MANAGING 

PREPAREDNESS GRANTS 

AND ASSESSING 

NATIONAL CAPABILITIES 

Continuing Challenges 

Impede FEMA’s Progress

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

GAO-12-526T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-526T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

March 20, 2012

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY

Continuing Challenges Impede Progress in Managing 

Preparedness Grants and Assessing National 

Capabilities 

Why GAO Did This Study

From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, 

the federal government appropriated 

over $37 billion to the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

preparedness grant programs to 

enhance the capabilities of state and 

local governments to prevent, protect 

against, respond to, and recover from 

terrorist attacks. DHS allocated $20.3 

billion of this funding to grant recipients 

through four of the largest 

preparedness grant programs—the 

State Homeland Security Program, the 

Urban Areas Security Initiative, the 

Port Security Grant Program, and the 

Transit Security Grant Program. The 

Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act of 2006 requires the 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) to develop a national 

preparedness system and assess 

preparedness capabilities—capabilities 

needed to respond effectively to 

disasters. FEMA could then use such a 

system to help it prioritize grant 

funding. This testimony addresses the 

extent to which DHS and FEMA have 

made progress in managing 

preparedness grants and measuring 

preparedness by assessing capabilities 

and addressing related challenges. 

GAO’s comments are based on 

products issued from April 2002 

through February 2012 and selected 

updates conducted in March 2012. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations to 

DHS and FEMA in prior reports to 

strengthen their management of 

preparedness grants and enhance 

their assessment of national 

preparedness capabilities. DHS and 

FEMA concurred and have actions 

underway to address them. 

What GAO Found

DHS and FEMA have taken actions with the goal of enhancing management of 

preparedness grants, but better project information and coordination could help 

FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of unnecessary duplication among grant 

applications. Specifically, DHS and FEMA have taken actions to streamline the 

application and award processes and have enhanced their use of risk 

management for allocating grants. For example, in November 2011, GAO 

reported that DHS modified its risk assessment model for the Port Security Grant 

Program by recognizing that different ports have different vulnerability levels. 

However, in February 2012, GAO reported that FEMA made award decisions for 

four of its grant programs—the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the 

Urban Area Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit 

Security Grant Program—with differing levels of information, which contributed to 

the risk of funding unnecessarily duplicative projects. GAO also reported that 

FEMA did not have a process to coordinate application reviews across the four 

grant programs. Rather, grant applications were reviewed separately by program 

and were not compared across each other to determine where possible 

unnecessary duplication may occur. Thus, GAO recommended that (1) FEMA 

collect project information with the level of detail needed to better position the 

agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and across the 

four grant programs, weighing any additional costs of collecting this data and (2) 

explore opportunities to enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and 

administration of the programs to identify and mitigate the potential for any 

unnecessary duplication. DHS agreed and identified planned actions to improve 

visibility and coordination across programs and projects. FEMA has proposed 

consolidating the majority of its various preparedness grant programs into a 

single, comprehensive preparedness grant program called the National 

Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013; however, this may 

create new challenges. For example, allocations under the NPGP would rely 

heavily on a state’s risk assessment, but grantees have not yet received 

guidance on how to conduct the risk assessment process. FEMA has established 

a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how best to implement the 

program. 

DHS and FEMA have had difficulty implementing longstanding plans and 

overcoming challenges in assessing capabilities, such as determining how to 

validate and aggregate data from federal, state, local, and tribal governments. 

For example, DHS first developed plans in 2004 to measure preparedness by 

assessing capabilities, but these efforts have been repeatedly delayed. In March 

2011, GAO reported that FEMA’s efforts to develop and implement a 

comprehensive, measurable, national preparedness assessment of capability 

and gaps were not yet complete and suggested that Congress consider limiting 

preparedness grant funding until FEMA completes a national preparedness 

assessment of capability gaps based on tiered, capability-specific performance 

objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. In April 2011, Congress 

passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS that reduced funding for 

FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount requested in the 

President’s fiscal year 2011 budget. For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated 

$1.28 billion less than requested in the President’s budget. 

View GAO-12-526T. For more information, 

contact William O. Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-

8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-12-526T 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing and to 

discuss the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA)—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—

to manage preparedness grants and measure and assess national 

capabilities to respond to a major disaster. From fiscal years 2002 

through 2011, the federal government appropriated over $37 billion to a 

variety of DHS homeland security preparedness grant programs to 

enhance the capabilities of state, territory, local, and tribal governments to 

prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks 

and other disasters.1

Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 

of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

DHS allocated more than half of this total—$20.3 

billion—to grant recipients through four of the largest preparedness 

programs—the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas 

Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit 

Security Grant Program.

