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i 

68–166 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–58] 

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 

AFTER NEW START 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 27, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

TOM KARAKO, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 27, 2011, Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence After New START 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 27, 2011 ....................................................................................... 37 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011 

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AFTER NEW START 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Halperin, Dr. Morton H., Senior Advisor, Open Society Foundations ................ 7 

Miller, Hon. Franklin C., Principal, The Scowcroft Group ................................... 9 

Payne, Dr. Keith, Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense 

and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University ............................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Halperin, Dr. Morton H. .................................................................................. 55 

Miller, Hon. Franklin C. .................................................................................. 62 

Payne, Dr. Keith ............................................................................................... 46 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 44 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘De-alerting Strategic Missile Forces,’’ by Franklin C. Miller, from the 

book In the Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and Comments on America’s 

Strategic Posture (Taylor A. Bolz, editor; United States Institute of 

Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2009) ......................................................... 77 

‘‘On Missile Defense,’’ Chapter 3 from America’s Strategic Posture: The 

Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 

of the United States (William J. Perry, chairman, and James R. Schlesinger, vice-chairman; United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2009) ........................................................................................ 82 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 89 

(1) 

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AFTER NEW 

START 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 27, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:12 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on sustaining nuclear deterrence after New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. 

With the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012 

recently passed by the House, this represents our subcommittee’s 

first non-budget-driven hearing for the 112th Congress. Our panel 

consists of non-governmental witnesses, three distinguished gentlemen who each have served in previous administrations in some 

senior capacities relating to our discussion today. 

We have with us Dr. Keith Payne, a former Commissioner of the 

Strategic Posture Commission and Professor and Head of the 

Washington-based Graduate Department on Defense and Strategic 

Studies for Missouri State University; Dr. Morton Halperin, also a 

former Commissioner with the Congressional Strategic Posture 

Commission and a Senior Advisor to the Open Society Foundations; 

and finally, Franklin Miller, a Principal of the Scowcroft Group 

who has served in senior capacities in a number of administrations. 

The witnesses have been asked to provide their assessment of 

post-New START U.S. nuclear posture and policy, including potential reduction of the U.S. stockpile below New START levels; the 

significance of nuclear modernization; considerations relating to a 

recently announced upcoming review of U.S. deterrence requirements; and nonstrategic nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe for extended deterrence and assurance. 

Today’s hearing is just one in an ongoing series of events by 

which the House Armed Services Committee will conduct oversight 

of these issues. On July 7th, the full Armed Services Committee received a classified briefing from the Department of Defense, the 

Department of State, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] on several topics being considered today. 
2 

We have also notified the Administration that we intend to hold 

an open hearing on these same issues again this fall with testimony by a panel of Government witnesses. 

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today and further 

thank them for their leadership and service to our country on these 

issues. 

I will keep my comments brief to allow ample time for members 

to ask questions, but I would like to highlight four important areas 

I hope our witnesses and our discussion may touch upon today. 

First, I want to emphasize the bipartisan consensus that has 

emerged on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue about the urgent 

need to modernize the U.S nuclear enterprise in order to be able 

to create a sustainable deterrent for ourselves and for our allies. 

After two decades of neglect, our nuclear enterprise has fallen 

into hard times. Awareness of these facts has been spurred in part 

by the Strategic Posture Commission created by this subcommittee 

under the leadership of its former chair, Ellen Tauscher, and also 

by the experience of the debate over the New START treaty. 

Specifically, I think we have come to see a pragmatic bipartisan 

convergence on two basic points: One, that nuclear abolition is a 

long way off; and two, that we will ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains credible for the foreseeable future. 

To be sure, full funding for nuclear modernization is costly and 

difficult in these challenging economic times, but it is necessary. 

Pledging $85 billion over 10 years for nuclear weapons activities, 

President Obama noted in December that ‘‘I recognize that nuclear 

modernization requires investment for the long-term, in addition to 

this one year budget increase. This is my commitment to Congress—that my Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President.’’ 

This statement, built upon the observation of the November update to the Section 1251 Report, namely that, ‘‘given the extremely 

tight budget environment facing the Federal Government, these 

[increased budget] requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the Administration places on maintaining the safety, security 

and effectiveness of the deterrent.’’ 

To be sure, we have our policy differences, but I believe that even 

our differences have helped spur a healthy constructive debate. In 

all candor, Congressional focus on these issues has languished for 

too many years. But I believe the events of recent years have the 

potential to usefully renew attention by Members of both Houses 

of Congress. 

My second point, however, is one of concern, the ink is barely dry 

on New START and already senior administration officials are describing their ambitions to move to deeper nuclear reductions below 

the treaty levels—changes which could include cuts to our nondeployed hedge stockpile, potentially eliminating a leg of the triad, 

altering the long-established U.S counterforce nuclear target strategy and reducing alert postures for our forces. Administration officials have even indicated that reductions could be made unilaterally. 

Premature steps to cut our nuclear force below New START levels and, in particular, cuts which outpace modernization progress 
3 

could threaten to upset some of the broad consensus which has 

been so carefully acquired. 

My third point concerns an upcoming 90-day review of the deterrence requirements announced on March 29th by National Security 

Advisor Tom Donilon for the express and apparently single-minded 

purpose of creating options for further reductions. As we all know, 

strategy must drive force structure, not the other way around. But 

we also know that it is easy to change assumptions in order to get 

the answers you want. 

This committee will continue to conduct oversight on this review 

and decisions about U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure more 

broadly. We also continue to monitor another study: The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review currently ongoing for NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. Which brings me to my 

fourth and final point: the forward deployment of U.S. nonstrategic 

weapons in Europe has long contributed to Alliance solidarity and 

the transatlantic link. NATO’s new Strategic Concept reaffirms 

that NATO is a nuclear alliance and the importance of broadest 

possible participation by allies in the nuclear mission. 

Some of us are concerned that the Administration potentially, in 

concert with some Western allies, might try to use the Defense Posture Review that is being undertaken to pressure Central and 

Eastern Europeans to begrudgingly accept substantial reductions 

or even complete withdrawal of these weapons from Europe, an act 

which could have untold and adverse consequences for the future 

of the world’s oldest and most successful alliance. 

This year the House acted to address each of these concerns. The 

House-passed NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] included 

provisions which would sustain the linkage between progress in nuclear modernization to both further nuclear cuts and New START 

implementation; involve Congress in the long-term decisionmaking 

about deeper reductions; and slow down withdrawals. 

The Administration expressed strong objections about some of 

these provisions and issued veto threats about others. 

Again, I want to thank all of you for being here today, and I look 

forward to your testimony on these important issues. These are 

issues that our committee has been diligently reviewing and discussing and debating. I appreciate your attention to those issues. 

And I want to recognize my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do deeply apologize for having gotten held up in my office. I try not to let that happen. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. Dr. Payne, Dr. 

Halperin and Mr. Miller, thank you so much. 

We look forward to hearing your thoughts about the future of nuclear weapons in this century, and I guess the progress of what it 

really takes to maintain a strong and reliable deterrent. Given everything that is going on—the New START treaty—the desire may 
4 

be to eliminate even more of nuclear weapons if we could, and how 

we might, and what opportunities might exist to do that and of 

course, other players, other than Russia and ourselves, who have 

nuclear weapons. 

I think that the Administration has been committed to unprecedented investments in maintaining our nuclear arsenal, as my 

chairman here said. I think the President is leading much-needed 

efforts to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in a post– 

Cold War era. He gave us part of his vision to strengthen our national security when he included those issues in his 2009 Palm 

Sunday speech in Prague, including New START as being the first 

step for further reduction, the ratification of the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty, reducing the role of nuclear weapons, and talking 

about strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

He noted in his Prague speech the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons and the most dangerous—that it was the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. And even considering the other 

players out there in the world, the fact of the matter is that about 

95 percent of the nuclear weapons still exist in Russia’s and our 

hands. So I think that is why we are so interested in New START 

and we are interested in other opportunities that might exist. And 

yeah, a little apprehensive, all of us I think, about what it would 

mean to go to lower levels and whether that would take away our 

deterrence factor or whether that would make us safer or—you 

know, we have a lot of questions about that. 

And of course, you three, in particular, in front of us, we hope 

have the answers to some of that anxiety that we may have. 

So in the National Defense Authorization Act-mandated Commission on the Strategic Posture for the United States, in which I 

know that the two doctors in front of us participated, it included 

by saying, ‘‘This is a moment of opportunity to revise and renew 

U.S. nuclear strategy.’’ And I agree with that. 

Some of our weapons are old. They may not be the most efficient, 

smartest way to just keep having them. Maybe we don’t need all 

that firepower there. Maybe we are safer without them. I think it 

really is a good time for us to take a hard look at what we have, 

what others have, and also part of that whole NATO alliance and 

how some NATO members feel about having tactical weapons and 

other things on their land. So I think it is a good time to look at 

this. 

And there are a few questions that I hope you will address today. 

How best do we reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons? And 

is it through implementing further reductions and how might that 

be? How do we decrease the risks of miscalculation if we do decide 

we will go lower? And adjusting alert postures and reducing the 

role of nuclear weapons out there: how do we do that? How can 

we—maybe we can even say we can get away from that, but how 

do we go about that? 

So we have engaged in a serious debate on this committee, and 

I am very, very thankful that the chairman and I on this committee get along so well and that all of our members really participate in so many ways in trying to ask the right questions and get 

to the right answers. Sometimes, you know, there is not just one 

right answer. So we are really thrilled about having you before us. 
5 

There is still disagreement between us on many issues, and 

hopefully, you can shed some light on these very tough issues, so 

thank you very much. And I look forward to learning some more 

today and debating and continuing the debate, and I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Now we turn to our three witnesses and ask each of them to 

summarize their written statements in about 5 minutes. We will 

then proceed to members’ questions. 

The committee has received full written statements from each of 

the witnesses, and without objection, those statements will be 

made as part of record. 

Dr. Payne, I recognize you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND HEAD, 

GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC 

STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Chairman Turner and Ranking Member 

Sanchez, it is an honor to be here today. 

The Administration recently announced that it will undertake a 

new review of U.S. nuclear requirements, as you noted. This review 

ultimately should be linked to the key goals served by U.S. nuclear 

forces and the number and types of forces necessary to support 

those key goals. The five longstanding U.S. national goals pertinent 

in this regard are, one, the stable deterrence of attack; two, the assurance of allies via extended deterrence; three, the dissuasion of 

competitive challenges; four, defense in the event of war; and five, 

arms control. These five goals have been longstanding U.S. goals, 

in fact going back approximately five decades, and a bipartisan 

consensus has been behind these goals. 

The forces linked to these five goals overlap to some extent, but 

these goals also have their own individual, unique requirements 

that may be incompatible and therefore require tradeoffs. 

The Administration has expressed a commitment to effective capabilities for deterrence, assurance and limited defense. However, 

it also has explicitly elevated nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament to the top of the U.S. nuclear agenda and emphasized that 

it sees nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament as two sides of 

the same coin. 

This prioritization and linkage logically has led to concern that 

the goal of nuclear reductions will take precedence in the Administration’s calculation of how much is enough. This concern was 

stoked by senior administration officials who stated specifically 

that this nuclear review is for the purpose of further U.S nuclear 

reductions and to facilitate the ‘‘journey’’ to nuclear zero. 

As described, this approach to reviewing U.S. nuclear requirements appears to start with the answer that further nuclear reductions are warranted and appropriate. The risk of this approach is 

that further reductions taken to advance the goal of nuclear zero 

may be out of step with the forces necessary to deter, assure, defend and dissuade now and into the future. 

The Administration’s willingness to place top priority on arms reductions and subordinate these other goals may be seen in various 
6 

policies and declarations. For example, Russia has a large numeric 

advantage in operational nuclear weapons. And the U.S. has important unmet goals with regard to reducing Russian nuclear 

forces. Nevertheless, the Administration’s New START Treaty requires unilateral U.S. reductions in deployed forces. The Administration has decided to reduce U.S. tactical weapons unilaterally, 

and senior White House officials have stated explicitly that the 

United States may pursue additional unilateral reductions. 

There appear to be two competing dynamics within the Obama 

administration: One is committed to balancing the goals of arms 

control, extended deterrence, assurance and limited defense; the 

other, instead, appears to place top priority on nuclear reductions 

and steps toward nuclear zero. 

The fundamental question with regard to the Administration’s 

nuclear review is, Which of these two different views of U.S. priorities and requirements will govern its calculation of how much is 

enough? Is there room for further reductions in U.S. deployed 

forces below New START levels simply because some now claim 

that a basic retaliatory deterrence threat could be maintained at 

300, 500 or 1,000 nuclear weapons? The answer must be no. The 

answer must be no to that question. 

