Conflict Management

and “Whole of Government”: 

Useful Tools for U.S. 

National Security Strategy?

Editors:

Volker C. Franke

Robert H. Dorff

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Strategic Studies Institute Book

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND “WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT”:

USEFUL TOOLS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

STRATEGY?

Volker C. Franke

Robert H. Dorff

Editors

April 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-524-0
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword ......................................................................v

Preface........................................................................viii

Daniel S. Papp

1. Introduction ..............................................................1

Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff 

Part I: 

2. Security Sector Reform: 12 Central 

Questions for Responding to the 

Security Challenges of the 21st Century...........17 

Robert Kennedy 

3. The Puzzle of National Security 

Planning for the Whole of Government............67

Mary R. Habeck 

4. Development is Destruction, and Other 

Things You Weren’t Told at School...................91 

 Michael Ashkenazi

Part II: 

5. Where Does Whole of Government Meet 

Whole of Society?...............................................127

Lisa Schirch

6. Security System Reform in Weak or 

Fragile States: A Threefold Challenge 

to the Whole of Government Approach..........153

 Fouzieh Melanie Alamir
iv

7. A Whole Lot of Substance or a Whole Lot 

of Rhetoric? A Perspective on a Whole of 

 Government Approach to Security 

 Challenges...........................................................185

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

8. Whole of Government in Diplomacy 

and Development: Whole or Hole?................. 217

James Stephenson

9. The National Security Staff: What’s 

Missing in Whole of Government 

Approaches to National Security.....................231

Jack A. LeCuyer

Part III:

10. Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan—

Looking from Outside the Box.........................275

 Christopher Holshek

11. Civil-Military Teaming: A Solution?..............307

 William J. Flavin

12. Ethical Lessons of Maximizing 

Private Contractor Value in Afghanistan 

and Iraq................................................................347

 Doug Brooks and Mackenzie Duelge

13. Multiethnic Conflicts in U.S. Military 

Theaters Overseas: Intercultural 

Imperatives .........................................................381

 Gregory Paul P. Meyjes

About the Contributors......................................439
v

FOREWORD

On February 25, 2011, Kennesaw State University 

(KSU) and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the 

U.S. Army War College, conducted a symposium entitled “Conflict Management: A Tool for U.S. National 

Security Strategy.” This symposium was the first 

collaboration between KSU and SSI, and it was conducted in the inaugural year of KSU’s new Ph.D. program in International Conflict Management (INCM). 

In addition to the focus on conflict management, the 

symposium was designed to examine one of the ongoing research interests in the SSI academic engagement 

series, the role of “whole of government” (WoG) efforts in addressing contemporary national and international security challenges and opportunities. Three 

symposium panels addressed the following topics: 

“Responding to New Foreign Policy and National 

Security Threats,” “WoG Prospects and Challenges,” 

and “WoG Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.” The 

symposium discussions ranged from the conceptual 

to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in international 

interventions. Invited panelists shared their experiences and expertise on the question of WoG and the 

impact of fragile and failing states on national security concerns. The panelists engaged the audience in 

a discussion that included viewpoints from academia, 

the military, government agencies, nongovernmental 

organizations, and industry. Despite the broad range 

of viewpoints, a number of overarching themes and 

tentative agreements emerged. The reader will find 

them in the chapters of this edited volume.

The Strategic Studies Institute and the co-editors of 

this volume join in thanking the faculty, students, and 
vi

staff of KSU for their extraordinary efforts in organizing and implementing the symposium, and in the 

preparation of this book. We also extend a very special 

thanks to KSU President Dr. Daniel S. Papp and Dean 

of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences Dr. 

Richard A. Vengroff for their energetic support of and 

commitment to the event and the publication of this 

book. In addition, we would like to thank Dr. Jack Moran, Associate Professor of Political Science, for skillfully moderating one of the panels; Mackenzie Duelge, INCM Ph.D. student who, as graduate assistant 

for the symposium, helped coordinate the conference 

logistics and co-authored the conference brief; and 

INCM Program Administrator Rose Procter, whose 

tireless efforts and great dedication ensured the successful organization and effective implementation 

of the symposium. Finally, our thanks go to the first 

cohort of INCM Ph.D. students, all of whom volunteered to serve as program liaison and campus guides 

to the panelists.

KSU and SSI are pleased to present this book, 

and we hope that readers will engage us further in 

the kinds of issues and debates that surfaced at the 

symposium and that are captured and extended in the 

pages that follow. For both national and international 

security, we must continue to develop effective tools 

and implement coordinated strategies of conflict management.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

viii

PREFACE

THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

TO SECURITY, AND BEYOND

Daniel S. Papp

Throughout most of the 20th century, national security focused primarily, and sometimes exclusively, 

on military affairs. In the 21st century, this has changed 

as new and more comprehensive ways of thinking 

about, studying, and planning for national security 

and global security are being adopted in response to 

new security challenges and threats that go beyond 

the dangers posed by traditional causes of war and 

conflict. In addition to terrorism, these other threats to 

security are posed by, but not limited to, shortfalls of 

energy and nonfuel mineral resources, scarcity of food 

and fresh water, encroaching desertification, and cyber attacks. To some, these new challenges and threats 

present as much, and over time perhaps more, of a 

challenge and threat to security as do guns, bombs, 

and missiles. 

The faculty of the Ph.D. Program in International 

Conflict Management (INCM) at Kennesaw State University (KSU) recognized this reality and, in conjunction with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC), structured a series 

of meetings and conferences to discuss emerging security challenges and threats to debate and analyze 

the strengths and weaknesses of the Barack Obama 

administration’s whole of government (WoG) approach to dealing with these challenges and threats. 

This volume contains papers delivered at the first 

KSU-SSI conference. 
ix

Why are such meetings and conferences valuable 

and why is this volume worth reading? According to 

many, including high officials in the previous George 

Bush and current Barack Obama administrations, the 

often interrelated and predominantly nontraditional 

nature of many of the emerging challenges and threats 

to national and global security require new ways of 

thinking and new plans of action. While traditional 

military capabilities are requisite to counter traditional military challenges and satisfy traditional military 

needs, new thinking about security is needed if the 

21st century world is to become safer and more secure.

Steps were initiated to move in this direction during the Bush administration (2001-09) when at various times the President implied that the United States 

should unite defense, diplomacy, and development 

(“The Three Ds”) to achieve a more peaceful and 

secure world. This so-called Three Ds conception 

sought to link ways in which both traditional and nontraditional challenges and threats to security could be 

countered. Conversely, critics of the Three Ds concept 

asserted that boundaries between the Three Ds prevented effective implementation of policies to counter 

traditional and nontraditional challenges and threats. 

Other critics avowed that defense, diplomacy, and development by themselves were not sufficient to cope 

with 21st century security challenges and threats, and 

that a more inclusive concept was needed. 

These criticisms were undoubtedly key factors 

in influencing the Obama administration to adopt a 

new approach to traditional and nontraditional security challenges and threats in its May 2010 National 

Security Strategy (NSS), which declared that “a broad 

conception of what constitutes our national security” 

was needed, and that the international order that the 
x

United States sought to create could only be reached 

by:

. . . resolv[ing] the challenges of our times—countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the 

spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; combating a changing climate and sustaining 

global growth; helping countries feed themselves and 

care for their sick; resolving and preventing conflict, 

while also healing its wounds. 

But how to do this? Again according to the May 

2010 NSS, the answer was to adopt a WoG approach to 

national and global security that viewed national and 

global security, as well as the challenges and threats 

to national and global security, in a comprehensive 

manner. Thus, the May 2010 NSS argued that a more 

holistic approach to national and global security must 

be developed and implemented. 

That more holistic approach is what the conference 

from which this volume is derived examined. The conference itself was an eye-opening and mind-expanding 

exercise in thinking about 21st century challenges and 

threats to security, and what is needed to respond to 

these challenges and threats to make the world a more 

safe and secure place. Indeed, the KSU Ph.D. Program 

in INCM, and SSI of the USAWC, are both fully committed to educating students, conducting research, 

and participating in programs that will help achieve 

these laudable objectives as we move deeper into the 

21st century. We trust that readers of this volume will 

appreciate, and in their own ways contribute to, these 

same objectives.

Finally, I would like to thank the Director of SSI, 

Professor Douglas Lovelace, and Dr. Robert H. (Robin) Dorff for helping to plan and execute the confer-
xi

ence, as well as for chairing a panel and co-editing this 

volume; I would also like to thank Dr. James Pierce 

and Ms. Rita Rummel for their excellent work in publishing this monograph. Additionally, thanks also to 

Dean Richard Vengroff of the Kennesaw State College 

of Humanities and Social Sciences; Dr. Volker Franke, 

Director of the KSU Ph.D. Program in INCM; and the 

entire INCM staff, but especially Ms. Rose Proctor, for 

their invaluable work in planning and conducting the 

conference.

ENDNOTES - PREFACE

1. See for example, President Bush’s July 17, 2001 address to 

the World Bank in which he said that the United States “must be 

guided by three great goals,” the first “to keep peace with military 

forces in support of freedom and free states,” the second “to ignite 

a new era of global economic growth through a world trading 

system that is dramatically more open and more free,” and the 

third “to work in true partnership with developing countries to 

remove the huge obstacles to development, to help them fight illiteracy, disease, unsustainable debt.” George W. Bush, “Speech 

to the World Bank,” Washington, DC, July 17, 2001. Even after 

the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, Bush emphasized a non-explicit form of the Three Ds. For example, in his 

March 22, 2002, speech to the United Nations, “Financing for Development” Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, Bush declared his 

intention to increase U.S. development assistance by 50 percent 

and create a “Millennium Challenge Account” to help developing 

states. George W. Bush, “Speech to the United Nations ‘Financing for Development’ Conference,” Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 

2002. Similarly, Bush in his introductory remarks to the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America

also obliquely referenced what later became the Three Ds:

We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of 

the world . . . 
xii

The United States will deliver greater development assistance through the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly, invest in 

their people, and encourage economic freedom. We 

will also continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and other infectious 

diseases. . . .

We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can 

build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral 

institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.

2. “The Three D’s: Defense, Diplomacy, and Development,” 

Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, August 1, 2008, 

available from www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/three_ds.

html.

3. The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010, p. 51.

4. Barack Obama, “Introductory Remarks,” in Ibid.

5. The White House, 2010 National Security Strategy, pp. 14-16.

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff

When President Barack Obama unveiled his administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in May 

2010, he proclaimed: 

We live in a time of sweeping change. The success 

of free nations, open markets and social progress in 

recent decades has accelerated globalization on an 

unprecedented scale. This has opened the doors of opportunity around the globe, extended democracy to 

hundreds of millions of people, and made peace possible among major powers. Yet globalization has also 

intensified the dangers we face—from international 

terrorism and the spread of deadly technologies to 

economic upheaval and a changing climate.1

A decade into the new century, the security architecture established in the aftermath of World War 

II seems to be “buckling under the weight of new 

threats.”2

 Today, America faces security challenges 

from violent extremist organizations, ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most recently Libya, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

the global financial crisis, the revolutionary wave of 

demonstrations and uprisings in the Arab world and, 

more generally, weak and failing states. These challenges are exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part 

because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic 

and operational environments change. To meet these 

new security challenges more effectively, Secretary 
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and then-Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power and enhancing 

America’s whole-of-government (WoG) capabilities. 

“Development,” Secretary Clinton explained, is “one 

of the most powerful tools we have for advancing 

global progress, peace, and prosperity.”3

Indeed, our experiences since the end of the Cold 

War have demonstrated that development and security are intrinsically linked, and that political stability, economic opportunity and lasting peace are 

predicated on the successful transformation of violent 

conflict and the creation of sustainable legitimate government. In the past, the international community, 

the U.S. Government included, responded to emerging security challenges largely in an ad hoc fashion 

by “recreating and refashioning the necessary tools, 

strategies, and relationships anew with each crisis.”4

Today, however, responding quickly to global crises and emerging threats has become part of the modus 

operandi in the White House, the Pentagon, and at the 

State Department (State). As a result, conflict management in fragile, failing, and failed states has become 

the new face of U.S. national security. Active engagement in conflict or post-conflict environments draws 

heavily on military and civilian capabilities and resources alike, and more than ever before requires the 

close coordination and cooperation of a wide range 

of state and nonstate, international and domestic actors. In today’s conflict contexts, the political, security, 

economic, social, and cultural spheres are so highly 

interdependent that failure in one sphere risks failure 

in all others. No single actor or agency and no single 

strategy suffice for developing and implementing enduring and sustainable solutions to these challenges. 

