alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

Guidelines for Small Business and Community Lending Initiative

SBA 7(a) Pooled Certificates

Program Objective

Using authority under Section 101 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”), the 

United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) will purchase pooled certificates backed 

by the guaranteed portions of Small Business Administration (“SBA”) 7(a) loans (the “Pooled 

Certificates”) packaged on or after July 1, 2008 from financial institutions. The purpose of this 

program is to provide liquidity for the small business credit market. Treasury expects its 

purchase of Pooled Certificates will help increase liquidity and provide lenders with the 

confidence that they need to extend credit to small businesses, which are a key driver of 

economic activity and job creation. 

Selection of Purchase Agent and Valuation Agent

Treasury has the statutory authority to retain financial agents to provide services on its behalf. 

Pursuant to its financial agent authority, Treasury has hired a financial agent to help value the 

Pooled Certificates (the “Valuation Agent”) and another financial agent to purchase Pooled 

Certificates on Treasury’s behalf and to manage these assets after the purchase (the “Financial 

Agent”). 

Eligibility

Treasury’s Financial Agent will purchase eligible Pooled Certificates, the requirements of which 

are set forth in the master purchase agreement (“MPA”) and include that the Pooled Certificates 

be packaged on or after July 1, 2008. Purchases of eligible Pooled Certificates shall occur 

pursuant to the “Bid Procedure” as set forth in the MPA. 

Method for Pricing and Valuation

1. The purchase of eligible Pooled Certificates shall be performed pursuant to the Bid 

Procedure and will involve an “offer wanted” bid solicitation process whereby the 

Financial Agent specifies to the selling pool assemblers the unique parameters of the 

Pooled Certificates that Treasury seeks to purchase. 

2. As part of Treasury’s evaluation of the offers for purchase by pool assemblers, Treasury 

will use a variety of valuation methods including the use of Financial Agents and market 

price information. 

3. Pricing will be market-based and determined by the bids that come in from the bidding 

pool assemblers. 
2 

Form and Terms of Purchase

1. To protect the taxpayers’ interests, Treasury will enter into an MPA with pool assemblers 

selling Pooled Certificates. In connection with each purchase from an SBA pool 

assembler, Treasury will receive senior debt securities from the pool assembler to satisfy 

the requirements of Section 113 of EESA. 

2. In the MPA, each pool assembler will agree to a number of terms, conditions and 

covenants, including a requirement to take all necessary action to ensure that it and its 

executive officers comply with the requirements of the EESA. 

These program guidelines are being published in accordance with the requirements of Section 

101(d) of EESA.
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3695 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to change certain eligibility 

provisions for loan forgiveness for teachers, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 30, 2024 

Ms. STABENOW introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to change 

certain eligibility provisions for loan forgiveness for 

teachers, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Teacher Debt Relief 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. LOAN FORGIVENESS FOR TEACHERS. 

7 The Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 

8 et seq.) is amended— 

9 (1) in section 428J(g)(2) (20 U.S.C. 1078– 

10 10(g)(2))— 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•S 3695 IS

1 (A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘or’’ 

2 after the semicolon at the end; 

3 (B) by striking subparagraph (B); and 

4 (C) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as 

5 subparagraph (B); 

6 (2) in section 455(m) (20 U.S.C. 1087e(m)), in 

7 paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘both this subsection and 

8 section 428J, 428K, 428L, or 460’’ and inserting 

9 ‘‘both this subsection and section 428K or 428L’’; 

10 and 

11 (3) in section 460(g)(2) (20 U.S.C. 

12 1087j(g)(2))— 

13 (A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘or’’ 

14 after the semicolon at the end; 

15 (B) by striking subparagraph (B); and 

16 (C) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as 

17 subparagraph (B). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 9 A0 24 2 . MATTHEW J OSHUA HALL v . THE STATE.

