SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1958-15T1

DAMARIS URDAZ CRISTIANO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY CRISTIANO,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Argued June 6, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti, Fasciale, and Gilson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FM-02-894-10.

Marion B. Solomon argued the cause for 

appellant (Arons & Solomon, P.A., attorneys; 

Ms. Solomon and Patricia L. Burris, on the 

briefs).

Damaris C. Urdaz, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Anthony Cristiano appeals from a December 11, 2015 

order that, among other things, denied his motion to compel his 

former wife, plaintiff Damaris Urdaz Cristiano, to pay child 

support based on the costs of the parties' eldest son attending 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 17, 2017
2 A-1958-15T1

private high school. The order also denied defendant's request 

to designate him as the parent with primary residential custody 

and denied his request for attorney's fees. We affirm. 

I.

The parties were married in October 1994, and divorced in 

November 2010. They have two children, a son born in September 

2000, and a second son born in August 2002. 

When they divorced, the parties entered into a property 

settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated into the final

judgment of divorce. Under the PSA, the parties agreed to share 

joint legal custody of the children, plaintiff was designated the 

parent of primary residential custody, and the parties enjoyed 

"roughly equal" parenting time with their children. Both parties 

waived their right to alimony.

With regard to child support, the PSA provided that defendant 

would be responsible for the children's private grammar school 

tuition and the cost of the children's health insurance. The PSA 

went on to provide that in consideration of defendant paying those 

costs and the parties' roughly equal parenting time, neither party 

would receive child support. In that regard, the PSA provided:

The parties have specifically agreed that in 

light of the roughly equal time sharing 

arrangement set forth more fully in the 

Parenting Plan attached hereto as Exhibit "B" 

and the Husband's payment of the Children's 
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private grammar school tuition and health 

insurance, neither party shall receive direct 

Child Support from the other party.

The PSA also provided that if there were a change in the 

grammar school tuition payment by the husband or the cost of the 

children's health insurance, the parties would revisit the issue 

of child support. Specifically, the PSA provided:

In the event there is a change to the tuition 

payment by the Husband i.e. the Children 

attend public grammar school or his payment 

of the Children's health insurance, the 

parties shall revisit the issue of the 

potential payment of Child Support from one 

party to the other. In the event the parties 

cannot agree they shall return to mediation 

before filing any application with the Court.

The PSA also allowed for modification of child support in the 

event that there is a change in circumstances.

The PSA did not address paying the costs for the children to 

attend private high school. The PSA did, however, provide that 

the parties agreed that they would both contribute to the 

children's college education expenses. The amount of their 

respective contributions would depend on the parties' then 

existing financial circumstances and abilities, including, but not 

limited to, income and assets.

In July 2014, defendant filed a motion seeking to compel 

plaintiff to pay a portion of the private high school tuition for 
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the parties' eldest son. The court ordered mediation, but 

mediation was unsuccessful.

In April 2015, plaintiff filed a motion seeking an order

stating that she was not obligated to share in the costs of the 

parties' children attending private high school. Defendant failed 

to respond to that motion. Accordingly, an order was entered 

granting plaintiff the relief she sought.

Thereafter, defendant retained new counsel and the court 

agreed to reconsider the matter. In an order entered on August 

17, 2015, the court found that defendant had voluntarily and 

unilaterally enrolled the eldest son in private high school and 

that plaintiff had no obligation to pay for the eldest son's

private high school tuition. Defendant did not appeal that order.

In September 2015, defendant filed a motion to recalculate 

the parties' respective child support obligations based on the 

increased costs resulting from the parties' eldest son attending

private high school. Defendant also sought to be named as the 

parent of primary residential custody for school purposes. In 

filing that motion, defendant did not request a plenary hearing 

concerning any issue. Plaintiff opposed the motion and crossmoved to enforce the court's August 17, 2015 order, which had held 

that she had no obligation to contribute to the children's private 

high school education.
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On December 11, 2015, after hearing oral argument, the Family 

Part denied defendant's request to impose a child support 

obligation upon plaintiff based on the eldest son's private high 

school tuition. The court also denied defendant's request to be 

named as the parent of primary residential custody. On plaintiff's 

cross-motion, the Family Part granted plaintiff's request to 

reaffirm the August 17, 2015 order, which found that plaintiff was 

not responsible for the costs of the children's private high school 

education. Finally, the Family Part denied both parties' request 

for attorney's fees.

Defendant appealed the December 11, 2015 order. In accordance 

with Rule 2:5-1(b), the Family Part issued a supplemental written 

decision, dated January 27, 2016, amplifying the reasons for the 

December 11, 2015 order.

II.

On appeal, defendant makes five principal arguments: (1) we 

should apply a relaxed standard of review; (2) the Family Part 

erred in interpreting the parties' PSA and finding that plaintiff 

did not have to contribute to the costs of private high school 

education; (3) the Family Part erred in failing to schedule an 

evidentiary hearing to address the alleged ambiguities in the 

parties' PSA; (4) the court erred in failing to address the factors 

identified in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982), and Hoefers 
6 A-1958-15T1

v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590 (Ch. Div. 1994), aff'd, 288 N.J. 

Super. 478 (App. Div. 1996); and (5) the Family Part erred in 

denying defendant's request for attorney's fees.

A. Child Support for Private High School

The fundamental issue on this appeal is whether the parties' 

PSA required plaintiff, either directly or through child support, 

to contribute to the costs of private high school for the children. 

That question was directly addressed by the Family Part in its 

order of August 17, 2015, where it held that there was no such 

obligation.

As noted, defendant did not appeal the August 17, 2015 order. 

Instead, defendant filed a new motion seeking child support based 

solely on the changed circumstances that the eldest son had 

enrolled in a private high school. Thus, as the Family Court 

correctly recognized, defendant was essentially seeking to require 

plaintiff to contribute to the costs of the eldest son's private 

high school tuition through child support.

The only order on appeal before us is the December 11, 2015 

order, which denied defendant's request to establish child support 

based on the increased costs of the son's private high school 

tuition. Therefore, the question presented is whether defendant 

showed a change of circumstances warranting the imposition of a 

child support obligation on plaintiff. Defendant candidly 
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acknowledges that the only change in circumstances he relies on 

is the increase in tuition from paying for private grammar school 

to paying for private high school.

Settlement agreements in matrimonial cases are contracts that 

should be enforced so long as they are fair and just. Petersen 

v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981). Our courts recognize a 

"strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements in 

matrimonial matters." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016) 

(quoting Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)). 

"[F]air and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual consent 

should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed." Ibid. (quoting 

Konzelman, supra, 158 N.J. at 193-94). Moreover, "courts [may 

not] remake a better contract for the parties than they themselves 

have seen fit to enter into, or to alter it for the benefit of one 

party and to the detriment of the other." Karl's Sales & Servs.

v. Gimbel Bros., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div.), certif. 

denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991). 

Here, a plain reading of the parties' PSA does not allow 

defendant to seek child support based on the costs of private high 

school tuition for the children. The PSA expressly addressed the 

costs of private grammar school. The PSA also expressly addressed 

the costs of the children's college expenses. The PSA was silent 

on the costs of private high school.
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Read in full context, however, the silence concerning private 

high school tuition does not allow defendant to seek those costs 

either directly or as child support. In that regard, the PSA 

stated "neither party shall receive direct Child Support from the 

other party." The PSA then provided that child support could be 

"revisit[ed]" under four circumstances: (1) a change in 

defendant's payment of private grammar school tuition, (2) a change 

in defendant's payment for the children's healthcare insurance,

(3) "a modification to the parenting time," or (4) "a substantial 

change in circumstances as defined by Lepis v. Lepis," [83 N.J.

139 (1980)].

The first three circumstances do not apply. As to the fourth, 

defendant failed to establish a change in circumstances warranting 

the imposition of child support. Our review of the Family Part's 

determination regarding child support is limited. "[W]e do not 

disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial

judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of 

justice[.]" Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 

65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Township of North

Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 

N.J. 221 (1963)). Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts'
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special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate 

courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). 

Here, we discern no basis to disturb the Family Part's finding 

that there was no showing of a change of circumstances. We also 

discern no basis to disagree with the Family Part that defendant 

made no showing warranting a change in the designation of plaintiff 

as the parent of primary residential custody. It was undisputed 

that the parties continued to share essentially equal parenting 

time with both children. That the eldest son was attending a 

private high school, while the younger son continued to attend 

private grammar school, did not constitute grounds for making a 

change in the parties' original parenting time arrangement. 

B. Defendant's Other Arguments

The other arguments presented by defendant lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e) 

(1)(E). We add only a few brief comments. As already discussed, 

our standard of review is well-established. Moreover, the 

application of the correct standard of review warrants an 

affirmance. 

We find no error in the Family Part failing to schedule an 

evidentiary hearing. Defendant did not move for an evidentiary 

hearing in filing his motions nor did he request one in a manner 
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that would cause the court to grant such a request. Just as 

significantly, defendant did not identify what disputed issues or 

material facts needed to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing.

We also need not resolve the parties' arguments over whether 

defendant voluntarily enrolled his eldest son in private high 

school. The record is clear that when the eldest son began private 

high school, defendant knew that the Family Part had denied his 

request to compel plaintiff to contribute to the costs of private 

high school. Nothing compels defendant to send his son to private 

high school. Thus, the material undisputed fact is that defendant 

decided to voluntarily enroll his son in a private high school

after he knew he would have to pay the tuition. 

We also find no error in the Family Part failing to address 

the factors identified in Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. 529, or Hoefers, 

supra, 288 N.J. Super. 590. Newburgh addresses factors to be 

considered for the costs of college. Supra, 88 N.J. at 545. 

Hoefers addressed a PSA, which expressly provided that the father 

would be responsible for private school. Supra, 288 N.J. Super.

at 596-97.

Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the Family 

Part's decision to deny defendant's request for attorney's fees. 

See R. 4:42-8; R. 4:42-9(a)(1); see also Platt v. Platt, 384 N.J. 

Super. 418, 429 (App. Div. 2006). 
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Affirmed.