2 In 

response to the Act, DHS centralized most of its preparedness programs 

under FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate to better integrate and 

coordinate grant management. The Act also requires that FEMA develop 

a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities—

capabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters—to determine the 

nation’s preparedness capability levels and the resources needed to 

achieve desired levels of capability.3

 

1 This total is based on Congressional Research Service data and GAO analysis, and 

includes firefighter assistance grants and emergency management performance grants. 

See Congressional Research Service, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to 

States and Localities: A Summary of Issues for the 111th Congress, R40246 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010).

2 The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). The provisions of 

the Post-Katrina Act became effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, with the 

exception of certain organizational changes related to FEMA, most of which took effect on 

March 31, 2007.

3 6 U.S.C. §§ 744, 749.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-526T 

Over the last decade, we identified and reported on issues related to 

DHS’s and FEMA’s management of four of the largest preparedness 

grants and the challenges associated with assessing national 

preparedness capabilities. In April 2002, shortly after the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001, we identified the need for goals and performance 

indicators to guide the nation’s preparedness efforts and help to 

objectively assess the results of federal investments.4 After DHS began 

operations in March 2003, and leading up to catastrophic damage caused 

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, our 

reports focused on challenges in managing preparedness grant funds to 

states and urban areas and minimizing the time it takes to distribute grant 

funds and associated efforts to streamline the process while ensuring 

appropriate planning and accountability for effective use of the funds.5

After the renewed focus on all-hazards preparedness prompted by the 

2005 hurricanes, we reported in 2007 and 2008 on the extent to which 

DHS was using a risk-based approach in its grants distribution 

methodology for states and urban areas. 6 Our reports in 2009, 2010, and 

2011 analyzed the use of risk assessment in the management of transit 

and port security grants7

 

4 GAO, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector 

Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, 

and the impact of preparedness grants in 

GAO-02-621T

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).

5 GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Federal Funds for First Responders, GAO-04-788T

(Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004); Homeland Security: Management of First Responder 

Grant Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 2, 2005); Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs and 

Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-530T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 12, 2005); and Homeland Security: DHS’s Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve GAO-05-652 (Washington, D.C.; July 11, 2005).

6 GAO, Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds 

to Selected Urban Areas GAO-07-381R (Washington, D.C.; Feb 7, 2007); Homeland 

Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and Management 

Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge,

GAO-08-488T, (Washington, D.C.; Mar 11, 2008); and Homeland Security: DHS RiskBased Grant Methodology Is Reasonable, But Current Version’s Measure of Vulnerability 

is Limited, GAO-08-852, (Washington, D.C.; Jun 27, 2008).

7 GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk 

Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened,

GAO-09-491 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2009); Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has 

Taken Actions to Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, but 

Additional Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts, GAO-10-650T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 

2010); Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness 

Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-12-47 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2011). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-526T 

building national capabilities. During that same period, we reported on 

FEMA’s limited progress in assessing national preparedness.8 Our most 

recent report, which we issued in February 2012 and are releasing today, 

addresses FEMA’s management of four of the largest preparedness grant 

programs—the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas 

Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit 

Security Grant Program.9

My remarks today are based on our work issued in the 10-year period 

from April 2002 through February 2012 on the efforts of both DHS and, 

more recently, FEMA, to manage preparedness grants; develop national 

preparedness capabilities; implement a national framework for assessing 

preparedness capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels; identify 

capability gaps; and prioritize future national preparedness investments to 

fill the most critical gaps. These remarks are also based on selected 

updates conducted in March 2012 on FEMA’s proposal for consolidating 

its various grant programs.

As requested, my testimony today focuses on the extent to which DHS 

and FEMA have made progress in managing preparedness grants and 

measuring national preparedness by assessing capabilities and 

addressing related challenges. To conduct our work, we analyzed 

documentation, such as DHS’s National Preparedness Goal and Core 

Capabilities (the latest evolution of the Target Capabilities List),10

 

8 GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and 

Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts,

and 

interviewed relevant DHS, FEMA, state, and local officials. More detailed 

information on our scope and methodology appears in our published 

GAO-09-369 (Washington, D.C.; 

Apr. 30, 2009); Urban Area Security Initiative: FEMA Lacks Measures to Assess How 

Regional Collaboration Efforts Build Preparedness Capabilities, GAO-09-651

(Washington, D.C.; Jul 2, 2009); FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop 

and Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities, GAO-11-51R

(Washington, D.C.: Oct 29, 2010); Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in 

Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP

(Washington, D.C. Mar. 1, 2011).

9 GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination 

among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 

2012). 

