### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 16 -CR

St e ve n Ra y C line , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B URNET COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 9451 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES J. H EARN , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Steven Ray

Cline appea l s a fe l o ny

conviction for dr iving while intoxicated as enhanc ed by

two prior convic tions. Af t er ap p ellant was c onvicted by a jury, the jury

assessed punishment at twenty

y ear s’ conf

inement an d a $10,000 fine . I n four points of er ror, a ppellant
c ha lle ng e s th e de nia l of

his mot ion

fo r c on tin

ua nc e and the a dmi ssi on

of e vid e nc e rel atin g to h is prior convic tions and ext rane ous conduct. F or the re asons that follow, we aff irm the conviction. Be cau s e ap p el l an td o es n o tch al l en ge t h e s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce , o n l y

a recitation of the fa cts rele vant to the issues on appe al is nece ssary . Appellant wa s arr ested on January 17, 2002, for dr iving wh ile intox icated w hen his vehicle collided with another vehicle. A

ppellant’s vehicle struc k the re ar of

the other ve hicle, which was stopped in a left-hand lane waiting for a brea k in traff ic to make a

left turn. At the sc ene, appellant acknowledg ed to law enforce ment personne l that he wa s driving the vehicle that rea r-e nded the other

vehicle. A

ppellant also told Depa

rtment of2

Public Safety

trooper Cha d Pernec ka that his name w as Roy ce N eal Cline, that he w as alone in the
ve hic le , an d that he ha d not b e e n d ri nk ing . B e c a

us e a pp e lla nt s me lle d o f a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e s, his ba lanc e wa s uns te a dy , h is e y e s w e re re d a nd g la ssy , a nd he was be lli g e re nt, Pe rn e c ka be g an to
a dmi n is te r s ta

n d ar d s o b r ie ty te s ts
. A lt

h o u g h a p p e ll an t h a d e ar li e r d e c li n e d me d ic a l tr e a tm e n t, he tol d th e tr oo pe r h e ne e de d a do c tor and wa nte d to be take n to the ho sp ita l. Appellant wa s transported to the emer g ency room of Seton Hig hland L akes H ospital by EMS. The reg istered nur se who tre ated a ppellant testified that he c omplained of knee pain but
was unc ooperative in his t re at m en t . He r emoved his splints and intravenous ne edle, a nd left the
emer g ency

room befor e he could be treated and discharg ed. Appellant wa s arr ested in the pa rking lot , p re pa ri ngto l e a ve a s a

pa sse ng e r i n a

no the r i nd ivi du a l’ s v e hic le . H e wa s b oo ke d in to t he ja il g iving his brother ’s name, Royce Cline.

At trial, appe llant was pre sent for voir dire an d j ury selec tion but failed to appe ar when tria l commence d. He wa s not present for the re mainder of

the trial. The jur

y convicted appellant of

third-deg ree felony driving while intox icated, a s enhanc ed by prior convic tions. He was later a pprehe nded and the trial court imposed sente nce a s assessed by the j ury . This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Motion for Continuan ce

Th e ba sis fo r ap pe lla

nt’ s motio n f

or c on tin ua nc e wa s th a t th e State ha d in su ff ic ie ntl y put appellant on notice of the State’s intent to s ee k an aff irmative finding of a de adly wea pon, his witnesses “ar e cur

rently unavailable ,” he ha d inadequate time to prepa re f or trial, and he wished to dischar ge h i s d efe nse attorne y . He f iled his first motion for continuance four da y s befor e the3

commence ment of trial. The trial co u rt d en i ed the moti on on the same date. Appellant r eurg ed his mot ion on the same da y his trial was sche duled to commence . The trial c ourt ag ain denied the motion. We reviewthe t rial court’s denial of a mot ion for continuance f or abuse of discre tion. Ro ss v . S tate , 133 S.W
. 3 d 618, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). To prese rve e rror , a motion for continuance must be sworn and in writing
. De wbe rry v . S tate , 4 S.W .3d 735, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Article 29.06 provides that whe n a mot ion for continuanc e is based on the absenc e of a witness, the written motion must state, among other infor mation, the witness’s name a nd residenc e, the dilige nce use d to pr ocure the witness’s attendanc e, and the materia l f acts expected to be proved by the witness. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 29.06 (W es t 2 0 0 6). Appe llant’s written motion contained none of the re quired witness infor mation. Mo re ov e r, dil ig e nc e in t

