AIRBORNE

ELECTRONIC 

ATTACK

Achieving Mission 

Objectives Depends 

on Overcoming 

Acquisition 

Challenges

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

March 2012

GAO-12-175

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-175, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

March 2012

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on 

Overcoming Acquisition Challenges

Why GAO Did This Study

Airborne electronic attack involves the 

use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or 

suppress enemy air defense and 

communications systems. Proliferation 

of sophisticated air defenses and 

advanced commercial electronic 

devices has contributed to the 

accelerated appearance of new 

weapons designed to counter U.S. 

airborne electronic attack capabilities. 

GAO was asked to assess (1) the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

strategy for acquiring airborne 

electronic attack capabilities, 

(2) progress made in developing and 

fielding systems to meet airborne 

electronic attack mission requirements, 

and (3) additional actions taken to 

address capability gaps. To do this, 

GAO analyzed documents related to 

mission requirements, acquisition and 

budget needs, development plans, and 

performance, and interviewed DOD 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD conduct 

program reviews for certain new, key 

systems to assess cost, schedule, and 

performance; determine the extent to 

which the most pressing capability 

gaps can be met and take steps to fill 

them; align service investments in 

science and technology with the 

departmentwide electronic warfare 

priority; and review capabilities 

provided by certain planned and 

existing systems to ensure investments 

do not overlap. DOD agreed with three 

recommendations and partially agreed 

with the two aimed at reducing 

potential overlap among systems. DOD 

plans to assess coordination among 

systems, whereas GAO sees 

opportunities for consolidation, as 

discussed in the report.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) evolving strategy for meeting airborne 

electronic attack requirements centers on acquiring a family of systems, including 

traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, 

and related mission systems and weapons. DOD analyses dating back a decade 

have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments, but 

budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, 

DOD canceled some acquisitions, after which the services revised their operating 

concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing 

DOD to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among 

systems during operations. As acquisition plans have evolved, capability 

limitations and sustainment challenges facing existing systems have grown, 

prompting the department to invest in system improvements to mitigate shortfalls.

DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its 

growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, 

progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by developmental 

and production challenges that have slowed fielding of planned systems. Some 

programs, such as the Navy’s EA-18G Growler and the Air Force’s modernized 

EC-130H Compass Call, are in stable production and have completed significant 

amounts of testing. Other key programs, like the Navy’s Advanced Anti-Radiation 

Guided Missile, have required additional time and funding to address technical 

challenges, yet continue to face execution risks. In addition, certain systems in 

development may offer capabilities that overlap with one another—a situation 

brought on in part by DOD’s fragmented urgent operational needs processes. 

Although services have shared technical data among these programs, they 

continue to pursue unique systems intended to counter similar threats. As military 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate 

current acquisition programs across services. However, this consolidation may 

be hampered by DOD’s acknowledged leadership deficiencies within its 

electronic warfare enterprise, including the lack of a designated, joint entity to 

coordinate activities. Furthermore, current and planned acquisitions will not fully 

address materiel-related capability gaps identified by DOD—including some that 

date back 10 years. Acquisition program shortfalls will exacerbate these gaps.

To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other efforts 

to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the near term, 

services are evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems to 

enable them to take on additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the 

utility of existing systems and better position operators to complete missions with 

equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on DOD 

successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and technology. DOD has 

recently taken actions that begin to address long-standing coordination shortfalls 

in this area, including designating electronic warfare as a priority investment area 

and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. 

These steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities 

ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned implementation roadmap for 

electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how closely component 

research investments are aligned with the departmentwide priority.

View GAO-12-175. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 

or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Letter 1 

Background 3

DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among 

Systems 5

Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results 16

Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and 

Investments in Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge 

Gaps 30

Conclusions 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 36

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 40

Appendix II Analyses of Select Airborne Electronic Attack Systems 43

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 64

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 69

Tables

Table 1: Characteristics of Airborne Electronic Attack Systems in 

Sustainment 13

Table 2: Recent and Planned DOD Investments toward Acquiring 

Airborne Electronic Attack Systems 17

Table 3: DOD’s Progress Developing and Fielding New Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems 19

Table 4: Potential Overlap among Communications Jamming 

Systems Supporting Ground Forces 25

Table 5: Primary Airborne Electronic Attack Capability Needs 

Identified since 2002 29

Table 6: Current DOD Science and Technology Initiatives Related 

to Airborne Electronic Attack 32

Table 7: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-6B 

Prowler, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 44

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Table 8: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the AN/ALQ-99 

Tactical Jamming System, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 46

Table 9: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EC-130H 

Compass Call, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 48

Table 10: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-22A 

Raptor, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 50

Table 11: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-18G 

Growler, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 52

Table 12: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for AARGM, Fiscal 

Years 2012-2017 54

Table 13: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for IDECM, Fiscal 

Years 2012-2017 56

Table 14: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the Next 

Generation Jammer, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 58

Table 15: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for MALD/MALDJ, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 61

Table 16: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-35 

Lightning II, Fiscal Years 2012-2017 63

Figures

Figure 1: Key Analyses Underpinning Airborne Electronic Attack 

Acquisition Strategy and Investments 6

Figure 2: Airborne Electronic Attack Family of Systems Strategy 

for Countering Near-Peer Adversaries 9

Figure 3: Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Tailored to Counter 

Irregular Warfare Threats 11

Figure 4: EA-6B Prowler 43

Figure 5: AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System 45

Figure 6: EC-130H Compass Call 47

Figure 7: F-22A Raptor 49

Figure 8: EA-18G Growler 51

Figure 9: AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile 

(AARGM) 53

Figure 10: Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures 

(IDECM) 55

Figure 11: Next Generation Jammer 57

Figure 12: Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD)/Miniature Air 

Launched Decoy—Jammer (MALD-J) 59

Figure 13: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter) 62
Page iii GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Abbreviations

AARGM Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile

AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array

ASD (R&E) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering 

CEASAR Communications Electronic Attack with Surveillance and 

 Reconnaissance

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DOD Department of Defense

HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

ICAP Improved Capability

IDECM Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures

ITALD Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy

J-UCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems

LAIRCM Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures

MALD Miniature Air Launched Decoy

MALD-J Miniature Air Launched Decoy—Jammer

RDT&E Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation

TALD Tactical Air Launched Decoy

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 29, 2012

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Airborne electronic attack capabilities are key enablers for U.S. military 

operations ranging from irregular warfare1 to major combat against 

potential near-peer adversaries.2

Global proliferation of more sophisticated air defenses and advanced, 

commercial digital electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated 

appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic 

attack capabilities and limit U.S. access to theaters of combat. These 

weapons—some held by both nation-state and nonstate actors—vary 

from advanced, integrated air defense systems to simpler, digital radio 

frequency memory devices. As the range of adversary weapons 

increases, electronic jammers and other equipment must respond with 

improved capabilities or may have to operate farther from the battle, 

lessening their effectiveness.

Airborne electronic attack involves the 

use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress) 

enemy air defense and communications systems, either through 

destructive or disruptive means. These aircraft employ a variety of 

mission systems and weapons to prosecute threats, and they rely on 

defensive countermeasures to provide additional protection.

In light of these developments, you asked us to review the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) airborne electronic attack capabilities and investment 

 

1

Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for 

legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect 

and asymmetric (dissimilar) approaches, though it may employ the full range of military 

and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

2

Potential near-peer adversaries can be defined to include countries capable of waging 

large-scale conventional war on the United States. These nation-states can be 

characterized as having nearly comparable diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic capacity to the United States.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

plans. In response to this request, we assessed (1) the department’s 

strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities; (2) progress 

made developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack 

mission requirements; and (3) additional compensating actions taken by 

the department to address capability gaps, including improvements to 

tactics, techniques, and procedures and investments in science and 

technology. In a separate report, we plan to address the effectiveness of 

the department’s governance structure for overseeing its electronic 

warfare policies and priorities and the relationship between electronic 

warfare and cyber operations.

To assess the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic 

attack capabilities, we analyzed documents outlining mission 

requirements and acquisition needs including the 2009 Electronic Warfare 

Initial Capabilities Document, service roadmaps related to airborne 

electronic attack, budget documents, and program briefings. We 

corroborated this information through discussions with officials 

responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements and 

systems, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine 

Corps requirements branches; U.S. Strategic Command; and the Joint 

Staff. To assess progress made developing and fielding systems to meet 

airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed materials 

outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes including, 

capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports, budget 

submissions, and program briefings. These same materials afforded 

information on key attributes of individual airborne electronic attack 

systems, which we used to assess potential overlap among systems in 

development. Further, we identified persisting capability gaps by 

reviewing DOD analyses related to airborne electronic attack 

requirements. To supplement our analyses and gain additional visibility 

and perspective into these issues, we conducted numerous interviews 

with DOD officials charged with managing airborne electronic attack 

requirements and those responsible for developing, acquiring, and testing 

airborne electronic attack systems. To assess additional compensating 

actions taken by the department to address airborne electronic attack 

capability gaps, we reviewed service documents outlining recent 

improvements and refinements to tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

key airborne electronic attack aircraft. We also reviewed broad agency 

announcements to understand ongoing science and technology activities. 

We corroborated this information through interviews with the user 

community responsible for developing and maintaining operating 

procedures for airborne electronic attack systems and with DOD airborne 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

electronic attack research leaders. A more detailed description of our 

scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD invests in electronic warfare capabilities as a means to maintain 

unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum during war and 

selectively deny adversary use of the spectrum. Traditionally, electronic 

warfare has been composed of three primary activities:

• Electronic attack: Use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or 

antiradiation weapons to attack with the intent of degrading, 

neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.

• Electronic protection: Passive and active means taken to protect 

personnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or 

enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

• Electronic warfare support: Actions directed by an operational 

commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of 

radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat 

recognition, targeting, and planning, and the conduct of future 

operations.

Airborne electronic attack—a subset of the electronic attack mission—

involves use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade 

(suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems, either 

through destructive or disruptive means. These capabilities are 

increasingly important and complex as networked systems, distributed 

controls, and sophisticated sensors become ubiquitous in military 

equipment, civilian infrastructure, and commercial networks—

developments that complicate DOD’s ability to exercise control over the 

electromagnetic spectrum, when necessary, to support U.S. military 

objectives.

Airborne electronic attack systems increase survivability of joint forces 

tasked to enter denied battlespace and engage anti-access threats or 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

high-value targets,3

Section 1053 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 requires that for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the 

Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

secretaries of the military departments, submit to the congressional 

defense committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare 

strategy.

whether involved in major combat operations against 

a potential near-peer adversary or in irregular warfare. They also enable 

access to the battlespace for follow-on operations. Aircraft executing 

airborne electronic attack missions employ a variety of mission systems, 

such as electronic jammers, and weapons, such as antiradiation missiles 

and air-launched expendable decoys. These aircraft also rely on aircraft 

self-protection systems and defensive countermeasures for additional

protection. All four services within DOD contribute to and rely upon 

airborne electronic attack capabilities using a variety of different aircraft. 

Each service is also separately acquiring new airborne electronic attack 

systems. 

4 Each report must contain (1) a description and overview of the 

department’s electronic warfare strategy and organizational structures for 

oversight; (2) a list and description of all electronic warfare acquisition 

programs and research and development projects within DOD; and (3) for 

the unclassified programs and projects, detail on oversight 

responsibilities, requirements, funding, cost, schedule, technologies, 

potential redundancies, and associated capability gaps, and for the 

classified programs and projects, a classified annex addressing these 

topics, when appropriate.5

 

3

Anti-access threats can be defined as those that impede the deployment of U.S. forces 

into the combat theater, limit the locations from which those forces could effectively 

operate, or force them to operate from locations farther from the locus of conflict than they 

would normally prefer. High-value targets are persons or resources that an enemy 

commander requires for the successful completion of a mission.

In response to this requirement, DOD 

submitted its first Electronic Warfare Strategy of the Department of 

Defense report in October 2010. The department produced its second 

electronic warfare strategy report in November 2011.

4

Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (a) (2009). 