Recall that U.S. forces serve multiple purposes. No estimate of 

how much is enough for deterrence alone is an adequate measure 

of U.S. strategic force requirements. In addition, deterrence and assurance requirements can shift rapidly across time and place, and 

therefore, our forces and our force posture need to be flexible and 

resilient to be able to adapt to shifting and unforeseen threats and 

circumstances. In short, we must sustain the number and diversity 

of our force posture necessary for this flexibility and resilience. 

Is there room in this regard for further reductions? Following 

comprehensive analysis, the former Commander of STRATCOM, 

General Chilton, recently concluded that the New START force levels would provide adequate force flexibility for deterrence under 

specific assumed conditions. But even with optimistic assumptions 

about the future, General Chilton apparently determined that New 

START numbers are compatible with the necessary flexibility, but 

no lower. 

Nothing has changed over the past few months to suggest that 

General Chilton’s caution is no longer valid. To the contrary, some 

recent threat developments are troubling. I will just list one, and 

that is that Russia now identifies the United States and NATO as 

its greatest threat. It frequently resorts to crude nuclear threats to 

U.S. allies. And it places highest defense investment priority on the 

modernization of its nuclear forces, including a new heavy ICBM 

[intercontinental ballistic missile] capable of carrying 10 to 15 nuclear warheads each. This context hardly seems ripe for further reductions, particularly U.S. unilateral reductions that could degrade 

the flexibility and resilience of U.S. nuclear forces. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Halperin. 
7 

STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, SENIOR ADVISOR, 

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 

Dr. HALPERIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure 

to be here. 

I want to try to focus on what I think is the area of consensus, 

or potential consensus. But I do have to say that the fears that I 

think, Mr. Chairman, you have expressed and that the first witness 

expressed about where the Administration is going, are not—is not 

the same Administration that I talked to and listened to. 

I think, if anything, I have the opposite fears: that most of the 

people in the Administration have decided that the START Treaty 

and the Nuclear Posture Review was about all they could get done 

in the nuclear field, and that they had passed the task of even considering further reductions to the next Administration. I think that 

is as likely to be the outcome of these discussions as the kinds of 

concerns that you have expressed. 

My hope is that we will not begin by concluding either that further reductions are possible now and desirable, but also that we 

will not conclude that because there are a number of tasks for nuclear weapons and the Russians may occasionally say something 

that alarms people, that there is no possibility that we could go to 

lower numbers. I think we ought to treat it as an open question. 

I want to suggest some items that I think should be part of a consensus about how we should consider that. 

First of all, I want to emphasize the importance of the agreement 

on modernization. And Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to 

hear you speak the other day, and I agree with you that we need 

to change the budgeting process. As long as you trade off nuclear 

modernization with water projects, we are going to lose, especially 

in the current climate. 

I was the lone voice on the Nuclear Posture Commission urging 

to move the entire nuclear weapons process into the Defense department. I was for that when I was in the Government when the 

Atomic Energy Commission was abolished. I didn’t understand 

then why it wasn’t done, and I don’t understand now why it isn’t 

done. But I think anybody who studies the Congress knows that 

you can’t move it to the subcommittee where it belongs unless you 

first move it in the Administration to where it belongs. And I think 

Congress ought to think about doing that. 

The second area in which I think we should have a consensus is 

that our targeting should continue to be against military targets 

and not counter-value targets. It is illegal, it is immoral, it is counterproductive to base your deterrent on what is sometimes called 

‘‘minimum deterrence’’ and the notion that you just target cities. It 

is, of course, the case that what we target will end up killing vast 

numbers of people, but we need to continue to ask ourselves the 

question, What military targets do we need to be able to hold at 

risk to provide assurance, to provide deterrence, and to continue to 

make clear to the military that the target set must be military targets and not cities? 

Third, I hope we can get a consensus to maintain the triad, even 

as we go to lower levels. Now if you can imagine a world in which 

we are in several hundreds, we may have to reconsider that. But 

I share your view, and the Commission very much expressed the 
8 

review, that zero is not going to come any time soon. And moreover, in my view, it is not a good guide to where we should go now. 

To say, as every President—as you noted Ronald Reagan said, 

every President I think, but the last one said we would like a world 

without nuclear weapons, doesn’t mean that that’s guidance for 

what we should do today, tomorrow or the next 10 years. I believe 

it is not at all such guidance. We ought to ask ourselves the question of where we want to go now. And in my view, that includes 

saying we need to keep the triad for the foreseeable future. 

I think, frankly, a lot of the objections to going lower are really 

from people who fear that the leg of triad that they most value, either because of a strategic analysis or, in some rare case, because 

the item is made in their district or in their state, leads people to 

object to going lower because of that fear. And I think, both from 

a strategic point of view, it makes sense to keep a triad, and from 

a political point of view, I think it helps us have a discussion that 

is not distorted by those kinds of concerns. 

Finally, as I said, I think we need an agreement that we should 

not go—we should not have a predetermined answer to the question, Can we go lower? We should not start out knowing we can 

go lower or that we should not go lower. 

Mr. Chairman, my clock is not working, so I don’t know whether 

I have used up my time or not. 

Mr. TURNER. You are doing well. 

Dr. HALPERIN. So I do think that—and I would hope we get an 

agreement with the Administration that we are not going to read 

an announcement one day that they have gone beyond the START 

levels. I think that would be a fundamental mistake. It would 

break the possibility of a consensus. 

On the other side, I would hope people would hold off announcing 

that they know before we do the study that we cannot go to lower 

levels. 

I do think we ought to consider one change in the existing guidance as part of the study. There is, as you know, a current requirement for a prompt launch capability, even though there is also a 

requirement that we not rely on prompt launch for deterrence. I do 

not think we need a prompt launch capability, but again, I would 

not make that an assumption of the study, but neither do I think 

we should make it an assumption that we do need such a prompt 

launch capability. I think the military should be free to look at the 

question of what we need for all the purposes that Keith has laid 

out, but without an assumption that we need a prompt launch capability. 

Now that does not mean that the military should be told to dealert the forces. I think, for lots of reasons I would be happy to go 

into, that is a fundamental misunderstanding, that would be a fundamental mistake. But that is different than a requirement that 

we have a substantial prompt launch capability. 

Finally, I want to say about forward-deployed nuclear weapons, 

because I think this is an area in which I do disagree with you, 

Mr. Chairman. I think the NATO alliance will survive—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry, your time has expired. I am just kidding, go ahead. 
9 

Dr. HALPERIN. I think the NATO alliance will survive, even if we 

with take our nuclear weapons out of Europe. It will continue to 

be a nuclear alliance. It will continue to rely, as it always has, on 

the credibility of our strategic deterrent to prevent our potential 

adversaries in Europe from using nuclear weapons. 

I do think it has been as divisive as it is cohesive. For every European that desperately wants to us keep the weapons there, there 

is a European that wants us to take them out. My view has always 

been, whatever view you have on that subject, you can travel 

through Europe and find people who agree with you in every country and at every level, but somebody who has a different view goes 

and comes back and talks to a different set of people. So I think 

there is no easy answer to this question. Just because we are for 

NATO cohesion doesn’t mean the answer is ‘‘don’t take them out.’’ 

My own view is that it is time to further consolidate them, that 

they should be moved to two military bases from whatever number 

they are now, that those should be American military bases, and 

that we should not be pressuring our allies to spend the very small 

amounts that they spend on defense to buy new nuclear-capable 

aircraft or to adjust the aircraft that they do buy so that they are 

nuclear-capable. I think it is extremely unlikely they will ever 

mount those weapons. And as we learned again in Libya, we do actually fight sometimes. And I think it is more important for our allies to be able to fight. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Miller, as a courtesy, we will not start the clock 

on you, also. 

And Dr. Payne, as we give you responses to questions, we will 

let you catch up. 

This has been fascinating, though, and I did want to give the 

flexibility. 

Mr. Miller. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. FRANKLIN C. MILLER, PRINCIPAL, 

THE SCOWCROFT GROUP 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, it is an honor to be 

here. 

Let me begin, because this discussion is about beyond New 

START, by saying I did support the New START Treaty. But I did 

not support it because it reduced weapons. In fact, it allows more 

weapons than the 2002 Bush-Putin treaty, but we won’t go into 

that now. 

I supported it because it reopened the inspections regime but, 

more importantly, because the Administration committed as part of 

the ratification process to modernize our strategic forces. And I am 

concerned now that I do not see that promised modernization. 

The Administration owes the Congress and it owes the American 

people and it owes those of us who fought for New START on the 

promise of modernization some transparency into what it intends 

to do in modernizing the bomber and ICBM legs of the triad. I 

would note that we just lost an ICBM today. There was a failed 
10 

test launch out of Vandenberg, which tells you something about the 

dangers of an aging force. 

With respect to the only leg of the triad to which money has been 

committed, the Ohio Program, we now read stories that this program is in question, that perhaps a modified Virginia-class attack 

submarine could be used, which is a complete nonstarter. It is very 

worrisome; the Virginia-class submarine modification could not 

carry the Trident II D–5 [Fleet Ballistic Missile], which is at the 

very heart of our deterrent program. 

Additionally, the other idea of extending the Ohio replacement 

program for another several years so that we could have fewer 

boats and more tubes is similarly a huge mistake. It will be important for to us have more SSBNs [Ballistic Missile Submarine], not 

fewer SSBNs. I would note, in an alliance context, that delaying 

the Ohio replacement program could imperil—literally imperil—the 

U.K.’s SSBN replacement program. The U.S. Navy and the Royal 

Navy have a joint program to build a common missile compartment. The U.K. must absolutely begin deploying new SSBNs in the 

mid- to late 2020s, and a delay in our own program could pose an 

unacceptable risk to the U.K. deterrent, which, as members are 

aware, is entirely SSBN-based. 

I am also concerned, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, 

that the Administration is, before the ink is dry on New START, 

talking about further reductions. Why do we need further reductions? The Administration owes us—that is, the Congress and the 

American people—an explanation as to how additional reductions 

are going to create enhanced stability. What we want is a safer 

world. Reduced nuclear weapons levels may or may not contribute 

to that. We need to know what the Administration intends to do. 

And the notion that this is a step toward the nuclear-free world 

is not an acceptable answer, because the Prague speech and the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons has, to put it mildly, not 

had great resonance in the capitals of the other nuclear weapon 

states. Not in Paris. Certainly not in Moscow and Beijing, where 

nuclear weapons are central to their security policies. Not in 

Islamabad or Tel Aviv or New Delhi or Pyongyang, or in Tehran, 

for that matter. 

And I find it especially troubling, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the National Security Advisor’s statement that we are going 

to examine the target base in order to have additional reductions. 

I am very familiar with the target base; I was in charge of U.S. 

nuclear targeting for 16 years. I have written two Presidential Directives and at least five Secretary of Defense Nuclear Weapons 

Employment Plan Policies. 

Deterrence since the late 1970s has focused on determining what 

a potential aggressor leadership values, and then holding those assets at risk. It is not about what we value; it is about what they 

value. Traditionally this has included military forces, military and 

political command and control, and the industrial potential to sustain war. We shouldn’t hold at risk assets a potential aggressor 

leadership doesn’t value. 

But similarly, we shouldn’t give up the opportunity and the capability to hold at risk assets which are valued. And you can’t deter 

by holding just a portion of a potential aggressor’s value structure 
11 

at risk. You must say to a potential aggressor, if you attack us, we 

will destroy that which you counted on to rule the post-war world. 

This value structure will vary from aggressor to aggressor and 

even from one set of leaders to a successor set within a particular 

nation, but I think our current policy accounts for that. 

I am sure there are efficiencies to be found in the target base, 

but scrubbing that base for the purpose of reducing our weapons 

is simply not good policy. 

The call for adjusting alert rates perplexes me. The fear of accidental nuclear war was dealt with in the mid-1990s by putting 

broad ocean area target sets in our missiles. I am happy to engage 

in that debate later on. 

With respect to NATO, let me simply say the following: The Strategic Concept just agreed by the Alliance last November calls for 

widespread basing in nuclear weapons in Europe. Some of our allies nevertheless are pursuing a cynical, beggar-thy-neighbor approach to the common good. I view this as a craven moral failure 

by those who once sought collective security and even asked the 

United States to put our very existence as a nation on the line to 

deter an attack on them in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 

1990s. But now, feeling safer and more secure, they would deny to 

the new members of the Alliance the very security they once 

sought. 

At the same time, it is extraordinarily patronizing, Mr. Chairman, for Americans, who brought these people into the Alliance, to 

say to the new members of NATO that, contrary to their fears, contrary to the saber-rattling threats that they have heard and Dr. 

Payne described, that they really don’t have to worry about Russia—not their problem—and that our forces based on the United 

States can handle the military mission of deterring Russia. 

It is not about a military mission. It is as you have indicated, Mr. 

Chairman, a political mission, a mission of reassurance. And as 

long as U.S. allies believe that those weapons need to be there, we 

need to make sure that we provide that security. 

I think the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is grossly obscene. 

I think it is inconsistent with the 21st century. I think we ought 

to negotiate to reduce it, but not at the cost of withdrawing all of 

our weapons from Europe as long as our allies want them. 

