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S. HRG. 112–308 

NOMINATION OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN TO BE 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

CENTER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

JULY 26, 2011 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 3 

Conrad, Hon. Kent, a U.S. Senator from North Dakota ...................................... 5 

WITNESS 

Olsen, Matthew G., Director-Designate, National Counter-Terrorism Center ... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Letter Dated July 22, 2011, from William Lynn to Senator Dianne Feinstein .. 15 

Letter Dated July 22, 2011, from Keith Alexander to Senator Dianne Feinstein ....................................................................................................................... 16

Letter Dated July 20, 2011, from Mike McConnell to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss ................................................................................. 18 

Letter Dated July 20, 2011, from Michael Mukasey to Senator Dianne Feinstein ....................................................................................................................... 20

Letter Dated July 14, 2011, from David S. Kris to Senators Dianne Feinstein 

and Saxby Chambliss ........................................................................................... 22 

Letter Dated July 15, 2011, from Michael Leiter to Senators Dianne Feinstein 

and Saxby Chambliss ........................................................................................... 23 

Letter Dated July 21, 2011, from Kenneth Wainstein to Senators Dianne 

Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss .......................................................................... 25 

Letter Dated July 22, 2011, from Timothy J. Heaphy to Senators Dianne 

Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss .......................................................................... 28 

Letter Dated July 25, 2011, from J. Patrick Rowan to Senators Dianne 

Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss .......................................................................... 30 

Letter Dated July 25, 2011, from Matthew W. Friedrich to Senators Dianne 

Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss .......................................................................... 32 

Letter Dated July 14, 2011, from Frank R. Wolf to Senator Dianne Feinstein . 33 

Letter Dated July 21, 2011, from Frank R. Wolf to Senator Dianne Feinstein . 65 

Letter Dated July 22, 2010, from Ronald Weich to Senators Dianne Feinstein 

and Saxby Chambliss ........................................................................................... 79 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 98 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 207 

Letter from Don W. Fox, Office of Government Ethics, Dated July 11, 2011, 

to Senator Dianne Feinstein Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report ........................................................................................................................ 231 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN TO BE 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

CENTER 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Mikulski, Conrad, Udall of Colorado, Warner, Chambliss, Snowe, and 

Coats. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. 

The process will be as follows: I will make some remarks. The 

Vice Chairman will make some remarks. We will then call on the 

distinguished Senator from North Dakota for remarks. And then 

we will proceed. I trust that is agreeable with everybody. 

The Committee meets today to consider the President’s nomination of Matt Olsen to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Mr. Olsen is currently the general counsel of the National Security Agency, and he’s held a number of senior positions in the Department of Justice, including the National Security Division and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Mr. Olsen has appeared as a witness before this Committee previously, and he has frequently briefed members and staff over the 

last several years. I’d like to welcome him back to this Committee. 

I’d like to begin today by discussing the current terrorist threat 

and the role of what we call NCTC, which Mr. Olsen will be leading, if confirmed. 

The NCTC is the central agency within the United States government dealing with the identification, prevention, disruption and 

analysis of terrorist threats. It’s very important. While it’s best 

known for its role in consolidating and analyzing terrorism-related 

intelligence, it also plays an important role in conducting strategic 

planning for counterterrorism actions across our government. 

The NCTC grew significantly in size, capability and maturity 

under the previous Director, Michael Leiter. Its successes and 

2 

those of the broader counterterrorism community include numerous 

terrorist plots that were thwarted, both here at home and abroad. 

NCTC has also achieved less noticed but equally important advances in the sharing of threat information across the intelligence 

community—a streamlining, if you will, of intelligence, an improved watch-listing capability, and greatly improved analytic capability. 

Despite improvements and reforms, especially in response to the 

findings and recommendations of this Committee and others after 

the Christmas Day attempted attack by Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab, I’m still very concerned about the possibility of terrorist attacks against the United States. I believe this is a very 

critical time. 

The period leading up to the 10th anniversary of 9/11 is a period 

of heightened threat. Despite counterterrorism pressure against alQa’ida in Pakistan, including the successful strike against Usama 

bin Ladin in Abbottabad, the group remains dangerous and vengeful. 

At the same time, the threat from al-Qa’ida’s affiliates and adherents around the world has increased and presents particular 

challenges. I’m especially concerned about the threat to the United 

States homeland from al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula—AQAP, 

we call it—as well as threats emanating from terrorist safe havens 

in Somalia and elsewhere. 

This means, at least to me, that this is a crucial time for our 

counterterrorism establishment to be at full strength and not to be 

leaderless. NCTC is a linchpin of this establishment. So I’m very 

pleased that the President has moved quickly to nominate Mr. 

Olsen, an individual serving in a senior intelligence community position today, to take the helm of this organization. 

Let me take just a moment to read the first paragraph from a 

letter of support for Mr. Olsen’s nomination, written by General 

Keith Alexander, the Director of the National Security Agency. 

‘‘I am writing to wholeheartedly endorse the nomination of Matthew G. Olsen to be the next Director of the NCTC. Matt has 

served as the National Security Agency’s general counsel for the 

past year and has shown true leadership, outstanding judgment 

and decisionmaking ability. He’s been a key part of the agency’s efforts to provide intelligence that allows our government to counter 

terrorist threats. In my opinion, Matt is superbly qualified to hold 

this critical intelligence community position.’’ 

Before his current position at NSA, Mr. Olsen served in the Department of Justice for 18 years, including 12 years as a federal 

prosecutor. In a letter of support for Mr. Olsen’s nomination, 

former Attorney General Michael Mukasey wrote of Mr. Olsen, ‘‘He 

was not only an excellent lawyer and manager, but also an exemplary person in dealing with his colleagues. Matt has, in abundance, every personal and professional quality and skill you could 

hope to find in a nominee to head the NCTC. His nomination has 

my unqualified support.’’ 

And finally, there is a letter from Mike McConnell in which he 

also offers his strongest possible support. ‘‘As a 44-year veteran 

serving the nation as a member of the intelligence community, I 

had many opportunities to work with professionals of the DepartVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:47 Mar 20, 2012 Jkt 072744 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72744.TXT DPROCT
3 

ment of Justice. This was particularly true when serving as the Director of the National Security Agency and as the Director of National Intelligence. During those years of service, I never met or 

served with a more accomplished or dedicated professional than 

Matt Olsen. He understands the IC, its processes and procedures, 

and has served with distinction.’’ 

Well, I can go on and on, and I have many more pages here. I’m 

not going to do it. Suffice it to say that I believe that we have an 

extraordinarily qualified professional which can step into the leadership of NCTC and, at this very potentially vulnerable period, provide it with the leadership it really does deserve and merit. 

So, with that, Mr. Vice Chairman, may I ask you to make your 

remarks? Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Olsen, congratulations on being nominated to be the Director 

of the National Counterterrorism Center. Thank you for your service to this country, especially in some very demanding roles over 

the last several years, and we also welcome your family and thank 

them for their great support to you and thus to our country. So we 

appreciate that very much. 

I also want to just say a special word of thanks to Mike Leiter, 

who you’re going to be succeeding. You and I talked about this the 

other day. You and Mike are good friends. You know the kind of 

leadership he’s provided in some very difficult circumstances. And 

while we’ve still had some growing pains at NCTC, Mike has 

brought us through some very tough times and I think has kind 

of righted the ship at times when it headed in a wrong direction. 

And I’m very appreciative of Mike’s service and of his leadership. 

Mr. Olsen, your nomination comes at a critical point in our history in our fight against terrorism. While we’ve made considerable 

progress against al-Qa’ida in the FATA, we face growing threats as 

al-Qa’ida continues to spread. 

In my view, AQAP in Yemen poses the biggest threat to our safety and I urge you to make dismantling that group your primary 

focus before they strike us successfully here at home. 

This past spring brought immense changes to the Middle East, 

but it remains unclear what effect this may have on our long-term 

counterterrorism efforts. This uncertainty is further complicated by 

our own current fiscal condition, where resource constraints will 

undoubtedly impact our national defense and counterterrorism enterprise. 

Amid these new threats it is critical to our national security that 

the NCTC fully perform its mission. You and I have talked about 

some of the failings leading up to the Christmas Day bombing attempt, especially NCTC’s inability to connect the dots. While there 

has been much progress, a lot of work remains, including on information-sharing and detainee and data retention. 

