WARFIGHTER 

SUPPORT

DOD Needs Strategic 

Outcome-Related 

Goals and Visibility 

over Its Counter-IED 

Efforts

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2012

GAO-12-280

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-280, a report to 

congressional requesters 

February 2012 

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

DOD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and 

Visibility over Its Counter-IED Efforts 

Why GAO Did This Study

Over $18 billion has been appropriated 

to the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device (IED) Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) to address the improvised 

explosive device (IED) threat, and 

there is widespread consensus that 

this threat will continue to be influential 

in future conflicts. DOD established the 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006

to lead, advocate, and coordinate all 

DOD actions in support of the 

combatant commanders’ and their 

respective joint task forces’ efforts to 

defeat IEDs. This report, one in a 

series on JIEDDO’s management and 

operations, addresses the extent to 

which DOD (1) has provided a 

comprehensive counter-IED strategic 

plan including measurable objectives 

that determine the effectiveness of 

efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, 

and (2) has identified counter-IED 

initiatives and activities, and 

coordinated these efforts. To address 

these objectives GAO reviewed 

counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 

2006 through 2011, reviewed and 

analyzed relevant strategic-planning 

documents, collected and reviewed 

data identifying DOD counter-IED 

efforts, and met with DOD and service 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends four actions for 

DOD to develop a comprehensive 

strategic plan with strategic outcomerelated goals and a complete listing of 

counter-IED efforts to maximize its 

resources. DOD concurred with one of 

the recommendations but did not 

concur with three. GAO continues to 

believe that its recommendations are 

warranted as discussed in the report.

What GAO Found

As the responsible DOD agency for leading, advocating, and coordinating all 

DOD efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) the Joint IED Defeat 

Organization (JIEDDO) was directed to develop DOD’s counter-IED strategic plan 

in February 2006 under DOD Directive 2000.19E. As previously recommended 

by GAO, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop such a plan, but its 

strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic-management 

practices or have since been discontinued. For example, JIEDDO’s 2007 

strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes—

a leading strategic-management practice. In addition, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010 

strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using 

these measures because it later determined that the measures were not relevant 

to the organization’s goals. Although DOD tasked JIEDDO to develop its counterIED strategic plan, DOD has not translated DOD’s counter-IED general mission 

objective of eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence into actionable 

goals and objectives. JIEDDO issued a new counter-IED strategic plan in 

January 2012; however, the new plan does not apply to all other counter-IED 

efforts departmentwide, only to those managed by JIEDDO. Consequently, 

JIEDDO’s new strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for 

determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. Further, as 

JIEDDO implements its plan, it will continue to face difficulty measuring 

effectiveness until DOD establishes and provides results-oriented goals to

accompany its general mission objective. Without actionable goals and 

objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO and other DOD components cannot tie 

individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes. As a result, DOD 

and external stakeholders will be left without a comprehensive, data-driven 

assessment as to whether their counter-IED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission

and will not be informed about the overall effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts 

or use of resources as they relate to DOD’s mission. 

DOD has not fully identified its counter-IED initiatives and activities, and as a 

result is not able to effectively coordinate these efforts across DOD. In attempting 

to develop a comprehensive database, as previously recommended by GAO, 

JIEDDO has used at least three systems to collect and record complete 

information on DOD’s counter-IED efforts but discontinued each of them for 

reasons including lack of timeliness, comprehensiveness, or cost. For example, 

beginning in 2009, JIEDDO pursued Technology Matrix as a possible counterIED database for all efforts within the DOD. However, JIEDDO discontinued 

support for Technology Matrix as a database since DOD did not require all 

relevant organizations to provide information to JIEDDO, and therefore it was not 

comprehensive. Without an automated means for comprehensively capturing 

data on all counter-IED efforts, the military services may be unaware of potential 

overlap, duplication, or fragmentation. For example, GAO identified six systems 

that DOD components developed to emit energy to neutralize IEDs, and DOD 

spent about $104 million collectively on these efforts, which could be duplicative 

because the military services did not collaborate on these efforts. Given the lack 

View GAO-12-280. For more information, of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, other efforts may be overlapping. contact Cary B. Russell at (404) 679-1808 or 

russellc@gao.gov
Page i GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD Has Not Provided a Results-Oriented Strategic Plan to 

Manage Its Counter-IED Efforts 6

DOD Has Some Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives but Does 

Not Have a Comprehensive Listing of All DOD Counter-IED 

Initiatives 11

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II Supplemental Table to Figure 1 26

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 28

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 32

Related GAO Products 33

Table

Table 1: Instances of Incomplete or Insufficient Counter-IED 

Strategic Management from 2006 to 2011 26

Figure

Figure 1: Instances of Incomplete or Insufficient Counter-IED 

Strategic Management from 2006 to 2011 8

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense 

IED improvised explosive device 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

TAC Tripwire Analytical Capability 

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Page 1 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

February 22, 2012

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett

Chairman

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Through fiscal year 2011, Congress has appropriated over $18 billion to 

the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 

address the improvised explosive device (IED) threat.1

 

1 This total represents appropriations and rescissions made to the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Fund for JIEDDO. Generally, these funds are available for the 

purpose of allowing the Director of JIEDDO “to investigate, develop and provide 

equipment, supplies, services, training, facilities, personnel and funds” to assist U.S. 

forces in IED defeat. See, e.g., Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No.112-10, div. A, tit. IV (2011). The appropriation 

provisions often specify that the Secretary of Defense may transfer funds to other 

appropriations categories to accomplish this purpose after notifying the congressional 

defense committees. See id.

In addition, other 

Department of Defense (DOD) components, including the military 

services, have spent billions of dollars from their own funds developing 

counter-IED capabilities. For example, the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) Task Force, which leads DOD’s efforts to produce and 

field MRAP vehicles to protect troops against IEDs and other threats, 

received over $40 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. The IED 

threat continues to be a major concern in Afghanistan in addition to other 

areas throughout the globe, with over 500 IED events per month 

worldwide outside of Southwest Asia, according to JIEDDO. There is 

widespread consensus that this threat will not go away and that IEDs will 

continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in future conflicts. In 

fighting the IED threat, both JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to 

reduce IED incidents and casualties. For example, during 2010, JIEDDO 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

initiated 49 major efforts, which according to JIEDDO, made significant 

contributions toward defeating the IED threat.

Prior to the establishment of JIEDDO in 2006, no single entity was 

responsible for coordinating the DOD’s counter-IED efforts. DOD 

established JIEDDO and directed it to lead, advocate, and coordinate all 

DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders and their 

respective joint task forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic 

influence.2 DOD’s directive mandates that JIEDDO’s director serve as the 

DOD point of coordination for initiatives across the full range of efforts 

necessary to defeat the IED threat, integrate all counter-IED solutions 

throughout DOD, and coordinate with other DOD components for ongoing 

midterm research and development initiatives and long-term science and 

technology efforts, among other duties.3

In response to direction from congressional committees,

A primary role for JIEDDO is to 

provide funding and assistance to rapidly develop, acquire, and field 

counter-IED solutions.

4

 

2 Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization (JIEDDO) ¶ 4 (Feb. 14, 2006) (hereinafter cited as DODD 2000.19E (Feb. 

14, 2006)); Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Establishment of the 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (Jan. 18, 2006). DODD 

2000.19E superseded DODD 2000.19, Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat 

(June 27, 2005), and facilitated the transformation of the IED Defeat entity from a joint 

task force into a joint organization.

we have 

reported on several issues related to JIEDDO’s management and 

operations. Specifically, in a March 2007 classified report, we reported on 

JIEDDO’s lack of a strategic plan and the resulting effects on the 

development of its financial and human capital management programs. 