The reason the Russians want to us withdraw all of our weapons 

from Europe is that they know precisely that that will really undercut allied confidence in the United States, and that will deeply 

hurt the NATO alliance. 

Mr. Chairman, let me end at this point and go to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to go to Mr. Lamborn first, but before 

I do, Mr. Miller, I do have to correct you on one statement that you 

made that maybe will be helpful for the other two panelists: There 

is no Ohio replacement program. Being a native of Ohio, I think 

it is correctly referred to as the Ohio-class submarine replacement 

program. I just want to make it clear there is no Ohio—— 

Mr. MILLER. I stand corrected. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 
12 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I say anything else, I want to congratulate the ranking 

member on that beautiful wedding ring on her hand. 

This first question is for all of you. Earlier this year, NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] Administrator Tom 

D’Agostino testified before this subcommittee that the new plutonium and uranium facilities need to be up and running before we 

make substantial cuts to the nondeployed hedge force. But when 

the House tried to slow down cuts to the nondeployed hedge force 

until these new facilities were ready, the Administration issued a 

veto threat. And now we hear that the Administration is looking 

to negotiate a future agreement to cut both our nondeployed and 

deployed weapons. Please talk to us about why we should keep a 

substantial nondeployed reserve force as a hedge and how modernizing our infrastructure, as I referred to earlier, is essential before 

we could make any possible cuts to the nondeployed stockpile in 

the future? 

Under current guidance, are there any risks in making further 

cuts to our hedge if these new uranium and plutonium facilities are 

not complete? 

I would love to hear from all three of you. 

Dr. PAYNE. I will be happy to start. The first question, as I understand it, is why have a hedge, or a large hedge, as part of your 

stockpile? And the policy notion—the policy rationale for that is, in 

response to the fact that deterrence requirements, assurance requirements, all of those goals that these forces are intended to support, the context can change dramatically for technical reasons or 

policy reasons, or both. 

And therefore, having a hedge of forces that could be reintegrated into the force as necessary is very important to have the 

flexibility and resilience of a force structure to be able to accommodate dramatic changes. It was very difficult to build these systems, 

and they take a long time to build. 

Therefore, you don’t want to have to change your force structure 

very, very rapidly, because change can come rapidly, and you need 

to have the forces in being, so to speak, so that you can respond 

to rapid changes, because you know you are not going to be able 

to build those forces very rapidly in response to rapid changes. 

That, essentially, is the rationale for maintaining a hedge; it is 

to protect our ability to deter and assure in the future in a world 

that can change dramatically, in some cases, even overnight. 

How does modernization help reduce the need for that standing 

hedge? I think that was the second part of the question. Well, modernization of our infrastructure allows us to respond more rapidly 

and in a more agile way to these types of changes. And the greater 

your ability to respond in an agile way with your force infrastructure—the greater your ability to do that, the less you need standing forces. 

So we have suggested that there is this inverse correlation between your ability to move agilely and quickly with your infrastructure, and your need for a large standing hedge. And that is why, 

I believe, Director D’Agostino said we should not move to reduce 

the hedge forces until we have this modernized infrastructure that 
13 

would allow us to provide new forces, in the instance that there are 

very dramatic and negative changes, either political or technical, 

coming in the future that happen quickly. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I want to take the opportunity to agree with everything that Keith just said, I don’t have many opportunities do 

that and I didn’t want to pass one. I agree with all of that. The 

only other point I would make is, it takes a long time to build nuclear weapons, but it also takes a long time to destroy them. As I 

understand it, we have a large stockpile of weapons awaiting destruction. 

And therefore, there isn’t an opportunity to destroy more weapons now. We can change the label on some of the existing stockpile 

if we wanted to from hedge force to a force awaiting destruction, 

but almost nothing different would happen but the label on the 

force. 

So I don’t think it is a real argument; we can’t really destroy 

many more, more quickly. And there is no particular reason to. 

And I think, given the concerns and given the agreement about 

modernization, we should take to the bank the agreement that 

when we have these new facilities, we will be able to reduce the 

force and, at that time, have a serious discussion about how much 

we can reduce it and how quickly we can reduce it. 

Mr. MILLER. Let me associate myself with what my colleagues 

have said. I think this is very simple. This is a case of promises 

made, and then assumptions and ground rules being changed. 

During the Cold War, we had active warhead production lines, 

and we were able to test our nuclear weapons. Neither is the case 

anymore. We don’t have active warhead production lines, and we 

are abiding by our signature on the CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear 

Test-Ban Treaty]; we are not testing. 

The only way we can replace a failed weapon in the arsenal is 

to take one out of storage, and that is the so-called hedge. The Administration said it was prepared to reduce the size of that hedge 

force, that warhead replacement force, when we were able to start 

building new warheads. 

I would point out by the way that the Russians have been producing new warheads on a 10-year cycle since the beginning of the 

Cold War. 

So the deal was, we have the ability to produce new warheads 

to replace old ones or failed ones in the stockpile, and then you 

start getting rid of the hedge. 

And now the idea is, oh, we are going to start getting rid of the 

hedge, but we are not going to be able to produce the new warheads. That is a complete change in assumptions, and it is a complete change in the logic behind the original proposition, even of 

the CTBT. 

So I agree with my colleagues. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And you feel that that would be a dangerous thing 

to do. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And on de-alerting, you made reference to it earlier, how might de-alerting some of our forces—what 

would that do to our strategic stability and crisis response? And 

can we expect Russia to do any de-alerting? And has anything 
14 

changed since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which says that 

we should keep current alert statuses; has anything changed since 

then so that we can de-alert now? Once again, I would love to hear 

from all three of you. 

Mr. MILLER. I will start. First of all, nothing has changed. 

Second of all, to set the context, we are not at Cold War levels 

of alert. We have fewer submarines at sea. There are different alert 

levels. The ICBM force is still in a position where it could launch 

if necessary on a short notice, but the whole question of de-alerting 

was to avoid accidental war. And it was for that reason in the mid1990s that these broad ocean area targets were put into the guidance systems on a day-to-day basis. 

I have been listening to calls for de-alerting for 20 years. We 

have studied those to death. There is no way to verifiably de-alert 

forces on both sides, and it raises the specter that you have suggested, which is if you do some de-alerting, either one side won’t 

have de-alerted, or there will be a race to re-alert in a crisis. 

I contributed a chapter to the Strategic Posture Commission 

Annex. I am happy to give that to the committee. 

But the real question is, why further de-alerting? What are we 

trying it achieve? We are not going to get the Russian ICBM force 

off of alert, even if he we took all of our ICBMs off of alert. And 

if you think that the Russians have a hair-trigger and you take 

some of their forces down, then the rest are on a tighter hair-trigger. So I don’t understand the logic that says this is a good thing 

to do. And I understand the risks that are attendant with it, the 

whole rearming re-alerting question, so I think it is a terrible idea 

that we hear about a lot, but I can’t find any logic to it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Dr. Halperin. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I actually agree that. My view is that de-alerting 

is very dangerous, because it implies that in a crisis, you re-alert, 

and that is the last thing you want to do is have both sides looking 

like they are moving toward they are about to launch a strike and 

then you get what Tom Schelling many years ago called the reciprocal fear of surprise attack, and you make war more likely. 

You want a nuclear posture, in my view, that you don’t change, 

even if you think war is more likely. 

The one area where I think we need a debate is the one I have 

suggested, which is the question of a requirement for a prompt 

launch capability. I would like us to be in a situation where the 

military understands that they don’t have an option to come to the 

President and say, ‘‘Mr. President, we think the Russian missiles 

are on the way, and we looked at our force again, and we are not 

confident they can survive a Russian attack; therefore, we want 

you to authorize a strike before the Russian missiles land.’’ 

I want to President to say to the military now, ‘‘I am going have 

an alert force, and I am going to have a secure force. I am not 

going to be pushed into launching because somebody thinks missiles are really on the way.’’ And if that means we have to spend 

more money on command and control and more money on how to 

get the President out of Washington quickly or figure out who is 

in charge if we can’t get him out, we ought do that. 

But we ought not to rest our deterrent on the belief that we can 

go to the President and say, ‘‘Fire before the Russian missiles 
15 

land.’’ That does not mean we should change the alert posture; it 

does not mean we should do anything called de-alerting, but it does 

mean, in my view, that we ought to make it clear that a prompt 

launch capability is not what we rely on to deter a Russian attack. 

Dr. PAYNE. I am in a position of agreeing, again, with both of my 

colleagues’ points. 

Just to, in a sense, restate the point that Mort made, which he 

made a long time ago—as a matter of fact, he was one of the early 

masters of this particular subject—and that is a re-alerting race in 

a crisis would be extremely dangerous, and it is what we should 

avoid. Taking our forces off alert or degrading alert would lead us 

to the potential for a re-alerting race in a crisis. 

We should do nothing like that because we want postures where 

nothing requires Presidents to make hasty decisions. Now what we 

do want to do is protect and expand the decisionmaking time for 

the U.S. and Russian Presidents. And in fact, that is what the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission said on this subject. It 

said the notion of de-alerting, that the idea that our forces are on 

a hair-trigger alert is simply erroneous. That is how the Commission characterized that particular point. And it said ‘‘The alert postures of both countries are in fact highly stable.’’ I believe we were 

right then, and I believe that’s still accurate. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am sorry that took a little bit longer. 

I yield back. I would ask unanimous consent that the report Mr. 

Miller referred to would be made a part of the record. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent answers and great discussion. I really appreciate, as I said when we opened, both your expertise and your 

willingness to share with us. 

Ms. Sanchez has requested that I go to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the Ranking Member for yielding. 

And I want to thank our panel for being here on this all-important topic. Let me start with this, how would you rank or compare 

our nuclear deterrent to other nuclear weapons powers, including 

Russia and China? And how does our nuclear deterrent compare to 

other nuclear powers in terms of numbers? 

Mr. MILLER. We have approximate parity with Russia in strategic forces. The Russians have an arsenal of nonstrategic or tactical weapons which is 10 to 15 times ours. Both United States and 

Russia have significantly more strategic weapons than do China or 

France or the United Kingdom. Indeed, with the growth of Pakistan’s arsenal, it is rapidly approaching the same level as the 

United Kingdom, but the short answer is the same as Russia in 

strategic; deep imbalance with Russia in nonstrategic; more than 

China; more than the rest. 

Dr. HALPERIN. My understanding is that we do have a substantial advantage in numbers over the Russians in nondeployed strategic weapons which may, in fact, make the overall number of 

weapons that each side has much closer than we normally discuss. 
16 

I also believe that the United States’ arsenal is much more sophisticated and much more effective and much more reliable than 

the Russian arsenal. And we continue to make improvements 

through the activities of our laboratories, which I think are second 

to none in these areas. 

So I do not think there is any basis for concern that, somehow, 

some other nuclear power is going to overtake us in our capabilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And we have heard the criticism that the Russians will have to reduce their numbers of warheads and delivery 

vehicles to a much lesser extent than the United States. Are all delivery vehicles that the United States is dismantling or shifting to 

nondeployed status currently operational, or were some of these 

phantom delivery vehicles not being used yet still counted as deployed? 

Dr. PAYNE. To meet the New START ceiling on launchers, which 

I think is the metric you are referring to, the United States will 

have to reduce approximately 180 launchers to get to the New 

START ceiling on deployed launchers of 700. The Russians would 

actually have to build up by approximately 180 launchers to get 

that ceiling. So the context truly is with New START ceiling on 

launchers, the United States will have to reduce by approximately 

25 percent. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Define that term ‘‘launcher.’’ 

Dr. PAYNE. It is an ICBM, an operational in-service ICBM, 

SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] or bomber. So to meet 

those ceilings, the United States will have to reduce by approximately 25 percent its number of deployed launchers. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Say that part again. 

Dr. PAYNE. Approximately 25 percent its number of deployed 

launchers. Russia would have to increase its number of deployed 

launchers by approximately 35 percent to reach the New START 

ceilings; that is the context we are in now. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So given the perception of asymmetry in implementation obligations, what is the value of the New START limits 

and arms control in general? 

Dr. HALPERIN. I think, as Frank suggested, the most important 

was to reestablish the inspection regime that we had before, and 

to reestablish a legally binding agreement between Russia and the 

United States on its nuclear forces, which sets a ceiling for both 

countries that each other can count on and which may provide the 

basis for agreed further reductions. 

I am, in fact, very dubious that we will at any time soon be able 

to negotiate another comprehensive treaty, but I think it at least 

provides a framework and a basis for that. It also was, I think, 

part of building a national consensus on the need to modernize the 

forces and provided a context in which, I think, people otherwise 

were worried that modernization might lead to a new arms race, 

that you had an agreed force level which would prevent that from 

happening. 