Whether it is an attack or an imminent threat like 12–25 or 

Times Square, you will often be the first point of contact with this 

Committee. We will expect your unvarnished analytic judgments, 

the facts and frank assessments. In the past, efforts to control the 

4 

message for political purposes have resulted in Congress being 

given little or inaccurate information. That’s not pointing a finger 

at this administration; it’s happened in other administrations. As 

the NCTC Director, you will be expected to be forthright with this 

Committee and to push back on any effort to keep information from 

us. 

Along these same lines, I have shared with you some of my concerns about the recommendations made by the Guantanamo Review Task Force, which you directed. It disturbs me that under 

your leadership detainees were transferred or recommended for 

transfer to Yemen throughout 2009, even as the intelligence community warned the administration about the security situation 

there. 

We already knew that former Gitmo detainees were in AQAP 

leadership in Yemen, but it was only after AQAP’s failed Christmas 

Day attack that the transfers stopped. In my mind this was an unacceptable risk for us to take. You mentioned in my office the pressure on the task force, in part because you were guided by the executive order on closing Gitmo. I suspect that the one-year deadline 

for closing Gitmo affected task force analysis and decisions. 

When the only original two options for each detainee were prosecution or transfer, it seems like there would have been significant 

pressure to lean towards transfer. I wonder if this explains why, 

after the initial task force review found 92 detainees suitable for 

transfer, a second review came up with 40 more transferable detainees and another 30 for conditional detention, which at the time 

was essentially delayed transfer. 

Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia has expressed similar concerns about transfer decisions in a letter to the Committee, and 

some of the interactions that he had with you regarding the potential transfer of Uighurs into the United States. I am concerned that 

a member of Congress thinks he has been misled so I think it 

would be helpful if you explained your interactions with Congressman Wolf, and you and I have talked about this and I want to give 

you the full opportunity to do that this morning. 

But I urge you to be as forthcoming and direct about this, including information provided to or withheld from Congress on this 

issue. Ironically, in your new position one of your jobs will be tracking former detainees who have re-engaged, including some recommended for transfer by the task force. I urge you to take a fresh 

look at any intelligence on Gitmo detainees. 

Given the threat from AQAP and a recidivism rate now over 26 

percent, we are in no position to let any more dangerous detainees 

go. Unfortunately, the drive to close Gitmo has had the immediate 

and negative impact of leaving us with few options to detain terrorists outside of Afghanistan. As we draw down in Afghanistan, we 

will even lose that option. 

I’m sure you have seen press stories noting that the United 

States may be killing terrorists but we are not trying very hard to 

capture them, mostly because Gitmo has been taken off the table. 

Yet capturing and interrogating terrorists remains one of the best 

ways to get actionable intelligence and to prevent future threats. 

Again, Mr. Olsen, I congratulate you on your nomination and 

these issues need to be laid on the table and need to be fleshed out 

5 

because the direct point of contact with this Committee is going to 

be you in so many instances, and we need to certainly have that 

feeling of trust that we have developed and need to develop stronger over the coming years while you’re in this position. 

So thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

And now I’d like to recognize the distinguished Senator from North 

Dakota, the Chairman of our Budget Committee on the Democratic 

side, Kent Conrad. Mr. Chairman, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENT CONRAD, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator CONRAD. I thank you, Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, 

Vice Chairman Chambliss. Senator Coats, good to see you, and 

Senator Wyden. Senator Udall, Senator Warner. 

I am delighted to be able to introduce Matt Olsen. His parents 

are from North Dakota, people I’ve known a very long time. Matt’s 

roots are deep in North Dakota. He returns there every chance he 

gets with his family, his wife, Fern, and his children, Ellie, Nate 

and Will. His sister Susan is with us as well. 

As I said, I’ve known this family for a very long time, and they 

are the best that it gets. His father was the chief of staff to the 

man that I defeated for the United States Senate—and so I know 

how good he really is. Van passed away three years ago, but I 

know he’s looking down with a twinkle in his eye today, proud of 

Matt and all that he has accomplished. 

You know, after defeating Van’s boss for the United States Senate, I came here with some trepidation of what my relationship 

might be like with Van and his wife Myrna. They treated me with 

the greatest courtesy and over time became very good friends—the 

highest quality people that our state has to offer, and I believe the 

highest quality of people in the country. These are Americans 

through and through. 

Matt, your father would be so proud of you at this moment. I 

know he’d be looking down and saying, the boy’s done good. And 

indeed you have. You’ve served your country with distinction at the 

Justice Department, the FBI and the National Security Agency, 

where you’re currently the general counsel. Your public service has 

spanned three presidential administrations. That’s a notable and 

impressive accomplishment and it speaks volumes about your competency and your professionalism. 

Colleagues, Matt has already accomplished so much, and now the 

President has asked him to assume one of the most important and 

demanding jobs in the intelligence community, the Director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center. We all know that the NCTC’s 

mission is vital to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing the information with our partners and 

integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. There is no doubt in my mind that Matt has the experience 

and the character to lead the NCTC. 

But don’t just take my word for it. Admiral Mike McConnell 

served as Director of National Intelligence in President Bush’s administration, and as Director of the NSA in the Clinton administration. 

6 

Here’s what Admiral McConnell had to say about Matt. ‘‘Having 

known and worked with Mr. Olsen for over four years, I have observed him to be the utmost professional, dedicated to the security 

of the nation. He understands the intelligence community and the 

law and processes needed to keep us safe. He has great respect for 

the law, our values and the activities needed to ensure the safety 

of the nation. I have every confidence that, if confirmed, Mr. Olsen 

will serve the nation, the Congress, the administration and the intelligence community at the highest level of service and performance.’’ 

Colleagues, Matt is smart. He is honest and he is a true professional and an absolute patriot. I can’t put it much better than Admiral McConnell did. I hope very much that this Committee will 

move quickly on his confirmation and that our colleagues in the 

Senate will follow suit. It is really my honor to be here with Matt 

Olsen. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the remarks. I know you have a busy day. Much is happening, so you feel free to stay or leave, whichever you wish. 

Senator CONRAD. I’ll join you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Olsen, we will now turn to you. I was going to introduce your 

family. Senator Conrad did to some extent, but perhaps you’d go 

a little further and even ask them to stand up. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and thank you very much, Vice Chairman Chambliss. 

I want to thank the entire Committee for taking the time to consider my nomination this morning. I especially want to thank Senator Conrad for that very warm and personal introduction. I really 

appreciate that. 

And I am grateful to the many members of the Committee that 

have had the opportunity over the last two weeks to meet and have 

conversations with. I really appreciate the thoughtful consideration 

that the Committee is giving to my nomination. 

At the outset, I want to thank the President for having the confidence to nominate me for this position and the Director of National Intelligence for supporting me. I am tremendously honored 

and humbled to be considered for this position. 

Let me also, if I may, take a moment to express my condolences 

to the people of Norway in the aftermath of the tragic attacks in 

Oslo last week. My grandfather emigrated to North Dakota from 

Norway at the age of 16. I have extended family that was in Oslo. 

I think that these heartbreaking events serve as a reminder to all 

of us of the importance of working together as an international 

community to prevent these sorts of acts of terror. 

And I appreciate very much, Madam Chairman, the opportunity 

to introduce my family. So I sit here today before you because of 

the support of my family and my friends and my colleagues, many 

of whom are here today. My wife, Fern, is directly behind me. My 

children—my daughter Elizabeth, my oldest son Nate, my youngest 

son, Will—are all here with me. 

7 

I especially want to acknowledge my mother, Myrna, who is sitting here on the end; my father, Van, who was warmly remembered in Senator Conrad’s remarks. Along with their love and guidance, my parents, my mother and father, have provided my sisters 

Susan and Jennifer with an example of how to live, I believe, with 

honor and integrity and devotion to others, and I couldn’t be more 

grateful for them being here today. 

Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss, members of 

the Committee, today, as we approach the 10th anniversary of alQa’ida’s attacks on September 11th, it is appropriate to reflect on 

that day, the day that our nation suffered the single most devastating attack in our nation’s history. 

It was in the aftermath of that attack of that day that Congress 

established the National Counterterrorism Center. NCTC is the 

primary organization in the federal government for analyzing, integrating and sharing all-source intelligence information pertaining 

to terrorism and counterterrorism. In my view, no other organization is as singularly focused on preventing acts of terrorism. 

A decade after the September 11th attacks, we remain at war 

with al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. Thanks to the leadership of this 

Committee and to Congress, and thanks to the work of thousands 

of dedicated men and women in the intelligence community, including, as well, our men and women in uniform across the globe, alQa’ida is weakened. 

