COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PRACTICE

J E R R Y M E Y E R L E | M E G A N K AT T | J I M G A V R I L I S

ON THE GROUND IN

AFGHANISTAN
“Great format and important lessons learned. . . . This book should be

mandatory reading for all Marines.”

—General Richard D. Hearney, USMC (Ret), former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

“A superb book, chock-full of multinational combat examples with great

maps and photographs. This well-written book should be mandatory

reading for special operators and unit commanders. On the Ground in

Afghanistan blends theory and practice in an effort to adapt to war in

unique and often peculiar contexts.”

—Joseph J. Collins, professor of national security strategy at the National War College and former deputy

assistant secretary of defense for stability operations

“Effective counterinsurgency is about learning and adapting to local

conditions. This volume lets the small unit leader profit from 15 different

fights—and should convince him or her that there is no one best way to

fight an insurgent."

—T. X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century

“A completely outstanding piece of work.”

—David Kilcullen, author of The Accidental Guerrilla and Counterinsurgency

“This is a book that will be of great interest to soldiers, policy makers,

and scholars alike—it is an invaluable addition to the literature on

insurgency in general and the Afghan conflict in particular.”

—Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism and director of the Center

for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University

Praise for On the Ground in Afghanistan:

Counterinsurgency in Practice

A joint publication of CNA and Marine Corps University Press

J E R R Y M E Y E R L E | M E G A N K AT T | J I M G A V R I L I S

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PRACTICE

ON THE GROUND IN

AFGHANISTAN
MARINE CORPS

U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

This book represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of printing. The views expressed in it do not

necessarily represent the opinions of the U.S. Department of the Navy or the U.S. Marine Corps.

CNA Corporation

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Marine Corps University Press

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Quantico, Virginia 22134

www.tecom.usmc.mil/mcu/mcupress

On The Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice.

© 2012 by CNA Corporation. All rights reserved.

PCN 10600008500

Published by Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, VA.
Dedication

The authors wish to dedicate this book to the many U.S. and NATO service

members who have risked life and limb to help stabilize Afghanistan—among them Sergeant William Cahir, U.S. Marine Corps, who appears in this photo (sitting, center left).

Sergeant Cahir was killed while on patrol in southern Afghanistan on 13 August 2009.

U.S. Marines talk with leaders at a meeting in the Nawa District, Helmand Province.

(Photo by Cpl Artur Shvartsberg, U.S. Marine Corps)

v

Contents

Maps and Figures ix

Acronyms and Abbreviations x

Preface and Acknowledgments xi

Introduction 1

U.S. Marines

Vignette 1: U.S. Marine Platoon, Gulistan, Farah, 2008 27

Vignette 2: U.S. Marine Battalion, Nawa, Helmand, 2009 37

Vignette 3: U.S. Marine Advisors, Tagab Valley, Kapisa, 2008 53

U.S. Army

Vignette 4: U.S. Army Battalion, Kunar and Nuristan, 2007–2008 61

Vignette 5: U.S. Army Battalion, Khost, 2004–2008 73

Vignette 6: U.S. Army Battalion, Nangarhar, 2005–2009 81

U.S. Army Special Forces

Vignette 7: U.S. Army Special Forces Team, Kandahar and Zabul, 2003–2005 95

Vignette 8: Three U.S. Army Special Forces Teams, Kunar and Nuristan, 2004–2005 105

Vignette 9: U.S. Army Special Forces Team, Kandahar, 2003–2004 113

vii
British Army and Marines

Vignette 10: UK-Led Task Force, Musa Qala, Helmand, 2006–2009 117

Vignette 11: British Marine Battalion, Uruzgan and Helmand, 2008–2009 125

Vignette 12: British Army Advisors, Sangin, Helmand, 2009 133

Dutch Army and Marines

Vignette 13: Two Dutch Army Companies, Uruzgan, 2006–2009 139

Vignette 14: Dutch Marine Company, Deh Rashaan, Uruzgan, 2009 147

Canadian Army

Vignette 15: Canadian Soldiers and Engineers, Dand, Kandahar, 2009 153

Conclusion 165

Notes 177

About the Authors 186

viii
Vignette Locations x

Gulistan Valley, Farah Province, April–November 2008 32

Nawa, Helmand Province, 2009 43

Southern Tagab Valley, Kapisa Province, 2008 56

Northern Kunar and Eastern Nuristan, 2007–2008 63

Figure 1: Opium Cultivation in Nangarhar, 1994–2009 (in hectares) 83

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2004 84

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2005 85

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2006 86

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2007 87

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2008 89

Shinkay Valley, Zabul Province, 2004–2005 97

Northern Kunar and Eastern Nuristan, 2004–2005 110

Central Helmand, December 2008 130

Sangin, Northern Helmand, 2009 134

Deh Rawood, Chora, and the Baluchi Valley, Uruzgan, 2006–2009 140

Deh Rahsaan Valley, Uruzgan Province, 2009 149

Maps and Figures

ix
ABP Afghan Border Police

ADT agribusiness development team

AMF Afghan Militia Forces

ANA Afghan National Army

ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AO area of operations

CAG civil affairs group

CERP commander’s emergency response

program

CNAT counternarcotics advisory team

COIN counterinsurgency

COP combat outpost

CP checkpoint

FB firebase

FDD focused district development

FLET forward lines of enemy troops

FOB forward operating base

FPF force protection facility

HA hectare

HiG Hizbul-e-Islami Gulbuddin

HVT high-value target

IED improvised explosive device

IO information operations

ISAF International Security Assistance

Force

ISI Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence

JPCC Joint Provincial Coordination Center

JSOA joint special operations area

MEDCAP medical civic assistance program

MSST military stabilization support team

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO noncommissioned officer

NGO nongovernmental organization

ODA operational detachment alpha

OMLT operational mentor and liaison team

PB patrol base

PRT provincial reconstruction team

PSYOP psychological operations

RIAB radio in a box

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

SF U.S. Army Special Forces

TF task force

UN United Nations

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime

Acronyms and

Abbreviations

x
This book provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units—teams, platoons,

companies, and highly dispersed battalions—have done to roll back the insurgency in

some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan. The focus is on counterinsurgency at

the tactical and local levels.

The book includes 15 vignettes about different units from the U.S. Marines, U.S. Army,

and U.S. Army Special Forces; the British army and marines; the Dutch army and

marines; and the Canadian army. The case studies cover 10 provinces in the south and

east of Afghanistan. They describe the diverse conditions the units faced in these

provinces, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and

the successes involved in these operations.

This study would not have been possible without the generous help of Marines and soldiers from the U.S., British, Dutch, and Canadian militaries. They spent many hours with

the authors going over the details of past events and relating their experiences.

Preface and

Acknowledgments

xi
1. U.S. Marine Platoon, Gulistan, Farah, 2008

2. U.S. Marine Battalion, Nawa, Helmand, 2009

3. U.S. Marine Advisors, Tagab Valley, Kapisa, 2008

4. U.S. Army Battalion, Kunar and Nuristan, 2007–2008

5. U.S. Army Battalion, Khost, 2004–2008

6. U.S. Army Battalion, Nangarhar, 2005–2009

7. U.S. Army Special Forces Team, Kandahar and Zabul, 2003–2005

8. Three U.S. Army Special Forces Teams, Kunar and Nuristan, 2004–2005

9. U.S. Army Special Forces Team, Kandahar, 2003–2004

10. UK-Led Task Force, Musa Qala, Helmand, 2006–2009

11. British Marine Battalion, Uruzgan and Helmand, 2008–2009

12. British Army Advisors, Sangin, Helmand, 2009

13. Two Dutch Army Companies, Uruzgan, 2006–2009

14. Dutch Marine Company, Deh Rashaan, Uruzgan, 2009

15. Canadian Soldiers and Engineers, Dand, Kandahar, 2009

Vignette Locations

CHINA

TAJIKISTAN UZBEKISTAN DUSHANBE
* The term “small unit” is used in different ways. Publications about small unit infantry tactics often

use the term to refer to units smaller than a platoon. The U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Unit Leaders’

Guide to Counterinsurgency uses the term to refer to formations at the company level and below.

For the purposes of this study, battalion-sized formations are also considered small units, since the

battalions covered in this book were spread out over very large areas, with companies and platoons

scattered about on small bases. The vignettes in this book focus on the actions of these companies

and platoons under the strategic direction of their battalion commanders.

Only in the fall of 2009 did counterinsurgency became the centerpiece of U.S. strategy

in Afghanistan, yet Coalition troops had been fighting an insurgency there since at least

2003, before the outbreak of violence in Iraq and the development of the new counterinsurgency field manual. Soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan made many mistakes;

they also employed many sound practices learned through hard experience. This book

captures some of those practices and the unique conditions under which they were

developed.

Military units that deployed to remote areas of Afghanistan learned to operate in an unfamiliar environment: a desperately poor, war-torn agricultural society with no functioning central government or modern economy, its population dispersed across

thousands of tiny villages cut off from one another by unforgiving terrain with virtually

no infrastructure. Coalition troops found themselves fighting a politically astute rural

insurgency tied closely to the population. The political problems driving the violence

were exceedingly opaque, complex, and localized.

Small units*operating in extremely remote regions of Afghanistan, often completely isolated from their higher headquarters, had to navigate the treacherous waters of internecine tribal politics. They had to identify potential supporters and detractors while

retaining some semblance of neutrality; empower local leaders without being manipulated by deceitful power brokers and corrupt officials; and fight off large numbers of

proficient enemy fighters without harming civilians or making enemies of powerful tribes,

some of whose members were involved in attacks on Coalition troops—all in an environment of persistent insurgent intimidation.

Introduction

1
Despite these challenges, many small units on the ground met with successes rarely

captured in the media. Many of these lessons have yet to make their way up the chain

of command or be reflected at the strategic level.

The purpose of this book is to shed light on what small military units did in different parts

of Afghanistan from the earliest years of the insurgency in 2003 to the surge of U.S.

forces in 2009. It is, in part, a collection of their experiences. It describes the varying

conditions faced by small units in remote areas, how they responded to these conditions, what worked, and what did not.

This is not a book about policy, strategy, or national politics in Afghanistan, nor is it a

book about counterinsurgency theory. Many others have written on these topics. The

focus of this book is on small-unit counterinsurgency tactics and local-level politics.

There is a tremendous gap in understanding this aspect of the war. It is at the small-unit

level that counterinsurgency is actually practiced and that evidence for the success or failure of the overall U.S. effort in Afghanistan is to be found.

This book includes 15 vignettes of counterinsurgency operations by military units, many

of them deployed to some of the most remote and difficult areas of Afghanistan. These

vignettes describe in detail the conditions faced by small units at the tactical level and

their responses to local conditions. The insights in this book are based entirely on the information contained in these vignettes and on the views of officers involved in the operations described. The research is based almost entirely on interviews with

these officers.

The vignettes are written like storyboards: each is followed by a brief conclusion covering the main themes and lessons learned. The authors chose this approach because it

is an effective method of describing and analyzing individual operations by small units

in remote areas.

The vignettes cover 10 provinces in the south and east of Afghanistan from 2003 through

2009. There are examples of operations by the U.S. Marines, U.S. Army, and U.S. Army

Special Forces; British soldiers and marines; Dutch soldiers and marines; and the Canadian army. The book describes operations by battalions, companies, platoons, special

forces teams, and small groups of trainers embedded with the Afghan army and police.

2 | On the Ground
A Different Sort of Conflict

As the war in Iraq winds down, the one in Afghanistan is reaching new heights. Soldiers

and Marines are heading to Afghanistan in large numbers to retake the initiative and

implement a far-reaching counterinsurgency strategy. Many learned counterinsurgency

in the cities of Iraq and are now employing its principles in the villages of Afghanistan.

The basic principles remain valid: a focus on the population, the primacy of politics, restraint in the use of force, and good governance.

Afghanistan, however, is a different sort of place. It is an underdeveloped society with

an extremely dispersed, almost entirely rural population. The insurgents are based in

villages and have little support in the cities. Many Afghans have never left their villages

and possess little knowledge of the outside world—to many, the Kabul government is like

a foreign entity. In order to influence a population that is so spread out, troops must disperse across vast distances and operate from isolated bases. They must deal with

conservative rural communities, most of them illiterate, for whom national identity and

public service are unfamiliar concepts. Islam, tradition, and ties of blood are far

more important.

Afghanistan’s population is extremely fragmented. The politics of each village, town,

and valley are a hornet’s nest of small tribes and clans fighting constantly over land,

water, and other resources. These conflicts have little connection to larger political dynamics, or even to those of adjacent areas. The Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan, who

make up the bulk of the insurgency, have long been a fractured and quarrelsome lot,

fiercely protective of their autonomy, suspicious of outsiders, and distrustful of nearly

all forms of authority.

Decades of insurgency and civil war have destroyed much of the traditional leadership,

leaving the Pashtuns more divided and fractious than ever. In this environment, it is

hard to forge consensus, find leaders to work with who have real power, and form alliances without earning the enmity of rival factions. For Coalition forces, the political

fault lines are not clear, and there is constant danger of getting drawn into local feuds.

Decades of war have also destroyed what little central government once existed in

Afghanistan, leaving Coalition troops to build institutions from scratch.

Introduction | 3
A strong culture of vengeance exists among the Pashtuns. When airstrikes cause harm

to civilians or property, or local fighters and tribal leaders are captured or killed in raids,

their relatives and fellow clansmen are sometimes obligated to seek revenge. Doing so

is a matter of honor. In any society, indiscriminate violence and overly zealous kill-capture missions are likely to undermine popular support and strengthen the insurgency,

but in Afghanistan, these actions present the additional danger of causing entire clans

and tribes to declare war on Coalition troops.

Finally, Afghanistan is a desperately poor country, its economy based mostly on subsistence agriculture. Reconstruction funds can go a long way where people have so little. Sometimes, a small well or a few jobs is enough to change the economy of an area

or to secure the support of a key village or clan. Yet outside money can also be extremely destabilizing for rural communities that are not used to large influxes of cash.

A Localized Insurgency

Afghanistan’s politics and economy are extremely localized. Every area is like a separate country. It is not uncommon for major developments in one area to have little or no

effect on places just miles away, or for tactics that worked in one location to fail miserably in villages nearby. Marines and soldiers operating in Afghanistan need to understand their local environment on its own terms and tailor their operations accordingly,

with the understanding that conditions vary widely from place to place.

Units followed in this book required considerable autonomy, flexibility, and creativity in

order to adapt to the unique conditions in their areas of operations. It was extremely difficult for higher headquarters to develop a full picture of the conditions in remote districts. One had to be there over an extended period to develop even a basic

understanding of the environment. In many cases, platoons and companies operated

in areas so isolated that conditions were radically different and almost entirely disconnected from the rest of the battalion’s area of operations.

These differences help explain why successes could apparently be achieved in some

places but not in others. For example, Canadian forces in Dand District, south of Kandahar City, made considerable progress employing sound counterinsurgency techniques. Yet Dand was also a relatively peaceful area dominated by tribes inclined to

4 | On the Ground
support the government. In Panjwayi, to the west, the Canadians faced considerable difficulty and lost many soldiers—in part because they employed a more heavy-handed

approach, but also because the tribes of the Panjwayi had strong connections to the Taliban and a long history of armed resistance (see Vignette 15).

Sangin District in northern Helmand Province was one of the most dangerous areas of

Afghanistan, in part because of early operations by the British, however, much of the

problem was the town’s unique tribal makeup and the fact that it was a major center

for the drug trade. Techniques employed with some success in other parts of Helmand

had little effect in Sangin (see Vignette 12).

In Nawa District in central Helmand, the U.S. Marines met with quick success, but efforts in Marjah just a short distance away ran into serious trouble—not because of different tactics, but because Marjah was a different sort of place (see Vignette 2). In the

east as well, there were places—such as the Korangal Valley in Kunar Province—where

U.S. operations led to violent and intractable situations in some valleys but not others.

In some areas, there was an identifiable leadership to work with; in others no one appeared to be in charge. For example, in Chora District in Uruzgan Province, Dutch forces

were able to build relationships with some key tribal leaders, which helped stabilize the

area. The Dutch then expanded into the nearby Baluchi Valley only to find that there was

no discernible tribal leadership. The area was a hornet’s nest of competing Ghilzai clans

heavily infiltrated by the Taliban. The area’s only prominent leader had been killed in a

U.S. raid the year before (see Vignette 13).

In other places, the fighting had almost nothing to do with the Taliban or other groups

based in Pakistan; the insurgency was about resistance to outside influence and little

else in some valleys in the northeast. This was the case, for example, in the Korangal

Valley in Kunar Province, one of the most dangerous places for U.S. forces. Similar

motivations drove much of the fighting farther north in Nuristan (see Vignette 8). Pashtun tribes across the south and east have a long and proud history of taking up arms

against outsiders of every stripe.

A common thread throughout all the vignettes is the importance of involving the local

population, communities, and leaders, as well as existing social, political, and economic

Introduction | 5
structures in what the unit commanders were trying to accomplish. Those units that

understood the local situation and involved the residents to greater degrees were often

able to reach their objectives with less conflict and fewer casualties. Local approaches

worked best.

Navigating the Political Terrain

Insurgency is inherently political; it is about employing organized violence to achieve

political objectives. The insurgents in Afghanistan are cunning political operatives. To be

effective, small units needed to have an intimate knowledge of the political terrain and

the ability to navigate it shrewdly. The more successful units immersed themselves in

the complex politics in their areas of operation. They gathered information on tribal and

ethnic groups—their viewpoints, interests, disputes, and histories of conflict.

Every district and valley of Afghanistan is an intricate web of locally based tribal and clan

rivalries, disputes over land and other resources, and feuds that go back generations.

In talking to Coalition forces, village leaders often spoke ill of elders in nearby hamlets.

The Taliban took advantage of divisions between clans and power brokers, forming alliances with those who harbored grievances against the government or the Coalition, or

whose interests were threatened by the U.S. presence.

Ongoing feuds between clans and tribes mirrored the fighting between insurgents and

Coalition troops. It was common to see one clan or tribe ally with the government and

U.S. forces, and its rival with the Taliban or other Pakistan-based insurgent groups—

much like regional powers during the Cold War who joined the United States or the Soviet Union in order to gain leverage against their neighbors. It was not possible to

separate these local-level political dynamics from the insurgency writ large; they were

inextricably linked.

One of the unintended consequences of forming deep alliances with local tribal groups

or power brokers was that it created suspicion and resentment among other groups

who then joined the Taliban to balance the power of their rivals. By taking sides and allying with certain power brokers, the United States alienated others—creating opportunities that the Taliban exploited masterfully.

6 | On the Ground
For example, in the Deh Rashaan Valley in Uruzgan, U.S. and Dutch forces worked

closely with Barakzai and Popalzai tribesmen and carried out raids against rival Ghilzai

tribes to the north. The Ghilzais in turn allied with the Taliban (see Vignette 14). Of two

rival Noorzai Pashtun clans in Gulistan in southwest Afghanistan, the militarily weaker

but better educated clan latched onto the Marines when they arrived in the spring of

2008; the other kept its ties to the Taliban (see Vignette 1).

In Deh Rawood District in Uruzgan Province, rival factions tried constantly to use their

access to Coalition troops as leverage against their local enemies. U.S. forces had

allied with local strongmen, prompting others to ally with the Taliban and fire on U.S.

troops. The Dutch faced fewer attacks in part because they made neutrality a core

objective (see Vignette 13).

Through these experiences, units learned that it was essential to remain neutral in local

conflicts and to be seen as an honest broker and a fair provider of public goods, such

as security and infrastructure. Doing so required not taking sides or getting involved in

feuds between tribes and clans and not forming alliances of any sort. Military officers

had to understand the politics and be involved in them to some extent but also had to

remain above the fray and unassociated with any particular faction—a very difficult thing

to do.

Searching for Political Solutions

The most successful operations were those in which a unit identified the political problems driving the insurgency in its area and came up with viable solutions. In these

cases, further counterinsurgency operations were sometimes unnecessary. Dialogue

and negotiation also reduced the amount of fighting necessary during clear-hold-build

operations and helped protect vulnerable forces in isolated areas.

For example, in the Mirabad Valley in Uruzgan Province, a place notorious for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detonated against Dutch forces, a mobile battle group of

British marines pushed in, met with the valley’s elders, and determined that the people of the Mirabad had allied with the Taliban as a result of repeated abuses by the district police chief and the men under his command. The valley’s leaders also felt they had

been shut out of power at the provincial level and that rival tribes were using their control over the government to exploit the people of the Mirabad.

Introduction | 7
The British marines persuaded the Dutch to reach out to the valley’s leaders, bring them

into the political process in the provincial capital, fire the police chief, and rein in the

local police. Soon thereafter, the IEDs in the Mirabad Valley disappeared, and the Dutch

were able to move through the valley unmolested. The valley was stabilized without any

permanent deployment of forces and without firing a shot. Once the various parties had

reached a political solution, further action, including clear-hold-build operations, was no

longer required (see Vignette 11).

Reaching out to marginalized groups proved effective elsewhere as well. For example,

U.S. soldiers in the northeast made a point of engaging with Nuristani clans left out of

power at the district and provincial levels. Evidently, earlier units deployed to this region had not dealt with these clans, many of which were responsible for attacks on U.S.

forces. Attacks on convoys in the region dropped significantly once U.S. forces engaged

with these marginalized tribes (see Vignette 4).

Political engagement lent legitimacy to combat operations and allowed units to achieve

military objectives with less fighting and loss of life. For example, as the British prepared to retake the town of Musa Qala in northern Helmand in 2007, they established

contact with a prominent tribal leader whose fighters made up the bulk of the Taliban

force there. The British persuaded the leader to defect in exchange for political power

once the British took over. As the UK-led task force moved on the town, the leader ordered his fellow tribesmen to stand down. The remaining insurgents melted away with

little fighting as the Coalition swept into the town (see Vignette 10).

In Nuristan, a battalion of U.S. soldiers was able to project power into some of the most

dangerous and hostile terrain in all of Afghanistan by negotiating with village leaders

ahead of military operations. Unlike earlier units deployed to Nuristan, the battalion

faced relatively little resistance as it pushed into isolated mountain valleys that had a

long history of armed resistance against outsiders—valleys where there had been numerous attacks on U.S. forces in the past. After months of painstaking talks with the elders of eastern Nuristan, the battalion was able to negotiate a peace between U.S. forces,

village leaders, and the insurgents. These negotiations allowed the battalion to push into

the area without a shot being fired. These negotiations required substantial knowledge

about the political terrain and considerable diplomatic skills (see Vignette 4).

8 | On the Ground
Engaging the Population and Building Popular Support

Soldiers and Marines who used a population-centered approach tended to make more

progress with less violence than those who focused on the enemy or the terrain. Doing

so required dispersing into small outposts in or near populated areas, getting out constantly on foot, engaging and collaborating with local leaders, and implementing development projects that benefitted communities and built popular support. Units that

followed this approach took on greater risk in the short term, but usually ended up safer

in the long run.

The more successful units focused almost entirely on the population. Many did not

bother to chase down insurgents. When the Marines cleared through Nawa in 2009,

they focused on setting up outposts and beginning reconstruction. They allowed many

fighters to escape and even offered amnesty to those who agreed to lay down their

arms (see Vignette 2).

On the few occasions that Afghan National Army (ANA) units led clear-hold-build operations, they too focused on the population and did not give chase to fleeing insurgents.

For example, in the Tagab Valley east of Kabul, Afghan soldiers did not even shoot back

when fired upon. Instead, they moved slowly up the valley, holding shuras (meetings of

local leaders) in villages, setting up bases, and starting reconstruction projects. The

Afghan army managed to stabilize the valley with little fighting (see Vignette 3).

Using Afghan forces to engage the population helped build relationships. Military operations that included local security forces were more effective than those that involved

only Coalition troops. Even more so, when U.S. advisors were embedded with the Afghan

army—not just occasionally conducting operations with them—the effects were more

positive. In many places, the local population was more willing to accept the presence

of Afghan soldiers, and they attracted fewer attacks (see Vignette 3).

Successful counterinsurgency operations involved constant interaction with local people and countless cups of tea and sociable conversation. Relationship building proved

essential. Afghanistan, like most underdeveloped rural nations, is a relationship-based

society. In such places, building trust is necessary, which takes time, commitment, and

work. It was not enough to institutionalize interactions between commanding officers

and government officials—personal rapport was crucial.

Introduction | 9
Conducting foot patrols from small outposts in populated areas also proved essential.

On foot, soldiers and Marines were able to interact with people constantly in order to

gather useful information and understanding and to form relationships. Small units that

spread out into small outposts and patrolled every day on foot were more effective than

large units that were consolidated on large bases disconnected from the local population (see Vignettes 2, 5, 13, and 14).

Armored vehicles and large, heavily fortified bases put barriers between local people

and Coalition troops. The same was true of wearing body armor and carrying weapons—

and especially pointing guns at civilians. In 2003, when permissive security conditions

in Kandahar City allowed U.S. troops to drive in unarmored vehicles and walk around

without guns or body armor, it was much easier to engage with the people. As violence

grew in later years and the Coalition shifted to battle mode, Coalition troops became increasingly cut off from the city’s population (see Vignette 9).

Units that projected a heavier, more imposing and invasive presence often attracted

more attacks. The more successful special forces teams operating in remote areas

learned that it was important to maintain a light footprint in order to gain access to the

population; otherwise, a team’s actions could threaten local power brokers and heavily armed clans that had a penchant for taking up arms against outsiders. Providing a

nonintrusive benefit won local support and therefore local protection. Leveraging Afghan

leaders to mobilize the population often proved to be the best way to defeat the insurgency. The worst possible outcome for Coalition troops in Afghanistan was to be seen

as an army of occupation (see Vignette 4).

Foot patrols and engagement with the population also saved lives. In Kandahar

Province, for example, Canadian soldiers in such districts as Zharey and Panjwayi operated out of large, heavily fortified bases and moved around in armored vehicles. These

units met with intense fighting and took many casualties. In areas where the Canadians dispersed onto small bases and patrolled on foot, they suffered fewer attacks (see

Vignette 15).

The same was true for the U.S. Marines in Nawa in 2009. They spread out into 26 small

outposts and conducted constant foot patrols out of these bases. They were out so

often that the locals wondered whether the Marines ever slept. They also held shuras

10 | On the Ground
nearly every day near their outposts. By doing so, the Marines in Nawa were able to

dominate the areas around their positions and build support among the nearby population (see Vignette 2).

In Helmand and parts of Kandahar, the insurgents used IEDs to prevent Coalition troops

from interacting with the people. The aim of the IEDs was to make movement so dangerous that soldiers and Marines would no longer patrol far from their bases, ceding control over the population to the Taliban. In most cases, the best counter to the IED threat

was regular foot patrols and engagement with the population.

Soldiers and Marines who were able to build support among the population found that

the IED threat diminished considerably over time. On the other hand, the more troops

stayed in their bases and allowed their movements to be restricted, the more intense

the IED threat became. This was the case in many places, including Sangin, the notorious town in northern Helmand where thousands of IEDs stood between British forces

and the population (see Vignette 12).

In many remote areas, the population protected U.S. and NATO forces—not the other

way around, as is suggested by the counterinsurgency manual. For many of the 12-man

special forces teams operating out of isolated firebases, building a base of support

among the local population was essential for survival. Popular support, gained through

sound counterinsurgency techniques, proved to be the best form of force protection. In

some places, special forces teams moved safely in areas with substantial Taliban presence because the local population supported the team’s presence and pledged to protect it from attack (see Vignette 7).

The same was often true of conventional forces stationed in remote and dangerous

areas. For example, soldiers in northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan managed to befriend village leaders who offered sanctuary to U.S. forces passing through. These leaders also promised protection to U.S. troops when within the confines of their villages.

Local elders sometimes accompanied U.S. Army patrols outside their villages in order

to deter attacks by local militants. These patrols were rarely, if ever, fired upon (see

Vignette 4).

However, not far away in the Korangal Valley, where the population was hostile and village leaders refused sanctuary to U.S. forces, soldiers were under constant fire everyIntroduction | 11
where and took many casualties. Where Coalition troops had popular support, they

faced little danger; where they were looked upon as an occupying force, they were never

secure, even in the apparently safe confines of their bases.

Using Reconstruction Funds

Many units learned to target their use of reconstruction funds toward specific objectives

rather than fund projects for their own sake. This meant using funds to gain and maintain support in key areas, draw fighting-age males away from the insurgency, bring quarrelling factions to the negotiating table, and punish recalcitrant tribes and clans.

It was not enough to simply execute a large number of reconstruction projects—to give

people wells, roads, and other amenities in the hope of winning hearts and minds.

Throwing money at problems rarely worked. Successful units used reconstruction funds

to build relationships in pursuit of clear political objectives. These relationships were

often more important than the projects themselves.

Used unwisely, reconstruction funds frequently did more harm than good. For example, it was not uncommon for resentful tribes who did not receive funds to sabotage projects and attack U.S. troops. Contractors who became wealthy and powerful as a result

of their special relationship with U.S. forces threatened local power brokers, leading to

violence that was often mistaken for insurgent activity. The same was true of projects

that employed outside labor.

Those units that were able to tie the local economy into the continued presence of

Coalition forces were particularly successful. They did this mainly by creating jobs and

targeting certain leaders or segments of the population. The goal was to bring money

into the community without upsetting the political and social balance of the locality.

This worked even where the population was inclined to support the insurgency

(see Vignette 7).

Reconstruction projects aimed at large-scale job creation tended to be effective, especially where there were large numbers of landless laborers. For example, Canadian

engineers in Dand District, south of Kandahar City, recognized early on that a few

wealthy men owned all the land. Nearly everyone living in the district were sharecroppers and laborers who stood to gain little from roads, irrigation canals, wells, and other

12 | On the Ground
projects that promised to improve the productivity of the land. Such projects would

merely enrich a few large landowners. The Canadians instead focused on low-technology, labor-intensive projects aimed at providing jobs to young men of fighting age. After

six months, the Taliban was no longer able to recruit fighters in Dand District (see

Vignette 15).

When it came to getting results from job creation programs, much depended on local

conditions. For example, like the Canadians in Kandahar, U.S. soldiers in northeast

Afghanistan focused on low-technology projects aimed at providing employment. Yet

insurgent facilitators based in Pakistan offered generous salaries to would-be recruits—

far more than the U.S. military could provide with its limited amount of funds. Reconstruction projects in the northeast did not yield the clear-cut results that Canadian

soldiers saw south of Kandahar City (see Vignette 4). In Sangin in northern Helmand,

a major center for the poppy trade, well-heeled drug traffickers (who were allied with the

Taliban) paid handsomely for attacks on British forces. The funds available to the drug

traffickers dwarfed those available to British forces (see Vignette 12).

Successful units recognized that money was power. U.S. soldiers in Zabul’s Shinkay

Valley dispensed funds as patronage—much like a patronage-based political machine.

They used their money to create a network of supporters around their firebase and in

villages farther beyond. Successful units gave money directly to laborers, rather than go

through local contractors or power brokers, unless their intention was to empower these

individuals (see Vignette 7).

They also spread their funds around in order to avoid the appearance of favoritism that

might breed resentment. In Dand District, the Canadians hired one fighting-age male

from every extended family. Their intention was to spread their funds out as evenly as

possible and to tie every family in the district into the reconstruction effort. (see

Vignette 15)

In northeast Afghanistan, U.S soldiers gave funds directly to village leaders in exchange

for specific concessions, such as support for upcoming operations, actionable intelligence, or reduced attacks on convoys. In this case, the battalion’s objectives were to

empower cooperative local leaders by giving them control over reconstruction funds

and to give the battalion leverage over these leaders. The soldiers also pushed money

Introduction | 13
into outlying areas ahead of major operations in order to buy support and soften resistance. This approach worked well and saved many lives (see Vignette 4).

In Nangarhar Province in the east, U.S. forces supported a governor who paid tribal

leaders to stop growing poppy. The governor combined these incentives with threats

against those who refused to comply. In just one year, Nangarhar went from being one

of Afghanistan’s main opium cultivators to one that was declared “poppy free.” (see

Vignette 6)

Raising and Advising Indigenous Forces

Building soldiers, police,* and irregular forces was an essential but often overlooked

mission. At the strategic level, the effort was disorganized and poorly resourced. It was

not until relatively late in the conflict—when U.S. commanders began thinking about

drawing down—that raising indigenous forces became a priority and the effort began to

pick up steam. Despite these problems, Army and Marine training teams made a great

deal of progress at the tactical level, especially advising Afghan soldiers, standing up

local police, and using irregular forces.

The more successful training teams were embedded with Afghan units at every level.

These teams lived with the Afghan soldiers and police. They patrolled with them, fought

with them, and sometimes died with them. Afghan security forces went through training in regional academies, but the training they received in the field from embedded

advisors was key. In many cases, the presence of combat mentors kept Afghan units

together and allowed them to go on patrol and carry out operations. Embedded

advisors were the steel frame that kept Afghan forces operational until they gained

enough experience to operate on their own. This model of combat advising was far more

effective than partnering, in which U.S. units carried out joint operations with

Afghan forces.

Combat advising was one of the most difficult and dangerous missions in Afghanistan.

Trainers moved around with Afghan units, often in convoys of soft-skinned vehicles that

did not have dedicated air support or quick reaction forces. They went on missions with

14 | On the Ground

* For more on police advisors in Afghanistan, see William Rosenau, Acknowledging Limits: Police

Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011).
Afghan soldiers and police who did not speak English, did not always stand their ground

when engaged, were not well armed or equipped, and who could not always be trusted.

For example, in Gulistan District in southwest Afghanistan in early 2008, a platoon of

U.S. Marines was tasked with building a local police force whose chief was working for

the Taliban. The police chief informed on the Marines for the Taliban and tried to lead

the Marines into pre-laid ambushes. The police chief arranged for the killing of his own

men if they refused to cooperate with the insurgents. Not until the Marines pushed the

Taliban out of the area were they able to turn the police force around (see Vignette 1).

In 2008, Afghan army units, assisted by U.S. Marine trainers embedded at multiple levels of command, cleared through the insurgent-controlled Tagab Valley in central

Afghanistan and built a solid base of support among the population. With the assistance of their combat advisors, the Afghan army took responsibility over battlespace for

the first time since the U.S. intervention in 2001. When given the support they needed—

and left to their own devices and not overshadowed by larger U.S. forces—these Afghan

units did quite well (see Vignette 3).

In places where the Taliban was particularly strong, combat advisors kept Afghan army

units from crumbling in the face of constant ambushes and IEDs. British advisors in

Sangin in Helmand Province lived with Afghan army units on small bases and patrolled

with them daily (see Vignette 12). U.S. Marines followed this model when they took over

British-controlled areas in southern Afghanistan (see Vignette 2). Where there was hard

fighting, it was absolutely essential that Afghan units received the support they needed;

when they did not, units quickly deteriorated. Embedded advisors from U.S. and NATO

militaries were instrumental in ensuring that Afghan soldiers and police received adequate support, especially when under attack.

