DOD SUPPLY CHAIN

Suspect Counterfeit 

Electronic Parts Can 

Be Found on Internet 

Purchasing Platforms 

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate 

February 2012

GAO-12-375

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-375, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

February 2012 

DOD SUPPLY CHAIN

Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found 

on Internet Purchasing Platforms 

Why GAO Did This Study

Counterfeit parts—generally the 

misrepresentation of parts’ identity or 

pedigree—can seriously disrupt the 

Department of Defense (DOD) supply 

chain, harm weapon systems integrity, 

and endanger troops’ lives. In a 

November testimony (GAO-12-213T), 

GAO summarized preliminary 

observations from its investigation into 

the purchase and authenticity testing of 

selected, military-grade electronic parts 

that may enter the DOD supply chain. 

As requested, this report presents 

GAO’s final findings on this issue. The 

results are based on a 

nongeneralizable sample and cannot 

be used to make inferences about the 

extent to which parts are being 

counterfeited.

GAO created a fictitious company and 

gained membership to two Internet 

platforms providing access to vendors 

selling military-grade electronic parts. 

GAO requested quotes from numerous 

vendors to purchase a total of 16 parts 

from three categories: (1) authentic 

part numbers for obsolete and rare 

parts; (2) authentic part numbers with 

postproduction date codes (date codes 

after the last date the part was 

manufactured); and (3) bogus, or 

fictitious, part numbers that are not 

associated with any authentic parts. To 

determine whether the parts received 

were counterfeit, GAO contracted with 

a qualified, independent testing lab for 

full component authentication analysis

of the first two categories of parts, but 

not the third (bogus) category. Part 

numbers have been altered for 

reporting purposes. 

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this report.

What GAO Found

Suspect counterfeit and bogus—part numbers that are not associated with any 

authentic parts—military-grade electronic parts can be found on Internet 

purchasing platforms, as none of the 16 parts vendors provided to GAO were 

legitimate. “Suspect counterfeit,” which applies to the first two categories of parts 

that were tested, is the strongest term used by an independent testing lab, 

signifying a potential violation of intellectual property rights, copyrights, or 

trademark laws, or misrepresentation to defraud or deceive. After submitting 

requests for quotes on both platforms, GAO received responses from 396 

vendors, of which 334 were located in China; 25 in the United States; and 37 in 

other countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan. Of the 16 parts 

purchased, vendors usually responded within a day. GAO selected the first of 

any vendor among those offering the lowest prices that provided enough 

information to purchase a given part, generally within 2 weeks. Under GAO’s 

selection methodology, all 16 parts were provided by vendors in China. 

All Parts GAO Received Were Suspect Counterfeit or Bogus 

Specifically, all 12 of the parts received after GAO requested rare part numbers 

or postproduction date codes were suspect counterfeit, according to the testing 

lab. Multiple authentication tests, ranging from inspection with electron 

microscopes to X-ray analysis, revealed that the parts had been re-marked to 

display the part numbers and manufacturer logos of authentic parts. Other 

features were found to be deficient from military standards, such as the metallic

composition of certain pieces. For the parts requested using postproduction date 

codes, the vendors also altered date markings to represent the parts as newer 

than when they were last manufactured, as verified by the parts’ makers. Finally, 

after submitting requests for bogus parts using invalid part numbers, GAO 

purchased four parts from four vendors, which shows their willingness to supply 

View GAO parts that do not technically exist. -12-375. For more information, 

contact Richard J. Hillman at (202) 512-6722 

or hillmanr@gao.gov or Timothy Persons at 

(202) 512-6522 or personst@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Letter 1 

Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet 

Purchasing Platforms 3

Appendix I Details of Authentication Analysis Tests 17

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 19

Figures

Figure 1: Status of Parts Purchased and Tested 4

Figure 2: Authentication Analysis Results of Obsolete or Rare Parts 6

Figure 3: Authentication Analysis Results of Part with Invalid Date 

Codes 12

Figure 4: Photos of Parts Received Despite Request for Invalid Part 

Numbers 15

Abbreviations

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

RTS resistance to solvents

SEM scanning electron microscopy

XRF X-ray florescence

Contents

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 21, 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Counterfeit parts—generally the misrepresentation of parts’ identity or 

pedigree—have the potential to seriously disrupt the Department of 

Defense (DOD) supply chain, delay missions, affect the integrity of 

weapon systems, and ultimately endanger the lives of our troops. Almost 

anything is at risk of being counterfeited, from fasteners used on aircraft 

to electronics used on missile guidance systems. There can be many 

sources of counterfeit parts as DOD draws from a large network of global 

suppliers.1

In 2011, we reported that the increase in counterfeit electronic parts is 

one of several potential barriers DOD faces in addressing parts quality 

problems.2 More recently, you asked about the availability of counterfeit 

parts on Internet platforms commonly used to buy hard-to-find militarygrade electronic parts, including those used in weapon systems. In a 

November testimony, we summarized preliminary observations from our 

investigation into the purchase and authenticity testing of selected, 

military-grade electronic parts that may enter the DOD supply chain.3

In conducting this investigation, we created a fictitious company to gain 

access to Internet platforms that provide access to vendors selling 

This 

report presents our final findings on this issue.

 

1 GAO, Defense Supplier Base: DOD Should Leverage Ongoing Initiatives in Developing 

Its Program to Mitigate Risk of Counterfeit Parts, GAO-10-389 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 29, 2010).

2 GAO, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct 

Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, GAO-11-404 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 

2011).

3 GAO, DOD Supply Chain: Preliminary Observations Indicate That Counterfeit Electronic 

Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing Platforms, GAO-12-213T (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 8, 2011).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

military-grade electronic parts. Our company included a fictitious owner 

and employees, mailing and e-mail addresses, a website, and a listing on 

the Central Contractor Registration.4 We attempted to purchase 

memberships to three Internet platforms that were of interest to this 

committee. One platform granted us membership despite not receiving all 

requested supporting documentation, the second granted us membership 

after we supplied the requested documentation as well as fictitious 

business references, and the third denied our request for membership 

even after we provided all documentation and references. None of the 

platforms contacted our references. We then requested quotes from 

vendors on both platforms to purchase a total of 16 parts from three 

categories: (1) authentic part numbers for obsolete and rare parts; 

(2) authentic part numbers with postproduction date codes (date codes 

after the last date the part was manufactured); and (3) bogus, or fictitious, 

part numbers that are not associated with any authentic parts. Using a list 

of four authentic part numbers this committee provided, we purchased 7 

parts from the first category and 5 parts from the second (for which we 

altered only the date code). We independently verified with the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) that these part numbers were used for military 

applications using DLA’s Federal Logistics Information System and by 

interviewing DLA officials.5

We requested parts from vendors that were new in original packaging, not 

refurbished, and had no mixed date codes. We selected the first vendor 

among those offering the lowest prices that provided enough information, 

such as name, addresses, and payment method, to make a purchase. 

We attempted to avoid using the same vendor more than once unless no 

other vendor responded to our request; however, vendors may operate 

under more than one name. We did not attempt to verify the 

We used three invalid part numbers provided 

by the committee, which altered portions of existing part numbers that 

identify certain performance specifications, to purchase the 4 bogus parts. 

We then confirmed with DLA and selected part manufacturers that the 

numbers we developed were invalid. We altered all part numbers for 

reporting purposes.

 

4 The Central Contractor Registration is the primary contractor registrant database for the 

U.S. federal government. The Central Contractor Registration collects, validates, stores, 

and disseminates data in support of agency acquisition missions.

5 DLA’s Federal Logistics Information System via the World Wide Web provides general 

information about more than 8 million supply items used by the U.S. government and 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

independence of any vendor before we made our purchases. Finally, we 

contracted with the SMT Corp. for full component authentication 

analysis.6

The results of this investigation are based on the use of a 

nongeneralizable sample, and these results cannot be used to make 

inferences about the extent to which parts are being counterfeited. We 

conducted this investigation from August 2011 to February 2012 in 

accordance with standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency.

For details on this analysis, see appendix I.