10 The Target Capabilities List is a list of 37 capabilities that federal, state, and local 

stakeholders need to possess to respond to natural or manmade disasters; we first 

reported on DHS’s efforts to develop the List in July 2005. 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-526T 

products. In addition, we conducted updates to our work in March 2012 

by analyzing FEMA’s guidance and policies.

We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives

DHS and FEMA have streamlined application and award processes, 

enhanced the use of risk management principles in its grant programs, 

and proposed consolidation of its various grant programs to address grant 

management concerns. In February 2012, we reported that better 

coordination and improved data collection could help FEMA identify and 

mitigate potential unnecessary duplication among four overlapping grant 

programs—the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas 

Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit 

Security Grant Program. FEMA has proposed changes to enhance 

preparedness grant management, but these changes may create new 

challenges.

FEMA Has Taken 

Actions to Address 

Grant Management 

Concerns but Needs 

Better Coordination
 

Page 5 GAO-12-526T 

Since its creation in April 2007, FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate 

(GPD) has been responsible for the program management of DHS’s 

preparedness grants.11

 

11 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act transferred most of the 

Preparedness Directorate to FEMA, effective on March 31, 2007. Pub. L. No. 109-295, 

120 Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006). 

GPD consolidated the grant business operations, 

systems, training, policy, and oversight of all FEMA grants and the 

program management of preparedness grants into a single entity. GPD 

works closely with other DHS entities to manage grants, as needed, 

through the grant life cycle, shown in figure 1. For example, GPD works 

with the U.S. Coast Guard for the Port Security Grant Program and the 

Transportation Security Administration for the Transit Security Grant 

Program.

FEMA Has Streamlined 

Application and Award 

Processes and Enhanced 

Use of Risk Management 

Principles
 

Page 6 GAO-12-526T 

Figure 1: General Grant Life Cycle

Since 2006, DHS has taken a number of actions to improve its risk-based 

grant allocation methodology.

• Specifically, in March 2008, we reported that DHS had adopted a 

more sophisticated risk-based grant allocation approach for the Urban 

Areas Security Initiative to (1) determine both states’ and urban areas’ 

potential risk relative to other areas that included empirical analytical 

methods and policy judgments, and (2) assess and score the 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-526T 

effectiveness of the proposed investments submitted by the eligible 

applicants and determine the final amount of funds awarded.12

• We also reported that DHS’s risk model for the Urban Areas Security 

Initiative could be strengthened by measuring variations in 

vulnerability.13 Specifically, we reported that DHS had held 

vulnerability constant, which limited the model’s overall ability to 

assess risk and more precisely allocate funds. Accordingly, we 

recommended that DHS and FEMA formulate a method to measure 

vulnerability in a way that captures variations in vulnerability, and 

apply this vulnerability measure in future iterations of this risk-based 

grant allocation model. DHS concurred with our recommendations 

and FEMA took actions to enhance its approaches for assessing and 

incorporating vulnerability into risk assessment methodologies for this 

program. Specifically, FEMA created a risk assessment that places 

greater weight on threat and calculates the contribution of vulnerability 

and consequence separately.14

• In June 2009, we reported that DHS used a risk analysis model to 

allocate Transit Security Grant Program funding and awarded grants 

to higher-risk transit agencies using all three elements of risk—threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence.15 Accordingly, we recommended that 

DHS formulate a method to measure vulnerability in a way that 

captures variations in vulnerability, and apply this vulnerability 

measure in future iterations of this risk-based grant allocation model. 

DHS concurred with our recommendations and FEMA took actions to 

enhance its approach for assessing and incorporating vulnerability 

into risk assessment methodologies for this program.

• In November 2011, we reported that DHS had made modifications to 

enhance the Port Security Grant Program’s risk assessment model’s 

vulnerability element for fiscal year 2011.16

 

12

Specifically, DHS modified 

GAO-08-488T. 

13 GAO-08-852. 

14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland Security Grant 

Program Guidance and Application Kit, (Washington, D.C., May 2011.)

