

1. County civil defense director (policy).

2 County radiological defense officer.

3. Chairman, USDA County Defense Board.

4. Local representatives of AMS, AKb, r b,

and ses having radiological defense responsibilities.

Operational Plans in Joint USDA and Local

Functions

Since farm size, land use, terrain, road systems,

and communications requirements vary greatly

from area to area, detailed plans will also vary

and must reflect local conditions. The following

are general statements of items for such a detailed

plan:

The USDA local representative will apply

USDA cuides and procedures for that part of the

momtoring required for evaluation of : ( 1 ) acceptable land and farm water use; (2) the degree of

contamination of agricultural commodities stored

or harvestable on farms, ranches, and at bin sites,

forests and forest products; and (3) the probable

effects on livestock and poultry.

In acquiring information for land use, Soil Conservation Service, USDA, will recommend and use

methods of reporting, plotting, and mapping the

radiological defense (RADEF) situation. In conjunction with the county radiological defense officer, ses will determine when the monitoring for

land or water use evaluation should be undertaken.

This would be at some time between the following

two conditions :

1. Dose rates decayed to intensity low enough

to present an acceptable hazard to monitors.

2. Dose rates high enough for measurement

with OCD survey instruments.

AMS, ARS, FS, and SCS will plan the extent

and methods of carrying out the additional monitor assignment indicated in the Secretary's Memorandum No. 1489, Revised.

In an emergency, the USDA County Defense

Board will apply USDA criteria in recommending:

1. Disposition to be made of commodities,

livestock, and poultry ;

2. Utilization of agricultural land ;

3. Other disposition relating to tood and agnculture, and forest lands within the county.

The county civil defense organization will perfonn radiological defense functions m conformance with directives in the OCD guidance for State

and local civil defense. Those functions will include the development of monitoring and reporting

capability in accord with USDA requirements

listed on page 11.

Fcod and Drug Administration's Role

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA),

in cooperation with State and local government

counterparts, is responsible for monitoring food

for radiological, chemical, and biological contamination, with the exception of food and related

items assigned to USDA. Portions of the plans

for such monitoring should be worked out jointly

by representatives of FDA, USDA, and State and

local governments.

Cooperation in Aerial Monitoring

Several of the States are developing aerialmonitoring capability, utilizing the CD V-710 and

CD V-715 survey instruments in cooperation with

the Civil Air Patrol. A special aerial instrument

is currently being developed for OCD. The establishment of multiple-purpose aerial-monitoring

capability at 3,000 public-use airports is planned

for completion by the end of fiscal year 1964. At

that time, the need for monitoring capability at

additional airports will be reassessed.

Dire^ction, or at least coordination, of aerial

monitoring will be primarily a State function, for

the following reasons :

1. It is appropriately used over areas larger

than the typical county or city.

2. Monitoring of highly contaminated areas

from bases in less contaminated areas is feasible.

3. During an emergency period, restrictions

on use of aircraft are to be expected, as specified in the plan for Security Control of Air

Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiation (SCATER).

4. Negotiations for permission for civil defense units to perform aerial monitoring are

more practical at State than at local level.

It is planned that aerial-monitoring procedures

will be developed for several monitoring purposes,

including mapping the contamination of agricultural lands. As these procedures and capabilities

are developed, the USDA State plans should be

coordinated with those of the State civil defense

organization, similar to the local coordination

previously outlined.

12
PART v.—OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES OF USDA MONITORING STATIONS

Those who are responsible for the operation of

USDA monitoring stations should be guided by

the following procedures.

Care of Instruments

¡ Instructions for maintenance an^'o^efití^rM

i;b^€^ of radiological instruments are found in

the USDA Rddidogical Training Manual (page

Special attention will be given to the transportation and use of radiological equipment, to prevent damage.

Wliile recording radiation, the monitors should

either carry the equipment by hand or transport

it in shockproof boxes designed especially for the

instrument.

Batteries

Refer to the instrument instruction manual for

the proper battery installation procedure. Particular attention should be given to correct battery

polarity during installation. For instruments

used every few days, batteries should be removed

monthly and the. battery contacts inspected for

any dirt or corrosion present. Dirty contacts

should be cleaned with a cloth or steel wool.

If the instrument is to be stored for more than

several weeks, batteries should be removed from

the instrument and stored in a cool, dry place.

Where feasible, batteries can be wrapped in plastic

or other moistureproof material and placed in refrigerated storage, greatly extending the shelf life.

Whenever an instrument is not in use, make certain that it is turned off; otherwise, the batteries

will be discharged and the instrument rendered

ineffective. With good batteries, all instruments

should operate continuously for 100 to 150 hours.

Intermittent use should extend the operating life

two or three times. Keplace batteries annually,

or sooner if necessary. For a state of continued

readiness, fresh batteries must be available for all

monitoring instruments.

Calibration

Each instrument should be calibrated at least

biannually to verify that it is measuring correctly.

If the operational check of a calibrated instrument

is satisfactory, a monitor must rely on the instrument reading and accept it as an accurate measurement of the gamma dose or dose rate.

. OCD has developed and is procuring calibration equipment. The equipment will be located

at each of the OCD repair depots. Department

agencies and field stations will be advised of details on the availabilty of the equipment and scheduling for the calibration of USDA instruments.

Operability Reports

Each station will record operability checks

every 2 months, as indicated in figure 3, Inspection, Maintenance, and Calibration Log for Radiological Instruments.

Repair of Monitoring Equipment

Repair service for radiological monitoring instruments is available at the following OCD

Depots :

OCD/GSA Depot

Route 1

Romulus, N.Y.

OCD, care Veterans Administration Supply Depot

Somerville (Royce), N.J.

OCD/GSA Depot

North Fifth Ave.

Lebanon, Pa.

OCD/GSA Depot

Bunding T-31

Shelby, Ohio

OCD/GSA Depot

440 South Front Street

Rockwood, Tenn.

OCD/GSA Depot

Naval Industrial Reserve Shipyard

Seneca, 111.

OCD/GSA Depot

Bastrop

Texas

OCD/GSA Depot

1121 Fourth Street SE.

Hampton, Iowa

OCD Depot

Building No. 931

Mira Loma Air Force Station

Mira Loma, Calif.

OCD/GSA Depot, Stockton Annex

Naval Supply Center, Oakland

Rough and Ready Island

Stockton, Calif.

OCD Depot

Building 21

U.S. Naval Supply Depot

Spokane, Wash.

Procedure When Attack Is Imminent

The following courses of action will serve as a

check list of appropriate preattack readiness pror*pn nres t

1. Insert batteries in instruments not in daily

use and perform standard operability checks.

2. Charge dosimeters.

-j^ Jl>i f^i' yy^ 0. il f"^' ñ <rcfr ni v¡

0—63-

-Ua-MáLÍ ¿^eyf^S SaiJT, '] '^ip'-, 1^. Iñí.^ PX^ts If

¿a^/j-
INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION LOG

FOR RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS

DATE ACTION REMARKS SIGNATURE

14

DIRECTIONS:

1. Keep this log with the instruments.

2. Inspect all radiological instruments every two months.

Perform an operational check on survey meters and, if necessary,

rezero all dosimeters. Enter the results of the inspection on this

log.

3. Initiate action for repair or replacennent of inoperable

instruments. Enter the appropriate action on this log.

4. Replace batteries annually or sooner, if necessary. Enter

replacement on this log.

5. Make instruments available for calibration as required.

Enter action on this log.

FiGUEE 3.—Sample form of inspection, maintenance, and caUbration log for radiological instruments.

9nnnV ^^^i^ availability of outer clothing and 4. Check communications in accordance with

buppnes tor minimizmg contamination of the standard operating procedures,

persons who will perform out-of-doors monitor- 5. Check availability of recording forms,

^* pencils, and equipment required, as well as
equipment needed subsequently for outdoor

monitoring, such as flashlights and clipboards.

6. Place vehicles required for later mobile

activity under cover to avoid contamination.

7. Alert off-duty personnel to report to assigned stations or alternate stations, or to take

instruments to assigned shelter locations, in accordance with the operating plans of the monitor's agency.

Procedure When Emergency Occurs

The fallout station monitor will measure, record,

and report unsheltered dose and dose rates to the

appropriate USDA office, as shown by figure 4.

Unless otherwise specified by the local organization, the monitor will :

1. Make a FLASH REPORT when the

the outside dose rate reaches or exceeds 0.5

roentgen per hour. The report will be in the

following format :

tttt LLLFallout

where :

tttt is the time of the fallout observation

in local standard time; and

LLL is the agency designation and the

monitoring station location.

2. Eecord and report dose and dose rates in

accordance with the Radiological Reporting

Log (fig. 4).

3. Record and report dose rates as follows :

tttt LLLrrrr

where :

tttt is the time of the reading in local time;

LLL is the agency designation and monitoring station location ; and

rrrr is the measured dose rate.

4. For the first 12 hours after the arrival of

fallout, dose rate reports will be made at 37- /

bmr /72J^£2!i;jzZc<i^'bas|&dL^ ^t^(){)riQßOO,iO90Ofl2Öof^^ and5. During the period ig to .áí hours after

the mitial report of fallout occurrence, dose

rate reports will be made eack^ours, based *

upon observations taken at 0300, 0900, 1500,

f/,^y^ 5. Time Conversion

Using the Time Conversion Table (table 1

below), enter above each "Z" time designation the

corresponding time for your locality. "Z" time is

a common reference time essential to analysis and

evaluation of radiological data by radiological

defense officers, and is often referred to as Greenwich Meridian Time. It is important that the

monitor convert and record these times in the appropriate spaces on his log to assure that all reports

have a common reference time.

TABLE 1.—Time conversion

Eastern Central Mountain

Greenwich Eastern Standard or Standard or Standard or Pacific

Mean Time Daylight Central Mountain Pacific Standard

Daylight Daylight Daylight

0100 * 2100 *2000 * 1900 * 1800 * 1700 0200 * 2200 * 2100 *2000 * 1900 * 1800

0300 *2300 * 2200 * 2100 2000 * 1900

0400 *2400 *2300 *2200 *2100 * 2000

0500 0100 *2400 *2300 * 2200 * 2100

0600 0200 0100 *2400 *2300 * 2200

0700 0300 0200 0100 *2400 * 2300

0800 0400 0300 0200 0100 * 2400

0900 0500 0400 0300 0200 0100

1000 0600 0500 0400 0300 0200

1100 0700 0600 0500 0400 0300

1200 0800 0700 0600 0500 0400

1300 0900 0800 0700 0600 0500

1400 1000 0900 0800 0700 0600

1500 1100 1000 0900 0800 0700

1600 1200 1100 1000 0900 0800

1700 1300 1200 1100 1000 0900

1800 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000

1900 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100

2000 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200

2100 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300

2200 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400

2300 1900 1800 1700 1600 1500

2400 2000 1900 1800 1700 1600

Co 4. 1 o ^ ^^y *^ *^® ^^^^^ calendar date for equivalent date in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Example: Observed

v^entral ^. ^. Standard Time is 10:00V. p.m. (2200 CST) on the 14th day of the month (142200 CST). Expressed in GMT

^ttime would be 0400Z on the 15th day of the month (150400Z)

^

< 6, '(It Ip^^^^^d :£ '''^' ^-\^»^$ ^ *+ ^

tft 7:'J^ R^,^ t5X 1^ c\^v¿-

Expressed in GMT,

15

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16
PART VI.^PERSONNEL PROTECTION

Safety of Monitors

Safety of the monitoring personnel is to be given

first consideration. Plans should be developed so

that each person who has rural monitoring or Defense Board responsibilities will know his duties

in the event of an emergency. Dosimeters should

be worn by monitors at all times while in a contaminated area. The deliberate exposure of

workers to radiation in order to save contaminated

crops that are not essential or might be discarded

later is not warranted.

Radiation protection measures are based on the

assumption that all ionizing radiation is harmful.