As shown in figure 1, each of the 16 parts we purchased was either 

suspect counterfeit or bogus. Specifically, all 12 of the parts we received 

after requesting authentic part numbers (either with valid or invalid date 

codes) were suspect counterfeit, according to SMT Corp. In addition, 

vendors provided us with 4 bogus parts after we requested invalid part 

numbers, which demonstrates their willingness to sell parts that do not 

technically exist. The following sections detail our findings for each of the 

three categories of parts we purchased.

Under our selection methodology, the 16 parts we purchased were 

provided by 13 vendors in China. After submitting requests for quotes on 

both platforms, we received responses from 396 vendors, of which 334 

were located in China; 25 in the United States; and 37 in other countries, 

including the United Kingdom and Japan. All 40 of the responses we 

received for the bogus part numbers were from vendors located in China 

(6 of these vendors also offered to sell us parts for the authentic part 

numbers we requested). We selected the first of any vendor among those 

offering the lowest prices that provided enough information to purchase a 

given part, generally within 2 weeks.7

 

6 We selected SMT Corp. as the independent, full component authentication testing 

laboratory based on its (1) ability to conduct 100 percent component inspection with 

transmission X-rays, (2) use of a patented heated solvent test, and (3) use of scanning 

electron microscopy to detect surface abnormalities as well as doing spectroscopic 

analysis of surface material on the components.

As such, 3 vendors each supplied 2 

parts and 10 vendors each supplied 1 part. We sent 13 payments to 

Shenzhen, 2 payments to Shantou, and 1 payment to Beijing. Despite 

operating under different company names, 2 vendors provided us with 

7 These vendors usually responded to our initial requests for quotes within a day.

Suspect Counterfeit 

Electronic Parts Can 

Be Found on Internet 

Purchasing Platforms
 

Page 4 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

identical information for sending payment (name of representative and 

contact information). There could be a number of explanations for this, 

ranging from legitimate (the vendors handle payments through the same 

banker or accountant) to potentially deceptive (same individuals 

representing themselves as multiple companies). Thirteen parts were 

then shipped from Shenzhen and 3 from Hong Kong.

Figure 1: Status of Parts Purchased and Tested
 

Page 5 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

All seven of the obsolete or rare parts that SMT Corp. tested were 

suspected counterfeits. Each part failed multiple component 

authentication analyses, including visual, chemical, X-ray, and 

microscopic testing. The parts were purchased from five different 

vendors. Figure 2 provides photos and detailed test results for each part.

Category 1: Authentic Part 

Numbers for Obsolete or 

Rare Parts
 

Page 6 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Figure 2: Authentication Analysis Results of Obsolete or Rare Parts

DAA6 (two parts purchased). Both purchases made using part number 

DAA6 contained samples that failed multiple authentication analyses, 

leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the parts were suspect counterfeit. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Both parts were purchased from different vendors using the same part 

number, but were not identical, as shown in figure 2. An authentic part 

with this part number is an operational amplifier that may be commonly 

found in the Army and Air Force’s Joint Surveillance and Target Attack 

Radar System; the Air Force’s F-15 Eagle fighter plane; and the Air 

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps’s Maverick AGM-65A missile. If authentic, 

this part converts input voltages into output voltages that can be hundreds 

to thousands of times larger. Failure can lead to unreliable operation of 

several components (e.g., integrated circuits) in the system and poses 

risks to the function of the system where the parts reside.

The part we received from one vendor failed four of seven authentication 

analyses. Visual inspection found inconsistencies, including different or 

missing markings and scratches, which suggested that samples were remarked. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) analysis revealed further 

evidence of re-marking. X-ray fluorescence (XRF) testing of the samples 

revealed that the leads contain no lead (Pb) instead of the 3 percent lead 

(Pb) required by military specifications.8,9 Five samples were chosen for 

delidding, which exposes parts’ die, because of their side marking 

inconsistencies. While all five samples had the same die, the die 

markings were inconsistent.10

 

8 XRF analyzers quickly and nondestructively determine the elemental composition of 

materials commonly found in microelectronic devices. Each of the elements present in a 

sample produces a unique set of characteristic x-rays that reveals the chemistry of the 

sample in a manner analogous to a fingerprint. A lead is an electrical connection 

consisting of a length of wire or soldering pad that comes from a device. Leads are used 

for physical support, to transfer power, to probe circuits, and to transmit information.