15 GAO-09-491. 

16 GAO-12-47. 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-526T 

the vulnerability equation to recognize that different ports have 

different vulnerability levels. We also reported that FEMA had taken 

actions to streamline the Port Security Grant Program’s management 

efforts. For example, FEMA shortened application time frames by 

requiring port areas to submit specific project proposals at the time of 

grant application. According to FEMA officials, this change was 

intended to expedite the grant distribution process. Further, we 

reported that to speed the process, DHS took actions to reduce 

delays in environmental reviews, increased the number of GPD staff 

working on the Port Security Grants, revised and streamlined grant 

application forms, and developed time frames for review of project 

documentation.17

Despite these continuing efforts to enhance preparedness grant 

management, we identified multiple factors in our February 2012 report 

that contributed to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily 

duplicative projects across the four grant programs we reviewed—the 

Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, 

the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant 

Program.18

Overlap among grant recipients, goals, and geographic locations 

exist. The four grant programs we reviewed have similar goals and fund 

similar activities, such as equipment and training in overlapping 

jurisdictions, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication among 

the programs. For instance, each state and eligible territory receives a 

legislatively-mandated minimum amount of State Homeland Security 

Program funding to help ensure that geographic areas develop a basic 

level of preparedness, while the Urban Areas Security Initiative grants 

explicitly target urban areas most at risk of terrorist attack. However, 

many jurisdictions within designated Urban Areas Security Initiative 

regions also apply for and receive State Homeland Security Program 

funding. Similarly, port stakeholders in urban areas could receive funding 

These factors include overlap among grant recipients, goals, 

and geographic locations, combined with differing levels of information 

that FEMA had available regarding grant projects and recipients. We also 

reported that FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews 

across the four grant programs.

 

17 GAO-12-47. 

18 GAO-12-303. 

FEMA Needs Better 

Coordination and 

Improved Data Collection 

to Reduce Risk of 

Unnecessary Duplication
 

Page 9 GAO-12-526T 

for equipment such as patrol boats through both the Port Security Grant 

Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and a transit agency 

could purchase surveillance equipment with Transit Security Grant 

Program or Urban Areas Security Initiative funding. While we understand 

that some overlap may be desirable to provide multiple sources of 

funding, a lack of visibility over grant award details around these 

programs increases the risk of unintended and unnecessary duplication.

FEMA made award decisions for all four grant programs with 

differing levels of information. In February 2012, we reported that 

FEMA’s ability to track which projects receive funding among the four 

grant programs varied because the project information FEMA had 

available to make award decisions—including grant funding amounts, 

grant recipients, and grant funding purposes—also varied by program due 

to differences in the grant programs’ administrative processes. For 

example, FEMA delegated some administrative duties to stakeholders for 

the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security 

Initiative, thereby reducing its administrative burden. However, this 

delegation also contributed to FEMA having less visibility over some grant 

applications. FEMA recognized the trade-off between decreased visibility 

over grant funding in exchange for its reduced administrative burden.

Differences in information requirements also affected the level of 

information that FEMA had available for making grant award decisions.

For example, for the State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas 

Security Initiative, states and eligible urban areas submit investment 

justifications for each program with up to 15 distinct investment 

descriptions that describe general proposals in wide-ranging areas such 

as “critical infrastructure protection.”19

 

19 Investment justifications are one component of the State Homeland Security Grant 

Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the 

Transit Security Grant Program applications for grant funding. They provide narrative 

information on proposed activities (investments) that are to be accomplished with the 

grant funds. The investment justifications must demonstrate how proposed investments 

address gaps and deficiencies in current capabilities, and also demonstrate adherence to 

program guidance.

Each investment justification 

encompasses multiple specific projects to different jurisdictions or entities, 

but project-level information, such as a detailed listing of subrecipients or 

equipment costs, is not required by FEMA. In contrast, Port Security and 

Transit Security Grant Program applications require specific information 

on individual projects such as detailed budget summaries. As a result, 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-526T 

FEMA has a much clearer understanding of what is being requested and 

what is being funded by these programs.

FEMA has studied the potential utilization of more specific project-level 

data for making grant award decisions, especially for the State Homeland 

Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative.20

FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews across the 

four grant programs. In February 2012, we reported that grant 

applications were reviewed separately by program and were not 

compared across each other to determine where possible unnecessary 

duplication may occur. Specifically, FEMA’s Homeland Security Grant 

Program branch administered the Urban Areas Security Initiative and 

State Homeland Security Program while the Transportation Infrastructure 

Security branch administered the Port Security Grant Program and 

Transit Security Grant Program. We and the DHS Inspector General 

concluded that coordinating the review of grant projects internally would 

give FEMA more complete information about applications across the four 

grant programs, which could help FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of 

unnecessary duplication across grant applications.

However, while 

our analysis of selected grant projects determined that this additional 

information was sufficient for identifying potentially unnecessary 

duplication for nearly all of the projects it reviewed, the information did not 

always provide FEMA with sufficient detail to identify and prevent the risk 

of unnecessary duplication. While utilizing more specific project-level data 

would be a step in the right direction, at the time of our February 2012 

report, FEMA had not determined the specifics of future data 

requirements.

