MODERNIZING THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE

New Plutonium 

Research Facility at 

Los Alamos May Not 

Meet All Mission 

Needs

Report to the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Water Development, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate

March 2012

GAO-12-337

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-337, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water 

Development, Committee on Appropriations, 

U.S. Senate

March 2012

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE

New Plutonium Research Facility at Los Alamos May 

Not Meet All Mission Needs

Why GAO Did This Study

Plutonium—a man-made element 

produced by irradiating uranium in 

nuclear reactors—is vital to the nuclear 

weapons stockpile. Much of the 

nation’s current plutonium research 

capabilities are housed in aging 

facilities at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory in New Mexico. These 

facilities pose safety hazards. The 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) has decided to 

construct a multibillion dollar Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

Nuclear Facility (CMRR) to modernize 

the laboratory’s capabilities to analyze 

and store plutonium. GAO was asked 

to examine (1) the cost and schedule 

estimates to construct CMRR and the 

extent to which its most recent 

estimates reflect best practices, (2) 

options NNSA considered to ensure 

that needed plutonium research 

activities could continue, and (3) the 

extent to which NNSA's plans reflected 

changes in stockpile requirements and 

other plutonium research needs. GAO 

reviewed NNSA and contractor project 

design documents and visited Los 

Alamos and another plutonium facility 

at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory in California.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to

improve CMRR’s schedule risk 

analysis and to conduct an 

assessment of plutonium research 

needs. NNSA agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations to assess plutonium 

research needs, but disagreed that its 

schedule risk analysis should be 

revised, citing its recent decision to 

defer the project. GAO clarified the 

recommendation to specify that NNSA 

should take action when it resumes the 

project.

What GAO Found

The estimated cost to construct the CMRR has greatly increased since NNSA’s 

initial plans, and the project’s schedule has been significantly delayed. According 

to its most recent estimates prepared in April 2010, NNSA determined that the 

CMRR will cost between $3.7 billion and $5.8 billion—nearly a six-fold increase 

from the initial estimate. Construction has also been repeatedly delayed and, in 

February 2012 after GAO provided its draft report to NNSA for comment, NNSA 

decided to defer CMRR construction by at least an additional 5 years, bringing 

the total delay to between 8 and 12 years from NNSA’s original plans.

Infrastructure-related design changes and longer-than-expected overall project 

duration have contributed to these cost increases and delays. GAO’s review of 

NNSA’s April 2010 cost and schedule estimates for CMRR found that the 

estimates were generally well prepared, but important weaknesses remain. For 

example, a high-quality schedule requires a schedule risk analysis that 

incorporates known risks to predict the level of confidence in meeting a project’s 

completion date and the amount of contingency time needed to cover 

unexpected delays. CMRR project officials identified hundreds of risks to the 

project, but GAO found that these risks were not used in preparing a schedule 

risk analysis. As a result of these weaknesses, NNSA cannot be fully confident, 

once it decides to resume the CMRR project, that the project will be completed

on time and within estimated costs. 

NNSA considered several options to preserve its plutonium-related research 

capabilities in its decision to build CMRR at Los Alamos. NNSA assessed three 

different sizes for a new facility—22,500, 31,500, and 40,500 square feet. In 

2004, NNSA chose the smallest option. NNSA officials stated that cost was the 

primary driver of the decision, but that building a smaller facility would result in 

trade-offs, including the elimination of contingency space. In the end, NNSA 

decided to build a minimally-sized CMRR facility at Los Alamos with a broad 

suite of capabilities to meet nuclear weapons stockpile needs over the long-term. 

These capabilities would also be used to support plutonium-related research 

needs of other departmental missions. 

NNSA’s plans to construct CMRR focused on meeting nuclear weapons stockpile 

requirements, but CMRR may not meet all stockpile and other plutonium-related 

research needs. NNSA analyzed data on past workload and the expected need 

for new weapon components to help ensure CMRR’s design included the 

necessary plutonium-related research capabilities for maintaining the safety and 

reliability of the nuclear stockpile. However, some plutonium research, storage, 

and environmental testing capabilities that exist at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory may no longer be available after NNSA consolidates plutoniumrelated research at Los Alamos. Furthermore, NNSA conducts important 

plutonium-related research in other areas such as homeland security and nuclear 

nonproliferation, but it has not comprehensively analyzed plutonium research and 

storage needs of these other programs outside of its nuclear weapons stockpile 

work and therefore cannot be sure that the CMRR plans will effectively 

accommodate these needs. As a result, expansion of CMRR or construction of 

more plutonium research and storage facilities at Los Alamos or elsewhere may 

View GAO-12-337. For more information, be needed in the future, potentially further adding to costs.

contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or 

aloisee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Letter 1 

Background 5

CMRR’s Initial Cost Estimate Has Significantly Increased and Its 

Schedule Has Been Delayed 9

NNSA Considered Several Options to Preserve Plutonium-Related 

Research Capabilities, but Ultimately Chose to Build a Minimally 

Sized Facility at Los Alamos 14

CMRR May Meet Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Requirements but 

May Not Accommodate Other Plutonium-Related Research 

Needs 17

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Appendix II Summary Assessment of CMRR’s Cost Estimate Compared to 

Industry Best Practices 28

Appendix III Summary Assessment of CMRR’s Schedule Estimate Compared to 

Industry Best Practices 33

Appendix IV Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 36

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Tables

Table 1: Extent to Which CMRR’s Cost Estimate Met Industry Best 

Practices 11

Table 2: Extent to Which CMRR’s Schedule Estimate Met Industry 

Best Practices 12

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Abbreviations 

CMRR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

 Nuclear Facility

DOE Department of Energy

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

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Page 1 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 26, 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairman

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

Plutonium—a man-made radioactive element produced by irradiating 

uranium in nuclear reactors—is vital to the nation’s nuclear weapons 

stockpile. Plutonium is used in “pits”—the spherical central core of a 

nuclear weapon that is compressed with high explosives to create a 

nuclear explosion. Several kilograms of plutonium are sufficient to make a 

nuclear bomb, so plutonium must be stored under extremely high security 

to protect it from theft. In addition, exposure to small quantities is 

dangerous to human health, so that even inhaling a few micrograms 

creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer and inhaling larger 

doses can cause immediate lung injuries and death. Also, if not safely 

contained and managed, plutonium can be unstable and spontaneously 

ignite under certain conditions. Therefore, any facility that stores or 

conducts research on plutonium must be robustly designed to safely 

prevent the uncontrolled release of hazardous material to the 

environment and to securely store the material to protect it from potential 

theft.

Much of the nation’s current plutonium research and development 

capabilities are housed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 

Mexico. The laboratory is one of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) two primary laboratories responsible for 

designing nuclear weapons components that contain plutonium; the other 

is Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.1

 

1

NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. 

L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate, semiautonomous agency within the Department of 

Energy, with responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval 

reactors programs.

Los Alamos has 

been supporting the production of new pits since the closure of the 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, Colorado, 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

in 1989, as well as homeland security activities, energy programs, and 

nuclear nonproliferation activities.

The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research nuclear facility at Los Alamos 

conducts plutonium-related research that is crucial to effectively maintain 

the nuclear weapons stockpile. However, the facility is nearly 60 years 

old, and its aging infrastructure poses safety hazards. In addition, the 

facility is situated on a seismic fault line, raising concerns about the effect 

of earthquakes on the safety and security of plutonium used for research 

or stored at the facility. Because of these concerns, NNSA has decided to 

construct a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear 

Facility (CMRR) at Los Alamos that will (1) modernize the laboratory’s 

capabilities to analyze plutonium and (2) store plutonium in vaults that 

provide a secure environment that protects against its accidental or 

intentional misuse and minimizes health risks for workers and the 

surrounding communities.2

NNSA’s proposed construction of the CMRR is part of a larger strategic 

effort to consolidate nuclear materials from other locations across the 

United States and to modernize nuclear research, development, and 

production facilities that support the nuclear weapons stockpile. For 

example, NNSA’s plans call for some of the plutonium-related research 

currently conducted at a high security facility at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory known as Superblock to be transferred to CMRR. 

NNSA’s plans also call for much of the plutonium currently stored at 

Livermore’s Superblock to be consolidated at Los Alamos for continued 

research activities, and for the other material not needed for research at 

Livermore or Los Alamos to be stored at DOE’s Savannah River Site 

pending final disposition. In addition, the nuclear weapons stockpile’s 

requirements for plutonium are evolving. Specifically, the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty that the United States and Russia signed in April 

2010 is to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 

Originally estimated to begin construction in 

2008, the project has experienced several delays and, in February 2012 

after we had provided a draft of this report to NNSA for its comments, 

NNSA announced that it had decided to defer construction of the facility 

for at least 5 years.

 

2

For the purposes of this report, CMRR refers to the design and construction of the 

nuclear facility portion of NNSA’s CMRR project. The scope of this report does not include 

the first phase of the project—the Radiological Laboratory, Utility, and Office Building—

which is much smaller in scope and cost and is substantially complete.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

30 percent. As a result of this treaty and NNSA’s approach for 

modernizing the stockpile through the refurbishment of existing weapons, 

demand for newly manufactured pits has fluctuated in recent years. In 

light of these fluctuations, NNSA’s current strategy is to design the CMRR 

around a broad suite of capabilities—equipment, processes, and 

expertise—that it anticipates may be needed to fulfill the stockpile’s 

requirements regardless of the specific demand for pits.