We made several recommendations based on this finding to the 

Secretary of Defense to improve the management of JIEDDO operations, 

stressing the need for JIEDDO to develop a detailed strategic plan that 

would clearly articulate JIEDDO’s mission and the types of counter-IED 

solutions it should provide and include results-oriented goals and 

objectives and measures of success. In addition, we testified and issued 

3 See DODD 2000.19E, ¶ 6.2 (Feb. 14, 2006).

4 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 110-477, at 1003-04 (2007) (conference report accompanying 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008); S. Rep. No. 109-292, at 

239-40 (2006) (report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, accompanying the 

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2007). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

a report in October 2009, in which we noted that despite the creation of 

JIEDDO, many of the organizations engaged in the counter-IED effort 

prior to JIEDDO continued to develop, maintain, and expand their own 

counter-IED capabilities.5 In July 2010, we reported that JIEDDO did not 

have metrics that inform DOD about the effect of the agency’s efforts on 

combating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence.6

To address these objectives, we considered DOD counter-IED efforts 

from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. To analyze the extent to which DOD 

has provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including 

strategic results-oriented goals and metrics that determine the 

effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, we reviewed DOD’s 

counter-IED strategic-planning documents that we gathered from JIEDDO 

as well as the Combatant Commands. In addition, we also interviewed 

JIEDDO officials involved in strategic planning and assessment to learn 

about the implementation of the actions detailed in some of the 

documents. From these documents and interviews, we identified several 

triggering actions that either provided the impetus for, or resulted in, 

strategic management efforts. We compared these actions against 

leading strategic management practices and principles demonstrated by 

Accordingly, you 

requested that we assess the progress DOD and JIEDDO have made 

with regard to counter-IED strategic planning and achieving 

comprehensive visibility over DOD-wide counter-IED activities.

Specifically, this review addresses the extent to which (1) DOD has 

provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including resultsoriented strategic goals and performance metrics to determine the 

effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, and (2) DOD has 

identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these 

efforts.

 

5 GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of 

DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts, GAO 10-95 (Washington D.C., Oct. 

29, 2009); GAO Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Ability to Coordinate 

and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts, GAO-10-186T, 

(Washington D.C. Oct. 29, 2009).

6 GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization’s System of Internal Control, GAO-10-660 (Washington D.C., 

Jul.1, 2010).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

successful results-oriented organizations7

We conducted this performance audit between June 2010 and February 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 

contains additional details of our scope and methodology.

and rated each according to 

their fulfillment of these leading practices. To determine the extent to 

which DOD has identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and 

coordinated these efforts, we reviewed JIEDDO databases on counterIED efforts and interviewed DOD, Service, and JIEDDO officials to 

determine the degree of comprehensive awareness regarding DOD’s 

counter-IED efforts.

Created by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 2006, JIEDDO is 

responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD actions in 

support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task 

forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Prior 

DOD efforts to defeat IEDs included various process teams and task 

forces. For example, DOD established the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in 

June 2005 for which the Army provided primary administrative support. 

This task force replaced the Army IED Task Force, the Joint IED Task 

Force, and the Under Secretary of Defense, Force Protection Working 

Group. To focus all of DOD’s efforts and minimize duplication, DOD 

published a new counter-IED policy in February 2006 through DOD 

Directive 2000.19E, which changed the name of the Joint IED Defeat 

Task Force to JIEDDO and established it as a joint entity and jointly 

 

7 GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a 

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies GAO-03-293SP

(Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002), GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions 

and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture GAO-03-190 (Washington D.C.: Jan. 17, 

2003), GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations GAO-03-669 (Washington D.C.: Jul. 2, 2003), GAO, 

Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief Management 

Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership GAO-07-1072 (Washington D.C.: Sep. 

5, 2007), GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs GAO-09-175

(Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2008), GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive 

Planning and a Results-Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing 

Inventories GAO-10-331 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010) 

Background
 

Page 5 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

staffed organization within DOD, reporting directly to the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense.8 The directive states that JIEDDO shall “focus” 

(i.e., lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the 

Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts 

to defeat IEDs as “weapons of strategic influence.”9

In prior GAO reviews, we reported on several issues related to JIEDDO’s 

management and operations. In March 2007, we reported JIEDDO’s lack 

of a strategic plan and the resulting effects on the development of its 

financial and human capital management programs. We made several 

recommendations based on this finding to the Secretary of Defense to 

improve the management of JIEDDO operations, stressing the 

development of JIEDDO’s detailed strategic plan. Subsequently, we also 

reported in March 2008 on JIEDDO’s internal controls and made several 

recommendations focused at improving JIEDDO’s internal control 

system.10 JIEDDO agreed with our recommendations and undertook 

efforts to address our findings and recommended actions. In addition, we 

testified and issued a report in October 2009 regarding steps that 

JIEDDO and DOD have taken to manage counter-IED efforts.11 Our 

testimony also included some of the challenges we later discussed in a 

report released in July 2010 about JIEDDO’s lack of effective output 

performance measures,12

 

8 See DODD 2000.19E, ¶¶ 1.2, 5, 7.1.1 (Feb. 14, 2006). The issuance of the Directive 

followed a January 2006 memo from the Deputy Secretary of Defense announcing the 

establishment and mission of JIEDDO. See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, Establishment of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) (Jan. 18, 2006).

internal control weaknesses, and the lack of 

adherence to its approval process for counter-IED initiatives. We made 

several recommendations to JIEDDO focused on improving its internal 

9 See DODD 2000.19E, ¶ 4 (Feb. 14, 2006).

10 GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and 

Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 

GAO-08-342 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008). 

11 GAO-10-95; GAO-10-186T. 

12 In the context of performance plans and similar provisions found in certain sections of 

Title 31 of the U.S. Code, output measures are defined as the tabulation, calculation, or 

recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner; 

outcome measures are an assessment of the results of a program activity compared to its 

intended purpose. See 31 U.S.C. § 1115(h)(7), (8).
 

Page 6 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

controls. DOD and JIEDDO agreed with our recommendations and have 

taken actions in response.

Beginning in February 2006, JIEDDO has been responsible for 

developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan for countering the IED 

threat,13 but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading 

strategic management practices, or have since been discontinued. In 

March 2007, we found that JIEDDO had not developed a strategic plan 

and as a result could not assess whether it was making the right 

investment decisions or whether it had effectively organized itself to meet 

its mission. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense require the 

Director of JIEDDO, in developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan, to 

clearly articulate JIEDDO’s mission and specify goals, objectives, and 

measures of effectiveness. JIEDDO fully concurred with our 

recommendations and was working to complete a strategic plan when we 

issued this report, and in September 2007, JIEDDO completed its DODwide counter-IED strategic plan. However, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan

did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes, which is 

a leading strategic management practice. Subsequent JIEDDO strategicplanning efforts also did not follow leading strategic management 

practices or have been discontinued. For example, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010 

strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO 

discontinued using these measures because they determined that the 

data from these measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals. 

We have previously reported that good strategic planning helps 

organizations (1) make the key decisions that will drive their actions, (2) 

measure the effectiveness of their actions to achieve intended results, 

and (3) if not achieving intended results, have the data to determine 

modifications needed to achieve intended results—all attributes of a plan 

that helps maximize organizational resources.14

 

13 See DODD 2000.19E, ¶ 6.2.9 (Feb. 14, 2006). Specifically, JIEDDO is to coordinate 

with the DOD components to develop, publish, and update this plan.

Many of JIEDDO’s plans 

contained output measures such as the percentage of initiatives for which 

JIEDDO completes operational assessments or the percentage of 

counter-IED initiatives that were adopted by one of the Military Services. 

While collecting outputs is an important initial step in measuring progress, 

14 GAO-03-293SP; GAO-03-190; GAO-03-669; GAO-07-1072; GAO-09-175; 

GAO-10-331. 

DOD Has Not 

Provided a ResultsOriented Strategic 

Plan to Manage Its 

Counter-IED Efforts
 

Page 7 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

they do not provide information about progress toward achieving 

JIEDDO’s mission as outcome measures would.

Since 2006, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop a counterIED strategic plan including its 2007 and 2009–2010 strategic plans, 

which in the case of the 2007 plan, included elements for guiding DOD 

subordinate organizations and the military services involved with counterIEDs in developing their own counter-IED planning. However, those plans 

did not have outcome-related goals specific enough for JIEDDO and 

these organizations to be able to develop enduring measures of 

effectiveness that inform DOD whether its counter-IED mission is being 

met. As shown in figure 1, we identified 17 key actions or triggering 

events applicable to DOD that were to either produce counter-IED 

strategic plans for the department or further develop the strategic plans.

However, the 17 actions have either been discontinued or did not satisfy 

key strategic-management-planning practices, including developing 

results-oriented strategic goals, performance measures, and the 

adjustment of plans or intended actions based on the results of these 

measures.15 For some of the 17 actions and events, we found that while 

JIEDDO had made efforts to satisfy leading strategic management 

practices, these efforts fell short of developing results-oriented goals and 

performance measures that link with DOD’s counter-IED mission. We 

assessed some efforts as partially fulfilling strategic management 

practices because developing output measures is a step toward 

developing outcome measures, and measuring individual initiatives 

contributes toward the overall counter-IED effort. However, JIEDDO has 

not expanded its assessments beyond these individual efforts and 

determined how these efforts, overall, help to achieve DOD’s counter-IED 

mission.

 

15 Some of these best practices are discussed in GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively 

Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, GGD-96-118, (Washington, 

DC: June 1, 1996). The report discussed principles and practices demonstrated by 

results-oriented organizations.
Figure 1: Instances of Incomplete or Insufficient Counter-IED Strategic Management from 2006 to 2011

Source: GAO analysis.

September 2011

April 2010

February 2006

March 2007

September 2007

January 2008

February 2009

March 2009

May 2010

July 2010

December 2008

December 2010

February 2011

March 2011

July 2011

2010

2011

2009

2008

2007

2006

Interactivity instructions: Roll over the bull's-eye next to the event to view more information

First 

JIEDDO 

Director

Change 

in 

Director

Change 

in 

Director

Change 

in 

Director

C-IED Conference Recommended Development of Metrics

DOD Defined JIEDDO’s Mission and Directed it to Develop a Strategic Plan

GAO Recommended JIEDDO Develop a Strategic Plan

Congressional Committee Directed DOD to Finalize JIEDDO’s Strategic Plan

DOD Issued DOD-wide C-IED Strategic Plan 

JIEDDO Wrote in its 2007 Annual Report that it had Issued an Implementation Instruction for Its Strategic Plan 

C-IED Conference Recommended Development of Metrics

JIEDDO Established Metrics in its Organization and Functions Guide

Strategy for FYs 2009 Through 2010 Created

JIEDDO Wrote a C-IED Strategic Management Paper 

GAO Recommended JIEDDO Improve Process for Assessing Effectiveness

JIEDDO Drafted Overarching Assessment Processes and Procedures Manual 

2011 JIEDDO Execution Plan Created

C-IED Conference Recommended the Development of a Standardized Assessment Framework

JIEDDO Drafted C-IED Strategy to Coincide with Draft DOD Directive Revision

JIEDDO Began to Establish Initiative Evaluation Plans Early in Initiative Development

JIEDDO to Revise its Draft C-IED Strategy to Incorporate Anticipated New National C-IED Policy Requirementsa

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

0 1 2 3 4

N/A

0 1 2 3 4

N/A

0 1 2 3 4

N/A

Degree of follow-through or completion of leading strategic management practicesb

Develop a

mission

statement 

Apply acquired

knowledge to

improve performance 

Develop resultsoriented strategic goals 

Develop

performance measures

0 1 2 3 4

Fulfills leading 

management practice

Partially fulfills leading 

management practicec

December 2007

Page 8 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

a

JIEDDO issued its 2012-2016 Counter-IED Strategic Plan in early January 2012 and issued the detailed performance measurements annex on January 19, 2012. However, because JIEDDO’s plan was 

competed subsequent to our review, we did not evaluate the plan’s compliance with leading strategic management practices. Moreover, JIEDDO’s plan is limited as a strategic plan for DOD’s counter-IED 

efforts because it has not been adopted as DOD’s department-wide strategic plan for managing all of its counter-IED expenditures and investments made by military services and DOD agencies other than 

JIEDDO. 

b

Criteria used to rank the instances were taken from GAO Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act GGD-96-118, (Washington DC, Jun 1, 1996). c

In these examples, JIEDDO created strategic goals or developed a means of measuring performance; however in these cases the goals were not results-oriented or the performance measurements were 

not linked to strategic goals or were discontinued. Thus, we give partial credit for developing goals and measures but not full credit for fulfilling leading strategic management practices.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

In early January 2012, JIEDDO issued its counter-IED strategic plan for 

2012–2016, which established five principal goals for JIEDDO with three 

to six supporting objectives for each goal. This plan did not specify what 

actions JIEDDO planned to take to achieve these goals. On January 19, 

2012, JIEDDO augmented its strategic plan by issuing an annex detailing 

numerous actions to achieve these objectives, and establishing 230 

separate metrics that JIEDDO expects will provide the means of 

assessing its progress. In addition, JIEDDO is planning to begin, in March 

2012, quarterly internal reviews to assess progress and make 

adjustments to its counter-IED efforts accordingly. Such action has not 

been a step JIEDDO has included in its past efforts. We see good 

potential in JIEDDO’s strategic plan; however, because the portion of the 

plan relevant to our recommendations was issued on January 19, 2012—

shortly before issuance of this report—we did not evaluate the plan and 

have not therefore assessed the extent to which this new plan will follow 

leading strategic management practices and provide results-oriented 

strategic goals and sufficient performance metrics for JIEDDO. Further, 

according to JIEDDO officials, the strategic plan applies only to counterIED efforts managed by JIEDDO and does not apply to all other counterIED efforts departmentwide. Consequently, successful implementation of 

JIEDDO’s strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for 

determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. 

According to JIEDDO officials, DOD will produce a departmentwide 

counter-IED strategic plan in the future, but there is no specified timeline 

for issuance of this plan.

As JIEDDO moves forward to implement its counter-IED strategic plan, 

and DOD develops a departmentwide counter-IED strategic plan, DOD 

will continue to face difficulty in developing measures of effectiveness, if it 

does not have results-oriented strategic goals to accompany DOD’s 

general counter-IED mission statement. The department has identified 

eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence as the overarching 

mission of its counter-IED programs, but has not translated this mission

into actionable goals and objectives. Without actionable goals and 

objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO, and other DOD components 

cannot tie individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes. 

As a result, DOD and external stakeholders are left without a 

comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether DOD’s counterIED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission. Furthermore, without a means 

to measure the success of JIEDDO’s efforts in achieving DOD’s counterIED mission, JIEDDO’s basis for determining how to invest its resources 

among its three lines of organizational effort—to attack the network, 

defeat the device, and train the force—is limited. While JIEDDO has 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

established procedures to assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize and 

manage its requirements and individual investments—including 

coordinating and collaborating with various DOD entities—to rapidly 

pursue these critical lines of effort,16

Lastly, JIEDDO has not had a completed, fully developed strategic plan 

until recently, with long-term strategic goals that informed incoming 

directors about which actions have taken place and which must be 

continued in order to maintain continuous progress toward achieving 

long-term goals. Having such a strategic plan would have benefitted 

JIEDDO leadership as JIEDDO’s directors changed four times over the 6 

years JIEDDO has existed (see fig. 1). Without this framework, new 

strategic-planning efforts have been initiated under each of these 

directors to improve the organization and manage counter-IED support— 

efforts that contributed in varying degrees to strategic management but, 

as discussed above, were not implemented or were discontinued in many 

instances. Now that JIEDDO has completed its strategic plan, it should 

work to ensure that implementation helps provide continuity for the 

organization as JIEDDO leadership changes in the future.

JIEDDO and DOD are not informed 

about the overall effectiveness of their counter-IED efforts and use of 

resources as they relate to DOD’s mission.

 

16 According to its Director, JIEDDO coordinates its counter-IED initiatives with numerous 

DOD offices, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and 

Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense—(Comptroller), J3 and J8 from the Joint Staff, 

and the Military Services.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

DOD does not have full visibility over all of its counter-IED efforts. DOD 

relies on various sources and systems for managing its counter-IED 

efforts, but has not developed a process that provides DOD with a 

comprehensive listing of its counter-IED initiatives and activities. For 

example, JIEDDO has developed the JIEDDO Enterprise Management 

System to manage its own operations by collecting and reporting cost and 

other information related to JIEDDO’s organizational and funds 

management, its coordination of JIEDDO funded projects and projects 

funded by other DOD activities, its administrative activities, and its own 

counter-IED projects.17 However, while this system contains information 

that could be used to identify individual initiatives, it does not 

automatically separate costs directly expended on counter-IED initiatives 

from JIEDDO’s infrastructure and overhead costs such as facilities, 

contractor services, pay and benefits, and travel. Consequently, this 

system does not provide an automated means to comprehensively and 

rapidly identify and list all of JIEDDO’s counter-IED initiatives. Further, 

even if it did collect this information, the system is limited to JIEDDO, and 

therefore would not include a comprehensive listing of other DOD efforts 

outside of JIEDDO. However, JIEDDO is required by DOD Directive to 

lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in support of combatant 

commanders’ and their respective joint task forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs 

as weapons of strategic influence.18 In 2008, a congressional 

subcommittee noted the absence of any indication that DOD processed 

(e.g., synthesized or kept a database) or made use of information it 

received regarding DOD-wide counter-IED activities.19 Further, in October 

2009, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the military 

services to work with JIEDDO to develop a database for all DOD counterIED initiatives. DOD concurred and stated that several counter-IED 

databases have been established across DOD.20

 

17 JEMS is the umbrella system for all of JIEDDO’s information IT systems and as such 

we are using it to represent JIEDDO’s information technology systems collectively without 

listing its various sub-systems. 

However, DOD has not 

yet fully implemented this recommendation. While DOD has used various 

18 See DODD 2000.19E, ¶ 4 (Feb. 14, 2006).

19 See Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations of the House Armed Services 

Committee, 110th Cong., The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: 

DOD’s Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow (Comm. Print No. 110-11, November 

2008). 

20 GAO-10-95. 

DOD Has Some 

Visibility over 

Counter-IED 

Initiatives but Does 

Not Have a 

Comprehensive 

Listing of All DOD 

Counter-IED 

Initiatives
 

Page 12 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

systems over time as listed below, to collect and record complete 

information on its counter-IED efforts, it has discontinued each of them for 

this purpose. DOD therefore still lacks a database for listing all DOD 

counter-IED initiatives. As a result, DOD may not be able to effectively 

coordinate counter-IED efforts across DOD, including JIEDDO, the 

military services, and relevant DOD agencies.21

• Quarterly Congressional Report Appendix: Beginning in 2008, 

JIEDDO listed all DOD counter-IED initiatives in its quarterly IED 

report to Congress to provide Congress with insight into DOD’s 

counter-IED initiatives and activities. In 2009, JIEDDO reduced this 

listing to a subset of DOD’s counter-IED initiatives. However, 

according to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO increased interactions with 

congressional staff to improve transparency into DOD’s counter-IED 

initiatives and activities. According to JIEDDO officials, the information 

discussed in these meetings provided congressional staff with key 

information that was more current than that provided by the quarterly 

reports. According to JIEDDO officials, in 2010, congressional staff 

from the Senate and House Armed Services Committees indicated to 

JIEDDO that they no longer needed to receive quarterly reports. 

JIEDDO discontinued issuance of the quarterly report and ceased 

collecting listings of counter-IED efforts from the department as a 

whole.22

 

21 Recently, a provision in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2011 required DOD to develop and maintain “a comprehensive database” with 

information for coordinating, tracking, and archiving each counter-IED initiative within 

DOD. See Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 124(a)(1) (2011). Among other purposes, DOD is to use 

the information to identify and eliminate redundant initiatives. See § 124(a)(2)(A). DOD is 

also required to develop appropriate means to measure the effectiveness of these 

initiatives and to prioritize funding accordingly. See § 124(b).

JIEDDO continues to meet with congressional staff to 

discuss key counter-IED efforts, but without the benefit of a 

22 A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 repealed

certain quarterly reporting requirements. See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1062(d)(5) (2011). 

However, reporting requirements for other information related to counter IED efforts may 

remain.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

comprehensive list of counter-IED efforts that would provide a better 

basis for determining key efforts to report to Congress.23

• Technology Matrix Database: In 2009, DOD developed this database 

through JIEDDO in response to our recommendation to establish a 

comprehensive counter-IED database, expending a total of 

$225,000.24 JIEDDO requested sponsorship from DOD Deputy 

Director for Research and Engineering to make this database an 

official repository of DOD technology information for counter-IED 

efforts, and require full participation of all DOD entities. However, the 

database was not fully developed in its concept, structure, and 

procedures. Thus, the Research and Engineering officials did not 

require all organizations involved in developing counter-IED solutions 

to use this database until these shortcomings were addressed. 

Without this requirement from Research and Engineering, JIEDDO 

concluded that the database could not provide comprehensive 

counter-IED information as intended, and JIEDDO discontinued using 

this database for this purpose in early 2010 and looked to other 

ongoing alternatives to provide this capability.

• Tripwire Analytical Capability (TAC): JIEDDO acquired and further 

developed this system in 2009 for intelligence querying purposes but 

also explored this system for possible use in collecting comprehensive 

data on DOD’s counter-IED initiatives managed by the military 

services and other DOD agencies outside of JIEDDO, automatically 

through programmed computer interfaces. JIEDDO considered using 

this data to populate a JIEDDO counter-IED database. However, 

according to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO subsequently determined that 

less expensive commercially available alternatives were available and 

discontinued its exploration of TAC in May 2011 for collecting DOD 

counter-IED data. At the time JIEDDO ceased considering TAC for 

 

23 In a report accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 

2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations directed JIEDDO to submit to 

congressional defense committees monthly commitment, obligation, and expenditure data 

by line of operation—defeat the device, attack the network, train the force, and staff and 

infrastructure—and by year of appropriation. Additionally, the Committee directed JIEDDO 

to submit to the congressional defense committees monthly reports of obligation data on a 

project-by-project basis by line of operation. See S. Rep. No. 112-77, at 275 (2011). 

However, if this direction is applied only to JIEDDO-funded projects, the reports may not 

capture DOD-funded counter-IED projects outside of those funded by JIEDDO. 

24 GAO-10-95
 

Page 14 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

use in collecting data on DOD’s counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO had 

not expended any additional funds on TAC specifically for this 

purpose.25

JIEDDO is currently developing a new JIEDDO-wide information 

technology architecture and plans to develop a database for counter-IED 

efforts across DOD as part of this new architecture. This effort is in the 

conceptualization stage, and JIEDDO officials do not anticipate 

completion before the end of fiscal year 2012. Further JIEDDO does not 

have an implementation plan that includes a detailed timeline with 

milestones, a key management practice, to help track its progress in 

achieving this goal.26

Faced with the current absence of a DOD-wide counter-IED listing, which 

we had previously recommended JIEDDO develop, JIEDDO developed a 

master list of its own internally-funded, active counter-IED initiatives in 

May 2011. Because JIEDDO does not have an automated mechanism 

that reliably and quickly identifies its own counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO 

must review its system for collecting and managing its funds used in order 

to identify, differentiate, and determine which of its funded activities are 

stand-alone counter-IED initiatives and which are administrative and 

indirect overhead activities. JIEDDO’s funds-tracking system contained 

887 unique identification numbers assigned from 2006 to May 2010 to 

categorize and manage its expenditures. According to JIEDDO officials, 

review of its funds management system has been labor intensive and is 

not yet completed because the funds management system does not 

contain an automated mechanism or coding to differentiate between all 

expenditures for administrative and indirect overhead versus 

expenditures for stand-alone counter-IED initiatives.27

 

25 All funds expended by JIEDDO for TAC were directly related to intelligence querying 

purposes. 

For example, in 

December 2010, JIEDDO established a requirement for the review of its 

active counter-IED initiatives by JIEDDO stakeholders in preparation for 

certain major milestone decisions and meetings. However, JIEDDO did 

not have an automated mechanism to identify its stand-alone counter-IED 

26 GAO-09-175. 

27 JIEDDO’s expenditure tracking system, does not differentiate between expenditures it 

makes that constitute overhead and infrastructure and expenditures it makes that JIEDDO 

considers to be separate, stand alone counter-IED initiatives.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

initiatives, and therefore, when JIEDDO began implementation of this 

process in May 2011, it had to review one by one its 887 funds tracking 

system numbers to separate its stand-alone counter-IED initiatives from 

overhead. JIEDDO completed this review June 17, 2011, and concluded 

that 223, or approximately 25 percent, of JIEDDO’s 887 expendituretracking-system control numbers were currently active stand-alone 

counter-IED initiatives.28

Without a comprehensive listing of counter-IED initiatives, DOD 

components may be unaware of the total spectrum of counter-IED efforts 

within the department, and thereby continue to independently pursue 

counter-IED efforts that focus on similar technologies and may be 

duplicative. In our March 2011 report

While this list could provide JIEDDO and 

external stakeholders with a comprehensive inventory of active JIEDDOfunded counter-IED initiatives, it is incomplete because it does not identify 

or separate out inactive stand-alone counter-IED initiatives from 

administrative overhead expenditures. According to JIEDDO officials, 

JIEDDO could produce a comprehensive list of its counter-IED initiatives 

in a matter of 2 to 4 days, but had not done so as of December 15, 2011.

Further, if JIEDDO did produce such a list, it would represent one point in 

time and would not provide a comprehensive DOD-wide database of 

counter-IED efforts because it would not include counter-IED efforts 

funded and managed by other DOD components independently of 

JIEDDO.

29

• Counter-IED Directed Energy Technology: The military services have 

developed six different systems that emit energy, such as radio 

waves, directed at IEDs to neutralize them.

and ongoing work, we identified 

several instances of potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation 

within DOD regarding its counter-IED efforts by analyzing overlap in the 

capabilities and function of these systems. The following are examples 

we identified:

30

 

28 According to JIEDDO, active initiatives are those with ongoing JIEDDO funding 

commitments from JIEDDO, or those that JIEDDO has not terminated or transferred to 

other DOD entities for management. 

While detailed data 

29 GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save 

Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue GAO-11-318SP (Washington D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011).

30The systems are being developed by the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps with 

some funding provided by JIEDDO. 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

available on the six initiatives are classified, the efforts exhibit a range 

of different approaches regarding physical size, weight, and cost, and 

data show that the various DOD components involved have spent 

about $104 million collectively on these efforts to date. However, 

given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, there could be 

more directed energy efforts that we have not identified. Moreover, 

concerns regarding the fragmentation and duplication in DOD’s 

directed energy counter-IED efforts have risen to the highest levels 

within the warfighter community. Specifically, the commander of U.S. 

Central Command, in August 2011, conveyed concern regarding 

issues including apparent “duplicity of [development] effort” in directed 

energy technology with organizations (in DOD) working different 

solutions. The correspondence called for coordination and 

cooperation by DOD on its directed energy efforts to develop a 

directed energy system that works in theater as quickly as possible 

given that the development has been under way since 2008. In 

response, in August 2011, JIEDDO, as DOD’s coordinating agency for 

these efforts, developed a plan and, in September 2011, brought 

various service program offices together to develop a solution as soon 

as possible. According to JIEDDO officials, the six systems will 

continue in development through fiscal year 2012, at which point, 

JIEDDO will determine which of the systems best satisfies U.S. 

Central Command’s requirement. While this new approach may 

eliminate future unnecessary duplication of effort, earlier coordination 

and better visibility could have prevented duplication that may have 

occurred up to this point. According to JIEDDO officials, the level of 

concern expressed and the fact that the concern was expressed in 

writing resulted in JIEDDO being able to secure the cooperation 

needed by the various organizations working different directed energy 

solutions to coordinate in this instance. However, this is a unique 

occurrence because, according to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO does not 

have the authority to direct—i.e., compel— various DOD 

organizations that may be working on overlapping technologies or 

efforts to reach consensus regarding selection among competing 

alternatives. Therefore, JIEDDO has not always been successful in 

securing the cooperation of the services to coordinate on counter-IED 

efforts.

• Radio Frequency Jamming Systems: The Army and Navy continue to 

pursue separate developments of counter-IED jamming systems, 

which provide a limited radius of protection to prevent IEDs from being 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

triggered by an enemy’s radio signals. In 2007, DOD established the 

Navy as single manager and executive agent for ground-based 

jamming.31 Under DOD Directive 5101.14, military services may 

conduct ground-based jammer research and development to satisfy 

military service-unique requirements if the requirements are 

coordinated before initiation with the DOD’s single manager for 

jammers and, for any system or system modifications resulting from 

such efforts, operational technical characteristics and logistics plans 

are approved by the single manager.32 The Navy has developed a 

standard technology and system for ground-based jamming called 

JCREW I1B1,33

 

31 The Secretary of the Navy, as the Executive Agent for Military Ground-Based CREW 

Technology, is responsible for designating a flag grade officer as the single manager for 

CREW. See Department of Defense Directive 5101.14, DoD Executive Agent and Single 

Manager for Military Ground-Based Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive 

Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) Technology, ¶ 5.3.1 (June 11, 2007) (hereinafter cited 

as DODD 5101.14 (June 11, 2007)).

which DOD has designated as the ground-based 

jamming program for the entire Department. However, the Army has 

continued to develop its own ground-based jamming system called 

Duke. According to Navy officials, in 2010, the Army continued to 

develop new technology for insertion into its Duke system—expected 

to cost about $1.062 billion when completed and installed—without 

notifying and coordinating with the Navy as DOD’s single manager for 

ground-based jammer technology. According to Army officials, the 

Army is pursuing development of its own system because it intends to 

expand the use of this technology for purposes other than countering 

IEDs such as jamming enemy command, control, and communication 

systems. However, according to Navy officials, the CREW system’s 

technology has the flexibility and capacity to expand and provide the 

same additional functions as the Army plans for its Duke system. 

Moreover, according to Navy officials, the Navy’s system is further 

along in its development. Because the Navy and Army are pursuing 

separate jamming systems, it is not clear if DOD is taking the most 

cost-effective approach. While, according to JIEDDO officials, the 

Office of Secretary of Defense was considering how to resolve this 

issue, a decision had not been made before this report was 

completed. Regardless of the final outcome however, a more 

32 See DODD 5101.14, ¶ 4 (June 11, 2007).

33 JCREW is used to abbreviate “Joint Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive 

Device Electronic Warfare” 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

coordinated approach early in the process when initiating programs of 

this magnitude could prevent unnecessary duplication in costs and 

effort. 34

• Electronic Data Collection Systems: According to JIEDDO officials, 

JIEDDO has funded the development and support of approximately 

70 electronic data collection and analysis tools that overlap to some 

degree because they include capabilities to collect, analyze, and store 

data to help the warfighter combat the IED threat. Although JIEDDO 

recently reported that it could not verify total funding for its information 

technology investments,35

 

34 The Senate Appropriations Committee recently noted the Navy’s executive agent and 

single manager role for CREW, as well as a DOD Inspector General report documenting a 

disconnect between the Army and DOD CREW programs. The Committee recommended 

denying funds requested by the Army for fiscal year 2012 to initiate an Integrated 

Electronic Warfare Systems program, stating that the Committee did “not believe it is 

prudent to initiate a new program of this magnitude that has such significant overlap with 

the Department’s program of record.” See S. Rep. No. 112-77, at 174-75 (2011).

GAO determined through a review of DOD 

financial records that DOD has expended at least $184 million 

collectively on information technology development for its data 

collection and analysis tools. According to JIEDDO officials, JIEDDO 

is aware of the redundancy within these electronic tools. In April 2011, 

the JIEDDO Deputy Director for Information Management raised the 

issue of redundancy in JIEDDO’s information technology systems 

including its counter-IED data collection and analysis systems and 

tools. Consequently, since April 2011, JIEDDO has worked to 

eliminate overlapping information-technology capabilities where 

feasible including among the approximately 70 analytical tools 

JIEDDO has funded and developed for use in countering IED 

networks. For example, on July 1, 2011, JIEDDO discontinued 

funding for one of these initiatives—Tripwire Analytical Capability 

(TAC)—citing as reasons TAC’s limited purpose, high cost, and 

duplicative capabilities. However, in making the decision to 

discontinue TAC yet continue operating the other data collection and 

analysis tools, JIEDDO had not compared and quantified all of the 

potential options to streamline or consolidate these tools to create a 

single collective system that includes extracting data on counter-IED 

efforts across DOD. As a result, JIEDDO cannot be certain it is 

35 REPORT OF AUDIT 2011-07-002: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization: Information Technology Investment Management, Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization Office of Internal Review, 6 September 2011. 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

pursuing the most advantageous approach for collecting, analyzing, 

storing, and using available data for combating the IED threat. 

Further, although JIEDDO has discontinued funding TAC, the 

Defense Intelligence Agency is continuing to develop the tool for its 

own use, resulting in the potential for DOD-wide duplication between 

TAC and JIEDDO’s other data collection and analysis tools.

Six years after DOD established JIEDDO as its coordinating agency to 

lead, advocate, and coordinate responses to the IED threat across the 

department, DOD continues to lack comprehensive visibility of its counterIED expenditures and investments, including those from JIEDDO, the 

military services, and relevant DOD agencies. The absence of a strategic 

plan with outcome-oriented goals and visibility over DOD’s counter-IED 

efforts are recurring themes that we have identified in prior reports as 

affecting JIEDDO’s ability to manage DOD’s efforts effectively and 

efficiently. JIEDDO has demonstrated progress in addressing previously 

raised issues—by developing a formal, more rigorous internal control 

system, and in issuing a 2012–2016 strategic plan for the management of 

JIEDDO’s counter-IED efforts—but these actions have not fully 

addressed the issues we have raised in this report. Specifically, DOD has 

not implemented adequate actions to (1) provide a comprehensive plan to 

ensure that all DOD counter-IED efforts are strategically managed in 

order to achieve its goal to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic 

influence, and (2) comprehensively list all DOD-wide counter-IED 

initiatives in a database that provides internal and external parties with 

visibility into the department’s counter-IED efforts. Without a 

comprehensive plan and listing of its counter-IED initiatives, DOD 

continues to risk fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in its counter-IED 

efforts, such as those identified in this report, as well as lack the ability to 

prioritize projects within future budget levels. Given the limited 

applicability of JIEDDO’s recently issued strategic plan and the limited 

progress JIEDDO has made in implementing our prior recommendation 

regarding developing a comprehensive listing of DOD-wide efforts, it is 

critical that DOD places greater focus and emphasis on the actions it 

takes in addressing these issues. As the nation addresses fiscal 

challenges, and DOD is directed to identify efficiencies, it will need to 

reduce and eliminate unnecessary duplicative counter-IED initiatives. We 

therefore reiterate our prior recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the military services to work with JIEDDO to develop a 

database for all DOD’s counter-IED initiatives.

Conclusions
 

Page 20 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

In addition to the prior recommendation reiterated above that remains 

open, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, who is responsible for direction and control of 

JIEDDO, to take the following four actions:

• Define outcome-related strategic goals associated with DOD’s 

counter-IED mission to enable the development of measures of 

effectiveness that will help to determine progress of DOD’s counterIED efforts.

• Assess JIEDDO’s recently completed strategic plan and its 

implementation to ensure that it

• incorporates outcome-related strategic goals, 

• includes sufficient measures of effectiveness to gauge progress, 

and

• uses the data collected from these metrics to adjust its counterIED efforts, as needed. 

• Develop an implementation plan for the establishment of DOD’s 

counter- IED database including a detailed timeline with milestones to 

help achieve this goal.

• Develop a process to use DOD’s counter-IED database once it is 

established to identify and compare all counter-IED initiatives and 

activities, to enable program monitoring, and reduce any duplication,

overlap, and fragmentation among counter-IED initiatives.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 

third of our four recommendations—to develop an implementation plan for 

the establishment of DOD’s counter-IED database—and did not concur 

with the other three. DOD’s written comments are included in appendix II. 

DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into 

this report where appropriate.

In disagreeing with our first recommendation for the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense to define outcome-related strategic goals associated with DOD’s 

counter-IED mission to enable the development of measures of 

effectiveness that will help to determine progress of DOD’s counter-IED 

efforts, the department stated that the JIEDDO Director has accomplished 

this task by issuing its 2012–2016 counter-IED strategic plan in January 

2012. While we agree that the recent issuance of JIEDDO’s plan is a 

positive development, it does not fully address our recommendation 

because the plan does not apply to all counter-IED efforts 

departmentwide. According to JIEDDO officials, the plan applies to the 

management of JIEDDO counter-IED efforts only and has not been 

adopted as DOD’s strategic plan for managing all of its counter-IED 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 21 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

expenditures and investments from the military services and relevant 

DOD agencies. Therefore, JIEDDO’s strategic goals do not satisfy the 

need for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to define outcome-related 

strategic goals for the department taken as a whole, and we believe our 

recommendation remains valid.

In disagreeing with our second recommendation for the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense to document and assess JIEDDO’s strategic plan to ensure 

that it incorporates outcome-related strategic goals, includes sufficient 

measures of effectiveness to gauge progress, and uses the data collected 

from these metrics to adjust its counter-IED efforts, as needed, the 

department stated that JIEDDO has established outcome-related 

strategic goals and measures of effectiveness in its January 2012

strategic plan and related implementation plan. DOD further stated that in 

March 2012 JIEDDO will begin quarterly internal reviews to assess 

progress against its goals and make adjustments to its counter-IED 

efforts. Completion of JIEDDO’s strategic plan is a positive step; however, 

because the portion of the plan relevant to our prior recommendations—

the annex containing measures of effectiveness, timelines, and goals—

was issued on January 19, 2012, we were unable to evaluate the plan 

before issuance of this report and therefore cannot comment on its 

adequacy relative to our recommendations. However, JIEDDO’s 

numerous prior strategic-planning actions have not followed leading 

strategic management practices, or have been discontinued. Therefore, 

JIEDDO’s recently completed counter-IED strategic plan and plans for 

internal quarterly reviews alone do not negate the need for the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense to assess the adequacy of JIEDDO’s strategic plan 

and its implementation, and we believe our recommendation remains 

valid. However, we modified the language in our recommendation to 

reflect the fact that JIEDDO has now recently issued a strategic plan and 

to clarify that the remaining action needed by the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense is to assess its adequacy and implementation.

In concurring with our third recommendation for the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense to develop an implementation plan for the establishment of 

DOD’s counter- IED database, DOD stated that DOD Directive 2000.19E 

is currently being revised to create a requirement for Combatant 

Commands, military services, and DOD agencies to report counter-IED 

initiatives to JIEDDO. According to DOD, this step will enable JIEDDO to 

develop a database for all DOD counter-IED initiatives. We agree that 

establishing this requirement should help JIEDDO’s counter-IED 

database development; however, according to JIEDDO officials, DOD 

Directive 2000.19E has been under revision for 2 years without DOD 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

issuing a new directive. Therefore, it is critical that DOD complete this 

task as soon as possible to enable JIEDDO to develop its planned 

counter-IED database as described in DOD’s comments.

In disagreeing with our fourth recommendation for the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense to develop a means to identify and reduce any duplication, 

overlap, and fragmentation among counter-IED initiatives, DOD stated 

that it had existing processes and organizations including JIEDDO and its 

Senior Integration Group to facilitate coordination and collaboration with 

the military services and across DOD, which would address this 

recommendation. We agree that existing DOD processes such as 

JIEDDO’s Capabilities Development Process and DOD’s Senior 

Integration Group prioritization process can be helpful in coordinating 

DOD’s counter-IED efforts. However, the effectiveness of DOD’s existing 

coordination and collaboration processes has been limited given that 

these processes did not prevent the issues of potential duplication we

identified in this report. For example, in the case of DOD’s directed 

energy counter-IED efforts where DOD has collectively expended $104 

million, the processes cited by DOD in its response did not identify and 

resolve the fragmentation and potential duplication present in these 

efforts. As a result, the commander of U.S. Central Command, as 

mentioned previously, protested in writing to DOD officials about potential 

duplication of efforts. Without an adequate process to use DOD’s counterIED database, once it is developed, DOD will continue to lack assurance 

that it is identifying and addressing instances of potential duplication 

before making significant investments. In finalizing our report, we 

modified the wording of our recommendation to clarify our intent that DOD 

establish a process (rather than a means) to use its counter-IED 

database once it is established.

In addition to comments on our recommendations, DOD questioned the 

accuracy of our statements regarding the soundness of JIEDDO’s 

prioritization and resource allocation determinations. Specifically, DOD 

stated that our report was inaccurate in stating that JIEDDO does not 

have a sound basis to determine how to invest DOD’s resources among 

the lines of operation: attack the network, defeat the device, and train the 

force. DOD further stated that JIEDDO has established procedures to 

assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize requirements in coordination with 

warfighting commanders and that JIEDDO coordinates counter-IED 

initiatives with numerous DOD offices, which DOD concluded ensures 

warfighting priorities, effectiveness of fielded counter-IED efforts, and cost 

reasonableness are addressed and evaluated. DOD also asserted that 

JIEDDO’s existing programming and prioritization processes align 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

JIEDDO’s investment resources with Combatant Commander priorities.

We recognize that JIEDDO has resource allocation and prioritization 

processes in place and have modified the language of this report to 

acknowledge these processes where applicable. However, we maintain 

our position that JIEDDO’s basis for determination of resource allocations 

and prioritizations is limited because DOD has not been able to identify all 

of its counter-IED efforts, as stated above, and lacks actionable goals and 

objectives needed to tie JIEDDO’s and the Department’s performance 

measures to outcomes that would assess its counter-IED efforts.

Therefore, DOD does not have full assurance that its investments are 

achieving its strategic goal in the counter-IED fight.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 

(404) 679-1808 or at russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix IV. 

Cary B. Russell, Acting Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

We considered counter-IED strategic planning efforts from February 2006 

through 2012. To analyze the extent to which DOD has provided a 

comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including strategic resultsoriented goals and metrics that determine the effectiveness of efforts 

across DOD to combat IEDs, we collected and reviewed DOD’s counterIED strategic-planning documents from JIEDDO. We also reviewed prior 

GAO reports and work papers involving strategic planning and 

management, both for JIEDDO and for the government in general. We 

used these GAO reports to identify leading strategic management 

practices derived from leading strategic management principles 

demonstrated by successful results-oriented organizations for use as 

evaluation criteria in this review. In addition, we interviewed JIEDDO 

officials involved in strategic planning and assessment to learn about the 

implementation of the actions detailed in the counter-IED strategic 

planning documents collected. Furthermore, we attended a counter-IED 

conference sponsored by JIEDDO in March 2011 that focused on a key 

element of strategic planning and management—measuring outcomes 

and performance—to observe and collect additional information relevant 

to DOD’s counter-IED strategic management. From the documents 

collected and interviews conducted, we identified several triggering 

actions that either provided the impetus for, or resulted in, counter-IED 

strategic management efforts in JIEDDO or elsewhere in DOD. We 

compared these actions against leading strategic management criteria 

described above and rated each according to its fulfillment of these 

leading practices.

We considered counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 

managed by DOD components with involvement in counter-IED efforts: 

JIEDDO, military services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has identified counter-IED 

initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts, we reviewed 

JIEDDO databases on counter-IED efforts and interviewed OSD, military 

service and JIEDDO officials to discuss the availability of data about 

additional counter-IED efforts/initiatives. Through our interactions with 

JIEDDO officials, we determined that the best, most comprehensive 

repository of counter-IED information that currently existed was the 

Technology Matrix. We analyzed the Technology Matrix to obtain a list of 

persons, for each organization, who had entered information regarding 

counter-IED efforts into the database. Additionally, we reviewed and 

analyzed prior GAO counter-IED work to obtain relevant contact 

information, obtained current contact information of relevant organizations 

through our Inspector General liaison, and reviewed and analyzed other 

external sources of information, which contained relevant organizations. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

We interviewed OSD, Service, and JIEDDO officials to discuss and 

determine awareness of DOD’s counter-IED efforts. To determine the 

effects of the absence of a comprehensive DOD listing of counter-IED 

initiatives within the department, we assessed whether DOD components 

continue to independently pursue counter-IED efforts that may be 

redundant or overlapping. We updated counter-IED initiatives case 

studies that we previously reported as having redundancy of effort and 

developed additional case studies of overlapping counter-IED efforts 

within DOD. We purposefully selected the additional case studies based 

on information in interviews with DOD officials or in data or 

documentation collected during this review that evidenced similar 

capabilities and objectives among two or more counter-IED efforts. In 

each case study, we compared the overlapping counter-IED efforts to 

determine and describe the degree of redundancy and potential 

duplication among the efforts for each case study given overlap of the 

capabilities and functions of these systems.
Appendix II: Supplemental Table to Figure 1

Page 26 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

The following table identifies 17 key actions or triggering events 

applicable to DOD that were to either produce counter-IED strategic plans 

for the department or further develop the strategic plans. This table is 

similar to figure 1 but shows the interactive text without needing the 

interactive computer capability.

Table 1: Instances of Incomplete or Insufficient Counter-IED Strategic Management from 2006 to 2011

Date Event Details Related to Event

February 2006 DOD Defined JIEDDO’s Mission 

and Directed it to Develop a 

Strategic Plan

DOD provided JIEDDO with the counter-IED mission to “defeat [IEDs] as 

weapons of strategic influence,” but DOD did not provide results-oriented 

strategic goals on which to base a strategic plan. 

March 2007 GAO Recommended JIEDDO 

Develop a Strategic Plan

JIEDDO concurred with our recommendations. 

March 2007 and 

September 2007

Congressional Committee 

Directed DOD to Finalize

JIEDDO’s Strategic Plan

A congressional committee directed DOD in March and September 2007 to 

finalize and submit JIEDDO’s strategic plan. JIEDDO produced a document 

in September 2007 that contained a mission statement but did not include 

results-oriented strategic goals or performance measures. 

September 2007 DOD Issued DOD-wide C-IED 

Strategic Plan 

This 9-page DOD-wide plan clarified the mission of JIEDDO and contained 

strategic goals. However, these goals were not results-oriented, and the 

plan did not include performance measures. 

December 2007 JIEDDO Wrote in its 2007 Annual 

Report that it had Issued an 

Implementation Instruction for Its 

Strategic Plan 

As of February 17, 2012, JIEDDO was unable to locate the implementation 

instruction, and therefore could not provide a description of the instruction’s 

purpose or contents. 

January 2008 C-IED Conference 

Recommended Development of 

Metrics

JIEDDO produced metrics and collected data subsequent to this 

recommendation; however, according to JIEDDO, the collection of data for 

these metrics was discontinued by 2009. 

December 2008 JIEDDO Established Metrics in 

its Organization and Functions 

Guide

JIEDDO created metrics in this guide, but they were not representative of 

JIEDDO’s work and were never implemented according to JIEDDO. 

JIEDDO’s 2011 Organization and Functions Guide stated that measures of 

effectiveness are under development and will be updated in future 

publications, but none had been published as of February 17, 2012. 

February 2009 Strategy for FYs 2009 Through 

2010 Created

Plan contained strategic goals and proposed performance measures; 

however, the performance measures were later abandoned because they 

were not relevant to the work performed by JIEDDO staff. 

March 2009 C-IED Conference 

Recommended Development of 

Metrics

According to JIEDDO, the measurements that it developed were related to 

outputs, not outcomes, and thus were limited in assessing performance. 

April 2010 JIEDDO Began to Establish 

Initiative Evaluation Plans Early 

in Initiative Development. 

As of February 17, 2012, JIEDDO had created evaluation plans for 24 of its 

32 initiatives started after April 2010. The plans designated tests, 

evaluations, and data to be collected to determine the level of performance 

regarding these initiatives.

May 2010 JIEDDO Wrote a C-IED Strategic 

Management Paper 

JIEDDO wrote a C-IED strategic paper, but DOD did not adopt it as an 

official strategic document with implementation authority. Further, the paper 

contained ideas gathered from within JIEDDO on C-IED goals but because 

they were not results-oriented, the paper lacked specifications for 

developing results-oriented metrics. 

Appendix II: Supplemental Table to Figure 1
Appendix II: Supplemental Table to Figure 1

Page 27 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

Date Event Details Related to Event

July 2010 GAO Recommended JIEDDO 

Improve Process for Assessing 

Effectiveness

JIEDDO concurred with our recommendation and produced an Assessment 

Methodology which was to provide a consistent approach for evaluating 

initiatives individually, and was not intended to link with results-oriented 

strategic goals. 

December 2010 JIEDDO Drafted Overarching 

Assessment Processes and 

Procedures Manual 

Draft manual described the process for conducting assessments and tied 

together different assessment areas but was never finalized and, as of 

February 17, 2012, JIEDDO had not issued an assessment manual that was 

results-oriented.

February 2011 2011 JIEDDO Execution Plan 

Created

The Execution Plan, linking its activities to budget priorities over a 2-year 

period, enabled JIEDDO to prioritize its initiatives’ funding decisions. 

However, the plan focused on tactical, short-term decisions and did not 

contain long-term strategic goals or a framework for assessing progress 

toward meeting goals.

March 2011 C-IED Conference 

Recommended the Development 

of a Standardized Assessment 

Framework

JIEDDO continued to meet periodically with a working group formed at the 

March 2011 C-IED Conference to develop measures of effectiveness as 

part of an assessment framework. However, as of February 17, 2012, 

JIEDDO had not published a final assessment framework to enable it to 

measure performance.

July 2011 JIEDDO Drafted C-IED Strategy 

to Coincide with Draft DOD 

Directive Revision 

JIEDDO drafted a strategic plan based on anticipated changes in DOD 

Directive 2000.19E. However, the departing Deputy Secretary of Defense 

did not approve the revised directive. 

September 2011 JIEDDO to Revise its Draft C-IED 

Strategy to Incorporate 

Anticipated New National C-IED 

Policy Requirements

JIEDDO officials stated that their strategy will incorporate requirements from 

a forthcoming national C-IED policy as well as the revised DOD Directive 

2000.19E. Once DOD approves the scheduled revision of 2000.19E, 

JIEDDO officials said they plan to issue a C-IED strategy containing resultsoriented strategic goals and action plans containing related metrics. 

JIEDDO officials also said they plan to adjust action plans based on the 

resulting data from these metrics. As of February 17, 2012, neither the 

national policy nor the revised DOD directive had been issued.

Source: GAO analysis. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 30 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 31 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 32 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

Cary Russell, (404) 679-1808 or russellc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Grace Coleman, Rajiv D’Cruz, Emily Norman, Michael 

Shaughnessy, Rebecca Shea, Michael Silver, Amie Steele, William M. 

Solis, John Strong, and Tristan T.To.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 33 GAO-12-280 Warfighter Support

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington 

D.C.: March 1, 2011. 

Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More 

Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation.

GAO-11-273. Washington D.C.: March 1, 2011. 

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GAO-10-660. Washington D.C.: July 1, 2010. 

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Warfighter Needs. GAO-10-460. Washington D.C.: April 30, 2010. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a ResultsOriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories.

GAO-10-331. Washington D.C.: March 26, 2010. 

Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Ability to Coordinate 

and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts. 

GAO-10-186T. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009. 

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 

Coordination of DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts. 

GAO-10-95. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter 

Needs. GAO-09-175. Washington D.C.: November 14, 2008. 

Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial 

and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

Defeat Organization. GAO-08-342. Washington D.C.: March 6, 2008. 

Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief 

Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership.

GAO-07-1072. Washington D.C.: September 5, 2007. 

Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington D.C.: July 2, 

2003. 

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Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a 

Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington D.C.: January 17, 

2003. 

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Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 

Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. Washington D.C.: November 14, 2002. 

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance 

and Results Act. GGD-96-118. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996.

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