U.S. and NATO forces also made good use of local security guards and irregular forces.

For example, U.S. soldiers in the remote northeastern mountains learned that the insurgents were more reluctant to fire on local Afghan guards. Posting locals at guard

posts led to a reduction in attacks on U.S. bases in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. American soldiers also persuaded local leaders to protect reconstruction projects in their villages (see Vignette 4). Special forces teams in Kunar organized local defense forces to

Introduction | 15
protect road projects and held local leaders responsible for attacks on these projects

near their villages (see Vignette 8).

Protecting the Population

Preventing the insurgents from intimidating the population was essential to building

popular support and making reconstruction work. Afghans were rarely willing to cooperate with Coalition troops if they (or their families) believed they might face retaliation.

Where insurgents could target individuals working with the Coalition, the presence of

Coalition troops did more harm than good. In contested areas where Coalition forces and

insurgents fought for control over the same population, the plight of civilians was

the worst.

Where the insurgents managed to infiltrate back into cleared areas and operate underground, reconstruction efforts faltered or failed altogether. For example, in such

places as Nawa and Musa Qala in Helmand, U.S. and British forces managed to push

the insurgents out and keep them from returning. In these places, the population cooperated with the Coalition, and reconstruction efforts proved relatively successful (see

Vignettes 2 and 10). In other areas of Helmand, such as Marjah and Sangin, where the

insurgents infiltrated back in to intimidate the population and lay IEDs and ambushes,

U.S. and British forces faced considerable difficulties with rebuilding the government

and getting projects underway (see Vignette 12). In such places, the population was

often less secure and less well-governed than under the Taliban. People played both

sides in order to survive.

In many places where insurgent influence remained strong, soldiers and Marines could

not trust local government officials, especially the police. For example, in Gulistan in

early 2008, a U.S. Marine platoon was forced to work with a district governor and police chief who were actively collaborating with the Taliban. The government officials

tried to lure the Marines into pre-laid ambushes and reportedly engineered the killing

of local police who cooperated with the platoon. Only when the Marines succeeded in

pushing the Taliban out of most parts of the valley—thereby ending its campaign of intimidation—did district officials start cooperating with the Marines (see Vignette 1).

Many Afghans were skeptical about the commitment of U.S. and NATO units. Local people had to consider their lives and those of their families five or more years down the

16 | On the Ground
road when the Taliban might very well return to power and retaliate against those who

had collaborated with the Coalition (see Vignettes 2 and 14).

In some areas, the population did not want the protection of Coalition troops or Afghan

soldiers. Permanent garrisons and checkpoints attracted insurgent attacks and led to

fighting that caused harm to civilian life and property. In some of the more remote areas,

Taliban influence was relatively benign; violent struggles for control between insurgents

and Coalition troops posed a greater threat (see Vignette 7).

Employing Restraint in the Use of Force

Restraint in the use of force was essential to every operation detailed in this book.

Killing the wrong people had far-reaching consequences. In many places, ill-informed

or poorly conceived combat operations reversed months—and in some cases, years—

worth of patient effort overnight. In other places, targeting operations had second-order

effects that were not apparent until months or years later.

Power brokers close to U.S. forces often used their special relationships with the Coalition to eliminate their enemies by passing false information naming their rivals as Taliban. Officers repeatedly fell for these tricks, carrying out raids against individuals based

on information from local interlocutors whose motives were questionable. These operations—in which U.S. and NATO units were manipulated into killing prominent local leaders whose commitment to the insurgency was uncertain—created powerful enemies

and probably caused more harm than had they done nothing at all.

For example, in the Deh Rashaan Valley north of Tarin Kowt, the Ghilzai clans in the

northern part of the valley allied with the Taliban after a series of airstrikes by U.S. and

Australian forces that killed several prominent tribal leaders. Their rivals among the

Popalzai and Barakzai to the south—who controlled the provincial government and had

regular access to Coalition forces—may have identified certain Ghilzai leaders as Taliban,

when in fact their connections to the movement were tenuous and uncertain. Rather

than reach out to the Ghilzai clans and try to bring them into the government, Coalition

troops targeted their leaders for assassination, alienating and pushing them into alliances with the Taliban, which deepened the divide further and led to more violence

(see Vignette 14).

Introduction | 17
Generally, killing people, even insurgents, did more harm than good. Many insurgents

were related to locals, including prominent leaders working with the government and

U.S. forces. Killing locals often fueled demands for vengeance, even if these young men

were obviously involved in the insurgency. Many local residents resented the killing of

their loved ones no matter what their activities might have been. In many cases, avenging their deaths was a matter of honor, and it was common for clans targeted in earlier

raids to attack U.S. and NATO forces of their own accord (see Vignettes 4, 8, and 14).

Military units that were successful at stabilizing an area and building popular support

almost never carried out raids in populated areas they sought to influence. For example, Dutch soldiers in Uruzgan did not conduct raids in or near the areas where they intended to build popular support (see Vignette 13). The same was true of some special

forces teams (see Vignette 7).

Raids against enemy fighters tended to yield mixed results. In many cases, they proved

counterproductive—especially in remote, mountainous areas where there were few Coalition forces and little accurate and up-to-date information. In the mountains, the terrain

was so difficult, the road infrastructure so limited, and the distances so long that insurgent leaders often had plenty of time to flee, leaving innocent people to suffer the

consequences of Coalition attacks. It was nearly impossible for outside forces to move

through the mountains undetected (see Vignette 8). Air assault raids in particular were

a problem because most of the forces carrying out these operations were based far

from their targets and knew little about the areas in which they operated (see

Vignette 7).

It was not uncommon for villagers to take up arms against outsiders—any outsiders,

whether rival clans or U.S. forces—who entered the confines of their villages uninvited,

especially at night. Under such circumstances, Coalition troops could not easily distinguish between insurgents trying to protect themselves and local men seeking to defend their village. Many units simply assumed that anyone firing at them was an enemy

fighter. Raids in which innocent people were harmed or their honor violated created enduring enmity in many areas of the country. As a result, entire families, clans, or even

tribes took up arms against the Coalition and allied with the Taliban (see Vignette 7).

18 | On the Ground
In several cases covered in this book, kill-capture missions and other enemy-centric

combat operations caused violence to escalate significantly. For example, security conditions in Kandahar City in 2003 were so permissive that Coalition troops walked around

without body armor. Later units focused on raids and measured their progress by the

number of enemy fighters killed. As a result, Kandahar City became increasingly violent

and unstable, and relations between U.S. forces and the population grew strained (see

Vignette 9).

These vicious cycles strengthened the insurgency and created problems that became

increasingly difficult to solve. Misplaced combat operations caused entire clans or tribes

to declare war on Coalition forces, prompting the shedding of more blood and demands

for more vengeance. Killing more people often made the problem worse and gave

strength to the insurgency.

Large-scale sweep operations in particular were ineffective and counterproductive.

These operations, which involved a battalion or more of U.S. forces pushing into a large

area from different directions in order to kill or capture a substantial number of insurgents, caused significant damage to civilian life and property yet netted few enemy

fighters. Most of these sweeps were slow, clumsy, and ill-informed. Insurgents easily escaped through porous cordons or hid their weapons and pretended to be civilians. Since

holding forces were rarely left behind, the insurgents returned to business as usual

when the operations were over. Afghan militia forces involved in these operations were

often accused of widespread looting. These operations alienated entire valleys, causing untold damage to the overall U.S. effort (see Vignette 7).

Despite these pitfalls, the discriminate use of force was often an integral part of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The goal was to demonstrate superior strength and will

to the insurgents and the population while doing no harm to civilian life or property.

After decades of civil war in which villages had seen one armed faction after another

take power, many Afghans had learned to support whichever side happened to be the

strongest.

For example, when the U.S. Marines arrived in Gulistan in southwest Afghanistan in the

spring of 2008, they encountered a population that was almost entirely controlled by

Introduction | 19
the Taliban. Most villages initially expressed indifference or outright hostility toward the

Marines. After a number of high-profile engagements where the Marines prevailed without hurting civilians or their property, entire villages began working with them (see

Vignette 1). In Nawa in central Helmand, the Marines defeated the Taliban in a matter

of days. Once it was clear that the insurgents stood no chance—and that the Marines

were there to stay—the population turned around almost immediately (see Vignette 2).

Restraint was usually the better part of valor, and diplomacy was more important than

force. The insurgents exploited local grievances to build popular support and recruit

fighters. Killing insurgents often aggravated these grievances, made political solutions

more difficult, and expanded the pool of enemy fighters. In the words of one battalion

commander in northeast Afghanistan, “You can’t simply kill your way out of an insurgency. The supply of fighters here is inexhaustible” (see Vignette 4).

Some of the vignettes in this book suggest that it may never be too late to turn the tide.

Often, officers were able to reach out to leaders whose communities had been victims

of heavy-handed operations to offer compensation and promise that past mistakes

would not be repeated. In Kunar, a U.S. Army battalion made peace with an openly hostile village that had been the site of several botched raids during earlier years of the war.

The village had since become the site of numerous attacks on U.S. forces. Through public apologies, sustained engagement, reconstruction projects, and assurances that all

future raids would cease, the battalion was able to turn the village around. Attacks

stopped, and insurgents were no longer able to operate there (see Vignette 4).

Finding the Right Balance Between Concentration and Dispersion

It took time and a lot of trial and error for units to figure out how much territory and how

much of the population they could reasonably control with the capabilities they had.

Finding the right balance between concentration and dispersion—in order to adequately

protect the population and limit insurgent safe areas without spreading one’s forces

too thin—was particularly hard in Afghanistan, with its vast expanses of rural hinterland,

unforgiving terrain, and spread-out population.

Where a large number of forces were deployed in a relatively small area— such as the

U.S. Marines in Helmand after 2008—the dilemma was less acute. But where small

20 | On the Ground
units were responsible for massive areas, no good solutions could be found. There were

always areas of Afghanistan’s vast rural hinterland where the Taliban could operate

safely, and that created pressure for U.S. and NATO forces to constantly clear new areas.

Once there, they could not withdraw. Otherwise, the Taliban would return and the gains

made would quickly disappear.

Some battalions were spread out across an entire province, or even multiple provinces.

For example, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7), the first U.S. Marine unit to establish a

permanent presence in southern Afghanistan, was spread across eight districts in Helmand and Farah Provinces. Many of the routes between bases passed through Talibancontrolled territory. The 2/7 was ordered to train the police in each of these eight

districts, forcing the battalion to disperse its forces across a massive area mostly controlled by the Taliban (see Vignette 1).

In eastern Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, a U.S. Army battalion was responsible for all

of northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan. The battalion operated across multiple mountain ranges, its forces dispersed into combat outposts that could only be reached by air

(see Vignette 4). Before 2007, a single 12-man U.S. Army Special Forces team was responsible for this entire region (see Vignette 8). Army Special Forces teams elsewhere

in Afghanistan were responsible for similarly large areas (see Vignette 7).

Some Coalition troops were able to follow a gradualist, oil-spot strategy that involved focusing on small areas where they knew they could make a difference, rather than

rapidly expanding into new areas. These units met with greater success, at least in the

areas where they focused their energies. The oil-spot approach, which involved protecting and consolidating a base of support and then slowly expanding this base,

seemed to work better than rapid expansion through large-scale clearing operations.

For example, in Dand District south of Kandahar City, a reinforced company of Canadian

soldiers and engineers focused on only one village at first. Once this village and its immediate surroundings were stable, the soldiers slowly expanded into nearby villages

(see Vignette 15). The Dutch followed a similar approach in Uruzgan Province. In areas

where the Dutch focused their energies, they met with considerable success (see

Vignette 13).

Introduction | 21
The downside of the oil-spot approach was that it left many areas under de facto Taliban rule. For example, the Dutch followed an oil-spot strategy that involved focusing on

small areas where they knew they could make a difference, recognizing that the Taliban would continue to operate further afield. Though Dutch influence in Uruzgan remained strong in certain areas, the Taliban operated freely in much of the province.

The initial British plan in 2006 was to oil spot out from Helmand’s provincial capital,

Lashkar Gah, but when the Taliban attacked all of the towns in northern Helmand simultaneously, the British were forced to fan out across the province in order to keep the

majority of Helmand’s population from falling under Taliban control. The British soon

found themselves spread thin, under siege, and unable to conduct patrols and engage

effectively with the population. Because they were so spread out, the insurgents were

able to infiltrate back into many cleared areas. This was true for many U.S. units as well.

Many units learned the hard way the perils of expanding too far too soon. In many cases,

they did not know what they were getting into. The insurgents’ strength only became apparent once new areas had been cleared, new bases set up, and new commitments

made. Returning to a more consolidated force posture required shutting down bases

under duress, which looked a lot like defeat.

Units that went too far afield or spread out across too large an area found their lines of

communication frequently cut, their smaller bases and outposts under threat, and their

influence attenuated. This was a serious problem for the British in southern Afghanistan

in 2006 and 2007 and was also a problem for the U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan

with its high mountains and long distances. In the northeast, insurgents

actually overran two remote bases—Combat Outposts Wanat and Keating—in 2008

and 2009.

Was it better to focus on a smaller area in the hopes of making solid gains there or to

cast a wide net hoping to put pressure on the Taliban everywhere? In Afghanistan, with

its unforgiving terrain and spread-out population, there was never a good answer to

this question.

The only real solution to this dilemma was to build Afghan security forces capable of protecting the population in newly cleared areas. Coalition troops, however, rarely did so.

22 | On the Ground
Only in one vignette—in which Afghan soldiers supported by U.S. Marine advisors stabilized an insurgent-controlled valley east of Kabul—was this approach adopted. Another rarely tried solution was mobilizing the population and integrating local defense

forces with national forces. The police, which often served as de facto paramilitaries

charged with fighting the insurgents rather than policing the population, did not have

the capability or professionalism to hold back the Taliban on their own.

Maintaining Continuity

The counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan suffered from constant unit turnover, lack

of historical memory, and a tendency to repeat mistakes. Units on their way out took

much of their hard-won local knowledge with them. In most cases, new units had to

“reinvent the wheel.” In some areas, local Afghans had seen 10 to 15 units cycle

through, each a blank slate.

Relationships between Coalition forces and local Afghans suffered every time units rotated out and new ones took their place. For example, in Khost Province, the battalion

commander and provincial reconstruction team commander built strong relationships

with the governor and other officials; their subordinate officers built similar relationships with other officials across the province. Popular support for the United States

grew in Khost and violence dropped off. Yet, when the battalion left and a new group

of officers came in, relationships frayed. Insurgents exploited the situation with a surge

in attacks, and the progress achieved quickly disappeared (see Vignette 5).

The gains made with the population were often fragile. It was not uncommon for a unit

to make considerable progress, only to see those gains disappear or even reverse themselves a year or two later. For example, Khost Province in 2007 was dubbed a model of

effective counterinsurgency by many, including the Afghan president and U.S. secretary of defense. A year later, violence again escalated when the insurgents went on the

offensive, relationships between key figures broke down, and much of what had been

accomplished in 2006 and 2007 was quickly erased (see Vignette 5). U.S. Army Special Forces teams in Kandahar faced similar problems: gains made in Kandahar in 2003

were wiped out in 2004 by new units that focused on kill-capture missions and allowed

relationships with local people to falter (see Vignette 9).

Introduction | 23
Such radical shifts in focus from one unit to the next sent mixed messages to the population. They signaled a lack of determination and commitment that U.S. efforts would

be sustained. Local people began to hedge their bets and collaborate with the Taliban.

Forging Unity of Effort Without Unity of Command

The more successful counterinsurgency operations were those in which different units

and government agencies worked closely together at the local level. Doing so was not

easy in the absence of a unified command structure. Special forces units, officials from

the State Department and USAID, conventional forces, and civilian and military personnel from different NATO countries all had separate reporting chains. Even basic communication was a challenge.

Units that failed to coordinate often operated at cross-purposes. This problem was especially acute where commando units were engaged in counterterrorist operations in

the same areas that conventional forces were focused on counterinsurgency. It was not

uncommon for kill-capture teams to carry out raids in the same villages where conventional forces were attempting to build popular support. Some of these raids were based

on faulty intelligence, resulting in the deaths of innocent village leaders. Others caused

collateral damage that angered the population, undercutting months of painstaking effort. It often took years for conventional forces to regain support in these areas.

In Khost Province, the Army battalion, provincial reconstruction team (PRT), and special

forces units worked closely together. The battalion worked with the commandos to limit

night raids in certain areas and to increase the accuracy of the intelligence on which

these raids were based. The PRT engaged with local leaders, some of whom provided

actionable information and willingly handed over suspected insurgent leaders and

facilitators. This cooperation broke down with the arrival of new unit commanders (see

Vignette 5).

Civil-military coordination was key in areas with multiple units. For example, in Nangarhar Province, the Army battalion, provincial reconstruction team, agribusiness development unit, and counternarcotics team worked together to support the governor’s

plan to eliminate opium poppy from the province. The effort was a success, due in large

part to effective coordination and the use of reconstruction funds toward the same

goals (see Vignette 6).

24 | On the Ground
Unfortunately, such unity of effort was more the exception than the rule. Without unity

of command, the level of coordination depended heavily on the personalities of different commanders. With the rotation of each new unit, relationships had to be rebuilt between different U.S. and NATO partners, and between American and Afghan officials. It

was not uncommon for cooperation to break down due to personality conflicts, differences in opinion, or lack of communication. With such a fragmented command structure, no leadership at the top was capable of enforcing unity among units in the field.

Operating with Little Strategic Guidance

In most of the cases outlined in this book, units that followed a population-centric approach did so of their own initiative, in response to local conditions, and with little strategic guidance. Many mission statements said little more than “conduct COIN” or “target

insurgents,” leaving it up to the small unit on the ground to figure out what objectives

it should have and how to achieve them.

The vignettes in this book suggest that there was a lack of clear direction and unity of

effort at the top until at least mid-2009. Campaign plans and strategy documents existed, but they were often contradictory and not stringently enforced or clearly communicated. For every unit that focused on the population, others did not. Operations at

the tactical and operational levels were not nested within a single strategic framework.

Units often worked at cross-purposes and approaches changed from one commander

to the next. As a result, many hard-won gains were lost.

That said, deeper forces were also at work that militated against the development of a

clear strategy—and will continue to do so in the future. Conditions in Afghanistan vary

so widely and forces are so thinly spread out that operations are by necessity extremely

localized. In such an environment, offering clear and relevant strategic direction from

the top—from a headquarters hundreds of miles away across some of the world’s most

impassable terrain—is an enormous challenge. The Afghan leadership in Kabul faces

similar challenges when it comes to managing district governments.

Even the most focused and carefully formulated strategy will run into problems in such

an environment. At the end of the day, it will be up to small unit leaders to adapt counterinsurgency principles to the unique circumstances in their areas of operation.

Introduction | 25
26 | On the Ground

The vignettes that follow describe some of the conditions faced by small units in remote regions of Afghanistan, the approaches they adopted, and some of the successes

they achieved. They demonstrate what can be accomplished at the local level, even in

the absence of clear strategic guidance.
From May to November 2008, a platoon of U.S. Marines from 2d Battalion, 7th Marine

Regiment (2/7) operated in the isolated and dangerous Gulistan Valley in Farah Province

in southwest Afghanistan. Gulistan District was an enemy sanctuary that had never

been pacified. The insurgents had a firm hold on the population, the district government, and police. By November, the platoon of Marines had pushed the Taliban out of

the district’s main villages and built a base of support for the government.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines was the first U.S. Marine battalion to establish a permanent presence in southern Afghanistan. Its mission was to train the Afghan police in

eight districts in northern Helmand and Farah, a vast, mostly ungoverned area where

insurgents moved freely. After arriving in theater, the battalion learned that there were

few functioning police forces in these districts and that the area was almost entirely

controlled by the Taliban.

Gulistan was the most remote district in 2/7’s area of operations. The platoon’s outpost

was located more than a day’s drive from the nearest U.S. base. A few U.S. and NATO

units had been in and out of Gulistan, but none had established a permanent presence. These forces had achieved little and built few relationships with the locals.

Establishing the Marines’ Footprint in Gulistan

In April 2008, 2d Battalion was sent to southwest Afghanistan to train the local police.

The battalion was spread across eight districts in two provinces straddling two regional

commands. In Helmand Province, the battalion was responsible for the districts of Musa

Qala, Sangin, Now Zad, and Washir. In Farah Province, the battalion had Bala Baluk,

Bakwa, Delaram, and Gulistan Districts.

Vignette 1

U.S. Marine Platoon

Gulistan, Farah, 2008

Unless otherwise noted, information in this vignette comes from interviews with the platoon

commander on 13 May 2010.

27
This vast area consisted of large numbers of highly proficient Taliban fighters and virtually no competent police. British forces in Sangin, Musa Qala, and Now Zad were

under constant siege. In six of these districts, the Marines were the only significant military force (British forces were in Sangin and Musa Qala); it was up to them to hold these

districts against the Taliban while building police forces from scratch. The Marines’ deployment was meant to be a one-shot effort with no plan for follow-on forces, yet the battalion ended up establishing what would become a long-term U.S. Marine presence in

Farah and northern Helmand.

Within weeks of arriving in theater, the battalion was ordered to disperse its three rifle

companies across this vast area. One company was sent to Sangin, another to Musa

Qala and Now Zad. The third went to Delaram, a notorious truck stop along the Ring

Road between Helmand and Farah Provinces. This third company was responsible for

four districts in Farah, all Taliban sanctuary areas.

In late May, a platoon of Marines left Delaram and drove north into the remote Gulistan Valley. The platoon set up a makeshift combat outpost at the district center next to

28 | On the Ground

Forward Operating Base Gulistan on 8 July 2008. (Photo by LCpl Gene Allen Ainsworth III,

U.S. Marine Corps)
the local boys’ school and met with local officials. Armed only with some basic maps,

many of them dating back to the 1950s, the Marines knew almost nothing about

the area.

They also did not know before they arrived that Gulistan District was entirely under the

control of the insurgents who collected taxes and operated a parallel shadow government. It was common knowledge in the valley that the district governor and police chief

were actively collaborating with the Taliban, which ruled through a combination of political alliances and intimidation. Militants from Helmand and other areas of Afghanistan

used Gulistan as a safe haven—a place to rest, train, and plan operations.

The platoon’s combat outpost, located at the district center, was a day’s drive from the

company headquarters in Delaram, through mountain passes controlled by the

insurgents. In October 2007, more than 100 insurgents from Helmand had launched

a catastrophic ambush on a U.S.-Afghan convoy attempting to regain control over the

valley. Before the Marines arrived, the small district police garrison had been

repeatedly overrun.

As soon as the Marines arrived, the Taliban stepped up its campaign of intimidation.

Within days of the platoon’s arrival, the Americans observed a car driving through the

village. As the vehicle passed down the main road in the village, people turned off their

lights and generators. The Marines learned the next morning that the car was that of a

Taliban commander threatening people with beatings or death if they played music,

allowed women to leave the home, sent their girls to school, or interacted with

the Marines.

The Taliban delivered “night letters” (written threats delivered under the cover of darkness) to a nearby girls’ school, forcing it to shut down. The Marines countered with security patrols and a mobile defense of the schoolhouse during the school day. Within two

weeks the school was running again. The insurgents also threatened the police, most

of whom were local men with families living in the valley. There were daily reports that

insurgents were organizing to attack the platoon’s combat outpost.

The district governor and police chief actively collaborated with the Taliban. Although

they were from different clans, they were close allies. These officials fed the Marines

false information and sold weapons and ammunition to the insurgents.

Gulistan | 29
The Taliban continued to control the only route into and out of the valley, through the Buji

Bast Pass, south of the district center. In mid-June, the Marines surrounded a village

near the pass known to harbor insurgents attacking traffic on the road. The insurgents

fled before the Marines arrived. When the Taliban tried to return several days later, the

village leadership fought them off. The villagers were no longer afraid after seeing how

quickly the insurgents were defeated at the hands of the Marines.

From the day the Marines arrived, they executed a deliberate campaign plan developed

by the platoon commander to influence the area. The platoon made two to three foot

patrols each day to nearby villages, as well as one mounted patrol to an outlying village. After several weeks of continuous patrolling and relationship building, the townspeople—especially the shopkeepers and teachers—began cooperating with the troops.

During their patrols, the Marines noticed that people appeared supportive or at least indifferent in some villages, while in other areas the population was openly hostile.

The platoon commander insisted that every patrol have a specific mission other than just

presence, whether it be to speak with a local shopkeeper, hold a small shura, or gather

specific information about the area. The Marines learned to come to every meeting with

an agenda but to be patient and engage in casual conversation first. It was not part of

local Afghan culture to get to the point quickly. In every meeting, the Marines repeated

the same message: they were there to provide security, train the police, and stop anyone who threatened the villagers or Marines.

The Americans demonstrated understanding and compassion without displaying timidity or weakness. They engaged and pursued anyone who shot at them on patrol and

never hesitated to dismount and close with the enemy when it made tactical sense.

They were ready to engage the population or the enemy as the situation required.

In early July, over 100 insurgents armed with rockets and other heavy weapons attacked

the platoon’s outpost at the district center. Their plan was to overrun the position, and

if that failed, force the Marines to call in air strikes on civilian compounds the insurgents were using as firing positions. The fighting raged for over two hours, but the platoon did not call in air strikes. They exercised restraint, and no civilians were harmed.

The Taliban lost at least 13 men before they withdrew.

30 | On the Ground
After the attack, the Marines noticed a change in attitude among the people living

around the district center. The Marines heard villagers saying that “there is something

different about Marines,” that they were stronger than the insurgents. People began

cooperating with the Marines, telling them about the valley’s tribes and political

dynamics.

The Marines eventually learned that there were two dominant Noorzai Pashtun clans

in the valley: the Jimalzai and the Khojizai. The Jimalzai, many of whom were teachers

and businessmen with some education, were more supportive of the U.S. presence.

The Taliban enjoyed strong support in many Khojizai villages. The Marines also learned

that the district governor was the seniormost leader among the Khojizai and that he had

deliberately misled the Marines about his tribal affiliation.

Rolling the Taliban Back and Rebuilding the Police

In July, 75 local men from the Afghan National Police (ANP) returned from the regional

training academy in Shouz in Herat Province in the west. Despite their extra training, the

police still lacked basic infantry and marksmanship skills, and corruption and drug

abuse were rampant. Individual police officers’ main source of income was bribes and

extortion, and they were not trusted by the population. The platoon struggled to keep

the police from using drugs while on duty.

The district police chief was widely known for incompetence, treachery, and vindictiveness. Police officers complained of beatings and rape, and of fears that they might be

murdered in their sleep. By mid-July, 10 officers had deserted and another 30 went on

leave and never returned. By the end of July, only 21 policemen remained. The Marines

later learned that the police chief’s plan was to purge the agency of all men not personally loyal to him, then reconstitute the force with his own people.

The police chief, whom the Marines believed was working for the Taliban, tried several

times to lead them into areas where they would be vulnerable to attack. The platoon

commander tried repeatedly to have him removed, but to no avail, as the chief had

been appointed by the district governor, who had connections in Kabul. According to the

platoon commander, “We had to keep eyes in the back of our head. All we could do was

mitigate his ability to threaten us, by keeping at least two Marines for every one police,

in order to keep the police from becoming a liability in a gunfight.”

Gulistan | 31
Gulistan Valley, Farah Province, April–November 2008
Immediately after the return of

the newly minted officers, the Taliban threatened them and kidnapped their relatives. Insurgents

kidnapped an engineer from

Kabul who was in charge of building a forward operating base for

the platoon near the district center. The Taliban also stepped up

its campaign of intimidation

against the population, including

sending night letters to the teachers at the local boys’ school as

well as to villagers suspected of

cooperating with the Marines. The platoon split into three rifle squads and conducted

four weeks of continuous patrolling in the district center. The idea was to prevent the

insurgents from intimidating the police, so the police could train with them. The insurgents backed off and focused on outlying villages.

In late July, eight kilometers north of the district center, insurgents kidnapped, tortured,

and killed three Tajik policemen returning home on leave. The district police chief—who

viewed the Tajiks in his force as a threat to his power in the valley—had reportedly told

insurgents that the policemen would be traveling that way. When the Marines tried to

recover the bodies, insurgents trapped the convoy in a well-laid L-shaped ambush. As

the Marines and police moved south toward their base, they were hit again.

In early August, 40 to 50 Taliban ambushed a squad of Marines as it tried to establish

a cordon around a village believed to be harboring insurgents. An eight-hour firefight ensued in which the Americans drove the insurgents out of the village. The next day, the

village elders came to the district center and held a shura with the platoon commander.

The elders expressed gratitude to the Marines for sparing innocent lives in the houseto-house assault through the village and indicated that more than 20 insurgents had

been killed.

Gulistan | 33

View of the Gulistan Valley.

(Photo by U.S. Marine Corps)
Despite these engagements, which took a heavy toll on the local Taliban and

improved the stature of the Marines, the security situation remained precarious in most

of the district’s villages. The insurgents continued to control much of the valley. More

police deserted in August when the chief let them go “on leave,” knowing that they

would not come back. By the end of the month, only nine officers remained of the

original 75.

The Marines decided that the situation in the police force had become intolerable. They

pushed the district governor and police chief to reconstitute the force with local recruits

and send them away for training. According to the platoon commander, “They [the district governor and police chief] said, ‘we’ve got this cousin and that cousin, and we will

give them a weapon and a uniform.’” The Marines had serious misgivings but believed

they had no choice except to leave recruitment to the district government. The police

chief got what he wanted—the dissolution of the existing force, which represented various ethnic and tribal groups in the district, and its replacement by a force personally

loyal to him and drawn largely from a single clan.

In mid-August, the Marines faced another crisis related to the construction of the forward operating base near the district center. The Kabul-based contractor in charge of

the project had not paid the workers in more than two months. People had come from

all over the valley to work on the project, many of them farmers who had left their fields

uncultivated for the summer. Many of the workers had borrowed against their promised

wages, and had fallen into debt with local money-lenders. The workers trusted the

Marines, believing they would eventually be paid. By fall, the workers still had not been

paid and, although work was nearly complete, most men returned to their fields. The

Marines attempted to repay the villagers through various means of barter, such as food

and fuel, but the debt was simply too great.

In late August, the Taliban began leaving the district and regrouping in more remote

areas to the east. Locals began telling the Marines that the insurgents had left the

northern part of the district, though attacks continued around the Buji Bast Pass along

the southern edge of the valley. In October, the district governor began cooperating

openly with the Marines for the first time.

34 | On the Ground
Reports of Taliban intimidation ceased, and children returned to school. Farther south

near the Buji Bast Pass, villagers confronted the Taliban, telling them to leave and never

return. In November, many local officials who had been victims of intimidation returned

to work in the bazaar and at the forward operating base. They dealt openly with

the Marines.

During the last week of November, the Marines turned over command to a platoon from

3d Battalion, 8th Marines. Although there continued to be attacks in the southern part

of the valley and reports of insurgent movement on routes between Helmand and Farah,

the Taliban was no longer in control in most of the area, and security was much improved. These gains endured through 2009 and into 2010.

Conclusion

The Marines in Gulistan operated on their own in one of the most remote areas of

Afghanistan, far from higher headquarters, reinforcements, and re-supply. The platoon

had little time to prepare and knew almost nothing about the area going in. The Marines

were surrounded by Taliban-controlled territory and forced to work with local officials

who were actively collaborating with the enemy.

Such conditions put considerable pressure on the Marines. To operate effectively—perhaps even to survive—they had to be creative, flexible, and aggressive. The platoon commander had to become an expert in area politics, sift through deceitful claims of

treacherous officials, identify potential supporters and detractors, and fight off large

groups of proficient enemy fighters—all in an environment of persistent Taliban intimidation of the local population. These tasks went far beyond the unit’s original mission

to simply train the local police.

Dealing with the police proved to be the platoon’s greatest challenge. Corruption and

drug abuse were rampant, and morale was terrible. Worst of all, the district police chief

worked for the Taliban. He systematically abused the men under his command, with

the express intention of forcing them to desert. With no way to build a viable police

force with such a man at the helm who could not be removed, the Marines had no

choice but to work with him.

Gulistan | 35
Despite these obstacles, the Marine platoon managed to push back the Taliban, regain

control of the Gulistan Valley, and secure the support of much of the population.

According to the platoon commander, the key to his unit’s success was the flexibility to

accept and deal with a certain level of corruption and treachery, and above all else,

demonstrate superior strength and will. The platoon had considerable autonomy to

adapt its tactics and operations to the unique conditions it faced.

The unit succeeded because of its disciplined adherence to basic infantry principles

and thorough pre- and post-combat action process. A basic understanding of the concepts of counterinsurgency, coupled with a solid grasp of infantry tactics (with a bias toward speed and maneuver), ensured the platoon’s ability to tackle the complexity of

tribal networks, while enabling it to prevail in every tactical engagement.

36 | On the Ground
In the summer of 2009, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (1/5) undertook an operation to clear and hold a Taliban stronghold in the Nawa District of Helmand Province.

In June, 300 Marines joined a small contingent of British and Afghan soldiers already

in Nawa to patrol near their base and draw insurgents into the district center. Two weeks

later, the remainder of the battalion closed in on the center from the north, south, and

west. After two days of fighting, the Taliban was tactically defeated.

The Marines quickly transitioned from combat and clearing operations to stability and

holding operations that included befriending locals, holding community shuras, and

conducting small reconstruction projects.

Throughout their deployment, the battalion’s priority was to provide security for local

Afghans. To do so, the Marines spread out into 26 outposts over 400 square miles of

farmland and desert. They conducted multiple daily foot patrols along with Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces—collectively known as Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF)—for the primary purpose of talking to locals and creating alliances with key leaders. While locals were initially hesitant to cooperate with the

Marines and ANSF, the presence and actions of the Coalition gained the Afghans’ trust

over time.

While the Marines were managing the security situation, the battalion commander

worked closely with the new district government representatives to help promote local

governance. He also formed close relationships with the British stabilization advisor,

Vignette 2

U.S. Marine Battalion

Nawa, Helmand, 2009

Nawa District is also known more formally as Nawa-I-Barakzayi District, reflecting the dominant

Pashtun tribe in the district, the Barakzai.

Unless otherwise noted, information in this vignette comes from interviews with U.S. Marines from

1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment on 24 and 25 February; 22, 29, and 30 March; 21, 27, and 28

April; and 6 and 19 May 2010

37
USAID representative, and civil affairs officer to ensure unity of effort. Together, they held

community shuras to discuss major Afghan concerns and visited villages to conduct

impromptu shuras with local leaders. Working with key leaders also allowed them to

devise a reintegration campaign for villagers who had low levels of involvement with

the insurgency.

