The D.C. Freeway Revolt and the Coming of Metro 

Part 9

Post-Revolt 

Table of Contents 

Why Did Chairman Natcher Do It? ................................................................................................ 2

Clearing the Air ............................................................................................................................... 4

Air Quality Plans ............................................................................................................................. 6

President Nixon’s Plans for the Bicentennial in the District .......................................................... 9

About That Balanced System ........................................................................................................ 10

The Joint Hearing on Metro .......................................................................................................... 11

Highway Funding for Transit ........................................................................................................ 17

Decision on the Three Sisters Bridge ............................................................................................ 21

A New City Council Chairman ..................................................................................................... 24

I-66 Takes Center Stage ................................................................................................................ 31

District Appropriations Act, FY 1973 .......................................................................................... 43

A Landmark Event For The Nation’s Capital ............................................................................... 54

Across the Lincoln Memorial ....................................................................................................... 61

I-66 Flounders ............................................................................................................................... 69

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972......................................................................................... 74

The 1972 House Bill ..................................................................................................................... 82

The 1972 Senate Bill ..................................................................................................................... 91

The Conference Goes Down to the Wire ...................................................................................... 93

Problems Building ........................................................................................................................ 97

WMATA’s Bus Takeover ........................................................................................................... 100

After the Election ........................................................................................................................ 107

Awaiting Congressional Action in 1973 ..................................................................................... 112

Metrobus ..................................................................................................................................... 115

The Senate Takes Up the 1973 Act ............................................................................................. 116

The House Gets to Work ............................................................................................................. 121

While Congress Worked ............................................................................................................. 128

Facing Chairman Natcher ........................................................................................................... 131

Awaiting the 1973 Act ................................................................................................................ 141

Completing the 1973 Act ............................................................................................................ 144

The 1973 Act Becomes a Law .................................................................................................... 146

The Center Leg Freeway Opens – In Part ................................................................................... 153

The Flow of Oil ........................................................................................................................... 155

What To Do About The South Leg ............................................................................................. 158

In Virginia, I-66 Moves Forward ................................................................................................ 165
Part 9

Post-Revolt 

Why Did Chairman Natcher Do It? 

As 1971 ended, The Sunday Star magazine Washington carried an article by Kentucky-based 

journalist Ward Sinclair trying to explain Chairman Natcher’s role in the long freeway-subway 

impasse. Sinclair recalled the usual feature of 62-year old Natcher’s life – his goal as a young 

lawyer to be part of the U.S. House of Representatives; his safe seat in Kentucky (17 years in the 

House at the time of the article); his personal life as a teetotaling nonsmoker who avoided social 

outings; his pork-barrel interests on behalf of the locks, dams, and lakes in Kentucky; his refusal 

to talk with reporters outside his home district; his failure to accept campaign contributions, 

including contributions from the highway lobby; and his pride in his perfect voting record: 

The trouble with most of the theories about Natcher’s recalcitrance, and they abound in 

these parts, is that the theoreticians try to decipher his motives on their own terms – not 

on William Natcher’s terms . . . . He defies all the popular myths.

He had won a seat in the House in a special election in 1953: 

Once Natcher got to Washington, he lost no time in getting to know the right people and 

doing the right things to cement himself in Congress. He knew the appropriations 

committee was the right place to be, so he made friends with the late chairman, Clarence 

Cannon, and later, in 1962, as a favor to Cannon, Natcher accepted the chairmanship of 

the D.C. appropriations subcommittee, a thankless but necessary task. 

Most Members of Congress tried to avoid service on the District committees, much less a 

chairmanship, which had many challenges and few rewards for their home district or State: 

The District of Columbia is a brushfire. With it come two of the most thankless jobs this 

side of indexing the C&P telephone directory – the chairmanships of the House and 

Senate appropriations subcommittees for the District. Only an infinitely patient and 

detail-devoted man, at ease with the line-by-line minutiae of a monumentally boring D.C. 

budget, could handle the task without (1) going batty or (2) lousing it up completely . . . . 

Many of his colleagues consider him one of the more powerful men in the House, by 

virtue of his No. 2 ranking on appropriations subcommittees for agriculture and laborhealth, education and welfare, and by virtue of his close rapport with top men in the 

Democratic leadership.

Why, then, would this dedicated Congressman take on the abuse that was heaped on him for his 

refusal to release the subway funds? 

Natcher’s interminable obstinacy over funding of the metropolitan subway system has 

earned him more contumely than he probable deserves, but Natcher doesn’t mind being a 

lightning rod for Congress. He would never suggest that Congress as a whole should take 

the blame. He would never suggest that blame more logically ought to be aimed at the 
public works committees. It isn’t his way. So, in Northeast Washington, they call him a 

racist. In Georgetown, the taffeta ladies summon up their highest dudgeon and call him a 

wretch. The frustrated patriots of Northwest just call him a lousy politician . . . . 

In reality, none of these easy epithets will do for Natcher, because he is many other 

things: exasperatingly stubborn, unforgiving of the treacherous, paranoically suspicious, 

unrelentingly private, regally indifferent to his critics, maddenly self-righteous, possessed 

of a sense that he is somehow to make history. 

Sinclair identified two recurring themes in Chairman Natcher’s public statements that “go a long 

way toward illuminating the basis for his repeated refusals to release the city’s portion of the 

money needed to continue work on the rapid transit system. The first theme was the chairman’s 

“disdain for deception,” a view that “a man’s word is his word,” and a refusal to “play cute 

semantical games with him.” That was how he considered the words and actions of “certain 

local functionaries”:

There were promises to forge ahead with the D.C. freeway system that Natcher so 

fervently thinks is necessary; and yet, in fact, the system was not forging ahead. 

Although the causes of the delays – “slow-moving studies, litigation and injunctions” – may have 

been beyond local control, Chairman Natcher “tends to think not.” He often cites NCPC’s

reversal of its brief support in 1966 for the freeways as soon as he released the subway funds. 

The second theme was Chairman Natcher’s “personal view of the majesty and infallibility of 

Congress.” As he made clear before the House voted to reverse his stand, the prestige of 

Congress as a coequal branch of the Federal Government was really what was at stake. When 

Congress passed a law, it “must be obeyed without question by all the people.” Given his view 

on this subject, “the freeway question [was] cut and dried”: 

Congress wants the freeways built – witness the 1968 and 1970 federal-aid highway acts, 

which decreed that the District of Columbia would do such and such to complete its road 

system . . . . 

He was not swayed by the argument that Congress did not tell Bowling Green, Kentucky, or any 

other city where to put its roads. He was not swayed by colleagues, such as Senator John 

Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, that forcing a vast freeway system on a city that does not want it 

was wrong:

Congress has acted, the law is the law. He remarked in one recent conversation that he 

would insist the law be complied with “until Congress tells me otherwise . . . .” 

From this stance, the only alternative for dealing with those who so blatantly flout the 

mandates of Congress is not to submit to their vague promises, but to hit them where it 

hurts – cut off the money they so badly want for the subway. Pinch so hard that they’ll 

have no recourse but to get moving on freeways. 
Representative Giaimo admired Chairman Natcher, but had told him early in 1971 “that I 

couldn’t in good conscience go along with him any more” on the subway funding freeze. When 

the vote in May sustained Chairman Natcher’s decision by a smaller margin than expected, “He 

disagreed with what I did, but he didn’t hold it against me. He took the amendment with grace”: 

Giaimo tried again this month by moving to restore the subway funds. This time he 

pulled off the stunning rebuke of the leadership, but only after the White House had 

deployed its heavy lobbying artillery on the Hill. Presumably, Natcher now understands 

he had been told “otherwise” by Congress. And if Giaimo is correct in his estimation of 

his chairman, the subway holdup is a thing of the past. [Sinclair, Ward, “Subways Are 

For Stalling,” Washington/The Sunday Star, December 26, 1971] 

Clearing the Air

On January 19, the Post carried a letter to the editor from Angela Rooney of the National 

Coalition on the Transportation Crisis responding to the editorial “The End of the Freeway 

Trauma?” Rooney, a founder of ECTC, wrote that the “freeway trauma” was not over “if for no 

other reason than that 7.8 miles of Interstate freeways cannot do anything but worsen an already 

critical air pollution situation in this metropolitan area.” She wrote that Secretary Volpe, Mayor 

Washington, and the city council had recommended this mileage to Congress “without 

recognizing the necessity of making a detailed statement of the environmental impact of the 

roads as required by Section 102(2)(C) of the Environmental Policy Act.” 

As for the editorial’s assertion that the officials were representing the wishes of the community, a 

review of recent “so-called hearings” would “put the matter straight”:

The Federation of Civic Associations . . . soundly rejected all new freeway construction 

and called for a boycott of “hearings” because they were not held in accordance with 

federal laws and regulations. Their anti-freeway position was reinforced by Maryland 

public officials. In 10 years there has been no public support for more freeways except 

for certain special business interests, a fact that goes a long way in explaining the Post’s 

wishful thinking. [Rooney, Angela, “Freeway Trauma,” Letters to the Editor, The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, January 19, 1972] 

The Justice Department, with support from the D.C. corporation counsel, submitted a 20-page 

brief, supported by 219 pages of lower court opinions and legal citations, to the Supreme Court 

on January 17, 1972, seeking overturn of the U.S. Court of Appeals’ ruling on the Three Sisters 

Bridge. The brief denied that the Department of Transportation had taken procedural shortcuts in 

approving construction. The petition raised two issues for Supreme Court consideration: 

(1) Did the planning, environmental, and other requirements of Federal law prevent 

Secretary Volpe from approving projects before ‘final plans’ had been approved? 

(2) Did the 1968 law, with its “notwithstanding” language, take precedence over 

generally applicable highway procedures?

The brief made clear:
The congressional directive that this particular bridge be constructed, as planned, without 

further delay is, we submit, a complete answer to the present litigation.

Further, the “intent of Congress that the Three Sisters Bridge be constructed” and that 

construction should start within 30 days following enactment of the 1968 Act “has been thwarted 

by the court of appeals.” 

In a footnote, the brief dismissed Judge Bazelon’s contention about the undue political influence 

on Secretary Volpe. “We . . . do not consider Chief Judge Bazelon’s views on that subject in this 

petition.” The footnote pointed out that neither of the other judges in the three-judge panel had 

concurred on this point. [Eisen, Jack, “Ruling Asked on 3 Sisters,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, January 18, 1972; Barnes, Fred, “Bridge Plea Taken to High Court,” The Evening 

Star, January 19, 1972] 

On January 19, Representative Conte, in extended remarks on the House floor, said the petition 

“manifests a clear, responsible fulfillment of the administration’s pledge to take all possible legal 

steps to permit completion” of the Three Sisters Bridge. This action “should satisfy” those who 

opposed release of the District’s Metro funding “on the grounds that the executive branch was 

dragging its feet” on the project. The petition represented “a clear, responsible fulfillment of the 

administration’s pledge to permit completion of the project.”

He placed a January 17 letter he had received from Secretary Volpe in the record citing the two 

principal arguments in the brief: 

First, we contend that the decision of the Court of Appeals, by its requirement that 

nothing be done until final plans for a project are approved, would frustrate highway 

planning nationwide. Secondly, we contend that Congress, in enacting Section 23 of the 

Federal Highway-Aid Act of 1968, directed in no uncertain terms that construction of the 

Three Sisters Bridge be commenced within 30 days, any other provision of Federal law to 

the contrary notwithstanding. 

Representative Conte expressed his “earnest hope” that the Supreme Court “acts favorably on the 

Government’s petition and that the Congress will now give its unqualified support to completion 

of the vitally needed Metro project.” [“Resumption of Work on Three Sisters Bridge,” 

Congressional Digest-House, January 19, 1972, pages 317-318] 

The same day, Representative Giaimo addressed a luncheon of the Greater Washington Central 

Labor Council. He said he expected Congress to approve a bill providing a Federal loan 

guarantee for Metro bonds. Failure of the bill would “injure the Metro fatally” because its bonds 

would be impossible to sell. “Frankly, I’m optimistic. I think we’ll be successful,” he said. As 

for the Three Sisters Bridge appeal, he said, “When the Court rules, then we’ll know whether or 

not there will be a Three Sisters Bridge, which I want to see constructed.” [Eisen, Jack, “Metro 

Bill is Predicted by Giaimo,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 20, 1972] 
The Star, in an editorial, expressed the hope that the Supreme Court would accept the appeal 

“and resolve the issues as expeditiously as possible.” The review was “surely warranted” in view 

of Judge Bazelon’s “tortuous interpretations of law”: 

The Justice Department accuses Bazelon of interpreting various environmental and 

planning safeguards expressed by Congress in a manner that thoroughly distorts and 

“misconceives the purpose of these provisions.” Its brief asserts: “Compliance with the 

court of appeals’ view . . . would, in most instances, result in substantial delays and 

require substantial additional expenditure of public funds and would, in some instances, 

be almost impossible.”

Congress could be expected to involve itself in the issue again in the pending Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1972. However, the “crucial issues involving the bridge . . . rest now with the 

Supreme Court, posing roadblocks of national and local significance which urgently need 

removal.” [“Nixon’s Bridge Appeal,” The Evening Star, January 22, 1972] 

Air Quality Plans

President Nixon had signed the landmark Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 on December 31, 1970. 

The CAA directed the new EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS, 

pronounced “Knacks”) that every State must achieve by 1975. Each State was to develop a State 

implementation plan to achieve that goal by reducing pollution for sources that were stationary 

(factories, for example) and mobile (motor vehicles). The plans were due January 31, 1972. 

The District’s Department of Environmental Services, the Environmental Health Administration, 

and the Bureau of Air and Water Control submitted a 354-page State implementation plan to 

EPA for reducing air pollution. The study, titled Implementation Plan for the Control of Carbon 

Monoxide, Nitrogen Dioxide, Hydrocarbons and Oxidants, found that 95 percent of total 

pollutants in the city were from motor vehicles. They discharged 19,574 tons of particulates into 

the air, along with 57,046 tons of sulphur oxides, 279,189 tons of carbon monoxides, 37,338 tons 

of hydrocarbons, and 39,311 tons of nitrogen oxides. 

For mobile source pollution, the District’s plan to achieve its NAAQS was similar to plans from 

around the country by placing much of the burden on commuters by forcing about 100,000 of 

the estimated 400,000 commuters in 1975 to use buses instead of cars. To accomplish this 

25-percent reduction in commuter use of cars the report proposed several steps: 

• Banning on-street curb parking in the downtown area; 

• Raising taxes on commercial garage operators to force them to increase their parking 

fees;

• Impose a “drastic increase” in fees for all-day parking on commercial lots; 

• Force an “immediate suspension of subsidy” by District and Federal agencies for 

employee parking fees;

The city had 140,413 commercial, private, and curb parking spaces; the goal was to reduce this 

number by between 20,000 to 25,000 spaces. Doing so while increasing costs would “create a 
problem for the present commuter using private automobiles” that would force commuters onto 

public transit. The city proposed to spend $32 million for new buses to carry those new transit 

commuters.

The District rejected a preliminary proposal to ban all Maryland and Virginia cars from the city 

during the day. When news of the idea had been reported, Senator Spong warned Mayor 

Washington that the plan “would generate substantial ill-will and . . . result in retaliatory action at 

District residents.” Mayor Washington informed the Senator that the city had rejected the idea 

“when reasonable alternatives to private automobile transportation are available.” 

The city also proposed conversion of government and private fleet vehicles from using gasoline 

to using gasoline-and-propane or gasoline-and-natural gas for fuel. The report estimated the 

conversion would cost $400 per vehicle. 

The plan also called for steps to encourage car pools. The present passenger car occupancy in the 

city was 1.3 people. The steps taken would cause people to form car pools for their work-related 

trips. 

Virginia’s Air Pollution Control Board’s State implementation plan also focused on automobile 

use in northern Virginia. Development of Metro was “perhaps the best method to cut down air 

pollution” in the area, but would not have any impact by the target year of 1975. In the interim, 

Virginia’s Air Pollution Control Board called for increased downtown parking rates, a 

computerized car pool registry, and more dedicated express lanes such those in use on 

I-95/Shirley Highway.

Maryland’s Health Department agreed that curbing the automobile was the key to reducing air 

pollution, but argued to EPA that the problem was not so much cleaning up Montgomery and 

Prince George’s Counties as cleaning the air over the District of Columbia. Officials argued that 

achieving NAAQS in the region by 1975 was not realistic; they asked for a 2-year extension on 

compliance to allow area officials to identify ways to reduce motor vehicle use in the 

metropolitan area.

Edward L. Carter of the Maryland Bureau of Air Quality Control said the extension was needed 

because the District had the most polluted air in the region. Reductions in the surrounding 

counties were possible, but District air did not honor State line boundaries. 

Overall, Carter said that changing the habits of commuters was the key: 

Some jurisdictions have come up with plans which may or may not be workable 

depending on whether you can get people to reduce their use of automobiles. Until you 

come up with measures to force people to use mass transit and reduce automobile traffic, 

voluntary plans will not have a significant impact on the automobile population. Until 

you have the power to require that certain things be done, you can propose anything you 

want.
Maryland’s plan was similar to the District’s proposals to shift motorists from their cars to 

transit. The State implementation plan also proposed charging tolls to enter freeways and use 

congested roads at peak traffic hours, reduced bus fares, and increased gasoline taxes in urban 

areas, including an annual pollution tax on motor vehicles based on the number of miles driven 

and the size of the engine. 

[Gay, Lance, “D.C. Proposes Steps To Reduce Traffic,” The Evening Star, February 1, 1972; 

Scharfenberg, Kirk, “City Clean-Air Plan: Cut Commuter Cars,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, February 1, 1972; “Suburban Car Ban Rejected by D.C.,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, January 29, 1972; Landers, Jim, “Virginia Drafts Clean-Air Plan,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, February 2, 1972; Walsh, Edward, “Md. Asks Delay in 

Deadline,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 5, 1972] 

Almost immediately after the District’s plan went to EPA, Chairman Hahn told reporters that the 

plan was not the city’s official plan. Neither Mayor Washington nor the city council had seen it, 

much less approved it. “I had no idea this thing was going out,” he said. “No one on the council 

saw it. The mayor didn’t know it was going out. Councilman Willard’s Committee on the 

Environment would hold hearings on the proposals on February 8 “to try to rectify the damage” 

release of the report had caused.

Mayor Washington’s aide, Julian Dugas, told reporters, “It’s a workable proposal forwarded to 

meet EPA regulations to be eligible for federal grants. But there are a lot of hard policy 

questions to be considered before we can accept that stuff.” In a press release, Mayor 

Washington’s office said that “until the new regulations are adopted by the City Council the plan 

is an administrative guide – a sort of workable program.” The proposals were merely “possible 

control measures” and that “all developments require careful meshing” to avoid adverse effects 

on the District’s economy. [Critchfield, Richard, “Commuter Plan Hit, Hearing Set Tuesday,” 

The Evening Star, February 3, 1972] 

Star editors picked up on the city’s reaction to the “wacky EPA report.” After outlining the 

District’s plans for the “miracle” of a one-fourth reduction in automobile commuting through 

parking restrictions and new buses by 1975, the editors wrote: 

Now even the most ardent anti-internal combustionist would have to agree that – clean air 

aside – that’s a devil of a three-year commitment for any modern city government to 

make. And guess what? The District hasn’t made it . . . . 

But whatever the facts as to that part of the bureaucratic snafu, Hahn’s assurances that the 

absurd proposal to curtail the District’s already inadequate parking supply “is not city 

policy” – and is not apt soon to be – are good to hear. As Hahn, no great friend of the 

automobile himself, puts it: “You can’t cut out parking for people who need to get here 

until you provide a practical alternative.” 

The time may come for such drastic tactics, “although frankly we doubt it now,” but at this time, 

the plan’s goals remain “largely a dream.” The most “attractive, workable transit system” was 
Metro, and it had a long way to go before it could provide the needed areawide service to reduce 

automobile use. [“Clean-Air Foulup,” The Evening Star, February 4, 1972] 

(Plans for reducing air pollution in cities around the country were greeted with similar doubts and 

outrage.) 

In a February 8 special message to Congress on the 1972 environmental program, President 

Nixon proposed a range of congressional actions, including one to address sulfur oxide 

emissions, “one of the air pollutants most damaging to human health and property, and 

vegetation.” He asked Congress to impose a charge on sulfur emitted into the atmosphere “from 

combustion, refining, smelting, and other processes.” Beginning in 1976, the charge would be 

15 cents per pound of sulphur “emitted in regions where the primary standards – which are 

designed to be protective of public health – have not been met within the deadline” for 

compliance with the Clean Air Act. In areas that met the standards but exceeded the secondary 

national-standard, the charge would by 10 cents per pound. Areas that met primary and 

secondary NAAQS would be exempt from the charge: 

The charge is an application of the principle that the costs of pollution should be included 

in the price of the product. Combined with our existing regulatory authority, it would 

constitute a strong economic incentive to achieve the sulfur oxides standards necessary to 

protect health, and then further to reduce emissions to levels which protect welfare and 

aesthetics.

The same day as the President’s message to Congress, Chairman Willard held a Committee on 

Environment hearing on the District’s State implementation plan. In what the Star described as 

an “acrimonious hearings,” Michael Stenberg, deputy chief of EPA’s regional office in 

Philadelphia, warned that the city was “technically in violation of the law” because the plan 

submitted to EPA by the deadline had not been approved by the city council or mayor. The city 

would have until July 30 to submit an approved State implementation plan. If the city did not do 

so, EPA would design the plan to comply with the Clean Air Act. 

Sammie Abbott also participated in the hearing. He pointed out that city children showed levels 

of lead that were at dangerous levels. He also criticized Environment Committee Chairman 

Willard, the city council’s most ardent freeway supporter. Abbott said Willard had “as much 

right to sit in there as Al Capone does . . . on a committee on law order.” [Carper, Elsie, 

“Pollution Tax Aired By Nixon,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 9, 1972; 

Hill, Gladwin, “A Polite Nudge on Environment,” The New York Times, Feburary 9, 1972; 

Fahnestock, Sheridan, “Clean It Up,” Metro Wrapup, The Evening Star, February 9, 1972; “U.S. 

Tells D.C. to Clean Air,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 9, 1972] 

President Nixon’s Plans for the Bicentennial in the District

On February 4, 1972, President Nixon released a Special Message to the Congress Outlining 

Plans for the Bicentennial Observance in the District of Columbia. The central challenge of the 

Bicentennial was to plan for the observance “on the move,” he said. “We can best forge such a 

spirit, the [American Revolution Bicentennial] Commission went on to recommend, by 
approaching the Bicentennial as an occasion both for understanding our heritage better and for 

quickening progress toward our horizons . . . .” 

For the District of Columbia, two goals “for forging a better future” were improved schools and 

building the Metro subway system: 

METRO, and all of the other elements which with it will comprise a balanced modern 

transportation system for greater Washington, are central to Bicentennial plans for the 

District. We need the pride of achievement in area wide cooperation which the system 

will give all communities taking part. We need its people-moving capacity to cope with 

visitor traffic which may average up to 100,000 people daily throughout the anniversary 

year. I am today renewing the commitment of all the agencies and resources of the 

Federal Government toward maximum progress on the entire transportation system – 

subway, freeways, bridges, parking, and support facilities – before 1976. The action of 

the Congress in December to support continued METRO funding was enormously 

heartening to the people of the Capital region; it gave, in fact, a glimmer of hope to 

beleaguered commuters everywhere. The grim Thanksgiving prospect of a great many

excavated streets to fill back in has now become the far brighter prospect of at least 

24 miles of operating subway – the most modern anywhere – by 1976. Urgently needed 

now is prompt approval by the Congress of Federal guarantees for METRO revenue 

bonds – the next essential step to getting the trains running.

He was particularly interested in construction of a Metro station at Arlington National Cemetery, 

“for which funds are requested in my new budget.” In addition to providing easy access “from 

Washington to the Arlington shrine . . . it would offer the arriving visitor one more convenient 

transfer point from private to public transportation on the way into the Capital itself.” 

He had directed Secretary Volpe “to coordinate interagency action plans for supplementing those 

subway lines in service by 1976 with a cooperated network of other public transportation on 

which visitors can move from fringe parking areas (to be developed under these plans) to points 

of interest nearer the city center.”

About That Balanced System

Opponents of the Three Sisters Bridge, represented by Owen and Norton of Covington and 

Burling, filed briefs with the Supreme Court on February 16 opposing review of the U.S. Court 

of Appeals’ ruling. 

They contended that the issues involved were local in importance “with no national implications 

of any kind.” The Supreme Court, the brief said, had a “longstanding policy . . . not to review 

such local decisions.” Further, a Supreme Court ruling would apply only to the bridge case and 

have little bearing otherwise because the circumstances were “unique in the history of the federal 

highway program.” The brief explained: 
It is inherently improbable that any repetition would ever occur as a practical matter, and 

it is also the fact that there have been recent developments in the law which make any real 

repetition virtually impossible.

As a result, the Justice Department and District of Columbia were asking the court to rule on the 

facts of the case rather than the law. 

Owen and Norton also disputed those facts, particularly as to the will of Congress. The 

governments’ petition “inaccurately characterizes the statute as requiring that actual construction 

commence within 30 days.” The fallacy of this interpretation was “readily demonstrable.” 

Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 directed that the District “shall commence 

work” on four projects within 30 days. “Work” did not mean construction since “much planning 

and designing work remained to be done before any actual construction work could possibly 

commence on the bridge.” 

The brief pointed out that President Nixon had ordered the Justice Department to work with the 

Department of Transportation and the District of Columbia to appeal Judge Bazelon’s ruling to 

the full Appeals Court and, if unsuccessful there, to the Supreme Court. “While the President’s 

order had the desired effect of placating Mr. Natcher and obtaining release of the subway funds, 

it also serves to distinguish [the case] . . . from normal government . . . petitions which are filed 

by the solicitor general on his own initiative.” [Barnes, Fred, “Reject Bridge Case, High Court is 

Asked,” The Evening Star, February 17, 1972; Eisen, Jack, “Foes of Three Sisters Bridge Oppose 

Review of By High Court,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 17, 1972] 

The President’s order was generally thought to have been decisive in securing release of the 

District’s Metro matching funds. Further, according to capital area adviser Krogh, the White 

House was planning to give the “strongest possible support” to the legislation authorizing a 

Federal bond guaranty for Metro. “We’re approaching this issue with the same degree of 

seriousness – and perhaps even more – than [sic] we approached the vote on the House floor last 

December,” he told reporters. “We’ll go all the way – whatever it takes.” [Angle, Martha, 

“Nixon Set to Push for Bond Guaranty,” The Evening Star, February 13, 1972] 

The Joint Hearing on Metro

The unusual joint hearing of the House and Senate District Committees on the bond guarantee 

took place on March 1 and 2, 1972. Representative Earle Cabell (D-Tx.), chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Business, Commerce, and Fiscal Affairs of the Committee on the District of 

Columbia, and Senator Eagleton, chairman of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 

were the presiding officers.

Chairman Cabell, a businessman who had been mayor of Dallas (1961-1964) when President 

Kennedy was assassinated in that city, said that everyone present was “conscious of the need for 

the construction and implementation of our METRO system.” He listed five questions that the 

hearings were intended to address: 
(1) Has the costly delay in this construction been the fault of the Congress, or the fault of the 

people of the District of Columbia in this refusal to abide by the provisions of existing 

law relative to any existing highway laws?

(2) Can this project be self-liquidating as originally proposed? Will the fare box liquidate 

these bonds? 

(3) Have the Metropolitan Transit Authority exercised their best judgment in the expenditure 

of its available funds to this point? Have they been diligent in conserving their funds? 

(4) What is the difference between anticipated revenues, after initiation of operations, and its 

operating and debt-service costs?

(5) How many dollars is it anticipated that the U.S. Treasury must pick up in order to meet 

the bond commitments which they (the Treasury) are guaranteeing? 

After brief supportive comments from area Representatives Hogan, Broyhill, and Gude, Secretary 

Volpe appeared before the joint committee. Since becoming Secretary, he said, he had stressed 

the principle of “a balanced transportation system, a system which offers a true modal choice to 

all our citizens.” The Nation’s capital was advancing such a system, with Metro the key to “an 

efficient public transportation system” for the metropolitan area. “METRO will be the heart of 

the system. It is the keystone of a coordinated transportation system and essential to the effective 

performance of the Federal Government.” 

Fortunately, the legislative and executive branches were fully committed to Metro. He cited 

President Nixon’s February 4 special message to Congress outlining plans for the Bicentennial in 

the District. The President had said that Metro, as part of a “balanced modern transportation 

system,” was central to the plans because its “people-moving capacity” was essential to coping 

with the hundreds of thousands of people expected to visit the city in 1976. Secretary Volpe 

quoted the portion of the statement in which the President committed all agencies to make 

maximum progress on construction, and urged Congress to approve Federal guarantees for the 

revenue bonds. 

Secretary Volpe was heartened by the physical progress of Metro, with 9 miles under 

construction and 11 stations under contract. WMATA was addressing a wide range of issues, 

including what the Secretary referred to in quotes as “people problems” typical of any major 

construction project in a big city. “Unfortunately, a new problem has arisen, a financial problem 

which threatens to halt the progress which has been made”:

Having been in the construction industry most of my adult life before I went into public 

service, I can attest to the fact that the period between 1969 and 1971 was the period of 

probably the greatest rise in construction prices and construction wages of any period 

I can remember in the last 40 years. So, it is not anything that could have really been 

foreseen.

As a result, “WMATA’s financial advisers, securities underwriters, [concluded] that the absence 

of additional security seriously impaired the marketability of the METRO revenue bonds.” The 

proposed legislation would “assure the orderly financing of the METRO system.” Despite all the 

progress to date and the obstacles overcome, “additional help from the Federal Government is 

necessary.” 
In response to a question from Chairman Cabell, Secretary Volpe explained that the role of the 

Department of Transportation would be to “serve as a conduit between the Congress and 

WMATA.” He said:

We would be reviewing, on a timely basis, the reports and the progress of WMATA. As 

the legislation requires, we would not issue or give permission for the issuance of bonds 

unless we were satisfied that there was a reasonable prospect for WMATA to pay off the 

bonds. 

Aside from a role in assuring the success of WMATA, the Department would serve “as the eyes 

and the ears of the Congress, to transmit to you any information which we felt you ought to have 

with regard to this situation – such as financial reviews.”

Representative Nelsen asked if, in view of the support for a balanced transportation system, “the 

highway part of this system is now moving as it should?” Secretary Volpe replied that the 

highway system was “moving as rapidly as the Department of Transportation and the D.C. 

Highway Department, are able to move consistent with the statutes that the Congress has enacted 

and by which we must abide.” The Department had “done everything we possibly could do to 

bring about the construction of the freeway system that was feasible and which the Congress 

asked us to build and, in some cases, asked for our thoughts concerning.” 

He offered to submit FHWA’s latest monthly status report on the freeway network. On a 

national basis, “I am not supposed to look at each individual project’s progress.” However, “this 

is the Capital City and the President expressed to me on a number of occasions his desire that 

I give as much time as possible to see to it that progress is continued on all modes of 

transportation here in the Capital City.”

Representative Nelson appreciated the offer because even if the bond guarantee bill passed the 

House District Committee, “we still must go out on the Floor of the House” for a vote: 

There has always been a great debate as to whether or not there has been foot-dragging, 

and what can be done and what should be done, in order to move the balanced 

transportation system, as you indicated. 

The FHWA’s report was submitted by E. H. Swick for Administrator Turner on March 1, 1972: 

Three Sisters Bridge

A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court during the month of 

January. Opponents of the bridge filed a brief on February 16, urging the Court to deny 

the Government’s petition. The Court has not ruled on the matter to date.

Potomac River Freeway

The National Capital Planning Commission’s consultant, Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and 

Todd (WMRT) is at work on land use studies for the Georgetown Waterfront. The 

Highway Department’s consultant, Sverdrup and Parcel, has prepared preliminary 

engineering drawings for four alternate design concepts, and has provided those drawings 

to WMRT for its use in preparing alternate corridor development plans. Alternate plans 
and a 4(f)/Environmental Impact Statement are to be completed by the end of March 1972 

after which a design public hearing will be held and a single development concept 

selected.

The work of WMRT is being periodically reviewed by the Interagency Coordinating 

Committee, through which we are represented by Messrs. Hirten and [Asaph] Hall 

[Special Assistant to Deputy Under Secretary John P. Olsson]. 

South Leg of the Inner Loop (Lincoln Memorial and Tidal Basin Area)

Preliminary drafts of an Environmental Impact Statement . . . have been reviewed and are 

being finalized. It is anticipated that the Draft Environmental Impact Statement will be 

released and circulated for comments during the month of March. It is expected that a 

design public hearing will be conducted during the month of April. 

Center Leg of the Inner Loop (West of Capitol)

Construction is in progress. Contract PS&E for the K Street bridge have been approved 

and the project has been advertised for bids. Design is continuing and an environmental 

impact statement is being prepared for the air rights housing project between H Street and 

K Street, Northwest.

East Leg of the Inner Loop (RFK Stadium Area)

Design studies are in progress. 

North-Central Freeway

Northeast Freeway 

North Leg of the Inner Loop 

East Leg of the Inner Loop (portion north of Bladensburg Road)

These segments which were included in the D.C. Restudy are inactive at present, pending 

review by the Congress. 

Representative Broyhill asked when the Secretary expected the Supreme Court to respond to the 

Justice Department’s petition. With I-66 and access to Dulles International Airport partly 

dependent on I-266 and the Three Sisters Bridge, “it is almost like sitting and waiting for the 

other shoe to drop.” 

Department General Counsel John W. Barnum replied that the Supreme Court normally “clears 

up all such petitions for certiorari before the end of the term” in June, but the Department was 

hoping for a response “substantially before that.” In the certiorari-petition stage, four Justices 

would have to agree to hear the case, but if that happened, the Supreme Court review would not 

take place until the fall.

Secretary Volpe added that the Department was working with the city, HUD, and NCPC “on an 

environmental plan and a layout for the Georgetown water-front which also ties into I-66.” They 

also were working on plans for design hearings on other freeway projects. “So, we are not just 

sitting still waiting for” the Supreme Court. [Federal Guarantee of Bonds for National Capital 

Region Subway System, Joint Hearings before the Committee on the District of Columbia of the 
United States Senate and Subcommittee on Business, Commerce, and Fiscal Affairs, of the 

Committee on the District of Columbia, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2d Session, on 

S. 2297 and H.R. 11877, March 1 and 2, 1972, pages 1-3, 16-29] 

The next witness was Jack F. Bennett, Deputy Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, Department 

of the Treasury. The Treasury Department, he said, fully supported the proposed bill. The 

margin of safety for $1.2 billion in bonds was satisfactory:

Over the life of these bonds, it has been estimated that this project will generate, in 

addition to meeting its cost and repaying the bonds and paying interest, something on the 

order of $1.4 billion over and above those requirements. That would be on the order of 

$15 million a year in some of the earlier years, rising on up toward $100 million a year in 

later years. That is a margin of safety.

Beyond that, you probably recognize the bill itself provides that the guarantee cannot be 

issued until the Secretary of Transportation is satisfied that the Government is 

undertaking “an acceptable financial risk to the United States.” 

The legislation further provides that if at any time the Secretary of Transportation decides 

action is necessary to protect the interest of the United States, be can direct such prudent 

action. [Federal Guarantee of Bonds for National Capital Region Subway System, 

pages 29-32] 

Mayor Washington was scheduled to be the next witness, but had succumbed to the flu. Deputy 

Mayor Watt read the mayor’s statement. The statement explained the anticipated benefits of 

Metro:

METRO will mean many things for Washington: new development, both commercial 

and residential; expanded employment opportunities; improved access to work, business, 

retail, recreational, entertainment, and cultural centers; and strengthened ties among the 

various jurisdictions in the Washington area. I believe that METRO will greatly assist 

our efforts to create a viable regional cooperation which will stimulate our efforts to 

create a viable regional cooperation which will stimulate the health and vitality of center 

city and surrounding jurisdictions . . . . 

Thus, the legislation before you today is extremely important because it will complete the 

financial plan necessary for the construction of the METRO system. 

The goal was “to assure the orderly financing of the METRO system.” With passage of the 

legislation, “the system can be completed as projected and at the least cost to the Federal 

Government and the local participating governments.” 

The bill, in Title II, also increased the District’s contribution from $216.5 million to $269.7 

million, an increase of $53.2 million. Comparable increases were anticipated for the surrounding 

jurisdictions. [pages 39-44] 
WMATA officials also testified on March 1. After a brief history of the project, Chairman 

Fisher summarized the status of construction: 

To the north of Union Station work is underway on the Rhode Island Avenue station and 

on the system’s yard and shop facilities. South and west from Union Station, a cut and 

cover section of subway leads to Judiciary Square where a station is taking form under 

the various courts buildings. Much of the structural work from there to 7th and G Streets 

is nearing completion. Along G street, from that point to the Treasury at 15th Street, it is 

now decked over with work advancing beneath on two stations and connecting sections. 

From 15th and G Streets, a 150-tone machine has tunneled under the corner of the 

Treasury property – which we are being sure is properly shored up – and under Lafayette 

Park enroute to Farragut Square. Mining then proceeds under Farragut Square to 

K Street.

Beginning at the Rock Creek intersection with the Connecticut Avenue section of the 

Rockville route, tunneling is moving rapidly toward Dupont Circle. Over a half mile of 

solid rock tunnel has been mined. To the south of Dupont Circle, Connecticut Avenue is 

largely decked over as work proceeds on two stations and the subway line connecting 

with the Farragut Square tunnel 

Last June 17th, the participating Virginia local governments conducted a groundbreaking 

ceremony to celebrate the beginning of work in Virginia. Since that time a tunnel running 

from the system portal near the Iowa Jima statue under Rosslyn to the Rosslyn station is 

well underway. Tunneling under the Potomac has begun and the subway line along Eye 

[I] Street to Farragut Square, including two stations, is under construction. 

In all, 11 stations and 9 route miles are under construction. And an additional 25 stations 

and 27 miles are under design contract. So you can see, METRO is no longer an 

abstraction. 

Turning to the financing issue, Chairman Fisher told the joint hearing that the original financing 

plan depended on selling $835 million in revenue bonds. Then WMATA found that the cost for 

the 98-mile system had increased by about $500 million. Next came the difficulty of selling the 

bonds: 

A second development which became apparent was that the proposed sale of revenue 

bonds could not be accomplished without additional assurance to the investor. Our 

financial consultants had concluded that some form of tax backup or guaranty would be 

necessary to attract investors. An additional problem associated with the sale of bonds 

involves the current rate of interest demanded by the market. Our original projections 

were an average of 5 percent on tax-exempt bonds. The current estimate is an average of 

7 percent on taxable bonds. 

After consulting WMATA’s financial advisors and 16 of the Nation’s leading underwriters, “it 

became clear that there was no possibility of marketing our revenue bonds with the existing 
conditions.” Further, the interest rate assumptions made in 1968 were reasonable at the time, but 

“had been proven optimistic in today’s market place.” This change in interest rates meant that 

the bonds, if sold, would increase the amount of funding needed for interest payments and 

generate less revenue than expected for construction, thus further diminishing their salability. 

Although one option was to increase each jurisdiction’s contribution to the project, WMATA 

realized that “it was obvious that a taxing mechanism could not be arranged soon enough to 

avoid a hiatus in the funding of construction requirements.” 

The pending bill to guarantee the revenue bonds had three advantages: 

It will allow the immediate sale of bonds at the most favorable interest rate and thereby 

avoid any serious disruption to the planning construction schedule. It will allow up to 

3 years for the local governments to consummate the necessary legal steps to provide for 

their increased shares. At the same time, the Federal interest will be protected since the 

sale of the additional $300 million in bonds will be conditioned upon the development of 

suitable matching arrangements to preserve the Federal-local matching formula . . . . 

We trust that the Congress will find the proposal consistent with the goals and standards 

which it has set over the past two decades. 

After generally supportive questioning, the hearing ended for the day. [pages 44-57] 

The second day of hearings continued the supportive statements from local jurisdictions and 

agencies.

Highway Funding for Transit 

Traditionally, Congress considered reauthorization of the Federal-aid highway program every 

2 years. In 1972, consideration began early, but was affected by issues that had been brewing 

since the mid-1960s when cities began taking over failing private-sector transit companies to 

maintain needed service. As with early projections for Metro in the Washington area, many 

cities thought that with efficient operation, they could run the systems with revenue from the fare 

box. Fairly soon, the cities came to understand that the fare box could not generate enough 

revenue and that some other source of funds would be needed. 

The Highway Trust Fund, with its multibillion dollar balance, was a tempting target for those 

seeking transit aid, especially for cities trying to avoid tax increase to pay operating subsidies. 

Highway advocates explained that the balance was not unused money. The balance consisted 

mainly of highway user tax revenue committed to projects that were going to be under 

construction for several years. The traditional comparison was to a family checking account with 

a large balance, but numerous checks written and not yet cashed. 

Transit advocates, Members of Congress from big cities, environmentalists, and urban planners 

were undeterred. By 1972, urban Interstates construction was sufficiently controversial that protransit forces argued the funds for unwanted Interstate highways should be used instead for 

transit, including operating subsidies – the biggest headache for cities. 
Secretary Volpe, the former Federal Highway Administrator who had stated early in his tenure 

that the Highway Trust Fund should be restricted to highways, changed his mind. The Nixon 

Administration supported opening the Highway Trust Fund to transit in pursuit of a balanced 

transportation system for the Nation’s cities. However, the Administration opposed Federal aid 

for operating subsidies, which opponents often referred to as “throwing money down a rathole.” 

The Secretary’s proposal, released on March 14, 1972, recommended consolidating all existing 

urban highway and mass transit programs into a Single Urban Fund, with the exception of the 

Interstate program and minor transit initiatives. All rural highway programs would be 

consolidated into the Rural Federal-Aid System and a Rural General Transportation Fund. 

Highway interests opposed the plan because it allowed diversion of Highway Trust Fund revenue 

to transit. Transit interests opposed it, too. Since the funds could be used for highways or 

transit, they feared that the powerful highway lobby would ensure that highway projects received 

most of the funds. In the absence of a constituency, Congress never seriously considered 

Secretary Volpe’s bold move, but it reflected his change of thinking and the policies that the 

Department of Transportation would promote in coming years. 

At the same time, the House and Senate Public Works Committees were dominated by road 

supporters who resisted diversion of Highway Trust Fund revenue. Further, in the Senate, the 

Committee on Public Works was not responsible for transit. In the early days of Federal-aid for 

transit, the Federal housing agency administered the funds. As a result, the Committee on 

Banking and Currency had jurisdiction over transit programs. It retained that jurisdiction even 

after the Federal-aid transit program was shifted to the Department of Transportation and 

administered by UMTA. 

One of the committee’s members, Senator Harrison A. “Pete” Williams, Jr. (D-NJ), was based in 

Plainfield and was the Senate’s chief transit advocate. He had served in the U.S. House of 

Representatives (1953-1957) before winning election to the Senate in 1958. Early on, he adopted 

transit aid as an issue that was important to the Nation and his New Jersey constituents.

By 1972, advocates such as Senator Kennedy, Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-Ct.), and 

Representatives Koch and Bella Abzug (both D-NY) and other members of the New York City 

congressional delegation were among those introducing bills to create a mass transportation trust 

fund or a transportation trust fund, with much of the revenue coming from highway users whose 

revenue currently was credited to the Highway Trust Fund. The problem with a mass transit trust 

fund was that unlike the highway equivalent, increasing taxes on money-losing transit lines to 

stock the fund might reduce ridership. 

The most influential alternative was the Muskie-Cooper amendment introduced by Senator 

Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.), one of the Senate’s most aggressive environmental advocates and a 

potential candidate for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, and Senator Cooper, both 

members of the Committee on Public Roads. Their amendment would allow cities to use their 

Federal-aid urban system funds for traditional highway projects or transit, including rapid rail 

transit. 
Senators Muskie and Cooper and other supporters of their amendment argued that it would allow 

local officials to use the funds for the projects that best met each area’s unique needs. Opponents 

said that allowing the funds to be used for rail transit would violate the sanctity of the Highway 

Trust Fund, which was set up for highway purposes, and a betrayal of the highway users who 

were told their taxes went to the highway program. 

The other unusual proposition was initiated by Secretary Volpe’s successor as Governor of 

Massachusetts. Lt. Governor Frank W. Sargent became Governor to complete Volpe’s term. 

Governor Endicott Peabody (1963-1965) had appointed Sargent one of five Commissioners of 

Public Works, in charge of the Division of Waterways, in 1964. Governor Volpe elevated 

Sargent in 1965 to be chairman and chief road builder. Shortly after becoming Governor, 

however, Sargent addressed a crowd of protestors assembled on the Boston Common for “People 

Before Highways Day” and assured them that he would never put freeways before people. The 

crowd, which booed when he appeared, cheered his unexpected new attitude.

Governor Sargent, the convert, decided not to build Boston’s Inner Loop (I-695) or the extension 

of I-95 into the city from the southeast, the two most contentious remaining projects. Instead, he 

would revitalize the Boston area’s transit network. The problem was that although no one, not 

even FHWA, could force the State to build a highway, but if it decided not to do so, the State and 

the city would lose hundreds of millions of dollars, and the jobs and economic boost that came 

with the dollars. The only alternative under current law was to shift the Interstate designation to 

another location that might prove less controversial. 

Meanwhile, Governor Sargent did not have any obvious source of funds for the ambitious transit 

agenda he adopted. By 1972, Governor Sargent and his Secretary of Transportation, Alan S. 

Altshuler, had identified alternative routes elsewhere in the State, but were seeking a more 

flexible approach. 

In early March, the Subcommittee on Roads of the House Committee on Public Roads began 

hearings on the 1972 highway legislation. When Secretary Volpe appeared before the 

subcommittee on March 16 his Single Urban Fund received what by then was the expected 

skeptical reception. 

On March 21, the subcommittee heard from a delegation from Massachusetts, including 

Secretary Altshuler. He said his “primary purpose” was to urge support for “a very specific 

provision.” At the time, the substitute Interstate mileage was limited to 200 miles, which had 

been committed by then: 

We believe that a sufficiently flexible highway program must be able to accommodate the 

finding that in some urban corridors it is no longer feasible to carve new rights-of-way – 

and to do so without imposing harsh financial penalties upon the States involved. In 

these urban corridors, the States concerned will generally have to undertake large 

transportation investments, both highway and transit, of a noninterstate nature . . . . In 

cooperation with AASHO, we urge that Interstate funds be made available for 

reassignment to meet these needs where such reassignment is compatible with the 

objectives of the Interstate program.
Secretary Hughes of Maryland testified on the same issue. He said that Maryland had built or 

programmed 358 miles of Interstate highway. But about 30 miles in the Baltimore area and 

Maryland’s Washington suburbs are unbuilt. This unbuilt mileage included I-95 and I-70S inside 

the Capital Beltway as well as segments of I-70N, I-83, I-95, and I-395 in Baltimore: 

Repeated efforts have been and are being made to resolve the issues associated with 

[these segments] . . . . However, public opposition, connected to a great extent with 

environmental impact issues, continues to overshadow the basic need to provide for a 

high level of transportation service in these corridors. 

He cited I-95 in the Washington area as an example:

Recent actions by the D.C. Council and the U.S. Department of Transportation to revise 

portions of the Interstate System within the District raise questions as to the utility of our 

plans to study further the proposed I-95 corridor in Prince Georges [sic] County. 

Maryland, he said, was studying “what it believes to be a realistic approach toward providing 

alternate means of satisfying this inter- and intra-state travel demand in the event that these 

controversial sections are not constructed.” Secretary Hughes said:

The State of Maryland will be prepared in July 1973 to demonstrate to the Federal 

Government that such a revised system can be advanced to the construction stage in 1975 

in order that the State does not suffer a loss of Interstate funds and associated system 

mileage, resulting in an inability to avoid high levels of congestion and to provide for the 

needs of the motoring public . . . . Maryland proposes to develop a logical system of 

replacement Interstate facilities, consistent with present Federal Interstate funding 

commitments, for use in the event certain controversial segments of the program system 

are not constructed. 

First priority would be to identify facilities that replace the function of the missing Interstate 

segment. Second priority would be “facilities that will provide alternate routings for Interstate 

movements” to relieve congestion on existing highways. Finally, the State would emphasize 

facilities that “satisfy Interstate movements that have not been provided for” at present.

The funding authorized for the controversial Interstate segments in the Baltimore and 

Washington areas would be sufficient to pay for these alternative routes. He asked Congress to 

allow the State to substitute new freeway routes for the portions that may be abandoned, with the 

substitution based on cost (about $1 billion) rather than mileage as under current law.

Secretary Hughes told reporters that substitutes might include an expressway from Baltimore to 

Annapolis and upgrading of the John Hanson Highway (U.S. 50) between Washington and 

Annapolis to Interstate standards. He stressed this was not a plan, but simply an illustration of 

where Maryland might shift the mileage if Federal law permitted. [1972 Highway Legislation, 

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Roads of the Committee on Public Works, House of 

Representatives, 92nd Session 2nd Session, Committee Print 92-32, pages 541-5553; Eisen, Jack, 
“Permission to Alter Road Plans Asked,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 22, 

1972] 

In April, State Highway Administrator Fisher confirmed that Maryland no longer planned to 

build its portion of the North-Central Freeway. He wrote to Delegate Donald R. Robertson, chair 

of the Montgomery County delegation to the General Assembly, to say the State was seeking 

authority to use the funds for another route, such as U.S. 50 to Annapolis or an outer beltway in 

Montgomery County. [“Freeway Plan Dropped by Md. Agency,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, April 9, 1972] 

Decision on the Three Sisters Bridge

On March 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals issued a supplementary opinion addressing issues raised 

concerning the 1893 provisions of the District Code that plaintiffs had argued the District had not 

satisfied in advancing the Three Sisters Bridge. The Appeals Court found that these 

requirements did not apply to the Three Sisters Bridge: 

The language of section 23, and its history and objective, persuade us that the overriding 

intention of Congress was also to exempt the project from the necessity of further 

compliance with these recommendatory and consultative provisions of the local code. 

Clearly one of the objectives of Congress was to have the bridge project go forward 

promptly. The “notwithstanding . . . any law . . . to the contrary” language, construed in 

light of this objective, and of the history of the project, bears a construction that the 

provisions of the D.C. Code now considered should not delay or bar the authorities from 

proceeding. 

The supplementary opinion also considered Title 16, United States Code, Section 470f, which 

required the Federal Agency to consider the impact of projects such as the Three Sisters Bridge 

on properties included in the National Register of Historic Places, and should afford the Advisory 

Council on Historic Preservation an opportunity to comment. The Secretary of Transportation is 

a member of the Advisory Council and may have already complied with this provision (“we 

understand he may already have done so”), but if not, he should do so. 

This supplementary opinion had no bearing on the appeal to the Supreme Court. 

On March 27, 1972, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. Normally, such decisions are made 

without explanation, but in this case, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger released a concurring 

opinion: 

I concur in the denial of certiorari in this case, but solely out of considerations of timing. 

Questions of great importance to the Washington area are presented by the petition, not 

the least of which is whether the Court of Appeals has, for a second time, unjustifiably 

frustrated the efforts of the Executive Branch to comply with the will of Congress as 

rather clearly expressed in Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. If we 

were to grant the writ, however, it would be almost a year before we could render a 

decision in the case. It seems preferable, therefore, that we stay our hand. In these 
circumstances, Congress may, of course, take any further legislative action it deems 

necessary to make unmistakably clear its intentions with respect to the project, even to the 

point of limiting or prohibiting judicial review of its directives in this respect.

In effect, Chief Justice Burger neither agreed nor disagreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals’ 

findings, but believed a year’s delay in completing Supreme Court review was inadvisable. 

Instead, the decision left the future of the bridge to Secretary Volpe, who must now ensure 

compliance with the requirements of the Appeals Court’s decision of October 12, 1971. 

Secretary Volpe did not have an immediate reaction. However, his spokesman indicated he had 

conferred with General Counsel Barnum and Administrator Turner. 

Representative Broyhill called on the Committee on Public Works to write legislation that would 

force construction of the bridge. If the committee did not do so, he said, he would. Committee 

sources indicated that action was not likely and that if Representative Broyhill drafted a bill to 

initiate action, it would simply be referred back to the committee, which likely would ignore it:

A committee spokesman said the committee would not relish the prospect of holding 

hearings on a matter “committee members had considered settled.” 

Sources said the District’s recalcitrance on provisions of the 1968 Highway Act, and its 

opposition to construction of freeways delineated in the act, had caused the committee – 

perhaps with a few exceptions – to view further legislation as futile.

A Senate Public Works Committee staff member said it was unlikely that that committee 

will pick up Burger’s suggestion. “I see no further need for Congress to say that we really 

meant [what] we’ve already said twice before.”

Sammie Abbott promised to continue fighting the bridge: 

We pledge increased determination to meet the next moves of the pro-freeway forces by 

every means as we have in the past: Public education and mobilization, political and 

legal action. 