he tim e lin e ss o f a

mot ion fo r c on tin

ua nc e is r e qu ir e d a s w e ll as dilige nce in pr ocuringthe presence of witnesses. Id .; De wbe rry , 4 S.W .3d at 756. Appellant’ s motion was filed four da

y s befor e trial, did not ide ntify the witnesses that we re una ble to appea

r nor show any diligenc e to support the motion. Nor did he assert t he respect in which the witnesses we re
un a va ila ble or tha t th e ir re sid e nc e s w e re un kn ow n. Al tho ug h a pp e lla nt a lso a sse rt e d th a t th e State did not put him on notice of its int ent to seek a

n aff irmative finding of a de adly wea pon, that he had inadequate time to prepa

re for trial, and that he further wished to disc harg e his attorney , the motion fa ile d a s w e ll t o d e mon str a te any su pp or t f or the se ba re a sse rt ion s. On the first da

y of trial, appe llant r eurg ed his motion, arguing that, since the motion
wa s d e nie d, his de fe ns e att orn ey ha d a c tua lly

iss ue d a su bp oe na fo r a wi tne ss who wa s p re se nt i nThe wit n es s for whom c ounsel soug ht a writ of attachment wa s prese nt in court at the 1 be g inn ingof

the tr ia l. 4 c ourt , b ut c ou ld n ot loc a te an in div idu a l kn ow n a s Jam e s, or Str e tc h, wh o w a s a

mate ri a l w itn e ss. On the sec ond day

of trial af ter jury selec tion but before the jury had bee n sworn, appellant failed to appea r in court. His c ounsel orally rene wed the motion for continuance to investigate appe llant’s dis a pp e ara nc e . T he tr ia l court de nie d both mot ion s. Ev e n if w e we re to c on sid e r t he or a l mo tio ns , they do not satisfy

article 29.06. The application for subpoena s came only four da y s befor e trial a

nd
c ouns e l w a ite d unti l th e State ha d r e ste d to se e k a wr it o f atta c hme nt. Appellant has failed to make 1

a sh ow ingof

any dil ig e nc e us e d in

loc a tin g or

ob ta ini ngthe a va ila

bil ity of wi tne sse s. Moreove r, appe llant failed to show the r eleva nce or ma te r ia li ty o f th e a b s e nt w it n e s s’s testimony , and has the ref ore not shown a ctual pre

judice fr om the denia l of the c ontinuance. See Ro ss , 1 33 S.W. 3d

a t 62 9; Va sq ue

z v . S tate , 67 S. W.3 d 2 29 , 2 40 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); see als o He ise lbe tz v . S

tate , 906 S.W .2d 5 00, 511-12 (Te x . Crim. App. 1995) (to establish an a buse of discretion base d on denial of a continuanc e, def endant must show he wa s prejudice d by his counsel’s inadequate pre paration tim e). W e conc lude that the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’ s motion for continuance . We overrule appellant’ s first point of err or.
Adm ission of Evidence

I n his remaining points of err or, appe llant complains of the admission of evide nce of prior convictions (State’s Ex hibits 7 and 9), medical r ecor ds showing the results of a blood- alcohol test and re citing that appellant “wa s arr ested in par king lot” a

nd was “ escor

ted to police ca

r” ( State’s5

Ex hibit 10), a copy

of appellant’ s driving rec ord (State’s Ex hibit 6), and testimony by a fing erpr int
e x p e rtl i n k i n g p e np a c k e te v i d e n c e t o a p p e l l an tt o e s t a

b l i s h h i s i d e n t i t y. We review a trial c ourt’s dec ision on the admissibi lity of evide nce f

or an a buse of dis c re tio n; a

tr ia l c ourt

a bu se s it s d isc re tio n w he n its de c isi on fa lls ou tsi de “ the zon e of re a so na ble disag ree ment.” Sa laz ar

v . S tate , 3 8 S.W .3 d 141, 15 3- 54 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); se e als o S or to
v . S t ate , 1 7 3 S
. W
. 3 d 469, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The test for an abuse of discre tion is not whether , in the opinion of the revie wing court, the f acts pre sent an a

ppropriate case for t he trial court’s a ction; rather , it is a question of whether the cour t acted w ithout refer ence to any g uid ing rules or principles, and the m ere fac t that a trial c ourt may decide a matter

within its discretionar

y authority differ ently

than an a

ppellate c ourt does not demonstrate such an a buse. Mo ntgom e ry
v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on re h’g ).