M at t h ew Jo s h u a Hal l

, p ro ceed i n g p ro se, pl ed g u i l t y t o ch i l d m o l es t at i o n an d

ag g rav at ed ch i l d m o l es t at io n , an d t h e t ri al co urt en t ered t h e ju d g m en t o f co n v i ct i o n

an d s en t en ce o n Ap r i l 9

, 20 1 8

. Hal l fi l ed t hi s ap p eal o f t h e ju d g m en t o n M ay 1 7,

2 0 1 8 . W e l ack ju ri sd i ct i o n

. A n ot i ce o f a p p e a l m

us t b e fi led wi t h i n 3 0 d ay s o f en t ry o f t h e t ri al co u rt
ju d g m en t o r o rd er s ou g h t t o b e ap p eal ed

. OCGA § 5 -6 -3 8 (a). Th e p ro p er an d t i m el y

fi li n g o f a n o t i ce o f ap peal i s an ab s o l u t e req u i rem en t t o co n fer ju ri s d i ct i o n o n t h i s

Co u rt

. Ro wl a nd v. S t a t e , 2 6 4 G a. 8 7 2

, 8 72 (1 ) (4 52 SE2 d 75 6 ) (1 9 95 ). Here, Hal l

fi led h i s ap p eal 3 8 d ay s aft er t h e t ri al co u rt e n t e r e d t h e ju d g m en t

. Th erefo re, t h i s

ap p eal i s u nt i m el y

an d i s h ereb y

DISM ISSED fo r l ack o f ju ri s d i ct io n

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e
, A t la n t a
,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e is a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. October 09, 2018

10/09/2018
#### Robert K. BRIGGS, Petitioner, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY (Self Insured) and the Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 44788.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 8, 1974.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Audrey LANGLINAIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ignace DAVID, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4397.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Sept. 25, 1973.

Preston M. Summers, Abbeville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Deshotels & Deshotels 'by O. H. Desho-tels, Jr., Kaplan, for defendant-appellee.

Before CULPEPPER, MILLER and DOMENGEAUX, JJ.

ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

CULPEPPER, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Audrey Langlinais, moved to dismiss the answer to the appeal filed by the defendant-appellee, Ignace David, on the grounds that the defendant has no right to ask for a modification of a lower court’s judgment by means of an answer to the appeal.

Plaintiff originally brought suit for a separation from bed and board, alimony pendente lite and for a partition of a certain pension fund which she alleged was community property. On April 26, 1973, she obtained formal judgment awarding a separation from bed and board and alimony pendente lite, but denying her claim for the division of the pension fund.

On June 25, 1973, 60 days after the judgment was rendered, plaintiff was granted a devolutive appeal to this Court, which appeal was made returnable on August 20, 1973.

The appeal was filed in this Court on August. 7, 1973, and the defendant filed answer to the appeal on August 22, 1973.

*96In his answer to the appeal the defendant requests a modification of the judgment of the lower court insofar as the judgment relates to alimony pendente lite.

Defendant’s answer to the appeal is dismissed as this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain- it.

An appeal from a judgment granting or denying a separation or alimony must be taken within 30 days from the date of judgment or from the refusal to grant a new trial. LSA-C.C.P. Articles 3943, 3942, and Article 2087(1) — (3). Since plaintiff’s appeal was not perfected until 30 days after the judgment (there was no motion made for a new trial), the judgment awarding the judicial separation and alimony is final. The appeal insofar as it relates to the status of community property, was timely. Pennison v. Pennison, 157 So.2d 628 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1963), writs refused 245 La. 585, 159 So.2d 290 (1963); Granger v. Granger, 193 So.2d 898 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1967).

Since there is no appeal before this Court on the question of the separation or alimony, this Court is without authority to consider the answer to the appeal relating thereto. If a court is without jurisdiction to pass upon an issue on appeal, it is equally without jurisdiction to entertain an answer thereto. Schuler Rubber and Supply Company v. Enterprise Electric Company, 10 Orleans App. 135 (1913).

For the reasons assigned, the motion to dismiss the defendant’s answer to the appeal is hereby granted.