5

Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (b) (2009). 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD’s strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements—

including both near-peer and irregular warfare needs—centers on 

acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low 

observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission 

systems and weapons. Department analyses dating back a decade have 

identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments in 

airborne electronic attack capabilities. However, budget realities and 

lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven 

changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, the 

department canceled some acquisitions, after which services revised their 

operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved 

money, allowing the department to fund other priorities, but reduced the 

planned level of synergy among airborne electronic attack systems during 

operations. As acquisition plans for these systems have evolved, 

operational stresses upon the existing inventory of weapon systems have 

grown. These stresses have materialized in the form of capability 

limitations and sustainment challenges for existing systems, prompting 

the department to invest in improvements to these systems to mitigate 

shortfalls.

Key DOD analyses completed since 2002 identified capability gaps, 

provided a basis for service investments in airborne electronic attack 

systems, and supported an overarching acquisition strategy for achieving 

these requirements. The department outlined its findings in reports that 

included an analysis of alternatives, a capabilities-based assessment, 

and initial capabilities documents. Figure 1 highlights a chronology of 

these analyses and identifies key airborne electronic attack components 

of each report.

DOD Strategy to 

Lower Costs Also 

Reduced Synergy 

among Systems

Airborne Electronic Attack 

Acquisition Strategy Has 

Evolved
 

Page 6 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 1: Key Analyses Underpinning Airborne Electronic Attack Acquisition Strategy and Investments

The 2002 Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives established 

the primary framework by which the department began investing in new 

airborne electronic attack capabilities. The analysis focused on those 

capabilities needed to suppress enemy air defenses from 2010 to 2030. 

The study identified two primary components required to provide a 

complete and comprehensive airborne electronic attack solution:

• Core component: A recoverable platform or combination of platforms 

operating in enemy airspace. The core component provides the 

airborne electronic attack detection and battle management 

capabilities for reactive jamming.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

• Stand-in component: An expendable air platform providing critical 

capabilities against certain advanced threat emitters and employed in 

threat environments not accessible to the core component.

Subsequent to this analysis, DOD developed a system of systems 

strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack mission needs. A system 

of systems is a set or arrangement that results when independent and 

useful systems are integrated into a larger, connected and interdependent 

system that delivers unique capabilities during military operations. The 

system of systems strategy established specific roles and operating 

responsibilities among the military services in a joint environment and 

expanded the basic core and stand-in component needs into four major 

capability areas for airborne electronic attack:

• Stand-off: Jamming occurring outside of defended airspace. Planned 

stand-off systems included the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call 

aircraft and development of an electronic attack variant of the Air 

Force’s B-52.

• Modified escort: Jamming occurring inside defended airspace, but 

outside of the range of known surface-to-air missiles. Planned 

modified escort systems included the Navy’s EA-18G Growler and 

EA-6B Prowler aircraft.

• Penetrating escort: Jamming occurring inside the intercept range of 

known surface-to-air missiles. The department planned to rely on 

aircraft equipped with active electronically scanned array (AESA) 

radars, including the F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II aircraft to 

perform this jamming function.

• Stand-in: Jamming occurring inside the “no escape range” of known 

surface-to-air missiles. The department planned to rely on 

development of recoverable Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (JUCAS) and the Air Force’s Miniature Air Launched Decoy—Jammer 

(MALD-J) to provide this function.

As time progressed, budget issues and lessons learned from operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan drove changes to the strategy and program 

content. Most notably, the department canceled development of two 

major components of the system of systems—the B-52 Standoff Jammer 

and J-UCAS—in 2005 and 2006, respectively, citing higher-priority needs 

and budget constraints. The B-52-based jamming concept was later 

rejuvenated through the Air Force’s Core Component Jammer initiative, 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

but that program was similarly canceled in 2009. Following these 

developments, the department revised operating concepts and joint 

service responsibilities, moving away from its system of systems plans in 

favor of a family of systems strategy for airborne electronic attack.

A family of systems is fundamentally different from a system of systems. 

Under a family of systems construct, independent systems—using 

different approaches—together provide capability effects to support 

military operations. Unlike the synergy found in a system of systems, a 

family of systems does not acquire qualitatively new properties or 

necessarily create capability beyond the additive sum of the individual 

capabilities of its members. The member systems may not even be 

connected into a whole. In the case of airborne electronic attack, DOD 

officials stated that a system of systems would have employed a dynamic, 

networked capability to share data in real-time among platforms—a 

concept known as electronic warfare battle management. Under the 

family of systems strategy, officials stated that this process is less 

automated and the parts are less connected. Therefore, in making this 

strategy change, the department traded some unique, synergistic 

capabilities that the system of system’s interdependent components might 

have provided in favor of near-term budget savings and other priorities.

Figure 2 outlines the department’s current family of systems strategy for 

countering near-peer adversaries. This family of systems includes 

traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, and related mission 

systems and weapons.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 2: Airborne Electronic Attack Family of Systems Strategy for Countering Near-Peer Adversaries
 

Page 10 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD’s 2009 electronic warfare capabilities analysis identified the growth 

of irregular warfare in urban areas as presenting challenges to military 

operations. The analysis noted that irregular adversaries can exploit 

civilian and commercial communications infrastructure to minimize 

detection and subsequent attack. According to the department, precise 

electronic attack planning and execution are required to ensure that these 

threats are defeated while avoiding interruption to U.S. communications 

capabilities.

The department has used existing airborne electronic attack systems, 

such as the EA-6B and EC-130H, to meet its near-term irregular warfare 

needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, officials report that these 

platforms are optimized for countering high-end, near-peer threats, and 

their use against irregular warfare threats is inefficient and costly. 

Consequently, the department has begun investing in new, less 

expensive airborne electronic attack systems tailored to counter irregular 

warfare threats. These systems are fielded from both traditional fixedwing aircraft and from unmanned aerial vehicles. Figure 3 illustrates 

operations involving these systems.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 3: Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Tailored to Counter Irregular Warfare Threats
 

Page 12 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

As DOD’s acquisition plans for airborne electronic attack systems have 

evolved, operational stresses upon the current inventory of systems have 

grown. These systems date back to the 1970s and 1980s and were 

originally designed to counter Cold War era threats. Many of the 

department’s existing airborne electronic attack systems face capability 

limitations, requiring the department to pursue modernization efforts to 

increase the effectiveness of the systems or to identify and develop 

replacement systems. Further, existing systems face sustainment 

challenges from age, parts obsolescence, and increased operational 

stresses from lengthy and sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

According to Air Force and Navy officials, these challenges have reduced 

the availabilities of some systems to warfighters. Table 1 identifies the 

department’s existing airborne electronic attack systems and related 

characteristics, including future replacement systems identified to date.

Existing Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems 

Face Capability 

Limitations and 

Sustainment Challenges
 

Page 13 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Table 1: Characteristics of Airborne Electronic Attack Systems in Sustainment

System Mission description

Estimated end of 

service life Replacement system

EA-6B Prowler Modified escort jamming 2020 EA-18G (Navy)

F-35B Lightning II (Marine Corps)

AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming 

System

a

Modified escort jamming Mid-band: 2024

Low-band: 2026

High-band: 2028

Next Generation Jammer

F-16CM Suppression of enemy air defenses 2024 F-35A Lightning II

AN/ALQ-131 and AN/ALQ-184 

Pod Systems

Aircraft self-protection (F-16 and A-10) 2025 Electronic Attack Pod Upgrade 

Program 

AN/ALQ-135 Internal 

Countermeasures Systems

Aircraft self-protection (F-15) 2035 Eagle Passive/Active Warning 

Survivability System

AGM-88 High Speed AntiRadiation Missile (HARM)Suppression of enemy air defenses 2035 Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided 

Missile (AARGM) 

b

EC-130H Compass Call 

(Baselines 0 and 1)

Stand-off jamming (communications) 2053 N/A c

ADM-141 Tactical Air 

Launched Decoy 

(TALD)/Improved Tactical Air 

Launched Decoy (ITALD)

Suppression of enemy air defenses Unknown TBD d

F-22A Raptor

e

Penetrating escort TBD N/A

Integrated Defensive 

Electronic Countermeasures 

(IDECM) Blocks 1 and 2

Aircraft self-protection (F/A-18 E/F) TBD IDECM Blocks 3 and 4

Legend: N/A = not applicable; TBD = to be determined.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

In addition to the fixed wing, airborne electronic attack capability that F-35B Lightning II is anticipated 

to provide, the Marine Corps plans to rely on its Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare 

concept to replace the warfighting capability and capacity currently provided by the EA-6B. This 

concept seeks a more holistic approach toward electronic warfare by combining both air and ground 

capabilities. To date, DOD officials state that the Marine Corps has completed a draft initial 

capabilities document, a concept of operations, and various electronic warfare gap analyses in 

support of its concept.

b

This date refers to the expected service life of the Air Force’s inventory of HARM only. Air Force 

officials told us that retirement of the Air Force’s inventory of HARM is aligned with the expected 

retirement of Block 50/52 F-16 aircraft.

c

As of January 2012, the EC-130H program schedule showed that center wing box replacement for 

the 14th Compass Call aircraft should be complete by 2018. A program office official told us that 

center wing box replacement extends the operational service life of the aircraft an additional 35 years, 

suggesting an end of service life in 2053, assuming no additional improvements to the fleet.

d

According to a Navy official, neither TALD nor ITALD has an estimated end of service life. The Navy 

plans to continue providing minimal sustainment funds for these systems, as resource availability 

permits.

e

The Navy has begun evaluating TALD/ITALD replacement options.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD is taking actions to address capability limitations and sustainment 

challenges across several key systems, such as the following:

• EA-6B Prowler: Since its introduction in the 1970s, the Navy and 

Marine Corps have made significant upgrades to the EA-6B Prowler. 

The latest of these upgrades—the Improved Capability electronic 

suite modification (ICAP III) provides the Prowler with greater jamming 

capability and is designed to improve the aircraft’s overall capability 

as both a radar-jamming and HARM platform. By the end of fiscal 

year 2012, 32 EA-6Bs will be upgraded to the ICAP III configuration. 

Navy officials told us that persistent operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, however, have degraded the condition of EA-6B aircraft. 

In addition, we have previously reported that parts obsolescence 

presents the biggest challenge to the EA-6B’s ability to fulfill its 

mission role.6 We noted that although the Navy has made several 

structural upgrades to the EA-6B fleet, it is actively tracking a number 

of key components, including cockpit floors, side walls, fin pods, 

bulkheads, actuators, engine components, landing gear, and avionics 

software—all of which are at increasing risk for costly replacement the 

longer the aircraft remains in service.

• HARM: According to Navy officials, even though HARM has

undergone various block upgrades to provide increased capabilities 

since fleet introduction in 1983, advancements in enemy radar 

technology have rendered the weapon somewhat ineffective for 

typical Navy targets. As a result, the Navy is fielding a major 

technological upgrade to HARM through its AARGM acquisition 

program. AARGM provides a new multimode guidance section and 

modified control section mated with existing HARM propulsion and 

warhead sections. The Air Force, similarly, is pursuing modifications 

to HARM control sections on missiles in its inventory—a process that 

will provide a global positioning system receiver to those units. Air 

Force officials stated that they have long sought this receiver 

component addition because of vulnerabilities in the HARM targeting 

method. This effort is being pursued in conjunction with other 

modernization efforts for Air Force F-16CM aircraft.

 

6

GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key 

Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions, GAO-10-789 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 29, 2010).
 

Page 15 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

• TALD and ITALD: Navy officials stated that advancements in enemy 

integrated air defense systems have decreased the effectiveness of 

both TALD and ITALD units. According to program officials, newer 

radars can discern from the TALD/ITALD flight profile that the system 

is a decoy and not a valid target. The Navy has begun evaluating 

TALD/ITALD replacement options under its Airborne Electronic Attack 

Expendable program initiative.

• EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 0 and 1): Although the Air Force 

initially fielded the EC-130H Compass Call as a communications 

jammer supporting suppression of enemy air defenses, the system 

has evolved to include irregular warfare missions and radar jamming. 