Any err or in admitting e vidence must have bee n prese rved by a prope r objec tion and ruling
. Et hin gto n v . S

tate , 819 S.W .2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The objec tion must have been timely

and include the proper basis for the objection unl ess t he particular g round wa s appar ent from the c ontext
. Lan k

sto n v . S tate , 8 27 S.W. 2d 90 7, 90 8- 09 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Spe c if ic objections are require d to pr eser ve err or in or der to a ffor d the trial cour t the opportunity

to rule and
a llo w the op po sin g c ouns e l an op po rt un ity to r e me dy

the de fe c t and

su pp ly oth e r t e sti mony . Ru le 33.1(a) (1)( A) re quires that an obje ction state the g rounds for the ruling being soug ht “with sufficie nt specific ity

to make the tria l court aw are of the complaint, unless the spec ific g rounds wer e appa rent from the context.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (a )( 1 )( A)
. I n Lankston , the cour t held that, under the pr e de c e sso r t o Ru le 33 .1 , “ no te c hn ic a l c on sid e ratio ns or fo rm of wo rd s” are ne c e ssa

ry and that a ll6

that is require d is to “ let the trial judg e know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clea

rly enoug h for the judge to unde rstand him at a time when the tr ial court is in a prope r position t o do something a bout it.” Lankston , 827 S.W .2d at 909. Making the trial cour t awar e of the complaint require s that both the grounds and what is beingobjected to be appar ent. Hernande z
v . S tat e , 599 S.W .2d 614, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on re h’g ).
1. Prior c onv ic tio ns I n his second point of er

ror, a ppellant complains that t he S tate included e vidence of his prior convictions beyond that nece ssary to show the exist ence of a prior conviction as an e lement of th e o f f e n s e an d th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s p r e ju d ic ia l in v io lati o n o f T e xa s Ru le o f E v ide nce 403. Specifica ll y , a

p p e ll an t c o n te n d s th a t b e c a u s e th e e xh ib it s c o n ta in e d a f in d in g th a t a

p p e ll an t ha d violated the ter

ms of his probation and wa s order ed to serve a term of 30 day s in jail (Exhibi t 7) and in c lu d e d te r ms o f a p le a b ar g a in im p o s in g a f iv e - y e ar s e n te n c e (Exh ib it

9 ) , b o th in p r io r D WI
c on vic tio ns , th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti ngthe se po rt ion s o f t he re c or ds
. Appellant complains that the probative value of the exhibi ts was g reatly outweig hed by the pr e jud ic ia l ef

fe c t of a dmi tti ngthe m in to e vid e nc e . Witho ut c iti nga uth or ity , a

pp e lla nt a sse rt s that “the f

act that a prior convic tion was a fe lony , th e t er m s o f any plea ba rg ain, the sente nces imposed, and whe ther probation was g rante d, violated, or re voked do nothi ng to make a conseque ntial fac t more or less probable , and ar e thus irre levant and pr ejudicial, and the trial court
err ed in admitting this evidenc e.” B y making only

conclusory

asser tions in hi s brief, a

ppellant has failed to mee t this burden.7 Relevant e vidence is defined a s “evide nce having any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fa c t th a t is of

c on se qu e nc e to t

he de te rm inatio n o f the a c tio n mor e pr ob a ble or le ss p ro ba

ble than it would be without the evidenc e.” T ex. R. Evid. 401. Relevant e vidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweig hed by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or by considerations of undue delay , or nee dless prese n t at ion of cumulative evide nce.” Tex. R. Evi d. 403. Be cause only unfairly prejudicia l evidence is ex cluded, tr ia l c ourt s “ sh ou ld f