21

In our February 2012 report, we note that one of FEMA’s section chiefs 

said that the primary reasons for the current lack of coordination across 

 

20 In August 2009, FEMA established the Reporting Requirements Working Group to 

compile a list of select grant reporting activities, collect grant stakeholder feedback, and 

make recommendations regarding future data collection policies. FEMA utilized the 

working group’s analysis and recommendations in a May 2011 Report to Congress. 

21 GAO, More Efficient and Effective Government: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, 

Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue GAO-12-449T

(Washington, D.C.; Feb 28, 2012); and Department of Homeland Security Office of 

Inspector General, Efficiency of DHS Grant Programs, OIG-1069 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

22, 2010).
 

Page 11 GAO-12-526T 

programs are the sheer volume of grant applications that need to be 

reviewed and FEMA’s lack of resources to coordinate the grant review 

process. She added that FEMA reminds grantees not to duplicate grant 

projects; however, due to volume and the number of activities associated 

with grant application reviews, FEMA lacks the capabilities to cross-check 

for unnecessary duplication. We recognize the challenges associated with 

reviewing a large volume of grant applications, but to help reduce the risk 

of funding duplicative projects, FEMA could benefit from exploring 

opportunities to enhance its coordination of project reviews while also 

taking into account the large volume of grant applications it must process.

Thus, we recommended that FEMA take actions to identify and mitigate 

any unnecessary duplication in these programs, such as collecting more 

complete project information as well as exploring opportunities to 

enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the 

programs. In commenting on the report, DHS agreed and identified 

planned actions to improve visibility and coordination across programs 

and projects. We also suggested that Congress consider requiring DHS 

to report on the results of its efforts to identify and prevent duplication 

within and across the four grant programs, and consider these results 

when making future funding decisions for these programs.

In the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request to Congress, FEMA 

has proposed consolidating its various preparedness grant programs—

with the exception of the Emergency Management Performance Grants 

and Assistance to Fire Fighters Grants—into a single, comprehensive 

preparedness grant program called the National Preparedness Grant 

Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013. FEMA also plans to enhance its 

preparedness grants management through a variety of proposed 

initiatives to implement the new consolidated program.

According to FEMA, the new NPGP will require grantees to develop and 

sustain core capabilities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal 

rather than work to meet mandates within individual, and often 

disconnected, grant programs.22

 

22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, (Washington, 

D.C., Sept. 2011.)

NPGP is intended to focus on creating a 

robust national response capacity based on cross-jurisdictional and 

FEMA Has Proposed 

Changes to Enhance 

Preparedness Grant 

Management, but these 

Changes May Create 

Challenges
 

Page 12 GAO-12-526T 

readily deployable state and local assets. According to FEMA’s policy 

announcement, consolidating the preparedness grant programs will 

support the recommendations of the Redundancy Elimination and 

Enhanced Performance for Preparedness Grants Act, and will streamline 

the grant application process. This will, in turn, enable grantees to focus

on how federal funds can add value to their jurisdiction’s unique 

preparedness needs while contributing to national response capabilities. 

To further increase the efficiency of the new grant program, FEMA plans 

to issue multi-year guidelines, enabling the agency to focus its efforts on 

measuring progress towards building and sustaining national capabilities. 

The intent of this consolidation is to eliminate administration redundancies 

and ensure that all preparedness grants are contributing to the National 

Preparedness Goal. For fiscal year 2013, FEMA believes that the 

reorganization of preparedness grants will allow for a more targeted 

grants approach where states build upon the capabilities established with 

previous grant money and has requested $1.54 billion for the National 

Preparedness Grant Program.

FEMA’s Fiscal Year 2013 Grants Drawdown Budget in Brief also 

proposes additional measures to enhance preparedness grant 

management efforts and expedite prior years’ grant expenditures. For 

example, to support reprioritization of unobligated prior year funds and 

focus on building core capabilities, FEMA plans to:

• allow grantees to apply prior years’ grant balances towards more 

urgent priorities, promising an expedited project approval by FEMA’s 

Grant Programs Directorate;

• expand allowable expenses under the Port Security Grant Program 

and Transit Security Grant Program, for example, by allowing 

maintenance and sustainment expenses for equipment, training, and 

critical resources that have previously been purchased with either 

federal grants or any other source of funding to support existing core 

capabilities tied to the five mission areas contained within the National 

Preparedness Goal.

The changes FEMA has proposed for its fiscal year 2013 National 

Preparedness Grants program may create new management challenges.