However, experience and research have shown that

if exposure is kept below a certain level, medical

care will not be required for the majority of the

people. The problem, then, is to control exposure

so that these recommended levels are not exceeded.

To accomplish this, adequate methods and procedures for radiation exposure control and contamination control must be established.

The major protective measure to be taken by

monitors against fallout radiation in the early

postattack period is shelter. Other measures include control of radiation exposure, control of

contamination, and decontamination.

Protective Measures Before Monitoring Mission

Area monitoring, or locating the areas of contamination and determining the dose rates within

these areas, is necessary to the planning and execution of recovery operations. However, every

mission and activity outside of the shelter must be

evaluated in terms of the radiological hazard involved. The monitors should first be informed

concerning routes to be followed, locations where

readings are needed, the mission dose, and the estimated time needed to accomplish the mission.

The monitors must :

1. Plan to keep personal exposure doses as

low as possible.

2. Know the purpose, extent, and importance

of each monitoring mission.

3. Know the allowable exposure dose for each

mission and the expected dose rates to be encountered.

4. Allow for the exposure to be received while

traveling to and from the monitoring area. Obtain information about the condition of roads,

bridges, etc., that might prolong travel and

lengthen exposure time.

Protective Measures for Postattack Mission

When beginning the outside monitoring activities after an attack, the monitor should take all

protective measures possible to prevent contamination of his body. Clothing will not protect personnel from gamma rays, but it will keep the fallout

away from the skin and reduce the need for extensive washing or scrubbing of the body to prevent

beta bums. Most clothing is satisfactory; however, loosely woven clothing should not be worn.

The monitor should :

1. Wear dosimeters.

2. Spend a minimum of time outside of shelter

when dose rates are high.

3. Wear adequate clothing and cover as much

of the body as possible. Wear boots or rubber

galoshes or cover the shoes and ankles with suificiently strong materials. Tie pants cuffs over

bootsto avoid possible contamination of feet and

ankles.

4. Avoid highly contaminated areas whenever

possible. Also avoid puddles and very dusty

areas where contamination is more probable.

5. Avoid inhaling fallout. Under dry and

dusty conditions, avoid stirring up dust unnecessarily. Wear a protective mask, if available. A

large folded handkerchief or a folded piece of

closely woven cloth worn over the nose and

mouth will help to minimize the inhalation of

fallout.

6. Avoid unnecessary contact with contaminated surfaces such as buildings and shrubbery.

Monitors using vehicles for outside monitoring

operations should remain in the vehicle, leaving it

only when necessary. To prevent contamination

of the interior of the vehicle, all windows and outside vents should be closed when monitoring is not

being performed from the vehicle. Vehicles provide only slight protection from gamma rays but

excellent protection from beta rays, and prevent

contamination of the occupants.

Vehicles and equipment required for postattack

operations should be protected from fallout. They

should be kept under cover in garages and warehouses. Windows and doors of vehicles and storage areas should be closed.

Each monitor is responsible for controlling his

exposure and maintaining his personal Radiation

Exposure Record. Radiation exposures of monitor personnel are likely to lack a uniform pattern.

The only reliable method for keeping track of

exposure is through the use of personal dosimeters

and the keeping of complete exposure records.

17
TABLE 2. Example of maximwn adult work schedule for areas contaminated hy radioactive fallout

{i-week basis)

ÍERD 100 roentgens; H + 1 dose rate 1,000 r/hr—equivalent to about 100 r/hr at H+7, or 22 r/hr at H+24; i shelter

^ factor of 100—1 % of unsheltered dose]

Time after explosion

12 hours (same day or during first 24 hours)

2d 24 hours

3d 24 hours

Work period

(time

outside

shelter) 2

Hour

Time after explosion

4th through 7th day _.

8th tllrough 14th day.

15th through 21st day

22d through 28th day.

Work period

(time

outside

shelter per day)

Hours

1 Equivalent dose rates for H+7 and H +24 hours are stated in order that those citizens possessing their own monitoring instruments will be able to measure the degree of fallout contamination in their specific areas and adjust the work

periods to suit their situations.

2 Work periods may be split—part morning and part evening, for instance. It is assumed that most of the work

period on the first day would be spent in a barn or similar structure and that on succeeding days at least one-fifth of the

work period would be spent in such structures which provide some protection. First 2 weeks—off-duty hours spent in

shelter allowing no more than 1 percent of unsheltered radiation to penetrate. Third and fourth weeks—major portion of

the worker's off-duty hours spent in shelter but limited fraction of time could be spent in a typical basement or cellar.

Monitoring for Personnel Protection

Monitoring for personnel protection will be

based on the standards and practices outlined in

the following :

1. ÜSDA Radiological Training Manual.—

Personnel Protection, Revised July 1961, pp.

120-135. ^ ^ FF

2. Agriculture Handbook No. 234, Protection

of Food and Agriculture Againsû Nu^leœr Attack^ issued 1962.

3. Handbook for Radiological Monitors^ FGE-5.9 Office of Civil Defense, Department of

Defense, April 1963.

Calculated Risk of Personnel Exposure to

Radiation

Decisions concerning calculated risk of personnel exposure should, if possible, be evaluated by a

qualified radiological safety officer who has had

training as a radiological instructor or radiological defense officer. If there is any doubt concerning such a decision, personnel safety should be

preserved by conservative decision against excess

exposure. Weight should be given to genetic

concern of younger personnel (below 30 years of

Personnel risk will be largely determined by the

radiation levels of the area m which monitoring is

hv nSn ^'*'^-. ^^^ following guide will he uled

oy U öDA monitors :

An unsafe area is defined as that which has a

measured dose rate of more than 0.1 roentgen

fnfpS'*' A person could enter an area having

SZ/ ^* 0-1 roentgen per hour and stay iov

mor. ÎLrîn^^^ receiving an effective dose of

more than 50 roentgens. This is due to both

18

natural reduction of intensity and biological

repair during 30 days. However, this is a conservative standard and emergency conditions

could modify this according to emergency personnel exposure standards previously discussed.

Primary guides for all personnel to follow

during emergency operation :

1. Avoid unnecessary exposure to radiation.

Hazards must be closely weighed against the

requirements for exposure to the hazard.

2. For continuity of essential operations and

avoidance of clinical symptoms during emergency conditions, maximum Equivalent Kesidual Dose (EßD)^ should not exceed 100

roentgens. Table 2 presents a recommended

time schedule for workers in contaminated

areas.

3. For emergency activities which require an

ERD of more than 100 roentgens, a calculated

risk short-term exposure may be administratively decided, based on the following averages

for normally healthy persons. These emergency

short-term exposure standards are for wholebody exposure within 3 days or less.

clinical

Exposure to :

(a) 25 roentgens will give no

effects.

(b) 100 to 200 roentgens is expected to

cause disabling sickness in only about

one-tenth of the people so exposed.

The illness may require up to 6 weeks

for recovery.

(c) About 300 roentgens usually causes

severe radiation sickness and requires

a longer recovery period.

*^The accumulated exposure dose of gamma radiation

corrected for such recovery as has occurred at any

particular time.
(d) Above 300 roentgens should be

avoided, since risk of death is added to

that of radiation sickness.

(e) 450 roentgens represents the midlethal

dose for humans.

4. All personnel required to work under radiation exposure shall wear dosimeters at all

times.

5. All personnel coming from a contaminated

area shall be monitored and shall be required to

brush shoes and shake or brush clothing before

entering the shelter areas.

6. Food or water should not be stored in a

contaminated area, and eating, drinking, and

smoking in a contaminated area is unsafe and

should be prohibited.

Biological recovery of damaged body cells and

tissue is actually greater after total long-term

exposure than after acceptable short-term exposure, since the damaging effect of radiation is

offset by biological repair.

The concept of ERD, sometimes called effective

biological dose (EBD), is based on the consideration that 10 percent of the damage due to radiation

is irreparable, that 45 percent is repaired in one

month, and that the remaining 45 percent is

repaired in an additional three months.

Additional information on ERD and denial

time may be found in Agriculture Handbook No.

234.

19
PART VIL—AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE:

PROCEDURES

INSTRUCTIONS AND

Among the responsibilities assigned to ARS by

Secretary's Memorandum No. 1489, Revised, are

the development and maintenance of a radiological

monitoring capability at all federally inspected

meat slaughtering and processing plants and at

public livestock marketing centers subject to continuing ARS inspection. The duties are divided

between the Animal Disease Eradication Division

(ADE) and Meat Inspection Division (MID).

Animal Disease Eradication Division

This section provides information and suggestions on protecting livestock against radiation

and the handling of animals exposed to radioactive fallout following a nuclear attack.

The use of animals and animal byproducts for

food may reduce the hazard of radioactive contamination following nuclear warfare below that

which must be tolerated if food is obtained

directly from plants. Although total body irradiation and intestinal doses from ingested isotopes

will be much higher for animals than for man,

their relatively faster maturity and shorter reproductive cycle will compensate for some of the

changes produced by the increased radiation from

radioactive fallout.

The best estimates by scientists working in the

bioradiological field indicate that domestic animals

may be relatively less susceptible than humans to

damage from ingestion of fallout products, particularly in view of the shorter life span of animals.

Radiological instruments assigned to ADE will

be used primarily to protect personnel dealing with

animals, to monitor livestock entering public stockyards, to supplement the animal monitoring program of the Meat Inspection Division, and to protect the general human population consuming animal products, rather than for animals per se.

As stated on page 7, site intensity monitoring

information should be furnished to the USDA

County Defense Board Chairman, who in turn can

relay this to the local civil defense authorities.

Radiation Eflfects on Livestock

Tolerance to radiation varies among species of

animals as well as among animals of the same species, as indicated in table 3. All domestic animals,

nowever, have a similar response to total body irradiation. Few, if any, will become ill following

exposure up to 250 rœntgens, and few, if any, will

^rvive brief doses of as high as 1,000 roentgens.

I he smaller the dose and the slower the rate, the

better the radiation can be tolerated. Body size

seems to have little to do with survival, although

very young or very old animals may be more radiosensitive.

TABLE 3.—Percentage of mortality of unsheltered

aninials after ^^ hours'^ exposure to various radiation doses

[Values from constant intermediate radiation exposure

dose rate experiments]

Species

CattleSheep--

Swine--

Poultry

Mortality

100

percent

80

percent

50

percent

20

percent

0

Exposure dose (roentgens) *

650

700

800

1,200

600 550 450

600 525 450

700 600 450

1, 100 900 600

300

350

350

400

^ Exposure dose in area or building where livestock are

located.

Many animals exposed to lethal and midlethal

range doses of total body gamma radiation may

still be salvaged for food 7 to 14 days after exposure. Ked meat from animals exposed to lethal

doses of radiation is safe for human consumption

without undue hazard from radiation. It would

be important in some cases that animals receiving

such exposure be salvaged for food at the appropriate time. If animals are clinically ill, they should

not be used for food.

A reliable indicator of the health status of an

exposed animal is body temperature. Under emergency conditions, if the animal has a normal temperature and is alert and physically strong, it

should pass antemortem inspection even though

it may have diarrhea, blood-tinged stools, nasal

discharge, or increased rate of respiration. Final

disposition of the carcass will, however, depend

upon necropsy findings.

Studies indicate that if cattle survive 40 days

after receiving the most substantial part of the

dose, which pro'bably would be received during

the first 96 hours after nuclear attack, they would

be a good risk for keeping in the herd. Infertility

has not been observed in cattle which have survived radiation exposure of relatively short dura21
tion, regardless of the dose. Genetic changes, if

and when they occur, can be controlled l)y selective

breeding. . Death will occur mainly from i^-amma radiation,

although beta radiation alone will cause damage

to the skin and eyes, and may have an ^ulditive^

effect on an animal exposed to a relatively high

but sublethal dose of gamma radiation. The outer

layers of the skin could receive a large radiation

dose from the beta particles, and in some circumstances this might cause serious ''beta burns.^'

Studies have shown that sheep, unless recently

sheared, are naturally well protected from beta

radiation damage from fallout by the thickness of

their wool. During the first nuclear test shot at

Alamogordo, N. Mex., in 1945, cattle were exposed

to 250 to 400 roentgens of gamma radiation along

with approximately 50,000 rad ^ beta radiation

(according to best available estimates of physicists). With one or two exceptions, the cattle

survived.