Robert M. Kennan, Jr., transportation chairman of the Committee of 100, which was among the 

plaintiffs, said, “The way is cleared for a reappraisal of the bridge proposal on its merits.” He 

added, “If it gets that, we are confident the project will be abandoned.” [Kneece, Jack, “New 

3 Sisters Action is Doubtful This Year,” The Evening Star, March 28, 1972; Eisen, Jack, 

“3 Sisters Appeal Rejected,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 28, 1972] 

A Post editorial following the decision began: 

Once again, for the umpteenth time in as many years, the Three Sisters Bridge – the 

bridge that people can’t see because it isn’t there, but feel no less powerfully about on 

that account – is back on page one, complicated as usual and unresolved as ever. 
The fate of the bridge “involves politics, home rule, money, planning, conservation, freeways, the 

Metro rapid transit system, housing, assertions of congressional power, Presidents of the United 

States and, in this latest round, the Supreme Court.” However, the Supreme Court had neither 

killed the Three Sisters Bridge nor ordered work to resume. In fact, “the Supreme Court didn’t 

even want to hear the case.” 

Instead, it left the Appeals Court ruling in place, and that ruling had returned the case to Judge 

Sirica with instructions on how to proceed. The editorial summarized the instructions: 

1. District Court Judge John J. Sirica is told to clarify – and possibly reconsider – his 

finding in 1970 that proper hearings had been held six years earlier on the location of the 

bridge. 

2. The District Court is also told to send the case to Secretary of Transportation John A. 

Volpe, who is to make several determinations dealing with such factors as the proposed 

usage of, and impact upon, parkland along the Potomac shore. Mr. Volpe is also 

instructed to make a documented record of these and other determinations, such as 

whether the bridge jibes with areawide transportation planning criteria. 

Of course, Chief Justice Burger’s “highly unusual concurring opinion” practically invited 

congressional action that could force construction. That was now a possibility. First, the 

decision not to hear the case meant the Supreme Court left in place Judge Bazelon’s comments 

about pressure from Chairman Natcher. “Many congressmen read that as an insult to the 

legislative branch of the sort that demands retaliation.” Second, the Chief Justice had “managed 

to fan these flames” by raising the question of whether Judge Bazelon’s ruling had “unjustifiably 

frustrated the efforts of the Executive Branch to comply with the will of Congress.” The 

statement then observed that a Supreme Court ruling might be a year off and that in the 

meantime, Congress could act “to make unmistakably clear its intentions,” even limiting or 

prohibiting judicial review:

These comments – coming as they do from the Chief Justice of the United States – strike 

us as peculiar, to say the least. We had not thought it to be the function of the Chief 

Justice to advise Congress, and still less encourage it, to take particular actions; or to pay 

quite such close attention to a local dispute largely unrelated to national affairs; or to 

suggest answers to questions not before the court. Yet he seemed to do all three in 

pointing out that Congress could now pass still another law requiring the bridge to be 

built, and could couple it with a provision prohibiting judicial review of its action. 

Despite this virtual invitation to legislative relief, perhaps “Congress may have had enough of the 

whole Three Sisters saga by now, and might be willing to let the matter undergo the same 

procedures as any other federal highway project.” Perhaps, in truth, what was needed was “a 

thorough, up-to-date review of this dog-eared plan as it applies to today’s transportation outlook 

here.” Instead of simply being another “excuse for frivolous delaying tactics,” such a review 

might “produce a fresh decision with which everyone involved in this ancient imbroglio could 

live in peace—or at least in something closer to tranquility.” [“Three Sisters: Back to the 

Drawing Boards,” The Washington Post, March 30, 1972] 
The Star agreed that the Chief Justice had offered several options for resolution, including a 

legislative solution, an administrative response, “or everyone can forget the whole thing.” The 

administrative option for Secretary Volpe was not promising: 

For no matter what kind of good-faith effort the Department of Transportation might now 

make to answer the maze of administrative and legal procedural questions raised by Judge 

Bazelon, our guess is that this inevitably would lead to further inconclusive litigation. 

That, as the Chief Justice implied, left the legislative option as the most promising. By law, 

Congress could make its intentions unmistakably clear. True, Congress tried to do that in 1968 

by directing construction to begin. Now, however, it had a new vehicle, namely the biennial 

Federal-aid highway bill that was to be enacted in 1972. “The merits of the bridge are clear” and 

President Nixon “is firmly on record” in support, and yet: 

If it seems incredible that any dispute over a Potomac River bridge crossing should be 

occupying the very top echelons of the legislative, judicial and executive branches of the 

federal government, the fact is that such things happen occasionally in the Nation’s 

Capital, and have throughout its history. This one will linger on until Congress, with the 

President’s help, ends it. [“Justice Burger’s Prescription,” The Evening Star, March 29, 

1972] 

A New City Council Chairman

As early as December 1971, the White House had begun looking for a Republican to replace 

Chairman Hahn when his 3-year term ended on February 1. The Star reported: 

Hahn, 49, a liberal Republican, has apparently disappointed the White House by 

successfully forging the council’s limited authority into a controversial weapon of a 

relatively independent and innovative legislative body. 

The White House is reported to feel that Hahn’s bid for independence has sometimes 

been at the expense of Mayor Walter E. Washington and is a source of disharmony within 

the city government.

Under Chairman Hahn, the council had “provoked criticism from many quarters. Some elements 

of the city’s business community have accused Hahn of seeking publicity and issuing self-serving 

statements.” He had “in a sometimes flamboyant manner . . . turned what might have been a 

figurehead post into a full-time job.” He had been at odds with the mayor on a number of issues, 

including whether to provide a subsidy to D.C. Transit System to save the reduced fare for the 

elderly:

The subsidy, supported by Council Vice Chairman Sterling Tucker, was strongly opposed 

by Hahn, who argued it would strengthen the position of D.C. Transit’s controversial 

president, O. Roy Chalk, and delay the company’s acquisition by a public body. 

Mayor Washington, after a week’s silence, finally endorsed the subsidy. 
Then there was the Three Sisters Bridge:

A particularly sore point has been Hahn’s opposition to building the Three Sisters Bridge, 

against President Nixon’s specific endorsement of that project in order to guarantee the 

flow of subway construction funds from Congress. At one point, Hahn’s public 

declaration against the bridge came during delicate private negotiations and nettled some 

of the participants. [Critchfield, Richard, “White House Seeks Successor to Hahn,” The 

Evening Star, December 22, 1971] 

From the start, former Councilman John A. Nevius was the frontrunner to replace Hahn. Since 

losing the race for the District’s nonvoting Delegate to Congress, Nevius had served as Deputy. 

On April 13, Assistant Press Secretary Gerald L. Warren announced the decision to appoint 

Nevius. The President, Warren said, appreciated Hahn’s work, but “felt that this was the time for 

new leadership” of the city council. Warren also announced that the White House would 

renominate Councilman Sterling Tucker, whose term had expired on February 1 along with 

Hahn’s term. Hahn and Tucker had continued serving in the interim. Like Hahn, Nevius was 

white, thus maintaining the racial balance on the city council.

The announcement came while Hahn was attending a birthday party for Mayor Washington, who 

was turning 57. By contrast with the White House’s muted announcement of Hahn’s ouster, 

President Nixon sent the mayor a laudatory telegram on his birthday: 

I welcome this opportunity to publicly tell you of my deep admiration and very real 

respect for your years of dedicated leadership as mayor of the nation’s capital. We all 

feel fortunate to have the benefit of your wisdom and experience. 

According to the Post, White House staff had wanted to nominate Nevius in January, but had 

been overruled by Attorney General Mitchell: 

Mitchell felt Hahn should be permitted to retain his post because of his campaign fund 

raising efforts on behalf of the Republican party. 

However, sources said Nixon decided that he had to be replaced after some members of 

the House and Senate continued to complain bitterly about him. 

The Post reported that: 

Hahn’s outspoken views, his frequently abrasive tactics, his alienation of some elements 

of the D.C. business community and his inability to get along with some key members of 

Congress were cited most frequently yesterday for his loss of the chairmanship . . . . 

Privately, Council members said they felt Hahn’s efforts to make the Council an 

independent body was the reason his ouster. 

“He was forceful,” said one. “They want us to quiet down and be a part-time Council.”
Hahn’s predecessor, John W. Hechinger, struck a similar note in speculating on Hahn’s 

failure to win reappointment. “In his initial charge to us, President Johnson said to act as 

if we were elected. The varying power structures in Washington – they’re not quite used 

to it.” 

Or, as the Star put it, “Hahn had managed to step on too many toes – particularly in the 

traditional Washington power base from which he came.”

A News Analysis in the Post explained it in terms of balance between Mayor Washington and 

Chairman Hahn: 

In many ways, President Nixon’s ouster of Gilbert Hahn Jr. last week from the D.C. City 

Council chairmanship put the final touch on a four-year rapprochement between 

Mr. Nixon and Major Walter E. Washington and a four-year downhill relationship 

between the President and Hahn. 

One of the chief reasons given by congressional and administration sources close to the 

shakeup was that Hahn was ousted because of his many disagreements with the mayor.

Before appointing Hahn, President Nixon had been impressed by the attorney’s ideas on crime, 

court reform, and increasing the number of city judges and police officers. Since the 

appointment, however, “Mr. Nixon and other key Republicans have increasingly shown a 

preference for Mayor Washington’s moderate, nonpartisan conduct to those of the more partisan, 

ebullient Hahn.” 

Representative Broyhill was one of the area Members of Congress who resented Hahn: 

Broyhill not only opposed Hahn’s moves for independence but more so his efforts to tax 

suburbanites . . . . 

But when the mayor proposed his bold program of 1971, the reciprocal income tax on 

commuters, the White House kept silent, although the administration probably knew it 

would go nowhere. 

That same year, when Hahn proposed an areawide payroll tax as a way out of the Metro 

subway system’s financial difficulties, the White House publicly overrode Hahn and one 

of Hahn’s best administration friends, Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe, by 

proposing an alternative. 

His battle for a parking tax on workers who drive downtown to work had drawn criticism from 

Members of Congress from Maryland and Virginia. The tax was described as an environmental 

measure meant to reduce the number of commuters entering the city by encouraging them to 

switch to transit or carpools: 

However, congressional sources said Hahn’s adamant backing of the plan was not the 

reason for his expected loss of the Council chairmanship. 
There has been growing disenchantment with Hahn on Capitol Hill. Especially irritating 

was the Council’s refusal last year, at Hahn’s insistence, to enact a 30-cent increase in the 

local property rate requested by Mayor Walter E. Washington and the President. Instead 

the Council raised the rate by 10 cents.

Even as rumors that Hahn was about to be replaced, Senators Mathias, Beall and Spong took to 

the Senate floor on April 12 to attack the plan for a parking tax. Representative Broyhill vowed 

to defeat the proposal. [Proposed Tax By District of Columbia Council on Automobiles Parked 

in Commercial Parking Lots, Congressional Record-Senate, April 12, 1972, pages 12338-12341] 

Some members of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia privately said they would 

not vote for Hahn’s confirmation if he were renominated: 

Some Republican members of the House and Senate also objected to Hahn’s personality, 

complaining to White House officials that he did not know how to deal with them and 

that he had no sense of public relations. [Green, Stephen, and Scharfenberg, Kirk, 

“Nevius May Head Council,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 13, 1972] 

By contrast, as the Star reported in a profile of the nominee, Nevius was seen as a liberal 

Republican in the mold of Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York City (1966-1973). He was a 

“cool, rational politician who will never shoot from the hip on an issue and end up blasting off 

his toes.” He was “more apt to be agonizingly slow at time as he deliberately analyzes the issues 

before drawing up his position.” 

When the appointment was announced, Nevius said he was “delighted to have a new opportunity 

to serve the city. I love the city.” He would not comment on any issues or offer an opinion on 

Hahn’s chairmanship. He thought he would leave HUD, but was unsure. It depended on 

whether his work as chairman of the city council would constitute a full-time job.

In an interview, a reporter asked about his balanced style of decisionmaking. Nevius said, “I see 

no reason to change that approach. My approach to things is to try to analyze them carefully and 

thoroughly . . . get a good grasp on the pros and cons . . . [which is] the best approach for coming 

up with the right answer.” 

This studied style had its critics. One unnamed supporter of Hahn thought Nevius would hurt the 

city in the long run. “Basically I think Jack’s a pretty indecisive guy. He’s nice. He’s 

personable. But when push comes to shove, he’ll fudge. He is willing to let an issue drift on in 

hopes of a consensus.” The profile cited his stance on freeways while serving on the council as 

an example: 

Once while on the City Council, Nevius side-stepped one of the most controversial issues 

in the city – whether or not to build new freeways – so well that most people even today 

do not know his real position on the matter. 

Nevius managed this even though he was chairman of the council’s committee which was 

asked to recommend a course of action on freeways – which were unwanted by District 

residents but favored by Congress. 
Instead of one alternative, Nevius sent the council three – then sat back and watched as 

the remaining eight council members committed themselves to various sides.

When then Council Chairman John Hechinger found himself hard put for a solution, 

Nevius carefully helped draw up a resolution which put the issues in Mayor Washington’s 

lap.

Then he turned around and voted against the resolution he helped to write. Even though 

the resolution passed 5 to 4, his position on freeways was still left unclear.

When asked about the parking tax, he did not have a position. “It’s a new issue, and I have to do 

my homework first.” [Scharfenberg, Kirk, “Nixon Picks Nevius to Head Council,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, April 14, 1972; Prince, Richard E., “Nixon’s 

Rapprochement With Mayor Led to Hahn’s Ouster,” News Analysis, The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, April 17, 1972; Sarro, Ronald, “One Damn Too Many” and Anders, Michael, “In 

The Lindsay Mold,” Hahn and Nevius, The Evening Star, April 14, 1972] 

In an editorial, the Star gave Chairman Hahn credit for taking “a more aggressive role for the 

still-embryonic D.C. City Council.” He can take pride that “the council is not apt again to 

become as ill-defined and purposeless as it had been” when he took office. However, his 

“manner of doing business – his personal style – was something else.” After summarizing his 

adversarial approach, the editorial defined his style: 

If no one in the local government worked any harder, it is doubtful that anyone else could 

have rubbed as many people the wrong way in the course of three years. 

A White House source had said that in considering a Hahn reappointment, the issue was not 

dedication. The question was: “how you do business with people to make government work.” 

In that respect, Nevius was “a good choice.” His civic credentials and love of the city were 

unquestioned, even if his leadership qualities were untested. In his hopeless quest as the 

Republican candidate for Delegate in a predominately Democratic city, “he ran a good race, and 

gained a degree of community-wide respect that should be a strong plus in the new post.” 

The editors concluded that given the demands of the new job, “we trust that Nevius intends to 

make it, as did his predecessor, a full-time commitment.” [“New Leadership,” The Evening Star, 

April 15, 1972] 

The Post’s editors thought that President Nixon’s decision not to reappoint Hahn “actually says 

more about this city’s peculiar and undemocratic system of local government than it does about 

the merits of the two men involved.” The people, as usual, were not part of the decision: 

Many of us have read or heard explanations, of course, but the White House felt no 

compelling need to share its thinking of its decision with the colonial subjects affected. 

Instead, the administration left things up in the air for some two and half months after 

Mr. Hahn’s term had officially expired – and then dumped him shabbily . . . . 
At the very least, Mr. Nixon might have thanked Mr. Hahn personally and publicly, rather 

than leaving it up to deputy press secretary Gerald L. Warren to issue a perfunctory 

statement of appreciation and an empty explanation that it was “time for new leadership.”

The result of this crude handling of a changeover was not only to insult Mr. Hahn 

unnecessarily, but to cast Mr. Nevius wrongly in the role of Republican pet, content to do 

the bidding of Mayor Washington, the President and the Congress – and not to annoy any 

of the colony’s overlords. 

The editors conceded that Hahn had “annoyed people in power – mainly because he sought to 

increase the power of the city council, with the idea that this might help get things done.” In 

doing so, he “became a thorn in the side of officialdom”: 

The cold fact is that the White House and Congress hold the ultimate power over this 

city, and Mr. Hahn’s attempt to make the city council into something it cannot be under 

this system – an independent arm of a democratic local government – rested from the start 

on an unfortunately false premise. This ought not to mean, however, that a council 

chairman must always be a rubberstamp for the mayor’s policies, or the will of higher 

authorities. We trust that Mr. Nevius will continue to search for ways in which the 

council can act where other authorities do not – or will not, however formidable the 

limitation on its ability to function at all. [“The City Council Shakeup,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, April 18, 1972] 

The confirmation hearing for Nevius and Tucker took place before the Senate District Committee 

on April 19. Only Chairman Eagleton was present. Nevius opened his brief statement by saying, 

“I guess you could say I’m back here because I feel there is so much more to be done.” Tucker 

recalled that at his confirmation hearing 3 years earlier he had promised to serve the people of the 

city with diligence, integrity, and determination to “achieve for them the highest possible quality 

of life.” If confirmed for a second term as vice chairman, he would be “guided by that resolve. 

With both men before him, Chairman Eagleton raised questions for them to answer in turn, but 

the answers were brief with virtually no follow up. In essence, confirmation was not in doubt. 

The day before, the city council had voted 5 to 2 on the first reading of the parking tax regulation, 

but had postponed the second reading until Nevius took office. Chairman Eagleton asked the 

two men for their views on the regulation. Nevius replied that every big city faced the same 

problem, namely “the flight of the tax base to the suburbs, beyond the city line, and in our case it 

is not just the city line, it is a constitutional line”: 

The city . . . needs the money of the suburbanite who commutes but by the same token we 

don’t want to drive that suburbanite out beyond the Capital Beltway forever and his place 

of employment out there. 

The question was one of “balancing these equities.” He had “not had a chance to really look” at 

the proposed regulation, but described the issue as a “dilemma” for the city. He was “not certain 
where I’d come out.” He understood that it was an environmental measure, but it also involved 

the revenue problem: 

So I am inclined to think I would be opposed to it but there is one thing I am certain of 

and that is that if it doesn’t have to go into effect until early 1973. There is no need to 

pass it in early 1972. [sic] 

Tucker favored a parking tax, but did not support the current proposal. The key was to find a 

measure that was fair to the city and suburbs as they “deal with the problem of pollution as it is 

supposed to, with the problem of revenue being a secondary issue, as it should be . . . .” 

As for freeways, they were discussed only briefly:

The Chairman. What is your position with respect to the building of the Three Sister’s 

Bridge [sic]?

Mr. Nevius. I am opposed to it, Senator. 

Mr. Tucker. And so am I. 

Chairman Eagleton asked about public ownership of the bus system and subsidizing service. 

This question was, by then, a key issue Congress was facing on a national level as it developed 

highway legislation amidst calls from urban officials to use Highway Trust Fund revenue for rail 

transit and subsidies. Nevius said that with the possible exception of Houston, Washington was 

the largest metropolitan area in the country “still struggling along with a privately owned 

municipal transportation system.” Experience nationwide “has demonstrated the overhead cost 

of operating such a system has gotten to the point in our economy where the fare box and the 

rider can no longer support public transportation and that there has to be taxpayer help as we’ve 

done in so many other areas.” The time had come for the District of Columbia to do so as well.

Tucker replied that “private ownership of public transportation makes about as much sense today 

as private ownership for public schools would make.” Transit was a necessity, and the fare can’t 

keep going up. He would favor a subsidy for public ownership, but not now. He had “no 

confidence in the present ownership of the public transportation system.” He thought the city 

should purchase D.C. Transit Systems “as quickly as possible.” 

Other questions concerned home rule, removal and disposition of solid waste, further use of 

Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium with the departure of the second incarnation of the 

Washington Senators baseball team after the 1971 season (to become the Texas Rangers), the 

need for and placement of a convention center, and the need for an Office of Consumer Affairs. 

[Nominations for Chairman and Vice Chairman District of Columbia Council, Hearing before 

the Committee on the District of Columbia, United States Senate, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 

April 19, 1972] 

The Senate District Committee approved Nevius and Tucker, 6 to 0, and sent the nominations to 

the Senate. On April 20, the Senate unanimously confirmed Nevius as chairman and Tucker as 

vice chairman. Chairman John A. Nevius took office on April 24. 
(The push for a parking tax came to an end in June. The original proposal by Councilman 

Willard was for a $1 a day tax on parking in downtown. The tax was lowered to 50 cents when it 

was given preliminary approval on the initial vote, but the required second vote had not taken 

place, primarily because Chairman Nevius was still studying the idea. Willard called for a 

showdown vote, but it was postponed indefinitely on June 12 when he accepted Nevius’s request 

not to put the regulation on the agenda for the next session, scheduled for June 20, as the Star

reported: 

Council sources said Willard did not attempt to push the regulation to a vote after 

Nevius’s request because of fears that the mayor – [facing] congressional opposition – 

would veto the measure if it passes. The sources said Willard apparently felt he did not 

have enough votes to override such a veto . . . . 

Council sources said Nevius “obviously had had enough time” to study the measure and 

that his action was a stalling tactic. “He’s being less than candid” if he said he has not 

had enough time, other council sources said. 

(Willard, by then, had announced he would leave the city council on June 30 to return to his job 

at the American Security and Trust Company. With his departure, the city council had lost the 

two strongest supporters of the parking tax – Hahn and Willard. Similar ideas for a commuter 

tax would be considered over the years, but never enacted. [Anders, Michael, “Parking Tax 

Showdown Put Off,” The Evening Star, June 12, 1972] 

I-66 Takes Center Stage 

Arlington County officials, ACT, and other private citizens who opposed construction of I-66 

were not aware in early 1972 that EPA had sent a seven-page December 1971 report to State 

highway officials regarding I-66. The report, which became available only in late March, was 

highly critical of Virginia’s environmental impact review of proposed I-66, which was limited to 

the Virginia side. The project “could have a significant adverse effect on the environment,” but 

Virginia had failed to propose alternatives to the highway project. “Location alternatives are 

given less than a full page of discussion and it appears that no real analysis was made in 

weighing and considering other corridor location alternatives to the proposed I-66 corridor.” The 

Post summarized possible alternatives:

EPA listed several possible alternatives to construction of the highway, including mass 

transit, exclusive traffic lanes for buses, more one-way lanes during rush hours, and 

discouraging automobile commuting by charging high tolls and raising D.C. parking fees. 

The report also questioned the State’s assumption that I-66 would smooth traffic flow on 

Arlington County’s main thoroughfares: 

Past experience with “commuter” freeways . . . has shown that any easing of local traffic 

congestion during peak hours is temporary at best. A road of this type generates its own 

traffic, which tempers any benefits to be derived from its construction. 
At minimum, EPA said, “air, noise and water pollution impacts of each alternate route and mode 

of transportation” should be reviewed: 

Such an expressway traversing the Washington metropolitan area will impact heavily on 

the human environment throughout its route. Information should be provided also on 

measures to protect air quality during the construction of the highway. The statement 

should discuss the effects of the proposed highway, during construction and use, on the 

ability of the region to meet current local and-or national ambient air quality standards. 

The revised impact statement “should include an estimate of the noise levels at various distances 

from the highway and anticipated community response to those levels.” EPA dismissed the 

design changes proposed by landscape architect Simonds: 

The EPA statement also attacked parts of a highway department plan to lessen noise 

pollution from I-66 by lining the road with trees and earthen dikes. “Use of landscape 

planting to curtail noise would not be adequate, since plantings possess none of the 

physical properties required of a good sound shield. Plantings are porous to air flow, 

vibrate easily, and lack density,” the EPA report said. 

The EPA report said the earthen dikes on both sides of the highway, even if they cut 

down on noise, could increase air pollution. “It should be recognized that pollution levels 

tend to be increased by a channelized roadway,” the report said. 

The plans for the trees and earthen dikes were drawn up by John Simonds, a Pittsburgh 

landscape architect, who received the $275,00 contract to find ways to limit the 

highway’s impact.

Further, according to EPA, Virginia’s draft “fails to consider the effects of the proposed highway 

(including bridge) on surface waters, underground water, community water, supply distribution 

systems and sources, and community sewerage systems,” as well as “methods to control siltation 

of waterways during construction.” 

Another deficiency, in EPA’s view, was that Virginia had not given any “consideration to the 

disposal of debris from construction and land clearing activities.” A disposal plan should 

“consider possible effects on [the] visual environment of the urban and park areas through which 

the highway will pass.” 

Further, the review was “not broad enough to allow a complete assessment of [the] potential 

environmental impact” of the Three Sisters Bridge or its access roads on either side of the 

Potomac River. “The environmental statement should include an assessment of the potential 

effects of the entire length of I-266 in the metropolitan area, including the Three Sisters Bridge.” 

It should review “alternative routes for I-266 in the state of Virginia, as well as alternative routes 

for the continuation of I-266 in other parts of the metropolitan area.” The analysis should 

consider not building the bridge and its access roads and explore non-auto “modes of travel” as 

better ways to handle the transportation of people in the corridor. 
Emilia Govan, learning of the EPA report, said the agency’s comments on I-66 “are very much in 

line with what the citizens have been saying; in fact, they’re probably stronger.” [Barnes, Fred, 

“EPA Warns Virginia on Bridge,” The Evening Star, April 2, 1972; Mathews, Jay, 

“Environmental Agency Scores Virginia on I-66,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

April 5, 1972] 

On April 5, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond barred 

work on what it called “Arlington I-66.” The unanimous ruling, written by Judge Braxton 

Craven with concurrences by Judges John D. Butzner and Joseph H. Young, ordered the State 

and FHWA to cease all work until they filed an EIS, reviewed the plan to pave portions of two 

parks, and held new hearings on the impact of the highway. 

The court rejected the State’s argument that an EIS was not needed because NEPA was enacted 

after the route had been approved: 

Doubtless Congress did not intend that all projects ongoing at the effective date of the 

Act be subject to the requirements of Section 102 [of NEPA]. At some stage of progress, 

the costs of altering or abandoning the project could so definitely outweigh whatever 

benefits that might accrue therefrom that it might no longer be “possible” to change the 

project in accordance with Section 102. At some stage, federal action may be so 

“complete” that applying the Act could be considered a “retroactive” application not 

intended by the Congress. The congressional command that the Act be complied with “to 

the fullest extent possible” means, we believe, that an ongoing project was intended to be 

subject to Section 102 until it has reached that stage of completion, and that doubt about 

whether the critical stage has been reached must be resolved in favor of applicability.

We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does not provide an escape 

hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA’s procedural requirements 

somehow “discretionary.” Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger . . . . 

We cannot, of course, define for all cases the point of completion beyond which 

Section 102(C) is no longer applicable. We are certain, however, that Arlington I-66 has 

not yet reached that point: P.S.&E. approval has not been given, construction contracts 

have not been awarded, and actual construction on the highway itself has not begun. 

Virginia did not dispute that it had not complied with Section 4(f) of the Department of 

Transportation Act or the companion Section 138 of Title 23 in planning to use portions of Bon 

Air and Spout Run Parks for I-66 right-of-way. The provisions had been enacted after approval 

for I-66 use of the parks. However, as the Supreme Court had found in the Overton Park case, a 

project involves several approvals in the course of development, so the date of “approval” was 

not the criterion for applicability. In view of the Supreme Court’s decision, the three-judge panel 

was “compelled” to conclude that Section 4(f) applied “to a project until it has reached that stage 

of progress where the costs of altering or abandoning the proposed route would certainly 

outweigh whatever benefits might accrue therefrom, and that doubts about whether this stage has 

been reached must be resolved in favor of applicability.” Arlington I-66 had not reached that 

stage of completion. 
The panel also rejected the State’s argument that the Section 4(f) issue was moot because the 

State was complying with it voluntarily. Voluntary compliance “does not give appellants full 

relief.” The panel explained:

In the first place . . . suspension of work on Arlington I-66 is necessary if the Secretary’s 

determination under Sections 138 and 4(f) is to be meaningful; continuing investment in 

the project at its present state of development would render alternatives to use of the 

parks less feasible and prudent. In the second place, the Secretary’s determination with 

respect to Spout Run Parkway will be meaningful only if made after it is known with 

reasonable assurance whether the proposed I-266 and Three Sisters Bridge project will be 

built and, if so, where the bridge will be located. Pursuant to an order of the Circuit 

Court of the District of Columbia, the Secretary is now in the process of reexamining the 

proposed location for the I-266 project . . . . Although the district court’s finding that 

“(t)he Three Sisters Bridge is not a part of I-66 – neither is the connecting road, I-266” is 

not clearly erroneous, it failed to consider the relationship between the projects. If the 

I-266 project is not built at all or if the location of the bridge is changed, it is apparent 

that avoiding Spout Run Parkway for the use of I-66 will be more feasible and prudent 

because present plans call for I-266 to connect with I-66 in this park. 

In addition, the State must hold a public location hearing in accordance with Section 128 of 

Title 23, United States Code. The 1958 hearing did not satisfy the requirement as amended by 

the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. The hearing should consider not only the impact of I-66 

on the environment and the community’s planning goals but the economic effects of the location 

in view of plans for Metro in the Rosslyn area. Plans for Metro in the I-66 right-of-way had not 

been anticipated at the time of the 1958 hearing:

From today’s vantage point, the economic effects of Arlington I-66 might be significantly 

different than projected in 1958 – rapid rail service might better satisfy the needs of this 

area than would I-66. Moreover, Arlington I-66 has not yet reached the stage of 

completion where alteration or abandonment of the proposed route is impossible. We are 

certain that Congress intended that if there is a reasonable possibility that a mistake has 

been made in the planning of a project as expensive, disruptive, and permanent as a 

highway, and if that project can still be altered or abandoned, the project must be held in 

abeyance pending determination of whether a mistake has in fact been made.

Contrary to the District Court’s ruling, the three-judge panel did not believe that the continuous 

monitoring of the area by agencies satisfied the public hearing requirement. “Study by experts is 

not the equivalent of a public hearing, and continuing evaluation of the economic effects of 

Arlington I-66 based only on such study is, therefore, not consideration within the meaning of the 

statute. 

The ruling concluded: 

VI. RELIEF
In summary, we hold that further acquisition of right-of-way and construction of 

Arlington I-66 must be enjoined until federal appellees have

(1) filed and considered an environmental impact statement, in accordance with 

 Section 102(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, and, 

(2) ascertained that there is “no feasible and prudent alternative” to the use of Bon Air

Park and Spout Run Parkway (the determination with respect to Spout Run 

Parkway to be made after the resolution of the Three Sisters bridge controversy) 

and that the project includes “all possible planning to minimize harm” to these 

parklands, in accordance with Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act and 

Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, and until state appellees 

have certified to the Secretary that a new public hearing has been held (or the 

opportunity for such hearing has been afforded) 

(1) to obtain information about the social effects of the proposed location, its impact 

on the environment, and its consistency with the community’s urban planning 

goals, and 

(2) to obtain information about the economic effects of the proposed location in light 

of the planned rapid transit service to Rosslyn. 

and that the information obtained from this hearing and hearing upon the design 

of the Lee Highway portion of Arlington I-66 have been considered, in accordance 

with Section 128(a) as amended of the Federal-Aid Highway Act.

On remand the District court will enter an appropriate judgment granting injunctive relief 

and such other relief as may be necessary.

Reversed and remanded.

Donald S. Burris, who had argued with case with Lawrence Latto, said of the ruling that, “The 

whole thrust of the opinion recognizes the continued public interest and concern in making 

decisions on development.” 

ACT’s James Govan said:

This is a perfect decision. We won on all counts. This is going to require a fresh look 

and I don’t see how they can continue to justify the decision [to build I-66] 

The ruling was of particular concern to WMATA, which was planning to run a 61⁄2-mile Metro 

line in the I-66 right-of-way. General Graham estimated that construction of the track would be 

delayed at least a year. If the State were unable to build I-66, WMATA could build its line, but 

at greater cost since it would have to acquire the right-of-way. 

[Arlington Coalition on Transportation et al., v. John A Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, et 

al., No, 71-2109, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 458 F.2d 1323, 3 ERC 1995, Envtl. L. 

Rep. 20,162, April 4, 1972 (as modified May 9, 1972); Mathews, jay, “U.S. Court Bars Work on 

I-66,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 6, 1972; Mathews, Jay, “Road Ban to Delay 

Metro in Virginia,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 7, 1972] 
On April 18, Virginia appealed the ruling and asked the full seven-judge Appeals Court to 

consider the case. The 15-page petition focused mainly on whether the three-judge panel was 

correct in applying NEPA and Section 4(f) to a project that had been approved before their 

enactment. In part, the petition said: 

Congress did not intend in its understandable concern for future damage to the 

environment to give disgruntled landowners ammunition to endlessly delay sorely needed 

projects which had complied with the laws and regulations as they existed at the time of 

their planning. [Scannell, Nancy, “Rehear Road Case, Virginia Asks Court,” The 

Washington Post, April 19, 1972] 

Fred Barnes of The Evening Star interviewed James and Emilia Govan, co-chairs of ACT, after 

the ruling by the three-judge panel. The Govans had been following news about I-66 since 

moving to their home in Arlington, five blocks from the proposed route, in 1965. (They had 

moved in 1963 to the Washington area where Jim worked for the Agency for International 

Development.) First, they told Barnes, they noticed the design was an elevated freeway. 

“Everybody had thought I-66 was going to be built at ground level or as a depressed road,” he 

said. Then in early 1970, surveyors identified 30 more homes to be demolished in the Maywood 

section. The Govans started contacting State, county, and Federal officials seeking information, 

but found it was “impossible” to get information or even to learn when a public hearing might be 

held. 

In 1970, they attended a public hearing where they learned that I-66 would be 14 lanes wide. “It 

was at that hearing that the whole thing crystallized for us,” James said. “There were 600 people 

there, and 550 of them were against the road.” A few days later, they formed ACT:

We just got angry because we had been dealing with these people in Richmond and we 

got nothing but vague and insensitive responses, and all the while our officials in 

Arlington were sitting on their hands. We decided that if anyone was going to do 

anything about this, it would have to be citizens. 

ACT hired Environmental Systems Lab, a California company, to evaluate the noise and air 

impacts of I-66, “but their efforts were to no avail. 

They met with Governor Holton in February. Barnes explained: 

The Govans and a handful of other citizens met with the governor for an hour, pleading 

with him to call a moratorium on I-66. 

Holton refused; two days later the Virginia Highway Commission approved the final 

design for the freeway and the next day ACT and several individual citizens sued in 

U.S. District Court in Alexandria to block construction of I-66. 

James told Barnes, “We really had high hopes for Gov. Holton.” 

Emilia added, “We tried every angle. We went to every agency. We exhausted all of our 

remedies before going to court.” 
Aside from agency obstruction, James said the most common obstacle the past 2 years was the 

“response of people that, ‘Gee, we agree with you about I-66, but its construction is just 

inevitable at this late date.’” [Barnes, Fred, “They Beat ‘City Hall’ on Interstate Rt. 66,” The 

Evening Star, April 10, 1972] 

Representative Broyhill saw the Supreme Court decision on the Three Sisters Bridge and the 

Appeals Court decision on I-66 as raising the specter of further efforts by Chairman Natcher to 

withhold District funds for Metro. The Virginia Congressman asked President Nixon to convene 

“an immediate meeting” with Secretary Volpe, Interior Secretary Morton, and EPA 

Administrator William D. Ruckleshaus. The President should “bring an end to the ineptness and 

lack of cooperation their departments and agencies are displaying with regard to the construction 

of a balanced transportation system in the National Capital area mandated by Congress.” He 

feared that some Members of Congress who supported Metro “now feel the balanced 

transportation concept has been abandoned by the administration.” 

The Post account of Representative Broyhill’s request reported, “It was learned last night” that 

Chairman Natcher “will again try to block the subway funds if the federal agencies do not move 

to build the bridge.” Unless President Nixon ensured action to comply with court requirements, 

“Natcher may be in a stronger position now” than in December 1971 when the House adopted the 

Giaimo Amendment. 

Representative Broyhill blamed the court rulings on the departments and agencies involved in 

transportation, specifying “their interpretation of administrative laws and regulations 

promulgated by the departments and agencies” and their “ineptness, red-tape and sloppy 

administrative work.” The courts had not found that Congress could not order construction of 

the bridge or other freeways, but if the departments and agencies did not get moving, “We are 

going to end up with the biggest empty holes ever dug in any nation’s capital.” [Green, Stephen, 

“Metro Fund Freeze Seen by Broyhill,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 13, 1972] 

The Post’s editors were having a change of heart. They pointed out that in 1958, when Virginia 

began planning I-66 between the circumferential and the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, “the word 

‘ecology’ was a highly specialized, scientific term.” Rail rapid transit and subways for the area 

were “widely considered an antiquated torture that made living in New York City unpleasant”; 

the idea of such a thing in Washington “was something of a pipe dream that was not taken 

seriously by a lot of people until the Metro compact was signed 10 years later, in 1968.” 

Now, citizens, notably ACT, had raised questions based on “our new awareness of the ecology 

and the decision to build Metro”: 

Raising these questions will not repeal the automobile, obviate the need to find creative 

solutions to the problem of traffic congestion or put the Virginia Highway Department 

out of business. But it does, in our view, justify the ruling of the Fourth Circuit Court of 

Appeals that further work on this freeway be stopped until these questions have been duly 

considered and answered.
Although VDH intended to appeal the decision, the editors hoped that, “pending the outcome of 

this appeal, it will also update its thinking about the basic purpose of its work”: 

That purpose is not to build all the freeways that the law and the resources of the 

Highway Trust Fund will allow. It is, in the end, to make life easier and more attractive 

for all the people who live and work in the area under its jurisdiction. [“I-66: Fourteen 

Years Later,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 15, 1972] 

James Govan attended a public hearing at Swanson Junior High School that WMATA had called 

to gather comments on the location of the East Falls Church Metro station and 2 miles of 

connecting tracks. In view of the recent court ruling, Govan criticized WMATA for not 

abandoning I-66 as the location for Metro through Arlington County. “Metro has apparently 

been avoiding this issue for a year now. I don’t think we can avoid this issue much longer.” He 

suggested that the year-long delay that General Graham had predicted could be avoided if Metro 

planned the rail line without the highway. 

Metro officials had anticipated the issue and had a prepared statement ready. The statement 

indicated that “the most expedient course . . . is . . . to move ahead in a manner that will not 

preclude the highway and will in fact assure a minimum of community disruption with or without 

the proposed highway.” [Mathews, Jay, “Metro Aides Urged to Scrap Plan for I-66 in 

Arlington,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 26, 1972] 

ACT led several hundred people on May 1 on a hike along part of the I-66 right-of-way. In a 

short speech after the hike, James Govan told the group that “his “ideal” proposal was to convert 

the right-of-way to a 10-mile long park. He tied the idea in with the suggestion of the American 

Revolution Bicentennial Administration that each State create a park for bicentennial activities in 

1976. “There’s a new spirit today,” James said. “It’s the spirit of ’76, not I-66. It says that 

schools, home, gardens and parklands are much more valuable than concrete.” [Fahnestock, 

Sheridan, “Park,” Metro Wrapup, The Evening Star, May 1, 1972] 

On May 4, 1972, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Engineer Harwood said that Virginia would 

begin construction of a 2-mile section of I-66 in Fairfax County, from the Capital Beltway to 

State Route 7, which he said was not specifically covered by the court ruling. He planned to hold 

an informational hearing regarding the plan for construction in Fairfax County. Construction 

would begin in November. 

Assistant State Attorney General Stuart Dunn confirmed the interpretation that the 2-mile stretch 

was not affected by the court-imposed moratorium on construction in Arlington County. The 

State had purchased all the right-of-way for the Fairfax County section and as far as he knew, no 

one had ever proposed an alternate route for this segment. 

Initial reaction was unfavorable, as the Post reported: 

Audrey Moore, a member of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, said: “I can’t see 

any benefits to loading any more traffic onto Rte. 7 if you’re not going to continue the 

highway on through.” 
Lawrence Latto, an attorney representing the highway opponents, suggested construction 

of the two-mile stretch could create pressure to build the entire road and limit the study of 

alternatives to the road . . . . Latto said the opponents have no plans as of now to go to 

court in an effort to stop work on the two-mile, $20 million stretch. [Mathews, Jay, 

“Va. Plans 2 miles of I66 in Fall,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 5, 1972] 

On May 10, the full Appeals Court refused to hear Virginia’s appeal on I-66, but did amend the 

three-judge panel’s finding that work shall not proceed until the Three Sisters Bridge is finally 

located or abandoned: 

Whether Three Sisters Bridge will be built and where it will be located are factors that 

cannot be ignored in deciding what to do about I-66 and I-266. But our judgment shall 

not be construed to prevent simultaneous consideration of all three inter-related projects 

and their probable impact on each other. 

The recent court decisions prompted Highway Commissioner Fugate to say he wanted to get “a 

few things off my chest about I-66” during a speech to the Virginia Chamber of Commerce in 

Arlington. Delaying construction of I-66 would create “chaotic congestion and . . . an 

unnecessary toll in tragedies resulting from traffic accidents.” Environmental groups blocking 

the project were forcing delays “to the detriment of the overwhelming majority” of northern 

Virginia residents:

In my judgment, many of the worthwhile environmental gains of recent years and the 

aspirations of many serious conservationists and preservationists are being jeopardized by 

those whose principal interest is to delay, denounce, and delude, who appear bent on 

obstruction for the sake of obstruction alone. 

He added:

Antihighway sentiment, antiautomobile sentiment is a new phenomenon in urban areas. 

It’s almost an hysteria. People shoot from the hip, they don’t care why. 

As for critics of I-66, he continued: 

I am quite certain that those who oppose the construction of Route 66 do not speak for the 

majority of citizens in Northern Virginia. Motorists now using [U.S.] Route 29-211 

between the Beltway and the Potomac River make the trip at peak periods in an average 

of 29 minutes. They could travel between the same points on Route 66 in 16 minutes. 

And I believe time is pretty important to most commuters.

Fugate said that, “Elimination of the present stop-and-go driving for motorists who would use 

I-66 instead of existing roads” would save about $4.3 million a year in vehicle operating costs. 

He added that according to a mail survey that Representative Broyhill had conducted, 69 percent 

of 32,291 residents of Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudoun Counties favored the highway. Only 

19 percent were opposed and the rest were undecided. 
He rejected EPA’s view that freeways such as I-66 create more traffic problems than they 

alleviate. I-66 would not only improve local traffic problems by shifting commuters to the 

Interstate, but “could be expected to save four lives and prevent 100 injuries and approximately 

300 traffic accidents each year.” 

As for impacts, steps had been taken in the 1950s to minimize environmental damage. “The 

location follows an abandoned railroad corridor, and even in 1959, it was clear that its use would 

minimize the environment impact of the highway because for years . . . it had been a 

transportation corridor, serving a largely industrial area”: 

Altogether, 94 percent of the dwellings and almost 99 percent of all business properties 

needed for the right of way have been acquired (and) nearly 76 percent of the residents 

and more than 84 percent of the businesses have relocated – all at a cost of more than 

$28 million in public funds. [Mathews, Jay, “Road Official Attacks Foes of Rte. 66,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, May 11, 1972; Barnes, Fred, “Fugate Blasts Foes of 

I-66 in Arlington,” The Evening Star, May 11, 1972] 

The Star editorial team liked Fugate’s alliterative description of those who “delay, denounce and 

delude.” No doubt the “‘anti-freeway freaks’ would respond in kind,” and accuse the 

roadbuilders of wanting to “despoil, depopulate and denude” northern Virginia. This “war of 

words” would probably escalate, but Fugate, the Star said, “has the edge. When words fail him, 

he can always send in the bulldozers.” [“Roadbuilder’s Rhetoric,” The Evening Star, May 13, 

1972] 

Virginia officials met with FHWA Administrator Turner on May 15 to discuss traffic problems 

in Northern Virginia. Representative Scott, who was running for the Senate, called the meeting 

in his office. Fugate attended, along with Dr. Charles Clapp, Special Assistant to the President, 

Domestic Council Staff, representing President Nixon. Under Secretary of Transportation Beggs 

attended as well. 

After the meeting, Representative Scott told reporters that with I-66 and the Three Sisters Bridge 

blocked, officials had to consider all possible alternatives to relieve the area’s “transportation 

crisis.” The officials considered options such as widening U.S. 50, building service roads along 

U.S. 50 to reduce local traffic on the main roadway, providing commuter rail service using 

existing railroad lines, widening the George Washington Memorial Parkway entirely on parkway 

right-of-way, widening U.S. 29-211, and providing more buses. These alternatives would serve 

as stopgaps until the State could build I-66. 

Representative Scott strongly endorsed Metro’s plan to construct its line in the I-66 median: 

There’s no way to have a subway in Fairfax County unless we also have 66 because the 

median strip will be used for the subway . . . . We need both the highway and Metro. 

Can you imagine what a howl we would have if property in Arlington and Fairfax 

Counties were taken without the highway going along with it! 
As a result of the hour and a half meeting, Representative Scott said, Federal and State highway 

officials agreed to give top priority to the issue. [Quady, Roy, “‘Top Priority’ Promised to Area 

Traffic Crisis,” Northern Virginia Sun (Arlington), May 16, 1972] 

On May 16, Virginia announced it would appeal the Appeals Court ruling on I-66 to the Supreme 

Court. Given the inevitable delay in a response from the Supreme Court and, if the request were 

granted, a subsequent decision, the State was beginning plans for the hearings the Appeals Court 

had required. In addition, the State planned to hire a consultant to conduct an exhaustive review 

of I-66’s social, economic, and environmental impacts. “He will consider alternate locations, and 

whether there is any need for I-66 at all,” Fugate’s spokesman told reporters. 

As the Post pointed out, the Supreme Court’s decision on whether to consider the appeal could 

not be predicted. One thing that was known was that “the road would pass within a mile of the 

home of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who lives at 3111 N. Rochester St., Arlington.” Justice 

Harry Blackmun lived in “an Arlington high-rise building at 1701 N. Kent St., adjacent to a now 

little used section of I-66 that would link the road with the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge.” 

[Mathews, Jay, “Virginia to Appeal I-66 Rule,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

May 17, 1972] 

The same day as the announcement of the appeal, Virginia highway officials conducted a survey 

of motorists to determine how traffic would be affected if a 2-mile segment of I-66 were built 

inside the Capital Beltway to State Route 7. The survey was intended to respond to concerns the 

Fairfax County Board of Supervisors had expressed about the impact of I-66 traffic on Route 7. 

The State had positioned 27 highway department interviewers and two State troopers at the I-66 

exit to the beltway:

Under the original plans for the survey, five questions – covering the motorist’s original 

destination and opinion of the proposed I-66 extension – were to be asked one of every 

10 motorists. Each interview was to take about 30 seconds. The complete survey was to 

run for 12 hours, beginning at 6 a.m. 

By 7:30 a.m., the interviews had resulted in traffic being backed up 6 miles in the eastbound 

lanes of I-66, cars overheating and running out of gas, and motorists cursing and jeering at the 

troopers directing traffic. The State suspended the interviews at 8:45. Interviews resumed at 

11 a.m.: 

But at noon, motorists were still complaining as they moved slowly through a narrow lane 

marked with orange barricade devices. At 3:15 p.m., mostly out of raw frustration, the 

highway department called off the survey. 

“We just goofed with this survey,” Fugate told reporters. “I apologize to the motorists for our 

lack of planning and good judgment. And I sure hope it won’t happen again.” The department’s 

resident engineer, Donald Keith, put it this way; 

When we were planning this survey, we didn’t know some people would hold up traffic 

for five minutes while they cursed out the state troopers. We had no idea some motorists 
would stop and insist on being interviewed. And I guess we just didn’t foresee the 

problems that would be caused by the crush of 50,000 cars.” 

Fugate acknowledged that he had requested the survey, but in his own defense, added, “I didn’t 

tell the people how to go about getting the information.” He suggested that the wrong technique 

had been used. [Whitaker, Joseph D., “I-66 ‘Survey’ Causes Huge Traffic Jam,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, May 17, 1972] 

In an editorial, the Star took exception to the survey. “Whatever doubts may have lingered in 

anyone’s mind about the Virginia Highway Department’s view of itself and the taxpaying 

motorists it theoretically serves had to be shattered beyond recall” by the survey. The editors 

understood the “ostensible reason” for this peak period survey. However, instead of conducting 

the survey by the “placing of little wires across the road – a device the department uses 

everywhere else,” Virginia highway officials decided on “a preposterous rush-hour traffic count.” 

The decision appeared to be “the kind of irresponsible tantrum that only a virtually autonomous 

agency could conceive of,” an attempt to “show its bureaucratic muscle to the motoring public”: 

These highways, the department was saying, belong to us, and if you peasants get uppity 

over our plans for you, we’ll just put a chain across. Today I-66, tomorrow the Shirley 

Highway.

This father-knows-best attitude might be more acceptable if it came from anyone but 

those wonderful folks who brought you the Pentagon Mixing Bowl, now being corrected 

at enormous cost. Or from the drawing boards of the engineers who stuck an overpass 

pillar in the middle of the express bus lane of I-95 not long ago. 

Things being as they are, maybe it’s time someone told the department officials that 

Virginia’s road network is not the Rhine River, and they are civil servants, not robber 

barons. [“The Robber Barons of I-66,” The Evening Star, May 24, 1972] 

Fugate took exception to the editorial, as discussed in a long letter to the editor the Star

published on June 7. He again apologized for the inconvenience and unintentional disruptions 

motorists experienced, but said the study was “an effort to obtain essential traffic information.” 

The editorial was “erroneous and misleading” in implying that the study “resulted from some 

sinister desire to harrass [sic] citizens.”

The “overwhelming majority of citizens” wanted the State to proceed with construction of I-66 

when court issues were resolved and funding became available. The Commonwealth of Virginia 

planned to appeal the Circuit Court’s ruling based on requirements that “did not exist during 

more than a decade of planning and highway right-of-way acquisition for I-66, and although 

$30 million in public funds has been spent, all fully in accordance with state and federal 

regulations existing at the time.” 

The “principal purpose” of the traffic survey was to determine the validity of concerns that 

construction of the 2-mile stretch of I-66 in Fairfax County would create traffic jams on State 

Route 7. In the State’s view: 
Such an extension, aside from providing safer, more convenient and more direct access 

for these motorists, would relieve the heavily congested Beltway of traffic destined for 

Route 7. 

The documentation the survey was to provide would help “resolve this difference of opinion by 

determining the number of motorists who would or would not use such an extension if it were 

built.” 

As for those “little wires across the road” the editorial had suggested, they were used only to 

count vehicles; “one cannot expect the wires to learn the destinations of motorists.” The State 

had distributed cards to motorists to determine their origin and destination, but few were returned 

and many were thrown out the windows to litter the roadside. 

Fugate also responded to the reference to the Pentagon highway network: 

The Pentagon mixing bowl, for which your editorial incorrectly credited us, was designed 

and constructed by the federal government in the mid-1940s. Our files do not indicate 

that The Star considered it a monstrosity at the time. Six years ago, Virginia assumed 

responsibility for its maintenance and improvement. 

That overpass pillar in the express bus lane “was not a product of faulty roadway design, as you 

allege.” The pillar was needed at the time to keep the Shirley Highway express lane in operation 

during reconstruction. 

VDH officials “are fully aware that they are civil servants, responsible for providing the highest 

attainable levels of public service.” The demands on them in a rapidly growing urban area were 

“enormous,” but Fugate said “an examination of all the facts, not of some facts and some fiction, 

will indicate that these employees perform exceedingly well indeed.” [“The Robber Barons of 

I-66, Letters to the Editor, The Evening Star, June 7, 1972] 

District Appropriations Act, FY 1973 

On March 29, 1972, Director Airis appeared before Chairman Inouye’s subcommittee on 

appropriations for the District of Columbia. Before introducing his formal statement, he 

summarized his agency’s request:

For 1973, the total operating expense request is $18,096,500, which represents an 

increase of $1.231 million. The major item included in this increase is $303,200 and 

21 positions for operation and maintenance of the Center Leg Tunnel. 

The Center Leg Tunnel, sir; as you know, a section of I-95, lies right in front of the 

Capitol. That is scheduled to be placed in operation for the public late this year or in 

January of next year. The 21 positions are for the operation of this tunnel, the 9th Street 

Expressway Tunnel which was opened for use last Christmastime, and for the tunnel 

section of the Southeast Freeway which runs under Barney Circle. Other major increases 
are $100,000 for energy and maintenance for street lights, and $122,000 for replacement 

construction equipment. 

Airis’s statement indicated that of the District’s original Interstate mileage of 29.5 miles, 

10.8 miles were completed and in use: 

These include, within the District, the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge and a section of the 

Potomac River Freeway (I-66) including the connecting E Street Expressway; the 

14th Street Bridges (I-95) which now includes the center bridge completed and opened to 

use by express buses on April 5th of last year; the Southwest Freeway (I-95) including the 

northbound 12th Street Expressway and the southbound 9th Street Expressway which was 

opened on December 20th; the Southeast Freeway (I-695) to the completed 11th Street 

Bridges over the Anacostia River; and the Anacostia Freeway (I-295). All of these 

facilities are heavily used.

Construction was underway on another 1.8 miles of the Interstate System: 

These include the Center Leg Freeway (I-95 between D Street, S.W. and New York 

Avenue). Completion of the portion to Massachusetts Avenue is now targeted for early in 

1973. A construction contract to bridge K Street over the Center Leg will be awarded 

shortly. A portion of the East Leg (I-295) is under construction between Interchange “C” 

and Barney Circle at Pennsylvania Avenue. It is also scheduled to open for traffic early in 

1973. 

