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SJC-11703

RANDY A. BRITTON vs. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS.

April 30, 2015.

Board of Bar Examiners. Attorney at Law, Admission to practice.

On May 12, 2006, Randy A. Britton applied for admission to 

the Massachusetts bar, and he took and passed the written bar 

examination in July of that year. Based on information in his 

application, including his responses to questions concerning his 

employment history and involvement in litigation, and the 

pendency of his application for admission to the Connecticut 

bar, the Board of Bar Examiners (board) interviewed Britton and 

then stayed further investigation pending a final determination 

on the Connecticut application. After Britton withdrew that 

application, the board resumed its investigation, appointed

special counsel to assist in the investigation, and thereafter 

conducted a hearing to inquire whether Britton "is of good moral 

character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications" to 

warrant his admission to the bar. G. L. c. 221, § 37. See 

S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). 

Britton was the sole witness at the hearing. The board 

determined that he was not qualified for admission and 

recommended that the petition be dismissed. S.J.C. Rule 3:01, 

§ 5.3, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). Britton 

petitioned the county court for a hearing on his application, 

raising a variety of constitutional, statutory, and other 

challenges to the board's decision. After a hearing, a single 

justice issued a very thorough memorandum in which he carefully 

addressed and rejected each of Britton's challenges. The single 

justice thus denied Britton's application and dismissed his 

petition. We affirm for essentially the same reasons stated by 

the single justice.
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1. Facts. In his application, Britton disclosed that he 

had been "wrongfully terminated" by two employers, and that he 

had brought multiple lawsuits involving separate incidents 

against former employers, attorneys, police officers, and a 

media outlet alleging, among other things, wrongful termination, 

violation of civil rights, defamation, breach of contract, 

malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. In addition, he 

reported that his application for admission to the Connecticut 

bar had been pending since 2004. The board's investigation 

revealed additional involvement with the legal system and other 

matters, which he had failed to disclose in his application.

a. Failures to disclose. In support of his application, 

Britton submitted three letters of recommendation. One of those 

letters was from an attorney who had obtained a criminal 

complaint against Britton and whom Britton had sued. After 

investigation, the board determined that the criminal complaint 

was dismissed with an order that Britton pay restitution, and 

that the civil matter was settled under terms requiring the 

attorney to provide a positive letter of recommendation. In his 

application, Britton stated that the attorney had written the 

letter "[i]n an effort to minimize the damage he has done." The 

board found that Britton attempted to mislead it as to the 

nature of the recommendation.

In addition, the board's investigation revealed that 

Britton twice had been charged criminally. Although neither 

charge resulted in a conviction, Britton failed accurately to

disclose his criminal history as the bar application required. 

Likewise, the board found that Britton failed to disclose a 

civil complaint he had filed that unsuccessfully challenged the 

denial of his request for a firearms identification card and a 

license to possess an assault weapon. Finally, the board 

determined that Britton violated his "continuing duty" to 

disclose relevant information by failing to report that he had 

filed a petition for redetermination of a tax deficiency with 

the United States Tax Court. See Rule V.1.2 of the Rules of the 

Board of Bar Examiners (2010).

b. Litigation history. The board found that Britton has a 

substantial history of initiating pro se legal actions, the 

majority of which have been unsuccessful, and some of which have 

resulted in sanctions or an order to pay restitution. Among 

other things, in 2007, Britton removed an action brought against 

him and his spouse by a condominium association in the Concord 

Division of the District Court Department to the Federal 

District Court in Boston, where it was promptly remanded with 
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the observation that "attorney's fees and costs are appropriate 

because the Brittons lacked anything remotely like an 

objectively reasonable basis for removal." On remand, the judge 

dismissed Britton's counterclaims, which included claims of 

Federal mail fraud, attempted extortion, G. L. c. 93A 

violations, and other claims, and awarded attorney's fees and 

costs to the plaintiff.

In 2005, Britton brought an action against the city of 

Lawrence and its police officers for false arrest, civil rights 

violations, malicious prosecution, and other crimes, arising out 

of criminal proceedings against him that eventually were 

dismissed. The civil case was dismissed, in part because of 

Britton's "history of disregard of his discovery obligations, 

and . . . for his disobedience of the [c]ourt's . . . order." 

After multiple requests for extensions of time, his appeal also 

was dismissed.

In 1993, Britton commenced an action in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking 

damages in excess of $50 million against a former employer and 

others, claiming that he had been wrongfully terminated, and for 

breach of a settlement agreement. He subsequently commenced a 

second action arising out of the same facts, adding additional 

parties. After the actions were consolidated, and the second 

action was stayed, Britton nonetheless continued to issue 

subpoenas in the second case, resulting in an order not to issue 

subpoenas or document requests without leave of court. The 

first action was resolved adversely to Britton, and the second 

action was dismissed. His appeals were unsuccessful. Britton 

disclosed only the first action in his application.

c. Unauthorized practice of law. In October, 2007, a 

reviewing committee of the Connecticut Statewide Grievance 

Committee found that Britton had engaged in the unauthorized 

practice of law in Connecticut.