As noted by Chairman Bilirakis in last month’s hearing by the House 

Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communications, allocations under the 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-526T 

new grant program would rely heavily on a state’s Threat and Hazard 

Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA).23 However, nearly a year 

after the THIRA concept was first introduced as part of the fiscal year 

2011 grant guidance, grantees have yet to receive guidance on how to 

conduct the THIRA process. As we reported in February 2012, questions 

also remain as to how local stakeholders would be involved in the THIRA 

process at the state level. In March 2012, FEMA’s GPD announced that 

FEMA has established a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how 

best to implement the new program. According to Chairman Bilirakis, it is 

essential that the local law enforcement, first responders, and emergency 

managers who are first on the scene of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, 

or other emergency be involved in the THIRA process. They know the 

threats to their local areas and the capabilities needed to address them.

Finally, according to FEMA’s plans, the new National Preparedness Grant 

Program will require grantees to develop and sustain core capabilities; 

however, the framework for assessing capabilities and prioritizing national 

preparedness grant investments is still not complete. As we noted in our 

February 2012 report, FEMA’S efforts to measure the collective 

effectiveness of its grants programs are recent and ongoing and thus it is 

too soon to evaluate the extent to which these initiatives will provide 

FEMA with the information it needs to determine whether these grant 

programs are effectively improving the nation’s security.24

 

23 Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) are intended to be 

tools that allow organizations at all levels of government to identify, assess, and prioritize 

their natural and man-made risks to facilitate the identification of capability and resource

gaps, and allow organizations to track their year-to-year progress to address those gaps. 

24GAO-12-303
 

Page 14 GAO-12-526T 

DHS and FEMA have had difficulty in implementing longstanding plans to 

develop and implement a system for assessing national preparedness 

capabilities. For example, DHS first developed plans in 2004 to measure 

preparedness by assessing capabilities,25 but these efforts have been 

repeatedly delayed and are not yet complete. FEMA’s proposed revisions 

to the new NPGP may help the agency overcome these continuing 

challenges to developing and implementing a national preparedness 

assessment. 

Since 2004, DHS and FEMA have initiated a variety of efforts to develop 

a system of measuring preparedness. From 2005 until September 2011, 

much of FEMA’s efforts focused on developing and operationalizing a list 

of target capabilities that would define desired capabilities and could be 

used in a tiered framework to measure their attainment. In July 2005, we 

reported that DHS had established a draft Target Capabilities List that 

provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability at 

various levels of government that FEMA would expect federal, state, 

local, and tribal first responders to develop and maintain.26

 

25 GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National 

Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals,

DHS planned 

to organize classes of jurisdictions that share similar characteristics—

such as total population, population density, and critical infrastructure—

into tiers to account for reasonable differences in capability levels among 

groups of jurisdictions and to appropriately apportion responsibility for 

development and maintenance of capabilities among levels of 

government and across these jurisdictional tiers. According to DHS’s 

Assessment and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS intended to 

implement a capability assessment and reporting system based on target 

capabilities that would allow first responders to assess their preparedness 

by identifying gaps, excesses, or deficiencies in their existing capabilities 

or capabilities they will be expected to access through mutual aid. In 

addition, this information could be used to (1) measure the readiness of 

federal civil response assets, (2) measure the use of federal assistance at 

the state and local levels, and (3) assess how federal assistance 

programs are supporting national preparedness.

GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

26 An example of a desired outcome for the target capability of mass prophylaxis—

prevention of or protective treatment for disease—was to effectively reach an entire 

affected population in time to prevent loss of life and injury. GAO-05-852. 

FEMA Has Not Yet 

Completed National 

Preparedness 

Assessment Efforts to 

Address Longstanding 

Concerns 

DHS and FEMA’s 

Longstanding Plans to 

Develop and Implement a 

National Assessment of 

Preparedness Have Not 

Been Fulfilled
 

Page 15 GAO-12-526T 

DHS’s efforts to implement these plans were interrupted by the 2005 

hurricane season. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina—the worst natural 

disaster in our nation’s history—made final landfall in coastal Louisiana 

and Mississippi, and its destructive force extended to the western 

Alabama coast. Hurricane Katrina and the following Hurricanes Rita and 

Wilma—also among the most powerful hurricanes in the nation’s 

history—graphically illustrated the limitations at that time of the nation’s 

readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic disaster; that 

is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately overwhelm the response 

capabilities of affected state and local first responders and require outside 

action and support from the federal government and other entities. In 

June 2006, DHS concluded that target capabilities and associated 

performance measures should serve as the common reference system 

for preparedness planning.