Because of the extensive safety and security measures required to 

analyze and store plutonium, the cost of constructing new nuclear 

facilities is typically a multibillion dollar venture. In the past, we have 

reported on several major DOE and NNSA construction projects that 

faced cost increases and schedule delays.3 DOE’s long-standing 

difficulties in preparing cost and schedule estimates is one reason 

contract management in NNSA and DOE’s Office of Environmental 

Management is on our list of federal programs at high risk of fraud, waste, 

abuse, and mismanagement.4 Because other federal agencies have also 

had problems developing high-quality cost and schedule estimates, we 

issued a cost-estimating guide in March 2009, consisting of best practices 

drawn from across industry and government, to assist agencies to 

develop cost and schedule estimates that are well-documented, 

comprehensive, accurate, and credible.5

In this context, you asked us to review NNSA’s plans for constructing the 

CMRR. Specifically, our objectives were to examine (1) NNSA’s cost and 

schedule estimates for the construction of the facility and the extent to 

 

3

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its Uranium 

Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology Readiness, 

GAO-11-103 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010); GAO, Department of Energy: Actions 

Needed to Develop High-Quality Cost Estimates for Construction and Environmental 

Cleanup Projects, GAO-10-199 ( Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2010); GAO, Nuclear 

Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration Needs To Better Manage Risks 

Associated with the Modernization of Its Kansas City Plant, GAO-10-115 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 23, 2009): GAO, Nuclear Waste: Uncertainties and Questions about Costs and 

Risks Persist with DOE’s Tank Waste Cleanup Strategy at Hanford, GAO-09-913

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2009); and GAO, Department of Energy: Contract and 

Project Management Concerns at the National Nuclear Security Administration and Office 

of Environmental Management, GAO-09-406T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 2009).

4

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2011).

5

GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

which its most recent estimates reflect best practices, (2) options NNSA 

considered to ensure that plutonium-related research activities will 

continue as needed, and (3) the extent to which NNSA’s plans to 

construct the CMRR and its consideration of options reflected changes in 

nuclear weapons stockpile requirements and the plutonium-related 

research needs of other departmental missions.

To examine NNSA’s cost and schedule estimates for the CMRR project 

and the extent to which its current estimates reflect best practices, we 

reviewed relevant NNSA documents and met with agency and Los 

Alamos project officials to discuss the changes in the estimates that have 

occurred to date and the reasons for them. We compared NNSA’s most 

recent cost and schedule estimates––prepared in April 2010––with best 

practices contained in our cost estimating guide and gave project officials 

the opportunity to provide and discuss feedback on our assessment. To 

examine the options NNSA considered to ensure that its plutoniumrelated work will continue, we reviewed NNSA and contractor documents 

on plutonium research needs and the various options available to meet 

those needs. We also met with NNSA and contractor officials to better 

understand how these options were analyzed to determine the best 

approach to fulfill NNSA’s mission. To determine the extent to which 

NNSA’s plans reflect changes in nuclear weapons stockpile requirements, 

we reviewed NNSA analyses that were used to support CMRR project 

decisions and met with NNSA officials to determine if these analyses 

were comprehensive and reflected up-to-date nuclear weapons stockpile 

requirements. We also visited the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore 

national laboratories. To ensure the data we used were sufficiently 

reliable, we compared information gathered from a variety of data 

sources. For example, we interviewed officials from both Los Alamos and 

Livermore to obtain separate and independent perspectives on CMRR 

project plans. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 through 

February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 

contains a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

In the mid-1990s, Congress directed DOE to develop the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program to provide a single, highly integrated technical 

program for maintaining the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile. Stockpile stewardship comprises activities associated 

with conducting nuclear weapons research, design, and development; 

maintaining the knowledge base and capabilities to support nuclear 

weapons testing; and assessing and certifying nuclear weapons safety 

and reliability. Stockpile stewardship includes operations associated with 

producing, maintaining, refurbishing, surveilling, and dismantling the 

nuclear weapons stockpile. The Stockpile Stewardship Program’s 

objectives were updated as a result of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, 

which establishes the U.S. nuclear policy for the next 5 to 10 years, 

including the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile requirements.6

Nuclear stockpile requirements include a pit production capacity that is 

defined by estimating the number of pits NNSA needs to manufacture 

annually to effectively support the nuclear weapons stockpile. The 

demand for pits has fluctuated over the past decade for various reasons. 

Until 2005, NNSA planned to produce pits in a large-scale manufacturing 

plant to be built called the Modern Pit Facility, which would have 

increased pit production capacity per year to a range of 125 to 450 pits. 

This project was terminated and, at around the same time, NNSA began 

to study a new approach for modernizing the stockpile, called the Reliable 

Replacement Warhead program, which would have produced 50 pits per 

year and which was also short-lived. Through this program, NNSA would 

have designed new weapon components, including pits, to be safer and 

easier to manufacture, maintain, dismantle, and certify without nuclear 

testing. Since 2008, NNSA’s guidance has established pit capacity for 

future production at about 20 pits per year, with an upper range limit of 80 

pits per year. In addition, NNSA has recently determined that pit lifetimes 

are longer than anticipated and that it may increase the reuse of existing 

pits, reducing the demand for newly manufactured pits. Currently, pit 

The 

Nuclear Posture Review and the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

reinforce the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United 

States and Russia. As part of this treaty, the United States has agreed to 

reduce the size of its strategic nuclear weapons stockpile from a 

maximum of 2,200 to 1,550 weapons, with the remaining weapons in the 

stockpile continuing to be an essential element of U.S. defense strategy.

 

6

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, (Washington, D.C.: April 2010).

Background 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

capacity requirements are uncertain and still in flux. Demand may again 

fluctuate as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review and changes to the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. For example, there are still unknowns in 

implementing the Nuclear Posture Review and modernization work on 

each nuclear weapon type may require a varied number of new pits.

To execute the activities to maintain and refurbish the nation’s existing 

nuclear weapons stockpile, NNSA oversees eight sites that comprise its 

nuclear security enterprise—formerly known as the nuclear weapons 

complex—which includes three national weapons laboratories, four 

production plants, and a test site, all of which carry out missions to 

support NNSA’s programs. One of these sites, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, plays a crucial role in carrying out NNSA’s maintenance of 

the nuclear weapons stockpile, including (1) production of weapons 

components, (2) assessment and certification of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile, (3) surveillance of weapons components and weapon systems, 

(4) assurance of the safe and secure storage of strategic materials, and 

(5) management of excess plutonium inventories. Los Alamos was 

established in 1943 during the Manhattan Project in northern New 

Mexico. It is a multidisciplinary, multipurpose institution primarily engaged 

in theoretical and experimental research and development. A significant 

portion of Los Alamos’ work is focused on ensuring that nuclear weapons 

stockpile needs are met. Since 2000, pit production has been established 

within the Plutonium Facility Complex at Los Alamos’s Technical Area 55, 

and certified pits have been produced over the past 5 years in that facility.

A particularly important facility at Los Alamos within Technical Area 55 is 

the nearly 60-year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility. The 

facility has unique capabilities for performing analytical chemistry, 

material characterization, and research and development related to 

plutonium. This includes activities that support the manufacturing, 

development, and surveillance of nuclear weapons pits; programs to 

extend the life of nuclear weapons in the stockpile; and nuclear weapon 

dismantlement efforts. This pit production mission support work was first 

assigned to Los Alamos in 1996. NNSA also currently maintains some 

plutonium-related research capabilities at other facilities, such as 

Livermore’s Superblock facility. These capabilities are necessary 

components of NNSA’s overall stockpile management strategy. NNSA 

and DOE also use the unique plutonium-related capabilities located at 

Los Alamos and Livermore to support the plutonium-related research 

needs of other national security missions and activities outside of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile work, including nuclear nonproliferation 

activities; homeland security activities, such as nuclear forensics and 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

nuclear counterterrorism; waste management; and material recycle and 

recovery programs.

The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility was initially designed and 

constructed to comply with building codes in effect during the late 1940s 

and early 1950s. In 1992, recognizing that some of the utility systems and 

structural components were aging, outmoded, and generally deteriorating, 

DOE began upgrading the facility. These upgrades addressed specific 

safety, reliability, consolidation, and security issues with the intent of 

extending the useful life of the facility for an additional 20 to 30 years. 

However, beginning in about 1997 and continuing to the present, a series 

of additional operational and safety concerns have surfaced. In particular, 

a 1998 seismic study identified two small parallel faults beneath the 

northern portion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility. The 

presence of these faults raised concerns about the structural integrity of 

the building in the event of an earthquake. DOE and NNSA determined 

that, over the long term, Los Alamos could not continue to operate the 

mission-critical support capabilities in the existing Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research facility at an acceptable level of risk to worker safety 

and health. To ensure that NNSA can fulfill its national security mission 

for the next 50 years in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound 

manner, NNSA decided in 2004 to construct a replacement facility, known 

as the CMRR.7

Federal agencies, including DOE and NNSA, have experienced longstanding difficulties in completing major projects within cost and on 

schedule. To provide assistance in preparing high-quality cost and 

schedule estimates, we compiled best practices used throughout 

government and industry and, in March 2009, issued a guide outlining the 

criteria for high-quality cost and schedule estimates. Specifically, our 

guide identified four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable cost 

estimate: (1) credible, (2) well-documented, (3) accurate, and (4) 

 

7

In 2004, NNSA determined that it needed a nuclear facility to relocate certain analytical 

capabilities from existing facilities at Los Alamos, which are near end-of-life, as part of 

NNSA’s plans for maintaining and certifying the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. In 

deciding whether to build a new facility or instead use or refurbish other existing facilities, 

a 2006 Los Alamos study determined that a new nuclear facility should be built because 

the fundamental objectives of NNSA’s strategic planning for the nuclear weapons complex 

could not be achieved without it.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

comprehensive.8

Our guide also identified nine best practices for effectively estimating 

schedules: (1) capturing key activities, (2) sequencing key activities, (3) 

assigning resources to key activities, (4) establishing the duration of key 

activities, (5) integrating key activities horizontally and vertically, (6) 

establishing the critical path for key activities, (7) identifying total float 

(i.e., the time that activities can slip before the delay affects the 

completion date), (8) performing a risk analysis of the schedule, and (9) 

updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine dates.