In addition, the battalion helped Afghans rebuild the district’s infrastructure. They

cleared canals, built roads, improved small bridges, and opened schools and clinics.

Once security was provided, the Coalition arranged projects to win over locals and stimulate the economy using information collected by the Marines during their patrols and

shuras. Within weeks of the Marines’ arrival, Afghans began to return to Nawa. The

district center was transformed from a ghost town to a relatively secure and lively

marketplace.

A British Platoon Surrounded

In 2006, a small British Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) was sent to Nawa

to mentor Afghan soldiers and police. The British and ANSF, collectively known as Task

Force Nawa, were outnumbered by Taliban fighters and became pinned down with heavy

daily firefights. The British in Nawa lacked the manpower to conduct daily patrols. When

they did patrol, they could rarely travel far outside their patrol base at the district center. The task force became tactically isolated and was only accessible by helicopter as

Taliban fighters encircled the base. As a result, the British had little access to the population and, in turn, knowledge, about what was happening outside their base. Beyond

their small security zone, the Taliban had freedom of movement.

During this time, there was no Afghan government in place. By 2009, the district

governor had not been to Nawa in two years. The Taliban taxed, threatened, and stole

from locals; closed schools; and generally controlled the area. Many of the locals fled.

Only a handful of the approximately 120 shops in the district center’s main bazaar remained open.

These conditions prevailed until the summer of 2009 when the U.S. Marines deployed

to Southern Afghanistan.

38 | On the Ground
Shaping Operations in Nawa

In the early summer of 2009, the Marines worked with the British military to devise a

plan to drive the Taliban out of Nawa. In late June, 300 Marines arrived in the district

and joined the British OMLT and ANA soldiers at the district center.

Insurgents attacked the district center as soon as the Marines arrived and continued

to attack them every day. For two weeks, the Marines experienced heavy, daily fighting.1

The Taliban in Nawa were good fighters; they were aggressive and had a basic understanding of infantry tactics. The police fought aggressively and with little restraint—“like

cowboys”—alongside the Marines at the schoolhouse. Within days, the Americans began

including the ANP on their platoon-sized patrols, expanding the security zone.

The ultimate goal of the U.S. Marine surge in the south was not only to provide security

but also to instill confidence in the local population about their government. Shortly

after the initial 300 Marines arrived in the district, a new district governor, Haji Abdul

Manaf, was appointed to Nawa. Locals knew and respected Governor Manaf from his

experience fighting against the Soviets during the 1980s.

Clearing Nawa

In early July, the rest of the battalion entered Nawa as part of a major offensive across

Helmand called Operation Kanjar (“Strike of the Sword”). An additional 800 Marines and

their ANSF partners conducted movement-to-contact, cleared the district center, and expanded the security zone around the district center.

The Marines encountered little opposition. The Taliban were tactically defeated and relinquished control of the district within 36 hours. While many Taliban fighters were

killed, others fled to the nearby town of Marjah or went into hiding.

The battalion dispersed throughout the district into small outposts. Each Marine company was assigned two positions based on the locations of population centers and lines

of communication.

The Americans’ number one priority was to provide security for the population and, by

doing so, to separate the insurgents from the population. They were more concerned

Nawa | 39
with befriending the local populace than hunting down enemy fighters, and they limited the use of mortars and air power.2 They did not drop a single bomb out of fear of

harming civilians and alienating the population. The Marines also reimbursed many locals for damages that occurred during the fighting.3

The Marines initially conducted some raids against suspected Taliban leaders; however, after a few missions, they realized that these raids upset the local population while

yielding few results. Therefore, these raids were cut back.

Communication with the population was vital to the Marines’ success in Nawa. Unlike

in other operations, prior to their deployment, the Marines prepared a unified strategic

communication plan based on five “enduring talking points” to explain who they were,

what was going on, and why they were there. These were as follows:

1. We are here in your village/town at the request of your government to help

your brave Afghan National Security Forces to make the area safer, more

secure, and increase prosperity for the people.

2. We are here in partnership with your Afghan security forces. Together, we

can improve peace and prosperity in your town.

3. We seek your assistance in identifying those who are seeking to destroy

your government and keep you in fear. The sooner we can identify these enemies of Afghanistan, the sooner we can remove them from your village.

4. Coalition forces have no intention to stay in your village permanently. We

will stay long enough to ensure security and will leave when your own security forces can maintain this security on their own.

5. We look upon you as our friends. We have left our families to assist you,

just as we would for any friend.

Holding Nawa

Before the operation, the battalion expected heavy fighting until September. However,

when fighting stopped just two days after their arrival in Nawa, they were forced to transition from combat to stability operations much sooner than anticipated.

40 | On the Ground
The Marines spent the remaining months of their deployment patrolling the area, supporting the expansion of governance, and developing security forces to hold and build

the district.

The Marines and ANSF had sufficient numbers to disperse throughout the district. From

the initially assigned two company-sized positions, the Marines further dispersed into

platoon- and squad-sized outposts, resulting in 26 positions by the end of their deployment. These additional outposts were selected based on areas that the battalion

needed to control, such as villages and roads where there had been frequent Taliban

activity. Marines at these outposts conducted three to four patrols each day, which reassured locals that Marines were everywhere, providing security. In addition to protecting Afghans, the Americans conducted foot patrols to meet with locals (with the

help of interpreters), discover local issues and concerns, and identify local leaders.

At first, however, few locals wanted to talk to the Marines, as the Taliban continued to

threaten and intimidate. For example, the Taliban had spread propaganda that the

Marines would leave after the August 2009 presidential elections and the Taliban would

then regain control of Nawa. Since Nawa had been cleared in the past and the Coalition had never stayed in sufficient numbers to hold the area, local Afghans were inclined to believe the rumors. To demonstrate their lingering presence, the Taliban

occasionally left threatening night letters in villages after nightfall to let the population

know that they were still around and watching. Villagers also received threatening phone

calls. The Marines, however, actively sought to continuously disprove Taliban propaganda—by, for example, staying in the area after elections—and to distinguish themselves from the threatening actions of the Taliban. Marines emphasized the “golden

rule”: treat others as they would want to be treated if their roles were reversed. They

were also apologetic when necessary. The population soon realized that the Taliban

could no longer back up their threats, which prompted Afghans to cooperate more freely

with the Marines.

The Marines met with locals on every patrol, shaking hands and drinking tea. By doing

so, they also differentiated themselves from their British predecessors who had “pointed

guns” at locals when they patrolled and had not spent much time talking with them. The

Marines were careful to be culturally aware and respectful. For example, they did not

enter mosques unless they were invited.

Nawa | 41
Persistent foot patrolling made the Marines’ presence known to the local population. The

battalion commander’s policy was that no Afghan was to go 72 hours without seeing a

Marine or police officer. Some platoons distributed their own version of night letters

during night patrols to let people know that the Marines were always around. Many locals began to believe that the Marines never slept.

The Marines used their patrols as an opportunity to collect information about their area.

They asked locals about their opinions and top five concerns. Typical questions included

• What changes to the population have there been in the past year? Have

people left? Have people returned? Why?

• What are the most important problems? Why?

• Who do you believe can solve your problems? Why?

• What should be done first? Why?

Asking these questions required the Marines to have patience and good “people skills.”

It was worth the effort, and the Marines familiarized themselves with the area, befriended locals, and prioritized projects.

During their patrols, they also made a conscious effort to identify an area’s key leaders

and befriend them. After discerning power brokers in their area of operation (AO)—including village elders, tribal leaders, and religious leaders (mullahs)—the Marines met

with them at least once a week to drink tea and discuss their concerns. In some cases,

these conversations increased in frequency to every other day by the end of their deployment. Many company and platoon commanders took off their gear when talking

with elders as a sign of respect. This key leader engagement not only helped the Marines

learn more about what the locals needed but also drove operations by providing Marines

with more accurate information about who to talk to and what was happening in

their area.

The Marines also worked with key leaders on reintegration. From the beginning of their

time in Nawa, they advertised that local Afghans who had worked with the Taliban—

known to the Marines as the “little t taliban”—should have the opportunity to reintegrate. That is, Marines would forgive past small grievances and not arrest past

42 | On the Ground
LEGEND

River

Major road

Secondary road

Helmand River

To Lashkar Gah

5 kilometers

Heavily cultivated area

Desert

Canal

District center

N

Nawa district 

center

To Marjah

Nawa, Helmand Province, 2009
aggressors as long as they were peaceful in the future. By late July, this became an official policy involving the assistance of village elders. In front of their village elders, men

pledged not to participate in insurgent actions; by witnessing their pledges, the local elders took responsibility for keeping them straight.

Community meetings, known as shuras, gave the Marines another opportunity to collect information about their respective AO. The battalion commander and district governor walked around to talk with locals in what became known as a “walking shura.”

Similarly, Marines held impromptu shuras with locals at the platoon and squad levels

during their patrols. After discovering ripped-up leaflets in canals, the Marines decided

against the routine mass distribution of informational materials. Instead, they began to

use the handouts as an icebreaker with which to convene a small impromptu shura.

They would have an interpreter on hand to explain the leaflets. The idea was that those

Afghans would then take the leaflets back to their village to an educated villager who

would read and confirm what they had been told by the Marines. In addition to leaflets,

the Marines began to publish a Nawa District newsletter every couple of weeks to explain what was going on in the district. The Marines also relied on policemen to hand

44 | On the Ground

Platoon commander meeting with locals on a patrol. (Photo by U.S. Marine Corps)
out these newsletters in main bazaar areas. Because of low literacy rates, all written

products included numerous pictures.

In addition, the Marines distributed radios in a box (RIABs) to locals during their patrols.4 These radio transmitters had recorded messages from leaders, such as the district governor, police chief, and ANA commander. Separately, the battalion also operated

a local radio station and broadcast music, prayers, news, and health messages for the

local populace.

The Marines partnered with ANSF at the lowest level of command. They ate, lived, and

patrolled side by side with ANP and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). They also

planned most operations together. On every patrol, the Marines encouraged positive

ANP interaction with the populace; for example, they encouraged the police to distribute flyers and to stay to answer questions.

Upon arrival, one Marine likened the ANP to the Mexican Federales because they only

behaved when closely monitored. If the Marines did not closely watch them, a policeman might smoke hashish or carry away a farmer’s chicken. In October, the local ANP

were sent to the police academy as part of the eight-week focused district development

(FDD) program. Additional ANCOP were sent to the area to take their place. Although the

locals initially preferred them to the ANP, they ended up requesting their local police

back because they were more familiar with the area. After the ANP returned from their

training, the Marines noticed a slightly more professional force. Their behavior also

improved the longer they spent with the Marines. By the end of the 1/5 deployment,

some of the ANP even tried to mirror the Marines’ appearance by cutting their hair in

Marine fashion.

Even when the ANP were not present, the Marines tried to build up police credibility

among locals by talking about the positive things the ANP had done. Posters of police

officers with Afghans were displayed in bazaars to improve how the locals perceived

the ANP and to give the police themselves a constant reminder of professionalism.

A few weeks after the Marines cleared the area, shops began to open and residents

began to return to Nawa. Many residents had fled north to Lashkar Gah but returned

once they heard through word of mouth that security was improving. By the end of

October 2009, the Marines noted that at least 80 of the 120 shops were open in the

Nawa | 45
district center bazaar, demonstrating that locals had growing faith in the economy and

the security environment.

By the end of the Marines’ deployment, local Afghans had started to take responsibility for their own security. IED incidents decreased by 90 percent.5

As security improved, locals approached the Marines about other issues, such as health

care and irrigation. Lack of water was always an issue. The Marines listened to the

problems but emphasized that the solutions were the district government’s

responsibility. However, the Marines helped the government by providing funds and

equipment for projects. In essence, the Marines served as a broker, which demonstrated

to locals that everyone was working together. The Marines also conducted numerous

confidence-building projects, including clearing canals and building roads. Each platoon had a budget—almost exclusively funded by the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)—but local village elders decided on projects. Locals were hired

to do all the building.

Even though Helmand had the most opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and Nawa

District was the second-largest cultivator in the province in 2008, the Marines (unlike

their ANSF counterparts) avoided participating in poppy eradication. In conjunction with

the Helmand provincial reconstruction team, however, they did help push out wheat

seed distribution during the planting season in the fall. They also discussed opium

poppy planting with locals and recommended that they not grow it the next season.

Building Nawa

By providing security, the Marines were able to help foster the development of local government. The battalion commander created strong ties to the new district governor and

other local leaders and was so widely respected by the population that he became

known as “Colonel Bill” throughout the district. The battalion commander and district

governor began attending community meetings together to build confidence in the

Afghan government, and the district governor and administrator went out in the district

center every day and to outlying areas at least twice a week. While the people did not

trust the central government in Kabul, they trusted the provincial and district leadership.

46 | On the Ground
The battalion commander was able to work closely with the U.S. and British civilians in

the area. Within a month of arriving, the Helmand PRT sent a British stabilization advisor to the district from another part of the province, and the battalion was also assigned

a USAID representative. Both civilians, in addition to a civil affairs reservist, worked

closely with the battalion commander and his Marines.

At least once a week, the battalion held a high-profile community outreach shura to

discuss major district issues and concerns. These shuras typically involved the battalion commander, district governor (and in some cases the provincial governor), district

administrator, USAID representative, and British stabilization advisor, therefore demonstrating a united front. Each week these meetings were held in a different part of the

district. The first, in late July, involved the provincial governor. Platoons advertised these

shuras during their patrols, and more locals attended them as time went on.

These planned shuras allowed the battalion and Afghan government officials to address big issues, such as civilian deaths and Taliban propaganda. For example, early in

their deployment, a Marine sniper team killed a farmer who was irrigating at night, mistakenly believing that he was planting an IED. The battalion held a large shura afterward

to apologize to locals and admit their mistake.

These shuras also helped address Taliban propaganda. For example, the Taliban spread

rumors that the Marines were there to change the Afghan lifestyle. The Marines, however, quickly tried to emphasize that they wanted to help improve the local Afghan

lifestyle and provide Afghans with the security necessary to allow for political discussions. Local concerns seemed to be assuaged rather quickly once a commanding officer addressed it at a shura.

Despite improvements in security, there were also setbacks. In late September, the PRT

worked with the district government to build a 46-member community council in Nawa

(including a handful of known former Taliban). The district governor persuaded elders

to reconstitute a traditional council featuring locally selected representatives from each

subdistrict. Unfortunately, after the community council was created, insurgents assassinated three of its members, all former Taliban. Their deaths, however, only seemed to

strengthen the community council’s resolve and reaffirm their belief that they needed

Nawa | 47
Local Afghan men attend a shura in the Nawa District, Helmand Province.

(Photo by SSgt William Greeson, U.S. Marine Corps)

to continue. For security purposes, the council members all stayed in a house together,

which forged a bond between them.

As winter approached, the locals became worried because the Marines they knew were

about to be replaced by a different Marine battalion.6 The outgoing Marines eased their

fears by introducing their replacements to locals and key leaders and distributing flyers

explaining the transition.7

Conclusion

During the summer and fall of 2009, the Marines conducted a population-centric

counterinsurgency campaign in Nawa. Because they faced far less resistance than expected, they began executing the “hold” aspect of the operation within days of the

“clear.” The Marines transitioned quickly from a situation that they thought would be

heavily kinetic to a heavy civil affairs and information operations (IO) focus to favorably

influence local perceptions. They were flexible and quickly adapted to a campaign of

“handshakes and smiles.”

Throughout their campaign, the battalion’s enduring mission was to protect locals from

the Taliban threat and win their confidence. The concentration of force, with the recommended troop-to-population ratio, pushed Taliban fighters out and then protected

the population by daily foot patrols. Ultimately, the population did not care who provided

security, as long as it was provided. While there was some early hesitation to cooperate, locals seemed fed up with being bullied by the Taliban. By living among the people

and reassuring Afghans that they would be there for “as long as it takes,” the Marines

gave villagers a sense of security. The return of families was a sign of progress.

The relatively secure environment allowed the Marines to build personal relationships

and trust with locals. The battalion realized that “building castles and wearing heavy

armor” would distance them from the people. Therefore, they operated in small units

(alongside ANSF) and walked everywhere to focus on befriending the populace, not

hunting the Taliban. This required patrols to have tactical patience—to spend time drinking cups of tea and shaking hands with locals—and not rushing to get back to the base.

By taking the time to talk with residents and build these relationships, the Marines were

able to collect better intelligence that they could use to hunt insurgents.

50 | On the Ground
Understanding the local population was a priority. Squad leaders, platoon leaders, and

company commanders were all responsible for analyzing the civilian communities and

befriending local leaders in their respective areas of operation. It took some time for

Marines to get used to the Afghan schedule and their customs (e.g., irrigating at night),

but they learned quickly and were able to adapt to local circumstances.

Information operations was the primary driving force behind all Marine actions and was

integrated throughout all activities. As part of their IO campaign, the Marines did not

make big promises at the beginning of their deployment and were careful not to promise anything they could not deliver. Even as the end of their tour approached, the outgoing 1/5 Marines distributed informational materials, explained the troop transition,

mentored their replacements, and introduced them to locals and key leaders to assuage the people’s fears.

After the battalion’s focus on security, governance and development followed. The

Marines worked to build the credibility of the district government and security forces

while maintaining security. The battalion commander created strong ties with capable

Afghan and civilian partners, and his company commanders mirrored him. It also helped

that all of the company commanders had former counterinsurgency experience in Iraq.

Through large community outreach shuras and small impromptu shuras, the Marines—

from the battalion commander to the squad leader—worked with local leaders to

identify community problems and gain a better understanding of what was happening

in their area. The Marines were outside the wire every day talking with locals and

addressing concerns, such as civilian casualties or misperceptions spread by the

Taliban. In addition, they helped the local government fund and supply local

development projects.

Nawa | 51

From April to November 2008, a group of U.S. Marine advisors worked with the Afghan

National Army (ANA) to clear, hold, and build the southern portion of the Tagab Valley,

east of Kabul. The ANA’s 201st Corps, 3rd Brigade, had sole responsibility for the area.

Afghan soldiers managed to stabilize the valley with minimal Coalition support.

The ANA planned and led the operations in southern Tagab, but Marine advisors were

involved at every level of command, from the corps (division) level down to the kandaks

(small battalions) on the ground. The Marine advisors also pushed for the operations

and convinced the ANA that they would succeed.

The southern Tagab Valley was a stronghold of Pakistan-based insurgents responsible

for numerous large-scale attacks in eastern Afghanistan. Enemy fighters moved freely

through the area and controlled the population. There was no government presence

in 2008.

This case is significant because, for the first time, the Afghan army managed to seize

ground from the Taliban and hold it with little Coalition assistance. The success of the

operations demonstrated that battlespace can be turned over to Afghan units, provided

they are ready and have good leadership.

The Struggle Over the Tagab

When the Marines arrived in April 2008, the Tagab Valley was considered a no-go area

where insurgents moved freely. Enemy fighters moving into the valley from the east

posed a threat to Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital city. Rival militias seeking to control the

eastern approach to Kabul had fought over the valley constantly during the 1990s civil

Unless otherwise noted, information in this vignette comes from interviews with U.S. Marine

advisors to the Afghan army’s 201st Corps and its subordinate units.

Vignette 3

U.S. Marine Advisors

Tagab Valley, Kapisa, 2008

53
war, when the valley changed hands about 10 times. Its residents had a reputation for

cooperating with whichever outside force happened to be stronger at the moment.1

The southern part of the Tagab Valley was almost entirely Pashtun. There were no reconstruction projects or functioning government. Poppy farming and timber smuggling

were prevalent and insurgent influence

was strong. Local warlords provided

Pakistan-based insurgent groups with

local fighters. The northern part, on the

other hand, was mostly Tajik. Tagab

had a functioning government and substantial Coalition presence. The district

governor was a Tajik distrusted by the

Pashtuns to the south.

There had been several operations to

clear the southern Tagab in 2005,

2006, and 2007. In 2005, U.S. forces

pushed into the valley, forcing the insurgents to flee to nearby valleys and

into Pakistan. The soldiers then left,

and the insurgents returned as strong

as before.2 In 2006, U.S. forces cleared

through the valley a second time and

left Afghan police behind to hold the area. Insurgents overran the police posts in 2006

and again in 2007, after which the police refused to man the positions. In 2007, the Taliban claimed full control over southern Tagab.3

The ANA Goes In

In May 2008, Afghan soldiers and police—with U.S. support—launched a large-scale

poppy eradication operation in Tagab District. Afghan soldiers moved with the police up

the valley, providing security while the police destroyed poppy fields. Barely a shot was

fired as about 250 Afghan soldiers and police moved through the valley in four-wheeldrive trucks.

54 | On the Ground

Afghan soldiers line up to march into the Tagab

Valley. (Photo by U.S. Marine Corps)
No forces were left behind after the poppy eradication operations. The campaign involved sweeping through the valley, destroying poppy crops, and then leaving. The ANA

and their advisors later decided that if they could move through the valley with so little

resistance, they might be able to hold it and even begin reconstruction.

The Marine advisors believed that, given past precedent, the police would not be able

to hold the valley on their own. The ANA would have to set up permanent bases and patrol the area indefinitely, with the police in a supporting role. The Marines managed to

persuade the U.S. military command to give the Afghan army sole responsibility and

operational control over southern Tagab.

In June and July, the ANA started moving forces and supplies to the southern mouth of

the valley. The plan was to move from there into the southern part of the valley, set up

a forward operating base, and push farther north, setting up patrol bases at the mouths

of smaller valleys leading into

the southern Tagab. At the

same time, another group of

ANA soldiers and their trainers

pushed south from the Tajik

areas in northern Tagab.

In September 2008, ANA engineers improved the road to the

southern mouth of the valley

and built a bridge over the

Naghlu River. They then began

pushing slowly into the valley itself, improving the road as they

went. Their intention was to

eventually pave the road

through the valley, opening up

a shorter route between Pakistan and Central Asia that

would bypass the treacherous

Jalalabad Pass.

Tagab Valley | 55

A U.S. Marine trainer and his interpreter talk with

villagers in the Tagab Valley. (Photo by U.S. Marine

Corps)
Jalalabad Pass

Kabul

Naghlu

Sarobi

Dam

Ring Road to

Kandahar

Highway to Jalalabad

and the Khyber Pass

Southern Tagab

N

10 kilometers

RiverRoadLake

LEGEND

To the

Panjshir

Valley and

northern

Afghanistan

Side valleys To northern Tagab

Southern Tagab Valley, Kapisa Province, 2008
The ANA engaged with the villages along the river, built patrol bases, and began smallscale reconstruction projects. Despite occasional harassing attacks by the insurgents,

most of whom were hiding in smaller side valleys, the Afghan soldiers did not go after

them. The ANA built a forward operating base in the southern part of the valley and

smaller checkpoints along the valley floor.

The focus was not on clearing the area, but on establishing bases, securing the road,

engaging with the population, and beginning reconstruction. It was common knowledge

that insurgents operated in significant numbers in the side valleys; however, as long as

violence remained low, the ANA and their advisors were willing to leave the insurgents

alone. Some of those working for the insurgents were related to local leaders cooperating with the ANA. Afghan army officers and their advisors believed that if they built

enough support, those working for the enemy would eventually switch sides.

The Afghan soldiers held shuras in each major village along the river. The ANA brought

trucks full of food, clothes, and other supplies to distribute as they went, and Afghan

dentists and medics provided some basic medical care. As they moved farther into the

valley, they gained momentum: the shuras got bigger and the population, more

welcoming.

The ANA led the shuras—the Marine advisors did not speak. Each Afghan army kandak

had a religious affairs officer who was a trained mullah (a teacher of the Holy Koran),

and these men doubled as political officers and did most of the talking. They told villagers that poppy growing was not allowed in Islam and promised the people reconstruction projects in exchange for cooperation.

The ANA, with the Marines’ help, executed many reconstruction projects in southern

Tagab, especially well construction and medical missions. They also helped the valley’s

people export pomegranates and saffron to increase profits for the local farmers who

had no access to cold storage and had to sell their fruits immediately. Most of the fruit

went to Pakistan, where it was stored in refrigerated containers, then exported back into

Afghanistan at a 300 percent markup. Subsequently, people from villages farther afield

began coming down to the ANA bases and asking for similar projects. Some asked the

Afghan army to put patrol bases near their villages.

Tagab Valley | 57
In October, Afghan soldiers pushed patrols into some of the side valleys where insurgents were operating in greater strength than in the main valley. By November, the main

insurgent group in the Tagab began pulling out of the valley, apparently believing that

it had lost the support of the population.

Conclusion

The United States can learn important lessons from the operations in the Tagab Valley,

including how U.S. forces might eventually transition battlespace to Afghan units. Even

after combat forces withdraw, there will still be a need for advisors at multiple levels of

command, including on the ground with the kandaks. U.S. Marine advisors have developed a model for readying units for independent operations and transitioning battlespace to Afghan control. For the Marines, the entire purpose of the operations in the

Tagab was to transition the battlespace to Afghan control, with as little Coalition support

as possible.

The idea was to give the ANA responsibility over a discreet battlespace where no strong

U.S. or NATO units overshadowed the Afghan army, and to hold the ANA accountable for

what happened there. If the ANA succeeded in southern Tagab, there would hopefully

be greater impetus elsewhere to hand over control to the Afghan army. As far as the

advisors knew, no strategic plan existed in 2008 to transition battlespace anywhere in

the country to Afghan control. It was not a priority for the command in Afghanistan,

where the focus was on fighting the insurgency with U.S. and NATO forces.

The success of the operation was due to many factors, among them strong leadership

at the brigade and kandak levels, effective Marine advisors at each level of command,

the absence of other U.S. or NATO combat units, and the fact that the Afghan army

owned the battlespace. The ANA was on its own; it was forced to either operate independently or fail.

When working with the Afghan army, the tendency among most U.S. and NATO forces

was to engage in partnering. In practice, this usually meant U.S. units planned and led

the operations, with Afghan forces in a subordinate, supporting role. Partnering, which

gave little responsibility or latitude to the ANA, often created undue dependency on foreign forces and stifled the ANA leadership, discouraging them from taking the initiative

58 | On the Ground
or assuming responsibility. This was especially true among more developed Afghan

army units that had the capability to operate independently but rarely did so.

According to several advisors, many U.S. and NATO forces operated with the attitude that

they owned the area under their control. Those forces did not trust the ANA and shut

them out of the planning process. Often, they used Afghan units to achieve tactical objectives without any consideration for the long-term development of the force.

In the Tagab, U.S. Marine advisors did not merely partner with Afghan soldiers for operations and return to their base for the night. The Marines were embedded advisors

who lived and worked with Afghan officers and accompanied them on every patrol. The

Tagab Valley | 59

Afghan army officers lead a shura in a village in the Southern Tagab.

(Photo by U.S. Marine Corps)
Marines believed they were particularly well suited to train Afghan soldiers as light infantry, due in part to the Marine culture of “every Marine a rifleman.”

The advisors’ role was completely different from the roles of other U.S. and NATO forces.

The advisors’ mission was to ensure that the ANA was used in a way that developed its

capability to operate independently. The advisors also provided resources not available

to the ANA and backup if needed. These included quick-reaction forces, artillery and

air support, and casualty evacuation.

The Marines quickly learned that the ANA’s weaknesses were in organization, planning,

and logistics. The ANA rarely had the resources to sustain itself in long operations—they

needed substantial logistical support. There were also problems with retention, due to

long deployments away from home, low pay, and poor working conditions. Individual

Afghan soldiers, however, were of high caliber and operated well in small units, especially when they had good leaders.

60 | On the Ground
From May 2007 to July 2008, officers of the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (1-

91)—also known as Task Force (TF) Saber—immersed themselves in the complex political environment of northeast Afghanistan. Through countless conversations with local

people, the battalion gathered information on the area’s many tribal and ethnic groups—

their viewpoints, interests, and histories of conflict—and used this knowledge to achieve

its objectives while significantly reducing levels of violence.

The officers of Task Force Saber preferred to negotiate—rather than simply fight—their

way into remote and dangerous areas. They combined political, economic, and military

tools to acquire leverage in these negotiations. They built relationships with local

leaders, integrated local shuras with the Afghan government, used reconstruction funds

to secure support and create incentives for stability, and used military operations to

keep the insurgents off balance. The battalion empowered cooperative local leaders and

held them responsible for what happened in their areas, while marginalizing the

insurgents.

As a result of these efforts, many insurgents stopped fighting; others changed sides as

pro-government leaders gained strength. Levels of violence dropped dramatically. Despite these successes, the gains made were not irreversible—much depended on tenuous relationships between local communities and U.S. and Afghan forces. Maintaining

Unless otherwise noted, information in this vignette comes from interviews with 1-91 officers at

Forward Operating Base Naray in early March 2008, including the battalion commander, his

nonkinetic effects officer, headquarters troop commander, civil affairs officers, information

operations officers, and border police trainers. The author also interviewed several local journalists

working on the base, and attended shuras with leaders from Ghaziabad District in Kunar and

Kamdesh in Nuristan. This vignette also draws on an article by Nathan Springer titled

“Implementing a Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Strategy, Northeast Afghanistan, May 07–

July 08,” Small Wars Journal 6 (2010): 1–19, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/

implementing-a-populationcentr/.

Vignette 4

U.S. Army Battalion

Kunar and Nuristan, 2007–2008

61
these relationships required constant effort. Continuous patrols and engagement in

the communities was essential to build relationships, gain local understanding, and

sustain support and coordination.

The battalion’s area of operations included northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan—some

of the most remote and inaccessible terrain in Afghanistan. The people lived in a series

of isolated river valleys separated by ridgelines as high as 14,000 feet. Each valley was

like a separate country, its people suspicious of outsiders and often armed to the teeth.

Nuristan was one of the last areas to be conquered by Afghan rulers and converted to

Islam. The Soviet army in the 1980s faced some of its most crushing defeats there. It

was also one of the most dangerous for U.S. forces.

Navigating the Political Terrain

The soldiers of 1-91 arrived in Afghanistan in May 2007 intent on pursuing a populationcentric strategy. The battalion commander, a former history professor at West Point,

was a student of counterinsurgency. His plan was to focus on local engagement and

building relationships, targeted use of reconstruction funds, organization of local shuras,

and political negotiation.

Understanding what might motivate a community to turn against the insurgency required an in-depth understanding of the area and its politics. The officers of Task Force

Saber spent the early part of their tour talking to as many local people as they could—

learning about local politics, tribes, economics, and cultural traditions. The soldiers sat

with villagers for hours at a time, day in and day out, just to put together a basic picture

of the area’s complex political dynamic.

In the district of Ghaziabad in northern Kunar, also part of 1-91’s area of operations (see

map), there were five main groups: the Mushwanis, Salarzais, Gujjars, Kohistanis, and

Nuristanis. Mushwanis and Salarzais are Pashtuns, while Gujjars, Kohistanis, and Nuristanis are separate ethnic groups that speak different languages. There were also seminomadic groups from Chitral in Pakistan who crossed into Kunar and Nuristan during

the winter when the passes in Pakistan were blocked by snow.

These groups did not get along. The Nuristanis of Ghaziabad, whose villages were deep

in the mountains away from the Kunar River, refused to accept or participate in any

62 | On the Ground
Asmar

Naray

Kamdesh

Bargi Matal

Ghaziabad 

District

Naray 

District

Kamdesh 

District

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN

Gowardesh 

Bridge

Landay Sin River

Kunar

River

LEGEND

District center District boundary

Provincial boundary

International border

Village N

10 kilometers

Arandu

Dirt path

Road

River or waterway

Northern Kunar and Eastern Nuristan, 2007–2008
shuras with the Pashtun tribes and did not recognize the Pashtun-dominated district and

provincial governments. Gujjar leaders had allied with the Russians during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and were considered persona non grata by Pashtuns, Kohistanis, and Nuristanis alike. There were also divisions within these communities that were

not so easy to discern. They fought among themselves constantly.

Beyond the ethnic dimensions, there were numerous disputes between various villages

and clans, particularly in Ghaziabad District. Many of these were over land, access to

water, and money. Projects that ran through or affected several villages—such as roads,

pipe schemes, or micro-hydro projects that promised to deliver electricity to multiple villages—often led to serious conflicts that jeopardized these projects. Outside contractors—basically, anyone not part of the local community—were viewed as a threat. The

district government was ineffective when it came to resolving these problems. There

was also constant fighting between armed groups over control of natural resources, especially timber and gems smuggled into Pakistan.

The fighting in Nuristan was wrapped up in the politics of the region and had little to do

with religious radicalism or al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In some cases, bitter rivalries between local power brokers led one side to join the government and the other, the insurgents. Coalition raids based on misinformation—often deliberately false information

passed to U.S. forces by local power brokers looking for creative ways to eliminate their

enemies—had pushed many toward the insurgents during earlier years of the war.

The battalion, which acquired a reputation as an honest broker through repeated

meetings with local leaders and the building of relationships based on trust, refused to

take sides in local disputes for fear of getting drawn into local feuds. The soldiers of

1-91 built consensus through frequent dialogue and enabled community shuras to

resolve disputes.

Task Force Saber also used these shuras to improve security. For example, in July 2007,

the battalion reached out to the Nuristanis of Ghaziabad District. The commander realized that the Nuristanis had been marginalized in the district government and that U.S.

forces were basically at war with them. After a major attack on a U.S. convoy attributed

to Nuristani militants in Ghaziabad, a group of Nuristani elders came to the battalion

headquarters at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Naray. They agreed to put pressure on

64 | On the Ground
the militants to stop the attacks in exchange for political recognition and reconstruction

projects. Illegal checkpoints and attacks on convoys in Ghaziabad decreased dramatically thereafter.

In August 2007, the battalion reached out to the leaders of an openly hostile village

eight kilometers south of Naray. The village of Saw had been the site of a botched

nighttime raid in the winter of 2005—a cause of dishonor for which the village sought

revenge by launching frequent rocket attacks. It was considered a no-go area when

1-91 arrived.

From August to November 2007, TF Saber began visiting the village regularly and meeting with its leaders. The battalion also sent school supplies. The next day, village

leaders delivered 100 thank you notes written in Pashtu by the village’s children. As the

relationship grew, 1-91 began construction of a clinic, a school, and a bridge. U.S. and

Afghan soldiers visited the village regularly to discuss the projects and to provide

medical assistance. The village leaders gradually halted insurgent movement through

their lands.

In early 2008, the battalion built a bridge in Saw that crossed the Kunar River— the

only bridge for miles around. Men from the village guarded the bridge around the clock

and repulsed several attacks on the project. By the end of its tour, TF Saber had managed to secure the cooperation of 40 villages that were earlier considered hostile. Some

of these villages raised their own self-defense forces to protect their communities. These

villages had become invested in the reconstruction that the battalion was providing and

were keen to protect these projects.