2
3

Drawing lessons from the operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan showed the need for improved coordination between civilian organizations 

and the military and, as a result, in July 2004 Congress 

authorized the funds to create the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 

in State to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. 

Government civilian capacity to support stabilization 

and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Recognizing 

existing inefficiencies in responding to international 

crises both in terms of time and resources, President 

George Bush signed National Security Presidential 

Directive (NSPD) 44 in December 2005, outlining 

the responsibilities of the new office for integrating 

more effectively the government’s civilian and military capacities. NSPD-44 specifies that America “has 

a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist 

in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, 

especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and 

market economies.”5 Aimed at promoting the security 

of the United States “through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction 

and stabilization assistance,”6

 NSPD-44 charges the 

State Department with coordinating and strengthening “U.S. reconstruction and stabilization assistance” 

and with harmonizing “such efforts with U.S. military 

plans and operations.”7

Acknowledging the need for building and integrating joint civil-military capabilities for advancing 

American interests as well as interests shared with 

other countries and peoples, President Obama underscored in his foreword to the 2010 NSS that: 
4

our armed forces will always be a cornerstone of our 

security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends on diplomats who can act in every 

corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous 

outposts; development experts who can strengthen 

governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, 

strengthen justice systems and work seamlessly with 

other countries.8

Aimed at strengthening civilian conflict management capacity, the President requested more than 

$320 million in his fiscal year (FY) 2010 Budget for 

the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), in part to 

support the recruitment, development, training, and 

equipping of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), authorized by Congress in 2008 “to help address the rise 

of new challenges to U.S. national security, including 

weak governance, political conflict, and internal violence in countries around the world.”9

 The CRC consists of civilian federal employees who are specially 

trained and equipped for rapid deployment “to provide conflict prevention and stabilization assistance to 

countries in crisis or emerging from conflict.”10

 Effective conflict prevention and transformation, 

most experts agree, require greater coherence between 

security, governance and development policies, and 

enhanced coordination among governmental agencies 

and with local, regional, and international partners. 

With its increased emphasis on civil-military cooperation to more effectively meet the mission objectives 

in peace building and stability operations—including the CRC—the U.S. Government has recognized 

the benefits of employing what some observers have 

termed smart power: using the right tool, or combination of tools, for each operational context.11
5

Secretary Clinton explained: 

With the right tools, training, and leadership, our diplomats and development experts can defuse crises before they explode. Creating new opportunities for advancing democracy, promoting sustainable economic 

growth, and strengthening the rule of law in fragile 

states are all overlapping and mutually reinforcing 

endeavors. They cut across bureaus and offices and 

agencies. They demand not just the skills of our State 

Department diplomats and USAID [U.S. Agency for 

International Development] experts, but also the expertise of civilian specialists across the U.S. Government.”12

The need for the comprehensive integration and 

coordination of civilian and military, governmental 

and nongovernmental, national and international 

capabilities to improve efficiency and effectiveness 

of conflict prevention/resolution and post-conflict 

stabilization and peace building efforts is widely recognized. While many academic and policy observers, 

military experts, and peace practitioners have lauded 

Washington’s efforts for integrating civil-military relations and strengthening interagency cooperation, others have criticized contemporary attempts at creating 

WoG responses to international crises and conflicts for 

over commitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and personnel, competition between agencies, 

ambiguous mission objectives, and undermining the 

military’s primary purpose of defending the national 

interest. The “buzz” the WoG idea has generated merits a closer look at the advantages and disadvantages 

of the concept and calls for a more systematic analysis 

of its challenges and opportunities. 
6

On February 25, 2011, a number of leading civilian and military experts came together at a symposium held at Kennesaw State University to evaluate 

the benefits and shortcomings of the WoG approach 

in response to the increasingly dynamic and complex 

global security environment. Intended to facilitate dialogue between academic experts, military leaders, policymakers, and civilian practitioners, the symposium 

provided an opportunity for a state of the art analysis 

of current WoG approaches and their effectiveness for 

coordinating stabilization and peace building efforts 

and, eventually, for shifting the burden of stability 

operations to civilian actors and enabling the timely 

scaling-down of military deployments.13

This volume presents the central arguments and 

key findings of the symposium, tracing the genesis of 

the conception of a WoG approach, critically examining current WoG practices, and drawing lessons from 

the operational contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

first part of the book describes the overall global security context within which peace building and stability operations are currently conducted, examines the 

merits of WoG approaches as effective conflict management strategies, and discusses their efficacy for 

responding to a range of emerging threats.

In Chapter 2, Robert Kennedy provides a framing 

analysis of the security environment of the early 21st 

century with specific focus on the role and position 

of the United States, and outlines the issues and challenges Washington confronts as it attempts to address 

emerging threats through an integrated interagency 

approach. While it is easy to declare that agencies 

ought to cooperate, Kennedy argues, such cooperation is neither easily embraced nor successfully implemented. Effective integration will require giving up 
7

agency fiefdoms and jointly addressing threats ranging from fragile and failing states to terrorism and totalitarianism.

Mary Habeck takes Kennedy’s argument to task 

and examines the particular challenges underlying the 

planning and implementation of government-wide reforms in general, and of WoG efforts in particular. In 

Chapter 3, she looks specifically at ambiguities in the 

definition of planning, organizational and structural 

frictions, and coordination failures that undermined 

integration attempts during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Discussing a range of proposals for alleviating 

these problems, Habeck concludes that any sustainable solution is predicated on broad-based government consensus and enforcement from above at the 

presidential and/or congressional level. In her view, 

proponency, advocacy, and leadership are required. 

Reversing the tables, in Chapter 4 Michael Ashkenazi discusses the unintended side-effects of Western, 

and particularly American, WoG efforts on the recipients of foreign assistance and developmental aid. 

Acknowledging the two-fold objectives of development—to alleviate misery from poverty and to reduce 

security threats posed by the “have-nots”—Ashkenazi 

argues that development, as conceived in the West, is 

premised on the systematic, intentional, and irreversible destruction of to-be-developed societies, with the 

risk of raising indigenous resentment and, as a result, 

further aggravating potential threats to the West. 

Therefore, Ashkenazi concludes, effective integrated 

development strategies must connect individuals and 

agencies in the donor and recipient communities. In 

terms of WoG efforts, they will remain largely irrelevant if the existing and perhaps inherent contradictions in development (what it is and what it does for 

donors and recipients) cannot be reconciled.
8

The second part of this volume addresses some 

of the practical challenges of implementing WoG 

approaches to international conflict management 

and specifically to U.S. intervention in fragile states. 

Echoing Ashkenazi’s advocation of comprehensive 

integrated development strategies, Lisa Schirch conjectures that one of the key shortcomings of current 

WoG approaches is their lack of integration with organizations that help build and maintain the strong 

civil society structures imperative to sustainable peace 

and effective development. Following a discussion of 

existing tensions between strategies of national and 

human security, Schirch argues in Chapter 5 that successful stabilization and security require an even more 

comprehensive “whole of society” approach that must 

include the interests and perspectives of diverse sectors of civil society in the target countries.

Addressing WoG efforts from a macro perspective, 

Melanie Alamir reflects in Chapter 6 on the overall 

utility of WoG approaches for achieving desired political end states by examining systematic challenges 

at three levels: the donor country’s political system, 

the recipient country’s political system, and the system of international crisis response. When considering outcomes, Alamir shows that WoG approaches, 

despite their theoretical appeal, have only limited 

practical utility because the nature of international interventions depends on the types of parties involved. 

Effective interagency cooperation is particularly difficult to achieve in weak states that lack stable political structures. Cooperation in donor countries on the 

other hand is determined largely by domestic political 

considerations of efficiency and accountability, shifting focus away from the intervention’s primary targets and desired outcomes.
9

Tracing the application of WoG to issues of U.S. 

national security, Charles Dunlap analyzes the merits 

and limitations of greater coordination across government agencies in light of the marked expansion 

of diplomatic and civilian development capabilities. 

Examining some of the unintended consequences of 

integrating response strategies to security threats, 

Dunlap contends in Chapter 7 that, despite the widely 

accepted WoG mantra, in some instances a unilateral 

approach that relies primarily on one particular agency is the preferred or only practical alternative. As a 

result, Dunlap advocates considering WoG as just one 

tool in the smart power toolbox that, when selectively 

employed, may be very effective, but that should not 

serve as a default in all circumstances.

Building on Dunlap’s argument, James Stephenson warns in Chapter 8 that U.S. presence in recipient 

states has increased to unsustainable levels, in part 

as a consequence of the uncritical embracing of WoG 

approaches. As a result, Stephenson argues ambassadors have become chief executive officers (CEOs) of 

complex interagency missions, and the military has 

become ever more engaged in stability operations that 

have become largely indistinguishable from civilian 

stabilization and reconstruction efforts. A successful WoG approach, Stephenson conjectures, would 

streamline efforts and have the various agencies and 

their representatives team up to serve the overall mission objectives before they consider individual agency 

interests. Specifically, and to offset continued strain 

on military resources, Stephenson suggests an expansion of civilian capacity for taking on a widening set of 

responsibilities for diplomacy and development and, 

ultimately, the projection of smart power. 
10

In Chapter 9, Jack LeCuyer argues that it is unreasonable to expect successful WoG efforts at the “tip 

of the spear” or on the ground, if there is a lack of 

integration and coordination at the hub of the national 

security system. LeCuyer specifically criticizes the fact 

that the role of the National Security Council (NSC), 

irrespective of the rapidly changing global security 

environment, has remained largely unchanged since 

its inception in 1947, and its staff continues to focus 

primarily on the urgent and crisis management instead of long-term strategic planning. In order to improve the performance, adaptability, and efficiency of 

the overall national security system for meeting new 

threats, LeCuyer recommends the proper resourcing 

of the NSC staff so that they can fulfill their role as 

strategic managers who actively contribute to the integration of the national security interagency system to 

achieve a WoG success at the strategic level.

The third part of the book examines WoG efforts 

in the field and attempts to draw lessons learned from 

operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to potential future interventions. Looking in from “outside 

the box,” Christopher Holshek explores the extent to 

which lessons drawn from Iraq and Afghanistan can be 

applied to other mission contexts. Although winning 

hearts and minds has been a cornerstone of American 

counterinsurgency strategy, Holshek argues in Chapter 10 that it has proven counterproductive in different cultural and operational environments and its 

techniques and tools—e.g., Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams—have only limited applicability in places like 

sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, Holshek suggests, 

there is also much to be learned from operational experiences beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. These more 

general lessons, Holshek concludes, should not only 
11

have profound implications for U.S. WoG engagements around the world, but also should help re-shape 

the American approach to national security writ large 

back home, because “we can no longer afford any 

other way.”14

Using a combination of historical and current case 

examples, William Flavin asks in Chapter 11 whether 

and to what extent civil-military teaming efforts may 

present an effective and efficient alternative to addressing the problems associated with current conflicts. 

Flavin identifies what constitutes a successful team 

and analyzes the effects of successful civil-military 

teaming on transitioning conflict. Flavin concludes 

that successful mission accomplishment is possible, as 

long as the focus of the civil-military teaming efforts is 

on the population, actively engaging local stakeholders and building legitimacy and local capacity to provide good governance.

Exploring lessons from the use of contractors in 

peace and stability operations, Doug Brooks and 

Mackenzie Duelge argue in Chapter 12 that by far, 

the biggest drain in Afghanistan and Iraq has been 

waste stemming from failures of planning, coordination, contract oversight and management, flexibility, 

and communication. Specifically, Brooks and Duelge 

examine the extent to which a generally negative attitude towards contractors has hindered their ability to perform and has interfered with the success of 

stability operations. Analyzing shortfalls in current 

practices framing government-private sector partnerships, Brooks and Duelge conclude that consolidating 

contracting government-wide as a hybrid approach, 

rather than a pure WoG approach, may be the most effective way to unify communications and record keeping, while keeping the work on the ground divided 
12

among those most qualified to do it. Ultimately, this 

kind of hybrid approach, the authors suggest, could 

not only help eliminate waste, but could also improve 

oversight, flexibility, and ethical behavior.

