In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-14-00303-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF J.W.V. AND L.M.V., CHILDREN 

 

On Appeal from the 316th District Court 

Hutchinson County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 40,431, Honorable David Gleason, Presiding 

 

December 5, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant the mother appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her parental 

rights to her two children, J.W.V. and L.M.V., and appointing intervenors D.C.C. and 

M.L.C., permanent managing conservators of the children.1 The mother’s courtappointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel supported by a brief. 

In her brief, counsel states she conducted a professional evaluation of the record and, 

after a thorough review of the applicable law, concluded no arguable grounds 

 

1 Answering a single broad-form question, the jury found the mother’s parental 

relationship with each child should be terminated. The trial court’s final order contains 

findings of five predicate grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the 

children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D),(E),(N),(O),(P) & (2) (West 2014).
2

supporting an appeal exist in this case and the appeal is frivolous. Although granted the 

opportunity, the mother did not file a response to counsel’s motion and brief. 

Counsel’s motion and brief present a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any 

grounds that might arguably support the appeal.2 They meet the requirement of Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see In re 

A.W.T., 61 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (finding Anders

procedures applicable in termination of parental rights case).

As the reviewing court we conduct an independent evaluation of the record to 

determine whether counsel correctly determined the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. 

State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82-83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 

L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).

After carefully reviewing the appellate record and counsel’s brief, we agree the 

appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record arguably capable of 

supporting an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 

 

2 Among possible appellate issues, counsel discusses the form of the jury charge 

which submitted five predicate grounds and the best interest inquiry in a single broad 

form question. She concludes the charge was not flawed. See Tex. Dep’t of Human 

Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990) (finding in a termination of parental 

rights case the controlling question is whether a parent’s rights should be terminated).
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2005). We, therefore, grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial 

court’s final order.

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 TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(a).

James T. Campbell

 Justice

 

 

3 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, mail the 

mother a copy of the opinion and judgment along with notification of the right to file a 

pro se petition for discretionary review under appellate rule 53. The documents and 

notification shall be sent to the mother at her last known address via certified mail, 

return receipt requested. Counsel shall also send this court a letter certifying 

compliance and attaching a copy of the return receipt within the time for filing a motion 

for rehearing. TEX. R. APP. P. 2; cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4.