In September 2006, we reported that numerous reports and our work 

suggested that the substantial resources and capabilities marshaled by 

federal, state, and local governments and nongovernmental organizations 

were insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by the 

unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane 

victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.27 We also reported that 

developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be 

part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to 

integrate and define what needs to be done, where it needs to be done, 

how it should be done, how well it should be done, and based on what 

standards.28

FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate within its Protection and 

National Preparedness organization was established in April 2007 and is 

responsible for developing and implementing a system for measuring and 

assessing national preparedness capabilities. Figure 2 provides an 

illustration of how federal, state, and local resources provide capabilities 

for different levels of “incident effect” (i.e., the extent of damage caused 

by a natural or manmade disaster).

 

27 GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and 

Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 6, 2006.) 

28 GAO-06-618. 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-526T 

Figure 2: Conceptual Illustration for Assessing Capability Requirements and

Identifying Capability Gaps for National Preparedness:

In October 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Act that required 

FEMA, in developing guidelines to define target capabilities, to ensure 

that such guidelines are specific, flexible, and measurable. 29 In addition, 

the Post-Katrina Act calls for FEMA to ensure that each component of the 

national preparedness system, which includes the target capabilities, is 

developed, revised, and updated with clear and quantifiable performance 

metrics, measures, and outcomes. 30 We recommended in September 

2006, among other things, that DHS apply an all-hazards, risk 

management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific 

capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.31

 

29 6 U.S.C. § 746.

DHS concurred with this 

30 6 U.S.C. § 749(b).

31 GAO-06-618. 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-526T 

recommendation and FEMA said it planned to use the Target Capabilities 

List to assess capabilities to address all hazards.

In September 2007, FEMA issued an updated version of the Target 

Capabilities List to provide a common perspective in conducting 

assessments that determine levels of readiness to perform critical tasks 

and identify and address any gaps or deficiencies. According to FEMA, 

policymakers need regular reports on the status of capabilities for which 

they have responsibility to help them make better resource and 

investment decisions and to establish priorities.

In April 2009, we reported that establishing quantifiable metrics for target 

capabilities was a prerequisite to developing assessment data that can be 

compared across all levels of government.32

In October 2009, in responding to congressional questions regarding 

FEMA’s plan and timeline for reviewing and revising the 37 target 

capabilities, FEMA officials said they planned to conduct extensive 

coordination through stakeholder workshops in all 10 FEMA regions and 

with all federal agencies with lead and supporting responsibility for 

emergency support-function activities associated with each of the 37 

target capabilities. The workshops were intended to define the risk 

factors, critical target outcomes, and resource elements for each 

capability. The response stated that FEMA planned to create a Task 

Force comprised of federal, state, local, and tribal stakeholders to 

examine all aspects of preparedness grants, including benchmarking 

efforts such as the Target Capabilities List. FEMA officials have described 

their goals for updating the list to include establishing measurable target 

outcomes, providing an objective means to justify investments and 

priorities, and promoting mutual aid and resource sharing.

At the time of our review, 

FEMA was in the process of refining the target capabilities to make them 

more measurable and to provide state and local jurisdictions with 

additional guidance on the levels of capability they need. Specifically, 

FEMA planned to develop quantifiable metrics—or performance 

objectives—for each of the 37 target capabilities that are to outline 

specific capability targets that jurisdictions (such as cities) of varying size 

should strive to meet, recognizing that there is not a “one size fits all” 

approach to preparedness.

 

32 GAO-09-369. 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-526T 

In November 2009, FEMA issued a Target Capabilities List 

Implementation Guide that described the function of the list as a planning 

tool and not a set of standards or requirements. Finally, in 2011, FEMA 

announced that the Target Capabilities List would be replaced by a new 

set of national Core Capabilities. However, it is not clear how the new 

approach will help FEMA overcome ongoing challenges to assessing 

national preparedness capabilities discussed below.

FEMA has not yet fully addressed ongoing challenges in developing and 

implementing a system for assessing national preparedness capabilities.

For example, we reported in July 2005 that DHS had identified potential 

challenges in gathering the information needed to assess capabilities, 

including determining how to aggregate data from federal, state, local, 

and tribal governments and others and integrating self-assessment and 

external assessment approaches.33 In analyzing FEMA’s efforts to assess 

capabilities, we further reported in April 2009 that FEMA faced 

methodological challenges with regard to (1) differences in data available, 

(2) variations in reporting structures across states, and (3) variations in 

the level of detail within data sources requiring subjective interpretation. 

As noted above, FEMA was in the process of refining the target 

capabilities at the time of our review to make them more measurable and 

to provide state and local jurisdictions with additional guidance on the 

levels of capability they need. We recommended that FEMA enhance its 

project management plan to include milestone dates, among other things, 

a recommendation to which DHS concurred. In October 2010, we 

reported that FEMA had enhanced its project management plan by 

providing milestone dates and identifying key assessment points 

throughout the project to determine whether project changes are 

necessary.34

Nonetheless, DHS and FEMA have had difficulty overcoming the 

challenges we reported in July 2005 and April 2009 in establishing a 

system of metrics to assess national preparedness capabilities.35

 

33

As we 

reported in October 2010, FEMA officials said that, generally, evaluation 

GAO-05-652. 