Limited experimental evidence and field testing

indicate that those animals in the path of fallout

that fail to develop "beta burns" will ordinarily

escape serious external radiation injury, and the

radionuclides from that cloud will be practically

innocuous to the grazing animal. The development of "beta burns'' depends on the dose received,

and several days or weeks may elapse before the

physical signs of the burns are apparent. Animals

that sustain exposure intense enough to produce

beta bums but live longer than 3 weeks or a month

will probably survive.

Monitoring of Livestock for Fallout

Determination of whether an animal has been

externally contaminated with fallout is made by :

(1) knowing that the animal was within, or has

come from, a "fallout" area; or (2) monitoring

the animal if instruments are available. Monitormg of animals is accomplished in the same manner

as with people or inanimate objects—by ascertaining the amount of beta and gamma radiation with

instruments held at varying distances from the

animals. The heavier the fallout contamination,

the greater will be the instrument readings. The

more energetic the beta and gamma rays, the

higher will be the instrument readings at further

distances. ( See page 26. )

The USDA County Defense Board or the civil

detense monitoring service will give information

as to the fal out radiation levels and arrival time

LI P^J'^^^^^ ^"^f^^ a^^d from this compute the

rZ.A^''^''' '^ ''^^'^^^ communication is disSnrZ^"^^^^ computation of total radiSltlT^l^'T^ instruments and a reasonable estimate of the fallout arrival time

winv^ c'ï ""* "^^"^^ ^^'""^ ^^ ^^t been moved, it

^^^^^y^mm^h have come into a stockyard as

' Radiation-absorbed dose.

22

a mixed group from various sources, each animal

should be monitored if possible. Heavily contaminated animals should be kept segregated from relatively "clean'' animals. Animals maintained inside

barns or other shelters may have been exposed to

letlial doses of gamma radiation without being

grossly contaminated with fallout particles. In

tliis case, rjilculation of total radiation which they

liave received can be estimated from information

concerning radiation levels in the area, adjusted

for the protection afforded by various shelters.

Knowing the midlethal and lethal ranges of

radiation for livestock, and radiation exposure of

livestock in various areas, ADE veterinarians will

be in a position to advise as to probable immediate

and long-term availability of livestock, and to advise which animals must be expeditiously slaughtered to conserve meat for human consumption.

Table 4 presents estimates of the fate of mature

food animals exposed to total body radiation.

Medication for Animals

Symptomatic treatment of animals for radiation

illness may not be a practical procedure since medical supplies available will probably be needed for

treating the human population. In any event,

early treatment with antibiotics before signs of

illness are observed is contraindicated since it will

succeed only in establishing resistant strains of

bacteria, and thus hinder adequate antibiotic response when such response is necessary.

Decontamination of Cattle

Cattle should be decontaminated only if this can

be done without undue danger to personnel involved. Dry brushing in sucli cases is not recommended because of possible or probable exposure

of personnel through inhalation, ingestion, and

external contamination. Two practicable methods

of decontamination are high-pressure water spray

or scrubbing and rinsing. Detergents increase the

effectiveness of scrubbing. (See page 26.)

Livestock Protection

The most valuable protection against gamma

rays would come from keeping livestock under adequate cover at least during the first critical 24 to

48 hours—and longer, if possible. With sufficient

mass of shielding materials between the animals

and the fallout, the penetration of gamma rays

into the sheltered area would be greatly reduced.

As indicated in table 5, the value of shielding in

preventing death among animals would be greatest

in areas exposed to brief radiation doses about

equal to the midlethal dose. Even at low radiation

intensities, however, there would be some beneficial

effect from shelter. It would help to prevent fallout from contaminating the animal's coat and

would minimize the hazard of contaminating

herdsmen and livestock handlers.

In short, the most useful and practical advice

that can be given for protection of livestock from

fallout is to have them under shelter before fall-
TABLE ^.—Estimated fate of 100 nmtwre food animals exposed to total body radiation ' '

[Exposure time: 4 days or less]

Dose, and time after exposure

350 r (LDO/30):

1 day

2 days

3 days

7 days

14 days

21 days

30 days

90 days

180 days

1 year

5 years

550r(LD 50/30):

1 day

2 days

3 days

7 days

14 days

21 days

30 days

90 days

180 days

1 year

5 years

760 r (LD 100/30):

1 day

2 days

3 days

7 days

14 days

21 days

30 days

Animals

Dead

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

20

48

50

51

52

52

55

0

0

0

0

65

90

100

Living

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

99

100

100

100

100

80

52

50

49

48

48

45

100

100

100

100

35

10

0

Rejected after—

Antemortem

inspection

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

2

75

50

25

0

0

0

0

0

2

10

30

35

10

0

Postmortem

inspection

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

4

5

2

25

2

0

0

0

0

0

5

15

0

0

0

Salvageable

100

100

100

100

100

97

98

100

100

100

99

100

98

98

94

0

0

0

47

48

48

45

100

98

85

55

0

0

0

* From information contained in ''Damage to Livestock From Radioactive Fallout in Event of Nuclear War," Publication 1078, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1963.

2 These estimates are generalized to include all mammalian food animals. It is likely that young animals and old

animals will respond more severely to an exposure; therefore, lowering the estimate by 100 roentgens will be a more accurate value for such animals.

out arrives, and also to have as much feed and

water as possible under shelter. Wherever possible, only feed having the lowest possible radioactivity should be fed to animals while radioactive

decay is occurring on contaminated pastures and

other outside feed sources. Low-radioactivity feed

and water supplies are particularly essential for

actively milking dairy animals.

Empty trench silos can be converted to livestock shelters by constructing a roof over the

trench and covering it with earth. Two feet of

earth on the roof would provide a protection factor of over 400. One foot of earth would admit

about 13 times as much radiation as would 2 feet.

A baffled entrance and watering facilities would be

desirable.

When buildings are inadequate to house all livestock, the overflow should be put in a yard, near

rarm buildings. Covered self-feeders and automatic livestock waterers can reduce contamination of feed and water.

Movable creep fences and other types of small

fenced areas that have covered self-feeders in them

can provide emergency areas for farm animals

after the early external radiation intensity has decreased through decay. These can be used to advantage when animals are to be confined to limited

pasturage.

An exact safe value is difficult to set for the return to pasture, but an external dose rate of 25

roentgens per week should permit all animals to

survive and be handled with safety. A brief exposure can be tolerated by most farm animals.

Supplemental feeding from noncontaminated

rough forage stocks can materially reduce the daily

dose of ingested radioactive material when grazing

on contaminated pastures is necessary, örazing

on pasture regrowth, after early mowing and re23
TABLE 5. Effect of shelter on the mortality rate of livestock

Kind of livestock and radiation

exposure—unsheltered dose (No.

of roentgens—1 day)

Cattle:

500_-.

1,000_

3,000-

Hogs:

500---

1,000 _

3,Ö00_

Sheep:

500--.

1,000-

3,000-

Poultry:

500--.

1,000-

3,000_

Mortality rate by nature of shelter

No shelter

Percent

30

100

100

30

100

100

38

100

100

10

64

100

Tight wooden

barn (protection

factor of 2)

Percent

0

30

100

0

30

100

0

38

100

0

10

100

2-story barn with

loft full of hay

(protection factor

of 5)

Percent

0

0

80

0

0

50

0

0

80

0

0

20

Basement-type

barn with loft full

of hay (protection

factor of 10 or more)

Percent

1 The reduction of radiation by shelter is described as the "protection factor/^ For example, if the protection factor

of any given sSure is 2, then the intensity of outside radiation is reduced by one-half. In areas where fallout arrives

at H + l, one-half or more of the radiation would be released after the end of the first day.

moval of cuttings, would also help to diminish the

assimilated radiocontamination.

Meat Inspection Division

This section includes the field procedures of the

Meat Inspection Division (MID) for monitoring

and salvaging livestock and meat products in the

event of a nuclear attack. These procedures are

primarily for guidance during the postattack,

operational-recovery phase in contaminated areas,

or for immediate postattack production in uncontaminated plants that would receive supplies or

animals from an affect>ed area.

Guidelines for a disaster of this magnitude can

never be complete and will require further emergency procedures or modification of those suggested here. There can be no substitute for a vast

amount of good judgment. Modifications of the

emergency procedures to fit local plant conditions

will be made by the inspector in charge, or designated alternates.

Decontamination of Livestock and Meat Products

With the development of megaton weapons and

improved methods of their delivery, there are even

greater uncertainties as to what the contamination

problems will be in the event of a nuclear war.

The personnel exposure that may be incurred, the

time when a decontamination effort can be undertaken, and the level of decontamination that must

be attained before the start of production will be

established by the USDA County Defense Board

or local civil defense authorities. If this information IS not received, the criteria in part VI, Per24

sonnel Protection, as recommended for agricultural workers, should be used.

Initial monitoring is made to establish or reaffirm the outside radiointensity at the plant location.

In most cases, meat plant decontamination will

not be attempted unless there is at least standby

power to supply water pressure and a source of

water with low levels of radioactivity. Desirable

methods of decontamination, as listed in the

USDA Radiological Traimng Marmal^ page 140,

should be used if possible.

A minimal decontamination effort should include first the establishment of a base of operations with loAv levels of radiation where personnel

can rest, eat, and change clothes. (See page 143,

USDA Radiological Training Manual^ for personnel decontamination facilities.) A survey

should be made of the plant, listing the intensity of

the areas that will require decontamination and

an order of priority established. All outer plant

openings should be closed so that the plant will

not be recontaminated with the first strong wind.

Next, all surfaces should be thoroughly vacuumed,

then scrubbed with water, detergents, and brushes.

Instruments to measure the effectiveness of the

work are essential, and the wearing of personnel

dosimeters is desirable.

Constant vigilance will be needed to prevent

recontaminating a clean plant. Air filters, if available, will be needed for any air intakes of the

plant. The entrance of contaminated animals

and the tracking in of fallout on the feet of employees are obvious sources of recontamination.

Additional decontamination effortsshould be made

as the need arises.
Evaluation of Animals for Food

In determining whether animals affected by nuclear weapons should be slaughtered for food, it

is well to remember that injury may be caused

by blast, or by thermal or ionizing radiation.

Consequently, the following criteria should be

used:

1. The critical status of food stocks for the

population.

2. Personnel protection.

3. The total or partial ionizing radiation effects, in addition to blast or thermal effects.

Also, the nature of the injury to the food animal

in question, the sequelae, and the state of its

recovery at the time of slaughter.

4. The availability of processing facilities,

and the means of storage or preservation of the

salvaged meat.

5. The contamination of the animal by radioactive substances.

Critical Status of Food Stocks

The critical status of food stocks for the population can most readily be obtained from local

civil defense officials and through the USDA State

and County Defense Boards.

Protection of MID Employees

In the event of an emergency, MID employees

will work within the framework of their own

organization insofar as possible, and under the

general jurisdiction of the nearest USDA County

Defense Board. In those cases where instructions

from local civil defense authorities or USDA

County Defense Boards on exposure are lacking,

the criteria in table 2, part VI, Personnel Protection, page 18, as recommended for agricultural

workers, may be used as a guide. Through these

sources, it will be determined when and where employees can work without undue exposure to radiation of themselves and of packing plant employees.

Nature of Radiation Injury to the Food Animal

The total or partial ionizing radiation effects,

in addition to blast or thermal effects, on food animals can be determined by those with a thorough

knowledge of this field of veterinary medicine.