Technically, the Three Sisters Bridge segment of I-266 was under construction, but work had 

been halted by court order. Airis said the District had satisfied Judge Sirica’s court order, but the 

U.S. Court of Appeals had added requirements. (When the statement was written, the appeal to 

the Supreme Court was pending. The Supreme Court had rejected the appeal 2 days earlier.)

Airis’s statement went through the remaining segments:

The Potomac River Freeway (I-266) along the Georgetown Waterfront is technically in 

the design stage. A special study commenced on January 26, 1972, to prepare a sectional 

development plan for the Georgetown Waterfront, which plan is to address the socioeconomic and environmental impact aspects of the freeway concurrent with 

recommending guidelines for future land developments. The study, sponsored by the 

Secretary of Transportation, is a cooperative effort between the District of Columbia 

Government, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development. It is being administered through the National Capital Planning 

Commission and includes significant citizen participation.

The East Leg of the Inner Loop to Bladensburg Road is also in the design stage – work is 

underway to prepare for a design public hearing which is requisite to commencing 

construction. 
The remaining segments were in preliminary status, with the South Leg of the Inner Loop 

scheduled for a design public hearing early in May. In 1971, the District had conducted 

additional studies in accordance with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 on the North Leg of 

the Inner Loop (I-66), the North-Central/Northeast connections (I-70S and I-95) and the upper 

end of the East Leg of the Inner Loop. The consultant report by DeLeuw, Cather Associates and 

Harry Weese and Associates had helped the District of Columbia and Secretary Volpe submit 

their required reports to Congress at the end of the year. 

In response to a question about whether the Potomac River Freeway was in a predesign stage 

rather than in design, Airis submitted a statement:

The Department of Highways and Traffic commenced design of the Potomac River 

Freeway on September 9, 1969, after receiving requisite approval from the Federal 

Highway Administration.

The design which was initiated is that described in the Conference Report for the 1968 

Federal-Aid Highway Act. Recent court actions have imposed the requirement to study 

further environmental impacts and to conduct additional public hearings on other 

metropolitan area freeway segments, notably the Three Sisters Bridge portion of I-266. 

The effect of the court rulings is to delay all design and construction activity on those 

projects.

The Sectional Development Plan Study mentioned in my opening statement is designed 

to provide the socio-economic and environmental impact evaluations of all alternative 

plans now under consideration by the community and government agencies. This data is 

to be used at a public hearing as required by Federal regulation for compliance with 

Title 23. Subsequent to the hearing, approval of a selected design will allow 

recommencement of the detailed design activity. [District of Columbia Appropriations 

for Fiscal Year 1973, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1, S-181-15, 

pages 871-881, 890] 

When Airis again appeared before the Senate committee on April 7, Chairman Inouye asked 

about the District’s request for $2.345 million for the Potomac River Freeway. “Would you 

advise this committee what the relationship is between this freeway and the Three Sisters Bridge, 

if any?

Airis explained:

The Potomac River Freeway ties into the inner-loop at K Street and about Twenty Sixth 

Street. Part of the Potomac River Freeway as built goes on down past Howard Johnsons, 

the Watergate, and on down to E Street Expressway, and also to the Theodore Roosevelt 

Bridge, the Lincoln Memorial area. That section is completed and in use. 

Airis cited his previous statement about the section along the Georgetown Waterfront, then 

continued: 
Now, going on upriver, at a point near the junction of Foxhall Road, and Canal Road, 

there is the Three Sisters connection as presently planned. Beyond that, on the District of 

Columbia-Maryland side, there is what is known in planning as the Palisades Parkway, 

two lanes in each direction. That ties in to the already partially completed George 

Washington Parkway on the District of Columbia-Maryland side.

Then farther upriver it connects into I-495. That, of course, is in heavy use. 

All of these arteries are in partial use at the present time. When and if the Potomac River 

Freeway is built, it will probably have both of these connections. If it does not have the 

Three Sisters Bridge connection, then for sure it will have a heavy duty connection on up 

on the District of Columbia-Maryland side of the river. 

Chairman Inouye also asked about the cost per month, $15,000, of retaining the contract for 

construction of the Three Sisters Bridge or $1.2 million. “Now, how long do you estimate we 

would have to pay this contractor to watch this equipment at $15,000 a month?” 

Airis responded that he had recommended canceling the contract 7 or 8 months ago, but retaining 

the contract was “a calculated risk.” Canceling would save $15,000 a month, but if the court 

permitted construction to resume, a new contract would have to be awarded, almost certainly at a 

higher price than the original contract. “As you well know, construction has been going on up at 

the rate of 5 to 10 percent a year, and we would face that increase.” He had renewed the request 

to terminate the contract as recently as a few weeks earlier, but the District could not make that 

decision without concurrence of the Department of Transportation. 

Before closing his testimony, Airis wanted to make one additional comment: 

Mr. Chairman, I just would like to point out the need for these facilities remains the same 

and that in the District of Columbia, traffic volumes went up about 31⁄2 percent last year. 

[District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973, Hearings before a 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 

2nd Session, Part 2, S-181-16, pages 1348-1349] 

Mayor Washington appeared before the House District Appropriations Subcommittee on 

April 12. (Chairman Natcher still refused to address him as major, instead using 

“Mr. Washington” as reflecting the fact that technically he was a commissioner.) Chairman 

Natcher restated his support for a balanced transportation system: 

In order to meet the tremendous day-by-day growth of traffic, the freeway system must be 

carried out, along with the present rapid rail transit system that is now under construction. 

The Highway Acts of 1968 and 1970 are the law and must be complied with. Both 

systems must proceed together.

He entered President Nixon’s statements on the subject into the record: 
I believe that President Nixon will carry out the commitments set forth in the letters and 

the statement and that the Department of Transportation, the Attorney General, and the 

District of Columbia officials should immediately join with the President in carrying out 

the mandate of the Congress set forth in the Highway Acts of 1968 and 1970. 

He wanted to know what the city was doing in view of the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the 

Three Sisters Bridge case. He also wanted to know what the Justice Department was doing “in 

regard to defending the suit” and what the Department of Transportation “is doing in complying 

with the Highway Acts of 1968 and 1970.” He added: 

I want to know what is happening and whether or not the requirements set forth by Judge 

Bazelon are being met and, just when we can see some action taking place on this suit. 

In response, Mayor Washington submitted a letter to Chairman Natcher on May 2. After 

recalling the history of litigation on the Three Sisters Bridge, Mayor Washington said the Justice 

Department, Transportation Department, and the city’s corporation counsel had examined Judge 

Bazelon’s opinion and had agreed on the steps to be taken. First, they had to decide whether a 

new location hearing for the bridge was needed. Judge Sirica had agreed with the District that 

the location “deviated so slightly from that which was discussed at a public hearing, that a new 

location hearing was unnecessary.” Judge Bazelon “remanded this aspect of the case to the 

District Court ‘for clarification of the factual basis for its conclusion’” because Judge Sirica’s 

opinion had not revealed “a factual basis” for the conclusion that the location was so similar to 

the location presented at the public hearing as to eliminate the need for a fresh hearing.

Despite “the abundance of evidence which was before the Court of Appeals on this point and the 

prior record in the case,” all parties agreed a new location hearing should be held: 

Such a location public hearing can be combined with the location public hearing on the 

Potomac River Freeway to be held this fall. Plans for the Potomac River Freeway have 

now progressed to such an extent as to make this possible. Unless a major change in 

location is found necessary, it is anticipated that the District will be ready for a design 

public hearing on the Potomac River Freeway a short time thereafter.

In the interim, the environmental statement (under the National Environmental Policy Act 

of 1969) required by the Court of Appeals decision will be completed and plans for the 

ramps and approaches to the Bridge will be ready for public comment. This will respond 

to the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that affirmative findings by the Department of 

Transportation under 23 U.S.C. §134 (pertaining to a comprehensive planning process) 

and 23 U.S.C. §138 (pertaining to the use of parklands) should be based, to the extent 

possible, on final plans for the Bridge. The Department of Transportation will be in a 

position by that time to make these assessments. The information that the Department 

will have as to noise, air, and water pollution in making its determination under 

Section 138, should be sufficient to meet the objections of the Court of Appeals to the 

findings made under 23 U.S.C. §109 (pertaining to safety). 
The tests on a model of the Three Sisters Bridge “clearly establish that the proposed Bridge 

satisfies the safety requirements of 23 U.S.C. §109.” With these steps completed, the 

Department of Transportation would be able to grant location and design approvals. 

As for the four projects listed in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, he provided a status 

report that restated the status that Airis had provided to the Senate subcommittee. Mayor 

Washington concluded his letter:

The District Government and the two Federal departments [Transportation and Justice] 

have each reaffirmed earlier commitments to comply fully with the Federal-Aid Highway 

Acts of 1968 and 1970 and are taking the indicated next steps. [District of Columbia 

Appropriations for 1973, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1, H-181-39, 

pages 14-20] 

Chairman Natcher welcomed Airis before the District Appropriations Subcommittee on April 27. 

Airis’s formal statement went through the status of the city’s Interstate network, with an updated 

status on the Three Sisters Bridge:

Since the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to hear the case, construction will likely remain 

halted until the U.S. Department of Transportation can satisfy the requirements imposed 

by the courts or until Congress passes additional legislation as suggested by Chief Justice 

Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court in his recent decision. The recent action of the 

U.S. Court of Appeals in Richmond halting further progress on I-66 in Virginia places 

this project in a similar status – the court order even ties it to the status of the Three 

Sisters Bridge.

In response, Chairman Natcher reiterated his longstanding support for a balanced transportation 

system involving simultaneous development of a freeway system and rail rapid transit. His 

subcommittee, he said, had never designated a single freeway or placed the Three Sisters Bridge 

or any other Interstate segment in a bill. In addition, the Committee on Public Works had not 

selected these routes. The District had approved all these segments.

“It was this subcommittee, and I think you will agree with this, Mr. Airis, that started the rapid 

rail transit system.” If the subcommittee had opposed rapid rail transit, “we could have very 

easily stopped rapid rail transit several years ago.” 

He acknowledged he was not an engineer, but: 

I would wager anything within reason that instead of $21⁄2 billion or $2,980,200,000, 

which is now the estimated cost for the rapid rail transit system as presented to the 

committee, this system will end up costing between $4 and $5 billion. I again say to you 

that I am not an engineer but I am just as positive of that as I am that I am sitting in this 

committee room at this time.

He thought the subcommittee had always “shown good faith on it.” 
He asked if Airis had changed his mind about the need for a balanced transportation system in 

the District. Airis had not, saying that “modern cities must be able to sustain themselves with 

modern types of transportation.” Each mode has to perform the job it does best: 

It is unfortunate that there has been so much feeling and emotion to the point that people 

are looking at the subway system as a panacea, and I do not believe it is proper to do that. 

It will be a fine assist in moving commuters, and I am sure it will move a lot of them. 

But over the years the city has expanded in 360 degrees, in every direction, and it is very 

difficult to serve all of them without the other adjuncts of the balanced transportation 

system.

I am talking here merely about the commuter. In addition, of course, to the home-to-work 

and work-to-home movements, there are all the other movements. If people will think 

about it, they would realize that after the rail or subway system is built, you won’t even 

handle “one crate of oranges on it.” All those things that are necessary for our urban 

civilization will be moved over the highways by some type of rubber tire traffic or by rail 

with rubber tire traffic from distribution points as we did in the old days. No; we have 

not changed our viewpoint. We have tried to keep up to date on what is happening in 

other cities and not only in this Nation but elsewhere in the world. I do not think anyone 

of us have seen anything that changes the central philosophy of a modern balanced 

transportation system for urban areas. 

As for the freeway network, the elements have been subject to change and debate, but “I would 

like to go ahead and build that system. I think the area needs it and we should go ahead and do 

it.” [District of Columbia Appropriations for 1973, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, H181-40, pages 306-312] 

On May 31, 1972, the Committee on Appropriations submitted its report to the House on the 

District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1973. Regarding WMATA, Chairman Natcher did not 

attempt to block funding: 

The Committee recommends the $33,498,000 requested for the District’s share of 

construction of the rapid rail transit system in 1973. Included in the amount is the actual 

share of $32,738,000, $260,000 for the construction of the Rhode Island Avenue 

pedestrian bridge, and an additional $500,000 for the cost of modifying the north access 

to the Gallery Place Station. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1973, Committee 

on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 2d Session, H. Report 

No. 92-1106, page 30] 

When Chairman Natcher presented the committee bill to the House on June 6, he again explained 

his support for a balanced transportation system, inserted the President’s letter and statement in 

the record, and included Mayor Washington’s letter on compliance with the Federal-Aid 

Highway Acts of 1968 and 1970. He did not, however, elaborate on compliance as he had in 

recent years. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1973, Congressional Record-House, June 6, 

1972, pages 19830-19834] 
Representative Gross asked about the Three Sisters Bridge. He had searched “in vain” for any 

sign of activity at the bridge site:

It was the position, I thought, of the Congress that in providing funds for the 

boondoggling subway[,] objection would be removed to the bridge construction. The 

gentleman [Giaimo] played an active part in getting Federal assistance for the subway. 

I would like to ask him what has happened to the bridge that is supposed to be under 

construction, and what about finishing the other freeways that are only partially 

constructed and on which work has stopped? Drive out of this city toward Baltimore, and 

you are dumped off a segment of freeway that goes nowhere. Can the gentleman explain 

why?

Representative Giaimo said he strongly supported the Three Sisters Bridge, but the U.S. Court of 

Appeals had blocked construction. All parties involved were trying to comply with the decision, 

but “until they go that route they are enjoined by the decision of the circuit court of appeals from 

proceeding with the bridge.” 

Representative Gross asked, “what happened to the quid pro quo that was implicit in the deal 

whereby Congress released subway funds.” 

Representative Giaimo said he was hesitant to ask this question of Representative Gross, but 

“what quid pro quo” was he referring to. “I am not aware of any quid pro quo.” 

Mr. Gross. Every dollar you have in this bill for the subway system. 

Mr. Giaimo. It has nothing to do with the bridge and the highway system. Each stands 

on its own. 

Time expired for the discussion, and Representatives Gross and Giaimo never clarified the quid 

pro quo question. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1973, Congressional Record-House, 

June 6, 1972, page 19836] 

However, Representative Myers, a member of the Committee on Appropriations, also wanted to 

discuss the contrast between Metro and the Three Sisters Bridge. He understood that 

construction was tied up in the courts, but he wanted to address a few points. Litigants claimed 

that the Three Sisters Bridge “was an environmental hazard to our community.” It was going to 

“deny certain access to the river” and “was going to be less than desirable as far as asthetics [sic] 

are concerned.” Some opponents even “made such statements that they will be making a 

platform of concrete clear along the river; all of the Potomac will be covered by concrete.” 

At the same time, WMATA was planning bridges in the vicinity of the 14th Street bridge, tunnels 

under the river, and another bridge across the Anacostia River: 

But how many people have you heard raising objections to the building of these two 

Metro bridges? It is rather strange that objections are only brought up when we are going 
to build a highway bridge, and yet the Metro system will be building two more bridges 

across these beautiful rivers, and yet no objection is raised to them. 

As for all the families that would be displaced by freeway construction, “have you heard any 

objection about the many families that will be displaced by the construction of the Metro 

system?” According to Metro, 744 families would have to be relocated. “Yet has there been any 

big hue and cry about that? I have not heard the first word of protest by the media.” 

Representative Myers also took exception to some aspects of the court rulings, such as the 

concern about the taking of much needed, valuable parkland. “I actually wonder how much 

parkland is going to be taken for the building of a couple of bridge piers, possibly a few hundred 

square feet.” Meanwhile, almost “$11 million in value of parkland is being taken by the Metro 

system.” This parkland included the line “running north alongside of this beautiful area in front 

of the Arlington Cemetery.” He added: 

That system over there will be running above ground through this beautiful parkland. 

Where are the environmentalists who came in here and cried so much about the highways 

being built across the Potomac? And we are told that through this beautiful parkland they 

are going to run a railroad. Then consider the fact that in the future there is always the 

possibility that the Metro system might be a failure, but once you get a railroad right of 

way you can store boxcars up there along this beautiful parkland. Where are these 

environmentalists when this is being done? We have not heard the first word of 

objection. 

He recognized the need for Metro, but he thought it was “very clear that they are not using the 

same standards for the construction of the Metro system that are being required today for the 

construction of a highway system as part of the balanced transportation system that this Congress 

has authorized be built.” 

His time expired but Representative Davis, who likely was enjoying Representative Myers’ 

tirade, granted an additional 5 minutes. 

Representative Myers wanted to point out “a few things concerning the Metro system that have 

gone unnoticed.” The system, he said, was going to use a lot energy, at least “90 million kilowatt 

hours requiring 35,000 tons of coal.” He asked where that coal was going to come from: 

It will require more than 500 coal cars per month to operate just the Metro system alone. 

This city and this area are being threatened when we need an additional 35,000 tons of 

coal to run the Metro system alone, plus all the other electricity we require.

Where, he asked, were the environmentalists when this topic was raised:

Where are they today? How much information concerning this has been given to the 

Congress? This electrical energy that is going to be required to run the Metro system 

alone is enough electricity to supply the States of Alaska or Wyoming, yet this electricity 

is going to be required just to run the Metro system here in the District of Columbia. 
The District had “some very real problems, this is very true, but sometimes we are unable to 

secure the true facts.” He added, “I think it is high time that this body, this city, and the Nation 

know how our tax dollars are being spent, and there are a number of cases of double standards.” 

[page 19387] 

During debate on June 7, Maryland’s Representative Long inserted a statement expressing his 

well-known concerns about Metro. He opposed the $33.5 million in the District appropriations 

bill and construction of the Metro subway. He stated his five reasons. First, based on the 

estimated cost of $3 billion, the same amount could be used to buy a new home “for every one of 

the 150,000 families in the average congressional district.” Counting the other 13 metropolitan 

areas planning subways, “the costs are going to run between $50 and $75 billion.” 

His second reason was the “probable lack of use” of Metro. “People do not want to use mass 

transit.” Crime was one reason. “If in New York City 3,200 police ride shotgun on the subways 

to keep law and order, imagine what it is going to be like in Washington, where we have a higher 

crime rate per capita than they do in New York City.” However, the real reason people “are 

loathe to take subways is that they just do not find it convenient to use mass transportation.” 

Third, Metro would be used mainly by people of high income, but people of ordinary means 

would pay for it: 

The beneficiaries will be most Federal employees already enjoying higher salaries and 

fringe benefits than the taxpayers back home . . . . What they have in mind, I think, is to 

let the poor people use the subway and keep their cars at home so that the well-heeled can 

get through the streets faster with their own automobiles.

Fourth, why spend up to $5 billion on new rapid rail facilities in Washington “when these 

already exist.” He was referring to existing railroad right-of-way throughout the areas: 

Why does the District of Columbia not undertake this quick, cheap, minimally disruptive 

program? Probably because it does not cost enough, there is no profit for the engineers, 

the designers, the contractors, the equipment manufacturers, and the investment bankers. 

Finally, he did not think mass transit was the answer to congestion in Washington or other large 

cities. “The answer is to stop locating so many Government agencies in Washington and to 

decentralize our Government back home – in your district and mine.” [District of Columbia 

Appropriations, 1973, Congressional Record-House, June 7, 1972, pages 19907-19908] 

That same day, the House approved the bill 302 to 67. 

On June 12, the Senate Committee on Appropriations issued its report on the District of 

Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1973. The Senate bill, like the House bill, appropriated 

$33,498,000 for the District’s matching share for subway construction. 

Without explanation, the bill did not appropriate funds for several freeways:

• North Leg, west section, inner loop 
• North Leg, central section, inner loop 

• East Leg, inner loop freeway

• 9th St. expressway

• Interchange “C,” inner loop 

• Center Leg, inner loop freeway

• Central Potomac River Bridge crossing (Three Sisters Bridge)

• Northeast, North-Central Freeway

• South Leg, inner loop 

• North leg, east section, inner loop 

The one exception was $2,345,000 appropriated for the Potomac River Freeway, the same 

amount as in the House bill. 

The committee’s report did include one reference to a freeway issue:

Three Sisters Bridge

The committee notes with frustration that funds continue to be utilized to maintain the 

existing contract for the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. This burden has 

hampered the District for the past two years at a cost of $15,000 a month. Only 10% of 

that amount is paid out of the City’s funds, the remainder being from the Department of 

Transportation, but the fact remains that good money is being spent to maintain a contract 

that will have to be substantially renegotiated before construction is continued. In 

addition, there is no real indication when construction will be allowed to resume by the 

courts. If the relocation hearings tentatively scheduled [sic] for this fall do not satisfy the 

courts, there may be indefinite delays and a continuing drain on the City’s resources. To 

scrutinize the budget as we have tried to do and to have this sort of uncontrolled waste, 

makes our efforts seem futile. The committee hopes that the District officials will do all 

that is in their power to see to it that either the construction is resumed as soon as possible 

or the contract is terminated to be renegotiated when the project is finally approved by the 

courts. District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1973, Report to Accompany H.R. 

15259, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 

Report 92-844, June 12, 1972, pages 11-12] 

The Senate debated and approved the bill on June 14, 1972, by a vote of 78 to 0. During the 

debate, the issues surrounding the freeways and Metro were not discussed. [District of Columbia 

Appropriations, 1973, Congressional Record-Senate, June 14, 1972, pages 20839-20848] 

The House-Senate conference to resolve differences between the two bills completed work on 

June 27. The bill included WMATA’s matching funds of $33.4 million. 

When the conference report came before the House on June 30, Chairman Natcher pointed out: 

The other body in marking up their bill approved the same amount that we approved for 

our rapid transit system of $33,498,000. For some reason or other the highway 
construction projects were deleted on the other side and, Mr. Speaker, everyone [sic] of 

those projects is back in this bill. 

He continued: 

Mr. Speaker, as you well know, the Highway Acts of 1968 and 1970 provide for the 

construction of the Three Sisters Bridge and the freeway program. These two laws will 

be carried out, Mr. Speaker, and as we have stated from the very beginning, we intend to 

complete our rapid transit system. The District of Columbia budget subcommittee 

appropriated the funds that started the rapid rail transit system and our action placed the 

Metropolitan Washington Area Transit Authority in a position to begin construction of 

this part of our transportation here in our Nation’s Capital. 

The House approved the conference report without a recorded vote. 

President Nixon approved the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1973, on July 10, 1972 

(P.L. 92-344). 

A Landmark Event For The Nation’s Capital 

As Congress agreed without delay or controversy to appropriate the District’s matching funds for 

Metro construction, WMATA was continuing its work. With construction underway, WMATA 

was finding that its path would not be smooth. 

As Representative Long had mentioned during his anti-Metro statement, WMATA was planning 

for a fifth span to carry Metro in the 14th Street Bridge complex. It was to be located in the 

complex of spans between the Penn Central Railroad bridge and the Rochambeau Bridge, which 

carried Virginia traffic into the city. 

On March 2, NCPC refused to endorse the crossing. Instead, it called for detailed estimates for a 

tunnel crossing and an explanation why the Penn Central Railroad bridge could not be widened 

to accommodate Metro. Jack Eisen explained: 

The proposal for a fifth bridge within view of the Jefferson Memorial was made by Metro 

officials in 1967, but got little attention largely because of widespread doubt the Metro 

ever would be built. 

Originally, Metro officials expected to build the transit span downstream from the Penn 

Central crossing. However, the committee was told on Tuesday that engineers 

encountered problems of routing tracks around the National Park Service regional office 

on the Washington side of the Potomac and the Marriott Twin Bridges Hotel on the 

Arlington side. 

The Metro line will run from 7th Street in downtown Washington via L’Enfant Plaza to 

the Pentagon station where trains will continue on a line to and beyond Alexandria . . . . 

The L’Enfant Plaza line will run in an underwater tube beneath the Washington channel 
surfacing in East Potomac Park to cross the bridge, then will go into a subway on the 

Virginia shore to pass beneath Shirley Highway Interstate Rte. 95). 

Two NCPC members, architect Paul Thiry and administrator C. C. Johnson, Jr., of the American 

Public Health Association, “voiced concern yesterday over the prospect of a fifth bridge that, 

they said, would clutter the area” – even though the bridge had been on Metro maps since 1968. 

The Post’s Around Town column dismissed their concern about clutter: 

So it would – roughly in the manner in which another bale would clutter a messy 

haystack. To make that additional slender bridge as invisible as possible amidst the 

profusion of freeway bridges, Metro’s planners would now place it between the 

Rochambeau Bridge and the Penn Central railroad bridge . . . . 

So, let’s stop fussing and get along. If the Planning Commission wants to improve the 

aesthetics of the 14th Street clump of bridges, it might ask Penn Central to simplify its 

bridge by taking those ugly trusses off. [Eisen, Jack, “Planners Balk Metro Bridge 

Proposal,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 3, 1972; “A Fifth Bridge,” 

Around Town, The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 6, 1972] 

At the end of the month, the WMATA board received a surprise from Edward Waddell of the 

construction staff. Construction of the line along G Street, NW., was 10 months behind schedule 

and would cost an extra $1.4 million to $4 million. Work on the Metro Center station was 

303 days behind schedule. Waddell explained that the problem was that some merchants in the 

1100 block of G Street had resisted alterations to their store front. Eisen explained the problem: 

As Metro staff officials described it, the main problem on G Street is that the street is 

narrow and the underground Metro Center station arch must occupy its full width. 

To permit the sinking of pilings, store display windows and signs that protruded into socalled “public space” above the sidewalks had to be removed and reconstructed flush to 

the building fronts. Also, the Machlen National Bank building at 11th and G Streets had 

to be underpinned. 

Jackson Graham, Metro general manager, said District of Columbia government policy 

permitted some merchants to delay long enough to hold up subway work. 

The exact cost of the delays would have to be determined through negotiations with the prime 

contractor, Peter Kiewit Sons Company. 

Cleatus E. Barnett, Montgomery County’s member on the board, said, “I am shocked . . . and the 

figures are pretty shocking, too.” 

When Chairman Fisher suggested that staff should have informed the board sooner, Construction 

Director William Alldredge admitted that “looking back,” Fisher probably was right. 

Three board members from Maryland prepared a memorandum denouncing the District for 

letting four of the 36 businesses in the vicinity of 1100 block of G Street to “determine when and 
under what conditions they would remove their building protusions” over the public sidewalk. 

“That policy brought Metro months of delay and millions of dollars in extra costs.” They urged 

all local jurisdictions to prevent similar situations.

The board would soon learn that the line between Dupont Circle and Rock Creek Park would 

cost $3-$5 million more than expected. The problem was poor rock conditions that had not been 

anticipated when the project was bid. The rock was laced with fractures and veins that 

preliminary borings had not detected. Engineers preparing the PS&E for the contract had 

expected that only 10 percent of the three-quarter-mile tunnel would require steel bracing arches 

and a fast-drying concrete coating sprayed from hoses. Instead, the contractor found that 

90 percent of the section would require bracing. 

The WMATA board voted to pay the contractor, S. A. Healy Company, for the additional costs. 

[Eisen, Jack, “Metro Is 10 Months Behind Schedule,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

March 31, 1972; Eisen, Jack, “Bracing Forces Up Metro Tunnel Cost,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, April 14, 1972] 

On April 10, Secretary Volpe announced a $3.1-million grant to COG for the first major mass 

transit study since the 1959 Mass Transportation Study. He called the study “the most unified 

planning for transit improvements ever conducted in the Washington area.” Eisen reported: 

The study is intended to bring improved bus routes and schedules, the erection of bus 

shelters and stations, the addition of more bus-priority traffic lanes leading into 

Washington and possible operating subsidies to hold down fares and prevent threatened 

service cutbacks.

Volpe said the program will integrate “all transit planning studies and projects” by 

12 public agencies in the city and its Maryland and Virginia suburbs “into one unified, 

comprehensive transit development program.” 

The study also, Secretary Volpe said, would carry out President Nixon’s “directive for 

coordination of local programs and for development of a balanced transportation system in the 

Nation’s Capital.”

The grant consisted of $3 million for primarily short-range actions and improvements that would 

be consistent with the long-range plans and objectives, the planning of which would be 

undertaken with the remainder of the grant, $133,300. The total grant would cover two-thirds of 

COG’s costs for the study, with local funds and staff services providing the remaining one-third. 

UMTA Administrator Villarreal said the total was the largest technical study grant in the history 

of UMTA’s technical study grant program: 

With this grant, we are again demonstrating the commitment of the Department of 

Transportation to improving mass transit in the Nation’s Capital. We feel that this 

immediate action program will help the Washington area qualify for two-thirds Federal 
capital grant assistance for needed transit improvements, within the first months of the 

program.

He was referring to the fact that at the time, Washington qualified only for 50-percent Federal 

transit funding because the area lacked a regional transit development program of the sort that 

would be developed under the grant. 

With Metro scheduled to open service in stages between 1974 and 1979, the 33-month “study 

will consider bus service through suburban corridors that will not have Metro routes and other 

corridors that will have Metro service only in the later” stages of construction:

The decision by Volpe to finance a single program followed a series of meetings last year 

by a COG-sponsored committee. It reported itself unable to reconcile the sometimes 

competing efforts of the 12 agencies, including Metro and COG itself. [Eisen, Jack, 

“Transit Study Slated,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 11, 1972] 

At the same meeting where the board agreed to additional pay for a contractor that had 

encountered unstable rock conditions, the board heard a staff recommendation in support of 

construction of a Metro bridge in the 14th Street bridge complex. General Graham had told the 

board that the tunnel suggested by NCPC would cost $20 million to $60 million more than the 

bridge, an additional cost that could not be justified. 

On April 20, the board voted unanimously to build the bridge. In doing so, it ignored NCPC’s 

concerns. As Eisen put it, “Although the commission’s role in the bridge issue is advisory, 

federal law requires that its advice be sought and given.” Any agency rejecting NCPC’s advice 

was required to explain the decision in writing. 

NCPC Executive Director Conrad charged, “They are actually end-running the planning 

commission and short-circuiting its comprehensive planning procedures.” He added, “We 

assumed that no further action would be taken [by WMATA] until the planning commission 

meets [on May 4]. This is not saying the commission would not have gone along” with the 

bridge plan. [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Board Approves Bridge, Snubs Planners,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, April 21, 1972] 

Meanwhile, construction work on Metro came to a halt after truck drivers in Local 639 of the 

Teamsters Union walked out of negotiations on May 12 for work on Metro and other projects in 

the area. Work on Metro continued initially, but contractors could not get material trucked in or 

debris removed from their sites after the drivers went on strike. With most Metro construction in 

the downtown area, sites did not have space to store the excavated material for any length of 

time. By May 20, General Graham told reporters, “Our jobs are largely shut down. Our 

contractors are going to have at least 2,500 of their 3,200 workmen off the job Monday [on 

May 22].” 

Work on Metro was at a virtual standstill for 3 weeks until the drivers approved a new contract 

and began returning to work on June 8. Resumption of construction would not be overnight, 

because the first order of business was to remove accumulations of dirt and debris that had been 
left on site when the strike began. In addition, contractors who had laid off their workers would 

have to reassemble crews before resuming work. 

Cement truck drivers who had walked out on May 15 were still on strike. The strike “has had the 

effect of dashing hopes of opening the first 4.6-mile section of Metro in downtown Washington 

on schedule on July 4, 1974,” as Fred Barnes wrote in the Star. A WMATA spokesman said, 

“We’re not out of the woods yet by a long shot.” [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Asks Exemption in Driver 

Strike,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 19, 1972; Eisen, “Most Work on Metro 

Shut Down,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 21, 1972; Barnes, Fred, “Some 

Subway Work Resuming,” The Evening Star, June 8, 1972] 

Cement truck drivers settled on June 22, but hundreds of laborers worked off the project on 

July 3 shutting all major Metro construction except on two tunnels where the contractors or 

subcontractors had entered into interim agreements with the Laborers District Council of 

Washington and Vicinity. 

On July 10, unionized laborers ended their strike that had begun shortly after the truck drivers 

settled their disputes. The laborers were seeking protection for their jobs in jurisdictional 

disputes with other unions, as Eisen explained. “Recently, most such disputes have been with the 

carpenters, over such things as who should install beams required in Metro construction.” The 

laborers also were seeking a 51⁄2 percent annual increase over the present $5.77-per-hour pay, but 

Eisen described that as “not being a major issue”:

Told of the back-to-work order, Jackson Graham, general manager of the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, exclaimed, “That’s great!”

“I took a tour of our largely idle construction sites today,” Graham said. “The water 

pumps have been kept busy, but that’s about all.” 

Dating to May 12 when the truckers walked off the job, Metro lost about 2 months in labor 

disputes. “Graham said it would take perhaps three more weeks to estimate the final effect of the 

strikes on the scheduled start of subway service.” Contractors returning to work would have 

extended time to complete their contracts, but not increased payments. Whether later contracts 

would cost more because of inflation during the delay remained to be seen. [Eisen, Jack, 

“Construction Walkout In D.C. Area Is Ended,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

July 10, 1972] 

At the same time, Congress was moving forward on the bill to provide a Federal guarantee for 

WMATA bonds. On June 20, the House Committee on the District of Columbia released its 

report on the National Capital Transportation Act of 1972. Debate in the House on June 26 was 

largely supportive. Representative Gross expressed concerns about the likely cost increases in 

the cost of Metro and that “Uncle Sucker” would ultimately be responsible for repaying the 

$1.2 billion in bonds, leaving the District residents to take a “free ride.” 

Representative O’Konski agreed with Representative Gross that the final cost of Metro would far 

exceed current estimates:
[Here] we are again with a broken record. I have heard it time and time again in the years 

I have been a member of this House. This is all it is going to cost. This is all it is going 

to cost. This is all it is going to cost. How many times have we heard this refrain? What 

we are actually engaged in is a deception. We are again deceiving the taxpayers of our 

Nation. Time and time again we have engaged in gross deception. But this Metro system 

is the grossest deception of all time. 

Nevertheless, the bill passed by a vote of 280 to 75. Chairmen Mahon and Natcher were among 

those who voted against District matching funds for Metro in December but who voted for the 

bond guarantee. Neither commented during the flood discussion. 

With support likely in the Metro-friendly Senate, Representative Gude said after the vote, “We’re 

over the hump. Taken together, that vote [in December] and this one were crucial.” [National 

Capital Transportation Act of 1972, Congressional Record-House, June 26, 1972, pages 22389-

22407; [Eisen, Jack, “Hill Votes Guarantee Of Metro,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

June 27, 1972] 

The Post and Star editors shared Representative Gude’s optimism. A Post editorial began:

We don’t mean to get ahead of events or lull anybody into a false sense of security but it 

actually begins to look as if one of Greater Washington’s longest running, always-on-thebrink crises is over: There is honest-to-goodness light at the end of the Metro tunnel, 

thanks to a grand vote in the House this week. With nary a word about the Three Sisters 

Bridge and by a lopsided 280-to-75 vote, the House approved the granting of a federal 

guarantee for bonds to complete the entire 98-mile Metro system that has been so long in 

the making. 

Although action by a supportive Senate was still needed, the House was “where for years the fate 

of this delicate regional subway project had been unfairly entangled in a web of congressional 

pique and power." Even Chairman Natcher had joined the majority, “having lost a big round last 

December that could have killed the project if more responsible members had not prevailed.” 

This success “was due to vigorous, responsible efforts by sympathetic members of the House – 

and to strong and effective support from President Nixon.” [“Metro Makes It,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, June 29, 1972] 

The Star thought that saying the House vote “was a landmark event for the Nation’s Capital 

understates the fact.” The vote “virtually assures the orderly completion of this region’s ultramodern 98-mile subway system by providing the financial underpinning it must have to avoid 

costly delays”:

One of the most gratifying votes, furthermore, was that of Representative Natcher, who 

previously had delayed subway appropriations in attempts to break Washington’s freeway 

logjam. The highway controversy had no legitimate involvement with this legislation, 

and rightly was held apart to be resolved on its own merits, at a later date. [“Green Light 

for Metro,” The Evening Star, June 29, 1972] 
The Senate Committee on District of Columbia released its report on June 28. The committee 

adopted the House bill without change, meaning Senate approval would end congressional 

consideration of the bond bill. The Senate passed the bill with minimal discussion and without a 

recorded vote on June 29. [National Capitol Transportation Act,” Congressional Record-Senate, 

June 29, 1972, pages 23309-23310] 

On July 13, President Nixon signed the National Capital Transportation Act of 1972 

(P.L. 92-349) “with special pleasure.” Metro, he said in a statement on July 14, “moves a long 

step toward successful completion with this new law”: 

Late last year, when it appeared the METRO might die altogether because of a complex 

legislative and judicial tangle, I appealed to the Congress for responsible action to cut the 

Gordian knot. The metropolitan Washington community was enormously heartened 

when such action was forthcoming . . . . 

But as METRO construction now moves forward at a quickening pace with solid 

Congressional support, there is reason to hope that the lessons learned en route to 

completion of the world’s most modern subway for our National Capital area may also 

mark the beginning of a new and more effective Federal-local partnership in District of 

Columbia government. This Administration is committed, and I am committed 

personally, to furthering that result by every means available to us. 

The legislation had several components. Of course, it guaranteed the Metro revenue bonds. It 

also authorized an increase of nearly 25 percent in the District of Columbia’s contribution to 

Metro (to $269.7 million, up from $216.5 million). In addition, it broadened the Metro compact 

relating to labor, permitted WMATA to operate Metro directly or under contract, and called for 

local jurisdictions to make up the difference between the normal fare and reduced fares for any 

class of riders (such as students or seniors) within their borders. 

On August 10, 1972, Secretary Volpe, Mayor Washington, and WMATA Chairman Fisher 

signed documents assuring payments for Metro construction: 

• Secretary Volpe and Chairman Fisher signed an agreement by the Federal Government to 

guarantee $1.2 billion in Metro construction bonds to be repaid from fare collection.

• Mayor Washington signed an amendment to the interstate compact, previously signed by 

Governor Mandel and Governor Holton following State legislative action, permitting 

public operation of a unified rail and bus transit system if Congress passed legislation 

allowing a takeover.

The agreements allowed WMATA to proceed with the sale of $225 million in bonds in 

September. The sale, as Jack Eisen observed, freed “Metro from future dependence upon 

congressional appropriations that repeatedly have been delayed.” Chairman Fisher reflected this 

change in status by saying, “I’m almost tempted to say it’s downhill. It’s not that. It’s over the 

hump.” [Eisen, Jack, “Documents Signed Assuring Payment For Metro System,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, August 11, 1972] 
Across the Lincoln Memorial

On June 18, the Star reported that Minority Leader Ford, “acting on orders from President Nixon 

. . . is working quietly to obtain legislation which would order construction of the Three Sisters 

Bridge without judicial interference.” A Ford spokesman confirmed the Minority Leaders’ 

actions, and said that he was only following Chief Justice Burger’s suggestion. 

Representative Broyhill was pleased by Ford’s efforts. “This is where it should be done. 

Keeping it in limbo like it has been is unfair to opponents and proponents.” He said it was “like 

waiting for the other shoe to drop.” He added that, “Construction of the bridge will help resolve 

the I-66 controversy.” [Kneece, Jack, “Rep. Ford Pushing 3 Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, 

June 18, 1972] 

The Post visited the site of the Three Sisters Bridge in early April and found that peace had 

settled in:

Birds flock to the sycamore trees at Three Sisters as before, traffic hums in the distance 

and the Potomac laps gently against the rusted pilings. Jets using Washington National 

Airport mar this peace, as does Sebastian, a toothy german shepherd whose bite is even 

worse than his bark. Let a visitor approach the Three Sisters Bridge construction site, a 

small compound of shacks and equipment just north of Georgetown, and Sebastian begins 

a fearful snarling and rattling of chains. 

He and his fellow watchdog, Rex, mean business. As the only permanent residents of this 

acre or so of Washington, they take their responsibilities seriously.

Since work was halted by court order, the city had paid approximately $275,000 to keep the two 

dogs, a construction superintendent, and two guards on duty. The city also had paid $1.2 million 

to the contractor, who had completed only 90 days of the estimated 400 work days before the 

project came to a halt in August 1970. 

The construction superintendent, Carlton Hudson of Head Construction Company, said “We 

work for the court. If they say work tomorrow, we start work tomorrow.” He and Frank den 

Outer of the District highway department worked out of a trailer on the site, keeping busy with 

maintenance of small boats, a tug, and a crane anchored by the shore. In addition, Hudson kept 

the lights working on a pier frame standing 20 feet out of the water—the only visible part of the 

project. [Levy, Claudia, “Peace Reigns Over Three Sisters Site,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, April 11, 1972] 

On April 7, 1972, Airis had told the Senate District Appropriations Subcommittee that the 

contract for building the piers for the Three Sisters Bridge should be “discontinued” in view of 

the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the case. The city’s inaction prompted Chairman 

Inouye to send a “sharply worded” letter dated August 2 to Mayor Washington about the funds 

wasted by paying the contractor mostly for not working on the bridge. Senator Inouye pointed 

out that if construction work resumed, the contract would have to be renegotiated anyway, thus 

minimizing the value of retaining the contractor on site. 
The letter reinforced Airis’s views, which had been strengthened when Hurricane Agnes (June 

14, 1972 – June 23, 1972), one of the worst in East Coast history, dumped 10-14 inches of rain 

on the area. The hurricane flooded the Potomac River, Rock Creek, and part of the National Zoo, 

and damaged the bridge site as Eisen described:

When the bridge work was halted, the contractor, Head Construction Co., built the steel 

framework for a cofferdam to protect the pier excavation near the Washington end of the 

bridge from Potomac River water. However, no outer skin was attached to the 

framework, and the two-pier excavations have largely been filled with rock and silt, Airis 

said.

During the flood that accompanied tropical storm Agnes in June, the framework was 

snagged by driftwood and swept downstream where it is lodged near the 14th Street 

Bridge . . . . 

“I concluded that there was not much reason to continue the contractor on the site,” Airis 

said. “I hasten to add that it [the cancellation] will have no effect on the construction of 

the bridge” if the decision is made to resume work. 

On August 4, shortly after receiving Chairman Inouye’s letter, city officials agreed to cancel the 

contract. [Eisen, Jack, “3 Sisters Contract Canceled,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

August 5, 1972] 

While canceling the contract for its controversial bridge project, the city revived plans for 

building the six-lane I-695/South Leg Freeway, one of the projects the Federal-Aid Highway Act 

of 1968 had ordered the city to build. As in the past, the plan called for two tunnels connected by 

a half-mile-long depressed roadway an average of 30 feet below ground. One tunnel would run 

on the Potomac River side of the Lincoln Memorial while the other would cross under the 

northern tip of the Tidal Basin. The depressed section would be crossed by a grassed overpass 

that would provide pedestrian access between the Reflecting Pool in front of the Lincoln 

Memorial and West Potomac Park.

The city argued that the plan would neutralize criticism from national conservation groups and 

local anti-freeway activists because it would increase park land by 1.7 acres by replacing existing 

surface-level roads, particularly the section of Independence Avenue parallel to the I-695 

alignment. Jack Eisen summarized the benefits cited in the city’s prospectus:

In its prospectus, the highway department claims the road is needed to serve traffic 

between Northwest Washington and the growing, congested Southwest employment area. 

Trying to channel all the traffic through the surface road network would cause more 

congestion and harm in the park areas than building the freeway, the department asserts. 

The city scheduled a public hearing on the project to begin on September 6, saying it would “be 

on the proposed corridor for the freeway and its design, but not on whether the project should be 

built.” [Eisen, Jack, “D.C. Revived Proposal on Potomac Park Road,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, August 9, 1972] 
Post architecture critic Von Eckardt did not wait for the public hearing to denounce this “slash 

across the monumental heart of the nation’s capital.” The issue at the heart of the debate was not 

how to cope with traffic “for in time we will surely develop techniques for reconciling the 

convenience of private transportation with the dictates of public health and amenity”: 

The issue raised by this South Leg Freeway, more than by any other highway built or 

proposed in this city, is simply whether or not we want to preserve and perhaps enhance 

the beauty and dignity of the national capital we have inherited. Despite assertions to the 

contrary, this freeway . . . seriously threatens that beauty and dignity at its very heart – the 

Mall, its parks and its great monuments, which more than 15 million people come to see 

every year.

What people will see, if this freeway is built, are tunnel entrances, gaping caverns, more 

than 100 foot wide [sic], some 200 yards on either side of the Lincoln memorial, 

replacing marvelous old trees. The tunnel entrances will exude noise and fumes. At 

night, the harsh light needed to make the tunnel safe, will surely detract from the glory of 

the illuminated memorial. Another pair of such holes will spoil the serenity of the Tidal 

Basin and its cherry trees. True, you won’t see the depressed road itself and there is to be 

a grassed overpass so visitors can, on that one point, cross from the Mall to Potomac Park 

where the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial is to be built, and to the river. 

Visitors may not see the road, but “most likely” they will “see its protective bannisters, flood 

wall and, most likely, high fences to keep vandals from throwing rocks at the cars.” 

The city’s “prospectus and its rather Pollyanna Environment [sic] Impact Statement” referred to 

the freeway as a “strategic” link between I-66 and I-95/Southwest Freeway and that it would 

separate commuter traffic (“mainly Virginians who work in the new offices in the Southwest”) 

from tourists who visit the Mall by car.” It also claimed “the road would actually enhance the 

park by removing the growing number of automobiles.” 

Von Eckardt questioned the name: 

Despite the freeway’s name, the statements [sic] no longer refer to the Inner Loop, the 

vital northern segment of which has aroused so much opposition, that it is no longer 

publicly mentioned. 

But does a “south leg” make sense without the rest of the loop? 

He did not want to debate traffic estimates (“loose guesses – and that is all they can ever be”), but 

did want to decry “those awful tunnel entrances,” with their “ventilation stacks some 50 feet 

high,” and the loss of many trees, “particularly some of the old elms along the Reflecting Pool. 

He did not object especially to inclusion of “the so-called 17th Street Drive,” which would be 

used by tourists in buses and cars (“it would be folly to try to deprive them of this pleasure”). 

That one concession, however, did not mean “the park should be allowed to succumb to 

America’s waning passion for speedy, automobile travel.” The law on this point, specifically 
Section 4(f), was “quite clear.” An alternative link between I-66 and I-95 on the Virginia side of 

the Potomac offered one possible “feasible and prudent alternative”: 

As regards the Mall, however, the law is evidently on the side of what I would consider to 

be common sense, a livable environment and – I would not want to abuse this word – 

patriotism. [Von Eckardt, Wolf “A Freeway That Shouldn’t Be Built,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, August 18, 1972] 

On the same day as Von Eckardt’s column, the Post carried an editorial against the proposal. 

The editorial board had “consistently favored a balanced transportation system” for the area. The 

paper “wholeheartedly” supported the Metro rapid rail system and keeping Amtrak “on the 

track,” and had questioned “the concept of an exclusive Highway Trust Fund.” Despite the 

advantages of the private automobile, “we believe it was a grave mistake to favor the car to the 

point where public transportation has badly deteriorated and commuting and railroad travel has 

become in many cases something of a nightmare.”

The editorial did not advocate eliminating the automobile, even as a means of commuting, but 

rather favored curbing “the zeal of highway builders and the powerful industries that support 

them.” Freeway battles around the country and in Washington had prompted the cancelation of 

“over-ambitious freeway plans on the grounds that our new concern for environmental values 

must take precedence over the actual or presumed convenience of motorists and truckers.” 

These comments, the editorial continued, were meant to put the South Leg Freeway in 

perspective. “For it is another such long-standing, over-ambitious project.” The editors thought 

the Von Eckardt’s column on the editorial page made “a compelling case against it.” The 

editorial concluded, “It is not necessary to be against all additional freeways to see why this 

particular project should be dropped.” [“Washington’s Lincoln Tunnel,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, August 18, 1972] 

A few days later, the Post published a letter from ACT’s James Govan criticizing the original 

Post article about the South Leg Freeway proposal. “Despair,” he said, was “the only word to 

describe my reaction” to the article, Govan began. The District’s plan “symbolizes, in a dramatic 

way, the continuing insensitivity of politicians and the highway engineers to the genuine desire of 

urban residents to see the end of massive freeways which desecrate their cities.” 

He pointed out that the environmental impact statement claimed the plan would preserve and 

enhance the Lincoln Memorial and make possible policies to restrict cars in the center city. 

“Both claims are outlandish.” Further, the statement revealed that “nothing is held sacred by the 

highwaymen.” He referred to the claim that some cherry trees would have to be removed, but 

that they could be replaced:

With such logic we could temporarily relocate the President while the White House is 

torn down to make way for a freeway and then rebuild it. Cherry trees, White House, 

black communities – all seem vulnerable to the determination of highwaymen to serve the 

needs of the more important one passenger per car commuter. 
Govan also considered the Post’s characterization of the planned public hearing as an error:

According to Federal regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation, this 

public hearing must permit public comment on “the need for, as well as the location of a 

Federal-aid highway” such as this proposed freeway. 

Citizens did have the right to challenge the need for the freeway and he hoped they would. 

Perhaps, Govan speculated, politicians who advocated freeways “must be made to understand 

that, while it may be true that most Americans cherish their cars, there are some things they 

cherish more – their homes, their parks, their national monuments.” Perhaps this latest proposal 

would “finally bring freeway foes and advocates together to say: this is one mile of freeway we 

can do without.” [Govan, James L, “Despair Over Another Highway,” Letters to the Editor, The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, August 23, 1972] 

While officials, critics, and citizens debated the merits of the South Leg Freeway, NPS took 

action on a longstanding goal: to remove traffic from Circle Drive between the Lincoln 

Memorial and the Reflecting Pool. On August 22, NPS closed the drive to motor vehicles except 

during the morning peak period, 6 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. Beyond those hours, the drive was open 

only to pedestrians and bicyclists. On the first day, the morning and afternoon went smoothly 

until the evening peak period. The result was what John E. Hartley, the District Highway 

Department’s chief traffic engineer, called “a fantastic backup.” George Berglacy, the NPS Park 

Police’s spokesman, said, “I must admit, I now know what it’s like to be on the receiving end of 

an obscene telephone call.” Defensively, he added, “That was never meant to be a commuter 

route in the first place.” 

The Star editors were less kind. “What has occurred . . . is a wholly predictable nightmare of 

congestion for motorists both leaving and entering the city.” In the early days after the closure, 

“cars have been backed up for more than a dozen blocks, in turn snarling other rush-hour traffic 

routes.” Protests were “steaming in,” and the editors expected the evening peak period ban to 

end soon. Perhaps a permanent ban was desirable, but will be needed for it to work was “the 

rational freeway pattern long proposed to divert traffic around that area—not the creation of 

makeshift bottlenecks.” [Kneece, Jack, “Tours 1, Motorists 0,” The Evening Star, August 23, 

1972; “Calculated Congestion,” The Evening Star, August 25, 1972] 

The experiment lasted until mid-January 1973 when Russell E. Dickinson, director of National 

Capital Parks, ordered removal of the barricades through the end of winter when tourist visits to 

the Lincoln Memorial were limited. The barriers would be restored in April because, Dickinson 

explained, the traffic streaming around the monument caused “extreme congestion and danger to 

visitors during the peak tourist season.” [“Circle Drive to Open,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, January 12, 1973] 

With the South Leg Freeway hearing a week away, Peter S. Craig and Robert M. Kennan of the 

Committee of 100 on the Federal City wrote to ask Mayor Washington to cancel the event. As 

planned, the hearings “violate applicable federal highway administration regulations,” and 

District law. They contended that the agencies charged with planning highways were NCPC and 
the city council. Neither the mayor nor the District Department of Highways and Traffic were 

the equivalent of a State highway agency or those two local bodies: 

If the hearing proceeds as scheduled, it will be futile. Any decision to construct I-695 

which is made on the basis of that hearing will be subject to certain reversal by the courts. 

In order to avoid further acrimonious litigation involving the District’s proposed highway 

program, we urge you to cancel the hearing . . . .” [Griffin, James, “Freeway Heading 

Called Illegal,” The Evening Star and Washington Daily News, August 31, 1972] 

(As of July 12, The Evening Star and The Washington Daily News merged, creating a new 

combined masthead, soon changed to The Washington Star-News.) 

The first day of the public hearing on September 6, held at 7:30 p.m. in the vast Commerce 

Department auditorium, opened with only about 100 people in attendance. Airis presented four 

South Leg alternatives, with emphasis on the preferred routing: 

Our proposal is to remove Independence Avenue and to relieve the surrounding Memorial 

area of the sight and sound of city traffic. 

Airis estimated that between 75,000 and 90,000 cars would use the South Leg connector between 

the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge and the Southwest Freeway by 1990. He told the audience that if 

the project is approved, it could be completed in early 1976 in time for the Bicentennial 

celebrations. 