34 GAO-11-51R. 

35 GAO-05-652 and GAO-09-369. 

FEMA Has Not Yet Fully 

Addressed Ongoing 

Challenges to Assessing 

National Preparedness 

Capabilities
 

Page 19 GAO-12-526T 

efforts they used to collect data on national preparedness capabilities 

were useful for their respective purposes but that the data collected were 

limited by data reliability and measurement issues related to the lack of 

standardization in the collection of data.

FEMA officials reported that one of its evaluation efforts, the State 

Preparedness Report, has enabled FEMA to gather data on the progress, 

capabilities, and accomplishments of the preparedness program of a 

state, the District of Columbia, or a territory. However, they also said that 

these reports included self-reported data that may be subject to 

interpretation by the reporting organizations in each state and not be 

readily comparable to other states’ data. The officials also stated that they 

have taken actions to address these limitations by, for example, creating 

a Web-based survey tool to provide a more standardized way of 

collecting state preparedness information that will help FEMA officials 

validate the information by comparing it across states.

We reported in October 2010 that FEMA had an ongoing effort to develop 

measures for target capabilities that would serve as planning guidance, 

not requirements, to assist in state and local capability assessments.

FEMA officials had not yet determined how they planned to revise the 

Target Capabilities List and said they were awaiting the completed 

revision of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which was to 

address national preparedness. That directive, called Presidential Policy 

Directive 8 on National Preparedness (PPD-8), was issued on March 30, 

2011.

In March 2011, we reported that FEMA’s efforts to develop and 

implement a comprehensive, measurable, national preparedness 

assessment of capability and gaps were not yet complete and suggested 

that Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding until FEMA 

completes a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at 

each level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to 

enable prioritization of grant funding.36 In April 2011, Congress passed 

the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS, which reduced funding 

for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount 

requested in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget.37

 

36

The consolidated 

GAO-11-318SP.

37 Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1632, 125 Stat. 38, 143 (2011).
 

Page 20 GAO-12-526T 

appropriations act for fiscal year 2012 appropriated $1.7 billion for FEMA 

Preparedness grants, $1.28 billion less than requested.38 The House 

committee report accompanying the DHS appropriations bill for fiscal year 

2012 stated that FEMA could not demonstrate how the use of the grants 

had enhanced disaster preparedness.39

According to FEMA’s testimony in a hearing on the President’s Fiscal 

Year 2013 budget request before the House Committee on Homeland 

Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, FEMA became the federal lead for the implementation 

of PPD-8 in 2011. The new presidential policy directive calls for the 

development of both a National Preparedness Goal and a National 

Preparedness System (both of which were required by the Post-Katrina 

Act in 2006). FEMA issued the National Preparedness Goal in September 

2011, which establishes core capabilities for prevention, protection, 

response, recovery, and mitigation that are to serve as the basis for 

preparedness activities within FEMA, throughout the federal government, 

and at the state and local levels. These new core capabilities are the 

latest evolution of the Target Capabilities List. According to FEMA 

officials, they plan to continue to organize the implementation of the 

National Preparedness System and will be working with partners across 

the emergency management community to integrate activities into a 

comprehensive campaign to build and sustain preparedness. According 

to FEMA, many of the programs and processes that support the 

components of the National Preparedness System exist and are currently 

in use, while others will need to be updated or developed.

For example, FEMA has not yet developed national preparedness 

capability requirements based on established metrics for the core 

capabilities to provide a framework for national preparedness 

assessments. As I testified last year, until such a framework is in place, 

FEMA will not have a basis to operationalize and implement its 

conceptual approach for assessing federal, state, and local preparedness 

 

38 Pub. L. No. 112–74, 125 Stat. 786, 960 (2011). This total includes all grant programs in 

the state and local programs account and the Emergency Management Performance 

Grant program but does not include funding appropriated for firefighter assistance grant 

programs.

39 H.R. Rep. No. 112-91, at 106-08 (2011).
 

Page 21 GAO-12-526T 

capabilities against capability requirements to identify capability gaps for 

prioritizing investments in national preparedness.

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the 

Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

For further information about this statement, please contact William O. 

Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-

8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. In addition to the contact named above, the following 

individuals from GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made 

major contributions to this testimony: Chris Keisling, Assistant Director; 

Allyson Goldstein, Dan Klabunde, Tracey King, and Lara Miklozek. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441061)
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