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i 

57–924 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–137] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY 

SERVICES’ OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 16, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

KATY BLOOMBERG, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 16, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for the Military Services’ Operation and Maintenance 

Funding ................................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 16, 2010 ........................................................................................ 37 

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES’ OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE FUNDING 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Readiness ................................................................................ 3 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ...... 6 

Chandler, Gen. Carrol H., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ................ 7 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................... 3 

Greenert, Adm. Jonathan W., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Amos, Gen. James F. ........................................................................................ 76 

Chandler, Gen. Carrol H. ................................................................................. 92 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W. ................................................................................... 47 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 46 

Greenert, Adm. Jonathan W. ........................................................................... 61 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Nine slides presented by Mr. Forbes .............................................................. 105 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 117 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 118 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 117 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 118 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 117 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 136 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 121 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY 

SERVICES’ OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

READINESS 

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the 

Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear testimony on the military 

services’ fiscal year 2010 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) request. I thank our distinguished witnesses from each of the military services for appearing before the subcommittee today to discuss funding for the services’ readiness programs. 

The Operation and Maintenance account is the single largest 

component of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) annual budget 

request. The military services’ O&M accounts provide funding for 

such readiness areas as operating forces, mobilization, training and 

recruiting, and administration of service-wide activities. 

For fiscal year 2011 the O&M portion of the total budget request comprises $283.1 billion. The fiscal year 2011 total O&M request 

is $17.8 billion more than fiscal year 2010 request. The fiscal year 

2011 total O&M request is broken into $167.9 billion in the base 

budget and $115.2 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO). Almost 40 percent of the total fiscal year 2011 O&M request is for Overseas Contingency Operations. 

The 2011 total budget request will increase the military services’ O&M account by $15.2 billion over fiscal year 2010. Army and Marine Corps forces continue to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq at the 

highest levels of readiness, but this readiness comes at the expense 

of non-deployed forces, whose people and equipment are needed 

overseas. 

Repeated deployment with limited dwell time continues to reduce 

the ability of the forces to train across the full spectrum of conflict. 

However, the Army and Marine Corps are beginning to experience 

small increases in time at home stations as forces withdraw from 

Iraq. The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects this positive development 

by providing increased training funds for each of the services. 
2 

At the same time, however, Navy and Air Force readiness levels, 

which throughout the wars have remained relatively steady, are 

declining due to strains on people and equipment. The Navy has 

more than 12,000 sailors deployed ashore in the Central Command 

areas of operations, where the Air Force has more than 6,600 people supporting the Army and Marine Corps. With the Army and 

Marine Corps heavily engaged in Afghanistan, this development in 

Navy and Air Force readiness is troubling, as it increases the risk 

to national security if our military had to quickly respond to emerging threats. 

The fiscal year 2011 request provides funding to continue to support reset of equipment damaged or worn out through nine years 

of constant operations. The Army and Marine Corps together would 

receive more than $8.4 billion for equipment reset in fiscal year 

2011. But I remain concerned that so much of the Army’s and Marine Corps’ depot maintenance budgets, upwards of 80 percent, is 

still funded through the OCO request. At some point depot maintenance funding must migrate back to the base budget. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request increases funding for both 

Army and Marine Corps pre-positioned stocks. This is equipment 

that is situated throughout the world for quick access and movement to emerging theaters of operation. While the current budget 

plan shows the Army and Marine Corps resetting all the pre-positioned stocks by 2013, my theory is that the budgetary pressures 

and other priorities will continue to drive the timeline farther to 

the right. The Navy’s fiscal year 2011 ship maintenance budget of $7.4 billion shows improvement over fiscal year 2010 level when the Navy 

had an unfunded requirement of almost $400 million. But pressures remain on the Navy O&M budget. This is evidenced by fiscal 

year 2011 unfunded ship maintenance requirements of $35 million, 

which the Navy noted is driven by current United States Central 

Command (CENTCOM) demand. 

The budget for Naval flight operations will increase by more than 

$875 million in fiscal year 2011, but almost half of this growth is 

inflationary rather than real programmed growth. Shortfalls remain in the Naval flight operations account, which shows a $423 

million unfunded aviation spares requirement in fiscal year 2011. 

The Air Force, too, is experiencing shortfalls in its flying hours 

program. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force O&M total budget request 

of $60.1 billion for active, reserve, and Air Guard represents 7.3 

percent increases over fiscal year 2010. But inflation and cost 

growth account for approximately $2 billion of the increase, and 

fuel price increases alone account for $1.1 billion of the increase in 

the base and $500 million of the increase in the OCO. The Air 

Force number one priority on its unfunded requirement list is 

weapons systems sustainment at $337 million. 

In light of these budgetary realities, what the subcommittee 

needs to hear from our witnesses today is where each of your services is taking risk in this budget request in terms of impact on 

readiness. 

Before I turn to my colleague from Virginia, I will also note that 

fiscal year 2011 budget continues the insourcing initiative the Department of Defense began in fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year 2011, 
3 

the four services will insource more than 22,000 positions now held 

by contractors. The department estimates that it will save more 

than $1 billion through these efforts. 

This comes at a time when we have learned that the commander 

of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is concerned about the loss of competencies and functions. TRADOC has 

decreased in size by 7,300 military positions and 4,500 Army-civilian positions since September 2001, while the average daily workout requirement has steadily climbed. 

To address this shortfall, TRADOC has employed more than 

9,000 contractors, resulting in what TRADOC commander termed 

a de-greening of the TRADOC force. All of the services express 

similar concerns regarding the loss of competency among their acquisition work. 

The chair recognizes the distinguished and good friend from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks that he would like to make at 

this time. 

Mr. Forbes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for holding this 

hearing. And with your permission, I would like to waive my opening statement, because I am going to use my time for my questions, 

because I have a few more than I would normally have, and just 

like to request permission to have my opening statement made a 

part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Our witnesses today are four distinguished military 

leaders. 

And thank you so much for your service to our country and your 

dedication in keeping America free and strong today. 

We have General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army. 

General, thank you so much for joining us today. 

Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert. 

Admiral, good to see you again, sir. 

And General James F. Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and General Carrol H. Chandler, Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force. 

Thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for giving us the input you are going to give us today as what we need 

to do to keep our readiness where it belongs. 

General Chiarelli, you may begin whenever you are ready, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear here today to discuss the readiness of the 
4 

United States Army as it relates to our fiscal year 2011 operations 

and maintenance, or O&M, budget request. I have submitted a 

statement for the record, and I look forward to answering your 

questions at the conclusion of my opening remarks. 

As all of you know, these are challenging times for our nation’s 

military. Over the past eight-plus years with the tremendous support of Congress and this committee, we have deployed the best 

manned, equipped, trained and led forces in the history of the 

United States Army. However, the fact remains we have asked a 

great deal from our soldiers and their families, and we are continuing to ask a great deal from them today. 

Demand on our forces remains high. Even with savings from the 

planned draw down in Iraq, the current level of demand does not 

appear likely to improve significantly for the foreseeable future. We 

must continue to work together to ensure all soldiers from both our 

active and reserve components and their families are properly 

cared for and have the training, equipment, and resources they 

need to accomplish their mission now and into the future. 

The Army’s fiscal year 2011 budget request wholly supports 

this—our fiscal year 2011 budget base and OCO requests $107.3 

billion in operations and maintenance funding, a $7 billion increase 

in fiscal year 2010. This growth reflects increases in pricing and inflation, migration of funding for enduring missions from OCO into 

the base, the need for new infrastructure in Afghanistan, as well 

as the significantly higher cost of transportation and in-theater 

maintenance in Afghanistan as compared to Iraq, and finally, the 

additional funds needed to restore balance across our force. 

We are confident this funding will enable us to accomplish our 

mission at home and abroad to care for our soldiers, civilians and 

family members, and adequately man, equip and train our force. 

That said, we all recognize an uncertain world—and there is always the possibility that circumstances may change unexpectedly 

and dramatically—if so, we will work very closely with Congress 

and the Department of Defense to make any necessary adjustments. 

I assure the members of the subcommittee that I and the Army’s 

other senior leaders are aware of the severe economic challenges 

facing our nation. We remain diligent in our efforts to be good 

stewards of the scarce taxpayer dollars and to find efficiencies and 

cost savings whenever and wherever possible while allocating 

available funds most cost effectively and responsibly. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again 

for your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United States 

Army and their families. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Greenert. 
5 

STATEMENT OF ADM. JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, VICE 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral GREENERT. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes 

and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, it is 

my honor to appear before you to testify on the readiness of our 

Navy. 

Naval operations are often one component of the Joint Force, so 

accordingly, it is my privilege to address the committee alongside 

my fellow service vice chiefs and the Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. 

Today we remain engaged in supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and all the other combatant commander areas of responsibility. We have over 120 ships deployed. That is more than 40 

percent of our fleet providing presence in every region of the world. 

Within hours of the earthquake in Haiti, we mobilized the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and quickly thereafter the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, and three ships and their supporting forces 

were dispatched only 34 days after they returned from a 6-month 

deployment to the Central Command. Our hospital ship, USNS 

Comfort, which arrived home this week, deployed into Haiti and 

completed over 800 major surgeries and tended to over 1,000 patients. Our commitment to the Fleet Response Plan made this 

timely and effective response possible. 

During the past eight years, resourcing our Navy in a high demand operational environment has been challenging, to say the 

least. The Congress has been incredibly helpful by supporting our 

budget requests as well as providing Overseas Contingency Operations funds or similar supplemental funding. However, high operational tempo, a reduced turnaround ratio, and reduced dwell continue to increase risk to fleet readiness, our force structure, and 

our personnel. 

As we look to the future, we must holistically balance our combatant commander requirements against our global force management. We have to transition from a supplemental resource dependency more toward a baseline budget resource that includes fiscal 

support necessary to meet those Combatant Command (COCOM) 

demands outside of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. And we refer to this transition as our new normal. 

To properly fund our new normal level of operations, we have increased our base budget O&M request by about six percent compared to last year. And we respectfully request the support of the 

Congress to fully fund our O&M base budget request and to fully 

fund our OCO request to support the current and the near-term operations in the Central Command. 

Naval ships and aircraft are capital-intensive forces. They are 

procured to last for decades. Routine maintenance, depot level 

maintenance, and repair replacement of the stressed force structure are key elements in this reset of our force. 

We refer to maintenance between deployments as reset in stride, 

and it enables timely rotational deployment of the ships and aircraft. It provides forces ready for surge operations, such as Operation Unified Response in Haiti, and it translates into decades of 

readiness for each ship and aircraft, which is a pretty good return 

on investment. 
6 

The stress of eight years of consistently high operations tempo 

can be debilitating to the sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, 

so it is incumbent on us, the leadership, to monitor the morale, the 

health and the tone of the force, and for us to act accordingly. 

Our budget request for sailor family readiness programs enhances our support to our sailors, our Navy civilians, and their 

families, particularly those wounded, ill, or injured. And we do this 

through expanded fleet and family support centers through our 

Navy Safe Harbor Program and the Operational Stress Control 

Program. 

Our Navy child and youth programs provide high-quality educational and recreational programs for our Navy children, and in 

particular we are leveraging military construction, the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding that you have provided, 

commercial contracts, and military certified in-home care to expand 

and increase our childcare. 

I submit that readiness is a function of capable forces with sufficient capacity that are ready for tasking. The return on investment 

in our Fleet Response Plan is measured by our ability to deliver 

the required capabilities and rotational deployments and simultaneously to be able to respond to the emerging needs of the combatant commanders. 

Our readiness budget request enables this return on investment, 

and I ask for your continued support. I thank you for your unwavering support and commitment to our sailors, our Navy civilians, 

and their families, and I thank all of you for what you do to make 

our Navy an effective and an enduring global force for good. I look 

forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the 

Appendix on page 61.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Amos. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity again to report on the readiness of your Marine Corps. 

On behalf of the more than 239,000 active and Reserve Marines 

and their families, I would like to extend my appreciation for the 

sustained support Congress has faithfully provided its Corps. 

As we begin this hearing, I would like to highlight a few points 

from my written statement. Within the CENTCOM theater of operations, we have successfully completed a responsible draw down of 

all Marines in Iraq. After seven years of sustained combat operations and nation building, our work in Iraq’s Anbar province is 

done. With the exception of our training teams and support to 

higher headquarters staff, 100 percent of our Marines and 100 percent of our equipment have left Iraq. 

As we sit in this hearing room today, more than 27,000 Marines 

remain deployed across the globe supporting Overseas Contingency 

Operations, security cooperation activities, and exercises. Specifically, your Corps has oriented its principal efforts towards Afghanistan. To date we have almost 17,000 Marines and sailors on the 
7 

ground in the Helmand province, growing to a force size of 19,400. 

We will close the units of the surge force by the end of April. 

All of our forward deployed units are manned, trained, and 

equipped to accomplish their assigned missions. These units continue to report the highest levels of readiness for those missions. 

For the past eight years we have been fully engaged in winning 

in combat operations as part of the generational struggle against 

global extremism. As I testified last year, this sustained effort and 

performance has not come without cost to the institution, to our 

equipment, to our strategic programs, and most importantly, to our 

Marines and to their families. 

Equipment readiness of our non-deployed units is of great concern to our senior leadership. We have taxed our home station 

units as the bill payers to ensure that Marines in Afghanistan and 

Marines in our Marine Expeditionary Units have everything that 

they need. As a result, the majority of our non-deployed forces are 

reporting degraded material readiness levels. This degraded state 

of readiness within our non-deployed forces presents risk to our 

ability to rapidly respond to other unexpected contingencies around 

the globe. 

The tempo of operations and the harsh environments that we 

have been operating in since 2003 have accelerated the wear and 

tear on our equipment. Necessarily, the diversion of equipment in 

theater from Iraq to Afghanistan has delayed reset actions at our 

logistics depots in the United States. Our current estimate of the 

cost of reset for the Marine Corps is $8 billion. 

Additionally, validating the lessons learned from eight years of 

combat has necessitated that we update and improve the way we 

equip our units. The cost for these changes to our equipment sets 

is estimated to be an additional $5 billion. 

Money to reset and to rebuild the Marine Corps will be required 

for several years after the end of the war. I ask for your continued 

support and funding as we rebuild our nation’s Marine Corps. With 

your steadfast support, we will succeed in current operations, take 

care of Marines and their families, reset and modernize our equipment, and training the Marine air ground task forces for the challenges of the future. 

We will continue to stand ready as the nation’s expeditionary 

force in readiness to do whatever she requires of us. I thank each 

of you for your faithfulness to our nation, and I request that my 

written statement be accepted for the record. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the 

Appendix on page 76.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. All the written statements will be included for the record. 

General Chandler, sir, good to see you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. CARROL H. CHANDLER, USAF, VICE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General CHANDLER. Good to see you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes and distinguished committee members, thank you 

for the opportunity to represent your Air Force before the committee today. 
8 

I am proud to be here also with my joint teammates, but let me 

begin by saying that your 680,000 strong United States Air Force— 

active duty, Guard, Reserve, and Department of Defense civilians— 

is ready to execute our mission. Our readiness is demonstrated 

every day as we serve alongside our joint and coalition partners in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. On any given day there 

are approximately 40,000 deployed airmen providing close air support, tactical and strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue, along with other combat 

and combat support functions. 

Of these 40,000 airmen there are approximately 5,300 providing 

joint expeditionary taskings, providing combat and combat support 

functions with Army and Marine Corps units in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. In addition to our deployed presence, more than 131,000 airmen are performing deployed in place missions supporting combatant commanders. These airmen are operating remotely piloted vehicles, maintaining satellite constellations, conducting inter-theater 

airlift, and maintaining our nuclear deterrence posture. 

Additionally, the Air Force continues to provide defense of the 

homeland as a total force effort involving Guard, Reserve, and active duty personnel from locations around the United States. 

Stabilizing our end strength is a critical part of maintaining personnel readiness. The Air Force met its goals for new accessions 

and retaining our current experience in nearly every area. Our retention rates are at a 15-year high, and we are generally exceeding 

our goals by about 20 percent. Only health professionals fail to 

meet retention and recruiting goals, and there are efforts under 

way to mitigate current shortfalls. 

Selected retention bonuses remained our most effective retention 

tool and these bonuses, along with critical skills retention bonuses 

for officers, are successfully targeting 91 enlisted and three officers 

specialties. 

Last June the Air Force initiated the Year of the Air Force Family, and more than halfway through this effort we are on course to 

eliminate the known childcare deficit in our child development centers by the year 2012. We are increasing spouse employment referral assistance, and we have added 54 school liaison officers to assist school transition for almost 175,000 school-age Air Force dependents. 

We are improving our Exceptional Family Member Program, 

which supports more than 15,000 airmen with special needs family 

members. We are also increasing the quality of programs providing 

deployment and reintegration support for our airmen and their 

families. 

Our aircraft are well-maintained and ready, although our aircraft 

inventory is seeing extensive use in contingency operations, and 

the fleet’s average age continues to increase. I would tell you the 

dedicated work and professionalism of our airmen ensures that we 

are always ready. 

Our combat Air Force aircraft continue to provide global power 

when and where it is required. Our airlift fleet continues to provide 

strategic airlift as well as theater and direct support airlift missions, moving personnel, and a wide variety of equipment and supplies. 
9 

The recent release of a KC–X request for proposal began the 

process of re-capitalizing our aerial refueling capability, and the 

planned acquisition of 175 KC–X aircraft will help provide refueling capability for decades to come. 

The nation’s nuclear aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) remain the highest priority of our service. Of all the 

missions the Air Force accomplishes every day, none is more critical than providing nuclear deterrence. Intercontinental ballistic 

missile crews sit nuclear every day, and nuclear capable and bomber and fighter crews and their weapons systems contribute to our 

deterrence posture. 

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide our best 

military advice and stewardship, delivering global vigilance, reach, 

and power for America. I thank you for your continued support for 

our Air Force and particularly for our airmen and their families. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chandler can be found in 

the Appendix on page 92.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. You know, as we look around the 

globe, I have never seen so many hotspots like I have seen lately, 

not only around the world, but right in our backyard, as we know 

what is happening across the border with all of the killings and 

cartels and drug trafficking. So we have got a challenge ahead of 

us. 

But what readiness—and this is for all the witnesses who are 

with us today—what readiness challenges do each of your services 

face in fiscal year 2011, and in what areas are each of your services 

taking risk in fiscal year 2011 O&M budget request? And what impact has the increased price of fuel had on your ability to meet 

readiness requirements? And maybe you can give us a little input 

from each respective service. 

We can start with you, General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. Well, Mr. Chairman, 2011 is definitely a 

transition year for the United States Army. That is the year that 

we see ourselves getting back into balance, and we define balance 

as 12 months deployed, 24 months or greater at home. And that 

is the interim goal for us in 2011 to get there. 

There will be some military occupational specialties, some soldiers that will reach sooner, and there is no doubt in my mind that 

there are some soldiers—to give you an example, our aviation soldiers, who will probably reach it later. Currently, our aviation is 

flying at about one-to-one. 

So the biggest risk for us after eight and a half years of war is 

if something were to happen that would not allow us to get that 

balance, because the force has been moving very, very, very hard 

for a long period of time. 

We are very, very happy with what we see happening in Iraq. 

The elections were successful. We expect to start seeing some of 

those soldiers returning home soon, and we believe that is going to 

be a big step forward in moving us toward reaching that critical 

balance by 2011. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In order to talk 

challenge in 2011, I need to go to 2010 first and talk risk. Right 
10 

now our risk in fiscal year 2010 is unfunded Central Command 

operational tempo, about $450 million, fuel prices increase in 2010 

about $250 million, and what we call request for forces, emergent 

requests by the combatant command, and the meeting of that in 

2010. It is about $150 million. 

And the risk is dealing with that in 2010, mitigating that within 

the 2010 budget and having what we call bow wave effect over into 

2011. So that is our first challenge, to be able to mitigate those 

things in 2010, deal with it so that the 2011 budget, as we submitted to you, stands on the basis of the readiness in 2010, meeting 

the readiness requirements of 2010. 

Looking at fiscal year 2011, I think our first challenge is meeting 

the execution requirements by the combatant commanders that are 

put before us, and that is outside of what we call the new normal. 

It is outside of Operation Iraqi Freedom, outside of Enduring Freedom. It is Southern Command, and it is the Pacific Command and 

the emergent requirements therein. 

In our budget, as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR), we are going to take on a ballistic missile defense mission 

around the world. That is a challenge. We think we have it right, 

but it will be a challenge that we have to meet. It is a new challenge. 

We have increased inter-theater lift requirements in our shipbuilding account in the Joint High Speed Vessel—that will be a 

challenge for us—and in irregular warfare. 

As I have mentioned in my opening statement, our risk is that 

we are unable to articulate our budget and get it authorized and 

appropriated in the amount we ask. That is a six percent increase 

so that we can see to it that having worked hard and really 

scrubbed our ship maintenance budget and our operation accounts, 

that we can execute those as we need to to meet the expected service life of our ships. 

We need to reset the force, sir. And we need to, I think, come 

to grips with that sooner than later. So thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

General Amos. 

General AMOS. Chairman, there is much goodness in the 2011 

budget. It has helped us with certainly the current fight, taking 

care of our Marines and families, protecting our end strength, allowing us to focus on irregular warfare, and to some degree preparing for the future. 

But there are concerns, and it is primarily as it deals with reset 

and modernization—reset, of course, being the factor of replacement of a worn-out vehicle with a similar vehicle. Modernization is 

a little bit of that, but also looking into the future and moving up 

in generations of equipment and capabilities. So that is a concern 

of ours. 

We have tried to mitigate that and articulate that requirement 

through this what we call the lessons learned. What did we learn 

from seven years of combat—and I talked about it in my opening 

statement—and trying to take those kinds of lessons learned and 

what does that mean to our table of equipment? What does that 

mean to modernization in capabilities? 
11 

There is no money in the budget to do that right now. So what 

we are finding is our equipment is being worn out in those harsh 

conditions, and the extreme usage of that forward deployed, our 

home station readiness is, as I said in my statement, is suffering. 

We are running roughly about 60 percent of the supply readiness— 

in other words 60 percent at home of what we should we have. 

That that is home is in good shape, but there is just less of it to 

spread around for training and less of it to go to another contingency. 

So that pressurizes what we call our procurement accounts—in 

other words the ability for the procurement side of the Marine 

Corps to say, okay, we need to modernize. Let us invest into this. 

That pot of money is decreasing remarkably, and so we have less 

discretion to be able to buy those kinds of things to modernize the 

Marine Corps. 

So we find ourselves doing what our nation wants us to do, almost wearing out our equipment back home to a point where we 

are not completely convinced we are going to be able to modernize 

it without the help of Congress. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Chandler. 

General CHANDLER. Sir, you know that in our base budget we 

funded weapons systems support at 65 percent. We certainly appreciate your support for the OCO increase that allows us to get to 

approximately 82 percent. That is why our number one unfunded 

priority in the Air Force is weapons systems sustainment for another $337 million to allow us to fund weapons systems 

sustainment at 85 percent. The risk we take as we do that is about a $2 billion risk from 

$13.4 billion down to about $11.4 billion. In that risk is depot level 

maintenance for aircraft and engines, as well as contractor logistic 

support and a few other items, to be specific. 

We are also the largest user of petroleum products in the department, so when we talk about the price of oil, for every barrel of oil, 

the cost, you can add approximately $8 to $10 to get the price of 

a barrel of JP–8. 

We continue to look for ways to conserve. We have looked at how 

we convert our fleet from 50 percent synthetic and 50 percent petroleum fuels. By the end of 2011, we will have all of our aircraft 

certified with a 50–50 mix of petroleum itself. But those kinds of 

expenses are the things that compete with the weapons systems 

support things that I talked about earlier. 

We are in the same position as the other services in terms of 

modernization and re-capitalization. The pressures that I have described, and what is weapons systems sustainment and fuel costs, 

tend to eat up O&M and other funds that would allow us to pursue 

modernization and recapitalization. So, again, we are in the same 

situation as the other services as well. 

And that then leads us to how we are dealing with some of our 

aging aircraft issues and the vicious cycle, then, of the weapons 

systems support money that has to go back in there that will prevent you, then, from being able to recapitalize the fleet where you 

need to. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, one of the things that concerns me the 

most is the escalation of the prices that we pay for the equipment. 
12 

If I understand correctly, during the first Desert Storm, Desert II 

war, we were paying something like $40,000, $50,000 for the High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees). Now, eight, 

nine years later, they tell me that is around anywhere from 

$350,000 to $450,000 per vehicle. Of course, we are putting more 

protection to protect our soldiers, but that is a heck of an expensive 

item, and everything seems to be going up, up, up. 

And we do have a caring committee here. They want to do what 

is best for you and our young men who are out there, you know, 

in harm’s way. But this escalation of prices, you know, and now 

they came up with a profit and not-for-profit, you know, budget request. Well, I am thinking that some of the big companies we deal 

with, that you have to deal with, are for-profit, unless I am mistaken, otherwise they wouldn’t be in business. 

But this really concerns me, and I don’t know how to address 

this, to be honest with you. And you can only do with what we give 

you, so you are kind of handcuffed. I mean, what can I do? I only 

got so much money from the Congress. But we want to work with 

you and future conflicts, and I think of each of you touched on future conflicts in case something develops around the world. 

I mean, we are in a heck of a predicament. What are we going 

to do? Our soldiers are tired, many deployments. Even though we 

are coming back, downsizing in Iraq and bringing some of our 

young men back, but it is a problem. And I don’t know if whether 

you want to touch on what I just said, but if not, I will just yield 

to my good friend for questioning. 

General AMOS. Chairman, that is the dilemma. It is the cost of 

equipment. The average cost of a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), for instance, is $750,000. It topped out at 

about a million. The least expensive is about $500,000. We are 

looking right now at vehicles that we could replace the 25,000 

Humvees that we have, or at least a portion of the 25,000 Humvees 

we have, that would give us greater mobility and give us a higher 

level of protection than a flat bottom Humvee and up-armored 

Humvee, but yet not break the bank. 

We are looking at those vehicles, and I am hearing reports, and 

there has certainly not been any selection. I am hearing reports of 

$100,000 for a vehicle to replace the Humvee. So, I mean, this is 

a dilemma we face, and each one of those things with a finite 

amount of latitude in procurement and modernization accounts. 

This reduces the amount, the sheer amount of vehicles in our case 

or pieces of equipment that we can buy. You are absolutely correct. 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, I share your concern. And 

one of the projects we are currently working on is a series of portfolio reviews. If you take any single system and look at it individually, you can make a pretty strong argument that it is required. 

But if you take and look at them in a portfolio of common systems—example, precision munitions—you will find that there are 

probably systems that we have, at least the United States Army 

has made, precision that don’t need to be precision or don’t need 

to be at the numbers that we bought them at. 

And we see the opportunity here for some efficiencies—not that 

precision isn’t important, but does that mean that every single sys-
13 

tem has to have a precision component to that? And I would argue 

that is not the case. 

And the other issue with precision munitions is the cost. You 

take a round for a 155-millimeter cannon, what we would call a 

dumb round, $650 apiece. If you go ahead and make that a precision round—it will get inside 10 meters circular error probable— 

you are looking over the life of that round about $78,000 apiece. 

So it is time we think in the Army that we step back and look 

with an understanding that this is an important capability to have, 

but wherever we can, look at these systems in a portfolio and seek 

where we might not be able to find efficiencies. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If we don’t have any other input, let me yield to my 

good friend from Virginia, Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for holding this hearing. 

And, gentlemen, you probably heard at the outset I waived my 

opening statement so that I could spend just a little bit more time 

on my questions. And I want to begin by saying that all of you are 

good men, and you serve with good men and women. I serve with 

good men and women up here, but sometimes even good men and 

women can make bad decisions, and that is why we have to have 

these hearings and we have to ask these questions. 

And I want to begin my questioning, Admiral, with you, if you 

don’t mind. I want to start by saying that you and I had the opportunity last week to sit down and talk, and I appreciate that opportunity. And I told you then I was going to give you the questions, 

and I gave you the questions. I said this is an open book exam. 

This is not to blindside anybody, and I want to tell you how much 

I respect you and your service to our country and what the Navy 

does. 

But I also told you I had some concerns, because we have been 

asking some questions that the Navy hasn’t been responding in 

their questions. One of the things that I mentioned at the meeting 

that we had was we were very concerned last year when we didn’t 

receive the shipbuilding plan that the law required. And we didn’t 

receive it based on the statute, but then when the entire Armed 

Services Committee through a congressional inquiry voted unanimously to ask for it, we still didn’t get it. 

When we finally got the shipbuilding plan, there were some discrepancies between the Congressional Budget Office numbers and 

between the plan itself. And I don’t want to talk about the plan 

today. I want to just tell you that the other thing that happens to 

us oftentimes is for me to get folks in here, whether it is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs or whether it is your boss, the Chief of 

Naval Operations (CNO), there is kind of a game. 

And I am not saying they play a game, but it is a game that goes 

on. It is called ‘‘Beat the Clock,’’ because we only have 5 minutes 

to ask questions, and oftentimes that 5 minutes goes by very, very 

quick, and sometimes the question we ask doesn’t get answered, 

and there is no follow-up. 

So today the clock is off—no shot clock. We don’t have to run it 

down. Open book test. If you need time, you got your staff here. 

We will give you a lifeline. Call the CNO, whoever you want. If I 

don’t phrase the question right, stop me, because it is not my inten-
14 

tion to blindside you or to put anything out on the table. The only 

thing I ask you not to do is please don’t say you will get back to 

me, because I don’t ever get anybody get back to me when we ask 

that. 

And so I want to begin with the question I told you I was going 

to ask you. It is about Mayport and about shifting a carrier from 

Norfolk to Florida. And I start with the Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS), which I know you have read, and I am not going 

to ask you if you have read it, because I know that you have, and 

I know you have studied it in preparation, hopefully, for this hearing. 

But I want to read to you what that EIS concluded. It said the 

rationale for moving that carrier was this. ‘‘Distribution of CVN 

homeport locations to reduce risk to’’ and then it said, ‘‘fleet resources in the event of natural disaster, man-made calamity or attack by foreign nations or terrorists.’’ Then the next subheading 

said, ‘‘Carriers, industrial support facilities and the people that operate and maintain these crucial assets.’’ 

Now, Admiral, since you are the Vice Chief—you are right under 

the CNO—I want to start with the one that says natural disasters. 

And I want to walk through that. And first of all, I want to say 

I think you and I can agree that as to Norfolk and Jacksonville, 

we are not worried about earthquakes particularly. At least, we 

haven’t had any in any of our lifetimes or our grandparents’ or 

great grandparents’ lifetimes. We are not really worried about a 

tornado hitting there to do that kind of damage, so we are worried 

about, first of all, hurricanes. 

And I want to put up a slide up here. It is slide number one. And 

if you can’t see it, Admiral, I will have one of my staff members 

put a poster up here closer to see it. So can you see that okay, or 

do you want them to put a—— 

Sam, can we have a poster put up closer to the Admiral just so 

that he can see what we are all looking at up here? 

This is from the EIS, and it says that for hurricane risk, no advantage between Norfolk and Mayport. And then Admiral 

Roughead, when he testified, and again it was right at the last-second buzzer going off, so I didn’t get to follow up, he said they are 

very, very similar. Mayport fares quite well. 

[Slide one can be found in the Appendix on page 105.] 

Mr. FORBES. And now I am going to ask you if we can put up 

slide two. And to the right, with all of those lines, is Jacksonville. 

To the left is Norfolk. These are hurricanes from 1851 to 2005. 

Now, Admiral, I want you to just tell me how you can say—because when they put these slides up, everybody always laughs. My 

staff laughs, and they say how in the world you can say you are 

going to disregard hurricanes? But can you tell me today how you 

can say, looking at those two slides as to hurricanes, there is no 

disadvantage to Jacksonville over Norfolk? 

And again, I told you I was going to put this slide up, so it is 

not a blindside for you. Here it is. 

[Slide two can be found in the Appendix on page 106.] 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you for that question, Congressman, 

and for the opportunity to comment. The timeframe that we looked 

at and slides that I looked at in the study—here we have 200, 
15 

roughly 200, 150-plus years, 155 years—in the most recent history 

I looked at, I found somewhere between, over the last 15 years, it 

was statistically insignificant—that is, the number of hurricanes in 

Jacksonville, Mayport area versus Virginia. 

This, as one zooms in and you look at the lines crossing here— 

it is difficult for me to do when I zoom in to Mayport—but I would 

say just optically, I can’t tell that it is all that much. Florida certainly has an issue, but I don’t know that Mayport is that much 

different. I can’t tell right now. I would have to go count the lines. 

But we looked at this from a risk, risk equaling, if you will, the 

probability times the consequences. And the consequences of a 

storm or a natural disaster far and away we deem to be very significant factor in determining this strategic homeporting. And we 

look at it not as a matter of if Mayport or Norfolk, but both, that 

we think it is important that we have a carrier in both ports, because the consequences are that significant. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, Admiral, when you talk about the percentages, you couldn’t tell as you zoom in on those lines—you use National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as the 

basis for your probabilities and all when you looked at the EIS. 

I am going to ask that we put up slide three now to show you 

that NOAA just disagrees with your optical glance at that. 

[Slide three can be found in the Appendix on page 107.] 

Mr. FORBES. NOAA says it is a 75 percent greater risk in Jacksonville to be hit by a category four hurricane, which is the one 

that is most probable to do the kind of damage, 58 percent greater 

for a category three, 47 percent greater for a category five. Admiral, I just in all due respect think that you can say hurricanes don’t 

matter. I really don’t think it is plausible to say that in this situation not a significantly greater opportunity that a hurricane is 

going to hit Jacksonville that it is going to hit Norfolk. 

I want to go to the next concern that you had in the EIS, though, 

where you talked about man-made calamities. And I guess one of 

the things you were worried about is the clumping situation of having carriers all together and some type of calamity that would hit. 

This chart—and again, I have got one closer for you to see—I 

guess we don’t have the same concerns with our SSBNs, because 

we have only got one base for them in Kings Bay, Georgia, and one 

base in Washington in Bangor. Or maybe, I guess, we have to ask 

Congressman Dicks and Congressman Kingston. They had better 

be careful, because we are going to have to break those up. I guess 

we need to ask Congressman Larsen on the EA–6Bs in Whidbey Island, because they are all together. We might have to break those 

up. Or maybe we ask Chairman Skelton on the B–2s in Whiteman 

Air Force Base, because we have got those clumped together. 

[Slide four can be found in the Appendix on page 108.] 

Mr. FORBES. But I want to go again to your man-made calamities 

and put up slide five, so you can look at this. This is a to scale 

copy. And again, it may be hard for you to see the TV, but you can 

see from looking at the chart. These are the openings coming into 

Pearl Harbor, San Diego, and Bremerton, Washington. You can see 

they are about 1,100 feet shore to shore, 2,000 feet, 2,000 feet. 

[Slide five can be found in the Appendix on page 109.] 

Mr. FORBES. And then put up slide six, if you would. 
16 

And in slide six, the one on the left to scale is Norfolk. The one 

on the right is Mayport, 1,000 feet shore to shore. This is the narrowest access, and I know you are well aware of that, being at 

Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk. It is 4,500 feet from island to 

island. 

The shot on the right of Mayport, if I am bringing in a freighter, 

coming up it is right off the ocean. You know, when you are bringing up Norfolk, you got to come up the bay and then you got to 

make that turn to come up to harbor. If a freighter is going down 

that ocean and turns to come up that channel, what are you going 

to do? He won’t respond to you, and he won’t stop on the Mayport 

side. 

[Slide six can be found in the Appendix on page 110.] 

Admiral GREENERT. One more time, you are talking about 

Mayport. 

Mr. FORBES. On the right, you look at that channel. It is only a 

thousand foot, and that is a thousand feet, not even the channel. 

That is a thousand feet from shore to shore. You bring a freighter 

up there, and all of a sudden the freighter turns to come up that 

channel. What do you do if he is not responding to you, and you 

don’t know what is in that freighter? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, there are a number of consequence 

management. If the freighter is in the channel and the freighter— 

make sure I understand it. He is blocking the channel, you are implying? 

Mr. FORBES. Coming up the channel, but he won’t respond to 

you, and you don’t know what he has got in his ship. What are you 

going to do? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, there is a function of threat. If I knew 

of or expected a threat, we have various and sundry ways to do 

that. There are certainly rules of the road. There is a protection 

that, depending on the value of the unit that I am dealing with, 

I have Coast Guard protection as well and Coast Guard mandates 

and regulations. 

Mr. FORBES. If he rams that freighter in that channel or up 

against the shore, doesn’t he block that channel from anybody getting in or out of that channel, as small as that channel is? 

Admiral GREENERT. Depending on the angle, I guess it is feasible. When you say ‘‘block,’’ I would have to look at that angle of 

it. There are ways to remove the ships from that channel as well. 

Mr. FORBES. But it would take a while to do that, wouldn’t it? 

Admiral GREENERT. It might. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, unlike the size of the channel in Norfolk, which 

you still have a number of ways of getting out. 

I also want to go back to what we talked about in here, the other 

one that you are concerned with—foreign nations. I take it we 

weren’t concerned very much about the Soviets, because we didn’t 

talk about moving the carriers during the Cold War. I would also 

assume we are not really worried about the Chinese, because we 

downgraded our intelligence priority on the Chinese now from priority one to priority two. So I would take it we don’t view them as 

a great risk. 
17 

But then you also have on here terrorists. In looking at the terrorist threat, how great do you think a terrorist threat is to the 

Hampton Roads area? 

Admiral GREENERT. I am unaware of any terrorist threat to the 

Hampton Roads area any different from any other port that we 

have, so to say there is no terrorist threat would probably be inaccurate, but not necessarily different from the others at this time. 

Mr. FORBES. And if you moved a carrier, how would it reduce 

that terrorist threat? 

Admiral GREENERT. What I do is I gain a relief of the consequences of any emerging or ultimately emerging terrorist threat. 

And we had two carrier ports during the Cold War. We had 

Mayport. 

Mr. FORBES. You have got actually five right now, though. 

Admiral GREENERT. Only one on the East Coast, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, but you have got five. 

Admiral GREENERT. Only one on the East Coast 12,900 miles 

away. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. If you had to do work on one of those carriers—I will get back to that in a minute. Tell me how you remove 

the risk if I move one carrier out of the port. 

Admiral GREENERT. Move one carrier to Mayport, you mean, sir? 

Mr. FORBES. How does that reduce the terrorist risk in Norfolk? 

Admiral GREENERT. It doesn’t remove the terrorist risk to Norfolk necessarily, unless they are compelled to target carriers alone. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. How does it protect the carrier by having one 

homeported in Mayport? 

Admiral GREENERT. Protect the carrier that I just moved to 

Mayport? 

Mr. FORBES. I am just going by your EIS, which says that you 

are moving it because you want to reduce the risk to carriers from 

terrorists. 

Admiral GREENERT. By dispersing the force, then what I do is 

that is one way to, if you will, counter the terrorist threat, to disperse the force. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Can we put up slide seven, please? 

You are aware, Admiral, that in the last 6 years you have only 

had five carriers together 34 days, right? 

[Slide seven can be found in the Appendix on page 111.] 

Admiral GREENERT. It hadn’t crossed my mind till you just 

showed me, Congressman. 

Mr. FORBES. But with only 34 days, a scheduling change could 

keep them from all being there together, too, couldn’t it? 

Admiral GREENERT. It depends on the time we do. We schedule 

our carriers. At times they are. We have a number of carriers in 

Norfolk periodically. 

Mr. FORBES. If we are focused on the risk there, and from terrorists and from foreign nations, and it sets a major risk, what is 

more important—protecting the 1.7 million people in the Hampton 

Roads area or protecting the carrier? 

Admiral GREENERT. I want to make sure I understand the question. 
18 

Mr. FORBES. Let me explain it real quickly. We got $1 billion to spend, roughly. Spend $1 billion to move the carrier or $1 billion 

to beef up security in Hampton Roads against terrorist attacks and 

other attacks there? Why are you spending $1 billion to move the 

carrier instead of beefing up for the terrorist attacks? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, Congressman, we feel pretty com- fortable right now about our numbers at about $590 million to 

move the aircraft carrier. We have looked at that extensively. I 

couldn’t tell you what the cost is if you say to beef up the port 

against a terrorist attack, because that would depend on the threat 

and the level to which I needed to beef up, if you will, the force. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, I am saying that based on your EIS, you are 

saying that you are moving it to defend against terrorist attacks. 

And I am asking you if you think that is a substantial concern, 

why not spend that money to beef up and protect the 1.7 million 

people living there? 

Admiral GREENERT. The reason we are desiring to move the carrier is to preclude the consequences of a terrorist attack, not the 

threat of a terrorist attack to—and by dispersing—— 

Mr. FORBES. Then tell me specifically the consequences that you 

are talking about—to the carrier? 

Admiral GREENERT. To the force, to the carrier force, by having 

a strategic dispersal like we had in the Cold War, to your earlier 

point. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. Now, I want you to go back and look at 

what would happen. So you are concerned about the carrier, not 

about the industrial base around there. Is that correct? 

Admiral GREENERT. Industrial base—— 

Mr. FORBES. Around Norfolk. You are concerned about a terrorist 

attack on the carrier itself, correct? 

Admiral GREENERT. I am not familiar with all of the details you 

are quoting in the EIS. You got me on that one, Congressman, 

so—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Admiral GREENERT. But we are concerned about the consequences of a terrorist attack. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. Let me just ask you just a couple more 

follow-up questions, and I will be done. 

Explain to me—it says in the same EIS—it says every third 

maintenance availability would be conducted in dry dock at a nuclear capable shipyard. CVN nuclear propulsion plant maintenance 

manning would be approximately 50 people with no CVN maintenance that is being conducted, but it would increase by an average 

of 750 for a 6-month maintenance availability. 

Now, it is my understanding that each availability average is 

about 6 months, takes about 400 men to do it. Are you going to be 

having those men in Mayport, women, to do the work? Or are you 

going to have to move them to Norfolk to do the work on the availability that you have? 

Admiral GREENERT. Docking availabilities will likely be done in 

Norfolk. That is where the docking, the carrier dock is located. As 

you know, we don’t have that. What we call continuous maintenance, to the degree there is some nuclear maintenance involved, 

would be done in Mayport. 
19 

Mr. FORBES. How often would you have the carrier in Mayport 

to do that continuous maintenance that you are talking about? 

Admiral GREENERT. I would have to take that for the record, 

Congressman. I have to look at—it would depend on where that 

carrier is in its rotational cycle and its Fleet Response Plan and 

how long it has been since its last docking—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 117.] 

Mr. FORBES. So you are saying all the maintenance, the availabilities would still be done in Norfolk? 

Admiral GREENERT. When you said ‘‘docking availabilities,’’ that 

is where I believe they would be done in Norfolk. We have a, if you 

will, one shipyard approach. It would depend on the lifecycle of the 

carrier. It is where that carrier would go following its, in that case, 

overhaul. And it would be an extended overhaul, if I am going to 

dock it, as you are familiar with up there in Newport News. That 

would be the likely location. 

So if for a docking availability, more than likely yes. It would be 

in Norfolk area. 

Mr. FORBES. So if it is going to be in Norfolk, how have you reduced the risk when you are putting it in Norfolk 6 months for 

each availability, and every 3 years it would be there for over 7 

months to do the maintenance on it? How have you reduced the 

risk factor? I don’t understand that. 

Admiral GREENERT. A docking availability and an overhaul in a 

carrier is not done once every 6 months, every—I think you said— 

36 months. I would have to look at—it would depend on the carrier, 

its core life, and all of those. So I would have to get back to you 

and lay that out as to the likelihood of each of those. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 117.] 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Last question I want to ask you on that, and 

then I will move on. You told me that the—you answered, the 

chairman said, your biggest worry was the unfunded Central Command tempo that I think you said would be $400 million to $500 

million. 

I want to put slide eight up here for you and ask you which do 

you worry about more, spending the $500-and-some million that 

you say it would cost, almost $600 million to move the carrier to 

Mayport, or doing the unfunded Navy requirements that are about 

$523 million? And I take it, if they are requirements, they are requirements to do the mission. 

[Slide eight can be found in the Appendix on page 112.] 

Admiral GREENERT. I worry about the long-term strategic consequences of not having but one carrier port on the East Coast. 

Mr. FORBES. You think that is more important than the $523 

million of unfunded requirements that you have here? 

Admiral GREENERT. I do. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And you think that is more important than 

the unfunded requirements that your fellow vice-chiefs have down 

for the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Army. 

Admiral GREENERT. I don’t want to speak for them. 

Mr. FORBES. I am asking your opinion. 
20 

Admiral GREENERT. My opinion? I have what I have here, which 

is my concern for the strategic dispersal and the fact that I have 

one carrier homeport on the East Coast. We consider that a very 

high priority. 

Mr. FORBES. The last slide I will put up is slide nine, where 

there are a lot of people—this was Loren Thompson testifying before the Seapower Subcommittee, and he said, ‘‘We are spending $4 

billion a day in this government that we do not have, and meanwhile our share of global gross domestic product has fallen from 32 

percent to 24 percent in one decade, so to spend that kind of money 

to get no additional gain in terms of military capability is bordering 

on scandalous.’’ I happen to agree with him. 

[Slide nine can be found in the Appendix on page 113.] 

Mr. FORBES. Last question I am going to ask, and I apologize for 

taking so much time. This is an important issue to many of us. 

General—for all three generals—do any of you know what presumptions the QDR made with regard to force readiness? In other 

words did the QDR assume our forces would be 75 percent ready, 

C–1 or C–2, 85 percent ready, 100 percent ready? Do we have that 

information or not? 

General CHIARELLI. We know for the Army, sir, and I believe all 

the forces that the QDR accepted the idea of a rotational base in 

our Army. We are looking at establishing that rotational base that 

has in it one corps, five division headquarters, 20 brigades, and 

90,000 enablers with a strategic hedge in the trained ready force 

of approximately half of that. 

Based on going to a rotational way of providing forces to the 

COCOM commanders, we know we will have a portion of the force 

that will be in reset coming out of that rotation. It could be as high 

as a third to a quarter. 

Mr. FORBES. General Amos, do we know what basis that we assumed our forces would be on the QDR in terms of the readiness— 

what percentage? 

General AMOS. Sir, to the best of my knowledge that I know of, 

I don’t know of any presumptions in the QDR that said it assumed 

certain force readiness levels. I know when we participated in it, 

and the Marine Corps has never been a fan of what we call tiered 

readiness where you have those forward deployed forces that are 

what you would call 100 percent ready, and then you have the 

forces back home that are at a significantly less, and it becomes a 

bathtub, and you start working your way. 

We are forced into that right now by virtue of the current fight 

in Afghanistan, so no question about it. The forces that come home 

are at a probably what we would call C–3 or C–4 for readiness, and 

that could be equipment for sure back home. We know that for a 

fact. And then it will be personal turnover and some of the things 

that General Chiarelli is talking about. 

But I am unaware of an assumption, Congressman Forbes, of a 

specific readiness level as we went into the QDR. 

Mr. FORBES. General Chandler. 

General CHANDLER. Congressman, I am also not aware of any 

specific percentage. Our rotation is based on the Air Expeditionary 

Force, as you know. Those forces are trained and ready to go. We, 

like the Marine Corps, have been forced to a certain level of tiered 
21 

readiness to ensure that those forces that go forward have the 

equipment they need and are properly trained. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Thank you. 

And now I will just close by saying, if you would, get back to us 

if you do find out that there was an assumption in the QDR of any 

percentage of readiness. The only reason is we would like to know 

what that assumption was to make sure we are there, and we 

funded you up to there. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 117.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. I will go to my good friend from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Chiarelli, seeing as how this is an operational and maintenance hearing, I very much appreciate your efforts to get some 

MRAPs to the training installations. One of the things that one of 

the base commanders brought to my attention is that since a lot 

of these vehicles are being returned from Iraq, that they are going 

to need a significant amount of time for maintenance. 

Have you programmed back into possibly providing some additional MRAPs for training installations? And again, I will harp on 

home. Camp Shelby, to the best of my knowledge, is at any given 

moment training these 5,000 troopers to go to Iraq or Afghanistan—with 19 MRAPs. Now, that really doesn’t seem to fit the 

standard of the Army, ‘‘We train as we fight.’’ And it takes nothing 

into account as far as the fact that some of them are going to be 

down on a given day. 

Given that a lot of that equipment is leaving Iraq and not all of 

it is suitable for the Afghan environment, you know, what effort is 

being made to take some of those vehicles with fixed axles that will 

not be useful in Afghanistan and trying to get them to the training 

installations? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, Congressman, I know you know that 

we have begun a pilot program at Red River to go ahead and rebuild MRAPs. We will have 53 of them in that pilot program this 

year, and that is going to significantly improve the maintenance 

and reset of MRAPs coming back. 

We have over 500 MRAPs that are set in the training base today. 

And at the same time, you know, we are trying to do a balance between the requirements of what is needed down range, and we 

don’t have any yet that have come out of Iraq that have not been 

needed in Afghanistan, even the larger models. 

And I have got to tell you were a little nervous that we had 500 

back here, remembering what happened with up-armored Humvees 

at one time. But we have been able to do this. I know we are opening a basic MRAP line again to get some additional MRAPs for Afghanistan. I expect the numbers to increase here as we meet the 

requirements in Afghanistan and pull additional forces out of Iraq. 

And my commitment to you is to restore that training base and 

get the numbers we need as rapidly as we possibly can. The only 

thing I would tell you that I think is something that helps to obviate that risk right now, and I really believe this, is the trainer that 

we have put at places like Shelby, that allows folks to train on the 
22 

MRAP much the same way we train on our aviation simulators. 

This is an excellent trainer that I think helps to obviate, but I, like 

you, would like to see more in the training base. And we will get 

them there as quickly as possible. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Greenert, I will admit that I am a supporter of putting our nation’s missile defense on ships. What I am 

concerned about, based on some of the things that have been said 

earlier, I am not convinced that the Navy has budgeted the increased steaming days that will be required to have that sort of 

presence around the world. I am not convinced that the Navy has 

budgeted for the additional fuel that is going to be needed to keep 

those vessels under way, and I am not convinced the Navy has 

budgeted for the number of ships we are going to need to fulfill 

that mission. 

So a couple of quick questions. Number one, what is your fuel 

budget for 2011? What was it compared to 2008 when we had high 

fuel prices? 

Secondly, again, I have heard now three CNOs tell me they needed 313 ships in the Navy, and yet this year the budget request 

would retire more ships than are delivered to the Navy. I think the 

CNO asked for permission to retire 10. Only seven are being delivered. That doesn’t get us to 313. That is going in the other direction. 

And so with that in mind, to what extent have you looked at alternatives for a service life extension of the FFGs until the Littoral 

Combat Ships are delivered and we can start growing the fleet 

again? And so I will leave you with those two questions. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Congressman. If I may, I will address the ballistic missile defense question first. 

We have been doing what we call long-range search and track. 

That is a national missile defense force since 2004. I happen to 

have some experience. I was out at the 7th Fleet in Japan when 

we started that. And we were concerned as well at that time about 

the additional cost of fuel, wear and tear on the ships when we assumed that mission where we keep ships on call. They are really 

on a tether, if you will, based very much on our indications and 

warning for a missile launch. 

We found that in fact it did not substantially increase our ship 

operating costs. We were able to continue the multi-mission function of those ships as the case may be, and as you are well aware, 

in 2006 and also again in 2009, we had increased tensions. We had 

launches by North Korea in that case. So we have some experience. 

I appreciate your interest in that, and we have to keep our eye on 

it. 

As we look at our phased adaptive approach requirement in Europe for fiscal year 2011, we are looking very closely at just exactly 

what you said. Where do we have to position the ships so that we 

can be in position, if called upon to conduct that mission? It is really about having the sensors in place, the sensor is able to get in 

place very quickly, and, of course, the weapon is in place with the 

right command and control. 

I will have to get back to you on the price of fuel in 2008 versus 

2011. I am pretty confident it is substantially greater, and to your 

point. 
23 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 117.] 

Admiral GREENERT. If I may, your second question, we did a— 

I won’t call it rudimentary, but we have to do some more close look 

at the feasibility of doing a service life extension program for our 

fast frigates, our FFGs, retirement. 

We took about five or six, took a look at the whole mechanical 

and electrical condition of those ships and what it would take to 

extend those ships 5 years, from 30 to 35 years. And that would, 

looking at—we have to look at anything from the hull thinning— 

the hulls are actually thinner. We are looking at the preservation. 

We are looking at the diesels. We looked at the engines, the gas 

turbines. It goes on. 

Pretty good look at those five ships, but I think we need to take 

a broader look at it. We need to take a broader look at the combat 

systems. But what we found out is for about $4 billion, we think 

that is about right to extend those ships 5 years to be able to employ them with the systems that we have out here today. 

We still aren’t sure that they will have the right command and 

control so that they can talk to the rest of the fleet today. Most of 

our FFGs operate almost independently, because they just can’t integrate with the strike groups today. They don’t have the command 

and control. It is where they are in the age and the life of their 

ships. 

I think it is a valuable exercise, and if I may, that is not a good 

word. It is not an exercise. It is a valuable consideration. Right 

now, Freedom is deployed. I think you know that, sir. She is on her 

third week of deployment and already down in Southern Command 

and has three drug busts. 

The speed and the maneuverability and the capability of that 

class of ship speaks pretty well right now. It is doing well right 

now. We have a lot of work to do to evaluate the Littoral Combat 

Ship, but with budgets being tight, if we extend the fast frigates, 

if we extend those ships 5 more years and spend the requisite 

amount, $4 billion, we might get a better class of ship and more 

capability putting that money into Littoral Combat Ship. Thank 

you, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, given that this is an O&M hearing, is anyone 

in your organization having the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. 

Stackley in particular, take a look at the fuel consumption of the 

two competing varieties of Littoral Combat Ship as one of the factors in the decision in the down select? 

Because I would hope that we would—fuel is obviously going to 

be a factor. I can’t see it but getting more expensive as time goes 

on, and I would hope that the Navy is at least considering—and 

I don’t know which one is more fuel efficient, but at least taking 

a look just to see which of the two varieties is more fuel efficient 

over the 20-plus years that we anticipate having those ships in the 

fleet. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. I can tell you that fuel consumption 

is a factor within that look. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Bishop. 
24 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, may I thank you all for your service to this nation? 

I realize that you have a global view in your jobs, but if you would 

permit me to be parochial for a bit. 

And, Admiral, you have got five minutes to relax for a second. 

First to General Chiarelli, if you could, I know you are very 

much aware of the Dugway Proving Ground, which has had an 800 

percent increase of workload since 9/11, but the facilities have not. 

And in fact, Bio Level 3 labs have now spilt into temporary trailers, 

which has now been about a decade of temporariness, if that is a 

word, and yet even though there is a safety concern that we have 

still yet to get into any kind of Army Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). 

Dugway is a remote area. It has that commissary that is 50 

years old and undersized. And it is 65 miles from the nearest civilization. I know we have had a chance sometimes coming close to 

have you visit out there. I have appreciated that. I am not actually 

asking for that, because it is a long way to get out there. 

But I would ask your consideration once again for Dugway, for 

the facilities that are out there and the upgrades they need, as well 

as the Tooele Army Depot, which has—I know this is not a Military 

Construction (MILCON) hearing, but they haven’t had a MILCON 

upgrade since I have been elected, and those are two facilities, I 

think, that have high opportunity to be having greater utility, especially for the Army. 

And if you will just consider that, you don’t even need to respond 

at this time, but I would appreciate your consideration on those 

two areas. The delegation has talked to you about those in the 

past, and I have appreciated that. 

General Chandler, if I could, I was going to ask you some questions. I appreciate your talk about the ICBM at the very beginning 

in your statement, and I did have some specific questions about the 

Enhanced Use Lease (EUL) there at Hill Air Force Base because, 

obviously, the 526 ICBM support group has been separated from 

their prime interrogation contractor for almost a decade now as 

well—well, not necessarily a decade, but it is a temporary one that 

is becoming more permanent. 

I just received word, though, that you are close to a cusp on a 

final solution to that, so if I could just encourage you and your staff 

to work with General Hoffman and the Air Force Materiel Command to make sure that we push that to a completion, especially 

before any legislative language is needed, let me thank you and 

your office for getting us that far and ask that we just go over the 

edge and finally get that finished. I would appreciate it. 

But I do have one question that deals once again with the industrial base for the ICBM. I still have certain concerns with the 

warm line that we are doing. The Navy, for example, has on, I 

think, their D–5 12 motor a year project to keep the warm line viable. 

In the budget for the warm line for the ICBM Project Minuteman 

III, you have $46 million in fiscal year 2011 for three motors, even 

though the industrial base says it takes six to maintain a warm 

line. But I am also concerned that in 2012 that $46 million is cut 
25 

to $10 million, and then to $13 million. Fiscal year 2013 it is down 

to zero. 

And I do have some concerns on how you anticipate keeping a 

warm line functionable to make sure that the M–III, which is, as 

General earlier this morning said, is still the cheapest and most effective leg of the triad. How are you going to keep them viable so 

that this program of record stays through 2030? 

General CHANDLER. Well, Congressman, first, let me say we will 

continue to work the EUL. That is something that is receiving a 

lot of attention with the Chief. I spoke with General Hoffman yesterday. There is no debate about the fact that having that capability inside the fence is good. The issue we need to work our way 

through our requirements that will stand the test of time, and we 

will continue to work that. 

There was a meeting today, I understand, between the Air Force 

as well as the contractor, and we will continue to work that. We, 

like you, would like to bring this to closure. 

Regarding the ICBMs, I have spoken with the people on the 

staff. There is a disagreement, frankly, between what we think is 

viable to keep the line open and what we think we are going to 

need in the future. I would ask you to let us continue to work a 

plan, if you will, that will get us to where we are going with solid 

booster motors, as well as where we are going with the Minuteman 

III, knowing that prompt global strike may in fact become a part 

of this. 

But we will continue to work this issue as well. I take your point 

with regard to how you maintain an industrial base at the pace 

that it is laid out, but this is an issue that we will look at in the 

2012 pond. 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your commitment 

to look at that. That is very kind. 

And, Admiral, I don’t know if I can solve your problem at all, but 

if I could recommend the Great Salt Lake in my district, we don’t 

have any hurricanes. I know it is landlocked totally, but the Army 

Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 

Congressman Oberstar still tell me it is part of the navigable water 

system of the United States, so it may be an option for you. 

Obviously, Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

General Chiarelli, you had mentioned in your remarks something 

about as we try to get back to a more normal time of maybe 12 

months deployed, 24 months at home, that that may not hit the 

Airborne quite as quick and just wonder if you could elaborate on 

that a little bit. 

General CHIARELLI. I may have misspoken, Congressman. I 

meant our aviation soldiers, not the Airborne per se. Our aviators 

right now are going at about a one-to-one dwell right now, and the 

demands on Army aviation are great. We are putting about 70 

hours a month on our Chinooks in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq 

and about 40 to 50 hours a month in Afghanistan. 

And there is some absolutely amazing work being done, being 

able to turn that equipment out of both of those theaters on a basic 
26 

rotation that has got you going 12 months deployed, 12 months at 

home, 12 months deployed, or just a little bit over 12 months. I see 

the demand on Army aviation going down slower than the rest of 

the force. 

Mr. KISSELL. Now, correct me if I am wrong, but are we not looking to two more Combat Aviation Brigades in the Army? 

General CHIARELLI. We are. One of them, of course, is a consolidation of assets to make the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade. And 

we are looking at a 13th that we want to stand up as quickly as 

possible to take some of the pressure off of the force and hope to 

have initial elements from the 13th, which will be a new build, in 

place by—not the entire Combat Aviation Brigade, but possibly a 

battalion or two by 2014. 

Mr. KISSELL. So where we have them the most stress in terms 

of the lack of downtime is the same area we are looking to build 

the new brigades. 

General CHIARELLI. That is exactly right. We are trying to take 

pressure off of our Combat Aviation Brigades. 

Mr. KISSELL. And in just thinking in that regard, which also is 

what we should be doing is building that up, if we are using that 

much, what problems, potential delays beyond the obvious do you 

see in trying to get two additional brigades in a time period when 

there is such stress in this area? Where are these troops coming 

from, the equipment? 

I know the National Guard is expressing concerns you might be 

taking equipment from them or delaying equipment coming to 

them. I just wonder if you can mention that a little bit. 

General CHIARELLI. For the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, we 

have the equipment. We are really consolidating resources that we 

have into a single Combat Aviation Brigade, standing down some 

separate battalions, so to speak, and moving them into a Combat 

Aviation Brigade. 

For the 13th brigade we will need new equipment. And in order 

to get some of that capability out early, we are working with the 

National Guard to check on the possibility of using some of their 

equipment for that early build with a payback. This could in fact 

be a good deal for the National Guard, because our plan would be 

to pay them back with equipment, new helicopters coming off the 

lines. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

General Chandler, in the last Defense Appropriations Act, there 

was an amendment that would require the chief of staff of the Air 

Force to get back to this committee by March 1st concerning BRAC 

at Fort Bragg. With the great influx of troops and flag officers into 

Fort Bragg, there was concern that the Air Force at Pope Air Force 

Base would not have equal rank to be able to do the proper planning, communication and discussions with the flag officers, of 

which there were supposed to be 34 on base. 

And we haven’t gotten that response yet, and I noted that last 

week, I believe it was, to the chief of staff that we are still waiting 

on that, so if you could pass that along. 

And also, last week we had some hearings with the chiefs of African Command, the European NATO Command, and Central Command. And two of the three said that one of their biggest worries 
27 

that keeps them awake at night is cyber security. Just wondering 

if, you know, in terms of operations, if you all have the similar concerns. 

And they were supposed to get back to us also in terms of how 

they are proposing to deal with that. Just wondering if any of you 

all have those savings concerns and how you propose to deal with 

them. 

General CHANDLER. Sir, if I can, first, I will go back and find 

your report or check with the status, and we will get back with it 

with regard to general officer housing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 118.] 

General CHANDLER. In terms of cyber, I would tell you that the 

Air Force views of cyber on an equal footing with air and space. 

It is an enabler for what we do. If we are not able to control cyber 

space, there is a good chance we will have a hard time in air and 

space as well. For that reason we have lumped our capabilities 

under Air Force Space Command and 24th Air Force, which will 

be the Air Force component of the new sub-unified command, 

Cyber Command. 

It is going to be a growth industry. We have a lot of capability 

in the Air Force. What we didn’t have was those concentrated 

under one commander in a place where we could get our hands on 

them readily and in fact present them to the combatant commanders. And I am sure that is probably part of the confusion that 

they expressed to you as well. 

Mr. KISSELL. Any other thoughts there? 

General CHIARELLI. Congressman, we, too, are organizing for 

cyber and have been organizing for cyber. We have recent decision 

to stand up our cyber, which will be a separate command aligned 

with United States Strategic Command. And it will be commanded 

by a three-star, and we are bringing our resources together to ensure that we have the most capable command possible to protect 

both the national and Army networks. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to address this question to General Chiarelli and 

Chandler. What concerns, if any, do each of you have regarding 

how much of your O&M requirement is being funded through OCO, 

particularly dwell maintenance? And when and how do you see 

that funding migrating back to the base budget? And you all may 

have addressed this one. I had to leave due to a speech on the floor, 

so I apologize. 

But, General Chiarelli, would you like to start with that? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, it concerns me, as we have, I think, 

been constant in stating to this committee and others that we see 

reset going on for 2 years, 2 to 3 years after we finish in both theaters. That is how long it is going to take to reset Army equipment. 

We see that our normal budget for our depots—we have money migrating in 2011 to it, about $200 million. We have a total reset 

budget this year of over $10 billion in 2011. And we need the support of Congress to continue for that reset. We expect that reset 
28 

will be paid out of OCO until we get through this period, a majority 

of it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, I may have missed it when you said it earlier, 

but what impact would it have on the Army’s readiness as far as 

reset, if we stay in Iraq longer than August 2010? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, the equipment would have to be reset 

sooner or later, Congressman. It would just slow down the amount 

of work we see coming back to the depots this year. We have been 

able to meet most of the requirements for Afghanistan out of prepositioned stocks in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. And a 

majority of the equipment that is coming out of Iraq as we begin 

our drawdown will be coming back to the States and reset either 

in depots on installations or at other locations. 

So if we had to leave more equipment in Iraq, it would in fact 

slow down the return of that equipment to the States. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. Thank you. 

General Chandler, go back to the O&M question of being funded 

through OCO. 

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir. We are concerned as well. As you 

know, we funded 65 percent of our weapons systems sustainment 

in our baseline. OCO funding brings that to 82 percent. That is a 

concern for us. Typically, we like to rotate the big-ticket items, aircraft and engines through depot on a periodic basis to not build a 

bow wave that you would suggest in terms of having to be funded 

outside the baseline. 

That is why our number one unfunded priority goes to weapons 

systems sustainment to the tune of $337 million. Assuming that we 

are deferring the aircraft and the engines that we will have to 

defer, that is somewhere in the vicinity of about 54 aircraft through 

depot and about 102 engines that will not go through depot based 

on the risk we are taking in the shortfall in weapons systems 

sustainment. 

So there is no doubt in our mind we need to get back on track 

to the methodology that we would like to use in terms of a steady 

flow through depot of things like aircraft and engines. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you. 

And the last question I have is for General Chiarelli. What is 

your service’s current plan for the disposition of MRAP vehicles 

upon conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. MRAP vehicles will in fact be moved into our 

formations. We have over 3,000 MRAP vehicles that will be part 

of our table of organization and equipment, particularly in combat 

service and combat service support brigades. And we will be establishing a number of sets of MRAPs that will be available for units 

that go into an environment that requires the MRAP vehicle. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you do plan to reset them. 

General CHIARELLI. We do plan to reset them, and that started 

the process that we are starting at Red River now to do that. I 

might add into that our depot base, depending on who I ask and 

what day of the week it is, I am told we need between $2.9 billion 

and $3.1 billion in the base to do our normal depot operations. And 

we are moving to get that amount in over the FYDP. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
29 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for your service, especially to Admiral 

Greenert, who hails from Western Pennsylvania and who is a 

Steelers fan. That is always a good thing. Welcome, all of you. 

My question to General Chiarelli, and you answered some of it 

with the reset question that Mr. Rogers asked. But you and General Amos, I believe, you testified in December saying that your 

general view was that there would be lower depot maintenance requirements, lower work at the depots. And in fact it doesn’t seem 

that it is going to be lower. 

From what you said that when we bring these vehicles back from 

Iraq, we are going to reset them. We are going to need to reset 

them. So I believe what you said is for the next couple of years, 

you are going to see a high level of reset activity and activity at 

the depots. Is that your view, generally? 

General CHIARELLI. It is, Congressman, and the point I was trying to get back last year when I testified in front of the committee 

was the fact that because of the force buildup in Afghanistan before 

the forces came out of Iraq, equipment that we had coming back 

and going into reset was being diverted into Afghanistan. 

Now that we have gotten past this first period, we expect toward 

the end of this fiscal year as those forces and that equipment come 

out of Iraq, we are going to see that return to the depots. And we 

feel properly postured to get that work into the depots. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Good. And the work that is being done with the 

equipment that is going from Iraq to Afghanistan, that is being 

done in theater? And it is my understanding we have the contractors doing that work, resetting it before it goes to Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. It is not always reset. It is in fact brought 

up to a higher maintenance standard in Kuwait with some government workers and some contractors. But as that equipment comes 

out of Afghanistan, it, too, will come back and be put into the reset 

pool. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. And I asked a question to General Myles a 

couple of weeks ago and asked with you the cost of that. And I am 

not sure anybody has determined, or at least told me, is the cost 

higher? I have heard with some estimates it is a lot higher to reset 

or repair, bring up to better, higher standard, doing it in theater 

than actually sending it back home and sending it to Afghanistan. 

Do you know what the numbers are? 

General CHIARELLI. The issue is timing. I do not have the exact 

numbers. I will in fact provide those to you, but the issue here was 

timing. To take that equipment, send it all the way back home, 

reset it and then have to send it into Afghanistan, given issues 

there, would have been problematical. So we did not do a full reset. 

We brought it up to what we would call 1020 standards and got 

it as quickly as we could into Afghanistan. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 118.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. And I would be interested at some point to see just 

what the cost differences are to reset it, raise the ramp up to 

standard of there versus here. So if you could get back to me on 

it, I would appreciate that. 
30 

And the final question is the long-term strategy with our depots. 

You had mentioned that some stuff will come back here and go to 

other locations. I take that other locations meaning maybe companies in the private sector. 

And I just wanted to know the long-term strategy with our depots. Are we going to keep that core competency in place? I know 

we have spent about $100 million over the last several years making sure our depots have what they need. And is that our strategy 

to make sure that that core competency remains at the depots so 

that if something happens again, we have that surge capability? 

General CHIARELLI. It is definitely our strategy. As you well 

know, we have begun this reset pilot for MRAPs in Red River. We 

are getting ready to kick off programs for transmissions for two of 

our helicopters in Corpus Christi. And we have structured our depots so there are about 70 percent government workers, 30 percent 

contractors. 

We, because we did have a little bit less reset in a couple of our 

depots, had to lay off some workers earlier this year, but we were 

able to do that out of the contract force and ensure that we maintain our government force of about 70 percent at all our depots. 

Our plans are to use our depots to their full advantage. I can assure you of that. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And, of course, one of the ways to do that is make 

sure we spread the workload equally throughout them so that we 

don’t weaken one of our depots or several of our depots. So I hope 

we do use that strategy as we move forward. So thank you. Thank 

you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I think that we are almost finished. We 

have two more questions, and this goes to General Chandler. 

The Air Force recently provided the committee with a classified 

report on your combat air forces restructuring plan. Most reports 

we get from you also, with an unclassified version, and I would like 

to ask that the unclassified version be provided to the committee 

immediately as soon as you can. And this would really help out the 

other members of the committee, who are interested in this issue. 

And that is my only comment. It is not a question, but a comment, unless you want to make a statement on this. 

General CHANDLER. No, sir. I would take that, and we will get 

back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 117.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just, Admiral, coming back to you one more time and one more 

question, I want to preface this. Congressman Taylor mentioned 

that this is an O&M hearing, and in fact it is. The unfortunate 

thing is we don’t get access to you guys very often. 

And the second thing is that we have shortfalls in shipbuilding. 

We have shortfalls in the number of planes we have. And we have 

shortfalls in the maintenance we can get. So when we are spending 

$590 million someplace, we had better make sure we are spending 

it right, because we are going to have shortfalls somewhere else. 
31 

And that is why this question about the carrier is so important to 

me. 

The other reason it is important to me is I will just tell you and 

just be out front with it. Several years ago before any of these EIS 

statements, before any of this thing was made, I was in the White 

House, and I heard President Bush say to a member of the Florida 

delegation, ‘‘We are going to get that carrier down there to you in 

Mayport.’’ And I am not saying he wasn’t doing what he thought 

was right, but that was before any of the studies were made. And 

it would be at least questioned sometime the decision and the motives for doing something. 

Then when the chairman asked you what you were really worried about, you said, ‘‘I am worried about the unfunded Central 

Command tempo and the $500 million for that.’’ But when I asked 

you which is more important, you tell me the carrier. And I sit here 

and wonder, well, why isn’t the Admiral sitting here saying, ‘‘I am 

worried to death that we aren’t having that homeport of that carrier right now.’’ 

And the last question I just want to kind of nail in just so I understand, because I am just not buying the hurricane argument 

and some of the other ones. And, you know, you are telling me that 

the docking availabilities are going to be done in Norfolk. That is 

the bulk of the time. 

On the other times that this carrier would be in port, I want to 

ask you this question. Are you concerned that two carriers are together, that three carriers are together? What is the tipping point 

for you? Because I take it even if you put this carrier down there, 

you are going to have times in Norfolk where you are going to have 

three carriers together, four carriers together. Does that bother 

you? And are we going to have to have five different ports for these 

carriers? Help me with that one, if you could. 

Well, let us take the two-carrier scenario. Does that bother you? 

Admiral GREENERT. No, Congressman. I am not concerned about 

two carriers together, three carriers together. We have three carriers together today in Newport News in maintenance. 

The issue is that we don’t have a second carrier port. We have 

through history. Mayport has been a carrier port for a long time. 

It is not about the Mayport. It is about a second port to have a carrier and the strategic dispersal. And it is important to us. 

And in the context of the question given to me earlier by the 

chairman, it was he talked to me—I took it to mean O&M. 

Mr. FORBES. So then—— 

Admiral GREENERT. He asked me what were my O&M concerns, 

and so I was trying to answer that question. 

Mr. FORBES. And that is fair enough. So then your concern is 

really not that the carriers are bunched up together and something 

could happen to them together. You are just concerned that we 

don’t have another homeport for another carrier. I mean, I am just 

trying to make sure I understand what you just told me. 

Admiral GREENERT. I am concerned that we have on the East 

Coast with every other ship type that we have—SSBNs. We have 

two other ports other than Kings Bay where we can put SSBNs 

into, and every other type of ship—cruisers, destroyers, SSNs— 

other than a nuclear carrier. We have no second port and—— 
32 

Mr. FORBES. To homeport it. But you could put it there that it 

would be worked on, correct? 

Admiral GREENERT. Which ship? 

Mr. FORBES. The carrier. 

Admiral GREENERT. The carrier? Currently, no, sir. We would 

need to make changes to Mayport anyway to go in and to—— 

Mr. FORBES. But as far as working on the carrier in a catastrophic situation that you were talking about terrorists, you do 

have Newport News, who builds the carriers, and they could do the 

work on the carriers, if we needed to, correct? 

Admiral GREENERT. They could. It is the same channel. We 

talked earlier about channels, navigational channels and that. It is 

Norfolk, Newport News—— 

Mr. FORBES. But you are not realistically worried about that 

channel being blocked, are you? 

Admiral GREENERT. Which channel, Congressman? 

Mr. FORBES. The Norfolk channel, 4,500 feet—are you worried 

about that? 

Admiral GREENERT. Under the right set of circumstances, yes, I 

can. 

Mr. FORBES. Tell me that set of circumstances, if you would. 

Admiral GREENERT. A barge. 

Mr. FORBES. You are saying one barge? 

Admiral GREENERT. You know, our time together in Norfolk, I 

have seen maintenance being done on the channel on the NAV–8 

up there by the Bay Bridge Tunnel. 

Mr. FORBES. Is it your testimony—and just I will close with this, 

because we are talking about not only spending this money, but we 

are talking about having to move 700 men to Florida, if we do the 

work down there, because you are not talking about creating a new 

workforce down there. 

You are talking about them paying per diem while they are down 

there. You are talking about them being away from their families. 

You are talking about doing all of the availabilities in Norfolk 

based on your testimony, some of those as much as 7 months at 

a time when we are bringing all those crews from Mayport to Norfolk to have to stay during that period of time away from their families. 

And your testimony is to me today, just the last one, that you 

think a single barge could shut down the channel in Norfolk. 

Admiral GREENERT. No, sir. A single barge likely couldn’t shut 

down the channel in Norfolk. A single barge combined with the circumstances of shipping you gave me a few examples before—I 

mean, we could paint this picture perhaps a number of ways. I 

would give it to you, you know. I am not familiar with all of the 

exact distances, but I am saying there are chokepoints. There are 

certain points in the Norfolk and the tidewater area—the Hampton 

Roads area, excuse me, where there are critical areas. 

The movement for nuclear work—I can’t tell you the exact numbers. I don’t know that it is 700, but that is an extraordinary number to do nuclear work today on a carrier. 

Mr. FORBES. The average by the shipyard is 400. 

Admiral GREENERT. Four hundred. And I can give you—I will research that and get you what kind of work packages we use today 
33 

when we do maintenance away from a nuclear repair facility such 

as Newport News or such as Puget Sound are such as Norfolk 

Naval Shipyard. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, General Chiarelli, I just have one more 

question. 

In a recent letter to the Army chief of staff, General Dempsey is 

the head of Training and Doctrine Command. He raised some serious concerns about how low manning loads in TRADOC were damaging TRADOC’s ability to carry out its mission. 

What are your thoughts on the issues raised in this letter? And 

what can the Army to in the near term to address the issues General Dempsey raised? Is the main issue simply lack of people, or 

is it lack of funding and personnel or O&M accounts? 

For the committee to try to help in this area in this year’s legislation, what can we do to be supportive of what you are owning? 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, I was briefed just before I 

came up here about the current strength at TRADOC. And they 

are currently about 71 percent strength. And you can look at 71 

percent and realize that that is truly not their true strength. 

As you know, TRADOC is part of the generating force, and we 

have cut the generating force from about 114,000 folks 10 years ago 

down to 92.1 today. And we have substituted many of those folks 

who used to wear uniforms with civilian contractors. And I think 

one of the things that General Dempsey talked about was the degreening of TRADOC. 

TRADOC’s problem, and when I quoted the 71 percent figure, 

that does not include the individuals that they have that have been 

tasked out as individual augmentees downrange. You see their 

numbers drop much lower than 71 percent when you take away 

those folks, because those folks who remain assigned to TRADOC, 

but for temporary duty downrange for 12 months. 

So that exacerbates this issue. A large cut in the generating force 

and the fact that we have so many individual augmentees—over 

11,000 today in the United States Army, and many of them come 

out of the generating force. 

I think one of the things we all have to get past is kind of a Cold 

War thought process that we had when we talked about tooth to 

tail, and the generating force was always considered the tail. And 

we were always looking to try to increase tooth. 

Well, in the very complex fights we are in today, that is requirements for what TRADOC does to train our soldiers every single 

day, both when they come in the Army and throughout their whole 

career, is absolutely critical to having the kind of leaders we need 

to fight these fights. 

We are looking at the generating force and what we need to do 

to get it right-sized and ensure it has the number of ‘‘green suiters’’ 

they need to do the very important job they have to do. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I think that—— 

Mr. Shuster, do you have a question? 
34 

Mr. SHUSTER. Yes, I have one question. And it is based on what 

Mr. Forbes said. He said, right, we don’t get a whole lot of opportunity to spend time and get the question here. So I have a question, and actually it is a question I have heard Chairman Skelton 

ask before, and I think it is worthwhile asking you folks, all of you, 

to answer. It is what keeps you up at night. 

And I would start with General Amos. What does keep you up 

at night, that keeps you—what are your concerns and—— 

General AMOS. Sir, probably the single thing that keeps me up 

at night is where are we going to be when VJ Day is declared and 

whatever that is going to look like and whatever criteria is going 

to be set, but when our nation says success, let us bring our men 

and women home, will Congress, will the American people, will the 

leadership of our government still have the stomach to understand 

that we are going to have to spend several more years with the effort and money to truly reset and re-capitalize this force. 

Now, that worries me more than anything. You know, I read the 

same newspapers you do. I have the same sense of anticipation of 

where the budgets are going over the next couple of years, and it 

is going to pressurize, because there is certainly no slack in the requirement for equipment, people and that type of thing. 

So that is the single thing that worries me the most is when it 

is done, will we have the stomach to be able to have the wherewithal to be able to recapitalize our force? 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General Chandler 

General CHANDLER. Sir, I would say one of our biggest concerns 

is where we are going to be 10 to 15 years from now. Today we 

are rightfully trying to balance the fight we are in today with preparing for where we need to be tomorrow. 

And as General Amos has expressed, there is a lot of pressure 

on budgets, whether it is weapons systems sustainment. One pressure we didn’t talk about today are the personnel costs of maintaining the volunteer force that we have today, which is the best armed 

forces in the world, but doesn’t come without a price. 

Weapons systems and the costs accelerating around those, particularly the high-tech weapons systems and the business-oriented 

in terms of aircraft and things that go with them in terms of weapons are things that we are going to need to work our way through 

and think about as we look to where we need to be 10 to 15 years 

from today. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

Admiral Greenert. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you for the question. I am concerned 

about the compiling effect of the wear and tear on the equipment 

and the fact that we haven’t come to grips with reset. 

So a little bit about what General Amos said. If we don’t reset 

the equipment and then when this war is over and folks say, okay, 

let us get on with for us the maritime strategy and whatever the 

National Command Authority requires of us. We have what we call 

in the Navy quality of service, and that is, basically, the condition 

of the equipment that our people operate, the ships, the aircraft 

that they are in. 
35 

And there is the stress on them right now, which is extraordinary, and I think we have to understand it. My colleagues to my 

right and left have—they are dealing with something bigger than 

the Navy, but we still have the same kind of issues that they have. 

And my hat is off to them with dealing with it. 

We understand unit readiness pretty well. We understand people 

readiness reasonably well, what it takes for a person to be 

deployable. And we need to understand what takes our families to 

be prepared to help support these fine men and women that go out 

and do that. And I think we need to—it keeps me up at night understanding that, because we may recruit the individual, but we reenlist the family. And if we don’t have that support unit and therefore the people in the future, then it doesn’t matter how much force 

structure we have. Thanks. 

Mr. FORBES. General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. I won’t repeat reset, but reset keeps me up 

at night for sure. The other thing that keeps me up at night is 

achieving balance. I think it is absolutely critical the Army get to 

a point where we have at least a majority of our folks two years 

or more at home between deployments. 

And the other thing that concerns me is the importance of focusing on reset and the cost it is going to take to reset a force that 

has been run very, very hard for 81⁄2 years. 

I worry about our ability to modernize the force. In a period of 

diminishing budgets, in a very difficult time for our country, can 

we modernize? Can we take advantage of the great technological 

edges we have? Can we do what my personal Apple iPhone has 

been able to do? Come out with three successive models in a very 

short period of time, or are we stuck in a 10-year industrial cycle 

that just makes it so very, very difficult for us to move to the most 

modern of equipment. 

So I worry a lot about that, given our recent experiences. We are 

trying to learn everything we can from them, but I think it is absolutely essential that not only do we reset the current equipment 

that we have got, but that we have a plan for modernizing our 

force so that we are ready for the threats of the future. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank each of you for your answer. And I 

would just like to say I think it is extremely valid in the future. 

Where are we going to be? As the general said is America and Congress going to have the stomach to do it? 

And I think our number one responsibility in the Federal Government is national security, the common defense. Everything else 

pales to that, and we have got to make sure we continue to reinforce that to the American people, because we have folks around 

the world that are getting smarter and getting stronger and buying 

this other equipment that would do us harm. 

And we also, equally concerning to me, is we have allies that 

want to do less, and America is forced to do more. So I certainly 

think about those things with you and support everything you are 

doing and want to work with you in the future. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. This has been an outstanding 

hearing today, and thank you for being candid with us. 

No, go ahead. 
36 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I would like to thank each of you gentlemen 

for your service to our nation, for being here today. But since I 

have the different services here, General Chandler, could you get 

me the price, a fully burdened price of a gallon of fuel or barrel of 

fuel, whichever you prefer, that you buy at—Air Force Base. 

General Amos, the same thing for Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan. 

And General Chiarelli for either Regional Command (RC) South 

or RC East, whichever you prefer. A fully burdened cost to a gallon 

or a barrel of fuel. Okay. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 118.] 

Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. ORTIZ. That is a very good question, because sometime back 

it came to my attention that when we talk about the transportation 

and the getting there and moving the gasoline, that when we pay 

all of that, and this is what I heard, that it comes to about $400 

a gallon. I don’t know whether this figure is close, but this is what 

I hear. 

But thank you so much for responding to later on for the record 

for Mr. Taylor. And this has been a great hearing, and we are in 

this game together, and we are going to work with you, and we are 

going to give you as much as the Budget Committee gives us. This 

is how it works. 

But I want to thank for your service. And I know, you know, the 

family goes through a lot, too. You have family, you have children, 

and it takes a lot from your daily life to be, you know, doing the 

work that you are doing, separated from your family. But thank 

you so much for what you do. 

I want to thank the other members for being with us today. We 

have a very responsible subcommittee, and they want to do this the 

best. And I also want to thank the staff, because they do a lot of 

work. They do a lot of traveling so that we can come up with some 

of the answers to some of the questions that you might have. 

Again, having no further questions, this hearing is adjourned. 

Thank you so much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 16, 2010 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 16, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2010 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

General CHANDLER. On 17 March, 2010, the AF sent the requested information 

regarding an unclassified version of the CAF Restructure Report to Ms. Lynn Williams and Ms. Cathy Garman. This information included the executive summary, 

the environmental analyses, a summary of the manpower authorizations necessary 

for reassignment, the funding needed for FY2010–FY2015, and the re-investment 

plan. Also included was the appendix reviewing the AF fighters considered for force 

structure reductions. These documents are provided in this response. 

TAB 1—CAF–R Executive Summary 

TAB 2—CAF–R Tables 

TAB 3—Appendix C—AF Fighters Considered for 10POM Force Structure Reduction 

TAB 4—UNCLASSIFIED FY10 CAF Restructure Flow 

[See page 30.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral GREENERT. The notional maintenance schedule for a CVN reflects two 

continuous maintenance periods, known as Carrier Incremental Availabilities 

(CIA’s), during its 32 month operating cycle. Each of these periods will last 30 days 

and will be conducted pier-side in Mayport. [See page 19.] 

Admiral GREENERT. The notional maintenance schedule for a CVN reflects: 

a) A Dry-docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) once every third operating cycle (approximately every 8 years) for a total of four periods during its 

expected service life. This docking period, for an East Coast CVN, would take 

place in a Norfolk, VA area shipyard. 

b) A 39 month Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) conducted at Northrop 

Grumman Shipbuilding in Newport News, VA at the mid point in the ship’s 

life (about 23 years). 

During periods when the Mayport CVN is in Norfolk, the facilities in Mayport will 

be available to perform maintenance on remaining CVNs, thus maintaining geographic dispersal capabilities. [See page 19.] 

General CHANDLER. For the peak demand the QDR assumed that 100% of the 

combat coded forces would be available. However, an excursion was run to provide 

an estimate of force availability to account for a shorter warning time and a recovery from rotational activities. This equated to a force availability of 80% for the Air 

Force. 

Clarifying information: For purposes of the force sufficiency analysis within 

QDR, the department used scenarios that were divided into 3 separate rotational 

periods. In the steady-state, non-surge period of activities, each of the services applied their service established rotational goals. For the Air Force that equated to 

1:4 deploy-to-dwell ratio for the active component and 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio 

for the reserve component. It was assumed that these rotational goals were sufficient to ensure a ready force to meet the rotational demands. 

In the surge, major warfight period, full mobilization was assumed. Given, the 

warning timelines and sequencing of the scenario combinations it was assumed that 

100% of the forces would be available. For the post-surge, stability and reconstruction period, QDR used 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio for the active component and 1:4 mobilization-to-dwell ratio for the reserve component. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Admiral GREENERT. The initial fuel budget request for FY2008 was $2.9 billion. 

The budgeted amount was adjusted three times during the year of execution due 

to increased fuel prices. As a result, total obligations for FY2008 were $4.8 billion. 

The fuel budget request for FY2011 is $4.1 billion. [See page 23.] 
118 

General CHIARELLI. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] [See page 36.] 

General AMOS. A contracting company for NATO named ‘‘Supreme’’ delivers fuel 

to 3 USMC locations in Afghanistan, namely Camps Dwyer, Leatherneck, and 

Delaram. The fully burdened cost of delivery of fuel to Leatherneck is $6.50 per gallon, which is paid to ‘‘Supreme’’. [See page 36.] 

General CHANDLER. The Air Force buys fuel in Afghanistan from both the Defense 

Energy Support Center (DESC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

The DESC standard price to their Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) customers 

is, currently, $2.82 per gallon to a ‘‘point of sale.’’ This point of sale price includes 

all of DESC’s costs up to the point of sale in Afghanistan to include the commodity 

cost, transportation, intermediate storage and distribution facilities, maintenance 

and upkeep costs and DESC labor and overhead costs. NATO also sells fuel to US 

forces in OEF, currently, for $6.50 per gallon. This price includes NATO’s DESClike costs plus the cost of distribution to their forward locations and the costs of running their bulk fuel installations. Neither DESC’s nor NATO’s standard price includes the logistics costs and associated force protection costs of onward movement 

from point of sale, such as to a combat outpost, incurred by the services. 

The DESC and NATO prices are ‘‘burdened’’ with overhead. However, these ‘‘burdened’’ prices should not be confused with the ‘‘fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF)’’ 

construct as contained within the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. The 

FBCF construct, which is designed to be used in Service acquisitions of future systems, begins with the DESC standard price and adds the cost of Service logistic 

‘‘tails’’ and any force protection needed to secure a fuel delivery beyond the DESC 

point of sale in acquisition tradeoff analyses. [See page 36.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

General CHIARELLI. The Army is not performing ‘‘Reset’’ per se in Kuwait, so it 

is not possible to provide a cost comparison. We are however repairing Army equipment that had been in use in Iraq, before transferring it to Afghanistan. The difference is in the scope of work—the repairs in Kuwait are generally just enough to 

ensure the item of equipment is fully mission capable; on the other hand, ‘‘Reset’’ 

not only makes an item of equipment fully mission capable, but it also ensures that 

the item of equipment meets the Army maintenance standard laid out in AR 750– 

1, in accordance with the applicable technical manuals, and also includes such 

maintenance actions as to eliminate the effects of delayed desert damage (for example, while inspecting a tank in accordance with the technical manual, removal of the 

turret from the hull would not be required; however, in Reset, because we want to 

remove the effects of operating for a year in the fine sand and dust prevalent 

throughout Iraq, we remove the turret, clean and service the race ring, all to ensure 

that any build up of sand and debris does not come back to haunt us down the 

road). Although the maintenance done in theater is to a lower scope than ‘‘Reset,’’ 

the repairs we make in theater help ensure that equipment provided to our forces 

in Afghanistan is fully mission capable, without having to bring it all the way back 

to CONUS for repair. Finally, only a very small amount of the total maintenance 

workload conducted in theater is classified as ‘‘depot level’’ repair, but we do ensure 

that the Army captures those costs in our annual 50/50 depot level maintenance report—in some cases, that work is performed by depot (government) workers deployed forward from CONUS; in other cases, it is performed by contract . . . but in 

all cases, it is counted in the appropriate category for purposes of the 50/50 report. 

[See page 29.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

General CHANDLER. Yes, there are sufficient AF Senior leaders at Pope AFB to 

sustain the mission. [See page 27.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2010 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. What are the implications, in terms of O&M spending in the future, 

of keeping the Army Reserve and Army National Guard in an ‘‘operational reserve’’ 

status? Would current funding levels, which include OCO funding, have to eventually become part of the base budget request? Can the Army afford to do that? 

General CHIARELLI. Current funding levels, including OCO O&M, allow the Reserve Components to sustain the ARFORGEN training strategy, which is a major 

component of operational reserve. The OCO funding would have to become part of 

the base budget in order to continue operational training. There are other components of ‘‘operational reserve’’ that are still being studied, for example full time support, that are not currently part of OCO. These would eventually have to be added 

to the base budget before the Reserve Components are a fully operational force. In 

order to get the Reserve Component to an ‘‘operational reserve’’ status, the Army 

would eventually need an increase in base funding. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Jack Stultz, the Chief of the Army Reserve, has said that the 

reserve component will need at least $1.5 billion more across the FY12–FY17 time 

period to maintain ‘‘operational reserve’’ status. Is that about the right figure? 

General CHIARELLI. The $1.5B figure is a per year estimate for maintaining an 

‘‘operational reserve’’ status. Across the FY12–17 time period, the total is approximately $9.2B. This amount includes additional collective training days and additional support needed. The Director, Army National Guard and Chief, Army Reserve 

have stated that this will help maintain an operational force by sustaining readiness 

levels and supporting increased participation of non-deployed Soldiers in Military 

Support to Civil Authority exercises, theater engagement programs and other Army 

requirements. We are also looking at more options during our FY12–16 process to 

determine costs of an operational reserve. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The readiness levels of most non-deployed Army units remain very 

low, due to a combination of equipment shortfalls, personnel shortfalls, and a lack 

of time to train. How much will the readiness of non-deployed Army units improve 

in FY11, assuming the Iraq drawdown continues as planned? How much will dwell 

time increase? How much more dwell time will units need to really improve their 

readiness levels, in particular for full-spectrum operations training? 

General CHIARELLI. Assuming responsible draw down operations continue on 

schedule in Iraq, the Army will make progress towards reaching our 2012 interim 

force rotational cycle goal of two years at home station for every year deployed for 

our Active Component (AC) and four years at home station for every year deployed 

for our Reserve Component (RC). Responsible drawdown from Iraq provides the 

Army with the flexibility that has been missing to build operational depth. To capitalize on this new flexibility, we have refined our force generation model to build 

full-spectrum readiness consistently and predictably, which will result in the formation of a full-spectrum force with capabilities to hedge against unexpected contingencies. Assuming the Iraq drawdown occurs in accordance with U.S. Forces-Iraq’s 

plan, we will begin to build the contingency force in 2011, achieve the full contingency force by 2012, and have sustained operational depth by 2013. These measures 

will restore Army readiness and strategic flexibility to our Nation’s leaders. 

Assuming the drawdown in Iraq continues on schedule and no further troop increases are required for Afghanistan, the Army will achieve our intermediate Boots 

on the Ground (BOG) deployed to at home (Dwell) ratios of 1:2 for AC units and 

1:4 for RC units in 2012. 

The Army’s long term BOG:Dwell goal is 1:3 AC and 1:5 RC. The Army’s temporary growth and changes in global force demands ensure a steady state balance 

to long term BOG:Dwell in 2015. 

The Army estimates that approximately 70% of the AC and 80% of the RC Brigade Combat Teams will achieve the BOG:Dwell goals of 1:2 AC and 1:4 RC by 

2011. The remainder of the force will continue to see their dwell rate increase and 

should meet these goals by 2012. 

Mr. ORTIZ. It is our understanding that the Army is revising its depot maintenance requirements process to synchronize with ARFORGEN and integrate core 
122 

workload and fleet management. Please describe what is driving this revision and 

what the Army hopes to achieve. 

General CHIARELLI. That is correct—the Army has aligned the process to determine depot maintenance requirements to better support Army Force Generation 

(ARFORGEN), to better synchronize fleet management requirements over the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), and to incorporate Title 10, SEC 2464 Core 

Depot Requirements. The new process captures depot maintenance requirements 

across both the base and OCO, and incorporates them into a single database. This 

will allow the Army to look forward as it considers base and reset requirements in 

a synchronized fashion across the Future Years Defense Program. Army depot maintenance priorities are based on ARFORGEN equipping needs to support training, 

readiness, and deployment requirements, and will be based on equipment availability, reliability, and the unit’s status in the ARFORGEN pool. 

The Army’s new process also recognizes and prioritizes core requirements as a key 

parameter. The Army requests appropriate funding for core depot requirements to 

ensure that the Army’s industrial base retains the knowledge, skills and abilities 

needed to sustain our critical warfighting equipment throughout the system’s lifecycle. Incorporating fleet management strategies into our depot maintenance requirements determination process ensures that the POM addresses both current 

readiness/combat damaged equipment, and also future requirements based on 

OPTEMPO/age parameters. 

All this will ensure that the Army is postured to provide capable and reliable 

equipment that meets the Army’s readiness standards, as well as to maintain or reduce operational and support costs. Our expectation is that the combination of these 

efforts will enable the Army to develop a synchronized depot maintenance budget 

that is forward looking, tied to ARFORGEN and ensures that the Army’s industrial 

base remains a critical and viable component of our sustainment strategies. This 

process recognizes that the Army’s industrial base is sized and funded to meet the 

Army’s current and future equipment sustainment needs and will provide predictability and stability to our depot workloads and support core depot requirements. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What would be the impact on equipment reset and Army training and 

readiness if the Army were to remain in Iraq longer than the August 2010 withdrawal deadline? 

General CHIARELLI. The military is currently scheduled to sustain 50,000 personnel past August 2010, through December 2011. Any troop levels higher than 

those currently scheduled would impact on equipment reset, training, and readiness. 

The Army would have to adjust equipment reset priorities to source the additional 

deploying units, thus degrading the Army’s efforts to build operational depth and 

hedge against unexpected contingencies. Unit dwell times would not improve as 

quickly as we projected under the current OIF Responsible Drawdown Plan. Training cycles would remain constrained, limiting our capacity to conduct full spectrum 

operations training. Finally, the Army would have to continue the practice of filling 

units with personnel late in the force generation lifecycle, which lessens the time 

personnel have to train with the unit before they deploy. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the FY11 budget request prepare each of your services for 

future conflict? 

General CHIARELLI. The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2011 will enable the 

Army to sustain our Soldiers and Families, continue preparing our Soldiers for success in the current conflict, reset them effectively when they return, and continue 

to transform them for an uncertain future. 

Specific to preparing for the future, the FY11 budget request supports three key 

Army goals. First, the Army is committed to improving individual and collective 

training to better prepare Soldiers and leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Second, we continuously work to provide our formations with 

effective equipment in a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and 

protects our most critical resource—the Soldier. Finally, we must transform the 

Army to a rotational model using Army Force Generation or ARFORGEN. This is 

our core process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a sustained 

and rotational basis to meet future strategic demands. 

For example, the FY11 budget supports training and sustainment of Army forces 

to include individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full 

spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the ARFORGEN 

process. 

The FY11 budget also invests $3.2 billion in Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modernization programs that include procurement of the first incremental changes packages for Infantry BCTs, research, development, testing and evaluation for subsequent change packages, and the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle. Additional investments in the FY11 budget provide funding to begin equipping a thir-
123 

teenth combat aviation brigade and support the increase in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What concerns do each of you have regarding how much of your O&M 

requirement is funded through OCO, particularly depot maintenance? When and 

how do you see that funding migrating back to the base budget? 

General CHIARELLI. The OCO O&M dollars for depot maintenance support the 

Reset of our equipment as it returns from combat operations. Over the next several 

years, as the number of deployed forces decreases, this Reset requirement will decrease. However, we expect that OCO Reset funding will be needed two to three 

years after the return of all deployed forces. As fewer forces are deployed, home station OPTEMPO and training increase. This will drive an increased reliance on base 

budget funding in OPTEMPO and depot maintenance that we will see over the next 

few years. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What impact has OMB’s new rules regarding what can be and cannot 

be included in the OCO request had on your services’ requests for reset funding? 

General CHIARELLI. The impact of the OMB criteria has been minimal with respect to Reset. The rules allow for replacement or repair to original capability (to 

upgraded capability if that is currently available) of equipment returning from theater. Procurement-funded Recapitalization to enhance a system’s capabilities, if that 

Recapitalization is performed to meet war-related requirements (such as adding 

armor), is also permitted. Of concern for the Army is OMB’s determination that procurement funding must be executed within 12 months. A better metric for procurement funding might be based upon the delivery schedule of an equipment item. 

Mr. ORTIZ. For logistics support that is being brought back in-house to be performed by service personnel, do your services have the necessary technical data 

packages? 

General CHIARELLI. Yes. As a rule, only the systems that have available technical 

data packages are returned for organic depot maintenance support. If a technical 

data package is not available there is not an effort to return the system for organic 

depot maintenance. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What criteria have been established for determining which functions 

should be insourced? 

General CHIARELLI. Depot maintenance planning and source of repair determination is an integral function of the integrated logistics support process. Representatives from all involved parties (acquisition, logistics, legal, headquarters and others) 

are involved in the process. It starts with the Core Logistics Assessment and finalizes with the Depot Source of Repair decision. Guidance is provided by numerous 

documents, but most notably in AR 700–127 and AMCR 750–10. The intent is to 

ensure Army compliance with statutes affecting the performance of depot maintenance operations, especially in 10 USC 2464, commonly referred to as the CORE 

statute. As the law proscribes, each Service will maintain a core capability to perform depot maintenance for equipment identified for potential combat operations. 

Generally speaking, the program office establishes an ad hoc committee to initiate 

this effort. This committee, frequently referred to as a sustainment integrated process team, develops the CORE requirements on behalf of the program manager. The 

team also initiates documentation for approval of these requirements, which then 

becomes the basis for determining those functions that will be ‘‘in-sourced.’’ 

Mr. ORTIZ. What plans do your services have in place to assist contractor employees whose functions may be insourced? 

General CHIARELLI. We plan to fill our vacancies using the applicable civil service 

hiring rules. If a contractor chooses to reduce its workforce as a result of changes 

associated with execution of in-sourcing policy, individual contractor employees may 

be eligible to apply for the in-sourced or other government positions. Some may also 

be entitled to veterans’ preference. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please provide details of all corrosion mitigation and prevention costs 

in your services’ FY11 budget request. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army has budgeted significant dollars to fight against 

corrosion. While not specifically identifiable in the Army Budget as corrosion mitigation funds, corrosion considerations are embedded in every activity throughout 

equipment life cycles. 

The Army has only one separate program element (PE) identified for corrosion 

prevention and control (CPC) in the Army budget which, is 423013 for Operations 

and Maintenance (OSD PE 0708012A). This PE was established with funding for 

the Army Materiel Command to support five validated CPC activities: development 

and tracking of corrosion performance metrics, collection and reporting of corrosion 

data, rapid revision of corrosion specification, implementation of mature technologies, and overall program management. For FY11 the Army requested $4.339M 

for CPC in PE 423013. 
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The vast majority of Army CPC efforts are not funded out of PE 423013 but are 

embedded in other PEs and other functions as part of regular operations throughout 

the Army—functions such as material selection, production, packaging, storage, 

preservation, provisioning, standardization, training, regular maintenance, etc. 

These efforts play a critical role in preventing or controlling corrosion but are often 

ignored when discussing CPC activities. The amount of funds specifically budgeted 

for CPC are virtually impossible to isolate from the regular activities and costs of 

the total effort. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How are your services handling the reset of equipment being redeployed from Iraq to original capability before it goes to Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. Equipment transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan is inspected 

and repaired in Kuwait under the oversight of U.S. Army Central Command so that 

it is fully mission capable and suited for current operations. Maintenance actions 

in Kuwait on equipment headed to Afghanistan does not constitute reset. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Given that significant amounts of equipment are moving directly from 

Iraq to Afghanistan, what is the impact on your services’ equipment reset and the 

reset budget? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army is factoring this equipment into its Overseas Contingency Operations budgeting and workload forecasts so the movement from Iraq 

to Afghanistan merely delays reset costs. Equipment from Iraq is sent to Kuwait 

where it is repaired to fully mission capable status before being shipped to Afghanistan. These maintenance actions do not constitute reset. Such equipment will not 

return for reset in FY10 or FY11, decreasing our requirements in those years, but 

will still require reset upon redeployment from Afghanistan. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the status of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned stocks? 

To what extent have your services drawn from prepositioned stocks over the past 

two years and what funding shortfalls currently exist with respect to your services’ 

prepositioned materiel? What funds have been included in the FY11 budget requests 

to alleviate shortages? What shortage areas remain the greatest concern for your 

services? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army reports readiness status for APS Unit Equipment 

Sets that are fully operational or plan to be operational in the near future. Detailed 

readiness levels are classified but projected levels of fill for APS–3 and APS–5 unit 

equipment sets are as follows: 

1) APS–3 Afloat Army Strategic Flotilla (ASF) IV Theater Opening/Port Opening 

Package (TO/PO) uploaded on the USNS Watson is currently enroute to the 

Pacific area of operations after completing a cargo maintenance cycle at 

Charleston, SC. The TO/PO Package has 97% Equipment On Hand (EOH) 

level of fill. 

2) The APS–3 Afloat Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with motorized augmentation set that will be uploaded on two Large Medium Speed Roll-on Rolloff (LMSR) ships in September and November 2010 has a projected 90% EOH 

level of fill. The Army plans to increase this level of fill prior to upload through 

available equipment from reset/repaired OIF retrograded equipment, depot, 

and new production. 

3) The APS–5 Southwest Asia (SWA) Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) with 

motorized augmentation set located in Kuwait, originally planned to be fully 

operational on 31 Mar 2010, is delayed to Mar 2011 due to the recent issue 

of medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles, Material Handling Equipment, 

and SINCGARS radios in support of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

Expansion. The HBCT currently has an 87% EOH level of fill which includes 

all tracked vehicles. The motorized augmentation set has 83% EOH fill. The 

Army plans to fill equipment shortages over the next year from reset/repaired 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) retrograded equipment, depot, and new production. 

4) The APS–3 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with motorized augmentation set currently located in Kuwait has a 94% EOH level of fill; the motorized 

augmentation set has 99% EOH fill. Medium & Heavy Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, Tractors, Vans and Container Handlers were issued to help fill OEF Expansion requirements. This APS IBCT will become the APS–3 Army Strategic 

Flotilla II IBCT when no longer required by CENTCOM in SWA. 

5) The APS–5 Infantry Battalion with Forward Support Company and motorized 

augmentation set located in Afghanistan has 74% EOH fill and is planned to 

be fully mission capable by Sep 2011, IAW the approved APS 2015 Strategy. 

Over the past two years, more than 2600 pieces of APS equipment have been 

issued in support of operations in OEF & OIF (OIF Surge and OEF Expansion). Ex-
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amples of equipment drawn are tactical wheeled vehicles, trailers, engineer equipment, material handling equipment, communication equipment, and generators. 

APS funding (∼$7B OMA and OPA) is required from FY11–15 to maintain APS and 

complete the rebuilds of APS–5 (Fires Brigade and two Sustainment Brigades) and 

APS–3 (Sustainment Brigade and IBCT). 

The FY11 budget request (Base & OCO) to execute the APS 2015 Strategy tasks to be accomplished in FY11 totals approximately $2B. This includes Other Procurement Army (OPA) funding of ∼$1.5B and Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) 

funding of ∼$545M. This funding will allow the Army to reconstitute portions of the 

APS required in the 2015 APS Strategy and provide for Care of Supplies in Storage 

for APS–3 and APS–5; further, this budget request funds five uploaded APS–3 

Large Medium Speed Roll-On Roll-Off (LMSR) and container ships; and returns 

three LMSR ships from reduced operating to full operating status. 

For APS, shortages of tactical wheeled vehicles, generators, engineer, materiel 

handling, and communications equipment remain the greatest concern. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What issues have precluded your services’ achievement of the full reconstitution of prepositioned stocks? What is the current cost estimate of resetting 

or refilling prepositioned materiel and equipment to ensure compliance with requirements of current operations and the National Military Strategy? 

General CHIARELLI. Several issues impact the speed with which the Army is able 

to fully reconstitute its prepositioned stocks. The main issue is the competing demand for equipment between units in combat operations, units in training at home 

station, and Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) requirements. Using APS–5 to illustrate, the Army has nearly completed the rebuild of APS–5 twice, but each time 

when reconstitution was nearly complete, a new requirement developed (first in 

Iraq, and most recently in Afghanistan), that caused us to issue some of the APS– 

5 stocks. This is not necessarily bad, as this APS set is doing precisely what it is 

intended to do—provide the warfighter a ready source of equipment for contingencies. The Army will continue to aggressively pursue the reconstitution of APS 

within competing priorities and available resources. We remain confident that APS 

reconstitution will be complete by 2015. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The total cost to reconstitute and maintain Army Prepositioned Stocks across the Future Year Defense Plan (FY11–15) is approximately $7B. 

General CHIARELLI. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. One finding of the recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016 was that the type of equipment in the prepositioned stocks may 

need to be reconsidered in terms of capabilities needed first in the warfight. What 

consideration are your services’ giving to this finding, and what consideration are 

your services giving to potentially restructuring your prepositioning program, including locations? 

General CHIARELLI. Although Mobility Capability Requirement Study 2016 

(MCRS–16) findings are a consideration in the analysis of Army Prepositioned 

Stocks (APS), APS composition and disposition are primarily driven by Combatant 

Commander Operational Plan (OPLAN) requirements. APS provides forward positioned equipment and sustainment stocks for maneuver and support formations employed in early phases of operational plans. The strategic purpose of APS is to support the warfight force flow needs, reassure allies, and provides Flexible Deterrence 

Options (FDO). There are two types of APS sets: a) Land-based sets are regionally 

aligned sets that provide a robust, forward presence to deter potential hostile forces, 

and should deterrence fail, provide combat capability to defeat the enemy. b) Afloat 

equipment sets are multi-apportioned sets (not tied to a single regional scenario) 

providing strategically-agile, forward positioned, persistently present full spectrum 

operations capability that reinforce land-based sets in support of priority OPLAN requirements. In addition to priority OPLANs, APS supports an array of additional 

Combatant Commander operations, including counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, Non-combatant Evacuation, Theater Security Cooperation, Building Partnership Capacity and training exercises. MCRS future scenarios and potential considerations are based on assumptions that are not 

entirely firm or precise. The mixture of versatile combat and support sets allows 

maximum agility and relevant support within the current operational environment. 

As Combatant Commander plans evolve, APS composition and disposition is reviewed and adjusted as necessary. 

Department of the Army is conducting an assessment that will take into account 

Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the MCRS–16 analysis, an examination 

of updated war plan requirements and ongoing operations. The results of this assessment will be fully coordinated with the Joint Staff and United States Transportation Command, and incorporated into emerging APS strategies. 
126 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Quadrennial Defense Review strategy of supporting one 

rather than two major combat operations simultaneously change your services’ calculation of war reserve requirements and how has this affected the FY11 budget? 

General CHIARELLI. The defense strategy articulated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) includes ‘‘maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable 

nation-state aggressors.’’ The Army is analyzing the QDR to determine how it affects war reserve planning factors and force structure. The end result will be war 

reserve requirements aligned with the QDR and a defense strategy to fight two 

major combat operations simultaneously. The QDR did not have a direct effect on 

the Army’s FY11 war reserve budget, but it will influence future budget requests. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What underlying requirements do your services use to build and rebuild their prepositioned stocks? Do these requirements vary by APS? Do these requirements reflect changes in your services’ overall manning and deployment strategies? 

General CHIARELLI. Army Prepositioned Stocks composition and disposition are 

primarily driven by Combatant Commander Operational Plan (OPLAN) requirements. APS provides forward positioned equipment and sustainment stocks for maneuver and support formations employed in early phases of operational plans. The 

strategic purpose of APS is to support the warfight force flow needs, reassure allies 

and provide Flexible Deterrence Options. There are two types of APS sets: a) Landbased sets are regionally aligned sets that provide a robust, forward presence to 

deter potential hostile forces, and should deterrence fail, provide combat capability 

to defeat the enemy. b) Afloat equipment sets are multi-apportioned sets (not tied 

to a single regional scenario) that provide strategically-agile, forward positioned, 

persistently present full spectrum operations capability to reinforce land-based sets 

in support of priority OPLAN requirements. In addition to priority OPLANs, APS 

supports an array of Combatant Commander additional operations including 

counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, 

Non-combatant Evacuation, Theater Security Cooperation, Building Partnership Capacity and training exercises. As Combatant Commander plans evolve, APS composition and disposition is reviewed and adjusted as necessary. 

Yes, based on the Guidance for the Employment of the Forces and Joint Services 

Capabilities Plan for directed OPLAN and Concept of Operation Plan requirements. 

The APS afloat assets are used to support multiple Combatant Commanders’ 

warfight requirements and are not tied to a single scenario. The mixture of mission 

and enabler capabilities provides Combatant Commanders with operational flexibility. The APS ground based sets support rapid deployment and early entry forces 

in high threat environments. 

Yes, APS strategy development is directly linked to changes in the Army Force 

Generation process, force packaging and deployment strategy. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is your services’ current plan for the disposition of MRAP vehicles upon conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will they be reset and 

made part of prepositioned equipment? If so, how many and where? What number 

of MRAP vehicles will be retained by your service and for what purpose? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army expects to retain over 15,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)/MRAP–All-Terrain Vehicles, which will be placed 

in the force structure, and we have developed a draft allocation plan for the return 

of MRAPs from theater. This plan is currently under review by Army senior leaders. 

The proposed plan will reset vehicles as they are retrograded from theater and place 

a majority of the MRAP Fleet in Task Organized Brigade Combat Team sets that 

will deploy when MRAP levels of protection are required, similar to Army 

Prepositioned Stocks. Approximately a quarter of the MRAPs will be placed in 

Transportation, Explosive Ordinance Disposal units, and echelon above brigade 

Medical units. In these cases, MRAPs are either displacing other platforms or filling 

platform shortages. A limited number will be placed in training sets, to be drawn 

upon by units to conduct driver and collective training as required and for 

Sustainment Stock and War Reserve. This proposed allocation plan provides operational flexibility and mitigates the storage and maintenance burden on home station units. 

Mr. ORTIZ. A significant number of non-standard items of equipment have been 

procured to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. What types of 

equipment does this category include? What is your service’s plan for the disposition 

of this equipment, including the cost to repair and maintain it? If retained at the 

organizational or depot level, what are the expected storage requirements? Are repair, maintenance and storage requirements reflected in the FY11 budget? 

General CHIARELLI. Non-Standard Equipment (NS–E) has played a significant 

role in enhancing the Army’s capabilities. The MRAP, the various types of IED de-
127 

feat devices, base entry intrusion protection systems, and commercial power generation equipment are some examples. 

Disposition procedures for NS–E no longer required in Iraq (or Afghanistan) are 

laid out in a detailed HQDA order, but generally, our first priority is to redistribute 

those items to meet needs elsewhere in the CENTCOM area of operations. If not 

required anywhere in CENTCOM, by the Army, another Service, or another U.S. 

Government agency, then items will either be stored for future use, or disposed of. 

The Army has painstakingly gone through each item of NS–E that we own, and predetermined whether it is something we will retain, or something we will dispose of. 

Retained NS–E will be stored as part of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS), or in 

a CONUS supply depot. ‘‘Retained NS–E’’ will be stored until it is re-distributed to 

meet a future requirement, a decision is made to make it a Program of Record and 

integrate it into the force, or the requirement for it no longer exists (at which time 

it will be disposed of ). The Army will budget for ‘‘Retained’’ NS–E that is either 

stored or left in use in units. An example is the MRAP. By FY11, MRAP 

sustainment will be incorporated as part of APS and in some cases, added to unit 

tables of organization and equipment, like all other materiel authorized for use in 

units. ‘‘Retained’’ NS–E for which the Army does not have an enduring need, yet 

has utility to support potential future missions will be reset in theater using Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds and stored. 

Not-to-be-Retained items will not be brought back from Southwest Asia, but rather will be redistributed in theater or disposed of. The Not Retained NS–E that is 

excess to CENTCOM requirements is being offered to the Department of State (US 

Mission Iraq) and the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property 

(NASASP), or for Transfer to Coalition or host nation. Examples of Not Retained 

NS–E equipment include: exercise equipment; computers and monitors; office furniture; air conditioners; and commercial generators. It is important to note that 

some NS–E does not meet U.S. specifications or U.S. Customs clearance requirements, has been in theater for a number of years and is now beyond its expected 

useful life. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please explain the statement ‘‘The Navy’s FY 2010 OCO appropriation 

did not fully capture OEF execution requirements’’ and describe the pressures that 

this realization has put on your FY11 budget request, particularly the flying hour 

program. 

Admiral GREENERT. Submission of the FY10 OCO budget request in May 2009 occurred as the Navy was shifting to a much higher flight hour OPTEMPO associated 

with longer flights into Afghanistan than into Iraq, and to a higher Carrier Strike 

Group presence reflected in the CENTCOM Commander’s Request for Forces. A portion of these OPTEMPO increases were included in the FY10 Supplemental Request, and they were fully captured in the FY11 OCO Request. The combination of 

the FY11 OCO Request and FY11 baseline budget support the higher OEF 

OPTEMPO overall, and the required level of FY11 flying hours in particular. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Reset for the Navy has not had the same focus as Army and Marine 

Corps equipment reset because Navy forces are being applied in a different manner 

in support of OIF and OEF. Please explain the Navy’s approach to reset and the 

challenges the Navy faces in this area, especially for the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) approach 

to reset is similar to Army and Marine Corps reset. It is composed primarily of 

equipment deployed to a theater in support of a specific ground combat contingency 

operation. For instance, equipment in OIF is transferred to staging areas where it 

is received and inspected. At the staging area, disposition is made to either divest 

or retrograde. In general, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, communications equipment, and small craft are retrograded, while other equipment is 

evaluated based on condition and economic analysis. If a piece of equipment will 

cost more to transport and repair than to replace, the equipment will be divested. 

A significant portion of the life support equipment (e.g., tents, field gear, etc.) is not 

economical to transport/repair. This equipment is divested in country through Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO) and replaced by the appropriate 

systems command (SYSCOM). Retrograded equipment is repaired through the 

SYSCOM overhaul process and prepared for redeployment. Specifically, two Seabee 

battalion equipment sets (construction equipment), Maritime Expeditionary Security 

Force small craft and squadron equipment sets that had been in OIF for over six 

years constitute a significant portion of the reset requirement. NECC’s reset requirements are also related to the Personal Gear Issue (PGI), tool kits, and special 

equipment associated with continuous EOD platoon deployments. Additionally, the 

presence within OIF of a Riverine Squadron since February 2007 with its combatant 

craft, tactical equipment, life support, and communications gear requires attention. 
128 

Finally, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group and Combat Camera equipment are also included in the FY11 reset plan. NECC and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) are also exploring opportunities with the Army and 

Marine Corps to overhaul equipment in theater at existing facilities. NECC and all 

Naval assets will have reset requirements that will exist after OIF/OEF ends as we 

evaluate, restore, or replace equipment upon return to CONUS. These requirements 

are being evaluated and will change as OPTEMPO and capability requirements 

change. 

The Navy’s biggest challenge with reset is establishing the appropriate baseline 

OPTEMPO for the future. Our OPTEMPO in CENTCOM will continue as the combat mission ends in Iraq. Navy enabling forces will remain in CENTCOM to provide 

various combat support/combat service support to Joint and coalition forces in the 

region. Concurrently, we will continue to maintain a forward-deployed force of about 

100 ships globally to prevent conflict, support allies, and respond to crises. Navy 

ships and aircraft are capital-intensive forces, procured to last for decades. Scheduled maintenance of our force structure, and training and certification of our crews 

between deployments is a key element in the ‘‘reset’’ of the force. This ‘‘reset in 

stride’’ process is perhaps different from other Services. It enables our ships and aircraft to rotate deployments and provide continuous forward presence as well as be 

ready for sustained surge operations, such as the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Haiti recently. We are perhaps unique in that our maintenance accounts maintain the force, modernize, and ‘‘reset in stride’’ for the service lives of 

our platforms. Since increased emergent operations are consuming the expected 

service lives of Fleet units, at an advanced rate, Navy relies on OCO to fund overseas contingency operations and ‘‘reset-in-stride’’. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What price has the Navy paid for pulling out of its engineered approach to maintenance? Was Navy onboard manning cut too deeply? How is the 

Navy correcting this situation? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy has always utilized an engineered approach to 

maintenance with a focus on reducing maintenance costs while increasing operational availability. In the late 1990s, the Navy shifted its practices from calendarbased periodicities and long industrial periods for its surface ships to a maintenance 

regime that relies upon the principles of reliability-centered maintenance and condition-based maintenance. This transition instituted the conduct of Phased Maintenance Availabilities of shorter duration that reduced the time the platforms were 

unavailable for deployment. These changes resulted in a focus on short term, ‘‘get 

the ship underway’’ type of work, instead of life cycle focused work associated with 

tanks, structures and distributed systems, which added risk to our ability to reach 

the expected service life for our surface ships. 

In May 2009, Navy established the Surface Ship Life Cycle Maintenance (SSLCM) 

Activity to provide life-cycle support for all classes of surface ships comparable to 

the engineering planning and support provided to nuclear powered submarines and 

aircraft carriers. The primary mission of this organization is to provide centralized 

life-cycle management of the surface ship Class Maintenance Plans (CMPs) to support fleet operational requirements and to enable ships to achieve expected service 

life. The SSLCM Activity has completed engineering assessments of maintenance requirements for DDG 51 and LSD 41/49 class ships, resulting in a more robust technical foundation to support programming and budgeting decisions. 

Onboard manning on surface ships has been reduced as a result of optimal manning initiatives. The analysis conducted for that effort focused on ensuring that 

ships are assigned sufficient numbers of trained people to stand the watches required to operate the ship in battle. There was a conscious decision to move part 

of the maintenance workload from the smaller ship crews to shore maintenance organizations. Simultaneously, the Navy implemented separate actions to consolidate 

maintenance organizations in a drive for efficiency and reduction in shore infrastructure. 

The number of people who are actually onboard a ship can be different from the 

Navy Manning Plan for that vessel for a variety of reasons, including Individual 

Augmentee assignments, unplanned losses, temporary injury or illness situations 

and the timing associated with Sailors’ detaching and reporting. Recent INSURV inspections and other independent assessments have determined that the optimal 

manning effort might have gone too far in the case of ships that deploy for lengthy 

periods without regular access to fully equipped maintenance facilities. The situation is under current review and will be addressed in the next budget cycle. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What training actions is the Navy taking in response to the recent dramatic increase in removals of commanding officers for cause, including six firings 

in the first three months of this calendar year? 
129 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy leadership takes the recent detachments for cause 

among commanding officers very seriously. We are assessing the situation to determine whether there are common threads that indicate a need for systemic changes 

in training. Our preliminary review suggests that the detachments have not been 

the result of any single underlying cause associated with failure in the training or 

commanding officer selection processes, but have been largely attributable to personal behavior or failure of leadership issues. Commanding officers are required to 

maintain high standards of leadership and conduct, and current training emphasizes these requirements. Should we identify specific issues that warrant changes 

in training, we will promptly implement the necessary changes. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Secretary Mabus last month discussed the Navy’s substantial increase 

in operation and maintenance funding as a critical component of military readiness. 

The subcommittee has advocated for conditioned based maintenance as a means of 

cost savings by allowing real-time monitoring of a ship’s components, thereby allowing the crew to repair machinery in advance of catastrophic failures. CBM also reduces the logistical footprint necessary to conduct costly and time-consuming bowto-stern examinations. As the Navy engages in cost-effective decisions to build the 

most capable force, what is being considered to integrate CBM systems into ships’ 

design rather than retrofitting after commissioning? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy employs a variety of Condition Based Maintenance 

(CBM) Systems on our in-service platforms today, most notably the Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS) which is installed on 103 platforms with 26 programmed for installation. For new ship designs, CBM systems and processes are integral elements of both the DDG 1000 and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) systems, 

as required by OPNAVINST 4790.16A, Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Policy. 

Both ships have reduced manning levels relative to previous ship classes of the 

same size, which as a design parameter has driven the need to take CBM to new 

levels of analysis and detail. In DDG 1000, instrumentation that monitors system 

performance is coupled with distance support systems that provide enhanced information exchange that enables greater shore based support to the ship and its crew. 

LCS is also implementing CBM in order to meet maintenance strategy requirements 

as defined in the Capability Development Document (CDD). LCS conducted a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for key systems, and implemented CBM processes that identify critical components and externally induced degradation factors, that when combined with future ship operations requirements, enable the prediction of the best time to conduct maintenance. This reliability engineering-based CBM approach, designed in up front, maximizes the ship’s operational availability, reduces the frequency of unplanned maintenance, reduces overall maintenance costs and minimizes the maintenance burden on the crew. Systems 

for which CBM is being developed for DDG 1000 and LCS can then be used, either 

directly or with some modification, for either existing ships (backfit) or reused in 

the design of future ships (forward fit), providing similar benefits for those ships. 

In addition to the DDG 1000 and LCS Classes, the LPD 17 Class has CBM systems installed during construction and new construction DDG 51 Class ships (DDG 

113 and follow) and the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) will have CBM systems as 

part of their design. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the FY11 budget request prepare each of your services for 

future conflict? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Department’s objectives, priorities and budget are 

aligned with the National Defense Strategy, and address the requirement to train 

and maintain a force capable of executing Combatant Commander Operational 

Plans (OPLANs), preventing/deterring conflict, and prevailing in a range of future 

contingencies. The FY 2011 budget supports Fleet Response Plan OPTEMPO, providing the training and surge capability to meet today’s OPLAN requirements, as 

well as those of future contingencies, effectively and decisively. The FY11 budget resources ship and aircraft depot maintenance requirements to 99% and 96%, respectively. These investments are key to ensuring that today’s force is not only available 

for current contingencies, but are maintained in proper condition for future engagement. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What concerns do each of you have regarding how much of your O&M 

requirement is funded through OCO, particularly depot maintenance? When and 

how do you see that funding migrating back to the base budget? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy is currently engaged with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assess funding and requirements, and in particular to properly 

characterize the distinction between enduring baseline and OCO requirements. 

Findings from this effort will serve as the basis for adjusting ship and aircraft depot 

maintenance requirements and funding profiles. 
130 

Mr. ORTIZ. What impact has OMB’s new rules regarding what can be and cannot 

be included in the OCO request had on your services’ requests for reset funding? 

Admiral GREENERT. OMB’s guidelines for funding of OCO requests have not limited the Operation & Maintenance accounts reset funding. Depot Maintenance funding for the Navy’s air, ship and ground forces is in line with the level of operational 

effort being expended in support of the ongoing overseas contingencies. 

OMB rules do impact reset funding of assets experiencing high contingency operation OPTEMPO wear and tear, which has caused ‘‘stress losses’’ (accelerated fatigue life consumption) mainly within the aviation community, and to a lesser extent on ground equipment within the Dept of Navy. These stress loss assets (reduced operating life remaining) represent a growing reset cost that will have to be 

addressed in order to properly restore the Navy to full operational capability. 

Mr. ORTIZ. For logistics support that is being brought back in-house to be performed by service personnel, do your services have the necessary technical data 

packages? 

Admiral GREENERT. DASN (A&LM) is not aware of any specific DoN examples of 

logistics support that is being brought back in-house to be performed by service personnel. The current DoDINST 5000.2 requires that program managers have a Data 

Management Strategy (DMS) that includes defining the ‘‘data required to design, 

manufacture, and sustain the system; as well as to support re-competition for production, sustainment, or upgrades’’. When creating a DMS, a program manager 

must also assess the merits of including a priced contract option for the future delivery of technical data and intellectual property rights not acquired upon initial contract award and identify the risks to the program by not obtaining those data rights. 

The DMS is a recent requirement, therefore, the status of individual programs 

would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What criteria have been established for determining which functions 

should be insourced? 

Admiral GREENERT. The identification of contract support efforts and services appropriate for in-sourcing positions began with a review the Section 807 (10 USC 

§ 2330a(c)) inventory of contracts and evaluating new workload requirements to ensure they are appropriately resourced and staffed by military, government civilians, 

or contractual efforts. This process, led by OSD P&R, is ongoing. Section 2463 of 

Title 10 United States Code requires the Department of Defense to ensure consideration is given to using DoD civilian employees to perform functions that are performed by contractors but could be performed by DoD employees. The DoD has 

issued guidance that implements these provisions and provides the appropriate authorities and tools for making determinations to in-source the performance of functions that are inherently governmental, closely related to inherently governmental, 

inappropriately contracted personal services or exempt from private sector performance. Further, contracts in which government employees can perform the services 

more cost effectively or contracts that are performing poorly may also be candidates 

for in-sourcing under 10 USC § 2463. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What plans do your services have in place to assist contractor employees whose functions may be insourced? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please provide details of all corrosion mitigation and prevention costs 

in your services’ FY11 budget request. 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. As the nation’s strategic reserve forces, what impact will emergent Request for Forces have on execution of your FY11 readiness budget? 

Admiral GREENERT. The impact of Request for Forces (RFF) on the execution of 

the FY11 budget is dependant on the nature and scope of the RFFs, which are approved by the Secretary of Defense. RFF impact spans the range of shifting forces 

from other previously planned Combatant Commander missions, deploying additional forces that are in Fleet Response Plan surge-ready status, or activating units 

in Reduced Operating Status. When forces shifted to a higher OPTEMPO AOR (e.g., 

PACOM to CENTCOM) are deployed from a surge-ready status, or are activated 

from a Reduced Operating Status, incremental (unbudgeted) costs are incurred, requiring supplemental funding or mitigation from other requirements. The 

unbudgeted emergent costs can be significant. For example, the incremental flying 

hour costs alone of shifting a Carrier Air Wing from a non-CENTCOM AOR to 

CENTCOM are on the order of $20M per month. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the status of Navy and Air Force prepositioned stocks? To 

what extent have your services drawn from prepositioned stocks over the past two 
131 

years and what funding shortfalls currently exist with respect to your services’ 

prepositioned materiel? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy prepositioned material loaded on to each of the 

Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons (MPSRONs) is currently at 99%. The Navy is 

currently in the midst of deploying new equipment, the Improved Navy Lighterage 

System (INLS) and Waterfront Equipment (WE), which replace aging and outdated 

material currently onboard ships. 

Overall, there remains a mix of old and new equipment because several of the 

ships have not rotated through their maintenance cycle in order to replace their 

equipment. All ships will have the new INLS and WE by the summer of 2011. 

Navy lighterage and 35 pieces of Civil Engineering Support Equipment (vehicles, 

generators, etc) were drawn recently in support of the Haiti relief operations. All 

the Navy lighterage has been returned to the ships. The Navy has accountability 

and visibility of the Civil Engineering Support Equipment which will be returned 

shortly via surface lift. 

Otherwise, over the past two year the Navy prepositioned equipment has only 

been drawn for exercise purposes. Equipment is typically utilized for a period of 30– 

60 days and then returned onboard the ship. 

The Navy does not have a funding shortfall for its prepositioned material, however it should be noted that the Navy does not have ‘‘fenced’’ funds strictly to support its prepositioned material. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How long will it take the Marine Corps to recover key core warfighting 

capabilities following cessation of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How important is reset to the Marine Corps’ ability to sustain equipment for current operations in Afghanistan and to provide for ongoing training of 

non-deployed and next-to-deploy units? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How much of the increased maintenance costs for the MV–22 are captured in the FY11 budget request? How does the Marine Corps plan to mitigate the 

shortfall? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How are your services handling the reset of equipment being redeployed from Iraq to original capability before it goes to Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Given that significant amounts of equipment are moving directly from 

Iraq to Afghanistan, what is the impact on your services’ equipment reset and the 

reset budget? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the status of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned stocks? 

To what extent have your services drawn from prepositioned stocks over the past 

two years and what funding shortfalls currently exist with respect to your services’ 

prepositioned materiel? What funds have been included in the FY11 budget requests 

to alleviate shortages? What shortage areas remain the greatest concern for your 

services? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What issues have precluded your services’ achievement of the full reconstitution of prepositioned stocks? What is the current cost estimate of resetting 

or refilling prepositioned materiel and equipment to ensure compliance with requirements of current operations and the National Military Strategy? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. One finding of the recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016 was that the type of equipment in the prepositioned stocks may 

need to be reconsidered in terms of capabilities needed first in the warfight. What 

consideration are your services giving to this finding, and what consideration are 

your services giving to potentially restructuring your prepositioning program, including locations? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 
132 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Quadrennial Defense Review strategy of supporting one 

rather than two major combat operations simultaneously change your services’ calculation of war reserve requirements and how has this affected the FY11 budget? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What underlying requirements do your services use to build and rebuild their prepositioned stocks? Do these requirements vary by APS? Do these requirements reflect changes in your services’ overall manning and deployment strategies? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is your services’ current plan for the disposition of MRAP vehicles upon conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will they be reset and 

made part of prepositioned equipment? If so, how many and where? What number 

of MRAP vehicles will be retained by your service and for what purpose? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. A significant number of non-standard items of equipment have been 

procured to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. What types of 

equipment does this category include? What is your service’s plan for the disposition 

of this equipment, including the cost to repair and maintain it? If retained at the 

organizational or depot level, what are the expected storage requirements? Are repair, maintenance and storage requirements reflected in the FY11 budget? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the FY11 budget request prepare each of your services for 

future conflict? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What concerns do each of you have regarding how much of your O&M 

requirement is funded through OCO, particularly depot maintenance? When and 

how do you see that funding migrating back to the base budget? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What impact has OMB’s new rules regarding what can be and cannot 

be included in the OCO request had on your services’ requests for reset funding? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. For logistics support that is being brought back in-house to be performed by service personnel, do your services have the necessary technical data 

packages? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What criteria have been established for determining which functions 

should be insourced? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What plans do your services have in place to assist contractor employees whose functions may be insourced? 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please provide details of all corrosion mitigation and prevention costs 

in your services’ FY11 budget request. 

General AMOS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. As the nation’s strategic reserve forces, what impact will emergent Request for Forces have on execution of your FY11 readiness budget? 

General CHANDLER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the status of Navy and Air Force prepositioned stocks? To 

what extent have your services drawn from prepositioned stocks over the past two 

years and what funding shortfalls currently exist with respect to your services’ 

prepositioned materiel? 

General CHANDLER. With regard to general War Reserve Materiel (WRM), over 

the past two years 370 vehicles, 221 pieces of aerospace ground equipment, 403 

fuels operational readiness capability equipment assets, and 6,138 miscellaneous 

pieces of equipment have been drawn from prepositioned stock to support Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and theater security pos-
133 

ture and exercise requirements. Additionally, the Air Force Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) program has deployed the equivalent of 43 initial housekeeping sets (capable of supporting 550 personnel per set), one stand-alone Swift 

BEAR housekeeping set (capable of supporting 150 personnel), and an additional 12 

mobile electric power-12 (MEP–12) generators in support of OIF/OEF over the past 

two years. As BEAR converts from the initial housekeeping set to unit type code 

(UTC) configuration, there are 3,807 UTCs that are mission capable and 2,368 

UTCs that are either partially or non-mission capable. Currently, the total shortfall in Air Force prepositioned materiel is $905.3 million dollars. The Air Force is requesting an additional $315 million dollars in overseas 

contingency operations to re-set these assets. There is an additional shortfall of $211 

million across the future year defense plan to fund BEAR Air Force Central operations. 

Mr. ORTIZ. While the O&M budget shows a 7.3% increase, much of that is based 

on inflation and fuel costs and other cost-growth factors. We are concerned that 

readiness within the Air Force may be continuing to decline as a function of aging 

aircraft and increased optempo. What actions is the Air Force taking to improve its 

readiness? 

General CHANDLER. The Air Force is addressing readiness using a two-fold approach. First, aging issues are addressed through predictive sustainment engineering, service life extension, and component improvement programs. Second, the Air 

Force is investing in procurement and recapitalization for the F–35, KC–X and legacy aircraft modifications. Overseas Contingency Operations have presented a constant challenge since late 2001, and the Air Force has dealt with increased operations tempo by modifying our deployment construct to account for surges and capture actual risk levels, and deploy-to-dwell ratios. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Weapons system sustainment is funded at 82 percent, with only 63 

percent covered in the base budget. What risks are being taken with that level of 

funding? And does the Air Force deem this as acceptable risk now that you have 

determined that you’ll need service life extension programs on almost all of your aircraft to meet your inventory requirements in the out-years? 

General CHANDLER. At 65 percent funding for weapon system sustainment (WSS), 

the Air Force will experience some risk in materiel readiness. To balance Air Force 

resources and ensure our highest priorities are funded, the Air Force requested 

overseas contingency operations funding ($2.3 billion) to meet contingency requirements. This additional funding brings the Air Force to an 82 percent funding level 

and ensures balanced risk across the Air Force WSS portfolio. The drop in the percentage of requirements funded in the baseline is the result of requirements growth 

out-pacing funding growth. The level of risk associated with 82 percent funding resulted in weapon system sustainment being the number one requirement on the unfunded priority list. 

Mr. ORTIZ. With the end of the production line for the F–22, and the delay in the 

JSF schedule, how does that now affect the assumptions that the Combat Aircraft 

Restructuring plan was based upon? Will these facts affect how the Air Force moves 

forward with the retirement of 250 additional legacy aircraft? 

General CHANDLER. There are no impacts to the Combat Air Force Restructure 

(CAF–R) Plan assumptions. The CAF–R plan assumed that the F–22 production 

would end at approximately 187 aircraft and the F–35 will be replacing F–16s over 

the next 20 years—a slip to IOC will have minimal impact to the overall war fighting risk of the plan. A recent independent study by RAND concluded that the Air 

Force will need more fifth-generation fighters, long-range strike capability, and critical munitions in the near-to-mid term, with or without the restructure. The retirement of 257 legacy aircraft does not significantly add to these risks. 

The delay in F–35 IOC will also not impact the execution of the plan. QDR assessments indicate that the programmed force of strike aircraft will be sufficient to defeat potential adversaries, including those with advanced anti-access capabilities; 

however, we have accepted an increased level of risk. The AF has also postured the 

A–10 and F–16 fleets for potential F–35 program delays as this aircraft is being designed and fielded as their replacement. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Were the commanders at our overseas bases consulted and included 

in the decisions made related to the CAF restructuring plan? Was Bruce Lemkim, 

deputy under secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, consulted regarding the impact of the reductions on the service’s ability to build partnership capacity? 

General CHANDLER. All affected Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and the Reserve 

Component were involved in the decision to restructure the Air Force fighter force, 

and in developing the plan to identify the bases and units that would be impacted. 

Throughout the Air Force Corporate Process, the International Affairs Directorate 
134 

of the Air Force Secretariat (SAF/IA) was represented and involved in developing 

the Combat Air Forces Restructuring plan. When the reductions directly affected activities and functions for which SAF/IA provides oversight, SAF/IA provided appropriate input to the process, such as advocacy for sufficient aircraft to conduct tuition-based international training. It is important to note that the Air Force Component Commanders are responsible to define requirements for operational forces necessary to accomplish their mission, including building partnerships (BP) in their 

AOR. SAF/IA assists the Air Force Component Commanders in helping partner nations develop appropriate air power capabilities in accordance with US national objectives. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How was the Air Force decision made to accelerate the retirement of 

legacy fighter aircraft? Are you worried about the potential gaps that could be created in our homeland defense systems, such as Air Sovereignty Alert? 

General CHANDLER. The decision to accelerate the retirement of legacy aircraft 

was made after evaluating our requirement for force structure to fulfill the National 

Military Strategy with a tolerable level of risk. Savings from the accelerated retirement allowed the Air Force to increase its capacity in several mission priorities such 

as the nuclear enterprise and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Homeland defense is a DoD priority mission, and the Air Force anticipates no gaps in 

our ability to support Operation NOBLE EAGLE due to legacy fighter aircraft retirement. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The GAO made a number of recommendations related to the Air Force 

Air Sovereignty Alert mission. What is the status of implementing those recommendations? 

General CHANDLER. The January 2009 GAO report to Congress titled ‘‘HOMELAND DEFENSE: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert 

Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace’’ provided us with five recommendations to improve air operations. Since its publication, we have continuously tracked our 

progress in fulfilling the recommendations made by the GAO. The Air Force is on 

track to institute the GAO recommendations. 

Update and implement the homeland air defense alert program action directive 

(PAD): The Air Force completed a review of all PAD required actions, verifying that 

each has been accomplished. The Air Force incorporated pertinent PAD issues into 

a comprehensive policy document currently undergoing final approval. 

Update the Air Force homeland defense policy, homeland operations doctrine, and 

CONOPS to incorporate & define the roles and responsibilities for homeland air defense alert operations: The GAO report provided additional substance and specifics 

for updating Air Force Policy Document 10–8, Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 

A revised version of this document is undergoing final approval, and incorporates 

GAO findings and recommendations. It also incorporates information from the DOD 

Strategy on Homeland Defense & Civil Support, the roles and responsibilities of 

OASD (HD & ASA), and details from the program action directive. This Air Force 

Doctrine Document will be subsequently reviewed at a regularly scheduled interval. 

Incorporate the homeland air defense alert mission within the Air Force submissions for the 6-year Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP): Since Fiscal Year 2004, 

the Air Force has incorporated the Homeland Defense mission in its submission of 

the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum for the 6-year FYDP. Additionally, 

the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required that Air Force provide Congress with a report regarding expenditures on the ONE mission. 

Develop and implement a plan to address any projected capability gaps in homeland air defense alert units due to the expected end of the useful service lives of 

their F–15s and F–16s: Defense of the homeland is a priority mission of the Air 

Force—we will not back away from that responsibility. The Air Force anticipates no 

potential gaps in our ability to support ONE caused by legacy fighter aircraft retirement. 

Add Operation NOBLE EAGLE to Units DOC Statements: As of August 2009, as 

recommended by the GAO report, we completed inserting the requirement for air 

defense alert into the Designed Operational Capability statements for all units engaged in ONE. As a result, the unit readiness to perform the mission will be specifically monitored. 

Develop and implement a formal method to replace deploying units that still provides unit commanders flexibility to coordinate replacements: Under the Secretary 

of Defense-approved Global Force Management construct, combatant commanders 

and NORAD state requirements for forces through US Joint Forces Command 

(USJFCOM). Subsequently, USJFCOM requests forces from Air Combat Command 

(ACC), the Air Force forces provider. ACC currently has a formal process in place 

to meet USJFCOM sourcing requests, using successive steps to cover ONE alert op-
135 

erations for a deploying unit. Since 9/11, all USJFCOM requests for Air Force 

sourcing have been fulfilled. 

Mr. ORTIZ. There have been conflicting reports on the numbers of Air Force 

augmentees in theater and whether that number will decrease or increase as a result of the drawing down of forces in Iraq and the surge of forces into Afghanistan. 

What impact does the augmentee mission have on the overall Air Force mission? 

How does it affect Readiness? 

General CHANDLER. We remain fully engaged in supporting the Joint team, anticipating a slight rise in the number of Air Force augmentees in theater from approximately 1,500 in Fiscal Year 2010 to 1,600 in Fiscal Year 2011. This increase will 

impact the mission, diminishing our organized, trained and equipped unit capabilities. In addition, augmentee sourcing is generally supported by Field Grade Officers 

and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers, which adversely affects unit leadership, 

training, and capability. Air Force end-strength does not account for augmentee 

tasks which are over and above postured capability. Additionally, augmentees tend 

to be tasked to high tempo capability areas such as Intelligence, Communications, 

Logistics Readiness, etc, further exacerbating sustainment of rotational sourcing. 

Despite these challenges, we will continue to be ‘‘All In’’, providing the needed support to the war-fighting commander. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The flying hour program has been decreased by a significant amount 

in the FY11 budget request. Please explain. 

General CHANDLER. The Fiscal Year 2011 peacetime flying hour program is fully 

funded. Due to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) taskings, the Air Force historically under-executed peacetime hours and over-executed OCO hours. The peacetime flying hour program was optimized for Fiscal Year 2011 to bring the President’s Budget in line with expected peacetime execution. If OCO taskings decrease 

in future years, contingency hours will be realigned to the peacetime program. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the FY11 budget request prepare each of your services for 

future conflict? 

General CHANDLER. With the FY11 budget request, the Air Force is balancing today’s demands with preparing for a wide range of potential future conflicts. Specifically, the Air Force has invested Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

(RDT&E) and Procurement funds towards expanding our Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability, supporting the increased focus on Irregular 

Warfare and Building Partnerships, and developing new and emerging technologies. 

Our RDT&E request invests in critical technology and competitive concept exploration for Long Range Strike, a ‘‘family of systems’’ to provide responsive global 

force projection and precision force application for military utility in the 2020 plus 

timeframe. The RDT&E request will also begin KC–X tanker development, continue 

F–35 flight testing and F–22 3.2 software development, and enhance our legacy 

fighter capability with F–15 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar development. 

Our procurement request invests in 5th Generation fighters and improves ISR capability with buys of 22 F–35 Lightning II aircraft, and 40 unmanned aircraft (36 

MQ–9 Reapers and 4 RQ–4 Global Hawks). Additionally, we’re investing in MQ–1 

Predator datalink, ground control, and sensor modifications, as well as target location accuracy and high definition video for the MQ–9. 

Our increased focus on Irregular Warfare and Building Partnership Capacity is 

highlighted in our FY11 request with procurement of 15 Light Mobility Aircraft 

(LiMA). This commercial off the shelf (COTS) aircraft will help prepare partner nations (PN) to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating airlift capability consistent with PN needs and anticipated methods of employment. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What concerns do each of you have regarding how much of your O&M 

requirement is funded through OCO, particularly depot maintenance? When and 

how do you see that funding migrating back to the base budget? 

General CHANDLER. The Air Force’s current baseline maintenance and 

sustainment funding is insufficient to cover both baseline and OCO requirements. 

Depot maintenance, a subset of the Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) portfolio, 

includes both organic and contract maintenance, sustaining engineering and technical order updates. Despite continuous increases in baseline funding for weapon 

system sustainment since 2003, requirements growth has continued to significantly 

outpace funding growth. The Air Force took measured risk across our WSS requirements in the FY11 budget, funding only our highest priority requirements. For 

these reasons, WSS is the top priority submission on Air Force unfunded requirements list. Reductions of OCO funding without a proportionate shift to the baseline 

budget will further increase risk in WSS, possibly to untenable levels. Per OSD 

guidance, a migration of OCO funds to baseline budget will begin in fiscal year 2012 

for Air Force depot maintenance requirements. 
136 

Mr. ORTIZ. What impact has OMB’s new rules regarding what can be and cannot 

be included in the OCO request had on your services’ requests for reset funding? 

General CHANDLER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. For logistics support that is being brought back in-house to be performed by service personnel, do your services have the necessary technical data 

packages? 

General CHANDLER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What criteria have been established for determining which functions 

should be insourced? 

General CHANDLER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What plans do your services have in place to assist contractor employees whose functions may be insourced? 

General CHANDLER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please provide details of all corrosion mitigation and prevention costs 

in your services’ FY11 budget request. 

General CHANDLER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. General Chandler, the President’s Budget Request includes a proposal that would reduce the Air National Guard’s C–130 inventory by 21 planes in 

order to shift them to the active Air Force. I understand that 13 of these planes 

would be shifted due to BRAC and the closing down of the Puerto Rico Air Wing. 

However, I am troubled that eight C–130s from eight unnamed states would also 

be shifted to the Air Force, thereby reducing each of those Air National Guard 

Wing’s Primary Assigned Aircraft to only 7 C–130s. What reasoning and analysis 

are behind this decision? Is the Air National Guard not more cost effective than the 

active Air Force when performing the same training missions? Lastly, did the Air 

National Guard provide any input when this decision was made? 

General CHANDLER. The Air Force fully appreciates the dedication of our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Total Force partners, and we understand the 

concerns that you and others have raised regarding potential movements within the 

C–130 fleet. We are currently working with Active, Guard, and Reserve leadership 

to ensure that we have the most effective balance to support the Air Force’s operational requirements, the mission needs of the states, and the required formal training, and to ensure we are postured for long-term readiness. 

We expect to complete this review by no later than early May; we will inform you 

as soon as we reach a final decision. 

Æ