In addition, our cost guide lays out 12 key steps that 

should result in high-quality cost estimates and hundreds of best 

practices drawn from across industry and government for carrying out 

these steps. For example, one of the key steps includes conducting an 

independent cost estimate––that is, one generated by an entity that has 

no stake in the approval of the project but uses the same detailed 

technical information as the project estimate. Having an independent 

entity perform such a cost estimate and comparing it to the project team’s 

estimate provides an unbiased test of whether the project team’s cost 

estimate is reasonable.

9

Many of these practices have also been incorporated into DOE’s recent 

guidance for establishing performance baselines.10

 

8

In the context of our cost guide, a cost estimate is the summation of individual cost 

elements, using established methods and valid data, to estimate the future costs of a 

project, based on what is known today.

9

GAO-09-3SP. 

10DOE, Performance Baseline Guide, DOE G 413.3-5A (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 

2011). Although there is not a one-to-one correlation, many of the GAO-identified best 

practices, are also suggested schedule development practices in DOE’s Performance 

Baseline Guide. DOE also requires that NNSA establish a project performance baseline to 

document estimated project cost and schedule for planned capital projects in order to 

measure the project’s performance. See DOE, Program and Project Management for the 

Acquisition of Capital Assets, DOE O 413.3B (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2010).
 

Page 9 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

The estimated cost to construct the CMRR, according to estimates 

prepared in April 2010, is nearly six times higher than the project’s initial 

cost estimate that was prepared in 2005. The project’s estimated 

completion date has also been delayed by at least 8 to 12 years. Our 

review of these most recent detailed cost and schedule estimates for the 

CMRR project found that the estimates generally reflect best practices, 

but are not yet entirely reliable.

Since CMRR was first proposed, its costs have risen significantly, and its 

schedule has been repeatedly delayed. Specifically, in 2005, when DOE 

developed initial plans for CMRR, it estimated that the project would cost 

from $745 million to $975 million and would be completed between 2013 

and 2017. This estimate was prepared using preliminary information—

before a detailed project design was substantially under way—and was 

therefore considered by DOE to be a rough estimate. In April 2010, NNSA 

estimated that the CMRR will cost between $3.7 and $5.8 billion—a 

nearly six-fold increase from the initial estimate—and that construction 

will be complete by 2020—a 3- to 7-year delay. In February 2012, after 

we had provided NNSA with a draft of this report for its comments, NNSA 

announced that it had decided to defer CMRR construction by at least an 

additional 5 years, bringing the total delay from NNSA’s original plans to 8 

to 12 years.

NNSA officials explained that the majority of the cost increases occurred 

because of changes to the facility’s design and because of project delays. 

Specifically,

• Modifications to the facility’s design. To address concerns about 

seismic activity, the project design was modified to strengthen the 

facility to withstand a potential earthquake. For example, significant 

design changes resulted from the need to thicken the concrete walls 

to satisfy increasingly stringent seismic requirements. In addition, to 

proceed to final design, project officials had to evaluate the potential 

effects of an earthquake on the facility’s complex ventilation system. 

This effort included several studies, consultations with vendors and 

other designers, and an assessment of the availability of equipment 

that would meet seismic requirements. Overall, Los Alamos estimates 

the seismic related design changes increased the project costs by 

almost $500 million.

CMRR’s Initial Cost 

Estimate Has 

Significantly 

Increased and Its 

Schedule Has Been 

Delayed 

Estimated Cost to 

Construct CMRR Has 

Increased by Almost SixFold, and Its Scheduled 

Completion Has Been 

Delayed
 

Page 10 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

• Delays in the construction start date and longer overall project 

duration. CMRR construction was originally expected to begin in 

2008, but was first delayed until 2013 and is now not expected to 

begin before 2018. The initial delay in starting construction from 2008 

to 2013 had varying causes, including facility design changes 

described previously as well as the additional time needed for NNSA 

to determine where and how to consolidate plutonium operations in 

the nuclear security enterprise, according to project officials. This 

delay starting construction pushed the estimated construction 

completion date from between 2013 and 2017 to 2020—3 to 7 years 

later than initially expected. At the time, the facility was expected to be 

operational in 2022.11 These delays further increased costs, partly 

because inflation meant that equipment and materials became more 

expensive as time passed. In addition, the longer project duration also 

contributes to increases in the cost of workers’ wages and salaries. 

Overall, project officials estimate that about $1.2 billion in additional 

costs resulted from these schedule delays. In February 2012, NNSA 

announced another significant project delay—at least an additional 5-

year deferral in starting the construction of the CMRR—resulting in a 

total of an 8 to 12 year delay from NNSA’s original plans. However, 

NNSA has not yet determined the impact to the project’s costs as a 

result of this additional delay.

Our review of NNSA’s most recent cost and schedule estimates for the 

CMRR construction project found that the estimates were generally well 

prepared but that important weaknesses remain. Specifically, we found 

that the CMRR cost estimate prepared in April 2010 exhibits most of the 

characteristics of high-quality, reliable cost estimates. As identified by the 

professional cost-estimating community and documented in our costestimating guide, a high-quality cost estimate is comprehensive, welldocumented, accurate, and credible.12

 

11The delay between completion of construction and the date of operation allows for 

equipment to be prepared for use and workers to be trained on new equipment, among 

other things. 

Our review of the CMRR cost 

estimate found that the cost estimate exhibits three of the four 

characteristics of a high-quality estimate by being substantially 

comprehensive, well documented, and accurate, but only partially 

12GAO-09-3SP. 

NNSA’s Most Recent Cost 

and Schedule Estimates 

Generally Meet Industry 

Best Practices, but Are Not 

Yet Entirely Reliable
 

Page 11 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

credible, as shown in table 1. Appendix II contains additional information 

about each of the four general best practice characteristics and our 

assessment of the estimate compared to detailed best practices.

Table 1: Extent to Which CMRR’s Cost Estimate Met Industry Best Practices

Best practice characteristic Overall assessment

Comprehensive

a

Substantially met

Well documented Substantially met

Accurate Substantially met

Credible Partially met

Source: GAO analysis of CMRR project cost information.

a

The CMRR cost estimate only partially met industry best practices for 

credibility because project officials did not use alternate methods to 

crosscheck major cost elements to see whether the results were similar 

under different estimating methods. In addition, according to our guide, 

there are varying methods of validating an estimate, but the most rigorous 

method is the independent cost estimate that is generated by an entity 

that has no stake in the approval of the project. Conducting an 

independent cost estimate is especially important at major milestones 

because it provides senior decision makers with a more objective 

assessment of the likely cost of a project. A second, less rigorous method 

for validating a project’s cost estimate—an independent cost review—

focuses on examining the estimate’s supporting documentation and 

interviewing relevant staff. Independent cost reviews address only the 

cost estimate’s high-value, high-risk, and high-interest aspects without 

evaluating the remainder of the estimate. An independent cost review on 

the entire CMRR project was initiated in 2011, but the more rigorous 

method of validating—conducting an independent cost estimate—has 

only been used on a small portion of the project representing about 6 

The ratings we used in this analysis are as follows: “Not met” means CMRR provided no evidence 

that satisfies any of the characteristic. “Minimally met” means CMRR provided evidence that satisfies 

a small portion of the characteristic. “Partially met” means CMRR provided evidence that satisfies 

about half of the characteristic. “Substantially met” means CMRR provided evidence that satisfies a 

large portion of the characteristic. “Fully met” means CMRR provided complete evidence that satisfies 

the entire characteristic.
 

Page 12 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

percent of the project’s total costs.13

With regard to CMRR’s schedule, the project’s schedule estimate fully 

met two and substantially met six out of nine best practices for a highquality schedule as identified by our guide and minimally met one. For 

example, two of the best practices the estimate fully met concerned how 

well it (1) captured all of the project’s activities, including design, 

construction, and other tasks that collectively form a comprehensive 

schedule, and (2) is successfully kept up-to-date. Table 2 lists best 

practices along with our assessment of the extent to which the project’s 

schedule met each best practice.

According to NNSA officials, DOE 

orders do not require NNSA to seek an independent cost estimate until 

just prior to establishing the project baseline, and project officials told us 

NNSA is preparing to have one conducted before the project baseline is 

established. However, until a quality independent cost estimate is 

completed on the entire project or another means of validating the 

estimate for the project, DOE and NNSA officials cannot be confident that 

the current cost estimate is completely credible.

Table 2: Extent to Which CMRR’s Schedule Estimate Met Industry Best Practices

Source: GAO analysis of CMRR project schedule information. 

 

13An independent cost estimate was initiated in 2011 covering the design and 

infrastructure needed to complete the CMRR nuclear facility project, such as concrete 

batch plants and equipment storage, which represents only $250 million of the estimated 

total project cost.