2. Discussion. We accord deference to the board's 

recommendation, but it is ultimately this court's responsibility 

to determine an applicant's fitness to practice law in the 

Commonwealth. See Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91 (1996), 

citing G. L. c. 221, § 37. That determination requires 

consideration of the public interest, Matter of Prager, supra, 

and "[a]ny significant doubts about an applicant's character 

should be resolved in favor of protecting the public by denying 

admission to the applicant." Matter of an Application for 

Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 393, 397 
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(2005), quoting Matter of Prager, supra at 100. We have said 

that "[c]andor with the board is essential. 'It is the 

obligation of an applicant to assure the members of the board 

and, ultimately, this court that he or she possesses the

necessary qualification to practice law in the Commonwealth. 

Such a showing requires a full and exhaustive disclosure of 

prior wrongdoing, including all relevant circumstances 

surrounding the conduct, both militating and mitigating, and 

official documentation where appropriate.'" Strigler v. Board 

of Bar Examiners, 448 Mass. 1027, 1029 (2007), quoting Matter of 

Prager, supra.

Britton's conduct in filing multiple lawsuits that have 

resulted in sanctions or orders to pay costs and fees and in 

repeatedly failing to comply with court orders demonstrates lack 

of respect for the judicial process. See Desy v. Board of Bar

Examiners, 452 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2008); Matter of an Application 

for Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, supra at 398. 

Likewise, Britton's failure to disclose relevant and material 

information, both in his application and during the board's 

investigation, shows a marked lack of candor. See Strigler v. 

Board of Bar Examiners, supra, citing Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 

Mass. 448, 456, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 919 (1998) (failure to 

fully answer "is a powerful indication that the applicant lacks 

the good character required for admission to the bar"). See

also Rule V.1 of the Rules of the Board of Bar Examiners, supra

("There shall be a rebuttable presumption that nondisclosure of 

a material fact on the candidate's application[s] to the bar, 

law school or undergraduate school is prima facie evidence of 

the lack of good character"). Britton's conduct in Connecticut 

is consistent with the conclusion that he lacks the necessary 

character and fitness for admission to practice here.

There is no merit to Britton's claims that the board's 

proceedings were defective or unlawful. Although he claims that 

the board "illegally" circumvented sealed record and criminal 

offender record information statutes in the course of its 

investigation, the single justice properly concluded that the 

statues neither prohibit the type of investigation conducted by 

the board nor forbade the board from inquiring into his criminal 

history. See Corliss v. Board of Bar Examiners, 437 Mass. 1023, 

1024 (2002) ("We would expect the board to inquire into the 

background of applicants who present a criminal history . . . 

[and], on discovering inconsistent statements and 

misrepresentations in an application, to conduct a more thorough 

investigation . . ."). Moreover, there is nothing to suggest 

that the board considered Britton's history to be evidence of 
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misconduct: rather, it was his failure to disclose that 

history, and the explanation he gave for omitting the 

information, that demonstrated a lack of candor. Whether a bar 

applicant is of good moral character and fitness "is a most 

serious issue," and "[q]uestions exploring this issue are not to 

be answered by gamesmanship." Matter of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 

295 (2004). Finally, the record amply supports the single 

justice's observation that Britton's criminal history was 

obtained by the board through his own disclosures, including 

disclosures in Connecticut, and publicly available court 

filings. See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the 

Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 653 (1978) (information that is 

publicly accessible not protected criminal offender record 

information).

We also reject Britton's claim that the board failed to 

provide him with adequate constitutional safeguards in the 

investigation and hearing process. Britton was given ample 

notice of the board's formal hearing, and was provided in 

advance of the hearing with the character and fitness report 

prepared by the board's special counsel. He had a "full and 

fair opportunity to present evidence in support of his case and 

to call witnesses, including those identified in the special 

counsel's report." Desy, 452 Mass. at 1014. No more is 

required. While the proceedings were lengthy, there is nothing 

to suggest that either the process itself or the duration of the 

proceedings amounted to a due process violation. Indeed, as the 

single justice concluded, "[t]he time (and expense) needed to 

discover that which [Britton] should have disclosed is 

attributable entirely to [Britton], not to the board."

On the record before us, therefore, we are "left with grave 

doubt about [Britton's] present character and fitness to 

practice law. We resolve that doubt 'in favor of protecting the 

public by denying admission.'" Desy, supra. Britton has not 

met his burden of demonstrating that he presently "possesses the 

necessary qualification to practice law in the Commonwealth." 

Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 100. See Matter of an 

Application for Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, 444 

Mass. at 398, quoting Matter of Prager, supra (applicant has 

burden "of demonstrating that his admission to the bar would not 

be 'detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration 

of justice, or the public interest'"). As the board found, 

"Britton's disregard for the rules and standards by which the 

legal system operates and for which the legal process is 

structured, show his unwillingness to conduct himself with 

respect for the law and his inability to use sound judgment in 
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conducting professional business." This, coupled with his 

demonstrated lack of candor, amply supports the board's 

recommendation that the application be denied.

3. Conclusion. The decision of the single justice denying 

Britton's application for admission to the bar, and dismissing 

his petition, is affirmed.

So ordered.

Randy A. Britton, pro se.

Sara Gutierrez Dunn (Robert G. Jones with her) for Board of 

Bar Examiners.