Sixteen witnesses testified on the first day. The Star estimated that “only about one fifth 

supported the proposed six lane freeway.” As in the past, anti-freeway speakers denounced the 

hearing format and the authority of Colonel Starobin, whom Mayor Washington had appointed 

the presiding examiner. Peter Craig, as though preparing for a lawsuit if the city advanced the 

South Leg as proposed, took the lead: 

Warning city officials that citizens groups already had successfully brought three lawsuits 

against other freeway and bridge plans, Peter S. Craig, an attorney with the Committee of 

100 on the Federal City, declared that only the D.C. City Council could legally hold 

hearings on the proposed freeway and that the mayor had no legal authority to appoint a 

hearing examiner.

“The mayor-commission-whatsoever [has no role] other than to veto action by the council 

. . . it is the council not the mayor who is the equivalent of a state highways [sic] 

department here.” 

The Post’s Jack Eisen also found the claims familiar, but said, “there was an added ingredient, 

the road’s location in an area that constitutes one of the nation’s most beloved shrines.” Angela 

Rooney, representing the National Coalition on the Transportation Crisis, said, “Shafting the 

Lincoln Memorial in behalf of speed and tourists is a triumph of greed over logic.” Former 

Representative Eugene D. Keogh (D-N.Y), chairman of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial 

Commission, recommended that the roadway, if it must be built, should be placed entirely in a 
tunnel to avoid impacting the area for the planned memorial, which would be located on either 

side of the trench section.

The city’s environmental agency offered lukewarm praise for the proposed freeway:

William McKinney, deputy director of the city’s Department of Environmental Services, 

said his agency was “opposed to any proposal that would increase the level of traffic in 

the rush hours.” 

However, he did not oppose the project. He called the highway department’s 

recommended design preferable and offered to help find ways to curtail downtown 

parking, provide reserve bus lanes, and do other things to reduce traffic downtown. 

Eisen also found that the hearing was “tranquil,” in contrast to “stormy opposition at freeway 

hearings in the past decade.” He added:

While applause from the audience of 100 was generally restrained, it was apparent that 

most opposed the road. 

Support for the project came from spokesman [sic] for Downtown Progress, the 

Washington Board of Realtors and the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade. 

Starobin, in response to a question from James Govan, said that Mayor Washington and the city 

council would “pay heed” to the opposition expressed during the hearing. [Griffin, James, 

“South Leg Debated at Highway Hearing,” The Washington Star-News, September 7, 1972, 

Eisen, Jack, “Citizen Groups Attack Plans for Freeway,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, September 7, 1972] 

On the second and final day of the hearing, national conservation groups attacked the plan. As 

Eisen put it, the Wilderness Society and the National Wildlife Federation “fired broadsides” at 

the plan, according to the Post. They joined critics from local conservation groups: 

“The south leg proposal is of much more than local interest,” declared James G. Deane, 

executive editor of the Wilderness Society’s publications. Attacking the highway 

department’s insistence that the road will clear unwanted surface traffic from the park and 

Mall areas, Dean called the road “not remotely a park improvement; a freeway simply 

doesn’t belong there.” 

Despite Secretary Volpe’s agreement with Interior Secretary Morton, the Interior Department 

could not legally permit freeway encroachment on parkland, according to Robert M. Kennan, Jr., 

general counsel of the Wildlife Federation. Airis defended the plan by saying the freeway was 

intended mainly for tourists and business visitors, not “one-to-a-car commuters.” [Eisen, Jack, 

“Conservationists Attack proposed I-695 Leg Near Lincoln Memorial,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, September 8, 1972] 

An editorial in the Star took an almost weary tone, stating that the scenario of the hearings “was 

as familiar as that of a well-loved theatrical drama. Supporters thought the tunnels would unsnarl 
congestion while opponents considered it an esthetic disaster – and nothing will “shake, by as 

much as an inch, the advocates of either position.” Unlike the many other freeway controversies 

in the District, this one came down to a single issue, namely “the impact of the project on one of 

the nation’s most hallowed park areas.” 

After all, the traffic was already there in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial, “bumper-tobumper in rush hours,” as anyone “with eyes” could see. No families or businesses would be 

displaced and the proposal was not so much a new freeway as a link between existing freeways. 

The tunnel proposal was not initiated by highway officials “but by the National Park Service 

itself, as a means of eliminating surface traffic from the park.” The editors thought the tunnel 

plan would do exactly that and that the NPS would support the new plan. The plan probably 

could be improved: 

But there was no room for this sort of sensible, logical criticism in the emotional 

atmosphere of controversy that pervaded last week’s . . . hearing sessions. And that was 

an unfortunate loss. [“Return Engagement,” The Washington Star-News, September 14, 

1972] 

Later in the month, NCPC released a highly critical report on the proposal, calling it “insensitive” 

to potential aesthetic and environmental impacts. After reviewing the city’s draft EIS, NCPC 

questioned whether alternatives had been considered: 

What alternatives, if any, have been studied for reallocating or reducing the traffic 

demand on the South Leg? For example, how many of these vehicles have both origin 

and destination on the east side of the Potomac River and how many could perhaps be 

accommodated on the Virginia side . . . .? 

Can arterial streets such as Constitution Avenue carry part of the load on the District side, 

or can the Jefferson Davis Highway (U.S. Route 1) and/or the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway accommodate all or part of the Virginia traffic assigned to the South 

Leg?

NCPC also asked:

Has consideration been given to moving people rather than automobiles by public transit 

alternatives such as the Shirley Highway express bus system?

NCPC also disputed the city’s view that the tunnels would do little permanent damage to 

Potomac Park:

This view overlooks the encroachment of the project on the Washington Monument 

grounds, the reduction in the size of grounds and the almost complete separation of the 

Washington Monument, in some alternatives, from the Tidal Basin area.
In addition, NCPC said the proposal contained few details in map or text form, “making it 

difficult for anyone to fully compare and evaluate the planning, urban design and environmental 

impact of each alternative”:

This whole matter should be reanalyzed, clarified and the results documented in order to 

determine the new gain or loss in public park and open space. [Taylor, Walter, “Freeway 

Plans Criticized,” The Washington Star-News, September 20, 1972] 

EPA also was critical of the draft EIS, calling for “much more evaluation and quantification” of 

the freeway. Robert J. Blanco, EPA’s regional chief, sent a letter to Leonard A. DeGast, assistant 

director of the District Department of Highways and Traffic, stated that, “The routing of through 

traffic into the urban core seems inconsistent with the goal of decreasing vehicles miles traveled 

in the core area.” The final EIS “should make an appraisal of the regional air pollution impact of 

the various alternatives.” EPA called for more information on traffic projections, the mix of 

trucks and automobiles that would use the freeway, right-of-way dimensions, and pollution from 

tunnel vents would affect building and plant life. 

Blanco asked for more information on the timetable for highway and Metro construction, mass 

transit’s role in the regional system, alternatives to the proposed South Leg Freeway, and how the 

freeway would affect traffic patterns and parking in the city. Noting that the West Potomac Park 

area did not have separate storm sewers, Blanco asked for detailed information on surface 

drainage and design details for tunnel construction in the Tidal Basin area. He also wanted more 

information on noise potential and minimization, stating that “there should be a specific design 

noise level . . . rather than being content with the philosophy that a proposed project is merely 

quieter” than the current noise level. [“EPA Asks Details For ‘Inner Loop,’” The Washington 

Star-News, October 1, 1972] 

I-66 Flounders 

In March 1972, EPA had told Virginia that I-66 “could have a significant adverse effect on the 

environment.” EPA was concerned about increasing traffic congestion and air pollution; it 

criticized Virginia highway officials for not considering alternatives such as rail rapid transit.

As the State completed a new EIS, EPA applied a new rating system to I-66 in June. The project 

received a rating of 3 on a scale of 1 to 4, the next to lowest rating. A rating of 3 meant that I-66 

needed “major revisions or major additional safeguards to adequately protect the environment.” 

Virginia, EPA stated, should consider alternatives such as rail rapid transit. [“EPA Gives 

I-66 Plan Next to Lowest Rating,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 22, 1972] 

WMATA was concerned that delays in approval of I-66 would affect the agency’s plan to build a 

Metro line in the freeway’s median from just west of Glebe Road in Arlington to Nutley Road 

near Vienna, a distance of about 6.5 miles. On July 6, the board of directors decided to build the 

line in the right-of-way, which the State had already acquired, regardless of I-66’s fate. 

In fact, WMATA’s assistant planning director, Mathew Platt, told the board that building Metro 

in the right-of-way would cost less if I-66 were never built inside the Capital Beltway. If I-66 
were not built, the Metro line would not require retaining walls and other features to ensure safe, 

efficient operation between two sets of freeway lanes. The Metro line would cost $108.6 million 

if the freeway were built, but $102.1 million if it were not. Director Harris of Fairfax said, 

“Quite obviously, the public facility that comes in late would have to pay the added cost.” 

General Graham agreed. “This is the position we would take.” Still, VDH owned the right-ofway, regardless of the freeway’s fate, resulting in Metro having to negotiate to use the land. 

“That,” Chairman Fisher put it, “will be an interesting negotiation.”

The board did not literally approve use of the right-of-way. Its approval was in the form of 

approving two Metro stations, East Falls Church and West Falls Church, and the adjacent 

alignment in the highway corridor. [“Subway Route Set In I-66 Corridor,” The Washington StarNews, July 7, 1972; Eisen, Jack, “Arlington-Vienna Metro Route Set,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, July 7, 1972] 

The State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on August 8 seeking to overturn the injunction 

blocking I-66. The appeal contested the decision of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that 

new Federal environmental laws should be applied retroactively to I-66 because it had not 

reached a point of completion that made construction inevitable. The State contended that 

planning for I-66 had reached a point before enactment of NEPA and other environmental laws 

that the location was virtually irreversible:

The likelihood of a substantial change with respect to the present plans for the project 

even after expenditure of seven to eight hundred thousand dollars for the study is 

extremely slight.

Land, the appeal pointed out, had already been acquired at a cost of $28.6 million, with 

76 percent of affected families relocated. [Associated Press, “Va. Appeals Injunction On I-66,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 9, 1972; Barnes, Fred, “Original I-66 Engineers 

Chosen for Impact Study,” The Washington Star-News, August 22, 1972]] 

In August, VDH decided to postpone construction of the 2-mile section of I-66 between the 

Capital Beltway and State Route 7. A Fugate spokesman said the concern was not that 

construction might violate the court order blocking construction in Arlington County, but that 

opening the short stretch before the rest of the highway might create traffic snarls by dumping 

traffic on State Route 7 in Fairfax. The Post reported: 

The spokesman said “preliminary indications are that the adverse effects would be greater 

than we originally thought” and that the department would decide within a month whether 

to proceed with the two-mile section early next year. Another highway department source 

indicated Fugate was leaning toward delaying construction of the section at least a year 

until a court-ordered review of the impact of the highway in Arlington is complete. 

James Govan speculated that VDH’s review of the 2-mile section “should indicate that they 

might have problems at a lot of points.” James Collis of a Fairfax group thinking about going to 

court to block construction in the county said, “I would guess when they ran into some 
opposition they thought to make sure of their groundwork.” [Mathews, Jay, “Va. Defers I-66 

Link, Study Set,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 19, 1972] 

On August 22, Virginia highway officials announced that they had hired the consulting firm of 

Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff to conduct the court-ordered study of I-66 in Arlington 

County. The State estimated that the study would take a year to 18 months. John Simonds’ 

Pittsburgh firm of Environmental Planning and Design would also participate in the study. 

The fact that Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff’s findings in the 1950s led to the routing 

of I-66 in the county along the abandoned railroad right-of-way prompted immediate criticism. 

ACT’s Emilia Govan called the selection “very inappropriate at the very least.” The firm was 

being called on to reevaluate its own study. She recommended selection of a firm that was not 

previously involved with the freeway plan. 

Fugate announced that he had appointed five officials to “monitor” the study: 

• Martha V. Pennino, chairman, Metropolitan Washington COG; 

• Joseph Alexander, head of the Northern Virginia Transportation commission; 

• Joseph Fisher, chairman, WMATA; 

• A. Leslie Phillips, vice chairman of the area TPB; and

• Jimmie Singleton, head of the Northern Virginia Planning District Commission.

Emilia Govan denounced the group for being predominantly pro-highway. “Representatives of 

our organization and other citizens groups and commissions concerned with I-66 and related 

transportation and environmental issues (should) be immediately included in the membership of 

the monitoring committee. [Barnes, Fred, “Original I-66 Engineers Chosen for Impact Study,” 

The Washington Star-News, August 23, 1972] 

After so much negative publicity about I-66 in recent years, supporters of the project formed 

Citizens for I-66 to advocate for the route. Funded by businesses and private citizens, the group 

flooded Arlington and Fairfax Counties with 16,000 leaflets and 20,000 red-white and blue 

bumper stickers extolling the route. The leaflet called I-66 “an outstanding example of 

progressive transportation planning,” with its small parks, bicycle trails, and platform for tennis 

courts. 

Other groups joined in support, including the chamber of commerce for the two counties and the 

Highway Users Federation for Safety and Mobility. The federation’s Robert Justice said, “I’m 

convinced that the area is going to die as a viable economic entity if I-66 is not built. The area is 

going to strangle to death in traffic.” Rudolph G. Seely, a real estate developer in Fairfax, said he 

participated in the effort to respond to highway opponents who were “terribly well-organized, 

vociferous, and well able to put forth their point of view.” By contrast, he said, “I feel that the 

users of motor cars and the traffic planners have not been adequately heard in the controversy 

over I-66.” [Mathews, jay, “I-66 Friends Launch Drive Backing Plan,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, August 25, 1972] 
When Mrs. Govan wrote to Fugate with questions about how he selected the consultant, he 

replied that, “I can see nothing to be gained in answering detailed questions you list as to the 

consultants. Both firms are nationally recognized as having the highest competence for carrying 

out transportation and environmental studies such as the one the Highway Commission is now 

undertaking in the I-66 corridor.” 

As for her interest in attending a September 5 meeting, Fugate said it was limited to 

“representatives of the Highway Department and members of [I-66 advisory] committee.” He 

added that, “Later, groups such as yours will have full opportunity for participation.” Fugate said 

the purpose of the meeting was to establish guidelines for the study. 

Mrs. Govan was disturbed by the reply: 

This is ridiculous. If the citizens aren’t allowed in at the first stage of discussions of the 

study, the scope of it will have been determined before any citizens have any input into it. 

We feel they must do a study of non-highway alternatives. [Griffin, James, “Fugate 

Refuses I-66 Answers,” The Washington Star-News, August 26, 1972] 

The Justice Department announced on August 29 that it had decided not to join the State in 

asking the Supreme Court to review the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ April 4 decision 

blocking I-66 in Arlington County. The Post reported: 

Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Lawrence G. Wallace said yesterday government attorneys 

felt construction of the highway might begin sooner if the federal government did not ask 

the Supreme Court to review the lower court ruling . . . . 

Wallace said Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold decided not to challenge the court of 

appeals ruling after considering the affect [sic] of the case on other environmental suits in 

progress and the likelihood of a favorable Supreme Court. 

An attorney for the Virginia Highway Department understood the decision in the context of the 

pending presidential election. “It’s an election year and it’s an environmental suit . . . . I can see 

that the administration does not want to come down on the wrong side of a popular issue.” He 

summed up by saying that based on his discussions with Justice Department attorneys, “They’re 

thinking about a nation-wide problem, and we’re thinking about a statewide problem.” 

[Mathews, Jay, “U.S. Quits Fight on I-66 Plan,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

August 30, 1972] 

Solicitor General Griswold went a step further in late September by asking the Supreme Court to 

turn down Virginia’s request for a hearing. His memorandum to the court referred to the Circuit 

Court’s ruling as “somewhat vague” and potentially “troublesome” as the government defended 

other highway decisions. “Reopening the hearing process with respect to the thousands of 

federal-aid highway projects under way throughout the country would cause significant 

administrative difficulties and, in our view, was not required by Congress.” He continued: 

However, because of the particular facts of the case, including the possibility of very 

substantial changes in the relevant factors since we believe the decision [by the Court of 
Appeals] does not establish a precedent of sufficiently general applicability to require 

further review by this Court. 

The Post reported: 

A spokesman for the Virginia highway department expressed surprise at the Griswold 

action. Federal attorneys “have been telling us this decision would give them trouble in 

the rest of the country,” the spokesman said. 

Sources close to the state highway department feel the federal government is simply 

reluctant to take firm action against environmentalists in an election year.

Attorneys for ACT and other I-66 opponents said they were pleased with the action. [Mathews, 

Jay, “Bid to Review Ban on I-66 Snagged,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

September 30, 1972] 

The Solicitor General’s action reduced the likelihood that the Supreme Court would consider the 

State’s appeal. On November 6, that expectation was realized when the Supreme Court declined, 

without explanation, to review the U.S. Court of Appeals’ ruling. With four votes needed, only 

Chief Justice Burger and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., voted to take up the case. Donald S. 

Burris, an attorney for the citizens groups fighting I-66 said the court’s decision “represents total 

victory for the aspects of the case we are litigating,” while Emilia Govan said:

The conclusion is very good for those of us who want them to re-evaluate the whole 

thing. It puts the burden on the highway department, which is as it should be. [Mathews, 

Jay, “High Court Backs Delay of Rte. 66,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 7, 1972] 

Virginia’s public meeting at the Kenmore Junior High School a week later did not go well, as the 

Post recounted: 

About 250 persons came to a “public participation workshop” on the proposed Interstate 

Rte. 66 last night to say that the Virginia Highway Department’s approach to public 

involvement is “totally unacceptable.” 

Loud applause frequently interrupted Emilia Govan, co-chairman of the Arlington 

Coalition on Transportation, as she castigated highway officials as “nonelected 

bureaucrats (who) veto any decisions made by the citizens, a (highway department) 

consultant team or elected officials . . . .” 

“To give policy-making power to highway officials and to deny it to citizens and elected 

officials is totally unacceptable – not only because the highway officials are irrevocably 

committed to I-66 as planned, but because these officials are not directly responsible to 

the people,” said Mrs. Govan to a burst of applause at last night’s meeting. 

She suggested that the State’s steering committee be revised to include elected officials from the 

affected communities and the District of Columbia, the road’s terminus. 
Other speakers affirmed support for some of her statements, while about 40 people 

shouted out opposition [to them]. 

Some also objected when Mrs. Govan called for audience adoption of three criteria to 

form the basis for all subsequent phases of the study: “To maximize the use of mass 

transit for commuting and other travel purposes; to prevent degradation of the natural and 

human environment, and to move the greatest number of people in the most efficient 

economical and convenient manner.” 

County Supervisor Alexander, a member of the steering committee, objected that, “We should 

not have a plebiscite tonight.” 

Mrs. Govan contered that, “This is billed as a public workshop and it’s the only forum we have 

to express our opinions.” The audience overwhelmingly approved her three criteria. [“Va. 

Highway Officials Blistered on I-66 Plan,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 15, 1972] 

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972 

On March 16, 1972, Secretary Volpe appeared before the House Subcommittee on Roads, during 

its hearing on the planned Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972. Representative Harsha, during his 

question period, asked the Secretary to respond in writing to a set of questions, one of which was: 

Question 18. Do you believe if we had completed the freeway system in the District of 

Columbia, that the congestion problem experienced in the Capital of the Nation would be 

as severe as it presently is?

Answer. In some respects, yes, because in the Washington area the congestion problem is 

related to the peak hour commuting problem. The planned freeway system is related to 

the peak hour commuting problem. The planned freeway system was planned only to 

serve a portion of peak hour traffic (such as motorists without alternative means of 

transportation, car pools, trucks, buses and taxis) and general traffic throughout the day. 

A portion of the problem may have been alleviated by the planned freeway system had it 

been completed. However, the remainder [of the problem] would not have been because 

much of this demand really could be better served by an improved public transportation 

system. The private automobile is a relatively inefficient method of meeting peak hour 

demand in densely settled urban areas, particularly since the average ridership levels is so 

low in this country. In addition, new freeway capacity can influence land use patterns and 

induce new traffic growth, so a reduction in congestion is often short lived. Thus, new 

road capacity in and of itself to accommodate more automobiles alone will not solve the 

problem of peak hour congestion in such areas. 

In an earlier report to Congress, I recommended a freeway system which is adequate to 

meet the general traffic needs as well as a portion of the peak hour traffic of the District 

of Columbia. You should note my emphasis on continued support to the METRO system 
and integration with the existing bus companies to meet the overall transportation needs 

of this area.

In the long run, I believe that the peak hour commuting problem can be met only by 

providing a balanced transportation system for the D.C. metropolitan area. This would 

include reliance on the METRO system presently under construction, the new freeways 

which I recommended for the District of Columbia, a fully coordinated and integrated bus 

system, and better utilization of existing street capacity. The Shirley Highway [express 

bus lanes] project is an example of the latter approach. I strongly believe that the proper 

combination of the above elements offers the best hope for reducing commuter traffic 

congestion. [1972 Highway Legislation, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Roads of 

the Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives, 92nd Session 2nd Session, 

Committee Print 92-32, pages 508-509] 

On March 21, the subcommittee heard from a delegation from Massachusetts, including 

Secretary Altshuler. With the full support of Governor Sargent, he said his “primary purpose” 

was to urge support for “a very specific provision.” At the time, Federal-aid highway legislation 

recognized that Federal law authorized 200 miles, known as Howard-Cramer mileage after the 

House sponsors, for alternative routes if States decided not to build an Interstate highway. With 

that mileage already committed to routes around the country, Secretary Altshuler favored an 

alternative that would allow city officials to cancel unpopular Interstate highways without losing 

the millions of dollars – based on the 1972 ICE – associated with them:

The provision that we desire is part of the official program that shall be presented 

tomorrow by the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO). The 

language of the AASHO recommendation in which we are so urgently interested provides 

that, where it is determined that previously approved Interstate links cannot be 

constructed, the responsible officials at all levels of government should be authorized: 

To negotiate a compromise solution, satisfactory to the Secretary, that will satisfy 

the intent of Congress of completing a connected system aid, furthermore, that in 

arriving at a compromise and negotiated solution, the amount of funds included in 

the present cost estimate for the section of interstate highway involved, and not 

the mileage, should be the controlling factor. 

This recommendation was endorsed by the chief administrators of the Nation's State 

highway departments by a vote of 42-4 in the official AASHO balloting on the 

1972 legislative program – that took place last month.

Its implementation would require no more than the alteration of two numbers in the 

so-called-Cramer-Howard amendment of 1968 (Public Law 90-238). 

Secretary Altshuler explained:

We believe that a sufficiently flexible highway program must be able to accommodate the 

finding that in some urban corridors it is no longer feasible to carve new rights-of-way – 
and to do so without imposing harsh financial penalties upon the States involved. In 

these urban corridors, the States concerned will generally have to undertake large 

transportation investments, both highway and transit, of a noninterstate nature . . . . In 

cooperation with AASHO, we urge that Interstate funds be made available for 

reassignment to meet these needs where such reassignment is compatible with the 

objectives of the Interstate program. [pages 541-548] 

After Secretary Altshuler, Secretary Hughes of Maryland testified on the same issue. He said 

that Maryland had built or programmed 358 miles of Interstate highway. But about 30 miles in 

the Baltimore area and Maryland’s Washington suburbs were not built. This unbuilt mileage 

included I-95 and I-70S inside the Capital Beltway as well as segments of I-70N, I-83, I-95, and 

I-395 in Baltimore. Like Altshuler, he asked Congress to allow the State to substitute new 

freeway routes for the portions that may be abandoned, with the substitution based on cost (about 

$1 billion) rather than mileage. “Public opposition connected to a great extent with 

environmental impact issues continues to overshadow the basic need to provide for a high level 

of transportation service in these corridors.” 

He endorsed the AASHO amendment and informed the subcommittee that Maryland “proposed 

to develop a logical system of replacement Interstate facilities, consistent with present Federal 

Interstate funding commitments, for use in the event certain controversial segments of the 

programed system are not construction.” To correct “travel deficiencies” caused by the inability 

to construct certain routes, Maryland would proceed on a priority basis: 

First priority in the replacement system will be given to facilities that serve to replace the 

function of a missing segment in a nearby location in order that a continuous Interstate 

routing is possible. 

Next, priority will be given to facilities that will provide alternate routings for Interstate 

movements in order to relieve existing Interstate facilities that will receive additional, 

heretofore unanticipated travel demand. 

Finally, facilities will be proposed to satisfy Interstate movements that have not been 

provided for in the presently programed system. These facilities will tend further to 

provide alternate routings for Interstate movements as they will interchange with the 

existing system. 

This system of replacement facilities will be developed so that each project meets 

Interstate System criteria, contributes to the formation of a local network of freeways to 

serve Interstate movement, and is capable of construction within a reasonable time frame.

 [pages 549-552] 

Secretary Hughes told reporters that substitutes for the controversial urban routes might include 

an expressway from Baltimore to Annapolis and upgrading the John Hanson Highway (U.S. 50) 

between Washington and Annapolis. He stressed this was not a proposal, but simply an 

illustration of where Maryland might shift the mileage if Federal law permitted. [1972 Highway 
Legislation, pages 541-548; Eisen, Jack, “Permission to Alter Road Plans Asked,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, March 22, 1972] 

On March 28, the subcommittee heard from Francis A. Porter, president of Porter Associates, 

Inc., in Landover Hills, Prince George’s County, Maryland. He testified, however, as executive 

secretary of the Committee for a Balanced Transportation Policy in the county. The committee 

supported Metro, but also I-95 through the county and the District of Columbia, as well as the 

necessary support roads and public transportation. His prepared statement stated: 

Our concern dates from the adoption last Dec. 28th of the District of Columbia City 

Council’s report on the Interstate Freeway System in Washington . . . . The report 

declares that the New York Avenue Industrial Freeway should be constructed to a 

connection with a greatly improved Baltimore-Washington Parkway as a “realistic 

alternative” to I-95, implied in the decision is belief that this route will handle adequately 

trips with a Washington destination, and that interstate through traffic will use the 

Beltway. [sic]

He objected to the current study in Maryland of I-95 within the county, as well as statements by 

the District’s city council that it did not want to force “repugnant” decisions on the county by 

pursuing its segment of I-95. Opponents suggested that Metro and improvement of existing 

highways would be able to handle the traffic: 

Opposition was climaxed by a hot fight over a bill (which fortunately failed) in the State 

legislature that would have denied the Maryland share of the proposed study, thus killing 

the entire project. The astounding thing is that the opponents, both in the District and in 

Maryland, have given no indication of understanding the relationship of I-95 to Metro 

although rapid transit is the keystone of their argument against completion of the 

highway. 

He pointed out that Metro was supposed to occupy the I-95 right-of-way from the vicinity of 

New York Avenue to 2 miles beyond the District line in Maryland. WMATA was planning to 

place two Metro station on air rights over the highway, with Metro occupying the I-95 median 

strip for the first 2 miles after leaving the District. Metro costs for the line are all predicated on 

right-of-way acquisition, engineering, and construction of I-95: 

Metro officials I have talked to literally shudder when asked what additional money must 

be programmed for this line. And they state flatly that elimination of I-95 will 

substantially delay and possibly eliminate the entire segment from Union Station to 

Greenbelt. On the other side of the coin, they admit that simultaneous construction of 

Metro and I-95 – which has not been planned – would probably bring substantial savings 

in the two projects and offer an advanced service schedule for Metro. 

He acknowledged that construction of I-70S through Montgomery County to the District was 

dead. However, the committee did not consider any alternatives to construction of I-95 to be 

acceptable. The committee thought that the I-70S funds should be shifted to I-95. Porter 
recommended the Committee on Public Works include a provision in the 1972 Act that would 

restore I-95 to the District’s freeway system and:

1. Recognize that I-95 through Prince Georges County and the District of Columbia is an 

essential part of the transportation network serving the entire East Coast and guarantees 

adequate access for all of the nation’s citizens seeking to visit their Capital City.

2. Recognize that large amounts of taxpayers’ money can be saved by the simultaneous 

construction of I-95 and the Rhode Island-Prince Georges Plaza segment of Metro.

3. Recognize that construction of I-95 through the urban sections of Prince Georges County 

and the District of Columbia should meet every possible criteria contributing to the 

reductions in disruption of neighborhoods, and impacts on environmental factors. This 

should include standards for compensation for unavoidable noise pollution to neighboring 

properties, as well as improvements in the present system of compensation for properties 

affected by public construction projects. [pages 825-831] 

On March 28, the subcommittee heard from Grosvenor Chapman and Gardner Palmer of the 

Citizens Association of Georgetown regarding the Three Sisters Bridge. Palmer, who chaired the 

association’s Committee on Legislation, cited the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the 

appeal:

We are not here to kick a dead horse. In fact, we do not believe it is really a dead horse, 

and that is why we wish to present testimony before the subcommittee, and we feel that 

there are two difficult situations that must be faced.

One situation was the provision in past Federal-aid legislation requiring construction of the 

bridge, with Secretary Volpe and the District now required to go through the whole review 

process again, which would “cause a great deal of unnecessary anguish throughout the city of 

Washington, and throughout Arlington County.” 

The other situation was a “Government-authorized study and a mining study in the historic 

district of Georgetown’s waterfront.” At President Nixon’s direction, the Federal Government 

was financing the study partly to preserve the historic waterfront “but also as part of the 1976 

Bicentennial Exposition and celebration.” Georgetown, as he mentioned, predated the District of 

Columbia’s creation as the Nation’s capital.

Palmer said that much of the debate was on the bridge itself – “you might say one abutment of 

the river bank to the other” – without enough attention paid to the effect of the traffic after it 

reaches the District. “We have taken the position that if we must accept it, we must accept it,” 

but he added, “all we ask is that it be planned with the greatest delicacy . . . .” He pointed out 

that since enactment of Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, “traffic has not 

grown in the way that it was predicted it would grow, so that even more so today it would appear 

that the bridge is not going to be necessary.” 

He urged repeal of Section 23, which the prepared statement called “a colossal mistake,” to allow 

planning to proceed without the bridge dictating six lanes of traffic through Georgetown. Even 
with Section 23 still a law, the Three Sisters Bridge “should not be built and, in all probability, 

will not be built.” In view of court rulings, it probably could not satisfy Title 23 and other 

relevant laws. Residents of the District and Arlington County did not want the bridge. Further, 

if built, it would interfere with solutions to the traffic problems in Georgetown by funneling six 

lanes of traffic through the area.

When the association completed its opening statement, Chairman Kluczynski agreed to place 

their lengthy formal statement in the record. He said that before inserting Section 23 in the 

1968 Act, “I was very interested in that, and drove out there, and I saw three rocks sticking out of 

the river and they wanted to name it that, and there is quite a history to it.”

When Chapman said he had not been able to cover the specifics of the Georgetown waterfront 

and the effect of the added traffic, Chairman Kluczynski interrupted to say he had to be on the 

House floor in a few minutes for a vote. “You could give the story to our engineer-consultant 

here, and we will have it in the record in its entirety.” [pages 897-908] 

The subcommittee concluded its hearings on April 12, 1972. The report on the hearings 

contained statements and letters received beyond the hearings themselves on many issues, 

including several on the District’s freeway controversy. One was an April 12 letter from 

Robert F. Koch of Bethesda, Maryland to Chairman Kluczynski. Koch, speaking as an 

individual, wanted to go on record as supporting the freeways in the DeLeuw-Cather report. He 

said that the people of Montgomery County also supported the North-Central Freeway, 

notwithstanding the State’s recent decision to drop the freeway “in apparent ignorance of the 

strong public support” for it. 

He enclosed a copy of his letter to Senator Mathias stating that “any talk of ‘balanced’ 

transportation in this area is a joke.” The Metro subway “enjoys a sacred status,” but I-66, the 

Three Sisters Bridge, the North-Central Freeway are “in serious trouble after years of delay” 

while the Northwest Freeway was dropped. “Everyone seems to forget that Metro runs on tracks 

and requires a complete road system to supplement and support it.” 

Koch told Senator Mathias that the “well-publicized opposition of organized groups” had led to 

the “popular fallacy” that the public opposed freeways. This “completely false” impression may 

stem partly from the turnout at hearings. While the public “stays away in droves” and relies on 

the wisdom of its elected representatives, the hearings “are usually packed with objectors, who 

impress these same officials with their vehemence and create a completely false notion of a 

‘popular mandate’ to do away with freeway planning.” 

He illustrated “the monumental injustice of all this” by citing the example of the North-Central 

Freeway. When Representative Gude polled his constituents in mid-1971 on construction of the 

North-Central Freeway, 54 percent favored the freeway. The 1969 Quayle survey found that 

two-thirds of District residents favored the 1968 freeway system. “Obviously it is time for some 

statesmanlike action on the part of our elected officials to get the job done in spite of the 

obstructionists.” 
In his letter to Chairman Kluczynski, Koch observed that he had chaired the Transportation 

Committee of the Bethesda-Chevy Chase Chamber of Commerce:

I have observed the steady deterioration of highway planning in this metropolis over the 

past ten years, thanks to a parade of Johnny-come-latelys in the NCPC and local 

governments, who have done a great job of cutting, slashing, changing, delaying, etc. 

The attrition continues today, with the D.C. City Council, DOT, HUD, EPA, and various 

courts all thwarting the people’s needs and the will of Congress expressed in the 1968 

Highway Act.

If we are to get the roads we so badly need here, only Congress can override the messy 

situation and get the job done. [pages 897-901, pages 1025-1026] 

Dr. Leslie Logan of Arlingtonians for the Preservation of the Potomac Palisades, one of the 

litigants in the Three Sisters Bridge case, submitted a statement to the House Subcommittee on 

Roads later in the month. He urged repeal of Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1968, although his primary concern was the Three Sisters Bridge. He questioned whether 

additional capacity was needed in view of recent traffic studies:

On May 19, 1971, there were no more commuters at the morning peak hour from Virginia 

to Washington than there were in 1964-65, despite population growth. 

Aside from need, the Three Sisters Bridge “would destroy the beauty of the Potomac River gorge 

and adversely affect the national parklands along the Potomac River for several miles.” On a 

practical level, “it would be a large source of air and noise pollution.” Further, Section 23 and 

the bridge itself “are probably contrary to law,” as determined by the courts. 

The statement pointed out that NPS Director Hartzog, in June 1965, had identified viable 

alternatives to the proposed bridge: 

These alternatives include greater use of the bridges already built by reconstructing 

approaches and providing additional capacity on Chain Bridge and Key Bridge, widening 

George Washington parkway roadway from Spout Run to Theodore Roosevelt Bridge 

from four to six lanes, and providing connections between Highway 50 and Jefferson 

Davis Highway to facilitate the movement of traffic to the 14th Street bridges and points 

south. 

He also pointed out the opposition to the bridge in Arlington County: 

The bridge would not be consistent with Arlington’s plans for the future; a bridge has two 

ends – it cannot be consistent with local planning on one side and not on the other. 

[pages 897-901, pages 1048-1050; Barnes, Fred, “3 Sisters Alternative Asked,” The 

Evening Star, April 20, 1972] 

In addition, Douglas M. Parker of the law firm of Lankler and Parker provided a letter to 

Chairman Kluczynski on behalf of the Connecticut Avenue Association and the Committee 

Concerned for K Street. The groups opposed the location of the proposed North Leg of the Inner 
Loop along K Street, NW. In response to Section 129 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, 

the District of Columbia and Secretary Volpe had recommended an alignment along K Street. In 

doing so, however, they had “ignored the expressed view of Congress in this matter and failed to 

provide a sound basis for Congressional action.” 

The 1968 ICE included a North Leg “in the vicinity of T and U Streets, N.W.” and that was the 

route specified in Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. In the District’s 

Department of Highways and Traffic report dated January 12, 1970, the city rejected the 

alignment along T and U Streets:

At the same time, however, the report pointed out that a tunnel under K Street “would 

require serious business disruption during the construction period.” The District of 

Columbia City Council also received testimony on February 3, 1970, to the effect that 

(a) a tunnel under K Street could not serve as a traffic distributor; (b) the cost of a 

K Street tunnel would be prohibitive (c) [sic] the construction of a K Street tunnel would 

produce an enormous, perhaps fatal, amount of disruption to the business community in 

that area, and (d) a large number of families would be displaced by a K Street tunnel. 

Parker wrote that the two organizations he represented presented this testimony to the city and 

that it “was not challenged by a single witness.”

Nevertheless, on February 17, 1970, the city council had recommended a tunnel under K, L, or 

M Streets. Further, the council’s report “stated that no route north of M Street was acceptable 

and that a tunnel connecting the E Street Expressway with Downtown was the only acceptable 

alternative to K, L, and M Streets.” 

Quoting the House Report on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Parker cited the call for 

“careful consideration” of the “potentially disastrous effects” that tunnel construction would have 

on K Street businesses. Section 129 of the legislation called for study of the North Leg of the 

Inner Loop and reports to Congress by the District and the Secretary regarding the project 

“including any recommended alternative routes or plans.” 

Despite the expressed concerns, the District’s consultant recommended the K Street alignment 

for the North Leg and the city council endorsed the recommendation. Secretary Volpe concurred 

in part by stating that there should be “a connector facility along the K Street corridor” but 

expressing reservations “as to the type of facility.” He noted the cost and potential community 

disruption along the corridor, but “offered no plan as to how such problems might be overcome” 

beyond further consideration of alternatives such as “a surface improvement concept with or 

without grade separation.” 

Parker concluded: 

It appears that neither the consultants, the District of Columbia, nor the Secretary of 

Transportation have observed the Congressional mandate to explore fully all of the 

available alternatives. Accordingly, we submit, Congress should now reject the K Street 
alignment in explicit terms and direct the further study of the remaining 

alternatives.[pages 1037-1038] 

The 1972 House Bill

On September 14, the Subcommittee on Roads approved a provision as part of the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1972 (H.R. 16656) that would prohibit any court from halting construction of 

the Three Sisters Bridge:

Three Sisters Bridge

Sec. 139. No court shall have power or authority to issue any order or take any action 

which will in any way impede, delay, or halt the construction of the project described as 

estimate section termini B1-B2, and B2-B3 in the 1972 Estimate of the Cost of 

Completing the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways in the District of 

Columbia and as estimate section termini 02-03 in the 1972 Estimate of the Cost of 

Completing the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways in the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, in accordance with the prestressed concrete box girder, 

three-span design approved by the Fine Arts Commission, known as the Three Sisters 

Bridge. Nor shall any approval, authorization, finding, determination, or similar action 

taken or omitted by the Secretary, the head of any other Federal agency, the government 

of the District of Columbia, or any other agency of Government in carrying out any 

provisions of law relating to such Three Sisters Bridge be reviewable in any court. 

[H.R. 16656, 92d Congress, 2d Session, in the House of Representatives, September 14, 

1972, pages 107-108] 

The committee’s report on September 25 explained that the history of the Three Sisters Bridge 

had been “one of intense emotion, countless years of planning and dispute, court action and 

literally millions of words in the press and other media.” The committee, by enacting Section 23 

of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, but “no one moved toward construction of the bridge 

until late in 1969,” when “other circumstances produced a change in attitude and the bridge was 

started.” Construction was halted by “endless court suits,” resulting in Chief Justice Burger’s 

explanation that the Supreme Court would not consider an appeal “solely out of considerations of 

timing.” The Chief Justice noted that the Court of Appeals’ decision “unjustifiably frustrated . . . 

the will of the Congress.” In view of his opinion that Congress could act on the matter “even to 

the point of limiting or prohibiting judicial review of its directives.” The committee was acting 

“accordingly.” [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, Committee on Public Works, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 92d Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 92-1443, September 25, 1972, page 17] 

A spokesman for Chairman Kluczynski reaffirmed that role of Chief Justice Burger’s invitation 

to congressional action: 

Subcommittee sources said the measure is aimed at U.S. Court of Appeals Judge David 

Bazelon, who in ruling in favor of the citizen groups said that Volpe, in deciding to build 

the bridge, should not have considered the pressure of Natcher and other House members 

to force freeway construction in exchange for subway money. 
Representative Schwengel had not been present for the vote on the provision but said at the time 

that he would attempt to block the measure when the full committee takes up the bill:

I’m disturbed that the subcommittee completely ignored the wishes of the people of the 

District. We treat them like foreigners. In every other area we have state highway 

commissions listening to what the local community wants. [Green, Stephen, 

“Amendment Would Halt Court Action on Bridge,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, September 15, 1972] 

Despite efforts by Representatives Schwengel and Abzug, the committee retained the provision 

in the final bill. 

The bill’s Section 140 also was related to the District freeway disputes:

District of Columbia

Sec. 140. None of the provisions of the Act entitled “An Act to provide a permanent 

system of highways in that part of the District of Columbia lying outside of cities”, 

approved March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 532), as amended, shall apply to any segment of the 

Interstate System within the District of Columbia.

The committee’s report explained that: 

This 79 year old Act is still applicable to the nation’s capital today. At a time when a vast 

modern highway system has been developed throughout the nation, there is always the 

possibility in the District of Columbia that the application of this Act can in some manner 

impede the need to develop a modern highway program for Washington. 

No city in the United States needs a full scale highway program greater than does 

Washington, D.C. to whom hundreds of thousands of tourists flock every year to visit its 

scenic and historic wonders. 

The Committee feels that to allow such an Act the continuation of which might even 

remotely prevent the development of a full scale highway program for the nation’s capital 

is a disservice to the city of Washington, to its citizens, and to the American public across 

the country, and for this reason urges it repeal in this section, with respect to the Interstate 

System only.

The report pointed out that, for example, the 1893 Act “prohibits the construction of a highway 

within the nation’s capital at a width great than 160 ft.” 

As for the provisions in the 1968 and 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Acts, the committee stated, 

“The reports received by the Committee . . . have been deficient, and for this reason, the 

Committee now states that under Section 23(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of the 1968, the 

entire Interstate System in the District of Columbia should be built forthwith.” The exception 

was the South Leg of the Inner Loop, “on which recent hearings have been held by the District of 

Columbia which should produce a satisfactory plan for its construction.” [page 18] 
The bill also addressed the District Interstate controversies in Section 110 on “Federal-Aid 

Systems.” In recent years, Congress had tried to speed completion of the Interstate Construction 

Program by imposing deadlines for submitting PS&E for all remaining segments. If a State did 

not submit the documentation on time, the Secretary of Transportation was to remove Interstate 

designation for the segment. Section 110 extended the due date by 2 years to July 1, 1977. 

Committee members recognized that the deadline would give District officials an easy way to kill 

the city’s remaining Interstate segments by simply not submitting the documentation. Therefore, 

Section 110 exempted the District of Columbia from this provision. (The Senate included a 

similar provision in its version of the 1972 Act, but did not exempt the District of Columbia from 

the deadlines.) [page 32; Green, Stephen, “Amendment Would Halt Court Action on Bridge,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 15, 1972] 

 

Secretary Volpe had written to Chairman Blatnik on September 18, before the committee vote, to 

say the Nixon Administration strongly opposed the provision on the Three Sisters Bridge. In 

general, Secretary Volpe said, the administration believed that congressional attempts to exempt 

individual projects from Federal requirements or court review “are not desirable.” 

Further, “if the purpose . . . is to expedite the processing of the Three Sisters Bridge project, it is 

our opinion that it does not achieve that purpose.” Because “the provision is prospective,” 

Section 139 “would leave the existing court order standing.” Department of Transportation 

attorneys believed that “processing the Three Sisters Bridge without complying with the existing 

court order may lead to contempt proceedings against the secretary of Transportation [sic].” The 

committee, as the Star pointed out, ignored the letter in taking final action on the bill. 

Martha Angle, reporting for the Star, pointed out that the committee received Secretary Volpe’s 

letter before voting on the bill, but “members apparently ignored his objections. A much more 

vigorous debate is likely when the measure reaches the House floor next week.” She added that 

even if the provisions related to District freeways survived the House debate, “they could be 

eliminated in conference with the Senate.” [Angle, Martha, “Volpe Scores House on 3 Sisters 

Action,” The Washington Star-News, September 23, 1972] 

The bill also authorized Interstate construction funds through FY 1979 and approved use of the 

1972 ICE for apportionment of funds in FYs 1974 and 1975. Secretary Volpe had submitted the 

ICE to Congress on December 29, 1971. The report stated that the previous ICE had estimated 

the total cost of the Interstate System would be $69.870 billion (Federal share: $62.5 billion). 

The 1972 estimate was $76.3 billion (Federal share: $68,26 billion), “without allowance for 

possible escalation in future program years.” As in past years, the difference in cost since the 

1970 ICE could be attributed to Interstate additions and major adjustments, unit price changes, 

new legislation added increased emphasis on social considerations, added costs for preliminary 

engineering, right-of-way acquisition, and construction items. 

[A Revised Estimate of the Cost of Completing the National System of Interstate and Defense 

Highways, Communication from the Secretary of Transportation Transmitting a Revised 

Estimate of the Cost of Completing the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 104(b)5, Title 23, United States Code, Committee on 

Public Works, U.S. House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 2d Session, Committee Print 92-29, 

February 1972, pages 13-14] 

On September 25, 1972, the House Committee on Public Works released a report on its version 

of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972. 

Representatives Abzug, Schwengel , and Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) submitted additional views, 

totaling 11 pages, opposing both D.C.-related provisions: 

We believe that local highway officials and local citizens should have the opportunity to 

be heard with regard to highway construction projects, and that they should also have the 

right to a day in court if they believe that such a project is in violation of law. To prevent 

them from having that say, and that day in court, as section 139 attempts to do, violates 

basic principles of American democracy and may be unconstitutional . . . . 

In addition, we oppose section 140 of the bill, which we feel would wreak havoc with any 

further Interstate highway planning and construction in the Nation’s Capital. 

The bulk of their statement was divided into four lengthy segments: 

I. SECTION 139 WOULD PERMIT AN INTERSTATE HIGHWAY IN VIRGINIA 

 AND FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAYS THERE AND ELSEWHERE TO BE 

 CONSTRUCTION UNLAWFULLY

Although the District of Columbia has a unique status under the Constitution, the 

Commonwealth of Virginia was a sovereign State. Congress might have the authority to direct 

construction of the Three Sisters Bridge in the District, but had never exercised such authority in 

Virginia or any other State. “The citizens of Virginia and the other States, acting through their 

duly authorized officials, have had authority to decide whether, where and in what manner 

Interstate highways should be construction.” By ordering the District to build the Three Sisters 

Bridge, which touched down in Virginia, Section 139 would deprive Virginia’s citizens of that 

authority, thereby creating “a dangerous precedent” for the Federal-aid highway program. 

The prohibition of judicial review went even further, but was unclear as to exactly which 

elements of Title 23, United States Code, or related laws, such as NEPA, would not have to be 

satisfied because citizens could not go to court based on noncompliance. “We do not know the 

answers to these questions, for section 139 does not tell us.” 

Further, the Constitution provided for a court system, headed by the Supreme Court. The three 

Representatives had “serious doubt as to the constitutionality” of Section 139, which deprived 

citizens of their right to due process of law in the courts. 

II. SECTION 139 UNWISELY AND UNNECESSARILY INTERFERES IN A LOCAL 

 HIGHWAY CONTROVERSY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND NORTHERN

 VIRGINIA
Of Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Representatives said, “No legislation 

has evoked a more anguished or unanimous cry of protest from the people in the Nation’s 

Capital.” Opposition to the provision was widespread and intense “both within the District and 

throughout the country,” with President Johnson referring to it as “the most objectionable feature 

in this bill” and “inconsistent with a basic tenet of sound urban development – to permit the local 

government and the people affected to participate meaningfully in planning their transportation 

system.” The Representatives quoted extensively from President Johnson’s statement on why he 

signed the legislation, including his point that he did so only because Section 23 called for 

construction in accordance with Federal highway law.

They described the history of court cases involving the Three Sisters Bridge. “Some have said 

that the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision ‘defied’ the will of Congress. That is not correct.” 

Section 23 directed construction of the bridge “in compliance with all applicable provisions” of 

Federal-aid law. Evidence revealed during the litigation demonstrated that Federal and local 

officials acting “under extreme pressure by-passed procedural requirements and ignored 

substantive protections which had been imposed by Congress,” citing Representative Natcher and

the Metro funding. Far from defying the will of Congress, the court “was directing that the will 

of Congress be obeyed as written.” 

The courts had correctly raised questions about the safety of the proposed design of the Three 

Sisters Bridge. They quoted from Administrator Turner’s March 1970 memorandum stating that 

the unconventional design and the lack of experience with it in the United States “make the 

undertaking extremely hazardous and fraught with danger.” They referenced the test of the scale 

model, citing the report that it had been broken before testing began. They did not believe 

Congress should mandate construction of a bridge in the Nation’s Capital that was “extremely 

hazardous and fraught with danger.” 

III. THE THREE SISTERS BRIDGE AND OTHER FREEWAYS IN THE DISTRICT 

 OF COLUMBIA ARE OPPOSED BY THE COMMUNITY

The Committee on Public Works had not held hearings on Sections 139 or 140. In fact, the 

committee had not held hearings on the District freeway impasse since April 1968. During 

hearings on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, only one witness, representing the Citizens 

Association of Georgetown, had testified on the subject and he had urged repeal of Section 23 of 

the 1968 Act: 

The singular and overriding fact that emerged from this committee’s hearings in April, 

1968 was the unanimity of civic opposition to the present District of Columbia highway 

program. Never in the history of this committee has there been such an outpouring of 

civic protest against a highway program.

The Representatives listed the many groups opposing the measures and recounted the history of 

protests, beginning with opposition “in Northwest Washington where proposals to destroy Rock 

Creek Park, Glover-Archbold Park, and Northwest residential neighborhoods evoked unanimous 

opposition from civic groups in that area.” 
In recent years, they said, opposition had centered on the Three Sisters Bridge. They cited the 

informal referendum in November 1969 during which 84 percent of voters opposed the bridge. 

The Representatives concluded their summary of the history of opposition to the freeway 

network by writing: 

The Interstate highway program embodied in section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 

of 1968, and particularly the Three Sisters Bridge, has no community support. Without 

that community support, the Congress should not further interfere in the highway 

controversy in the District and northern Virginia by enacting section 139 of H.R. 16656. 

IV. SECTION 140 WOULD WREAK HAVOC WITH ANY FURTHER INTERSTATE

 HIGHWAY PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In repealing the District of Columbia Highway Act of 1893, as amended, for Interstate highways, 

Section 140 “does not contain anything to replace these provisions, thereby leaving a total void in 

District laws relating to planning and construction of Interstate highways.” Section 140 “would 

sweep away all these provisions with respect to Interstate highways – public hearings for affected 

property owners; public notice to affected property owners from detailed maps and plans; the 

right of property owners to use their property until condemnation begins.” The Representatives 

compared this action with repeal of statutes in Iowa, New York, or Oklahoma. “It takes little 

imagination to foresee that the result will be utter chaos in planning, approving and constructing 

Interstate highways in Washington, D.C.” 

They acknowledged complaints by some Members of Congress about the District’s failure to 

complete its Interstate mileage. They pointed out, however, that many segments, including the 

Three Sisters Bridge, “appear to be misconceived.” Some may not be, but Section 140 was “an 

open invitation to the District government to plan nothing, approve nothing and construct nothing 

in the foreseeable future.” The provision led to many unanswered questions, such as who was 

responsible for planning highways in the District of Columbia, were public hearings necessary 

and, if so, who should hold them, are public notices necessary for Interstate highways, can 

District officials trespass on private property for survey purposes? “Even those not intimately 

familiar with the conduct of District government affairs can confidently predict that several years 

could be consumed in attempting to find answers to those questions.” 

The Committee on Public Works “is obviously not equipped by jurisdiction or experience to 

review and, if necessary, revise the District of Columbia’s highway laws.” Repealing the 1893 

District highway law “would be foolhardy and fruitless . . . without replacing them and providing 

the best possible framework for informed local decision-making.” 

In conclusion, they pointed out that Section 139 was “an awkward attempt to assure construction 

of a project that is overwhelmingly opposed by the communities on both sides of the Potomac 

River. And by abolishing the District’s highway laws in relation to the Interstate System, Section 

140 “would have chaotic consequences for the Nation’s Capital. Both sections “should be 

deleted from the bill.” [pages 83-93] 
With the House preparing to debate the bill, Secretary Volpe released a statement on October 3 

covering many of its provisions. Among other views, Secretary Volpe favored a provision that 

eliminated mileage restrictions on Interstate segments chosen to replace those deleted from the 

System. He also favored the Muskie-Cooper amendment that would allow funds from a deleted 

Interstate segment to be shifted to the Federal-aid urban system where they could be used for 

non-Interstate projects, including rail rapid transit. The provision was not in the House 

committee bill, but Representative John B. Anderson (R-Il.), Secretary Volpe pointed out, would 

introduce “a similar amendment providing $700 million to the Highway Bill.” 

He recommended deletion of both provisions on District freeways. 

On October 4, a Post editorial opposed the Section 139 prohibition on court action regarding the 

Three Sisters Bridge. The editorial began:

Three Sisters Bridge, the bridge that isn’t there but will not go away, is back. And it is 

back in the worst of all places, on Capitol Hill – more precisely, in the highway bill which 

has just emerged from the House Public Works Committee. 

This was the same committee that, as “bridge-fight aficionados will recall,” had crafted “the 

peremptory 1968 law” ordering construction of the bridge. It was now “trying again to ram those 

lanes of freeway across the Potomac between Georgetown and Arlington, by simply bulldozing 

aside whatever happens to be in the way – including the federal courts, a few federal laws, the 

Nixon administration, the District government, and the possibility that the area’s transportation 

needs have changed.” 