As guidelines, see "Monitoring of Livestock for

Fallout," on page 22, and consult the USDA

Radiological Training Manual and similar publications dealing with radiation of animals. It is

possible that such radiation effects will not be

evident until postmortem inspection of the carcass

is made.

If there is no injury or illness, it is safe to

assume that the animal would be passed for

slaughter. If, on the other hand, the animal is

obviously seriously injured or ill, it should not

be passed for slaughter. In cases of intermediate

conditions of injury or illness, the inspector should

utilize his professional knowledge and consider

the other criteria for emergency slaughter.

Food animals exposed to total or partial body

external irradiation can be safely used for food

if they are slaughtered before the onset of symtoms of radiation sickness or if they have completely recovered from the ensuing illness. The

same criteria as those governing the slaughter of

animals sick from any cause should be followed.

Based upon studies made with food animals exposed to total body irradiation, there is no evidence that the flesh of letlially irradiated animals

is harmful if postmortem changes are not pronounced. Because of lowered resistance resulting

from exposure to high levels of radiation, infections may develop 7 to 14 days after exposure and

be accompanied by a severe generalized illness.

The infections may assume the forms of bacteriemias, septicemias, or pneumonias. Such animals

would not be suitable sources of food.

Animals rejected for slaughtering because of

serious radiation illness or injury should not be

accumulated in the antemortem pens of an official

establishment. (See table 2, page 18.) Bacterial

and viral diseases may develop uninhibited in

these defenseless animals and then spread to animals that would otherwise remain uninfected. If

moribund or known to be lethally irradiated and

ill, these rejected animals should be humanely

destroyed. The removal of rejected animals for

treatment is to be made with the permission of

the responsible Animal Disease Eradication

officials.

Processing Facilities and Storage of Salvaged

Meat

Information about the availability of processing

facilities and the means of storage or preservation of salvaged meat can be most readily obtained

through the USDA State and County Defense

Boards, or by local inquiry.

Antemortem Monitoring of Animals

The monitoring of live animals will not be attempted unless the background activity is low

enough that a usable indication of the contamination level can be obtained. In areas where background makes a measurement inconclusive, it

should be presumed that all animals are contaminated and require the procedures outlined below,

unless it is known that the animals have been

shipped, arrived at the plant, and were slaughtered without contamination.

Measurement of the total beta-gamma activity

on the surface of the animal is the objective. Personnel exposure, background radiation, and the

radiation on the skin of the animal may limit the

measurement capability. A shielded area to reduce background radiation is desirable.

Instruments being dropped or broken because

of an unexpected animal movement could seriously

impair the plant monitoring capability. Measures

to preclude this possibility will be taken before

antemortem measurement is attempted. Contami25
nation of the probe or instrument can be Prevented

by 00^^^^^^^ the probe and/or instrument with thm

^ The CD V-700 with probe open, positioned at

4 inches from the animaPs back and if possible

under the abdomen, will give a vahd mdication

of surface activity. Only one or two animals need

be measured if the lot originates from the same

point. Wlien the capacity (50 milliroentgens per

hour) is exceeded, measurement could be made at

a further distance from the surface However,

the beta indication will decrease sharply with

distance.

If the radiation intensity precludes the use of

the CD V-700, the CD V-710 may be used. When

background radiation is substantial, its influence

on the CD V-710 animal measurement should be

checked by remeasuring a few animals in a wellshielded area.

Animals exposed during fallout arrival will have

higher surface activity levels along the back. In

contrast, those sheltered during fallout descent,

but later eating contaminated feed or pasture,

would have a more Ínstense abdominal surface

radiation from lying in their droppings and from

ground and vegetation contact.

Primary Concerns When Slaughtering Contaminated Animals

Meat, fortunately, will contain only a small fraction of the radiation intensity found on the back

of the animal and in the intestinal contents. Three

primary concerns with the slaughter of such animals are: (1) The transfer of the radioactive materials to exposed meat surfaces during the dressing operation ; (2) the danger of skin burns from

the beta particles to personnel having prolonged

direct contact with the outer covering of the animals or intestinal contents; and (3) the effect that

contaminated products will have on the maximum

radiation level that has been established for the

inside plant areas.

Precautions When Washing Contaminated

Animals

The feasibility of washing contaminated animals

before slaughter will vary with the amount of

water available, the species, and the extent of the

contamination. More effective radiocontamination

removal will be obtained when detergents are included m the washing process.

u V'^J^^^]'^^^'^^ ^^ ^^^ contaminated swine would

be highly desirable since they can be washed more

enectively than other species and since swine later

pass through a common scalding tank which would

unoJ^ '^i^cumulate and transfer the activity to

Annmr/.'^^ ^' '^'^^]^^^ contaminated animals.

tZZi ^^"',f^^ts Pl^^^ed in the scalding tank

26

Cattle washing should either be done thoroughly

or not attempted. Postmortem experience has

proven that there is less hide dirt transferred to

the meat or to the arms of butchers from a dirty

dry animal than from a half-washed, wet animal.

It would be well to slaughter contaminated cattle

only when dry.

The thorough washing of calves is now done

with normal dressing procedures. In view of the

existing facilities, this should be continued with

radioactively contaminated calves, even though no

drying period would be possible between the washing and evisceration operations.

Washing of contaminated sheep would be illadvised. However, a drying period before the

slaughter of any wet sheep is recommended.

Precautions When Dressing Contaminated

Animals

Dressing operations should be undertaken with

full co^izance of the danger of beta bums developing if all exposed personnel are not properly

protected. When a beta bum is incurred, an erythema may develop initially; however, the full

extent of the lesion may not he apparent for several

weeks.

Employees should wear protective clothing to

prevent the transfer of radioactive material from

the animal's skin or ingesta to their own body.

Wet operations require waterproof gloves, arm

coverings, etc. In a time of emergency, these protective devices may have to be improvised. Rubber

gloves, protective plastic coverings, masking tape,

rubber aprons, and rubber boots are commonly

available for this purpose. Keeping these clothes

and coverings clean as the work progresses will

reduce the exposure hazard.

The animals identified as not showing contamination should be slaughtered at the start of the

day's operations. Contaminated animals should

be dressed with extreme care to prevent the transfer of radioactive material to any meat surface.

Sanitary dressing operations now used in federally

inspected meat plants will be more important than

ever before. The apparent contamination from

hides, pelts, or ingesta should be trimmed away

before the final carcass washing, to prevent needless contamination of clean meat areas. Every

effort should be made to place in the cooler those

carcasses that have little or no radioactivity.

From contaminated animals only the eviscerated

carcass, cheeks, and hearts should be saved for further use as food. It may be necessary to identify

certain carcasses or lots placed in the cooler so

that they may receive furthertrimming or removal

of contaminated shank bones, or held for radioactivity decay. Complete carcass boning will not

be required ; however, bones should not be used for

soup st<)ck or similar products. Pork skins from

contaminated animals should not be released for

processed items where the skin itself will even-
tually be consumed until monitoring indicates satisfactory removal of radioactive contamination.

Effect of Maximum Radiation Level in Meat

Plants

The maximum radiation level that has been established for personnel working inside a meat

plant may limit the number of contaminated animals that can be slaughtered, or may require a

more thorough skin decontamination procedure

before slaughter. It may be necessary to hang

fewer animals on the bleeding rail, to empty and

wash slaughtering departments more frequently,

or to store the hides at remote locations. Contaminated hide packs could constitute an increased

personnel hazard because the gamma activity component is not completely self-absorbing. This

would cause the proximate intensity to increase as

the contaminated hide pack gained bulk.

In many cases, a large portion of the total accumulated body radiation dose will be received

during the first 2 or 3 days after the attack period,

in homes, travel, rescue, and decontamination

operations. A relatively small portion may be

received after the meat plant operations resume.

The general principle of limiting the number of

personnel to the lowest practical level and rotating

personnel who work in areas having higher radioactivity rates should be followed to the greatest

extent practicable.

Dosimeters, if available, should be worn by one

plant employee in each of the more exposed work

categories, to register the total whole-body gammaradiation exposure. This information should be

recorded and forwarded to the USDA County Defense Board. The dosimeters now available do

.not indicate beta activity. A butcher wearing a

dosimeter and having direct arm and hand contact

with sheep pelts, for example, could receive severe

beta burns, while the dosimeter indicated that the

dose received within the plant could be tolerated

with no ill effects.

Personnel and clothing decontamination must

be given adequate attention. (See the USDA

Radiological Training Manual^ page 143.)

Monitoring of Meat and Meat Food Products

Testing for the beta-gamma component during

the first 30-day postattack period will be done with

the CD V-700. The probe must be open and the

window fully exposed to the surface being measured. To prevent contamination, the probe should

be covered with a thin plastic bag.

Monitoring when the contaminant is dispersed

throughout the food or water,—The use of a quantitative monitoring procedure such as described

here implies the use of a quantitative contamination standard. The total human irradiation

situation in emergency conditions and the food

contamination aspect of this are so complex that

a simple gross radioactivity standard for foods

must be arbitrarily set and its value will be limited

to that of a rough guide to contamination levels.

The standard recommended here is expressed in

terms of milliroentgens per hour, as derived from

previously, used water concentration standards

expressed in microcuries per liter. Both this particular value and the basis of establishment of such

standards may be altered in the future as a result

of additional infonnation or of changes in the

technical or official procedures for establishment of

standards.

A working area must be selected where the meter

indicates a background of less than 30 milliroentgens per hour. Since the space required to conduct this type of monitoring is small, it should not

be difficult to improvise a shielded area if needed.

Place a representative sample of the food to be

monitored in a cup, glass, or similar container with

a 3- to 4-inch open top.

Rest the probe across the edge of the container

i/i inch from the sample, and observe the meter

indication, as illustrated in fi^re 5. Precautions

must be taken to avoid contamination of the probe.

If the reading is less than 10 milliroentgens per

hour above background, the food is acceptable for

a consumption period of 10 days.

Monitoring lohen radioactivity is concentrated

at or near surface of food,—Early after the attack

period, most meats are expected to have principally surface contamination. If shielding is required to provide a background of less than 30

milliroentgens per hour, a larger railed hallway

or room would be useful.

The probe should be positioned an inch from

the meat surface. The extent to which the meter

exceeded the background would be the degree of

contamination. If after trimming or otherwise

removing the surface activity, measurement did

not indicate the background to be exceeded by 10

milliroentgens per hour, the food would be acceptable for a 10-day consumption period.

10-Day Consumption Period for Human Food

The radioactivity level delineated by the above

measurements is considered consei^ative and is

subject to change. It is basic that wherever choice

exists, food consumption be limited to the lowest

contamination available. It is just as fundamental, however, that people can die if deprived

of food.

With the concurrence of appropriate civil defense authorities, the 10-day emergency level may

be exceeded for meat or meat food products in

critical food situations. The possibility of extending this emergency period is important, since

it is not likely that many areas will overcome food

contamination within a 10-day period.

Reducing Meat Contamination

Contaminated meat or meat food products

should not be discarded. If possible, those exceeding the permitted radioactivity should be placed

27
FIGURE 5.—Monitoring food for acceptability for a 10- and 30-day consumption period.

in storage and radioactivity rechecked subsequent

to decay.

The decay of fallout on meat follows the usual

pattern, and the time when a higher radioactivity

will be within the suggested emergency level is not

difficult to determine. In the earlier postattack

periods, even the distribution time might result

in a higher radioactivity food being wnthin acceptable levels.

Removing the surface of superficially contaminated meat or meat food products is consistent

with the policy of releasing meat with the least

possible radioactivity. Great care must be taken

that such trimming or discarding does not unnecessarily contaminate the remainder of the product. Meat trimming is to be done while pieces

are individually suspended, to avoid recontamination from a boning table. Any extensive trimming operation will tend to become less effective

as the butchers' knives, scabbards, gloves, and

clothing become contaminated, imless preventive

measures are taken. Monitoring to check the

28

effectiveness of the trimming operation will be

more accurate at a distance from the contaminated

meat or trimmings.