Answer to the appeal dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<RESTATED>

<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                         MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                               504,662
<SECURITIES>                                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        400,189
<ALLOWANCES>                                               0
<INVENTORY>                                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     904,811
<PP&E>                                                     0
<DEPRECIATION>                                             0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     1,201,811
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                238,995
<BONDS>                                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                      0
<PREFERRED>                                                0
<COMMON>                                              10,730
<OTHER-SE>                                           961,086
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       1,210,811
<SALES>                                              305,910
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     305,910
<CGS>                                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        264,515
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                           0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                         0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       41,395
<INCOME-TAX>                                          17,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   24,395
<DISCONTINUED>                                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                            0
<CHANGES>                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                          24,395
<EPS-BASIC>                                             0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           0.00


</TABLE>
#### Catherine T. RITTER, Appellant, v. Olga CRESPO and Rufino Crespo, her husband, Verne Peter Dubois, Appellees.

No. 72-1188.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 27, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; George Richardson, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Joint Application of 

DELTA AIR LINES, INC. and 

 KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES 

for statements of authorization pursuant to 

14 C.F.R. 212 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket OST-2004-19214 

NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL CODESHARING 

Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to: 

Nienke Neij 

Corporate Legal Counsel 

KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES 

P.O. Box 7700, 1117 ZL Schiphol 

The Netherlands 

31 (0)6 22813099 

nienke.neij@klm.com 

Alexander Van der Bellen 

Managing Director – Regulatory Affairs 

 & Associate General Counsel 

Christopher Walker 

Regional Director – Regulatory Affairs 

DELTA AIR LINES, INC. 

1212 New York Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 842-4184 

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com 

chris.walker@delta.com 

October 9, 2013
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Joint Application of 

DELTA AIR LINES, INC. and 

 KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES 

for statements of authorization pursuant to 

14 C.F.R. 212 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket OST-2004-19214 

NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL CODESHARING 

Pursuant to the blanket statements of authorization granted to Delta Air Lines, 

Inc. (“Delta”), KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (“KLM”), and their respective affiliates, the 

carriers hereby notify the Department that, on or after 30 days from today, Delta’s “DL*” 

designator code will be displayed on the KLM operated routes between Amsterdam 

(AMS) and Moscow (SVO); and Amsterdam (AMS) and St. Petersburg (LED). 

Respectfully submitted, 

 

/s/ Nienke Neij 

______________________ 

Nienke Neij 

Corporate Legal Counsel 

KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES 

Alexander Van der Bellen 

Managing Director – Government Affairs 

 & Associate General Counsel 

DELTA AIR LINES, INC. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 A copy of the foregoing Notice has been served this 9th day of October, 2013, upon 

the following persons via email: 

robert.cohn@hoganlovells.com; Francis.Heil@aa.com; Robert.Wirick@aa.com; 

dan.weiss@united.com; thomas.bolling@united.com; howard.kass@usairways.com; 

benjamin.slocum@usairways.com; esta.rosenberg@dot.gov; brian.hedberg@dot.gov; 

info@airlineinfo.com
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. CORRECTED IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 97-60604 Summary Calendar

________________________ JOHNNY K. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus TOWER LOAN OF MISSISSIPPI, INC. , Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Mississippi

(5:96-CV-73BrS)

_________________________________________________________________ March 17, 1998 Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The appellant, Johnny K. Brown, appeals from an adverse summary judgment dismissing his claim of age discrimination brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 After a de novo review of the summary judgment record, we affirm. Brown was terminated from his employment with Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc., five weeks after he was hired. He was forty-2

five (45) years old both at the time he was hired and at the time he was terminated. Brown attempts to overcome the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons advanced for his discharge with a claim of pretext based upon a stray remark (“you just can’t teach old dogs new tricks”) made by a supervisor who was not involved in the decision to terminate him and after the decision to terminate Brown had been made. That stray remark is woefully inadequate to create an issue of fact with respect to the appellee’s articulated non-discriminatory reasons for discharging Brown. See Waggoner v. City of Garland , 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993). For essentially this reason and as further explained in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the district court, dated July 30, 1997, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
# L_2005261EN.01002001.xml

| 7.10.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 261/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.10.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 261/20