Best practice Overall assessment

Capturing all activities

a

Fully met

Sequencing all activities Substantially met

Assigning resources to all activities Substantially met

Establishing the duration of all activities Substantially met

Integrating schedule activities Substantially met

Establishing the critical path for all activities Substantially met

Identifying float between activities Substantially met

Conducting a schedule risk analysis Minimally met

Updating the schedule using logic and durations to 

determine dates

Fully met
 

Page 13 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

a

The CMRR schedule estimate minimally met industry best practices for 

conducting a schedule risk analysis. Namely, according to our guide, a 

high-quality schedule requires a schedule risk analysis that uses already 

identified risks, among other things, to predict the level of confidence in 

meeting a project’s completion date and the amount of contingency time 

needed to cover unexpected delays. CMRR project officials identified and 

documented hundreds of risks to the project, but these risks were not 

used in preparing a schedule risk analysis. For example, project officials 

identified the following three risks that are likely to occur: (1) a necessary 

electrical system upgrade that might not be completed in time for 

construction activities, (2) uncertainties associated with the flow of 

simultaneous design changes, and (3) noncompliance with certain quality 

assurance standards for nuclear facilities. These risks could cause 

delays, ranging anywhere from 1 to 5 years. Nevertheless, the project’s 

schedule risk analysis identified only a 1-year schedule contingency for 

the entire project. If NNSA is unable to successfully mitigate these risks 

and if they occur together, there is a high likelihood that the 1-year 

contingency that NNSA established may be exceeded. As a result, project 

officials cannot be certain the schedule estimate contains all identified 

risks in its risk analysis. Project officials told us that, before the project

baseline is established, they expect to have a schedule risk analysis that 

includes identified risks and that they are in the early stages of developing 

a plan to do so.

The ratings we used in this analysis are as follows: “Not met” means the CMRR provided no 

evidence that satisfies any part of a practice. “Minimally met” means the CMRR provided evidence 

that satisfies a small portion of a practice. “Partially met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies about half of a practice. “Substantially met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies a large portion of a practice. “Fully met” means the CMRR provided evidence that completely 

satisfies a practice.

NNSA is taking steps to mitigate the risks that have been identified and, 

because the project is still in early stages, many risks may be resolved. 

For example, to mitigate the risk that the electrical system upgrade would 

not be completed in time to avoid a delay in construction activities, project 

officials have identified specific steps to help ensure that the upgrade is 

performed in a timely manner. However, without a schedule risk analysis 

that contains risks identified by CMRR project officials, NNSA cannot be 

fully confident, once it decides to resume CMRR construction plans, that 

sufficient schedule contingency is established to ensure that the project 

will be completed on time and within estimated costs. As a result, overall 

project costs could potentially exceed NNSA’s April 2010 estimate of 

between $3.7 billion and $5.8 billion and NNSA had not yet determined 

the impact to the project’s costs of its recent decision to defer CMRR 

construction for at least 5 years. Appendix III contains additional 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

information on each practice and our assessment of the estimate 

compared to best practices.

To replace the plutonium-related research capabilities in Los Alamos’s 

deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility, NNSA 

considered several options. In the end, NNSA decided to build a 

minimally sized CMRR facility at Los Alamos with a broad suite of 

capabilities to meet nuclear weapons stockpile needs over the long-term. 

These capabilities would also be used to support plutonium-related 

research needs of other departmental missions. NNSA evaluated these 

options based on their expected effect on cost, schedule, risk, and ability 

to meet the plutonium-related research needs of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile stewardship program.

NNSA first focused on identifying and replacing the capabilities necessary 

to maintain and modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile. Specifically, 

these capabilities included those necessary to study the chemical and 

metallurgic properties of plutonium pits to ensure that they are properly 

produced, certified, and monitored over time so they remain safe and 

reliable.14

 

14Actual pit production will not take place in CMRR, but it will provide plutonium-related 

analytical capabilities to support pit production being done at another facility known as PF4, which is located within Los Alamos’s Technical Area 55. The purpose of the pit 

production program is to re-establish the capability to produce pits, which were formerly 

produced at the Rocky Flats Plant outside of Denver, Colorado, until 1989 when 

operations there ceased. Responsibility for pit production was then assigned to Los 

Alamos in 1996.

For example, to ensure that a nuclear weapon will function as 

intended, the plutonium inside of the pits needs to meet strict 

specifications. Meeting these specifications requires having the capability 

to analyze and characterize the plutonium’s chemistry and material 

properties. The specifications require NNSA to measure several chemical 

attributes, including chemical composition and impurities, as well as the 

pit’s structural attributes, such as the metal’s microscopic grain size, its 

texture, any potential defects, and its weld characteristics. NNSA 

identified at least 58 distinct capabilities that will be required in the new 

facility to allow it to conduct the analyses necessary to build at least one 

NNSA Considered 

Several Options to 

Preserve PlutoniumRelated Research 

Capabilities, but 

Ultimately Chose to 

Build a Minimally 

Sized Facility at Los 

Alamos 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

pit of every type currently in the stockpile.15

To house these needed capabilities, NNSA assessed three potential 

sizes for a new facility—22,500 square feet, 31,500 square feet, and 

40,500 square feet. The 40,500 square foot option included about 10,500 

square feet of unequipped space—known as contingency space—to 

allow for program changes, such as increased pit manufacturing. In 

addition, this contingency space could accommodate users outside Los 

Alamos, such as researchers from Livermore. However, in 2004, NNSA 

chose the smallest and least expensive option—22,500 square feet. 

NNSA officials told us that cost was the primary driver of this decision.

NNSA determined that as 

many as 79 capabilities may be required if NNSA needs to manufacture a 

larger quantity of pits—up to its high estimate of 80 pits per year, which is 

the Department of Defense’s published military requirement for pit 

production. In addition to research capabilities, NNSA determined that the 

new facility would need to provide other capabilities to support research 

operations. In particular, long-term plutonium storage space is needed to 

support plutonium-related research at CMRR.

NNSA’s choice to build a minimally sized facility was questioned in two 

studies conducted subsequent to NNSA’s decision in 2004. Specifically, a 

Los Alamos study conducted in 2006 found that increasing CMRR’s size 

by 9,000 square feet—to a total of 31,500 square feet—would be the best 

option based on cost, schedule, risk, and the facility’s ability to meet 

plutonium-related research needs.16

 

15Weapon types in the nuclear weapons stockpile include the W78 and W87 warheads for 

intercontinental ballistic missiles used by the Air Force; W76 and W88 warheads for 

submarine launched ballistic missiles used by the Navy; B61 and B83 bombs used by the 

Air Force; and the W80 warhead for missiles used by the Navy and Air Force.

Furthermore, a separate 

independent study prepared for NNSA in 2006 determined that adding 

9,000 square feet to CMRR would lower risk and increase facility flexibility 

16Los Alamos National Laboratory, Options for Plutonium-Related Missions and 

Associated Facilities Between 2007 and 2022, LA-CP-06-0957 (Los Alamos, NM: Oct. 10, 

2006).
 

Page 16 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

but could cost an additional $179 million.17

Subsequent to its 2004 decision to build CMRR at Los Alamos, NNSA 

continued to study other locations for consolidating plutonium-related 

research within the nuclear security enterprise. Specifically, as part of its 

development of a complexwide strategy to modernize nuclear research, 

development, and production facilities that support the nuclear weapons 

stockpile, NNSA studied consolidating the nation’s plutonium-related 

research capabilities at Los Alamos, the Pantex Plant in Texas, the 

Nevada National Security Site in Nevada, the Savannah River Site in 

South Carolina, and the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. In 

December 2008, NNSA decided to consolidate plutonium research at Los 

Alamos and reaffirmed its earlier 2004 decision to locate the new CMRR 

at Los Alamos. Consolidating plutonium-related research capabilities at 

Los Alamos presented several advantages, including lower costs and 

risks when compared to other locations. For example, colocating 

plutonium analytical capabilities with Los Alamos’s pit manufacturing 

capabilities reduced the costs and risks of protecting plutonium from 

potential theft. As part of NNSA’s decision to consolidate plutonium 

research at Los Alamos, NNSA also decided that the CMRR would be 

used to support plutonium-related research needs of other non-weapons 

Nevertheless, NNSA officials 

told us that a smaller sized facility had the best chance of minimizing 

costs. NNSA officials acknowledge that the smaller size option poses 

more risk because the facility will include no contingency space. This 

space may be necessary, for example, to respond to potential increases 

in pit production needs if in the future they unexpectedly approach or 

exceed 80 pits per year. If this occurs, and no contingency space is 

available, other plutonium-related research beyond that required for the 

nuclear weapons stockpile will also likely be affected. According to NNSA 

and Los Alamos officials, these risks could be mitigated by conducting 

some nonnuclear weapons plutonium-related research at other facilities, 

such as Los Alamos’s PF-4 pit production facility. However, PF-4 also has 

ongoing laboratory and storage limitations and may not be able to 

accommodate these other nonweapons plutonium activities.

 

17Techsource Incorporated, Independent Business Case Analysis for Construction of the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 21, 2006). The $179 million cost difference represents the $4.175 billion estimate for 

the larger 31,500 square foot facility less the $3.996 billion estimate for a smaller 22,500 

square foot facility. The study results are based on estimated project costs from fiscal year 

2007 through fiscal year 2022. Estimated costs are shown in fiscal year 2006 dollars and 

are not adjusted to reflect present worth or net residual value.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

activities, including nuclear nonproliferation activities; homeland security 

activities, such as nuclear forensics and nuclear counterterrorism; waste 

management; and material recycle and recovery programs. However, the 

size of the planned CMRR facility—22,500 square feet—has not changed 

since NNSA’s initial 2004 decision, which calls into question the facility’s 

ability to support the needs of these other activities.

NNSA’s plans to construct the CMRR focused on meeting changing 

nuclear weapons stockpile requirements. However, CMRR may not be 

able to accommodate all stockpile and other plutonium-related research 

needs, particularly as other NNSA facilities reduce or end their plutonium 

research activities as a result of broader NNSA plans to consolidate its 

plutonium activities.