a vo r a dmi ssi on in c los e c a se s, in ke e pin g wi th the pr e sumpt ion of a dmi ssi bil ity of relevant evidence.” Mo ntgom e ry , 8 10 S.W. 2d a t 38 9. As lon g a s th e tr ia l c ourt op e rate s w ith in the boundar ies of its discretion, i t s d ec i s i o n will not be disturbed on appea l. Mc Fa rla nd v . S tate , 84 5 S. W.2d 82 4, 83 7 (Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 391. Moreove r, the opponent of a piece of evidenc e, appellant in this case , has t he burden to demonstrate not only the prejudicia l nature of

the evidenc e but also that these ne g ative attributes substantially outweig h any probative va lue. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 377.

The State ha d the burde n to prove, be y ond a re as o n able doubt, it s enhanc ement para g raph a s allege d i n t h e char g ing instrument. Se e Fl owe rs v . S tate , 220 S.W .3d 919, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); W ill iam s v . S

tate , 980 S.W .2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1998, pet. ref

’d). Whil e no require d method of proof is se t out by statute, a judgme nt a nd sentenc e,
o r t heir func tional equivalent, may suffice
. Se e Mi tc he ll v . S tate , 8 4 8 S. W. 2 d

9 1 7 , 9 1 8-19 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1993, pet. re f’d) (finding that an abstra ct of judg ment was the f un cti onal equivalent of

a judg ment and sente nce)
.8 A p rior convic tio n c an b e pr ov e n b y the int ro du c tio n o f a

“ pe n p a c ke t,” wh ic h is the docu m en t co m p iled by a prison off

icial base d upon other primar y documentation that he ha s
rec eived f rom the cle rk of the c onvicting c ourt. Fl owe rs , 2 20 S.W. 3d a t 92 3 n .1 4; Cud

dy v . S tate , 107 S.W .3d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2 0 0 3 , n o p et
. ). A pe n packe t is admissi ble to show a defe ndant’s prior c riminal rec ord provided it is proper ly authentica ted. Re e d v . S

tate , 811 S.W .2d 582, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Certification by the re cord c lerk of the Texas Depar t m en t of Criminal J u s t i ce, I nstitut ional Division constitut es prope r authe ntication of the c opies of the j u d gm en t and sentenc e found in a pen pac ket. Id. Under

the ana ly sis set forth in B e c k v . Stat e , 719 S.W .2d 205, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), a pen packe t must not only prove t h e e x istence of a c onviction but also link t hat conviction to the def endant. The Bec k court re asoned,
We have c onsistently

hel d that a prior c onviction alleg ed for enhanc ement or a conviction as a

part o f prior c riminal rec ord of a defe ndant under

Article 37.07

. . . ma y b e e s ta b li s h e d b y c e rti f

ie d c o p ie s o f a ju d g me n t an d a s e n te nce a nd authenticated copies of

the Texas Depa

rtment of Corre ctions rec ords including fing erpr ints, supported by expert testimony identifying them as identical with known pr int s o f t he de fe nd ant.
Id . at 209. The c ourt held admissible the ce rtified copie s of a judg ment an d s entenc e and the authenticated re cords of

the Texas Depa

rtment of Corre ctions. Id . at 210-11. I n this instance, both challeng ed exhibits wer e ce rtified and a uthenticated a s require d by Texas Rules of Evidenc e 901 and 902. See Tex. R. Evid. 901 (authe ntication) and 902(4) (se lfauthentication of cer

tified copies of

public rec ords). Appe llant does not challeng e the certification of the re cords but that they contain pre

judicial information.9 State’s Ex hibit 7 shows evidenc e of a prior conviction and includes a c o p y o f t he judgme nt and orde r of pr o b at i o n as we ll as an orde r for commitment to the county jail, which contains a f

inding that a

ppellant had violated the terms of his probation and was orde red to ser ve a term of 30 day s in

ja il
. St a te ’ s E xh ib it

9 a ls o s h o w s e v id e n c e o f a p r io r c o n v ic ti o nan d

in c lude s the jud g me nt cont aini ngthe te rm s o f a ple a ba rg a in a nd the se nte nc e imp os e d, i.e ., fi ve y e ars ’ confine ment and a fine of $500. Appellant has c ited us to no authority that this information included in a pe n p a c ke t or