I do think we ought to try to find a way, if we can, to persuade 

the Russians that they really should not build a new large multiwarhead land-based ballistic missile. That is about the least stable 
17 

thing that either side can do, and I think it is useful to try to think 

about ways, if there are any, to talk them out of that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So how does missile defense affect the numbers 

level and assuring confidence that we can either prevent or stop a 

nuclear attack, and how does this affect the limits that have been 

established? 

Dr. HALPERIN. Mr. Chairman, while we are putting things in the 

record, I would ask permission to put in the record the chapter on 

missile defense from the nuclear commission report, because I 

think it is an extraordinary document. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 82.] 

Dr. HALPERIN. You had in that Commission people who have 

been fighting with each other about missile defense for 50 years. 

Many of us, the same people—I mean Johnny Foster and I have 

had literally had this argument for 50 years. And yet we agreed 

on that document and what I think that document says; it is unrealistic to think that you can build ballistic missile defense against 

a large, sophisticated nuclear force—read: the Russian force and 

the American force, with a question mark about the Chinese, but 

certainly those, too. 

And then on the other hand it is useful to develop active missile 

defenses to meet regional and smaller threats, that that is not only 

not destabilizing, but it is in our interest, and that we have an interest in trying to persuade the Russians that the defenses that we 

build against small nuclear threats are not directed at them, and 

I think we all agreed on that and I think that is the right way to 

think about ballistic missiles. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Clearly, though, having a robust missile defense 

system undermines an aggressor’s confidence in a successful first 

strike. 

Dr. HALPERIN. No, I think it is the reverse, absolutely the reverse, because nobody believes a ballistic missile defense can work 

against the first strike from a sophisticated country. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But the aggressor could never be confident of 

which missiles were going to survive and get through, and which 

missiles are going to be taken out. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Right, but he can hope to come to rely on the fact 

that he has a ballistic missile defense to destroy the incoming missiles against his cities. So I believe that if both sides, if we and the 

Russians both had a robust ballistic missile defense, that that 

would increase instability and not stability, which is why I have 

been for many years and continue to be a strong proponent of the 

ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. I think it was a mistake to 

walk away from it, but that is done. 

And I think it would be a mistake, as the Commission said, for 

either the United States or Russia to try to build a ballistic missile 

defense against the other. 

Mr. MILLER. If I could just jump in. If you have a sizeable strategic arsenal—as with the United States and Russia, Congressman—you can, through your targeting policies, deal with a limited 

ballistic missile defense, that is really not very difficult. I would 

carry this discussion, though, just one step further, and that is to 

say that because we are working with our NATO allies to build a 
18 

phased adaptive approach in NATO, some believe that the NATO 

ballistic missile defenses obviate the need to have a forward-based 

nuclear presence, and that is not what our allies think. 

And if the Alliance is all about defending all of NATO, as long 

as the allies believe that we need to raise the threshold of aggression by threatening unacceptable retaliation, the missile defenses 

in Europe would be a complement to our NATO nuclear deterrent, 

but they cannot be a substitute for those forward-based weapons. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I would just say they can’t be a substitute for an 

effective NATO nuclear defense, but I do not believe that that requires a forward-based force. I believe the forward-based force, 

even as it exists now, plays an insignificant role in the confidence 

of our allies in our nuclear deterrent and in the confidence that the 

Russians have that our nuclear deterrent protects not only us but 

our allies as well. 

Mr. MILLER. But that is not what the NATO concept said in November. The NATO concept is very clear about the need for nuclear 

forces, and that is a judgment of the 28 heads of government of the 

alliance. 

Dr. PAYNE. Might I just add on this point, I think it is important 

to recognize that the Russian defense professionals, who are very 

cognizant of missile defense and the interaction of offense and defense, frequently write—in fact, almost every article that they publish on this subject says that they recognize and acknowledge that 

the type of missile defenses that the United States is in the process 

of deploying are not going to be a threat to their strategic retaliatory capability. They say, ‘‘We understand that; others don’t, but 

we understand that’’ and that, in fact, some of the articles by these 

folks will say this is a political issue; it is not a military technical 

issue. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you very much. 

My time is expired, but I want to thank the gentlemen for your 

testimony here today. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Well, gentlemen, thank you again so much. This has been a great 

discussion, and I really appreciate the opportunity to hear from 

each of you on these issues, and I certainly celebrate the areas 

where there has been agreement. 

But for all of us who are engaged in this discussion and dialogue, 

I also want to thank you for the clarity in which you describe the 

issues, because in addition to your conclusions, you give us some 

backdrop as to how the decisions are made and the policy issues 

that arise from these challenges. And with that, I really thank you. 

Dr. Halperin, I hope that you are correct in your assessment of 

this Administration’s direction. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I hope I am wrong. 

Mr. TURNER. That is great. 

You know, between us, you know, our concern obviously is that 

we, because of the areas that we have identified as concerns, we 

have placed in the National Defense Authorization Act some specific language that would, you know, provide some boundaries, in 

part, to get assurances from the Administration that they had no 

intention of going beyond those boundaries. And instead of getting 
19 

those assurances, which you are confident of, we actually got veto 

threats. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Yeah—well, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I suspect 

that the veto threats came from the fact that the previous Administration educated all of us about the importance of Presidential prerogatives and that the veto threats—I haven’t seen them, but my 

guess is that they are about Congress interfering in what the executive branch thinks of as its prerogative, not about the substance 

of whether they are going—— 

Mr. TURNER. They actually have been a little bit of both, and I 

certainly understand the prerogative issue and would have similarly expected some objection there. But I did expect that the Administration might come forward, as you have, and said that, you 

know, their lack of interest in going beyond those boundaries. So 

we give, everybody, again, that ability to come back and have some 

bipartisan support for what is going on because there is a great 

deal of concern. 

And I would like to go to one of the areas where you said we did 

have some disagreement because I think there is probably still a 

large area in which we do have agreement with respect to NATO 

and our forward-deployed nuclear weapons. 

We had William Perry, former Secretary of Defense and Chair of 

the Strategic Posture Commission, here, and I asked him, the issue 

of, you know, our concern that there would be unilateral withdrawal of our weapons from Europe without a corresponding concession from Russia in their tactical nukes. As you are aware, during the START negotiations, the Senate was very adamant that the 

Administration must look now to not reductions in U.S. weapons 

but look to tactical nuclear weapon reductions on the part of Russia. And Secretary Perry said he thought that would be a bad idea 

to have unilateral withdrawal without corresponding concessions 

from the Russians. 

I would—and I am going to, of course, ask all of our members 

of the panel this, but I would suspect that we probably have an 

area of agreement between you, me and Secretary Perry, that the 

value of these weapons as a bargaining opportunity with respect to 

Russian tactical nukes, should not be dismissed. 

Once we go through a process of, withdrawal reductions, we lose 

an opportunity because we don’t have many other things, unless 

this Administration is willing to go past nuclear weapons in bargaining to gain those concessions. 

And I would like your thoughts. I am assuming—perhaps you 

could give us your insight as to whether or not you agree with Secretary Perry that it is a bad idea. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I agree that—well, I am not sure I agree with him 

because I have a view that is different. 

I do not think we should be willing to trade our withdrawal of 

our nuclear weapons from Europe for some reduction, even a substantial reduction, in Russian tactical nuclear weapons because if 

it is the case—which I do not believe, but my colleagues do and 

many people do—that the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent for our NATO allies depends on the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, that will not change if the Russians cut their tactical nuclear arsenal by two-thirds, or even eliminate it because 
20 

they will still have their strategic weapons, which, while they can’t 

have intermediate-range missiles, they can find a way to target 

them on the NATO countries. 

So I think we have to debate this issue on its merits. I understand that the alliance has said that. The alliance has been saying 

that for many, many years. It said that about 6,500. We are now 

down to a number, which I think none of us are allowed to say, but 

we all agree is lower substantially lower than 6,500. 

And the same things that we were told would happen now if we 

go to zero. I was in the Pentagon. We were told, ‘‘If do you that, 

if you freeze at 6,500, all these same terrible things will happen; 

nobody will believe that the deterrent is credible.’’ And of course, 

the Russians were then in Berlin, so it was a different situation. 

My view is we ought to say to our NATO allies what our military 

has said publicly: We do not believe those weapons are necessary 

for a credible deterrent. But if you believe they are, we will leave 

them there. But we have to deploy them in a way that we are confident they are not subject to sabotage. 

One of the issues that I think we need to worry about, and that 

the military certainly worries about is that, as has happened in the 

past, people end up on those bases and hold up a nuclear weapon 

and then you get a demand to take them out in a way that would 

be counterproductive to the Alliance. So I am not for taking them 

out because the United States decides. 

I am for saying what our military has said: We don’t think we 

need them for a deterrent, but if you do, we will leave them there. 

And if we conclude that, we should not bargain them away for any 

amount of reduction in the Russian—— 

Mr. TURNER. Well, as I turn to Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, I will 

expand the question based on what Dr. Halperin has answered. In 

addition to the bargaining chip aspect of my question, we know 

that the Nuclear Posture Review states that in Europe, ‘‘The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate . . . contribute[s] to Alliance cohesion and provide[s] reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional 

threats.’’ If you might comment, then, on both issues. I will go first 

to Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. Let me, I might mention a couple of points with regards to the unilateral reductions. 

We saw unilateral reductions by the United States in both deployed launchers and warheads. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Payne, could you move the microphone a little 

more in front of your—— 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes. The New START treaty mandates U.S. unilateral reductions in the number of deployed launchers and warheads, 

and we will implement that. The United States has decided to unilaterally reduce the US number of tactical nuclear weapons with 

the taking down of the TLAM–N [Tomahawk Land Attack MissileNuclear] system, and the Administration has announced the possibility of further unilateral reductions. 

These are the kinds of statements that I am concerned about, 

and that is what I would lay on the table with regard to Mort’s confidence; these are some of the reasons why I am concerned. 
21 

The problem with unilateral reductions isn’t that unilateral reductions are necessarily bad, but if you have unmet negotiating 

goals, such as the United States has, engaging in unilateral reductions simply limits your ability to ever get to where you want to 

go in the area of arms control. 

So there is a strange juxtaposition where we have said as a country, we want to be able to find reductions in the Russian tactical 

nuclear arsenal because it is so large, and yet we engage in unilateral reductions at the strategic level. We have engaged in unilateral reductions at the tactical nuclear level, and now we are talking 

about further unilateral reductions. 

Those two positions don’t make sense. If we have unmet negotiating goals, engaging in this long stream of unilateral reductions, 

at least in my mind, doesn’t make any sense. 

And, in a sense, I find Mort’s comment reassuring because what 

I understood Mort to have said is, if the allies want U.S. nuclear 

weapons to stay in NATO for their assurance, then they should 

stay. That is, in fact, what the Commission said, the Strategic Posture Commission, and that strikes me as a fully well-thought-out 

position. 

Mr. TURNER. For the record, Dr. Halperin nodded in the affirmative. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Yes. 

Dr. PAYNE. If—and one of the processes that the Commission 

went through was we heard from a large number of foreign representatives. And I—without breaking any confidences, I can assure you that representatives from Central European and Eastern 

European allies who are now in NATO were strongly opposed to 

the notion of the U.S. essentially withdrawing its nuclear weapons 

from the continent. 

In fact, they made the point that one of the reasons they wanted 

to be NATO allies was because they came under the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella, and those nuclear weapons were in Europe. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. I agree with that. 

The first point I would make is this is why most of the new allies 

joined the alliance, to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

The presence of those weapons is highly symbolic. The new allies 

believe that that represents the U.S. commitment to their defense. 

The threat is not really just Russian tactical nuclear weapons; it 

is Russian local superiority in Central Europe and in the Baltics. 

We hear a lot about NATO’s superiority. If you lived in the Baltics or if you lived in the Slovak Republic or Czech Republic, you 

are not thinking that NATO has conventional superiority. And that 

is why they want the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons there. And 

that is why they have told us that, and that is why the Alliance 

in its policy statement of last November said that we will retain 

weapons there. 

The notion that we can just do it all by strategic systems from 

the United States is something we have tried before and failed. 

In the late 1970s, when the Soviets were deploying the SS–20 

missile, the Pentagon’s first approach was, ‘‘That is okay, we can 

just add more strategic warheads to Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe’s targeting capabilities,’’ and the allies said, ‘‘No, that is not 
22 

going to cut it; we need something on the ground that we can feel 

and touch and see.’’ This is a similar situation, and I don’t believe 

we should ever go to zero in Europe as long as the allies believe 

they need to be there. 

If at some point the allies don’t feel we need to have the weapons 

there anymore, we should take them home. That is what happened 

in South Korea in the late 1980s. It is interesting now that some 

South Koreans are beginning to say they want the weapons back. 

They are never coming back, and we know that. 

So, again, if the allies believe this is important to their security 

and NATO is an alliance where the collective security is in 

everybody’s interest, we need to listen to all the members of the Alliance. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Mr. Chairman, may I just comment on that? 

Mr. TURNER. Yes, please. 

