John J. Callahan was appointed to serve as acting Commissioner of the Social 1

Security Administration effective March 1, 1997. He has been substituted for Shirley

S. Chater pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-1488

___________

Donna Briggs, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner, *

Social Security Administration, *

1

*

Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: October 23, 1997

Filed: March 19, 1998

___________

Before McMILLIAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.
The Honorable Edward J. McManus, United States District Judge for the

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Northern District of Iowa.

Ritalin is a central nervous system stimulant that is prescribed to stabilize

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children who are diagnosed with attention deficit disorder. See Physician's Desk

Reference 848 (50th ed. 1996).

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Donna Briggs appeals the district court's affirmance of the denial of her

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application for Child's Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits based on

disability. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Donna Briggs, who is now fourteen years old, has been diagnosed as having

borderline intellectual functioning, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and

a conduct disorder. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. She

then sought review and was granted a hearing. 

At the hearing, both Donna Briggs and her mother, Brenda Briggs, testified.

Donna testified that she spends part of her day in a special education class. Her mother

testified that Donna has had problems in school since first grade. She stated that

Donna is hyperactive, fidgety, disruptive, aggressive and cannot concentrate. She also

stated that her daughter's behavior and academic performance has improved since she

was prescribed Ritalin. 

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The evidence presented at the hearing included a questionnaire prepared by

Donna's fifth-grade teacher noting that Donna was performing below grade level in all

academic areas. She described Donna as "low functioning," but stated that she "usually

demonstrates appropriate behavior." The record also included reports from

psychologists who examined Donna. Dr. Thomas Anderegg reported that Donna "is

capable of doing all activities of daily living appropriate for a child her age but requires
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supervision in order to do them consistently," and has "significant behavioral problems

that interfere with getting along with others and following rules." He found Donna to

be functioning in the low average range of intelligence, with adaptive behavior in the

average range. Another psychologist found that her "impairments do not substantially

reduce her ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively in an ageappropriate manner." The school psychologist reported that Donna's intellectual

functioning was within the borderline range, and that her reading and written expression

skills were about two years behind those of her peers. 

The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits. He found that although

Briggs had established the existence of a severe impairment, her condition did not meet

or equal any impairment in the listing of presumptively disabling conditions. See 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (the listings). The ALJ thus conducted an individual

functional assessment and found that Briggs was not disabled because she could

function independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner.

The appeals council affirmed, as did the district court. Briggs appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We will affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial

evidence. See Young v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 200, 201-02 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would accept

it as adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. See Lawrence v. Chater, 107

F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1997). In assessing the substantiality of evidence, we must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision, as well as evidence

that supports it. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). We may not

reverse the Commissioner merely because substantial evidence would have supported

the opposite conclusion. See id.
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As an initial matter, there is a dispute between the parties over whether recent

enactments to the Social Security Act apply to this action. Under the law in effect at

the time the ALJ made his decision, a child was considered disabled if the child "suffers

from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of comparable

severity" to an impairment that would disable an adult. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)

(1995). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of

1996, which was signed into law on August 22, 1996, changed the standards by which

child SSI benefits are awarded. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). The

new legislation provides that a child will be considered disabled if he or she has a

"medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and

severe functional limitations." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(C)(i) (1997). The legislation

applies to "any individual who applies for, or whose claim is finally adjudicated with

respect to, Social Security benefits after the date of the enactment of the Act." Pub. L.

No. 104-193 § 211(d), 110 Stat. 2190. Since this action was still pending after August

22, 1996, the new legislation applies. See id. at § 211(d)(1)(A)(ii), 110 Stat. 2190.

Legislative history indicates, however, that the new statutory definition imposes

a standard for disability that is more stringent than the earlier standard for evaluating

childhood disability claims. See generally, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725 (1996),

reprinted in, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2716 (stating "severe" should be given its

ordinary meaning, not "other than minor"); 142 Cong. Rec. S4095-05, S4099 (daily ed.

April 25, 1996) (summary of centrist coalition budget--referring to "tightened definition

of childhood disability"). Accordingly, if a claim had been properly denied under the

old standard, it must also be denied under the new, more stringent, standard. We will

thus analyze this action under the old standard, as did the ALJ. Because we find that

Briggs is not disabled under the old, more lenient, standard, we need not evaluate her

case under the new, more stringent, standard.

Briggs asserts that the ALJ erred in determining that she does not meet listing

112.05(D) (Mental Retardation). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 112.05(D).
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That listing provides that a child is disabled if he or she has: 1) a valid verbal,

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 to 70; and 2) "a physical or other mental impairment

imposing additional and significant limitation of function." Id. Briggs's IQ score of

69 meets the first prong of the listing. Briggs contends that her ADHD and behavior

problems impose sufficient limitations of function to satisfy the second prong.

We disagree. Although the ALJ did not specifically discuss Briggs's condition

in the context of listing 112.05(D), we find the record supports the conclusion that

Briggs's other impairments do not meet the requirements of the listing. The record

shows that Briggs's hyperactivity has improved with medication. Reports from her

teachers indicate that her behavior is acceptable at school. Although Briggs

undoubtedly has additional impairments, there has been no showing that the

impairments impose a significant limitation on her activities. 

Even if a listing is not satisfied, a child may nonetheless be disabled if the child's

impairment is of comparable severity to that which would disable an adult. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.924(b) (1995). A child's impairments are considered comparable to an

adult's disabling impairments only if they substantially reduce his or her ability to

function independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (1995). The ALJ performs an individual function

assessment in this regard. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d(a) (1995). 

We have reviewed the record and find that there is substantial evidence to

support the ALJ's finding that Briggs's mild mental retardation, coupled with her ADHD

and behavior problems, are not of comparable severity to those which would disable

an adult.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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A true copy.

 ATTEST:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.