In the summer of 2007, the battalion reached out to elders in the dangerous and nearly

inaccessible district of Kamdesh in Nuristan. That summer, there were several large

firefights in Kamdesh, as well as many small-scale attacks. By October, elders began

an organized effort to pressure the insurgents to stop fighting. In early 2008, the soldiers helped put together a shura of 100 local leaders representing different villages.

These leaders traveled around the district trying to persuade people to stop supporting

the insurgency and engage with the government.

The elders met frequently with TF Saber officers and sometimes accompanied them on

patrol as a show of support. The battalion commander traveled to Kamdesh to meet

Kunar and Nuristan | 65
them as well. In March 2008, the elders traveled to FOB Naray—a long and dangerous

journey—and met with the 1-91 battalion commander. They then traveled to Kabul, met

with President Karzai, and asked him for support.

When insurgents solicited outside support for a major attack in June 2008, local leaders informed Afghan and U.S. forces. As a result, 1-91 was able to defeat a force of 150

or more fighters, dealing a serious blow to the insurgency.

Task Force Saber officers

reached out to religious leaders and provided funds to refurbish mosques. Many local

mullahs, or religious leaders,

had preached against the

Coalition and called on local

youth to attack U.S. and

Afghan forces. They insisted

that U.S. soldiers were not to

be trusted, that they would

burn villages like the Russians

had during the 1980s. Some

mullahs turned around completely as a result of the battalion’s outreach efforts, and

began speaking in favor of the

Coalition.

The battalion also funded a

newspaper and the area’s only radio station. A local teacher ran the radio station, which

broadcast programs on Islam, local news, and music from India, Pakistan, and Iran.

People in far-flung villages sent letters requesting songs. There were programs in different local languages, such as Nuristani, Pashtu, Khoistani, and Gujjari. The battalion

fielded thousands of requests for hand-held radios.

Over time, Task Force Saber built a solid base of support in some of the most remote

and dangerous areas of Afghanistan, while taking relatively few casualties and causing

66 | On the Ground

A meeting of the Kamdesh shura in Nuristan, March 2008.

(Photo by U.S. Army)
little harm to civilian life and property. With so few forces and such difficult terrain, the

battalion—if it was to be effective and not make enemies needlessly—had little choice

but to rely on the population to protect its troops and achieve its objectives.

Using Money to Acquire Leverage

Task Force Saber used its reconstruction funds as part of a targeted effort to build on

and strengthen relationships with local communities. The battalion also used funds to

empower receptive leaders in key villages. The officers of 1-91 provided funds directly

to local leaders and gave them control over projects in their villages, rather than work

through outside contractors.

The soldiers did this only after visiting these communities and developing relationships

with their leaders. They did not simply contract out projects from the safety of their forward operating base.

The mission of 1-91 was to open up new areas in northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan.

Pushing money into these areas was a way to generate popular support and acquire

leverage with local leaders, rather than simply rely on combat operations and patrols.

According to TF Saber officers, the tactic made soldiers safer by reducing attacks on convoys and patrols.

There was always a quid pro quo—that is, the battalion ensured that it got something

in return for its money, whether intelligence or a reduction in attacks. The focus was on

gaining and maintaining leverage. The battalion created relationships with key leaders

by providing them with reconstruction funds and used the promise of future funds to ensure their continued cooperation. The battalion also used its funds to force quarreling

tribes to settle their differences. Feuding clans often came to a consensus quickly, if failing to do so meant getting no money at all. In more remote areas of Nuristan, village

leaders sometimes came to the battalion’s combat outposts. The soldiers in these outposts negotiated with the elders by asking for information, political support, or security

for their patrols in exchange for reconstruction funds.

The battalion also cut off funds as a way to punish village leaders who failed to deliver.

For example, in Ghaziabad District, the battalion stopped all reconstruction funds for a

month following a series of attacks on supply trucks. The Ghaziabad shura promised to

Kunar and Nuristan | 67
stop the attacks in exchange for a resumption in funding. According to the battalion

commander, “cutting off their funding was a more effective stick than going into a village and detaining a bunch of people.”

Working with elders to hire engineers, scope projects, and submit proposals gave village

leaders a sense of ownership over reconstruction projects. Once the project was approved and some initial funds were available, the unit was then able to apply leverage.

For example, 1-91 could then tell village leaders that unless insurgent attacks stopped,

they would not see the rest of the funds. This tactic became increasingly effective as

time went by.

The leaders of 1-91 learned that simply going after the insurgents without taking the

time to build relationships and credibility tended to do more harm than good. Many

insurgents in the region were related to people in the villages, including village leaders.

Civilian casualties fueled demands for vengeance, even among people not inclined to

join the insurgency. Combat operations carried fewer risks and had more lasting effects

in communities where the population had turned against the insurgents and

isolated them.

Task Force Saber arrived at the conclusion that many local men involved in attacks on

U.S. troops were not irreconcilable. Those who fired on U.S. soldiers were not necessarily

extremists, much less linked to al-Qaeda. Armed resistance against outsiders—any outsider whether American, Russian, or Afghan—has a long and proud history in northeast

Afghanistan.

The battalion’s aim was to empower cooperative village leaders, to give them the resources to take charge of their areas, influence their youth, and keep the insurgents out.

The battalion did this, at least in part, by giving these leaders control over reconstruction funds spent in their villages—what projects went where and who to hire.

This tactic was a way to counter Pakistani-based insurgent facilitators who paid handsomely for new recruits. Local men were going to Pakistan and returning with money,

weapons, and training—upsetting the balance of power in the region. Many set up illegal checkpoints and used their weapons to raid villages in neighboring valleys.

68 | On the Ground
The officers of 1-91 were aware that some of the money given to village elders would

be stolen and that some projects could not be adequately monitored. In order to mitigate these problems, the battalion worked to secure community “buy in” for projects by

giving them some sense of power and ownership over the construction process and by

persuading local leaders to invest their reputations in the successful execution of projects in their villages. Once a group of leaders had set priorities and invested effort to

get a project drafted and approved and under local management, their honor was on

the line.

In general, projects owned by the local community were done faster, to a higher standard, and with fewer security problems than those contracted to outsiders. When an entire community knew the cost of a project and how many people were supposed to be

employed, social pressure against corruption increased. The same process worked for

humanitarian assistance.

Combat Operations

Task Force Saber used political negotiation to achieve its objectives, while reducing violence against U.S. and Afghan forces. Local engagement often preceded combat operations and was often the key factor shaping the timing of these operations.

The battalion’s combat operations focused on targeting insurgents, interdicting their

movement over the border with Pakistan, and protecting its forward positions. These

missions required the battalion to expand its influence into the remote areas of Kunar

and Nuristan.

The geography of northern Kunar and Nuristan is extremely restrictive—dominated by

high mountains and isolated valleys, many of them accessible only by air. The battalion

was able to safely secure only the populations along the Kunar River. There were plenty

of places beyond the Coalition’s reach where insurgents could take refuge. The terrain

was too difficult and the area too large to dominate through sheer force presence.

Until the summer of 2008, the soldiers could not drive more than 10 kilometers north

of their main base without being attacked. The most serious attacks on convoys occurred in Nuristan during the summer of 2007. Some large-scale ambushes involved 50

Kunar and Nuristan | 69
to 100 insurgents. Nuristani insurgents operated numerous illegal checkpoints. They

also hit trucks in Ghaziabad District. The soldiers at FOB Naray spent considerable time

trying to stop these attacks.

Though there were many attacks on the roads—most of them in 2007—it was extremely

rare for 1-91 soldiers to come under fire in or near a village. This was particularly true

in villages that the battalion had engaged with in the past. Village elders sometimes

escorted 1-91 troops from one village to the next or between their village and one of the

combat outposts. Insurgents never opened fire on a patrol accompanied by local leaders. As the battalion made friends in the villages, it was also able to gather better information about the insurgents, which made kill-capture missions more precise and

less likely to harm innocent people or their property.

The insurgents in 1-91’s area were well organized, well trained, and heavily armed—

particularly in 2007. Each local commander led a gang of young men from his valley, with

the help of money, weapons, and training from insurgent facilitators based across the

70 | On the Ground

A U.S. soldier looking over the Gowardesh Bridge in Nuristan in May 2008.

(Photo by SSgt Tyffani L. Davis, U.S. Army)
border in Pakistan. For large operations, these facilitators united several local gangs

temporarily and gave them extra weapons and money and a plan of attack. Once the

operation was over, local fighters dispersed and returned to their villages. Local gangs

often fought over illegal checkpoints and control over the region’s illicit timber and

gem trade.

In April and May of 2008, the battalion launched a major operation to re-establish a

strategically located border police checkpoint at a place known as the Gowardesh Bridge

in Nuristan. Insurgents had overrun a small police garrison at the bridge in August 2007

after the border police abandoned the position.1 Task Force Saber officers met with

elders from the area to secure their support for the operation. These elders, many of

them upset by the numerous illegal checkpoints on the road, asked the insurgents to

support the operation or leave. When the troops arrived at the bridge, a group of Nuristani elders came out to greet them. Not a shot was fired.

Conclusion

For the officers of Task Force Saber, understanding local politics was essential to achieving the battalion’s objectives without unnecessary fighting. Doing so was not easy. It required earning the trust and support of local leaders through relationship building,

constant engagement, and savvy use of reconstruction funds. Most of all, it required

patience and a willingness to listen.

TF Saber’s effort was more diplomatic than military. Personal relationships underpinned

everything the battalion did. Soldiers in outposts provided the security necessary to do

what was really important—reach out to the population and negotiate with its leaders,

while remaining impartial and staying out of local feuds. It was a population-centric

strategy.

In meetings with village leaders, 1-91 officers spent considerable time talking about

matters other than the insurgency, such as the harvest, local history, or the weather. It

was not part of the culture to get to the point quickly. It took time to build rapport and

to get people who were deeply suspicious of outsiders to provide information about the

politics of their area. The soldiers of TF Saber engaged with people in their villages, not

on the base. They used reconstruction funds to build relationships, empower cooperative leaders, and persuade communities to work with the Coalition.

Kunar and Nuristan | 71
Task Force Saber’s strategy was to move slowly, using relationships, shuras, money,

and targeted security operations to influence people and change the local dynamic.

The idea was not to throw an entire battalion of soldiers into Nuristan, get into a lot of

firefights, and clear the area. The people in northern Kunar and Nuristan were extremely

suspicious of anyone not from their particular valley and had a long history of fighting

outsiders. The area was too large and the terrain too difficult to clear entirely of enemy

fighters. The only alternative was to mobilize the population and turn young men away

from the insurgency.

The battalion followed a “do no harm” approach that involved considerable restraint in

the use of force. The officers of 1-91 understood that if innocent civilians were harmed—

or even local fighters whose friends and relatives resented the killing of their loved ones

no matter what their allegiances may have been—the situation could quickly spiral out

of control. According to the Task Force Saber commander, “You can’t simply kill your

way out of an insurgency. The supply of fighters here is inexhaustible.”

The battalion commander believed that if he did not move cautiously into Nuristan, it

could become like the Korangal—a reclusive valley in central Kunar known for its violent

resistance to outside influence. Coalition forces had pushed into the Korangal against

the wishes of its leadership, got into firefights, made enemies, and took many

casualties.

72 | On the Ground
From 2004 to 2008, Khost was one of Afghanistan’s most dangerous provinces.1 Located in eastern Afghanistan, it shares a 112-mile mountainous border with Pakistan’s

tribal areas. Insurgents from the Haqqani network—the same group that besieged Soviet bases during the 1980s and operated terrorist training camps in Khost during the

1990s—passed back and forth across the border with ease.2 During the early years of

the war, U.S. troops focused on targeting insurgent leaders through raids and cordonand-search operations, which caused resentment among the locals and undermined the

counterinsurgency effort.

In 2007, a U.S. Army battalion and provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in the province

began to turn the situation around. Soldiers left their headquarters and dispersed into

the province’s districts to secure areas and mentor officials. Unlike their predecessors,

the battalion spent less time driving in armored convoys and more time among the people. At the same time, the PRT carried out a large number of projects implemented

through the Afghan government. These parallel counterinsurgency and development

efforts conducted by the maneuver battalion and PRT began to show notable progress,

which was amplified by American media.3 By the end of 2007, the Afghan president

and U.S. defense secretary called Khost a model of successful counterinsurgency.4

Khost Province is also often spelled “Khowst.”

Unless otherwise noted, this vignette is based on interviews and email correspondence with the

Khost PRT commander (March 2007–March 2008) on 13 November 2009; Khost PRT commander

(March–November 2008) on 21 and 26 January 2010; Khost PRT commander (November 2008–

July 2009) on 12 November 2009; PRT Department of State representative (April 2007–August

2008) on 17 July 2010; maneuver battalion commander of 321st Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

(2007–2008) on 13 January 2010; maneuver battalion commander of 4th Battalion, 320th Field

Artillery Regiment (February 2008–March 2009) on 20 January, 10 March, and 16 July 2010;

company commander in Khost (February–September 2008), 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 101st

Airborne Division, on 24 February 2010; and information operations officer for the PRT in Khost

(March–November 2008) on 25 February 2010.

Vignette 5

U.S. Army Battalion

Khost, 2004–2008

73
In 2008, however, security conditions in the province again deteriorated as the insurgents adapted, new U.S. units rotated in, and conditions changed in nearby Pakistan.

Early PRT Involvement

In 2004, the United States sent its first PRT to Khost, based at Forward Operating Base

(FOB) Chapman. From 2004 to 2006, the Khost PRT started reconstruction projects,

such as roads and schools, yet progress was minimal. Several commanders were transferred, and the PRT and the province’s maneuver battalion did not work together on

their development and reconstruction efforts.5

In 2006, the PRT began to work more closely with local officials. It participated in district and provincial shuras, and civil affairs teams moved into some district centers to

learn about local needs.6 The PRT began choosing projects through an open bidding

process that involved government officials. Cooperation between the PRT and maneuver battalion also improved. For example, the battalion gave the PRT its Commander’s

Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for reconstruction to improve unity of

effort and streamline decision making.7

In August 2006, a new governor, Arsala Jamal, took charge in Khost. Governor Jamal

spoke fluent English, had experience working with nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), and was trusted by the Coalition and a significant number of locals. Communication can be a barrier in many areas of Afghanistan, and the fact that Governor Jamal

spoke fluent English eased coordination with the Coalition.

Yet despite these developments, Khost became increasingly violent. In the fall of 2006,

the Pakistani army pulled out of North Waziristan, the tribal area on the Pakistani side

of the border.8 The Haqqani network, referred to as “the most dangerous and

challenging foe for the Coalition forces” in the area, had more freedom to move across

the border to Afghanistan as the Pakistani army withdrew.9 Violence increased and the

number of suicide attacks began to rise. By the end of 2006, Khost had more

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) than anywhere else in Afghanistan, most of them

in Sabari District.

74 | On the Ground
Fragile Gains: 2007

In Khost, the PRT and maneuver battalion operated from different bases. It took considerable time to move soldiers anywhere within the province. Not only did this hinder

their response time to protect the population from enemy activity, but regular road convoys also made the soldiers more vulnerable to IEDs.

In early 2007, the maneuver battalion launched a new campaign. It built three concentric rings of security around the provincial capital, with the Afghan National Police

(ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) at the two inner rings and the Americans on the

outer ring.10 The general idea was that if the people in Khost City (the provincial capital) felt secure, other aspects of the Coalition’s counterinsurgency strategy—such as

local governance and reconstruction—would follow.

Khost | 75

Khost’s PRT commander and provincial governor speak at a public event on 16 May

2007. (Photo by PFC Micah E. Clare, U.S. Army)
As a part of this new strategy, much of the battalion moved off the main base and into

small patrol bases adjacent to several key district centers that housed the district governor, chief of police, and the town’s security forces.

The primary mission for troops at these outposts was to increase security and local governance. Soldiers patrolled with the ANA and ANP almost every day around the district

centers. They spent more time engaging with the population than moving in armored

convoys. By co-locating and working with officials, U.S. troops were able to build relationships and learn about conditions in each district. Their presence provided “an immediate promise of security, and for the first time, a taste of the rewards of having a

government.”11

In March 2007, the PRT received additional funds, which it used to launch a large number of projects that it coordinated closely with the efforts of the maneuver battalion.12

Khost received more assistance in 2007 than it had in the previous five years combined, most of it for road projects. In one year, the PRT began to build 300 wells, 50

schools, 6 district centers, 30 irrigation dams, and 50 miles of road, and did not neglect remote areas.13 These projects, in turn, created local jobs.

The PRT not only increased the number of projects, but also changed the way it managed them. It expanded open bidding for contracts and stopped paying contractors in

advance. It also emphasized “getting the story out” on these projects by advertising its

activity to the local population so they knew that improvements were being made across

the province, as well as highlighting the government’s involvement. The PRT included

the governor, district governors, line directors, and tribal elders in groundbreaking and

grand opening ceremonies. The idea was to show Afghans tangible results of improved

security and create a buzz about reconstruction efforts.14

During this period, the PRT, the maneuver battalion, and U.S. Army Special Forces (SF)

worked more closely together than before and met weekly with the governor to coordinate initiatives and responses to problems. The maneuver battalion commander limited

nighttime raids and worked closely with the special forces operating in the area. In earlier years, SF units in the province, which fall under a separate chain of command, had

often carried out raids without informing the battalion or PRT—sometimes in villages

where conventional forces were trying to build support through nonkinetic activities,

thereby undermining the counterinsurgency effort.

76 | On the Ground
Even though there was significant insurgent activity, relations between the Coalition

and the local population improved.15 Security improved in the district centers to the

point where the PRT commander felt safe enough to stay the night. The percentage of

IEDs turned in by Afghans increased from 30 percent in early 2006 to 60 percent by

March 2007.16 0Religious leaders also issued religious rulings, known as fatwas, condemning suicide bombings.17 As security improved, NGOs returned. In January 2007,

the UN opened an office in Khost for the first time.18

Things Fall Apart: 2008

The media coverage of Khost’s much-touted success attracted a lot of attention—not

only in the United States but also among insurgents. In 2008, the security situation

worsened as insurgents went on the offensive to regain control of the province.

In addition, unit rotations in early 2008 halted the Coalition’s momentum. Within 30

days, new units replaced the PRT and maneuver battalion, causing the Coalition to lose

its local familiarity in the province. At the same time, Governor Jamal left for months to

visit his family in Canada. The combination of the unit rotations and an absent strong

local partner created a steep learning curve for the new units, especially as they faced

an influx of insurgent activity. In March, suicide bombers attacked the district centers

in Sabari and Tani within days of each other.

With the turnover of units, the PRT and the maneuver battalion also did not work as

closely with the provincial government as they had the year before. After the governor

returned from his extended leave, U.S. officers no longer met with him on a daily basis

but saw him two to three times a week instead.

Coordination between the maneuver battalion, PRT, and special forces—which had kept

night raids to a minimum in 200719—also appeared to break down with the arrival of

new commanders and units. The new maneuver battalion and PRT commander did not

work as closely together as their predecessors had, and each had different strategies

on how to approach the situation. As a result, there was less integration of effort. The

previously limited night raids resumed and often special forces conducted raids without informing the battalion or the PRT. Since Afghans do not place much value on the

differences between military uniforms, they did not differentiate between the U.S. soldiers they saw daily and the commandoes who raided their homes at night. Locals expressed growing frustration with these night raids.20

Khost | 77
The new maneuver battalion arrived with fewer forces than the previous unit but was

given additional forces as violence grew. In addition to dealing with increased insurgent

activity and large insurgent safe havens, the new battalion also gained additional battlespace. More forces were distributed to each outpost for additional force protection.

By spring 2008, U.S. troops were positioned alongside the ANA and ANP in at least 7 of

the 13 districts. Yet insurgents continued to move freely in many areas during the night,

distributing night letters and speaking at mosques.

With additional forces, the new battalion spent more time targeting insurgents and

clearing remote areas, in part because of stepped-up enemy activity. In an effort to gain

more control, the battalion pushed into insurgent safe havens in outlying areas. As U.S.

troops spent more time pursuing the enemy, interaction with the population in the districts declined. U.S. troop presence was especially thin in the villages beyond the district centers. In addition, many villagers reported having never seen a representative of

the Afghan government, and many locals could not identify their district governor.21

In addition to its increase in clearing operations, U.S. troop distribution in the province

also changed. U.S. troops turned over the defense of two district centers to ANA detachments. The goal was to “transfer as many district centers to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) control as possible.”22 While the maneuver battalion redistributed

its forces in the province, the PRT also decided to punish the restive district of Sabari

by ceasing operations there. Security continued to deteriorate. In addition to increased

insurgent activity, neighboring villages and rival tribes often fought over reconstruction

projects. By the summer of 2008, “no area of Khost was secure from IEDs anymore, the

Taliban was gaining political support, and the people’s cooperation with the government was deteriorating.”23

As troop distributions in the province changed, attacks on district centers increased, as

did the overall number of attacks. On 20 November 2008, a suicide car bomb nearly

destroyed the Domanda District center in Shomal and its adjacent patrol base along the

dangerous Khost-to-Gardez Pass. In December, there was another suicide attack outside the Mandozai District center, which killed 14 schoolchildren. Suicide bombers also

attacked the main bases of the PRT and maneuver battalion. The attacks signified to

locals that the Coalition was losing. In one poll taken at that time, respondents indi78 | On the Ground
cated that their perception of security in Khost had declined.24 By the end of 2008, almost every district had a security problem.

At the same time, the Coalition lost its local partner who had been actively involved in

trying to improve the province. In November 2008, Jamal resigned as governor, likely for

his own safety. Insurgents had led an effective assassination campaign against many

Khost leaders and had tried to assassinate Governor Jamal at least five times during

his term.25 After Governor Jamal’s departure, U.S. forces lacked a strong Afghan local

leader to work with. Months passed without filling his vacancy. A new governor was finally appointed in January 2009 but soon lost the trust of the PRT and left office seven

months later. The security and governance situation continued to fall apart.

Conclusion

U.S. forces made significant progress in Khost in 2006 and 2007. The “Khost model”

demonstrated many effective counterinsurgency practices, such as the dispersal of

forces into small patrol bases in population centers, constant patrols with Afghan forces,

and close Coalition coordination.

Force presence was key. U.S. forces dispersed into platoon-sized outposts next to key

district centers, colocated with the local government and security forces. Operating in

small units increased mobility, allowed greater access to the local populace, and allowed for daily patrols with the ANA and ANP.

However, the small patrol bases that allowed U.S. forces to sustain presence among

the populace were also more vulnerable. In 2008, insurgents increasingly targeted the

district centers. Two outposts were destroyed by suicide bombers.

Personalities and relationships mattered. Close cooperation between the commanders of the PRT, the battalion, and the special forces in 2007 minimized the possibility

of these units working at cross-purposes. In addition, Governor Jamal was active and

effective. Coordination with Afghan officials helped create the sense among the population that everyone was working toward the same goal. By discussing projects with

local leaders at shuras and continuing their involvement in the subsequent open bidding process, the PRT helped empower the Afghan government and increase political

participation.

Khost | 79
In 2008, insurgents launched a renewed campaign of violence and intimidation. At the

same time, unit rotations appear to have hindered the Coalition’s progress. The PRT

and maneuver battalion left the area within a month of each other, leaving the new

units to familiarize themselves with the province during a time when the governor was

absent. This left a large gap in local understanding for the new forces to fill. Relationships and trust had to be rebuilt, and there was a steep learning curve. In addition, the

new commanders did not work as closely with each other as their predecessors had, and

unity of effort suffered as a result. Finally, Governor Jamal’s resignation, which caused

Khost to lose a strong, committed, and trusted governor, made matters worse.

Unfortunately, the gains made by Coalition forces from 2006 to early 2008 were too

fragile. Intensified insurgent attacks in conjunction with unit rotations, less Coalition

coordination, the loss of an effective governor, and increased U.S. activity across the border undid much of what had been accomplished. As security declined, the people of

Khost began to doubt that the Coalition still had the momentum. Stepped-up raids and

clearing operations by the Coalition also contributed to a decline in public support. Ultimately, it was premature to call the operation in Khost a model of successful counterinsurgency after only two years of progress.

80 | On the Ground
This vignette describes how a U.S. Army battalion, provincial reconstruction team (PRT),

and agribusiness development team (ADT) took a backseat role to support a strong

provincial governor’s plan to eliminate opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar Province

in eastern Afghanistan. Unlike in other areas of Afghanistan, the Afghan government

took the lead in Nangarhar while U.S. forces stepped aside to support their efforts

through training, mentoring, and funding.

Over the course of one year, Nangarhar Province transformed from being a top opium

poppy cultivator to being “poppy free.” This accomplishment was made possible due to

a benign security situation, a powerful governor, and the Coalition’s supporting efforts

to empower Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provide viable crop alternatives to farmers.

While the local populace initially supported the Taliban in the 1990s for bringing stability

to the area, Nangarharis soon realized that the movement was “far too radical” for

them.1 Because the Taliban lacked strong support, U.S. forces were able to force most

of them out of the province within a month after arriving in 2001.

After the Afghan provincial government regained control in 2002, insurgent violence

remained relatively low in Nangarhar compared to its neighboring provinces. Roadside

bombs remained a threat, and attacks continued along the province’s long and open

border with Pakistan, which allowed insurgents to attack and then retreat.

Unless otherwise noted, this vignette is based on interviews with Department of State Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs officers on 18 and 20 November and 6

December; PRT USAID representative (2004–2006) on 14 January 2010; PRT commander (March–

November 2008) on 20 April 2010; and maneuver forces commander (May 2007–July 2008) on 26

April 2010. Also, email correspondence with an Army civil affairs officer at the Nangarhar PRT (June

2005–June 2006) and counternarcotics team member (February 2007–November 2009) on 15

January 2010.

Vignette 6

U.S. Army Battalion

Nangarhar, 2005–2009

81
In 2005, a former warlord from southern Afghanistan became governor of Nangarhar.

Despite his reputation as a corrupt leader involved with the drug trade in the south, he

proactively pursued a ban on opium poppy in Nangarhar in 2007. His persuasive and

powerful personality helped convince local tribes to stop growing opium poppy, and he

kept district-level government leadership from participating in the drug trade. At the

same time, he worked with the Coalition to reward districts for their compliance with the

opium ban by awarding development projects and used his own funds to help reconstruct the capital city of Jalalabad.

The relatively stable security situation and strong governor allowed the Coalition in Nangarhar to focus on supporting the provincial government’s efforts with development

and reconstruction. At first, the Coalition focused on efforts to help stimulate the economy in Jalalabad, once considered the economic hub of eastern Afghanistan.2 After the

province’s PRT arrived in 2003, it focused on roads, bridges, irrigation systems, power,

health clinics, and schools. Nangarhar became one of the largest recipients of aid in

Afghanistan. By 2007, the PRT was focusing many of its projects on leveraging the governor’s success in poppy eradication. At the same time, insurgent attacks decreased in

Nangarhar even though they increased in neighboring provinces.

Due to Nangarhar’s relative security and the general competence of the local government and ANSF, Afghans also took the lead in providing security for the province. U.S.

military forces took a supporting role by training Afghan National Police (ANP) and helping to establish a Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) in 2008 to coordinate actions between the ANSF and Coalition.

A Strong Governor

In June 2005, the Coalition gained a strong local partner when Gul Agha Sherzai was

appointed governor of Nangarhar. A Barakzai Pashtun from Kandahar, Sherzai fought

with the mujahideen against the Soviets and had a history of opposing the Taliban. He

was the governor of Kandahar from 1992 until 1994, when the Taliban forced him

into exile.

In 2001, with the help of U.S. forces and his own personal militia, Sherzai led a force

into Afghanistan to reclaim Kandahar. He was officially reappointed governor of Kandahar in December 2001. After he was appointed, his militia undermined security by tax82 | On the Ground
ing and threatening the population; he alienated some tribes by favoring others; and he

made an estimated fortune of $300 million through the opium trade and illegal taxes

at the Pakistani border.3 President Karzai removed him from power in August 2003.

Karzai reassigned Sherzai to Nangarhar in 2005, when it was considered one of the

most troublesome areas in the country, primarily due to its high level of opium poppy

cultivation. Governor Sherzai did not have any tribal connections in Nangarhar and

quickly learned that he would need to alter his behavior to maintain influence. He began

to build a network of supporters, including the Mohmand and Shinwari tribes, both located in southeastern Nangarhar. Sherzai’s Kandahar-based militia did not follow him

to Nangarhar.

The local population largely respected Governor Sherzai because of his efforts to promote development and reconstruction, especially in the capital city of Jalalabad.4 He

was dubbed “the Bulldozer” because of the many reconstruction projects he implemented. The local population widely acknowledged that most of the governor’s reconstruction funds came from illegal tolls. They did not seem to mind the corruption,

Nangarhar | 83

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Taliban 

ban

1st Gov 

ban 2nd Gov 

ban

Tribes 

decide to 

grow 

poppy 

again

Figure 1: Opium Cultivation in Nangarhar, 1994–2009 (in hectares)8
however, because many of them benefited from it. Governor Sherzai was voted “person of the year” in 2008 in a call-in radio poll and was briefly in the running for president before pulling out of the race in 2009.5

Governor Sherzai maintained close relationships with the PRT, Coalition forces, and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), meeting with them at least several times a

week. He also attended groundbreaking and grand opening ceremonies of development and reconstruction projects carried out by the PRT.

Bans on Opium Production

Nangarhar had a long history of opium poppy cultivation, typically ranking among the

top three provinces in Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation fell in 2001 after a ban was

imposed by the Taliban (see Figure 1). However, the Taliban’s ban on opium poppy

cultivation proved unsustainable and planting resumed even before the Taliban fell from

power.6 The opium trade later became one of largest sources of funding for the

Taliban.7

84 | On the Ground

Hesarak

Sherzad

Khogiani

Chaparhar

Pachier

wa

Agam Deh

Achin

Rodat

Sorkh

Jalalabad

Kunar

Darae

Noor

Kama Goshta

La'lpur

Durbaba

Nazian

Shinwar

Kot

Mohmand

Dara

Behsud

Torkham

Gate

to Kabul

to Pakistan

Highway

continues

Kuz

Bala

Bati Kot

Highway continues

Rod

LEGEND

3,000 –

–

–

4,000 ha

Poppy Cultivation in hectares (ha)

2,000 3,000 ha

1,000 2,000 ha

Less than 1,000 ha

Main Road (Route 1)

Official Border Crossing

N In 2004, more than 80 percent of families

were involved in Nangarhar’s poppy cultivation,

making Nangarhar the second highest opium

poppy cultivator in Afghanistan

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2004
While Nangarhar was once considered one of Afghanistan’s “breadbaskets,” problems

with irrigation became a major hindrance to the productivity of local farmers. Decades

of war in Afghanistan had destroyed most of the province’s irrigation systems, making

it difficult for rural farmers to access sufficient and reliable water supplies. Years of

drought contributed to the shortages in the water supply, which affected what crops

farmers were able to grow (e.g., wheat required more water and fertilizer than

opium poppy).

In an effort to deter local farmers from continuing to grow opium poppy, the provincial

government made two major attempts to eradicate poppy growth in Nangarhar.

First Attempt: 2004–2005 Ban

After a near-record cultivation for the province in 2004, when more than 80 percent of

Nangarhari families were involved in opium poppy cultivation (see Map: Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2004), then-governor Haji Din Mohammed implemented a ban on

opium poppy for the 2004–2005 growing season in accordance with President Karzai’s

anti-opium campaign.8 The provincial government largely based its implementation on

Nangarhar | 85

Hesarak

Sherzad

Khogiani

Chaparhar

Pachier

wa

Agam Deh

Achin

Rodat

Sorkh

Jalalabad

Kunar

Darae

Noor

Kama Goshta

La'lpur

Durbaba

Nazian

Shinwar

Kot

Mohmand

Dara

Behsud

Torkham

Gate

to Kabul

to Pakistan

Highway

continues

Kuz

Bala

Bati Kot

Highway continues

Rod

LEGEND

3,000 4,000 ha

Poppy Cultivation in hectares (ha)

2,000 3,000 ha

1,000 2,000 ha

Less than 1,000 ha

Main Road (Route 1)

Official Border Crossing

N The governor-led anti-opium poppy campaign in

2004 caused opium cultivation in Nangarhar to

decrease production by 96 percent in 2005

–

–

–

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2005
what the Taliban had done during the 2000–2001 ban and placed emphasis on preventing farmers from planting the crop.9 The governor threatened district-level government leaders by indicating that their jobs depended on the reduction of opium

cultivation. At the start of the planting season in November, district administrators informed tribal leaders (who were responsible for poppy cultivation decisions in Nangarhar) of the poppy ban and paid them for their compliance. Tribal leaders were also

promised development assistance in return for compliance with the ban.

After the information campaign during the planting season, the government proceeded

with an eradication campaign during the harvest, destroying 1,860 hectares of opium

poppy and arresting farmers.10 Licit crops were occasionally destroyed in the process.

Corruption was also a big problem. Many wealthier farmers were able to pay off eradicators to spare their crops.

Because of the ban, opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar decreased by 96 percent in

2005 (see Figure 1 and Map: Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2005). U.S. officials

claimed it was “the most significant victory in the battle against narcotics in

Afghanistan.”11

86 | On the Ground

Hesarak

Sherzad

Khogiani

Chaparhar

Pachier

wa

Agam Deh

Achin

Rodat

Sorkh

Jalalabad

Kunar

Darae

Noor

Kama Goshta

La'lpur

Durbaba

Nazian

Shinwar

Kot

Mohmand

Dara

Behsud

Torkham

Gate

to Kabul

to Pakistan

Highway

continues

Kuz

Bala

Bati Kot

Highway continues

Rod

LEGEND

3,000 4,000 ha

Poppy Cultivation in hectares (ha)

2,000 3,000 ha

1,000 2,000 ha

Less than 1,000 ha

Main Road (Route 1)

Official Border Crossing

N In 2006, two influential tribes in the

south, the Shinwari and Khogiani, began

to grow poppy again; Achin District was

primarily Shinwari

–

–

–

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2006
However, while Nangarhar was considered an opium eradication success, the ban

caused economic hardship and discontent among the population. As in other provinces,

farmers in Nangarhar took loans from drug traffickers in the fall to plant their poppy

crops. The traffickers then returned after the harvest to be repaid in poppy. Traffickers

multiplied the debt if they were not repaid within a year. In 2005, the vast majority of

farmers were not able to compensate for their income loss through other crops.12 As a

result, many farmers could not pay off their debts. Some reportedly repaid traffickers

by selling their daughters into marriage, which also occurred during the Taliban opium

ban.13 The ban also had a deeper impact on the overall economy, as people had less

disposable income to spend in markets and other industries.

In addition, the majority of farmers saw few rewards after complying with the poppy

ban. Promises of alternative livelihoods and development projects for farmers were not

fulfilled at expected levels. Only a small number of development projects found their way

to the average farmer.