According to SMT Corp., die markings in 

components manufactured within the same date and lot code should be 

consistent. Finally, the devices found in the first lot tested went into “last 

time buy” status in 2001, meaning that the parts were misrepresented as 

newer than they actually were. The manufacturer confirmed this status 

and added that the part marking did not match its marking scheme, 

meaning that the date code marked on the samples would not be 

possible.

9 DOD, DOD Performance Specification for Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) 

Manufacturing, MIL-PRF-38535J (Dec. 28, 2010).

10 A die is a small wafer of semiconducting material on which a functional circuit is 

fabricated.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

The part received from the second vendor failed five of seven 

authentication analyses. Visual inspection again found inconsistencies, 

including additional markings on about half the samples. Further, 

scratches and reconditioned leads indicated that the parts were removed 

from a working environment—that is, not new as we requested. SEM 

analysis corroborated these findings. As with the other DAA6 part, XRF 

testing revealed that the leads contain no lead (Pb). X-rays revealed 

different sized die, and delidding revealed that the die were differently 

marked.

IHH1 (one part purchased). The purchase made using part number 

IHH1 contained samples that failed five of nine authentication analyses, 

leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the part was suspect counterfeit. An 

authentic part with this part number is a multiplexer, which allows 

electronic signals from several different sources to be checked at one 

location. It has been used in at least 63 different DOD weapon systems, 

including the Air Force Special Operations Forces’ AC-130H Gunship 

aircraft, the Air Force’s B-2B aircraft, and the Navy’s E-2C Hawkeye 

aircraft. If at least one of the specific signals is critical to the successful 

operation of the system, then failure could pose a risk to the system 

overall.

Visual inspection revealed numerous issues, including color differences in 

the top and bottom of the part’s surfaces, suggesting resurfacing and remarking. Large amounts of scuffs and scratches, foreign debris, and 

substandard leads were also found. The part also failed resistance to 

solvents (RTS) testing when it resulted in removal of resurfacing material. 

Further, Dynasolve testing (additional RTS testing) revealed remnants of 

a completely different manufacturer and part number. SEM showed 

evidence of lapping, which is the precise removal of a part’s material to 

produce the desired dimensions, finish, or shape. Finally, delidding 

showed die that were similar but insufficiently marked to determine 

whether they matched the authentic part number. However, because of 

the failure of the Dynasolve testing, the die cannot be correct.

MLL1 (two parts purchased). Both purchases made using part number 

MLL1 contained a number of samples that failed three of seven 

authentication analyses, leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the parts 

were suspect counterfeit. Both parts were purchased from different 

vendors using the same part number, but were not identical, as shown in 

figure 2. An authentic part with this number is a voltage regulator that may 

be commonly found in military systems such as the Air Force’s KC-130 

Hercules aircraft, the Navy’s F/A-18E Super Hornet fighter plane, the 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Marine Corps’s V-22 Osprey aircraft, and the Navy’s SSN-688 Los 

Angeles Class nuclear-powered attack submarine. If authentic, these 

parts provide accurate power voltage to segments of the system they 

serve. Failure can lead to unreliable operation of several components 

(e.g., integrated circuits) in the system and poses risks to the function of 

the system where the parts reside.

The parts received from both vendors failed the same authentication 

analyses. Visual inspection was performed on all evidence samples from 

both purchases. Different color epoxy seals were noted within both lots, 

according to SMT Corp., which is common in suspect counterfeit devices 

because many date and lot codes are re-marked to create a uniform 

appearance. Moreover, XRF testing of the samples revealed that the 

leads contain no lead (Pb); according to military performance standards, 

leads should be alloyed with at least 3 percent of lead (Pb).11

YCC7 (two parts purchased). Both purchases made using part number 

YCC7 contained samples that failed several authentication analyses, 

leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the parts were suspect counterfeit. 