Focusing on the need for a qualitatively deeper 

command of cultural matters, Gregory Meyjes argues 

in the concluding chapter that U.S. interventions, 

whether based on a military or WoG approach, are 

only as viable as their conceptual framework permits; 

to be successful they require a three-tiered approach 

to ethnic, state, and global realities, based on a grasp 

of ethno-cultural dynamics. Instead of the prevailing two-dimensional approach whereby traditional 

national security efforts are complemented by local 

information in theater, Meyjes describes international 

conflict management strategies grounded in cultural 

self-awareness, intercultural competence, recognition 

of collective cultural rights, and the protection of substate ethno-nationalities. These insights, processes, 

and capabilities, Meyjes concludes, revolve around 

the inescapability of ethno-cultural justice as the key 

to peace and stability in multiethnic societies and, by 

extension, to international security. They are deemed 

critical for intervention and WoG more generally to 

meet the demands of a world greatly imperiled by 

ethnic conflict.

The chapters in this book reflect the perspectives 

of authors who have seen, worked with, and studied 

both the problems and the approaches to conflict management in a variety of different settings and contexts. 

Not all of them are enthusiastic proponents of the 

WoG concept for implementing conflict management; 

nor are they all strict skeptics of the concept. It is no 

surprise, then, that together the chapters in this edited 

volume do not offer the reader a collective answer to 
13

questions about the future of WoG. But together they 

do provide important and necessary insights into the 

challenges we face and the considerations we must include in our efforts to address the complexities of linking development and security in an integrated effort 

to manage conflict as part of an overall strategy. WoG 

is certainly one conceivable strategic way to achieve 

this linkage. Is it the best or the most appropriate way? 

What is success and what should we reasonably expect to accomplish? Is WoG a strategically useful concept for even thinking about the available tools in our 

conflict management efforts? These are only a few of 

the questions raised and addressed by the authors in 

the chapters that follow. We believe these chapters are 

well worth reading by those who wrestle with these 

problems as scholars, practitioners, or both.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Foreword to the National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: 

The White House, May 2010, p. i, available from www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

2. President Obama, in his remarks accepting the Nobel 

Peace Prize, available from www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/world/

europe/11prexy.text.html?ref=europe.

3. Available from www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_aug09/p1_

clinton080902.html.

4. Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, Smart Power 

in Action: 2009 Year in Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of State, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/

137690.pdf.

5. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), Washington, DC: The White House, pp. 1-2, available from www.fas.org/

irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf.
14

6. Ibid., p. 1. 

7. Ibid., p. 2.

8. National Security Strategy, p. i.

9. Remarks by Robert Loftis, Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, commemorating the third anniversary of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), July 16, 2011, available 

from www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/newsroom/168618.htm.

10. See the CRC website, available from 

www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/.

11. See Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “A Smarter, More Secure America,” Report of the CSIS Commission on 

Smart Power, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, available from www.csis.org/

media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf. For further information on the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, see www.csis.org/

smartpower/.

12. Available from www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/.

13. For further detail on the KSU-SSI Symposium, see the 

symposium website available from ksussi.hss.kennesaw.edu/.

14. See the Human Security Report Project’s Human Security 

Report 2009/2010, Simon Fraser University, available from www.

hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx. 
15

PART I

17

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM:

12 CENTRAL QUESTIONS FOR RESPONDING 

TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST 

CENTURY

Robert Kennedy

At the end of the Cold War, John Mearsheimer 

penned an article, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold 

War,”1

 in which he suggested that one day we might 

wake up lamenting the loss of order afforded us during the Cold War. Though his concerns were focused 

on the potential rise of instabilities in Europe, they 

have nonetheless unfortunately proven true in the 

wider context of global instabilities that now give rise 

to activities that threaten the security of the United 

States as well as that of other nations. Indeed, the security challenges that now confront the United States 

are exceedingly complex. The reasons are many and 

varied. However, often they stem less from the prospect of war among nation-states than from threats that 

arise from intrastate instabilities that have emerged 

following the end of the Cold War. As a result, processes and structures designed to meet the demands 

of the Cold War and the threats to U.S. national security posed by the Soviet Union are no longer adequate. 

In recent years, to meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment, there have been calls for 

an integration of the instruments of national power, 

from across government collaborative planning to integrated responses organized on an interagency basis. 

This chapter examines the security environment 

that has come to characterize the early 21st century 
18

and outlines the issues and challenges the United 

States confronts as it attempts to address the threats 

of tomorrow through an integrated interagency approach. The chapter concludes that the emerging environment does indeed demand a greater integration 

of effort than has thus far been emblematic of U.S. foreign and security policies, and to accomplish that will 

require, at a minimum, answers to a number of central 

questions, which are addressed below. 

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE 21ST 

CENTURY

When the Cold War ended, so ended a conflict 

that spanned nearly half a century, consumed vast 

resources, and threatened the annihilation of much 

of humanity. For many, the horizons seemed bright. 

Visions of a more peaceful world order were entertained. However, relief from conflict was brief. Iraq’s 

invasion of Kuwait and conflicts in such places as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and finally the attacks 

on September 11, 2001 (9/11), shattered illusions that 

the world had reached the “End of History,” as Francis Fukuyama argued, when conflict is replaced by 

“economic calculations, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”2

Indeed, history did not end. Conflict has not been 

replaced by other concerns. For the time being, the 

security environment of the early 21st century does 

not threaten human annihilation. Nevertheless the 

dangers are real and in many respects demand more 

articulated approaches than those used to hold the Soviet Union at bay during the Cold War. So how has 

the security environment changed, and what are the 

dangers that lie ahead?
19

Cold War Restraints Gone.

Gone are the Soviet Union and threats of nuclear 

annihilation. Also gone is the stability imposed by the 

bipolar nuclear standoff that in many respects resulted in the “Long Peace” as John Lewis Gaddis put it, 

and with it went the systemic discipline that rendered 

the rise of dissident groups difficult, if not impossible, 

in many parts of the world. With the demise of the 

Soviet Union, the cooker lid has been released and 

pressures within have emerged to wreck their havoc. 

Multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and/or 

multi-tribal states, often created by the stroke of a pen 

on a map and once held together by dictators, supported by one side or the other during the Cold War, 

frequently have given way to weak and feckless governments in the post-Cold War period. The internal 

cohesion imposed by the restraints of the Cold War 

has disappeared, exposing historic tensions among 

differing groups and giving rise to instabilities, failing 

governments, and internal conflicts, as well as creating havens and new opportunities for violent and extremist groups.

Diminished Deterrence.

Furthermore, the deterrence equation that often 

held conflict in check has been undermined. Deterrence of conflict works best when the costs and risks 

are shared and stark. During the Cold War, the cost of 

acquiring the ability to deliver a devastating military 

attack on the United States or any of its client states 

by the Soviet Union or vice versa was immense, and 

the risk was the potential for mutual annihilation. 
20

However, even during the Cold War, deterrence had 

its limits. Threats of massive retaliation broke down 

in lesser conflicts where direct attacks by one superpower on the homeland of the other superpower were 

not the issue. Nevertheless, where the superpowers 

abetted and served as mentors and suppliers of needed economic aid and military arms and equipment to 

competing factions in so-called Third World countries, 

the superpowers were usually able to keep conflict in 

check, modulating the behavior of their respective client states to ensure that superpower fundamental security interests were not directly threatened. 

Today, the cost of attacks such as those on the 

World Trade Center or the Pentagon is a trifle in comparison to the devastation they could cause. Moreover, 

many of today’s potential aggressors are not state actors. Nor do they require the assistance of a state to 

threaten the security of others. They hold no territory 

that can be easily threatened with a military counterattack. They do not mind sacrificing themselves, their 

families, or others to accomplish their objectives. Furthermore, precise knowledge of which of the many 

individuals or independent or semi-affiliated groups 

perpetrated an event may not be known. Yes, known 

terrorist training camps can be attacked, forces can 

sometimes be sent to foreign lands in an attempt to 

ferret out the perpetrators, alliances can sometimes 

be forged to bring the weight of the international 

community to bear. But successful outcomes are not 

assured. As a result, the risks to the aggressors of effective military reprisal are often low, and the threat 

of such a reprisal is largely ineffective. Hence, if the 

efforts of such groups are to be thwarted, other approaches for dealing with the threats they pose will 

need to be added to the arsenal of policy tools.
21

Globalization.

The globalization of technology, the media, and 

know-how also has played a major role in altering 

the contemporary security environment. The Internet, 

still in its infancy as the Cold War was coming to an 

end, now provides easy access to a breadth of information that in the past only the most dedicated, diligent, 

determined, and educated segments of society could 

acquire. Globalization of communications and the 

concomitant emergence of a wide range of communications technologies have made instant interchange 

with any place or person on the globe the standard 

rather than the exception. Money can be moved, people contacted, and plans instantly shared or changed. 

Such technologies have had a vast and often positive 

impact on societies. But they do have a darker side. 

Today terrorists, criminals, extremist organizations, and others bent on doing harm can gain access, with the mere click of a mouse, to information 

widely available on the Internet on such things as how 

to combine commonly available materials to make 

bombs, the advantages and limitations of using certain 

chemical compounds or pathogens to cause harm, and 

how to construct nuclear weapons. They can obtain 

information often available through the Internet or the 

media or both on such activities as the movements of 

individuals they may wish to target, materials they 

may wish to acquire, and actions planned by governments or in progress to thwart their efforts. They can 

move funds instantly to support their activities and 

communicate with cohorts around the world in order 

to coordinate their efforts. They can also attack cyber 

networks and endanger national political, economic, 

and military infrastructures, with global implications 

for the safety and welfare of peoples. 
22

Loose Nukes and the Proliferation of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction.

Since the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) concerns have been voiced over 

what has come to be known as the “loose nuclear 

weapons” problem. The term “loose nukes” originally referred to nuclear weapons that no longer could 

be accounted for following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. It is estimated that during the Cold War, the 

USSR had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and 

enough weapons-grade uranium and plutonium to 

triple that number.3

 Given the severe economic stress, 

rampant crime, and widespread corruption following 

the breakup of the Soviet Union, concerns were expressed that nuclear weapons, particularly so-called 

“suitcase bombs,” may have fallen into the hands of 

terrorists or criminals.4

Today the term “loose nukes” has acquired a wider 

definition, referring not only to nuclear weapons, but 

also to nuclear know-how and fissile materials. The 

problem created by the breakup of the USSR is further 

exacerbated by the continued proliferation of nuclear 

weapon states and potential proliferation of fissile materials as additional nations are added to the number 

of states possessing nuclear weapons. Today, in addition to the five so-called “declared” nuclear weapon 

states under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (China, France, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States), three states not parties to the Treaty have tested nuclear weapons—India, 

Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel is believed to have 

nuclear weapons, and Iran (an NPT state) is believed 

to be seeking to develop nuclear weapons. 
23

For all that has been said about the stability induced 

by the acquisition of nuclear weapons during the Cold 

War, the further proliferation of such weapons threatens to induce instabilities of grand proportion as opportunities for acquiring materials and know-how 

multiply. Arguably, it is the acquisition of the fissile 

materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium 

(HEU)—that poses the most difficult problem for terrorists or criminals seeking to build a nuclear weapon 

or an improvised nuclear device. Creating a nuclear 

weapon from HEU is technically easier than building 

a plutonium weapon. HEU is the ingredient required 

to produce the simplest gun assembly weapon of the 

type dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. Such weapons 

need not be tested to assure an atomic explosion. In 

2002, the U.S. National Research Council warned that 

such weapons could be fabricated without state assistance.5

Unfortunately, HEU is widely available today. A 

2003 estimate noted that there were about 50 tons of 

HEU available in civilian power and research programs in over 50 nations6

 and perhaps as many as 

2,000 tons in nuclear weapons programs globally.7 It 

only takes as little as 40-60 kilograms (kg) of HEU to 

produce a crude nuclear device. There have been no 

confirmed reports of missing/unaccounted for nuclear 

weapons, but there is ample evidence of a black market in nuclear materials. In the 1990s, U.S. authorities 

discovered attempts by al-Qaeda to obtain nuclear materials. Then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet told Congress that Osama bin Laden 

had sought to acquire or develop a nuclear device. 