Postemergency Monitoring

Thirty days after attack those isotopes which

are more dangerous for long-term biological reasons will comprise a greater proportion of any

contamination. The CD V-700, although useful

to indicate contamination, can no longer be used

on the basis of the 10-day emergency level to

accept food as suitable for distribution. Acceptability determinations on food after 30 days postattack should be made by laboratory analysis, as

required, based on the kind and quantity of contamination present.

Salvaging Contaminated and Damaged Food

The principle of salvage of contaminated or

damaged food is to segregate the contaminated

from the uncontaminated and to clean up the

former, if possible. Often the radioactivity or
damage will be on only the surface of a stockpile

and by carefully removing the surface, containers

may be uncovered which have suffered no damage

or contamination. Such unaffected products

could be released for immediate consumption. In

the portion that must be decontaminated before

use, the dusting or washing of containers with a

detergent solution will remove much of the contamination. When the contaminating material is

radioactive fallout, the contents of completely

sealed, undamaged packages or containers will be

free of radioactivity.

Refrigerated products,—Meat and meat products located in sealed and undamaged refrigerators or freezers will not be contaminated with radioactive fallout. With the breakdown of

refrigeration, which is very likely in a damaged

area, perishable products may be salvaged. If it

has not been possible to use fresh meat immediately and bacterial damage is not too advanced,

the meat may be washed or trimmed and cooked

thoroughly before release for consumption.

Sterile canned jn^oducts,—Sterile canned products will have a greater salvage potential than

will many other types of meat product because

the canned products are relatively resistant to

physical damage and can await the laj)se of the

denial time that must precede salvage in highly

contaminated areas.

Kadioactive contamination «can be removed from

the surface of cans by a relatively simple washing

procees. The * danger of nonpotable water or

sewer contamination may be eliminated by washing, dipping in a chlorine solution, and drying.

The monitor's knowledge of the normal appearance of cans will enable him to determine the

soundness of most of the product involved. Damaged canned goods must be carefully examined for

rust spots, seam damage, lack of vacuum, or other

defects. Obviously ruptured or swollen cans

should be disposed of without delay.

It would be desirable to incubate doubtful cans

if this IS feasible. The incubation period is to permit identification of incipient spoilage in progress

m slack vacuum cans, from rust spots having perforated the can, or seam ruptures not apparent to

the unaided eye. The absence of proper incubation temperatures may require the holding of these

cans if emergency conditions permit. Such decisions, however, should be based on the supply of

the food stocks and the calculated risk involved.

Products in ^Za6'6'.—Glass containers will, be

especially subject to crushing and breakage.

Radioactive material or contamination from polluted water easily lodges under screw caps or

friction-type lids and is difficult to remove.

Meat food product ingredients,—^^Cereals and

other meat food product ingredients will cake

when moistened, but some undamaged material

may be recovered from the center of bags and

drums. Radioactively contaminated fresh vegetables, such as potatoes, carrots, and onions, if not

crushed, can usually be salvaged by thorough

scrubbing and then peeling.

Glass splinters.—One of the most troublesome

results of the blast effect is the contamination of

the product with glass particles as from shattered

windows. The splinters are driven into cans and

through other types of product. No really satisfactory salvage procedure has been developed for

this type of contamination.

Radioactivity in Intestinal Contents of Animals

The contents of intestines will have a higher

radioactivity rate than will intestinal organs, kidney, and liver. It may be that the dilution factor

and the use of sewage screening devices will permit

the disposal of contaminated contents into municipal sewage lines without a serious radioactive

problem being created. In some situations, however, sewage lagoons may be the answer to this

problem, or it may be easier to remove the intestinal tract unopened and dispose of it by burial.

29
PART VIII.—AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE: INSTRUCTIONS AND

PROCEDURES

As assigned by Secretary's Memorandum No.

1489, Revised, the Agricultural Marketing Service

is responsible for "radiological monitoring of the

poultry slaughtering and processing plants subject to continuous AMS inspection and for agricultural commodities (including grain) owned by the

Commodity Credit Corporation or USDA (except

those stored on farms, ranches, or at bin sites) /'

Poultry Division

The following section includes suggested procedures for monitoring and salvaging poukry and

egg products. It is to be used as a reference and

'guide by the field personnel of the Poultry

Division, AMS, during the postattack recovery

phase in plants located in areas contaminated by

radioactive fallout, or in plants located in uncontaminated areas but receiving poultry and egg

products or other supplies from areas that may

be contaminated.

It is not possible to predict accurately all of the

circumstances that may affect the operation of the

poultry and egg-processing plants in the emergency period following a nuclear attack. However, instructions have been developed by the

Poultry Division that will shift operations to an

emergency basis. All areas of responsibility not

covered by emergency instructions will continue in

accordance with the laws, regulations, and policies

that apply under normal conditions.

Poultry Division employees shall conduct monitoring operations on poultry and eggs at inspected

plants. Eeports of radiation levels, damage assesment, and productive capacity at their assigned

station sites shall be provided to the USDA

County Defense Boards, which, in turn, shall

relay this information to the local civil defense

authorities.

If a nuclear attack should occur, poultry inspectors and egg product inspectors located in the

attack areas shall remain in sheltered areas until

the USDA County Defense Boards or local civil

defense authorities indicate that conditions are

once again safe for unsheltered activity. At that

time the poultry and egg product inspectors shall

proceed to carry out their inspection and monitoring assignments. If such information is not available, the criteria outlined in part VI, Personnel

Protection, shall be used. Initially, this may

involve advising processing plant management on

procedures necessary to clean and decontaminate

facilities in preparation for resuming production

activities.

The plant facilities shall be reasonably free of

radioactive fallout dust before the beginning of

operations, and all rooms, compartments, and

equipment shall be cleaned as frequently during

operation as is necessary to prevent entry of radioactive material into the product and to prevent

unnecessary exposure of plant employees to radiation. The background radiation level in the plant

must be low enough to permit the proper use of

the appropriate food-monitoring instruments.

(See page 140 of the USDA Radiological Training Manual for methods of decontaminating an

establishment.)

Ventilating systems shall be protected with filters adequate to exclude radioactive dust. Openings that could admit fallout to the plant shall be

closed.

Only water and ice that are relatively free of

radioactive contamination shall be used to wash

and chill the carcasses.

When production operations are resumed, monitoring and inspection procedures appropriate for

each individual plant's facilities, personnel, and

operation shall be instituted by each inspector or

grader in charge, to assure the production of a

wholesome product containing radioactive contamination within acceptable limits.

Monitoring Responsibilities of Poultry and Egg

Products Inspectors

In radiological monitoring, the poultry inspectors and e^g products inspectors have two major

responsibilities :

1. Supervision of processing operations to assure the production of poultry and egg products that are wholesome and relatively free

from radioactive fallout contamination or that

meet emergency standards of acceptability.

This will necessitate examining the product before,

during, and after processing, and a continual

examination of the processing environment to

assure that it is relatively free of fallout contaminants and acceptable for use. (See monitoring

procedures be^nning on page 24.)

2. Supervision of the decontamination procedures necessary to remove radioactive fallout from the surfaces of packaged products.

31
When packed in a container and sealed, a poultry

or egg product that is free of radioactive contaminants will not be contaminated l)y fallout unless

there is damage to the container, allowing contamination to enter, or unless the product comes

into contact with a contaminated suriace when

removed from the container.

Monitoring of Poultry and Poultry Products

The following monitoring' procedures shall be

followed in the inspection of poultry and poultry

products. ^ , , ^ All poultry or poultry products brought to an

official plant together and from one i)Oint of origin

shall be monitored on a lot basis, to determine

whether they have been contaminated with radioactive materials. Uncontaminated lots shall be

processed before contaminated lots. Precautions

necessary to assure that a wholesome product does

not become contaminated during processing must

be observed.

When a lot is found to be contaminated, it shall

be segregated while the le\ el of radioactivity and

the nature of the contamination are determined.

(See page 28, Salvaging Contaminated and Damaged Food.)

When a qualified monitor determines that a lot

of contaminated poultry may be handled safely

by employees working in the live poultry area, such

birds may be decontaminated by picking, eviscerating, and washing. In some cases it may be determined that heavily contaminated lots should be

returned to the farm and held under such conditions that radioactive decay and the bird's ability

to remove dust from its own feathers will render

the poultry safe for handling. If a lot is found

to be contaminated at a level that would constitute

a hazard to employees handling the product or to

other products being processed in the plant, it shall

be decontaminated if possible. If safe decontaminaton is not possible, poultry shall be condemned and disposed of in a manner that will preclude its use for human or animal food.

Monitoring procedures shall be carried out by

only those inspectors or graders who have been

trained and certified to act in this capacity. Monitoring shall be conducted on a lot basis by representative sampling. However, birds that, on antemortem inspection, are found to be contaminated

with fallout shall be examined with sufficient care

to assure that no carcasses contaminated beyond

the local limits of acceptability are passed for food.

(See Precautions When Dressing Contaminated

Animals, page 26.)

Representative samples of bone and meat shall

be exammed from lots showing evidence of internal

contamination. In some cases, the product may

be salvaged by raw boning before cooking.

If salvage can be, achieved by holding the product until radioactive decay has reduced the activity

to an acceptable level, the product shall be identified in a positive manner and segregated under

controlled conditions.

Decontamination of Live Poultry

Most decontamination of live poultry should

occur at the farm before shipment. Fortunately,

the producer may utilize some of the factors peculiar to poultry to decontaminate them with a

minimum danger to himself. Birds are more resistant to biological damage from radiation than

are most farm animals, and can and will shake

dust and debris from their feathers without significantly contaminating the skin. Therefore, if

the birds are placed in a suitable environment, they

may reasonably be expected to decontaminate

themselves effectively.

Unwarranted danger to personnel may result

from any attempt to decontaminate poultry on a

bird-by-bird basis. The length of time involved,

the dusty conditions that would prevail, and the

lack of any effective method (vacuuming or washing live poultry is not suitable) would make such

a procedure inadvisable.

Personnel employed in decontamination operations shall be protected in accordance with procedures recommended for handling live poultry.

Decontamination of Poultry Product Containers

Packaged poultry products, such as ready-tocook poultry in plastic bags, and canned products,

may be readily decontaminated when, after radioactive decay, they can be safely handled.

Usually the product, in its immediate container,

will be stored in a shipping container. Then decontamination can be accomplished by carefully

removing the product from the contaminated shipping container, removing any radioactive material

from its surface by washing, wiping, or vacuuming, and transferring the product to a clean shipping container.

Decontamination should be accomplished by the

simplest, most effective methods in the shortest

time and with the least possible radiation exposure

of personnel.

Processing Contaminated Poultry

Rigid controls must be used when processing contaminated poultry. They shall be processed last.

Management shall protect employees by requiring

that all persons handling such live poultry wear

suitable clothing and gloves to protect their body

surfaces from beta burns. Respirators will prevent the inhalation of radioactive dust. Short

work periods with frequent changes of clothing

and shower baths will further reduce the hazard.

Scalding tanks shall be overflowed at a rate adequate to prevent the buildup of high levels of radioactive debris in the tank. Line speeds shall be slow

enough to assure thorough bleeding so that birds

will not struggle upon entering the scalding water

32
and inhale contaminated water into their lungs and

air sacs. Any carcasses showing evidence that this

has occurred shall be condemned.

Feathers shall be removed from the plant frequently to avoid buildup of high levels of radioactivity. They should be disposed of in a manner

that will not create a hazard.

During the eviscerating process, particular care

shall be exercised to see that no tissues contaminated by contents of the alimentary canal are

passed for food. Most of the fallout material ingested by the poultry will remain in the digestive

tract.

Lungs shall be completely removed from all

poultry received from fallout areas. If radioactive particles have been inhaled, they will be deposited on the surfaces of the respiratory passages

and the air sacs. Tanks and vacuum lines used

for lung removal shall be emptied frequently.