Air Force officials told us that the Compass Call is the most utilized 

aircraft within the C-130 family and has been continuously deployed 

since 2003 supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

accelerating the need for the Air Force to replace the center wing box 

on each of the 14 aircraft in the Compass Call fleet. Further, Air Force 

officials told us that they are increasing the size of the fleet by one 

aircraft to alleviate stress on current aircraft and to increase the 

availability of airborne electronic attack capability to the Air Force. 

According to a fleet viability assessment completed in 2010, the 

current size of the fleet is insufficient to meet combatant commander 

taskings for Compass Call.

• AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System: The Navy’s Low Band 

Transmitter upgrade to the AN/ALQ-99 system is intended to replace 

three aging legacy transmitters that suffer from obsolescence and 

reliability problems. According to Navy officials, persistent use of 

these transmitters in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

has exacerbated system shortfalls. Navy officials told us that they are 

also identifying options for improving reliability and resolving 

obsolescence issues with the mid and high bands of the AN/ALQ-99 

system. However, Navy officials project that even with these 

improvements, system capabilities will be insufficient to counter 

anticipated evolutions in threat radars and missiles beginning in 2018. 

This shortfall is expected to be addressed by the new Next 

Generation Jammer.

• AN/ALQ-131 and AN/ALQ-184 Pod Systems: The Air Force has 

identified obsolescence issues and capability shortfalls affecting these 

systems, which provide tactical aircraft self-protection. The Air Force 

is pursuing a replacement/upgrades program designed to move the 

Air Force to a single, self-protection pod system for its F-16 and A-10 

aircraft.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its

growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. 

However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by 

developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of 

several planned systems. Some programs, including the Navy’s EA-18G 

Growler and the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call modernization, are in 

stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. On 

the other hand, the Navy’s AARGM, the Air Force’s Miniature Air 

Launched Decoy (MALD), and other programs have required additional 

time and money to resolve technical challenges. In addition, certain 

airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer capabilities 

that overlap with one another—a situation brought on in part by the 

department’s fragmented urgent operational needs processes. As military 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to 

consolidate current acquisition programs across services; however, this 

consolidation may be hampered by leadership deficiencies affecting the 

department’s electronic warfare enterprise. Furthermore, current and 

planned acquisition programs, even if executed according to plan, will not 

fully address the materiel-related capability gaps identified by the 

department—including some that date back 10 years.

DOD investments to develop and procure new and updated airborne 

electronic attack systems are projected to total more than $17.6 billion 

from fiscal years 2007 through 2016.7

 

7

Investment total includes nearly $1.1 billion in funding for aircraft self-protection systems, 

which airborne electronic attack aircraft rely upon to conduct missions.

These systems represent the 

department’s planned mix of assets for (1) countering near-peer, 

integrated air defense and communications systems and (2) providing 

communications and radio frequency jamming against irregular warfare 

threats. Table 2 outlines the department’s recent and planned 

investments toward developing and acquiring several of these systems.

Acquisitions May Not 

Produce Sufficient 

Results 

Investments in New 

Airborne Electronic Attack 

Systems Have Yielded 

Mixed Results to Date
 

Page 17 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Table 2: Recent and Planned DOD Investments toward Acquiring Airborne Electronic Attack Systems

Then-year dollars in millions

System

Current research, 

development, testing, and 

evaluation (RDT&E) 

cost estimate

Current 

procurement 

cost estimate

Total RDT&E and 

procurement funding 

(through fiscal 

year 2012)

Remaining 

RDT&E and 

procurement 

funding 

requirements

Next Generation Jammer $2,141.5 N/A $402.6 $1,738.9 

EA-18G Growler 1,839.4 $9,341.6 10,032.5 1,148.5

AARGM 631.0 1,277.7 877.5 1,031.2

MALD and MALD-J 505.1 a 1,339.6 953.8 890.9

IDECM Block 4 254.1 609.1 271.6 591.6

EC-130H Compass Call 

Modernization 129.0 957.2 709.9 376.3

MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod

b

133.4 100.3 53.1 0.0

Intrepid Tiger II

c

26.5 50.3 43.4 33.4

Communications Electronic Attack 

with Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (CEASAR) pod 0.8 13.0 13.8 0.0 d

Total $5,660.8 $13,688.8 $13,358.2 $5,810.8

Source: GAO analysis of DOD budget submissions and program baselines.

Notes: Remaining funding requirements for EC-130H Compass Call Modernization represent funding 

through the end of a 5-year budget forecast. In addition, F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II (Joint 

Strike Fighter) funding is excluded from this analysis because those aircraft will provide capabilities 

that support several missions, including airborne electronic attack.

a

MALD and MALD-J figures do not include costs or appropriations related to the previously planned 

MALD-J Increment II. In its fiscal year 2013 budget submission, the Air Force canceled the Increment 

II program. Prior to this cancellation, the Air Force planned to invest $272.3 million in RDT&E funding 

through fiscal year 2016 to begin developing this new capability.

b

Total does not include funding needed to support Air Force plans to modernize three additional EC130H aircraft in fiscal years 2017 through 2018 because the Air Force has not yet identified these 

funding requirements. However, according to Air Force officials, they expect the 2017 and 2018 

modernization budgets to each remain constant with planned fiscal year 2016 funding of $85.5 

million.

c

In its fiscal year 2013 budget submission, the Air Force canceled the MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack 

Pod program. Prior to this cancellation, remaining funding requirements for the program were 

expected to total $180.6 million.

d

Total excludes approximately $16.0 million in program funding from the Operations and 

Maintenance, Army account, which the Army has used, in part, to lease C-12 aircraft to host the 

CEASAR pod. In fiscal year 2013, the Army plans to request an additional $10.3 million in Operations 

and Maintenance funding to support these activities.

As table 2 shows, several airborne electronic attack systems are in an 

advanced stage of funding. However, under current estimates, over 

$6.0 billion in funding is still required to fully deliver these new systems to 

the warfighter. Further, the department has not yet identified the full 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

amount of funding required for certain key systems, such as the Next 

Generation Jammer, which could require billions of additional dollars to 

field. 

Correspondent to their different funding profiles, the department’s new 

systems are also in various stages of development, with some 

progressing more efficiently than others. Table 3 identifies the mission 

role(s), developmental status, and fielding plans for these systems. In 

addition, appendix II provides additional details on the status of several of 

these programs.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Table 3: DOD’s Progress Developing and Fielding New Airborne Electronic Attack Systems

System Mission description Development status

Actual/estimated 

fielding date

EA-18G 

Growler

Modified escort 

jamming

The Navy has fielded EA-18G aircraft with limited cost and schedule 

growth to date. Through fiscal year 2011, the Navy placed 90 of the 

planned 114 Growler aircraft under production contract. Operational 

testing identified suitability concerns, which the Navy has addressed 

through software changes. In July 2011, the system completed its first 

combat deployment supporting operations in Iraq and Libya. The Navy 

continues to develop new software blocks to add aircraft capability.

2009

CEASAR pod Irregular warfare 

jamming

In September 2011, the Army initiated an operational assessment of the 

CEASAR system by deploying three pods; two contractor-owned, 

government-operated C-12 aircraft; and associated operators and 

support personnel to Operation Enduring Freedom. Following this 

authorized 1-year assessment, the Army will make a determination on 

CEASAR’s readiness to transition into a formal acquisition program.

2011

Large Aircraft 

Infrared 

Countermeasures

(LAIRCM)

Aircraft self-protection Current acquisition plans add a next generation missile warning 

system to LAIRCM to provide improved detection against infrared 

threat missiles. Recently, the next generation missile warning system 

completed initial operational test and evaluation, and a full rate 

production decision is planned for 2012. 

2011

IDECM Blocks 

3 and 4

Aircraft self-protection IDECM Block 3 entered full rate production in 2011. IDECM Block 4 

integrates significant hardware design changes to the ALQ-214 onboard 

jammer component. These changes will enable the system to operate 

on F/A-18C/D aircraft, while maintaining the system’s functionality on 

F/A-18E/F aircraft. Planned concurrency in the Block 4 testing and 

production schedules increases risk of retrofits to delivered systems.

2011 (Block 3)

2014 (Block 4)

AARGM Suppression and 

destruction of enemy 

air defenses

Hardware and software failures during operational testing in 2010—and 

subsequent deferral of remaining testing—drove a 9-month fielding 

delay to the system. Manufacturing quality and reliability concerns 

prompted the Navy to institute a “fly before you buy” program to screen 

poor weapons prior to government acceptance. AARGM recently 

resumed operational testing, but the Navy assesses system suitability as 

high risk.

2012

Intrepid Tiger II Irregular warfare 

jamming

The Intrepid Tiger II program is developing 2 pod variants for AV-8B 

(variant 1) and RQ-7B (variant 2) aircraft. Variant 1 entered operational 

testing in 2011 ahead of planned deployment of initial pods. Design 

change costs, including a radio system change, were absorbed by 

reducing pod quantities (14 to 8). Variant 2 testing under the 

Collaborative On-line Reconnaissance Provider/Operationally 

Responsive Attack Link demonstration program concluded in April 2011. 

Full performance of variant 2 pods remains unproven due to platform 

(RQ-7B) unavailability and integration issues, including susceptibility to 

electromagnetic interference. 

2012 (Variant 1)

TBD (Variant 2)

MALD Suppression of 

enemy air defenses

MALD operational testing was suspended following anomalies and 

subsequent crashes of test vehicles in June 2010 and February 2011. 

System design changes facilitated a return to testing, but an August 

2011 test shot also failed. Testing concluded in September 2011.

2012
 

Page 20 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

System Mission description Development status

Actual/estimated 

fielding date

MALD-J Stand-in jamming MALD-J employs the same flight vehicle as MALD, with slight 

differences to account for inclusion of a jammer. The Air Force approved 

MALD-J entry into low rate initial production in September 2011, with 

planned production start in May 2012. Operational testing has been 

reduced from 15 to 7 months in an attempt to mitigate program delays 

resulting from MALD design deficiencies. DOD states this reflects an 

increase in test range priority and a decrease in data turnaround time. 

2012

MALD-J 

Increment II

Stand-in jamming Funding shortfalls curtailed Air Force plans to award a technology 

development contract in fall 2011 for MALD-J sensitivity and jamming 

power improvements—key capability gains intrinsic to Increment II. The 

program was later canceled In the fiscal year 2013 budget submission.

N/A

EC-130H 

Compass Call 

(Baselines 2 

and 3)

Stand-off jamming 

(communications)

Baseline 2 modernization—currently scheduled for 8 of the Air Force’s 

planned 15 EC-130H aircraft—adds new capabilities including improved 

special purpose emitter array transmitters and addresses aircraft 

obsolescence issues. Modification work on the first of these 8 aircraft 

began in fiscal year 2011, with 3 more aircraft following in fiscal year 

2012. The Air Force is currently studying configuration options for 

Baseline 3, which officials expect to install on 7 EC-130H aircraft. 

2014 (Baseline 2)

2017 (Baseline 3)

F-35 Lightning 

II (Joint Strike 

Fighter)

Penetrating escort F-35 entered low rate initial production in 2007 and has since 

experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays. Development 

challenges caused the program to be restructured in 2010, triggering a 

Nunn-McCurdy cost breach.a

TBD

GAO has repeatedly expressed concerns 

about the F-35’s technology maturity and design stability. The program 

revised its testing plan and is making progress against a new schedule.

MQ-9 Reaper 

Electronic 

Attack Pod

b

Irregular warfare 

jamming

Prior to cancelling the program in its fiscal year 2013 budget submission, 

the Air Force planned to integrate electronic attack pods on Block 5 MQ9 aircraft—the first units expected to have sufficient power to operate the 

pods. Program officials stated that electromagnetic interference caused 

by the pods jamming the MQ-9 command and control systems posed a 

key technical challenge. The program entered technology maturation 

phase in 2010 and planned to award an engineering and manufacturing 

development contract in 2013.

N/A

Next 

Generation 

Jammer

Modified escort 

jamming

The Navy plans to award technology development contracts for the 

system in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013, with award of an 

engineering and manufacturing development contract to follow in 2015. 