Russians report that they have broken up hundreds of 

nuclear-material smuggling deals. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported more 
24

than 100 nuclear smuggling incidents since 1993.8 In 

April 2010, Georgian president Saakashvilli reported 

that his country had seized a shipment of HEU, presumably smuggled through the Caucasus.9

Moreover, the problem may not be entirely one 

originating in foreign lands. Russia has accused the 

United States of lax protection standards at nuclear 

and biological facilities. They contend that secret information from the U.S. Los Alamos Laboratory ended up in the hands of drug gangs, that several U.S. 

institutions dealing in viruses failed to provide sufficient security to prevent an intruder from entering 

their facilities, and that some 1,500 sources of ionizing 

radiation (e.g. spent nuclear fuel rods) were lost by the 

United States between 1996 and 2001.10

President Barack Obama highlighted the issue on 

the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, in April 2010, warning that the prospect of 

nuclear terrorism is “the single biggest threat to U.S. 

security, both short-term, medium-term and longterm. This is something that could change the security 

landscape of this country and around the world for 

years to come.”11

Hyper-Ethnicism, Religious Extremism, and 

Tribalism.

Unlike the most devastating conflicts of the 20th 

century, which were frequently driven by fanatical 

nationalism or the Cold War that was driven largely 

by ideology, many of today’s conflicts are fueled by 

hyper-ethnicism, religious extremism, and/or tribalism.12 It is the very absence of nationalism (that state 

of mind, that collective group consciousness, that 

sense of being one with nation13) that often not only 
25

leads to conflict but also confounds efforts at conflict 

management and resolution. Seemingly irreconcilable 

differences, fueled by parochial interests and diverse 

ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings make it difficult 

to find common ground upon which to build a stable 

peace. Furthermore, in places like Afghanistan, where 

tribal cultures oftentimes eschew western ethics and 

the western sense of fair play, duplicity in diplomatic 

dealings and a willingness to sell one’s community to 

the highest bidder, make any permanent settlement 

problematic. One has only to read Peter Hopkirk’s 

works on Central Asia14 to gain a historical appreciation of the complexities of achieving permanence 

to any deal done in such a tribal environment or to 

understand the concerns expressed by U.S. military 

leaders currently in Afghanistan as they try to piece 

together local coalitions to fight against al-Qaeda or 

the Taliban. A deal done today may be a deal undone 

tomorrow for any number of reasons that are unlikely 

to be well understood by western diplomats or military leaders. 

Latent as Well as Manifest Frustrations.

In addition to the issues mentioned above, instabilities also can arise from latent frustrations over corrupt, 

incompetent, or authoritarian governments brought 

to the fore by natural or manmade disasters (earthquakes, floods, inability to protect against guerrilla 

or terrorist attacks, etc.); unforeseen political events 

such as assassinations of political figures; or economic 

downturns and corresponding rising unemployment. 

In the former category, for example, the earthquake 

that devastated Managua in 1972 and the blatant corruption that saw little relief money finding its way to 
26

those in need, flooded the ranks of the Sandinistas and 

helped create an unstable situation that ultimately led 

to the overthrow of the dictator Anastasio “Tachito” 

Somoza Debayle. Similarly, the December 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto exacerbated extant political turmoil in Pakistan and contributed to events that 

led to the August 2008 resignation of President Pervez 

Musharraf. Of course, recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, 

Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere in the Middle East bear 

testimony to the impact of the combined effects of economic downturn, unemployment, and popular discontent with authoritarian rule. Blatantly manifested 

frustrations, such as those arising from the inability 

of the Israelis and Palestinians to resolve issues arising from over a half century of tensions between these 

peoples, also remain a major source of global concern 

as irritants spill over and sometimes threaten the security and safety of peoples of other nations.

Today’s Challenges.

Today the United States is faced with a multiplicity 

of threats and challenges, none of which is as perilous 

or as potentially deadly as the Cold War confrontation 

between the two superpowers. Nonetheless, some of 

the problems pose potentially dangerous consequences for the United States, its allies and friends, and indeed others. However, for the most part, the dangers 

that lie ahead flow not “from the strength of determined opponents,” but often “from the weaknesses 

of other states.”15 To be sure, the United States must 

guard against the rise of potentially hostile military 

peer competitors, as well as be prepared to protect 

its security interests and those of its allies. Of course, 

these tasks do not, a priori, demand the expansion 
27

or use of military power. Rather, a commonality of 

interests among leading states in a less ideologically 

driven world might lead cooler heads to find win-win 

solutions to complex problems involving competing 

or conflicting interests. 

The United States also must address the difficult 

security challenges that a nuclear North Korea or the 

further proliferation of nuclear weapons may pose, 

for example, in Iran. Nor can the United States ignore 

determined opponents who attempt to acquire capabilities disproportionate to their relative size through 

access to high-tech arms or through the use of the 

damaging and potentially crippling compounding effects of cyber and other technologies that are increasing available on a global scale. 

However, the problem of fragile, fractured, and failing states that has largely arisen as a result of changes 

in the post-Cold War security environment is likely 

to remain among the more serious security challenges 

that confront the United States and the world community in the decades ahead. Such states can provide a 

breeding ground and safe haven for crime; drug and 

human trafficking; ethnic, religious, and tribal strife; 

and violent extremist groups. Here one has only to 

think, as President Obama has suggested, of al-Qaeda or some other terrorist group armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear 

weapons or devices. They also can destabilize entire 

regions, making wider conflicts more probable. Thus, 

precluding instabilities and mitigating and managing 

conflicts, particularly in fragile, fractured, or failing 

states, but also elsewhere, are among the major security challenges confronting the United States. 

The operative question, then, is how should the U.S. 

Government address such challenges? The answer has 
28

become increasingly clear that the kind of relatively 

undifferentiated containment policies, which relied 

principally on military power during the Cold War, 

will not suffice. Rather, successfully addressing the security environment of the 21st century will require the 

skillful application of smart power16 which integrates 

the instruments of America’s soft and hard power.

INTEGRATING THE INSTRUMENTS OF 

NATIONAL POWER: ISSUES AND 

CHALLENGES

More than a decade ago, the Hart–Rudman Commission signaled the need for “strategic fusion of all 

appropriate instruments of national power,” noting, 

“The nature of the future security environment appears to require advanced, integrated, collaborative 

planning and organized interagency responses beyond what is possible under the current interagency 

system.17 In January 2009, the Department of Defense 

(DoD) Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report

struck a similar note supporting efforts “to increase 

unity across the government for addressing common 

national security problems”—a so-called “whole-ofgovernment” approach.18 Likewise, Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton has affirmed:

One of our goals coming into the administration was 

. . . to begin to make the case that defense, diplomacy 

and development were not separate entities, either in 

substance or process, but that indeed they had to be 

viewed as part of an integrated whole and that the 

whole of government then had to be enlisted in their 

pursuit.”19
29

It is, of course, facile to contend that U.S. efforts 

to preclude, limit, and terminate conflict and assist 

countries in their transformation to peace and stability 

require greater coherence between and among U.S. security, governance, and development policies, as well 

as enhanced coordination, and consolidation among 

U.S. governmental agencies and with local, regional, 

and international partners. If national or grand strategy can be defined as the integration of the instruments 

of national power (political, economic, psychological, military, etc.) to achieve national objectives, then 

it only makes sense that all agencies of government 

entrusted with such tasks be integrated in efforts to 

address threats and potential threats to U.S. security. Indeed, it is surprising that some 235 years since 

its founding, over 100 years since the United States 

emerged on the world scene following the SpanishAmerican War, more than 66 years since the end of 

World War II and the emergence of the United States 

as a superpower, and 20 years since the end of the 

Cold War, only in recent years has Washington begun 

to take seriously the notion that an integrated effort in 

foreign and security policy is required.20 Nevertheless, 

integrating the efforts of the many U.S. departments 

and agencies that have foreign and security responsibilities in a whole of government (WoG) approach 

raises a number of important, indeed critical issues: 

1. What Should Be the Objectives of America’s 

Foreign Security Policy?

Beyond simply responding to crises as they arise 

around the world, does the United States have a vision 

of itself in the world? Has it defined the kind of world 

it hopes will emerge in the 21st century and the role 
30

the United States can play in encouraging the emergence of such a world?21 Henry Kissinger noted over 

30 years ago: ”[W]e will never be able to contribute to 

building a stable and creative world order unless we 

first form some conception of it.”22 He further argued 

that there was “no focal point for long-range planning 

on an interagency basis.” As a result, often “foreign 

policy turns into a series of unrelated decisions—

crisis-oriented, ad hoc and after-the-fact in nature.” 

Thus longer-term objectives are seldom considered.23

Today, the need to frame short-term responses within 

the context of a broad vision of U.S. long-term objectives remains a continuing foreign policy challenge. 

Perhaps, equally important, does the United States 

have a clear conception of the political, economic, psychological, and military challenges it is likely to confront in attempting to forge a dynamically stable (i.e., 

stable, yet creative) environment and has the United 

States defined a broad strategy, which includes other 

international actors,24 that is designed to shape the 

strategic environment through a blending of the instruments of soft and hard power and a balancing of 

short-, medium-, and long-term objectives? 

Washington bureaucrats may have found it exhilarating following the breakup of the Soviet Union to 

contend that the United States had won the Cold War 

and that Russia need not be consulted on major issues 

of the day. They also may have been inclined to roll 

their eyes dismissively when a Central Asian country 

was mentioned. They failed to see the future importance of Russia and the countries of Central Asia to 

any conception of a secure world. They soon found out 

that America needed Russia as a partner in addressing 

a number of important security considerations, and 

the assistance of some Central Asian countries in its 
31

war on terrorism. The ability to see forward, to think 

beyond conventional limits—outside of the box, if you 

will—is essential if U.S. policymakers are to address 

successfully current and future security challenges. 

Yet such a trait is not always welcomed nor rewarded 

in Washington.25 Breaking with this pattern is requisite in the setting of foreign policy and national security objectives.

As has now become all too evident, acting alone 

the United States cannot address successfully many of 

the issues that now confront or will confront it in the 

future. Shaping the political environment so that the 

cooperation of others is forthcoming is likely to be one 

of America’s most important tasks and difficult challenges. This will require the United States to be seen as 

working not just to advance its own interests but also 

those of the broader community of nations. No WoG 

approach will be successful if this is not understood. 

This will require leadership. But leadership26 “does 

not come cheap.” As Joseph Joffe noted a decade ago, 

[T]he price [of leadership] is measured in the currency 

of obligation. Leaders succeed not only because of 

their superior power, but also because they have a fine 

sense for the quirks and qualities of others—because 

they act in the interest of all [emphasis added]. Their 

labor is the source of their authority. And so a truly 

great power must not just prevent but pre-empt hostile coalitions—by providing essential services. Those 

who respect the needs of others engage in supply-side 

diplomacy: They create a demand for their services, 

and that translates into political profits, also known as 

“leadership.”27

Thus the vision that must serve as guide to America’s foreign and security policy objectives must 
32

transcend narrow and often short-term national selfinterest. The model for action must reflect Breton 

Woods, Dumbarton Oaks, and Marshall Plan values 

rather than narrower national concerns. This is likely 

to entail a broadening of the scope of national security 

beyond traditional concepts. This also is where vision 

may play its greatest role, and ignorance cause the 

greatest distraction.

2. When Should the United States Become 

Involved?

With a vision to the future, where, when, and under what circumstances should the United States become involved in issues confronting other nations? 

Since the end of World War II, the United States has 

deployed its military forces far and wide and been 

otherwise involved in countless efforts around the 

globe in the name of preventing the spread of communism, preserving the peace, averting humanitarian 

disasters, and/or precluding or managing instabilities and conflicts. For example, following World War 

II, U.S. military forces occupied Germany, Japan, the 

southern half of Korea, and a part of Austria, and reoccupied the Philippines. The United States also went 

to the assistance of South Korea when it was attacked 

by North Korea; South Vietnam when it was threatened by the communist-led Viet Cong; Kuwait when 

it was attacked by Iraq; and Kosovo when it was under attack by Serb forces. Following the 9/11 attacks, 

U.S. forces were deployed to Afghanistan where they 

remain to this day, attempting to shore up Afghan security forces, assisting in the defeat al-Qaeda and their 

Taliban supporters, and assuring a more democratic, 

stable peace. U.S. forces also were deployed to Iraq 

for a variety of reasons, and as of this writing, a sig-
33

nificant number remain there to help forge a stable environment and democratic peace. More recently U.S. 

forces have been deployed to the Mediterranean in 

support of a United Nations (UN) mandated “No Fly 

Zone” established to protect civilians from attacks by 

the Gadhafi regime and its supporters. 