Development projects created some employment opportunities, but they did not

compare to opportunities previously available through the opium crop. Cash-for-work

Nangarhar | 87

Hesarak

Sherzad

Khogiani

Chaparhar

Pachier

wa

Agam Deh

Achin

Rodat

Sorkh

Jalalabad

Kunar

Darae

Noor

Kama Goshta

La'lpur

Durbaba

Nazian

Shinwar

Kot

Mohmand

Dara

Behsud

Torkham

Gate

to Kabul

to Pakistan

Highway

continues

Kuz

Bala

Bati Kot

Highway continues

Rod

LEGEND

3,000 4,000 ha

Poppy Cultivation in hectares (ha)

2,000 3,000 ha

1,000 2,000 ha

Less than 1,000 ha

Main Road (Route 1)

Official Border Crossing

N By 2007, Nangarhar was again the second

highest opium poppy cultivator in Afghanistan; however, it was grown in more

concentrated areas than previous years

–

–

–

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2007
programs—typically short-term manual labor—were thus perceived as insufficient since

they did not pay farmers enough to make up their income losses.

Labor rates also affected income. Most of the opium was replaced by wheat, however,

wheat requires less labor than opium—on average, 350 working days per hectare for

opium versus 51 days per hectare for wheat.14 Many workers who typically traveled to

cultivating areas of Nangarhar suddenly found themselves out of work. Wage rates thus

declined because of the surplus of available workers. As a result, many workers went

into Pakistan to find employment.

The cultivation ban caused resentment toward the Coalition, which was seen as spearheading the eradication. People even threatened to provide support to the Taliban who

passed through the area.15

Ultimately, the ban was unsustainable because farmers could not afford to uphold it for

another year. They also claimed that the government had not kept its development

promises. Two important tribes in the south, the Shinwari and Khogiani, collaborated

and chose not to follow the government’s opium ban for another year.16 By 2006, opium

poppy cultivation began to increase in remote parts of the province dominated by those

two tribes (see Map: Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2006).

Achieving Poppy-Free Status: 2007–2008 Ban

In 2007, Nangarhar opium poppy cultivation increased by 285 percent (see Figure 1),

making the province, once again, the second-highest cultivator in the country. Poppy cultivation, however, was concentrated in remote areas, which differed from the pattern in

previous years (see Map: Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2007). More eradication was

conducted in 2007 than any year before, inciting the highest number of eradicationrelated security incidents in the country.17 U.S. military forces noticed a shift from attacks on Coalition forces to attacks on the ANSF, which were responsible for governor-led

eradication in the province.

Despite his involvement with the drug trade in Kandahar, Governor Sherzai reportedly

opposed poppy production in Nangarhar. During the fall of 2007, he launched a proactive anti-poppy campaign with the help of the Coalition using a three-pronged approach.

First, the governor worked with local officials and the provincial council to help eliminate

88 | On the Ground
poppy cultivation. Governor Sherzai threatened to remove local administrators from

their positions if poppy grew in their districts and gained credibility when he removed

three district governors. In turn, local officials engaged community leaders to emphasize the benefits of not growing the crop. As in previous campaigns, local leaders were

paid for their compliance with the ban. With the help of the PRT, provincial officials and

district committees then led a public information campaign to spread the anti-poppy

message with the Coalition’s help. Governor Sherzai promised to reward areas that reduced poppy cultivation with increased development assistance. As a result, tribal leaders all agreed not to grow poppy and not to provide anti-government fighters safe haven

in their areas.18

Second, the new policy was strictly enforced. Unlike in previous eradication campaigns,

if poppy fields were discovered, local leaders gave farmers the opportunity to eradicate

the crop themselves. Governor Sherzai issued an ultimatum: “Plow up the poppy fields

or go to jail.”19 If farmers refused, they were arrested. Those involved at the lower levels, such as farmers and low-level traffickers, received the most punishment. ANSF

conducted the least amount of eradication in 2008 than in any other year.20

Nangarhar | 89

Hesarak

Sherzad

Khogiani

Chaparhar

Pachier

wa

Agam Deh

Achin

Rodat

Sorkh

Jalalabad

Kunar

Darae

Noor

Kama Goshta

La'lpur

Durbaba

Nazian

Shinwar

Kot

Mohmand

Dara

Behsud

Torkham

Gate

to Kabul

to Pakistan

Highway

continues

Kuz

Bala

Bati Kot

Highway continues

Rod

LEGEND

3,000 4,000 ha

Poppy Cultivation in hectares (ha)

2,000 3,000 ha

1,000 2,000 ha

Less than 1,000 ha

Main Road (Route 1)

Official Border Crossing

N The governor-led anti-opium poppy

campaign in 2007 caused Nangarhar to be

“poppy free” for the first time in 2008

–

–

–

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar, 2008
The Coalition chose to ignore some of the governor’s more forceful persuasion methods.

For example, he reportedly spread rumors that farmers’ noncompliance would result in

U.S. raids. Coalition forces had established a larger presence throughout the province

in May 2007, and Governor Sherzai implied that their mandate was to enforce the antipoppy campaign, even though that was not the case.21

Finally, by engaging with the local population, the provincial and district-level government

learned more about what local communities needed. Governor Sherzai reportedly

visited many districts himself. As a result, more people, particularly those from remote

areas who had never interacted with government officials, became acquainted with the

government.

Due to the governor’s strong anti-poppy campaign, Nangarhar Province became designated “poppy free” for the first time in 2008 (see Figure 1 and Map: Poppy Cultivation

in Nangarhar, 2008).22 As many as 40,000 farming families received some kind of compensation for the loss of opium revenues.23 Wheat prices also increased at the same

time, giving farmers a viable crop alternative.

Under the Good Performers Initiative, provinces determined by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to be “poppy free” received funds for development assistance. In 2008, Nangarhar received the maximum $10 million reward,24 but the

governor was not given direct access to these funds to ensure that the entire amount

went toward reconstruction projects. Districts planned to use the money to improve the

irrigation infrastructure.25

The Supporting Role of U.S. Forces

While the Coalition did not actively participate in the governor’s eradication campaign

(per command guidance), it did support the governor’s efforts through public information campaigns and reconstruction projects. A second PRT, known as an agribusiness

development team (ADT)—the first of its kind in Afghanistan—deployed to the province

in February 2008 to augment the PRT and focus specifically on agriculture, because

farming was the primary profession in the province. Projects included building grain

mills and cool storage facilities, distributing seeds, advising farmers on farming techniques, and assessing and fixing water and power problems. The PRT and ADT were

careful to deliver on their promises.

90 | On the Ground
The Coalition also worked with the provincial government and the provincial community

council to create the “Nangarhar, Inc.” economic business plan. The interagency plan

consisted of quick-impact projects aimed at leveraging the governor’s poppy eradication

success during the growing season.26 For example, in the district of Rodat, the PRT and

counternarcotics advisory team (CNAT) dug canals, known as karezes, to increase local

irrigation capabilities and paved roads to help farmers get their crops to market, while

the ADT encouraged and taught farmers marketing techniques and ways to grow new

onion varieties. Due to these coordinated efforts, some districts, such as Rodat, experienced record onion sales. Farmers were even able to make more money on onions

than they had on poppy.27

While the PRT and ADT focused on reconstruction and development, military forces kept

a relatively low profile in the province as they helped build local Afghan capacity to provide security. U.S. military forces gained a larger presence in May 2007, and, as more

forces arrived in the area, the number of clashes with insurgents increased.

The new soldiers worked closely with the Afghan National Police (ANP)—conducting daily

joint patrols at all hours—and with a police chief who was largely respected by the population and Governor Sherzai (unlike the governor’s predecessor, Haji Din Mohammed).

The ANSF took the lead in every search and arrest, and patrolled the capital city without the help of U.S. soldiers. Yet while the ANP controlled the situation in Jalalabad,

they lacked manpower and resources in many districts—especially in remote areas—

and rarely left their posts or district centers. The Coalition set up two major law enforcement training programs—district-level immersion and focused district

development—in the province. While police were in training, the governor pressured

tribal leaders to be responsible for security in their own areas.

In 2008, the Nangarhar Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) was established to

coordinate actions between the Coalition and local Afghan security forces.28 Locals

were able to dial an emergency phone number to contact the center for help in situations ranging from natural disaster emergencies to insurgent activity. The JPCC was colocated with the ANP Headquarters and had representatives from the military forces,

Afghan National Army (ANA), and Afghan Border Police (ABP) on site to help respond to

emergencies effectively. At least once a week, U.S. soldiers met with the ANSF at the

Nangarhar | 91
center to coordinate actions and exchange information. In effect, this helped put the ANA

and ANP in control of providing security for the province, especially in Jalalabad. U.S. and

Afghan military forces also met with Pakistani border police to discuss border activity.

The PRT, ADT, and military forces—collectively dubbed Team Nangarhar— were all headquartered on the same base. Living on the same base eased coordination among the

different teams.

Conclusion

Nangarhar is different from other provinces in Afghanistan’s south and east due to its

relatively benign security situation and functioning government, which allowed U.S.

forces to enable the Afghans to take the lead in providing security. Because the Taliban

did not have a stronghold in the province, an influential governor and a strong police

chief were able to work together to secure areas. The U.S. Army battalion in Nangarhar

took a supporting role in training the ANP and creating the JPCC to improve coordination. In addition, the battalion worked with the province’s PRT and ADT to distribute aid

and complete reconstruction projects in line with the provincial government’s development plan. Unity of effort was key to their success.

The success of the anti-poppy campaign in Nangarhar resulted largely from strong political will. In 2007, Governor Sherzai, who had once been a notorious warlord in Kandahar, became responsible for a successful campaign to eliminate opium poppy in

Nangarhar. His pressure and commitment were crucial to the success of the overall

campaign. Even though the Coalition chose to ignore some of his more firm-handed

tactics, he was ultimately successful in working with local leaders to reduce poppy cultivation in the province and in increasing development as a reward.

The 2007 campaign incorporated lessons from prior bans, including the importance of

economic sustainability. As he did with the ban in 2004, Governor Sherzai emphasized

the positive benefits to the public of growing alternative crops, paid off tribal leaders for

their compliance during cultivation, and threatened leaders who did not comply. However, this time, he enforced his threats by firing district governors when poppy was discovered in their areas and by making widespread arrests. He also allowed farmers to

eradicate their own poppies, compensated families for the loss of their opium revenues,

92 | On the Ground
and provided them with viable crop alternatives. The price of wheat increased that year,

providing families with an equivalent income. Through supporting PRT and ADT development projects, the local populace saw an effect in their daily lives. Some of the smallest projects had the biggest impact.

Governor Sherzai’s successful anti-poppy campaign would not have worked without security. Nangarhar’s relatively benign security situation allowed farmers to travel to market their goods more easily than farmers in more dangerous provinces, such as

Helmand, could.

Unlike the many sharecroppers in the south, tribes in eastern Afghanistan have an important decision-making role in determining what crops to grow. By paying off and securing the compliance of the tribes, Governor Sherzai was able to guarantee low poppy

cultivation levels.

Finally, farmers in Nangarhar were provided with viable crop alternatives, such as onions

and wheat, allowing families to earn an equal or greater income. In 2008, the price of

wheat surpassed that of opium poppy. However, wheat prices decreased the following

year, so its long-term sustainability remains in question.

Nangarhar | 93

This vignette describes the efforts of a small U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) team over

the course of two very different deployments.

During its first tour, from September 2003 to March 2004, the team was part of a large,

centrally directed assault force based at Kandahar Airfield that focused entirely on killcapture missions and large-scale sweeps. These operations yielded few results, in part

because most Taliban had either fled or been killed in 2003.

During its second deployment, from June 2004 to January 2005, the team focused on

small-scale counterinsurgency with little central direction in a remote area of Zabul

Province. Through careful local engagement and economic investment, the SF team

built a base of support in an adamantly pro-Taliban area.

September 2003 to March 2004: Direct Action

During its first deployment to Afghanistan, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA)

focused on high-value targeting. It was based at Kandahar Airfield, a sprawling

Soviet-built base outside of Kandahar City that was the headquarters of numerous

military units.

The team was part of a larger force that concentrated entirely on counterterrorism and

direct action—mainly airborne raids. It conducted no governance or development activities, engagement with the population, or anything else long term. Nor did the team

conduct any training, equipping, or advise-and-assist operations.

Nearly all of the team’s missions turned out to be “dry holes”—that is, operations that

saw no enemy contact. Many were airborne raids that targeted Taliban leaders and

Unless otherwise noted, this vignette is based on extensive interviews with the team’s commanding

officer, in Monterey, California, on 12 October 2009. All information—as well as perspectives on

operations and the areas mentioned—comes from these interviews.

Vignette 7

U.S. Army Special Forces Team

Kandahar and Zabul, 2003–2005

95
arms caches. Some of these raids mistakenly targeted Afghan civilians. The team did

not find a single insurgent leader during its first tour and saw almost no fighting.

These operations were largely ineffective in part because there were few insurgents to

be found in 2003 and 2004 and also because information was frequently old or faulty.

Afghans often fed SF units false information to manipulate them. The distances were

so great and the terrain so difficult that it was usually impossible for SF units to go into

remote areas undetected; by the time they arrived, insurgent leaders (if there were any)

had fled.

The team’s battalion was relatively centralized, with little in the way of distributed operations (i.e., decentralized execution, latitude to subordinate units). Many missions

were battalion-level sweep operations, some of them involving hundreds of Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) loyal to the governor of Kandahar.

One of these large-scale sweep operations was in the Deh Chopan Valley, a remote area

in Zabul Province, during October 2003. The assault demonstrates many of the problems with direct action and battalion-level operations in remote areas of Afghanistan.

The SF battalion knew almost nothing about Deh Chopan prior to the operation, except

what it had been told by militia fighters who themselves knew little about the area. The

battalion had no up-to-date maps and relied entirely on the AMF to lead the way. Their

information on the supposed existence of a large enemy force was more than two

months old by the time the operation began.

The plan was to advance on the area from four directions using a combination of U.S.

forces and Afghan militiamen. It was a movement-to-contact operation; the idea was to

push in by land and air from multiple directions and seek immediate engagement with

the enemy. The battalion did not intend to do cordon-and-knock operations (i.e., establish an outer perimeter and search compounds), much less establish a permanent

presence, hold the area, and build institutions.

It was to be a massive sweep operation carried out mostly by indigenous militias. These

militiamen were primarily loyal to Gul Agha Sherzai, the warlord governor of Kandahar

Province and a member of the Barakzai tribe [for more on Sherzai, see Vignette 6]. The

people from Deh Chopan came from a different tribe.

96 | On the Ground
5 kilometers Legend Small village Road River District center

N

Shinkay Valley, Zabul Province, 2004–2005
The AMF engaged in widespread looting during the operation. They were poorly organized and undisciplined. SF units following after handed out money to many of those

looted by the militiamen.

As the SF and AMF moved into the valley, they saw busloads of Afghan men of fighting

age driving in the opposite direction. SF units stopped some of these vehicles, but the

men inside were unarmed and all had a story; there was no clear indication that they

were Taliban. Many were insurgents, but many were also local people keen to avoid

the fighting.

The operation resulted in very little contact with the Taliban. The insurgents had hidden

their weapons and either fled or gone underground by the time the SF and AMF arrived

in Deh Chopan. One of the SF teams and some AMF set up a firebase in the valley. After

about a month of quiet, they left. Many of the insurgents then returned to Deh Chopan.

Using typical guerrilla methods, they withdrew, waited for the occupying force to leave,

and then returned.

The operation in Deh Chopan was the largest of numerous direct action missions carried out by the SF team highlighted in this vignette from September 2003 to March

2004. It is unclear what, if any, effect these large-scale combat operations had on the

insurgency, much less on the capacity of the Afghan government to stand on its own.

June 2004 to January 2005: Counterinsurgency

The team spent its second deployment to Afghanistan from June 2004 to January 2005

in a counterinsurgency role while based out of a small outpost in Shinkay District, an

extremely remote and mountainous area in Zabul Province. The team was responsible

for the eastern half of Zabul, from the Ring Road south and east all the way to the border with Pakistan—an enormous, sparsely populated area with mountainous terrain.

The team’s battalion headquarters adopted a highly decentralized, indirect approach,

with considerable autonomy given to each SF team to engage with the local population,

train indigenous forces, collect intelligence, and conduct raids as need be. The battalion’s many teams were dispersed into small firebases across southern Afghanistan,

many of them in extremely remote areas. The battalion focused almost entirely on counterinsurgency and conducted relatively little counterterrorism or direct action.

98 | On the Ground
Shinkay Firebase was an exposed mud compound with minimal fortifications, guarded

mainly by Afghan soldiers and militiamen. The Shinkay district government consisted of

only a few local police and a district governor housed in a small building near the firebase. The district governor apparently cooperated with the Taliban, and the insurgents

mostly left him alone.

The team inherited two companies of Afghan soldiers trained by a previous SF team.

Most were ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks, and their officers were mainly northern Pashtuns. There were also about 150 to 200 Afghan mercenaries, most of them from Kandahar. These militiamen guarded the base; they were not allowed to go on offensive

operations.

The team’s influence did not extend more than 12 to 15 kilometers beyond its firebase.

The farther a village was from the base, the less influence the team had, and the more

the Taliban were in control. These were small villages, most of them less than ten mudwalled compounds, and very spread out. Beyond 15 kilometers in every direction was

a vast area where the team almost never went. U.S. forces had no presence on the

other side of the mountain range toward the border with Pakistan where insurgents

moved freely and controlled many populated areas.

The Taliban wielded considerable influence across this vast area, including the areas

immediately around the firebase, which was dominated by Pashtuns from the Hotak

tribe, part of the Ghilzai confederation—the same tribe as the Taliban’s supreme leader,

Mullah Omar. Many hardcore Taliban fighters and senior leaders came from this area

and continued to operate there after the U.S. invasion.

Most of the Hotak villages were adamantly pro-Taliban and resistant to any government

presence. For them, the Taliban presence was a way of life. Even under Taliban rule, they

mainly governed themselves. The U.S. invasion had little effect on their situation. Small

numbers of Taliban operatives continued to provide useful services with minimal corruption or repression. They provided security, prevented extortion, punished criminals,

and adjudicated disputes between families and clans. There was little evidence that

insurgents were intimidating Hotak villages.

The Taliban had anywhere from five to 15 operatives in most major villages or clusters

of villages. They moved around on motorcycles, usually unarmed, and operated an

Kandahar and Zabul | 99
effective intelligence network. They dispersed and fled in advance of most raids and cordon-and-knock operations. Yet they also consolidated forces to attack government installations and ambush U.S. patrols. Insurgents based in different villages would gather

in one location, carry out their attack, and then disperse again.

The local people did not seek protection from American or Afghan forces. They were

openly hostile to the idea of Afghan police or army garrisons within the confines of their

villages. When asked, village leaders said they did not want to be responsible for the security of Afghan army or police checkpoints, which would attract insurgent attacks and

cause divisions within their communities. Despite the presence of Taliban operatives

near the firebase, the team carried out few raids within its sphere of influence for fear

of alienating the population.

The only exceptions were a few openly pro-government villages, all of them inhabited by

non-Hotak tribes with connections to the Karzai government. These villages contained

large police garrisons, which often came under attack.

The SF team participated in a nearby shura every Tuesday morning, which included elders from surrounding villages. Local elders asked for money and projects from the team

and complained about the heavy-handed tactics of previous units. The area’s leaders

carried out most of their business outside the shura in one-on-one meetings. The team

allowed local people to come and go freely on the base. About 120 locals were

employed on the base. Many also came to receive free medical care from the team’s

doctor, who was trained in surgery, general medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine.

The team also traveled to distant villages to treat the sick. Known as medical civic

assistance programs, or MEDCAPs, these missions often yielded valuable information

and goodwill.

The team (and the Afghan soldiers under its command) was tied in closely to the local

economy. It became an important source of revenue for the surrounding population.

The SF team bought nearly all its food in nearby markets and used only local labor, all

purchased at local rates. The soldiers also employed a local cook to prepare their meals.

The one item contracted from outside was heavy equipment, which was not

available locally.

100 | On the Ground
The team avoided working through local contractors, especially those who spoke English (indicating that they were experienced at manipulating U.S. forces) or were from

outside the area. The team learned early on that dispensing money through a single individual made this person unduly powerful and encouraged corruption. Local contractors tended to hire only from their clan, creating resentment among others. U.S. soldiers

paid wages directly to workers and purchased goods themselves from the local market.

When hiring laborers, the team went to the weekly shura and asked for workers from

each village leader.

Insurgents operating in these villages reportedly carried out few or no attacks on the SF

team, for fear of alienating the locals. The one major exception was a roadside bomb

attack later traced to a rival clan that had reaped no benefits from the presence of U.S.

forces. This clan apparently felt threatened by the growing prosperity of those villages

closer to the firebase.

Over time, the local population came to value the economic benefits that the presence

of U.S. forces brought and worked to ensure the security of the base and its surroundings. The people did this despite their tribal connections to the Taliban and their tendency to support its political program and give refuge to its fighters.

Conclusion

During its first tour in Afghanistan, from September 2003 to March 2004, the SF team

learned that direct action did not always work, especially against insurgents in remote

mountain areas where there were no Coalition forces and very little accurate

information.

Battalion-level sweep operations proved ineffective, both at capturing or killing

insurgents and at projecting influence. The operation in Deh Chopan achieved little, except to alienate the people there. The operation met with few insurgents and caused

considerable harm to the local population. The operation was slow, clumsy, and ill-informed. Insurgents had plenty of time to flee, leaving innocent people to bear the brunt

of the attack.

The team learned some sobering lessons about indigenous militias. Afghan mercenaries engaged in widespread looting as they moved through Deh Chopan. These forces

Kandahar and Zabul | 101
may have put an “Afghan face” on the operation, but they were not native to Deh

Chopan. They abused the population as if Deh Chopan was an enemy nation. By allying with these militias and facilitating their predatory behavior, the SF battalion helped

sow enduring enmity against U.S. forces.

The SF team also learned not to trust information unless it had been carefully vetted.

The Afghan militia commanders and other individuals repeatedly fed false information

to the SF battalion, leading it on fruitless missions, some of which led to civilian deaths.

The team’s second deployment could not have been more different. The team’s experiences from June 2004 to January 2005 demonstrated that counterinsurgency could

work, even when the population was inclined to support the enemy; the solution was to

bring money into the community while doing no harm.

The SF team used its funds strategically to tie the health of the local economy to the continued presence of Coalition forces. Economic interest trumped ideology and tribal connections. It is unclear whether the SF team won hearts or minds or whether doing so

was even possible. What the team did do was link the interests of the community to

the interests of the SF team and the Afghan soldiers under its command.

The soldiers learned early on that money was power, especially in a place as poor and

rural as Afghanistan. The team dispensed funds as patronage, much like a patronagebased political machine. It gave money directly to laborers to provide jobs and spread

these funds evenly among the area’s 20 or so villages.

The team learned that giving small amounts of money was better than giving large sums;

it did not take much to achieve desired effects. The soldiers were careful to pay local

market rates for labor and goods. The team ended up spending only a fraction of its allotted funds.

The team avoided funneling money through contractors or a single local leader. It

learned early on that doing so created power brokers who used their influence to benefit their constituents at the expense of others, causing other communities to resent the

presence of Coalition forces. Cutting out middlemen increased the amount of influence

the SF team was able to glean from the money it spent, while minimizing corruption.

102 | On the Ground
The local population protected the SF team, not the other way around. The soldiers

were able to build such a strong and reliable network of support around their firebase

that they did not require fortifications and could move around easily with little risk of attack—even though Shinkay was a notoriously pro-Taliban area.

During its second deployment, the team focused its activity on a relatively small area

around its firebase. The team recognized that its ability to influence the population diminished the farther out it went. Rather than spread its efforts across a wider area,

the team focused its energies on 20 or so nearby villages. The team avoided patrols except where its presence was welcomed and did not establish Afghan army checkpoints

except in the few villages that clearly supported such a presence.

The team learned that local people did not necessarily want to be protected by Coalition forces, whether American or Afghan. Permanent garrisons and checkpoints attracted insurgent attacks and threatened the autonomy of fiercely independent,

self-governing villages. This was particularly true in remote areas such as Shinkay, where

the Taliban’s presence was never particularly intrusive. Where locals opposed the presence of soldiers and police, bases and patrols tended to strengthen the Taliban by providing it with opportunities to win popular support.

The human and physical terrain in Afghanistan vary widely from one area to the next,

especially in remote mountain valleys. During the team’s second tour, the SF battalion

headquarters gave its teams considerable autonomy, allowing them to adapt to different local conditions.

Finally, in Shinkay, the people protected U.S. forces. The soldiers depended on local

support for their security. Once the neighboring villages came to see the value of the SF

presence, the team faced little risk of attack in the surrounding area.

Kandahar and Zabul | 103

From June 2004 to October 2005, three U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) teams rotated

through northern Kunar and Nuristan in remote northeastern Afghanistan on six- to

seven-month tours. Their operations set the groundwork for the conventional units that

followed.

The region’s people live in isolated mountain valleys and have been fiercely protective

of their autonomy. It was one of the few areas of Afghanistan that the Soviet army failed

to penetrate in the 1980s. The Taliban had little influence there, even at the height of

their power.

The area is close to the border with Pakistan. Beyond that are the inaccessible areas

of Dir and Bajaur in northwestern Pakistan, where the al-Qaeda leadership was reportedly hiding at the time.

A major part of the mission for these small teams was to collect intelligence on al-Qaeda

and associated groups and target their leaders. Yet for these teams operating in the distant reaches of northeast Afghanistan, developing relationships with local people and

building indigenous forces was an essential task in order to collect the information

needed to target terrorist leaders as well as simply to stay alive.

This vignette focuses on three consecutive SF teams. The first was in Kunar and Nuristan from June to December 2004. The second was there from December 2004 to June

2005, and the third, from June to October 2005.

June to December 2004

In the summer of 2004, an SF team was sent to northern Kunar and Nuristan to target

leaders of al-Qaeda and the Hizbul-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG). At that time, much of the

This vignette is based entirely on interviews with the leaders of these three teams.

Vignette 8

Three U.S. Army Special Forces Teams

Kunar and Nuristan, 2004–2005

105
106 | On the Ground

al-Qaeda leadership was believed to be hiding just across the border in the far northwestern reaches of Pakistan.

The SF team established its firebase at Naray, a small village along the Kunar River in

the far northern corner of the province. The village consisted of just a handful of fortified compounds and a few poppy fields along a ridge overlooking the river. During the

first few weeks, the team patrolled into nearby villages to gather information and acquaint themselves with the villagers. Before long, the team began pushing north on

multiday missions into Nuristan where the HiG’s influence was strong.

It took days for the team to get to Nuristan’s remote and isolated mountain valleys. The

roads were poor, and many villages were accessible only by foot. Most people lived in

tributary valleys branching off the area’s only drivable road. If the team used its

vehicles at all, it was to drive to the mouth of a mountain valley and then hike the rest

of the way.

The team’s influence, in terms of its ability to effectively protect the population and secure its cooperation, did not extend more than 1 or 2 kilometers north and south of the

firebase. It took as long as seven hours just to hike to the observation posts overlooking the firebase and visit the villages nearby. The team set up a small base to the north,

but insurgents attacked the position relentlessly, forcing the team to close it down.

The team soon learned that the best and perhaps only way to gather useful information

was to go on three- to seven-day foot patrols into the mountains. SF and the Afghan soldiers patrolling with them ate, drank, and slept in villages along the way. They had to

pack lightly if they hoped to cross ridgelines as high as 12,000 feet.

Before moving into a village, the team would set up a cordon outside the town. Once inside, it was a matter of honor for the elders to ensure the soldiers’ security. The team

was attacked only once while inside a populated area, and nearly all attacks on the soldiers occurred away from populated areas. Some of these were sophisticated attacks

from multiple directions.

The team was able to collect information on the enemy, but effectively targeting insurgent or terrorist leaders proved exceedingly difficult. It was nearly impossible for U.S.

forces to move around the region’s remote mountain valleys without word spreading
Kunar and Nuristan | 107

ahead of their arrival. Most insurgents managed to flee or hide long before the soldiers

arrived. The insurgents had networks of informers throughout the region that provided

early warning. Each village also had lookouts who watched for outsiders passing through

their territory. The same was true of valleys such as the Korangal to the south, where

heavy-handed sweep operations netted few insurgents and made many enemies.

The team learned a great deal about local tribal conflicts and historical rivalries. These

conflicts were complex; many revolved around water. Feuding clans mined paths to the

river and lobbed mortars at one another. Heavily armed men with field rations hiked

days to raid villages in neighboring valleys. The team occasionally came across these

raiding parties, but left them alone for fear of getting involved in local feuds. The team

held shuras with elders from Kamdesh and Gowardesh and tried to broker agreements

between rival clans. The team avoided taking sides or using force to restrain one side

or the other. Insurgent leaders exploited these divisions, arming rival groups and using

local grudges to make inroads into remote communities.

National identity or loyalty to anyone outside one’s clan or village was almost unknown.

Each valley was like its own country, dotted with isolated and self-contained villages.

Many people in these towns had never left their village; anyone from outside was a foreigner to be treated with mistrust. Past governments had done little or nothing for these

villages, and they were accustomed to living without outside support or interference. The

idea of direct rule by provincial or district officials was a foreign concept.

Many villages were reluctant to cooperate with the team because of strong insurgent

influence, the belief that U.S. forces would not remain long, and an inherent distrust of

any outside force. The villagers mostly hedged their bets and played both sides. Many

villages were openly hostile and organized attacks on the team as it passed through

their territory, not because they necessarily had anything against the United States, but

because they viewed the presence of any outside armed group as a threat to their security and autonomy. The first time the team went to Kamdesh, people fled, thinking that

the Americans were Russians coming to destroy their villages.

The team was not tasked or resourced to bolster the government, build local forces,

engage with the population, or carry out reconstruction efforts. Locals often came to the

firebase to ask for help, but addressing local problems was not a priority mission.
108 | On the Ground

Nonetheless, the team devoted much of its effort to engaging the population and training and mentoring indigenous forces. Regular patrols, reconstruction projects, shuras,

and other efforts to engage local people were key to gathering intelligence, not just

against al-Qaeda but also against other insurgents keen to attack the firebase and soldiers on patrol. The only way to develop reliable sources was to build local support.

The SF team was too small and isolated to protect its firebase without reliable and

well-trained Afghan soldiers and militiamen to serve as force multipliers. Afghan troops

went on missions, helping to protect the team as it moved on foot through remote and

dangerous areas. A force of about 100 Afghan militiamen recruited from nearby villages

guarded the base and patrolled nearby. The team learned that the insurgents, many of

whom were local youths keen to target foreign forces, were reluctant to fire at

local guards.

December 2004 to June 2005

A second team took over in December 2004 and continued the efforts of the previous

team, with few apparent changes. This second team pushed out frequently on multiday

foot patrols through the mountains, staying in local villages and trying to gather useful

information to target and disrupt insurgents believed to be associated with al-Qaeda.

Like its predecessor, the team had little trouble finding people to talk to in the area’s

many remote villages. Yet its targeting efforts met with little success. It was nearly impossible for the team to take insurgent leaders by surprise, given their robust intelligence network and the difficulty of the terrain.

The team expanded its sphere of influence further around the firebase through local patrols and small reconstruction projects. The team started several road improvement

projects near the base, repaired some small bridges, and finished a clinic begun during the previous team’s tour.

The team developed a closer relationship with the local police chief at Bari Kowt and

started a program to help train the small force of 10 to 15 policemen. Over time, the police began moving out of Bari Kowt and into far-flung villages. The relationship was

sometimes strained, however, as the SF team suspected the police of maintaining links

with the insurgents.
Kunar and Nuristan | 109

The soldiers forged an agreement with several large villages in Kamdesh that agreed

to hand over some of their weapons. The agreement was difficult to enforce, however,

because Kamdesh was more than seven hours from the firebase, five hours by road plus

two hours hiking through the mountains. The team only went there three or four times;

it was the farthest north the team ever ventured. Whether the Kamdeshis really meant

to honor the agreement was never clear, as a small group of U.S. Marines and Afghan

soldiers went to Kamdesh in late January 2005 to recover some of the promised

weapons, and the convoy was ambushed from three sides while driving back through

a narrow canyon. Three Afghan soldiers were killed.

June 2005 to October 2005

In June 2005, a third SF team was rotated in. By mid-2005, the SF command in

Afghanistan was considering closing down Firebase Naray. The position was extremely

isolated and increasingly difficult to secure. It was surrounded by mountains, and the

road south was unsafe and often washed out because of floods. Roadside bomb incidents increased in 2005, forcing U.S. forces off the roads and restricting the extent of

their influence.

The team tried to rectify this situation by working to secure the road between the provincial capital at Asadabad to the south and the firebase at Naray. It organized and funded

local militias in villages along the route, with each militia responsible for a different section. The team also threatened to hold villages responsible for attacks along their stretch

of the road. After four months, there were few ambushes or roadside bombs between

Naray and the provincial capital at Asadabad, about 50 kilometers to the south.

By October 2005, the three consecutive SF teams had established a persistent presence around the firebase at Naray and projected sufficient influence beyond the firebase to make it possible for a larger conventional force to operate there in later years.

Yet U.S. forces remained largely unwelcome in the small tributary valleys of Nuristan to

the north. The only area of Nuristan where U.S. forces had some reliable support was

Bari Kowt, a border town that made a lot of money from commerce with Pakistan, and

it, too, was unsafe. There was only so much that a small team of U.S. soldiers and a company or two of Afghans could do to clear and hold a vast area with such difficult human

and physical terrain.
Gowardesh

Kamdesh

Bari Kowt

Arandu

Peshangar

Naray Durin

Pitigal

4436 2700 2220

3000

2600

2200

3000

3100

2900

3026

3000 3200

2800

3000

2600

2300

2600

3000 2900

2500

3000

3000

3000

Large villageSmall villageIsolated cluster ofbuildings

1000

Mountain (withelevation in meters)River valleyTributary valley

5 kilometers

Border with Pakistan

LEGEND

Provincial boundary

N

Northern Kunar and Eastern Nuristan, 2004–2005
Kunar and Nuristan | 111

Conclusion

The terrain and distances in northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan imposed near-insurmountable obstacles to everything the SF teams attempted to do. Outside forces

found it impossible to move through the region’s mountain valleys undetected. As a

result, kill-capture missions proved difficult and the risk of catastrophic ambushes remained high. The team’s influence was limited to villages near the firebase, while insurgents roamed free in the areas beyond.

The region’s population was isolated, self-governing, and mistrustful of outsiders. Government was nonexistent. Many attacks on U.S. and Afghan troops could be attributed

to well-armed local youth keen to fire at any foreign force passing through their territory.