In November 2010—based on findings from the system’s analysis of 

alternatives—Navy leadership directed the program to pursue a block 

approach to developing capability, whereby mid-, low-, and high-band 

jammers would be progressively fielded on EA-18G aircraft and, through 

a later increment, F-35 aircraft.

2020 (Mid-band)

2022 (Low-band)

2024 (High-band)

Legend: N/A = not applicable; TBD = to be determined.

c

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

A Nunn-McCurdy cost breach occurs when a program’s unit cost exceeds certain statutory 

thresholds.

b

F-35 does not currently have an approved fielding date. Prior to the program’s Nunn-McCurdy 

breach, the Marine Corps planned to declare initial operational capability for the aircraft in 2012. 

However, since the breach, DOD has not yet approved a new acquisition program baseline, and the 

services continue to evaluate potential fielding dates for the F-35.

c

Dates provided reflect system fielding plans with EA-18G; fielding dates with F-35 are undetermined.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Some airborne electronic attack acquisition programs have reached 

stable production with limited cost growth or schedule delays. Two 

primary examples include the following:

• EA-18G Growler: Acquisition of the EA-18G Growler—a modified 

escort jamming platform designed to carry AN/ALQ-99 and future 

Next Generation Jammer pods—achieved initial capability in 

September 2009, consistent with its 2007 baseline schedule. 

Additionally, program costs per aircraft increased less than one-half of 

1 percent from 2003 to 2010—an outcome partially attributable to 

quantity increases from 90 to 114.

• EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 2 and 3): Modernization of the 

EC-130H Compass Call is on schedule for fielding a new increment of 

capability, Baseline 2, in 2014 within available funding limitations. 

Baseline 2 introduces several new capabilities, including reactive 

radar response and the Joint Tactical Radio System terminal that has 

been delayed because of testing challenges. However, Compass Call 

program officials do not expect the radio system delay to affect the 

program’s fielding plans for Baseline 2 aircraft. According to the Air 

Force, cost considerations are a primary criterion in developing EC130H capability requirements. The program office does not entertain 

potential aircraft improvements unless those improvements are 

accompanied by full funding. The Air Force is initiating technology 

development activities for a subsequent phase of the modernization 

program, Baseline 3, and plans to begin production of these aircraft in 

2014, with initial fielding scheduled for 2017.

Our previous work has shown that good acquisition outcomes are 

achieved through the knowledge-based approach to product development 

that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant 

commitments are made.8

 

8

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. 

This model relies on increasing knowledge when developing new 

products, separating technology development from product development, 

and following an evolutionary or incremental approach to product 

development. In this approach, developers make investment decisions on 

the basis of specific, measurable levels of knowledge at critical junctures 

before investing more money and before advancing to the next phase of 

GAO-11-233SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).

Some Programs Are 

Progressing Well 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

acquisition. The good outcomes on the EA-18G and EC-130H programs 

can be attributed, in part, to acquisition strategies embodying elements of 

best practices.

Other airborne electronic attack acquisition programs have not 

progressed as efficiently, however. These systems have proceeded 

through product development with lower-than-desired levels of knowledge 

and subsequently faced technical, design, and production challenges, 

contributing to significant cost growth, fielding delays or both. Most 

notably, these systems entered—or are on track to enter—production 

before completing key development activities, including achievement of 

stable designs. We previously reported that concurrency in development 

and production activities limits the ability of an acquisition program to 

ensure that the system will work as intended and that it can be 

manufactured efficiently to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets.9

• MALD/MALD-J: MALD was authorized for low rate initial production 

in June 2008 with an initial plan for 300 low rate initial production units 

in two lots, beginning in March 2009. However, testing failures in 2010 

and 2011—coupled with a desire to avoid a potentially costly break in 

production—prompted the Air Force to extend MALD low rate initial 

production by two additional lots and increase total quantities under 

contract to 836. In September 2011, citing “successful completion of 

MALD-J engineering and manufacturing development activities,” the 

Air Force exercised a priced option to upgrade 240 of its planned 

MALD units to the MALD-J configuration, subsequently decreasing 

MALD quantities to 596. Because all future production lots are now 

planned as jammer-configured decoys (MALD-J), the 596 total 

represents the full MALD procurement—without the program having

 

9

GAO, Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by Standardizing the Way 

Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, GAO-10-439 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2010).

Some Programs Are 

Underperforming
 

Page 23 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

ever met the criteria necessary to proceed into full rate production.10

Since the MALD and MALD-J designs are identical—except for the 

addition of a jammer module to MALD-J—the absence of a proven 

manufacturing process for MALD introduces schedule risk to 

production of MALD-J.11 This risk is accentuated by continuing 

deficiencies affecting the MALD and MALD-J designs, which have 

required the Air Force to schedule additional developmental flight 

tests for each system in February 2012 to test corrective fixes. To the 

extent that this retesting phase shows a need for additional design 

changes, the Air Force may be forced to revisit its planned May 2012 

production start for MALD-J. 

• AARGM: The Navy authorized low rate initial production of AARGM 

units in September 2008 with initial deliveries scheduled to begin in 

January 2010. A total procurement objective of 1,919 units was set 

and an initial operational capability scheduled for March 2011. 

However, as a result of intermittent hardware and software failures in 

testing, the program was decertified for initial operational test and 

evaluation in September 2010, and low rate initial production 

deliveries were delayed until June 2011. The missile has 

subsequently reentered testing, but significant concerns about the 

system’s reliability remain. Further, Navy officials stated that the 

current program schedule is oriented toward success with virtually no 

margin to accommodate technical deficiencies that may be discovered 

during operational testing. In the event operational testing reveals new 

or lingering major deficiencies, program officials report the planned 

April 2012 fielding date will be at risk, and the Navy may be forced to 

revisit its commitment to the program.

 

10Pursuant to DOD Instruction 5000.02 dated December 8, 2008, low rate initial 

production phase is intended to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability 

and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide production or productionrepresentative articles for initial operational testing and evaluation. In the case of MALD, 

technical deficiencies and design changes during low rate initial production prevented 

demonstration of an efficient manufacturing capability, which in turn prevented the system 

from meeting the department’s criteria to enter full rate production. Department policy 

further states that in order for a system to receive full rate production approval, 

(1) demonstrated control of the manufacturing process and acceptable reliability, (2) the 

collection of statistical process control data, and (3) demonstrated control and capability of 

other critical processes must be shown. 

11According to DOD officials, any retrofits (design fixes) are under Raytheon (prime 

contractor) warranty with no additional cost to the government.
 

Page 24 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

• IDECM: From December 2000 to June 2010, the Navy authorized six 

different low rate initial production lots of IDECM Blocks 2 and 3, 

providing system improvements to the jammer and decoy 

components. Block 2 production units delivered ahead of schedule, 

but early Block 3 units encountered operational testing failures; later 

resolved, these failures drove production delays to remaining units. In

Block 4, the Navy is introducing significant hardware design changes 

to the ALQ-214 jammer component. Ground and flight testing to prove 

out these design changes is scheduled concurrent with transition to 

production in April 2012, increasing risk that initial Block 4 units will 

require design changes and retrofits.12 Officials stated that this 

concurrency is necessary in order to maintain an efficient production 

line transition from Block 3 to Block 4 and to meet the desired June 

2014 fielding date. They further noted that transition to Block 4 

production will initially be for 19 systems, with production rates 

increasing to as many as 40 per year following completion of testing.

Certain airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer 

capabilities that unnecessarily overlap with one another. This condition 

appears most prevalent with irregular warfare systems that the services 

are acquiring under DOD’s fragmented urgent operational needs 

processes. For example, the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force have all 

separately invested to acquire unique systems intended to jam enemy 

communications in support of ground forces. Further, Navy and Air Force 

plans to separately invest in new expendable decoy jammers—systems 

intended to counter near-peer adversaries—also appear to overlap. 

Declining military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—coupled with recent 

changes in the Air Force’s MALD-J program—afford opportunities to 

consolidate current service-specific acquisition activities. The 

department’s ability to capitalize on these opportunities, however, may be 

undermined by a lack of designated, joint leadership charged with 

overseeing electronic warfare acquisition activities.

 

12According to DOD officials, the Navy negotiated a firm fixed price production contract for 

IDECM Block 4, under which cost risk associated with retrofits is borne by the contractor, 

without financial burden to the government.

Planned Systems May 

Offer Capabilities That 

Overlap, Presenting 

Opportunities to 

Consolidate Acquisition 

Efforts 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD is investing millions of dollars to develop and procure airborne 

electronic attack systems uniquely suited for irregular warfare operations. 

Services are acquiring these systems under both rapid acquisition 

authorities as well as through the traditional acquisition process. These 

systems overlap—at least to some extent—in terms of planned mission 

tasks and technical challenges to date. Yet, they have been developed as 

individual programs by the different services. Table 4 highlights overlap 

among three of these systems.

Table 4: Potential Overlap among Communications Jamming Systems Supporting Ground Forces

System name Intrepid Tiger II CEASAR Pod

MQ-9 Reaper Electronic 

Attack Pod

Service sponsor Marine Corps Army Air Force

Host platform Variant 1: AV-8B fixed wing aircraft

Variant 2: RQ-7B unmanned aerial 

vehicle

a C-12 fixed wing aircraft MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial 

vehicle

Mission 

description

Communications jamming and 

surveillance capability in support of 

ground forces

Denial and disruption of enemy 

communications systems and 

improvised explosive devices in 

support of unit-level ground 

commanders

Communications and improvised 

explosive device jamming in support 

of combatant commander mission 

needs

Technical status Program recently completed 

compatibility testing for variant 1 to 

identify potential electromagnetic 

interference issues and reduce 

system fratricide. Interoperability 

testing will not be completed until 

after the system has achieved early 

operational capability (fielding).

Initial testing of variant 2 revealed 

electromagnetic interference with 

the RQ-7B’s safety of flight systems 

as well as aircrew system feedback 

and usability issues with the 

electronic attack payload system 

interface.

Electromagnetic Interference 

issues—resulting from continuous 

low frequency jamming—were 

identified in testing, subsequently 

causing impairment to aircraft 

navigation and communications 

systems. According to Army 

officials, these challenges have 

been overcome with solutions 

proven during the system’s recent 

2011 operational assessment.

The Air Force canceled this program 

in its fiscal year 2013 budget 

submission. Prior to cancellation, 

program officials anticipated 

potential MQ-9 electromagnetic 

interference issues caused by the 

jamming pod that could interfere 

with the aircraft’s communications 

link to ground station controllers.

Estimated 

acquisition cost

$76.8 million $13.8 million $233.7 million b

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

c

a

Integration and fielding on AV-8B aircraft represent minimum (threshold) requirements for the 

Intrepid Tiger II (Variant 1) pod. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the Marine Corps plans to transition 

Intrepid Tiger II (Variant 1) to other fixed and rotary wing aircraft, including the F/A-18C/D.

b

Total excludes $26.3 million in funding from the Operations and Maintenance, Army budget account 

through fiscal year 2013. The Army uses these funds to (1) lease two C-12 aircraft to fly the CEASAR 

pod and (2) fund aircraft and pod sustainment costs.

c

Potential Overlap among 

Irregular Warfare Systems 

Driven by Service-Specific 

Solutions to Urgent Warfighting 

Needs 

Reflects estimated acquisition cost prior to program cancellation.
 

Page 26 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

According to DOD officials, airborne electronic attack limitations in recent 

operations, urgent needs of combatant commanders, and the desire to 

provide ground units with their own locally controlled assets have all 

contributed to service decisions to individually develop their own systems 

to address irregular warfare threats. For example, one Marine Corps 

official told us that his service is focused on increasing its airborne 

electronic attack capacity to meet Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

requirements in combat. Marine Corps systems typically equipped to 

perform these tasks—especially the EA-6B Prowler aircraft—have 

reached their capacity limits responding to combatant commander 

taskings. Similarly, Air Force officials stated that ground warfighter 

requests for airborne electronic attack capabilities sometimes go 

unfulfilled or are delayed because of the overall constrained capacity 

during current operations. Further, Army and Marine Corps officials see 

operational benefits to providing ground unit commanders with smaller 

airborne electronic attack assets—permanently integrated within the

unit—to free up Air Force and Navy assets for larger-scale missions. In 

addition, the capabilities offered by current jamming pods, such as the 

AN/ALQ-99, are often overkill for the irregular warfare mission needs—

such as counter-improvised explosive device activities—facing ground 

unit commanders.