Furthermore, U.S. military forces have been involved in vast numbers of other security related efforts. This is not to mention the many covert activities 

involving U.S. military, paramilitary, and intelligence 

agencies in which the United States has engaged in 

order to advance American interests.28 In addition, to 

direct and covert U.S. involvement in foreign countries, the United States often has provided security 

related and development assistance not just to assist 

poor countries, but also to address potential instabilities that might lead to conflict and more recently as 

a weapon against terrorism. Also, financial aid and 

technical assistance frequently have been provided 

to foreign governments to strengthen and professionalize their military and police forces, as well as 

economic and humanitarian assistance to stabilize 

their economies, encourage development, alleviate 

poverty, mitigate disasters, and the like. Such developmental assistance is often channeled through multinational organizations and nongovernmental organizations and/or provided directly through bilateral 

agreements with recipient countries.

Many of the above-mentioned efforts have been 

relatively low cost. However, some have been a heavy 

burden, costly in lives and national treasure, and 

sometimes resulting in great domestic dissent and 

division among the American polity, a weakening 

of America’s reputation, a consequent weakening of 

support abroad, and have been counterproductive in 

terms of long-term policy objectives. 
34

Thus, among the more important factors that must 

be considered as Washington addresses the challenges 

of the coming decades is: Under what circumstances 

and how should the United States get involved? Clearly the United States has had an expansive view of its 

appropriate global role since the end of World War II. 

The operative question is whether, in their entirety, 

the long-term benefits of each of those efforts have 

outweighed the costs. Did the U.S. Government have 

processes in place at the time to answer that question 

before engaging, for example, in Vietnam in the 1950s 

and 1960s or Iraq in 2003? Does the United States have 

such processes in place now to address the current crises in Libya and at other locations in the Middle East 

or those that may arise elsewhere? Should it? 

These are not unreasonable questions, driven by a 

desire for retrenchment or pessimism about America’s 

future. As Washington attempts, to put it in former 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ words, “to adapt 

and reform our 63-year old national security apparatus 

to be more effective, above all, at building the capacity 

of other countries to provide for their own security,”29

it is reasonable to ask whether the United States needs 

to be as involved in the future in the security affairs of 

other countries to the same extent that it was during 

the Cold War. It is reasonable to ask in what countries 

America’s security demands involvement today; precisely why, to what ends both in terms of immediate, 

local objectives, and in the broadest strategic context; 

and under what circumstances are those ends likely to 

be achievable. Involvement has costs. Over extension 

of a nation’s resources can be just as threatening to its 

future as under involvement in meeting its challenges. 

An important corollary to questions of when and 

where the United States should become involved is 
35

the question: How should it be involved? Senior administration officials including the President and 

Secretary of State have indicated that they regard economic development as a weapon against terrorism. 

President Obama, signaling his support for development assistance for poor countries, noted: “Extremely 

poor societies . . . provide optimal breeding grounds 

for disease, terrorism, and conflict.”30 The proposition 

clearly seems plausible. It is reasonable to assume that 

the poor, the uneducated, those with little and therefore little to lose, embittered by societal disparities of 

wealth, and with few if any prospects for improvement are more likely to be recruited into the ranks of 

the terrorists. The problem is that studies have shown 

that “There is no evidence that sympathy for terrorism is greater among deprived people.”31 According 

to Alan Krueger, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of 

the Treasury for Economic Policy and professor at 

Princeton University, studies have shown little evidence that a typical terrorist is usually poor or ill-educated. Indeed, Krueger examined 956 terrorist events 

from 1997 to 2003 and found that the poorest countries, those with low literacy, or those with relatively 

stagnant economies, did not produce more terrorists. 

Moreover, he found that when data were restricted 

to suicide attacks, there was a statistically significant 

pattern in the opposite direction, with people from 

poorer countries less likely to commit suicide attacks. 

Other studies have had similar results.32 On the other 

hand, many of these same studies suggest that terrorist organizations prefer better educated, better skilled, 

more mature individuals, particularly for attacks on 

important targets, and that as economic conditions 

worsen, high unemployment among these groups enables terrorist organizations to recruit from the ranks 

of such individuals. 
36

Hence one conclusion that can be drawn from this 

is that while promoting economic development in the 

poorest countries may well be a good idea, it is unlikely to be a fully effective tool in terms of reducing or 

eliminating terrorism, or for that matter, other dissident and potentially dangerous groups. Rather, more 

selective assistance aimed at reducing unemployment 

or underemployment among the better educated, better skilled, more mature individuals, may be of relatively greater value. 

Moreover, an equally plausible proposition is 

that extremely poor nations provide optimal breeding grounds for terrorism and conflict because they 

are unable to develop and maintain effective governmental sovereignty. As a result, drug cartels, terrorist organizations, and other extremist elements are 

able to establish themselves within areas where the 

weak state is unable to maintain control. Such conditions may demand that relatively greater emphasis 

be placed on efforts to eliminate corruption, improve 

legal systems and law enforcement, assist in political 

integration, and the like.

So in deciding which implements in the foreign 

policy tool bag to choose in a given situation, the development tool needs to be carefully assessed along 

with other policy instruments in terms of their short-, 

medium-, and long-term implications for U.S. objectives.33 Undifferentiated economic development is a 

worthy goal from a humanitarian perspective. However, in terms of advancing American security, the determination of how the United States should become 

involved should be the product of a fully integrated 

process among governmental agencies that envisions 

responses as an integrated and collaborative effort. 
37

3. Who Should Decide When the United States 

Should Get Involved, the Extent of Involvement 

and Upon What Criteria Should Those Decisions 

Rest?

Of course, decisions on U.S. involvement ultimately rest with Congress and the President. Congress must authorize and appropriate funds for such 

efforts. The President, as head of the executive branch 

and commander in chief of the armed forces (and 

militia when called to federal service) is pledged to 

“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 

United States.” And, constitutionally, only Congress 

can declare war, though America’s Founding Fathers 

would be appalled at the increasing usurpation of 

power by American presidents, with congressional 

acquiescence, in introducing American armed forces 

into hostilities or taking the nation to war.34 However, 

this is another issue. 

The present issue is: Does the United States have in 

place the human capital to make appropriate recommendations to the President, senior national security 

advisors, and the Congress? Is there a team of professionals armed with sufficient historic and cultural 

knowledge, a clear view of past and contemporary 

political, economic, psychological, and military realities, an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the various instruments of national power, a 

broad strategic prospective, and “patterns of thinking 

that best match resources and capabilities to achieving the desired policy ends”?35 In other words, are 

there trained strategists capable of identifying and 

evaluating an array of political, diplomatic, economic, 

informational, and military options and making recommendations concerning whether, to what extent, 
38

and in what manner the United States should become 

involved in the security concerns of other nations?36 If 

not, how can these strategists be acquired and under 

whose authority should they reside—the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State (State), 

the DoD, the now moribund National Security Policy 

Planning Committee established in the last months of 

the George W. Bush administration, or perhaps some 

new agency?37 Will such a body require an expanded 

interchange with experts in academia, with society 

at large, and with foreign experts? And, how would 

such a system be managed? 

Perhaps equally important, upon what criteria 

should decisions for involvement be based? The aggregate of national priorities as set by Congress, the 

President, members of the President’s Cabinet, or for 

that matter the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 

can seem, and often are confusing, competing, and/

or opaque and therefore seldom serve as guides to 

specific foreign or security policy related decisions. In 

theory, decisions concerning U.S. involvement in foreign nations should be grounded in an evaluation of 

unfolding foreign events in terms of U.S. national interests. Yet “national interests” is an amorphous term, 

with decreasing clarity as one moves from defense 

of the homeland against attack, to providing for the 

economic well-being of American citizens, to insuring a favorable world order, to advancing American 

values, including humanitarian; and as one tries to 

differentiate between and among those interests that 

can be tabbed as survival or vital (both of which are 

generally understood as justification for some level of 

military response if needed) and major, or peripheral. 

In 1944 Walter Lippmann wrote: “Fate has brought 

it about that America is at the center, no longer the 
39

edges, of Western civilization. In this fact resides the 

American destiny.”38 As a result, during the Cold War 

a tendency emerged to equate a loss to communism 

anywhere in the world, to a loss everywhere. Such 

thinking was central to President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous “falling domino” principle.39 In his 1955 

letter to British Prime Minister Churchill, Eisenhower 

wrote:

We have come to the point where every additional 

backward step must be deemed a defeat for the Western world. In fact, it is a triple defeat. First, we lose a 

potential ally. Next, we give to an implacable enemy 

another recruit. Beyond this, every such retreat creates 

in the minds of neutrals the fear that we do not mean 

what we say when we pledge our support to people 

who want to remain free.40

Thus, the distinction between what was a vital and 

what was a peripheral interest became blurred. All interests seemed vital. All threats seemed to demand an 

American response. 

Today, as in fact the history of the Cold War proved, 

all challenges to American interests are not vital. All 

challenges to American interests, all opportunities to 

protect or enhance those interests, do not demand a 

direct American response, and those that do, need to 

be carefully evaluated in terms of their immediate and 

long-term implications for U.S. national security and 

the cost, risks, and probabilities of success associated 

with policy responses that might be contemplated. 

Though this approach seems to be generally understood in Washington, it remains unclear whether U.S 

policymakers have in mind clear criteria for making 

such judgments. 
40

Recent efforts to bring some clarity to this equation, as the United States carefully chose its response 

to events in Libya as rebels attempt to overthrow the 

long repressive government of Muammar Gadhafi, 

are somewhat encouraging, though not definitive. 

Then Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State 

Clinton made it clear that the United States does have 

a number of interests associated with the conflict and 

a stake in the outcome. But as Gates put it, the events 

in Libya are “not a vital national interest to the United 

States,” while making it clear that other interests may 

warrant American action,41 including the limited use 

of American military forces.42

4. When/Under What Circumstances Should the 

United States Assume the Leading/Senior Partner 

Role and When Should it Play Primarily a 

Supporting Role?

One critique of American efforts in Vietnam was 

that it quickly transformed itself into the senior partner. It became America’s war to win or lose. As a result, it is argued that the United States lost the leverage 

needed to force the South Vietnamese government to 

make changes in its manner of governance that might 

have had an effect on the outcome of the conflict. Has 

such become an issue as the United States attempts 

to encourage reforms in Afghanistan or elsewhere? 

Some, perhaps many, initiatives such as the ongoing 

effort to bring stability to Somalia may best be addressed by others (namely in this case, Uganda and 

Burundi under the command of the African Union), 

with the United States playing, as it has, a supporting 

role in efforts to defeat the al-Qaeda supported Shabab. 
41

Likewise, U.S. reluctance to play the leading role 

in Libya was likely driven, at least in part, by concerns 

that such a role might be counterproductive to longterm American objectives in the region and elsewhere. 

When contemplating the deployment or employment 

of U.S. military forces abroad, the United States must 

not only consider the risks and costs of such action in 

terms of U.S. lives and national treasure, but also the 

risks, costs, and opportunities understood in terms of 

broader national interests. Such interests include, for 

example, garnering the cooperation of others in efforts 

to curb terrorism, limit the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, forge new cooperative relationships 

in the post-Cold War environment, and build a more 

peaceful, dynamically stable world order. In such an 

environment, effective leadership demands the United States avoid, whenever possible, unilateral action. 

Moreover, when the United States does act, effective 

leadership does not always require being out in front. 

As President Obama has put it:

American leadership is not simply a matter of going it 

alone and bearing all the burdens ourselves. Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others 

to step up as well: to work with allies and partners so 

that they bear their share of the burden and pay their 

share of the costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all.43

Perhaps equally important and inherent in the President’s comments is the requirement to create among 

others a sense of ownership of the objectives, the processes, and the outcomes. Such ownership on the part 

of others reinforces notions of shared responsibility, 

often bears fruit in terms of cooperation on other issues, and can contribute to reducing perceptions of 
42

American hegemony and beliefs that the United States 

is driven by a desire to create a world order solely in 

its interests and image.

5. Does the United States Have in Place 

Individuals Who Can Manage the Processes of a 

Whole-of-Government, Integrated Approach?