c e rt if ie d c ourt re c or ds is i nad mi ss ible . M or e ov e r, a pp e lla nt d id n ot o ff

e r t o stipulate to prior DWIconvictions nec essar y to prove a

felony DWI nor did he see k to reda ct any information he believed to be unduly prejudicia l. Se e Tam e

z v . S tate , 11 S.W .3d 198, 202-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (State cannot ref use defendant’ s offe r t o stipulate to prior DWIconvictions
nece ssary to prove a felony DWI ). The trial court did not abuse its discre tion by admitting the pe n packe ts relating to appellant’s pr ior convictions. We overr ule appe llant’s second point of e rror . 2. Medical Records Appellant complains in his third point of error that the medica l re co rds i ntroduce d at trial improper ly

ref ere nce the results of a blood-a lcohol test perf ormed by hospital personnel a

nd
are ina dmi ssi ble he ars ay

and a lso ina dmi ssi ble un de r T e xas R ule of Ev ide nc e 40 3. I n h is f

ourt h point of err or, althoug h appellant c ontended g ener ally at trial that the e x hibit “contains prejudicia l state me nts in h e re ” wi tho ut part ic ula ri zing , on ap pe a l he co nte nd s tha t the state me nts in t he me dic a lrec ords exhibit , i.e., that appe llant “was a rre ste d in parkinglot” and wa s “esc orted to police c ar,”
wer e inadmissible under Rule 403.10 State’s Exhi bit 10, the medical-r ecor ds exhi bit, consisted o f an affidavit by the c us tod ian o f r e c or ds fo r S e ton Hi g hla nd L a ke s Me dic a l Ce nte r, wh o a lso te sti fi ed at tria l,
aver ring that the attac hed re cords wer e t ru e and c orre ct copies of hospital recor ds and kept in the regular c ourse of

business; emerg ency

room records; a c onsent for tre atment; a phy sician re cord; and prog ress notes. On one pag e of the rec ords, notes indicate that appellant took his “I V out,” lef t befor e being discharg ed, and “wa s arr ested in par king lot (w ife wa s driving) .” At anothe r point, the
rec ords indicate that the patient is “uncoope rative,” “police he re,” “pt esc orted to police c ar via WC ,” “pt re fused to si g n” instructions g iven verbally by nurse a nd a fur ther indication that appellant was in stable condition.

After Bonny Woods, S eton’s h e a lt

h in f o r ma ti o n ma n a g ement mana g er a

nd document custodian, testified a

nd the documents we re a dmitted over appe l l ant’s objec tion that the rec ords
wer e g ener ally

prejudici al , contained hear say , and that the State ha d failed to e stablish a proper predic ate f

or business re cords, Car ol Ba ssy , the hospital’s medica l technolog is t, te s ti f ie d to h e r d uties “re ceiving , collecting , maintaining and testing samples of patients’ blood.” She also testified that she re ceive d the sample of a ppellant’s blood and tested i t. She testified t o the results of t he test that showed a ppellant’s blood-a lcohol content and that the test was doc umented in the medica l rec ords that contained h er i n i t i al s and the date on which the te st was conduc ted. B oth Woods , as the
c us tod ian of

re c or ds , a

nd B a ssy , a s th e wi tne ss who pe rf or me d th e te st, we re qu a lif

ie d to te sti fy

to the authenticated re cords. Te x . R. Evid. 902(10)(a ) (business re cor d s acc ompanied by aff idavit); 803(6) ( business rec ords not excluded when mee t criteria as shown by

testimony

of custodian or oth e r “ qu a lif

ie d w itn e ss” ); Mo nto

y a v . S tate , 832 S.W .2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1992,11

no pet.) (notingthat ev en i f witness who a uthenticated r esults of urine dr ug scre ening was not custodian of recor ds, he appear ed to be a “ qualified witness,” as used in for mer Rule 803(6) ). In any
ev en t , b ec au s e t h e r es u l t s o f t h e c o mp l ai n ed -o f b l o o d -a l c o h o l t es tca m e i n t o ev i d en ce t h ro u gh Ba ssy ’s testimony

without objection, any err or in the admission of the exhibi t is cured. Se e Va lle

v . S tat e , 1 09 S.W. 3d

50 0, 50 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); se e als o Led ay v . S tate , 983 S.W .2d 713, 718 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) (“ Our ru le
. . . is that ov e rr uli ngan o bje c tio n to e vid e nc e wi ll n ot r e su lt i n
reve rsal w h en other such e vidence was re ceive d without objection, either be fore or af ter the complained- of ruling .”).