Kidneys tend to accumulate high levels of

cesium. They shall be removed from all lots of

poultry that show any evidence of fallout contamination.

Gizzards shall not be saved from such poultry.

The possibility of contamination with ingesta

containing fallout material is too great.

Evisceration shall be followed by a very

thorough internal and external wash.

Grading

During an emergency period created by a nuclear. attack, the gradmg of poultry and shell

eggs will be suspended. All graders involved in

these activities shall be assigned to food management functions, such as salvage, reporting supplies, and food monitoring.

Eggs and Other Poultry Products

Egg products inspectors shall, as previously

stated, resume their inspection and monitoring activities as soon as the egg-processing plants to

which they are assigned are put back into operation.

Monitoring and inspection activity at eggproducts plants shall assure that only wholesome

egg products relatively free of radioactive contaminants are released for food.

Steps necessary for such assurance shall include

examination of all products received for processing and continual monitoring of processing

operations, to assure that the processing rooms,

equipment, and product remain substantially free

of radioactive fallout.

If products are received in contaminated containers or if shells are lightly contaminated,

suitable methods for decontamination, such as

Justing, vacuuming, or washing, shall be employed,

(bee page 28 for additional information.)

Products found to be contaminated at levels

acceptable for use in accordance with official emergency instructions may be passed. If holding the

products will, through radioactive decay, bring the

contamination to an acceptable level, the product

may be retained.

Under emergency conditions, poultry or egg

products may be processed under conditions that

do not assure their wholesomeness from bacterial

contamination as defined by applicable regulations.

This may be a result of inadequate water supply,

shortage of chilling media, shortage of plant personnel, or lack of qualified inspectors.

If such a situation exists, the product shall be

identified so that it can be treated as a questionable

product by the ultimate consumer or by authorities

m charge of food distribution to prevent outbreaks

of foodborne disease. Such products could be

safely consumed if they are thoroughly cooked to

destroy the bacteria before decomposition occurs.

(For additional information see pages 25 through

Food Products of Commodity Credit

Corporation and USDA

The following information is presented for consideration and guidance in developing defense

plans and radiological monitoring and salvage

procedures for AMS field personnel responsible

for monitoring and handling food products of the

Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) or USDA.

CGC Stored Food Products and Containers

Generally, the CCC stored food products and

types of containers are as follows :

Food Product Commodity Type of Container

Butter Fiber boxes, 64-pound.

Cheese In blocks, 40- and 70-pound;

and in processed loaves, 5-

pound.

Milk, Nonfat dried Kraft, multiwalled bags, 100-

pound, and in 4i/^-pound

boxes in cartons.

Butter oil Cans, tin, 7-pound and 10-

pound.

Lard shortening Metal cans, 3-pound and 50-

pound.

Dried eggs Metal cans, 13-ounce and 3-

pound.

Cottonseed and soybean oil. Metal containers, 1- and 5-

gallon.

Cottonseed oil (refined) Steel storage tanks, large,

( nonedible ). stationary.

Honey— Metal containers, 5-gallon

cans and 55-gallon drums.

Canned meats Metal cans.

Beans Cardboard boxes, 2-pound and

100-pound bags.

Shelled peanuts Burlap bag, lOO-pound.

Farmers' stock peanuts Bulk storage in warehouses.

Milled rice Cloth bags.

Barley, Corn, Grain sor- (These stocks are in bulk

ghums, Oats, Rye, Soy- .storage at bin sites or in

beans, Wheat. warehouses, and include

terminals, subterminals,

and country elevators.)

33
Protecting Food Stocks From Radioactivity

Stored foods do not become radioactive merely

bv beinff in an area subject to radiological contamination. Radioactive material, however, may

be deposited upon the surface of exposed tood or

upon containers storing food. Radioactive material may also be dissolved or suspended in water.

Food can be contaminated by washing with contaminated water.

The bulk storage stocks will be largely subject

to salvage unless located in areas of more extensive physical damage. An important principle

is to prevent the spread of surface radiological

contamination. The surface of bulk stocks could

be carefully removed so that the inside would not

be contammated by the removal of the surface.

Stacked products should be handled in a similar

manner since the contamination would be mostly

on the outside packages or boxes.

Procedures for Avoiding Contamination of

Stored Food

To the extent possible, care should be exercised

to prevent entry of contaminants into any stored

food. Contamination is more easily prevented

than removed. Introduction of contarainants can

be minimized by closing and sealing, if possible,

all doors, windows, or other entrances to storage

space before the arrival of fallout, and by care

in avoiding any later introduction of contaminants

through (1) the ventilation system, (2) use of

contaminated equipment in movement of the

foods, or (3) exposure of food or containers in

transportation.

Decontamination Procedures for Food and

Containers

If monitoring indicates that food or food containers have become contaminated, use a vacuum

cleaner to remove all possible dust from outer

containers (e.g., cases of fiber boxes). This

method can also be used with a fair degree of success for removing much of the contamination from

paper, cloth, and burlap bags. When usin^ a

vacuum cleaner, take care to prevent spreading

dust from the exhaust from the vacuum cleaner

into the storage space, and use extreme care in

removing the collected radioactive material from

the vacuum cleaner. Bury such material. If

vacuum cleaning is not possible, a reasonable substitute is to brush the material thoroughly in an

area where the radioactive dust will not spread

to other foods.

Canned products,—Remove outer cartons or

boxes of a stack of stored products without contaminating the cartons or boxes remaining in the

stack. When removing cans from contaminated

cartons or boxes, take care not to transfer contamination to the surface of the cans. Repack in

clean containers. If the cans themselves have

radioactive contamination, measures for correcting this are outlined on page 29.

Cans of lard, butter oil, shortening, cottonseed

oil, and honey would not be especially endangered

by a small perforation or seam rupture except

for the leakage of liquid products. Stacks of

canned products that have become wet will continue to rust unless the stack is opened and the

cans dried. Procedures to be undertaken in case

canned products are contaminated with nonpotable water are outlined on page 29.

Metal containers of food should be thoroughly

scrubbed with a detergent solution in clean water

to remove radioactive materials. This is especially important just before opening the container

for use. The wash water should oe disposed of

in a manner that will not subject people or food

products to further* contamination.

The handling of meats in damaged cans is discussed on page 29.

Fiher-hoxed products cund mvZtilayer hags,—

These products offer good protection against radiological contamination. However, the containers

will be especially susceptive to pnysical damage

by flying glass or other objects, and water contamination would make salvage difficult.

Steel storage tanks.—^A higher percentage of

salvageability from all products stored in this

manner is anticipated.

Any food in sealed storage tanks, such as cottonseed oil in the process of further refining, is quite

secure from contamination by radioactive material. The only precaution suggested is care of

the material after it is removed from the storage

tank.

Bagged products.—Fallout is difficult to remove

from the outside surface of these containers, and

removal of the contents without contamination is

most difficult. Water damage and penetration of

flying objects could cause a high loss in this type

of product.

Farmers' stock peanuts are usually stored in

bulk storage Avarehouses. If these storages are

not reasonably tight during fallout and the period

immediately following, the peanuts may become

contaminated. Much of this contamination will

remain on the shell during the shelling process

and therefore would be removed from the edible

product. This may require special precautions

m the shelling process. Proper disposal should

be made of peanut shells which have been exposed

to fallout contamination.

Bulk stocks.—A high proportion of exposed

bulk stocks may be salvaged by removing the top

several inches of the radiological contamination

without recontaminating the deeper layers. When

these bulk stocks are contaminated with water, the

outer w^et layer tends to congeal and form a solid

surface after several days. Often the undamaged

center can be recovered by boring through the

outer layer and permitting the center to flow out

by gravity.

34
Bulk grains generally are stored in elevators, Monitoring Procedures for Human and Animal

and are thus well protected from contamination. Food

The principal precaution to be taken with such ^ ^ ^ . . ^ n

ffrain is to keep out contaminated air, especially ^ee page 27 for monitoring procedures for

luring the aeriation process. However, a good Products intended for human consumption, and

filter will remove a great deal of this contamina- P'^^^ ^1 f^^ monitormg of animal food.

tion. Care should be taken to avoid contamina- Personnel Protection

tion of the grain as it is taken out of the elevator,

and while in transit to the point of further proc- See part VI for details regarding personnel

essing. protection.

35
PART IX.—FOREST SERVICE: INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

As delegated by Secretary's Memorandum No.

1489, Revised, dated Febiniary 7, 1963, the Forest

Service is responsible for "guidance and coordination of monitoring for rural fire control and

operational monitoring on lands within National

Yovest boundaries and all State or privately

owned forest and range land protected by the

Forest Service under cooperative agreement.''

This section will show specific Forest Service procedures applying to this responsibility.

Organization for FS Radiological

Monitoring

Forest Service organization will generally include a station of one complete minimum set of

operational monitoring equipment for each of approximately 800 ranger districts. This guideline

may be modified, depending upon size of district,

local population, forest use, and defense capability

of other agencies in the area.

Each region will provide a monitoring plan

that will show the radiological monitoring equipment needed by location and amount, and the essential trained monitoring personnel to do its

assigned jobs.

In addition, the Forest Service will provide individual personnel dosimeters as required for continuity of program performance, up to 100 percent

of personnel and Station or office locations.

Reallocation of equipment during emergency

may be necessary.

Training of FS Monitors

Forest Service training objectives for radiological defense will provide :

1. Qualified radiological instructors, to

achieve a regional average of one per National Forest.

2. Four trained radiological monitors for

each station. If there are less than 4 employees at a station, all will be trained.

3. Information to all personnel essential to

their safety and continued functioning

during emergencies.

4. Minimum chemical, biological, first aid,

and other defense training essential to the

program.

Training programs will be in accordance with

USDA standards in part II of this Handbook.

Monitoring for FS Operations

All operations of the Forest Service in nuclear

radiation emergencies will involve four procedural approaches :

1. Personnel safety and protection.

2. Land or area monitoring where operational

projects are conducted.

3. Product or material monitoring as required for project work.

4. Providing monitoring information to civil

defense and other agencies on a cooperative basis.

Monitoring for Personnel Protection

Monitoring for personnel protection will be

based on the standards and practices set forth in

part VI, Personnel Protection.

A radiological safety officer will be appointed in

each forest headquarters to evaluate radiological

defense problems. He should have had training

as a radiological instructor or radiological defense

officer.

Monitoring Lands for Field Activities

Since all Forest Service field activities involve

outdoor work on lands subject to residual radiation, monitoring of those lands will be required

to assure protection and continued essential production without undue personnel hazard. Radiation intensities in work areas will be monitored,

and sufficient continuous record will be kept to

establish intensities of residual radiation and rates

of decay. Using these figures, supervisory personnel will assure that time spent in work in contaminated areas will not cause personnel exposures

in excess of the standards set for personnel protection. Monitors will use standard land or area

monitoring procedures for obtaining this information.

Specific considerations for individual activities

of the Forest Service follow, with standards and

guidance as they apply. In the absence of specific

standards, monitoring of all forest products will

be done with a survey meter, and any significant

increase in background radiation from any products will be reported to a radiological safety officer or a radiological monitoring instructor for

evaluation.

Monitoring for Fire Control

Fire-control monitoring is primarily a process

of area or land monitoring to assure safety of per37
sonnel engaged in fire-control activities Standard

Sermomtoring procedures will be used. Unsafe

SeL wni be^^^^^^ on the basis of the criteria

set forth in part VI, Personnel Protection, page 17.

All reS«^ users, cooperative ñreÍighting

agtncies, and associated land n-^^^^g^^f^J^j^^^^^

should be notified of hazardous areas ot their

'""cSderation should be given to such secondary

hazards as radioactive smoke from fires in heavily

contaminated areas, and associated fallout trom

the smoke. • i . ^.j. w. All fire-control personnel required to woik m

contaminated areas will be supplied with dosimeters, either individually or one for a group, and

the crew or individual exposure will not be allowed in excess of emergency personnel standards

previously given.

