NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NNSA Needs to 

Improve Guidance on 

Weapon Limitations 

and Planning for Its 

Stockpile Surveillance 

Program

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2012

GAO-12-188

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-188, a report to 

congressional requesters 

February 2012 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NNSA Needs to Improve Guidance on Weapon 

Limitations and Planning for Its Stockpile 

Surveillance Program

Why GAO Did This Study

Most weapons in the U.S. nuclear 

stockpile were produced over 20 years 

ago and are being sustained beyond 

original design lifetimes. It is critical to 

ensure that these weapons are safe, 

secure, and reliable to perform as the 

nation’s nuclear deterrent. The 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), a 

semiautonomous agency within the 

Department of Energy, is responsible 

for the nation’s nuclear weapons 

program. NNSA identifies nuclear 

weapon limitations—areas where 

military requirements may not be 

met—and conducts nonnuclear tests to 

evaluate the condition and reliability of 

weapons through its nuclear stockpile 

surveillance program. GAO was asked 

to determine the (1) number and types 

of such limitations and any concerns 

raised by Department of Defense 

(DOD) officials, and (2) actions NNSA 

has taken to implement its prior 

recommendations for the nuclear

stockpile surveillance program. GAO 

reviewed agency documents, analyzed 

limitations, and interviewed key NNSA 

and DOD officials. 

What GAO Recommends

Among other things, GAO 

recommends that NNSA, in 

appropriate collaboration with DOD, 

expand guidance on weapon 

limitations to include all limitations, 

revise this guidance to clearly describe 

the limitations’ potential impacts, and 

develop a corrective action plan for 

implementing surveillance program

recommendations. NNSA generally 

agreed with GAO’s recommendations 

and outlined planned actions to 

address them. DOD agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations. 

What GAO Found

For the 52 NNSA identified limitations for all weapons in the U.S. nuclear 

stockpile, 86 percent fall into six types: detonation safety under abnormal 

conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of 

limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. Some DOD officials 

expressed concern over the impact that certain weapon limitations have on 

weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning. According to DOD officials, 

current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing 

and planned NNSA efforts, should address most limitations for which the officials 

raised concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient 

flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told GAO that there may be less 

flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size.

For each weapon system, NNSA provides DOD with guidance containing 

additional information on nuclear weapon limitations. However, GAO found that 

this guidance does not cover all limitations and some DOD officials said that it 

may not provide them with relevant information for some limitations. Specifically, 

the guidance addresses approximately 60 percent of all limitations but does not

include limitations based on certain weapon components. In addition, one senior 

DOD official stated that the guidance did not help clarify the potential impact that 

a particular limitation may have on weapon operation and maintenance. The

applicable military service is now conducting its own analysis of this limitation’s 

potential impact. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing 

weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid because, 

among other reasons, corrective action to address the limitations is complete. In 

addition, it is uncertain if an ongoing DOD and NNSA review of nuclear weapon 

military requirements will be used to eliminate limitations based on potentially 

outdated military requirements.

NNSA has begun to implement some recommendations from the agency’s draft 

October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program

but has not developed a corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. For 

example, NNSA (1) created and staffed the position of Senior Technical Advisor 

for Surveillance in response to the review’s recommendation to establish strong 

NNSA leadership and (2) established a formal process for setting surveillance 

testing requirements. National laboratory and DOD officials GAO interviewed 

generally viewed NNSA’s actions as positive steps to improve the program. 

However, NNSA has not developed a corrective action plan, as called for by

Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123. According to this circular

on management controls, federal managers are to develop a corrective action 

plan to address program operations weaknesses identified through management 

reviews, among other things. Such plans are to include specific dates, assigned 

responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress and hold management 

accountable. According to a senior level NNSA official, the agency did not 

implement many of the recommendations from three prior surveillance program 

management reviews primarily because there was no specific approach for 

implementation. Without a corrective action plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) 

ensure that the draft October 2010 management review’s recommendations are 

fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress 

and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program. 

View GAO-12-188. For more information, 

contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or 

aloisee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Letter 1 

Scope and Methodology 4

Background 6

Action Being Taken to Address Limitations of U.S. Nuclear 

Weapons 9

NNSA Has Not Developed a Corrective Action Plan to Improve the 

Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program 18

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Appendix I Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 27

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Tables

Table 1: Nuclear Weapons in the U.S. Stockpile, as of September 

2011 7

Table 2: Types of Nuclear Weapon Limitations for all U.S. Nuclear 

Weapons 11

Figure

Figure 1: NNSA’s Stockpile Surveillance Program 9

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Abbreviations

CT computed tomography

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

MAR major assembly release

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

RMI Requirements Management Integration 

SNL Sandia National Laboratories 

STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

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Page 1 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

February 8, 2012

Congressional Requesters 

Arms control agreements and other policies since the 1960s have led the 

United States to maintain nuclear deterrence with decreasing numbers of 

weapons. Most nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile were produced 

over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond their original design 

lifetimes. Consequently, it is critical to ensure that the weapons in the 

nuclear stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous 

agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for, among 

other things, the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval 

reactors programs.1

The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), part of the Department of 

Defense (DOD), has primary responsibility for targeting nuclear weapons, 

preparing the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan, and, if ordered by the 

President, executing the war plan. The Nuclear Weapons Council, 

established by Congress in 1986, is a joint DOD/DOE organization that 

facilitates high-level coordination to secure, maintain, and sustain the 

nuclear stockpile.

NNSA manages the nuclear stockpile through the 

three national nuclear weapons design laboratories—Los Alamos 

National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); four production plants—

Pantex Plant in Texas, Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee, 

Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and Kansas City Plant in 

Missouri; and the Nevada National Security Site.

2 The Nuclear Weapons Council charters a Project 

Officers Group for each weapon system to provide a technical forum for 

weapon development and management activities.3

 

1

NNSA was created in 1999 under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3201 et seq. 

Each Project Officers 

Group is led by a lead project officer from either the Navy or Air Force; 

both the Navy and Air Force (referred to in this report as military service)

maintain and operate nuclear weapons.

2

Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 3137 (1986).

3

In this report, we use the term weapon to refer to a weapon system.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Weapons are designed and produced to meet DOD’s military 

requirements—key operational, nuclear yield, and maintenance 

requirements—throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence, which is the 

range of physical environments that could be encountered as the weapon 

travels from stockpile storage to a potential target.4

According to NNSA and DOD officials, identifying limitations is important 

to stockpile management because it provides a mechanism for explicitly 

knowing where DOD requirements may not be met and suggests 

strategies to mitigate risk. Some limitations are unique to a particular 

weapon, and other limitations may occur in multiple weapons. NNSA 

periodically updates a weapon’s MAR for a variety of reasons, including a 

completion of a weapon alteration or a life extension program (referred to 

in this report as activities). A weapon alteration is a material change 

regarding assembly, maintenance, or storage that does not alter the 

weapon’s operational capability. A life extension program, which can take 

up to a decade to complete, is a refurbishment intended to extend the 

lifetime of a weapon for an additional 20 to 30 years. When NNSA 

updates a weapon’s MAR, existing limitations may either remain 

unchanged or be deleted, and new limitations may be added.

The responsible 

national laboratories prepare a major assembly release (MAR) when they 

determine that a nuclear weapon is satisfactory for release to the military 

service. Among other things, the MAR contains a list of the weapon’s 

limitations, which are areas where the weapon may not meet certain 

military requirements throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence. 

Limitations may specify additional conditions for storing, maintaining, or 

operating the weapon.

Since 1992, the United States has observed a moratorium on 

underground testing of nuclear weapons. In 1995, the President 

established an annual stockpile assessment and reporting requirement to 

help ensure that the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable 

without underground nuclear testing. Subsequently, Congress enacted 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which 

requires that the directors of the national laboratories and the 

Commander of STRATCOM each complete an annual nuclear weapons 

stockpile assessment report.5

 

4

For example, a Stockpile-to-Target Sequence may include a temperature range of -180 

to +155 degrees Fahrenheit and an acceleration force of 10G at launch. 

These reports cover, among other things, 

5

Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 3141 (2002). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

issues of particular concern about the nuclear stockpile as a whole, as 

well as issues of concern for individual weapons.6

Shortly after the moratorium on underground testing, Congress required 

DOE to establish the Stockpile Stewardship Program to increase 

understanding of the basic phenomena associated with nuclear weapons 

and provide better predictive understanding of the safety and reliability of 

weapons, among other things.7 One element of the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program is NNSA’s Stockpile Evaluation Program (surveillance 

program).8 Under this program, NNSA conducts a variety of nonnuclear 

tests that evaluate the condition, safety, and reliability of stockpiled 

weapons. NNSA’s surveillance program is a critical information source for 

overall knowledge of the stockpile, as well as the annual assessment 

process. In the last five annual assessment reports (fiscal years 2006 

through 2010), directors of the national laboratories consistently 

expressed concerns with the surveillance program, both about the overall 

direction of the program and the limited number of surveillance tests 

being conducted. The STRATCOM Commander reported similar 

concerns in his 2009 and 2010 annual assessment reports. Furthermore, 

in 2009, the JASON panel of scientific experts recommended that NNSA 

revise the surveillance program to meet immediate and future stockpile 

needs.9

 

6

The Secretaries of Energy and of Defense are required to submit the laboratory directors’ 

and STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment reports unaltered to the President, who 

forwards them to Congress, along with the conclusions the Secretaries have reached about 

the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile.

In its report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2011 National 

Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee (1) 

stated that surveillance is essential to stockpile stewardship and that 

inadequate surveillance would place the stockpile at risk and (2) directed 

NNSA to submit a report by October 1, 2010, to the congressional 

7

Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 3138 (1993).

8

According to NNSA officials, the surveillance program started in 1958. 

9

JASON is a group of nationally known scientists who advise government agencies on 

defense, energy, and other technical issues.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

defense committees on its plans to address the 2009 JASON 

recommendation.10

Recognizing the need for a revised surveillance program in the post Cold 

War era, NNSA has conducted management reviews of the surveillance 

program in 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. The latest management review, 

issued in draft in October 2010 and not yet made final, found that NNSA did 

not implement the majority of prior recommendations to revise the program 

because NNSA (1) does not have a well-defined, documented process for 

executing the surveillance program; (2) changed leadership of the 

surveillance program at critical points in the implementation of early 

recommendations; and (3) did not develop a metric to ensure full 

implementation of any recommendation, which resulted in a continuing 

emphasis on reassessing the program. The draft 2010 review observed 

that many prior recommendations were still applicable today and provided 

additional recommendations, such as establishing strong federal 

leadership, implementing formal processes to guide program planning and 

execution, and establishing communication and information pathways.

In this context, you asked us to review nuclear weapon limitations and the 

state of the surveillance program. Specifically, we examined the (1) 

number and types of identified weapon limitations and any concerns 

raised by DOD officials (Navy, Air Force, and STRATCOM); and (2) 

actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the 

nuclear stockpile surveillance program.

To determine the number and type of nuclear weapon limitations, we 

reviewed each weapon’s current MAR and associated NNSA guidance. We 

then interviewed officials from NNSA and the national laboratories to obtain 

clarification on technically complicated limitations. NNSA and DOD do not 

group limitations into types or categories. However, in order to report 

unclassified weapon limitation information in this report, we developed 

categories for types of limitations based on the MAR information. Using 

content analysis methodology, two analysts independently assessed each 

 

10H.R. Rep. No. 111-491 (May 21, 2010). NNSA officials told us that the agency 

addressed this reporting requirement on April 15, 2011, by including a classified annex in 

its Fiscal Year 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

Scope and 

Methodology
 

Page 5 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

limitation and coded it as a certain type of limitation.11 To determine DOD 

officials’ concerns with the limitations’ impact for nuclear weapon 

operations, maintenance, and war planning, we interviewed officials in the 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, 

Navy and Air Force lead project officers from each weapon’s Project Officer 

Group and interviewed and received briefings from officials in 

STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command For Global Strike, 

the entity responsible for preparing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear 

war plan. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed the last five annual 

assessment reports (fiscal years 2006 to 2010) to determine what 

limitations the STRATCOM Commander reported. We also interviewed the 

current chairman of a technical advisory group who is responsible for 

completing the majority of the STRATCOM Commander’s annual 

assessment report and reviewed prior GAO work on the annual 

assessment process.12 To determine what, if any, mitigation actions DOD 

and NNSA currently engage in or plan to complete to address nuclear 

weapon limitations, we reviewed NNSA guidance and interviewed NNSA, 

national laboratory, and DOD officials. To determine how NNSA manages 

and reports on nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed (1) established 

procedures governing the MAR development and revision process, (2) 

NNSA guidance on nuclear weapon limitations, and (3) documents 

associated with an ongoing joint DOD/NNSA review of nuclear weapon 

military requirements. We compared the documents with the Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government.

13

To determine the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to address its 

recommendations on its surveillance program, we reviewed NNSA’s draft 

To determine if certain 

nuclear weapon limitations were potentially no longer applicable, we 

compared limitations with the most current information related to corrective 

actions as well as the current applicability of military requirements, as 

reported by NNSA guidance on limitations and officials from NNSA, the 

national laboratories, and DOD.

 

11Intercoder reliability (agreement) statistics were generated in the coding process, and 

the two analysts agreed on 90 percent of the limitations. Coding differences were resolved 

through reviewer discussion. 

12GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Annual Assessment of the Safety, Performance, and Reliability 

of the Nation’s Stockpile, GAO-07-243R (Washington D.C.: Feb. 2, 2007). 

13GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

October 2010 management review and analyzed key NNSA 

documentation related to implementation efforts. This documentation 

includes a draft version of NNSA’s surveillance program manual; charters 

establishing the roles and responsibilities for entities responsible for 

managing the program; draft project management tools; and newly 

established procedures for establishing, executing, and tracking 

surveillance testing requirements. In addition, we interviewed key NNSA 

personnel, including the acting senior technical advisor for surveillance, 

about NNSA’s planned efforts to address its recommendations. We also 

compared NNSA’s actions against the federal standards for addressing 

recommendations from management reviews contained in the Standards 

for Internal Control in the Federal Government and Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for 

Internal Control.

14 To determine the national laboratories’ role in the 

surveillance program, we conducted site visits, toured select facilities 

used to conduct surveillance tests, interviewed officials, and received 

briefings from officials at LLNL and SNL.15

We conducted our work from October 2010 to February 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We requested and received 

information in writing from LANL.

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs is responsible for the manufacture, 

maintenance, refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement of nuclear 

weapons. Most modern nuclear weapons consist of three sets of 

components—a primary, a secondary, and a set of nonnuclear 

components enclosed in a case. When detonated, the primary and 

secondary components, which together are referred to as the weapon’s 

“nuclear explosive package,” produce the weapon’s explosive force, or 

“yield.” LANL, located in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and LLNL, located in 

 

14GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

15For our site visits, we selected one of the two national laboratories with design 

responsibility for a weapon’s nuclear components and the national laboratory with design 

responsibility for nonnuclear components.

Background
 

Page 7 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Livermore, California, have design responsibility for the nuclear explosive 

package. SNL, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, 

California, has design responsibility for nonnuclear components. Some 

nonnuclear components—collectively called “limited-life components”—

have shorter service lives than the weapon itself and, therefore, must be 

periodically replaced. The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of 

eight weapons systems. Table 1 shows the weapon systems in the U.S. 

nuclear stockpile, their dates of entry into the stockpile, and the 

laboratories and military services responsible for each system.

Table 1: Nuclear Weapons in the U.S. Stockpile, as of September 2011

Warhead or bomb Description Military service Laboratory Date of entry into stockpile

B61-3/4/10 Tactical bomb Air Force LANL, SNL 1979/1979/1990

B61-7/11 Strategic bomb Air Force LANL, SNL 1985/1996

W76-0/1 SLBM warheada Navy LANL, SNL 1978/2008

W78 ICBM warheadb Air Force LANL, SNL 1979

W80-0/1c Cruise missile warhead Navy/Air Force LLNL, SNL 1984/1982

B83-1 Strategic bomb Air Force LLNL, SNL 1993

W87 ICBM warhead Air Force LLNL, SNL 1986

W88 SLBM warhead Navy LANL, SNL 1989

Source: NNSA.

a

Submarine-launched ballistic missile. 

b

Intercontinental ballistic missile. 

c

The Department of Defense concluded in 2010 that the Navy’s W80-0 serves a redundant purpose 

and should be retired. 

In February 2007, we reported on the process that DOD and DOE have 

established for fulfilling the annual assessment of the safety, performance, 

and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.16

 

16

We found that (1) the 

STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile is 

based primarily on the advice of a technical advisory group and provides an 

operational perspective; (2) the technical advisory group holds an annual 

conference where each entity involved in managing the stockpile—national 

laboratories, Project Officer Groups, NNSA, and DOD—present briefings to 

provide a complete perspective on the various issues affecting the stockpile; 

and (3) the laboratory director’s annual assessment is derived primarily from 

ongoing activities associated with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, 

such as the results of weapon system and component level tests conducted 

GAO-07-243R. 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

by NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program as well as data that provides an 

assessment of a weapon’s current reliability.

NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program comprises the Core Surveillance 

Program and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign, which are funded 

separately. Under the Core Surveillance Program, the national 

laboratories and production plants evaluate weapons and weapon 

components for the attributes of function, condition, material properties, 

and chemical composition through the following:

• System-Level Laboratory Testing. For such tests, units from each 

stockpiled weapon are chosen annually, either randomly or 

specifically, and sent to the Pantex Plant for disassembly, inspection, 

reconfiguration, and testing by the national laboratories.

• System-Level Flight Testing. These tests drop or launch a weapon 

with its nuclear material removed. NNSA coordinates flight testing with 

DOD, which is responsible for providing the military assets (e.g., 

aircraft and missiles) needed to drop or launch a weapon.

• Component and Material Testing. These tests are conducted on 

nuclear and nonnuclear components and materials by both the national 

laboratories and the production plants that manufactured them.17

The mission of the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign—a research and 

development effort initiated in 1998—is to provide tools for assessing 

weapon aging by characterizing aging trends, develop predictive aging 

models, and develop new diagnostic capabilities.18

 

17In 2007, NNSA embarked on a series of fundamental changes to the surveillance 

program that it believes will improve the detection of aging defects through increased 

testing of weapon components and materials. NNSA initially expected to complete 

component and material testing pilots by 2012 but now expects completion of these 

testing pilots by 2018.

When the diagnostics 

developed by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign reach maturity, they 

can be incorporated into the Core Surveillance Program’s component and 

material tests. For example, in fiscal year 2009, the Enhanced 

Surveillance Campaign developed a high-resolution computed 

18NNSA defines campaigns as technically challenging, multiyear, multifunctional efforts to 

develop and maintain the critical capabilities needed to continue assessing the safety and 

reliability of the nuclear stockpile without underground testing. 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

tomography (CT) image analysis tool for a particular nuclear component, 

which NNSA officials said they believe will enhance its ability to identify 

potential defects or anomalies. NNSA plans to conduct approximately 30 

of these CT component tests in fiscal year 2012 under Core Surveillance, 

according to planning documents. Figure 1 shows the interrelationships 

among the segments of NNSA’s Stockpile Surveillance Program.

Figure 1: NNSA’s Stockpile Surveillance Program

For all U.S. nuclear weapons in the current nuclear stockpile, NNSA 

identified 52 weapon limitations, and of these, the majority fall into six 

types. DOD officials told us that a few limitations are a concern due to the 

potential impact on DOD weapon operation, maintenance, and war 

planning, but these officials also said that current and planned mitigation 

actions generally address their concerns with weapon limitations. We 

found that NNSA guidance to DOD on some limitations contains 

incomplete information, and DOD officials told us that the way NNSA 

communicates the potential impact of limitations on nuclear weapon 

operation, maintenance, and war planning is sometimes unclear. 

Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon 

limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid—because, 

among other things, corrective action to address the limitation is 

complete—while some limitations will remain in effect until DOD changes 

potentially outdated military requirements.

Action Being Taken to 

Address Limitations 

of U.S. Nuclear 

Weapons
 

Page 10 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

We characterized the 52 limitations that NNSA identified for all U.S. nuclear 

weapons into 10 types of limitations based on our analysis of each 

weapon’s MAR and associated guidance documents as well as through 

interviews with officials from NNSA, the national laboratories, and DOD. 

Eighty-six percent of these limitations fall into 6 types: detonation safety 

under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more 

frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker 

safety. According to DOD officials, a large majority of these weapon 

limitations do not impact DOD nuclear weapon operation, maintenance, 

and war planning activities. However, some DOD officials expressed 

concerns to us over the impact of a few weapon limitations, such as 

increased maintenance costs or additional issues to consider when 

developing war plans. For most limitations about which they raised 

concerns, DOD officials told us that current DOD mitigation actions, as well 

as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should 

address these concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile 

allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told us there 

may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and 

decreases in size. Moreover, officials at one national laboratory told us that 

a smaller stockpile may not be able to support required mitigation actions if 

additional limitations, especially those that result in large decreases to 

weapon reliability, are identified in the future. The 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review states that the United States is currently considering future 

stockpile reductions that would be based on a variety of factors, including 

the continuing implementation of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship 

Program.19 Table 2 and the following discussion relates to the type of 

nuclear weapon limitations and the percentage of those limitations by type.

 

19The Nuclear Posture Review is a legislatively mandated review that establishes U.S. 

nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years.

Types of Limitations, DOD 

Concerns, and Mitigation 

Actions
 

Page 11 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Table 2: Types of Nuclear Weapon Limitations for all U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Type of nuclear weapon limitations 

Percentage of the 52

limitations for all U.S. nuclear 

weapons

Detonation safety under abnormal conditions 25% 

Weapon reliability 13%

Weapon delivery 12%

More frequent replacement of limited life components 12%

Nuclear yield 12%

Worker safety 12%

Weight 6%

Transportation 4%

Weapon testing unable to duplicate an Stockpile-toTarget Sequence environment 4%

Reliability of use control system componenta 2%

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA’s MAR documents.

Notes: Percentage does not equal 100 due to rounding. 

a

A use control system is a combination of design features, operational procedures, and other controls 

intended to allow authorized use and prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. 

• Detonation safety under abnormal conditions. Thirteen limitations—25 

percent of all nuclear weapon limitations—are associated with 

detonation safety under abnormal conditions (i.e., conditions not 

expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and associated 

activities). DOD officials did not raise concerns with any limitations of 

this type. As established by DOD, the probability of a nuclear 

detonation must not exceed 1 in a million per exposure to abnormal 

conditions (i.e., detonation safety standard for abnormal conditions). 

NNSA has issued a safety limitation for each weapon concerning 

potential exposure to a certain combination of abnormal conditions. 

DOD officials told us that these safety limitations are not a concern, 

provided that established procedures are followed, because of the 

extremely low probability of a weapon’s exposure to the abnormal 

conditions.20

 

20A 1998 joint DOE-DOD study determined that the probability of encountering the 

abnormal conditions to be extremely unlikely and did not recommend any operational 

changes.

Specifically, both the Air Force and Navy have 

established procedures and restrictions for storing, handling, and 

transporting a nuclear weapon to minimize, among other things, the 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

potential that weapons are exposed to any abnormal conditions. In 

addition, there is another limitation, common across multiple 

weapons, concerning a weapon’s high explosives being exposed to 

abnormal conditions. DOD officials told us that this limitation is not a 

concern and that there is a very low probability that a weapon would 

encounter the abnormal conditions. Furthermore, they said that there 

is infinite combination of possibilities for the specified abnormal 

conditions. As such, it is very difficult for NNSA to produce 

computational models that can verify DOD’s detonation safety 

standard is met for each possibility.

21

• Weapon reliability. Seven limitations—13 percent of all nuclear 

weapon limitations—are associated with weapon reliability.22 DOD 

officials did not raise concerns with five weapon limitations of this type 

but did raise concerns with two specific weapon reliability limitations. 

DOD officials told us that one limitation could potentially impact DOD 

operations; however, no mitigation actions have been developed 

because the applicable military service and the national laboratories 

are still trying to understand the technical issues behind the limitation. 

DOD officials told us that another limitation, associated with a 

particular weapon system, could potentially impact war planning or 

operations, and the STRATCOM Commander stated in two recent 

annual assessments reports that he had concerns with this particular 

reliability limitation.23

 

21Officials at one national laboratory told us that these abnormal conditions are an 

extraordinary unlikely event that cannot be assessed with existing stockpile stewardship 

tools and that no mitigation activities are planned for these types of events. 

DOD officials told us that both short-term and 

long-term mitigation actions address this limitation. Specifically, 

STRATCOM revised its planning to include actions that can increase 

the reliability of a key weapon component and thus increase the 

weapon’s overall reliability. However, STRATCOM officials told us that 

these mitigation actions impact operational flexibility. According to 

these officials, NNSA’s planned activities for this weapon, when 

completed, will address the reliability limitation, among other things. In 

22NNSA defines weapon reliability as “the probability of achieving the specified yield, at 

the target, across the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the 

weapon’s lifetime, assuming proper inputs.” 

23According to the Chairman of the technical advisory group, weapon limitations generally 

do not affect STRATCOM’s war planning efforts but that, on occasion, the STRATCOM 

Commander determined that certain limitations could affect some aspects of war planning. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

the most recent annual assessment, the Commander wrote that 

NNSA’s planned activities to address this limitation, among other 

things, faces schedule constraints and will likely require additional 

resources.

• Weapon delivery. Six limitations—12 percent of all nuclear weapon 

limitations—relate to the delivery of a weapon to its intended target. 

DOD officials did not raise concerns with four weapon limitations of 

this type, and they told us that mitigation actions have addressed their 

concerns with potential impacts to DOD operation, maintenance, and 

war planning activities for two specific weapon delivery limitations. 

Specifically, one limitation states that a weapon may not perform as 

designed if delivered in a particular mode. STRATCOM officials told 

us that they no longer plan to deliver the weapon in that mode but 

would instead use an alternate delivery mode that can produce similar 

weapon effects. The second limitation states that a weapon no longer 

met what DOD officials described to us as a key weapon delivery 

requirement. STRATCOM officials told us that joint actions between 

the applicable military service and STRATCOM mitigate their 

concerns with this limitation, though at higher weapons maintenance 

and management costs.

• More frequent replacement of limited life components. Six 

limitations—12 percent of all nuclear weapon limitations—are 

associated with the more frequent replacement of components that 

have a shorter service life than the weapon itself. DOD officials did not 

raise concerns with two weapon limitations of this type but did raise 

concerns with four specific limited life components replacement 

limitations. According to DOD officials, these four limitations 

significantly increase the military’s maintenance burdens or costs for 

the affected weapons. For example, a military service lead project 

officer told us that each replacement activity imposes a substantial 

cost—in labor, equipment operation, and security risks—and that 

more-frequent replacement activities further increase these already 

substantial costs. This lead project officer said that, within the next 

few years, NNSA plans activities that, when complete, will meet the 

replacement interval established by DOD. Furthermore, another 

military service lead project officer told us that more-frequent 

replacement complicates the coordination of maintenance schedules 

and stated that NNSA has not planned any actions to address this 

limitation because of expected changes to the nuclear force structure.

• Nuclear yield. Six limitations—12 percent of all nuclear weapon 

limitations—concern a weapon’s capability to produce the desired 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

nuclear yield. DOD officials did not raise concerns with five weapon 

limitations for this type, and they told us that mitigation actions have 

addressed their concerns with potential impacts to war planning for 

one specific nuclear yield limitation. DOD officials said that most of the 

nuclear yield limitations reflect negligible differences from the yield 

requirements specified by DOD and do not affect war planning 

because of improved accuracy in delivering weapons to potential 

targets. However, DOD officials told us that one of these limitations, 

associated with a single weapon system, could affect DOD war 

planning but that the impact is mitigated in the short term by having 

the military service conduct more-frequent maintenance on the 

weapon. NNSA is also planning activities that, if successful, would 

address the limitation.

• Worker safety. Six limitations—12 percent of all nuclear weapon 

limitations—concern workers’ personal safety when conducting 

weapon operation and maintenance activities. DOD officials did not 

raise concerns with any limitations of this type. Specifically, these 

officials said that some of these limitations would be encountered if a 

low-probability event with multiple abnormal conditions occurred 

together and that some of these limitations have been addressed by 

established procedures for maintenance activities. For example, 

maintenance technicians working on a certain weapon are to follow 

procedures designed to limit the amount of energy present in the 

maintenance bay.

• Weight. Three limitations—6 percent of all nuclear weapon 

limitations—concern a weapon’s actual weight being greater than the 

weight specified by DOD. DOD officials did not raise concerns with 

any limitations of this type. These limitations are applicable to three 

weapon systems. DOD officials said that these limitations were 

present when the weapons were first produced.

• Transportation. Two limitations—4 percent of all nuclear weapon 

limitations—relate to how a weapon can be transported. DOD officials 

did not raise concerns with any limitations of this type and said that 

NNSA has already addressed one of these limitations. Specifically, 

NNSA has developed a specialized transportation adaptor that 

enables transportation of the weapon in a manner consistent with 

DOD military requirements.

• Weapon testing unable to duplicate a Stockpile-to-Target Sequence 

environment. Two limitations—4 percent of all nuclear weapon 

limitations—are associated with the inability of a single weapon 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

system’s testing program to duplicate two environments that the 

weapon could encounter as it travels from the stockpile to a possible 

target. DOD officials did not raise concerns with these two specific 

limitations and said that NNSA now believes that the agency can 

duplicate one of the specified environments. NNSA plans to conduct a 

computational simulation and analysis of this specified environment 

during fiscal year 2012.

• Reliability of use control system components. One limitation—2 

percent of all nuclear weapon limitations—is associated with the 

reliability of use control system components. DOD officials did not 

raise any concerns with this type of limitation because of changes in 

operational plans.

Through Sandia National Laboratories, NNSA provides DOD guidance 

containing additional information on nuclear weapon limitations for each 

weapon. However, we found that this guidance does not cover all current 

limitations, and DOD officials said that it may not provide them with 

relevant information for some limitations. DOD officials told us that 

nuclear weapon limitations—which are primarily reported to DOD when 

NNSA issues or revises a weapon’s MAR—can be statements that, in 

some instances, contain highly technical information and vague wording 

and may not clearly communicate a limitation’s potential impact on 

stockpile operation, maintenance, and war planning. As stated previously, 

most modern nuclear weapons consist of the nuclear explosive package 

and nonnuclear components enclosed in a case. In general, limitations 

arise due to issues associated with either a weapon’s nuclear 

components or nonnuclear components. For limitations that involve 

components for which Sandia National Laboratories has design 

responsibility (i.e., nonnuclear components), the guidance lists each 

limitation as written in the MAR; usually provides additional technical 

information about the limitation’s cause, scope and impact; and lists a 

recommended mitigation action.24

 

24Sandia National Laboratories began issuing the guidance in 2009. This document also 

provides guidance on “environments of concerns,” which are areas where military 

requirements are still met but with decreased safety or performance margins. 

The guidance includes information on 

29 limitations—about three-fifths of all current limitations. However, the 

guidance does not provide information for limitations that are associated 

with a weapon’s nuclear explosive package. The guidance states that 

NNSA Guidance to DOD 

on the Potential Impact of 

Weapon Limitations Is Not 

Complete and Consistently 

Clear
 

Page 16 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

these limitations are for the two national laboratories with design 

responsibility for nuclear components to address, but neither NNSA nor 

its two laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) provide DOD with such guidance on 

nuclear weapon limitations.

GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states 

that management should comprehensively identify risks from both 

external and internal sources and that once risks have been identified, 

management should decide what actions should be taken to manage 

them.25

In addition, NNSA’s guidance on nuclear weapon limitations may not 

always provide DOD with sufficiently relevant information about the 

potential impact some nuclear weapon limitations may have on stockpile 

operation, maintenance, and war planning. For example, one military 

service lead project officer said that his efforts to clarify the impact that a 

particular limitation may have on weapon reliability with officials at a 

national laboratory were inconclusive and that the military service is now 

conducting its own analysis. For this particular limitation, NNSA’s 

guidance provides little additional technical information and concludes 

that the weapon may not operate as required in a particular delivery 

mode, and the recommended mitigation action is to have laboratory staff 

brief STRATCOM war planners. Acknowledging that the guidance is 

relatively new, the military service lead project officer told us that the 

document is not very helpful in explaining this limitation’s potential 

operational impact and that discussing a limitation in terms of military 

requirements and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence would be more helpful. 

GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states 

that information should be recorded and communicated to management 

As stated previously, nuclear weapon limitations identify areas 

where DOD’s military requirements may not be met. Potentially unmet 

DOD military requirements could present risks to nuclear weapon 

operation, maintenance, and war planning and require mitigation actions. 

It is critical that NNSA’s guidance to DOD on nuclear weapon limitations 

identify all existing limitations to help ensure that risks are 

comprehensively identified and management has the information needed 

to determine what, if any, actions are needed to manage weapon 

limitations.

 

25GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

and others within an entity in a form and within a time frame that enables 

them to carry out their responsibilities.26 Since military service lead project 

officers are senior managers responsible for a weapon’s development 

and management activities, it is critical that NNSA’s guidance provides 

information in a form that allows them to fully understand the potential 

impacts limitations have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, 

and war planning to determine what, if any, actions are needed to 

manage weapon limitations.

The national laboratories identified 4 (8 percent) of the 52 current nuclear 

weapon limitations—affecting four weapons—as no longer valid and 

should be removed when NNSA revises the weapons’ MAR.27

DOD and NNSA are currently jointly reviewing and considering changing 

DOD’s nuclear weapon requirements to help align NNSA infrastructure 

planning with deterrent planning, according to documentation from the 

The 

national laboratories concluded that these 4 weapon limitations could be 

removed from the list of limitations contained in a weapon’s MAR for 

various reasons, including that corrective action to address the limitation 

has been completed, that there is no military requirement, and that the 

replacement interval for limited life components currently meets and has 

always met military requirements. DOD and NNSA officials told us that if 

NNSA cannot prove that a weapon meets military requirements, a 

limitation must be listed for that weapon. Our review found and some 

DOD officials we spoke with said that certain military requirements for 

nuclear weapons that were applicable during the Cold War may not be 

applicable given the structure and role of today’s nuclear stockpile. In 

addition, some DOD officials we spoke with said that the department can 

be reluctant to modify a weapon’s established military requirements 

because there is little documentation or transparency about why some 

military requirements exist and that this issue is especially applicable to 

weapons that were designed to be delivered from multiple military assets. 

These officials said that DOD does not want to delete a requirement 

unless there is sufficient evidence for why it was established and it is 

clear that the basis for that requirement is no longer applicable.

 

26GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

27We included these four limitations in our above analysis of the types of weapon 

limitations because they are listed in each weapon’s current MAR. 

The National Laboratories 

Identified Some 

Limitations That Are No 

Longer Valid, While Other 

Limitations Will Remain 

Valid until DOD Changes 

Military Requirements
 

Page 18 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Nuclear Weapons Council. The findings of this joint review could also be 

used to ensure that limitations reflect the most current and accurate 

information. For example, one weapon delivery limitation that DOD 

officials did not raise concerns with could be eliminated if military 

requirements are updated because there is sufficient specificity as to the 

origin of that requirement to conclude that it is no longer applicable to 

today’s current and planned nuclear force structure, according to 

STRATCOM officials. However, the joint DOD and NNSA requirements 

review does not have a specific completion date, and it is uncertain if the

review’s findings will be used to update limitations based on potentially 

outdated military requirements and, thereby, ensure a relevant and 

reliable counting of nuclear weapon limitations.

NNSA has begun to implement some of the recommendations from its 

draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile 

surveillance program, but NNSA has not developed a formal corrective 

action plan to guide its multiple actions. The draft October 2010 review, 

conducted jointly by NNSA and the three national laboratories, makes 

multiple recommendations to NNSA to address a number of weaknesses 

in the surveillance program, such as the lack of federal leadership in 

program management and the absence of formal, documented processes 

for surveillance planning and management. Actions NNSA has taken to 

implement the recommendations include the following:

• The creation of a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (senior 

advisor) position. This position was created in response to the 

review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership for the 

surveillance program. According to the official position description, the 

senior advisor is to serve as the agency’s lead official for surveillance 

execution and integration and is responsible for providing direction 

and oversight to major surveillance modernization efforts. The senior 

advisor reports directly to the senior NNSA official responsible for 

overseeing stockpile activities related to research, development, 

design, and production.28

 

28This official is the Office of Defense Programs’ Assistant Deputy Administrator for 

Stockpile Management.

NNSA designated an acting senior advisor 

in October 2010 and hired a permanent senior advisor in July 2011. 

According to NNSA officials, the senior advisor has brought 

leadership to the surveillance program. For example, when a dispute 

NNSA Has Not 

Developed a 

Corrective Action 

Plan to Improve the 

Nuclear Stockpile 

Surveillance Program
 

Page 19 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

between national laboratory and production plant officials on the 

appropriate safety standards for handling a toxic chemical caused a 

backlog of a key component test, the acting senior advisor was able to 

mediate this dispute, and the component testing was resumed.

• Establishment of a formal requirements-setting process. NNSA 

formalized the process for having the national laboratories submit 

surveillance testing requirements and having NNSA’s production 

plants evaluate the requirements. The process is being applied to 

surveillance testing requirements for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. 

Specifically, the national laboratories determine surveillance testing 

requirements; production plants review these requirements for 

technical feasibility and resource availability; and a new committee 

adjudicates unresolved conflicts in priorities. Previously, NNSA had 

set surveillance testing requirements informally and on an annual 

basis. National laboratories and production plant officials said that 

informal planning created problems in executing surveillance tests 

because, among other reasons, they did not have sufficient time to 

schedule tests around other stockpile work—such as life extension 

programs—that used the same personnel and equipment.

• A new surveillance governance structure. This structure is intended to 

promote integrated planning and prioritization as recommended by the 

management review. Elements of the new structure include the 

Surveillance Integrated Requirements Working Group (requirements 

group) and the Surveillance Enterprise Steering Committee (steering 

committee). Established in July 2011, the requirements group 

resolves mismatches between surveillance testing requirements and 

financial, human, and material resources. Specifically, this group 

examines surveillance testing requirements and assesses the impact 

of uncompleted tests. Established in May 2011, the steering 

committee is the highest-level organization in NNSA solely 

responsible for surveillance; the steering committee approves 

surveillance testing requirements and will resolve disputes between 

the national laboratories and the production plants that are not 

resolved by the requirements group. 

• Management of the requirements process through a centralized 

database called the Quality Evaluation Requirements Tracking 

System. In line with the review’s recommendation regarding critical 

communication and information pathways, NNSA will require each 

entity in the Core Surveillance process to use this system to input, 

access, or manage surveillance data. For example, within this system, 

the laboratories will issue surveillance testing requirements, and the 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

plants will track progress and document completion of tests. NNSA 

will use the data in this system as a basis for the formal performance 

measures the agency uses to hold the national laboratories and 

production plants accountable for the execution of surveillance 

activities.

• Codification of surveillance governance and processes. Codification

supports the review’s recommendation to implement a disciplined and 

integrated management process, with clear roles and responsibilities. 

NNSA is codifying surveillance governance and processes in section 

5 of the Requirements Management Integration (RMI) manual.29

• Better Integration of Core and Enhanced Surveillance. As of August 

2011, NNSA charged the managers of the Core Surveillance Program 

and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign with defining integration 

points between them. NNSA also began developing an RMI guidance 

document detailing how the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign should 

develop new diagnostic tools. The 2010 review found that NNSA lacked 

a clearly defined interface between the Core Surveillance Program and 

Enhanced Surveillance Campaign and that the lack of a documented 

process for promoting integration, among other things, has resulted in 

the underutilization of Enhanced Surveillance Campaign capabilities in 

When completed, this manual will include the charters for key entities 

in the newly established surveillance governance structure and clear 

delineation of roles and responsibilities, according to NNSA officials. 

The manual will also include at least 12 guidance documents to serve 

as project management tools. For example, one such document 

codifies the process for investigating anomalies identified through 

surveillance activities; another addresses the process for adjusting 

surveillance schedules or plans. The guidance documents are all 

currently in draft, with completion expected by the end of September 

2012, according to NNSA surveillance program planning documents. 

The 2010 management review cited the critical need for clear roles 

and responsibilities for all individuals and committees throughout the 

surveillance enterprise; it found that the number of committees with 

undefined or poorly defined roles and responsibilities, combined with 

inadequate documentation, clearly contributed to NNSA’s past 

difficulties in modernizing the surveillance program.

 

29The RMI will replace NNSA’s Development and Production Manual (NNSA Order AL56XB), which currently serves as the authorization basis for Directed Stockpile Work 

activities—including stockpile surveillance.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

the Core Surveillance Program’s testing activities. In June 2011, the 

acting senior advisor told us that integration between Core and 

Enhanced Surveillance is central to the surveillance program’s future 

and that increased integration presents a management challenge. Two 

of the surveillance program’s objectives are to detect precursors of 

aging weapon components sufficiently early for corrective action in 

existing weapons and to ensure any defects are not repeated in life 

extension programs. According to NNSA officials, these objectives 

depend on the continued development of Enhanced Surveillance 

Campaign technologies that are then used to improve the number and 

scope of the Core Surveillance Program’s component and material 

tests.

National laboratory and DOD officials we spoke with generally viewed 

NNSA’s current and planned actions to improve the surveillance program 

as positive developments. However, these actions are not guided by a 

formal corrective action plan. According to an OMB circular that defines 

management’s responsibility for internal control in federal agencies, 

federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address 

weaknesses found in program operations, as identified through 

management reviews, inspector general and GAO reports, program 

evaluations, and financial statement audits.30 Corrective action plans are 

to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to 

measure progress to resolve the findings of audits and reviews. The 

circular also states that agencies should periodically assess and report on 

the progress of those plans. Furthermore, under the Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, federal managers are to take 

steps to ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly 

resolved by completing, within established time frames, all actions that 

correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management’s 

attention.31

 

30Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management’s 

Responsibility for Internal Control (Dec. 21, 2004).

A corrective action plan would provide a framework for such 

time frames, as well as a mechanism for holding management 

accountable for meeting the time frames. According to the acting senior 

advisor, NNSA did not address many of the findings and 

recommendations in its three previous surveillance program management 

reviews primarily because the agency did not have a specific approach 

31See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
 

Page 22 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

for implementation. This statement echoes the 2010 draft management 

review finding that the prior reviews’ recommendations were not 

implemented because, among other reasons, NNSA did not have a welldefined, documented process for executing the surveillance program. In 

May 2011, more than 6 months after NNSA issued its draft October 2010 

management review, the acting senior advisor directed the steering 

committee to establish a working group to develop a plan to implement 

the review’s recommendations, but both the scope and time frame of this 

plan remain uncertain. In the interim, NNSA officials have requested 

reports on individual actions taken to implement the review’s 

recommendations but not on the agencywide effort to implement these

recommendations. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) 

ensure that the draft review’s recommendations are fully implemented 

and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, 

that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.

It is critical that U.S. nuclear capability continues to reassure our allies 

and deter potential adversaries. With most weapons currently in the 

stockpile having been produced over 20 years ago and being sustained 

beyond their original design lifetimes, it is a testament to NNSA, the 

national laboratories, and the production plants that DOD officials were 

confident that nuclear weapon limitations do not currently reduce the 

effectiveness of the nation’s strategic deterrent. However, several factors 

raise concerns with the limitations and NNSA’s management of them. 

First, some limitations require mitigation actions, which can impose 

logistical burdens, increased security risks, and war planning restrictions 

on the Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM. DOD officials said they would 

have less flexibility in mitigating limitations in the future should the 

stockpile’s size be reduced as future arms control agreements are 

pursued. Second, NNSA guidance on limitations does not always clearly 

communicate to DOD the potential impacts that limitations have on 

nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning and does not 

include all identified limitations; it is uncertain if the risks associated with 

limitations are comprehensively identified and analyzed. Third, NNSA’s 

current list of nuclear weapon limitations may not reflect the most up-todate information, and the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements 

review may not contain enough specificity to ensure a relevant and 

reliable count of limitations.

The stockpile surveillance program provides critical data that informs 

stockpile decisions. A smaller, aging stockpile calls for increasingly 

complex and time-sensitive data. NNSA’s multiple actions taken in 

Conclusions
 

Page 23 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

response to recommendations in its draft 2010 surveillance program 

management review demonstrate the agency’s commitment to improving 

the program. NNSA is planning to fully address the findings and 

implement the recommendations contained in its draft review. However, it 

is unclear how or if NNSA will do so because the agency has not 

developed a comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with 

OMB Circular No. A-123 that details actions that agency personnel must 

take to implement the recommendations with specific dates, assigned 

responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress of this implementation. 

Completion of such a plan would provide the agency with a reasonable 

basis for ensuring that recommendations are fully implemented. Without 

such a plan, NNSA is in danger of not implementing many of the draft 

review’s recommendations, as it failed to do in its three previous 

surveillance program management reviews. For example, previous delays 

in integrating Core and Enhanced Surveillance have been attributed, in 

part, to a lack of a documented process. Furthermore, the successful 

development and completion of a comprehensive corrective action plan 

would demonstrate to key congressional and DOD stakeholders NNSA’s 

commitment to improving the surveillance program. Without such a plan, 

it is unclear how NNSA will provide itself and key stakeholders with these 

assurances.

To improve the processes used to test and report on the nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile, we are making four recommendations to the 

Secretaries of Defense and of Energy and the Administrator of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration, as appropriate:

• To improve the clarity of information NNSA provides to DOD about 

nuclear weapon limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, (1) 

expand the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD so that it includes 

each existing limitation and (2) assess, and revise as appropriate, the 

guidance provided by NNSA to DOD to ensure it clearly describes the 

potential impacts that each limitation may have on nuclear weapon 

operations, maintenance, and war planning.

• To improve the reliability and relevance of information associated with 

limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in 

coordination with the Secretary of Defense, determine if the findings 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 24 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

of the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review can be used 

to eliminate certain limitations. 

 To increase confidence in NNSA’s ability to fully address all findings 

and recommendations from its draft surveillance management review, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of 

the National Nuclear Security Administration prepare and complete a 

comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with OMB 

Circular No. A-123. This plan should identify the detailed actions that 

agency personnel must take to fully implement the recommendations 

in the review and include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and 

metrics to measure progress of this implementation. This corrective 

action plan should also address how to better integrate Core and 

Enhanced Surveillance. 

We provided NNSA and DOD with a draft of this report for their review 

and comment. In its written comments, NNSA said that GAO did a 

commendable job in reviewing a highly complex and technical area. 

NNSA agreed with two of the four recommendations and “agreed in 

principle” with the other two recommendations. NNSA also outlined the 

actions that it plans to take to address all four of the report’s 

recommendations. The complete text of NNSA’s comments is presented 

in appendix I. NNSA also provided technical clarifications, which we 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

For two of the recommendations, NNSA stated that the Assistant Deputy 

Administrator for Stockpile Management will oversee the development 

and execution of a corrective action plan for the nuclear stockpile 

surveillance program and ensure that the findings of the joint DOD and 

NNSA military requirements review be appropriately implemented. NNSA 

agreed in principle with the other two recommendations aimed at 

clarifying the information NNSA provides to DOD on nuclear weapon 

limitations. NNSA stated that it agrees with the desired outcome of these 

two recommendations, but NNSA concluded that a key procedural 

weakness in the process used to report on weapon limitations is the 

absence of a document that formally communicates DOD’s position on 

limitations. NNSA said that it will ask the Nuclear Weapons Council to 

require that military service lead project officers provide NNSA with a 

consolidated DOD response each time a MAR is issued, and that this 

response could include any concerns with nuclear weapon limitations. We 

agree with NNSA that the management of nuclear weapon limitations 

requires active participation from both NNSA and DOD through the 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Nuclear Weapons Council. If NNSA and DOD follow through with these 

planned actions, we believe that the agencies will be responsive to our 

recommendations. 

In its written comments, DOD agreed with all four of the report’s 

recommendations and said that the process by which nuclear weapon 

limitations are managed needs to be addressed. DOD said that it will 

coordinate with NNSA, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, to 

implement our recommendations. The complete text of DOD’s comments 

is presented in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the appropriate 

congressional committees, and other interested parties. The report also is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III. 

Gene Aloise, Director, 

Natural Resources and Environment 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

List of Requesters 

The Honorable John S. McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Jeff Sessions

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Michael R. Turner

Chairman

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jon Kyl

United States Senate

The Honorable David Vitter

United States Senate
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 27 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 28 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 29 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 30 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 31 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 32 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 33 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO-12-188 Nuclear Weapons 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director; 

Patrick Bernard; and Alisa Beyninson made key contributions to this 

report. Colin Chambers, Penney Harwell-Caramia, Jon Kucskar, Michelle 

Munn, Kevin O’Neil, Tim Persons, Rebecca Shea, Carol Shulman, and 

Kiki Theodoropoulos provided technical assistance.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361215)
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