Requirements for several of these irregular warfare systems were derived 

from DOD urgent needs processes—activities aimed at rapidly 

developing, equipping, and fielding solutions and critical capabilities to the

warfighter in a way that is more responsive to urgent requests than the 

department’s traditional acquisition procedures. As we previously 

reported, the department’s urgent needs processes often lead to multiple 

entities responding to requests for similar capabilities, resulting in 

potential duplication of efforts.13

 

13GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More 

Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation, 

Even under these circumstances, the 

services have shown it is possible to take steps to share technical 

information among the different programs and services. For instance, the 

Army’s CEASAR pod is derived from the AN/ALQ-227 communications 

jammer used on the Navy’s EA-18G—an attribute that Army officials state 

reduced design risk in the program and provided opportunities for 

decreased sustainment costs and reuse of jamming techniques between 

the two services. Similarly, Air Force efforts to develop electronic attack 

GAO-11-273 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011).
 

Page 27 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

pods flown on MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (prior to that 

program’s cancellation) leveraged previous technology investments for 

the canceled B-52-based stand-off jammer.

As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down—and the 

services evaluate whether to transition their current urgent needs 

programs over to the formal weapon system acquisition process—

opportunities may exist to consolidate program activities, such as the 

Intrepid Tiger II and CEASAR systems that are still demonstration 

programs whose transitions to formal acquisition programs have not yet 

been determined.

The potential for unnecessary overlap in efforts within the airborne 

electronic attack area is not limited to irregular warfare systems. With 

respect to near-peer systems, both the Air Force and Navy are separately 

pursuing advanced jamming decoys—the Air Force through its MALD-J 

program, and the Navy through its planned Airborne Electronic Attack 

Expendable initiative.

The two services have held discussions with one another about 

combining efforts toward a joint solution, including a meeting between 

Navy and Air Force requirements offices and acquisition officials in 

December 2010, but they have not yet reached resolution on a common 

path forward. According to Navy officials, relatively minor design and 

software modifications to what was a planned second increment to the Air 

Force’s MALD-J system could produce a system that satisfies both 

services’ mission requirements. However, Air Force officials stated that 

accommodating the Navy’s mission requirements within the system would 

increase program costs and delay planned fielding of the Increment II 

system, essentially rendering the planned program unexecutable. 

Subsequently, Air Force officials stated that unless Increment II, in its 

planned configuration, sufficiently met Navy requirements, they did not 

expect the Navy to have any formal role in the program. In July 2011, 

however, the Air Force suspended MALD-J Increment II activities 

because of a lack of future funding availability. In February 2012, the Air 

Force’s fiscal year 2013 budget submission officially canceled the 

program.14

 

14According to DOD, the Air Force is to provide a new plan for developing and procuring 

an Increment II variant of MALD-J and report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by 

March 30, 2012.

This cancellation affords an opportunity for continued dialogue 

Navy and Air Force Have Not 

Agreed on a Common Decoy 

Solution
 

Page 28 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

between the two services on the potential benefits and drawbacks to 

pursuing a common acquisition solution.

In 2009, DOD completed a capabilities analysis that cited electromagnetic 

spectrum leadership as the highest priority among 34 capability gaps 

identified. The study concluded, in part, that leadership deficiencies, or its 

absence, significantly impede the department from both identifying 

departmentwide needs and solutions and eliminating potentially 

unnecessary overlap among the services’ airborne electronic attack 

acquisitions. Specifically, the department lacks a designated, joint entity 

to both coordinate internal activities and represent electronic warfare 

activities and interests to outside organizations. Acknowledging this 

leadership gap, and its relation to acquisition activities, the department 

has initiated efforts to organize the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum 

Coordination Center under the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command. In 

addition, officials representing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering stated that they are considering 

actions they might take to improve leadership and oversight of electronic 

warfare acquisition activities across the services. In a separate report, we 

intend to evaluate planned and existing electronic warfare governance 

structures within DOD.

Notwithstanding the considerable investment over the years in new and 

enhanced airborne electronic attack systems and subsystems, capability 

gaps, some identified a decade ago, are expected to persist, or even 

increase, through 2030 as adversary capabilities continue to advance. In 

a series of studies since 2002, DOD identified existing current and 

anticipated gaps in required capabilities. Some have persisted for years—

for example, deficiencies in certain jamming capabilities to provide cover 

for penetrating combat aircraft. The analyses found that, in many cases, 

new materiel solutions were required to close these gaps. Table 5 

outlines primary findings from three major analyses.

Leadership Deficiencies 

Undermine the Department’s 

Ability to Reduce Overlap 

Planned Systems Will Not 

Fully Address Capability 

Gaps
 

Page 29 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Table 5: Primary Airborne Electronic Attack Capability Needs Identified since 2002

Capabilities analysis

Analysis 

sponsor Needs identified

Airborne Electronic 

Attack Analysis of 

Alternatives (2002)

Office of the 

Secretary of 

Defense

Stand-in and core component jamming 

capability needs identified. The analysis 

outlined 27 potential platform combinations to 

address these needs.

Initial Capabilities 

Document for Denying 

Enemy Awareness 

through Airborne 

Electronic Attack 

(2004)

Air Force Identified Air Force needs for materiel 

solutions to provide stand-off and modified 

escort jamming, in light of the then-pending 

retirement of Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft. 

The document also identified penetrating 

escort and stand-in jamming capability needs 

unique to the Air Force, while identifying 

potential materiel solutions.

Electronic Warfare 

Initial Capabilities 

Document (2009)

U.S. Strategic 

Command

Identified 34 electronic warfare enterprisewide capability gaps. Fifteen of these gaps 

relate directly to the airborne electronic attack 

mission area. The study concluded that of 

these 15 gaps, 7 require new materiel 

solutions. Top priority is fixing leadership 

shortfalls.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

The 2002 analysis identified needs for stand-in and core component 

jamming capabilities and suggested numerous ways to meet these. The 

2004 study revalidated these gaps and outlined 10 potential materiel 

solutions to fill those gaps. It also acknowledged the existence of both 

near-peer and irregular warfare threats requiring airborne electronic 

attack solutions. The Army and Marine Corps requested that the analysis 

address irregular warfare threats because of the growing concern over 

improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan and the suboptimal 

application of existing systems in the inventory to defeat those threats. 

The Air Force concluded in its analysis that fulfilling airborne electronic 

attack mission needs would require developing and fielding multiple new 

systems. 

The most recent study, U.S. Strategic Command’s Electronic Warfare 

Initial Capabilities Document, identified additional capability gaps affecting 

airborne electronic attack. This 2009 analysis built upon a capabilitiesbased assessment completed a year earlier and outlined mitigation 

strategies to address these gaps instead of merely prescribing specific 

platform solutions. This approach was consistent with the analysis’s 

charter to guide and inform the services’ acquisition programs. However, 

the analysis did recommend specific capabilities and system attributes for 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

the Next Generation Jammer program to consider that would assist in 

mitigating some of the gaps identified in the 2009 analysis. The analysis 

also concluded that new systems would be needed to close nearly half of 

the gaps identified in airborne electronic attack capabilities.

To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other 

efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the 

near term, services are evolving their tactics, techniques, and procedures 

for operating existing systems to enable them to take on additional 

mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems 

and better position operators to complete missions with equipment 

currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on the 

department successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and 

technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address longstanding coordination shortfalls in this area including designating 

electronic warfare as a priority area for investment and creating a steering 

council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. However, these 

steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities 

ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned implementation 

roadmap for electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how 

closely component research investments are aligned to the 

departmentwide electronic warfare priority.

The refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures can position the 

services to maximize the capabilities of existing systems while new 

capabilities are being developed. As Navy airborne electronic attack 

operators stated, when a capability gap requiring a new system is 

identified, warfighters generally do not have the luxury of waiting for the 

acquisition community to develop and field a system to fill that gap. In the 

interim, tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems must 

evolve to provide at least partial mitigation to the threat being faced. 

Development and refinement of new ways to use existing equipment 

allow the services to maximize the utility of their airborne electronic attack 

systems and leave them better positioned to complete missions with the 

assets they have available. The following two systems provide examples 

where operator communities have refined tactics, techniques, and 

procedures to meet emerging threats:

• AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System: Navy officials told us that 

threats encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan operations have driven 

significant changes to how the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System 

is employed. In essence, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the 

Improvements to 

Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures and 

Investments in 

Science and 

Technology Are 

Helping to Bridge 

Gaps 

Changing Tactics, 

Techniques, and 

Procedures for Existing 

Systems Can Mitigate Gaps 

in the Near Term
 

Page 31 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

system had to evolve to maximize the system’s capabilities against 

irregular warfare threats. According to Navy officials, however, these 

adaptations represent only a temporary solution as their application—

coupled with increased operational activity—has caused jamming 

pods to degrade and burn out at an increasing rate, subsequently 

increasing maintenance requirements for the system.

• EC-130H Compass Call: According to Air Force officials, EC-130H 

tactics, techniques, and procedures have rapidly evolved to 

encompass dynamically changing electronic attack threats, which 

include irregular warfare. These changes include modifications to both 

how the operator employs the aircraft as well as to the range of 

threats targeted by mission planners.

Both Navy and Air Force officials emphasized that sustained investments 

in tactics, techniques, and procedures offer considerable return on 

investment and can provide important, near-term solutions to longer-term, 

persistent threats. According to these officials, these investments position 

operators to “do more with less”—in effect, offer them the opportunity to 

mitigate or counteract a threat without the required new system. However, 

limits exist to the extent to which refinements to current operating 

approaches for existing systems can bridge capability gaps. For example, 

it is increasingly difficult to further optimize AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods to 

counter advanced, integrated air defense systems. Specifically, Navy 

officials stated that the AN/ALQ-99 has reached its limit in terms of the 

underlying architecture’s capability to grow to counter new, sophisticated 

types of threats.

Investment in the science and technology research base is a longer-term 

approach DOD uses to address capability gaps in mission areas. 

Electronic warfare, including airborne electronic attack, is supported by 

research investments in fields such as sensors, apertures, power 

amplifiers, and unmanned aircraft technology that may help address 

existing capability gaps. Service components categorize research 

investments differently from one another, which complicates efforts to 

clearly define funding devoted to airborne electronic attack. Table 6 

identifies some of DOD’s current airborne electronic attack-related 

research investments.

DOD Focusing Science and 

Technology Investments to 

Close Gaps in the Long 

Term, but Coordination 

Remains a Concern
 

Page 32 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Table 6: Current DOD Science and Technology Initiatives Related to Airborne 

Electronic Attack

Agency Acquisition vehicle

Examples of funded 

programs/fields Budgeted funds

Office of Naval 

Research

Long-range broad 

agency 

announcement

Electronics, Sensors, & 

Network Research

Receivers & Antennas

Power Amplifiers

A total of $4.0 million 

in fiscal year 2011 

for all electronic 

warfare research, 

but new plans are to 

increase this amount 

to approximately 

$24.0 million 

annually

Air Force 

Research 

Laboratory

Research interests of 

the office’s broad 

agency 

announcement

Electro-Energetic 

Physics

Materials & 

Metamaterials

Receiver Technology

A total of 

$29.7 million in fiscal 

year 2011 for all 

electronic warfare 

research, decreasing 

to $24.2 million in 

fiscal year 2012, with 

plans to increase 

funding in fiscal year 

2013

Defense 

Advanced 

Research 

Projects Agency 

(DARPA) 

Project-specific broad 

agency 

announcements

Behavioral Learning for 

Adaptive Electronic 

Warfare

Precision Electronic 

Warfare

A total of 

$20.7 million in fiscal 

year 2011 and 

$18.8 million in fiscal 

year 2012 for these 

two electronic 

warfare research 

programs

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

However, not all investments in these fields will necessarily improve 

airborne electronic attack capabilities. Research officials identify the 

transition to system development and procurement as one of the primary 

goals of defense research programs, but acknowledge, reasonably, that 

not every program will successfully develop a transitionable product. 