Virtually everyone else had accepted the ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals, including the 

Supreme Court. “But now the Public Works Committee has blasted the interval of calm in a 

most disruptive, mischievous way, intent on turning back the clock to 1968.” After listing the 

provisions, the editorial summarized them: 

In other words, no more public hearings, no more detailed reviews, no reconsideration on 

the merits, no enforcement of environmental protection laws, no due process for citizens 

with legitimate grievances and constitutional rights. Damn the torpedoes, damn the 

courts, and build the bridge. 

The action that the committee was taking reflected the “highly injudicious and gratuitous 

suggestion by Chief Justice Burger.” Congress had the right to do so, “But the wisest thing for 

Congress to do about the Three Sisters Bridge would be nothing at all.” Instead, the House had 

stirred the issue up again. The editorial hoped that the eventual House-Senate conference 

committee would “bestir themselves to delete this objectionable provision from the highway 

bill.” [“The Bridge That Isn’t There—Again,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

October 4, 1972] 

During the October 5 consideration of the bill on the House floor, Representative Abzug 

introduced an amendment striking Section 139 from the bill. She said that “even if the bridge is 
the greatest thing that could happen for transportation in this area,” she opposed the provision 

because it created an exception to NEPA and deprived citizens of the United States “of their right 

to have access to the courts for redress of their legal grievances.” She cited the many 

organizations, including the Post, that had called for deletion of the provision: 

The project has not complied with the law in numerous respects, there is doubt as to 

whether it is safe, and is opposed by the community. I urge the adoption of my 

amendment to delete section 139 from this bill.

Representative Broyhill confused the situation by offering “a perfecting amendment” that would 

add a section (b) stating that: 

This section shall take effect upon the final determination of the route of Interstate 

Highway I-66 from its present terminus in Virginia at I-495 to its connection with a 

bridge or bridges (presently constructed or to be constructed) across the Potomac River. 

The confusion stemmed from whether he was amending Representative Abzug’s amendment of 

Section 139. Representative Broyhill clarified that he was amending the provision, Section 139, 

that Representative Abzug was trying to strike from the bill. He said he favored I-66 as well as 

the Three Sisters Bridge, as did his constituents. 

Minority Leader Ford agreed that the language in the bill was strong, but pointed out that “the 

language has come at the suggestion of a per curiam decision or memorandum from the Chief 

Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.” Representative Ford read the statement into 

the record, then explained that the provision in the 1972 Act was a direct result of the Chief 

Justice’s suggestion and that the Chief Justice “fully concurs in the proposal by inference, if not 

directly, in this bill.” 

Chairman Natcher spoke in opposition to Representative Abzug’s amendment. After inserting 

into the record another lengthy recounting of his efforts to achieve a balanced transportation 

system for the city, he concluded: 

The provision set forth above concerning the bridge complies fully with the suggestion 

made by Chief Justice Burger of the Supreme Court. The amendment should be voted 

down and the provision in the bill pertaining to the Three Sisters Bridge project and the 

District of Columbia projects sustained.

Representative Gude, a cosponsor of the Abzug amendment, said “Section 139 must be removed 

from this legislation.” The question was not support or opposition to the bridge: 

Supporters of this amendment are on both sides of that issue. Along these lines I might 

point out that enactment of this section might well mark the opening of a whole new 

round of legal actions which could well cause not only great confusion but as a result, 

further impede the orderly review and construction processes already established. 

Adoption of this section could well further delay, rather than hasten construction of the 

Three Sisters Bridge.
He also was concerned that Section 139, if approved, would set “a very clear precedent for future 

back-door attacks on the carefully constructed processes established by NEPA and enforced by 

the courts.” 

He cited opposition to the bridge and the provision from “virtually every citizen’s association, 

and conservation organization in the area, as well as from many national conservation groups.” 

He also quoted from Secretary Volpe’s letter to Chairman Blatnik. 

District Delegate Fauntroy spoke in support of the Abzug amendment. Regardless of the merits 

of the Three Sisters Bridge, Section 139 “would be a blatant denial of basic civil liberties and a 

corruption of the American political system.” Congress had established Title 23 and other laws 

that applied to all Federal-aid projects. “Why should not the citizens of the community have an 

input into the policy determinations that give rise to this sort of project?”

Section 139, he said, would have these negative impacts but “it does not build the bridge. It is 

prospective. It addresses itself to events that will occur in the future.” As Secretary Volpe had 

said in his letter, “the section is inapplicable to any preexisting court decision.” Delegate 

Fauntroy closed his statement by quoting an editorial on WTOP radio: 

Barring citizens from asking for redress in the courts, even though their own taxes and 

their own communities are at stake, would be a corruption of the American system. No 

bridge – not even the Three Sisters – is so important.

Minority Leader Ford pointed out that the bridge had been in controversy for 6 years. In 1968, 

after 2 years, Congress said, in essence, “That is enough.” Four years later, “there have been 

repetitive legal actions taken to stymie the intent of the Congress, culminating in a decision by 

the Supreme Court in which we had the words of the Chief Justice giving us some guidance as to 

what we could do to get the bridge built.” He again quoted the Chief Justice’s language, then 

said, “The Court is telling us we should do something of this kind, as reflected in this section, in 

order to stop the kind of litigation which has frustrated the Congress and the people of this area 

for better than 6 years.” 

Representative Abzug responded to Minority Leader Ford by saying that after listening to the 

views of her colleagues, “I am more convinced than ever that this is one of the most scandalous 

provisions I have ever seen in a piece of legislation.” The principle that citizens could be 

stripped of their right to petition the courts “does not affect only the Three Sisters Bridge area; 

the principle affects every single place in the country.” 

She also responded directly to Representative Ford: 

So far as the comments of Chief Justice Burger are concerned – by the way, they were 

purely an aside and certainly do not have the force of law – this provision goes way 

beyond even what he said. Even though he is a judge, his comments may have been 

injudicious. He did not suggest that we should restrain or should prevent any citizen from 

doing anything at all as to the enforcement of any provision of law relating to the Three 
Sisters Bridge. He did not say we should make it unreviewable by any court. Members 

are distorting it by constantly saying that is what the Chief Justice said.

In any case, his statement is not a part of the law, and it was not a part of the decision. In 

fact, the decision sustained the lower [court], which had ruled that the bridge could not be 

built unless certain conditions were remedied. We must recognize that what is involved 

here is a complete denial of due process to any citizen who pays taxes in this area or in 

every other area of this country, and no responsible body, no legislature, could possibly 

agree to that and believe any words in the Constitution. 

She also urged the House to reject Representative Broyhill’s amendment to Section 139. 

Representative Broyhill again sought to clarify that if the House adopted the Abzug Amendment, 

but then approved his amendment, Section 139 would be reinstated. 

Regardless of the clarification, the House rejected the Broyhill Amendment to Section 139, 

without a recorded vote. The House then rejected the Abzug amendment, 125 ayes to 173 noes. 

[Providing for Consideration of H.R. 16656, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, Congressional 

Record-House, October 5, 1972, p. 34130-34141] 

Representative Anderson introduced his amendment to incorporate the Senate’s Muskie-Cooper 

amendment allowing cities to transfer Federal-aid urban funds, including funds from deleted 

Interstate segments that would be transferred to the urban account, for transit, including rail rapid 

transit. With help from Minority Leader Ford, nearly two-thirds of Republicans opposed the 

measure, despite President Nixon’s support for it. As Ford explained, the measure broke faith 

with highway users who paid taxes into the Highway Trust Fund for highway purposes only. 

Moreover, the proposal was a camel’s-nose-under-the-tent. “Make one exception and the 

floodgates will be opened. Do this and someone will say, let’s divert funds from the airport trust 

fund.” [page 34069] 

The House killed the provision by refusing to consider it when the House parliamentarian ruled 

that the amendment was not in order. The House voted 200 to 168 not to waive the point of 

order, thus not voting on the amendment itself but killing it nonetheless. 

The House went on to approve the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, including Section 139 

(renumbered 140) and 140 (now 141). 

The 1972 Senate Bill

The Senate had approved its version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act on September 19, 1972. It 

did not contain any provisions related directly to the District of Columbia freeways. However, it 

did contain several controversial provisions that could affect the District. The approved Senate 

bill included the controversial Muskie-Cooper provision authorizing local officials to use urban 

system funds for mass transit, including rail transit. The bill also included a measure, promoted 

by Massachusetts Governor Sargent and Secretary Altshuler, for eliminating urban interstate 

segments without losing the money that came with them. According to the measure, at the 

request of a Governor and the local officials concerned, the Secretary could withdraw the 
segment from the interstate system and transfer the funds intended for its construction to the 

urban system. The funds then, under the Muskie-Cooper provision, could be used for any 

highway or transit project eligible under the category. 

In addition, if local governments in an urbanized area established a metropolitan transportation 

agency with authority to develop and implement transportation plans, the State was to “pass 

through” the urban system funds attributed to that area based on population for use by the agency 

in accordance with the 3C planning process. 

The Senate bill also contained a highly controversial provision that worried opponents of the 

remaining District Interstate freeways. Section 147 of the Senate committee bill authorized 

termination of Federal-aid status for the project to build the U.S. 281/North Expressway through 

Brackenridge-Olmos Basin Parklands in San Antonio. The State had begun the project with 

Federal-aid funds, but was blocked by a June 1971 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals in New 

Orleans that required the project to meet the new environmental requirements, including 

Section 4(f). Texas and San Antonio officials had proposed to proceed without Federal-aid 

highway funds, but the court declared that the project had proceeded beyond the point of no 

return on Federal-aid status.

Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tx.), a member of the Committee on Public Works, and Senator John 

Tower (R-Tx) proposed the measure to remove Federal-aid status from the freeway so it could be 

built without complying with Section 4(f) or other inhibiting Federal laws and regulations. 

Senator James L. Buckley (Conservative Party, NY), a chief opponent of their amendment, was 

one of four Senators who had voted against the amendment in committee. He said at the time 

that he believed Congress “should not become involved in weighing the pros and cons” of such 

disputes. “This has occurred once in the past, in the case of the Three Sisters Bridge in 

Washington, D.C., with unfortunate consequences.” As Fred Barnes explained in the Star: 

The North Expressway case is similar in some respects to the two most publicized 

highway disputes in the Washington area, those involving the Three Sisters Bridge and 

Interstate Route 66. 

In the 1970 highway bill, Congress ordered that construction of the bridge should begin 

within 30 days. Construction did begin, but it was later halted by a court order. Whether 

the Three Sisters Bridge will ever be built is unclear today.

“If Congress establishes the president [sic] of exempting specific projects from federal 

laws,” Buckley said, “the usefulness of those laws will be whittled away.” [Barnes, Fred, 

“Freeway Foes See Texas Precedent,” The Evening Star and Daily News, August 29, 

1972] 

During Senate debate on the bill, Section 147 was one of the most controversial provisions, but 

on September 13, 1972, the Senate defeated the Buckley amendment to delete Section 147, by a 

vote of 24 ayes to 49 noes. 

As the House and Senate designated members to participate in the conference committee to

resolve differences between the two bills, leaders of the House Committee on Public Works were 
determined to delete any Senate provision that would allow the use of Highway Trust Fund 

revenue for nonhighway transit. 

(For a detailed account of the history of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, including the 

debate on the San Antonio provision, see “Busting the Trust: Unravelling the Highway Trust 

Fund 1968-1978” on this Web site.) 

The Conference Goes Down to the Wire 

With the House determined to hold its ground on the integrity of the Highway Trust Fund, and 

the Senate determined to “bust the trust” for rail rapid transit, the conference discussions were 

among the most contentious participants could recall. While conferees grew increasingly 

frustrated with each other’s refusal to compromise, developments continued outside the 

Congress. 

The Baltimore Sun had reported that the Maryland Department of Transportation had begun on 

August 3, 1972, to study alternatives to construction of the I-95 extension through Prince 

George’s County to the District line. The department had formed a Study Steering Committee 

consisting of 60 citizens, elected officials, business and environmental groups, and agency 

representatives. The committee was using $600,000 in Federal and State funds to finance the 

study. 

Hal Kassoff, who was directing the study for MSHA, said: 

It is the first study to consolidate highways and transit together, and it is a departure in 

terms of making an intensive effort to involve the community in a fair way.

He said the alternatives to be studied included “the possibility of building I-95, but range beyond 

it to transit improvements,” as well as not building I-95. He predicted that the study would be 

completed in the spring 1973. 

He added that planning for the 6-mile extension of I-95 had been halted after the District’s city 

council and Mayor Washington recommended that the I-95 extension from New York Avenue to 

the Maryland line not be built. [“Road Unit Opens Study on I-95,” The Baltimore Sun, August 3, 

1972] 

On the day the House voted for its version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, the Sun

reported that the Maryland Department of Transportation was “quietly planning a system of 

highway segments to substitute for controversial interstate highways” in the Baltimore and 

Washington areas. In an interview, Secretary Hughes said the main reason for devising 

alternative routes was to retain the more than $800 million authorized for the controversial 

current routings. The routes in doubt were I-70S and I-95 inside the Capital Beltway, totaling 

8.5 miles, and much of the Baltimore area’s remaining 22.5 mile expressway system. 

If these routes were not built, the State would lose the funds unless it had alternative segments 

ready for Interstate designation: 
Mr. Hughes said that a 5-mile section of Route 46 from I-95 to Friendship Airport, a 

19-mile segment of the Arundel expressway from the Baltimore Beltway to Route 50 

outside Annapolis and a 20-mile segment of Route 50 itself from Washington to 

Annapolis were among the proposals his department was considering to qualify for 

federal interstate funds . . . . 

“It looks like I-70S is not going to go,” the transportation secretary said yesterday, with 

regard to the first of the three controversial highways. “It represents $100 million in 

interstate funds. We could do a lot with that. We could build the whole Arundel 

expressway.”

The second disputed road, I-95 into Washington, is the subject of a study that is unique in 

Maryland transportation planning . . . . [It] will determine whether a road, a rail line or 

nothing should be built in the corridor. [Dilts, James D., “Substitute Highways Being 

Planned by State to Preserve U.S. Road Funds,” The Baltimore Sun, October 5, 1972] 

On October 10, WMATA entered the bond market, offering $225 million in bonds at an interest 

rate of 7.3 percent. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, heading the underwriters, reported 

the public sale, but found the public reception cooler than expected. Investors apparently wanted 

a return between 7.4 and 7.45 percent. [Jones, William H., “Investors Shy Away from Metro 

Bonds,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 12, 1972] 

On October 13, local newspapers reported that House-Senate conferees were close to agreeing on 

the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972. The main issue was the Muskie-Cooper amendment 

opening the Highway Trust Fund to rail rapid transit. Chairman Kluczynski offered a 

compromise. If Senate conferees would drop the Muskie-Cooper amendment, House conferees 

would not only support a provision introduced by Senator Harrison Williams providing $8 billion 

over 3 years for transit from the general Treasury, but would increase it. 

That was the main obstacle to agreement, but the provision on the Three Sisters Bridge also was 

an obstacle. “Senate conferees,” the Star reported, “are prepared to see the entire highway bill go 

down the drain this year rather than yield to the House on several crucial issues, including the 

bridge.” [Angle, Martha, “3 Sisters Bridge Issue Stalls Highway Bill,” The Washington StarNews, October 13, 1972; Braestrup, Peter, “Hill Nears Agreement On Road Act,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, October 13, 1972] 

The conferees were working against a deadline of October 18 when Congress would adjourn so 

all Representatives and one-third of the Senators could join the presidential candidates on the 

campaign trail for the November election. Despite predictions that the conference would break 

down, conferees reached surprise agreement on October 18. They agreed on a 1-year extension 

of the Federal-aid highway and safety programs to prevent States from running out of Federal-aid 

highway funds while the 93rd Congress addressed the controversial issues the conferees could 

not resolve. To please the House conferees, the bill dropped the Senate provision allowing use of 

urban system funds for rail rapid transit. To please the Senators, the bill dropped the House’s 

priority primary system funds, which many considered an extension of the Interstate System, but 

directed the Secretary to study the matter and report to Congress. 
The Interstate withdrawal and substitution provision of the Senate bill that allowed remaining 

funds to be transferred to the urban system did not survive the conference. However, the bill 

included $3 billion for the UMTA capital program, with a Federal share of 80 percent, and 

$100 million for operating subsidies the first year plus $300 million the following year, all out of 

the general Treasury. The Highway Trust Fund was not breached, but the Nixon Administration 

had made clear it would veto any bill that funded operating subsidies. [The conference report 

can be found at Congressional Record-House, October 18, 1972, pages 37115-37133] 

The provision on the Three Sisters Bridge had been dropped but the exemption of the District’s 

Interstate System from the 1893 District law, as amended, survived into the final bill, as did the 

provision allowing Texas to repay Federal-aid funds used on San Antonio’s North Expressway so 

construction could begin as a State-funded project. 

The Senate approved the bill by voice vote that evening before adjourning for the year. 

In the House, consideration of the Federal-aid bill was interrupted for a vote on another bill. 

When debate returned to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, Representative Myers raised a 

point of order that a quorum was not present. When a roll call was ordered, only 156 Members 

of the House were present. In the absence of a quorum, Speaker Albert adjourned the House sine 

die, without completing action on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972. The legislation was 

dead. [Congressional Record-House, October 18, 1972, pages 37199-37200] 

Representative Myers did not explain his action at the time or in coming days. The Post 

reported: 

Myers was unreachable last night. But Republican House sources said he was angry 

because the bill no longer contained a House-passed provision barring any court 

interference with construction of the Three Sisters bridge, now stalled by environmental 

lawsuits.

House Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.) later said he had no part in instigating the 

Myers move. Other GOP members said White House lobbyists had no hand in it. 

However, several administration lobbyists spoke earlier in the day of trying to persuade a 

congressman or senator to kill the measure, to save the President from a politically 

painful veto aimed at the mass transit subsidies provision. [Braestrup, Peter, “Highway 

Bill Dies in Congress,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 19, 1972]

This explanation appeared likely because Republicans had refused to respond to the roll call, thus 

killing the bill. 

(Representative Myers had not addressed the House during debate on the Abzug amendment, but 

supported the Three Sisters Bridge during debate earlier in the year on the District of Columbia 

Appropriations Act, 1973. He voted against Representative Abzug’s measure.) 

Despite these developments, the U.S. Department of Transportation was still considering the 

Three Sisters Bridge in response to Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. 

Assistant Secretary Hirten confirmed that the study was underway, but added that Secretary 

Volpe had not yet decided whether to proceed with the project as part of the Interstate System.
Jack Eisen wrote:

The highway bill died in the final days of Congress last week in a disagreement between 

House and Senate conferees over Three Sisters [sic] and the use of highway money to 

finance rapid transit nationally.

Hirten said the potential schedule for Three Sisters construction is part of an effort to 

resolve the fate of all pending freeway projects in the nation’s capital. “We’re trying not 

to the prejudge [Volpe’s decision), but to coordinate,” Hirten asserted. 

If Volpe approves the bridge project in the coming several weeks, Hirten said it would be 

reviewed by a committee on historic preservation in December. Public hearings on the 

location and design of the bridge would be held in January. The National Capital 

Planning Commission, now officially opposed to the bridge, would review the plans in 

March.

That would permit the award of a construction contract by August and the opening of the 

bridge to traffic early in 1975, Hirten said. [Eisen, Jack, “Three Sisters Span is Still 

Considered by Federal Agency,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 24, 

1972] 

According to an editorial in the Star, this report of Department of Transportation activity 

“created about as much stir around here as a pebble tossed into the Atlantic, for understandable 

reasons.” Nevertheless, the editors hoped that reports that Secretary Volpe would soon make a 

decision were true. “If such efforts by DOT and other agencies lead only to further obstructions, 

and more unconscionable delay, no one will have to wait long to find out.” President Nixon had 

“on numerous occasions” supported the bridge. “It is time those pledges were honored.” 

Moreover, Secretary Volpe’s decision would affect more than the Three Sisters Bridge:

No final resolution of a Georgetown waterfront redevelopment plan can be reached, for 

example, until the fate of the bridge is decided once and for all. Nor can the Interior 

Department’s Palisades Parkway finally be designed. And those plans, in turn, involve 

the reconstruction of the C&O Canal, which ought to proceed as rapidly as possible. 

Whatever the decision would be, “the administration’s clear responsibility is to end the 

stalemate.” [“Volpe and the Bridge,” The Washington Star-News, October 23, 1972] 

Whatever Secretary Volpe might decide, anti-highway leaders were certain that the House 

Committee on Public Works would continue their efforts to force the District to build the bridge 

in the 93rd Congress. Peter Craig told reporters, “The bridge has utterly no justification,” arguing 

that every study in the past 15 years demonstrated that it was not needed. Sammie Abbott said: 

We view the House action on the highway bill as the handwriting on the wall for the 

highway lobby. The use of the Highway bill for mass transit funding is a certainty for the 

next session. [Griffin, James, “3 Sisters Span Left in Limbo,” The Washington StarNews, October 19, 1972] 
Problems Building

Secretary Volpe was in Lexington, Virginia, on October 26 to address the 25th Annual Virginia 

Highway Conference. Jack Eisen reported:

Before making his formal speech, Volpe told some of the road builders who infiltrated a 

press conference that it would be to their benefit to support the transit plan. 

“The fewer miles of expensive urban highway you build,” Volpe asserted, “the more 

miles of less expensive rural highways you will get.”

If more money had been spent in past years on transit in the Washington area, Volpe said, 

it may have been unnecessary to spend $56 million on the complex “mixing bowl” 

interchange on Shirley Highway (Int. 95) near the Pentagon. 

In his speech, Secretary Volpe defended the plan to open the Highway Trust Fund to transit. 

Governor Holton, the next speaker, altered his prepared speech to endorse Secretary Volpe’s 

comments. The governor said that using highway funds for transit “may one day soon be the 

prevailing view. He challenged the road builders “to use your considerable influence to get a 

better balance” between the private automobile and public transit.

Commissioner Fugate also addressed the group, but avoided the controversial topic of highways 

versus transit. Instead, he pointed out that Virginia would be one of the hardest hit States if, 

contrary to expectations, Congress did not complete work on a new Federal-Aid Highway Act 

before the start of FY 1974 on July 1, 1973. Virginia was using Federal-aid highway funds as 

fast as they became available, and did not have a cushion to sustain the program if funds were cut 

off on July 1. [Eisen, Jack, “Change In Road Aid Seen,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, October 27, 1972]

Fugate was well respected in highway circles. As president of AASHO in 1970, he had testified 

before the House and Senate Committees on Public Works as they prepared the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1970. In Virginia, however, his reputation depended on which part of the State 

was polled, as reflected in this Post headline of a Fugate profile on October 19, 1972: 

Fugate is Ogre in Northern Virginia 

But a Hero Elsewhere in the State

The profile began: 

In the Virginia suburbs of Washington, where major state officials from distant 

Richmond are rarely seen, heard or recognized, Highway Commissioner Douglas B. 

Fugate has become something of a celebrity.

A “Douglas B. Fugate Balloon-Busting Contest” at a recent Earth Day festival drew 

hundreds of Arlington residents eagerly aiming darts at bright-colored symbols of the 

commissioner and the proposed I-66 highway he wants to build through their 

neighborhoods. 
A Reston newspaper suggested: 

He – and someone should remind him of this after getting his attention with a two-by-four 

– is a public servant, not a dictator of public policies. 

At 66, “the short, wiry civil engineer” had been with the highway agency since 1927 and had no 

plan to retire:

The drive and impatience that have made him one of the most active and successful 

highway officials in the country have at times only worsened his relations with 

environmentalists and elected officials north of Richmond. The idea of not building a 

road seems foreign to him. 

In Emilia Govan’s opinion, his popularity in other parts of the State had produced “a habit in him 

of doing whatever he feels like doing, without anybody stopping him.” 

FHWA’s top Virginia official, Harold King, praised Fugate for having one of the best records in 

the country for immediate use of available funds. This rapid response to funds was one of the 

reasons for his lack of popularity in northern Virginia, at least among those who oppose Interstate 

highways and believe rail rapid transit and exclusive bus lanes were the answer to the area’s 

traffic congestion:

When Fugate pushed for a beginning of work on I-66, I-266, and I-595 in Northern 

Virginia, the antihighway ranks solidified. When, despite a court order blocking 

construction of I-66 in Arlington, Fugate announced plans to go ahead with an adjoining 

two-mile strip in Fairfax, antihighway groups sprang up in Fairfax and Falls Church. 

When Fugate suggested closing the highly successful exclusive bus lanes on I-95, local 

bus commuters became apoplectic.

Fugate has since backed off from his earlier stands on the two-mile section of I-66 and the 

I-95 bus lanes, but he maintains that in the case of I-66, first planned in 1958, “if we’d 

had the money and built it 10 years ago when we had the present plan, there would have 

been no opposition.” 

The Post quoted from the “much-heralded speech” in Arlington during which he came down on 

critics, saying they were “bent on obstruction for the sake of obstruction alone,” among several 

choice critiques. Mrs. Govan said, “I get the feeling that he’s enjoying the battle with us, that 

he’s relishing it.” [Mathews, Jay, “Fugate is Ogre in Northern Virginia But a Hero Elsewhere in 

the State,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 19, 1972] 

Earlier in the year, WMATA was told that construction of Metro in the I-66 right-of-way would 

be less costly if the freeway were not built. In July, Fugate dashed WMATA’s hopes. In an 

interview with Jack Eisen, Fugate explained that the State had condemned the land for the rightof-way by certifying that it was needed for highway purposes. A State law was then approved 

allowing construction of Metro in the median of I-66. “If there is no highway,” Fugate told 

Eisen, “there is no median . . . . As I interpret the law, I don’t see how we could use the property 

for transit . . . . It would require a pretty drastic change in the law.” He added that the law 
requires that if the State did not use the right-of-way for I-66, it should be sold back to its original 

owners. 

WMATA officials had hoped to begin construction of the line in 1974, with trains beginning to 

run in 1977. The delay caused by the court order blocking advance of I-66 made that schedule 

unlikely. Deputy General Manager Quenstedt, having discussed the matter with Fugate, told 

Eisen, “What this seemed to do is to lock our construction schedule into the fate of I-66. Of 

course, if the decision ultimately is made not to build the road, then we would promptly file our 

own condemnation papers.” WMATA could not do so as long as the State owned the right-ofway. [Eisen, Jack, “Va. Metro Path Hits Blockage,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

July 23, 1972] 

On November 30, WMATA asked Virginia Attorney General Andrew P. Miller if Metro could 

be built in the median of proposed I-66 while the project was in the courts: 

The action by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority yesterday followed 

the disclosure that Joseph L. Fisher, board chairman, has urged Virginia Gov. Linwood 

Holton to ask the General Assembly to pass special legislation during the next session to 

permit Metro to build its line along the six miles of uncompleted I-66. 

With I-66 under court-ordered studies that could take up to 18 months, Metro was concerned 

“that the delays in constructing the highway also may delay the proposed opening of the Metro 

system in April 1977.” 

The Post, reporting on these developments, added that “at least one ecology group,” ACT, 

supported Metro’s proposal to begin construction regardless of the fate of I-66. Mrs. Govan said 

that ACT supported Metro construction despite the court fight over the highway. [Griffin, James, 

“Metro Requests Ruling on Rail Line on I-66 Site,” The Washington Star-News, December 1, 

1972] 

WMATA had other problems to address. In early November, WMATA had revised its schedule 

for Metro service. It still intended to open the initial 4.5-mile section in downtown by December 

1974 and to complete the 98-mile system in December 1979, as previously announced. 

However, service on suburban lines was now to be delayed by up to 2 years, as Eisen 

summarized:

Train service to Takoma Park has been put back from 1974 until 1976; to the Bethesda 

area from 1976 until 1978; to Alexandria and to the New Carrollton area of Prince 

George’s County from 1975 until 1977, and to the Falls Church area from 1976 until 

1977 . . . . 

A new construction and operations schedule has been anticipated for two years, but the 

extent of some changes surprised Metro board members. 

The delayed were blamed on “past financial problems, construction strikes, flooding of work 

sites during tropical storm Agnes in June, and both past and present planning and landacquisition problems.” Disagreements with local jurisdictions on stations and routes also 
delayed plans. As one Metro official told the Star’s James Griffin, “They’re trying to re-invent 

the wheel”:

Sixty of Metro’s planned 98 miles of track and half its 86 stations will be in Virginia and 

Maryland. Route alignment hearings, station design hearings, “impact reviews,” formal 

and informal, are cropping up all over the place, and for many suburbanites they are like 

too-early blooms in a spring that was thought of as far away. 

And always, the casual observer can hear, “Fine, fine, but not in my backyard.” 

Griffin found that race was one of the factors delaying the suburban lines: 

All of this has much to do with Metro, despite official pronouncements that questions of 

race do not enter into this off-touted largest construction project the world has ever seen. 

Indications so far are that Metro will merely reinforce the situation which exists today – 

with a more than 70 percent black population in the District and the only exodus going to 

Prince Georges County which has substantially lower-cost housing than either 

Montgomery County or those of northern Virginia.

“The suburbs will say to the blacks, in effect, that blacks can get out here easily enough 

via Metro, so you don’t really have to live out here,” says one northern Virginia officials. 

“It may perpetuate the ghetto situation.” 

The officials pointed out that it was unlikely many blacks would move to Montgomery 

County or the northern Virginia counties because of the prohibitively high cost of homes. 

He said the recent years of the black exodus from Anacostia in D.C. into Prince Georges 

would probably expand. 

Griffin also found a fear of reverse commutes by black District residents to jobs in the suburbs. 

“He reported that, “white workers may feel threatened by a diminishing job market there, 

although census figures seem to indicate that jobs in suburbia are increasing at such a rate that 

there may be jobs still going begging.” [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Sees 2-Year Delay In Suburbs,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, November 3, 1972; Griffin, James, “Metro Runs Into 

Trouble in Suburbs,” The Washington Star-News, November 12, 1972] 

WMATA’s Bus Takeover 

As WMATA dealt with unexpected costs, delays, and other challenges, D.C. Transit Systems 

was experiencing problems of its own, as Professor Schrag explained: 

According to the original plans, Chalk’s buses were none of WMATA’s business. The 

compact prohibited the Authority from operating a bus service and even required it to 

contract out the operation of its trains – a provision added in response to the union uproar 

over the 1963 bill. So at first, the Authority swatted Chalk away. By the late 1960s, 

however, D.C. Transit’s finances began to melt, and WMATA had to consider a takeover 

more seriously. Metro needed a healthy, attractive bus system to deliver commuters to 
rail stations, but a bus takeover would cloud the Authority’s finances at a vulnerable time. 

Caught between these imperatives, the Authority awaited congressional instruction. 

The waiting lasted until the spring of 1970 when District of Columbia leaders, whose 

constituents made up the vast majority of bus riders, pushed to give the Authority the 

ability to operate both buses and rail service and, if necessary, to acquire private transit 

companies . . . . 

By then Chalk was desperate. As one observer put it, “declining ridership, increasing 

fares, and widespread deterioration of service combine to produce unmistakable 

symptoms of impending death.” [Schrag, pages 175-176] 

On January 17, 1972, Secretary Volpe suggested combining the Metro rail line and the D.C. bus 

system under a single authority. “I think the . . . interests of Washington would be best served if 

there were one operation. It could be private or public.” [Dash, Leon, “Volpe Backs Central 

Agency To Direct Metro, Bus Firms,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 18, 

1972] 

The possibility that WMATA would take over the bus system had been building for years. The 

perennial battles over fare increases for bus service had taken their toll on the company’s 

revenues and sustainability, as Jack Eisen summarized in an April 6 Post article:

The D.C. Transit System is running on a shoestring and should take steps to add 

$12 million in investment capital, a financial consultant recommends.

The bus company also should sell at least $3.6 million worth of idle real estate and collect 

another $3 million it has lent to related firms, using this money to slash its debts, 

consultant Pasquale A. Loconto reported to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Commission.

The commission, the bus regulator, had sought the report from Loconto, of the New York firm of 

Touche Ross and Company, while considering the company’s request to increase the bus fare 

from 40 cents, the level since 1970, to 50 cents. Loconto found that O. Roy Chalk had invested 

only $500,000 when he purchased the company in 1956, and had not invested further funds since 

then. Stockholders were the principal investors. Debt now exceeded their equity by the sum of 

$18 of debt per $1 of investment. For that reason, Loconto’s report called for reducing debt 

levels. The company, in his view, was relying too heavily on short-term loans to finance its longterm debt. He found that loan repayments and interest were costing the company $6.7 million 

per year.

The company had not responded to that suggestion at press time, but a consultant to the firm, 

John Curtin, said, it would be “foolish . . . to expect any informed investor to put any money into 

a business like this.” [Eisen, Jack, “Transit Firm Said to Need More Capital,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, April 6, 1972] 

With the commission set to decide on the fare increase by May 26, Deputy Mayor Watt and 

Chairman Hahn testified before Chairman Cabell’s subcommittee of the House District 
Committee. Speaking on behalf of City Hall and the White House, Watt and Hahn proposed a 

way to avoid a fare increase. The city would use Federal grants to buy the company from Chalk 

at an estimated cost of $18 million for D.C. Transit System’s 1,058 buses, then lease the buses 

back to the company to operate for a token $1 a year for maintenance and operation. Hahn 

suggested that the company would use the money to retire indebtedness on equipment and to 

improve service. As Eisen explained: 

The proposal would relieve the company of about $3 million in depreciation and related 

costs of the buses, which could be subtracted from the company’s operating expenses. 

With these bus costs removed, the company would then receive a subsidy to keep its 

basic city fare at 40 cents for the present.

The proposal was presented as an interim measure to keep the buses running, at the current fare, 

until public ownership of the company could be achieved. 

Chairman Cabell was skeptical. He said, “we’ve been stopgapping for a long time,” suggesting 

the time for a permanent solution had arrived. He also questioned whether the company would 

perform as well as Watt and Hahn implied. “There’s a lot of difference between feeding your 

own horse and a horse that’s stabled in your barn.” [Eisen, Jack, “City Rein Urged for Bus 

Lines,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 14, 1972] 

With the company expected to lose $3.3 million if the commission did not approve the fare 

increase, the commission appealed to Congress for a stopgap $3 million subsidy for D.C. Transit 

System. With that subsidy, the commission could leave the fare at 40 cents. 

On May 8, the House rejected the subsidy contained in H.R. 14718 by a vote of 50 to 270, 

effectively killing the measure. According to an account in the Post, the vote came after “an 

emotional debate of nearly two hours,” even though the outcome was never in doubt. 

Minority Leader Ford set the tone by arguing that Washingtonians who had received a sharp 

increase in per capita income could afford the higher fare. Delegate Fauntroy argued for fare-free 

bus service, but after he spoke, “not one word [was] spoken in favor of the bill.” 

Representative John E. Moss (D-Ca.) labeled the company “this strange miniature Penn Central 

here in D.C., with valuable real estate benefitting only its owners.” 

Chairman McMillan apologized for bringing the bill to the House floor, saying the committee did 

so only at the commission’s request. 

Chairman Cabell thought the subsidy might actually work, but said of Chalk, “If I ever saw a 

sweetheart contract, he’s got it. But it exists . . . [and after the subsidy] something more 

permanent and . . . more equitable has got to be worked out.” He asserted the subsidy was 

needed on an emergency basis, but Representative Conte responded that a subsidy would be like 

“throwing corn down a rat hole.” [Green, Stephen, and Eisen, Jack, “House Kills Subsidy for 
D.C. Transit,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 9, 1972; District of Columbia Bus 

Subsidy, Congressional Record-House, May 8, 1972, pages 16151-16167] 

On May 19, the commission made the front pages of the Post and Star by rejecting the fare 

increase and adding conditions before it would reconsider. As Eisen pointed out: 

It was the first time since 1966 – when the commission first warned of the company’s 

eroding financial foundation – that the commission turned down a D.C. Transit 

application for a rise in its basic city fare. However, approved increases usually have 

been less than the company wanted. 

The commission agreed that the cost of operating the system was higher by over $3 million than 

the fares collected. However, Commission Chairman Jeremiah C. Water said in a statement:

We found that the financial condition of the company is extremely unstable, posing the 

possibility that the company will not be able to provide the full service required of it. 

We also found that a fare increase alone will not solve the financial problems. In these 

circumstances, we felt that the company should be required to correct the condition of 

financial instability before we would ask the bus rider to pay higher fares. 

The specific conditions we have set is [sic] that D.C. Transit must produce $6.4 million 

in funds from sources other than the fare box before we will agree to authorize higher 

revenue from the bus rider. 

The commission wanted the company to use the $6.4 million to reduce the company’s debt 

($4 million) and to purchase 85 new buses ($2.4 million). To raise the funds, the commission 

suggested that D.C. Transit Systems sell idle real estate, insist that affiliated companies repay 

loans, and seek additional capital from stockholders: 

If these funds are produced and applied in the manner we have indicated within 90 days, 

we will then proceed to the question of whether and in what amount the fare should be 

increased. If the funds are not so applied in that time, the record in the fare case will be 

closed.

The commission warned, “What we see in the future if we increase the fare and do nothing more 

is continued instability and a deterioration in the level and quality of service.” The company had 

exhibited “less than efficient management” in its debt buildup. As a result, a fare increase would 

be “unjust and unreasonable.” 

The commission described the congressional rejection of the subsidy bill as “a failure of 

government to respond to the needs of the community. Until that failure is remedied, the spectre 

of high bus fares and their destructive impact will be with us.” 

Waterman denied that the commission’s actions were an attempt to force consideration of public 

ownership. He added, however, that “my feeling is that eventual public ownership is probably 

the only answer over the long term.” [Barnes, Fred, “Bus Fare Rise Is Rejected,” The 
Washington Star-News, May 19, 1972; Eisen, Jack, “Bus Line Is Denied Fare Rise,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, May 20, 1972] 

Editors at the Star and Post were surprised and pleased by the commission’s decision. The Star 

editorial began:

It may be remembered as the local surprise of the year. No one we know of expected the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission to sock D.C. Transit as hard as it did 

last Friday, in denying the bus fare increases.

Such a total rejection is unparalleled in the commission’s history, but there’s another first 

in this action that is even more significant: The WMATC set severe preconditions that 

must be met before it will even consider the fare hikes again.

The commission deserved applause for its action, but “everything is still up in the air.” Whether 

D.C. Transit System could raise the funds within the time the commission set was unclear, but 

the decision provided “even more reason for congressional haste to authorize public ownership of 

the company.” Legislation for that purpose had passed the Senate 2 years earlier, but never 

received a vote in the House. Current bills remained on hold in the House District Committee. 

“We hope that this period in which a fare hike is being withheld will be used by the committee to 

act affirmatively on that bill, and hurry it along for floor action. [“D.C. Transit on the Spot,” The 

Washington Star-News, May 24, 1972] 

The Post editorial began by pointing out that “the whole town is elated” that O. Roy Chalk did 

not get a fare increase:

For the first time in years, the authorities didn’t just wring their hands and nod approval 

to a fare boost; they said no to the bus company, and threw in a stiff lecture on finances, 

corporate management and the public interest. The surprise is worth savoring. 

While uncertainties remained, what was “clearer and more urgent than ever now is the need to 

end this devastating arrangement by which Mr. Chalk always winds up with his fare increases: 

Congress should authorize public ownership of the bus lines.” Only if Congress met this issue 

head on “will the Washington area be able to concentrate on the business of providing efficient 

public transportation – instead of having to wrestle with stop-gap measures to bail out a failing 

system.” [“Score One for the Bus Riders,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 26, 

1972] 

Initially, D.C. Transit System threatened to implement the fare increase on May 27 in spite of the 

commission’s action. It decided not to do so in view of pending court action on an injunction. 

[Barnes, Fred, “Bus Fare Raise Delayed Temporarily,” The Washington Star-News, May 27, 

1972] 

While the focus was on the bill backing WMATA revenue bonds, WMATA and the White 

House were not eager to bring up yet another transit bill. However, the Nixon Administration 

strongly boosted the concept of public ownership on July 26 when Secretary Volpe wrote to 

Chairman Cabell to call on Congress to “move forward rapidly to prevent any further 
deterioration in the area bus system.” [Eisen, Jack, “Nixon Moves To Take Over Area Buses,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 27, 1972] 

Chairman Cabell introduced a bill on August 1. The House and Senate Subcommittees on 

Business, Commerce, and Fiscal Affairs of the District committees held joint hearings on the 

measure on August 14-16. [Bus Systems Acquisition by WMATA, Joint Hearings Before the 

Committee on The District of Columbia of the United States Senate and the Subcommittee on 

Business, Commerce, and Fiscal Affairs of the committee on the District of Columbia, House of 

Representatives, 92d Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. HR.16119, August 14, 15, and 16, 1972] 

Senator Mathias introduced a takeover bill on September 7, followed by a hearing on 

September 25. [Federal Payment For Additional Rapid Transit Facilities, Hearing Before the 

Committee on the District of Columbia, United States Senate, 92d congress, 2d Session, on 

S. 3966, September 25, 1972] 

During the joint hearing, Chalk estimated the sale value of D.C. Transit Systems to be 

$75 million ($40 million to $50 million for buses and other equipment, plus $25 million for 

garages and other real estate). WMATA estimated the value to be around $45 million. While 

the discrepancy was likely to lead to difficult negotiations if Congress authorized WMATA to 

condemn and acquire the property, the important point was that Chalk seemed to accept the 

inevitable loss of his company. [Eisen, Jack, “Chalk Asking $75 Million For Transit,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, August 16, 1972] 

Over the next few weeks, the bus acquisition bill and a District home rule bill became entangled 

in congressional infighting. On October 12, the House defeated the bus bill, 226 to 129, short by 

11 votes of the two-thirds majority needed because the bill was under suspension of the rules that 

prohibit amendments and limit debate. The unpopularity of Chalk was cited as a primary reason 

for the shortfall. The Senate approved the bill on October 14 by a unanimous voice vote. 

[National Capital Transit Act of 1972, Congressional Record-House, October 11, 1972, 

pages 35021-35031; National Capital Transit Act of 1972, Congressional Record-Senate, 

October 14, 1972, pages 36200-36204] 

On October 14, the House reversed itself and approved the bill, 184 to 60, sending it to the White 

House for signature. After the Senate had passed its bill, supporters in the House convinced 

Speaker Albert to bring the Senate bill to the House floor for a vote. White House lobbyists 

joined with Representatives Broyhill and Gude to convince their colleagues to approve the 

Senate bill. Representative Fraser summarized what Senator Mathias had said earlier in the day. 

If Congress did not approve the bill, it would return in January to face “a real disaster . . . a total 

collapse of bus transportation this area.” [Bus Systems Acquisition by WMATA, Congressional 

Record-House, October 14, 1972, pages 36427-36431] 

President Nixon approved the National Capital Area Transit Act of 1972 on October 21 

(P.L. 92-517). He issued a statement on his signing of this bill and five other District bills. 

About the transit legislation, he said: 
I am especially pleased to approve the National Capital Area Transit Act of 1972. 

Nothing is more essential in making a city livable than a regional transportation system 

which enables people to move easily among their homes, their places of employment, 

their leisure time pursuits and tourist attractions. During the last 4 years, Washington has 

taken long strides toward the development of such a system. Construction of METRO 

rapid rail transit system is progressing well [sic], as is the improvement of the regional 

highway system. The transit act signed today is a necessary complement to these steps. It 

opens the way for acquisition of the area's four major bus companies by the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and thus for the efficient coordination of bus and 

subway services when METRO begins operation in 1974. 

WMATA planned to take over operation of District Transit System and the three other private 

bus companies in January 1973. In doing so, WMATA expected to experience large deficits that 

would require growing government subsidies in coming years. It expected to lose the $3 million 

that the bus company had anticipated losing, but projected that annual loss to be $13.6 million in 

1977. Under the circumstances, subsidies were the only way to retain the current fares. 

Secretary Volpe and Chairman Fisher had testified before the joint hearing of the Senate and 

House District Committees on August 14 that subsidies would not be needed. Eisen reported: 

At one point, Volpe . . . declared: “I would say that if they [Metro] gave [improved bus] 

service . . . that they could achieve possibly a break-even point. If there were a deficit, it 

would be very small . . . .” 

Rep. Thomas G. Abernethy (D-Miss.) asked Volpe “if there is any intention or design set 

forth in this legislation which would authorize the subsidizing of fares either by the 

District government or the area government or the federal government?” 

“There is not, sir,” Volpe replied. 

Abernethy pressed on. “There is none, and such is not contemplated?” 

“No, sir,” Volpe said. 

Later that day, Abernethy asked Fisher . . . “whether or not a subsidy would be necessary 

to successfully operate this [bus] facility?”

Fisher responded: “It is our intention to operate the buses and integrate them with Metro 

[the subway] as Metro comes in without subsidy.” 

By September, when WMATA submitted its preliminary application to UMTA for $70.8 million 

to acquire the lines, the authority was projecting operating losses. However, General Graham

anticipated that the deficits would decline when major portions of the 98-mile Metro system 

opened in the late 1970s. The combined rail-bus network would then be able to pay for itself 

from fares, according to Graham. [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Sees Bus Deficits, Big Subsidies,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, November 16, 1972] 
Although the plan had widespread public support, many observers worried that WMATA would 

face the same problems that had proven the downfall of the private companies. WMATA held a 

week-long series of public hearings throughout the region in early December, during which 

citizens and public agencies expressed what Eisen called “deep concern that the Metro subway 

agency may not do enough to meet community needs.” 

Several witnesses, including former City Council Chairman Hechinger and Sammie Abbott, 

argued that WMATA should not charge any bus or subway fare or should reduce fares. The 

WMATA board should be solely responsible for determining fares. For now, the board planned 

to retain current bus fares. [Eisen, Jack, “Public Support of Bus Takeover Mixed With Concern 

Over Service,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 9, 1972] 

After the Election

In the presidential election, President Nixon scored a landslide victory over Senator George 

McGovern of South Dakota to win a second term. In the wake of his victory, he asked his entire 

Cabinet to submit their resignations. Initially, Secretary Volpe seemed to have escaped the 

purge, but instead was offered the post of Ambassador to Italy. The shift was announced on 

December 7. 

Secretary Volpe had been reluctant to accept the new position, despite the fact that it was a dream 

assignment for a man who was proud of his family’s Italian heritage. He felt he had unfinished 

business as Secretary of Transportation. He was proud that during his term, he had overseen 

efforts to achieve “real balance and environmental parity” among the modes. His biggest 

disappointment, he said, was that he had not secured legislation that would open the Highway 

Trust Fund to rail rapid transit. [Morison, Robert F., “Lack of Urban Transit Action Dismays 

Volpe,” The Journal of Commerce, December 20, 1972] 

His successor would be Claude S. Brinegar, a 45-year old senior vice president of Los Angelesbased Union Oil Company. (His name rhymed with “vinegar.”) He had never served in 

government and had never met President Nixon before their interview about the position. He had 

contributed only $50 to the reelection campaign. [“Charlton, Linda, “Oilman Will Get 

Transportation Post,” The New York Times, December 8, 1972] 

According to a news account, colleagues described Brinegar as a “precise, able administrator 

who doesn’t waste words and is an expert at statistics.” He was the “type of administrator who 

must find things out for himself.” One colleague said, “With most people, you can give them a 

mathematical equation and they’ll use it, but Claude’s got to derive the equation before he’ll use 

it.” An engineering colleague said, “He’s considered one of the extremely good statisticians. He 

handles statistical analysis better than anyone I’ve ever run into. He also handles every problem 

from the standpoint of logic . . . and he’s a very thorough grammarian.” 

Brinegar had limited experience with transportation, and that was mostly as a consumer: 

Brinegar’s experience in transportation appears limited to what he has experienced at 

Union Oil – and that’s mostly pipelines. He told a Los Angeles news conference 
yesterday that he has gained an extensive familiarity with transportation problems 

because he has flown one million air miles. He also pointed out he is a daily commuter 

on crowded Los Angeles freeways. 

Another transportation link was his service on the Board of Directors of International Speedway 

Corporation, which operated stock car tracks in Daytona Beach, Florida, and Talladega, 

Alabama. His service on the board was not because he was a car or racing buff, but because 

Union Oil owned 25 percent of the firm and was the official fuel supplier for the National 

Association for Stock Car Racing. [Aug, Stephen M., “Brinegar Known for Management,” The 

Washington Star-News, December 8, 1972] 

Secretary Volpe, in a year-end news conference, said he would turn over the fate of the Three 

Sisters Bridge to his successor. The Department had not yet completed the court-ordered review 

of the proposed bridge. He said, “Two, three or four months of additional work is needed to 

come into compliance with the court order.” [Eisen, Jack, “Volpe to Hand Over 3 Sisters 

Problem,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 14, 1982] 

While the Three Sisters Bridge remained on hold, officials were making progress on the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway. 

In February 1971, Maryland highway officials indicated that they planned to again seek 

designation of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway as part of the Interstate System. The 

$65 million authorized by Section 146 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 covered 

upgrading only the Federal portion of the parkway from the District line to Maryland Route 175 

near Fort Meade. If that section were widened to six lanes and Interstate standards, the Maryland 

State Roads Commission would have to widen the northern state-owned portion from Fort 

Meade into Baltimore. Chairman-Director Fisher explained:

We have had some discussions with federal highway officials, and believe $65 million is 

fairly close to the amount needed to do the job. We probably won’t be able to sit down 

and work out a specific agreement until after the General Assembly here adjourns [on 

April 13]. It’s necessary, though, that we also can improve the 14-mile road that goes 

from Route 175 into Baltimore, and widen it to six lanes. Otherwise, we’ll eventually 

have a six-lane highway feeding into a four-lane highway.” 

With Interstate designation, he anticipated, Maryland would have 90-10 Interstate funds for 

reconstruction of the northern end. [Rowland, James B., “Interstate Designation Sought for 

Parkway to Baltimore,” The Evening Star, February 8, 1971] 

Negotiations between NPS and Maryland about takeover of the parkway did not go smoothly. 

Appearing before a House Appropriations subcommittee, FHWA Administrator Turner 

explained why his agency’s budget for FY 1973 did not include the authorized funds for 

construction of the project. “Maryland has so far refused to enter into an agreement on the 

project.” He said that “some planning and design work” were underway, but construction would 

not begin in FY 1973. A Maryland Department of Transportation spokesman explained that the 

State could not agree to maintain and police the project while construction was underway if the 
Interior Department owned the road. The Interior Department did not want to use its resources 

on a road that was to be turned over to the State as soon as the widening was completed.

FHWA Executive Director Edgar H. Swick added that “the program is not getting off the ground 

as well as we had hoped”:

We have had problems between the Department of Interior and the state of Maryland as 

to who will assume the responsibility for maintenance and policing during construction. 

We have had three or four meetings with the two parties and so far the problem has not 

been resolved. We are still working on it. 

Representative Conte, hearing Turner’s and Swick’s testimony, said, “This is a shame because it 

is really needed more than anything else around here, I would say.” [Barnes, Fred, “Parkway 

Widening Delayed by Hassle,” The Evening Star, May 9, 1972] 

On June 7, NPS, the State, and FHWA found a compromise. Maryland would take over 

maintenance as each section of the road went to construction, with the contractor responsible for 

maintaining the section and controlling traffic as part of the bid price. The cost would be borne 

entirely by the Federal Government. NPS would continue police control of the entire parkway 

until construction was completed in 4 years. The agreement also called for completion of 

construction as quickly as possible, with final contracts to be awarded within 48 months of the 

first contract. Administrator Fisher said, “We will try to schedule it within the time period 

subject to the availability of funds for it.” 

Assistant Director Raymond L. Freeman signed the agreement for NPS on June 7. Fisher and 

Turner signed it on June 8. [Barnes, Fred, “U.S. State Draft Parkway Accord,” The Evening 

Star-News, June 4, 1972; Lewthwaite, Gilbert A. “State, U.S. Agency Agree on Widening D.C. 

Parkway,” The Baltimore Sun, June 8, 1972] 

The MSHA had submitted an application to the Regional Planning Council for $4.3 million in 

Federal funds to begin preliminary engineering for reconstructing the parkway to Interstate 

standards. The council approved the request in November, subject to several conditions, 

including designation of the parkway and its State highway extension as an Interstate route 

connecting with I-95 in Baltimore. The council also called on Maryland to evaluate the 

environmental impacts of the project. The funding was subject to FHWA approval. 

The project would involve widening to six lanes, reconstructing interchanges, and perhaps 

adding interchanges. If all went well, construction could begin in 3 years and would take about 

5 years to complete at a total cost of $115 million. The parkway section would be able to use the 

$65 million authorized by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 for 100 percent of costs. The 

extension into Baltimore would use Federal-aid highway funds plus State and local matching 

funds. 

Roland M. Thompson, the MSHA’s chief location engineer, said, “The two projects are going to 

be pretty staggering. It will wind up as a complete rebuilding of it.”
In approving the application, the council members acknowledged that the opening of I-95 

between Baltimore and Washington had relieved congestion on the parkway. However, as State 

chief transportation planner William Okert put it, the parkway was still operating “near its 

capacity”:

Mr. Ockert said after the meeting that if the parkway were upgraded to interstate 

standards, trucks would be allowed on the entire length. Mr. Thompson said that was one 

of the questions to be taken up in the engineering study . . . . 