As to the s tatements reg ardingappellant be ing a rre sted in the parkinglot and escor ted to the police ca

r, appellant objects on appea l that the s tatements are hearsay and “since t hey have no probative va lue as to his g uilt, they are unduly prejudicia l and should have be en excluded pursua nt to T e x. R. E vid . 4 03 .” I n o rd e r t o p re se rv e e rr or for app ell ate re vie w, the re mus t be a tim e ly and spec ific trial objec tion. See T e x. R
. A p p . P. 33 .1 ; DeBl anc v . S tate , 799 S.W .2d 701, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Moreove r, the c omplaint on appeal must comport with the trial objec tion, or nothing is presente d for r eview. Se e Re za c v . S tate , 782 S.W .2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Whe n a n e xhibi t c on ta ins bo th a dmi ssi ble and ina dmi ssi ble mate ri a l, t he ob je c tio n mu st s pe c if

ic a lly ref er to the m ater ial deeme d objectionable. Be ltran v . S tate , 728 S.W .2d 382, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 87 ); Hernande

z , 599 S.W .2d at 617. In Hernande z , the Texas Court of Criminal Appe als held that fai lu r e to s p e c if

ic a ll y r e f e r to th e in a dmi s s ib le p arts o f a p e np a c k e t i n tr o d

u c e d a t t h e p u nishment phase f ailed to pre serve the er

ror in admitting the entire pe n packe t. 599 S.W .2d at 617.12 Appellant wa s require d to make an objection with suf ficient specific ity that the trial court could be awa

re of what he was complaining about. Be cause the initial hearsay objection was to the entirety

of the medic al re cords that a re State’ s Ex hibit 10, the objec tion was too g ener al and insuffi c ie n t to in f

o r m th e tr ia l c o u rt o f th e b a s is o f th e o b je c ti o n . N o r c an w e s ay that the inadmissible m at er i al whi ch for ms the basis of the objec tion is apparent f rom the conte x t. The
me dic a l r e c or ds c onta ine d a pp ro xima te ly

te n p a g e s o f e ntr ie s pro pe rl y a uth e nti c a te d a s b us ine ss
rec ords, and the c omplained-of e vidence consists of two brief phrases. W e conc lude the er ror wa s not preser ved. Moreove r, eve n assuming a ppellant’s hea

rsay objection wa s s ufficie nt to preser ve
e rr or , g ive n the c on te xt of the state me nts in the e xhibi t and the te sti mony of the tr e a tin g do c tor , th e se statements wer e made by medical personnel for the purpose of di ag nosis and treatment. See Te x. R. Ev id. 80 3( 4) . A lth ou g h a pp e lla nt c omp la ine d o f c e rt a in i nju ri e s, his a c tio ns we re inc on sis te nt w ith
any de sir e fo r t

re a tme nt. Gre g Meador testified that he was the e merg ency room phy sician on duty

J anuar y 17, 2002, when a

ppellant first arr ived at the hos pital at approx imately 8:00 p.m. on a stretc her. Me ador testified that appe llant complained tha t his “leg hurt.” When Mea dor orde red a n x -ra y on both of appellant’ s knees, a

ppellant insisted there w as nothing wrongwith him. As Meador was c ompleting his pa perw ork, he lear

ned that appellant had left the hospital. He testified in re sponse to questioning by the prosec utor: Q. Was he dis c ha

rg e d at th a t po int ? A. No , h e wa s n ot.Trooper Pernec ka testifi ed that after he advised a ppellant of his rig hts and reque sted a 2 br e a th o r b loo d s pe c ime n, a pp e lla nt “ ba sic a lly