Some acquisition programs, such as the Next Generation Jammer and 

the MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod, invest directly in research to 

guide the transition process and increase the likelihood of success. But 

even with this direct attention, technology maturation and development for 

Next Generation Jammer is expected to last 8 to 9 years. Consequently, 

current science and technology initiatives represent a long-term 

investment in future capabilities and are less suited to meeting existing 

needs.
 

Page 33 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD analyses during the past decade have identified coordination 

deficiencies that constrain the department’s ability to capitalize on its 

science and technology investments. For instance, a 2005 Naval 

Research Advisory Committee report found that within the Navy, research 

and development efforts were unduly fragmented, with one laboratory or 

development activity often being unaware of what another was doing.15

Further, this study highlighted the lack of a long-range science and 

technology investment planning process within the Navy. Similarly, in 

2007, the Defense Science Board reported that although relevant and 

valuable science and technology activity was occurring, an overarching, 

departmentwide strategic technology plan with assigned responsibility, 

accountability, and metrics did not exist.16 According to the board, DOD’s 

science and technology activities and investments should be more 

directly informed by the department’s strategic goals and top-level 

missions—an objective that would require a closer coupling of 

technologists and users, including requirements and capabilities 

developers. A 2010 Naval Research Advisory Committee report17 built on 

previous findings noted that stewardship of long-term naval capabilities 

was “vague at best” and lacked specific organizational assignment.18

DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address these shortfalls, 

including formalizing existing investment processes for several key 

science and technology areas. Most notably, in April 2011 the Secretary 

The 

report recognized the Navy as having the lead role within DOD for 

electronic warfare, but identified sporadic and uncoordinated execution 

across the technical community—noting little evidence of engagement 

among the science and technology community at large. Further, the 

report advised that closer coordination between operational and technical 

communities was essential for the realization of desired long-term 

capabilities.

 

15Naval Research Advisory Committee, Science and Technology for Naval Warfare 2015-

2030, NRAC-05-3 (Arlington, Va.: August 2005).

16Defense Science Board, 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Strategic Technology 

Vectors (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2007).

17Naval Research Advisory Committee, Status and Future of the Naval R&D 

Establishment (Arlington, Va.: September 2010).

18The report characterized long-term naval capabilities as the “Navy-After-Next.” NavyAfter-Next represented concepts, platforms, and systems that had yet to be conceived, 

defined, or both, and for which there was no program of record.
 

Page 34 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

of Defense designated electronic warfare as one of seven priority areas 

for science and technology investment from fiscal years 2013 through 

2017. According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)), this designation 

carries the promise of increased research funding and has prompted 

chartering of the interdepartmental Electronic Warfare Priority Steering 

Council. This council is made up of research officials from ASD (R&E), 

the services, and various defense science and technology groups, such 

as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and is charged with 

effectively evaluating electronic warfare capability gaps and linking them 

with research initiatives necessary to fill them. To support this process, 

the council is developing an implementation roadmap to guide 

coordination of investments within the electronic warfare area. The 

council also facilitates ASD(R&E) coordination with requirements teams 

and service/external research offices to determine the specific fields of 

inquiry that will be needed to support planning for future electronic 

warfare capability needs. Previously, this coordination was handled 

informally, whereas the new council provides authority and visibility to the 

discussions and decisions made.

Notwithstanding these important steps, services may inevitably face 

situations where they have to choose between funding their own, servicespecific research priorities and funding departmentwide priorities. As the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering testified in 

2011, DOD’s seven priority areas for science and technology investment 

are meant to be in addition to the priorities outlined by individual 

components (i.e., service research agencies and DARPA).19 In other 

words, departmentwide science and technology priorities do not 

necessarily supplant service priorities. Absent strategic direction, 

however, services have generally been inclined to pursue their own 

research interests ahead of departmentwide pursuits. DOD’s planned 

implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers opportunities to 

assess how closely component research investments are aligned to the 

departmentwide electronic warfare priority and to coordinate component 

investments in electronic warfare. 

 

19Testimony of the Honorable Zachary J. Lemnios, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Research and Engineering, in a hearing before the House Committee on Armed Services, 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, on March 1, 2011.
 

Page 35 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

The rapidity of evolving threats, together with the time and cost 

associated with fielding new systems, creates a major challenge to DOD 

and its capacity to fill all of its capability gaps. This dynamic makes it 

imperative that the department get the most out of its electronic warfare 

investments. At this point, that does not appear to be the case. The 

systems being acquired have problems and will not deliver as expected; 

potential overlap, to the extent that it leads to covering some gaps 

multiple ways while leaving others uncovered, drains buying power from 

the money that is available; and DOD acknowledges a leadership void 

that makes it difficult to ascertain whether the current level of investment 

is optimally matched with the existing capability gaps.

Within the airborne electronic attack mission area, budgetary pressures 

and related program cancellations prompted the department to change its 

acquisition strategy from a system of systems construct—as underpinned 

by the 2002 analysis of alternatives—to a potentially less robust, but more 

affordable, family of systems. In addition, new systems, including AARGM 

and MALD, that are designed to replace or augment legacy assets have 

encountered technical challenges while in acquisition, subsequently 

requiring the services to delay fielding plans within each program. Other 

acquisition programs, including IDECM and MALD-J, are structured with a 

high degree of concurrency between development, production, and 

testing that position them for similar suboptimal outcomes. Although 

individual service decisions to delay or cancel underperforming or 

resource-intensive programs may be fiscally prudent, the cumulative 

effect of these decisions creates uncertainty as to when, or if, current 

departmentwide airborne electronic attack capability gaps can be filled. At 

present, even if the department successfully acquires the full complement 

of systems outlined in its family of systems strategy, some capability gaps 

identified a decade ago may persist. As such, the department can benefit 

from reevaluating its capability gaps—using structures like the new 

Electronic Warfare Priority Steering Council—to identify which ones are 

highest priorities for science and technology investment and to determine 

areas where it is more willing to accept mission risk. This analysis, when 

coupled with an examination of current service-specific science and 

technology investments, can position DOD to realize improved 

efficiencies in its electronic warfare research activities and better align 

constrained budgets with highest-priority needs. Additionally, because 

underperformance in acquisition programs exacerbates existing capability 

gaps, realistic assessments of higher-risk programs can provide needed 

insight into what capabilities each platform is likely to deliver and when. 

Shortfalls in acquisition should not be the deciding factor on which 

capability gaps the department accepts.

Conclusions 
 

Page 36 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

At the same time, services continue to pursue and invest in multiple 

separate airborne electronic attack systems that potentially overlap with 

one another. This overlap is most evident in irregular warfare systems, 

including the Marine Corps’s Intrepid Tiger II and the Army’s CEASAR 

systems, but is also present in Air Force and Navy efforts to develop 

expendable jamming decoys through their respective MALD-J and 

Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives. Pursuing multiple 

separate acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the 

same capability gap being filled twice or more, can lead to inefficient use 

of resources, and may contribute to other warfighting needs going 

unfilled. Leveraging resources and acquisition efforts across services—

not just by sharing information, but through shared partnerships and 

investments—can simplify developmental efforts, can improve 

interoperability among systems and combat forces, and could decrease 

future operating and support costs. Such successful outcomes can 

position the department to maximize the returns it gets on its airborne 

electronic attack investments. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 

actions:

• Given airborne electronic attack programmatic and threat changes 

since 2002, complete the following:

• Conduct program reviews for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and 

MALD-J systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance and 

direct changes within these investments, as necessary.

• Determine the extent to which the most pressing airborne 

electronic attack capability gaps can best be met—using the 

assets that are likely to be available—and take steps to fill any 

potential gaps. 

• Align service investments in science and technology with the 

departmentwide electronic warfare priority, recognizing that 

budget realities will likely require trade-offs among research areas, 

and direct changes, as necessary.

• To ensure that investments in airborne electronic attack systems are 

cost-effective and to prevent unnecessary overlap, take the following 

actions:

• Review the capabilities provided by the Marine Corps’s Intrepid 

Tiger II and Army’s CEASAR systems and identify opportunities 

for consolidating these efforts, as appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 37 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

• Assess Air Force and Navy plans for developing and acquiring 

new expendable jamming decoys, specifically those services’ 

respective MALD-J and Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable 

initiatives, to determine if these activities should be merged.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, DOD concurred with three 

of our recommendations and partially concurred with two 

recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that we 

incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

DOD concurred with our first recommendation to conduct program 

reviews for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and MALD-J systems and direct 

changes within these investments, as necessary, identifying a March 

2012 Navy review of the IDECM program and planned July 2012 Navy 

review of the AARGM system. For MALD and MALD-J, DOD plans to 

conduct a program review in early 2014, which will coincide with a

planned full rate production decision for MALD-J. In the interim, DOD 

intends to continue low rate initial production of MALD-J units. However, 

because MALD has experienced significant technical challenges within 

the past 2 years, and because DOD plans to invest an additional $176.9 

million toward MALD-J production through fiscal year 2014, we believe an 

earlier review may be warranted. In its written comments, DOD also 

stated that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and 

Tactical Systems will chair a meeting to review AARGM, IDECM, MALD, 

and MALD-J with the Navy and Air Force to verify progress, but it did not 

provide a timetable for this review.

DOD also concurred with our second recommendation to determine the 

extent to which the most pressing airborne electronic attack capability 

gaps can best be met—using the assets that are likely to be available—

and take steps to fill any potential gaps. Most notably, DOD cited plans 

for U.S. Strategic Command to annually assess all DOD electronic 

warfare capabilities—including current requirements, current and planned 

future capabilities, and the supporting investment strategy—and present 

this assessment to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Further, 

DOD concurred with our third recommendation to align service 

investments in science and technology with the departmentwide 

electronic warfare priority, noting in its written comments that it expects 

implementation roadmaps for priority areas (including electronic warfare) 

will serve to coordinate component investments and accelerate the 

development and delivery of capabilities.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 38 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations related to 

potentially unnecessary overlap among airborne electronic attack 

systems, identifying through its written comments plans for the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical Systems to 

review the Intrepid Tiger and CEASAR systems with the Marine Corps 

and Army to investigate the efficacy of additional coordination as future 

acquisition plans are evaluated. Similarly, DOD noted that following the 

expected March 30, 2012, completion of a new Air Force plan related to 

developing and procuring an Increment II variant of MALD-J, the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation; and Joint Staff would review Air Force and Navy plans and 

assess opportunities for coordination among the MALD-J and Airborne 

Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives, should funding be allocated for a 

future expendables program. However, the basis for DOD’s partial 

agreement on these two recommendations appears to stem from its 

desire to achieve efficiencies through increased coordination among 

programs—not through consolidation of systems possessing similar 

capabilities. We emphasize that coordination is not a substitute for 

consolidation—particularly in the current constrained budget 

environment—and we encourage DOD to expand the scope of its 

planned reviews to include assessments of potential unnecessary 

redundancies within these two sets of systems. 

Additionally, DOD commented that our draft report overstated the 

acquisition duplication among airborne electronic attack systems. Most 

notably, DOD pointed to its cancellations of the MQ-9 Electronic Attack 

Pod and MALD-J Increment II programs, as outlined in its fiscal year 2013 

budget submission, as evidence that duplication was being managed. 

These cancellations were announced after we had completed our work 

and drafted the report. During the period that our draft report was with the 

agency for comment, we revised our report and recommendations, in 

coordination with DOD, to account for these recent changes. Most 

notably, we revised our fourth and fifth recommendations to remove the 

newly canceled MQ-9 Electronic Attack Pod and MALD-J Increment II 

systems, respectively, as additional platforms where DOD may identify 

opportunities for consolidation. DOD’s written comments were 

subsequently crafted in response to our revised set of recommendations.

As noted above, opportunities to reduce duplication further remain. We 

also briefly introduced the Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic 

Warfare concept, in response to DOD’s comments, while further clarifying 

that our report did not evaluate ground- or ship-based electronic warfare 

systems. 
 