Mr. Thompson said that the average daily traffic on the parkway at the district line was 

73,000 cars [with trucks prohibited]; that at Friendship Airport, the road was carrying 

52,000 vehicles a day; and that near the Baltimore city line, the traffic was 45,200 

vehicles a day. [Dilts, James D., “Parkway Proposal Advances,” The Baltimore Sun, 

November 18, 1972] 

By December, the Star could report on the Study Steering Committee’s action on the I-95 

corridor in Maryland. The committee was studying five broad transportation proposals: 

One would involve widening the Baltimore-Washington Parkway to eight lanes from the 

D.C. line to the Beltway and constructing a connector between the existing I-95 and the 

parkway in the vicinity of the Outer Beltway.

The connector would be designated I-95. The eight lanes of the parkway inside the 

Beltway would be divided among three northbound and three southbound lanes, with two 

reversible express lanes in the median for express commuter buses and car pools. Beyond 

the beltway, the parkway would narrow to six lanes. 

The second highway alternative calls, in essence, for construction of the long-delayed 

North Central Freeway from I-95 and the Capital Beltway into the District. The highway 

would be generally within the PEPCO [Potomac Electric Power Company] right-of-way, 

entering D.C. near Gallatin and Galloway Streets NE. Short tunnel sections and 

depressed open-cut construction would be used to minimize adverse environmental 

impact.

The last highway alternative would make even more use of the PEPCO right-of-way, 

extending a six-lane I-95 south to New Hampshire Avenue, then along New Hampshire to 

the B&O railroad in the District. 

Other options included using existing transportation lines to their maximum capacity, using 

Metro rapid transit funds planned for the Greenbelt line along with a comprehensive bus system 

and commuter railroads, to create a “mixed modes” approach of highway and rail improvements. 

The committee also was considering the “no build” option. [Griffin, James, “I-95 Link to 

Parkway Being Studied,” The Washington Star-News, December 31, 1972] 

In the spring of 1972, the District had completed a 1,600-foot segment of the Center Leg of the 

Inner Loop Freeway. It was six lanes wide, cost $2.2 million, and was a freeway to nowhere, 
with a wall of dirt and concrete 25 feet high at Massachusetts Avenue in the north and a hole in 

the ground for a subway tunnel at the south end at D Street. As it sat there, unusable, workers in 

the area began to clamor for its use as a parking lot. Jack Hartley of the District highway agency 

said, “So we responded to pleas to relieve the critical parking shortage.” The city calculated the 

space could accommodate 500 parking spaces, which it distributed among Federal City College 

(200 spaces), metropolitan police department (200), and Georgetown University Law School 

(100). 

As the year ended, the Post surveyed the result, noting that despite this orderly distribution of 

parking permits, “things got a bit out of hand”: 

The lot is so crowded that traffic police are issuing tickets ($5 fine for parking in a 

reserved space) to poachers.

Part of the problem may be traced to Georgetown, where the would-be lawyers found, in 

the loose agreement with the city, a loophole big enough to drive hundreds of cars 

through. 

We’ve sold about 600 decals,” for the 100 spaces, said Dan Hurley, a student and 

assistant to the dean. “It was a deliberate oversell – it gives you a license to hunt.” 

Charging $1.50 per decal, the law school took in $900, making a profit beyond the city’s $600 

assessment for painting lines to create the parking spaces:

City officials don’t quite see it that way. “They did what?” shrieked Hartley . . . . “That’s 

not part of the deal,” continued Hartley. “We didn’t think it would be a money-making 

proposition.” 

When the city would replace the Center Leg parking spaces with traffic was unclear, but a likely 

target date was the summer of 1973, possibly in August: 

Even when, or if, the parking lot is abandoned, the Center Leg highway is destined to be 

somewhat of a crippled limb of a nonexistent inner loop. 

The south end eventually will connect with the Southeast and Southwest Freeways. The 

freeway ends at Massachusetts Avenue on the north side, but a connector road will be 

built to New York Avenue. [Baker, Donald P., “New Use for a Freeway,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 16, 1972] 

As 1972 came to an end, the District lost $66 million in Interstate construction funds. Based on 

apportionment of Interstate funds, the District had accumulated entitlement to $267 million in 

unprogrammed funds, but the funds came with time limits. An unnamed District highway 

official told the Star, “We haven’t been able to go ahead with Three Sisters Bridge, the Potomac 

Freeway along the Georgetown waterfront, the east leg of the Inner Loop, the upper end of the 

Center Leg and the south leg of the Inner Loop.” These projects, despite congressional mandates, 

had been stalled by environmentalists, anti-highway programs, and court battles. 
(The Federal-aid highway program operates on a reimbursement basis. The FHWA informs 

States and the District of the funds available to it by category each year, but the funds remain in 

the Highway Trust Fund. As the State or District expends its own funds on eligible projects, it 

submits vouchers during the course of project development for reimbursement. At that point, 

FHWA pays its share of the State’s expenditures. In the case of the Interstate construction funds, 

FHWA may have taken back the unused funds (which had never left the Highway Trust Fund), 

but the District remained entitled to funds equal to 90 percent of the cost to complete its 

Interstate network. The annual apportionment would continue to reflect the cost to complete the 

Interstate System in the District. Thus, in later years, the apportionment would continue to 

reflect the unbuilt segments as long as the program continued.) 

Virginia, by contrast, had obligated 100 percent of its Interstate highway funds, bringing the 

program to a “virtual standstill,” according to Fugate, until Congress approved new Federal-aid 

highway legislation. The State had 11 Interstate highway projects ready to use $142 million in 

Federal matching funds but could not proceed with them. One of the delayed projects involved 

widening the Cabin John Bridge on the Capital Beltway to eight lanes. Virginia highway 

officials considered it ironic that their efficiency in using Interstate funds resulted in the State 

being penalized in the wake of the congressional failure to approve the Federal-Aid Highway Act 

of 1972. 

Maryland, with its many controversial Interstate highways in Baltimore and the Washington 

suburbs, had $296 million in unspent highway funds. [Griffin, James, “Road Funds Periled,” 

The Washington Star-News, December 30, 1972] 

Awaiting Congressional Action in 1973 

With prospects for construction of the North-Central Freeway declining, the District decided to 

auction off 34 row houses in its path. The 34 two-story, three-bedroom brick homes were on the 

west side of 10th Street between Rhode Island Avenue and Franklin Street, NE. The city hoped 

they could be rehabilitated and occupied by the families evicted 5 years earlier. With shifts in the 

alignment of the proposed freeway, these homes were no longer needed but the remaining 

dwellings of the 69 homes acquired were still in its path.

The city disclosed its plans in a letter seeking NCPC’s approval. In the letter, Deputy Mayor 

Watt said the 34 homes “have been the subject of prolonged citizen concern because of the decay 

and crime affecting the Brookland community as a result of unoccupied structures . . . for over 

five years.” NCPC’s transportation committee endorsed the plan, but asked NCPC to withdraw 

any hint of support for the North-Central Freeway. [Eisen, Jack, “City to Sell Homes It 

Acquired,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 3, 1973] 

In Virginia, as noted, supporters of I-66 had organized to counter ACT and other opponents. 

Three western Fairfax County groups formed Citizens for I-66 and issued a fact sheet stating:

The issue is not concrete versus trees but people versus chaotic congestion and air 

pollution . . . . Travel time from the Capital Beltway to Washington would be cut nearly 

in one-half. 
The group, formed by the Greenbriar Republican Club, Navy-Yale Community League, and the 

Centreville Lions Club, planned to distribute BUILD I-66 NOW bumper stickers and to submit a 

petition to Fugate urging him to “press for resumption of the I-66 project at the earliest possible 

date.” Spokesman Paul Alwine said motorists had been the “silent majority too long.” The fact 

that the freeway would follow an abandoned railroad right-of-way for about 6 miles “lessens the 

environmental impact” and by eliminating stop-and-go traffic on other roads “would cut down on 

air pollution also.” [Crosby, Thomas, “Start Firing Up I-66 Support,” The Washington StarNews, January 17, 1973] 

The supporters’ impact was felt at a public debate held at George Marshall High School in 

Fairfax County sponsored by Howard, Needles, Tammen and Bergendorf under the contract to 

study the impacts of I-66. Turnout of about 400 people was nearly double attendance at the 

consultant’s public participation workshop on November 14, 1972, with many of the newcomers 

being Fairfax County residents who attended to support construction. 

State Delegate James R. Tate, who represented a Fairfax County district, said:

Those of us who live outside the beltway and must commute daily into the District of 

Columbia have a very serious problem. The cost to Virginia [of abandoning I-66 inside 

the Capital Beltway] would be astronomical and the effect disastrous.

James Govan of ACT asked the consultant to “help us break this vicious cycle of more roads and 

more cars.” He argued that the extension of I-66 would increase air pollution, noise and traffic 

congestion. 

Jay Mathews, in the Post, reported that the “nearly equal volume of applause and cheers for 

speakers on both sides of the issue was in marked contrast to November’s workshop . . . [when] 

the audience was almost entirely antihighway.” 

A member of the consultant team told him, “The people came on so strong in November that it 

rankled the proponents and they made up their minds to prove that there were more people in 

favor.” As John Fowler of the consultant team put it, it was “unfortunate but many view these 

community workshops as public hearings and use this as the forum for expressing positions.” 

The consultants had hoped the workshops would provide “for extensive informal question and 

answer periods,” but instead he “sat down and quietly listened to nearly two hours of speeches.” 

[Mathews, Jay, “Supporters, Foes of I-66 Debate,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

February 2, 1973] 

On March 13, the consultant released the results of a telephone survey, conducted by the 

nonprofit Bureau of Social Science Research, showing strong support for I-66: 

Of 1,027 telephone customers polled at random in Arlington, Fairfax and Prince William 

counties and the city of Falls Church, 70.8 per cent said they approved of the proposed 

road, 22.1 per cent said they disapproved and 7.1 per cent said they didn’t care, the firm 

said . . . . 
Even in north Arlington neighborhoods, where organized citizen opposition to the six- to 

eight-lane freeway has been strongest, 53 per cent approved of the road, against 38 per 

cent who disapproved . . . . 

Along with the 70.8 per cent support for I-66, 92.7 per cent supported Metro, 83.1 per 

cent supported more express bus lanes, and 62 per cent supported construction of the 

Three Sisters Bridge connecting Arlington and the District, according to the survey. 

The consultants released the results at another workshop, during which I-66 opponents pointed 

out that those polled actually favored alternatives to highways more than they supported I-66. In 

contrast, Horace Mann of Citizens for I-66 thought that “without a doubt,” the poll would speed 

final approval for the highway. [Mathews, Jay, “I-66 Backed in Va., Survey Shows,” The 

Washington Post and Time Herald, March 14, 1973]. 

Later that month, the Secretary Hughes of the Maryland Department of Transportation killed 

plans to build I-95 between the Capital Beltway and the District line through Northwest Branch 

Park in Prince George’s County. He called for study of a routing alongside a PEPCO 

transmission line parallel to New Hampshire Avenue:

I am in no way convinced that this option is feasible or desirable in terms of the ultimate 

outcome of the study. There are several compelling reasons, including legal 

considerations, for its inclusion [as an alternative]. 

He took these actions after a 6-month study while meeting with the Western Prince George’s 

Transportation Alternatives Study. 

The steering committee had voted 31 to 26 against the PEPCO alternative and preferred four 

other alternatives. Secretary Hughes adopted those four alternatives for study, but felt the 

PEPCO alignment should have a public hearing. He also wanted to ensure consideration of all 

reasonable alternatives as required by NEPA. 

Overall, Secretary Hughes adopted the steering committee’s four other plans for transportation 

development in heavily populated Prince George’s County inside the beltway and north of the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway. Eisen summarized them: 

All but possibly one of the five schemes would shift the location of the planned Metro 

rapid transit route to Greenbelt, would call for the widening the parkway [to eight lanes] 

and increase commuter service on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad tracks that bisect the 

area . . . .

Metro’s current plans call for building its tracks on the now-scrapped I-95 median strip 

between Fort Totten in Northeast Washington and the Prince George’s Plaza shopping 

center at East-West Highway in Hyattsville.

Under various of the new proposals, the Metro line would be shifted from its right of way 

alongside the B&O tracks to alignments closer to the University of Maryland campus at 

College Park. Two of the proposals would shift the terminal from Greenbelt westward to 
the point at which I-95 now ends at the Capital Beltway. [Eisen, Jack, “Officials Kills 

I-95 Route Into D.C.,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 23, 1973; “New 

Plan Sought for I-95 Link,” The Baltimore Sun, February 24, 1973] 

Metrobus

At 2 a.m. on Monday, January 15, 1973, WMATA took over O. Roy Chalk’s two bus lines: 

D.C. Transit System, which served the District and Montgomery County) and the WV&M Coach 

Company (Virginia routes, including express bus service across the Potomac River). After 

negotiations with Chalk did not reach agreement on a purchase price, WMATA had seized the 

operating assets and rights through condemnation. 

On February 4, WMATA acquired the assets of the area’s two other bus companies, the AB&W 

of Virginia and WMA of Prince George’s County. According to Professor Schrag: 

These two companies, which together server about 20 percent of the region’s bus riders, 

had been in slightly better financial health, but they too were losing passengers. Rather 

than compete with a publicly owned bus system, they requested a takeover and were 

purchases by negotiation rather than condemnation. 

He continued that “by purchasing assets rather than whole companies, WMATA had avoided 

taking over the companies’ financial debts.” For the Chalk properties, WMATA filed 

$38.2 million with the U.S. District Court as collateral for the eminent domain takeover of the 

companies. The collateral represented WMATA’s final offer to Chalk, who had rejected it. The 

court would settle the dispute. 

Without fanfare, WMATA dispatched all 1,119 buses on their scheduled morning runs, and 

1,116 for the evening peak period runs. On that first day, WMATA had managed to replace the 

former companies’ names on some of the buses with the new name of the combined bus service 

spelled out in red, white, and blue: Metrobus. The “M” was identical to the “M” to be used on 

the Metro rapid rail service. Inside, the buses carried a sign informing riders that for the first 

time, “This Is Your Bus.” [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Starts Inventory of Buses In Advance of Sunday 

Takeover,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 13, 1973; Eisen, Jack, “No Fanfare 

Marks Bus Line Takeover,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 14, 1973; Crosby, 

Thomas, “Metro at Helm of D.C. Transit, WV&M,” The Sunday Star and The Washington Daily 

News, January 14, 1973; Schrag, Page 176] 

WMATA understood that Metrobus would operate at a loss, projected initially at $2.2 million to 

operate Metrobus in 1973. Based on a formula recommended by the WMATA board, the 

District would be responsible for $1.1 million of the loss, with the Virginia suburbs ($700,000) 

and Maryland suburbs ($400,000) responsible for the remainder. The agency expected to use its 

borrowing authority initially to cover Metrobus losses. 

Jack Eisen recalled that WMATA officials and Secretary Volpe had testified that they expected 

fare revenue to allow the bus service to break even:
Volpe said later that he based his prediction on information supplied him by Metro. 

Metro officials said they meant to indicate that the buses eventually would pay their own 

way after the Metro subway system goes into operation and the buses are converted 

mainly into a feeder service to subway service.

Apparently concerned over congressional or Nixon administration reaction, both Watt 

and City Council Chairman John A. Nevius have insisted at recent Metro board meetings 

that the agency’s official references to the certainty of deficits be watered down. 

In its formal adoption of a bus takeover plan, the board accepted Nevius’ language that 

“public bus transit today is not necessarily . . . profitmaking” and that the future level of 

service and fares depends on a “willingness to assume or develop funding sources” to pay 

for “possible operating deficits.” 

Although local governments recognized that they would be responsible for deficits, they were 

hopeful that Congress would authorize a subsidy for Metrobus, even if the Nixon Administration 

opposed transit subsidies for the country’s money-losing transit public operators. [Eisen, Jack, 

“Metro Lacks Subsidy in Bus Takeover,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 7, 

1973] 

On February 17, during a meeting to work out a regional agreement to allow Metrobus to acquire 

620 new buses, WMATA Comptroller Lowe revealed that losses in 1973 would be 20 percent 

higher than expected – $3 million instead of $2.5 million. Lowe added that cumulative losses for 

the first 5 years would be nearly $40 million instead of $35.8 million as previously predicted. 

Eisen reported: 

The main reasons for the higher loss estimate, Lowe said, were the Metro board’s 

decision to eliminate extra transfer charges for rides between the city and the suburbs and 

to grant a discount to elderly bus riders throughout the region. 

District Councilman Robinson, hearing the prediction, said “we may have trouble” getting 

Congress to approve the city’s share of the deficit. “But we’re going to fight for it,” he told the 

officials. “I think we’re going to get it.” [Metrobus Losses in 1st Year To Run 20% Over 

Estimate,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 18, 1973] 

On February 1, Deputy Mayor Watt resigned to head the Office of Revenue Sharing in the 

Department of the Treasury. The White House did not name a successor. On January 11, 1975, 

Mayor Washington appointed his closest advisor, Julian R. Dugas, the city administrator, the new 

number two post in the city government. [Kiernan, “Mayor Picks Dugas As Top Assistant,” The 

Washington Star-News, January 11, 1975] 

The Senate Takes Up the 1973 Act

Because of the failure of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, many States needed a new 

apportionment of Federal-aid highway funds. They also needed a new apportionment of 

Interstate funds that had been frozen when the provision approving the 1972 ICE apportionment 
factors had died with the bill. Congress, therefore, turned to the subject early in 1973, beginning 

new rather than simply reconsidering the 1972 bill that had died at the end of the previous 

Congress. 

All the issues from 1972 remained to be resolved, including what to do about the controversial 

Interstate highways, particularly in urban areas, that appeared unlikely to be built. In addition, 

the fight over legislation ending the Federal status of the North Expressway in San Antonio grew 

stronger, with many opponents citing concerns that it would set a precedent for congressional 

action on other controversial projects. What to do about the unbuilt District freeways was 

another concern. 

The Senate Subcommittee on Transportation began headings on S-502 on February 7, 1973. As 

the hearings began, Senator Bentsen, chairman, introduced the bill, which contained his 

provision allowing Texas to repay Federal-aid funds and build the North Expressway with State 

funds. It also dealt with controversial Interstate segments by allowing States to substitute other 

Interstate routes to be built under the Interstate Construction Program, with Federal funds limited

to the cost of the withdrawn routes. 

Secretary Brinegar was the first witness. He generally supported the ideas Secretary Volpe had 

proposed in 1972, but was still new to transportation policy and was unable to elaborate on many 

points. 

Senator William L. Scott, who had defeated Senator Spong in November 1972, was now a 

member of the subcommittee. One of his top legislative priorities was completion of I-66 from 

the Capital Beltway to the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. During his question period, he expressed 

his frustration about delays in building I-66 into the city. “I hate to think that our Government is 

so ineffective that we cannot build a highway.” He knew about the court action delaying the 

route, but he wanted to know what the Secretary could do to expedite construction – “without 

telling us why it cannot be built.” Secretary Brinegar noted that he now lived in Virginia (at 

4056 41st Street North, Arlington, near the intersection of Chesterbrook Road and North Glebe 

Road, distant from the I-66 routing) and was aware of the problems of getting into and out of the 

city. However, “I have to admit I have not yet gotten to I-66.” He promised to look into the 

issue. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, S. 502, Hearings, Subcommittee on Transportation, 

Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 1st Session, 93rd Congress, Serial No. 93-H2, 

1973, pages 108-109, 113-114] 

When the National Wildlife Federation’s counsel, Robert M. Kennan, Jr., testified later that day, 

he addressed many issues and submitted a detailed statement. He called the exemption of the 

North Expressway in San Antonio “a shameful precedent” but expressed relief that S. 502, unlike 

the House bill in 1972, did not contain any “ill-conceived provisions that would have confounded 

the confusion resulting from the Congress’ first foray into the District [of Columbia] highway 

matters in 1968.” [page 193] 

The federation’s statement elaborated on its concerns about the Three Sisters Bridge. The 

statement commended the Senate for resisting repeated attempts by the House to force the 

District to build the bridge, but acknowledged that the issue was likely to come up in 1973. After 
quoting Section 139 from the House version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, the 

statement said:

We are not constitutional lawyers, but this language would appear to be if not outright 

unconstitutional, at least downright dictatorial. Denying the public access to the third 

branch of government is denying the public the protection of the checks and balances 

which our constitution set up. 

The statement mentioned Secretary Volpe’s observation that he would be held in contempt of 

court if he obeyed that provision. The House Committee on Public Works had not released its 

version of the 1973 Act, but the statement emphasized that “it is time the Congress stopped 

intervening in this dispute.” As with the North Expressway provision, a section on the Three 

Sisters Bridge, if enacted, would set a precedent for congressional interference:

Further, the bridge is the keystone to the freeway system which includes the ill-conceived 

South Leg – which would desecrate the Lincoln Memorial, Tidal Basin and whole 

monumental park area. Is nothing sacred? We urge the Senate once and for all to try and 

persuade the House to get out of the business of designing highways and back to the tasks 

for which the Members were elected by their constituents. [pages 888-889] 

On March 1, the Senate Public Works Committee rejected, 6 to 8, the Muskie-Baker amendment, 

formerly the Muskie-Cooper amendment, to open Federal-aid urban system funds to rail transit. 

(Senator Baker of Tennessee has replaced retired Senator Cooper as the cosponsor.) Despite the 

committee rejection, Senator Muskie was optimistic that the amendment would be approved on 

the Senate floor. Recalling the 48 to 26 vote approving the Muskie-Cooper amendment in 1972, 

he said, “We had a good margin last year and I hope we do as well this time.” [“Mass-Transit 

Backers in Senate Lose Bid to Tap Road Fund But See Eventual Win,” The Wall Street Journal, 

March 2, 1973] 

However, the committee approved other key provisions related to the urban Interstate debates 

around the country: 

• At the request of a Governor and the local governments concerned, the Secretary could 

withdraw approval of any Interstate segment if the route is not essential to completing a 

unified and connected system within a State. Dollar-for-dollar substitution of an essential 

connection would be permitted without restriction on length. The existing 200-mile limit 

for substitute routes, known as Howard-Cramer mileage, would be repealed. 

• If a substitute connection were not needed, or if the cost of the connection would be less 

than the cost of the original route, the total amount of the difference would be available 

for use on the Federal-aid urban system or for local public transportation purposes under 

Section 142 of Title 23. 

• States must notify the Secretary by July 1, 1974, of their intent to build remaining 

Interstate segments. By July 1, 1975, States must submit a schedule for completing their 

remaining segments (including alternate segments). Otherwise, segments would be 

removed from the System. 
As the Committee on Public Works completed work on S. 502, Senator Scott introduced an 

amendment requiring completion of the draft environmental impact statement for I-66 by 

October 1 as well as completion of all notices, reviews, and final consideration by the Secretary 

of Transportation by December 1, 1973. The committee adopted the amendment. After 

summarizing the history of the I-66 controversy, the committee report issued on March 13 stated: 

The bill would direct the Secretary to complete the draft environmental impact statement 

on this I-66 project by October 1, 1973, and to circulate it to all interested public agencies 

for comments within 45 days after issuance of the required notice. By December 31, 

1973, the Secretary would have to complete his consideration and review of all comments 

and information from the hearing, file the final version of the environmental impact 

statement, and make the other final determinations required by law before construction 

could proceed. The Secretary’s determination on all issues of fact would be conclusive. 

It should be pointed out that the Committee recommendations would have no effect on 

judicial decisions made pertaining to the procedures used for selecting the route for this 

highway nor would it bar future litigation of any kind. To the contrary, in order to 

expedite those procedures, the bill would establish a schedule to be followed by 

administrative agencies charged by law with reviewing the environmental impact 

statement and making final determinations. [The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, 

Report, Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 93d Congress, 1st Session, 

Report No. 93-61, March 13, 1973, pages 23-24] 

After the committee adopted the I-66 amendment on February 28, Senator Scott told reporters: 

“The highway will be built. I’m confident that it will be,” said the senator, smiling 

broadly as he left the closed-door Committee meeting. “You can be assured that I’m 

going to bird dog this thing. I’ll go to the White House” . . . . 

Scott said he has no worry but that all the reviewers will ultimately determine that the 

highway is needed. What he is concerned about, he said, is that the studies will drag on 

unduly. 

Scott interpreted his amendment as follows:

“It in effect does say, let’s build a highway. Let’s do what the law [court order] provides, 

but let’s build a highway.” 

According to Senate aides, he had initially considered an amendment that would exempt I-66 

from environmental, economic, or social studies required by law and subject to court review: 

His choice of the more moderate strategy of tight review schedules came, Scott said, as a 

result of “compromise” in the Senate Public Works Committee.

Although Senator Scott said Virginia highway officials assured him the schedule in the 

amendment could be met, Fowler of the consulting firm preparing the environmental document 

said the firm was 1 month behind the September contract date. Completion was now looking 
more “Octoberish.” He said, “It’s not beyond the realm of possibility that we could make the 

time up but I’d say that’s pretty remote, in all candor.” [Denton, Herbert H., “Measure to Build 

I-66 in Arlington Passes Senate Unit,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 1, 1973] 

The Senate took up the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 on March 14 and 15. On March 15, 

the Senate considered the provision freeing the San Antonio’s North Expressway from Federal 

oversight. As in 1972, Senator Buckley introduced an amendment to delete the provision from 

the bill. He acknowledged that supporters of the expressway had made the case that due to the 

unique circumstances of the case, the provision would not be a precedent for congressional action 

to resolve other highway disputes. “Notwithstanding,” he said, “it does provide a very large 

precedent and one which will be cited time and time again”:

What it is saying, in effect, is: Go ahead and reach out for that Federal money and when 

your hand gets caught in the environmental cookie jar, offer it back and proceed. 

It is my understanding that there are over 30 cases, certainly not on all four’s with this 

one, where equivalent arguments could be made for elimination of Federal protection. 

There was one matter offered in committee by the Senator from Virginia relating to the 

exemption of I-66 in Virginia. He understood arguments against this kind of legislation 

and, therefore, he resubmitted an amendment which would contemplate the full 

environmental procedures, only provided that there would be special priority granted to 

the consideration of the impact statement once submitted.

Senator Bentsen addressed the issue of precedent earlier when he said:

Senator Buckley speaks of all these interstate projects waiting back here in the hills and in 

the wings which will be seeking relief. This is not an interstate project. I have not heard 

any State offers to build a 90 percent federally-financed interstate system with local 

funds. Just name one. Even if a State wanted to build one, Congress could not wash its 

hands of such a project. Interstate highways have been designated as part of a national 

system. What we have in San Antonio is local people wanting to build a local road with 

local funds. 

After a lengthy debate, the Senate rejected the Buckley amendment, 43 to 50. [Federal Aid 

Highway Act of 1973, Congressional Record-Senate, March 15, 1973, pages 8184-8193] 

As the Senators discussed provisions of the legislation in sequence, Senator Scott inserted 

comments into the record on the I-66 provision. He explained that when the 93rd Congress 

convened, he asked to be included in the Committee on Public Works because of his interest in 

transportation and specifically completion of I-66 inside the Capital Beltway:

For this reason, I was glad to be assigned to the Senate Committee on Public Works and 

asked to serve on the Roads Subcommittee – now the Transportation Subcommittee. At 

our organizational meeting on January 18, as members of the committee will recall, I 

discussed my interest in the prompt completion of I-66. Further, on the opening day of 

hearings on this bill on February 7, I expressed an interest in the immediate construction 
of I-66 to Secretary of Transportation Brinegar – as I had done in former years with 

Secretary Volpe, and in fact with President Nixon. 

Section 152 of the pending bill is one which . . . I developed with the assistance of the 

chairman of the committee (Mr. Randolph) and the ranking minority member 

(Mr. Baker) – one which we agreed would not conflict with either the requirements of the 

National Environmental Protection Act [sic] or the section 4(f) parkland procedures of the 

Department of Transportation Act. It is carefully designed not to affect any court action, 

but simply to insure that the administrative requirements and determinations which must 

precede construction take place in an orderly and expeditious manner, so that further 

unnecessary delay does not occur . . . . 

When a matter has been under construction [sic] for 17 years and the road still is not 

built, then it seems reasonable to me that some dates for administrative action should be 

taken so that the highway can be constructed. [pages 8216-8217] 

The provision did not warrant discussion or any opposition. It remained in the bill when the 

Senate approved it later that day, 77 to 5, as did the North Expressway provision. [page 8232] 

The House Gets to Work

The House Subcommittee on Transportation, as the former Subcommittee on Roads was now 

called, began work on the 1973 Act in March. After Senate action on S. 502, the Subcommittee 

held hearings on March 19 through 23 regarding future highway needs. The subcommittee had 

not yet released a Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 bill, but Chairman Kluczynski hoped the 

witnesses would help the subcommittee “cope with the questions presented in S. 502 which has 

passed the Senate, and also the administration bill, which I introduced at the request of the 

administration on March 5.” (The Administration bill had not addressed Interstate freeway issues 

in the Washington area.) 

Because of the “emergency of the issue on mass transit,” he said the subcommittee had invited 

witnesses from “the entire spectrum of the mass transit program,” including operators, 

manufacturers, and unions. He added that the Committee on Public Works was “highly in favor 

of mass transit as it is for highways,” including “the proper financing of these two 

complementary systems of transportation.” The witnesses would help the subcommittee find “a 

proper solution to the problem and not one which represents a hastily contrived and partial 

answer which will only promote further confusion.” [1973 Highway Legislation (Future 

Highway Needs), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on Public 

Works, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Report 93-5, March 19-23, 

1973, page 1] 

As in the Senate Committee on Public Works, the hearings covered many issues, but 

occasionally covered issues relating to highways in the Washington area. Thomas Airis was 

president of AASHO in 1973, but testified only on the association’s positions. He did not 

comment on and was not asked about District freeway construction. [pages 548-564] 
On March 21, Robert Kennan appeared before the subcommittee on behalf of the National 

Wildlife Federation. As had been the case during his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee 

on Transportation, Kennan objected to the attempts to exempt San Antonio’s North Expressway 

from Federal requirement:

We deplore this committee’s proposal last year to exempt the San Antonio North 

Expressway from Federal environmental laws by special legislation. It would be a 

shameful precedent for similar action elsewhere in the country.

He also objected to the provisions in the committee’s 1972 bill on District freeway issues. He 

cited Section 139 on the Three Sisters Bridge, Section 140 exempting the Interstate freeways 

from the 1893 District highway law, and Section 110 exempting the District from the provision 

requiring deletion of Interstate segments if the Secretary of Transportation did not receive a 

satisfactory schedule for construction: 

We urge the committee to resist any proposal to include provisions specifically relating to 

District of Columbia highways in the 1973 Federal-aid legislation.

The District highway controversy is extraordinarily bitter and complex. This committee 

has [now] first-hand information about current public sentiment; no congressional 

hearings have been held on the subject since April 1968, 5 years ago. 

Since this committee took an interest in the controversy, we have witnessed a revolution 

in the attitudes of people living in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs toward solutions to 

this area’s transportation problems. 

Kennan cited Representative Gude’s opposition to District highway legislation since it might 

affect I-70S inside the Capital Beltway, and construction of the Metro system, now well 

underway: 

Most people who live and work in the Washington metropolitan area would apparently 

prefer rail transit and express bus service rather than more Interstate highways, to meet 

their future transportation needs. The proposed highway system this committee 

considered in 1968 is now almost universally regarded as a relic of the past.

It would be contrary to principles of proper planning and public participation in vitally 

important transportation decisions for this committee to compel the construction of any 

remnant of that antiquated system.

Representative Abzug asked Kennan: 

Do you feel that all District of Columbia highways in this Federal-aid legislation should 

be left to local consideration? 

Kennan said the federation agreed, added, “We think this is true across the country.” Federal-aid 

legislation was “no place” for Congress to “resolve these very difficult local matters, and this is 
true of the District of Columbia, as well as the controversies in Minneapolis, Seattle, Memphis, 

San Antonio, and elsewhere.” 

Representative Abzug, observing Kennan’s objections to the San Antonio and Three Sisters 

Bridge provision in the 1972 legislation, said, “Perhaps we will have a bit more success, I think 

so.” [pages 479-491] 

The next witness was John Lagomarcino of the National Recreation and Park Association. He 

focused his testimony on provisions in the 1972 House bills. The association objected to the 

provision on the North Expressway: 

Such legislation would be a dangerous precedent with serious national ramifications. 

Congress will have begun the task of undercutting, on a case-by-case basis, its own 

environmental safeguards. 

The association also objected to the provision on the Three Sisters Bridge, citing its similarities 

to the San Antonio situation. He asked, “will the Congress, on a case by case basis, attempt to 

substitute its judgment for that of responsible authorities, citizens, and the courts in an individual 

case?” The provision in the 1972 bill would have deprived Virginia residents of access to the 

courts “if state officials should abuse or exceed authority relative to transportation projects of all 

types, including the Three Sisters Bridge.” [pages 492-497] 

On March 22, Cynthia Wilson appeared before the committee on behalf of the National Audubon 

Society. She began by opposing the S. 502 provision allowing North Expressway to advance 

without complying with Federal requirements. Aside from the concern about the impact on 

Brackenridge-Olmos Basin Parklands, she was concerned about the precedent: 

To vote to allow one State to wriggle out of compliance with both section 4(f) and NEPA 

is a vote against both of those landmark statutes and will be viewed as just that by the 

people. Congress can, if it wishes, overturn judicial decisions, but in doing so Congress 

seems to be saying, “We really didn’t mean it when we voted to protect public parks; that 

was all rhetoric . . . .” 

You have seen the result of congressional meddling in the Three Sisters Bridge dispute; 

this is a horse of the same color. One exception will beget another; and this committee

could become bogged down in a myriad of requests from different parts of the country. 

She said the society had long opposed construction of the Three Sisters Bridge: 

The language in the House bill last year not only deprived the citizens of the District of 

Columbia and Virginia of judicial review, it also would have set a precedent depriving all 

citizens of judicial review in highway cases. 

As Kennan had said, Wilson acknowledged that the society did not consist of constitutional 

lawyers, but considered the language “to be if not outright unconstitutional, at least downright 

dictatorial” in denying citizens of the area access to judicial review. She urged Congress to stop 
interfering in such disputes, which take on national significance because they involve the 

Nation’s capital:

Further, the bridge is the keystone to the freeway system which includes the ill-conceived 

south leg – which would desecrate the Lincoln Memorial, Tidal Basin, and the whole 

monumental park area. 

Is nothing sacred? We urge this committee to reevaluate its past decision and stop 

forcing this bridge on the people of Virginia and Washington. 

During the question period, Representative Abzug commented: 

Well, I remember, of course, that in the last session of Congress, we did concern 

ourselves with some of these like the Three Sisters Bridge, and I think that the committee 

will have to take very seriously the question of these special involvements in special 

areas.

The Three Sisters Bridge did receive some considerable opposition on the floor of the 

House, in view of the fact, particularly to those of us who are constitutional lawyers, that 

it presented some very dangerous precedents, not only for highway legislation, but for 

legislation in general. We will try to defeat it again this year.

Representative Jim Wright (D-Tx.), a leading figure on the subcommittee, engaged in a brief 

dialogue with Wilson: 

Mr. Wright. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, with regard to the San Antonio Expressway, an 

effort is underway on the part of proponents and opponents locally in the San Antonio 

area to try to find some mutually amicable resolution of this problem. If they can, it 

would relieve Congress of the responsibility. 

Ms. Wilson. We think that would be the best solution if the local people could find an 

answer among themselves, that would be the best solution of all. 

Mr. Wright. To the end that this might be encouraged, both proponents and opponents 

have merely filed testimony for the record, feeling that conversation may exacerbate 

rather than relieve the problem. [pages 606-609] 

The next witness, ACT’s Emilia Govan, submitted a statement covering several issues, but 

primarily focused on I-66 inside the Capital Beltway in northern Virginia. She cited the poll 

showing that area residents preferred mass transit to highways. For example, when asked to rank 

four options (Metro, reserved express lanes, improving existing highways, and building I-66), 

Metro was the first choice for 62 percent of respondents. Only 15 percent chose I-66 as the first 

choice.

She said ACT opposed any provision that would overturn a court order requiring compliance 

with Federal law, including the provisions in S. 502 on the North Expressway and the measure in 

the 1972 House bill on the Three Sisters Bridge. Legislative provisions such as these were 
“unnecessary and undesirable.” Federal-aid legislation should legislate broad national policies, 

applied consistently around the country. “Special-purpose legislation on highway segments is 

unnecessary, because all the legal requirements imposed upon administrative agencies by the 

Congress and applied by the courts are reasonable.” Congress, therefore, should not “be wasting 

its time” considering the merits of such projects.

She urged the House not to include Senator’s Scott’s amendment to S. 502: 

The setting of arbitrary deadlines for the required study and consideration of a complex 

and controversial matter may well prejudice the objectivity and thoroughness of such 

consideration, and adversely affect the citizen participation aspects of the process. 

She cited the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling, the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear an appeal, 

the study underway by the VDH’s consultants, and the department’s statement at the first 

“Community Workshop” that the study would take 12 to 18 months, but no arbitrary deadlines 

would be set. She also quoted Fowler, who had stated that, “Predicting the actual time it will 

take to fully consider all aspects is unusually difficult to do.” She also pointed out that after 

Senator Scott’s amendment had been adopted, Fowler told John Frece of the Reston Times that 

finishing the study by October was “pretty improbable.” Being forced to complete the study by 

then meant short-changing public involvement, adding, “There’s no sense to do it (the study) if 

we don’t react to the response.” 

Further, Senator Scott’s provision was based on the assumption that “the inevitable conclusion of 

the study and of the required environmental considerations will be that the I-66 project should be 

constructed.” Such an assumption misconstrued the purpose of the environmental review. The 

study would be “superfluous if the original action proposed by the highway agency is the only 

one with any possibility of being implemented.” The provision also implied that “the legal 

requirements imposed by Congress and applied by the courts are nothing but mere papershuffling formalities to be gotten out of the way as quickly as possible so that the project may 

proceed as planned.” 

Govan added that the Senate committee had adopted the Scott amendment after the committee’s 

hearings. As a result, the Senate did not hear testimony on the provision: 

However, several Northern Virginia citizen organizations did express their opposition to 

any special legislation relating to I-66, in a telegram to members of the Senate Public 

Works Committee . . . . 

Representative Abzug said that similar controversies were occurring around the country. Hearing 

from groups such as ACT was important because it would help committee members understand 

that “we have to have a more realistic and social view toward the old questions of transportation, 

and also a more orderly way of solving the conflicts . . . .” [pages 609-614] 

On April 3, the Committee on Public Works met to consider S. 502. Representative Wright 

offered an amendment to substitute H.R. 6288 for the Senate bill following the enacting clause. 

H.R. 6288, which was essentially the 1972 House bill, covered the wide spectrum of highway 
and highway-oriented transit measures, as well as provisions involving specific projects, 

including: 

• “Federal-Aid Systems” (Section 110) – exempted any Interstate segments referred to in 

Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 from timetable requirements. 

• “Termination of Federal-Aid Relationship (Section 113) – allowed Texas to repay 

Federal-aid highway funds used on the North Expressway and complete the project with 

State funds. 

• “Three Sisters Bridge” (Section 138) – Prohibits courts from issuing any order or taking 

any action that would in any way “impede, delay, or halt” construction of the bridge. 

• “District of Columbia” (Section 139) – exempted the District’s Interstate highways from 

the 1893 act on a permanent system of highways for the city. 

As the committee began considering Representative Wright’s motion, Representative Abzug 

raised a point of order: 

Rule 11 of the Rules of the House provides that it shall not be in order for any bill 

providing general legislation in relation to roads to contain any specific provision for any 

specific road. I have read the gentleman’s amendment, and it seems to me it definitely 

violates this rule.

A great majority of the provisions in the bill refer to roads and related transportation in 

general, but Sections 113, 129, 131, 138, 140, 223 and 224 contain specific provisions for 

roads and related individual projects all across the country. 

Chairman Blatnik sustained her objection. 

Representative Wright replied:

I accede to the point of order, which I think was properly raised and has been properly 

sustained, notwithstanding the fact that all this material was encompassed in the bill that 

this committee approved and the House bill passed last year. 

His original motion having been ruled out of order, he offered a second motion to substitute a 

new version of his bill minus the provisions Representative Abzug had cited. The committee 

approved the change. 

Although committee members tried to reinsert their specific provisions, Representative Abzug’s 

point of order was sustained later in the process. The result was that most of the deleted 

provisions were left out of the S. 502 bill the committee approved on April 10. One provision 

that survived was contained in Section 139, exempting the District’s Interstate freeways from the 

1893 law. The House committee report on the bill repeated the language from the 1972 report on 

the exemption. 

The approved bill also exempted the District from the deadlines requiring submission of a 

schedule for completing the Interstate routes (July 1, 1974) and submitting PS&E for all unbuilt 

segments (July 1, 1975). The exemption applied to any segment of the Interstate System cited in 
Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Report 

on S. 502, Committee on Public Works, U.S. House of Representatives, 93d Congress, 

1st Session, House Report No. 93-118, April 10, 1973, pages 11, 27, 56] 

In addition, the members approved a measure, Section 145, that addressed the timetable for 

completing environmental impact statements on a State Route 18 bridge over the Raritan River in 

New Jersey and I-66 in northern Virginia. The I-66 measure was essentially Senator Scott’s 

provision. 

The next step was for the Committee on Public Works to present the bill to the Committee on 

Rules, which would establish the rules for House consideration. Members of the Committee on 

Public Works appeared before the Rules Committee on April 12. According to a transcript of the 

hearing, Representative Wright told the Rules Committee:

We have asked for a waiver of points of order in certain provisions of the bill which 

would be subject to points of order . . . . Those provisions in the bill that would be 

subject to points of order relate to specific highways and a general highway [sic] and we 

would ask you to waive points of order. However, if a member wanted to make an 

amendment to knock out one of those, he should be entitled to do it. [Stenographic 

Transcript of Hearings on S. 502, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Before the 

Committee on Rules, U.S. House of Representatives, April 12, 1973, Reynolds Reporting 

Associates, Inc., page 8. (The House did not publish reports on the discussions in the 

House Committee on Public Works or the Rules Committee. Transcripts were found in 

the subscription service, ProQuest – Legislative Insight.] 

As requested, the Rules Committee adopted a rule, House Resolution 356, for considering the 

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 that among other measures, waived all points of order on 

amendments addressing specific highways in general legislation. On April 17, after brief debate, 

the House of Representatives adopted the rule. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, 

Congressional Record-House, April 17, 1973, pages 12793-12796] 

The House began debate on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 on April 18. As committee 

members discussed each section of the bill, Representative Abzug took her turn to discuss 

several of them, including Section 139 regarding Interstate highways in the District of Columbia. 

The provision, as she noted, was identical to Section 140 in the 1972 legislation that failed. She 

did not intend to offer an amendment striking Section 139 from the 1973 version, but wanted to 

clarify one point: 

The committee’s report suggests that section 139 refers only to a provision in the act 

which prohibits construction of a highway at a width greater than 160 feet. That 

statement is not correct. Section 139 would, by its terms, repeal all the provisions of the 

1893 act in relation to interstate highways in the District.

She referred to her statement of additional views on the 1972 legislation and entered it into the 

record of the debate. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Congressional Record-House, 

April 18, pages 13116-13117] 
Representative Stanford E. Parris (R-Va.), a lawyer from Fairfax County who had won election 

in 1972 to now-Senator Scott’s former House district, commented on Section 145 affecting the 

timetable for review of I-66. His comments were extended remarks, not delivered on the House 

floor:

I firmly believe that approval of this section of the bill will constitute a great public 

service, not only to those who daily commute from Virginia to the District of Columbia, 

but also to the many visitors who annually arrive in our Capital City. 

He explained that I-66 was “an integral portion of our nationwide system,” but had been delayed 

for the past 17 years “in spite of the fact that all traffic studies which have been conducted point 

out the urgent need for I-66 as part of a balanced transportation system for the Metropolitan 

Washington area.” He had been “particularly pleased” that the Senate included a comparable 

provision in its bill, and he strongly urged his colleagues “to do likewise.” [Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1973, Congressional Record-House, April 18, page 13106] 

The House passed the bill on April 19, 1973, by a vote of 292 to 93. The final bill retained the 

provisions affecting the District of Columbia and I-66 in Virginia. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1973, Congressional Record-House, April 18, 1973 (pages 13097-13145) and April 19, 1973 

(pages 13224-13276)] 

While Congress Worked

On March 9, 1973, the Interior Department wrote to the District Department of Highways and 

Traffic regarding plans to build a freeway tunnel under the Lincoln Memorial plaza. In the draft 

environmental impact statement, the letter stated, the District had failed to justify the plan, saying 

“. . . this department finds it premature to consider this project” while others are in limbo, 

including I-66 and the Three Sisters Bridge. The letter recommended that the District consider 

alternatives that “could be less disruptive and/or more compatible in this highly sensitive 

National Capital area.” Interior suggested review of an alternative of building the freeway on the 

Virginia side of the Potomac River or dropping the South Leg altogether in favor of improving 

existing roads. 

The Post summarized Interior’s comments:

• The highway department failed to provide enough information on the impact of the 

freeway on parkland or to support its contention that the project would actually add 

parkland by eliminating some existing roads. 

• The highway department statement failed to analyze the impact the project might have on 

water resources in the Tidal Basin.

• The question of the aesthetic impact of the project is analyzed in “a fragmentary and 

elementary way.”

• The highway department failed to analyze the impact that vibrations from traffic might 

have on the Lincoln Memorial.

• The highway department failed to support its conclusion that the construction of the 

freeway would improve air pollution conditions. 
The Post mentioned that in October 1972, Russell E. Train, chairman of the Council on 

Environmental Quality, had written to Secretary Volpe to suggest that only “minimum 

improvements” be made to existing roads. The plan would not solve all problems but Train 

thought it would “serve most anticipated traffic” until officials can determine how Metro would 

affect traffic volumes. [Scharfenberg, Kirk, “D.C. Freeway Unjustified, U.S. Asserts,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, April 6, 1973] 

Thomas Crosby, in the Star-News, reported on May 10 that the Department of Highways and 

Traffic had submitted the final design plans for the South Leg to the city council and Mayor 

Washington. The 84-page design report described the South Leg Freeway (I-695) as a six-lane, 

1.5-mile freeway connecting the District side of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge with the 

Southwest Freeway:

The final design calls for the freeway to be composed of three 13,000-foot long tunnels 

and two 25-30 foot deep, 550-foot long depressed roadways which could later be 

converted into a single mile-long tunnel. 

Floodgates would be provided across from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing [on 

14th Street, NW.] to handle any overflow of the Potomac River, which highway officials 

say would occur only once every 50 years. 

The report stated that “all of the structures subjected to water pressure are thoroughly 

waterproofed.” The result, as Airis had said during the hearings, would be that the freeway 

would make an extra 4 acres of land available for park use. “What other highway project,” he 

asked, “has ever given land back to the park service?” 

The city council, Crosby said, “has gone on record as favoring the freeway, which originally was 

requested by the National Park Service to alleviate traffic and provide additional park area.” 

The report addressed concerns expressed by NCPC, the Interior Department, and others about the 

plan: 

The planning commission said alternate routes should be explored, and the final report 

says both Constitution Avenue and Jefferson Davis Highway (U.S. Route 1) were 

inadequate to handle the 67,000 cars which now use Independence Avenue daily. 

The Interior Department said the draft environmental statement lacked “specificity and 

quantification” and suggested another draft be drawn up and circulated for comment. 

The final design report stated that all adverse environmental impacts were “confined principally 

to the [three-year] construction period.” The final environmental impact statement had not yet 

been released to the public, but Airis assured reporters that it addressed the concerns expressed 

by the Federal agencies. 

Airis called the $110-million project a “high priority objective” that must be approved quickly if 

construction was to be completed in time for the rush of visitors for the 1976 Bicentennial 
celebration. [Crosby, Thomas, “Freeway Decision Due,” The Washington Star-News, May 10, 

1973] 

A Star editorial expressed skepticism that delivery of the report on the South Leg Freeway to the 

city council and Mayor would lead to construction. It sounded simple enough. “If the mayor and 

council approve, the project goes to the Department of Transportation and gets built. If not, it 

dies. Right?” 

The editorial answered that question: “Not necessarily.” The concept of tunneling under the 

Lincoln Memorial plaza and the Tidal Basin was “eminently sound,” but “something – a policy 

switch or a financial hitch or a rash of new esthetic objections – always has seemed to go 

wrong.” Just getting automobiles out of sight of park visitors would be “a significant aesthetic 

gain for the whole area”:

Perhaps, as the highway people believe, the plan’s latest refinements – responsive to 

specific criticisms voiced last year – finally will be sufficient to avoid another of the 

unforeseen setbacks that so persistently have materialized in the past.

With our fingers crossed, we hope they’re right. [“Highway Merry-Go-Round,” The 

Washington Star-News, May 15, 1973] 

As if to demonstrate the editorial’s point, Conrad Wirth, the former NPS Director and NCPC 

member, took strong exception to Crosby’s article: 

It is hard to believe that anybody – even a highway engineer – would make such a 

recommendation as that advanced by the District Highway Department; that is, to put a 

six-lane interstate highway through this nation’s great memorial Mall and the stretches of 

cherry blossom trees of West Potomac Park. It is even harder to give credence to the 

proposal for putting it through the area set aside by Congress to memorialize President 

Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And to follow the suggestion with a sarcastic and selfrighteous statement that four acres of land are being given in exchange is simply to add 

insult to injury.

Wirth said the statement that the NPS had requested the freeway was not correct. “The only 

thing the service tried to do was to get the traffic past the Lincoln Memorial underground, and 

into Independence Avenue.” Wirth favored the NCPC proposal for a tunnel the entire length 

from the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge to a junction with the Southwest Freeway east of the 

railroad tracks near 14th Street. 

As for the claim that adverse environmental impacts would be confined mainly to the 

construction period, Wirth asked, “How in the world can anybody make such a statement about a 

six-lane interstate highway going through the nation’s great memorial area?” The construction 

period was the least of the problems; its impacts can be corrected. “But those heavy-traffic 

roads, operating twenty-four hours every day, would constitute a pollution, beyond all 

imagination, of our air, hearing, and scenic and historic heritage. The idea is frightful.” 
He also was skeptical about the added 4 acres parkland that Airis had cited. “What four acres?” 

If he was referring to land on Independence Avenue from 14th Street to the Potomac River, the 

NPS already owned the land. As a result, “the highway group doesn’t have it to give away.” 

Was it the area of fill in the Tidal Basin that they were proposing be built? “That would be as 

destructive as is the six-lane interstate highway they propose to build”: 

But I guess we can’t expect anything very different from people who have spent their 

lives building highways. They don’t seem to have much interest in anything else. Thank 

goodness, that is not true of all engineers. [Wirth, Conrad L., “The Southwest Leg,” 

Letters to the Editor, The Washington Star-News, June 2, 1973] 

By then, Administrator Turner had retired a year earlier at the end of June 1972. After a long 

delay, former Nebraska Governor Norbert T. Tiemann took office as Federal Highway 

Administrator on June 1, 1973. 

After winning election in 1966, Governor Tiemann adopted an activist role to deal with 

Nebraska’s fiscal problems. He worked with the State legislature to create a tax base that 

provided the revenue the State needed to function. He also secured approval to enter into bonded 

indebtedness to pay for road improvements, with the debt backed by motor vehicle license fees 

and fuel taxes. In addition, Nebraska undertook the first broad reorganization of the Department 

of Roads, issued the first bonds for highway construction, established a 20-year plan for 

expressway construction, initiated the first mandatory driver examinations and motor-vehicle 

inspection programs, and closed the Omaha Gap on I-80. He served a 4-year term before losing 

his reelection bid in 1970. 

Administrator Turner, whose entire career had been with BPR, had been a traditional road 

builder. Governor Tiemann, a banker and politician, brought a new perspective to the role. He 

embraced the new philosophy of balanced transportation, with each mode doing what it did best. 

He made this perspective clear in his first speech, on June 18, 1973, to the Western Association 

of State Highway Officials. He said, “we have arrived at a point where we must reduce 

dependence on private cars in urban areas – particularly during the rush hours – and convince 

commuters to either form carpools or use public mass transit facilities.” Highway officials could 

no longer think of transportation modes as “independent entities, each with its own constituency 

and indifferent to the problems and the needs of the others”:

The point is, we must now think in terms of overall TRANSPORTATION planning, and 

the role of each mode in that plan. The modes cannot be competitive in our highly 

complex society of today—and tomorrow—instead, they must be complementary. 