At the same time, al-Qa’ida and its adherents around the world, 

as well as other terrorist organizations, continue to pose a very significant threat to our country. Confronting this threat and working 

with focus and resolve to prevent a terrorist attack is NCTC’s mission, first and foremost. 

And to fulfill this solemn responsibility, NCTC brings together a 

wide array of dedicated and talented professionals. This diverse 

workforce is, in my view, NCTC’s greatest asset. 

In addition, NCTC embodies the principle that we all must serve 

as one team to protect the nation. We must work collaboratively 

and we must use every element of our national power to bring relentless and focused pressure against al-Qa’ida and its adherents, 

as well as other terrorist networks around the globe. 

I’ve been privileged to serve—as a number of comments that 

were made this morning—in leadership positions dedicated to national security during my almost 20 years of career government 

service. 

As the general counsel of the National Security Agency, I’ve guided it and supported NSA’s intelligence operations and I’ve ensured 

that the agency’s activities adhere to the Constitution and the laws 

that govern its activities and that protect civil liberties and privacy 

of Americans. 

At the FBI, I was privileged to serve as counsel to Director 

Mueller, and in that role I was able to contribute to the transformation of the FBI into a world-class intelligence organization focused on preventing and disrupting potential terrorist plots. 

As a career official of the Department of Justice, working closely 

with this Committee and with Congress, I helped stand up the new 

National Security Division at Justice, and I managed the impleVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:47 Mar 20, 2012 Jkt 072744 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72744.TXT DPROCT
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mentation of the landmark changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that Congress passed in 2008. 

I also supervised the Guantanamo Review Task Force, bringing 

together national security professionals from across the government to compile and analyze intelligence information on detainees. 

And, finally, I served for about 10 years in the District of Columbia as a federal prosecutor. In that role I learned the value of working as a team with investigators and operators, and I learned the 

fundamental importance of finding and following the facts wherever they lead. 

If I am honored to be confirmed to this position, I can assure you 

that I am committed to forging a strong and cooperative relationship with Congress. I believe, based on years of experience as a career government official, that congressional oversight is essential to 

NCTC and the effective conduct of intelligence activities. 

Members of Congress and particularly members of this Committee bring a vital perspective to the difficult issues that the intelligence community faces. The role of Congress is critical to building 

the trust of the American people in NCTC and in the intelligence 

community. And if confirmed, I commit to providing full and timely 

communication and transparency with the Congressional oversight 

Committees. 

NCTC’s fundamental mission is to protect the nation from a terrorist attack. We must pursue this mission with vigilance and resolve. If confirmed, I pledge to do my very best to earn your trust 

and to give this effort my all. 

Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman, thank you very much for the 

honor of appearing before you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen follows:] 

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Olsen. 

I’d like the Members to know we have received the strongest and 

largest collection of letters on behalf of this nominee, certainly 

since I’ve been on this Committee, and it’s from the heads and deputy heads of many different agencies. So those letters, along with 

the two letters from Congressman Frank Wolf and the addendums 

to those letters will be placed in the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. A housekeeping duty, if I may. If you 

would answer the following questions yes or no, please: Do you 

agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when 

invited? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the 

NCTC and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the National Counterterrorism Center and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to 

the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee of intelligence actions and covert actions rather than only the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Olsen, the ranking member brought up the questions that 

have been raised by a Member of Congress. We discussed them in 

our meeting. And in your prepared testimony, on page five, you discuss them as well. 

You indicate that in April of ’09 you were part of a team of officials who provided a briefing about the initial stages of the process 

of reviewing detainees. And you were authorized during the briefing to discuss the review process. You were not authorized to discuss deliberations or decisions on specific detainees. 

And so, in accordance with those rules, you state, on page five, 

‘‘We provided a full and candid briefing about the detainee review 

process.’’ So I would like you to address this issue—you have read 

Congressman Wolf’s letter—and address it head on, if you will, for 

this Committee. 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and, 

as well, Vice Chairman Chambliss, for providing me with the opportunity to address those questions that were raised. 

Let me just say at the outset that there were essentially, as I understand from Congressman Wolf’s letter, two questions or concerns. 

One was that we altered threat information—that that information was altered in the course of the task force review and that 

there was intentional misleading of him during a briefing. And I 

will say, just at the outset, that neither one of those things occurred. And I appreciate the opportunity to provide additional explanation of that. 

First, the question of whether or not threat information was 

changed or altered over the course of the task force review—the job 

that I had as the executive Director of the Guantanamo review 

task force in 2009 was to bring together career professionals and 

compile all of the information that had been obtained over the 

course of several years about each detainee—something that hadn’t 

74 

been done before—and to bring that information together in one 

place and to give that information a fresh and independent and objective review. 

We took that information and under my leadership, and under 

guidelines that we adopted as part of an interagency effort, we 

looked at that information. It was my responsibility to ensure that 

that was done in an impartial and unbiased way, that all the information was reviewed, that it was done with an interagency approach, that every dissenting or disparate opinion or view was fully 

aired. 

And then we took that information and presented it to a group 

of senior-level decisionmakers, along with our recommendations. 

And then the decisions were made based on that information by a 

senior-level group or review panel from six different agencies. The 

result of that work over the course of a year was that all 240 detainees were given a disposition, and in every single case, every detainee was determined on a unanimous basis on what the appropriate status was of that detainee. 

There was never, at any time, any effort to change threat information, to hide from any fact. The explicit guidance—my particular 

responsibility, I believed, was to follow every fact and be as precise 

and specific and rigorous in analyzing those facts and then presenting that information to the policy-level decisionmakers. 

There were occasions when we looked at facts and looked at 

them differently than prior assessments had done. In particular, 

JTF–GTMO—joint task force at Gitmo—had prepared assessments. 

We looked at those. Those were all part of our information. And in 

many cases—most cases, I believe—we agreed with those assessments. But there were instances when we looked at those facts and 

came to different conclusions. But there was never, on any occasion, an effort to change, alter or hide from those facts. Those were 

all fully aired. 

On the second question, if I may—the question of whether or not 

I intentionally misled Congressman Wolf in a briefing—again, I did 

not. We met in April of 2009, in his office. I was part of a team 

from the Department of Justice and the White House that went to 

brief Congressman Wolf on not just the Guantanamo review task 

force but all three of the task forces that were set up under the 

three executive orders issued by President Obama in January of 

2009. 

This was at the very early stages of our review process. We had 

really just begun the effort to review the first set of detainees. And 

it was made clear to Congressman Wolf before that briefing and 

during that briefing that the ground rules would be that we could 

discuss the process that we were undertaking to conduct that review, but that we were not authorized to discuss any particular decisions or any specific detainees. 

We did, in fact, lay out the process for him, and I understand 

that now he has expressed concern that he was not given full information about the actual decisionmaking status with respect to the 

group of detainees known as the Uighurs, the Chinese Uighurs, 

who were at Guantanamo. I did not discuss, because I was not authorized to discuss or make a unilateral decision as a career DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:47 Mar 20, 2012 Jkt 072744 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72744.TXT DPROCT
75 

partment of Justice official, what the status was of that decisionmaking process. 

I certainly—as I’ve said to Congressman Wolf in a conversation 

I had with him on the telephone a few months ago, I understand 

his frustration and I very much, very much regret that he has the 

view that I intentionally misled him. And I do hope that if I’m confirmed, I would have the opportunity to regain his trust and work 

with him in a collaborative and cooperative way, moving forward. 

I will say that as a general matter I have been candid, honest 

and direct in all of my interactions with Congress. I have met 

many times with staff and Members, particularly of this Committee, over the course of my career as a career government official, not only on the Guantanamo review but also on the FISA 

Amendments Act and other matters. 

And I have taken it as a matter of pride and a deeply held view 

that I have been honest and candid and direct on all occasions. And 

as I said, I do hope I have the opportunity to regain the trust of 

Congressman Wolf and work with him. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Olsen, let me carry that question one step further because, 

obviously, it’s a very, very serious issue when you have a member 

of Congress who thinks he’s been misled. So I want you to have full 

opportunity to explain it. And I want to quote to you what Congressman Wolf’s recollection of the scenario was. In the memorandum that he prepared within the last couple of weeks that I 

know you’ve had the opportunity to look at, here’s what he says: 

He said, ‘‘It has recently come to my attention that I was misled 

about the status of the transfer of the Uighur detainees in April, 

2009. This information confirms the Newsweek report that career 

federal employees were explicitly directed to hide this information 

from Members of Congress, especially Republican Members. During 

an April 22nd, 2009, meeting in my office with members of the 

Guantanamo Bay detainee review task force, including Mr. Olsen, 

I inquired about the status of the potential transfer of Uighur detainees to the United States.’’ 

‘‘Mr. Olsen indicated that a decision had not yet been reached on 

the transfer of the detainees. None of the other career or political 

officials in the meeting countered Mr. Olsen’s assertion. That is 

why I was deeply concerned to learn, in an April, 2011, Washington 

Post article, that the final decision on the transfer of the Uighur 

detainees had been made during a White House meeting eight days 

before my meeting with Mr. Olsen. 

‘‘According to the Washington Post article, the first concrete step 

toward closing the detention center was agreed upon during an 

April 14, 2009, session at the White House. It was to be a stealth 

move. ‘They were going to show up here and we were going to announce it,’ said one senior official describing the swift, secretive operation that was designed by the administration to preempt any 

political outcry that could prevent the transfer.’ ’’ 

Mr. Wolf goes on, ‘‘Following the publication of this article in 

April, I personally called Mr. Olsen to ask whether he was aware 

at the time of my meeting with him on April 22nd, 2009, that a 

decision had already been made on the transfer of the detainees. 

76 

He told me that he was aware of the decision prior to our meeting. 

I believe that I was intentionally misled by Mr. Olsen and other 

administration officials during my April 22nd meeting with the 

task force. 

‘‘I am also concerned that the Attorney General did not acknowledge that a decision had been made when he appeared before the 

House Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations Subcommittee 

the following day. That’s why I was surprised when my office was 

notified by a career federal employee that the administration was 

misleading the Congress and planned to secretly transfer the detainees around May 1, 2009.’’ 

Now, I understand, Mr. Olsen, you’re saying you were not at liberty to discuss the details of any particular detainee, but this goes 

beyond that. His comments go beyond that. So I want to give you 

a full opportunity to address exactly what Congressman Wolf remembers about that meeting. 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes, thank you very much, Vice Chairman. At the 

time that that briefing occurred of Congressman Wolf on April 21st 

or 22nd, there had, at that point, been a decision by senior-level 

members of the administration—again, our process was to make 

recommendations to a senior review group. In this case, this went 

to a very high-level group of senior officials. 

And the decision at that point—I think April 14th is the right 

date; I’ve gone back and looked at my notes—there had been a decision to take, move, transfer a small number of detainees—Uighur 

detainees—to the United States. There was not, at that time, a decision on which detainees to move or, as I recall, no decision about 

where, exactly, they would go. But I remember, at the time of the 

briefing, that there had actually been, as I said, a decision to move, 

I think two, detainees—two Uighur detainees—to the United 

States, to transfer those detainees to the United States. 

So at that time, there had been that decision. 

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, as I recall, 

were given the responsibility—not my task force; not the Guantanamo task force—to determine which detainees were the right two 

to move, given a number of considerations, when to do that, under 

what circumstances, and where they would go. And those efforts 

were under way. 

At no time did I say that there was no decision to Congressman 

Wolf. I just believe that that is a misrecollection or misperception. 

I did say that I was not—we were not authorized to talk about specific decisions that were then under way, and I was not authorized 

to talk about specific detainees. 

Again, so I do understand his frustration. I don’t—I did not mislead. I was not in a position to decide myself at that time that I 

was going to lay out exactly where that decisionmaking process 

was. We had met before that briefing and talked about what we 

were going to say and what we were going to talk about in terms 

of the review process. And I do very much regret that he has taken 

that view and I do understand his frustration with learning 

through the press later that that decisionmaking process was well 

under way. 

But Senator, that is exactly where that stood on that day. When 

I briefed Congressman Wolf, there had been a decision to bring two 

77 

detainees. They had not been identified as to which ones. And, as 

I recall, there was no decision about exactly where they would go 

within the United States. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. In Congressman Wolf’s memo, he refers to other career political officials that were in that meeting. Did 

you go back and visit with those individuals to get their recollection of exactly what was said after Congressman Wolf came forward with this? 

Mr. OLSEN. I’ve talked to others who were part of the preparation for that briefing. I have not talked to—I have talked to other 

members of that briefing team previously, so several months ago 

I talked to, because I talked to Congressman Wolf, I think, in April 

of this year. And around that time, I talked to a number of the individuals who were part of that briefing. And it was—and I think 

our recollections were the same as to how that briefing went. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Can you provide the Committee with 

the names of those other individuals that were in that meeting at 

that time, within the next 24 hours? 

Mr. OLSEN. Absolutely. Absolutely. And the other step I took, 

Vice Chairman, was to talk to the Department of Justice legislative 

affairs office. And I believe that the Assistant Attorney General 

submitted a letter to the Committee along the same lines, that the 

ground rules for that briefing were that we would talk about the 

process, but not specific decisions or detainees. 

And, in fact, a letter was sent to Congressman Wolf in July of 

2009, so three months after the April 2009 briefing, which reaffirmed that decision, and that specific detainees were not the 

subject on which briefings would occur or had occurred, but that we 

were able to talk about the process. And so even at that time, in 

July of 2009, in a letter to Congressman Wolf, that was made clear 

and presented to Congressman Wolf in a letter from the Department of Justice. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Mr. OLSEN. If I may, may I just add one other quick point on 

this? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please. 

Mr. OLSEN. Because I really want to address what I understand 

is an understandable concern from the Committee if I’m confirmed 

and I’m in a position such as the Director of NCTC. 

I believe wholeheartedly that, in that role, that I have an absolute obligation, to the best of my ability, to provide all intelligence 

information in a full and timely way to this Committee. And I believe, if I am in that position, my authority, my ability to make 

that judgment in an autonomous and unilateral way, greatly exceeds what it was in April of 2009. And the Committee has my full 

commitment that I will live up to that obligation. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Vice Chairman, there is a letter dated 

July 22nd signed by Ron Weich, Assistant Attorney General, which 

clearly states the career officials who provided the briefing, including Mr. Olsen, were authorized by the Department to discuss the 

review process in general but were not authorized to discussion deliberations or decisions about any specific detainees. 

And it goes on to say, ‘‘Consistent with the parameters set for 

the briefing, he did not’’—he, being Matt Olsen—‘‘did not discuss 

78 

internal decisionmaking or the status of specific detainees.’’ This 

letter will go in the record and obviously be available. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

79 


Insert offset folio 64 here 72744.064
80 


Insert offset folio 65 here 72744.065
81 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The next one up was Senator Conrad and 

he’s not here. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And Mr. Olsen, thank you for our visit. I appreciated your candor 

and also your taking extra time to go over and meet in a secure 

facility so that we could discuss some sensitive matters. 

I have been on this Committee for more than a decade now, and 

I believe this is the first time we’ve had the top lawyer at the National Security Agency before the Committee in an open session. 

Now, I’m not going to get into any details of how the NSA does 

business. But since you are the chief legal officer at one of the 

country’s largest intelligence agencies, it’s safe to say that you are 

an expert on surveillance law. 

So I’d like to begin by asking a few questions about several areas 

of surveillance law and about how you and your colleagues have interpreted the laws so that we can get some of this information on 

the public record. 

The first question is, would you agree that key portions of the 

USA PATRIOT Act have been the subject of significant secret legal 

interpretations and that these interpretations are secret today? 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator Wyden, thank you. If I may just say at the 

outset, I did appreciate the opportunity to talk to you in both your 

office and in the classified setting to talk about some of these matters. And I appreciate your ongoing interest and concern about 

them. 

The direct answer to your question is that there are provisions 

of the PATRIOT Act that are the subject of matters before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a court that, by design, meets 

in a classified setting. And some of the pleadings and opinions that 

relate to the PATRIOT Act that have been part of proceedings before the Foeign Intelligence Surveillance Court are classified. 

Senator WYDEN. So it is fair to say that key provisions of the PATRIOT Act and how they’re legally interpreted are being kept secret as of today. 

Mr. OLSEN. It is certainly fair to say that there are opinions from 

the court that are classified. I do feel it’s important to add that 

those opinions are part of what is provided to this Committee and 

that the activities that are undertaken in accordance with those orders of the court are subject to extensive oversight from across the 

government. 

Senator WYDEN. Would you agree that key portions of the FISA 

Amendments Act of 2008 have been the subject of significant secret 

legal interpretations and that those are secret today? 

Mr. OLSEN. Let me say yes, and then let me add that the answer 

is that, similar to the PATRIOT Act, there are particular provisions 

of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that, in the course of 

implementing those provisions, the government—and I was part of 

this effort—submits pleadings to the FISA court. And then, by design, again, under the statute, the FISA court issues—considers 

those pleadings in a classified setting and then issues opinions authorizing or not those activities. 

And it is the case, if I may also add, that as we’ve reviewed those 

opinions, as we’ve looked at those opinions, working with you and 

82 

others, that it’s very difficult at times to separate those portions of 

the opinions that are subject to—could be disclosed because they 

only contained legal information versus the linkage or intertwining 

of legal analysis and facts. 

Senator WYDEN. So you have said that there are, in fact, secret 

legal interpretations with respect to both the PATRIOT Act and the 

FISA Amendments Act. And is there anything further that you can 

tell us about their subject matter? 

Mr. OLSEN. I don’t think there’s anything further that I can discuss in an open setting. I know you appreciate that, Senator. I 

know you appreciate—obviously you do—the importance of protecting the sources and methods that are described in those opinions. 

I would restate what I just said, that—— 

Senator WYDEN. Let’s—my time is very short. 

Mr. OLSEN [continuing]. Certainly. 

Senator WYDEN. You’ve given thoughtful answers. As you know, 

we have a difference of opinion here. It’s my view that we have to 

keep operations and methods secret, but we’ve got to also have 

public awareness of the laws on the books. We’re going to continue 

this discussion, I’m sure. 

I need to ask you one other question, and that is on a different 

legal topic. Do government agencies have the authority to use cellsite data to track the location of Americans inside the United 

States for intelligence purposes? 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator, I know that that’s a question that you’ve 

posed to the Director of National Intelligence, Director Clapper. It 

is a question that is a complicated and difficult question to answer, 

particularly in this setting. 

I will say that the intelligence community is working as we 

speak—I know we’ve talked to your staff—in developing a comprehensive answer to that question, which will be provided to you 

in writing. 

Senator WYDEN. Madam President, I know my time has expired, 

but just a quick follow-up on that. You seem to be suggesting, then, 

Mr. Olsen, that the executive branch has not yet settled that question. Is that accurate? 

Mr. OLSEN. I think it’s very important to be precise about exactly 

what the question is. And I—— 

Senator WYDEN. The question is, does the government have the 

authority to use sell-site data to track the location of Americans inside the country? I think you answered initially that it had not yet 

been settled by the executive branch with respect to whether or not 

there is that authority. I think this is an extremely important 

point, and I just want to make that clear, and I believe you’re saying it has not yet been settled by the executive branch that it has 

that authority. 

Mr. OLSEN [continuing]. I think there are certain circumstances 

where that authority may exist. I do think it’s a very complicated 

and difficult question. And I would ask your indulgence to allow 

that question to be prepared in an unclassified setting in writing 

to you, Senator. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

83 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And if I may, Senator, I well know of your 

concerns, and we have discussed them. And what I’d like to do in 

our first hearing, in September, when we come back—assuming 

there is an August break—I’d like to have that classified session, 

and would ask, Mr. Olsen, that you have that memo prepared, that 

the answer’s in writing, that you and any authorities you wish to 

bring with you will attend the hearing. Do I have your agreement? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes, absolutely. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator WYDEN. Madam Chair, just on this point, to wrap up, I 

would just like to say to you and to colleagues that you have been 

very fair in terms of handling this issue. As you know, Senator 

Udall and I and other colleagues have had concerns about it. We’ve 

been examining it in both classified and open session. And I want 

to thank you for the way you’re handling it. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Oh, you’re very welcome. Happy to do it. 

Senator Conrad. 

Senator CONRAD. Madam Chair and Vice Chair and Members of 

the Committee, instead of asking questions, I’d like to make a further statement, if I could, Madam Chair, about this nominee. He 

comes from a family that I have known for 30 years, a family that 

was on the other side of the aisle from me. As I indicated before, 

his father was the chief of staff of the man I defeated for the 

United States Senate. 

And yet he treated me with the greatest generosity of spirit that 

anybody could ask for. 

Now, I just want to say, these are people of the highest quality, 

of the very highest quality, in every single way. The highest character—I would trust Matt Olsen with every penny that I’ve got, because of the character of this family. 

And I know around here it’s all demolition derby. My God, when 

does it end? If we can’t take somebody who has, at every step, been 

endorsed with the strongest praise—people from the Republican 

side of the aisle, the Democratic side of the aisle—the highest performance standard, the highest quality standard, the highest character standard—and I understand we have an oversight responsibility, we have a responsibility to ask the tough questions. 

But I just want to say to colleagues, I would put my entire reputation on the line for this nominee. That’s how strongly I feel. 

So—you know, I’ve been here 25 years. I think I’ve conducted myself with character. And I hope it counts for something when we 

have a nominee of this quality. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. I think 

those are very heartfelt remarks and very much appreciated. So 

thank you. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Olsen, I appreciate the discussion we had in my office earlier, and your testimony today. Your educational background is superb, and your experience background is, if not unmatched, very 

impressive. And the recommendations that you’ve had from former 

Attorney General Mukasey, Mr. McConnell and General Alexander 

speak highly of you. And other people, very credible people, including Senator Conrad, have spoken about your character, your famVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:47 Mar 20, 2012 Jkt 072744 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72744.TXT DPROCT
84 

ily, the kind of person you are. And I think that’s high recommendation, from my colleague as well as from a number of other 

people. 

As you know, we discussed in my office the same concerns that 

Senator Chambliss discussed with you. I don’t want to repeat all 

of that. I do want to state that it’s disturbing that, assuming these 

new sources are credible about a secretive plan, a stealth plan— 

it’s disturbing if those are true. These are reputable news organizations. I assume The Washington Post—which I don’t always agree 

with everything they do, but they usually check very carefully before they make this type of allegation. This is a serious allegation, 

some kind of concocted White House stealthy, secret plan. 

You’ve discussed and, for the record, explained your position relative to this, where you were and your relationship with Mr. Wolf 

and so forth. 

But the larger question is, given the politics of the issue at the 

time, the fact that a decision was made by someone at the highest 

levels to bypass through a stealthy, secret plan is a serious, serious 

charge and, if true, a serious, serious offense. 

My question to you is—and you made your pledge to us that you 

will not withhold any type of intelligence that is available to you 

from this Committee. And I take you at your word for that. 

What I want to ask you is the reverse of that: If you become 

aware of some action, some policy decision, some piece of intelligence that this Committee ought to know about but that it is politically sensitive and perhaps there are concerns that you might be 

sharing information that people at policy levels don’t want shared, 

are you willing to serve as an independent Director of NCTC and 

provide us with your independent opinion as to that? I just think 

it’s critical that we are aware of that. 

And so I would like to get your reaction to that on the reverse 

side of what you do know relative to intelligence, or what you don’t 

know but have some concerns about not knowing—have something 

withheld from you that you’ve said, you know, I don’t feel like I’ve 

been given full information relative to what this Committee ought 

to be aware of. 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. The answer is 

yes, I absolutely do pledge to the best of my ability to provide my 

unvarnished views to the Committee; as I said, I commit to providing full, timely intelligence information to the Committee at all 

times. I commit to being an advocate for providing as much information as possible to the Committee within the executive branch. 

I wholeheartedly believe in the essential role that the Committee 

plays, and that that role is a partnership, particularly when it 

comes to intelligence matters and national security; that there is 

no place for political considerations when it comes to counterterrorism and the fundamentally important mission of NCTC. 

And so I would be both a person who would view that role as a 

partnership with this Committee, that I would provide that information and that I would be, as I said, an advocate for leaning as 

far forward as possible, as my abilities allow, into providing that 

type of information at all times to the Committee. 

And if I could maybe just address, sir, the specific issue, I don’t 

want the record to reflect that I view or had the understanding 

85 

that there was a stealthy or secret effort to move detainees into the 

United States. I don’t believe—I was not aware that that was ever 

the case, and I don’t believe that ever was the case. 

In other words, there was a decision to move two detainees—two 

Uighur detainees to the United States. There was an effort undertaken then by the FBI and DHS to determine who and where. 

But I never was under any impression—I never believed that 

that effort had progressed to the point that it was going to be a 

secret or stealthy move but rather that the time for disclosing that 

was being discussed and was not something that was my decision 

to make. 

Senator COATS. Thank you for that answer. I just want to restate 

how critically important it is that we have a trust with each 

other—— 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. 

Senator COATS [continuing]. Because we are dealing with matters of incredible importance to the safety and security of the 

American people. And if we lose that element of trust in terms of 

how we communicate with each other within the intelligence community—and we have a responsibility to ensure that, you know, we 

live up to our part of the bargain on this also. 

And I’m hoping that we can do that with you. And I think that 

perhaps this is a little warning sign here in terms of let’s be diligent to make sure that that level of trust exists and that level of 

sharing of information with the Committee and us with you exists. 

With that, Madam Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. OLSEN. I could not agree more, Senator. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Coats. 

Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And welcome, Mr. Olsen. You certainly come to this position with 

an impressive array of credentials, and I congratulate you. And certainly Senator Conrad’s commendations on your behalf certainly 

speaks volumes about what you represent and what you bring to 

this position, which is obviously significant as we continue to face 

a growing threat. 

I’d like to just explore with you for a moment in the aftermath 

of the assassination of Usama bin Ladin, how would you describe 

the al-Qa’ida threat and what it poses today? I know you have said 

it remains the most significant threat to the United States, in combination with regional affiliates that are dispersed. 

And as you’ve mentioned, it’s certainly a dynamic and complex 

environment and certainly an asymmetrical threat, hard to identify, hard to quantify. So where do you think we stand today in 

terms of, one, mitigating that threat, and certainly since the killing 

of Usama bin Ladin? 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

The threat I think today is as diffuse and as complex and challenging as it has been at any time. Certainly it is the case that, 

again through the leadership of the Congress and the hard work 

of thousands of men and women, both in the intelligence community and the military, we’ve made substantial progress against alQa’ida and its affiliates. 

86 

And the killing of Usama bin Ladin was a significant milestone 

in that effort. And it is clear, I think, from the threat information 

that I’ve seen, both beginning in 2004 when I started working with 

the FBI through my time at the Department of Justice and to my 

position now at the National Security Agency, that al-Qa’ida in 

many ways is weakened. It remains the case, however, that it is 

a more diffuse and dispersed threat, as you made reference to. 

And in particular, I think the concern that the Vice Chairman 

made reference to with respect to al-Qa’ida’s presence in Yemen 

and in places like Somalia makes it particularly challenging from 

a counterterrorism perspective. 

I think that in some ways the opportunity that presents itself 

now to the counterterrorism community in the United States, as 

well as with our allies around the world, is that we must actually 

redouble our efforts, that, as the President has said, al-Qa’ida is on 

the path to defeat, but we have to look at that threat in all of its 

various forms, not only in the tribal regions of Yemen but in the 

FATA in Pakistan and also in parts of North Africa, and in Somalia. 

Ultimately the NCTC’s mission is to stop another terrorist attack. And if I may just say that the leadership of Mike Leiter and 

now, in acting capacity, of Andrew Liepman, I think NCTC has 

played a vital role in that effort. But it’s a team approach and we 

face as challenging a time, I think, as we ever have. 

Senator SNOWE. Are you confident that we have the ability to, 

you know, work across the agencies, as you—obviously the obligation of the NCTC is to coordinate and to integrate all of that analysis. Do you think we’ve got it? 

Mr. OLSEN. I think that we’ve made a lot of progress. I do think 

as this Committee, in its report on the Abdulmutallab attack of December 25, 2009, demonstrated, we still face challenges. And particularly I reviewed the Vice Chairman’s and Senator Burr’s separate opinion, which was quite critical, and appropriately so I think, 

in certain ways, of NCTC. 

Senator, if I may say, I think the greatest challenge facing NCTC 

is in some way its greatest strength—that it brings together analysts, planners, other professionals from across the intelligence 

community and the military to bring all these different viewpoints 

together. 

How do we reconcile the different backgrounds and perspectives? 

That’s really its greatest strength. We need to rely on the intelligence community to continue to provide those professionals and 

provide an atmosphere and environment where they are located together and collaborate. 

So, in direct response to your question, I think that is one of the 

greatest strengths of NCTC. I think we have some progress to be 

made both with respect to the collaboration feature but also information sharing and breaking down barriers to sharing information 

not only within NCTC but with our partners. 

Senator SNOWE. You mentioned that we’ve degraded the capability of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan. How would you compare that threat 

with respect to the regional affiliates? Which is greater? 

Mr. OLSEN. It’s difficult to answer a ‘‘which is greater?’’ I think 

I do agree with the Vice Chairman’s observation that recent events 

87 

would suggest that the regional affiliates, particularly al-Qa’ida in 

the Arabian Peninsula and its presence in Yemen, have shown a 

willingness and a level of capability to strike in the United States. 

I think that it must be a primary focus of NCTC and of the 

counterterrorism community broadly. 

Senator SNOWE. Do you think that that is the single greatest 

goal of al-Qa’ida, is to strike the United States? Is that their foremost goal? 

Mr. OLSEN. It certainly remains a significant goal. I think that 

its goals are multivaried, and the threat—again, part of the challenge is that threat is not so much the senior leadership in Pakistan with one unified goal. It’s now diffused in various regional locations under various leaders and with various goals. But it is certainly sufficiently a goal that it has to be NCTC’s number one mission. 

Senator SNOWE. How would you define the strategic defeat of alQa’ida leadership? 

Mr. OLSEN. The strategic defeat of al-Qa’ida? I think I would define it as ending the threat that al-Qa’ida and all of its affiliates 

pose to the United States and its interests around the world. 

Senator SNOWE. Okay, thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. 

Senator Wyden has some additional questions, and the Vice 

Chairman and I also. So, Senator Wyden, why don’t you go ahead? 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And just two additional matters. 

Following up on Senator Snowe’s questions, Mr. Olsen, beyond 

al-Qa’ida’s core leadership in Pakistan and the al-Qa’ida affiliate in 

Yemen, which terrorist group, in your view, poses the greatest 

threat to the country? 

Mr. OLSEN. I would say that beyond al-Qa’ida senior leadership 

in Pakistan, its presence in Yemen, that probably the next most 

significant terrorist threat may emanate from the al-Qa’ida presence in Somalia in terms of the willingness and apparent ability, 

or at least the intent, to strike outside of that particular country. 

We know that that country, that group, has successfully mounted 

an attack in Uganda, and the apparent ability of a regional affiliate 

such as that to move outside of the borders of that country I think 

poses a significant threat. But the threat goes beyond even just alQa’ida, of course, and its affiliates, to other groups such as 

Hezbollah. 

So I think, again, I have to say that I’m not in a position at 

NCTC now so I approach these types of questions with some humility and some deference to the professionals who are looking at 

these questions on a daily basis. 

Senator WYDEN. One last question, if I might. 

Earlier this year Under Secretary Cohen from the Treasury Department told the Finance Committee, on which I serve, that Kuwait has become one of the most challenging countries to deal with 

when it comes to counterterrorism, and, in addition, that as other 

Gulf states have improved their cooperation with U.S. terrorist acVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:47 Mar 20, 2012 Jkt 072744 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72744.TXT DPROCT
88 

tivity in the Gulf we are seeing, in effect, Kuwait become more permissive—significantly more permissive. 

Do you have an opinion on this yet? 

Mr. OLSEN. My answer, Senator, if I may, is somewhat general, 

which—I would say that our relationships with countries such as 

Kuwait, other Gulf states, certainly countries like Pakistan are 

complex and have multiple dimensions. I do think that the counterterrorism effort is a central goal or central feature of those relationships. If I’m confirmed, I would look forward to the opportunity 

in the role of NCTC Director to provide my objective and unvarnished view about the counterterrorism threat to contribute to the 

overall discussion and development of a posture toward a country 

like Kuwait. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Vice Chairman, why don’t you go ahead, and I’ll finish up. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Sure. Mr. Olsen, I want to ask you, 

on three or four different subjects here, to give us a general discussion and response to some questions that I’m going to lay out. But 

I’m more interested in your general discussion on the issues. But 

obviously I think the questions will throw out some ideas for you. 

By December 2009, it had become clear that many transferred 

Gitmo detainees had joined AQAP in Yemen. Additionally, the IC 

and State Department took a dim view of the willingness or capability of the Yemeni government to monitor detainees. And I believe such assessments were made clear to the task force. 

Yet in late 2009, the task force decided to transfer seven Yemeni 

detainees back to Yemen, only one of whom was ordered released 

by the court. And his case was not appealed. Now, my questions 

are, in December 2009, did you personally believe it was a good 

idea to transfer detainees to Yemen? 

Secondly, you’ve told us before that you were trying to test the 

system by sending the group of detainees back in December of 

2009. Do you think testing the system when the result of a failed 

test could be an attack on Americans was a good idea? 

And lastly, in hindsight, in light of the fact that the government 

is winning all of its habeas appeals, would you have changed any 

of the task force transfer decisions? And do you think dangerous 

detainees were transferred as a result of the task force process? 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator, thank you. And I do very much understand, 

of course, in our conversations—both my conversation with you as 

well as the ongoing discussions I’ve had with members of the Committee staff—the substantial concern about the detainees from 

Yemen and the transfer decisions that were made back in 2009. So 

if I may give you a relatively general, longer answer, I appreciate 

your indulgence. 

The Yemen detainee population was a concern of the task force’s 

from its onset. When we started this process under the President’s 

executive order in February of 2009, there were 97 Yemeni detainees out of the 240 detainees at Guantanamo subject to the review. 

So by far the single largest nationality represented at Guantanamo 

were from Yemen. And this was a problem that existed before 

2009. In other words, prior to 2009, government officials had strugVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:47 Mar 20, 2012 Jkt 072744 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72744.TXT DPROCT
89 

gled with how handle the disposition of this substantial number of 

Yemen detainees. 

Over the course of that year, through our task force effort, we 

were very aware of a number of different factors. One, that the security situation in Yemen was continuing to deteriorate over the 

course of that year, and by December of 2009 we were quite aware 

of the concerns that the intelligence community and our military 

leaders were expressing about Yemen. 

We were also quite aware that our record of success in the habeas courts, that the number of Yemeni detainees as well as others 

were challenging the lawfulness of their detention, and we were 

being briefed by the Department of Justice about how those cases 

were going. At one point in September of 2009, I recall that we 

were approximately eight successful defenses versus 31 losses in 

the federal courts. And there was a real concern being expressed 

by the Department of Justice that not only were we losing these 

cases, but we were losing our credibility generally in a way that 

was affecting facts and legal rulings that might impact cases down 

the road. 

I think the other factor that was a significant one for us with respect to Yemen was that there were no options that appeared to 

be available in terms of other countries willing to take detainees 

from Yemen, not countries that had rehabilitation programs and 

not countries in Europe that had been taking a number of detainees—I think over 50 over the course of the last couple years—who 

had humane-treatment concerns about being repatriated to their 

home country. So I know I’ve just laid out to you a problem that 

you’re well familiar with. But those were the factors that were presented to us as we conducted this review. 

Our job on the task force, I felt—and my responsibility as the executive Director—was to provide the best factual information in the 

most precise, specific and rigorous way possible to decisionmakers. 

We did that over the course of the review. The decision to send 

seven detainees in December—now I know an eighth Yemeni detainee has been repatriated to Yemen—those decisions have all 

been made at very senior levels, and all based on the unanimous 

judgment of representatives of six different agencies, including the 

Department of Defense, the intelligence community and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Two of those eight detainees were ordered released 

by the court. 

I think when I said in our conversation that the six or so that 

went in December—if that number’s correct—or before, in the fall 

of 2009—I don’t remember the exact timeframe—but the thought 

there—and I was present for some of the discussions, although I 

wasn’t a voting member or a decisionmaker—the thought was we 

would never at any time send a significant number of Yemeni detainees back. The question was, could the Yemeni government and 

security forces handle the security measures that would be necessary to ensure that those transfers were handled responsibly? 

Our process had a very strict standard. No detainee would be eligible for transfer unless any threat that detainee posed could be 

sufficiently mitigated through adequate and appropriate security 

measures in the host country—in the destination country. That 

standard never changed from the beginning to the end of our task 

90 

force review. And that was a standard that the decisionmakers who 

made that decision applied. 

So if I may, in sum—I think those were very difficult decisions. 

And I want to address your question before I forget. It is true I 

cited the habeas record of eight and 31. We’ve done much better 

from the executive branch’s point of view since that time. We’ve 

had a number of successful litigation victories in the D.C. Circuit 

Court of Appeals. 

The question whether or not that would have changed our view 

or the view of the decisionmakers on a particular detainee I think 

is hard to answer, and somewhat speculative on my part. I do 

think that it would have lowered the significance of that factor as 

it pertained to a particular detainee. So it would have—you know, 

I suppose I could say it’s possible that it may have affected a decision. But it would be speculative for me to say more about that. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. You mentioned in my office with respect to the pressure on the task force that there was pressure in 

part because the task force was guided by the executive order on 

closing Gitmo. Can you explain now about how that pressure existed and what you did to try to make sure your decisions were not 

influenced by it? How many attorneys assigned to the task force 

had represented detainees before joining your staff? And did you 

feel pressure from any of those attorneys, others in DOJ or other 

parts of the administration to lean towards transferring as many 

detainees as possible? 

Mr. OLSEN. As I mentioned to you, Senator, in our meeting, it 

certainly was the case that we had an executive order issued by the 

President in January of 2009 and that we were duty bound to follow that executive order. That executive order set forth three potential options for each detainee: transfer, if such a transfer could 

be accomplished consistent with the national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States. That was the first option. If 

transfer was not available, prosecution, if feasible. And if neither 

transfer nor prosecution was an appropriate option, then select another appropriate option, undefined in the executive order. 

I wouldn’t necessarily say that that was pressure. That was guidance or direction from the President of the United States to follow 

that. And I felt my obligation was to ensure that everything that 

the task force did certainly followed that direction but did not respond to any of the what was obvious at the time, controversy from 

both sides about Guantanamo. It’s been a subject of controversy for 

many years. 

I felt it was my obligation to insulate the career professionals 

who worked on this review. Over the course of the year in 2009, 

over a hundred people worked on this review from the Department 

of Defense, from the intelligence community, CIA, NCTC, Homeland Security, State, Justice. And every single one of them was a 

career individual. 

In response to your question, I don’t believe that a single one of 

the attorneys who worked on the review had ever played a role in 

representing detainees. I know that’s been a subject of controversy 

and been reported in the press in the past with respect to other Department of Justice attorneys. I don’t believe that anyone on our 

task force had ever worked in that capacity. 

91 

Again, everyone who worked on my review came from the career 

ranks. As I said, I felt it was my responsibility to insulate that 

group from any of the types of controversy surrounding Guantanamo. And I think, if I may, Senator, say the results of the review, 

the recommendations and the analysis we did, resulting in unanimous decisions on 240 detainees, speak for themselves, I think, in 

this regard. 

Out of those 240 detainees, there were 126 transfer decisions. 

But there were also 48 decisions to hold those detainees under the 

laws of war. When we started the review in January of 2009, that 

was not necessarily even considered an option. We pushed for that 

as the right option for 48 detainees—that they could not be tried, 

there was not evidence to try them. They could not be transferred 

safely. They needed to be held indefinitely under the laws of war. 

That’s 48 of those detainees; in addition, 36 detainees referred either to the military commission or to federal courts for prosecution, 

36 in that category, and then 30 in the category Yemeni detainees 

of conditional detention. Those 30 detainees, the decision was that 

they would not be transferred. They would be detained until the security situation in Yemen substantially improved, something that 

obviously has not happened. So they are effectively in the same category as the 48 held under the laws of war. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. The Chairman and I are both very 

concerned about the fact that we currently have no detention and 

interrogation policy going forward with respect to individuals who 

may be captured, high-value targets who may be captured outside 

of Afghanistan. 

As Director of NCTC, you will be integrally involved in the deliberations relative to any proposal for a long-term plan on detention 

and interrogation. And my question to you is, are you prepared to 

give sound advice, number one, that you’re going to be asked to 

give? 

And secondly, if the administration appears to be headed down 

a road that you don’t think is the right direction to go, will you say 

to this Committee now that you’re going to express yourself in a 

very strong manner to help to try to develop the best possible policy for detention and interrogation of high-value targets, even 

though your opinion may be contrary to the folks at the White 

House who are nominating you today? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes, absolutely. And if I may, I do make that pledge. 

I think, in my prior positions, I have taken that position. In other 

words, I have given advice in an unvarnished, objective, independent way. As a career government official, I’ve made known my 

personal views and sought to move positions based on my objective 

and independent and non-political perspective. 

I do think that these questions, Senator—if I may say, some of 

these questions are some of the most difficult ones that we face 

from a counterterrorism perspective, the question of detention policy. I absolutely agree that it would be my responsibility, if I’m 

honored to be confirmed, to give my unvarnished and objective 

views, share the intelligence with this Committee, and advocate for 

what I believe is the right thing, to the best of my abilities within 

the executive branch. 

92 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Some would argue that Gitmo should 

be closed because it is used as a recruiting tool for al-Qa’ida. And 

that may be true. But yet al-Qa’ida uses our Israel policy, the Afghan war, the death of bin Ladin and a host of other issues as recruiting tools, and no one suggests that we should change these 

policies. 

In your current position or positions you have held, have you 

seen any evidence that we are safer or that recruits have fallen off 

as a result of the President’s announcement of his intent to close 

Guantanamo? 

Mr. OLSEN. I’ve not seen, from, again, my perspective, both on 

the task force and in a much more limited perspective in my current role at the National Security Agency, anything, in specific response to your question, to that effect, that there’s a change in recruiting based on the current government policy. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. All right. Lastly, let me tell you an 

issue that we’ve got that I know you’re aware about and get your 

thoughts on. In the past, NCTC has raised a number of concerns 

about not having access to all the intelligence information it needs. 

Of particular concern is access to information in the possession 

of the Department of Homeland Security. Generally, DHS is reluctant to provide information relating to an individual’s asylum application or refugee status on the grounds that sharing that information would violate U.S. person restrictions. The specific legal 

basis for DHS’s position is unclear. 

Have you got any thoughts on how we can address that problem 

with DHS? And are asylum seekers U.S. persons or considered U.S. 

persons? Is that an issue in your mind? 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator, I am generally familiar with this area or 

this issue. I don’t have the specifics of the particular concern with 

DHS. I’ve had some briefings about this question. 

If I may say, I do believe that, given my role at the Department 

of Justice and my role now, that I have both an understanding— 

actually, quite a deep understanding of the rules that apply to protect civil liberties and privacy of U.S. persons. But I also, I think, 

have a very strong view and a record of finding the appropriate 

ways to overcome legal, sometimes perceived legal, as well as the 

policy barriers to sharing information. 

I don’t believe that there is a strong basis for, as a policy matter, 

not allowing information to be shared when that information is 

necessary to protect the American people. And if I am honored to 

be confirmed, it will absolutely be my commitment to find a way 

to overcome expressed concerns about sharing information when 

that information is necessary to support NCTC’s mission, and that 

is to prevent another terrorist attack. So the Committee certainly 

has my commitment to look very hard at that question. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, as you and I discussed in my 

office, the critical role that NCTC plays is, for the most part, centered around information sharing, both in its requirement that you, 

as Director of NCTC, share information you have, but you’ve got 

to get the information first. 

And let me just say that the Chairman and I, I think, stand 

without question ready to make sure that you’ve got all the tools 

that you need. And from a policy standpoint, we’re prepared to do 

93 

what’s necessary to make sure that the information that you have 

to be shared is all of the intelligence information. 

And let me just close by saying that, as the Chairman stated, 

we’ve gotten inundated with letters of recommendation, which you 

should feel very honored to be supported in that respect. And I 

know you are. 

The letter from General Alexander was very complimentary. And 

not only did he write a letter, but he happens to be a good friend, 

a guy that I have the utmost respect for, and he called yesterday 

to reinforce that recommendation. And, because I have such respect 

for General Alexander, that means a lot. 

So we’ll look forward to moving down the road. And the only 

thing I would remind you of is if you could get us those names of 

those individuals in that briefing. And hopefully we’ll get this nomination moved quickly. 

Madam Chair, thank you. 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

You know, I’d like to close off the briefing. I cannot imagine a 

more thankless task than being Director of the policy Committee 

of which you were Director, because you know, no matter what, it’s 

thankless. And no matter what, there’s going to be criticism, and 

particularly in those days, as I recall them, where it was so very, 

very difficult. So I just want to thank you for that. And in my book, 

you’re a straight shooter. And I think that’s what matters here. 

I would like to just talk about the vision thing for a moment, if 

I might. One of NCTC’s statutory responsibilities is to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities and integrate all of the instruments of national power. 

However, when it granted NCTC this responsibility, Congress 

didn’t provide you with any authority to compel actions in these 

areas. So we may have to go back and look at that again. 

But the question is, what is your vision of NCTC’s role in conducting strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities and integrating all the instruments of national so-called power 

into that planning? 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

As you point out, one of the critical missions of NCTC is the strategic operational planning mission. I do believe that NCTC is 

uniquely positioned to conduct that mission. And my vision for that 

is consistent with, I think, the effort and the progress that NCTC 

has made in that regard over the last couple years—that is, bringing together the various represented entities, whether it’s military 

or intelligence community, combining those perspectives—and 

those perspectives vary—in a way that will allow us to make sure 

that the efforts that the U.S. government is undertaking to combat 

terrorism, whether it is on a regional level, focusing on a particular 

region or a particular problem or a particular topic such as countering violent extremism—conducting an all-of-government approach to address those issues, something that NCTC is, I think, 

as I said, uniquely positioned to do, both because it has members 

from all these different agencies brought together and because it 

has the mission granted to it by Congress. 

94 

So I would consider that to be one of the focuses that I would 

have. And I would also commit and I would not hesitate to return 

to this Committee with updates on that effort and to tell you if I 

think that there are authorities that are lacking or necessary. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Good. 

Now, you’re also the national intelligence manager for counterterrorism. And in that regard, you’re going to be responsible for 

evaluating the intelligence community’s performance on terrorism 

and recommending budget allocations across agencies. In my book, 

this is a very important job. How do you see yourself carrying this 

part of your responsibility out? 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you for that question. I have had an opportunity to talk at least briefly with Director Clapper about this very 

important role, particularly under the leadership that he has for 

ODNI and the intelligence community in general. I think that 

NCTC has done a good job in its role as the NIM. It is, I think, 

a real focus because of the challenges that we face—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I don’t particularly like that acronym, the 

NIM. 

Mr. OLSEN. It is not my favorite either, so I will—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Because this is a big deal. 

Mr. OLSEN. Yeah. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I mean, I don’t think it should be 

trivialized. And I think it’s one area where not enough is done and 

there is not enough central administration of budget authority. 

Mr. OLSEN. Right. So I will stick with ‘‘national intelligence manager.’’ 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. OLSEN. I think the challenge is that we do face a much more 

difficult budgetary environment than we did in the last few years. 

And I fully appreciate that reality. I’ve seen it in my role at NSA, 

where I’ve been part of senior leadership meetings about how NSA 

is going to react and respond to the budget constraints that we are 

likely to face, that we will face. 

The question will be, how do we make sure that we are focusing 

on the right priorities as a counterterrorism community? And how 

do we achieve efficiencies where we can in order to meet the challenge that the current budget environment poses? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, you see, from my point of view, 

counterterrorism is extraordinarily important. It is vital to the protection of the homeland. Therefore, having a strategy and an approach to it and a pattern and a practice that’s well established 

and carried out across the government is very, very vital to have. 

Candidly, I don’t know whether we have that today. And so this 

question is meant with a view that I think it’s really a prime mission of yours. 

Mr. OLSEN. Well, I appreciate that. And again, I will, for that 

reason, make that a prime mission of mine and will, again, commit 

to come back and talk to you and the Committee and the staff and 

keep you apprised as often as necessary on the progress we’re making. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right. One last thing. As you know, the defense bill has some language on detention in it, some of which is 

good and some of which we think is not good. We—you know, as 

95 

Chairman of the Committee—are trying to draft some legislation. 

I’d like to ask that you help us and work with us on that, if you 

will. 

Mr. OLSEN. Of course. I will, yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

I see no other Member. So we would like to have the Director of 

the NCTC in place actually before going on the August recess. And 

I really think this is a very important matter that we’re able to do 

that. So I would like to ask that any questions for the record be 

submitted by 5:00 on Wednesday—that’s tomorrow afternoon—so 

we can get answers and vote on the nomination just as soon as possible. We do not want to leave this agency leaderless. 

So I thank you for your service to our country. I’ve been watching 

the faces of your three children and your wife’s supervision in her 

eyes as this hearing has gone on. And I just want you three to 

know how very proud we are of your father, that he has been just 

of enormous service to this country and has much more yet to do. 

And I hope you are very proud as well. 

So, with that in mind, we’ll conclude this hearing and move your 

nomination onward. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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