Does the United States have professionals who 

understand the bureaucratic processes across departmental lines, can work in the interagency environment, 

and together forge consensus for effective action? If 

so, are there enough of them to manage integrated 

WoG solutions to the many complex challenges that 

lie ahead? If not, it might be wise to examine carefully 

the 2010 study by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), The Power of People. In that study, the 

PNSR contends:

. . . the strategic environment of the 21st century and 

the President’s National Security Strategy demand that 

the United States establish an Integrated National Security Professional system [INSP system]. Complex 

problems require National Security Professionals 

[NSPs] who are trained and experienced to collaborate 

across interagency and intergovernmental boundaries 

in both day-to-day work and crisis response. Many of 

these individuals have been designated under the current program, which lacks centralized management, 

strong leadership, a formalized human capital program, and a common funding source. Without these 

system attributes, the United States will not be able to 

develop and sustain the well qualified workforce of 

NSPs it requires.44

This is not to say that some progress on this issue 

has not already been made. Building on the lessons 

of Hurricane Katrina, President George W. Bush’s 
43

2007 Executive Order 13434 mandated that departments and agencies establish programs for the “Development of Security Professionals.” The executive 

order called for those programs to provide the U.S. 

Government with security professionals who by their 

training, education, and professional experience will 

emerge with enhanced mission knowledge, skills, and 

experience and consequently be better able to manage 

and direct integrated interagency responses and thus 

“enhance the national security of the United States, including preventing [italics added], protecting against, 

responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters, such as acts of terrorism.” 45

In response, departments and agencies of the U.S. 

Government have established programs and created 

courses open not only to members of their organizations but also to those of other organizations involved 

in national security. Critical shared capabilities have 

been identified. Some rotational assignments have 

been established and memoranda of understanding 

have been signed, permitting reimbursement of individuals assigned to other agencies. Moreover, department and agency programs often include educational 

components that are to help individuals develop an 

understanding of the cultural, religious, political, and 

social norms of other peoples and a modicum of foreign language capability if the mission so requires, 

as well as the ability to think creatively and strategically.46

However, the PNSR study notes, among other 

things, “results have been agency-centric and therefore disparate and non-uniform. Programs also suffer 

from a lack of centralized leadership, ill-defined roles 

and responsibilities, lack of a common lexicon, poor 

communication among programs, no direct funding 

source, and a lack of clearly defined metrics for evalu-
44

ation.”47 To address such deficiencies, the PNSR study 

calls for an Integrated Security Professional System 

and sets a pathway to achieve such a system. 

Of course, the success of any program designed to 

produce security professionals will turn not just on 

developing people who understand the interagency 

system and can manage human and material resources. Successful management and direction will largely 

depend on their ability to understand the context in 

which decisions must be made. This will demand individuals who, in their areas of responsibility, have 

at least a modicum of understanding of the history, 

culture, traditions, politics, and the past and current 

conditions that might lead to a crisis, and who can put 

the dots together in such a fashion as to successfully 

manage efforts to prevent a crisis from emerging or 

wisely manage efforts to assist in stabilizing a situation once a crisis has occurred. 

6. Does the United States Have the Ability to Assess 

Accurately What is Likely to be Necessary in Order 

to Restore Stability in Pre- or Post- Crisis or Conflict 

Situations?

In 2008 under the auspices of the Reconstruction 

and Stabilization Coordinating Committee,48 an interagency working group was formed. The Working 

Group was co-chaired by the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) Office of Conflict Management 

and Mitigation, and included representatives of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Forces Command, and the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The Working Group ran a successful 
45

trial of an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) in a workshop on Tajikistan. The ICAF 

provides tools for agencies of the U.S. Government to 

develop a shared understanding of the dynamics of a 

particular crisis and prepare for interagency planning 

for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization. 

It assists interagency teams in understanding why 

unstable conditions exist and how best to engage in 

order to transform the situation. Thus, an ICAF analysis is designed to “be part of the first step in any interagency planning process to inform the establishment 

of USG [U.S. Government] goals, design or reshaping 

of activities, implementation or revision of programs, 

or re/allocation of resources.”49

As with so many other assessment tools, the value 

of this tool will depend strongly on the personnel chosen to employ it. Indeed, such a tool is likely to require 

personnel with foresight, who possess a significant 

level of understanding of the historical, cultural, political, economic, and other factors that are likely to affect a given situation and often will need to be drawn 

together quickly. Thus only time will tell whether 

such a tool will be effective. 

7. Does the United States Have the Organization 

and Personnel to Help Stabilize Pre-and Post-Crises 

or Conflict Situations?

While the jury is still out, some substantial progress has been made. In 2004, the S/CRS—recently designated the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations—was created by congressional authorization. 

Its “mandate was to organize the civilian side of the 

U.S. government to run large stabilization operations 

such as Iraq and Afghanistan effectively and to create 
46

a pool of civilian experts with the right skills to deploy 

in such operations.”50 In December 2005, President G. 

W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, directing the Secretary of State to take 

the lead in coordinating and integrating all U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The idea was that 

this office would not take on the functions performed 

by others in State or other agencies of government, but 

rather would plan, organize, and coordinate the activities of the different agencies under the policy guidance of the NSC and the Secretary of State. By early 

2007, eight departments and agencies—Agriculture, 

Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland 

Security, Justice, State, Treasury, and USAID—agreed 

to build a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) drawn from 

employees of the eight agencies and to establish procedures, collectively called the Interagency Management System, for running future stability operations. 

The Department of Transportation joined in February 

2011.

The concept called for 250 Active and 2,000 

Standby members drawn from the eight designated 

agencies and a 2,000 member CRC composed of individuals from outside of the Federal government who 

would enlist for 4 years. The full-time job of Active 

members would be to deploy in foreign crises. Standby members would have full-time positions in one of 

the eight agencies, but be available for deployment in 

large crises, while CRC members would be available 

for deployments of up to 1 year. Congress began funding the Active and Standby components of the CRC 

in 2008. By the end of 2010, there were 131 Active and 

over 1,000 Standby members including agronomists, 

development specialists, diplomats, economists, engineers, law enforcement and corrections officers, law-
47

yers, public administrators, health officials, and others 

with a range of skills needed in foreign crises to assist 

in restoring stability, promoting economic recovery 

and sustainable growth, and advancing the rule of law 

as quickly as possible in fragile or failing states.

Even as the CRC was in the process of being established, its members along with the S/CRS created 

a civilian-military planning group and produced an 

Afghanistan strategy approved by the American ambassador and the NSC. In 2010, the Corps participated 

in 292 deployments to 28 overseas posts. Major deployments included Afghanistan, Haiti, the Kyrgyz 

Republic, and Sudan.51

Nevertheless, budgets for reconstruction and stabilization among the collaborating agencies remain 

uneven. Lack of agreement on what constitutes reconstruction and stabilization hinders interagency collaboration. Guidance on roles and responsibilities is 

unclear and inconsistent.52 Moreover, the CRC, which 

was to be composed of experts outside of government, 

was authorized but as of this writing has yet to be 

funded by Congress. State is now proposing that the 

Reserve be replaced by a more cost-effective “Expert 

Corps” consisting of an actively managed roster of 

technical experts, willing but not obligated to deploy 

to critical conflict zones.53 However, there is no certainty that Congress will be any more willing to fund 

such an expert group than it was the CRC. 

On the brighter side, development resources managed by State and USAID under the purview of the 

Secretary of State have grown from about $10 billion 

in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to $26 billion in FY 2010.54

However, funding for State and USAID programs suffered a setback in FY 2011.55 The DoD also has taken 

steps to create a body of personnel able to assist in, 
48

among other things, stability operations through the 

creation of a Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), 

the Afghanistan/Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands program, 

and the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program. The programs work hand-in-hand. Created in 

January 2009, the CEW draws on DoD civilians from 

a variety of career fields, including civil engineering, 

contracting, financial administration, and transportation, as well as foreign affairs and language specialists and lawyers. Workforce members are trained and 

equipped to deploy overseas in support of worldwide 

DoD missions, including “combat, contingencies, 

emergency operations; humanitarian and civic assistance activities; disaster relief; restoration of order; 

drug interdiction; and stability operations . . .”56

The AFPAK Hands program was initiated in 2009 

by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 

Mike Mullen. AFPAK Hands is a language (Pashto and 

Dari for Afghanistan, Urdu for Pakistan) and cultural 

immersion initiative for DoD military and civilian personnel aimed at creating a cadre of personnel who can 

assist the United States in building better long-term 

relationships with the Afghan and Pakistani people, 

governments, and militaries.57 The program requires 

a 45-month commitment for those who join and two 

deployments to Afghanistan or Pakistan of 12 and 10 

months, respectively. As of March 2011, 179 AFPAK 

Hands have been deployed and 160 were in training.58

The Ministry of Defense Advisors program was 

developed as a result of experiences in Afghanistan 

and Iraq that highlighted the need to supplement efforts to improve the tactical proficiency of security 

forces in those countries with improvements in the 

functioning of government ministries. Senior DoD civilians deploy as advisors for up to 2 years under the 
49

auspices of the CEW to share their expertise with their 

foreign country counterparts and forge long-term relationships while strengthening government security 

ministries. To date advisors have been deployed to 

support Afghan ministries of defense and interior.59

8. Which Agency Should be the Lead Agency?

Many of the issues involved in addressing the 

problems of fragile, fractured, or failing states and the 

all too often accompanying instability are political in 

nature—effective governance, official corruption, advancing democracy, developing and protecting civil 

society, professionalizing police forces, improving 

economic conditions, resolving humanitarian issues, 

providing food and shelter, disaster relief, etc. However, few, if any, of these issues fall under the sole 

purview of a single department of government. For 

example, while State has responsibility for the overall management of foreign policy, The Department of 

the Treasury is involved in such efforts as economic 

sanctions and embargoes and provides foreign technical assistance. The Department of Agriculture, among 

other things, provides international food assistance. 

The Department of Commerce advises on export controls. The Department of Justice is involved in drug 

enforcement. Actions by the Department of Homeland Security can have an impact on a wide range of 

issues affecting foreign governments. Furthermore, as 

the President and other administration officials have 

noted, frequently there is overlap and wasteful duplication of effort that could be addressed by a greater 

integration of effort. Of course in all of this, the DoD 

is the 800-pound gorilla with a lion’s share of the resources and control over a large segment of America’s 
50

intelligence capabilities. Moreover, military personnel 

by education, training, and experience are likely to be 

better organizers and managers of complex processes 

and somewhat better at developing strategies built 

upon an integration of the instruments of national 

power.60 A process needs to be developed that will allow for a rapid determination of the lead agency and 

flexibility in the movement of sufficient resources to 

support lead agency efforts to coordinate and fund 

WoG efforts, particularly where time is of the essence. 

Often State, acting in conjunction with USAID, 

serves as the lead agency in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. However, lack of personnel and 

funding hamper State/USAID’s ability to respond to 

rapidly developing situations that demand a large deployment of resources. Some steps have already been 

taken to ameliorate the problem. In 2006 Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $100 

million to:

. . . provide services to, and transfer defense articles 

and funds to, the Secretary of State for purposes of 

facilitating the provision by the Secretary of State of 

reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to 

a foreign country.61

The flexibility provided in this bill, which included 

the authority to provide services and transfer articles 

and funds to the Secretary of State, was lost when the 

provisions of the bill expired in 2010. However, in 2009 

Congress, in the FY 2010 Department of State Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Act, appropriated 

$50 million to a Complex Crisis Fund (CCF).62 The CCF 

provides USAID, in consultation with the Secretary of 

State, with funds “to support programs and activities 

to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen cri-
51

ses overseas.”63 The funds, which could not be used 

to mitigate disasters, were to remain available until 

expended. 

Though the appropriations fell far short of the 

Obama administration’s requests for a range of reconstruction and stabilization programs,64 the bill freed 

State from sole reliance on funds transferred from 

the DoD to support stabilization and reconstruction 

projects. Since the monies appropriated are unprogrammed, they provide State the needed flexibility to 

respond quickly to emerging or unforeseen events. 

In its February 2010 defense budget request for FY 

2011, the Obama administration sought $100 million 

for a CCF. However, Congress only funded $40 million. The President’s FY 2012 budget request includes 

$125 million to advance cooperative efforts to address 

national security challenges. Monies requested include 

funding for a new Global Security Contingency Fund 

($50 million) that integrates DoD and State resources 

to address security crises65 and the existing CCF ($75 

million).66 The budget request also includes authority 

to reprogram an additional $450 million from the defense budget, if needed.

Though clearly greater efficiencies in expenditures 

can be achieved, given the nature of the security and 

stabilization problems that must be addressed, at current levels, appropriated monies are unlikely to be 

sufficient. Some combination of “pooled funds” for 

use by agencies involved in reconstruction, security, 

and stabilization and separate funding for State efforts clearly has merit. Thus, Congress should take 

seriously the President’s request, including authority 

to reprogram funds to meet emerging security, reconstruction, and stabilization requirements. However, 
52

in addition to an increase in overall funding for such 

programs, if a reduction in the militarization of stabilization and reconstruction is a desired end, the balance 

between pooled and separate funding may warrant a 

relook. 