Monitoring for Timber Management

There are no specific standards for internal timber product contamination. External contamination can be substantially reduced by washing with

quantities of water, or by the normal floating m

log ponds, streams, etc. Drainage from washing

operations should be monitored and if radioactive

should not be allowed to flow into clear drainages

and cause further contamination.

Log ponds at sawmills or loading terminals

should be monitored if any possibility of contaminated timber exists, because of the possibility of

both short-term radioactive dust accumulation and

long-term adsorption in banks and mud bottoms

of long-life radioisotopes.

Monitoring for Watershed Management

The Forest Service is not responsible for monitoring individual or community water supplies.

However, since most Forest Service lands are

watersheds for large numbers of water users, the

Forest Service should provide information to the

direct or indirect watershed users on contaminated

watersheds feeding their supplies. Any noticeable

contamination of watersheds should be reported

to the USDA County Defense Board and to community and individual watershed users so they can

arrange to have their water supply tested. Also,

special attention should be given to monitoring

open-storage reservoirs and stock tanks.

Monitoring for Grazing and Wildlife

Monitoring for grazing and wildlife is essentially an area monitoring problem. All grazing

permittees should be notified of hazardous areas.

Livestock in general are more resistant to radiation

than are humans, but the same standards can be

used as guides to protective action. For example.

if monitoring and calculations show that livestock

have received a dose of 550 roentgens within a 4-

day period, moving them to a safe area will save

only a portion of them. Specific livestock protection procedures can be found on page 22. The best

protection is to move to a safe area if possible.

In the absence of other specific standards, permittees, hunters, and the Animal Disease Eradication Division, ARS, should be notified of known

livestock exposure on contaminated grazing lands.

Criteria on slaughter of exposed animals are found

on page 25.

It should be remembered that the meat of animals exposed to radiation is not damaged if the

animals are slaughtered before serious illness develops, so long as the radioactive material itself

does not physically contaminate the meat. See

page 43 concerning short-term denial, to children,

of milk produced in fallout contaminated areas.

Monitoring for Forest Land Management

The long-term strontium 90 hazard and specific

strontium 90 tests may result in denial of use of

land for direct food products consumption. Firstorder denial might be to dairy animals, then to

fresh vegetable food production. In case of longterm denial of such lands, a logical and practical

diversion could be to timber production. Similarly,

forest lands uncontaminated by the long-life strontium 90 might need to be converted to farm production to assure continued food production.

Such land-use adjustments will be directed by

the Secretary of Agriculture, but the Forest Service will advise on suitability for conversions.

Monitoring for Other FS Activities

Monitoring for engineering, recreation, State

and private and cooperative forestry and fire control, pest control, flood prevention, planting, and

forest diseases is essentially a land monitormg procedure for protecting personnel. Standard area

monitoring procedures will be used, and personnel

exposure standards observed.

Early warning of all forest users, such as permittees, residents, and recreation area users, when

hazardous fallout is monitored, will be a responsibility of the Forest Service.

Administration, personnel management, and

public relations activities will be directed toward

meeting the primary Forest Service responsibilities in emergency conditions.

Montoring information from these practices, as

well as technical information and assistance, wiU

be made available on request to any authorized

State, local, or Federal government agency or

public activity whenever practical and in the

public interest.

38
PART X.—SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE:

PROCEDURES

INSTRUCTIONS AND

Secretary's Memorandum No. 1489, Revised,

dated February 7, 1&63, states, in part :

The Soil Conservation Service is responsible for radiological monitoring of agricultural lands and water, farm

commodities stored or harvestable on farms, ranches, and

at ibin sites, and advising on safety for livestock.

This section provides suggestions for carrying

out Soil Conservation Service monitoring activities. It is impossible to anticipate every situation

that might occur in an emergency. Therefore,

these guidelines may be altered as more experience

is gained and further information is developed.

Good judgment in monitoring and interpreting

the information is, of course, essential.

Organization and Training of SCS Monitors

Operational monitoring stations will be established at each of the approximately 3,000 work

unit and subunit offices. These stations will have

the necessary equipment and trained personnel to

conduct radiological monitoring. The State Soil

Scientists will also be supplied with radiological

instruments and will be responsible for maintaining proficiency of personnel and equipment

throughout the state. A sufficient number of monitoring instructors will be trained in each State to

assist the State Soil Scientists in developing

proficiency among the monitors.

Each of the five SCS training centers will have

equipment and personnel qualified to give monitoring training to new Service personnel who pass

through the centers.

Personnel Safety

See part VI, Personnel Protection, for procedures to be followed.

Protecting Instruments from

Contamination

The monitor should prevent radiological contamination of the instruments at all times. Instruments can be placed in a thin clear plastic

bag to prevent contamination. In case of contamination, they can be cleaned with acloth dampened

in a mild soap solution. After decontamination,

each instrument should be monitored with a

CD V-700 to assure that contaminating material

is removed.

Reconnaissance Surveys

When To Conduct a Reconnaissance

A reconnaissance of the county or work unit is

first made to determine the levels of radiation and

the uniformity of radioactive contamination.

This should ibe done within the limits of allowable

personnel exposure, which should be determined

before starting the reconnaissance. Monitors

should keep their survey meters and dosimeters

with them at all times whenever an emergency has

been declared or an attack is imminent. The

monitor should know the specific accomplishment,

extent, and importance of each monitoring mission. Care should be taken to prevent the survey

meters from becoming contaminated. This will

reduce the chance of incorrect readings. The

vehicle to be used in the reconnaissance survey

should be stored under cover to help protect it

from contamination by radioactive fallout prior

to its use.

A reconnaissance survey should not be attempted as long as the radiation level is increasing.

How To Conduct a Reconnaissance

The pattern of road systems, terrain, land use,

and farm size will vary greatly from county to

county. This, along with variation in intensity of

fallout, will influence the type of reconnaissance

survey needed. Therefore, detailed plans for

monitoring must reflect local conditions at the

time the survey is made.

An initial ground survey through the county

with readings every few miles will indicate the

level and uniformity of the fallout. Any unusual

conditions should be noted. If the radiation is

uniform, further reconnaissance survej^s will not

be necessary unless additional fallout is received.

If additional information is needed, a more intensive survey can then be made. The pattern of

these more intensive surveys will depend largely

on the road system in the area.

In areas where the road system follows section

lines, a grid-type reconnaissance map can be developed. Where the road system is irregular, the

reconnaissance survey will of necessity follow the

same pattern. Extremely hilly or mountainous

areas may affect the pattern of the reconnaissance

survey.

In any case where the radiation is not uniform

over the county, it will be necessary to conduct

39
more detailed surveys to det^mme the areas of

high and low radiation and the extent ot each.

Localized areas of hij^h-intensity radiation or hot

spots" may be present in the area being monitored.

The monitor should be constantly on the alert tor

these while conducting the reconnaissance.

A map can be developed showing lines of equal

radiation (isoint^nsity lines), similar to a contour

map showing lines of equal elevations. This will

clearly indicate the areas of high and low radiation levels. Base maps should be developed before the emergency, for use in making reconnaissance surveys. These should show the anticipated

routes along which the meter readings will be

taken. A system of identifying the locations at

which the readings are to be taken shoidd be developed by some locally accepted method. This

will permit interchange of information on radiation levels by telephone between monitors and the

USDA County Defense Board office.

It is important that the survey meter readings

taken during the reconnaissance be representative

of the general area around the locations at which

the readings were taken. Thus the location at

which the reading is taken should be on a topography typical of the area. Factors that might

affect fallout intensity are buildings, vehicles,

fences, windows, ditches, woods, hills, or large

bodies of water. Readings should be taken so as

to lessen the effect, so far as possible, of these factors. Record the dose rate, the time, and location for each reading. If readings are taken within a vehicle, this should be noted. Until the level

of radiation is known, care should be taken so that

the monitor does not needlessly contaminate himself or the instrument.

The pocket dosimeter should be read at frequent intervals to determine the accumulated

dose.

All readings should be taken as quickly as possible in order to minimize the exposure of the

persons taking them. An effort should be made to

lessen the effect of gamma shielding by the monitor's body. This can be done by holding the surv^ey

meter at arm's length. Tlie survey meter should

be held approximately 3 feet above the surface of

the ground or above the material being monitored.

Using Reconnaissance Information

Information obtained from a reconnaissance

should be furnished to the USDA County Defense

Board and the local civil defense officials. This

will provide a basis for Defense Board actions and

recommendations. The information furnished to

the local civil defense officials will give them a

more accurate picture of the situation in their

local area.

Cooperation, continued liaison, and interchange

of mformation with local civil defense officials

are essential in order to avoid duplication of monitoring activities. Procedures should be developed

locally to facilitate this close working relation40

ship. Information obtained by local civil defense

monitors should be coordinated with that of

USDA monitors to provide the broadest possible

picture of the fallout situation.

Information on the levels of radiation should

be made available to the rural people. This would

be done following a prearranged plan with the

USDA County Defense Board and local civil defense officials. All methods of rapid communication should be considered.

It will be necessary to report the dose rate at

each monitoring headquarters location to the appropriate USDA office. The standard message

format will be used. This will facilitate reporting

to the USDA State Defense Board. Guidelines

for reporting are found in part V, Procedures

When Emergency Occurs, page 15. The agency

designation (initials) and the full name of the

monitoring station location will be used to indicate

location from which the message originated. Any

unusual conditions should also be reported to the

USDA State Defense Board.

Monitoring Agricultural Land

A gamma radiation level of 1 roentgen per hour

at 3 feet from the ground surface corresponds approximately to 10 microcuries per square centimeter of surface contamination. This approximation is valid only for surface contanunation on

land or crops. If some of the land has been cultivated and the fallout mixed in, it will not contribute fully to the reading on the survey meter.

This would result in a reading that is too low.

On pasture land, with the survey meter held at

a height of 3 feet, a gamma radiation level of 0.2

roentgen per hour would be the equivalent of about

2 microcuries of beta activity per gram of fresh

forage. During the first 30 days immediately following a nuclear explosion, a level of 0.2 roentgen

per hour on pasture land is within the acceptable

risk. If at any time during the first 30 days the

radiation level decreases to 0.2 roentgen per hour,

the pasture land can then safely be used for the

remainder of the 30-day period.

Even if the radiation levels exceed 0.2 roentg^en

per hour, it may be necessary to permit brief

periods of pasturing, for it is better to give contaminated feed than to permit the animals to

starve. The objective is to provide feed with the

lowest possible contamination. The movement of

feed from an area less contaminated, or the movement of the livestock to a less contaminated area,

should be considered. The USDA State Defense

Boards will have know ledge of radiation levels,

based on reports by monitoring locations, of areas

from w hich feed might be obtained or to which

livestock might be sent.

Cows that are to be used to produce milk for

infants should not be permitted to graze on pastureland where the radiation level exceeds 0.06

roentgen per hour. This may necessitate a priority for giving these animals feed which has been
sheltered or for moving in feed from areas which

have not been exposed to fallout.

If initial monitoring indicates unacceptable levels of radiation, an estimation of decay time to

acceptable levels can be made and remonitoring

carried out later. Rains which wash off the fallout material and new pasture growth will also

reduce the contamination. The above acceptable

risk limits are based on the assumption that the

surface contamination was 2 microcuries per

square centimeter, or 80 curies per acre of area,

and that 10 percent of this was retained on the

forage. It also assumes that the fresh weight of

forage amounts to about 5 tons per acre.

After this 30-day period, a new acceptable risk

level should be determined. These new risk levels

will be based on guidelines that will be furnished

by the Department of Agriculture on the national

level.

A determination must be made of the type and

extent of elements present in the particular fallout causing the contamination before the guides

can be applied.

Effects of Fallout on Land Use

Specific Responsibilities of SCS

As stated on page 39, the Soil Conservation

Service is responsible for planning and directing,

within the county, a program of guidance on the

use of land and water under emergency conditions.

