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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Christopher Spears,

Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-808 (Boone County CC-03-2009-C-86)

Shelby Searls, Superintendent,

Huttonsville Correctional Center,

Respondent Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner appeals the Circuit Court of Boone County’s September 22, 2022, order denying 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 Petitioner contends the circuit court erred by finding his 

trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel despite counsel’s failure to investigate 

and advise petitioner on the diminished capacity defense. Upon our review, finding no substantial 

question of law and no prejudicial error, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 

21(c). 

Petitioner was indicted in September 1998 for first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, 

burglary, grand larceny, and petit larceny. Petitioner pled guilty to first-degree murder and 

aggravated robbery, and the parties agreed to a binding sentence of life with mercy for first-degree 

murder. Sentencing for the aggravated robbery was discretionary with the court. Petitioner was 

subsequently sentenced to life with a recommendation of mercy for the first-degree murder 

conviction and a determinate term of eighty years for the aggravated robbery conviction, to be 

served consecutively.

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Petitioner filed his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the circuit court in 

August 2020, and the circuit court later held an omnibus habeas corpus evidentiary hearing. After 

reviewing audio recordings of the petitionerʼs 1999 plea hearing in open court, petitioner withdrew 

many of his habeas claims. 

1 Petitioner appears by counsel Roger L. Lambert. Respondent appears by Attorney 

General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General William E. Longwell. 

2 Said sentence is also consecutive to an unrelated burglary conviction for which the 

petitioner was sentenced to one to fifteen years. 

FILED

January 25, 2024

C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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Petitioner’s single assignment of error on appeal is that the circuit court erred by finding 

that his trial counsel was not ineffective for not investigating a claim of diminished capacity and 

advising him of the same. In Syllabus Point 1 of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 

771 (2006), we held:

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court 

in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review 

the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; 

the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions 

of law are subject to a de novo review.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the two-pronged test established 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): “(1) Counsel’s performance was deficient under 

an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Syl. Pt. 

5, in part, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). 

In reviewing counselʼs performance, courts must apply an objective 

standard and determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts 

or omissions were outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance 

while at the same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of 

trial counselʼs strategic decisions. Thus, a reviewing court asks whether a 

reasonable lawyer would have acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel 

acted in the case at issue. 

Id. at 6-7, 459 S.E.2d at 117-18, Syl. Pt. 6. 

At the omnibus hearing, trial counsel testified that he remembered discussing with 

petitioner his drug use, mental health, and lack of memory about the killing. We have held that a 

criminal defense attorney is obliged “to undertake reasonable pre-trial investigation of possible 

mental defenses where there are indications that a defendant suffers from a significant mental 

defect.” Syl. Pt. 7, in part, State ex rel. Vernatter v. Warden, 207 W. Va. 11, 528 S.E.2d 207 (1999). 

To substantiate a diminished capacity defense, petitioner must “introduce expert testimony 

regarding a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant incapable, at the time the crime 

was committed, of forming a mental state that is an element of the crime charged.” Syl. Pt. 3, in 

part, State v. Joseph, 214 W. Va. 525, 590 S.E.2d 718 (2003), accord State v. Simmons, 172 W. 

Va. 590, 600, 309 S.E.2d 89, 99 (1983) (holding that “[t]he existence of a mental illness is not 

alone sufficient to trigger a diminished capacity defense. It must be shown by psychiatric testimony 

that some type of mental illness rendered the defendant incapable of forming the specific intent 

elements.”). 

Notably, petitioner did not present any expert testimony at the omnibus hearing, which was 

necessary to prove his claim of diminished capacity. Furthermore, assuming petitioner’s counsel 

had pursued a diminished capacity defense at trial, a jury could still find the petitionerʼs criminal 

intent was not negated. In that vein, trial counsel thought accepting the plea was the better course 

because the potential sentence of life without mercy was of great concern due to the brutal nature 

of the killing. We agree with the circuit court that trial counsel acted reasonably considering the 
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circumstances of the underlying case at the time of trial preparation and the plea. Trial counsel’s 

advice to petitioner was objectively reasonable considering potential trial evidence that the victim 

was brutally stabbed 131 times, and that petitioner was almost certainly the culprit.3 Accordingly, 

we find no merit to petitioner’s assignment of error.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 25, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn

3 Law enforcement would have testified that the victim’s personal property was found at 

the petitioner’s nearby residence. An officer noticed one of petitioner’s shoes was covered in 

blood. Blood stains were found on petitioner’s utility room floor, and petitioner had washed his 

jeans at 5 a.m. on the morning of the murder. One of victim’s neighbors heard noises emanating 

from the back of the victim’s residence between 2 a.m. to 3 a.m. the same morning. Officers would 

also testify that the petitioner fled from his residence and hid during a search of the petitioner’s 

home. A witness heard petitioner threaten to kill the victim numerous times. Another witness stated 

the victim did not like petitioner and that the victim would not have given petitioner any of the 

items found in petitioner’s possession. The petitioner’s then-girlfriend said petitioner had 

something to tell her but could not because officers had approached him. Petitioner’s thengirlfriend also noticed blood stains on petitioner’s shoes, which he tried to hide from her view. 

Petitioner’s prints were also found in the victim’s residence.