Insurgent groups associated with al-Qaeda easily exploited this hostility to foreign influence. The three SF teams learned to maintain a light footprint and operate below

the radar screen lest they inflame the population’s xenophobic tendencies. Violence

increased in later years with the arrival of large conventional army battalions with a

more imposing and overt presence.

Frequent multiday foot patrols into the mountains proved essential to gathering useful

information. SF and the Afghan soldiers under their command hiked through valleys

and over ridgelines, eating, drinking, and sleeping in villages along the way and talking

to local people. Though the population did not necessarily welcome the presence of

U.S. forces, village leaders offered them sanctuary in accordance with local traditions.

On the contrary, large-scale sweep operations like those in the Korangal Valley farther

south (in which the SF teams at Naray sometimes participated) alienated local people,

rarely netted insurgents, and were generally counterproductive.

The SF soldiers also raised and mentored indigenous forces in order to protect the firebase and provide additional security while on patrol beyond Naray. There was little that

an SF team could do by itself, however well trained and adequately equipped. To operate effectively and stay alive in such remote and dangerous areas, SF had to work with

Afghan forces and conduct traditional counterinsurgency operations, such as foot

patrols, engagements with key leaders, and reconstruction projects, in addition to targeting terrorist leaders.

This vignette describes the efforts of a U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) team over the

course of two deployments—October 2003 to January 2004 and June to November

2004—in the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.

The team operated from a compound in Kandahar City once used by Mullah Omar. The

team’s battalion headquarters was at Kandahar Airfield on the outskirts of the city. The

overall focus of the battalion and its SF teams was on raids and large-scale kill-capture

missions. Counterinsurgency was not a priority mission.

Nonetheless, the team focused much of its energy on engaging the city’s population and

conducting other counterinsurgency-related tasks. Kandahar City in 2003 was quite

safe, its population openly supportive of U.S. forces. The soldiers moved around with little fear of attack, building relationships with local leaders.

When the team arrived for its second tour, however, it found that the environment and

mood of Kandahar City had changed dramatically. Violence was on the rise. New units

had adopted a more imposing and overtly military posture and had allowed relationships

with local people to fray. Continuing raids and other combat operations contributed to

growing tensions.

October 2003 to January 2004: Relationship Building

During its first deployment in Kandahar from October 2003 to January 2004, the team

engaged constantly with the population. The soldiers met many of the city’s leaders

and focused on relationship building and development projects.

This vignette is based on extensive interviews with the team commander in Monterey, California, on

12 October 2009.

Vignette 9

U.S. Army Special Forces Team

Kandahar, 2003–2004

113
The team’s mission was to conduct special operations. They received little or no strategic guidance or directives on counterinsurgency. The push from higher headquarters

was for direct action and armed reconnaissance, that is, movement-to-contact. However, the team’s activities also involved a notable amount of nonkinetic activity.

On its own initiative with little direction from higher headquarters, the team met

frequently with President Hamid Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai. The soldiers went

to the Karzai family’s house every few weeks for dinner. They met frequently with

Governor Pashtuni, who had replaced Governor Sherzai as the head of the provincial

government.

In 2003, Kandahar City was a safe and permissive environment for the SF team. The

soldiers often walked the streets without helmets or weapons. They did so intentionally

to maintain a low threat posture during their numerous interactions with local people.

They shopped in the bazaar and ate at local restaurants and in the homes of prominent

leaders. They met with the police chief and other city officials several times a week.

Some time into the team’s deployment, units from the 10th Mountain Division arrived

and conducted presence patrols in the city, which usually consisted of driving through

the streets in armored vehicles, often pointing their guns at the population. For the SF

team, the threatening posture of these patrols was counterproductive.

The team was not aware of any other U.S. officials working with Afghan government

leaders in Kandahar and implementing reconstruction projects, even though the city

welcomed development and political engagement. There was a large U.S. military presence at Kandahar Airfield, but only the SF team worked on development projects, such

as restoring local schools. The team worked closely with several nongovernmental organizations in the city.

The team learned a great deal about the city’s political dynamics. Each neighborhood

was ruled by a group of elders from that neighborhood. There were three main power

brokers in the city: the governor, the chief of police, and the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF)

commander. The three fought constantly and rarely agreed on issues. The Afghan Militia Forces were controlled by warlords outside the provincial government. The SF team

rented them out on occasion and trained them for use during specific operations.

The team conducted a few small raids, usually cordon-and-knocks, to detain Taliban

114 | On the Ground
leaders passing through. The team was also involved in some battalion-level sweep operations. These were large movement-to-contact operations that involved substantial

numbers of forces pushing through an area and then leaving, the idea being to net

large numbers of enemy fighters in a single operation. These sweeps met with little

success—the insurgents easily fled and then returned when U.S. forces left.

June to November 2004: A Changing Environment

When the team returned for its second tour in June 2004, the situation in Kandahar City

had changed dramatically. Violence, including ambushes on SF soldiers, was on the

rise. U.S. forces had stepped up raids and other combat operations, which caused widespread resentment in and around Kandahar.

The team attempted to conduct the same activities it had during its first deployment,

but found it more difficult now that violence was increasing. Bases were rocketed,

bombs exploded inside the city, and grenades were thrown at U.S. patrols. The Taliban

began moving back into the city, and public hostility toward the United States grew.

There was also a steady increase in insurgent intimidation and night letters. The United

Nations building and a school were hit by car bombs. The Taliban warned girls not to

leave their homes.

Because the relationship between the city and the military had changed, casual dress

with nonthreatening kit was no longer allowed for Coalition forces. U.S. soldiers wore

body armor, helmets, combat equipment, and carried rifles at meetings and inside people’s homes, putting barriers between themselves and the population. Many Afghan

leaders, who believed it was a matter of honor to protect their guests, were offended

by these practices.

The increase in violence coincided with a number of changes in the operating environment. Units from the 101st Airborne Division had replaced units from 10th Mountain

Division. Special forces no longer controlled all U.S. forces in their areas of operation;

this authority had passed to conventional units. The SF team was also no longer the

main point of contact with the governor and other high-level officials.

In 2004, the Afghan Militia Forces were disbanded, and U.S. forces were no longer allowed to work with them. They remained as powerful as before, but lost their official

Kandahar | 115
status and became outsiders. There was little effort to disarm or reintegrate the militias.

SF units were ordered to stop paying militiamen, who guarded SF bases and went along

on operations. Many of these militiamen began attacking U.S. forces, including the SF

team they had once worked for. The warlords remained powerful but were no longer

working with SF or the government.

There were few official security forces to fill the vacuum left by the militias. Kandahar

had police, but the SF team was not allowed to assist or train them. Police training was

part of the mission of the UN and the State Department and was not to be undertaken

by U.S. military forces. Several hundred police were deployed to Kandahar City but were

not well trained or adequately supervised. Police corruption and extortion were

rampant.

Conclusion

During its first tour in the city of Kandahar from October 2003 to January 2004, the SF

team was the main U.S. presence in the city. The team focused on the population, building relationships and assisting with development projects. The team met with the city’s

official leaders often and worked through issues with them. Kandahar was a safe place

with a largely positive outlook toward President Karzai, the United States, and the future.

The team approached the people in a nonthreatening way, communicated with them frequently, and helped to maintain security in the city.

When the team returned for a second deployment, from June to November 2004, it

found Kandahar a different place. The environment had changed, and violence had significantly increased. The SF teams no longer controlled the battlespace; control was

passed to conventional forces that adopted a more threatening posture. The incidence

of heavy-handed raids, sweeps, and other combat operations grew. Afghan militias were

disbanded without any serious effort to disarm or reintegrate them.

From June to November 2004, the team saw the city of Kandahar backsliding and destabilizing. The team’s population-centric focus had been successful the year before, but

changes since had created problems that were not easily solved. The Taliban was able

to infiltrate back into the city and build a base of support among the population. Violence

continued to increase, tensions between U.S. forces and the people grew, and it became increasingly difficult to engage with the population.

116 | On the Ground
In the spring of 2006, the British sent two platoons to Musa Qala to prevent the town

from falling to the Taliban. Hundreds of insurgents surrounded the small British position and kept it under constant siege. In October, the British withdrew after brokering a

controversial cease-fire with the town’s elders.

The cease-fire did not last for long. In January 2007, the Taliban invaded Musa Qala, removed the elders, set up its own government, and turned the town into a sanctuary for

insurgents across Helmand—a kind of Afghan Fallujah. The Taliban established sharia

courts, closed schools, banned television and music, conscripted young men, imposed

hefty taxes, and restricted women’s rights. Public hangings reminded residents of the

consequences of their noncompliance.

The British decided to retake the town with American and Afghan help. They did so only

after securing the defection of a mid-level Taliban leader. The British worked with the

Afghan government to devise a plan for clearing, holding, and rebuilding the town before combat operations began. The Coalition then surrounded Musa Qala, weakened the

insurgents’ defenses, and isolated them from the surrounding area. Information operations kept the local population informed so they could stay out of harm’s way.

In early December 2007, after months of “influence operations,” during which Coalition

forces slowly encircled the town, several thousand troops retook Musa Qala, aided by

Afghan soldiers nominally in the lead. Named Operation Mar Karardad, it was the largest

operation to date in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban’s defenses quickly collapsed, and

few civilians were harmed.

Coalition forces then set up positions in and around Musa Qala. Within days, most of

the population returned. By January 2008, there was a new governor, reconstruction

Vignette 10

UK-Led Task Force

Musa Qala, Helmand, 2006–2009

117
projects had begun, and the British were mentoring a new police force. Problems

persisted, however, especially outside the district center, where the Taliban remained

active.

Political Preparations

The Coalition waited for an optimal time to retake the district center. A major Taliban defection during the fall of 2007 was the catalyst for action. A moderate Taliban leader,

Mullah Abdul Salem, reached out to President Hamid Karzai after growing dissatisfied

with the Taliban’s use of foreign fighters. President Karzai strongly endorsed Mullah

Salem and pushed for political negotiations, which led to meetings that included the

British and American ambassadors and the ISAF commander.1

While Mullah Salem was not a prominent Taliban figure at the time of his defection,2 he

was an influential Alizai tribal leader in Musa Qala.3 He indicated that he could engineer

a tribal uprising against the Taliban in Musa Qala with the help of the Coalition. As part

of the negotiations, the government and Coalition promised him some protection.

Following political negotiations, the Coalition worked with the Afghan government and

Afghan National Army (ANA) to plan the operation. The Coalition aimed to use

minimal force.

Shaping Operations around Musa Qala

A British brigadier commanded shaping operations—or what he referred to as “influence operations”—with the British army’s 52 Infantry Brigade. The operations began

months before the launch of Operation Mar Karardad, in which they weakened the Taliban both psychologically and in terms of their defenses. From late August to October

2008, Coalition forces killed a reported 250 insurgents, including high-level Taliban political leaders, around Musa Qala, using raids and airstrikes.4

The brigadier planned to encircle the district center and then clear it.5 In early

November, he set the first blocking force against the eastern side of Musa Qala. The

British marines also patrolled near Mullah Salem’s village to help protect him from assassination. The British brigadier then put another blocking force west and northwest

of the town.

118 | On the Ground
Coalition forces closed down Taliban supply routes and isolated the town. Small patrols

reminded the Taliban (and residents) that the Coalition had not forgotten about them;

however, running battles broke out between Coalition troops and the Taliban. The Taliban also carried out attacks in Sangin and other areas of Helmand Province to relieve

pressure on Musa Qala.

To keep the population informed, a British-run radio station broadcast information about

their military activities. The British also distributed entertainment banned by the Taliban,

such as music and movies. At the end of November, the British notified tribal elders of

the impending attack.

In early December, Coalition forces moved in slowly from several directions and probed

the Taliban’s defenses. Aircraft circled overhead and continued to target Taliban

leadership.6

On 5–6 December, airplanes dropped leaflets warning of an imminent attack. The

leaflets urged the tribal leaders to eject the Taliban themselves and encouraged the

population to stay indoors; many fled. The Taliban vowed it would stand and fight with

over 2,000 fighters.

Clearing Musa Qala

Operation Mar Karardad began on 7 December 2007 at 1600. Following a round of

airstrikes, British, Danish, and Estonian troops, along with U.S. forces, advanced from

the south.

Before sunset on 7 December, 400 U.S. paratroopers were inserted by helicopter onto

the hills eight miles north of the district center. The Americans were to “surround and

beat the Taliban on the outskirts of the town.”7 On 8 December, they captured a cell

phone tower on a hill that overlooked the town. Heavy fighting followed for the next few

days. The Taliban were well organized and prepared, with weapons caches stashed

around the town.

As U.S. troops approached the district center from the north, about 4,000 British soldiers (as well as some Danish and Estonian troops) pushed in from the south to cut off

fleeing insurgents.8 Journalists embedded with these units helped publicize the

Musa Qala | 119
operation.9 Heavy aerial bombardment targeted Taliban positions as Coalition forces

made their approach.

On the first day, mid-level Musa Qala Taliban commander Mullah Tor Jan was killed,

followed by the Taliban deputy governor of Helmand Province, Mullah Faizullah, on 9

December.10 Many other Taliban commanders fled as their forces began to crumble

under pressure.

The insurgents loyal to Mullah Salem—about a third of the Taliban’s total force in Musa

Qala—refused to fight. However, the tribal uprising that Salem had promised never

occurred.

Coalition forces slowly worked their way into the district center, carefully passing through

minefields along the way. NATO troops had already secured the perimeter when 1,000

Afghan soldiers entered the town from the south. On 10 December, the Coalition

reached the district center. With little resistance remaining, the ANA symbolically raised

the Afghan flag in the district center on 12 December.

After six days, the Coalition had killed hundreds of Taliban and many other insurgents

had escaped to the mountains to the north. With only 3 Coalition troops killed, another

12 wounded, and 3 civilians reported killed, the operation was largely deemed a

success.

Holding Musa Qala

After clearing the town, the Coalition set up outpost positions in and around the district

center. One ANA kandak (a battalion) was put in charge of holding the town.

ISAF forces created a secure perimeter around the Musa Qala district center. The Coalition’s main lines of defense were north and south of town; the Taliban did not have

much of a presence to the east and west. ISAF troops also established a base outside

the district center to the west. Many smaller observation posts surrounded the district

center and were manned by a mix of British troops, ANA, and Afghan National Police

(ANP). Patrols outside the town came under constant fire.

These outposts created a small security bubble that made it possible for the British to

begin rebuilding the district government and police. The Taliban failed to infiltrate the

town again.

120 | On the Ground
The local police force re-formed under the area’s

previous chief of police, a former militia commander. The police chief’s 200 or 300 officers

came from Lashkar Gah and Kabul. His deputy

estimated that the police chief’s former militia

comprised 75 percent of his police force.11

British (and later U.S. Marine) police training

teams trained and mentored the ANP and went

with them on patrols.12 By mid-2009, the Musa

Qala ANP was “generally regarded as one of the

best in Helmand Province.”

While the security situation by the end of 2009

was not ideal and security did not extend much

outside the district center, Afghan and Coalition

forces continued to hold the town.

Low-level violence outside the city

persisted, and insurgents had

made at least four attempts on Governor Salem’s life since he assumed office.

Building Musa Qala

The Coalition developed a stabilization plan long before retaking the

town, allowing for its immediate implementation after the battle.13

After the operation ended on 12

December, the Coalition immediately began working with the

Afghan government to choose a new governor. Members of the British-led provincial reconstruction team (PRT) helped organize a shura to confirm the selection of a governor.

In the meantime, the Afghan Independent Directorate of Local Governance and local ofMusa Qala | 121

An Afghan raises Afghanistan’s national flag in

Musa Qala on 12 December 2007. (Photos by

Cpl Wayne K. Pitsenberger, U.S. Army)
ficials immediately appointed the Helmand deputy governor (a Musa Qala native) as

temporary district administrator for Musa Qala.

After some debate, Mullah Salem was appointed governor on 7 January 2008. While he

maintained popular support for the first few months in power, his popularity began to

fluctuate as complaints of corruption surfaced and he refused to rein in his

private militia.

A British military stabilization support team (MSST)—the first of its kind— arrived on 13

December to assess the damage. There was less destruction than had been anticipated. Most buildings simply needed basic repairs due to neglect. However, larger projects, such as rebuilding the central mosque destroyed during insurgent fighting with

the British in 2006, were also needed.

The Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development took the lead in post conflict reconstruction.14 According to an early estimate, the combined reconstruction plan

for Musa Qala included a $13.8 million joint contribution from the Afghan government,

the United Kingdom, and the United States. Although that number was expected to decrease after the MSST’s assessment, the Afghan government reportedly promised local

Afghans more than $60 million for reconstruction and welfare services. Musa Qala received only a small portion of those funds, largely due to its security situation, corruption, and misappropriated funds.

The British PRT started a Musa Qala district branch for the first time and began projects

within a few weeks after the operation. Within months, the PRT helped build a school,

health clinic, and roads. The PRT also instituted a cash-for-work public works program,

employing up to three residents daily.15

Yet problems remained. Projects did not always run as smoothly as planned. Locals

sometimes complained that public services were more efficient when the Taliban was

in control, and security concerns caused the PRT to abandon the cash-for-work program

after insurgents killed three laborers.16 PRT officers also faced difficulties visiting reconstruction projects outside the district center, where security remained poor.

Despite all the gains made in Musa Qala, the governor remained dissatisfied with the

amount of reconstruction work completed. He had overpromised and underdelivered.

122 | On the Ground
Many people in the area were still unemployed by the summer of 2009, and bureaucratic hurdles hindered the reconstruction of the central mosque. As Governor Salem

said, “Governments earn trust as a result of their actions.”17 He later continued, “I have

promised the people so much, but we have delivered so little, and people will turn

on me.”18

Many locals feared that the Taliban would return. One local elder said, “Everyone knows

that the town can be taken, but to keep power there is the key thing. It depends on the

skill of the government to make the people trust them. If they are not skillful, then the

people will turn to the Taliban.”19

Conclusion

Operation Mar Karardad was a success due in large part to the effective coordination

of political and military operations. Coalition forces established a ring of security that

allowed governance to grow and reconstruction to commence. The operations described

on this vignette are significant for several reasons.

First, political—not military—actions drove the operation. The Coalition worked out a

political deal before the military operation began, assisting with the defection of a Taliban leader who supported the Coalition. Mullah Salem was a respected leader in his

tribe and in the region. His militia showed their support of the Coalition by not fighting

against them during the operation. His defection also gave legitimacy to the retaking of

Musa Qala.

The ANA was involved in the planning and execution of the operation. Even though U.S.

and Coalition forces endured most of the fighting, the ANA entered the district center

and symbolically reasserted control. The operation was highly publicized as an ANA-led

operation. The aim was to strengthen Afghans’ confidence in their own forces.

The Coalition was wary of collateral damage during its military campaign to clear the insurgents. Information operations were successful in reaching the local populace; the

Coalition broadcast its intentions to the public through radio broadcasts and leaflets.

It advertised its military operations so that civilians would have ample time to escape

without harm. The population returned within days of the fighting.

Musa Qala | 123
The Coalition killed several high-level Taliban commanders, which helped break the insurgents’ resistance and caused many fighters to flee.

Afghans helped the Coalition devise a post conflict strategy at the same time as the

military operation, which allowed for a smooth transition. By formulating a post operational plan in advance, the Afghan government was able to immediately begin reconstruction projects. A local shura elected a popular local leader, Mullah Salem, who was

also endorsed by the central Afghan government.

Finally, the ring of security maintained by the British allowed governance to progress

without being subject to direct pressure by the Taliban. Coalition mentors helped stand

up and support an ANP force.

124 | On the Ground
From September 2008 to April 2009, a reinforced battalion, or battle group, of British

marines operated across southern Afghanistan—mostly in remote insurgent base areas.

Their activities ranged from brief raids to month-long operations that involved longrange patrols and the construction of fixed bases.

In some operations, the marines did not fire a shot; in others, they fought pitched battles. This vignette describes four missions in the mountains of Uruzgan Province and in

the deserts and heavily cultivated areas of southern and central Helmand.

In Uruzgan’s IED-laden Mirabad Valley, the marines arrived in strength by helicopter,

spoke with tribal leaders, accurately diagnosed the cause of unrest, and devised a

political solution that other units later implemented. Roadside bomb attacks then

dropped dramatically.

In the “Fishhook” area of southern Helmand, the battle group disrupted a key transit

area for foreign fighters and collected information that proved vital during later

clear-hold-build operations.

In the lush areas around Marjah and Nad Ali in central Helmand, the battle group fought

against hundreds of insurgents in entrenched positions. The marines struck at several

insurgent safe areas and established patrol bases under fire, although these bases

were later abandoned.

The battle group was a mobile unit based loosely out of Kandahar Airfield, not a “groundholding force” responsible for a fixed battlespace. It went wherever it was needed—

usually to places where there was no Coalition presence and where insurgents operated

in strength.

This vignette is based on interviews with officers from 42 Commando, Royal Marines—the battalion

commander and his three company commanders—in London on 24 February 2010.

Vignette 11

British Marine Battalion

Uruzgan and Helmand, 2008–2009

125
When entering insurgent-controlled areas, the battle group remained constantly on the

move. Restraint and local engagement were at the core of every mission to smooth the

way for later clear-hold-build operations.

Diagnosing Problems and Proposing Political Solutions in the Mirabad

Valley, Uruzgan, October 2008

In mid-October 2008, the battle group entered the Mirabad Valley east of Tarin Kowt,

the provincial capital of Uruzgan, to help the province’s Dutch-led task force. There were

reports of numerous IEDs laid across the valley, which restricted movement through

the area. There were no NATO or Afghan forces there.

The 42 Commando battle group flew into the valley and remained for 10 days, during

which they moved constantly. Although they did not fire a shot, they did find large quantities of explosives.

By speaking with the valley’s elders, the marines learned a great deal about the area’s

political dynamics. The people of the Mirabad harbored deep—and quite legitimate—

grievances against the government and NATO forces. The valley’s population came

mostly from Ghilzai tribes, which had been shut out of power by Durrani clans that dominated the provincial government in Tarin Kowt.

To reach the provincial capital at Tarin Kowt—to sell their produce or purchase goods in

the town’s bazaars—the valley’s residents had to pass through checkpoints manned by

corrupt police who extorted money from travelers. The chief of police had a reputation

for kidnapping and raping local boys. NATO forces in Tarin Kowt supported the government, and by extension, the provincial police so despised by the people of the Mirabad.

The Taliban skillfully exploited these grievances to recruit fighters and build a base of

support against the government. The insurgents provided weapons, explosives, and military training. Many local people looked to the Taliban for protection against the rapacious police. Allying with the insurgents and laying IEDs was a way to prevent NATO

forces from extending the reach of seemingly corrupt and predatory government officials

from outside the valley.

After gathering this information, 42 Commando passed it on to Dutch forces, who

sacked the police chief and put a stop to extortion at the checkpoints leading into the

126 | On the Ground
valley. The Dutch then brought the Ghilzai leaders from the Mirabad into the political

process. Soon after the battle group operation, some 70 elders from the Mirabad attended a shura in the provincial capital for the first time. With the elders’ permission,

the Dutch established a company-sized Afghan National Army outpost three kilometers

inside the valley. The elders were also given support to form their own local militia.

Soon after, the Dutch were able to move freely through the Mirabad Valley without fear

of IEDs. There were also fewer IED attacks in the provincial capital in Tarin Kowt.

Occupying Insurgent-Controlled Ground Near Marjah and Nad Ali in

Central Helmand, December 2008

In December 2008, the battle group participated in a three-week-long brigade-level operation to secure the area around Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand. Two

Uruzgan and Helmand | 127

British Marines patrol in Nad Ali District of Helmand Province on 3 January 2009.

(Photo by Cpl John Scott Rafoss, U.S. Marine Corps)
months earlier, several hundred insurgents—most of them based around the Talibancontrolled towns of Marjah and Nad Ali to the south—had nearly overrun Lashkar Gah.

The job of the 42 Commando battle group was to strike at insurgents in Marjah and

Nad Ali to keep them off balance while NATO units carried out operations around

Lashkar Gah. The marines were then to set up several patrol bases. Other units were

to man the positions once the operation was complete. The area was entirely controlled

by the insurgents, who operated there in substantial numbers.

On the night of 7 December, the marines air assaulted into a canal on the edge of the

desert between Nad Ali and Marjah. 42 Commando’s K Company fought its way to a

cluster of compounds and established a patrol base near the village of Kosha Kalay. L

Company pushed six kilometers southwest to stop insurgents moving north from Marjah. The battalion’s company-sized reconnaissance force moved to occupy a position

along a canal to the east. The patrol base sat on an important five-way junction between Nawa, Nad Ali, Marjah, and Lashkar Gah.

At both outposts, the insurgents fought pitched battles and beat a tactical retreat. They

watched, waited, then split into small groups, surrounded the nascent patrol bases,

and hit them with heavy weapons. The insurgents fired and moved at night, which is unusual in Afghanistan, and nearly shot down several helicopters with rocket-propelled

grenades (RPGs). For five days, the two companies fought off attacks from all sides

while engineers labored to set up fortifications.

The marines counterattacked by pushing small teams out to engage the insurgents.

They laid ambushes and maneuvered on the insurgents surrounding the two positions.

After nearly a week of fighting, attacks on the bases began to decline.

The marines then pushed patrols farther south toward Marjah. They constantly varied

their routes to keep the insurgents from establishing forward lines or identifying patterns. Despite these efforts, the insurgents began employing IEDs, which restricted the

battle group’s movements out of the two bases.

After more than nine days of heavy fighting, the battle group handed the bases off to

another British unit, which stationed a platoon of soldiers in each position—not nearly

enough to adequately defend them, much less patrol the surrounding area. The

128 | On the Ground
insurgents later encircled the two positions and kept them under constant siege. The

bases were subsequently shut down.

Shaping the “Fishhook” in Southern Helmand for Later Clear-HoldBuild Operations, February to March 2009

In February and March 2009, the 42 Commando battle group carried out a month-long

operation in an area known as the “Fishhook” in Garmshir District in southern Helmand, near the border with Pakistan. The goal was to gather information and disrupt

insurgent movement through the area in preparation for later clear-hold-build operations by U.S. Marines.

The area was a logistical hub and through point for men and material moving between

Pakistan and central and northern Helmand. The only operations conducted in the Fishhook since 2001 had been brief raids, none of them lasting longer than 12 hours.

Most of the marines arrived by helicopter, the rest in vehicles. They conducted numerous air and ground assaults from a temporary base in the desert. Some of these were

targeted raids against groups of foreign fighters. Others involved extensive patrols and

local engagement, which yielded information that the battle group handed over to U.S.

Marines planning to set up bases in the area.

In Marjah Again to Dislodge the Taliban, March 2009

In March 2009, the battle group was ordered to leave Garmshir and return to the area

between Marjah and Nad Ali in central Helmand for a movement-to-contact operation.

The mission was to fly in, engage the enemy, and then leave, in order to keep the insurgents tied down while Coalition units rotated out of the provincial capital.

Insurgents descended on the helicopter landing sites as soon as the marines touched

down. The Taliban fired at the helicopters, forcing several to fall back, and fixed the

marines with heavy weapons, rockets, and mortars.

Most of the local population fled. With the civilians gone, it became a conventionalstyle battle. For three days, the marines and the insurgents fought to seize and hold

ground. The marines called in bombers, attack helicopters, and artillery. The insurgents

took heavy casualties, with some 100 killed. The battle group’s three air assault

Uruzgan and Helmand | 129
Aynak

Nawa

Marjah

Lashkar Gah

Nad Ali

Kosha Kalay

Babaji

LEGEND

Canal

Helmand River

Road

5 kilometers

N

Central Helmand, December 2008
companies remained under constant fire in different locations. For two days they were

tied down and unable to maneuver.

On the third day, the three companies managed to link up and push south toward Marjah where about 200 insurgents were believed to be defending the town from entrenched positions. As the battle group pushed south in staggered formation, the

insurgents retreated into the town. On the fourth day, the battle group pushed back

north and returned to base.

Conclusion

The 42 Commando battle group was able to create breathing space for other units to

operate and collect information for later operations, but its operations were rarely decisive or enduring on their own.

It was up to ground-holding units (those responsible for providing security in a limited

area) doing traditional clear-hold-build operations to pacify key areas. When other units

were not adequately resourced for the hold phase, the gains made by the battle group

did not last—for example, the two patrol bases near Marjah in December 2008 that

were later shut down.

For 42 Commando, mobility was essential. The marines’ best form of protection was to

remain constantly on the move—to take the fight to the Taliban and avoid patterned

movements that might make them vulnerable to IEDs and ambushes. As a mobile air

assault force, the battle group was able to strike deep into insurgent-controlled territory

to keep the enemy off balance and retain some of the initiative.

Ground-holding forces, on the other hand, were fixed by the bases out of which they

operated. Patterned movements became unavoidable. Insurgents in Helmand tended

to retreat in the face of major clearing operations. They waited, took note of new patrol

bases, lines of communication, and repeated movements and then used IEDs and ambushes to restrict the movement of holding forces and limit their access to the population. Marines of 42 Commando learned that after about 36 hours, the advantage of

surprise wore off. Insurgents from the surrounding area were then able to pinpoint the

marines’ location, identify their patterns, maneuver against them, and lay IEDs.

Uruzgan and Helmand | 131
The 42 Commando battle group saw its mission as disrupt, exploit, influence, and understand. The battle group air lifted into remote areas, hoping to exploit the element of

surprise to target insurgents and find arms caches. The marines then engaged the population, especially during longer operations. There were rarely plans to leave holding

forces behind. The battle group’s approach, therefore, was to act as honorably as it

could to leave a lasting positive impression. Finally, the marines aimed to learn as much

as they could about local conditions and political dynamics, and often passed this information on to units planning future clear-hold-build operations in the area.

The marines learned to pay attention to the political causes of unrest; they found that

every area of Afghanistan was its own microcosm of complicated politics and tribal

conflict. In the Mirabad Valley, the battle group went in, accurately diagnosed the root

causes of violence and resentment against the government, and provided this

information to Dutch forces who then remedied the problem—all without firing a shot.

There was no need to do clear-hold-build operations once a political solution had

been reached.

132 | On the Ground
From April to October 2009, a company of British army advisors fought to hold the strategic town of Sangin in northern Helmand against insurgents who had infiltrated back

into the area. Small teams of 8 to 10 British troops conducted daily foot patrols with

their Afghan counterparts from a series of small patrol bases located on the outskirts

of town.

The insurgents targeted the patrols relentlessly with improvised explosive devices (IEDs),

ambushes, and suicide attacks to deny the soldiers access to the population and keep

them away from key transit routes. Sangin in 2009 was one of the most heavily mined

areas of Afghanistan and the most dangerous for British troops.

The town was a key poppy producing area and a logistical hub for the insurgents, who

enjoyed considerable popular support. Powerful drug barons, who were allied with the

Taliban, paid locals to lay IEDs, carry out ambushes, and report on the movements of

British and Afghan patrols.

There were believed to be thousands of active IEDs planted in and around the town. The

threat dominated everything the soldiers attempted to do and kept them away from

many populated areas.

The soldiers found that the most effective countermeasures were regular foot patrols

and engagement with the population. Yet patrols moved slowly. Forced to search constantly for IEDs in the soft ground of footpaths and mud walls, they were barely able to

move 1,500 meters in a day.

Vignette 12

British Army Advisors

Sangin, Helmand, 2009

133
Highway

Waterway or riverbed Compound or cluster of buildings

Rise in elevation

Heavily cultivated area

LEGEND

N

1 kilometer

Sangin, Northern Helmand, 2009
Outposting Sangin

The British army advisors, from 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, were part of an Operational

Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) responsible for training and advising a 400-man

battalion of Afghan soldiers spread around Sangin. The team had 45 troops, most of

them noncommissioned officers, operating out of four patrol bases within three kilometers of the district center.

Advising the Afghan army in Sangin was dangerous work. Small teams patrolled alongside Afghan soldiers without much of the support and enablers available to dedicated

combat forces. They moved on foot out of fixed bases with IEDs along nearly every possible patrol route.

A reinforced battalion, or battle group, of British soldiers from 2 Rifles served as the

area’s ground-holding force. They were based near the district center and bazaar, and

spread across a number of satellite positions in Sangin and points north.

Sangin was a hotly contested area. Intense fighting in 2006 had forced much of the population to flee. Security improved in 2008 with more troops, patrols, and outposts. Many

people returned and shops reopened. Yet the Taliban and drug traffickers returned as

well, with more sophisticated tactics. Insurgents wielded considerable influence and

moved freely, even in areas that were regularly patrolled.

Many soldiers in Sangin were convinced that much of the population was behind the insurgents and the drug barons who paid the locals to fight and lay IEDs. Most fighters

were landless laborers who worked in the poppy fields during the growing season and

fought for money when the harvest was over. Many locals provided tips on IEDs, but

they also kept the Taliban informed about the movements of British and Afghan patrols.

IEDs and the Struggle for Access to the Population

The IED threat in Sangin was monumental—greater than anywhere else in Afghanistan.

For example, an estimated 1,200 IEDs were planted in the cultivated areas south of the

Sangin district center—an area that is just one square kilometer. There were also at

least that many planted inside the town itself and to the north and east.

Sangin | 135
The IED cells operating in Sangin were sophisticated, ruthless, and persistent. The insurgents planted bombs indiscriminately in large numbers along every possible patrol

route and around every patrol base (often within 30 meters of the base walls) and detonated them by remote control or command wire.

In just six months, from April to October 2009, 22 British soldiers were killed in Sangin,

most of them in IED explosions while on foot patrol. In 2009, 2 Rifles experienced one

of the highest casualty rates of any U.S. or British battalion in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war in 2001. Sangin, a town of less than 20,000 people in 2009, accounts for over one-third of British casualties in Afghanistan.1

The 2 Rifles battle group took most of its casualties in the urban areas near the district

center. The area was marked by a maze of alleyways and canalizations between closely

built compounds. The routes through were predictable and bombs were easy to plant

and hide.2

The insurgents used explosive devices to restrict the movement of British and Afghan

troops and to deny them access to the population. The IED problem was so extreme

that counter-IED operations became, in effect, the primary activity of British advisors

while on foot patrol. The advisors found IEDs almost every day, many of them low-metal

content devices that were very difficult to detect. Insurgents laid IEDs around British

reconstruction projects, such as wells and bridges.

The advisors were forced to move at a snail’s pace, constantly sweeping the ground for

bombs, diffusing the devices, and disposing of them. As a result, the advisors were not

able to regularly patrol more than 1.5 kilometers beyond their bases. The areas of persistent presence around each of the four patrol bases barely touched. Much of the cultivated area south of the district center was under de facto Taliban control.