NNSA’s plans to construct the CMRR primarily focus on maintaining 

plutonium-related research capabilities that are necessary for meeting 

nuclear weapons stockpile requirements. NNSA designed the CMRR to 

support the capabilities necessary for maintaining the safety and reliability 

of the nuclear stockpile––namely, the testing, manufacturing, and 

certification of the pits––and, in particular, plutonium-related research 

capabilities, such as analytical chemistry and materials characterization, 

and associated special nuclear materials vault storage. More specifically, 

in designing the CMRR, NNSA analyzed detailed data on past nuclear 

weapons activities conducted at Los Alamos, including information on the 

frequency of plutonium samples analyzed over time and the expected 

annual requirement for manufacturing new pits to determine the 

plutonium-related research capabilities the new facility would need to 

meet NNSA weapons program requirements. For example, NNSA studied 

the number of plutonium samples that had been processed in 2007 at the 

old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility for analytical chemistry 

and materials characterization work and used the number as an average 

representation in assuming future workloads. In addition, NNSA 

considered the numbers of specific pieces of equipment and the 

associated square footage of laboratory space needed to conduct specific 

analytical chemistry and material characterization work.

CMRR May Meet 

Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile 

Requirements but 

May Not 

Accommodate Other 

Plutonium-Related 

Research Needs

NNSA’s CMRR Plans Focus 

on Meeting Nuclear 

Weapons Stockpile 

Requirements, But Some 

Plutonium-Related Work 

for the Stockpile May Not 

Be Accommodated
 

Page 18 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

In its planning, NNSA considered how plutonium-related capabilities in 

the CMRR could meet changing stockpile requirements, including 

NNSA’s established upper limit of producing 80 pits per year. NNSA 

designed the facility to ensure that it can meet the pit production 

requirements regardless of the specific number of pits produced—or, in 

other words, the number of pits produced each year will not significantly 

affect the capabilities NNSA will need in the new facility, although 

capacity limits cap the quantity of new pits at 80 pits per year. For 

example, NNSA’s 2009 CMRR Program Requirements document states 

that the new facility will have laboratory spaces designed in a way that is 

flexible and modular to accommodate changes in the mission and the 

dynamic conditions associated with normal processing and maintenance 

activities in a laboratory environment.

NNSA officials indicated that they are confident that the CMRR will 

generally meet nuclear weapons activities needs and accommodate 

changes in the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements, including the 

ability to produce up to 80 pits per year. However, some weapons 

activities capabilities that currently exist at other NNSA sites may no 

longer be available to the nuclear security enterprise because of broader 

NNSA modernization plans to consolidate plutonium activities. As part of 

NNSA’s plan to consolidate plutonium related work at Los Alamos, the 

CMRR was designed to absorb some plutonium-related research from 

other facilities as those other facilities reduce or end their weapons 

activities work. For example, Livermore’s Superblock facility is equipped 

with the necessary systems to safely work with plutonium and to support 

extending the life of certain warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Under NNSA’s strategy to consolidate plutonium work at Los Alamos, the 

majority of Livermore’s plutonium is scheduled to be removed in 2012, 

and some of this research will be discontinued at Superblock. NNSA 

plans to have the CMRR take on much of this work; however, Livermore 

officials told us they believe that NNSA may still lose some plutoniumrelated capabilities once some research is discontinued at Superblock. 

For example, NNSA may face a gap in the plutonium-related capabilities 

necessary to help improve nuclear warhead surety—that is, safety, 

security, and use control. NNSA has not planned for another facility to 

take over this work, and NNSA officials told us that the CMRR has not 

been designed to support this surety research. Furthermore, NNSA and 

Los Alamos officials told us that NNSA may also lose some pit testing 

capabilities that only take place in the Superblock at Livermore and are 

expected to be discontinued there in 2013. Pit testing includes thermal, 

vibration, and other environmental tests on pits that ensure that the 

weapon can successfully function from the time it is in the stockpile until it 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

is deployed and reaches a target. Livermore officials told us that CMRR 

will not accommodate pit environmental testing because the systems 

used to conduct the environmental tests could cause vibrations through 

the rest of the facility. This could disrupt other work that requires precision 

instrumentation. Livermore officials also told us that these pit 

environmental testing capabilities are necessary to help meet nuclear 

weapons stockpile requirements. Because the CMRR was not intended to 

support all of these capabilities, NNSA will need to find another location if 

this plutonium-related work currently being conducted at Livermore is to 

be continued. NNSA has begun studying the extent to which the 

environmental pit testing capabilities will be needed, and if so, where they 

will be located. However, NNSA currently has no final plans for relocating 

them elsewhere.18

DOE and NNSA conduct important plutonium-related research in other 

mission areas outside of nuclear weapons stockpile work, and it is 

unclear whether the CMRR as designed will be large enough to 

accommodate these nonweapons activities because they have not 

comprehensively studied their long-term research and storage needs. A 

NNSA record of decision states that the CMRR will support other national 

security missions involving plutonium-related research, including 

nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, and nuclear counterterrorism 

programs. For example, NNSA plans to use analytical chemistry 

capabilities in CMRR to perform nuclear forensics work that would be 

needed to, among other things, identify the source of and individuals 

responsible for any planned or actual use of a nuclear device.

However, DOE and NNSA have not comprehensively studied the longterm plutonium-related research and storage needs of programs outside 

of NNSA’s nuclear weapons stockpile work and therefore cannot be sure 

that the CMRR can accommodate them. In particular, DOE does not have 

important information on departmentwide analytical chemistry and 

material characterization research and storage needs, which can be 

helpful in making fully informed planning decisions about its long-term 

infrastructure and consolidation plans for the nuclear security enterprise. 

 

18NNSA has initiated a study considering implications of potentially upgrading Livermore’s 

nuclear facility security and hazard categories for short periods to allow NNSA to continue 

and maintain needed plutonium-related capabilities. An NNSA official told us that NNSA is 

confident that the environmental pit testing capabilities will be maintained somewhere.

CMRR May Not Meet 

Other Plutonium-Related 

Research and Storage 

Needs As DOE and NNSA 

Have Not Fully Analyzed 

Programs Outside of 

Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile Work
 

Page 20 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

As we have previously reported, conceptual planning for a building—a 

process by which an organization’s facility needs are identified and 

understood—is the critical phase of any successful building project 

development.19

NNSA and Los Alamos officials told us they are confident that the CMRR 

will be able to support other missions’ needs for plutonium-related 

research, but the facility’s design does not include dedicated space for 

other missions’ research needs and includes little to no contingency 

space. Los Alamos officials told us that shifting nuclear stockpile 

requirements and changing pit production rates may impact specific 

workloads and space capacity issues but that the CMRR is still too far 

from becoming operational to estimate these impacts. For example, if 

stockpile requirements are such that the higher boundary of pit production 

capacity is needed—up to 80 pits per year—then the new facility will have 

little, if any, space to address other missions’ research.

This conceptual planning results in a building design that 

should be well defined according to an organization’s needs and include 

input from all key stakeholders before it is designed. NNSA and Los 

Alamos officials told us that the programs supporting mission areas 

outside of the nuclear stockpile work—including NNSA’s Office of 

National Technical Nuclear Forensics and Office of Fissile Materials 

Disposition—were generally not involved in planning the CMRR. Los 

Alamos officials said that they thought that there was too much time 

before the new facility would be operating for other mission areas to know 

their specific needs. However, by not including input from all the mission 

areas during the design of CMRR, NNSA has risked not knowing all of the 

potential needs and uses for the new facility to complement its important 

missions outside of the nuclear weapons stockpile work.

20

 

19GAO, Guide to the Building Development Process: The First Phase: Conceptual 

Planning, 

Moreover, in a 

2008 analysis of the CMRR’s design, NNSA stated that Los Alamos is 

uncertain that it will be able to conduct all of NNSA’s plutonium-related 

research operations within the 22,500 square feet of laboratory space in 

the facility. NNSA planning documents indicate that CMRR is intended to 

GAO-04-859G (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).

20NNSA and Los Alamos have considered using space in Los Alamos’ PF-4 plutonium 

facility to handle additional plutonium-related research. However, NNSA officials told us 

that operating at this high pit production range would also likely use all of PF-4’s capacity. 

As a result, NNSA would have to consider reducing or eliminating other mission work 

currently supported in PF-4 or modify CMRR to incorporate additional needed space at 

additional cost.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

support nonweapons activity needs only if additional capacity remains 

after all weapons-related activities are supported. If additional capacity is 

not available, NNSA may face the prospect of not being able to use the 

new facility for one of its intended purposes of supporting certain 

plutonium-related research for missions outside of nuclear weapons 

stockpile work. A 2004 NNSA study suggested that this could effectively 

result in national security, nonproliferation, and environmental 

management programs potentially not performing in a cost-effective, 

compliant, and timely manner.21

In addition, the CMRR has been designed to support Los Alamos and 

NNSA’s mission need to store significant quantities of nuclear material 

associated with the plutonium operations in a safe and secure manner 

using vault storage. Specifically, NNSA plans to shift all of Los Alamos’ 

current vault storage materials from its existing chemistry and metallurgy 

facility and overflow inventory from the PF-4 facility to the CMRR.22

 

21NNSA, Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility 

Replacement Project Mission Need Statement (Jan. 15, 2004).

However, Los Alamos officials told us that Los Alamos may not have 

enough storage space even after the CMRR is complete. NNSA plans to 

first use the newly available vault space in the CMRR for short-term, daily 

storage of nuclear materials being used for programmatic work and then 

use any remaining space for long-term storage. NNSA designed the 

CMRR without much long-term vault storage because these materials 

were initially planned to be shipped offsite for disposal. However, due to 

broader departmental challenges with other NNSA sites receiving 

materials for disposal, Los Alamos may not be able to ship its nuclear 

material off-site. If this is the case, Los Alamos officials told us that they 

may have to find additional long-term vault storage. This could also 

potentially affect Los Alamos’ ability to receive nuclear materials from 

other sites under NNSA’s consolidation strategy. In addition, Los Alamos 

officials told us that NNSA is still considering facility layout options that 

would allow for vault storage space to be configured for other operations 

and lab space. If this space is used for functional laboratory space rather 

than storage, less space will be available for short-term vault storage than 

NNSA originally thought.