9. What Role for America’s Armed Forces?

Since traditional treats may continue to emerge, 

how should the armed forces be structured and trained 

to meet traditional threats as well as the challenges of 

the changed security environment of the 21st century? 

Secretary Gates politely noted: “Our military was designed to defeat other armies, navies, and air forces, 

not to advise and equip them.”67 Yet increasingly U.S. 

military forces are asked to undertake such tasks as 

peacekeeping and stability operations, which often 

entail use of the instruments of soft power—community relations, humanitarian efforts, negotiations and 

bargaining, getting mothers and babies to hospitals, 

etc. Indeed, stability operations have become a core 

DoD mission.

Yet the question remains: Is there adequate time 

to train soldiers to be effective fighters, trainers, and 

general peacemakers? Is there adequate time to train 

officers, generals, and admirals to be effective combat 

leaders and political strategists? Clearly, the actions 

of soldiers in unstable or conflict situations can have 

an enormous political impact. Yet time devoted to 

educating soldiers on the historical and contemporary traditions, cultural sensitivities and the like of the 

countries to which they are to be deployed or perhaps 

are already deployed likely comes at the cost of training that could directly affect the success of their military mission. Furthermore, such efforts may well be 
53

resisted or resented by some who have preconceived 

notions about the role of the military and its relationship to the application of “soft power.” 

On the other hand, if the future of American security depends as much upon stability operations in 

fractured states as upon battlefield successes, then altering traditional career paths in order to create a new 

generation of officers and soldiers trained in stability 

operations is absolutely essential to success in meeting 21st century threats. 

10. Are Current Intelligence Efforts Adequate?

Given the complex nature of the 21st century security environment, has the United States adequately 

assessed its intelligence needs? Are mechanisms for 

defining and communicating priorities from Cabinet 

departments and the NSC and translating those priorities into collection programs and analysis adequate? 

Are intelligence resources adequate to meet informational requirements for long-term planning as well as 

crises—e.g., people, languages, and technologies for 

collection, interintelligence agency coordination, and 

analysis? Do Cabinet departments and other agencies 

have quick access to information needed to make effective policy choices?

11. How Should the Efforts of Those Willing to 

Assist be Integrated?

How should America’s efforts be calibrated with 

those of other governments, international government 

organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? The effectiveness of integration will 

greatly depend on an understanding of the goals of 
such organizations, their organizational structure, the 

personalities and temperament of their leaderships, 

and how they actually operate. This may be a complex 

task. For example, in Afghanistan today there are approximately 16 IGOs, six NGO coordinating bodies, 

about 15 national local NGOs, and a vast number of 

foreign NGOs. There are additional NGOs that focus 

on women and on children. In Haiti, estimates of the 

number of NGOs are as high as 10,000. Furthermore, 

many NGOs eschew dealing with, let alone working 

in coordination with, the U.S. Government, or for that 

matter the agencies of any government. 

There are no easy solutions to this problem. Nevertheless, well-integrated and coordinated efforts are 

likely to result in more effective solutions at less cost. 

The United States is not devoid of experience in such 

matters. Perhaps knowledge of past successes and 

failures should be put to work to improve future coordination and integration.

12. How Should the Entire Process be Funded?

Current practices allow departments and agencies 

to decide how best to arrange their budgets in order 

to address national security issues as they see them. 

According to Gene L. Dodaro, Director of the Government Accountability Office and acting Comptroller 

General, this arrangement has created “a patchwork of 

activities that waste scarce funds and limit the overall 

effectiveness of federal efforts.” According to Dodaro, 

“Different organizational structures, planning processes and funding sources to plan for and conduct 

their national security activities . . . can hinder interagency collaboration,” resulting in “budget requests 

and congressional appropriations that tend to reflect 

individual agency concerns.”68

54
55

GAO director Dodaro was not the first to recommend changes to the national security budgeting processes. Among others, in a 2008 report, the Project on 

National Security Reform recommended “the creation 

of an integrated national security budget,” arguing 

that the current budgeting system exhibits “gross inefficiencies” and further noting:

Since we do not budget by mission, no clear link exists 

between strategy and resources for interagency activities. As things stand, departments and agencies have 

little incentive to include funding for interagency purposes; they are virtually never rewarded for doing so. 

As a consequence, mission-essential capabilities that 

fall outside the core mandates of our departments and 

agencies are virtually never planned or trained for—a 

veritable formula for being taken unawares and unprepared.69

Similarly, in November 2009 the Center for American Progress, a think tank led by President Obama’s 

transition chief, concluded:

The United States has the capability to confront these 

threats to global security and stability, but in order to 

do so most efficiently and effectively, we must also 

address the imbalance between key elements of our 

national power. A unified national security budget 

that enables policymakers to more readily make the 

trade-offs necessary between defense, economic development, and diplomacy is the best vehicle to prepare the U.S. government to confront the threats of the 

21st century.70

Altering current budgeting processes will not be 

an easy task. At present, there is no office in the executive or congressional branches of government staffed 

with the expertise to undertake the task of developing 
56

a unified national security budget. Moreover, such an 

undertaking would likely encounter resistance from 

entrenched bureaucratic interests that would be loath 

to relinquished cherished budgetary prerogatives.

CONCLUSIONS

There is growing consensus that while the U.S. 

Government may have been structured adequately 

to address the problems of the Cold War, a major 

rethinking is necessary if it is to be able to address 

successfully the relatively more complex problems 

of the 21st century. During the Cold War, the United 

States confronted an adversary that could, in a matter of minutes, inflict unimaginable destruction on its 

peoples and territory. However, that adversary was 

geographically defined. Its leadership was relatively 

conservative, rational, methodical, and reasonably 

predictable. There were, of course, other threats to 

U.S. security. However, those threats paled in comparison to the dangers posed by the Soviet Union, and 

many were assumed to be and were, in fact, aided and 

abetted by the USSR. 

Today the Cold War is gone, and with it are gone 

the relative stability and predictability of the security 

environment. Restraints that frequently held intrastate, and often interstate, conflict in check have been 

removed. Threats are more amorphous and diffuse. 

Historic multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-tribal, 

and/or multi-national tensions and latent frustrations 

over corrupt, incompetent, or authoritarian governments threaten the internal stability of states, fracturing some. Weak, fractured, failing, or failed states 

provide havens for violent and extremist groups. The 

proliferation of know-how and materials used in the 
57

construction of weapons of mass destruction and the 

globalization of communications provide new opportunities and increase exponentially the dangers posed 

by such groups.

Add to that mix a Russia that has yet to find its way 

to the West, the rise of China, a North Korea that has 

threatened to use its newly developed nuclear weapons, an Iran that may be seeking nuclear weapons, 

and the unresolved but highly volatile situation in 

the Middle East, and you have a much more complex 

global security environment than the one that existed 

during the Cold War. If the United States is to deal effectively with such an environment, it will require an 

extraordinary effort by the Intelligence Community. 

As James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, put it, today “...it is as if we were struggling 

with a large dragon for 45 years, killed it, and then 

found ourselves in a jungle full of poisonous snakes—

and the snakes are much harder to keep track of than 

the dragon ever was.”71 It also will require a clear understanding of U.S. foreign and security policy objectives and the capabilities and limitations of American 

soft and hard power in advancing those objectives, as 

well as a coterie of knowledgeable individuals who 

can advise the President and senior policy makers if, 

when, and how the United States should become involved in the affairs of other states. Equally essential, 

efficient and effective foreign and security policies 

will demand highly integrated interagency planning 

by well-trained professionals, and closely coordinated 

and highly integrated interagency responses. 

The security environment of the 21st century will 

no longer permit Cabinet departments and government agencies to operate as individual fiefdoms, 

closely guarding their prerogatives and turf. Rather, 

they will need to function as part of a WoG team ca-
58

pable of delivering well-coordinated and integrated 

efforts to shape the global environment and advance 

American and global interests. This will not be an easy 

task and will require answers to the many questions 

raised above. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50.

2. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National 

Interest, Summer 1989, p. 18.

3. See “Loose Nukes,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, updated January 2006 available from www.cfr.org/

publication/9549/loose_nukes.html.

4. Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed, former Russian Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) defector Stanislav Lenev; and 

former science advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin Alexi 

Yablokov confirmed the existence of such weapons. Lebed contended during a 60 Minutes interview: “[M]ore than a hundred 

weapons out of the supposed number of 250 are not under the 

control of the armed forces of Russia.” Official Russian sources 

denied the allegations. See, for example, ”’Security Issues Relating 

to Russia,’ House Floor Speech by Congressman Curt Weldon,” 

October 28, 1999 available from www.fas.org/irp/congress/1999_cr/

floor_102899.htm; and Carey Sublette, “Alexander Lebed and Suitcase Nukes,” May 18, 2002, available from nuclearweaponarchive.

org/News/Lebedbomb.html. 

5. Why Is Highly Enriched Uranium a Threat? NTI, updated 

September 2009, available from www.nti.org/db/heu/index.html. 

6. Ibid.

7. Thomas B. Cochran, “Safeguarding Nuclear Weapon-Usable Materials in Russia,” paper presented at the “International 

Forum, Illegal Nuclear Traffic: Risks, Safeguards and Counter-
59

measures,” Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., June 12-13, 1997, available from docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/

nuc_06129701a_185.pdf. 

8. “Loose Nukes.”

9. “Enriched uranium seized in Georgia,” Atlanta Journal Constitution, April 22, 2010.

10. “Russia accuses US of loose weapons control,” The China Daily, August 8, 2010, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/

world/2010-08/08/content_11116561.htm.

11. “Obama: Nuclear Terrorism is ‘the single biggest threat’ to 

U.S.,” USA Today (The Oval), April 11, 2010, available from content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2010/05/obama-kicks-offnuclear-summit-with-five-leader-meetings/1.

12. There are some who argue that “al-Qaeda-ism” is an 

ideology based on a radical Salafist interpretation of Islam. See 

for example, Hamid Reza Esmaeili, “Recognizing the Political 

thought of Al Qaeda,” Iran Review, June 10, 2008, available from 

www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Recognizing_the_Political_

Thought_of_Al_Qaeda.htm. 

13. See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, New York: The 

Macmillan Company, 1961, pp. 10-11.

14. For example, see Peter Hopkirk, Like Hidden Fire: The Plot 

to Bring Down the British Empire, New York: Kodansah International, 1994; Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire 

in Asia, New York: Kodansah International, 1994.

15. See James R. Locher III, “Forging a New Shield,” Project on 

National Security Reform, November 2008, p. ii, available from 

http://the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=539.

16. See for example, CSIS Commission on Smart Power, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.

17. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

(Hart-Rudman Commission), Washington, DC, April 15, 2001, 

Vol. 1, pp. xi, 4.
60

18. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2009, p. 31.

19. Address by Secretary Hillary Clinton, Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution, May 27, 2010.

20. Of course, there have been many calls for an integration 

of foreign and security policy efforts across agency lines. For example, one might point to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and 

its subsequent amendments, or to various presidential executive 

orders, or, for that matter, to various presidential policy directives 

that charge the National Security Council (NSC) with advising 

and assisting the President in integrating all aspects of national 

security policy.

21. For example, see Robert Kennedy, Of Knowledge and Power: 

The Complexities of National Intelligence, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008, pp. 13-14.

22. Henry Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Kermit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation, Washington, 

DC: The Brookings Institution, 1968, p. 614, cited in Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1979, pp. 66. See also Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 

3rd Ed., New York: Norton, 1977, p. 97.

23. See, for example, Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, pp. 

29, 39.

24. In 1977, Kissinger wrote: “The best and most powerful expression of American purposes in the world have been those in 

which we acted in concert with others,” American Foreign Policy,

p. 97.

25. To be fair, agencies often have convened so-called “red 

teams” to challenge conventional wisdom. However, it is not always clear that such teams are chosen to think outside the box as 

much as to juxtapose one conventional wisdom against another, 

as was apparently the case in the Team A/Team B approach taken 

to estimate Soviet strategic capabilities in 1976. See Kennedy, Of 

Knowledge and Power, pp. 109-110. 
61

26. I substitute “leadership” for the word “Primacy” used by 

Joseph Joffe in the quote that follows.