Some of the most dangerous missions the advisors undertook were resupply convoys

between the district center and outlying patrol bases. The insurgents laid IEDs in large

numbers along all motorable roads. The Taliban were able to predict the routes and frequency of most resupply convoys, despite the soldiers’ best efforts to avoid setting patterns. The advisors lost three Afghan soldiers during resupply missions.

136 | On the Ground
The Welsh Guards found that the best countermeasure was regular foot patrols. The

more the soldiers spoke with locals and built trust around their patrol bases, the more

information came in about IED locations. Regular patrolling—and the constant fighting

and risk of IED explosions that went along with it—were essential to keeping the

insurgents away from the base and the villages nearby, and securing the cooperation

of the locals.

Shifting Front Lines

If the advisors reduced the tempo of their patrols in any way, the insurgents immediately

took advantage by pushing closer to the bases. There were clearly identifiable front

lines—what the British called “forward lines of enemy troops,” or FLETs—that the insurgents heavily mined and fiercely defended. The insurgents pushed constantly to move

their defensive lines (and hence the ground they effectively controlled) closer to the patrol bases. For the advisors, holding Sangin was a constant struggle to hold their ground

and push these lines back. Progress was measured in tens or hundreds of meters.

With the end of the poppy harvest in June, the insurgents stepped up their tempo of operations and pushed steadily closer to the four patrol bases. There were attacks every

day on all four positions; many of these attacks were quite sophisticated. By August, patrols were not able to walk more than 200 meters in any direction without hitting a wall

of IEDs and heavy small-arms and RPG fire.

The advisors struggled to keep the roads open for resupply between their patrol bases

and the battalion headquarters at the district center. It became increasingly difficult

for the advisors to persuade Afghan soldiers to patrol beyond their bases. Fewer and

fewer local people showed up for shuras and contact with the population diminished

considerably.

Conclusion

IEDs in extraordinary numbers stood between British troops and the population of Sangin. Soldiers on foot were forced to move extremely slowly, greatly reducing the areas

that could be regularly patrolled. Insurgents used IEDs to keep Coalition forces out of

certain areas and away from the population. Projecting influence into these areas was

a constant struggle involving considerable risk.

Sangin | 137
There were no easy answers to the problem. Regular foot patrols and interaction with

the population—the very activities that insurgents used IEDs to restrict and prevent—

proved to be the best countermeasure against homemade bombs. Counterinsurgency

and counter-IED operations went hand in hand; both required ease of movement and

access to the population.

Insurgents operated underground in substantial numbers. This presented considerable

challenges to British and Afghan troops. The Coalition had cleared Sangin in 2007 and

held it with a substantial force dispersed across small outposts—just what counterinsurgency doctrine recommends. Despite these efforts, the insurgents infiltrated back

in again in 2008. Even with an entire battalion of British and Afghan troops, it was a constant struggle to control even small pieces of territory. IED blasts were a persistent occurrence, even in areas that were regularly patrolled.

The measure of influence that Coalition forces enjoyed in Sangin could be determined

in large part by the area they were able to regularly patrol. The extent of this area shifted

with the tempo of operations on either side of the conflict. From April to June 2009, the

ground patrolled by British forces included most of Sangin and its outlying areas. But

from late June to October, the insurgents stepped up their attacks, pushing the front

lines, so to speak, to within 200 meters of most patrol bases and retaking much of the

town. British forces later pushed back with intensified operations and more patrol bases.

Economics drove the tempo of operations on the enemy side. During the poppy season, which lasted until June, most men able and inclined to fight were gainfully employed in the opium harvest. From late June on, the Taliban and drug barons paid these

men to fight and lay IEDs. For this reason alone, it can be said that much of the population of Sangin was behind the insurgency—not because British and Afghan forces were

not doing counterinsurgency the right way, but because there was plenty of money to

be made by fighting.

138 | On the Ground
Beginning in the summer of 2006, Dutch battle groups based in Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital of Uruzgan, began pushing companies into remote valleys to the north and

west. The soldiers operated far from reinforcements in areas where the Taliban had

freedom of movement.

Despite a long history of Taliban influence, local populations proved surprisingly cooperative. In many areas, the Dutch were able to build a solid base of popular support.

This vignette focuses on operations in two locations: Deh Rawood, a large valley surrounded by mountains 40 kilometers west of Tarin Kowt; and Chora and the Baluchi Valley, a remote string of villages 30 kilometers north of the provincial capital. It covers

Dutch operations in Deh Rawood from July to December 2006 and November 2008 to

April 2009, and in Chora and the Baluchi Valley from November 2008 to April 2009.

Deh Rawood, July to December 2006

In July 2006, the Dutch sent a company of soldiers to Deh Rawood. Surrounded by

mountains on all sides, the area was totally isolated from the outside world. Mullah

Omar, the Taliban’s top leader, had lived in Deh Rawood as a child. Much of the local

population knew nothing about the U.S. invasion and the ouster of the Taliban. When

they saw the Dutch, many people believed the Russians had returned.

The soldiers operated almost entirely on their own, as a mountain range separated

them from their higher headquarters in Tarin Kowt. The soldiers conducted regular foot

patrols—often lasting several days—and stretching as far as 10 kilometers from the firebase. Many patrols involved driving to outlying areas, setting up a base camp, and hiking seven to eight kilometers to far-flung villages accessible only on foot. According to

Unless otherwise noted, this vignette is based on interviews with Dutch army officers at the Royal

Military Academy in Breda, the Netherlands, on 1 March 2010.

Vignette 13

Two Dutch Army Companies

Uruzgan, 2006–2009

139
10 kilometers

Chora

DehRawood

Tarin Kowt

BaluchiValley

LEGEND

River Inhabited, cultivated area

N

Deh Rawood, Chora, and the Baluchi Valley, Uruzgan, 2006–2009
one of the platoon commanders, these multiday foot patrols were the only way to reach

remote villages and exert substantial influence in the valley. Village leaders sometimes

warned the soldiers about ambushes on their way back to base. Yet these rarely occurred; there were few attacks on the Dutch in Deh Rawood in 2006.

Over time, the soldiers began to understand the rudiments of the tribal dynamic in the

areas they patrolled. They learned that there were long-standing rivalries among

different villages and clans. Village leaders often spoke ill of elders in nearby hamlets.

These local power brokers often accused their rivals of working for the Taliban. The

Dutch suspected that many of these claims were false, and that rival factions were

manipulating the Coalition’s campaign against the Taliban to gain an advantage in

local disputes.

For example, in one area of the valley, two rival power brokers, both strongmen from different tribes, lived close together and had tribal militias who occasionally fired on Dutch

troops. The two had a long history of conflict, much of it over land they both claimed.

One of these power brokers, who had been close to U.S. forces during the early years

of the war, repeatedly accused the other of working for the Taliban, prompting raids

and arrests by U.S. forces.

It was never clear to the Dutch whether (or to what extent) these accusations were true.

It was apparent, however, that the Taliban exploited local rivalries, siding with local

power brokers who were out of favor with the government or Coalition. U.S. forces in the

area tended to ally with certain local strongmen, often not realizing that by doing so

they were taking sides in local disputes, thereby earning the enmity of rival clans and

creating opportunities that the Taliban easily exploited. The Dutch were keen to avoid

taking sides.

The Dutch understood that maintaining neutrality in local disputes was essential. With

this in mind, Dutch forces treated the human intelligence they received with considerable skepticism. The soldiers also learned the importance of visiting leaders from both

sides involved in ongoing disputes or rivalries and spreading reconstruction money

around as much as possible.

Uruzgan | 141
Deh Rawood, November 2008 to April 2009

By November 2008, the Dutch had built four bases in Deh Rawood: a large forward operating base and three small patrol bases. A small Dutch army company of three platoons operated out of these positions. The soldiers shared the area with several Afghan

army companies and their advisors, a team of French soldiers.

Since the Dutch forces’ arrival in Deh Rawood in July 2006, the Taliban had grown in

strength, quietly infiltrating back into the valley in late 2007. They came in small groups,

rented houses, and befriended locals with gifts and money. They then went on the offensive, destroying bridges built by the Coalition, targeting locals believed to be collaborating with the Dutch, and overrunning police checkpoints.

The Dutch launched a series of operations against the resurgent Taliban, forcing the insurgents into the hills and the outskirts of the valley. The Dutch also stepped up foot patrols and invested more money in reconstruction. These operations met with substantial

popular support. By the fall of 2008, Deh Rawood was stable, though Taliban influence

remained strong beyond the fringes of Dutch control. The insurgents chose not to fight

for the valley, and the Dutch did not pursue them into their mountain redoubts.

After pushing the Taliban back, the Dutch soldiers conducted daily foot patrols through

the valley, many of them with Afghan troops. Many of these patrols lasted for three to

four days and involved staying overnight in far-flung areas of the valley. The Dutch found

that after they visited remote villages a few times, people began to open up and

cooperate.

There were no major attacks on Dutch forces in the valley in the fall of 2008 and the

spring of 2009. Locals turned in IEDs and provided actionable intelligence on impending suicide attacks. In February 2009, the Taliban tried to organize a suicide attack to

assassinate the district police chief. The Dutch heard about the plan and—along with

U.S., French, and Afghan forces—raided the village where the bomber had taken refuge.

Chora and the Baluchi Valley, November 2008 to April 2009

In Chora District, 30 kilometers north of Tarin Kowt, the story was similar to Deh Rawood.

In 2007, the Dutch had successfully forced the Taliban out of the area and kept them

out with the help of local tribal leaders. Many people from outlying areas built houses

142 | On the Ground
near Dutch bases, hoping to benefit from the security bubble created by the soldiers’

presence. There were few major attacks on Dutch patrols in Chora in 2008 and none

in 2009.

The Dutch focused on daily foot patrols, going as far as five kilometers from their bases

(within reach of their 81mm mortars) and meeting and talking to farmers and local

leaders, most of whom were easily accessible and willing to talk to the soldiers. The

Dutch also conducted mounted patrols to reach the more distant villages. Within this

radius of regular foot patrols, locals in any given area saw the Dutch about once every

five days; those closer to the base interacted on a daily basis.

The Dutch rarely carried out raids or other combat operations where they regularly patrolled, in part because doing so was unnecessary, and in part because the soldiers

were extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize the relationships they

had built.

The company held regular shuras with village and tribal leaders to decide on smallscale reconstruction projects done through local contractors. Civilians and soldiers from

the Dutch provincial reconstruction team handled most of these meetings. It took multiple shuras before the Dutch were able to achieve consensus on how reconstruction

funds should be spent. The soldiers allowed the district governor to mediate disputes

among elders over projects, which gave him considerable power.

Beyond the radius of regular patrols, Dutch soldiers relied almost entirely on local tribal

leaders to deny insurgent influence. Some of these leaders fought off the Taliban; others cut deals with the insurgents. In much of Chora, there were identifiable leaders—

most of them pro government Barakzai tribesmen who had allied with the Dutch.

Where local allies were not available or where tribal leaders were sympathetic to the Taliban, the insurgents managed to infiltrate the villages and exert substantial influence.

This was the case in the Baluchi Valley to the southwest, where militants constantly attacked Dutch forces. The area was a thicket of competing Hotaki and Tokhi Ghilzai clans

that had no discernible leadership with which to engage. The only power broker that the

Dutch knew of in the valley was a former district governor, but he was killed in a raid

sometime in the early fall of 2008. The man’s son had assumed his father’s mantle but

was known as a weak figure who was susceptible to Taliban influence.

Uruzgan | 143
Dutch, British, and Australian forces had swept through the valley in 2006 and 2007,

carrying out raids and attempting to clear it of insurgents but leaving no forces behind

to hold the area or engage with its population. The insurgents returned after each of

these operations.

In mid-January 2008, the Dutch carried out a relatively large operation to clear and

hold the Baluchi Valley where about 150 to 200 enemy fighters were believed to be operating. The soldiers cleared through the valley, searching about 400 compounds. They

patrolled the valley constantly for the rest of January and all of February and set up a

patrol base, manned by two platoons, in late February. The Dutch then started smallscale reconstruction projects and tried to identify cooperative leaders through a shura

involving 40 to 50 people. After about six weeks, the Dutch began to see growing cooperation, especially tips on IEDs. Yet in the spring of 2009, insurgents began trickling

back into the valley, carrying out attacks.

The expansion into the restive Baluchi Valley had forced the Dutch to take forces out of

Chora, endangering many of the gains made there. The Dutch company was ordered to

send one of its two available rifle platoons to the valley, cutting patrols in Chora by nearly

half. The soldiers were no longer able to maintain the level of interaction with the populace they had before, causing many of the relationships they had built to fray.

Conclusion

Deh Rawood, Chora, and the Baluchi Valley are extremely remote areas effectively cut

off from the outside world. Dutch soldiers learned to relate to a local population that was

almost entirely illiterate and to be patient and focus on cultivating personal relationships based on trust. They also learned the importance of understanding local tribal

dynamics and finding and engaging local leaders. Over time, the Dutch managed to

build a solid base of support in what had been a Taliban safe haven.

The soldiers did so by remaining neutral in local disputes and treating the intelligence

they received with skepticism. Past raids based on faulty information had pushed many

local leaders into the Taliban camp and alienated entire communities.

The Dutch followed an oil-spot strategy that involved focusing on small areas where

they could make a difference, recognizing that the Taliban would continue to operate

144 | On the Ground
farther afield. This strategy put considerable constraints on the Dutch military’s capacity to expand into new areas. The Taliban was able to operate beyond the fringes of

Dutch control, but Dutch influence remained strong in the areas where its forces were

concentrated.

By late 2008, the Dutch had reached the point at which going into new areas required

thinning out troops in other places where they were still needed. They faced a dilemma

common to many counterinsurgency forces: the more areas they cleared and held, the

more thinly spread their forces became and the fewer forces they had in each place,

making them less effective and less secure. Rather than expand farther, the Dutch focused on the areas they already controlled. In the words of one Dutch army company

commander, “The problem is that when you have a static number of troops, you become the victim of your own success when you expand.”

Uruzgan | 145

From July to December 2009, a company of Dutch marines built a network of supporters in the insurgent-controlled Deh Rashaan Valley in Uruzgan Province without actually

establishing a permanent presence. Deh Rashaan is about 10 to 15 kilometers north

of Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital and the headquarters of the Dutch-led Task Force

Uruzgan.

The marines launched regular, multiday missions into the valley in an attempt to gain

a foothold in the area. The company patrolled on foot throughout the valley, mostly at

night, forming alliances with local leaders and recruiting local militiamen to guide them

into the more dangerous areas of the valley. The marines moved around constantly and

operated from mobile patrol bases, never using the same site twice.

These regular “shaping” operations later allowed the Dutch to establish permanent

bases manned by Afghan police without facing much resistance. The relationships they

had formed and the information they had gathered proved essential to influencing the

area in 2010.

Mobile Patrol Bases, Foot Patrols at Night

The mission of the Dutch marines was to project influence into Deh Rashaan, gather

useful information, and find leaders to work with. They accomplished this through continuous, small-scale, multiday missions.

The marines pushed into the valley periodically for seven to 10 days at a time. They

raided suspected insurgent compounds, met with village leaders, and talked to local

people. A typical mission involved driving into the valley, circling the vehicles as a

makeshift base, and then patrolling the villages by foot.

This vignette is based on an interview with a Dutch Marine company commander attached to the

Dutch-led Task Force Uruzgan from July to December 2009. Interview conducted at the Royal

Military Academy in Breda, the Netherlands, on 1 March 2010.

Vignette 14

Dutch Marine Company

Deh Rashaan, Uruzgan, 2009

147
The marines moved on foot during the night and often slept in local compounds during

the day. Sleeping in the villages allowed them to patrol deep into the valley without

having to return to their makeshift base after every night patrol. Rather than rent a

compound, which would have left its owner open to accusations of collaborating with

the Coalition, the Dutch usually slept in buildings where they found weapons, which

provided them some justification for seizing the building temporarily. They also drank

local water, rather than carrying water with them, which allowed them more freedom of

movement.

The marines established makeshift patrol bases in different locations every time and

avoided using the same route twice or sleeping in the same compound. They believed

that operating from fixed bases would establish predictable patrol patterns, such as

moving to and from the same base every day, making them vulnerable to attacks.

148 | On the Ground

Dutch Marines on patrol in the Deh Rashaan Valley. (Photo by Royal Netherlands Marine Corps)
To 

Tarin Kowt

(10km)

Cultivated area

River

Compound or cluster 

of buildings

Rise in elevation

LEGEND

2 kilometers

N

Deh Rahsaan Valley, Uruzgan Province, 2009
There were relatively few direct-fire attacks in Deh Rashaan; the main threat was IEDs.

After the marines launched several week-long operations into the valley, the insurgents

started laying IEDs all over the valley, anywhere the troops were likely to go on foot. The

insurgents’ aim was to limit the mobility of the foot patrols and deny them access to the

population, by forcing them to creep along at a snail’s pace, always on the lookout for

explosives.

Local people were more willing to talk to the marines at night. The insurgents mostly operated during the day, as did their informants in the villages. The patrols’ most productive times were just after dusk and shortly before first light, when people were out but

it was still quite dark. Local elders sought out the marines during these times.

In early 2010, shortly after the marines returned to the Netherlands, the remaining

Dutch forces established two police outposts in the Deh Rashaan Valley. The effort to

set up the outposts met with little resistance, largely due to the shaping operations by

the Dutch marine company. The outpost facilitated the construction of a road from Tarin

Kowt north to Chora, a valley beyond Deh Rashaan where the Dutch operated several

small bases.

Local Guides, Local Politics

Deh Rashaan was divided between two main groups: Ghilzai tribes in the northern part

of the valley, most of whom were hostile to the government and sympathetic to the Taliban, and the Popalzai and other non-Ghilzai groups to the south, who were more supportive of Coalition forces. If locals were unwilling to talk to the marines, the patrol

moved on and did not return, figuring it was better to focus on people who showed some

desire to cooperate.

The marines acquired the most influence in the Popalzai areas; from there, the company

pushed north. After several months of operations, the Dutch developed sources in some

Ghilzai villages. Many who cooperated were active or former Taliban, usually with some

interest to serve. Ghilzai elders told the marines that Australian and American forces had

killed civilians in artillery and air strikes, causing many to take up arms against the

Coalition. Though willing to talk to the marines, these elders were open about their support to the insurgents and were not willing to establish a serious working relationship

with the Coalition.

150 | On the Ground
When patrolling into the Ghilzai areas, the marines often used local guides recruited

from non-Ghilzai villages in the southern part of the valley. These guides knew the terrain and the people. Some were members of a local Popalzai militia whose commander

offered to cooperate with the marines after the Taliban reportedly killed his son. These

local militiamen showed the marines ambush positions, IED sites, and insurgent transit routes. A patrol that might take the marines six hours on their own took only one

hour with the help of local guides. The guides refused to operate during the day but

were not afraid to move into Ghilzai areas at night.

Despite their obvious value, the company learned that these local militiamen could not

be completely trusted. They came from nearby non-Ghilzai villages, and many of them

had an axe to grind against the Ghilzais. The guides often tried to manipulate the marine company to serve their own local interests or those of their leaders. The valley’s

Popalzai villages had many disputes with the Ghilzais. Popalzai leaders tried to use the

marines against their rivals to the north, just as the Ghilzais used the Taliban against

the Popalzai.

The marines tried to avoid getting involved in these disputes, but neutrality was not always possible. The simple fact that the marines were allied with the government—and

therefore were associated with its officials, allies, tribal affiliations, and all it represented—sometimes forced them to take sides.

Conclusion

The marine company learned how to work with local militias to navigate the terrain,

identify insurgent safe houses, and avoid IEDs. Still, the marines understood enough

about local politics to realize that their guides had interests of their own and so could

not be completely trusted. Local militiamen proved extremely effective tactically, but

taking their side against the restive Ghilzai clans threatened to further inflame the valley’s conflicts and strengthen the Taliban politically.

The marines came to understand that the fighting in Deh Rashaan had little to do with

the Taliban writ large and everything to do with local politics. Most of the fighters were

locals who had received some weapons and training from outsiders. Ongoing feuds

between Ghilzai and Popalzai clans mirrored the fighting between insurgents and

Deh Rashaan | 151
Coalition forces. Rival factions formed alliances with outside forces to help them in their

local disputes. Even among the Ghilzais, some feuds erupted in bloodshed.

Deh Rashaan was a contested area. Many local people played both sides, cooperating

with the marines when it was dark and the insurgents when it was light.

The marines recognized this reality; they did not expect people to side overtly with the

Coalition, especially when there was no permanent force in the area to protect them.

The company’s practice of pushing into the valley for seven to 10 days at a time to conduct small-scale dismounted patrols—as opposed to doing large-scale clearing operations—allowed the Dutch to project influence north without establishing a permanent

presence. These operations were particularly effective at setting the groundwork for

later clear-hold-build operations.

By patrolling at night and sleeping in compounds during the day, the marines were able

to move freely through Taliban-controlled villages and build a network of supporters.

Their use of mobile patrol bases instead of fixed positions allowed them to keep the insurgents off balance and avoid IEDs.

The Dutch marines learned that it was important to vary their activities, such as moving along different routes, talking to different people, or using different tactics. The insurgents were particularly skilled at identifying patterns and adapting quickly, so the

marines had to avoid any tendency to fall into habits.

152 | On the Ground
From April to November 2009, a company of Canadian soldiers and engineers created

an island of peace and stability in the restive Panjwayi Valley south of Kandahar City.

The team initially focused on the village of Deh-e-Bagh in Dand District, then oil-spotted outward into nearby hamlets. Soldiers dispersed into small patrol bases and conducted regular patrols, while engineers implemented projects through local leaders.

The Canadians aimed to employ as many local fighting-age males as possible on lowtechnology, labor-intensive projects. The engineers spread these jobs out as widely as

possible by hiring roughly one person from each compound or extended family.

By the fall of 2009, the insurgents were unable to operate in much of Dand District. Taliban commanders complained they were unable to recruit local fighters. Large-scale

job creation effectively tied the local population to the Canadian effort.

Operation Kalay I: April to August 2009

In April 2009, the commander of Canadian forces in Kandahar sent a company of soldiers to the village of Deh-e-Bagh, the administrative center of Dand District, south of

Kandahar City. The move was dubbed Operation Kalay I.

The company consisted of a headquarters element, a rifle platoon, civil affairs officers,

a psychological operations team, and some diplomatic personnel whose job was to engage with district officials. The company worked alongside a unit of Canadian army engineers known as the Construction Management Organization, which focused on

relatively large, low-technology, labor-intensive projects.

This vignette is based on interviews with the 2009 commanders of Stabilization Company B and a

22-man engineer detachment known as the Construction Management Organization—both part of

Task Force Kandahar. Interviews conducted on 15 and 26 March 2010.

Vignette 15

Canadian Soldiers and Engineers

Dand, Kandahar, 2009

153
Afghan Uniformed Police and Canadian soldiers supervise the distribution

of food and other aid items. (Photo by Sgt Erich F. Braün)

The hope was that this combined force would be more sensitive to political and economic issues than other combat units and more mission-oriented than provincial reconstruction teams and development agencies manned by civilians.

The company’s mission was to go into Deh-e-Bagh, clear out the insurgents, live there,

and provide enough security for the district government to get back on its feet and for

engineers to employ local people on reconstruction projects. The company would then

gradually expand its area of operations as conditions permitted.

In April, the company made several trips to Deh-e-Bagh to gather information and secure

the support of the village elders, nearly all of whom were from the same tribe, the

Barakzai. One man owned nearly all the area’s arable land, which most of the population farmed as sharecroppers. This man gave his support as well.

There was little inherent support for the Taliban in Deh-e-Bagh, although fighters frequently passed through. There were perhaps 20 hardcore insurgents in the area. The

rest were part-time fighters, many of whom were in it for the money or because they had

little else to do.

On 19 May, Canadian forces went into Deh-e-Bagh. They fanned out across the village

and its surroundings without firing a shot. The company set up its patrol base in

the village.

On 24 May, with its patrol base secured, the company’s civil affairs officers began handing out food, blankets, fuel, and clothing. Two days later, engineers began work on a

canal project. They also renovated the district center, paved the central street through

the town, and began paving a road to a nomadic camp south of the village. The idea was

to immediately link a critical mass of the population to the stabilization effort before the

insurgents had time to regroup and infiltrate back into the area.

The engineers’ goal was to employ as many local people as possible for as long as possible. To this end, Canadian forces focused on low-technology, labor-intensive projects

that took months to complete. By July 2009, there were 340 locals working on various

projects in and around Deh-e-Bagh.

The purpose of this operation was to give gainful employment to landless laborers with

few marketable skills—those who had joined the Taliban for money and laid most of the

156 | On the Ground
IEDs—and tie them into the Canadian effort. By employing large numbers of fightingage males, Canadian forces drained much of the Taliban’s potential recruiting pool.

The workers received 400 Afghanis per day, based on an estimate of the standard market rate for local labor. The reason for this amount was to pay them more than they

might receive from the Taliban, but not enough to cause undue inflation or draw skilled

people such as doctors and teachers away from their jobs.

By July, the approach was clearly working. Canadian forces intercepted reports that the

insurgents were unable to recruit local fighters in the area around Deh-e-Bagh. Some

Taliban commanders reportedly ordered their subordinates not to attack Canadian

forces in Deh-e-Bagh, since the soldiers were helping people and doing no harm. By

July, attacks on Canadian troops were few and far between.

The Canadians spread jobs evenly across the community and tied each household into

the reconstruction effort. Engineers hired roughly one fighting-age male per compound

or household. This worked out to about 10 percent of the population. Within a few

months, nearly every person in and around Deh-e-Bagh had a close friend or relative

working on a Canadian-funded project.

The idea was to avoid giving a disproportionate share of jobs to one clan or faction, for

fear of causing resentment among those who felt left out. Such resentment had led to

attacks on Canadian projects elsewhere in Kandahar.

To this end, Canadian forces paid the workers directly, rather than through intermediaries. The engineers had learned that giving money to local leaders and relying on them

to pay wages to laborers created local power brokers who tended to use their influence

to enrich themselves and their fellow clansmen, often at the expense of rival factions.

Canadian engineers avoided hiring anyone from outside the area after learning the hard

way that doing so could cause serious problems. For example, a civilian contractor working with Canadian engineers in nearby Panjwayi District hired Pakistani subcontractors

for a large road project around the same time as the Deh-e-Bagh operations. Local men

issued death threats against the Pakistani subcontractors, accusing them of taking

jobs away from locals. Insurgents hit the Pakistanis with IEDs and small arms, and eventually forced them to leave. In the village of Temuryan, south of Deh-e-Bagh, elders

Dand | 157
threatened to kill a team of stonemasons that the engineers had brought in from Kandahar City. When the Canadians offered to pair local youth with the stonemasons as apprentices, the threats stopped.

Rather than rely on outside contractors, engineers hired and mentored locals with leadership potential and made them leaders of 15-man work teams. The company had a

158 | On the Ground

Residents of Deh-e-Bagh work on the renovation of the Dand District Centre. (Photo by Cpl

Jonathan Barrette)
team working on roads, one digging irrigation canals, and another filling in craters. Over time, these teams required less

and less supervision. By October 2009, most projects required little Canadian oversight. The engineers visited the

projects daily to monitor progress but were no longer involved

in day-to-day management.

Deh-e-Bagh was a small place with a relatively homogenous

population, most of it from a handful of Barakzai clans. The

workers knew each other and were quick to spot outsiders

who might be working for the Taliban. By breaking the workers up into small teams led by reliable Afghan partners, the

Canadian company was able to prevent the Taliban from

infiltrating the work crews as it had done in other areas of

Kandahar—for example, in nearby Panjwayi District where

rival tribes lived in close proximity and migrant labor was

prevalent.

In addition to facilitating reconstruction projects, Canadian

soldiers patrolled on foot constantly and met regularly with

local leaders. A team of diplomats maintained regular liaison

with district officials. Canadian advisors trained the Afghan

police and took them on patrols. When conducting searches

or raids against suspected insurgents, the soldiers brought a

local leader with them to talk to the villagers before the

search began.

Canadian troops also worked with local religious leaders,

which was unusual for Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The

Deh-e-Bagh area had about 12 mosques and two mullahs who tended to preach against

the Coalition. After the soldiers decided to refurbish the village’s mosques, the mullahs

began preaching in support of the Canadian operations.

The company spent many hours talking to local leaders, drinking tea and talking informally about any topic that happened to come up before discussing business matters.

Dand | 159
The goal was to build personal relationships and trust. Local leaders began asking the

company commander to help resolve disputes and deal with other local issues.

From May through July, Canadian forces focused entirely on a 10-square-kilometer area

in and around Deh-e-Bagh. Their goal was to slowly build up Deh-e-Bagh first and allow

time for neighboring villages to see the progress being made there.

Before long, elders from nearby villages began asking for projects. Canadian troops

called this the “village pull” effect. Even as their resources spread thin, Canadian engineers were reluctant to say no, for fear of inciting resentment among the villages that

were denied reconstruction funds.

Operation Kalay II: August to November 2009

Near the end of July, the Canadians decided to expand into villages south and west of

Deh-e-Bagh. In August, they set up patrol bases in the villages of Rumbasi, Temuryan,

and Belanday—each about five to six kilometers from Deh-e-Bagh (see map). Canadian

forces also set up small outposts and reconstruction projects in the villages of Walakan,

Anguryan, and Zor Mashor.

In Rumbasi and Temuryan, soldiers first spoke to the mullahs and village elders to gain

their consent, and then moved in, set up patrol bases, and began implementing projects. Canadian engineers consulted with village leaders to find a reliable local contractor, who then hired his own security.

In Belanday, near the border with the restive Panjwayi District, the soldiers could not find

any local leaders to work with. The village was heavily influenced by Noorzai tribesmen

to the west who were adamantly opposed to the Coalition presence. The Canadians

went in anyway. They brought their own security for the work crews and managed

reconstruction projects directly. There were more attacks in Belanday than in any other

part of Dand District, yet the level of violence gradually decreased and local

participation grew.

Insurgents targeted the new patrol bases at first, but conditions improved over time. Locals provided information about the insurgents, which Canadian troops used to carry out

a series of successful raids that pushed the Taliban farther south and west.

160 | On the Ground
There continued to be isolated attacks, but few attributed to the Taliban. Most were

traced to drug traffickers (usually of hashish, not poppy) who were trying to keep Canadian forces away from trafficking routes. By the fall, Dand District had become so stable that the isolated attacks had little effect on local conditions.

By October 2009, almost 700 local people were working on projects in seven villages

in Dand District. During that year, the number of locals employed on Canadian projects

had increased from 199 in June, to 340 in July, to 434 in August, to 612 in September,

and to 689 by October. In November, the number of employed workers was over 1,000.

Oil spotting strained the company of Canadian soldiers as it became increasingly spread

out. By August, most outposts had only a section of soldiers, or 10

men—the smallest unit allowed to operate independently in the Canadian army

(the company had only 65 fighting troops; the rest were engaged in noncombat

related duties).

The soldiers tried to compensate by relying more on the police as a holding force. The

problem was that most villagers hated the police. Most of the force was from northern

Afghanistan and did not speak Pashtu. Over time, however, Canadian trainers were able

to build the police into a reliable and cooperative force that was welcome in much of the

area, and even praised by some village leaders. Over time, these police were securing

areas on their own, allowing Canadian soldiers to focus their energies elsewhere.

Four different local security forces operated in Dand District. One was the standard

Afghan National Police, part of the Ministry of Interior. The district governor also had a

personal militia that he used to protect himself and certain reconstruction projects.

There were also militia fighters loyal to a local warlord and former governor of Kandahar Province, who kept the Taliban out of the southern part of Dand District. Canadian

forces ensured that these different elements spoke to one another and coordinated

their activities.

By the end of 2009, Deh-e-Bagh and the villages nearby were relatively stable and secure. Local contractors were running many projects independently, and attacks were few

and far between. The company of Canadian soldiers and its team of engineers had

achieved the short-term objective of stabilizing the area.

Dand | 161
Near the end of 2009, community and district leaders from nearby Panjwayi District

approached the company and its engineers and asked them to expand their employment program to the west. Panjwayi was a notoriously restive and violent area where Taliban influence was strong. The Canadians had found few leaders willing to cooperate

with the Coalition until word spread of the endeavor in Dand.

The continued effort, however, remained heavily dependent on the presence of Canadian soldiers and engineers. The Canadians in Dand did not believe they had enough

troops to expand their operations into the Panjwayi, despite the promising overtures by

leaders there.

It was also unclear whether the gains made were sustainable, whether the effort could

be transitioned from a military-led operation to a civilian one any time soon, or what effect stability in the small area in Dand District had on Kandahar Province as a whole.

What is clear is that the experiment in Dand exceeded all expectations. The successes

achieved there fundamentally altered perceptions of the Canadian presence in the surrounding area.

Conclusion

The oil-spot approach worked well in Dand District. As the progress made in Deh-e-Bagh

became apparent elsewhere, it was easy for Canadian forces to expand into nearby villages, often at the express invitation of local leaders. The oil-spot approach was quite

different than more ambitious clear-hold-build operations elsewhere, many of which involved clearing entire districts or groups of villages at once and setting up bases, with

or without the consent of local leaders.

Canadian forces clearly adopted the right approach. That said, existing conditions in

Dand District had a lot to do with the progress achieved there. Most of the people around

Deh-e-Bagh were Barakzai tribesmen who tended to lean toward the government—as opposed to the Noorzai in neighboring Panjwayi to the west, who tended to side with the

insurgents. Belanday Village, along the border with Panjwayi, was the most violent of all

the villages in Dand. Panjwayi District was one of the most dangerous areas of

Afghanistan, with a long history of armed resistance dating back to the war against the

Soviets in the 1980s. The area around Deh-e-Bagh was placid by comparison.

162 | On the Ground
Canadian soldiers and engineers focused their use of reconstruction funds on one objective: to employ as many fighting-age males as possible for as long as possible to

draw potential recruits away from the insurgency. With this in mind, the engineers focused on low-technology, labor-intensive projects that could be drawn out as long as possible. The objective was not to win hearts and minds—a vague and often unrealizable

goal—by providing public goods such as wells, roads, schools, and the like. The projects

themselves mattered less than the jobs they created.

This was particularly important in the villages around Deh-e-Bagh, where most local

people were sharecroppers. They did not own the land and so felt little ownership over

it. Infrastructure projects like wells, bridges, roads, canals, and the like improved yield

and increased the value of the land—but this mostly benefitted a handful of large landholders who did not always pass these gains on to the farmers who worked the fields.

Regular wages ensured the support of the majority of the population, especially those

unemployed fighting-age males most likely to join the insurgency.

The engineers’ single-minded focus on job creation helped streamline the use of reconstruction funds. The engineers succeeded in tying much of the population to the

military effort. There was considerable evidence to suggest that the jobs the engineers

created lured many local recruits away from the Taliban and turned the population firmly

against the insurgents.