22Los Alamos officials told us that one of the major uses of CMRR storage space will be to 

relieve vault storage space at its plutonium facility that has already reached its available 

storage capacity.
 

Page 22 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Once NNSA resumes the CMRR project and constructs the facility, 

CMRR will play an important role in ensuring the continued safety and 

reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The CMRR can 

potentially offer NNSA the opportunity to improve efficiency, save costs, 

and reduce safety hazards for workers. Because of the facility’s 

importance to the stockpile, multibillion dollar price tag, the inherent 

challenges in building facilities that can safely and securely store 

plutonium, and NNSA’s ongoing difficulties managing large projects, it is 

critical that NNSA and Congress have accurate estimates of the project’s 

costs and schedules, particularly when the CMRR project is resumed. 

After facing a nearly six-fold increase in estimated cost and schedule 

delays, NNSA’s most recent cost and schedule estimates generally meet 

industry best practices, but there are important weaknesses that call 

these estimates’ reliability into question. For example, an independent 

cost estimate—the most rigorous method to validate major cost elements 

that is performed by an entity that has no stake in the approval of the 

project—has not yet been conducted. To its credit, NNSA plans to have 

an independent cost estimate conducted prior to the completion of 

CMRR’s project baseline once the project is resumed. With regard to the 

project’s schedule estimate, however, NNSA cannot yet provide high 

assurance that all project risks are fully accounted for in the project’s 

schedule risk analysis that is used for updating the project’s schedule 

contingency estimates. As a result, NNSA cannot yet be fully confident 

that, once it decides to resume the CMRR project, the project will meet its 

estimated completion date, which could lead to further delays and 

additional costs.

However, reliable cost and schedule estimates for CMRR that fully meet 

industry best practices are of little use if DOE’s and NNSA’s mission 

needs are not met. Constructing CMRR is an important part of NNSA’s 

strategy to modernize its nuclear weapons facilities into a smaller and 

more responsive, efficient, and secure infrastructure to meet the changing 

requirements of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The CMRR was intended 

to support the plutonium-related research and storage needs of other 

DOE and NNSA national security missions and activities outside of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile work, including homeland security and nuclear 

nonproliferation activities; but because NNSA decided early in the project 

to reduce the size of the proposed facility to save money, CMRR may 

now lack the ability to accommodate these other research needs. In 

particular, the planned removal of most plutonium from Livermore 

presents NNSA with a dilemma in that the primary benefit of consolidating 

plutonium at Los Alamos—lower security costs—may be offset by the 

need to replace Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s plutonium 

Conclusions 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

research, storage, and environmental testing capabilities. Importantly, 

when NNSA decided to consolidate plutonium operations at Los Alamos, 

it did not fully consider whether planned or existing facilities at Los 

Alamos would be capable of continuing plutonium work being conducted 

elsewhere. For example, CMRR was not intended to accommodate the 

thermal, vibration, and other environmental pit testing that Livermore 

currently conducts because the vibrations this type of testing creates 

could disrupt other work at CMRR that requires precision instrumentation. 

Nevertheless, this type of testing is necessary to meet nuclear weapons 

stockpile requirements and so must be conducted somewhere. The full 

extent of the potential shortfall in plutonium research capabilities is not 

well-understood because DOE and NNSA have not comprehensively 

assessed their plutonium-related research, storage, and environmental 

testing needs. Plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and 

for other missions may have to compete for limited laboratory and storage 

space in CMRR and other facilities at Los Alamos, especially if the 

demand for newly manufactured pits unexpectedly increases. As a result, 

expansion of CMRR or construction of costly additional plutonium 

research, storage, and testing facilities at Los Alamos or elsewhere may 

be needed sometime in the future.

To strengthen cost and schedule estimates for the CMRR and ensure 

needed plutonium research needs are sufficiently accommodated, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three actions:

1. Once NNSA resumes the CMRR project and prior to establishing a 

new cost and schedule baseline, incorporate all key risks identified by 

CMRR project officials into the project’s schedule risk analysis, and 

ensure that this information is then used to update schedule 

contingency estimates, as appropriate.

2. Conduct a comprehensive assessment of needed plutonium-related 

research, storage, and environmental testing needs for nuclear 

weapons stockpile activities as well as other missions currently 

conducted at other NNSA and DOE facilities, with particular emphasis 

on mitigating the consequences associated with eliminating plutonium 

research, storage, and environmental testing capabilities from NNSA’s 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

3. Using the results of this assessment, report to Congress detailing any 

modifications to existing or planned facilities or any new facilities that 

will be needed to support plutonium-related research, storage, and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 24 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

environmental testing needs for nuclear weapons stockpile activities 

as well as other missions conducted by NNSA and DOE.

We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for its review and comment. 

In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, NNSA generally 

agreed with our recommendations to conduct a comprehensive 

assessment of needed plutonium-related research, storage, and 

environmental testing needs and to report to Congress on any 

modifications to existing or planned facilities or any new facilities that will 

be needed to support these needs. However, NNSA disagreed with our 

recommendation to incorporate all key risks identified by project officials 

into the project’s schedule risk analysis.

Specifically, NNSA stated that, subsequent to receiving our draft report 

for its comments, the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2013 was 

released and resulted in several changes to the funding and execution of 

the CMRR project. In particular, construction of the CMRR is now to be 

deferred for at least 5 years. Therefore, NNSA stated that it is conducting 

additional analysis to determine the most effective way to provide 

analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and storage capabilities 

that were originally intended for the CMRR through the use of existing 

infrastructure. As part of this analysis, NNSA stated that it will evaluate 

options to use existing facilities at other sites. We believe this is 

consistent with our recommendation that NNSA conduct a comprehensive 

assessment of needed plutonium-related research, storage, and 

environmental testing needs and that NNSA’s decision to defer 

construction of the CMRR will give it sufficient time to conduct this 

assessment. 

NNSA also commented that it will continue to work with Congress and 

other stakeholders as it adjusts its plutonium strategy. In our view, this is 

also consistent with our recommendation to report to Congress on any 

modifications to existing or planned facilities or any new facilities that will 

be needed to support plutonium-related research, storage, and 

environmental testing needs for nuclear weapons stockpile activities as 

well as other missions conducted by NNSA and DOE.

With regard to our recommendation to incorporate all key risks identified 

by CMRR project officials into the project’s schedule risk analysis, NNSA 

commented that spending project money to update the CMRR project’s 

schedule would not be prudent because of the construction delay. 

Therefore, NNSA disagreed with the recommendation. NNSA stated that 

its efforts in the near term would be focused on closing out the current 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

design and that any future efforts will require updated cost and schedule 

estimates. We agree with NNSA that it is not necessary to update the 

project’s schedule at this time because of the recently announced 

construction delay; however, we maintain that it is important that all 

project risks are fully accounted for in the CMRR’s schedule once the 

project is resumed. Therefore, we clarified our recommendation to specify 

that NNSA should take action to ensure that the CMRR’s schedule risk 

analysis is appropriately revised to account for all project risks when 

NNSA resumes the project and before it establishes a new cost and 

schedule baseline.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the 

Administrator of NNSA; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 

the appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix V.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Our objectives were to examine (1) changes in the cost and schedule 

estimates for the construction of the facility and the extent to which its 

most recent estimates reflect best practices, (2) options the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) considered to ensure that 

plutonium-related research activities could continue as needed, and (3) 

the extent to which NNSA’s plans to construct the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR) and its 

consideration of options reflected changes in nuclear weapons stockpile 

requirements and other plutonium-related research needs.

To examine the project’s cost and schedule estimates and the extent to 

which its current estimates reflect best practices, we reviewed relevant 

NNSA documents and met with agency and contractor officials on the 

changes that have occurred to date and the reasons for them. We 

compared NNSA’s most recent detailed cost and schedule estimates with 

industry best practices contained in our cost estimating and assessment 

guide and discussed them with project officials to give them the 

opportunity to provide feedback on our assessment. Our review examined 

specifically those NNSA cost estimates that were prepared in April 2010 

and schedule estimates, which at the time of our review were updated as 

of May 2011 or more recent for some portions of the schedule. As such, 

the cost and schedule estimates we reviewed do not reflect NNSA’s 5-

year construction deferral recently announced in February 2012 and 

NNSA has not yet determined the potential long-term cost impact of this 

delay.

To examine the options NNSA considered to continue plutonium-related 

analytical work, we reviewed NNSA and contractor documents on 

plutonium research needs and the various options available to meet those 

needs. We also met with NNSA and contractor officials to better 

understand how these options were analyzed to determine the best 

approach to fulfill NNSA’s mission. While NNSA evaluated options on 

how to best meet its mission needs, it may have also evaluated 

alternatives based on the environmental impact of building the CMRR. As 

such, our review examined the options NNSA assessed to maintain the 

capabilities for plutonium-related analytical chemistry, material 

characterization, and storage and did not address NNSA’s compliance 

with requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. We also met 

with NNSA and contractor officials to gain a better understanding of how 

these options were analyzed to determine the best approach to fulfill 

NNSA’s mission.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

To determine the extent to which NNSA’s plans reflect changes in nuclear 

weapons stockpile requirements, we reviewed NNSA analyses that were 

used to support CMRR project decisions and met with NNSA officials to 

determine if these analyses were comprehensive and reflected up-to-date 

nuclear weapons stockpile requirements. We also visited Los Alamos and 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. To ensure the data we used 

were sufficiently reliable, we compared information gathered from a 

variety of data sources. For example, we interviewed officials from both 

Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories to obtain 

separate and independent perspectives on CMRR project plans. We 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 through 

February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Cost Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 28 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice 

characteristic

Overall 

assessment Detailed best practice a Detailed assessment

Comprehensive

a

Substantially met The cost estimate includes all life 

cycle costs.