kin d o f f lip pe d o ut. Ime an, he fe ll o n th e fl oo r, sa id he nee ded a doc tor. We went to the jail personne l and said he’ s reque sting a doctor, he ’s having so me ty pe of a lle rg ic re a c tio n, hi s kne e is hur tin g . So we c a lle d E MS at th a t po int , b ro ug ht E MS in and he wa s transported ba ck to the hospital.” 13 Q. Why

no t? A. Well, sometime very quickly afte r me sitti ng down to fill out my paper work, somebody

said wher e is that g uy

on the s tretche r? I turned around, he was on one of our hall stretche rs, and he was gone . And, y ou know, essentially Iwas normally g oing to f

ill out di schar g e instructions, rec ommend whateve r I rec ommended, and he was g one. And I think there we re of

fice rs in the depar tment at that time and they had bolted out the bac k door and the n I hear d a little bit later that they caug ht him in t he par

king lot. This testimony

came into evidence without objection. I n connec tion with thi s initi al treatment, the nurse’ s notes on State’s Exhi bit 10 state t hat appellant left without being discharg ed and w as ar rested in the parkinglot. Meador testified t hat appellant returne d to the emerg ency room later that evening fo r a dd iti on a l tr e a tme nt. I n response to questioning, Mea dor testified a lso without obj ection: 2
A. He wa s very

theatric al. Ag ain, I see on my notes—it seems like Ireme mber him say ing like I

can’ t use my

left side, I ’m para ly

zed. When I was doingthe te sti ngthe re wa s n o in dic a tio n th a t th e re wa s any pr ob le m with his a

bil ity to m o v e h i s muscles, his streng th was appr opriate. I essentially

said that, sir, y ou kn ow , Idid

n’ t c ome up wi th a

ny thi ngwr on g the fi rs t ti me Isaw you so Ire a lly do n’ t thi nk

—you kn ow , I do n’ t fi nd any thi ngdif fe re nt at th is p oin t. Th e on ly th ing Ic an te ll you is h e wa s a

little bit mor e pe c uli ar i n h is behavior at that time.
Me a do r t he n o rd e re d a

blo od te st to a sse ss a

pp e lla nt’ s a lc oh ol le ve l and c he c ke d h is m oto r f un c tio ns . Af te r d e te rm ini ngit w a s sa fe to r e tur n a pp e lla nt t o ja il, Me a do r wro te th at app ell ant “ wa s a ble to stand and wa s discharg ed in g ood condition.”14 That appellant was “esc orted to police car ” following his r eturn to t h e e m er g ency
ro om i s con si ste nt w itha dmi ssi on of the e vid e nc e fo r d ia g no sis and tr e a tme nt. I n a

ny e ve nt,
a pp e lla nt d id n ot d e mon str a te that th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e wa s o ut wei ghed b y its pr e jud ic ia l natur e . We c ann ot s ay that th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

a dmi tti ngthe state me nts which we re inc luded within State’s Ex hibit 10.
3. DP S Driv ing

Re c ord Ap pe lla nt a lso c omp la ins in his thi rd po int of e rr or that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in
a dmi tti nga

c o p y o f a p p e lla nt’ s D PS dr ivi ngre c or d b e c a us e it w a s h e ars ay

and the re fo re ina dmi ssi ble
un de r T e xas R

ule of Ev ide nc e 80 2. As a c e rt if ie d c op y of a pu bli c re c or d, State ’s Exhi bit 6 f a lls sq ua re ly wi thi n T e xas R

ule of Ev ide nc e 80 3( 8) and its a dmi ssi on

do e s n ot c on sti tut e ina dmi ssi ble he ars ay . T e x. R. E vid . 8 03 (8 ); see, e .g. , Fl or es v . S tate , 139 S.W .3d 61, 64 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 20 04 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Gi bs on v . S tate , 952 S.W .2d 569, 572 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, pet. re f’d) ; Sm ith v . S tate , 895 S.W .2d 449, 454-55 (Te x . App.—Dallas 1995, pe t. ref’ d). We ca nnot say that the trial court a