Page 39 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

DOD also commented that our characterization of the family of systems 

strategy for airborne electronic attack was misleading, stating that the 

system of systems synergies envisioned in 2002 continue to be pursued. 

We acknowledge that DOD is considering options to field additional 

systems against high-end threats, but we believe that the current 

acquisition strategy and its distributed approach is very much in line with 

the definition of a family of systems, as outlined by DOD.20

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the 

Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

When DOD 

embarked on the system of systems strategy in 2002, it envisioned 

fielding certain major systems, such as B-52 Standoff Jammer and 

J-UCAS, which were later canceled. Without these planned elements, 

there is no evidence to suggest that the remaining systems together 

possess capability beyond the additive sum of the individual capabilities 

of its members—a characteristic fundamental to a system of systems.

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

 

20Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 

Systems and Software Engineering, Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems, 

Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: August 2008).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

This report evaluates the Department of Defense’s (DOD) airborne 

electronic attack capabilities and investment plans.1

To assess the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic 

attack capabilities, we analyzed DOD’s documents outlining mission 

requirements and acquisition needs, including the 2002 Airborne 

Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives, 2004 Initial Capabilities 

Document for Denying Enemy Awareness through Airborne Electronic 

Attack, 2008 Electronic Warfare Capabilities-Based Assessment, 2009 

Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, and 2010 Electronic 

Warfare Strategy of the Department of Defense report to Congress. We 

also reviewed platform-specific capabilities documents, service roadmaps 

related to airborne electronic attack, and budget documents to 

understand how the family of systems construct evolved over time. To 

identify capability limitations and sustainment challenges facing current 

airborne electronic attack systems, we reviewed program briefings and 

acquisition documentation related to these systems. To further 

corroborate documentary evidence and obtain additional information in 

support of our review, we conducted interviews with relevant DOD 

officials responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements 

and overseeing the related family of systems, including officials in the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development and Acquisition; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—

Information Dominance and Air Warfare directorates; Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements—

Electronic Warfare division; Air Force Air Combat Command; Army Office 

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training—

Electronic Warfare division; Marine Air-Ground Task Force Electronic 

Specifically, we 

assessed (1) the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic 

attack capabilities, (2) progress made developing and fielding systems to 

meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional 

compensating actions taken by the department to address capability 

gaps, including improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures and 

investments in science and technology.

 

1

As agreed upon with our congressional requesters, this report does not evaluate groundor ship-based electronic warfare systems.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and Joint Staff. We also held 

discussions with DOD officials responsible for sustaining current airborne 

electronic attack systems, including officials in (1) Navy program offices 

for Airborne Electronic Attack, Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection 

Systems, Direct and Time Sensitive Strike, and Aerial Target and Decoy 

Systems and (2) Air Force offices, including the F-22A Raptor and F16CM program offices and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center.

To assess progress made developing and fielding systems to meet 

airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed documents 

outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes, including 

capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports, budget 

submissions, system acquisition reports, and program briefings. These 

same materials afforded information on key attributes of individual 

airborne electronic attack systems, which we used to assess potential 

overlap among systems in development. Further, we identified persisting 

airborne electronic attack capability gaps by reviewing the 2009 

Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, along with earlier 

analyses related to airborne electronic attack requirements, and 

compared the capability needs identified in those documents with current 

DOD investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities. To 

supplement our analyses and gain additional visibility into these issues, 

we conducted interviews with relevant DOD officials responsible for 

managing airborne electronic attack requirements, including officials in 

the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—Information Dominance and 

Air Warfare directorates; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations, Plans, and Requirements—Electronic Warfare division; Air 

Force Air Combat Command; Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations, Plans, and Training—Electronic Warfare division; Marine AirGround Task Force Electronic Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and 

Joint Staff. We also held numerous interviews with DOD officials primarily 

responsible for developing, acquiring, and testing airborne electronic 

attack systems, including officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation; Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Navy program 

offices for Airborne Electronic Attack, F/A-18 and EA-18G, Direct and 

Time Sensitive Strike, and Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection Systems; 

Army Rapid Equipping Force; and Air Force program offices for 

MALD/MALD-J and MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

To assess additional compensating actions taken by the department to 

address airborne electronic attack capability gaps, we reviewed service 

documents outlining recent improvements and refinements to tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for EA-18G and EC-130H aircraft. We 

corroborated this information through interviews with officials from the 

Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and Air Force Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements—Electronic 

Warfare division charged with refining tactics, techniques, and procedures 

for EA-18G and EC-130H aircraft. We also reviewed broad agency 

announcements to understand ongoing science and technology activities 

related to airborne electronic attack. We supplemented this 

documentation review with discussions with officials engaged in science 

and technology work tied to airborne electronic attack, including officials 

in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering, Office of Naval Research, Air Force Research Laboratory, 

and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 43 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

This appendix provides analyses of 10 selected airborne electronic attack 

systems. Figures 4 through 13 show images of each system; tables 7 

through 16 provide budget data on each system.

Figure 4: EA-6B Prowler

Estimated end of service life: 2020

Mission description: The primary mission of the Prowler is the 

suppression of enemy air defenses in support of strike aircraft and ground 

troops by interrupting enemy electronic activity and obtaining tactical 

electronic intelligence within the combat area. The EA-6B uses the 

AN/ALQ-99 radar jamming pod for non-lethal protection by jamming air 

defense systems and its AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile for 

lethal physical attack of air defense systems.

Status: In 2010, we reported that the Navy had started replacing its EA6B aircraft with EA-18G Growlers and expected all Prowlers to be out of 

its inventory by 2012. However, the Navy projects Prowlers to remain in 

service until 2016 to further meet the joint expeditionary need. According 

to the Navy, this is subject to additional change contingent on the fiscal 

year 2013 budget. The Marine Corps plans to retire its Prowlers by 2020. 

In addition, the most recent upgrade program for the EA-6B—the third 

Improved Capability electronic suite modification (ICAP III)—is nearing 

completion. ICAP III provides the Prowler with greater jamming capability, 

including the ability to perform selective reactive jamming.

Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 44 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 7: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-6B Prowler, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $20.222 $19.728 $19.931 $20.280 $20.252 $20.632 $121.045

Procurement 27.734 30.062 18.600 14.099 10.068 10.285 $110.848

Total $47.956 $49.790 $38.531 $34.379 $30.320 $30.917 $231.893

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: RDT&E funding is limited to electronic warfare counter response.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 45 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 5: AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System

Estimated end of service life:

Mid-band: 2024 

Low-band: 2026 

High-band: 2028

Mission description: The AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System is an 

airborne electronic warfare system carried on the EA-6B and EA-18G to 

support the suppression of enemy air defenses. The system is capable of 

intercepting, automatically processing, and jamming received radio 

frequency signals.

Status: Obsolescence issues and advances in adversary technology 

have reduced the AN/ALQ-99’s ability to counter emerging threats. The 

Navy is developing its Next Generation Jammer program to replace the 

AN/ALQ-99 and plans to begin fielding the system in 2020. In the interim, 

the Navy is currently replacing three aging legacy low-band transmitters 

to resolve obsolescence and reliability problems.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 46 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 8: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E - - - - - - - 

Procurement $69.665 $49.799 $40.078 $28.892 $35.963 $30.945 $255.342

Total $69.665 $49.799 $40.078 $28.892 $35.963 $30.945 $255.342

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: There is no RDT&E funding associated with the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System in the 

fiscal year 2013 budget.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 47 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 6: EC-130H Compass Call

Estimated end of service life: 2053

Mission description: The EC-130H Compass Call is an airborne, wide 

area, persistent stand-off electronic attack weapon system able to disrupt 

and deny adversary use of the electronic battlespace using offensive 

radio frequency countermeasures. Its primary mission is to deny or 

disrupt command and control of enemy integrated air defenses, air 

defense surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery threats. Its 

secondary mission is to support ground and special operations forces by 

denying enemy communications and defeating improvised explosive 

devices.

Status: The Air Force has evolved the Compass Call since it was first 

fielded in 1982 to meet modern and emerging threats, including 

commercial communications, early warning radars, and improvised 

explosive devices. Upgrades and modernization efforts are completed 

during regularly scheduled depot maintenance. In 2003, as a response to 

Operation Enduring Freedom, these upgrades transitioned from “Block” 

upgrades to “Baseline” upgrades to allow for smaller and more focused 

modernization efforts. Currently, the Air Force is completing Baseline 1 
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 48 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

upgrades, beginning Baseline 2 efforts, and developing Baseline 3 

requirements. In addition, the Air Force is also replacing the center wing 

box on all 14 Compass Call aircraft, which will extend the service life of 

the fleet. Compass Call has been on continuous deployment in support of 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003; which has accelerated the 

need to replace the center wing boxes. Finally, to further alleviate stress 

on the fleet, the Air Force plans to procure an additional aircraft, 

increasing the size of the fleet to 15 aircraft by fiscal year 2016.

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 9: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EC-130H Compass Call, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $18.509 $12.094 $12.222 $12.559 $13.047 $12.989 $81.420

Procurement 302.324 64.024 55.878 54.108 56.480 57.552 $590.366

Total $320.833 $76.118 $68.100 $66.667 $69.527 $70.541 $671.786

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 49 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 7: F-22A Raptor

Estimated end of service life: Not available

Mission description: The F-22A is the Air Force’s fifth-generation air 

superiority fighter that incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable 

airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a supercruise engine. 

Originally developed as an air-to-air fighter, additional capabilities will 

allow the F-22A to perform multiple missions including destruction of 

enemy air defenses, air-to-ground attack, electronic attack, and 

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.

Status: The F-22A, along with the F-35, is expected to fulfill the Air 

Force’s requirement for penetrating escort jamming capability. The Air 

Force initiated a formal F-22A modernization and reliability improvement 

program in 2003 to incrementally develop and deliver increasing 

capabilities over time. These increasing capabilities would allow the F22A to provide penetrating escort jamming, as envisioned in the airborne 

electronic attack family of systems strategy. However, fielding of these 

capabilities has been delayed because of reductions in program funding. 

In addition, we have previously reported on schedule delays within the 

modernization and reliability improvement program and their effect on 

fielding additional capabilities within expected time frames. Further delays 
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 50 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

in fielding these planned capabilities may affect the Air Force’s ability to 

provide sufficient penetrating escort jamming, increasing mission risk.

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 10: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-22A Raptor, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $571.320 $511.767 $503.242 $387.510 $430.947 $463.263 $2,868.049

Procurement 232.032 283.871 291.741 248.001 282.249 329.775 $1,667.669

Total $803.352 $795.638 $794.983 $635.511 $713.196 $793.038 $4,535.718

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation. 

Source: Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: The above budget figures are only for F-22A modernization efforts only and do not include 

$104.118 million in fiscal year 2012 funds for equipment, program support, and shutdown activities 

necessary to preserve assets for long-term F-22A fleet sustainment.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 51 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 8: EA-18G Growler

Fielding date: 2009

Mission description: The EA-18G Growler replaces the EA-6B Prowler 

as DOD’s tactical electronic attack aircraft. Like the Prowler, the EA-18G 

will provide full-spectrum electronic attack to counter enemy air defenses 

and communication networks. The EA-18G incorporates jamming 

capabilities, such as the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System, and the 

use of onboard weapons such as the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, 

for the suppression of enemy air defenses. The Growler is the Navy’s 

platform to fulfill modified escort jamming capability needs.

Status: The Growler program entered full rate production in 2009, with a 

planned acquisition of 88 aircraft. However, in 2009, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to buy an additional 26 aircraft, 

bringing the total units to be acquired to 114. Through fiscal year 2011, 

the Navy placed 90 of 114 planned EA-18G aircraft under contract for 

production. Production is slightly ahead of schedule and has incorporated 

the increase in total units with limited per-unit cost growth.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 52 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

In 2010, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, declared the 

Growler operationally effective, but also found that the aircraft was 

unsuitable for operations based on maintainability concerns. Since then, 

the Navy has taken steps to improve the EA-18Gs suitability through 

software fixes, and the system recently completed follow-on operational 

test and evaluation. In addition, initial deployment of the aircraft in support 

of operations in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan recently concluded, and the 

Navy is assessing the aircraft’s performance, including the remaining 

challenges mitigating electromagnetic interference with the AN/ALQ-99. 