The soldiers dispersed into small outposts and patrolled on foot. They spent more time

outside their bases than any other unit in the province. They lived in the villages and interacted with locals every day. According to the company commander, “Living on the

FOB [forward operating base], you will not win. By living in small bases, you are always

talking to the people.” Despite their vulnerability, these outposts were never attacked.

The company commander found that by dispersing his forces and doing regular patrols,

his troops were safer than they would have been in a handful of large, heavily fortified

bases. In neighboring Panjwayi District, where soldiers operated out of large bases and

conducted relatively few patrols, Canadian troops were under constant attack.

Relationship building was central, but doing it properly required great patience. According to the company commander, “You might go to five or six shuras and get

nothing. It might not be until the ninth shura that you get that little piece of useful

Dand | 163
information.” Officers spent hours chatting informally with local leaders and drinking

tea—talking about their families, the harvest, the weather, anything to build rapport.

The Canadians learned that this was how business was conducted in Afghanistan.

According to the company commander, “Drinking tea and sitting in shuras is worth its

weight in gold. You never talk shop right away. That’s not the way it is done in

Afghanistan. The first thing is always the social call.”

Despite the successes they achieved, the engineers remained concerned about whether

what they achieved could be sustained without a permanent military presence and an

unending flow of cash. There were only so many Canadian soldiers and engineers to go

around, and only so much money to spend. The more areas the soldiers expanded into,

the more thinly spread they became. The more jobs they created, the more local people became dependent on outside funds.

The issue for the engineers was the need to hand their effort off to the Afghan government and civilian development agencies. They were also concerned that the tactical

successes they achieved in the villages of Dand might not be adequately exploited at

the strategic level. The same can be said of nearly every counterinsurgency operation

conducted in Afghanistan to date.

164 | On the Ground
The vignettes in this book contain many valuable insights about how relatively small

units on the ground actually conducted counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. They shed

light on the unique conditions these units faced, why they did the things they did, what

yielded results, and what proved to be counterproductive.

The experiences of these units—in some of the most difficult and dangerous areas of

the country—provide unique insights into the nature of the war in Afghanistan and highlight some of the challenges to come as U.S. and NATO forces draw down. For the most

part, it will be up to locally based forces to implement a stable transfer of power district

by district and firebase by firebase. Much of this will depend on the continued application of sound counterinsurgency principles adapted to local conditions.

As the United States draws down in Afghanistan, the critics of counterinsurgency and

stability operations will no doubt insist that the military turn its attention back to conventional operations and not retain the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. This would be

a mistake. While the United States must be prepared for major wars, the odds of actually fighting such wars are slim. It is mainly irregular conflicts where U.S. forces will be

deployed for active combat operations. Future operations along these lines are likely to

be much smaller in scale than recent conflicts, but the U.S. military must be prepared

nonetheless.

Many of the themes touched on in this book will be of enduring relevance for future

conflicts. The next places U.S. forces deploy in order to fight insurgents and restore

order will likely be underdeveloped, war-torn countries like Afghanistan. No matter what

happens in Afghanistan, U.S. forces will probably find themselves doing counterinsurgency and stability operations in other parts of the world in the not-too-distant future—

be it in Libya, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, or even Pakistan. There will never be enough

special forces for these tasks; conventional forces, especially the Marines, will be called

upon to fulfill these missions.

Conclusion

165
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have created a battle-hardened force with unprecedented experience in dealing with civilian populations in situations of great flux and violence. This experience will be of great value to future forces, whether they are tasked

with doing counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, stability operations, or

combat advising. This knowledge must be captured and retained, so that our ability to

deal with complex internal conflicts may continue to improve.

Implications for the Drawdown in Afghanistan

The main focus of effort for the United States in the next few years will be on transitioning responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces, keeping these forces

operational and united, preventing the Kabul government from collapsing, and sustaining the capability to strike against terrorist groups that threaten the United States.

As before, it will be largely up to small units on the ground to ensure that these objectives are met—that districts remain stable as U.S. forces draw down, that army and police units in the field do not fall apart, and that intelligence on terrorist groups in remote

border areas remains accurate and actionable.

Much of transition will unfold at the local level, with units in the field doing most of the

work. Afghanistan’s population is extremely fragmented, and likely to remain so. It is possible that the conflict in Afghanistan may have no national solution. If peace comes at

all in the next few years, it will be due in large part to numerous small victories in the

provinces and districts—the result of local political dynamics that military and civilian

leaders in Kabul may never fully understand. If the drawdown unfolds smoothly in

enough key districts, it may be possible to make up for some of the failures at the strategic level and with the government in Kabul.

In many districts in the south, especially in Helmand, U.S. and NATO forces have already

negotiated agreements with the tribes and built viable governments. Strategic assessments and planning should be guided by local conditions and by the perspectives of

units in the field who understand their areas better than anyone else. The larger-order

challenge will be to make sense of local developments and capitalize on them at the

strategic and policy levels. As units transition out, the local balance of power will change,

causing political dynamics to shift. Understanding these changes and finding ways to

manage them will prove an immense challenge.

166 | On the Ground
It will be important to reassure local leaders and to draw down slowly while maintaining stability. Various leaders and power brokers are already posturing for an eventual

U.S. withdrawal to ensure their interests and their survival. The Taliban could step up

their assassination and intimidation of key Afghan leaders as American troops leave, or

pull back and surge again when there are no longer enough foreign troops to fight back.

If Coalition forces leave too quickly and a critical mass of progovernment leaders are

killed or switch sides, it could create a snowball effect, leading to a resurgence of the

Taliban and anti-American militant groups.

Hard decisions will have to be made about what areas are more and less important

when it comes to larger political and strategic objectives. It will not be possible to keep

forces everywhere there is violence. Unlike the cities of Iraq, Afghanistan’s mainly rural

population—spread out among thousands of small, often isolated villages—can only be

partially controlled. There will be many areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan where insurgents will continue to find refuge. These areas may grow as the United States draws

down. It will be imperative to keep the insurgency from overwhelming key areas and to

keep it off balance long enough to allow the situation to stabilize.

As U.S. and NATO forces leave, it will ultimately be up to the Afghan army to keep the insurgency at bay and prevent a return to civil war. As of early 2011, few Afghan battalions were capable of operating independently; most will require embedded advisors

for quite some time, in addition to air, logistics, medical, and other support. It will not

be apparent how capable each Afghan unit is until it is given battlespace to control and

faces serious pressure from the Taliban. The key will be whether the army can, with

outside help, hold on to the capital and other crucial areas.

If history is any guide, the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan could

create a power vacuum for other regional players to exploit, each with their own particular interests and areas of influence inside Afghanistan. As the vignettes in this book

show, Afghanistan remains an extremely divided society with a weak government. At

every level there are factions engaged in bitter conflict looking for allies among rival

outside forces. It may be necessary to step up pressure on Pakistan and insurgents operating in that country as the United States hands over security responsibility to Afghan

units. Diplomats will have to engage with Afghanistan’s other neighbors as well, especially Iran, India, Russia, and China.

Conclusion | 167
In addition to funding the army, it would also be advisable to maintain the flow of funds

to reconstruction projects and local defense forces. Units in the field have injected massive amounts of cash into local economies. These funds have created progovernment

patronage networks that would soon crumble if the money disappeared. Many young

men would be out of work and more inclined to join the Taliban. On the other hand,

keeping funds flowing to reconstruction projects and local forces could serve as an important source of influence in the years to come.

Even if the United States withdraws most of its combat forces, it is likely that the counterterrorism mission will remain for some time. Though Osama bin Laden is dead, there

remains a vast infrastructure of extremist militancy—of which al Qaeda is only a

part—that straddles both sides of the border. As the vignettes in this book show, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are closely linked. U.S. and Afghan forces will need

to maintain the support networks they have painstakingly built over the years in the

border areas if they are to keep tabs on terrorist groups and act against them.

Beyond Afghanistan

The lessons of Afghanistan will prove invaluable when U.S. forces again find themselves

operating among civilians in another underdeveloped, war-torn society. It is often countries like Afghanistan—ungoverned, ruined by years of civil war and insurrection, with

desperately poor populations scattered about in isolated rural communities—where extremist groups thrive and that foster the sort of chaos and violence that invites foreign

intervention.

Countering a Rural Insurgency

Coalition forces in Afghanistan learned that operating among a highly dispersed population in rural areas poses unique challenges. Many small units operated out of extremely remote patrol bases, almost completely cut off from their higher headquarters.

In this respect, conventional forces have been tasked with operating like special forces,

who receive additional training and equipment in order to operate far from reinforcements. Soldiers and Marines learned how to adapt their approaches to the unique conditions in their areas. They developed accurate portraits of local politics, economics,

and social norms, and came up with counterinsurgency tactics that fit these conditions.

168 | On the Ground
Like rural insurgents everywhere, the Taliban moved easily across vast swathes of

sparsely populated terrain. With limited forces operating among a widely dispersed population, it was extremely difficult to secure isolated villages. U.S. troops learned to accept that in such places, villagers and local officials are going to play both sides. It was

not realistic to expect full cooperation from people whose security was not absolutely

assured. Units also learned that raids and other combat operations are often ineffective and counterproductive in remote rural areas where it is difficult for outside forces

to move undetected.

The most effective approach was to engage with villages as frequently as possible, use

reconstruction funds to provide jobs and tie people into the government and the U.S.

presence, and empower local leaders willing to resist the insurgency. The building of personal relationships based on trust was essential. This took time and patience. Local people in isolated parts of Afghanistan were inherently suspicious of outsiders and

accustomed to governing themselves. Coalition troops realized that it was important to

adopt a nonthreatening posture, so as to avoid inflaming the xenophobic tendencies of

fiercely independent tribes. The more thoughtful officers and NCOs strived to understand the subtle differences between local resistance movements and true insurgent

activity linked to the Taliban and other Pakistan-based groups.

In every local area, rival clans and power brokers struggled for influence, power, and access to resources. They fought constantly, often as a result of feuds that went back

generations. The insurgents easily exploited these local rivalries. Soldiers and Marines

learned that it was important to be careful about the alliances they formed with local

power brokers, remain neutral in local disputes, treat the intelligence they received with

skepticism, and be extremely circumspect when it came to targeting alleged insurgent

leaders. Some units that failed to do so made enemies of entire clans and tribes, causing them to take up arms against the Coalition.

Some small units in remote outposts learned that they could rely on the population for

their protection. Units tended to be quite safe in areas where people welcomed their

presence, even if Taliban influence remained strong. Where the local people were hostile, security conditions for U.S. troops were very bad, even if they operated from large,

well-fortified bases and had access to the best equipment and armored vehicles. Small

units in particularly remote and dangerous areas lived under the constant threat of

Conclusion | 169
their bases being overrun and patrols being wiped out by large numbers of enemy fighters. For some troops in particularly dangerous and isolated places, building popular

support was essential for survival—especially in villages near the base.

Units tasked with collecting intelligence for counterterrorism operations and targeting

high-level enemy leaders learned to combine these activities with traditional counterinsurgency operations aimed at building a base of popular support. Special and conventional forces both learned that in remote rural areas, counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism are closely linked. Despite stovepipes at the top, different agencies

often worked quite well together at the local level. Units learned to coordinate with other

civilian and military groups in their areas of operation and to work together in the absence of a unified command structure.

The Army and the Marines have learned to distribute their forces over vast areas and

to operate out of small bases. This capability will prove useful in future situations where

ground forces are sent to remote rural areas. When operating across huge expanses of

sparsely populated terrain, units had to constantly grapple with the dilemma of how

widely to spread their forces. Concentrating on small areas allowed troops to better protect a portion of the population and jump start reconstruction. But doing so left large

areas under the control of the Taliban. Spreading out too far endangered outposts and

lines of communication, and made it easier for the insurgents to infiltrate back into

cleared areas. It was essential for officers at every level to consider the relative merits

and dangers of concentration versus dispersion, and, when setting up certain patrol

bases, to think about the potential implications months or years down the road. The

dilemma was different in every place, depending on local politics, demographics, terrain,

and other factors.

Working in a War-Torn Society

By 2001, Afghanistan had been in a state of civil war for 22 years. Constant fighting had

deepened the divides between tribes and clans. Violence, rather than dialogue and negotiation, had become the primary means of settling disputes. Coalition troops that

adopted a population-centric approach learned that one of the best means for building

popular support was to help people resolve conflict peacefully. Units that were seen as

170 | On the Ground
honest brokers—aware of political fault lines but scrupulously neutral—achieved much

with relatively little fighting.

Years of war had also split tribes into numerous factions and eliminated prominent

tribal chiefs capable of enforcing unity. Many Coalition troops came to understand the

importance of developing consensus through shuras and other consultative

assemblies. They established security, enabling Afghan leaders to meet and negotiate

without intimidation or fear of bloodshed, and brought marginalized groups into the

political process.

In many places, a generation of internecine warfare had killed off or undermined much

of the tribal leadership. Warlords and young men with guns held sway through fear. The

traditional leaders were often there, but many did not have the power they once did.

Units on the ground learned how to bring these traditional leaders back into politics—

to identify them, protect them, and empower them. Marines and soldiers also learned

how to engage constantly with the population despite daily attacks, to focus on the people and engage in peaceful negotiation even when under fire.

Like people in any war-torn society, Afghans were traumatized by a generation of indiscriminate violence—the worst of it inflicted by Soviet airpower during the 1980s. Villagers expected the United States to restore peace. Airstrikes and other combat

operations that harmed civilian life and property caused many Afghans to think twice

about supporting the U.S. presence. The heavy-handed, often belligerent, enemy-centered posture of many Coalition troops did not help either. Military officers who listened

to the concerns of local people soon realized that it was essential to use restraint and

discrimination in the use of force, even against local fighters known to be involved in attacks on U.S. troops. More violence was not the answer.

Spending Money in Underdeveloped, Agricultural Economies

Where people are so poor, a little money can go a long way—assuming it is spent wisely.

A small well or micro-hydro project can transform a tiny village living on the edge of survival. A dirt road can open up isolated villages to commerce. Where there is little money

or development, giving local officials or pro-government village leaders control over

Conclusion | 171
even small pots of money can empower these individuals considerably. In such places,

reconstruction funds can be the most powerful tool in a unit’s arsenal.

Yet outside money can also be destabilizing. It was important for officers to consider the

unintended consequences of using reconstruction funds. For example, giving projects

to one faction and not another often caused resentment and bred more violence. Funneling money through the wrong contractors or officials contributed to corruption. Heavy

influxes of cash caused inflation that hurt poor farmers. The lure of inflated salaries

drew people away from their farms, teachers away from schools, and doctors away from

clinics—leading to negative consequences down the road when projects ended. In

Afghanistan, the units that used their money most successfully were sensitive to these

issues. They studied the local economy and considered the economic and political implications of each project.

Successful commanders thought carefully about what they wanted to achieve with the

funds they had, and the best ways to employ that money toward those ends—keeping

in mind the unique economic and political situation in their area. It was rarely a good

idea to just throw money at the problem and scatter projects about, with the general aim

of winning hearts and minds. Officers who used their money well thought carefully about

the impact they wanted projects to have and how this related to other political and military objectives. In other words, they used their funds strategically as part of a coherent

plan tailored to local conditions.

Building Local Governments from Scratch

When U.S. forces first arrived in Afghanistan, a generation of unrelenting violence had

destroyed what little government the country once had. Small units on the ground had

to build institutions almost from scratch. Coalition troops learned how to identify power

brokers and traditional leaders and bring them into the political process. They also identified systems of unofficial village governance and came up with innovative ways to

integrate them with district administrations. These units focused on connecting people

to their government from the ground up. Strong and well-respected governors also

helped. Successful units learned how to empower these governors and work

through them.

172 | On the Ground
U.S. and NATO forces learned to deal with local governments that were extremely corrupt and to advise and improve upon police forces that were often abusive, incompetent, full of drug addicts, and infiltrated by the Taliban. Units on the ground found ways

to reduce corruption and professionalize the police, while providing space for the security forces to grow.

Marines and soldiers also managed to mobilize the population behind the counterinsurgency effort despite serious problems in the government. They did so by constantly

engaging with the population, organizing regular shuras, and bringing local leaders into

the political process. Most governments in underdeveloped societies have serious problems with disloyalty, corruption, and police abuse. The ability to overcome these obstacles will prove immensely useful in future interventions.

In late 2001, Afghanistan had no functioning army or police force. As the insurgency

picked up steam, it became apparent that the United States and NATO needed to develop security forces capable of fighting insurgents and maintaining order with minimal outside support. National training programs turned out recruits in large numbers,

but it was up to units on the ground to organize, train, and advise these forces. Small

units also learned to raise and maintain irregular armed groups as a supplement to existing police and army forces.

Though raising and advising indigenous forces is a traditional special forces mission,

much of this effort fell to conventional forces in the Army and Marine Corps. The more

effective advisors lived with those they trained, patrolled and fought with them, and involved them in all aspects of planning—the ultimate goal being to get Afghan units to

the point where they were willing and able to operate on their own with little or no Coalition support. The conflict in Afghanistan has produced a wealth of expertise in the U.S.

Army and Marine Corps when it comes to raising and advising indigenous forces. It has

also improved the military’s understanding of just how central the training mission is in

counterinsurgency and stability operations.

The Primacy of Politics

One of the most important lessons from the Afghanistan conflict is that counterinsurgency is not just about protecting the population and building up the government. It is

Conclusion | 173
about mobilizing the population, bringing in local leaders and forging political coalitions.

That is how the Taliban and other insurgent groups operate. Everything they do is in

pursuit of political objectives. Military operations and reconstruction projects are not always the best tool and may actually get in the way if not properly coordinated with political activities. It is vital for there to be clear political objectives, for forces to be

deployed exclusively in pursuit of these goals, and for the strategy to be clear in the

minds of units on the ground.

Counterinsurgency doctrine stresses protecting the population. Yet in several cases

described in this book, the population protected U.S. and NATO forces, particularly in

remote areas with a heavy insurgent presence. Where Marines and soldiers were able

to build popular support, they were much safer; where they failed to do so, they came

under constant attack, no matter how many forces or how much money was at

their disposal.

In many cases, a smarter and less invasive approach, involving fewer personnel and

less money, would have done more to weaken the insurgency and keep troops safe. In

some cases, clear-hold-build was not the right approach at all. Reaching out to key leaders, negotiating, persuading them to support the government, and giving them what

they need to do so from behind the scenes were often more effective methods than

sending in large numbers of ground forces.

One of the main dangers of doing counterinsurgency, especially in underdeveloped

countries like Afghanistan, is that the operation can become protracted and lead to

mission creep. It is easy to get tied down and lose sight of the ultimate political objective and how to achieve it. The temptation to expand commitments, areas of operation,

and the scope of activities (i.e., from chasing terrorists and guerrillas to providing security, building governments, developing the economy, and cracking down on drugs

and corruption) is strong. Once forces are deployed in substantial numbers and new

bases established, the United States becomes committed. One cannot abandon bases

under fire without some appearance of defeat, which can have serious political and

military consequences.

174 | On the Ground
From the policy level all the way down to the tactical, it is vital for U.S. leaders to

understand what they are getting into before deploying additional forces or sending

them into new areas—to be circumspect about taking on new commitments without

sufficient information, long-term planning, and a clear sense of the ultimate

political objective.

Conclusion | 175

Vignette 2: U.S. Marine Battalion, Nawa, Helmand, 2009

1. Mark Walker, “Local Marines Holding Ground in Helmand’s Nawa District,” North

County Times, 25 July 2009.

2. Tony Perry, “Marine’s Success in Afghanistan Has a History,” Los Angeles Times,

31 December 2009, hereafter Perry, “Marine’s Success in Afghanistan Has a

History.”

3. John McCall, “H&S Marines Guard the Perimeter of Patrol Base Jaker,”

Leatherneck, October 2009, 15–16.

4. Perry, “Marine’s Success in Afghanistan has a History.”

5. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for

Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New

American Security, 2010), 13. Online at http://www.cnas.org/node/3924.

6. Tony Perry, “Marines in Afghanistan Hear a Plea: Don’t Leave Too Soon,” Los

Angeles Times, 23 November 2009.

7. Richard Tomkins, “Thanksgiving is a Hard Time for Marines,” UPI, 25 November

2009.

Vignette 3: U.S. Marine Advisors, Tagab Valley, Kapisa, 2008

1. M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response,

1979-1982 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 286.

2. “Operation Al Hasn,” Infantry (July–August 2007).

3. “Taliban Readies Ramadan offensive,” Al Jazeera, 13 September 2007. Online at

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2007/09/200852513105165396.html.

Notes

177
Vignette 4: U.S. Army Battalion, Kunar and Nuristan, 2007–2008

1. Gowardesh was the farthest advance the Soviet army had during the 1980s.

Vignette 5: U.S. Army Battalion, Khost, 2004–2008

1. Department of Defense (DoD), Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in

Afghanistan, Report to Congress, June 2008, 5, hereafter DoD, Report on Progress

Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.

2. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s

Untold Story (Lahore, Pakistan: Jang Publishers, 1992), 159; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban:

Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 2000), 132.

3. For example, see Ann Marlowe, “A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khost: An

Unheralded U.S. Success in Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard, 19 May 2008,

hereafter Marlowe, “A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khost.”

4. “CENTCOM Commander Attends Khost Leadership Conference,” American Forces

Press Service, 5 November 2007. Online at http://www.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=48048; Donna Miles, “Gates Lauds Progress in Afghanistan’s

Khost Province,” American Forces Press Service, 4 December 2007. Online at

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=48314.

5. Christopher Ives, Interview with CDR John Wade, Operational Leadership

Experiences, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 13, hereafter

Ives, Interview with CDR John Wade.

6. Ibid.; Micah E. Clare, “Khowst PRT Winning the Fight in Afghanistan,” Army News,

30 May 2007, hereafter Clare, “Khowst PRT Winning the Fight in Afghanistan.” Online

at www.army.mil/-news/2007/05/30/3404-khowst-prt-winning-the-fight-inafghanistan/.

7. Ives, Interview with CDR John Wade, 13–14; former Khost PRT commander (March

2007–March 2008) comments at CNA roundtable on 13 May 2008.

178 | On the Ground
8. In the fall of 2006, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf entered into a

peace agreement with the Taliban fighting in Waziristan. See “Pakistan ‘Taleban’ in

Peace Deal,” BBC News, 5 Sept 2006. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

5315564.stm.

9. Combined Joint Task Force-101, quoted in Tom Vanden Brook, “In Afghanistan,

Path to Stability is Full of Challenges for Obama,” USA Today, 12 January 2009.

10. The new campaign was known as “Protect the Quarterback.” See “Policing a

Whirlwind,” Economist, 15 December 2007; Marlowe,“A Counterinsurgency Grows

in Khost.”

11. Ann Marlowe, “Anthropology Goes to War,” Weekly Standard, 26 November

2007, 30.

12. Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do

We Know They Work? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,

2009), hereafter Malkasian and Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do

We Know They Work?

13. DoD, “DoD News Briefing with Cdr. Adams and Governor Jamal from the

Pentagon,” news transcript, 5 September 2007. Online at

http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4033; Marlowe,

“A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khost,” 22; Malkasian and Meyerle, Provincial

Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?

14. Malkasian and Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know

They Work?

15. DoD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 11.

16. John J. Kruzel, “Commander Sees Progress in Afghanistan’s Khost Province,”

American Forces Press Service, 5 September 2007; Ives, Interview with CDR

John Wade, 17.

17. Tom Philpott, “Rebuilding a Nation: U.S. Navy Sailors Head a Half-Dozen PRT

Teams Providing Hope for the Future in Afghanistan,” Seapower (April 2007): 48 and

50; Ives, Interview with CDR John Wade, 2.

Endnotes | 179
18. In 2006, Khost was one of the three provinces where UNAMA did not operate.

See UNDP Afghanistan Annual Report, 2006:1. Online at http://www.undp.org.af/

publications/index.htm.

19. Farah Stockman and Kamal Sadaat, “U.S. Alters Strategy, Makes Gains after

Botched Raid,” Boston Globe, 10 February 2008.

20. Robert J. Bebber, “Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost

Province: Information Operations at PRT Khost in 2008,” Small Wars Journal

(Febuary 2009), hereafter Bebber, “Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in

Khost Province.”

21. Ibid.

22. Casey Ware, “ANSF Assumes Control of Bak District Center,” CJTF-101 press

release, 22 August 2008.

23. Ann Marlowe, “In War Too, Personnel is Policy,” Wall Street Journal, 14

June 2008.

24. Bebber, “Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost Province.”

25. Assassination attempts on Governor Jamal included suicide car bombs in August

and October 2007 and a major attack on FOB Salerno in August 2008.

Vignette 6: U.S. Army Battalion, Nangarhar, 2005–2009

1. Nick Dowling and Tom Praster, eds., Nangarhar Provincial Handbook (Arlington, VA:

IDS International, 2009), 3, 8, hereafter IDS International, Nangarhar Provincial

Handbook.

2. The trade route known as Route 1 passes Jalalabad. Route 1 runs from Kabul

through the Afghanistan border at Torkham Gate, the largest and busiest official

border crossing to Pakistan.

3. Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Courts Former Warlords in Its Bid for Afghan Stability,”

Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2009, hereafter Rosenberg, “U.S. Courts Former

Warlords in Its Bid for Afghan Stability.”

180 | On the Ground
4. Governor Sherzai did much less outside the city. See IDS International, Nangarhar

Provincial Handbook, 29.

5. Sonia Winter, “Afghanistan: Radio Free Afghanistan Names ‘Person of the Year,’”

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 March 2008. Online at

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079668.html; Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S.

Courts Former Warlords in Its Bid for Afghan Stability.”

6. David Mansfield, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor (Kabul,

Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit [AREU], 2006), 10, hereafter

Mansfield, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor. Online at

http://areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=198&ContentId=7&ParentId=

7&Lang=en-US.

7. The U.S. military estimated that the Taliban collected $70 million annually, while

the UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that the Taliban and its affiliates earned

as much as $100 million each year from the drug trade. See Craig Whitlock, “Diverse

Sources Fund Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 27 September 2009.

Online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/

26/AR2009092602707.html.

8. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey

2004, November 2004, 62. Online at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/

crop-monitoring/.

9. Mansfield, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor, 9.

10. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey

2005, November 2005, 29. Online at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/

crop-monitoring/.

11. Farah Stockman, “Daughters Pay the Price in Poppy War,” New York Times, 29

September 2005, hereafter Stockman, “Daughters Pay the Price in Poppy War.”

12. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Addiction, Crime and

Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, October 2009, 95. Online at

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/addiction-crime-andinsurgency.html.

Endnotes | 181
13. Stockman, “Daughters Pay the Price in Poppy War; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Hasty

Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan Can Sow More Problems,” Christian Science

Monitor, 23 March 2006; Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The Opium Brides of

Afghanistan,” Newsweek, 7 April 2008, hereafter, Yousafzai and Moreau, “The Opium

Brides of Afghanistan.”

14. David Mansfield, Pariah or Poverty? The Opium Ban in the Province of Nangarhar

in the 2004/05 Growing Season and Its Impact on Rural Livelihood Strategies,

Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (PAL), June 2005, 12,

hereafter Mansfield, Pariah or Poverty? Online at

http://www.davidmansfield.org/all.php.

15. Mansfield, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor, 22.

16. The two tribes reportedly met prior to the planting season and agreed to plant

poppy and resist eradication. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007: Executive Summary, August 2007, 6–7.

Online at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/; David Mansfield,

Resurgence and Reductions: Explanations for Changing Levels of Opium Poppy

Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor in 2006-07, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation

Unit (AREU), May 2008, 15. Online at http://www.davidmansfield.org/field_work.php.

17. In 2007, governor-led eradication destroyed 2,339 hectares of opium poppy in

Nangarhar Province. As a result, seven security incidents related to eradication

occurred in the province that year. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, October 2007, 23. Online at

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/.

18. David Mansfield, ‘Poppy Free’ Provinces: A Measure or a Target, Afghanistan

Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), May 2009, 12, hereafter Mansfield, ‘Poppy

Free’ Provinces. Online at http://www.davidmansfield.org/all.php.

19. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Poppy-Free Nangarhar Province Shows Afghanistan

Improvements,” American Forces Press Service, 26 September 2008.

20. In April 2008, governor-led eradication eliminated only 26 hectares of opium

poppy, compared to 2,339 hectares the year before. See United Nations Office on

182 | On the Ground
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, November 2008, 72,

78. Online at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/.

21. The 750 soldiers in the task force spread out over four forward operating bases

and two combat outposts. Mansfield, “‘Poppy Free’ Provinces,” Afghanistan Research

and Evaluation Unit (AREU), May 2009, 12.

22. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan: Opium Winter

Assessment, January 2009, 12.

23. Yousafzai and Moreau, “The Opium Brides of Afghanistan.”

24. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Afghanistan Drug Control:

Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and

Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed, GAO-10-291, March 2010, 19.

25. DoD, “DoD Briefing with Lt Col Allison from the Pentagon Briefing Room,

Arlington, VA, and Mr. Shawn Waddoups, Via Teleconference from Afghanistan,” news

transcript, 26 September 2008. Online at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/

transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4294.

26. David K. Spencer, “Afghanistan’s Nangarhar, Inc: A Model for Interagency

Success,” Military Review (July-August 2009): 37. Online at http://usacac.army.mil/

CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MilitaryReview_200908310001-MD.xml.

27. USAID Afghanistan, “Two Year Market Development Strategy Realizes Record

Onion Sales, Contributes to Reduction of Illicit Crops,” press release, 16

October 2008.

28. Jacob Caldwell, “Center Blazes Trail in Afghanistan Emergency Services,”

American Forces Press Service, 28 January 2008.

Vignette 10: UK-Led Task Force, Musa Qala, Helmand, 2006–2009

1. Anthony Loyd, “The Mysterious Warlord Trusted to Spread Peace in Divided

Province,” The Times (UK), 12 January 2008.

2. Mullah Salem was a veteran of the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s and was

the Taliban governor of the southern province of Uruzgan prior to 2001.

Endnotes | 183
3. Mullah Salem belonged to the Pirzai subtribe.

4. For example, on 30 August 2007, Taliban leadership council member Mullah

Barader Akhund was killed in Sangin. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos (New

York: Viking, 2008), 399. Also see “U.S. Steps Up Fight Near Major Taliban-Held

Town,” New York Times, 28 October 2007.

5. Stephen Grey, Operation Snakebite (London: Viking, 2009), 128, hereafter, Grey,

Operation Snakebite.

6. An airstrike killed a Taliban senior commander, Mullah Ikhalas, on 2 December

2007. See “Several Militants Killed in Afghanistan Operation,” American Forces Press

Service, 5 December 2007.

7. Grey, Operation Snakebite, 7.

8. British troops included the 40 Commando Royal Marines Regiment, 2nd Battalion

of the Yorkshire Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the Scots Guards, supported by

light tanks from the UK Household Cavalry Regiment.

9. Stephen Grey with the Sunday Times and Rupert Hamer with the Sunday Mirror

were embedded with Royal Marines of the 2nd Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment.

10. “Two Taliban Commanders Killed in Afghanistan: U.S.,” Agence France Presse

(AFP), 16 December 2007; Fisnik Abrashi, “Troops Patrol Former Taliban Town,” USA

Today, 15 December 2007.

11. Anthony Loyd, “Former Drug Lord Koka is Nato’s New Poster Boy and a Police

Chief,” The Times (UK), 11 July 2008.

12. The 2nd Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Scotland began training the ANP in

Musa Qala. U.S. Marines briefly took over the responsibility of training the police and

shifted it back to the British in early 2009.

13. House of Commons International Development Committee, Reconstructing

Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session

184 | On the Ground
2007-08: Third Special Report of Session 2007-08, 24 April 2008, 7.

14. Under the direction of the Helmand provincial director.

15. Stephen Grey, Operation Snakebite, 304.

16. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, “Taleban Hamper Musa Qala

Reconstruction Efforts,”ARR No. 311, 2 February 2009. Online at

www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/498beca18.html.

17. Governor Salem quoted in Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Former Taliban

Commander Advises U.S. Ambassador,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16

January 2008.

18. Governor Salem quoted in Grey, Operation Snakebite, 319.

19. Local tribal elder quoted in Tom Coghlan, “Allies Prepare to Seize Taliban

Stronghold,” Telegraph (UK), 6 December 2007.

Vignette 12: British Army Advisors, Sangin, Helmand, 2009

1. Much of the population fled Sangin in 2006, only some of whom returned.

“Cocktail of Ingredients Making Sangin So Lethal,” BBC News, 8 March 2010.

2. Michael Yon, “Resurrection,” Michael Yon Online Magazine, 2 August 2009. Online

at http://www.michaelyon-online.com/resurrection.htm.

Endnotes | 185
Jerry Meyerle is a political scientist in the Stability and Development Program at

CNA. He is the author of several widely read studies on the insurgency in Afghanistan,

as well as studies on the Afghan army and articles on regional security and political violence in Pakistan and India. Meyerle is a frequent speaker on these issues at conferences, seminars, and briefing sessions to deploying units and has also served on

Afghanistan and Pakistan policy reviews for U.S. Central Command. In 2008, he was an

advisor to the commander of the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team in eastern

Afghanistan, where he worked on Pakistan border issues. He speaks Urdu and has a

PhD in political science and South Asian studies from the University of Virginia.

Megan Katt is a research analyst in the Stability and Development Program at CNA.

Most of her work at CNA has focused on various aspects of the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Prior to joining CNA, she supported research on international security and national defense issues at the RAND Corporation. She holds an MA

in international security studies from Georgetown University and a BS in business marketing from San Diego State University.

LtCol James A. Gavrilis, USA (Ret.), is a senior advisor in the Stability and Development Program at CNA. He is a former U.S. Army Special Forces officer with more than

24 years of experience in the infantry and special operations. Gavrilis has served overseas in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East in training, peacekeeping, and combat

operations. He has commanded and directed operations focused on urban unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. A graduate of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, he has an MA in international studies from Old Dominion University and a BA in political science from Pennsylvania State University.

186 | On the Ground

About the Authors
MARINE CORPS

U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice

provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units—

teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions—have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the

more remote areas of Afghanistan.

The book includes 15 vignettes about different units from the

U.S. Marines, Army, and Army Special Forces; the British army

and marines; the Dutch army and marines; and the Canadian

army. The case studies cover 10 provinces in Afghanistan’s

south and east. They describe the diverse conditions the units

faced in these provinces, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes

they achieved.

Key themes include:

•Dealing with a localized insurgency

•Navigating the political terrain

•Searching for political solutions

•Engaging the population and

building popular support

•Using reconstruction funds

“A COMPLETELY

OUTSTANDING PIECE

OF WORK.”

—DAVID KILCULLEN, AUTHOR OF THE ACCIDENTAL

GUERRILLA AND COUNTERINSURGENCY