Both parts were purchased from different vendors using the same part 

number. An authentic part with this part number is a memory chip that 

Further, 

XRF data between the top and bottom of the lead revealed 

inconsistencies in chemical composition, leading SMT Corp. to conclude 

that the leads were extended with the intention to deceive. Microscopic 

inspection revealed that different revision numbers of the die and 

differences in various die markings were found even though the samples 

were advertised to be from the same lot and date code. Commonly, 

components manufactured within the same date and lot code will have 

the same die revisions. According to SMT Corp.’s report, the 

manufacturer also stated that “it is very unusual to have two die runs in a 

common assembly lot. This is suspicious.” Finally, the devices found in 

the first lot tested went into “last time buy” status—an end-of-life 

designation—on September 4, 2001, meaning that the parts were 

misrepresented as newer than they actually were. The manufacturer 

confirmed this status and added that the part marking did not match its 

marking scheme, meaning that the date code marked on the samples 

would not be possible.

 

11 DOD, DOD Performance Specification for Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) 

Manufacturing. 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

has been used in at least 41 different DOD weapons systems, including 

the ballistic missile early warning system, the Air Force’s Peacekeeper 

missile and B-1B aircraft, the Navy’s Trident submarine and Arleigh Burke 

class of guided missile destroyer, and the Marine Corps’s Harrier aircraft. 

Failure of the chip, if not redundant, could pose risk to the overall system.

The part we received from one vendor failed four of seven authentication 

analyses. Visual inspection identified numerous issues, including bent or 

misshapen leads and lead ends and deformed, less-detailed logos of the 

claimed manufacturer. X-ray analysis revealed that various parts in the 

samples contained different sized die. SEM analysis showed that surface 

material had been precisely removed to allow for re-marking. Finally, 

delidding of two samples revealed die that were marked from a 

competitor manufacturer with a different part number than the one we 

requested. In addition, one die was marked with a 1986 copyright, while 

the other was labeled 1992.

The part received from the second vendor failed four of nine 

authentication analyses. Visual inspection showed evidence of remarking, with the color of the top surfaces of samples not matching the 

color of the bottom surfaces. Some samples displayed faded markings 

while others were blank and had heavy scuff marks to suggest 

resurfacing. The markings were also not as clear and consistently placed 

as manufacturer-etched markings would be. Leads were substandard in 

quality, had been refurbished, and were not as thick as specified. Further, 

SEM showed evidence of lapping. Finally, the samples responded 

inconsistently to Dynasolve testing.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Similarly, all five of the parts we received and tested after requesting 

legitimate part numbers but specifying postproduction date codes were 

also suspected counterfeit, according to SMT Corp. By fulfilling our 

requests, the four vendors that provided these parts represented them as 

several years newer than the date the parts were last manufactured, as 

verified by the part manufacturers. Figure 3 provides photos and detailed 

test results.

Category 2: Authentic Part 

Numbers with 

Postproduction Date 

Codes 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Figure 3: Authentication Analysis Results of Part with Invalid Date Codes

DAA6 (one part purchased). The purchase made using part number 

DAA6 contained samples that failed four of seven authentication 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

analyses, leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the part was suspect 

counterfeit. Surfaces on the parts in the evidence lots were found to have 

scratches similar to suspect counterfeit devices that have been remarked, as confirmed by both visual inspection and SEM analysis. In 

addition, the quality of exterior markings, including a lack of consistency 

between the manufacturer’s logo, was lower than would be expected for 

authentic devices. Tooling marks were also found on the bottom of all 

components within the evidence lot; these marks suggest that the 

components were pulled from a working environment. Further inspection 

led SMT Corp. to conclude that many samples with refurbished leads 

were extended with the intention to deceive. Moreover, XRF analysis 

revealed the leads contain no lead (Pb) instead of the 3 percent lead (Pb) 

required by military specifications.12

IHH1 (one part purchased). The purchase made using part number 

IHH1 contained samples that failed seven of nine authentication 

analyses, leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the part was suspect 

counterfeit. The part we received was supplied by a different vendor than 

the one that supplied the IHH1 part shown in figure 2. Visual inspection 

revealed numerous issues, including mismatching surface colors, many 

scratches and scuffs, foreign debris, and leads that were not uniformly 

aligned. SEM also showed evidence of lapping. RTS testing resulted in 

removal of resurfacing material, and surfaces faded when exposed to 

Dynasolve, which should not occur. Further, samples did not solder 

properly. Finally, X-rays indicated that different die were used within the 

samples. This was confirmed in delidding, which revealed inconsistencies 

in size, shape, and date markings. Of the two types of die found in the 

sample, one does not match the authentic part number.

Delidding revealed that the die, while 

correct for this device, were inconsistent. As previously stated, multiple 

die runs are considered suspicious. Finally, some of the samples went 

into “last time buy” status in 2001, despite the fact that we requested 

parts from 2005 or later and the vendor agreed to provide parts from 2010 

or later.

MLL1 (one part purchased). The purchase made using part number 

MLL1 contained samples that failed four of seven authentication 

analyses, leading SMT Corp. to conclude that the part was suspect 

 

12 DOD, DOD Performance Specification for Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) 

Manufacturing. 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

counterfeit. The part we received was supplied by a different vendor than 

the ones who supplied the MLL1 parts shown in figure 2. Visual 

inspection revealed scuffs and scratches indicative of re-marking, which 

was also seen in SEM analysis. Different colored epoxy seals and 

variegated sizes and colors of the center mounting slug were also seen. 

Leads also showed evidence of being refurbished with the intent to 

deceive. XRF testing of the samples revealed that the leads contain no 

lead (Pb); according to military performance standards, leads should be 

alloyed with at least 3 percent of lead (Pb).13

YCC7 (two parts purchased). The two purchases made from different 

vendors using part number YCC7 contained samples that failed several 

authentication analyses, leading SMT Corp. to conclude that they were 

suspect counterfeit. The part we received from one vendor failed three of 

eight authentication analyses. Visual inspection identified numerous 

issues, including different colored surfaces that suggest re-marking and 

unknown residues that indicate improper handling or storage. SEM 

analysis showed that surface material had been precisely removed to 

allow for re-marking, similarly to a YCC7 part with legitimate date codes 

tested above. Further, according to the manufacturer, the legitimate 

version of this part was last shipped in 2003, whereas the tested part 

showed a manufacturing date code of 2006. RTS testing resulted in 

removal of the part marking.

Delidding revealed that die, 

though similar, had markings indicating different revisions, which is 

uncommon for die manufactured in the same date code. Finally, the 

devices went into “last time buy” status in 2001, whereas the tested parts 

showed a date code indicating they were made in 2008. The 

manufacturer confirmed this status.

The part received from the second vendor failed three of nine 

authentication analyses. Visual inspection detected numerous issues, 

including different colored surfaces that suggest re-marking. The 

markings were also substandard, lacking clarity and consistency in 

placement. RTS testing removed part markings, further suggesting remarking. SEM showed evidence of lapping. Delidding revealed die that 

were consistent with the authentic part, but the date code showed 

evidence of re-marking to make them appear as if they had come from a 

 

13 DOD, DOD Performance Specification for Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) 

Manufacturing. 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

homogenous lot. Finally, the manufacturer verified that it last shipped this 

part in 2003, whereas our samples were marked 2007, which according 

to SMT Corp., could not be possible.

We received offers from 40 vendors in China to supply parts using invalid 

part numbers, and we purchased four parts from four vendors to 

determine whether they would in fact supply bogus parts. (See fig. 4.) 

These were different vendors than the ones that supplied us with the 

suspect counterfeit parts. The invalid numbers were based on actual part 

numbers, but certain portions that define a part’s performance 

specifications were changed. For example, one of our invalid numbers 

was for an actual voltage regulator but that operated at bogus 

specifications. None of the invalid part numbers were listed in DLA’s 

Federal Logistics Information System and, according to selected 

manufacturers, none are associated with parts that have ever been 

manufactured. As such, we did not send the parts to SMT Corp. for 

authentication analysis.

Figure 4: Photos of Parts Received Despite Request for Invalid Part Numbers

We received the four bogus parts after requesting invalid part numbers 

DAA5, GDD4, and 3MM8. We made two orders using DAA5, one from 

each Internet purchasing platform, which were fulfilled by different 

vendors. The parts we received from each vendor appeared similar, as 

shown in figure 4. The similarity may be due to a number of factors. For 

example, the vendors could have simply ignored the invalid portion of the 

Category 3: Bogus Part 

Numbers
 

Page 16 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

part numbers we requested (they did not contact us to inform us that the 

numbers were invalid). Another possible explanation could be that the 

parts happened to be fulfilled by the same vendor operating under two 

different names.