Additional software improvements are planned through fiscal year 2018.

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 11: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-18G Growler, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $17.100 $13.009 $15.311 $16.002 $16.106 $16.393 $93.921

Procurement 1,022.715 1,027.443 21.970 8.111 0.000 0.000 $2080.239

Total $1,039.815 $1,040.452 $37.281 $24.113 $16.106 $16.393 $2,174.160

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: The above budget figures do not include $34.151 million in fiscal year 2013 for procurement of 

initial spares.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 53 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 9: AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)

Estimated fielding date: 2012

Mission description: AARGM is an air-to-ground missile for carrierbased aircraft designed to destroy enemy radio-frequency-enabled 

surface-to-air defense. AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed 

Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and will utilize existing HARM propulsion 

and warhead sections with new guidance and modified control sections.

Status: The Navy authorized AARGM production in September 2008, 

with deliveries scheduled to begin in January 2010. A total of 1,919 units 

were planned, with initial operational capability scheduled for March 2011. 

The program began operational testing in June 2010 after a 9-month 

delay owing, in part, to concerns about the production representativeness 

of test missiles. The Navy halted operational testing in September 2010 

after hardware and software deficiencies caused a series of missile 

failures.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 54 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

These testing challenges prompted the Navy to delay AARGM’s planned 

initial operational capability date and undertake corrective actions to the 

system. These actions included an evaluation of the AARGM system 

through laboratory, ground, and flight tests from November 2010 through 

June 2011. Following this testing, Navy officials concluded that previous 

testing anomalies were successfully corrected but that the system was at 

high risk of not meeting suitability requirements during operational testing. 

The Navy found that insufficient system reliability and manufacturing 

quality controls remain open deficiencies that will likely result in an 

excessive number of system failures experienced by operational units, 

which could prevent the Navy from effectively executing planned 

missions. To address reliability concerns, the Navy instituted a “fly before 

you buy” program to screen poor weapons prior to government 

acceptance. As of July 2011, one-third of missiles delivered for testing 

were returned to the factory for repair.

Recently, the AARGM system resumed operational testing. The Navy 

now plans to field the system beginning in April 2012 and make a full rate 

production decision and contract award in June and July 2012, 

respectively.

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 12: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for AARGM, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $6.684 $6.995 $7.426 $5.470 $5.142 $5.028 $36.745

Procurement 71.561 86.721 112.022 126.324 158.073 160.820 $715.521

Total $78.245 $93.716 $119.448 $131.794 $163.215 $165.848 $752.266

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: The above budget figures do not include $0.209 million in fiscal year 2012 for procurement of 

initial spares.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 55 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 10: Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) 

Estimated fielding date: 2014 (Block 4)

Mission description: IDECM is a suite of self-protection countermeasure 

systems designed for the F/A-18E/F, including onboard jamming and offboard decoy jamming capabilities. The Navy has fielded IDECM in 

different blocks dating back to 2002 (Block 1), 2004 (Block 2), and 2011 

(Block 3). Each block improved the system’s jamming capabilities, decoy 

capabilities, or both. Block 4—the phase of production currently in 

development—extends IDECM onboard jamming capabilities to F/A18C/D aircraft.1

 

1

The F/A-18C/D will not be equipped with IDECM’s off-board jamming components (towed 

decoys) because these aircraft lack the necessary infrastructure to support these 

components.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 56 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Status: IDECM Block 4 entered development in 2009 and includes 

redesign of the ALQ-214 onboard jammer from the component design 

used for earlier blocks. This redesign is driven by the need to reduce 

weight in order to accommodate the IDECM onboard system on F/A18C/D aircraft. Essentially, the new ALQ-214 will perform the same 

onboard jammer function as found in IDECM Blocks 2 and 3 but with a 

different form and fit. The Navy expects to transition current IDECM Block 

3 full rate production to Block 4 units by April 2012. This production 

transition will occur concurrent with ground and flight testing of the Block 

4 system—a strategy that could drive costly design changes, retrofits, or 

both to units in production, in the event that the ALQ-214 redesign effort 

does not materialize on schedule. To mitigate this risk, Navy officials 

stated that Block 4 full rate production will initially be for 19 systems, with 

production rates increasing to as many as 40 per year following 

completion of testing. Further, DOD officials report that Block 4 production 

will be executed under a firm fixed-price contract—a strategy that DOD 

officials state will place the financial burden of any retrofits on the vendor.

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 13: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for IDECM, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $62.100 $29.874 $14.408 $13.897 $2.711 $2.848 $125.838

Procurement 40.272 57.067 84.305 102.388 133.449 51.569 $469.050

Total $102.372 $86.941 $98.713 $116.285 $136.160 $54.417 $594.888

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 57 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 11: Next Generation Jammer

Estimated fielding date: 2020 (Mid-band on EA-18G)

Mission description: The Next Generation Jammer will be an electronic 

warfare system to support the suppression of enemy air defenses, 

replacing and improving the capability currently provided by AN/ALQ-99 

Tactical Jamming System. The Navy’s EA-18G will employ the Next 

Generation Jammer as the electronic attack payload. In a separate 

increment of capability, the Navy plans to integrate the Next Generation 

Jammer onto the F-35B, which will eventually replace Marine Corps EA6B Prowlers. Each increment of capability will be divided into 

developmental blocks—Block 1 for mid-band, Block 2 for low-band, and 

Block 3 for high-band frequencies.

Status: The Next Generation Jammer is nearing completion of 

technology maturation activities performed by four different contractors 

before the program’s entry into the technology development phase. The 

Navy plans to enter the technology development phase in the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2013, with an engineering and manufacturing 

development contract planned for 2015. The Navy has adopted an 

evolutionary block approach to fielding the Next Generation Jammer. 

Initial operational capability for Block 1, on the EA-18G aircraft, is 

scheduled for 2020. The Navy expects to field Blocks 2 and 3 on the EA18G in 2022 and 2024, respectively. Fielding dates for the F-35 

increment’s blocks are currently undetermined.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 58 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 14: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the Next Generation Jammer, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $170.910 $187.024 $269.916 $321.817 $429.390 $528.777 $1,907.834

Procurement - - - - - - - 

Total $170.910 $187.024 $269.916 $321.817 $429.390 $528.777 $1,907.834

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: There is no procurement funding associated with the Next Generation Jammer in the fiscal year 

2013 budget.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 59 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 12: Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD)/Miniature Air Launched Decoy—

Jammer (MALD-J)

Fielding dates: 

2012 (MALD—actual)

2012 (MALD-J—estimated)

Mission description: MALD is an expendable decoy able to represent 

small, medium, or large aircraft in order to saturate or degrade enemy air 

defense systems. MALD-J is a variant of MALD that adds jamming 

capability to the decoy and forms the stand-in jamming component for the 

airborne electronic attack family of systems. The Air Force plans to 

acquire a total quantity of 596 MALD and 2,404 MALD-J units.

Status: The Air Force approved MALD for low rate initial production in 

2008. The Air Force expected to procure 300 MALD units in low rate 

production before transitioning to full rate production. However, following 

flight testing failures in summer 2010—attributable, in part, to design 

issues with the fuel filter—and a later test failure in February 2011 caused 

by foreign object debris in the fuel line, the MALD system was decertified, 

and remaining initial operational testing and evaluation activities were 

suspended. After additional corrective actions by the program office to the 
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 60 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

MALD design, the system reentered operational testing in July 2011, with 

test shots fired in late August 2011. According to Air Force testing 

officials, during the last test shot in the August series (OT-8), the engine 

for one decoy never started after it detached from the host aircraft, 

causing that MALD unit to crash. This operational testing event was the 

final one scheduled for MALD, and DOD officials report that, in January 

2012, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center delivered the 

MALD initial operational test and evaluation report assessing system 

performance. 

As a result of MALD’s testing shortfalls, the Air Force authorized 

additional low rate initial production purchases for MALD quantities—to 

the extent that the Air Force will now purchase the entire 596 unit 

inventory of MALD quantities under low rate initial production, without 

ever authorizing or achieving full rate production. Technical deficiencies 

and design changes during low rate initial production prevented 

demonstration of an efficient manufacturing capability, which in turn 

prevented MALD from meeting the department’s criteria to enter full rate 

production. DOD policy states that in order for a system to receive full 

rate production approval, the system must (1) demonstrate control of the 

manufacturing process and acceptable reliability, (2) collect statistical 

process control data, and (3) demonstrate control and capability of other 

critical processes.2

Deficiencies affecting the MALD vehicle have already contributed to 

MALD-J program delays. The MALD-J low rate initial production decision 

review—previously planned for September 2009—was delayed until 

September 2011. Operational testing has subsequently been delayed and 

is now expected to begin in May 2012. To mitigate this schedule delay, 

the Air Force has moved to compress MALD-J operational testing from 15 

months to 7 months, which program officials report reflects an increase in 

test range priority and decrease in data turnaround time. According to 

DOD officials, however, test range execution issues such as aircraft and 

test equipment availability could potentially extend MALD-J operational 

testing beyond the currently projected completion date. In addition, the Air 

Because the MALD and MALD-J designs are 

identical—except for the addition of a jammer module to MALD-J—the 

absence of a proven manufacturing process for MALD introduces cost 

and schedule risk to production of MALD-J. 

 

2

DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008).
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 61 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Force delayed, and later canceled, plans to develop a second increment 

of capability for MALD-J—one intended to provide more advanced 

jamming capabilities. Prior to these decisions, the Air Force’s fiscal year 

2012 budget submission outlined plans to budget $54.8 million in 

research, development, testing, and evaluation funding to MALD-J 

Increment II in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD, the Air Force is to 

provide a new plan for developing and procuring an Increment II variant of 

MALD-J and report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by March 30, 

2012.

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 15: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for MALD/MALD-J, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $14.917 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $14.917

Procurement 83.022 87.556 89.348 92.448 94.987 95.059 $542.420

Total $97.939 $87.556 $89.348 $92.448 $94.987 $95.059 $557.337

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: RDT&E data are for MALD-J Increment II only. There is no RDT&E funding for MALD or MALDJ.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 62 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Figure 13: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)

Estimated fielding date: To be determined

Mission description: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a family of fifthgeneration strike aircraft to replace and complement existing Navy, Air 

Force, and Marine Corps aircraft, such as the F-16 and the F/A-18. The 

F-35, along with the F-22A, is expected to fulfill DOD’s requirement for 

penetrating escort jamming capability.

Status: The F-35 program entered low rate initial production in 2007, with 

a planned baseline acquisition of 2,886 aircraft. The program experienced 

development challenges, including delays in testing, leading to a 

program-wide review. Based on this review, DOD restructured the 

program in 2010, increasing the time and funding for development. This 

restructure triggered a breach of the critical Nunn-McCurdy cost growth 

threshold. Presently, the program plans to procure 2,457 aircraft, and the 

services are still reviewing scheduled plans for operational capability and 

fielding.
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne 

Electronic Attack Systems

Page 63 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Budget: See the following table for budget information.

Table 16: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-35 Lightning II, Fiscal Years 2012-2017

Then-year dollars in millions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Total

RDT&E $2,708.228 $2,699.498 $2,464.703 $1,899.685 $1,426.668 $1,075.495 $12,274.277

Procurement 6,334.916 6,149.445 6,310.537 7,786.763 9,927.117 11,207.769 $47,716.547

Total $9,043.144 $8,848.943 $8,775.240 $9,686.448 $11,353.785 $12,283.264 $59,990.824

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Source: DOD fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.

Note: The above budget figures do not include $31.874 million in fiscal year 2012 RDT&E funds and 

$31.748 in fiscal year 2013 RDT&E funds for the Air Force Aircraft Engine Component Improvement 

Program.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 64 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 65 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 66 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 67 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 68 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 69 GAO-12-175 Airborne Electronic Attack

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Christopher R. Durbin; Laura 

Greifner; James Kim; Scott Purdy; Sylvia Schatz; Brian Smith; and 

Roxanna Sun.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120942)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, 

GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, 

go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.