bused its discretion in overr uling a ppellant’s hea

rsay object i o n and admitting State’ s Ex hibit 6.
4. Fin gerprint E

xpert Testim ony As part o f h is th ir d p o in t o f e r r o r , a p p e ll an t a ls o c h a ll e n g e s th e a dmi s s io nof testimony by a f i n gerprint expert who compar ed appe llant’s booking f inge rprints with other fi n ger p ri n t s t o es t ab l i s h h i s i d en t i t y . Ap p el l an tco mp l ai n s t h a t t h e t ri al co u rt erre d i nal l o wi n g a fing erpr int ex pert to testify to appellant’ s identity

based on doc uments not y et in evidenc e, i.e., the15

pen pa ck et s t hat wer e State’s Exhibit s 7 and 9. He urg es that “suc h evidenc e, beinghear say and unfairly prejudicia l, is inadmiss ible.” Be cause appellant identifie d hi m s el f when admitted at the hospital and the jail as Roy ce N eal Cline, rather than Steve n Ray Cline, appellant’s identity was re levant. At his arr ival at the jail, Henr

y Nolan, the c hief c riminal investigator for the district attorney ’s offic e and a fing erpr int expert, was summoned to assist in determining appellant’ s identity
. Nolan testi fied that four or five tim e s a y e ar h e is c a lle d to the ja il t o id e nti fy an inmate thr ou g h f

ing e rp ri nt a

na ly sis . A t tr ia l in response to questioning by th e p r osecutor a s to what documents he r eviewe d to determine a ppellant’s identity , Nolan testified:
A. I revie wed the Burne t County arr est repor

t. I ’ve r eviewe d a docume nt which is the Depa

rtment of Public Safety

driving rec ord re port, including driver’ s license f inge rprint. I ’ve r eviewe d a docume nt that is entitl ed a pe nitentiary packe t from t he Tex as Department of Crimi nal J ustice Institut ional Division and I ’v e re vie we d a

jud g me nt o ut o f C ounty

Court
. Q
. A n d

— g o ah e a d , I’ m s o r

r y. A. And State’s Exhibi t 3. Q. And in revie wing those documents, were y ou able to ana ly ze a known print c e rt if ie d a s Ste ve n Ra

y Clin e ’s pr int ? [Defense Counsel] : Your Honor, that calls for hear say . Some document

t h at ’s n o ti nt h i s co u r t r o o m an d y o u ’r e a s k i n g a known print, that’s an el ement the St ate must prove up. Objection to lack of

predic ate, be st evidence and h e ar s ay. The Court: Those objec tions are ove rruled. * * *16

Q. Wer e y ou

a ble to i de nti fy

and ana ly ze a pr int ? A. Ye s, sir , I

ana ly zed pr int s o n a ll tho se do c ume nts
. Q. Did y ou compar e them with what is State’s 3, whic h is in evidence , that booking c ard? A. Yes, sir, I

did. Q. Were you able to make a dete rmin at i o n as to the identity of the pe rson that was booked-in and printed on the booking car d from the jail and those other do c ume nts ? A. Ye s, sir , I

wa s. Q. What’s y our conc lusion? A. That all the prints ca me from Steven Ra

y Cline. Q. And is that t h e s am e individual that y ou identified in State’s 2A with that booking c ard? A. Ye s. [De fe ns e Couns e l]: Ob je c t, Yo ur Ho no r. L a c k of pr e dic ate , he ars ay , b e st evidenc e rule
. The Court: Over ruled. A. Yes, Sir. Appellant does not identify any of the doc uments ref

err ed to that w ere not admitted into evidence . Be cause al l o f the documents we re a dmitted into evidence, we cannot sa y the trial court a bused its discretion i n al lowing the fing erpr int ex pert to testify , compar ing the various identified prints with appellant’s know n prints at the t ime of booking , to determine his identity
. See Litt le s v . S tate , 726 S.W .2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (op. on r eh’g ) (a llowing a nd discussing17

use of pe n packe ts as proof of defe ndant’s identity

). We overr

ule appe ll ant’s remaining points of
err or.
CO NC LU SION

Hav in g overrul ed ap pel lan t’ s p oi nt s o f erro r, w e affi rm th e ju dgmen t o f t he tr ia l c ou

rt
.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Mar ch 26, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh