### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-20600

In re: ECKSTEIN MARINE SERVICE L.L.C.,

In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Eckstein Marine Service L.L.C. now known as Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland L.L.C. as owner/operator of the M/V St. Andrew for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability; ECKSTEIN MARINE SERVICE L.L.C., now known as Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland L.L.C.; MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY GULF-INLAND L.L.C., Plaintiffs – Appellants

v. LORNE JACKSON, Claimant – Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge: U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Februa ry 22 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

Plaintiff-appellant Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland LLC challenges the dis t r i c t c ourt’s dismissal of its limitation action as untimely. Finding no error, we affirm. I. Claimant-appellee Lorne Jackson was a crew member of t h e M/V St. Andrew, a 65-foot tug owned and operated by appellant Marquette. While on 1 deck on February 28, 2009, Jackson became entangled in a line and was pulled into a mooring bit, seriously injuring his left leg at the femur, fibula, tibia, knee and ankle, including fractures, soft tissue damage and ligament injuries. Jackson was immediately transported to a hospital and remained there for the next two weeks. On April 28, 2009 Jackson served Marquette with a Texas state court complaint alleging the February 28 accident was caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V St. Andrew and by the negligence of Marquette and its employees. 2 Jackson claimed his injuries permanently and substantially impaired him and

r e quested damages including past loss of earnings, future loss of e a r n i n g capacity, past and future disability, past and future disfigurement, past and future medical and hospital expenses, past and future pain and mental anguish, and maintenance and care. The petition alleged the amoun t s o u gh t was in excess of jurisdictional amounts but did not specify a sum. Marquette filed an answer on June 10. Following discovery, Jackson made a settlement demand for $3 million on December 2. Marquette refused. On January 18, 2010 Marquette filed an action for exoneration from or limitation of liability in federal district court to cap its liability at $750,000, the value of the M/V St. Andrew and its pending freight at

M arque tte w as for me rly kn ow n as Ec ks tei n M arine S ervic e, LLC. 1
The origi nal pet itio n w a s fil ed in Ha rri s County, Texas on Mar ch 17, 2009. Both 2 par tie s agree t hat Jack so n w as a Jo nes Ac t Seam an a t the tim e o f the acc ide nt. 2 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

the time of the accident. Jackson responded with a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied without prejudi ce. In July, Jackson renewed his motion, and the district court granted it. In the state court trial that followed, Jackson 3 won a judgment in excess of $750,000. Marquette filed this appeal. II. We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party asserting 4 jurisdiction carries the burden of proof. Whether a limitation action was timely 5 filed is a determination we also review d e n o v o
. “If, in making its timeliness- 6 ruling, the district court makes findings of fact, they are reviewed only for clear error.” 7 III. The Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act allows a vessel owner to limit its liability in certain actions for damages to the value of the vessel (and pending freight) on which the incident giving rise to the litigation occurred. To obtain 8 this statutory protection, the owner must “bring a civil action in a distri c t court...within 6 m o n t h s a fter a claimant gives the owner written notice of a

In re Eckstei n Mar ineServ. , LLC, No. H- 10-0 156, 2010 WL 3303640 (S .D

. Tex. Aug. 3 19).
Ma rtin v. Peps iA me ri ca s, Inc. , 628 F.3d 738, 740 (5t h Cir. 2010) ; see also E.A .S. T. , Inc.

4 of Stamfor d, Conn. v. M/ V Al ai a , 876 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5t h Cir. ), reh ’g deni ed , 881 F.2d 1071 (198 9) (no ting thatt he st andar d of revie w is the sam e i n ad mi ralt y ca se s)

. Budget Prep ay, Inc. v. AT &T Corp

. , 605 F.3d 273, 278 (5t h Cir. 2010) (c itin g Ram mi ng 5
v. U nitedState s , 281 F.3d158 , 161 (5t h Cir

. 2001) ).
Bil li ot v

. Do lp hin Serv s. , Inc. , 225 F.3d515 , 517 (5t h Cir

. 2000)

. 6
Id. (em phas is in origi nal)

. 7

46 U. S. C. § 3 0501, et s eq
. 8
3 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

claim.” If the action is not filed within that six-month period, it is dismissed as

9 untimely. The d i s t r ict court found that Marquette received written notice of

1 0 Jackson’s claim when it was served with his state court complaint on April 28, 2009. Because Marquette did not f i le its limitation of liability action until January 18, 2010 – eight and a half months later – it failed to meet the statute’s timeliness requirement. The district court therefore dismissed Marquette’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A. Marq u ette first challenges the district court’s treatment of Jackson’s motion to dismiss as an attack on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). His argument is two-fold: (1) timeliness is not a jurisdictional issue, and (2) Marquette did not have not i c e that Jackson was disputing the court’s jurisdiction. This circuit, like several other courts, has held that a party alleging a limitation petition was not timely f i l ed challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that petition. Marquette contends we are not bound 1 1
to follow this precedent because filing deadlines are never jurisdictional. This is simply inaccurate. While many statutory filing deadline s a r e n ot

Id. at§ 30511( a). 9
Exxon Ship

pi ng Co. v
. Cai ll etea u , 869 F.2d843 , 846 (5t h Cir

. 1989)

. 1 0
Com pl ai nt of Tom -M

ac, Inc. , 76 F.3d 678, 682 (5t h Cir. 1996) ( “ In thei r mo tio n to 1 1 dis mi ss , Claim ants ass ert ed that Tom -M ac’s lim itat ion of liabil ity act ion wa s not tim ely fil ed, thus chall enging the dis tri ct cour t’s juris dic t i o n t o hear Tom -M ac’ s pet itio n.” ); see also Cinc inna ti Ga s & Ele c. Co. v. Abe l , 533 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6t h Cir. 1976) (c itin g The Ma ine , 28 F.S upp
. 578, 582 (D

. Md

. 1939) , af f’ d sub nom
. Standa rd Whol esa le P. & A. Wor ks v. Tra ve le rs Ins. Co. , 107 F.2d 373 (4t h Cir. 1939) ); In re Wate rf ront Lic ens e Corp

. , 231 F.R. D. 693, 696–700 (S .D

. Fla. 200 5).
4 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

jurisdictional, we have long recognized that some are. The Limitation Act’s six- 1 2 month filing requirement is one of these. That the district court has original jurisdiction over admiralty claims does not change this. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), a plaintiff may elect to bring 1 3 admiralty and maritime claims in state rather than federal court. These 1 4 “cannot be removed in the absence of diversity” unless “there exists some basis 1 5 for jurisdiction other than admiralty.” Jackson chose t o f i l e h is complaint in 1 6
state court. The district court’s admiralty jurisdiction therefore could not, in and of itself, give the district court subject matter ju r i s diction over any part of the litigation. Only Marquette’s complaint under the Limitation Act was properly

See, e. g. , In re FEMA Tra il er Form a l d e hyde Prods

. Lia b. Litig. , 646 F.3d 185, 189 1 2 (5t h Cir. 2011) (“ The FTCA’s st atut e of lim itat ions is juris dic tio nal, and a clai man t is requ ired to me et both fil ing dea dli nes ”) (int erna l cit atio ns om itt ed) ; Khan v. Go nza le s , 223 Fed. App x. 417, at*1 ( 5th Cir. 2007) (“ The 30-d ay filing de adli ne [f or revi ewof a final or derof rem oval] is j u r isd ict ional. ”) (c itin g Na va rro -M ir anda v. As hcroft , 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5t h Cir. 2003) ); Ande rso n v. Pars ons State Ho sp
. & Tra ini ng Ctr. , 180 Fed. App x. 514, 515 (5t h Cir. 2006) (“A tim ely noti ce of app eal is nece ss ary for this cour t to exerc ise juris dic tio n.” ). Altho u gh the Sup rem e Court has rec entl y co n c l u ded that man y fil ing dea dli nes are pr obably not juris dic tio nal, it has not expli cit ly or im pli cit ly rejec ted this Circ uit’ s pr ior conc lus ion that the Limi tat ion Act’ s six- mo nth fil ing dea dli ne is a juris dic tio nal r e q u i r e m e nt. See Bow le s v. Russ el l , 551 U. S. 205 ( 2007) (c oncl udin g that st atut ory tim e lim its are juris dic tio nal in the cont ext of app ea l s ) ; H e n d e r s on ex rel

. He nderson v. Shins eki , 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (201 1) (no ting that Bow le s “d id not hold cat egori call y that every dea dli ne for se ek ing judic ial revie w in civil liti gationis jur isd ict ional. ”)

.

See U. S. Cons t. art

. III, § 2 c l

. 1 (“ The judic ial pow er [of the Unit ed Sta tes ] sha ll 1 3 exten d.

.. to all cas es of ad mi ralt y andm arit im e jur isd ict ion” ).
28 U. S. C. § 1333( 1) (“ The dis tri ct cour ts sha ll have origi nal juris dic tio n, exclus ive of 1 4 the cour ts of the Sta tes , of.

.. [a] ny civil cas e of adm iral ty or mar itim e juris di c t i o n , s a v i n g to sui tor s in all cas es all othe r rem edi es to wh ich they are othe rw ise enti tle d. ”) ; see also Bari s v. Sulp ic io Line s, Inc. , 932 F.2d 1540, 1542–43 (5t h Cir. 1991) (d isc uss ing the “s avings to sui tor s” claus e o f § 1 333( 1))

.

Bari s , 932 F.2dat154 3. 1 5
Poir ri er v. Ni ckl os Dr il li ng Co. , 648 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5t h Cir. 1981) (c itin g 14 Wright , 1 6 Mil ler & Coop er, Fed

. Prac

. & Proc

. § 3 674 (197 6))

. 5 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

before the district court, whi c h r e quired Marquette to follow the Act’s mandatory filing deadline. 1 7 Finally, Jackson’s pleadings gave a dequate notice to Marquette that he

was mounting a challenge to the district court’s jurisdi c t i o n b a s ed on the untimely filing of Marquette ’ s limitation action, even though they did not actually cite to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The motion’s pri m a r y argument for dismissal wa s t h at Marquette had missed the six-month filing deadline. The first paragraph of Jackson’s renewed motion to dismiss declared that “[t]he sixmonth time limit is jurisdictional and this matter is time-barred.” Jackson also made the jurisdictional argument explicit in his answer to the limitation complaint. The original answer stated that “Claimant admits the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, but denies the Petitioner’s right to claim limitation or exoner a t i o n from liability in this case.” Following a hearing on his m o t i o n , h owever, Jackson obtained leave to amend his answer. The only change in the amended version was to this paragraph, which now read: “Claimant denies the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this Honorable Court because this limitations action was not filed within six months from the time limitation plaintiff received notice of claim.” Because a challenge to the timeliness of a limitation action is a challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction and because Marquette h ad notice Jackson w a s m o u n ting such a challenge in his motion to dismiss, the

See The De ep Sea Tan kers, Ltd. v. The Long Bran ch , 258 F.2d 757, 772 (2d Cir. 1958) 1 7 (“ The law is we ll se ttl ed that a pet itio n to lim it liabil ity pur sua nt to 46 U. S. C. § 185 [no w c o d i f i e d a t § 3 0511] is valid and eff ect ive only if it is fil ed wi thin six mo nths aft er the shi pow ner rec eives wr itt en noti ce of clai m. ”) ; Standa rd Whol esa le P. & A. Wor ks , 107 F.2d at 376 (“ The st atut e clea rly and expr es sly requ ires as a cond itio n to the fil ing of the pet itio n that it mus t be fil ed ‘w ithi n s ix m onth s’ ” aft er rec eip t of a w rit ten noti ce of clai m)

. 6 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

district court did not err by cons t r u ing Jackson’s motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack. 1 8 B. Marquette next argues that the district cou r t erred by dismissing its limitation action because the complaint was filed before the six-month deadline expired. Under the Limitation Act, the six-month deadline b e gins to run only

w hen the “claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim.” The d i s t r i c t 1 9
court found Marquette received such notice when Jackson delivered his state court petition on April 2 8 , 2009 and did not file its limitation action until J a n u a ry 18, 2010, more than eight months later. Marquette maintains that Jackson’s December 2 letter demanding a $3 millio n s e t t l ement payment was the f irst communication it received revealing a reasonable possibility that Jackson’s claim would exceed $750,000. Because it filed its limitation petition only six weeks late r , Marquette argues, it did not breach the Limitation Act’s timeliness requirement. The Limitation Ac t’s six-month timeline does not automatically begin to

r u n w h en a vessel owner learns a claimant has filed a lawsuit. It is trigger e d only if and when the written noti c e r e v e als a “reasonable possibility” that the claim will exceed the value of the vessel, and ther e f o r e that the vessel owner might benefit from the Limitation Act’s protection. The rationale behind this 2 0

was explained by t h e S e c ond Circuit in Complaint of Morania Barge No. 190,

Mar quet te rais e s a n alte rnat ive argum ent that res olving this mat ter unde r Rule 1 8 12(b )( 1) wa s im pr ope r beca use Jack so n’s juris dic tio nal att ack wa s inte rtw ined wi th the me rit s of the clai m. We dis agree
. The dis tri ct cour t, in find ing that the allegat ions mad e in Jack so n’s st ate cour t com plai nt aler ted Mar quet te to a reas onable pos sib ilit y that his clai ms coul d
excee d $750, 000, wa s me rely evaluat ing the ki nds of allegat ions mad e by Jack so n at that init ial st age of the liti gation

. This did not require the dist ric t cour t to rea ch any conc lus ions regar ding wh ethe r Jack so n’s c laim s wo uld or sho uld suc cee d on thei r me rit s.
46 U. S. C. § 3 0511( a). 1 9
Tom -M

ac , 76 F. 3d at 683; Bil li ot , 225 F.3dat517

. 2 0
7 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

Inc. , the first c i r c u i t court decision to adopt the “reasonable possibility” test, which noted that a vessel owner would oth e r w i s e b e obligated “to go to the
expense of posting security and taking the o t h e r s teps necessary to commence

a li m i tation proceeding when the claimant’s specific representations demonstrate that such a proceeding will be wholly unnecessary.” Whether a 2 1 written notice reveals a “reasona b l e p o ssibility” that a claim will exceed the value of the vessel requires the court to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of the case. 2 2 Jackson’s state court complaint established a reasonable possibility that his c l a i m m i ght exceed $750,000, the value of the M/V St. Andrew. In his complaint, he alleged that his injuries occurred on the M/V St. Andrew , t h a t Marquette was liable for those injuries due to its negligence, and that he was seeking economic and non-econo m i c d a m a g e s
. This put Marquette on notice that it would have to defend its e l f a g a i nst a claim that might fall under the Limitatio n Act. The complaint also detailed injuries Jackson claimed were 2 3 permanent and catastrophic. He alleged he “sustained serious and debilitating injuries when he was struck by a mooring line,” causing him to “suffer[] serious and disabling injuries of a permanent nature.” The complaint did not limit the damages sought to a specific amount. Instead it listed damages f o r w h ich Jackson claimed he would require c o m p e n s a tion for the remainder of his lifetime, including past loss of earning, future loss of earning capacity, past and f u t u r e disability, past and future disfigurement, past and future medical and hospital expenses, past and future pain and mental anguish, and maintenance and care.

Com pl ai nt of

M ora nia BargeN

o. 190, Inc. , 690 F.2d32, 34 (2dCir

. 1982)

. 2 1
Bil li ot , 225 F.3dat518

. 2 2
See Tom -M

ac , 76 F. 3d at 683. 2 3
8 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

Marquette complains the complaint never indicated a dollar amount sought, and that it was filed before the full extent and permanence of Jackson’s injuries were definitively known. This argument fails to recognize that the claimant need only raise a “reasonable possibility” that the damages sought will exceed the value of the vessel. While this standard is not toothless, it is also not particularly stringent. Once a reasonable possibility has been raised, it becomes the vessel owner’s responsibility to ini t i a t e a prompt investigation and determine whether to file a limitation action. The Limitation Ac t provides 2 4
generous statutory protection to the vessel owners who reap all of its benefits. 2 5 When there is uncertainty as to whether a claim will exceed the vessel’s value, the reasonable possibility standard places the risk and the burdens associated with that risk on the ow n e r
. I n other words, if “doubt exists as to the total amount of the claims or as to whether they will exceed the value of the ship the

o w n e r will not be excused from satisfying the statutory time bar since h e m a y institute a limitation proceeding even when the total amount claimed is uncertain.” 2 6 If anything, Marquette’s investigation into the incident a f t e r i t received Ja c k s o n ’s complaint should have demonstrated that there was more than a reasonable possibility that Jackson’s claim might exceed $750,000. Marquette

Exxon Ship

pi ng Co. , 869 F.2d at 846 (“ The pur pos e of the six- mo nth pr es cri pt ion on 2 4 the lim itat ion of liabil ity pet itio n is to requ ire the s h i p o w n e r t o act pr om pt ly to gain the benef it of the st atut ory right to lim it liabil ity. ”) (c itin g In re Go ula ndri s , 140 F.2d 780, 781 (2d Cir. ), cer t. deni ed , 322 U. S. 755 ( 1944) ); In reM ora nia , 690 F.2dat33– 34.
See Esta Later Char ters , Inc. v. Ignaci o , 875 F.2d 234, 239 (9t h Cir. 1989) (no ting that 2 5 the Limi tat ion Act “p rovid es shi pow ners a genero us me asu re of pr ote cti on not availabl e to any othe r ente rp ris e i n o ur so ciet y.” ).

In re Mo ra nia , 690 F.2d at 34; see also Petiti on of Souther n SS Co. , 132 F.S upp
. 316, 2 6 319 (D .C. De l. 1955) (“ Becaus e.. .t he st atut e is in der ogatio n of the com mo n law and abrid ges the right s of a clai man t to a full rec overy of his dam ages , it is not to be cons tru [ed ] to inte rf ere wi th the right s of clai m a n t s to a great er exten t than is nece ss ary to full y and ade quate ly eff ect uate t he pur pos e o f the Act. ”)

. 9 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

has monitored Jackson’s medical condition since the accident as part of its cure obligation. During h i s initial two-week hospitalization, Jackson underwent multiple surgeries including debridement, the insertion of hardware to treat his bone fractures, and a skin graft. Doctors determined at that time that injuries to his leg, ligaments and soft tissue were extensive, and that his knee was “globally unstable.” An eyewitness at the scene of the accid e n t recalled that Jackson’s “foot was hanging off of his leg at a 90 – a 90 degree angle. It was just hanging off....It ha d b l o od everywhere.” In response to written discovery 2 7 requests, Jackson indicated he was awaiting further surgery, and that he “cannot walk.” Jackson’s professional experience was in physica l labor-based jobs, and in October 2009 an apprais al put his lost past and future earning capacity at $258,753 and his past and future lost household services at $27,864, f o r a total of $286,617 on these damages elements alone. Marquette protests that its legal research indicated the highest gen e r a l jury verdict for injuries similar to Jackson’s in Harris C o u n t y in the last decade was $335,000. While this finding might have made it less probable that Jackson’s claim would exceed $750,000, in light of the other evidence available to Marquette it did not make the possibility of such an award unreasonable. The two Fifth Circuit cases and the Second Circuit case relied on by both parties in this litigation are not to the contrary. Taken together, they establish 2 8

Mar quet te note s that this tes tim ony wa s fr om a dec kh and wh o wa s not em plo yed by 2 7 Mar quet te, and whos e dep os itio n wa s not tak en untilApril 2010. While the test im ony its elf
wa s unavailab le to Mar quet te bef ore the six- mo nth dea d l i n e expir ed, it dem ons tra tes the grap hic, op en and obvious nat ure of the injury thatan inves tigat ion wo uld have uncove red

.

See Bil li ot , 225 F.3d 515 (ho ldi ng the six- mo nth dea dli ne wa s not tri ggered by a clai m 2 8 that mi sid enti fie d the vess el on wh ich the incid ent occ urr ed) ; Tom -M ac , 76 F.3d 678 (ho ldi ng the six- mo nth dea dli ne wa s tri ggered by a clai m ide ntif ying one of se veral vess els involved in the accid ent and allegin g the owner wa s liable for tw o cre w me mbe rs ’ dea ths , even thou gh it d i d n o t a l l e g e a sp ecif ic amo unt of dam ages ); Mo ra nia Barge , 690 F.2d 32 (ho ldi ng the sixmo nth dea dli ne wa s not tri ggered wh ere the clai man t sp ecif ical ly a l l eged $366, 563. 94 in dam ages andt he vess el wa s valuedat$47 8,09 3.75 ). 10 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

that a claimant need not prove or even specifically allege that his damages will exceed the value of the vessel in order to trigger the six month deadline. So long

as the reasonable possibility standard has been met by th e claimant’s allegations, the vessel owner bears the risk even if the total value of the claim is uncertain. On the other hand, the owner is e n t i t l e d to rely on a claimant’s specific allegation that the claim will not exceed the vessel’s value. This court 2 9 summarized this standard in Exxon Shipping Co. as follows:

It is an established principle that a petition for limitation of liability cannot be sustained where the amount claimed is concededly less than the value of the vessel. Where the v e s sel owner, however, receives notice of a claim for less than the value of t h e v e s s el, yet he is also aware t h a t o t her claims likely to be the subject of litigation arising out of the same occurr ence may exceed the value of his ship, he must then file his petition within six m o nths of receiving notice of any claim, no matter how small, or otherwise be barred from asserting limitation of liability. 3 0
Jackson was under no obligation to specify an amount claimed in his initial state c ourt complaint, and never asserted that the damages he sought

were less than $75 0 ,000. Because his complaint alleging catastrophic and permanent injuries raised at least a reasonable possibility that his claim might exceed the value of the M/V St. Andrew, it was Marquette’s respo n s i b i l i t y to conduct an investigation, and to file a limitation action within six months if it wanted to avail itself of that statute’s generous protection. The district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when Jackson

See, e. g. , In re Mo ra nia , 690 F.2d at 35 (“ Mo rania wa s enti tle d to rely upon [ t he 2 9 clai man t’s ] sw orn rep res enta tio ns and sin ce the clai ms we re sub st antia lly les s than the value of t h e B arge and its pend ing fr eight.

.. Mo rania wa s not requ ired by 46 U. S. C. § 185 [no w r e c o dif ied as 46 U. S. C. § 30511] to fil e a com plai nt for exoner atio n fr om or lim it a t i o n o f liabil ity until[ the clai man t] t here aft er ame ndedit s com plai nt. ”)

. 869 F. 2d at 846 n.3 (int erna l q uota tio n m ark s and cit atio ns om itt ed)

. 3 0
11 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

delivered his complaint to Marquet t e on April 28, 2009, and that Marquette’s January 18, 2010 petition was untimely filed. C. In its final challenge to the district court’s judgment, Marquette contends it was deprived of an opportunity to be heard because the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on Jackson’s motion to dismiss. We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. When considering Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject

3 1
matter jurisdiction, the district court m ust give the plaintiff an opportunity to b e h e ar d , p articularly when disputed factual issues are important to th e m o ti o n ’ s outco m e
. In some cases, an oral hearing may be indispensable due to the

32 complicated factual disputes under l y i n g t he case. Contrary to Marquette’s 3 3 suggestion, however, an oral hearing is not alwa y s necessary if the parties receive an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery and otherwise p resent their arguments and evidence to the court. 3 4 In this c a s e , Marquette had notice that Jackson was challenging the district court’s jurisdiction on the basis that its limitation petition was not filed in a timely manner. Both Marquette and Jackson conducted several months of discovery before Jackson renewed his motion to dismiss, and both made multiple filings in the district court presenting their arguments regarding the petition’s timeliness as well as t h e evidence they had accumulated in support of those arguments. Under these circumstances, Marq u e tte had notice and an

Mo ra n v
. Kingdo m of SaudiA ra bia , 27 F. 3d 169, 172 –73 (5t h Cir

. 1994)

. 3 1
Se e M

ar tin v. Mo rgan Dr iv e Aw ay, Inc. , 665 F.2d 598, 602 n.1 (5t h Cir 1 9 8 2 ) ; 32 Wil li am son v. T

ucke r , 645 F.2d404 , 414 (5t h Cir

. 1981)

. Wil li am son , 645 F.2dat414

. 3 3
Id. at 413; Mo ra n , 27 F. 3d at 173. 3 4
12 Case: 10-20600 Document: 00511763905 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/22/2012No. 10-20600

o p p o rtunity to be heard. Because Marquette does not give us any rea s o n t o believe that it was unable to adequately present its evidence in writing or that it would have been able to make different or more persuasive arguments at an oral hearing, we conclude that the d i s t r i ct court did not abuse its discretion when it opted not to hold such a hearing. IV. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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