This will include devoting the best adapted lands

to the production of the most needed crops and

the application of adapted and needed conservation measures. It may be necessary to bring new

land into cultivation to meet emergency needs.

These lands should also be protected with adequate conservation measures.

Lands unsuited for agricultural production because of radioactive contamination must be located. These should be identified, by location and

extent, on maps made available to USDA Defense

Boards, local civil defense, local government officials, and the landowners aflFected. Eadioactive

areas that are determined to be above the limits

considered safe for people to live without special

shelters should also be delineated. The presence

of these areas should also be made known to all

concerned. Local civil defense ofläcials may wish

to consider marking these areas.

Contamination by Radioactive Materials

For weeks following a heavy deposition of fresh

fallout, iodine 131 may be a major radioactive contaminant of vegetation, including food crops

such as fresh vegetables and fruits. After ingestion by animals and poultry, iodine is rapidly

absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract, collected

in the thyroid gland, and secreted in milk and

eggs.

In the event of a nuclear attack, radioiodine

would be the most critical single factor in the contamination of milk durinfí: the first few weeks

after an explosion. The hazard would decrease

relatively rapidly because of radioactive decay,

but the short-time problem would be serious in

some areas.

As the external radiation hazard (gamma)

from the initial fallout decreases, the internal hazard (beta) becomes more significant. It might

be 6 months or longer before the strontium 90

becomes the major problem in agricultural production. However, after the first 60 days the

principal hazard of radioactive contamination in

milk arises from strontium 89 and strontium 90.

The strontium 89 will have virtually disappeared

by 1 year after its formation. Like other radioactive isotopes of fallout, strontium 90 falls on

the surface of plants and can be consumed with

foods and forage. Some of the strontium 90 is

deposited directly on the soil or washed into it,

remaining indefinitely—for all practical purposes—in the top several inches of untilled land.

The return to earth of strontium 90 in worldwide

fallout from large nuclear detonations is rather

slow. Eainfall is the principal mechanism that

brings strontium 90 from the atmosphere to the

ground.

The determination of lands which are not suitable for agricultural purposes must be based on

levels of strontium 90 contamination. Other

radioactive isotopes are not of great concern because they are either not taken up from the soil by

plants, are taken up in much smaller amounts, or

they have such short- "half-lives"'that they decay

to insignificant amounts in a relatively short time.

The acceptable levels of strontium 90 depend upon

the use to be made of the agricultural products and

the calcium content of the soil.

Recommending Denials in Land Use

One of the first postattack decisions to be made

by agricultural leaders is how to use land contaminated with fallout in order to continue to produce, indefinitely, a diet that permits the survival

of the people Avithout exposing them to unacceptable internal radiation hazards. Land denial

levels are based on the expected strontium 90 content of the foods to be grown on the land. Land

contamination levels for denial of the use of the

land for the various food groups may be raised

or lowered as more information becomes available.

Under no circumstances should land be cultivated

if the farmer or rancher would thereby expose

himself to unacceptable levels of external radiation.

The denial of land use, based on the strontium 90

analyses, is suggested for an indefinite period unless modified by other measures. For example,

decontamination of the soil by such methods as

surface soil removal and deep plowing would make

the land more suitable for agricultural production.

Several months or longer might elapse before

strontium 90 analyses could be made on many contaminated soils. Therefore, it is recommended

41
that temporary land use be based on thesüindardized gamma radiation mtensity at H + 1. boiJs

may be classed as low-, medium-, and high-calcium,

with 2,000 pounds available calcuum per acre considered low; 6,000 pounds, medium; and oO,000

pounds, high. These fall within the ranges indicated on the calcium-content map. (bee hg. b.)

The recommended intensities above which cultivation of the land should be denied are 100, ÔOO,

and 1,000 roentgens per hour, respectively, for the

low-, medium-, and high-calcium soils. The purpose of the temporary limitations is to minimize, m

a practical manner, the cultivation of land that

should be decontaminated before plowing. This

temporary denial will preclude tillage that would

incorporate the fallout material into the soil profile. The temporary denial should remain in etïect

until a decision is made as to whether to attempt

decontamination for use by special crops or to permit cultivation for use by crops with a low strontium 90 uptake.

The reason for the denial of land on a permanent basis is an excessive strontium 90 content in

the soil. The use of land that monitoring indicates may have an excess of strontium 90 should

be denied until a laboratory analysis can be made.

Guidelines for collecting the samples of soil to be

analyzed for strontium 90 content will be issued by

the national office when the decision is made to collect samples. Cultivation will tend to mix the

radioactive isotopes on the surface of the soil

throughout the soil profile to the depth of tillage.

This may make later decontamination impossible.

Exchangeable Calcium Content of Soil

The map of the exchangeable calcium content of

United States soil (fig. 6) can be used as a general

indication of where calcium deficiencies might be

expected. County maps showing levels of available calcium in soils should be developed in the

preemergency period. Individual farm soil fertility test results will also provide valuable information if available in an emergency.

Alternative Land Uses

It may be necessary to remove from food production lands that are heavily contaminated with

certain isotopes until the radioactivity has decayed

to levels permitting safe use. Such lands might

be planted to fiber or lumber producing crops.

This decision will depend on the results of an

analysis of the radioactive isotopes in the particular fallout causing the contamination.

FiGUKE 6.—Map of exchangeable calcium content of United States soil.

42
Land that is less contaminated may be removed

from the production of certain types of crops and

planted to other crops less likely to take up the

radioactive materials from the soil. Land use for

this purpose, starting with the crops most susceptible to strontium 90 uptake, is classified as follows :

(1) dairy animal forage and leafy vegetables; (2)

other vegetables, cereal grains, and fruits; (3)

feed for poultry and meat animals; and (4) fiber

crops, vegetable oils, and chemically processed

foods. Land may be shifted from cropland to

grassland if it may be safely used for meat production purposes. These recommendations will be

based upon the level of radioactive contamination,

the type of soil that is contaminated, the crops that

are adapted, and the needs for particular crops.

Remedial Measures Against Fallout

Countermeasures against radioactive fallout

include those actions that would reduce or eliminate the exposure of the population to the hazards

of radioactive materials. These procedures should

be directed to the source of the contamination, to

the mechanism that transmits it, or to the substance in which it gains access.

Eemedial measures such as decontamination of

land would be taken only after responsible authorities had carefully evaluated the situation and

declared a state of emergency. The decision would

not be an easy one. Medical assessment of the

probable damage from radiation would have to be

oalanced against the cost of the decontamination

measures, the resulting reduction in available

food supplies, and the economic and social dislocations resulting from the action.

Countermeasures could be drastic, or they could

involve changes in generally accepted farming

practices. Some measures could be simply an

improvement over local conditions and procedures. Some countermeasures could result in reducing the contaminant by only a small factor,

but a combination of several of these measures

could provide the necessary reduction.

These may include adding lime to acid soils,

removing contaminated crop residues, removing

radioactive surface soil, or deep plowing to place

the radioactivity below the root zone of the crops

to ibe grown.

In general, the addition of lime, gypsum, fertilizer, or organic matter in practical amounts to

low-calcium soils will help to reduce the uptake

of strontium by the plant by less than one-half.

For most soils and crops, it is recommended that

lime not be applied in excess of the amount of

calcium needed for maximum crop growth. In

the production of small cereal grains, addition of

ïïioTe calcium than is needed for optimal growth

may be helpful in reducing the strontium hazard,

without reducing the quality or quantity of the

crop.

The application of lime to established pastures

increases the calcium content of the vegetation.

An application rate of 2 tons of lime per acre, for

example, has lowered the ratio of strontium to

calcium in pasture gi'ass by two-thirds.

Remedial measures such as decontamination by

deep plowing or scraping should be recommended

only if the agricultural land has been seriously

contaminated with strontium 90. These measures, which may permanently bury the radioactivity or concentrate it where it is stockpiled, should

not be recommended until responsible authorities

have determined that such decontamination measures are advantageous or necessary.

It might be necessary to reduce the radioactivity

in small, highly contaminated areas. It also may

be necessary to reduce the radioactivity in small

parcels of land where the entire area is blanketed

with radioactive contamination. The decisions to

apply drastic decontamination measures will be

based on many factors. Among these are the personal dangers, cost, available food supplies, and

possible dislocation of people living in the area.

It is assumed that information and guidance on

land-use shifts will be provided by the State and

national levels of the Soil Conservation Service in

time of an emergency, but that this assistance will

be based on the information obtained by the SCS

monitor in the field.

Monitoring Agricultural Water

The general method for monitoring livestock

water from ponds or tanks would be the same as

that of monitoring food for human consumption,

as described in Monitoring of Meat and Meat Food

Products, page 27. Since 100 milliroentgens per

hour is beyond the range of the CD V-700 survey

meter, it will be necessary to support the probe a

few inches above the sample to be measured. This

will reduce the activity readings, after they have

been corrected for background, by a constant factor. The reduction factor should be determined,

using a sample within the range of the CD V-700

when the probe is held one-fourth inch from the

sample.

Runoff may have a tendency to concentrate the

fallout and result in higher radioactivity levels in

ponds and at the base of slopes. However, it is

probable that the radioactive contamination of

bodies of water will soon become less than that of

surrounding land because the radioactive fallout

will settle and be adsorbed by clay particles in the

bottom and sides.

Table 6 indicates that the acceptable risk levels

for animals are higher than those for human

beings, except for dairy cattle furnishing milk for

infants or children. This restriction for dairy

cattle reflects the need to keep the iodine 131 intake

of children much lower than that of adults.

43
TABLE %,—Suggested emergency levels for aninutl

feed and loater immediately after a nuclear

explosion

[30-day acceptable risk level]

Use of food and water

Dairy cattle (milk fed to infants under 2 years of age).

Dairy cattle (milk fed to children from 2 to 16 years of

age).

Other animals

Acceptable level ^

3 mr/hr above background.

10 mr/hr above background.

100 mr/hr above background.

1 Measured with CD V-700 probe (with shield open)

held )i inch from sample in coffee can or similar contamer,

except to measure a sample which would read 100 milliroentgens per hour at this distance. Then the probe

must be supported several inches from the sample.

This table will provide a basis for evaluating the

acceptability of livestock feed and water contaminated by radioactive fallout. For livestock,

the risk levels are acceptable for a 30-day emergency period. It would be better to exceed these

levels somewhat than to star\^e the animals or to

expose personnel to dangerous levels of radiation

in order to provide safer feed and water to livestock.

Monitoring Stored Crops

The procedure for monitoring stored crops

would be the same as for food and water. Stored

crops would be partially or completely protected

from contamination by fallout. Grain stored in a

tight bin, ensilage in a covered silo, haystacks

covered with a tarpaulin, and similarly protected

materials should have little or no contamination.

Many other materials, such as uncovered haystacks

and piles of farm produce, could be used if the

contaminated outer portions were removed. Ifthe

outer portions are found acceptable by monitoring,

then the inner portions can be used with confidence.

Monitoring Unharvested Crops

The first s:tep would be to determine whether

workers can safely carry out harvest operations.

Harvest should not be recommended where excessive exposure to workers would result.

Procedures for monitoring unharvested crops

would be much the same as for monitoring feed

and water. It will be necessary to obtain a representative sample of the harvestable portion of the

crop. The sample may be obtained by the regular

harvest method and checked for radioactivity

level.

Weather and normal radioactive decay may

lower the radiation level, thus permitting a later

harvest if the initial radiation is too high.

Advising on Livestock Safety

Livestock owners wall generally find it impractical to remove animals from fallout areas.

Therefore, it is desirable to have facilities for the

care of animals in some type of shelter. Every

effort should be made to supply at least a 2-week

supply of uncontaminated feed and water. Animals should be kept under shelter at least during

the first critical period of 24 to 48 hours. If feed,

water, or shelter space is not available for all animals, priority should be given first to milk-producing or other food-producing animals. Details

on livestock protection can be found on page 22.

44

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963 O—686-996