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1636/2005

of 6 October 2005

amending, for the seventh time, Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 of 11 October 2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (1), and in particular Article 10(a) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 lists the persons covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 lists the persons covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation.

| (2) | The Commission is empowered to amend that Annex, taking into account Council Decisions implementing Common Position 2004/694/CFSP of the Council of 11 October 2004 on further measures in support of the effective implementation of the mandate of ICTY (2). Council Common Position 2005/689/CFSP (3) extends and implements that Common Position. Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 should, therefore, be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Commission is empowered to amend that Annex, taking into account Council Decisions implementing Common Position 2004/694/CFSP of the Council of 11 October 2004 on further measures in support of the effective implementation of the mandate of ICTY (2). Council Common Position 2005/689/CFSP (3) extends and implements that Common Position. Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 should, therefore, be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 is hereby amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 October 2005.

For the Commission

Eneko LANDÁBURU

Director-General for External Relations

---

(1)  
  OJ L 315, 14.10.2004, p. 14. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1208/2005 (OJ L 197, 28.7.2005, p. 19).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 315, 14.10.2004, p. 52.

2

(3)  See page 29 of this Official Journal.

3

---

ANNEX

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004:

The following person shall be removed:

‘LUKIC, Sredoje. Date of birth: 5.4.1961. Place of birth: Visegrad, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationality: (a) Bosnia and Herzegovina, (b) possibly Serbia and Montenegro.’.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
These financial statements should be read in conjunction with the
financial statements and notes thereto included in the Company's Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1996.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000906768
<NAME> MRS TECHNOLOGY, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       3,290,982
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,999,994
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  7,313,982
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,856,293
<PP&E>                                       3,921,482
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,388,238
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,427,516
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,557,099
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        67,763
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,802,654
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,427,516
<SALES>                                      5,173,273
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,140,697
<CGS>                                        4,040,747
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,103,784
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 653
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,130,795)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,130,795)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.47)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.47)
        

</TABLE>
#### PEMBROKE PARK, INC. v. HIGH RIDGE WATER CO.

No. 38053.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 1969.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 213 So.2d 727.
RPS Energy

309 Reading Road, Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, RG9 IEL United Kingdom

| T #44 (0) 1491 415400 | F #44 (0) 1491 415415 | www.rpsgroup.com |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|

 

 

 

 

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ENGINEERS**

 

We hereby consent to the use of the name RPS Energy and of references to RPS Energy and to the inclusion of and references to our report, or information contained therein, dated February 7, 2008, prepared for *FX Energy*in the *FX Energy, Inc*. annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended 31st December 2007, and the incorporation by reference to the report prepared by RPS Energy into *FX Energy, Inc.'s* previously filed registration statements listed below.

 

| Form   | SEC File No. | Effective Date    |
|--------|--------------|-------------------|
|   |         |              |
| S-3    | 333-80489    | June 30, 1999     |
| S-3    | 333-104792   | October 27, 2003  |
| S-3    | 333-110345   | November 18, 2003 |
| S-3    | 333-112058   | February 11, 2004 |
| S-8    | 333-112717   | February 11, 2004 |

 

 

RPS Energy

 

 

/s/ Norman McLeod

Norman McLeod

Petroleum Engineering Manager

 

3 March 2008
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (**Nos. 333-113500 and**

**333-127859**) and Form S-8 (**Nos. 333-131416, 333-119607, 333-105842, 333-49852, 333-49856, 333-97523,and 333-97527**)

of Dyax Corp. of our report dated March 3,2006 relating to the financial statements, financial statement schedule,management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reportingand of our report dated March 3, 2006 relating to the financial statements ofDyax-Genzyme LLC, which appear in this

Form 10-K.

 

 
| /s/  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP |   |   |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|
|                            |   |   |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP      |   |   |
|  Boston,  Massachusetts    |   |   |
|  March 3, 2006             |   |   |

 

----