Dr. HALPERIN. The Central Europeans I talk to are much more 

concerned about their conventional military balance. They agree 

with Frank, as I do, that the real concern we have—and that we 

saw in Georgia—is whether the Russians can move conventionally 

along their borders, including against NATO countries. 

I am much more interested in our building up the credibility of 

our military presence in that part of the world, of our conducting 

exercises with the Poles and others on the border, and of finding 

ways to redress that local, tactical, conventional military balance 

which the Russians have shown us they do have and are capable 

of using, if not in NATO countries, at least in countries that are 

independent. 

And I think the lesson of the Cold War and of the period since 

the Cold War is that nuclear weapons are not a substitute for conventional military forces. They do not deter conventional action, either by nuclear powers or by non-nuclear powers, against nuclear 

powers, and I think we should be worried about the balance in the 

center of Europe. 

But the answer to that is not the few nuclear weapons we have 

in Western Europe; the answer to that is to take seriously that concern as a conventional military concern. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, I am going to take Mr. Miller’s comments 

about South Korea and expand this in the same genre for a moment. As we talk about the issues of reducing our strategic forces 

or our weapons in Europe, there are—beyond just our NATO allies—implications, both with those who would have confidence of 

our extended deterrence but also on whether or not they independently pursue nuclear weapons programs. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 

Japan, South Korea or others, may look to whether or not they feel, 

in the environment that they are in or with those nations that are 

now becoming nuclear powers, that they must independently pursue these programs. 

And if you would all comment on that for one moment, and then 

I am going to turn it over to Ms. Sanchez, and we will go to a second round. 

Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. Going back to the point that Frank made about South 

Korea and the call by some South Koreans for the nuclear weapons 

to come back, that is exactly the type of thing that we are seeing 
23 

in response to the new fears that various allies and friends have 

as a result of proliferation. 

North Korea obviously has a nuclear capability. There are fears 

that Iran may soon have a nuclear weapons capability and missile 

systems to match that and exactly, as a result of those types of developments, we are, indeed, seeing allies who are reconsidering 

their past commitment to be in a non-nuclear status. 

I don’t want to suggest that that is about to happen or, for example, that the Japanese are about to acquire nuclear weapons. I am 

not saying that. But what we do see is a very heightened concern 

by allies—key allies—and people in serious positions of authority 

who will say specifically that the directions that they are seeing in 

their region, the direction of nonproliferation they are seeing in 

their region, combined with the apparent U.S. interest in pulling 

back nuclear weapons, is of great concern to them and, in fact, they 

may have to reconsider their commitment to their non-nuclear status. We are hearing that explicitly from a number of allies and implicitly from others. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Again, I think we all hear from people in allied 

countries things that we are interested in hearing because those 

are the people we talk to in those countries. 

One of the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Commission 

was that we needed to fundamentally change the way we consulted 

with Japan on nuclear questions and that we should not move on 

the TLAM missile but, even more generally, on nuclear deterrence 

without genuine consultation with them. 

The Administration took up that recommendation. There were 

more extensive and serious consultations with Japan during the 

Nuclear Posture Review than we ever had before. 

And my reading from Japan, having visited there and talked to 

people in the Government and the defense establishment after the 

Nuclear Posture Review is that they were fully satisfied with the 

consultation in cooperation and were comfortable with all of the decisions that we had announced in the Nuclear Posture Review. 

To be fair, they were worried, as people in this room are, about 

what the next phase might be and wanted to be sure that they continue to be consulted. 

But I believe—and I think the European example shows it as 

well—that consultations with our allies about our nuclear forces, 

about how we plan to use those nuclear forces, about why we think 

they are credible, are as important to the effective credibility of our 

deterrent in dealing with the potential nuclear proliferation threats 

than the specific deployments and that we ought to continue to 

pursue both. 

Mr. MILLER. I think that the weapons that we have in Europe 

are weapons of war prevention. 

I obviously disagree with Mort. I think that the presence of those 

small number of weapons does symbolically raise the cost of a conventional attack on our NATO allies. I think that is why the allies 

believe they are so important. 

I believe the weapons in Europe have served an anti-proliferant. 

It has caused nations that could develop nuclear weapons not to do 

so. 
24 

I think in light of what is going on in Iran, withdrawing those 

weapons would send a signal which would cause people to lack confidence and to consider proliferating. And I think that our Far 

Eastern allies, Japan and South Korea, are also watching what we 

do with the NATO weapons when NATO allies have expressed a 

strong desire and a need to have the weapons forward. 

If we were to take them out, I think it would cause leaders in 

Tokyo and in Seoul to start questioning our commitment. And 5, 

10, 15 years down the road, we could have, we could have a proliferation situation in the Far East that I think would be very, very 

worrisome. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and, again, thank you, 

gentlemen. 

I think Dr. Halperin is probably correct in saying, you know, it 

depends on who you talk to on any given day as to how people feel 

about having our nuclear capability and, certainly, tactical weapons within Europe. 

And I just want to put for the record that, from my standpoint, 

one of the things that we are doing to reassure our allies within 

Europe is continuing as well as we can—considering we are also in 

two other wars, some would say three—to do forward-basing to put 

new bases in some of those countries in Romania, in Bulgaria, to 

move our troops out of the German line, if you will, and put them 

further south and further east in that area. 

So I think we are trying to, given the constraints that we have 

had on our military during what has been a very costly set of wars, 

that we have tried to do that, too. 

And given this concept that maybe what some of our NATO allies, especially the ones that used to be or were closer to the Soviet 

ring, that they view this whole issue of conventional warfare or 

somebody coming over their line—as we saw, for example, in Georgia, just a couple of years ago, that maybe that is what is making 

them want to hold onto this whole issue of strategic weapons. 

What other things do you think we could do, aside from nuclear, 

to assess and reassess and to build that confidence level with these 

former and, particularly, former satellites of the USSR? 

Dr. PAYNE. I agree with Mort in the sense that there are a number of measures that the United States can take to help reassure 

allies that don’t necessarily have anything to do with nuclear weapons. 

As a matter of fact, the Administration has talked about missile 

defense as helping reassure allies and, obviously, that is non-nuclear, and other non-nuclear forces and actions as well. And I agree 

with that. 

But let me suggest that, in a sense, there is no substitute for extended nuclear deterrence to nuclear weapons. You can’t provide 

extended nuclear deterrence with purely non-nuclear means. And 

so the question is, how important is the nuclear component of that? 

And this isn’t something that we can judge usefully from here because that judgment is made in foreign capitals. 

And I will respond a bit to Mort’s point that you—the answer you 

get depends on with whom you speak and so everything is all 

equal: I haven’t found that to be the case. I mean, what I have 
25 

found is very serious military and foreign affairs professionals who 

express the type of concerns that we have identified here. 

So I would like to suggest that I agree with Mort that there are 

a number of steps that we can take—close consultations, close cooperation on the conventional forces, a whole series of actions that 

we should and, in some cases, are taking to help affirm the allies’ 

confidence in the United States—but if you take the nuclear portion out of the deterrent, in a sense you are taking the pillar out 

from the building. I mean, the nuclear deterrent as part of extended deterrence is a key to the allied assurance with regard to 

U.S. commitment. This isn’t my interpretation; this is what many 

of them say. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Doctor, do you think that—and I will ask you 

both—but do you think that the number of nuclear weapons that 

we have based in Europe, is there an ability to eliminate some of 

those and still have that capability and that assurance to our allies, or must we have all the ones that we have there? Because 

there are definitely countries that—whose people and whose politicians no longer are thrilled about having them there. 

Dr. PAYNE. Congresswoman Sanchez, that is a great question, 

and I would only suggest that an answer that I might give isn’t 

worth very much because we want to go to the allies and see how 

the numbers affect their feelings of assurance with regard to the 

U.S. commitment. And so—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But I am not talking about their feelings now. I 

am talking about your—your knowledge of, are there actually some 

that we could eliminate and still have the coverage that we need 

should there be somebody coming across the eastern lines? 

Dr. PAYNE. Let me take the ‘‘feelings’’ word out this and say it 

depends on how the allies see it. In terms of the assurance that is 

provided by our nuclear weapons to our allies, the relationship between numbers and that level of assurance is all in their perceptions of the situation. So whether that number can come down and 

provide the same level of assurance is going to be in the perspective of our allies. 

And so some allies, I believe, would say those numbers can come 

down. Other allies, I think, would be very wary about the United 

States even coming down to the numbers at this point. 

And so that is why this is, in a sense, an act that is very challenging because we have a large alliance, and some allies feel very 

strongly about this issue. Other allies perceive the threat as being 

much more benign. And that is why I would put this in the context 

of an allied question, really not a question that we can answer here 

as well as we would like to. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Doctor. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Thank you. I would agree with that last sentence. 

The nuclear element is an important element of our deterrent and 

our assurance to our allies. The question is whether that requires 

the stationing of the weapons in the territory of the countries we 

are trying to defend or the alliance we are trying to defend. 

We have had credible nuclear assurance with Japan from the beginning without storage of nuclear weapons in Japan, because the 

Japanese did not want them. 
26 

We now have no nuclear weapons in Korea. I believe the credibility of our nuclear deterrent against a North Korean attack on 

South Korea is every bit as strong as it was before because there 

are large numbers of American troops in South Korea. And the 

North Koreans know that if they launch an attack with chemical 

weapons, or conventional weapons or nuclear weapons, they are 

going to kill lots of Americans and there is going to be a deterrent 

threat. 

I have always believed in Europe, the presence of American 

forces and the alliance conversations about both nuclear and conventional weapons were much more important than whether we 

had nuclear weapons here. 

I do want to go back into history because it is my understanding 

of the history that we were the ones who came up with the idea 

that nuclear weapons had to be stationed in Europe. 

It was not that our allies said we do not want your conventional 

forces unless we had nuclear weapons as well, but exactly the opposite. We said we are not sending our conventional forces unless 

they are accompanied with nuclear weapons. That is how it all 

began, and we have taught our allies to believe, because we believed, that the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe was necessary. 

This same debate with the same predictions of dire consequences 

occurred for every reduction from 6,500 to the current number. And 

every one of those moments, we were told exactly the same thing, 

talk to the right people in Europe, they will tell you this will have 

disastrous consequences. And the numbers have gone down steadily and, in my view, there have been no consequences because the 

Russians fully understand the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. 

I think it denigrates our commitment, and the understanding 

that our allies have of that commitment, to suggest that a few 

weapons in Europe somehow are an important part of the credibility of that deterrent. 

They are certainly no part, and here I want to be careful not to 

get into areas that we should not be discussing, but they are certainly no part of what we would actually do if there was a Russian 

invasion across the line. The notion that we would wait until those 

weapons were ready to begin to launch whatever defensive attack, 

including, if we thought it was appropriate, nuclear weapons—I 

think it is just wrong. 

We have weapons that are much more alert—if I can use that 

term—and if we decided nuclear weapons needed to be used, we 

would use. So this is not a matter of the operational need for those 

weapons in Europe because we might have some reason to want to 

deliver them from Europe rather than from submarines or 

from—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, I asked that in the context of, I remember 

last year, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman General James Cartwright said that, from a military point, there were probably 200 

U.S. tactical nuclear bombs stored in Europe that didn’t serve a 

military function that wasn’t already covered by other assets we 

had. 

So that was in my context of the fact that we have some NATO 

allies that have expressed very strong, to me, at different levels of 
27 

Government, have expressed very strong desires to, you know, 

some of this moved out whether, in fact, we can move some and 

still have the effect that we need from a deterrence standpoint. 

Mr. MILLER. Let me respond if I might. 

The first question you asked was, are there other things we can 

do to reassure the allies? Absolutely, we can. There are consultations. We can develop contingency plans to defend them. We can 

carry out exercises to make those contingency plans real. Unfortunately, some of the older allies in the Alliance have blocked our 

ability until very recently to even do that contingency planning, 

saying that it was not allowed. 

So the new allies were feeling pretty alone in that regard. We 

tried to do other things. We were blocked by some of the older allies. 

Second, the question of numbers of weapons and Jim Cartwright’s comment, I think, is not really the focus. Those weapons 

do not serve primarily a military purpose. They are weapons of war 

prevention and to reassure the allies. And I suppose it is true that 

you can get different views from people depending on who you talk 

to. You could walk through this building and get very different 

views. 

But, again, I hate to hold this [Active Engagement, Modern 

Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of 

State and Government in Lisbon, Nov. 19, 2010] up like it is Mao’s 

Little Red Book. But this represents not people you just talk to on 

the street, this represents what the NATO governments—all 28 of 

them, believe in. And what they said was, we will ensure that 

NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces and we will ensure the broadest possible participation 

of allies and collective defense planning on nuclear roles in peacetime basing of nuclear forces. 

So it is not just anybody; this is what the leaders of the alliance 

said just last November. 

I think that the situation in the Far East is different. History 

plays a role here. We do extended deterrence in the Far East by 

central systems, but there are weapons on the ground in Europe 

today. And if we took them out, we would be changing that situation, and the allies know it. 