In furtherance of our investigation to determine the willingness of firms to 

provide us bogus parts, we created a totally fictitious part number that 

was not based on an actual part number and requested quotations over 

one Internet platform. We received an offer to supply the part from one 

vendor, but did not invest the resources to purchase the bogus part.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need additional 

information, please contact Richard Hillman at (202) 512-6722 or 

hillmanr@gao.gov or Timothy Persons at (202) 512-6522 or 

personst@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Richard J. Hillman

Managing Director

Forensic Audits and Investigative Service

Timothy Persons

Chief Scientist

U.S. Government Accountability Office
Appendix I: Details of Authentication Analysis 

Tests

Page 17 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

This appendix provides details on each of the tests that constitute the 

authentication analysis SMT Corp. conducted for the parts we purchased.

Visual inspection: Visual inspection is performed on a predetermined 

number of samples (usually 100 percent) to look for legitimate 

nonconformance issues as well as any red flags commonly found within 

suspect counterfeit devices.

Resistance to solvents (RTS): A mixture of mineral spirits and isopropyl 

alcohol is used to determine the part marking resistance and pure 

acetone is used to remove any resurface material. This test is not 

performed on all parts. In some cases, resurfacing material would not be 

used by counterfeiters to re-mark a part; in others, the solvents would 

remove markings even on legitimate parts.

X-ray florescence (XRF) elemental analysis: The XRF gathers and 

measures the elements within a target area. This is used specifically for 

testing components for RoHS or Hi-Rel conformance, which refer to 

dangerous substances such as lead (Pb), cadmium (Cd), and mercury 

(Hg) that are commonly used in electronics manufacturing. For suspect 

counterfeit devices, it helps determine if a component has the correct 

plating for the specification it supposed to adhere to.

Package configuration and dimensions: This test measures key areas 

of the device to see if they fall within industry specifications.

Real-time X-ray analysis: X-ray analysis is performed on a 

predetermined number of samples (usually 100 percent). The internal 

construction of components is inspected (depending on the component 

package type) for legitimate issues such as broken/taut bond wires, 

electrostatic discharge damage, broken die, and so forth. For suspect 

counterfeit devices, the differences in die size/shape, lead frames, bond 

wire layout, and so forth are inspected.

Scanning electron microscopy: A scanning electron microscope is 

used to perform an exterior visual inspection—more in depth than the 

previous visual inspection. This is usually performed on a two-piece 

sample from the evidence lot. Depending on the package type, 

indications of suspect counterfeit devices are sought, including surface 

lapping, sandblasting, and sanding with regard to part marking removal.

Solderability: This test is usually for legitimate components to determine 

if they will solder properly when they are used in production.

Appendix I: Details of Authentication 

Analysis Tests
Appendix I: Details of Authentication Analysis 

Tests

Page 18 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Dynasolve: Dynasolve is a chemical used to break down epoxies in an 

effort to remove resurfacing material that is impervious to the standard 

RTS test.

Decapsulation/delidding and die verification: The die of a component 

is exposed with either corrosive materials or a cutting apparatus. This is 

done to inspect the die or “brain” of a component to determine its 

legitimacy. This process is performed on numerous samples to look for 

differences between samples, such as die metallization layout, revisions, 

part numbers, and so forth—all of which are red flags for suspect 

counterfeit parts.
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 19 GAO-12-375 Suspect Counterfeit Parts

Richard J. Hillman, (202) 512-6722 or hillmanr@gao.gov

Timothy Persons, (202) 512-6522 or personst@gao.gov

Cindy Brown Barnes, Assistant Director; Gary Bianchi, Assistant Director; 

Virginia Chanley; Dennis Fauber; Barbara Lewis; Jeffery McDermott; 

Maria McMullen; Kimberly Perteet, Analyst in Charge; Ramon Rodriguez; 

and Timothy Walker made key contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(192386)
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