Facing Chairman Natcher 

Chairman Natcher remained concerned about the District’s lack of progress on its Interstate 

freeways, as he made clear when Mayor Washington, Airis, and other officials testified on 

April 11 before his subcommittee regarding the District of Columbia Appropriations Act,1974. 
He began his comments on balanced transportation with a discussion of the origins of the Metro 

rapid rail transit system, a subject he had discussed many times before:

In 1955 I made the motion that started the rapid rail transit system in the city of 

Washington. The request for the District of Columbia’s share for the metropolitan area 

transit survey came before this subcommittee. The cost of the survey was $561,000 to be 

paid by the State of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia. I sat 

next to the chairman of the subcommittee at that time, Louis Rabaut, who said, “This 

would be one of the biggest mistakes we have ever made. I won’t make the motion.” I 

said, “Mr. Chairman, I think you are wrong. We need to have a rapid rail system in 

Washington together with an express bus system along with an adequate freeway 

system.” I made the motion and the District of Columbia’s share was appropriated and 

paid. This is the subcommittee, Mr. Washington, that in 1969 appropriated the money 

that started the rapid rail transit system under construction. After that, we had the law 

suit [sic] halting freeway construction and the enactment of the 1968 and 1970 Highway 

Acts ordering a resumption of construction. I believe that the acts must be complied 

with. We were for rapid rail transit in 1955. I am for it today. 

When the $1.2 billion worth of rapid rail transit bonds, which are guaranteed by the 

Federal Government, come due the Federal Government will retire every one of them. 

Not a single one of them will be retired out of the fare box. They are guaranteed by the 

Federal Government and the Federal Government will have to pay off every one of 

them . . . . 

Chairman Natcher was especially concerned about construction of the I-95/Center Leg Freeway 

behind the House Rayburn Building. It was, he said, “nothing but a disgrace,” adding, “That is 

the only category you can place it in.” Construction had been underway for 7 years: 

All of the people working in the three House Office Buildings and the Capitol that drive 

in from the southwest freeway have seen 18 and 20 men, who work for the construction 

company that has the contract, standing on the curb each morning to see how the girls 

were dressed, standing there by the hour. We complained about the idleness of the 

contractor’s employees and the delay in the completion of the project to Mr. Airis and he 

related the complaint to the contractor. The contractor wrote me a letter and said the 

reason for the great delay in the project was due to the fact that there were so many 

changes in the contract, trying to blame city officials.

He told Airis that “if every contract that you have the size of that one is going to take 7 years to 

complete, we ought to quit.” 

Mayor Washington replied, “I would agree,” but according to the transcript of the hearing, 

neither he nor Airis explained the delay or promised that the contract would be completed 

promptly. 
Chairman Natcher went through the history of the freeway controversies, once again inserting the 

documentation of letters and newspaper articles that he had inserted in previous hearing records 

and during House floor debates. 

He asked Corporation Counsel C. Francis Murphy to send an update on what the city had done 

regarding the Three Sisters Bridge lawsuit to comply with the provisions of the Federal-Aid 

Highway Acts of 1968 and 1970, “and tell us whether or not an environmental statement for one 

thing has ever been prepared and submitted and just what has transpired.” He also requested an 

update on the status of all the remaining freeway segments. 

On May 12, 1973, Mayor Washington replied to Chairman Natcher’s request. Mayor 

Washington began with the Three Sisters Bridge: 

With respect to the legal and legislative matters which you inquired about, Mr. Murphy 

advises me that, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has refused to grant a writ of 

certiorari, further litigation of the substantive issues involved in the lawsuit has been 

precluded. 

Mayor Washington mentioned Chief Justice Burger’s unusual comment about the possibility of 

congressional action to limit judicial review. He pointed out that the unsuccessful Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1972, with Section 139 designed to do just that, did not clear Congress. The 

House Committee on Public Works considered including the provision in the 1973 Act, but did 

not do so. “Absent such legislation, this project as well as all other interstate projects must be 

processed in accordance with the provisions of title 23 of the United States Code.” 

Mayor Washington then provided the status of the city’s remaining freeways: 

1. The south leg of the inner loop was part of the study report to the Congress in February 

1970. In September 1972, a combined corridor and design public hearing was held. In 

preparation for the hearing, a draft environmental impact statement was prepared and 

circulated to concerned agencies. The Department of Highways and Traffic in 

cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration is now ready to submit the final 

environmental impact/4(f) statement to the Department of Transportation. 

Recommendations of the Department of Highways and Traffic are now being reviewed by 

the city council and my office prior to submission of the District’s final design and 

location recommendations to the Department of Transportation. 

2. The Three Sisters Bridge was placed under construction [in] October 1969 but activity 

was halted by court action in August 1970. Since the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear 

the case, construction cannot be resumed until there has been compliance with the 

requirements imposed by the courts. 

3. On the District of Columbia end of the bridge, the related project is the Potomac River 

Freeway portion of I-266. This segment was placed in a design status in 1969 with the 

concurrence of the Federal Highway Administration. The purchase of right-of-way 

recommenced and all properties have now been acquired between 31st Street extended 

and Key Bridge. Because of court actions the Department of Transportation has required 

additional environmental assessment studies leading to public hearings. In addition, a 
Georgetown Waterfront Sectional Development Plan study was commenced on January 

26, 1972. The study is being conducted in three phases. Phase I is a review of alternative 

freeway plans, development of compatible preliminary land use plans, and assessment of 

environmental impacts of the alternatives. Phase II and phase III of the study were 

designed to prepare a sectional development plan and program for the Georgetown 

waterfront area consistent with the selected alternative highway plan. The phase I report 

was published in November 1972. The District government is now preparing for public 

hearings required by title 23 and is utilizing phase I data in the preparation of appropriate 

public hearing documents. It is planned to schedule the public hearing for later this year. 

In Virginia, Interstate Route 66, between the Capital Beltway and the Theodore Roosevelt 

Bridge is now the subject of an intensive multidisciplinary study by the Virginia 

Department of Highways. The study is scheduled for completion in the fall of this year 

with the objective of final evaluation through the public hearing process at an early date. 

4. Construction of the center leg of the inner loop has continued northward to Massachusetts 

Avenue and this portion is now scheduled to open in August of this year. The K Street 

overpass will be completed this fall. Completion of the remainder of the center leg, the 

covered section between H and K Streets and the temporary ramps northward to New 

York Avenue, is awaiting final environmental impact assessment. The final statement is 

scheduled to be submitted to the Department of Transportation before July 1. This 

project should be ready for advertisement this fall. 

5. The segment of the east leg between interchange “C” and Barney Circle at Pennsylvania 

Avenue is nearing completion. The outbound section was opened to traffic on May 2. 

The inbound section will be opened to traffic this summer. Northeastward of Barney 

Circle, additional public hearings are required in order to advance this project to the 

construction stage. Experience with the conduct of such hearings has indicated the need 

for more definitive air quality analysis as part of the environmental impact/4(f) 

assessment. This is the principal cause for the delay of the hearings suggested in last 

year’s statement. Preparation for a combined corridor and design public hearings [sic] is 

now underway with a hearing date anticipated for the fall of this year. 

Mayor Washington added a paragraph on I-95: 

With respect to I-95, the Maryland Department of Transportation embarked on a 

transportation alternative study in August 1972. Phase 2 of the study is examining five 

mixed-mode transportation alternatives. Four of the alternatives contemplate alignment 

tieing into the proposed Industrial Freeway along New York Avenue in the District. The 

phase II analysis is now nearing completion and will be presented through a public 

meeting process in mid-June. A public hearing to consider any resultant highway 

recommendations will be scheduled as soon as practicable thereafter. [District of 

Columbia Appropriations for 1974, Hearings, Subcommittee on District of Columbia 

Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, part 1, 

pages 26-39] 

When General Graham and other WMATA officials appeared before the subcommittee on 

May 2, Chairman Natcher briefly discussed the need for a balanced transportation system, dating 

to his 1955 motion. He then asked if General Graham still thought Metro construction would 
cost $2.980 million. General Graham said that “indications are pretty good, Mr. Chairman, that 

we can complete it for substantially that cost.” He thought the program was maybe $35 to 

$45 million over that estimate, but said, “It’s quite difficult to look down the road and see 

whether that is going to get any worse.” 

Chairman Natcher pointed out that from the start, he did not think the final cost would be 

$2.5 billion: 

I said to you, and I still say to you this morning – and I hope I am just as wrong as I can 

be – that it’s going to cost you about $4 billion to build this rapid rail transit system in the 

city of Washington and the surrounding metropolitan area. I was positive you couldn’t do 

it for your original estimate of $2.5 billion. I am hoping now that you do stay within this 

present estimate of $2.98 billion. 

Next, Chairman Natcher asked if General Graham believed the $1.2 billion in bonds, backed by 

the Federal Government, could be retired out of the farebox, or “do you agree with me, General 

Graham, that the Federal Government will pay every dollar of the $1.2 billion worth of bonds?” 

General Graham acknowledged that this was “a difficult question to answer.” The financial plan 

was based on assumptions about farebox revenue and ridership: 

At this time we are prepared to stand by that financial plan, which says that not 

$1.2 billion worth of bonds but approximately $882 million worth of bonds can be repaid. 

If you will recall, about $300 million was added in the form of an interest subsidy by the 

Federal legislation.

He cautioned that the WMATA board of directors “has indicated a willingness . . . to try to hold 

fares level.” The financial plan was based on the expectation that fares would go up as operating 

costs of the rail system increased:

If they take the same view on the rail system after we are in operation that they have taken 

on the bus system thus far, then there will have to be under present circumstances a 

subsidy from the local governments to make up that difference. [pages 939-942] 

On May 14, Airis returned for additional hearings before the subcommittee. Airis, in his opening 

statement, included a status report on Washington area freeways, including a summary of those 

open and the Maryland transportation alternatives study. Of the 29.5 miles of freeway originally 

contemplated, a total of 10.8 miles had been completed: 

These are the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge and portion of the Potomac River Freeway 

(I-66) including the connecting E Street Expressway; the 14th Street bridges (I-95) 

including the new center bridge which was opened to use by express buses 2 years ago; 

the Southwest Freeway (I-95) including the northbound 12 Street Expressway and the 

southbound 9th Street Expressway; the Southeast Freeway (I-695) to the completed 

11th Street Bridge over the Anacostia River; and the Anacostia Freeway (I-295) . . . . 
Approximately 1.8 miles of the system are now under construction. These include the 

center leg freeway (I-95) between D Street SW., and Massachusetts Avenue NW, now 

scheduled for completion in August of this year. 

The K Street structure over the center leg is the first contract in the portion between 

Massachusetts Avenue and New York Avenue. That is 40 percent complete. 

A segment of the east leg (I-295) is under construction between interchange “C” and 

Barney Circle at Pennsylvania Avenue.

I should also mention that the outbound movement on that segment was completed and 

put into operation on May 2. The inbound will be finished sometime this summer. 

He cited the court action delaying the Three Sisters Bridge and the study underway along the 

Georgetown waterfront. Design of the Potomac River Freeway (I-266), he said, was “tied to 

some extent to the resolution of the Three Sisters Bridge problem and, indeed, to the resolution 

of I-66 in Virginia.” 

The Department of Highways and Traffic’s recommended alternative for the South Leg was 

construction of three 1,300-foot tunnels west of the Lincoln Memorial and under the northern 

neck of the Tidal Basin: 

This plan can ultimately be converted into one long tunnel which will make the area west 

of the Tidal Basin fully usable as a park-visitor complex. 

This can be accomplished at the time the requirements of the Clear Air Act of 1970 

become effective. The facility as we have designed it, even with the two short sections of 

open, depressed portions, we felt can be justified from a park standpoint alone, as it turns 

back 4 acres of land that is now occupied by surface roads to the Park Service. 

The city was “at the threshold of submitting a final environmental impact statement and the 

combined corridor and design recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation,” 

subject to final review by the city council and Mayor Washington. 

The East Leg of the Inner Loop north of Barney Circle to Bladensburg Road was in design status. 

 “Work is now underway to assess the environmental consequences of this segment and to 

prepare for a combined corridor and design public hearing that is needed in view of past court 

orders on this project.” 

The remaining routes were “in a preliminary study status.” The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1970 had called for study of these routes, namely the North Leg (I-66), the Northeast-NorthCentral Freeway (I-95 and I-70S), and the upper end of the East Leg. Mayor Washington and 

Secretary Volpe had submitted their reports to Congress as required: 

I should point out that the main difference in the system which was recommended by the 

Mayor, the Secretary of Transportation, and the City Council are [sic] that the North 

Central Freeway along the alinement of the B & O Railroad, was eliminated and a 
substitute was made in the corridor of New York Avenue and the Penn Central Railroad, 

going past the Fort Lincoln development. We feel that it is a political decision and we 

support it. It will certainly be of great help to the city if it can be worked out with 

Maryland and something can finally be constructed. 

Chairman Natcher returned to a subject he had raised earlier, namely construction of the Center 

Leg Freeway near the Rayburn House Building. He pointed out that the project had been 

underway for 7 years and that, according to Airis’s statement, the completion date had changed 

from January 1973, the date provided in 1972, to August of the current year. It was, he reminded 

Airis, “nothing but a disgrace.” He recalled the idle workers and the contractor’s excuse about 

contract changes. He said that if this project was representative of projects in the District, “it 

certainly does not speak well for any that will be started in the future or those that are underway.”

Airis responded by saying the “6 to 7 years is one heck of a long time.” The city had dealt with 

the problem of the idle workers but “it probably has recurred to some extent.” The project was 

nearly complete, subject to several claims filed by the contractors, some of which “we feel 

dubious about”: 

Nevertheless, this project is one of a kind. A project of this scope and size had not been 

attempted before with the air rights projects. We have probably the world’s outstanding 

air rights project on the Labor Building alone. We had a very complicated reflecting pool 

that had to go over the Freeway, with all of the problems of waterproofing that go with it. 

On the south end we have a HEW Building [Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare] that also is an air rights project. The length of the tunnel structure is about twothirds of a mile and it requires very complicated and very meticulous air ventilation for it 

to work properly. The visual problems that go with designing and take off [sic] inside a 

tunnel were imposed on the Department as a result of where this project was to be built 

and the manner in which it was to be built. 

In addition to those, at a rather late date the Department had to accommodate the subway 

across the project at D Street, and the Metro works is not yet completed. Between 

D Street and E Street we have a Tax Court building under way, and there has been 

considerable discussion over a canopy to go across the freeway. All of these add up to a 

very, very complicated project. These are the principal reasons that this project had not 

been finished in the time that we would like to have accomplished it; that is, 3 or 4 years 

instead of 6 to 7 years. [District of Columbia Appropriations for 1974, Hearings, 

Subcommittee on District of Columbia Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations, 

U.S. House of Representatives, part 2, pages 862-874] 

Later, Chairman Natcher launched into what the Post called “an off-the-cuff statement that lasted 

15 minutes.” He asserted his support for a balanced transportation system for the District, 

referred to his 1955 motion, and pointed out that the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the 

District of Columbia had not selected a single freeway, all of which were selected by the District 

in cooperation with BPR. Similarly, his subcommittee had not drafted either provision of the 
Federal-Aid Highway Acts of 1968 or 1970 that had resulted in the freeway-subway impasse of 

recent years.

He recalled Chairman Rabaut’s warning that the motion that launched the Metro rapid rail 

system was a mistake. “I didn’t believe it then; I don’t believe it today.” However, he was 

concerned about the cost, recounting several exchanges with General Graham on the subject in 

recent years, including the discussion earlier in the hearing. He quoted General Graham, who 

was not present, as having said that he expected the system to be built within the $2.98 billion 

projected budget, with only minor overruns at present: 

Mr. Airis, one of these days – and you are going to live to see this day . . . when they are 

going to come back to this subcommittee and my friend, Mr. Myers, or one of these other 

members, will be chairman, and they are going to say, “Yes, it is going to cost $4 billion.” 

When just for a change they start telling the truth about it, Mr. Airis, so the people in the 

city of Washington will have all of the facts, then they are going to say $4 billion. 

Now, Mr. Airis, I am still in favor of the Rapid-Rail Transit System.

He mocked Members of Congress who had called for WMATA to take over the private bus 

companies. “You know, they complained for several years about the operation of the buses. 

Certainly I am one of those members of this committee who believes we should have had better 

bus service in our Nation’s Capital.” He was just thankful that his colleagues did not want 

WMATA to take over Amtrak: 

Now, Metro has taken them over, and at a cost of over $100 million. What is the first 

thing they are saying to us? “Subsidy.” They say it is going to be about $6 million. Over 

the next 4 years it is going to be many times that amount.

That is in addition to the subsidy for transporting the schoolchildren. I am in favor of the 

school transit subsidy, which is in this bill now for about $4 million. It has come up from 

a little over $2 million to a little over $4 million at the present time, and represents the 

difference between the 10 cents they pay and the regular 40 cents fare. Mr. Airis, as one 

member of the committee, I am in favor of making that payment. But I say to you on the 

record, I am not in favor of any $6 million subsidy or for any amount in the future for the 

operation of the bus company, over and above the subsidy for the schoolchildren. 

Then he reiterated his discussion with General Graham about the Federal guarantee of the Metro 

bond issuances. The bankers would not buy those bonds initially. “Because the fare box does 

not retire bonds.” He had voted for the bill authorizing $1.2 billion worth of bonds, backed by 

the Federal Government:

Mr.Airis, as I said in the beginning and I say to you again, as a matter of placing it in the 

record, that every bond will be retired by the U.S. Government. Not a single bond will be 

retired out of the fare box; not a single bond will be retired by the District of Columbia. 

They will all, under the guarantee made by the Government, be paid for by the Federal 

Government. 
So, Mr. Airis, just as a matter of being truthful, decent, and honorable about these things, 

why don’t they tell the truth to the people in the city of Washington. Down through the 

years you have read articles in the paper that are intended to sound good. Well, just for a 

change, don’t you think it is time to start telling the truth to the people?

Mr. Airis, I am in favor of completing the system regardless of the cost, but at the same 

time I think we should tell the people the truth about the cost and the fact that the bonds 

cannot be retired out of the fare box. 

As far as subsidy for the rapid transit system is concerned, that will be one of the major 

problems in 1976 or 1977 after it is completed. They will have to have a subsidy to 

operate it and they might as well start telling the people in the District of Columbia that 

that day is coming. If you want to start telling the truth about it, you ought to tell the 

people who pay the taxes what the situation is going to be. 

The District would face many transportation problems in coming years, Chairman Natcher said, 

“and the best way to solve them, as we go along, is to just be honest and decent and tell the 

people the whole story”: 

You know that is the best way to live, Mr. Airis, the other way to live is to just say 

nothing, refuse to give all the facts and just color and distort them, and that is what has 

been going on for years. 

Now is the time to start telling the truth about it . . . . 

With what is going on in our Nation’s Capital – the day will come, Mr. Airis, when the 

people in the city of Washington who pay their taxes, the ones who remain, are going to 

start saying, “Stop doing anything else in the District. Let’s have something done for the 

District.”

The transcript shows that at that point, Chairman Natcher and Airis had a discussion “off the 

record.” [pages 895-899] 

Jack Eisen asked General Graham about Chairman Natcher’s comments. Graham denied not 

telling the truth about the cost:

“We’ll build the rail system for $3 billion if the President and Congress will get together 

on a program for controlling inflation,” Graham told a reporter yesterday. “But we can’t 

if prices continue to go out of hand as they have in [President Nixon’s] Phase III” 

economic plan. [Eisen, Jack, “Rep. Natcher Opposed to Bus Subsidy,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, May 15, 1973] 

The Post took exception to Chairman Natcher’s comments about operating subsidies for 

Metrobus. WMATA needed subsidies to avoid raising fares. “Certainly his opposition to a bus 

subsidy could spell serious trouble for Metrobus.” 
The editorial board had to concede that his complaint about officials not being honest about 

deficits was “not without foundation.” They had chosen their words very carefully. After 

explaining the comments by former Secretary Volpe and WMATA Chairman Fisher, the editors 

continued: 

Metro officials have said that a stopgap bus subsidy will be essential until the combined 

bus and rail transit system is about to pay its own way. This is what apparently enraged 

Mr. Natcher – and what needs to be explained. First, despite Mr. Volpe’s good intentions 

in coming to the aid of Metro, his statement did not reflect the view of the system 

officials about the need for subsidy. In turn, Mr. Fisher’s response focused on how the 

subway-bus system would operate – not on how the buses would be financed until the 

subway is completed. 

In short, a subsidy was needed. “This is what Metro officials should have said all along, and 

what city officials ought to be saying, too.” Any subsidy from the city would be part of the city 

budget, “and the city budget, like it or not, is a responsibility of Mr. Natcher. Mr. Natcher 

doesn’t like to be misled.” 

For now, Chairman Natcher had made his point: 

In fact, the debate should no longer be over whether a subsidy is needed to keep fares at 

their present levels, but whether the subsidies should be large enough to make fare 

reductions possible. Now that O. Roy Chalk and the other private bus owners have left, 

the opportunity for a forthright discussion of this course should not be lost in an attempt 

to placate Congress. [“Rep. Natcher’s Bus Subsidy Complaint,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, May 25, 1973. Italics in original] 

The Star’s editors referred to his doubts about the cost estimate for constructing Metro, “and he 

may well be right.” He was, as everyone knew, “thoroughly irritated, with every justification, at 

the snail-paced progress of road-building in the city.” However, when it came to his opposition 

to subsidizing the bus system, “the gentleman from Kentucky could not possibly be more 

wrong.” Chairman Natcher and Metro officials disagree on whether WMATA and its supporters 

misled Congress on this point, but “nothing could be more fruitless” than trying to parse the 

debate:

What’s important is that the provision of the subsidies is vital to the public interest, and 

their inevitability was asserted clearly in the past on dozens of occasions . . . . 

The Washington area is not alone in electing to subsidize transit. Virtually every other 

urban center in the nation has turned to the policy out of necessity, because the alternative 

was unacceptable.

That alternative involved increasing fares and reducing service, or both, to balance costs and 

income. “That, in fact, is precisely what occurred under private ownership” and that, in turn, was 

“what largely motivated the campaign for public ownership.” 
The editors gave area officials credit for agreeing “to an equitable allocation of their own local 

funds – not federal funds – for this purpose of subsidizing bus service.” If Chairman Natcher 

refuses to appropriate the District’s share, the result “would surely result in another disruptive 

political confrontation in Congress that Natcher would be hard put to win, and which we trust he 

will not precipitate.” [“Natcher’s Doubts,” The Washington Star-News, May 18, 1973] 

Awaiting the 1973 Act 

On June 9, 1973, Mayor Washington proposed a $1.1 billion construction program for the next 

6 years, including $400 million for Metro construction. The budget included funds for 19 miles 

of freeway projects that the city council had not yet approved. The city council was expected to 

take up one of the freeways, the South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, during the summer. 

[Scharfenberg, Kirk, “Mayor Seeks $1.1 Billion in Construction,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, June 10, 1973] 

In Maryland, the citizens’ steering committee in Prince George’s County, after a 10-month, 

$675,000 study, recommended in June that the State drop plans to extend I-95 into the District of 

Columbia. Delegate Ann R. Hull, the committee chairwoman, announced the decision during a 

public hearing on June 16. While opposing the extension, the steering committee favored: 

• Widen the Baltimore-Washington Parkway to six lanes; 

• Designating the parkway as I-95 inside the Capital Beltway with eight lanes and building 

a connector road through Laurel between the parkway and I-95; 

• Shift the proposed Metro line planned to run east of the University of Maryland to the 

west of the College Park campus along University Boulevard with a station near Byrd 

Stadium and its terminus moved to the existing interchange of I-95 and the beltway 

instead of at Greenbelt Road; and 

• Adjust Metro’s line to Greenbelt, including a terminus north of the intersection of the 

beltway and the Baltimore and Washington Railroad tracks. 

Only about 75 people attended the hearing in the university’s Tawes Fine Arts Theater. Jack 

Eisen reported: 

Almost everybody who spoke favored improved transit and better commuter service on 

the area’s Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line; some favored the extension of I-95, and a 

larger number, like Mrs. Hull’s committee members, would eliminate the superhighway 

extension. [Eisen, Jack, “Panel Urges Md. To Drop Plan for I-95,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, June 17, 1973; Crosby, Thomas, “Transportation Alternatives Argued 

by Public,” The Sunday Star and The Washington Daily News, June 17, 1973] 

On July 12, Secretary Hughes officially dropped Maryland’s plan to extend I-95 into the District 

of Columbia. Although the I-95 extension was a planned part of a Maine-to-Florida route, it 

“must be judged primarily in terms of service to the Washington Metropolitan area. This 

department,” he said, “has not been convinced of the need for extending I-95 south of the 

Beltway on any new alignment.” He was addressing the 60-member steering committee. He had 

previously rejected the alignment through the Northwest Branch Park, but now he also was 
rejecting the alignment along the PEPCO power line. If the city proposed a joint public hearing 

on I-95 inside the Capital Beltway, Secretary Hughes said, “the department will not express a 

preference for extending I-95 south of the Beltway on the Pepco power line in any joint hearing.” 

As Eisen reported, “In an action that seems sure to stir a new controversy, Hughes indicated 

support for a connector freeway to link I-95 with the Baltimore-Washington Parkway.” It was, 

Hughes said, “an important link” to prevent the Capital Beltway from being inundated with I-95 

traffic bound to or coming from Washington. 

In addition, Secretary Hughes endorsed the steering committee’s proposal on the Metro line into 

Prince George’s County. He also supported a network of bicycle paths serving the University of 

Maryland campus, improved commuter service on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad line, and 

additional bus service. He called for a study of express bus service along New Hampshire 

Avenue (State Route 650) and feeder bus service to the railroad line and Metro stations.

Eisen called the decision “a crippling and perhaps fatal blow” to the I-95 extension, and “a major 

victory for community groups that have been fighting since the mid-1960s against plans to 

extend the road inside the Beltway.” Including the District’s segment, known as the Northeast 

Freeway between the District line and the North Central Freeway. With Maryland having 

previously killed the State’s segment of the North Central Freeway south of Silver Spring, 

Secretary Hughes’ decision effectively ended the North Central Freeway north of New York 

Avenue. Or, as James Dilt wrote in The Baltimore Sun, the scrapping of I-95 killed the extension 

into the city “for all practical purposes.” [Eisen, Jack, “Md. Vetoes I-95 Extension Into District,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 13, 1973; Dilts, James D., “Plan for I-95 leg to 

D.C. Dropped in favor of better mass transit,” The Baltimore Sun, July 13, 1973] 

During this period, efforts to develop I-66 in Virginia were running into roadblocks. A telephone 

poll, conducted at random in Arlington, Fairfax, and Prince William Counties, showed strong 

support for construction of I-66 inside the Capital Beltway. The results were revealed at a public 

workshop on I-66 on March 13. The Post summarized the results:

The survey while revealing overall support for I-66, also showed how much stronger 

opposition to the freeway is in the inner suburbs that I-66 would cut through. 

Residents beyond the beltway, who expect I-66 to speed their trips into the District, 

approve the road by 81 per cent. Only 64 per cent of residents living inside the beltway 

approved it. 

While the strongest opposition – 38 per cent – came in North Arlington, the weakest 

opposition – 8 per cent against, 92 per cent approval – occurred in Fairfax’s Centreville 

district, far beyond the beltway. 

Along with 70.8 per cent support for I-66, 92.7 per cent supported Metro, 83.1 per cent 

supported more express bus lanes, and 62 per cent supported construction of the Three 

Sisters Bridge connecting Arlington and the District, according to the survey. 
Asked about the area’s most needed transportation improvement, respondents identified bus 

service (37 percent), Metro (26 percent), upgrading existing roads (15 percent, and combining 

bus and rail (8 percent). Four percent did not think any transportation improvements were 

needed.

The nonprofit Bureau of Social Science Research had conducted the telephone poll of 1,027 

residents for the consultants preparing the court-ordered environmental review of I-66. The 

bureau said the margin of error for the poll was 3 percent. The study was one of several VDH 

had begun in the fall of 1972 after losing the court case. 

Rival groups saw the results as supporting their perspective. Paul Alwine, of Fairfax County 

Citizens For I-66, said, “It shows that more people favor the highway than are against it.” 

Harrison Mann of Citizens for I-66 was convinced the results would, “without a doubt,” lead to 

approval for construction. 

By contrast, Emilia Govan issued a statement pointing out that when asked to list, in order of 

personal preference, their choice of transportation, the ranking was: Build Metro, reserve more 

express bus lanes, improve existing highways, and build I-66. More people favored Metro (92.7 

percent) than favored I-66 (70.8 percent). [Mathews, Jay, “I-66 Back in Va., Survey Shows,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 14, 1973; Brosby, Thomas, “I-66 Gets Backing in 

Survey,” The Washington Star-News, April 9, 1973] 

In June, the Govans, on behalf of ACT, accused Fugate of attempting to blackmail the Fairfax 

County Board of Supervisors. A week earlier, Fugate had said that a proposed 12-mile highspeed toll road along the Dulles International Airport access road could be built only if I-66 were 

constructed. With the board already on record in support of the toll road, the Govans wrote to 

urge Chairman Jean Packard and the board to “spurn any Virginia Highway Department tactic to 

force the Board to support I-66.” Fugate’s statement was, in the Govans’ view, “but another of 

many pressure tactics being used by [VDH] to force construction of this highway. 

In our view, his statement . . . amounts to a form of ‘blackmail’ on the Fairfax Board to induce 

the board to exert influence in favor of construction of I-66.” The Govans told Packard that the 

toll road might help alleviate a “serious transportation problem in the growing Reston-ViennaHerndon corridor,” but urged Fairfax County not to try to solve its problem by creating one in 

Arlington County. 

Chairman Packard, in response, said any attempt to use the toll road plan to force the board to 

support I-66 was “disgraceful.” She planned to ask Fugate for clarification.

Although Fugate was not available for comment at press time, a spokesman assured reporters that 

the commissioner was expressing only his personal view that without I-66, the toll road would 

not collect enough tolls to support itself. “I’m certain he’s not engaging in any blackmail.” 

Previously, ACT had written to Governor Holton to warn him that VDH was exerting “improper 

and intolerable pressure” on the consulting firm leading the environmental review of I-66. The 

issue involved VDH’s decision to deny the firm’s request to extend the contract beyond the 
completion date of September 18. VDH official A. K. Hunsberger told a reporter that the 

department was insisting that the consultant complete the study by the September 18 contract 

date. No “extenuating circumstances” justified an extension. In the absence of an extension, 

project manager Fowler said the consultants had “quickened the pace of the study.” ACT and 

other I-66 critics opposed that “quickening,” which they feared could reduce citizen input and 

result in an interior product. [Crosby, Thomas, “ACT Charges Blackmail,” The Washington 

Star-News, June 28, 1973; Mathews, Jay, “Arlington I-66 Foes Charge Blackmail,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, June 29, 1973] 

The five-member Arlington County Board was not on record on I-66. Two board members, 

Everard Munsey and John W. Purdy, were ACT members who intended to support an antihighway resolution when it was offered, possibly in the fall. One board member, Dr. Kenneth M. 

Haggerty, had said he would oppose an anti-freeway resolution. The two other members, Joseph 

L. Fisher and Joseph S. Wholey, had not taken a position. 

Nevertheless, the board had written to the consulting firm to express concern that the tight 

schedule “may provide too little time for the careful consideration of alternatives” to the eightlane freeway. Fisher and Dr. Haggerty had supported sending the letter, but said they did so only 

because the consulting firm was rushing them to provide data on county parkland affected by the 

highway. Munsey and Purdy thought the deadline should be extended 3 to 6 months because the 

consultants needed more time to determine the impact of strong air quality controls, like parking 

surcharges, EPA had proposed for the area. 

Given the deadline, project manager Fowler was philosophical. “At some point, you have to say 

this is our best judgment of what the real world situation would be and go forth.” [Mathews, Jay, 

“Arlington Board Hints At I-66 Stand,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 28, 1973] 

Completing the 1973 Act 

The conference to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of the legislation 

proved contentious, with the conference report delayed until July 27. The final bill retained the 

District and Virginia measures, including exemption of the District’s Interstate System from the 

1893 Act on a permanent system of highways. The conference report included the provision on 

the North Expressway in San Antonio, as well as project-specific provisions on the Alaska 

Highway, Route 101 in New Hampshire, I-93 through New Hampshire’s Franconia Notch, 

construction of the Highland Scenic Highway in West Virginia, and relocation of U.S. 25E 

through a tunnel in Cumberland Gap National Historical Park 

However, the section that most affected the freeway battles in the Washington area was one that 

had emerged from similar controversies in Boston. Governor Sargent and Secretary Altshuler 

had promoted a way to cancel controversial urban Interstate highways and use the funds instead 

for the Governor’s ambitious but unfunded transit plans. Section 135 of the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1973 provided that mechanism. It allowed a Governor and local governments in 

an urbanized to submit a joint request to withdraw a controversial Interstate segment. The 

Secretary of Transportation could withdraw approval of the segment if it was not essential to 

completing a unified and connected Interstate System and the State provided assurances that it 
did not intend to construct a toll road in the traffic corridor. The left-over Interstate mileage 

could be used to designate an Interstate segment in any other State. 

With the Secretary’s approval, responsible local officials could advance nonhighway public mass 

transit projects, including construction of fixed rail facilities and the purchase of passenger 

equipment, including rolling stock for any mode of mass transit, or both. The Federal share of 

the nonhighway transit project was limited to the cost of the withdrawn route as shown in the 

1972 ICE, but the funds would come from the general Treasury, not the Highway Trust Fund. 

The Federal share would be the same as for projects advanced with UMTA funds or up to the 

limit of substitution funds. 

As Governor Sargent had anticipated, this provision contained the solution to the dilemma of 

mayors and local officials in Boston and around the country. They did not want to build a 

controversial Interstate segment, but they also did not want to lose the hundreds of millions of 

dollars in economic stimulus that would come their city’s way if the segment were built. Before 

enactment of the 1973 Act, the only way to retain the funds was to resist citizen anger about 

building the highway segment. Now, after several years of debate in Congress, mayors and local 

officials could have the funds, but use them for popular nonhighway mass transit, including rail 

rapid transit, instead of the unpopular freeway. 

The Senate took up the conference report on S. 502, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, on 

August 1. In introducing the bill, Senator Bentsen said: 

Mr. President, this conference report represents months of very arduous work by both the 

Senate and House conferees . . . . I can report that the conference held to reconcile the 

differences between the two bills was a very difficult one . . . . We were in conference 

over 2 1⁄2 months. The conferees met 29 times, and the House and Senate conferees met 

among themselves several times to try to work out solutions to our most difficult 

problem, the question of diverting money from the highway trust fund for the use of 

transit. I believe we have emerged with a strong bill which preserves the essence of the 

Senate position on the highway bill. 

He explained that conferees had begun with 110 points of difference in the two bills, but had 

resolved all but 13 of them by May 17, and those 13 remained unresolved for the remaining 2 

months. On the key issue of the Muskie-Baker amendment, Senator Bentsen said:

From May 17 until we reached a final agreement on July 18, there were no fewer than 

10 proposals and counterproposals to reach a solution on this question. I believe that the 

solution that we ultimately reached was an eminently fair one . . . . In the compromise, 

Mr. President, I believe both sides have given substantially. The Senate gives up rail 

mass transit from the trust fund until fiscal 1976, although general fund moneys can be 

exchanged for trust funds for these purposes in both 1974 and 1975. The House gives up 

its absolute insistence that no funds shall be diverted from the trust fund for nonhighway 

related projects.

As for mass transit operating subsidies, Senator Bentsen said: 
Faced with the unrelenting opposition of the administration, which indicated that 

operating subsidies in any form would invite a veto, and the skepticism [of] the House 

conferees, the Senate conferees agreed to drop operating subsidies from the bill. 

He said the bill did not ignore transit, but included $3 billion in additional funds for transit 

capital grants, as well as the breakthrough agreement on the Muskie-Baker amendment. The 

Interstate transfer provision also could benefit transit. In the Senate bill, any funds left over 

following a withdrawal “would have gone to the account of the urban area to be used for 

highways or any mode of mass transit.” The conference agreement modified the Senate bill to 

prevent the use of Highway Trust Fund revenue from withdrawn Interstates for mass transit. The 

“traded” funds would remain in the Highway Trust Fund for highway purposes, while an equal 

dollar amount of general Treasury funds would be made available for the transit project. 

[“Authorization of Appropriations for Construction of Certain Highways—Conference Report,” 

Congressional Record-Senate, pages 27194-27196] 

The Senate approved the bill 91 to 5. Senators Biden, Case, Proxmire, Williams, and William V. 

Roth, Jr. (R-De.) voted against the bill. [page 27221] 

On August 3, Representative Wright called up the conference report on S. 502 for consideration. 

 The report, he said, “has been hammered out on the anvils of mutual compromise with the other 

body.” It was “a good bill, a sound bill, and undoubtedly the best bill that could have been 

achieved under the circumstances.” Conferees encountered “strong feelings” from their Senate 

counterparts, but also “conciliatory and harmonious” gestures. “I think it is impossible to say 

that either House predominated more than the other.” He urged a resounding vote of approval. 

[“Conference Report on S. 502,” Congressional Record-House, August 3, 1973, page 28089] 

The House approved the legislation, 382 to 34, on August 3. [page 28110] 

The 1973 Act Becomes a Law 

For President Nixon, July and August 1973 were difficult months. On July 16, 1973, Federal 

Aviation Administrator Alexander P. Butterfield, a former deputy to top White House aide H. R. 

Haldeman, revealed to the Senate Select Committee to Investigate Campaign Practices (also 

known as the Senate Watergate Committee) the existence of a taping system in the White House. 

As The New York Times explained, “The recordings became the immediate focus of the central 

investigation by the Senate panel into the role President Nixon may have played in the Watergate 

cover-up.” [Naughton, James M., “Surprise Witness,” The New York Times, July 17, 1973] 

On August 6, Vice President Agnew revealed that he was under investigation by the United 

States Attorney in Baltimore, George Beall, for possible violations of criminal law. Initial media 

reports indicated he was suspected of extortion, bribery, and tax evasion related to a kickback 

scheme involving contractors, architects, and engineers employed on Maryland projects. He 

denied the charges (but would resign on October 10, 1973). 

On August 13, the Times reported that Federal investigators were planning to go through the 

records of the Vice President’s 2 years as Governor of Maryland and those of Jerome R. Wolff, 
Agnew’s appointee as chairman-director of the Maryland State Roads Commission. “In the new 

phase of the far-reaching investigation – which has all Maryland agog even though the state had 

become all but accustomed to seeing its political figures face criminal charges – Mr. Beall 

appeared to be concentrating on highway construction and engineering contracts.” [Waldron, 

Martin, “Agnew Term as Governor Under U.S. Scrutiny Today,” The New York Times, August 

13, 1973] 

(Wolff, after being confronted by Beall’s team, became a cooperating witness against Vice 

President Agnew and during the trials of other Maryland officials. Wolff, as it turned out, had 

kept meticulous records – including diaries and detailed notes on his day-planner – of the 

schemes he helped to carry out and the kickback payments made. Due to his cooperation, Wolff 

was never charged with a crime. He lost his engineering license but it was restored in 1978 on a 

legal technicality and worked as a hydraulics consultant for the rest of his working life. He died 

at the age of 98 in 2014. [Kelly, Jacques, “Jerome B. Wolff, former state roads chief who 

testified in case against Agnew, dies,” The Baltimore Sun, August 30, 2016] 

Later that day, as President Nixon signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 (P.L. 93–87), 

standing behind him were Senators Randolph and Baker, Secretary Brinegar, Federal Highway 

Administrator Tiemann, Urban Mass Transportation Administrator Frank C. Herringer, who had 

taken office in February, and freshman Republican Representative Hanrahan, whom the White 

House President wanted to aid in his reelection campaign. In a formal statement, he called it “a 

significant extension and reform of the Federal highway program,” which he described as “the 

strong tradition of Federal-State cooperation in building American highways.” This was, 

however, more than just a highway act: 

One of its most significant features is that it allows the Highway Trust Fund to be used 

for mass transit capital improvements. This landmark provision is one that I have urged 

for some time and one that I recommended with special emphasis in four different 

messages to the Congress this year. Under this Act, for the first time, States and localities 

will have the flexibility they need to set their own transportation priorities. The law will 

enable them at last to relieve congestion and pollution problems by developing more 

balanced transportation systems where that is appropriate rather than locking them into 

further highway expenditures which can sometimes make such problems even worse. 

He highlighted “the $3 billion I requested for funding the Urban Mass Transportation Act” and 

the provision allowing State and local officials “to substitute mass transit projects for certain 

urban Interstate highway segments which are controversial and non-essential.” He also pointed 

out that the 1973 Act earmarked urban highway funds for areas with populations over 200,000 

and “cuts red tape and improves efficiency by giving more authority to the States and by 

increasing planning funds.” He added: 

I am pleased that the bill also designates several links of the Interstate network forming a 

coast to coast route as the Dwight D. Eisenhower Highway, a fitting tribute to the father 

of the Interstate highway system. 
He regretted that the bill exceeded his budget proposals and included “a number of special 

narrow categorical grant programs at a time when it is particularly important for us to trim back 

on the budget and the bureaucracy.” However, he recognized that funding levels had been cut 

back from earlier versions “and I am gratified that certain other elements, particularly an antiimpoundment provision and mass transit operating subsidies, were eliminated from the final 

version.” 

Overall, he said, the legislation reflected “a spirit of constructive cooperation between the 

Congress and the Administration and I am confident that the Act can be properly administered so 

as to not violate my commitment to a non-inflationary budget.” He concluded: 

The legislation I sign today represents an important forward step for our country, not only 

in providing for better and more balanced transportation, but also in related fields such as 

environmental protection, highway safety, energy conservation, and community 

development. I am gratified that it includes important proposals to which I have long 

given high priority. 

I sign S. 502 with confidence that it will contribute significantly to the strength of our 

American economy and the quality of American life. 

Informally, the President had observed that, “the dullest thing in the world is to spend a day on a 

superhighway.” He added, also informally, “Let me say after these two smog alerts we’ve had in 

Washington, let’s have more mass transit.” 

After the ceremony, Secretary Brinegar and Melvin R. Laird, the former Defense Secretary who 

was now the President’s counsellor for domestic affairs, briefed reporters. Secretary Brinegar 

said: 

Both in terms of dollars and numbers of separate programs, this is the single most 

important piece of legislation that the Department of Transportation has been called upon 

to administer. 

He highlighted the urban transportation features of the 1973 Act, which gave “urban 

transportation planners immediate flexibility in the uses of the Highway Trust Fund dollars that 

are allocated to urban areas.” He said: 

No longer must these planners think “just highways.” Now they will be able to consider 

trade-offs to such alternatives as buses, exclusive bus lanes, and rapid rail systems. We 

do not see such flexibility as a “busting of the trust,” but rather as a sensible broadening 

of its uses. Approximately $21⁄2 billion is authorized for this “flexible” urban usage. 

In closing, he praised the conference committee that had drafted the final bill “in a spirit of 

constructive compromise.” The result was “a good bill—one that will go a long way toward 

providing our Nation with the balanced, total transportation system that it needs.” 

Reporter Lou Cannon, writing in the Post, said: 
Two emerging and related administration themes dominated the ceremonies and 

announcements surrounding the bill signing. One is the developing White House praise 

for Congress on non-Watergate issues, the other the reiteration of administration belief in 

its own ability to govern. 

Cannon quoted Laird as saying during his briefing, “It is important to bear in mind that we are 

moving forward on the domestic agenda for America.” [Cannon, Lou, “Nixon Signs $22 Billion 

Highway Bill,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 14, 1973; “President Signs 

Highway Bill With provisions for Mass Transit Assistance,” The New York Times, August 14, 

1973] 

Senator Randolph issued a statement after the ceremony: 

We deliberated the provisions of this bill in conference for more than 120 hours. The 

result is a measure that responsibly meets transportation requirements in large cities, 

small towns and rural areas. 

Enactment of the 1973 Act gave Jack Eisen an opportunity to summarize the impact of the law 

on the District freeway controversies. The only provision specifically about the District of 

Columbia’s freeway network was Section 135 (titled District of Columbia):

None of the provisions of the Act entitled “An Act to provide a permanent system of 

highways in that part of the District of Columbia lying outside of cities”, approved 

March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 532), as amended, shall apply to any segment of the Interstate 

System within the District of Columbia.

Eisen summarized the “stunning judicial setback” the city received in 1968 when the U.S. Court 

of Appeals blocked the Three Sisters Bridge and the North-Central Freeway because they did not 

comply with the 1893 law. The ruling resulted in the “notwithstanding” provision of the 1968 

Act, itself blocked in court. 

Now, the 1973 Act exempted the District’s freeways from the 1893 law’s restrictions. The 

provision “eliminates the legal basis for the court order in 1968 that brought the city’s interstate 

freeway program to a virtual halt, except for projects that were then well underway.” 

A “little noticed provision” of the 1973 Act renewed the congressional mandate for construction 

of the Three Sisters Bridge and other controversial freeways. Section 110 required the Secretary 

to remove from designation any Interstate segments that did not meet deadlines (July 1, 1974, to 

notify the Secretary that the State intends to construction the segment, and July 1, 1975, for 

submitted a schedule of expenditures), but added: 

This subsection shall not be applicable to any segment of the Interstate System referred to 

in section 23(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. 

By exempting the District from the requirement, Eisen explained, “it leaves in force a section of 

the 1968 Highway Act that says the District and federal governments must build the Three 

Sisters Bridge and other unbuilt interstate freeway links in the city.” The impact would not be 
immediate because the freeway projects needed administrative or judicial resolution. “The new 

legislation could make it harder for the city to drop any projects it might want to cut from the 

road system and make it harder for citizens to sue to keep those projects from being built.” 

A spokesman for the House Committee on Public Works called the provision a “housekeeping 

action” to maintain the status quo and avoid complications: 

The District is proceeding in good faith to meet the congressional will and this leaves the 

1968 Act intact . . . . We did not want to complicate or change the mandate. Obviously 

this is a sensitive matter.

Title III of the 1973 Act was titled the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, which authorized 

funds to: 

. . . assist States and local public bodies and agencies thereof in financing the acquisition, 

construction, reconstruction, and improvement of facilities and equipment for use, by 

operation or lease or otherwise, in mass transportation service in urban areas and in 

coordinating such service with highway and other transportation in such areas. Eligible

facilities and equipment may include land (but not public highways), buses and other 

rolling stock, and other real or personal property needed for an efficient and coordinated 

mass transportation system.

Section 301(a) of Title III increased the Federal share for projects eligible under the 1964 Act to 

80 percent, up from two-thirds. However, Eisen pointed out that the 1973 Act, while increasing 

the Federal share to 80 percent for Federal-aid transit projects around the country, left the Federal 

share for Metro at two-thirds, as provided for in the National Capital Transportation Act that 

“continues to contain the old formula.” WMATA Comptroller Lowe estimated that if Congress 

increases the Federal share to 80 percent for Metro, local governments would save an estimated

$142 million in local matching shares for the $3 billion system. 

Eisen advised readers that the next test of the District’s freeway plans would be the report by the 

city council’s transportation committee on the South Leg Freeway. The committee expected to 

issue its report in September.

Eisen recalled the “volatile political and social” debates over the past decade:

The issue has spawned angry confrontations between citizens and officials, 

demonstrations at road project locations and a series of successful legal challenges to 

construction plans. 

Initially, opposition to the roads came from an unusual coalition of lower- and middleincome city dwellers whose neighborhoods would be bisected by the freeways and 

conservationist groups worried about preserving the unique monumental character of the 

capital city.
The chief villain of both groups was the suburban automobile commuter. “White men’s 

roads through black men’s bedrooms” was one rallying cry.

More recently, however, city dwellers have been joined by Maryland and Virginia 

suburbanites who also oppose freeways in their neighborhoods. 

For example, plans for I-66 in northern Virginia were on hold by court order pending an 

environmental review. “If the freeway plan is abandoned, it would reduce and possibly eliminate 

any justification for the Three Sisters Bridge.”

The Maryland Department of Transportation had “dropped plans for extending I-70S and I-95 

inside the Capital Beltway, making the District’s long-planned North Central Freeway a road to 

nowhere. It, too, has been dropped”: 

Instead, Maryland has proposed to build a connecting road between its existing segment 

of I-95 and the Baltimore-Washington Parkway near Beltsville, north of the Beltway . . . . 

Under Maryland’s new plan, the Washington end of the parkway would be widened from 

four to six or eight lanes and would be brought up to freeway standards as already 

authorized by federal law. It would be linked to a new Industrial Freeway paralleling 

badly congested New York Avenue NE within Washington. 

This would provide a continuous route for Washington-bound I-95 traffic in Maryland 

and permit the District to comply with requirements of the 1968 highway law. 

Eisen added, that, “Opposition to the parkway widening already has cropped up in Prince 

George’s County.” 

Based on information from Airis, Eisen wrote: 

As the District’s interstate freeway program now stands . . . . it has only the 14th Street 

and Theodore Roosevelt bridges, the Southwest-Southeast Freeway south of Capitol Hill, 

the Anacostia Freeway and an isolated fragment of the Potomac River Freeway in Foggy 

Bottom in current service. 

At this point in the freeway battles, the city’s program “leaves the residential northern half of 

the District without any active freeway proposals.” An accompanying map depicted the 

North-Central Freeway (I-70S) and the Northeast Freeway (I-95) as “Eliminated.” The South 

Leg was shown as “Proposed” and “Plan pending.” The Industrial Highway was identified as 

“Crosstown North Leg tunnel is proposed but planning is dormant.” Eisen explained, “Nothing 

currently is being done about the proposal for a crosstown freeway that would carry Three Sisters 

Bridge traffic and tunnel under K Street NW to connect with the proposed new extension to the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway.” 

Outside the city, the map depicted Maryland’s plan for a freeway connecting I-95 east of the 

Capital Beltway with the parkway, depicting the link as “Proposed to connect with widened 

parkway into D.C.” In Virginia, I-66 was identified as “Court-ordered restudies under way on 
I-66 and Three Sisters Bridge.” [Eisen, Jack, “Congress Renews Mandate on Three Sisters 

Bridge,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 21, 1973] 

Post editors lauded Congress for including the provision in the 1973 Act that allowed cities to 

withdraw controversial Interstate segments and substitute rail rapid transit. The editorial picked 

up on Eisen’s theme: 

The Act renews the congressional order of 1968 that we essentially complete a freeway 

system that was proposed 27 years ago by the D.C. Highway Department’s consultants, 

J. E. Greiner Company of Baltimore and De Leuw Cather & Co. of Chicago. The 

consultants concluded their 1946 recommendation for an “inner loop” and radial freeways 

into the suburbs with the statement that there was “little likelihood that Washington will 

ever need a rail rapid transit system.” 

In contrast, of course, “we are building a rail rapid transit system now. It is the biggest public 

works project in the country”: 

We also know a great deal more than we did in 1946 about the disruptions and social 

costs of urban freeways (which inevitably breed more freeways), about the health hazards 

of automobile-caused pollution and about the essential coordination between 

transportation planning and urban planning in general. Because of this new knowledge, 

there is also a great deal more public interest in and opposition to the conventional 

highway builders’ wisdom that freeways ought to run through, rather than to urban 

concentrations. Yet, Congress continues to insist that we stick to this outdated wisdom 

and build the Three Sisters Bridge to bring Virginia’s I-66 into the city, and a radial 

freeway to connect with Maryland’s I-70S and I-95 and that we complete the “inner 

loop,” of which one portion, the Southwest Freeway, has already been built. 

Due to court orders, the 1973 Act would not “immediately unleash the bulldozers” for the Three 

Sisters Bridge. As a result, “those lyric little rocks in the Potomac, just upstream from Key 

Bridge, known as the Three Sisters, are likely to be left in peace for a while.” Other proposed 

freeways, including the Industrial Freeway, were not ready for construction. 

The exception was the South Leg Freeway, the “innocent name” for the six-lane freeway the city 

wanted to build, partly in tunnels, across the Lincoln Memorial grounds and the Tidal Basin: 

To contemplate what this surgery will do to the green center of the Nation’s Capital 

requires little imagination on the part of anyone who has ever walked, breathed and tried 

to enjoy nature (to say nothing of history) along a six-lane freeway. The justification for 

this vandalistic operation is, in part, that there is now far too much automobile traffic on 

the Mall, particularly along Independence Avenue as it winds its way across the Tidal 

Basin.
Many of those cars would disappear, the editorial explained, with the construction of Metro and a 

visitor center at Union Station north of the Capitol. “But that does not answer the Highway Act’s 

mandate – completion of that 1946 ‘system.’” 

The Post recommended that the city and NPS “desist from digging up the Mall . . . until the 

future of all the other mandated projects is decided”: 

We are optimists. We still hope that in time and with full respect for the law, 

Washington’s planners can come up with something better than the old Greiner-De Leuw 

Cather “system,” something that will satisfy environmental sense, traffic needs and the 

highway-minded congressmen. [“Washington and the 1973 Freeway Act,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, August 27, 1973] 

The Center Leg Freeway Opens – In Part

In early August, the Star alerted readers to the imminent opening of the Center Leg Freeway, the 

eight-lane, 1.4-mile section of I-95 that would connect the Southwest-Southeast Freeway and 

Massachusetts Avenue and Third Street, NW. The freeway was depressed for its entire 16-block 

length, running in a tunnel under the reflecting pool in front of the Capitol building. It passed 

under the new Labor Department and U.S. Tax Court building which was still under construction 

in the air rights over the freeway.