Substantially met. The total project cost for the 

construction of the Nuclear Facility is $4.2 billion. 

Government and contractor costs are included. 

However, operations and retirement costs are not 

included. These costs were not included because 

there was no mandate to estimate them. The cost 

estimate spans from start of construction in June 

2010 to completion in 2020 with a schedule 

contingency through 2022.

The cost estimate completely defines 

the program, reflects the current 

schedule, and is technically 

reasonable.

Fully met. Technical descriptions were provided in 

multiple documents such as the “CMRR Nuclear 

Facility (NF) Estimate at Complete Forecast–April 

2010,” the Los Alamos CMRR Mission Need 

Statement, the Program Requirements Documents, 

the WBS dictionary, and the “Final Environmental 

Impact Statement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Project.” 

The cost estimate work breakdown 

structure is product-oriented, 

traceable to the statement of 

work/objective, and at an appropriate 

level of detail to ensure that cost 

elements are neither omitted nor 

double-counted.

Partially met. The work breakdown structure and 

work breakdown structure dictionary are product 

oriented and the work breakdown structure flows 

down to level 4 of the program, project, or task. A 

statement of work was provided in the form of a 

mission need statement; however, it is not easily 

reconciled with the work breakdown structure 

dictionary.

The estimate documents all costinfluencing ground rules and 

assumptions.

Fully met. Cost influencing ground rules and 

assumptions can be found in the CMRR Estimate 

Update Execution Plan. Budget constraints and 

escalation are addressed. A list of high-level risk 

drivers along with the handling costs and risk input 

information was provided. Exclusions to the cost 

estimate are noted in the documents.

Well documented Substantially met The documentation captures the 

source data used, the reliability of the 

data, and how the data were 

normalized.

Partially met. The data was analyzed and high-level 

cost drivers have been addressed as well as unit 

rates and quantities. Source data used to develop 

the estimate were found. The cost estimate was 

based on historical data from other Department of 

Energy (DOE) sites and the data was normalized. 

However, the independent review team found 

inconsistencies and discrepancies of quantities 

(hours) and costs. In addition, the review team 

reported that even though the basis of estimate 

referred to current contract awards or proposals, no 

reference was made to specific contracts or 

proposals by date and number. 

Appendix II: Summary Assessment of 

CMRR’s Cost Estimate Compared to Industry 

Best Practices
Appendix II: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Cost Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 29 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice 

characteristic

Overall 

assessment Detailed best practice a Detailed assessmenta

The documentation describes in 

sufficient detail the calculations 

performed and the estimating 

methodology used to derive each 

element’s cost.

Substantially met. While not explicitly stating what 

methodology was used, the pricing approach 

summary indicates that the estimate was developed 

using a combination of the build-up method and 

extrapolation from pricing information and 

productivity rates from other DOE sites. However 

the calculations involved were not clearly shown.

The documentation describes, step by 

step, how the estimate was developed 

so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with 

the program could understand what 

was done and replicate it.

Substantially met. The documentation for the 

estimate contains a summary narrative about the 

project as well as high-level cost summaries. The 

documentation discusses risk and contingency 

reserve. However, it does not address sensitivity 

although a sensitivity analysis was performed. 

Narrative on how the sensitivity analysis was 

conducted was not provided.

The documentation discusses the 

technical baseline description and the 

data in the baseline is consistent with 

the estimate.

Substantially met. There are technical descriptions 

discussed in the documentation that are consistent 

with the basis of estimate and the work outlined in 

the detail cost estimate spreadsheets. However, we 

are unable to map specific technical descriptions as 

outlined in the requirements document to cost 

elements in the high-level or detailed cost 

estimates. During the site visit, project officials 

showed us how the scope of work in the work 

breakdown structure dictionary was written in a way 

to illustrate how the scope of work was captured.

The documentation provides evidence 

that the cost estimate was reviewed 

and accepted by management.

Partially met. Los Alamos policy states that reviews 

shall be performed. According to project officials, 

these reviews typically include an integrated project 

team review, functional manager review, directorate 

review, and in the case of projects of high 

complexity or risk, an external corporate review 

and/or DOE Los Alamos Site Office review. A 

CMRR functional review was held March 12, 2010, 

and the review of the current estimate was listed on 

the meeting agenda. However, without further 

documentation we are unable to determine whether 

or not a briefing was given to management that 

clearly explains the detail of the cost estimate—

including presentation of lifecycle costs, ground 

rules and assumptions, estimating methods and 

data sources as they relate to each work 

breakdown structure element, results of sensitivity 

analysis, risk and uncertainty analysis, and if a 

desired level of confidence was reached. 

Additionally, it is not clear that an affordability 

analysis, contingency reserve, conclusions, or 

recommendations were discussed with 

management. The documentation also does not 

show management’s acceptance of the cost 

estimate. 
Appendix II: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Cost Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 30 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice 

characteristic

Overall 

assessment Detailed best practice a Detailed assessment

Accurate 

a

Substantially met The cost estimate results are 

unbiased, not overly conservative or 

optimistic, and based on an 

assessment of most likely costs.

Substantially met. Risk and uncertainty analyses 

were performed providing an 84 percent confidence 

level. There are three components that contribute to 

the total contingency value established for the 

project—schedule, estimate, and technical and 

programmatic risk analysis.

The estimate has been adjusted 

properly for inflation.

Substantially met. The documentation contained 

information on escalation rates. However, it is 

unclear how the cost estimate data were 

normalized. For example, costs are listed but are 

not labeled as constant or then-year dollars. 

Detailed calculations on how escalation was 

applied to the cost estimate are not documented.

The estimate contains few, if any, 

minor mistakes.

Substantially met. The numbers shown in the 

estimate at complete document and the cost 

estimate spreadsheet are accurate and the 

independent review team found only one minor 

mistake in their review of the estimate. However, 

we were not provided access to the detailed 

calculations behind the spreadsheet to check that 

the estimate was calculated correctly. 

The cost estimate is regularly updated 

to reflect significant changes in the 

program so that it always reflects 

current status.

Substantially met. The CMRR Project Control Plan 

outlines a formal change control process that is to 

be executed in accordance with the Los Alamos 

Project Management and Site Services Directorate 

as well as the CMRR Baseline Change Control 

Board. These documents provide an approach to 

document, communicate, and approve potential 

changes to scope, cost, and schedule, and they 

provide the basis for incorporating changes into the 

project baseline and/or the forecast estimate at 

completion. These documents also describe the 

activities and responsibilities for making changes to 

the baseline. 

Any variances between planned and 

actual costs are documented, 

explained, and reviewed. 

Substantially met. Earned value is entered for each 

work package based on the earned value method 

indicated for that work package. Progress is 

reported in terms of percent complete by work 

package and is verified, analyzed, and reported to 

the project controls team. This information is then 

analyzed by the project controls team and control 

account managers and reviewed with CMRR 

management as the final reports are completed and 

published. However, there is no evidence of the 

cost estimate being updated to capture variances 

from the earned value system. 
Appendix II: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Cost Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 31 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice 

characteristic

Overall 

assessment Detailed best practice a Detailed assessmenta

The estimate is based on a historical 

record of cost estimating and actual 

experiences from other comparable 

programs. 

Substantially met. Part of the estimate was 

developed using the engineering build up method 

which includes historical data from other 

DOE/NNSA sites (Waste Treatment Plant, Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and two chemical 

demilitarization facilities). The reliability of the data 

is documented where confidence levels associated 

with quantity, productivity, labor, and nonlabor 

pricing are addressed. However, for some of the 

data, the sources were not provided and there was 

no evidence that earned value data was used to 

develop or update the estimate.

Credible Partially met The cost estimate includes a 

sensitivity analysis—a technique that 

identifies a range of possible costs 

based on varying major assumptions, 

parameters, and data inputs.

Substantially met. CMRR conducted some sort of 

sensitivity analysis. No documentation was given 

providing a narrative on how the sensitivity analysis 

was conducted—including whether high 

percentages of cost were determined and how their 

parameters and assumptions were examined. 

Additionally, it cannot be determined whether the 

outcomes were evaluated for parameters most 

sensitive to change or how this analysis was 

applied to the estimate. However, during a site visit, 

Los Alamos officials provided a copy of a report that 

shows how a sensitivity analysis was applied to the 

nuclear facility cost estimate. For this assessment, 

a high and low range was determined. Some of the 

factors that were varied included overhead and 

General and Administrative rates, and escalation.
Appendix II: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Cost Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 32 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice 

characteristic

Overall 

assessment Detailed best practice a Detailed assessmenta

A risk and uncertainty analysis was 

conducted that quantified the 

imperfectly understood risks and 

identified the effects of changing key 

cost driver assumptions and factors.

Substantially met. The cost estimate includes 

contingency costs for schedule ($99 million), cost 

estimate ($508 million) and technical and 

programmatic risks ($404 million). While a schedule 

risk analysis was performed that identified $99 

million in schedule contingency, it is not clear how 

this analysis was done as no supporting 

documentation was provided. An independent 

review team assessed the schedule risk analysis 

and found that the risk model did not contain 

enough detail to allow specific risk events to be 

associated with the schedule activities they affect. 

Documentation supporting the cost estimate ($508 

million) risk and uncertainty analysis was conducted 

via a Monte Carlo simulation which established an 

84 percent confidence level for cost estimate 

uncertainty. The process by which this analysis was 

done is well documented and includes the 

contingency level range results. However, this risk 

and uncertainty analysis only reviewed classic cost 

estimate contingency and did not assess technical, 

programmatic or schedule risks. In addition, the 

independent review team found that the cost risk 

uncertainty analysis was done at a summary level 

so it does not fully reflect the uncertainty of the 

design costs associated with uncertainty related to 

quantities or prices listed.