Starting from scratch, could we have done it with strategic systems only? Perhaps. But we are not starting from scratch, we are 

starting from the history of those weapons being there since the 

1950s and with new allies joining the Alliance to be under their 

umbrella. So I think that is very important. 

I was present from the late 1970s in Government through 2005. 

I was deeply involved in many of the reductions from 7,000 to the 

current level. 

At no point in those did we have real allied concerns that we 

were going to change the situation. The allies concurred in the way 

we were doing it, as long as they were reassured that there was 

going to be some sort of a presence. 

And I will say in closing, Congresswoman, to your question, I 

think, and I said it before, I think it is morally wrong, I think it 

is morally failed, for those allies who wanted those weapons there 
28 

during the Cold War, wanted the United States homeland to be at 

risk to help deter a Soviet conventional attack on their soil, can 

now say that it is okay, we are several hundred kilometers behind 

the lines now, we don’t care what the guys who are on the line 

think. 

I think that is a failed moral policy of some those allies, and it 

is a complete and total disregard of what NATO is all about, which 

is collective security, not an individual nation’s point of view. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So let me ask you just a question for my own purposes. Do you, if you could start all over—let’s say you had a blank 

slate and you were thinking about nuclear capability and what we 

wanted to see in that arena, what would you put in? And I guess 

I am asking this question from a sense of, Where should we think 

about putting funds? Where should we be accelerating what we 

need to do in order to not only have confidence from our allies 

there but, really, deter? 

Mr. MILLER. I think it is pretty simple. The B–61 bomb needs to 

be modernized anyway. There is a program to do so. The B–61 has 

both tactical and strategic capabilities. It needs modernization; 

some money is going to that. 

We are buying the Joint Strike Fighter, the F–35. That is very 

important, too. It is going to have a nuclear capability, and allies 

are going to buy that fighter aircraft. 

So it is not a question of cost or buying new aircraft that they 

weren’t going to buy anyway. It is a question of having the political 

will to have a couple of nuclear weapons on their soil as part of 

a collective defense. 

The new allies would take nuclear weapons, but because we 

made a pledge in the late 1990s to reassure the Russians, we can’t 

put them there. So now it is back to the collective good. 

As to the numbers of weapons, it is more whether countries will 

stay in the basing role as to whether we can reduce the number 

that we have there. I personally think we can reduce the number 

that we have there as long as countries continue to base them. 

I think the last thing we can do is to ensure that we continue 

to tell the old allies that we have protected their freedom for four 

decades or more, that they have a moral responsibility to help protect the freedom of the new allies. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Doctor. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I have to say I have now reread the NATO Strategic Concept, and I don’t, I didn’t remember it saying and I don’t 

find it saying that there is an agreement that there is a requirement that nuclear weapons be based in Europe. I think on the— 

can’t turn. 

Mr. MILLER. Other page. Widest possible—peacetime basing in 

the United States. 

Dr. HALPERIN. No, it says. Frank, it says ensure the broadest 

possible participation, allies, in collective defense planning on nuclear forces. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Dr. HALPERIN. In peacetime basing of nuclear forces. 

Mr. MILLER. In peacetime basing of nuclear forces—in Europe. 

Dr. HALPERIN. No. 
29 

Mr. MILLER. It doesn’t mean in the United States and France 

and—— 

Dr. HALPERIN. It doesn’t say that. It says the broadest possible 

participation in collective defense planning. You know and I know 

there were people who want—— 

Mr. MILLER. Keep going. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I am going to keep going. And in command and 

control and consultation arrangements. It is the broadest possible 

participation in those things. 

Mr. MILLER. In peacetime basing among the three. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, I think we have noted your diverging 

opinions. 

Mr. MILLER. We disagree. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Any other thoughts, Doctor, before I go over to Dr. 

Payne. 

Dr. HALPERIN. No. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Dr. Payne, any finishing thoughts? 

Dr. PAYNE. The question with regard to the blank slate, again, 

I think is a good question. To answer that question, we do need to 

do, I believe, what Frank was getting at, and that is to go to the 

allies as an Alliance and see what they see as necessary for their 

assurance. 

Let me just add that I frequently hear it said that the credibility 

of our deterrent to Russia is strong without nuclear weapons in Europe, and Mort just made that point. I hear that frequently. And 

the implication is, therefore, we don’t need weapons in Europe. 

Or, I have heard the point that says that we don’t need to employ nuclear weapons deployed in Europe; therefore, we can pull 

our nuclear weapons out of Europe. Those are the two points that 

are frequently made in this regard. 

But let me just suggest that neither of those points are really 

pertinent. We don’t have nuclear weapons in this case. We don’t 

judge our nuclear weapons by how we grade their credibility to 

Russia for the purposes of assurance of allies and we don’t grade 

our nuclear weapons by whether they would be useful and employed; that is war planning. We don’t do war planning on this 

panel. 

What we are looking at is, what does it take to assure the allies 

of our commitment to their security? That is the number one question, and that has very little to do with these other points that are 

often made. 

And so I think this Administration has done a good job in going 

to allies and done serious consultations with them on this question. 

The only thing that I would suggest here, in conclusion, is that I 

would hope that once we take those consultations, we actually act 

upon them and don’t act unilaterally in ways that these key allies 

who have joined NATO for this purpose or for this reason find very, 

very alarming—because, in a sense, it is the United States backing 

out of both treaty and moral commitments that we have made. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, certainly, I know that this Administration 

has worked very hard and we are very fortunate to have Ellen 

Tauscher over there working. She has got a very good working relationship with our European allies and they, to a large extent, 

trust her on a lot of these issues. 
30 

I know that this committee has worked very hard. We have made 

trips, even though we get slapped around for going to Europe to 

talk to our allies when, you know, when we are switching up or 

changing some ideas in particular with respect to missile defense 

that we have really, you know, worked hard to go and reassure and 

talk about what we really see. And I hope that we continue to work 

in a very bipartisan manner to do that. 

We are—I don’t think any of us are suggesting let’s pull everything out of the land over there. I think we are just trying to, in 

a time of very limited budgets and, you know, I mean, that is why 

we are at a standstill right now, even in trying to raise this debt 

limit. 

At a time of limited budget, we are trying to figure out where 

do we—where is the strategic place for us to be, given that we can’t 

do everything anymore? I mean, we can’t do everything. We just 

can’t do it anymore, so we have to just be smarter and that is why 

we ask you, what do you think is the best way for us to move forward? 

So I thank you for being before us. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. 

Let me start with a question about the Nuclear Posture Review. 

In that review, the Administration mentions as a subject for study 

for future reductions the effort of exploring new modes of ICBM 

basing. When they say for possible reductions, that fascinates me. 

Can you tell me what in the world that means? 

Dr. HALPERIN. I have been, I have been asking about that, and 

I am told there was one person somewhere in the Pentagon who 

had this, an interest in this and somehow got the sentence in when 

people weren’t paying attention. 

As far as I can tell, there is no—there is no serious interest in 

this. Nobody is thinking about new modes. I mean, that seems to 

be a reference to rail mobile—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Not putting on family cars, things like that? 

Dr. HALPERIN. No, no. Rail mobile is something we have thought 

about from time to time for many years. There are many things uncertain about America, but that we will never have rail mobile ballistic missiles, I think, is a certainty. It is not going to happen. 

There are many statements in the Nuclear Posture Review to 

worry about, but I would not worry about that one. You have my 

assurance. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, okay. I am glad you are comforted by all of 

that. 

Well, anyway, let me ask you about the nuclear triad. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 4, the 

Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense James Miller stated that the 

upcoming deterrence review would proceed consistent with what he 

called the ‘‘principles’’ of the Nuclear Posture Review. 

One important conclusion of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

was that the triad should be preserved. But in an interview published that same day, White House official Gary Samore suggested 

that this deterrence review would look at whether we should elimi-
31 

nate one of the legs of the triad. And some might wonder, therefore, which of the conclusions the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] 

the Administration considers definitive, and which parts of the 

NPR are subject to change. 

The NPR reaffirms that each of the legs of the triad has unique 

characteristics in terms of assurance, survivability, visibility, 

upload potential, accuracy, and ability to penetrate defenses. And, 

of course, I agree with that. 

So remind us if you can—and if those that are in the Administration are listening—what are some of the respective virtues of each 

leg of the triad, and I will kind of ask that as a broad question to 

each of you. 

Dr. Halperin, if you want to begin. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Well, let me say, I think before you came in, Mr. 

Franks, I said very clearly what I have always believed: It would 

be a mistake to open the question of whether we should move away 

from the triad. 

I believe that for foreseeable levels of nuclear forces, we should 

maintain the triad and that each of them does have different characteristics. 

The most important, in a way, is that what you worry about 

some catastrophic failure that you wake up some morning and discover, you know, three missiles exploded on the launch pad and 

you suddenly realize there is a technical flaw, and you have got to 

take them all down and fix them. Or you suddenly discover the 

Russians know where our submarines are, or that you conclude 

that their air defenses are so good that no bomber will ever get 

through. 

The essential point is it is possible to conceive of one system having a catastrophic failure like that. If you are a real worrier, you 

can conceive about two systems going out simultaneously. But 

three cannot, you know, then we get to the law of averages. They 

may all go out over time, but not at the same time. 

So just for that reason, it seems to me—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Just redundancy alone. 

Dr. HALPERIN. It is redundant. It gives you flexibility on how you 

can use them. You may be in a situation where you don’t want to 

fire from the land, but you feel willing to fire from the sea. You 

can imagine many different characteristics of the systems. 

But in my view, the most important one is that unexpected 

vulnerabilities, if they arise, are going to arise probably in only one 

system. It is one of the reasons why—because the other vulnerability we are worried about is suddenly discovering none the 

weapons work, and it is why the modernization of our weapons infrastructure is so important and finding ways to test the systems 

without nuclear tests is so important, so we don’t wake up one day 

and discover the weapons failed. 

But if we have three delivery systems in several different weapons, then I think we can be pretty confident that enough of it is 

going to work to deter. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller, I might expand on that a little. All things being 

equal, do the virtues of a triad become more or less relevant at 
32 

lower nuclear numbers? And if you want to expand on the question 

that I asked Dr. Halperin, that is fine, too. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. I believe that they do become more important at lower numbers. I think Mort has adequately has beautifully 

described the various attributes of the triad: Offsetting capabilities, 

offsetting vulnerabilities, offsetting failure modes, different signaling capabilities in a crisis or pre-crisis period. And as the force 

comes down, you absolutely want to have the capability in three 

legs to offset a failure mode in one leg. 

So I think that is absolutely essential. It is why I think the Administration really needs to be a lot more transparent with the 

Congress and the American people as to what it intends to do with 

the air breathing leg, with the bomber force, and with the ICBM 

force. 

I would also say that there is almost a fourth leg that is 

unremarked upon, and that is Prompt Global Strike. We have been 

talking about prompt global strike for probably 6 or 7 or 8 years, 

and all we have deployed are more and more PowerPoint® slides. 

We could break that ceiling. We could have in place a system based 

on Trident in about 3 years. 

The Senate held that up for a long time because it argued that 

was destabilizing. It asked the National Academy of Sciences to do 

a study on that. The National Academy came back and said this 

isn’t a problem. But we still haven’t moved forward. We are still 

studying to find the best of the best of the best systems. So that, 

I think, is a fourth component to an overall strategic triad. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, not to beat the question to death but, Dr. 

Payne, can you give me some idea of what you think the elimination of a leg of the triad would do to strategic stability of the 

United States? 

Dr. PAYNE. Well, to the extent that stability is based on the character of our force posture, it would ease, or potentially ease, an opponent’s efforts and strategy to get around our deterrent by reducing the survivability of our forces, by reducing those characteristics 

that Mort and Frank so nicely described. I mean, the whole point 

of having those characteristics isn’t just because we like to collect 

characteristics for forces, it is because they are extremely important because in toto what they do is they deny an opponent any 

plausible strategy for getting around our deterrent. And as you pull 

the legs of that triad down, you reduce that ability to deny them 

a theory of success, as it is called. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, of course, I couldn’t agree with you more. I 

could try, but I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Then, am I to assume, essentially, that this talk of removing a 

leg of the triad is just some low-level person in Administration that 

slipped that line in there somehow, right? And the person’s name 

is not Obama; correct? 

Mr. MILLER. We are all private citizens. I don’t think we can 

comment authoritatively. 

Mr. FRANKS. I was just trying assure myself here a little bit. All 

right. Well, thank you, all very much, and we appreciate your service to the country. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, I am going to ask you a wrap-up question that goes to the role of Congress. 
33 

Doctors Payne and Halperin, you participated in the Strategic 

Posture Commission, which actually called for, as a part of its recommendations, renewed congressional involvement and dialogue 

between the executive and legislative branches. 

Now, Dr. Halperin, you noted the one source of administration 

angst and veto threat motivation is executive prerogative. 

Mr. Miller, you said in your written testimony and in your statements here that both the Senate and House need to be more active 

and have deeper involvement in nuclear and strategic issues. 

So I thought we would take a moment and end on your collective 

thoughts on how the executive and legislative branches should be 

working together and how the House of Representatives might reinvigorate its robust oversight of these important issues. 

Mr. Miller, since it was actually in your written testimony, I will 

start with your thoughts. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, sir. 

I want to commend you and Ms. Sanchez for having these hearings and for doing that. I was a creature of the executive branch 

for 28 years. Some of my trips up here were more pleasurable than 

others, shall we say. But it was always important. 

The Congress has to be involved in these issues because it is 

through the congressional involvement that, in fact, the American 

people see a broader picture of all of this and, therefore, I strongly 

support a reinvigorated series of hearings and having the Congress 

say that these are important issues, that nuclear weapons may 

have a reduced role or a smaller role in our national strategy than 

they have had in the past. But they are, by God, truly important 

subjects on which the life of the Nation could depend at some point 

and a vigorous public debate to put these issues out into the open 

and to examine the Administration’s promises and its actions is 

terribly important. 

So I would commend you for that. And as I said in my written 

testimony, I think the Section 1051, where you are asking the commanders, the nuclear commanders, to provide you annual reports 

is terribly important. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Halperin. 

Dr. HALPERIN. I have always been and remain a very strong believer in Congress’ equal role in this. I noticed in your back room, 

you had the right section of the Constitution up on the wall. 

I think Congress does have the power to make rules and regulations for the Armed Forces and that the Armed Forces cannot 

spend a penny that they don’t get from the Congress. So I think 

it is clear this is and should be an equal relationship, and I would 

hope it would be one that was not marked by suspicion and by, in 

effect, a struggle to find differences or to exaggerate differences. 

I think you need to understand every administration has different people in it who say different things because they are engaged in debates within the Administration about one subject or 

another and that they are appealing to different audiences. And so 

I think it is important to remain calm and to engage in a dialogue 

which is open in both directions. 

So, as I have said, I think it is important that we not have a 

study which assumes the purpose of the study is to reduce the 

numbers, but I think it is also important to have a study in which 
34 

people are not saying in advance, but if you leave open the possibility that you are going to say a lower number is okay, that there 

is something wrong with that. 

I think my own view is that the nuclear forces should have a 

very high priority within the defense budget. Put a different way, 

I cannot imagine the defense budget, even in the current climate, 

going so low that we should not spend every penny which increases 

the credibility and effectiveness of the nuclear force. 

And so I don’t think there should be a fight about funding. I 

think we need to fund what we say we are going to fund, and I 

need to—we need to honor the sequencing that we committed ourselves to when the treaty was ratified. 

But I think within that, there is scope for debate about whether 

we should change some elements of the way we operate the force 

to make it more stable and more secure. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Payne, in addition to answering that question, 

since the clock was running during your opening, if there are additional comments that you would like to add in closing, you may 

take that opportunity now. 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The first part of the question was, I think it is between the Congress and the executive branch, and I am very encouraged by the 

hearings that you and Ranking Member Sanchez have put together. They strike me as enormously important and, I hope, something that will be continued; particularly your willingness to ask 

the questions and then asking the second and third order questions, because the answers to these types of questions can get 

somewhat arcane. The language isn’t all agreed upon. There are 

different buzzwords. It is not easy to have a clear understanding 

of this area, but I want to compliment you all on having hearings 

that have really brought this material out, and I would just say 

more of that would be great. 

I think that is one area that was somewhat lacking in the past 

and moving on to hearings that really get into these issues. And 

I am not talking about nuclear employment issues. Obviously specific questions about nuclear employment aren’t for public discussions. But that is not necessarily all that is important. In fact, in 

the types of things we are talking about, it doesn’t necessarily pertain. 

Being able to ask the question of what is your theory of deterrence? What do you think deters, and why do you think the forces 

that you have talked about that you either want or don’t want, will 

deter or assure the allies, or provide persuasion, or any of the other 

number of goals that these forces are supposed to support? 

And so I guess the bottom line of the comment that I am making 

is, more transparency in all of this is much better than the lack 

of transparency, and you have a prerogative with the power of the 

purse strings to ask these questions in very direct ways and insist 

on transparent answers. I think that would help, that would help 

enormously. 

And as for maybe the last 30 seconds that you graciously offered 

me, I would just like to suggest that when we look at future reductions, I didn’t say that there is no room for future reductions. There 

may well be room for future reductions. 
35 

What I did try and point out is, just because people now claim 

that we can have a retaliatory capability at lower numbers doesn’t 

equate that there is room for future reductions. That is an absolute 

non sequitur. Because how we judge the value and adequacy of our 

forces isn’t just based on whether we have the number of forces 

necessary to meet some targeting requirement. 

Reassurance to the allies has its own set of requirements. Extended deterrence of the allied—of our allied enemies, enemies of 

our allies, has another set of requirements. So the set of requirements that helps us get to a real understanding of our strategic 

force needs is much beyond what might be considered appropriate 

for some employment policy. That is only one—in fact, I would say 

that is only one small part of the answer. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, I want to thank you again. This has 

been a great discussion, and thank you for your important contributions to an issue that I think we all believe goes right to the 

heart of our national security. 

So, thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What do you think should be the appropriate level of our nuclear 

arsenal to meet our requirements for deterrence and nuclear defense? 

How should the Executive Branch determine ‘‘how much is enough’’ to deter a nuclear attack on the homeland or against our allies, what are the assumptions upon 

which those judgments are made, and how, if at all, should we adjust nuclear deterrence requirements to reflect 21st century realities? 

Have we ever had a fresh look that was not tied to simply reducing the number 

of weapons from Cold War levels, but rather based on what we really need to deter 

our adversaries? 

Dr. PAYNE. ‘‘How much is enough’’ for deterrence depends on the opponents, 

threats and circumstances US deterrence strategies are intended to address. These 

factors are not fixed and can change rapidly. Correspondingly, the answer to the 

question ‘‘how much is enough’’ also is subject to frequent and rapid change—there 

can be no enduring, fixed answer in terms of the number of warheads and launchers. In general, because US deterrence requirements can change as rapidly as the 

threat conditions and circumstances, the most important characteristic of the US arsenal for deterrence purposes is its ability to adapt rapidly to changing requirements across the spectrum of pertinent opponents and contingencies. Consequently, 

the number and qualities of the US arsenal for deterrence purposes should be 

shaped by the requirement that the US force structure be sufficiently flexible and 

resilient to adapt to a wide-range of plausible threats. This suggests the need for 

a diverse force of sufficient size to be so flexible and resilient. 

There have been several official reviews of US nuclear requirements that do not 

appear to have been so tied to simply reducing the number of weapons from Cold 

War levels. These reviews include the 1994, 2001 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews. In addition, the 2009 report of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture 

Commission on which I served made numerous recommendations regarding arms 

control, but was not simply tied to reducing force numbers. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As we modernize the nuclear weapons complex and build new billion dollar facilities for producing new plutonium pits and uranium secondaries for 

nuclear weapons, should we be thinking about how to incorporate verification capability in the event nuclear weapons capabilities are ever subject to arms control 

agreements? Why/why not? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes. For the purposes of transparency we should think about the potential benefits, costs and risks of incorporating such verification measures, as well 

as the prospects for strict reciprocity by at least Russia and China in doing so. 

Thinking about this issue now could help US negotiators to understand the implications of moving in this direction before they engage in discussions of the subject. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We learned earlier this year that Russia already has met most of 

its arsenal reduction obligations under New START. The State Dept. reported June 

1 that Moscow was below the treaty’s limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads 

and 700 deployed delivery vehicles and close to the 800 limit on launchers. The 

United States does not currently plan to reach these limits until 2018. 

In addition, Russian nuclear policy expert Alexei Arbatov has warned that Russian nuclear weapons might fall well below New START levels in the next few 

years, potentially to 1100 or 1000 warheads, and that Russia is designing a new 

heavy ICBM with MIRV capability to build back up to New START levels. 

How would this affect strategic stability? How might US nuclear posture and signals affect this decision? 

Would you agree that rather than induce Russia to build up, it is in the security 

and financial interests of both countries to pursue further, parallel reductions in 

their strategic nuclear forces and to cut the size of their non-deployed reserve stockpiles? 

Dr. PAYNE. Prior to the ratification of the New START Treaty, it was obvious from 

the open Russian press that the number of Russian deployed warheads and launchers would not be reduced by the Treaty ceilings. Russian forces already were moving 

to lower numbers due to natural aging and withdrawal of the systems. This is why 
90 

Treaty skeptics rightly argued that the treaty effectively requires unilateral warhead and launcher reductions by the United States. 

It also is clear from the open Russian press that Russia has robust nuclear modernization programs that will lead to the deployment of a variety of new Russian 

nuclear weapons later in this decade, primarily after the term of the New START 

Treaty. It appears that this Russian nuclear buildup has been in process for years 

and that even the recent US unilateral reduction in tactical nuclear weapons and 

the US unilateral reductions called for by the New START Treaty have not dampened Russia’s nuclear modernization programs. This Russian nuclear buildup is not 

induced by US behavior, but by Russia’s felt-need to meet its many and varied security requirements via heavy reliance on modern nuclear capabilities, including visa`-vis China. 

It certainly is in US and Russian interests to have the lowest number of forces 

compatible with each country’s respective security requirements. And, it is my hope 

that Russia will reduce the size of its very large tactical nuclear arsenal—an arsenal 

that is approximately 10 times the size of the comparable US arsenal. However, because Russia has significantly different security requirements than does the United 

States, and sees great value in its continuing nuclear modernization programs, the 

prospects for Russian acceptance of further deep parallel reductions are limited, as 

is the prospect for Russian acceptance of negotiated deep reductions in the number 

of Russian deployed warheads or in the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Last year, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright has acknowledged, that the approximately 200 U.S. tactical nuclear bombs 

stored in Europe do not serve a military function not already addressed by other 

U.S. military assets. Do you agree/disagree? Is there any contribution to nuclear deterrence that could not be achieved by our strategic weapons? 

Dr. PAYNE. I have no reason to disagree with Gen. Cartwright’s statement. However, the lack of an immediate military function for US nuclear forces in Europe 

has little to do with the value of these forces for extended deterrence and the assurance of allies. Deterrence and assurance are political and psychological functions— 

the value of nuclear weapons for these missions is largely in their non-use, not their 

military employment per se. In this regard, US nuclear forces located in Europe certainly appear to be important for the continued assurance of some key NATO allies 

and the continued presence of US nuclear forces in Europe may contribute uniquely 

to the credibility of deterrence in plausible scenarios. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under what likely scenarios would the US tactical nuclear weapons 

in Europe be used, and in what situations would they be preferable over other existing weapons, including conventional and strategic nuclear weapons? 

Dr. PAYNE. I would prefer not to speculate about actual nuclear employment options or to compare those options to the employment of non-nuclear forces. My focus 

is on the deterrence of war. Whether or how nuclear forces would be employed for 

military purposes may have little direct relevance to their potential value for the 

deterrence of war and the assurance of allies. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How relevant are the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to Russia’s security calculations? To what extent might the Russians see the presence of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as an excuse for inaction on addressing their own 

tactical nuclear arsenal? 

Dr. PAYNE. Russia’s requirement for tactical nuclear weapons clearly is not driven 

by the number or presence of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. According to 

numerous open Russian discussions of tactical nuclear weapons, Russia’s conventional forces are far from adequate to defend Russia’s extensive borders, including 

against conventional attacks. Russia essentially has chosen to rely on tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for the inadequacies in its conventional forces to defend its borders. Russian doctrine specifically leaves open the option of using tactical 

nuclear weapons to defend Russia’s borders against conventional attack. Consequently, I do not believe the removal of the relatively small number of remaining 

US nuclear weapons in Europe would have any effect on Russia’s felt-need to maintain a large number of modern tactical nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In 2008, the Air Force conducted a Blue Ribbon Review and found 

security to be insufficient around some of the sites where U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are likely based in Europe. Allies apparently made security adjustments. Since 

then, protestors breached security at Klein Brogel Airbase, where some of these 

weapons are thought to be stored. To what extent should nuclear security and terrorism be considered in a decision to remove or reduce the tactical nukes? 

Dr. PAYNE. Maintaining the security of US nuclear forces should be a priority consideration at all times and circumstances. 
91 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What do you think should be the appropriate level of our nuclear 

arsenal to meet our requirements for deterrence and nuclear defense? 

How should the Executive Branch determine ‘‘how much is enough’’ to deter a nuclear attack on the homeland or against our allies, what are the assumptions upon 

which those judgments are made, and how, if at all, should we adjust nuclear deterrence requirements to reflect 21st century realities? 

Have we ever had a fresh look that was not tied to simply reducing the number 

of weapons from Cold War levels, but rather based on what we really need to deter 

our adversaries? 

Dr. HALPERIN. We have not had a fresh look at the requirements for deterrence 

since the end of the cold war. We need such a review asking for each potential adversary what forces are necessary to deter nuclear attacks on the United States or 

other countries that we protect from nuclear attack with our forces. We need to understand that a major part of the deterrent of such attacks is our capacity and will 

to respond promptly with conventional forces. Our nuclear forces should be seen as 

a backup. The level of nuclear forces that are needed is difficult to specify in advance. I am confident that the number we need for this purpose is well below 1,000 

total weapons both deployed and non-deployed. Whether we can go to such numbers 

would depend on whether the Russians would agree to the numbers and whether 

we can reach some agreement with China. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you explain the link between nuclear non-proliferation and 

progress on nuclear arms control? 

Dr. HALPERIN. I believe that over time there is a direct link between nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Unless the US and Russia (who still possess more 

than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons) continue to reduce their forces and decrease their reliance on nuclear weapons the non-proliferation regime could come 

apart. The most important step we could take now would be to ratify the CTBT and 

bring it into existence. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As we modernize the nuclear weapons complex and build new billion dollar facilities for producing new plutonium pits and uranium secondaries for 

nuclear weapons, should we be thinking about how to incorporate verification capability in the event nuclear weapons capabilities are ever subject to arms control 

agreements? Why/why not? 

Dr. HALPERIN. We need to be thinking hard about how to verify existing stockpiles 

and production facilities both in the US and Russia as well as new facilities which 

we are building. If we are to get to agreements on total stockpile levels below 1,000 

we will need new ideas for verification. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We learned earlier this year that Russia already has met most of 

its arsenal reduction obligations under New START. The State Dept. reported June 

1 that Moscow was below the treaty’s limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads 

and 700 deployed delivery vehicles and close to the 800 limit on launchers. The 

United States does not currently plan to reach these limits until 2018. 

In addition, Russian nuclear policy expert Alexei Arbatov has warned that Russian nuclear weapons might fall well below New START levels in the next few 

years, potentially to 1100 or 1000 warheads, and that Russia is designing a new 

heavy ICBM with MIRV capability to build back up to New START levels. 

How would this affect strategic stability? How might US nuclear posture and signals affect this decision? 

Would you agree that rather than induce Russia to build up, it is in the security 

and financial interests of both countries to pursue further, parallel reductions in 

their strategic nuclear forces and to cut the size of their non-deployed reserve stockpiles? 

Dr. HALPERIN. A Russian decision to build a new heavy ICBM would reduce strategic stability. To ward this off the United States should announce that it will meet 

the START levels as soon as possible and give a timetable for that. We should also 

consider proposing an amendment to the START Treaty to provide for lower levels 

of deployed warheads and delivery systems leaving all other aspects of the treaty 

in place. Alternatively we should propose to the Russians that we each go to a lower 

level by mutual restraint without amending the treaty. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Last year, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright has acknowledged, that the approximately 200 U.S. tactical nuclear bombs 

stored in Europe do not serve a military function not already addressed by other 

U.S. military assets. Do you agree/disagree? Is there any contribution to nuclear deterrence that could not be achieved by our strategic weapons? 

Dr. HALPERIN. I agree with Gen. Cartwright. The weapons deployed in Europe do 

not, in my view, make any contribution to deterrence not achieved by our strategic 

forces. The decision to remove the remaining weapons should be made by the NATO 
92 

alliance by consensus but the USG should state this conclusion as the official position of the American government. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Affirming that ‘‘As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,’’ and that ‘‘The supreme guarantee of the security of the 

Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those 

of the United States,’’ the November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, unlike its 1999 

predecessor, made no mention of non-strategic weapons forward deployed in Europe. 

In addition, German, Dutch and Belgian government officials have called for the removal of forward-based tactical nuclear weapons at bases in these countries. 

With tactical nuclear weapons no longer appearing to be a unifying, but rather 

a divisive, element within NATO, what alternatives are there to demonstrate US 

resolve to defend European allies that could replace the political value of tactical 

nuclear weapons in Europe? 

Dr. HALPERIN. We need to discuss what we should do if a decision is made to remove the remaining nuclear weapons. We should commit to continuing close consultations on our nuclear posture and to maintaining a significant conventional military presence in Europe. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under what likely scenarios would the US tactical nuclear weapons 

in Europe be used, and in what situations would they be preferable over other existing weapons, including conventional and strategic nuclear weapons? 

Dr. HALPERIN. There are no conceivable scenarios in which the weapons now in 

Europe would actually be used. They are not available for immediate use as are our 

strategic weapons and our conventional forces. They have no operational role. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How relevant are the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to Russia’s security calculations? To what extent might the Russians see the presence of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as an excuse for inaction on addressing their own 

tactical nuclear arsenal? 

Dr. HALPERIN. I do not think our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe play any significant role in Russian security calculations. I also do not think that removing 

them would have any significant impact on the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In 2008, the Air Force conducted a Blue Ribbon Review and found 

security to be insufficient around some of the sites where U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are likely based in Europe. Allies apparently made security adjustments. Since 

then, protestors breached security at Klein Brogel Airbase, where some of these 

weapons are thought to be stored. To what extent should nuclear security and terrorism be considered in a decision to remove or reduce the tactical nukes? 

Dr. HALPERIN. Concerns about nuclear security and terrorism as well as the costs 

of guarding against them should be primary considerations in deciding whether to 

remove the weapons. A successful penetration by a protest group could generate 

strong public demands to remove the weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. There have been some criticisms that the US decision to retire the 

TLAM–N (Nuclear Tomahawk) prompted concern in Japan. Can you shed more light 

on this and how would this inform the process and consultations with our NATO 

allies and East Asian allies on extended deterrence? 

Dr. HALPERIN. I visited Japan both during and after the NPR. I am very confident 

that the Japanese government and private analysts understood the rationale for the 

USG decision to retire the TLAM–N and that it did not prompt any concern in the 

context of exceptional consultation between the two governments. The lesson is to 

fully consult and to explain the options we are considering and listen carefully to 

the responses of other governments. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What do you think should be the appropriate level of our nuclear 

arsenal to meet our requirements for deterrence and nuclear defense? 

Mr. MILLER. U.S. deterrence policy must be based on assessing the goals and valued assets of our potential adversaries. We must threaten to destroy, if attacked, 

the assets which a potential enemy leadership would rely on to dominate a postwar world. In the case of authoritarian states, this often includes military forces, 

the ability to control their own country (thus including leadership, intelligence, and 

internal security forces), and the industrial potential to sustain war. This intellectual template must be fleshed out by continued and focused intelligence and scholarship on the value structure of every potential enemy leadership which would threaten nuclear attack or major aggression against the United States or our allies. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How should the Executive Branch determine ‘‘how much is enough’’ 

to deter a nuclear attack on the homeland or against our allies, what are the assumptions upon which those judgments are made, and how, if at all, should we adjust nuclear deterrence requirements to reflect 21st century realities? 

Mr. MILLER. As noted above, we must determine ‘‘how much is enough’’ by understanding what assets potential enemy leaderships value and then holding those as-
93 

sets at risk. This construct is as true in the 21st century as it was in the 20th century, although the specific assets to be held at risk may differ from historical models. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Have we ever had a fresh look that was not tied to simply reducing 

the number of weapons from Cold War levels, but rather based on what we really 

need to deter our adversaries? 

Mr. MILLER. The major review of U.S. nuclear war plans carried out by the 

George H. W. Bush administration and the Nuclear Posture Review conducted by 

the George W. Bush administration both focused on what was needed to deter potential adversaries. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As we modernize the nuclear weapons complex and build new billion dollar facilities for producing new plutonium pits and uranium secondaries for 

nuclear weapons, should we be thinking about how to incorporate verification capability in the event nuclear weapons capabilities are ever subject to arms control 

agreements? Why/why not? 

Mr. MILLER. I am no longer sufficiently well versed in nuclear weapons production 

techniques to be able to provide the sub-Committee with a useful answer in this regard. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We learned earlier this year that Russia already has met most of 

its arsenal reduction obligations under New START. The State Dept. reported June 

1 that Moscow was below the treaty’s limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads 

and 700 deployed delivery vehicles and close to the 800 limit on launchers. The 

United States does not currently plan to reach these limits until 2018. 

In addition, Russian nuclear policy expert Alexei Arbatov has warned that Russian nuclear weapons might fall well below New START levels in the next few 

years, potentially to 1100 or 1000 warheads, and that Russia is designing a new 

heavy ICBM with MIRV capability to build back up to New START levels. How 

would this affect strategic stability? 

Mr. MILLER. The Russian government is evidently content that strategic stability 

is not endangered, from its standpoint, by having reached the New START levels 

well before the United States. We should not try to second-guess their judgment as 

regards the sufficiency of Russian strategic nuclear force levels. From an American 

perspective, I cannot believe Russia’s having reached the New START levels before 

we have poses any issue for strategic stability. I would, however, regard Russian 

development and deployment of a new heavy ICBM as a destabilizing act and I 

would urge the Russian government not to do so. As for Mr. Arbatov’s assertion, 

this could either be a ploy to frighten American policy makers into further reductions they may not deem in America’s interest or another example of heavy-handed 

Russian bluster. If it in fact turns out to be true that Russia builds a new heavy 

ICBM it will tell us that Russia places little regard on U.S. views of strategic stability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How might US nuclear posture and signals affect this decision? 

Would you agree that rather than induce Russia to build up, it is in the security 

and financial interests of both countries to pursue further, parallel reductions in 

their strategic nuclear forces and to cut the size of their non-deployed reserve stockpiles? 

Mr. MILLER. No. I believe we need to continue to deploy whatever sized nuclear 

deterrent meets US national security objectives as described above in my answer 

to question 1. If the New START levels exceed those U.S. requirements we should 

consider negotiations to pursue additional reductions. If our requirements cannot be 

met below New START levels we should not pursue further reductions as those 

would endanger our national security. The Russian government is perfectly capable 

of determining for itself whether its nation requirements are met by the level of 

forces it currently fields. Strategic stability is a far more important goal than lower 

numbers. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Last year, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright has acknowledged, that the approximately 200 U.S. tactical nuclear bombs 

stored in Europe do not serve a military function not already addressed by other 

U.S. military assets. Do you agree/disagree? Is there any contribution to nuclear deterrence that could not be achieved by our strategic weapons? 

Mr. MILLER. I have enormous respect for my friend Jim Cartwright. I believe he 

meant only to indicate that the military task assigned to U.S. nuclear weapons 

based in NATO can be met by other U.S. systems. Of course nuclear weapons are 

different from any other type of weapon and have primarily a political role. The political roles of our NATO-based weapons—reassurance of allies and deterrence of potential adversaries from ‘‘limited aggression’’ against NATO—cannot be fulfilled by 

U.S. strategic weapons. Those political roles—influenced deeply by the long and 
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unique history of NATO nuclear policy and politics—can only be achieved through 

the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons ion NATO soil. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under what likely scenarios would the US tactical nuclear weapons 

in Europe be used, and in what situations would they be preferable over other existing weapons, including conventional and strategic nuclear weapons? 

Mr. MILLER. The assurance and deterrent values of our nuclear weapons in Europe are used every day. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How relevant are the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to Russia’s security calculations? To what extent might the Russians see the presence of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as an excuse for inaction on addressing their own 

tactical nuclear arsenal? 

Mr. MILLER. The obscenely bloated size of the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal 

cannot be justified in the 21st century in any way. It is risible to state or conclude 

that the small U.S. NATO-based nuclear stockpile threatens Russian security in any 

way, much less that it is an excuse for Russia to deploy today a tactical nuclear 

arsenal at least 10 times the size of NATO’s. The intent of Russian policy—which 

seeks the total eviction of U.S. nuclear weapons from NATO soil—is to undermine 

and destroy NATO allies confidence in the U.S. security guarantee to the Alliance 

and to increase their own ability to intimidate NATO members with the nuclear 

saber-rattling the Russian government has repeatedly indulged in over the last several years. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In 2008, the Air Force conducted a Blue Ribbon Review and found 

security to be insufficient around some of the sites where U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are likely based in Europe. Allies apparently made security adjustments. Since 

then, protestors breached security at Klein Brogel Airbase, where some of these 

weapons are thought to be stored. To what extent should nuclear security and terrorism be considered in a decision to remove or reduce the tactical nukes? 

Mr. MILLER. The 2008 Air Force study was intended to bolster the view of those 

elements in the U.S. Air Force who sought the return of all U.S. nuclear weapons 

from Europe. The subsequent 2008 Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear 

Weapons Management (also known as ‘‘the Schlesinger Task Force’’) reviewed the 

security of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe from an objective perspective and concluded that security at our nuclear sites in NATO Europe was adequate as of that 

time but urged that improvements be made when and if required by new threats. 

I believe the Air Force is taking those recommendations seriously and acting on 

them. 

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