The District had intended to open the freeway on August 8 but “finishing touches” delayed the 

opening until later in the month. By then, most of the parking spaces provided on a temporary 

basis on the freeway would be eliminated: 

Airis said the Center Leg opening “is a fine thing for the city. It will provide a more 

efficient means for traffic to get into center city and it will relieve traffic on several side 

streets.” 

. . . . The Center Leg has been planned to connect with the New York Avenue Industrial 

Freeway, which has yet to be designed or built, but work is continuing on an uncompleted 

three-block section of the Center Leg between Massachusetts and New York Avenues. 

[Crosby, Thomas, “Center Leg Freeway to Open This Month,” The Washington StarNews, August 8, 1973] 

Although Airis had expected the Center Leg Freeway section of I-95 to open in August, the 

opening had been delayed until October, when the Post reported: 

Scheduled to open at the end of this month, the freeway comes with rebroadcast 

machines, saturable core reactors, impact attenuators and other gadgetry, all of which 

contributed substantially to its cost of $70 million. It is 1.4 miles long and, yard for yard, 

the city’s most expensive road. 

The unique features included in the freeway made it highly sophisticated: 
Sophisticated equipment will permit emergency vehicle radios to transmit and receive 

while in the tunnel, as well as end interruptions to civilian radio programs when autos go 

underground. 

Impact attenuators at abutments were designed to absorb vehicle impacts to minimize injuries. A 

city traffic engineer, George W. Schoene, said:

It’s the latest concept in preventing personal injury. Damage will still be done to the 

vehicle, but any serious injury to the driver will be minimized. When the car hits the 

attenuator, the black cells with mushroom-like tops pop one at a time, spraying water 

everywhere.

Safety features included “the preprogrammed saturable-core reactors that dim or brighten lights 

gradually as motorists enter and leave the highway-tunnel.” According to the city, the tunnel 

included 71⁄2 miles of fluorescent light using 3,865 tubes. Twenty-eight chain-driven fans would 

keep the air in the tunnel clean while closed-circuit televisions and other features would allow 

officials to monitor traffic. “The lighting,” Schoene said, “is the most unique in the city. Most 

of the other systems are 220 volts, this system is 2,000 volts.” 

Reporters viewed the exhaust system:

Visitors to the blower room of the tunnel were dwarfed by the big exhaust and fresh air 

fans that are part of the ventilation system. 

There are 28 chain-driven fans in the facility, 16 to pull in fresh air and 12 for exhaust. 

In addition, the tunnel featured: 

Two closed-circuit televisions, 44 emergency phones, four cameras (eventually there will 

be 30 cameras located at the access and exit ramps from portal to portal) and a computer 

hooked to detectors on the roadway will be able to count vehicles, measure speed and 

give all this information to a control center

Airis said, “Some commuters will use it, but it is designed to provide a better way of moving 

service delivery vehicles around downtown street traffic.” He said, “The main objective of the 

facility is to remove traffic from the surface of the mall area in front of the Capitol . . . part of a 

long-range park service and planning commission plan.” 

Despite all these benefits, “it will create problems for others,” namely those parkers who would 

have to make new arrangements for their vehicles. [Wells, Major C., “Sophisticated District 

Freeway to Open Soon,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 14, 1973] 

Finally, on November 5, 1973, at 11:20 a.m., Mayor Washington cut a red ribbon stretched 

across the two northbound lanes and the freeway was opened. He said the connection would 

“add viability to the inner city” by taking traffic off side streets.
The first person to drive through the tunnel was 25-year old Spec. 5 1.C Lennie Firsina, who told 

a reported, “Actually, I’m making history because of a mistake. I took a wrong turn back there.” 

One problem was that even though hazardous cargo was prohibited, several gasoline trucks used 

the tunnel on the first day: 

“That’s our first headache,” said Stuart Cross, a District traffic engineer. Trucking 

associations and bulk plants for oil companies will be told to route hazardous cargo 

vehicles around the freeway, Cross said. 

Hundreds of trucks used the freeway yesterday and Airis said, “That’s what we wanted. 

The freeway is designed to take trucks out of the Mall area and off residential streets.

Construction to link the Center Leg Freeway with New York Avenue was underway with the 

goal of completion in 1974. [Crosby, Thomas, “Yep, It’s Open . . . At Last,” The Washington 

Star-News, November 6, 1973] 

The Flow of Oil

From October 6 to 26, 1973, Egypt and Syria were at war with Israel. Known as the Yom Kippur 

War or the Arab-Israeli war, the battle ended with a decisive victory by Israel. 

On October 17, 1973, 11 Middle East nations, all members of the Organization of Arab 

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), proclaimed a progressively increasing monthly cut in 

exports of oil to the United States and other nations perceived as unfriendly to Arab goals. The 

cut soon became a boycott until March 1974. The OAPEC and the Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Counties (OPEC), which included non-Arab countries, used the boycott as an 

opportunity to raise the price of their oil after the boycott. 

Historian Daniel Yergin described the reaction:

What better recipe could there have been for panic prices than the oil supply situation in 

the memorable final months of 1973? The ingredients included war and violence, 

cutbacks in supply, embargoes, shortages, desperate consumers, the specter of further 

cutbacks, and the possibility that the Arabs would never restore production. Fear and 

uncertainty were pervasive and had a self-fulfilling effect: both oil companies and 

consumers frantically sought additional supplies not only for current use but also for 

storage against future shortages and the unknown. Panic buying meant extra demand in 

the market. Indeed, buyers were scrambling desperately to get any oil they could find. 

“We weren’t bidding just for oil,” said one independent refiner who did not have a secure 

source of supply. “We were bidding for our life” . . . . 

The age of shortage was at hand. The prospect, at best, was gloomy: lost economic 

growth, recession, and inflation . . . . Moreover, the United States, the world’s foremost 

superpower and the underwriter of the international order, had now been thrown on the 

defensive, humiliated, by a handful of small nations . . . . 
In the United States, the shortfall struck at fundamental beliefs in the endless abundance 

of resources, convictions so deeply rooted in the American character and experience that 

a large part of the public did not even know, up until October 1973, that the United States 

imported any oil at all. [Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & 

Power, A Touchstone Book, 1993, pages 615-616] 

Journalist and author David Halberstam described the immediate impact:

The American economy and the American people were completely unprepared for the 

change. The squandering of oil was built into the very structure of American life. 

Everyone had become dependent upon cheap energy. Almost all American cars, for 

example, had automatic transmissions, which used 25 percent more gas than the old 

manual transmission. With many American brands of car, if a buyer wanted a manual 

shift, he had to say so in advance so it could be ordered from the factory. By the time of 

the Yom Kippur War, 85 percent of the job holders in America drove to work every day – 

and as a result, public transportation had atrophied. Suddenly gas was expensive and 

scarce. In a short time it went from 36 cents a gallon to 60. People lined up for hours at 

every service station. There were fights as drivers tried to jump the line, reports of bribes, 

and even one murder committed in a struggle for gas. In the neurosis created by the 

boycott there was a new craze called “topping off,” which was an attempt to keep one’s 

tank perpetually filled. At one service station in Pittsburgh a motorist came in and bought 

11 cents’ worth, and the attendant spit in his face. The Boston police department came up 

with an interesting statistic: The number of cases of automobile arson went up 

dramatically, from 149 to 330, in the year when the gas prices jumped; most of those 

torched cars were gas guzzlers. In the first quarter of 1974 the use of gas dropped 

7 percent in the United States instead of rising the normal 7 percent. [Halberstam, David, 

The Reckoning, William P. Morrow and Company, 1986, pages 458-459] 

In an address on November 7, 1973, President Nixon advised the Nation that the energy crisis 

was “a problem we must all face together in the months and years ahead.” The Federal 

Government, he said, would take several steps, such as preventing industries and utilities that use 

coal from converting power plants to use oil, reducing the number of flights as well as the supply 

of heating oil for homes and offices by 15 percent, reducing the temperatures in government 

buildings, and speeding up the licensing and construction of nuclear power plants. He asked 

State and local officials to take appropriate steps, including: 

How many times have you gone along the highway or the freeway, wherever the case may 

be, and seen hundreds and hundreds of cars with only one individual in that car? This we 

must all cooperate to change.

Consistent with safety and economic considerations, I am also asking Governors to take 

steps to reduce highway speed limits to 50 miles per hour. This action alone, if it is 

adopted on a nationwide basis, could save over 200,000 barrels of oil a day – just 

reducing the speed limit to 50 miles per hour. 
In addition, the President indicated he would direct his staff to work with Congress on emergency 

energy legislation. It would make daylight savings time a year-round provision, relax regulations 

to balance environmental interests with energy requirements, impose energy conservation 

measures such as restrictions on working hours for shopping centers, authorize full production in 

Naval Petroleum Reserve #1 (Elk Hills, California) and the exploration and further development 

of other Naval Petroleum Reserves, including Naval Petroleum Reserve #4 in Alaska, and give 

the Federal Government authority to reduce highway speed limits throughout the Nation as well 

as the power to adjust the schedules of planes, ships, and other carriers. 

These were all short-term measures. For the long term, he outlined measures his Administration 

would take, such as launching a campaign to free the country from reliance on oil from other 

parts of the world. He was convinced the Nation had the reserves, as well as the technology to 

meet this goal. He cited the Manhattan Project and President Kennedy’s pledge to put a man on 

the moon in 10 years: 

Let us unite in committing the resources of this Nation to a major new endeavor, an 

endeavor that in this Bicentennial Era we can appropriately call “Project Independence.” 

Let us set as our national goal, in the spirit of Apollo, with the determination of the 

Manhattan Project, that by the end of this decade we will have developed the potential to 

meet our own energy needs without depending on any foreign energy sources. 

Let us pledge that by 1980, under Project Independence, we shall be able to meet 

America’s energy needs from America’s own energy resources.

Yergin said of Project Independence: 

To call this plan ambitious was a considerable understatement; it would require many 

technological advances, vast amounts of money, and a sharp swerve away from the new 

road of environmentalism. His staff had told him that the goal of energy independence by 

1980 was impossible, and suggested that it was thus silly to proclaim. Nixon overruled 

his staff. For energy was now both a crisis and high politics. 

Nixon fired his energy czar, John Love, and replaced him with Deputy Treasury Secretary 

William Simon:

Telling the Cabinet about Simon’s new post, Nixon likened it to Albert Speer’s position 

as armaments overlord in the Third Reich. Had Speer not been given the power to 

override the German bureaucracy, Nixon explained, Germany would have been defeated 

far earlier. Simon was somewhat discomfited by the comparison. Nixon further said that 

Simon would have “absolute authority.” But that was one thing he surely did not have in 

fragmented, contentious Washington. [The Prize, pages 617-618] 

In coming weeks, the country would endure drastic shortages of gasoline, turn to carpooling, give 

increased emphasis to mass transit and the bicycle, and see freeways as encouraging wasteful use 

of oil. 
What To Do About The South Leg

Robert M. Kennan, Jr., age 35, died on October 29, 1973 of an embolism after gall bladder 

surgery. Kennan, who lived on Broad Branch Road, NW., east of Connecticut Avenue not far 

from Rock Creek Park’s Beach Road, was general counsel of the National Wildlife Federation 

and a trustee of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City at the time of his death. 

Obituaries in the Star and Post described his work in the anti-freeway battles. In the Washington 

area, he had provided his legal expertise to lawsuits blocking the Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac 

River Freeway, and extension of I-66 in Arlington County. At the national level, he had been 

involved in efforts to keep Interstate highways out of Florida’s Big Cypress Swamp and the 

Sandia Crest Mountains in New Mexico. His most recent case involved litigation to open 

FHWA’s NEPA procedures to public view. One of his lawsuits had in prompted FHWA, which 

wanted to exempt 1,000 highway projects that had been initiated before NEPA from its 

requirements, to require compliance. 

The Star’s obituary was titled:

Robert Kennan, 35, Dies; 

Opponent of Freeways 

He was survived by his wife and son Alexander. [“Robert Kennan, 35, Dies; Opponent of 

Freeways,” The Washington Star-News, October 31, 1973; “Robert M. Kennan Jr., Wildlife 

Federation Aide,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 31, 1973] 

On November 14, 1973, the city council’s transportation committee circulated its draft report on 

the South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway. The committee had considered proposing to abandon 

the project, but rejected that idea:

We have . . . reached the conclusion that auto traffic through the south leg corridor cannot 

as a practical matter be eliminated or diverted and, hence, must be provided for. Not to 

build the south leg would result in environmental degradation in the project area. 

The report recommended that the South Leg Freeway include more tunneling than the 

Department of Highways and Traffic had proposed. The reported stated that, “If any roadway is 

to exist – under any set of assumptions . . . the necessity for a roadway seems clear – a subsurface 

one is clearly preferable.” 

Eisen indicated that the report called for more tunneling than previously proposed: 

As revised by D.C. highway department planners, the new proposal calls for putting about 

48 per cent of the length of the 1 1⁄2 mile, six-lane road in tunnels at the outset, with 

provisions for complete tunneling later. The original plan called for shorter tunnel 

sections with the balance in depressed ditches out of sight of most park visitors . . . . 
The freeway project would include the removal of Independence Avenue, now a busy 

commuter artery, in West Potomac Park, to be replaced by local park roads.

Director Airis indicated the South Leg Freeway would include reserved lanes for buses. 

The plan was consistent with the plan that Transportation Secretary Volpe and Interior Secretary 

Morton had agreed to in May 1971, but Eisen added: 

By a touch of irony, the project is being proposed for approval at a time of a major 

shortage of petroleum-generated energy and when public policy emphasizes mass transit 

over highways. [Eisen, Jack, “Inner Loop South Leg, Tunneling Urged,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, November 15, 1973] 

On November 17, Delegate Fauntroy issued a statement denouncing the planned project. “It’s a 

silly way to spend $110 million,” he said. “This is a road that nobody needs and nobody wants. 

It would be enormously destructive to the entire area.” 

He acknowledged that he had supported the South Leg Freeway as a four-lane tunnel in 1968 

when he chaired the city council’s transportation committee. Now, he said, the proposal was 

“much worse” than the earlier plan, in part because “conditions have changed dramatically since 

then.” He explained, “In view of the energy crisis, the last thing we need to do is to encourage 

new freeways.”

Three other council members from that earlier period also assailed the new proposal. Former 

Chairman Hechinger pointed out that the freeway was intended to handle increased downtown 

traffic generated by I-66 in Arlington, the Three Sisters Bridge, and a Potomac River Parkway in 

the Canal Road corridor. All three projects, he pointed out, were stalled and probably would 

never be built. Hechinger thought that if the city council decided to advance the freeway, it 

should at least hold a public hearing on the project. 

Former Councilwoman Shackleton pointed out that, “Without the Three Sisters Bridge and the 

other roads, this freeway makes no sense.” Feinberg, Lawrence, “$110 Million Road Project Is 

Assailed,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 18, 1973] 

Councilman Tedson J. Meyers, a member of the transportation committee, had voted against the 

report in a 2 to 1 vote. President Nixon had nominated Meyers, 43 years old, in January 1972 to 

fill the seat held by former Councilman Yeldell, who had resigned on November 30, 1971, to 

become Director of the District Department of Human Resources. Because Meyers, like Yeldell, 

was a Democrat, his appointment had not changed the political balance of the city council. 

Meyers was, however, white, thus changing the racial mix. Meyers, who took the oath of office 

in March 1972, was a communications attorney with the firm of Sullivan, Beauregard, Meyers, 

and Parkson. He and his wife live with their two children, ages 4 and 2, at 1828 Wyoming 

Avenue, NW., in the Adams Morgan neighborhood. 

Meyers issued a nine-page minority report opposing the freeway and urging the city council to set 

a date for a public hearing. The goals of the freeway, his report stated, were unclear. He said, 

“The Environmental Impact Statement clearly admits that no survey has been taken analyzing the 
source of traffic and its destination” along the proposed route. “We have only the projections of 

the proposing agency. There is very little – if any – balance of data.”

In the absence of a traffic survey, Meyers had taken a 2-hour helicopter ride a few days earlier to 

monitor Friday morning traffic. “For a good part of that time, we just hovered at about 500 feet 

and took a long look.” He used a stop watch to measure traffic flow per minute. He observed 

that “a relatively small percentage of the traffic flowing onto Independence Avenue arrives in this 

city over the interstate freeway source [Theodore Roosevelt Bridge] for which I-695 is proposed 

as a relieving link.” He explained, “It appears that the largest source of south or southeast bound 

traffic entering the center city from the west in the morning rush is not the I-66 interstate 

highway at all [Theodore Roosevelt Bridge], but Rock Creek Parkway.” His estimate was that 

the parkway provided “at least 50 percent” of westbound traffic on Independence Avenue. 

In short, “There is no showing of need” for the South Leg as planned. “Thus, as an urgently 

needed connection between I-66 and I-295, the case for the South Leg Freeway is by no means 

clear,” he said. “We should demand more proof.” 

In his view, the flow of the largest traffic volumes, from Rock Creek Parkway, could be eased 

with a few interchanges and overpasses to reduce crossroad delays. Further, the coming of Metro 

was another reason for delay because until its impact on traffic was known, the city could not say 

with certainty that additional freeways were needed. “Moreover,” he said, “the immediate fuel 

shortage, and the poor long-range prospects for the petroleum sources, suggests that now is not 

the time to build another freeway.” 

Councilman Rockwood H. Foster, whom President Nixon had nominated to the council on 

September 21, 1972, was noncommittal. Foster was a former foreign service officer and member 

of the city’s board of education who lived in a Georgetown condominium at 3047 West Lane 

Keys. He had not read Meyer’s report. “I’ll have to wait and see what happens” when the city 

council meets on November 19 to decide what to do. [Eisen, William A., “South Leg Freeway 

Decision Postponed, The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 19, 1973; “Civic 

Leaders Protest Plans for the South Leg,” The Washington Star-News, November 19, 1973] 

The city council had been expected to add the project to its agenda for November 19 and 20. 

However, Chairman Nevius decided on the evening of November 18 to remove it from the 

agenda. He took the action in concurrence with the Rev. Moore, chairman of the transportation 

committee. Moore said the delay was appropriate to permit “further deliberations,” although he 

did not explain how they would be conducted. Chairman Nevius explained, “The decision was 

made sometime Thursday to take it off the Tuesday agenda. Several people have injected new 

thoughts on the plan, and we want to look into it more deeply.” 

Vice Chairman Tucker thought that instead of considering the South Leg Freeway, the council 

should take an overall look at freeway plans. In that way, the council could decide which should 

be killed. 

Councilman Foster was disappointed by the postponement. If given a chance to vote, he told a 

reporter, he might vote against the freeway.
Despite the decision to call off the vote, about 50 people gathered in the wide hall outside the city 

council’s chamber on November 19 to protest the South Leg Freeway in front of local television 

cameras. They had been summoned by Hechinger, who had invited many familiar names, 

including Sammie Abbott, Marion Barry, Jr. (then chairman of the Board of Education), 

Reginald Booker, Grosvenor Chapman, Julius Hobson, Angela Rooney, and former council 

members Polly Shackleton and Stanley J. Anderson. Helen Leavitt, author of SuperhighwaySuperhoax was there (Eisen said of the book that it “has become a textbook for freeway fighters 

across the land”).

Eisen described the protest: 

They were black and white, Georgetowners and ghetto dwellers and a sprinkling of 

suburbanites, people of affluence and others of modest means, joined together in a cause 

that perhaps above all others has unified Washington civic leaders . . . . Nothing else, 

except threatened increases in bus fares that were opposed by many of the same people, 

seemed to excite so much attention.

A series of court decisions and governmental actions killed some of the freeway projects 

and put others in cold storage. As a cohesive group, the antifreeway coalition fell apart . . 

. . 

As antifreeway rallies go, the whole affair yesterday was rather subdued and could prove 

to be anticlimactic. For the freeway foes already had won a tactical victory.

The victory was the city council’s postponement of the vote. 

Hechinger, who had supported the freeway plan in 1968 as a victory for anti-freeway forces, said 

“there is no longer a reason to assume that the D.C. recommendations of the 1960s” were valid in 

the 1970s in view of Metro construction, current gasoline shortages, and growing air pollution. 

Freeways such as the South Leg Freeway were going to destroy Washington. “The time to put 

this on the shelf is now.” 

Anderson said the South Leg “may be obsolete by the time it’s finished with the trend taking 

place in the country today as a result of the energy crisis.” 

Several protesters, Eisen reported, said “the road should be killed as a useless monument to a 

disappearing age of automobile commuting.” As for those Virginia and Montgomery County 

commuters who favored the freeway, they should use transit: 

The bluntest comment on the road project was voiced by veteran civic activist Hobson, 

who is suffering from a currently arrested case of spinal cancer. Getting out of his 

wheelchair and standing erect, Hobson said of the road: “To hell with it – we don’t want 

to see it built.” [Elsen, William A., “South Leg Freeway Decision Postponed,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, November 19, 1973; Eisen, Jack, “Antifreeway 

Campaigners Reassemble,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 20, 1973 
“Civic Leaders Protest Plans for the South leg,” The Washington Star-News, November 

19, 1973] 

In an editorial, the Post agreed with the decision: 

Much more thought is needed on all these points [raised by Meyers] before giving a goahead to dig up the Mall on the basis of outdated studies and questionable assumptions. 

The council should take a fresh look at all freeway plans, not in light of what looked right 

even five years ago, but what will meet the latest traffic needs and environmental 

considerations. As we have said previously, we continue to believe that, in time and with 

full respect for the laws that still bind this city’s ability to act, Washington’s planners can 

come up with more satisfactory answers to the region’s transportation problems. 

[“Freeways Again,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 1, 1973] 

Members of the city council were not impressed by the anti-freeway rally. They saw it as a 

prelude to political fights that would erupt if home rule legislation pending in Congress was 

approved, with the result being elections for the city’s leaders. “The people,” Vice Chairman 

Tucker said, “ought to understand the nature of some of the attacks.” 

Referring to the statements by former council members Anderson, Hechinger, and Shackleton, 

the Reverend Moore said, “It’s a sort of warmed-over crowd that came down here to deal with 

warmed-over issues left over by them.” He and Chairman Nevius noted that the three former 

members had supported the South Leg link not that long ago. 

Hechinger could not be reached for comment, but former Councilwoman Shackleton 

acknowledged that she would like to run if an elected council were approved under the home rule 

legislation. However, she denied that political ambition had anything to do with her statements 

at the rally:

Whether home rule or not home rule, I think we would have gone ahead with this 

[freeway] issue because it is one we have all been involved in. If they want to call it 

political, everything is political; it’s the name of the game.

She pointed out that the 1968 plan that the three former members had supported contained more 

freeways than she supported, but they did so to free the funds to get Metro construction 

underway: 

As John Hechinger said at the press conference, time have changed since 1968. We have 

air pollution problems and a fuel crisis that we didn’t have then. It just doesn’t make any 

sense to build more freeways. [Eisen, Jack, “Attacks on City Council Held ‘Political,’” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 21, 1973] 

Post editors commented on the change in attitude: 

Nary a local official had said the word aloud in some time, and little wonder – for nothing 

in umpteen years has managed to set off as much united community clamor as the 

mention of freeways. But, sad to say, the word was back in circulation last week, as was 
the old familiar core of vocal antifreeway crusaders. Subject of this latest alert was a 

revived plan for a proposed superhighway, known technically as Interstate Route 695 and 

less affectionately as the South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway.

Recalling that the history of the route dates to the 1960s “or maybe even back to 1946,” the 

editors explained that what had brought it before the city council was “the question of approving 

a design, which has been dubbed ‘Plan A (modified),’ and which has yet to be seen in model 

form.”

They praised Councilman Meyers for his insight into the need for the freeway: 

Having monitored the traffic flow from a helicopter on two recent mornings, Mr. Meyers 

found reason to believe that the largest flow of traffic – from Rock Creek parkway – 

might easily be improved with a few interchanges and overpasses “costing far less than 

$111 million” needed for the South Leg. 

The editors agreed with Councilman Meyers that now, in the midst of an energy crisis was “not 

the time to build another freeway.” The city council should take a fresh look at the need for the 

South Leg Freeway “before giving a go-ahead to dig up the Mall on the basis of outdated studies 

and questionable assumptions.” The editors concluded: 

As we have said previously, we continue to believe that, in time and with full respect for 

the laws that still bind this city’s ability to act, Washington’s planners can come up with 

more satisfactory answers to the region’s transportation problems. [“Freeways Again,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 3, 1973, italics in original] 

On December 29, Mayor Washington wrote to Chairman Moore of the transportation committee 

to rescind approval of the South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway. He did not ask the city council 

to kill the project, only that the project “not go forward at this time.” His primary stated reason 

for withdrawing support was concern about disruption to the park area during the Bicentennial:

Among the issues that have been raised during Council consideration is whether the 

project can be completed in time for the bicentennial observance. I must report that it is 

not now possible to give such an assurance for the whole project.

The first phase of the freeway project, the tunnel under the Lincoln Memorial grounds might 

“under tight scheduling” be completed by January 1, 1976, but Mayor Washington was uncertain 

even of that schedule. “It is vital that no part of this area be torn up by construction during this 

period, if that can be avoided.” 

Concern about Bicentennial visitors was, Mayor Washington wrote, fortuitous because “it will 

provide an opportunity to consider other issues which have arisen recently which could affect the 

South Leg project.” The energy crisis and EPA’s air quality requirements were on his mind: 

We can expect major shifts of persons from automobile use to mass transit because of 

transportation strategies which we must follow in order to meet air quality standards and 

other environmental considerations. 
He ordered Director Airis “to explore, in consultation with interested federal agencies, possible 

surface road improvements” in the park. 

The Star’s article on the letter contained a heading over the title asking:

Death of Freeway?

One “council source” said that Mayor Washington’s letter “kills what was already a dead issue 

with the Council.” Since Chairman Nevius had postponed consideration of the South Leg 

Freeway on November 20, the city council had not taken any action on the South Leg Freeway. 

Chairman Moore said, “The best way to describe where that freeway issue sits now is in limbo.”

Councilman Meyers called Mayor Washington’s letter “a step backward in the right direction.” 

Former Councilwoman Shackleton said, “It looks like the end of that one. It’s good news. The 

citizens have accomplished their purpose.” ECTC Chairman Booker also was pleased. “We’re 

glad he dropped it,” but he doubted the stated reasons, saying “we think it’s mainly for political 

considerations, with home rule impending. He wants to make himself attractive to voters and 

sees tremendous opposition [to freeways] in the black community as a political reality.” [Eisen, 

William A., “Mayor Drops Support for Freeway Leg,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 30, 1973; Braeden, David, “Mayor Orders South Leg Delay,” The Washington StarNews, December 30, 1973] 

(Part 10 will discuss the pending home rule and the desire to appeal to voters.) 

Star editors, writing on January 3, 1974, were not happy about Mayor Washington’s letter, 

calling it “regrettable.” His argument was “at least an arguable basis for reversing his prior proconstruction position.” Under the circumstances, completing it before the Bicentennial was 

unlikely. As a result, “it is prudent to put the whole thing in deep freeze.” 

The editors, however, gave Mayor Washington little credit for ensuring the park would not be 

torn up when visitors arrived in 1976: 

There is, of course, a further reason why any tears shed by the mayor on this occasion are 

of the crocodile variety: The anti-freeway forces had threatened to make a pollical issue 

of the West Potomac Park freeway in the District’s forthcoming local election campaigns 

– and indeed city council members already were back-pedaling from their own previous 

positions of support. Given that scenario, it is unlikely that Mayor Washington is 

unhappy to see the issue neutralized. 

What galls us, though, is how thoroughly this project has been made the victim of an 

emotional wave of generalized anti-freeway sentiment.

After all, highway builders had not designed the plan; it was proposed by NPS officials. “Among 

its harshest critics today are former city council members who not so long ago had supported its 

construction. 
As for Mayor Washington’s instruction to the Department of Highways and Traffic to explore 

surface roadway improvements, “there is virtually nothing of consequence in that context to 

explore.” The editors concluded: 

A plan of potential benefit to the city has been allowed to slip down the drain, and it’s too 

bad. 

The title of the Star editorial was “End of the Road.” 

The Post’s editorial board, which had abandoned the newspaper’s long-time advocacy for 

freeways, began its editorial:

Score one for Washington’s vigilant and vocal anti-freeway brigade: You won’t have the 

South Leg to kick around anymore. 

It agreed with Mayor Washington’s stated reason for abandoning “this long-planned 

desecration.” If his “political antennae” had something to do with it, “we can only say that it is 

an excellent example of how the right to elect our local government ought to affect the decisions 

made in city hall.” Nevertheless, his decision “should not be attributed solely to political 

considerations”: 

It is a recognition that this city needs to take a fresh look at all freeway and transportation 

plans, not in light of what looked right even five years ago, but what will meet the latest 

traffic needs and environmental considerations . . . . 

We continue to believe that, in time and with full respect for the laws that bind this city as 

well as the desires of its voters, Washington can come up with satisfactory answers to the 

region’s transportation needs. [“Freeways – And Political Inroads,” The Washington 

Post, January 7, 1974] 

(In 1974, the Post removed Times Herald from its name and returned to its original name, The 

Washington Post.) 

On January 14, 1974, the city council voted to shelve plans for the South Leg Freeway for an 

indefinite period. “Without one word of debate,” Eisen reported, the city council acted after 

Chairman Moore of the transportation committee repeated Mayor Washington’s words. 

The impact of the decision was unclear because, in theory, the city council could revive the 

freeway it was shelving only at this time. [Eisen, Jack, “D.C. Council Shelves Plan For 

Freeway,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 15, 1974; “Council Shelves South 

Leg,” The Washington Star-News, January 15, 1974] 

In Virginia, I-66 Moves Forward 

The parallel battle in Virginia over I-66 continued as the entrenched opposition pursued every 

option to force the entrenched VDH to kill the Interstate freeway inside the Capital Beltway.
Even the plan to provide at least $1 million for park improvements as mitigation for construction 

of I-66 drew criticism. The freeway would require acquisition of five park parcels totaling about 

22 acres. Compensation for that parkland might be more than the total acreage and the projected 

$1 million. Just weeks before the deadline for the consultant report, however, Chairman Munsey 

of the Arlington County Board, said, “I wish they’d give us those kind of [park] funds directly 

rather than trading them for a miserable road.” 

The idea that highway officials would find substitute parkland alongside I-66 prompted questions 

about whether such parkland would be usable. ACT’s James Govan said, “It would be like 

picnicking next to I-95. Who wants to?” 

Nevertheless, Charles H. Russell of Citizens for I-66 said that highway officials were “not going 

to short-change the citizens of Virginia.” Referring to the State slogan, he added, “Virginia is for 

lovers, and what that means is lovers of beauty.” [Mathews, Jay, “I-66 Park Fund Termed Both 

Benefit, Bribe,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 1, 1973] 

Two weeks before the deadline, a public opinion poll conducted by the Bureau of Social Science 

Research for the consultant study reported on public attitudes in the District of Columbia about 

transportation. The poll, a companion to the earlier study of northern Virginia residents, 

suggested that a plurality of District residents (37.6 percent) favored construction of I-66 in 

Virginia, while 17.3 percent opposed it and 55.1 percent said they did not know or care about 

I-66. 

However, the new survey revealed that for District residents, I-66 was not a high priority. Over 

60 percent of the 284 residents surveyed had not heard about I-66 or the Three Sisters Bridge, 

and 24 percent had never heard of the Metro rapid rail system. Only 2 percent of District 

residents said road improvements were most important, while 72 percent put bus and rapid rail 

transit at the top of their priority list.

According to the Post: 

The 102-page report on the public opinion survey . . . . looks at attitudes on the long 

delayed highway by seemingly every imaginable population group: liberals, moderates 

and conservatives; bus riders and automobile drivers; those living inside the Beltway and 

those outside the Beltway. Although nearly every group polled produced a majority or 

plurality in support of the highway, liberals, bus riders and those living inside the Beltway 

were the least enthusiastic about I-66. 

In northern Virginia, 58.6 percent of those polled “said they would or probably would switch to 

buses or rapid rail transit if those forms of public transportation were improved to their 

satisfaction.” 

The Govans claimed the results was “not valid.” Emilia noticed that “people who never heard 

about I-66 were asked to express an opinion.” People who are unconcerned about the highway, 

she pointed out, were more likely to favor it. James said, “If the poll means anything at all, it 

means that the public has made a clear and overwhelming choice in favor of mass transit.”
Because of the small sample size, the bureau said the results could be off by as much as 

10 percent. [Mathews, Jay, “D.C. Citizens’ Support for Rte. 66 Lukewarm,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, September 14, 1973; Crosby, Thomas, “I-66 Project Found Unknown to 

Many,” The Washington Star-News, September 13, 1973] 

Howard, Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff missed Virginia’s deadline for the environmental 

report and the deadline of October 1 imposed by Senator Scott’s amendment to the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1973. Project manager Fowler told reporters he knew of no penalties for 

missing either deadline, but thought the report could be completed by the end of October. 

[Crosby, Thomas, “I-66 Ecology Study Deadline Missed,” The Washington Star-News, 

October 3, 1973] 

The U.S. Department of Transportation, according to a spokesman, also acknowledged that as a 

result of the delay in Virginia, it would miss Senator Scott’s deadline for completing its review 

by December 31. ACT praised the Federal officials for not trying to meet the statutory deadline. 

If they had tried to do so, James Govan said, “There would be just that much less time for public 

reaction” to the EIS. The Post pointed out: 

Although the Scott amendment sets out strict deadlines for various stages of a courtordered highway review, it provides no penalties if the deadlines are not met. [Mathews, 

Jay, “Late Report Delays Action on Inside-Beltway I-66 Leg,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, October 6, 1973] 

On November 16, about 2 months late, Virginia released the consultant’s 400-page draft EIS. In 

the Post, reporter Jay Mathews summarized the options studied: 

(1) The base case, the existing transportation system plus Metro and some exclusive 

 bus lanes; 

(2) The transit option, more bus lines to Metro stops; 

(3) The highway option, essentially I-66 with some other road improvements; 

(4) The multi-mode/new facility option, a combination of the first three options; and 

(5) The multi-mode/road improvements options, a combination of the first two 

 options with widening of some other roads or partial construction of I-66. 

The report stated:

The evaluation of the alternatives shows that I-66 would be of significant benefit to both 

users and nonusers traveling within the corridor. However, the other options also would 

have significant benefits.

Although the report, as Mathews put it, found “significant benefit” from I-66 if constructed, it 

painted a “dark picture . . . of I-66’s air pollution, destruction of scarce parkland and ‘major 

disruptive impacts’ in Arlington County.” I-66 would cut travel time in half and reduce traffic on 

the George Washington Memorial Parkway and many streets in the District. “Its beneficial 

impact on local streets is most significant in Falls Church, where I-66 adjacent to the city would 

serve as a bypass for through trips.” 
The report also noted the results of the opinion survey. “Community sentiment as measured by 

the community attitudinal survey indicates a consensus in favor of constructing I-66.” 

By contrast, Mathews observed: 

Yet notations of the road’s disadvantages appeared far more frequently throughout the 

six-pound mass of maps, graphs and colored charts that made up the impact survey. 

The highway would improve accessibility, but “would result in more heavily congested 

conditions” than any option except one (the present situation plus Metro). “Street intersections 

adjacent to highway interchanges would experience congested conditions due to the large 

numbers of turning movements that would occur.” The highway would produce significantly 

larger noise impacts than the other options, except no-build. “Air pollution impacts – in terms of 

both emissions and ambient concentrations – are predicted to be higher for the highway option 

than for any other option” and would “have significant deleterious impact on the lands in the 

vicinity of the I-66 facility.” With reduced energy consumption now a national priority, the 

report said that mass transit options, minus I-66, would produce the highest energy savings. 

The report also considered whether the coming of Metro would eliminate the need for I-66: 

Analyses . . . indicate that the construction of the Vienna Metro line generally will absorb 

the growth of radially oriented travel demand if I-66 is not built. 

However, automobile use would not decline, with congestion on other roads continuing during 

peak periods if I-66 were not built. 

The report stated that I-66 should not be built unless the Three Sisters Bridge was built: 

The additional river capacity is required to accommodate the traffic which would use I-66 

and the roadways connecting to I-66 and I-266 (a spur connecting I-66 to Three Sisters) as 

currently envisioned. 

Mathews considered the report “at least a limited victory” for ACT, an assessment that ACT 

shared. Emilia Govan said, “I’m delighted. I had hoped the study would show that mass transit 

can do the job, do it better than I-66 and with fewer adverse social and environmental impacts, 

and that’s what it seems to show. [Mathews, Jay, “I-66 Report Mixed,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, November 17, 1973] 

By a 4-1 vote, the Arlington County Board adopted a resolution expressing “clear-cut 

opposition” to I-66, describing the route as “seriously detrimental to the welfare of the county.” 

The crowd of about 100 citizens cheered the vote. The only dissenter, Dr. Kenneth Haggerty, 

would be replaced on January 1, 1974, by Ellen Bozman, who had campaigned against I-66. 

The vote took place at a hearing where 50 speakers addressed the board. Only four favored 

construction of I-66. “Most speakers,” according to the Star account, who opposed the extension 

“warned about excessive noise and air pollution from the freeway and urged instead that more 
mass transit be provided in the corridor where the I-66 segment is planned.” [“Arlington Board 

Votes ‘No’ on I-66,” The Washington Star-News, December 5, 1973; Shaffer, Ron, “Arlington 

Board Votes Against I-66,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 5, 1973] 

VDH held a week of public hearings on I-66, beginning December 17 in the 700-seat ballroom of 

the Ramada Inn in Rosslyn at 1900 North Fort Myer Drive. The hearings were to begin each day 

at 8 a.m. and, with breaks, end at midnight or after 3:00 a.m. Those asking to testify were 

assigned days and times. According to VDH, about 240 speakers and organizations had been 

scheduled, with individuals assigned 15 minutes and organizations given 30 minutes. 

For example, a Federal planner who had “waited for months to speak at the final scheduled 

public hearing on the extension of I-66” was assigned 15 minutes on December 19 at 3:30 a.m. 

“It’s very disappointing. I believe the state could do better in scheduling the speakers. I may just 

mail my speech in.”

Ashton C. Jones, Jr., of Citizens for I-66 said the late-night scheduling was “unfortunate,” but 

declined further comment. Jim Govan of ACT was more open: 

I’ve never heard of such a thing; it’s just ridiculous. What working person is going to 

show up at a public hearing at 2 a.m.? To me this is a way of the highway department 

saying, “We don’t care whether you come or not.” [Shaffer, Ron, “Late Night Hearing 

Set On I-66,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 12, 1973] 

Before the proceedings, Citizens for I-66 held a news conference to make the point that their 

group represented thousands of people, while the antihighway forces consisted basically of 

individuals. Spokesman John Hoerner said, “Any two housewives can get together and say 

‘we’re for clean air’ or something like that.” In response, Emilia Govan told reporters, “That’s 

just ridiculous.” Both groups claimed about 1,200 dues paying members. 

The first day included 22 speakers against the highway and seven in favor. The Post described 

the first day:

A week of nearly nonstop public hearings on the proposed extension of Interstate Rte. 66 

through Arlington got under way yesterday with generally restrained presentations by 

factions for and against the highway despite their violent clash of convictions. 

As expected, prohighway people stressed the need for a faster route from the outlying 

suburbs to the District of Columbia, and those against the highway extension said it 

would provide for a far less efficient use of energy than would mass transit development. 

The feelings of speakers did occasionally “boil over,” as when Sammie Abbott addressed the 

hearings:

“This hearing should be held in an insane asylum,” speaker Sam Abbott screamed at the 

dozen highway department officials and consultants sitting somberly before him. In light 

of the energy crisis, Abbott yelled, “it would be insane to consider the slightest increase 

in the use of the automobile.” 
Abbott, for years the area’s most vocal freeway foe, was thanked for his presentation by 

chairman Jimmie H. Singleton, an adviser to the highway department, and gaveled to 

silence after he berated the highway officials for failing to take up his invitation for 

questions. 

Emilia Govan criticized the highway officials for not providing adequate notice of what she 

considered a rushed hearing. She also charged that VDH had prejudged the outcome in favor of 

the “multimode option.” She argued that if VDH chose that option, the highway officials would 

build I-66 and wait for others to provide the transit option that might never materialize. 

She added that contrary to supporters’ claim that commuters on I-66 would save 30 minutes, the 

savings would be more like 15 minutes, about the same as for transit with less pollution and 

energy consumption. 

To prove her point about prejudging the outcome, she submitted letters that Virginia Secretary of 

Transportation Wayne Whitham had sent informing two Arlington residents that barring a court 

order, VDH would build I-66. She told the hearing: 

We have evidence that the Commonwealth of Virginia has made a decision to build I-66 

before considering the views expressed at the court-ordered public hearing and before the 

final impact statement has been prepared. 

Whitham responded, “I have favored I-66 and my position hasn’t changed. The requirement of 

the court having been fulfilled, I believe that’s also the policy of the [highway] commission.” 

Fugate added, “The commission has adopted I-66.” 

James Govan pointed out that the multimodal option was not really an alternative to I-66 because 

it included construction of the Interstate highway. 

Opponents did not expect to convince VDH to abandon I-66. Rather, they contended transit was 

a feasible alternative. In that case, Section 4(f) would prevent Secretary Brinegar from approving 

the taking of any parkland. 

Arlington County Board Chairman Munsey expressed concern about noise impacts that seven 

schools along I-66 would “suffer,” possibly causing them to close. Mass transit, he said, would 

be safer, just as fast, and reduce congestion better than the highway. 

Virginia State Senator Omer L. Hirst (D-Fairfax County) said: 

Northern Virginia is automobile dependent and there is no . . . expert opinion that 

contends that counties like Fairfax, Loudoun and Prince William . . . will be able to do 

away with the personal automobile. 

He predicted that I-66 “would do more to relieve the present congestion on various streets and 

roads in Arlington and Fairfax counties . . . than any other construction.” 
The Reverend Gipson, the long-time freeway opponent representing the Upper Northeast 

Coordinating Council in the District, said construction of I-66 would simply funnel more 

vehicles onto the District’s already overcrowded roads. “We’re very concerned about any 

proposal that brings more roads at us.” [Shaffer, Ron, “Start of Hearings on I-66 Is Calm,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 18, 1973; Kast, Heilah, “I-66 Decided On?” The 

Washington Star-News, December 18, 1973] 

During the December 18 hearing, I-66 supporters dominated the testimony. Citizens for I-66’s 

Jones argued that building I-66 would save gasoline because it would eliminate much of the stopand-go traffic on area streets. He said that I-66 would relieve congestion on the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway and State Route 123 while providing an improved link to the 

Dulles Access Road. As for the impact on Arlington schools, he said they “have had ample time 

to prepare” for the highway. 

Another member of Citizens for I-66, John Hoerner, took exception to the anti-highway 

argument that freeways induce traffic to the point of congestion, making transit the best option. 

He argued that, “The trains run empty during off hours in every transit system. This wastes 

tremendous energy.” 

The group’s chairman, Harrison Mann, supported the multimode option. The combination of 

I-66, Metro, and feeder bus lines to the Metro stations would result in more passenger-carrying 

capacity than the highway or transit alone. 

Some critics testified. James B. Sullivan, director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, 

accused consultants of “seriously underestimating” the air pollution that would result from 

construction of I-66. The Star summarized a related line of attack:

Twenty economists from the Public Interest Economics Center criticized the study 

because “it under estimates the cost of the proposed transportation options while 

overestimating their benefits.

The economists said nothing but the so-called “base case” – the existing transportation 

for foreseeable improvements – would be justifiable in cost. 

As the Post and Star pointed out, the spur of I-66, namely the I-266 Three Sisters Bridge, also 

was in the news that day. Judge Sirica held a hearing to consider a request by the plaintiffs for 

the government to pay their fees. Assistant Corporation Counsel Thomas C. Bell of the District 

of Columbia told Judge Sirica the city still planned to build the bridge, but was awaiting approval 

for the project from Secretary Brinegar. Judge Sirica asked, “Why has it taken so long?” Bell 

did not have a clear answer, but referred to new Federal environmental requirements that were 

being applied to the bridge project. “It’s very slow progress . . . . We are mandated to build this 

bridge by Congress.” 

After the hearing, a Department spokesman told a reporter that Secretary Brinegar would not 

decide whether to approve the Three Sisters Bridge until the fate of I-66 is decided. “We’re in a 

holding pattern until the hearings are complete,” the spokesman said. [Kast, Shielah, “I-66 
Backers Dominate Hearing,” The Washington Star-News, December 19, 1973; Shaffer, Ron, 

“Adversaries Over Route I-66 Coexist,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 19, 

1973; “DOT Delays Decision on 3 Sisters Bridge,” The Washington Post, December 19, 1973] 

On December 19, ACT accused Virginia highway officials of having decided to build I-66 before 

the week-long hearings began. “From the evidence we’ve seen,’ Emilia Govan said, “the 

decision has already been made at the state level to build the highway, and if that’s true, that’s 

contempt of the court order.” She also wondered whether highway officials would take the time 

to read the voluminous transcript of the hearings and what weight would be given to critical 

comments.

With a reporter in listening distance, VDH’s A. K. Hunsberger, cochair of the hearings, told her 

that he favored building the multimodal option. That was not the official position, as Fugate 

made clear to the reporter. State highway officials were “going to reevaluate” their decision to 

build I-66. “The Highway Commission will review the question very carefully and come up with 

another decision on the matter.” Highway officials assured the reporter that each member of the 

Virginia Highway Commission would receive a copy of the transcript and the testimony “will be 

read.” Meanwhile, Hunsberger pointed out that he was simply stating “my opinion” and that he 

had “an open mind” on all the options under consideration. He added that critical issues raised 

during the hearings “would be responded to” by the State’s consultants before any decision is 

made. 

Attendance at the day’s hearing was sparse, with no more than 60 present in a ballroom at the 

Rosslyn Ramada Inn that could seat 700: 

In yesterday’s testimony, Martha V. Pennino, Fairfax County Supervisor from the 

Centreville District, said the arrival of the Metro system in the suburbs will not reduce the 

need for a highway from western Fairfax County to the District. “As this area continues 

to grow, so will the use of the automobile,” she said. 

Other prohighway speakers said the road extension is necessary to stimulate development 

in the Northern Virginia suburbs beyond the Beltway. Opponents said the extension 

would not relieve total traffic in Arlington as proponents maintain, but would generate 

even more traffic. [Shaffer, Ron, “Foes of I-66 See Plans as Already Set,” The 

Washington Post, December 20, 1973] 

By December 20, the “seemingly endless flow of speakers for and against” I-66 was “suffering 

occasional interruption now.” Speakers, pro and con, were repeating the same points, as the 

Post summarized: “The highway will ruin the environment, shorten commuter time, waste 

energy, promote business activity.” During a brief recess for lack of a speaker, Singleton 

characterized the 53 hours of testimony thus far: 

There’s a day-time and a night-time population. The night-time opponents are 

completely prepared with technical expertise. Their main objective I’m afraid is to render 

the consultants’ expertise inaccurate. They say you are going to increase pollution and 

congestion and destroy the quality of life.
The proponents have not done so much from the technical sense; they seem to say that 

common sense says we need it. I think the “pros” are representing many more people in 

Northern Virginia. 

By his calculation, the hearing thus far had included 111 speakers in favor of I-66, and 106 

against its construction.

Reflecting the pace, a police officer on security duty described the hearing as “drag time.”

A member of ACT, Kathy Freshley, said her group was calling people “on our side who couldn’t 

come so they can at least submit their statements for the record.” She added, “It’s an 

extraordinary time for a fight five days before Christmas, but if you didn’t testify it would be 

railroaded right through. We’ve got to be counted.” 

Pro-I-66 forces wanted to respond to Emilia Govan’s claim that State highway officials had 

decided to build the highway even before the hearings began. Citizens for I-66’s Mann called 

that claim, “Pure poppycock” and said that Govan was making “self-serving charges to use in 

further delaying tactics through the court.” 

When printed copies of his statement were being distributed, Govan commented “we can’t even 

get our statements typed. We just don’t have the money to do that.” She added, “There’s a 

difference in style between our groups.” 

The two sides had taken rooms, for $23 a day, at the Ramada Inn. Emilia Govan explained: 

On our side it’s been a spontaneous grass roots effort with very scrimpy financing. We 

are operating on a shoestring. I was hesitant to get a room here, but it turned out to be a 

necessity. We had to have a place to work.

As the Post pointed out, pro and con speakers may have fallen into repetitive arguments, but the 

sides differed in the accommodations. By contrast with ACT, the pro-highway forces’ suite was 

“filled with people drinking coffee they had bought from the hotel management and 

enthusiastically describing the hearings as ‘sort of a little political campaign’”:

The differences between the two groups were apparent: the proponents had two electric 

typewriters, the opponents had an old manual; the proponents rented two tables at $109 a 

day in front of the ballroom, the opponents have only one. [Kiernan, Laura A., “Views on 

I-66 Resolved to 4 Key Points,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 21, 

1973] 

On the fifth day of the hearings, WMATA Deputy General Manager Quenstedt testified that 

failure to build I-66 inside the Capital Beltway would result in “extremely high additional costs” 

for the Metro line to Virginia. He insisted he was not endorsing I-66, but simply urging officials 

to decide the fate of the highway as soon as possible so Metro could proceed accordingly. “We 

are committed to construct this route as expeditiously as possible, whatever decision is made on 

I-66.” 
If I-66 were built, Metro and the highway builders could proceed at the same time. If I-66 were 

not built, Metro would “have to implement extensive design changes that will result in an 

extremely high additional cost.” The current design was based on grading, draining, retaining 

walls, site elevation, and bridge lengths with construction in the median of I-66 in mind. 

Quenstedt also pointed out that the right-of-way for I-66 cost about $22 million, but if I-66 were 

not built, the land would revert to the original owner. If Metro had to buy its own right-of-way, 

the cost would be far higher in the current market. “But if we have to go back through the 

process of condemning and buying once again, we’ll do just that, because the board has already 

decided we’re going to go down that corridor.” 

Pro and con forces responded to Quenstedt’s testimony. Mann said the testimony was “vitally 

important and shows that Metro regards I-66 as complementary to the Metro system.” Emilia 

Govan said, “I was afraid of something like that. His remarks indicate that the people who run 

Metro have always been in bed with the highway boys and are not interested in providing good 

rapid transit for this area.” She pointed out that the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 would 

allow Virginia to request withdrawal of I-66 inside the Capital Beltway from the Interstate 

System in return for funds for rail rapid transit, thus addressing Metro’s cost concerns. [Omang, 

Joanne, “Metro Aide Backs I-66, Cites Costs,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 22, 1973; “Metro Rail Tied to I-66,” The Washington Star-News, December 22, 1973] 

By the end of the 5-day I-66 hearings, the Post said that, “339 speakers representing individuals, 

civic organizations and governmental bodies spoke during the 84 hours of hearings . . . . 170 

endorsed the 10-mile expressway, 168 opposed it, and one agency, the Fairfax County Park 

Authority, took no position.” The record covers 1,700 pages of testimony and included 760 

letters and 21 petitions with 11,000 signatures. 

In the end, the hearing was “gaveled to conclusion in an almost empty meeting hall big enough 

for 700 persons at the Rosslyn Ramada Inn in Arlington”: 

At the conclusion of the hearings, Austin K. Hunsberger, director of engineering for the 

Virginia Department of Highways, said that he and his two top officials in the department 

will review the hearings and make recommendations on building the road to the highway 

commission.

If the commission approves construction, its recommendation will be passed on to 

U.S. Secretary of Transportation Claude S. Brinegar for a final decision. [Edwards, 

Paul G., “339 Talked in 6 Days of I-66 Hearing,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, December 23, 1973, cited in White, page 60] 

As cited in Leland White’s article about the I-66 controversy, the Fairfax Globe said the hearings 

“had all the earmarks of a political convention”:

Different factions passed out buttons, stickers, and reams of propaganda, while their 

leaders huddled in upper-floor hotel suites, plotting strategy and polishing speeches . . . . 

Staring impassively, chomping on cigars, pipes and toothpicks, the men from the VDH 
heard environmentalists call I-66 everything form a “concrete monster” to an 

“unspeakable obscenity” to “the rape of Arlington.” [Davies, Frank, “The I-66 Hearings: 

The Last Hurrah,” Fairfax Globe, December 27, 1973; White, page 61] 

During the hearings, no one had objected to Metro. According to Donald Appel, who headed the 

study team that prepared the draft EIS, the question was, “What constitutes a balanced 

transportation system?” In other words, “how much mass transit and how much automobile.” 

Hunsberger saw the issue in the same terms:

One group is advocating a balanced transportation system. The others advocate 

abandonment of one form of transportation and insertion of another. 

James Govan, of course, was in the latter group when it came to balance: 

The day of choice in commuting to work, a single person in a car, is going to end in this 

decade. Restrictions on gas, parking charges and transportation control measures are 

going to at least require car pooling. [Kast, Sheilah, “How Many Cars, How Much 

Transit,” The Washington Star-News, December 23, 1973]