Major cost elements were crossed 

checked to see whether results were 

similar.

Partially met. Documentation was provided that 

shows comparison of selected CMRR cost 

elements against cost estimates of other sites.

An independent cost estimate was 

conducted by a group outside the 

acquiring organization to determine 

whether other estimating methods 

produce similar results.

Partially met. An independent cost estimate was not 

conducted by a group outside of the acquiring 

organization. However, an independent cost review 

was performed by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers in conjunction with an experienced 

contractor. This independent cost review resulted in 

the identification of key findings which require a 

Corrective Action Plan. The independent cost 

review focused on engineering design, and nuclear 

facility special facility equipment engineering 

design. The independent cost review team had 24 

key findings and recommendations.

Source: GAO analysis of CMRR project cost information.

a

The ratings we used in this analysis are as follows: “Not met” means the CMRR provided no 

evidence that satisfies any of the practice. “Minimally met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies a small portion of the practice. “Partially met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies about half of the practice. “Substantially met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies a large portion of the practice. “Fully met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

completely satisfies the practice.
Appendix III: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Schedule Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 33 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice Explanation Detailed assessment

Capturing all 

activities

a

The schedule should reflect all activities as defined 

in the program’s work breakdown structure, to 

include activities to be performed by both the 

government and its contractors.

Fully met. The schedule integrates all of the effort of 

NNSA, its contractor, and its major subcontractors. 

Sequencing all 

activities

The schedule should be planned so that it can meet 

critical program dates. To meet this objective, key 

activities need to be logically sequenced in the 

order that they are to be carried out. In particular, 

activities that must finish before the start of other 

activities (i.e., predecessor activities) as well as 

activities that cannot begin until other activities are 

completed (i.e., successor activities) should be 

identified. By doing so, interdependencies among 

activities that collectively lead to the 

accomplishment of events or milestones can be 

established and used as a basis for guiding work 

and measuring progress.

Substantially met. While we found that about 16 percent 

of the activities were missing predecessors and 

successors, or had constraints, lags, and leads, the 

majority (84 percent) of the activities were logically 

sequenced. There are more than 2,400 activities (5 

percent) with missing or dangling predecessors or 

successors. There are summary tasks linked with logic (3 

percent), but we have determined that they do not affect 

the credibility of the schedule. There are 123 activities 

(less than 1 percent) with start-to-finish logic. There are 

460 activities (less than 1 percent) that have 10 

predecessors or more. There are 590 activities (1 

percent) scheduled with constraints, in addition to or 

substituting for complete logic. 

Assigning resources 

to all activities

The schedule should reflect what resources (i.e., 

labor, material, and overhead) are needed to do the 

work, whether all required resources will be 

available when they are needed, and whether any 

funding or time constraints exist.

Substantially met. Not all activities in the project schedule 

are resource loaded—only 3,757 activities (8 percent) out 

of the 45,429 activities with positive remaining duration 

have resources assigned in the schedule we received. 

However, there is credible evidence that the program and 

Los Alamos manage resources in various ways outside 

the project schedule and that their resource solutions are

fed back to the project schedule so that it is feasible 

given resource limits.

Establishing the 

duration of all 

activities

The schedule should realistically reflect how long 

each activity will take to execute. In determining the 

duration of each activity, the same rationale, data, 

and assumptions used for cost estimating should 

be used. Further, these durations should be as 

short as possible and they should have specific 

start and end dates. Excessively long periods 

needed to execute an activity should prompt further 

decomposition of the activity so that shorter 

execution durations will result.

Substantially met. There are 1,642 activities (4 percent) 

with durations 44 days or greater, which means that the 

majority of the activities (96 percent) have activities that 

are of short duration. Contributing to this is the rolling 

wave approach to the schedule, where the near-term 

activities are detailed while activities further in the future 

are left in large planning packages until they become 

near-term, at which point they are broken down into their 

component activities.

Integrating schedule 

activities horizontally

The schedule should be horizontally integrated, 

meaning that it should link the products and 

outcomes associated with already sequenced 

activities. These links are commonly referred to as 

handoffs and serve to verify that activities are 

arranged in the right order to achieve aggregated 

products or outcomes. The schedule should also be 

vertically integrated, meaning that traceability exists 

among varying levels of activities and supporting 

tasks and subtasks. Such mapping or alignment 

among levels enables different groups to work to 

the same master schedule.

Substantially met. As discussed previously in the 

“sequencing all activities,” there are activities missing 

predecessor and successor logic as well as the presence 

of constraints, lags, and leads that call into question the 

adequacy of horizontal traceability. Vertical traceability 

was confirmed. The schedule hierarchy includes five 

levels, increasing in detail and specificity from top to 

bottom.

Appendix III: Summary Assessment of 

CMRR’s Schedule Estimate Compared to 

Industry Best Practices
Appendix III: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Schedule Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 34 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice Explanation Detailed assessment

Establishing the 

critical path for all 

activities

a

Using scheduling software, the critical path—the 

longest duration path through the sequenced list of 

key activities—should be identified. The 

establishment of a program’s critical path is 

necessary for examining the effects of any activity 

slipping along this path. Potential problems that 

may occur on or near the critical path should also 

be identified and reflected in the scheduling of the 

time for high-risk activities.

Substantially met. This schedule’s critical path has 5,479 

activities with zero or negative total float. There are so 

many critical activities because of a number of 

constraints on intermediate milestones which is causing 

negative float on paths to those activities. However, these 

activities do not all drive the final delivery. Los Alamos 

officials said that when they baseline the schedule, they 

plan to remove many of the constraints that are causing 

negative float. Many of these constraints are there to 

enable Los Alamos to monitor status of intermediate 

milestones.

Identifying float 

between activities

The schedule should identify float so that schedule 

flexibility can be determined. As a general rule, 

activities along the critical path typically have the 

least amount of float.

Substantially met. Of the remaining activities, 22 percent 

have unexplained large positive and large negative total 

float values. Even with agency review, these were 

present in the schedule. The total float values in many 

cases are several years long. There are 4,611 activities 

(10 percent) that have total float over 1,000 days or about 

3.8 years. These high total float values are likely related 

to the incomplete logic described in the “sequencing all 

activities” best practice.

Conducting a 

schedule risk 

analysis

A schedule risk analysis should be performed using 

a schedule built using a good critical path method 

and data about project schedule risks, as well as 

statistical analysis techniques (such as Monte 

Carlo) to predict the level of confidence in meeting 

a program’s completion date. This analysis focuses 

not only on critical path activities but also on 

activities near the critical path, since they can 

potentially affect program status.

Minimally met. There is no evidence that a risk analysis 

has been conducted on this schedule or any summary 

schedule derived from this schedule. Los Alamos officials 

said that they have conducted a risk analysis using 

Monte Carlo simulation based on a prior and more 

concise schedule a full year before the version we 

reviewed was developed. The version we reviewed 

contained 90,000 activities and was developed in the 

Spring of 2010—a full year after Los Alamos conducted 

its risk analysis and Monte Carlo simulation. Los Alamos 

did not conduct a risk analysis on this more recent 

schedule, nor did it prepare and simulate a summary 

schedule based on this more recent schedule. The 

summary schedule that Los Alamos simulated was based 

on critical and near critical paths. This schedule 

comprised the main, secondary and tertiary critical paths. 

As a result, we believe that the schedule did not cover 

the entire work of the project, and therefore may have 

excluded some activities or paths that have risk sufficient 

to affect the finish date. Instead, Los Alamos selected 

about 2,100 activities based on total float, but this 

practice is risky because they may not have included all 

of the activities that risks in the risk register may affect. 
Appendix III: Summary Assessment of CMRR’s 

Schedule Estimate Compared to Industry Best 

Practices

Page 35 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Best practice Explanation Detailed assessment

Using logic and 

durations to 

determine the start 

and completion dates

a

The schedule should use logic and durations in 

order to reflect realistic start and completion dates 

for program activities. The schedule should be 

continually monitored to determine when forecasted 

completion dates differ from the planned dates, 

which can be used to determine whether schedule 

variances will affect downstream work. Maintaining 

the integrity of the schedule logic is not only 

necessary to reflect true status, but is also required 

before conducting a schedule risk analysis.

Fully met. The CMRR schedule is updated at least 

monthly, although much of it is updated weekly. The 

schedule integrity is checked after each update and 

metrics are compiled on problems to determine if the 

schedule’s integrity is improving with each update.

There are no activities in the past that lack the 

designation of actual start or actual finish. There are 

some activities on or after the data date that have actual 

start or finish designations, but that may be because 

there are 15 schedules combined in the Integrated 

Master Schedule and some were updated somewhat 

after May 9, 2011.

Source: GAO analysis of CMRR project schedule information.

a

The ratings we used in this analysis are as follows: “Not met” means the CMRR provided no 

evidence that satisfies any part of the practice. “Minimally met” means the CMRR provided evidence 

that satisfies a small portion of the practice. “Partially met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies about half of the practice. “Substantially met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

satisfies a large portion of the practice. “Fully met” means the CMRR provided evidence that 

completely satisfies the practice.
Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 36 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 37 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 
Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 38 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 39 GAO-12-337 Plutonium Research at Los Alamos 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant 

Director; John Bauckman; Jennifer Echard; Eugene Gray; David T. Hulett; 

Jonathan Kucskar; Alison O’Neill; Christopher Pacheco; Tim Persons; 

Karen Richey; Stacey Steele; Vasiliki Theodoropoulos; and Mary Welch 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments 

(361267)
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