27. Joseph Joffe, “Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big.” The National Interest, Summer 2001, available from findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_

m2751/is_2001_Summer/ai_76560814/pg_10/?tag=content;col1. 

28. A partial list might include such efforts as the Berlin airlift; 

Lebanon in 1958 to protect against threatened insurrection and 

again in 1982-83 to facilitate the restoration or order and Lebanese 

sovereignty; Thailand and Laos to support anti-communist forces 

seeking to prevent communist elements from creating an unstable environment that might have resulted in the overthrow of the 

government in those countries; the Dominican Republic in 1965, 

ostensibly to protect American lives during a period of instability; El Salvador, to strengthen the government in its fight against 

guerrilla forces threatening an overthrow of the government; 

Grenada to help restore order and rescue American students following instabilities caused by an internal power struggle and the 

murder of the prime minister; Bolivia, Columbia, and Peru to 

combat drug production and trafficking; the Philippines to assist 

the government in preventing a coup; Panama on various occasions to preclude instabilities and protect American lives; Bosnia 

and Herzegovina to provide humanitarian relief; in support of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Serbian 

forces during the Yugoslav War of the 1990s; Somalia to provide 

humanitarian relief and restore order; Macedonia in the 1990s and 

Haiti in the 1990s and 2004 to maintain stability; and East Timor 

as a part of a UN-mandated International Force for East Timor 

to restore peace. Among the covert activities that might be mentioned are Iran, 1953; Guatemala, 1954; Cuba and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, 1960; Iraq, 1968; Chile, 1973; Afghanistan, 

1978-80; Nicaragua and El Salvador, 1980s; Iraq, in the early 1990s; 

Serbia, 2000; Venezuela, 2002; and Somalia, 2006-07. 

29. Robert Gates, Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 

February 24, 2010, available from www.nixoncenter.org/index.

cfm?action=showpage&page=2009-Robert-Gates-Transcript.

30. “Exploding misconceptions,” The Economist, December 18, 

2010, p. 146.
62

31. Ibid.

32. For example, Claude Berrebi of the Rand Corporation, examining data on the characteristics of suicide bombers recruited 

by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad from the West Bank and Gaza, 

concluded that nearly 60 percent of the suicide bombers had more 

than a high school education, compared with less than 15 percent 

of the general population. The Pew Global Attitudes Project of 

2004 concluded that more schooling equated to greater support 

for suicide bombing aimed at America and other Western targets. 

Ibid.

33. For example, in terms of the Middle East, surely resolving 

the Arab-Israeli conflict is likely to contribute to a reduction in incentives for terrorist attacks against Israel, as well as those countries perceived as its ally. One also can look elsewhere around 

the world for irritants that encourage terrorism and that beg for 

political solutions. Furthermore, greater long-term investments in 

international educational programs such as those that have been 

run by the DoD since the end of the Cold War offer some hope. 

Educational programs such as those at the George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 

Germany; the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii; 

the Africa Center; the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies; or 

the Near East-South Asia Center view security in its broadest context and in part have been aimed at altering value systems that see 

strict authoritarian rule as the only avenue to unity, and progress 

or restrictions on civil and political rights as the only means to 

stability, or which fail to see corruption as a pathology inhibiting 

political and economic progress and social improvement. Also to 

be considered is a widening of professional and personal links to 

the American military, not only those which focus on U.S. military programs of support in foreign countries, but also programs 

which include foreign officers in American military educational 

institutions, from U.S. military academies to war and defense colleges. Such programs seem to have had an impact on the so far 

relatively peaceful transition from the near 30-year rule of Hosni 

Mubarak in Egypt. Despite the inherent authoritarian nature of 

military life, the American military is an excellent transmitter of 

democratic values, and the inculcation of these values among indigenous leaders can play an important stabilizing role in failing 

or failed states.
63

34. See Robert Kennedy, The Road to War: Congress’ Historic 

Abdication of Responsibility, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2010.

35. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Challenging Future of Strategic 

Planning in Foreign Policy,” in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., Avoiding 

Trivia, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009, p. 8.

36. See, for example, Forging a New Shield, pp. 344ff.

37. Several alternatives have been proposed. For example, see 

Michael Donely, “Rethinking the Interagency System,” Occasional 

Paper #05-01, McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, Inc., March 2005, 

pp. 6-9.

38. Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, Boston, MA: Little, 

Brown, and Company, 1944, cited in Ted McAllister, “America’s 

Vital Interests,” First Principles, August 10, 2009 available from 

www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=1298&theme=am

sec&loc=b.

39. President Eisenhower’s News Conference, April 7, 1954, 

Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 382, available from http://

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws#axzz1nKDHF1gl.

40. Cited in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, Revised and Expanded Ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 

2005, p. 129.

41. For example, there is an ongoing debate in the halls of the 

Pentagon over whether mass atrocity prevention is a DoD core 

mission. 

42. See, for example, “Gates Says Libya Not Vital Interest,” 

March 28, 2011, available from www.military.com/news/article/

gates-says-libya-not-vital-interest.html.

43. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President 

in Address to the Nation on Libya,” March 28, 2011, available 

from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarkspresident-address-nation-libya. 
64

44. The Power of People: Building an Integrated National Security 

Professional System for the 21st Century, Project on National Security Reform, November 2010, p. xiii. The Quadrennial Defense Review

recognized this deficiency, calling for the full implementation of 

the National Security Professional program. See The Quadrennial 

Defense Review, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 71.

45. Executive Order 13434, May 17, 2007, sec 1. 

46. For example, see Department of Defense Instruction Number 1430.16, November 19, 2009. 

47. The Power of People, p. iii.

48. President George W. Bush’s National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 44 created the Reconstruction and Stabilization 

Policy Coordinating Committee. The committee is chaired by the 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a designated member of the NSC staff and has broad interagency representation.

49. “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization, pp. 1-3, available from http://pdf.

usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB943.pdf.

50. “A Look Back: Ambassador Herbst Retires, Reflects on 

Four Years as Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 

Summer 2010, Civilian Response Newsletter, U.S. Department of 

State, September 22, 2010, available from www.state.gov/documents/

organization/148080.pdf. Also see “2010 Year in Review: Conflict 

and Stabilization,” Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, February 9, 2011.

51. Ibid.

52. For example, see The Power of People, pp. 31, 208.

53. “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,” 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 145. 
65

54. “Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review,” p. 116.

55. See Department of Defense and Full-year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.R. 1473, P.L. 112-10. 

56. See Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, January 23, 

2009. 

57. Army Sgt. 1st Class Matthew Chlosta, “‘Afpak Hands’ 

Begin Immersion Training,” American Forces Press Service, 

May 5, 2010, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=59031. 

58. Karen Parish, “’AfPak Hands’ Strive for Cultural Awareness,” American Forces Press Service, March 3, 2011, available 

from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63019. 

59. For example, see “MoDA,” U.S. Department of Defense, 

available from www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/.

60. In recent years, concern has been expressed that education 

available from American military educational institutes—staff 

and particularly war colleges—has become skewed toward operations, with less thought devoted to educating strategists. Nevertheless, in contrast, State provides its officials nothing comparable 

to the continuing education provided U.S. military officers other 

than sending a few Foreign Service offers to the National Defense 

University or the various service war colleges.

61. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 

Public Law 163, 109th Cong., 1st sess., January 6, 2006, p. 3458.

62. See Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2010, Public Law 111-117, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 16, 

2009, available from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ117/pdf/

PLAW-111publ117.pdf.

63. Ibid., p. 3327.
64. See, for example, Nina M. Serafino, “Department of Defense ‘Section 1207’ Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns FY2006-FY2010,” CRS Report for Congress, March 2, 2011, p. 4.

65. Global Security Contingency Funds are similar to Section 

1207 funding. They are Defense and State pooled funds and the 

Secretary of State must consult with the Secretary of Defense before funds are expended.

66. See “Fact Sheet, State and USAID—FY 2012 Budget,” 

available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/183808.

htm. Also see “FY2012 Prevention Budget Priorities: Testimony 

Submitted to the House,” Friends Committee on National Legislation, March 29, 2011, available from fcnl.org/issues/ppdc/fy2012_

budget_priorities_testimony_submitted_to_the_house/. 

67. Ibid.

68. Walter Pincus, “GAO urges changes in budgeting for national security,” Washington Post, January 18, 2010.

69. Forging a New Shield, pp. v, vii, xi.

70. Integrating Security: Preparing for National Security Threats 

of the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, November 2009, p. 4.

 71. “Testimony of R. James Woolsey,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, February 12, 1998.
67

CHAPTER 3

THE PUZZLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 

PLANNING FOR THE WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT

Mary R. Habeck

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2005, the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University 

hosted a 1-day symposium to analyze and critique 

whole of government (WoG) planning for the invasion of Iraq. While Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 

had been highly successful during Phases I through 

III, the war plan suffered from several strategic flaws 

during Phase IV (the post-conflict period), including 

a failure to predict or prepare for an insurgency. The 

symposium at SAIS brought together, for the first time 

since the invasion occurred, many of the planners for 

Phase IV to talk about their experiences and to discuss what might have gone wrong in the process that 

was supposed to prepare the U.S. Government for any 

contingency.

The conclusions reached by the participants shed 

a clarifying light on the challenges that the U.S. national security apparatus faces with WoG planning 

in general, as well as highlighting specific issues with 

planning presented by the new security environment 

after September 11, 2001 (9/11). In the run-up to the 

Iraq War, no government-wide standard procedure, 

organization, or leadership existed to guide planning 

across agency lines. There was no common definition 

for planning and little understanding of how plan-
68

ning processes differed within the various agencies, 

making it difficult to coordinate and integrate diverse 

plans into a general strategy that every agency would 

follow. The result was that Phases I, II and III, which 

were dominated by planners and operators from one 

agency (the Department of Defense [DoD]), flowed 

relatively smoothly, while Phase IV, which depended 

on close coordination between multiple agencies, experienced near-catastrophic failure.1

The George W. Bush administration took steps to 

rectify the situation after OIF, establishing offices to 

improve coordination between the DoD and the State 

Department (State), creating incentives for interagency 

staff assignments, and setting up processes for some 

joint operational planning. These efforts were, naturally enough, focused on post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, and targeted the DoD, State, 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), the main partners involved in OIF Phase IV. 

Other sorts of national security operations that might 

require interagency planning and other agencies beyond these three were relatively neglected, and a full 

reworking of WoG planning for national security issues has failed to materialize in the intervening years.

Any attempt to carry out government-wide reforms, even those confined just to national security 

matters, will run into difficulties, but there are particular issues associated with planning that have made 

this effort exceptionally challenging. This chapter will 

look at a series of general problems that became apparent during OIF, but have not yet been fully dealt with: 

the definition of planning, organizational and structural frictions, and coordination failures. The chapter 

then looks at how planning is further complicated—

and yet made more urgent—by the current national 
69

security environment. The events of 9/11 and afterward demonstrate that the United States has serious 

gaps in its planning system that must be filled if the 

country is to confront and overcome the difficult challenges of the 21st century. A concluding section provides some proposals for alleviating these problems, 

while acknowledging that a real solution will only be 

implemented when a broad consensus emerges within the government that reform is necessary, or change 

is enforced from above through a presidential order 

and/or through action by Congress. Only then will 

the U.S. Government have one of the tools required 

to carry out its most basic function: providing for the 

common defense.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: NATIONAL 

SECURITY PLANNING ACROSS THE 

INTERAGENCY

There are fundamental structural issues that impede an integrated planning process throughout the 

U.S. national security community, most importantly 

the vastly different ways that planning is understood 

and carried out across the interagency. Planning 

touches every facet of U.S. Government national security operations, beginning with the expression of 

policy by the President. This is given written form by 

the National Security Council (NSC) staff in the National Security Strategy (NSS), a document produced 

every 2 years that sets the objectives and priorities of 

the administration.2

 Each department then uses the 

NSS to create a document that describes, at times in 

detail, the agency’s mission and objectives, how these 

will be achieved, and how the agency’s objectives 

will, in turn, move national policy forward, thus aid-
70

ing the government in achieving its objectives. Toplevel documents are supplemented by more detailed 

implementation statements and, in some agencies, by 

contingency or longer-term planning papers.

Any attempt to implement and coordinate WoG 

planning would need to take into consideration issues 

such as differences in how this process is carried out 

within the national security community and the differing missions of the agencies, but it is the divergent 

views of what constitutes planning that are especially 

troublesome. Put most succinctly, the various agencies that make up the government often believe that 

they are having a communication about the same 

topic when, in fact, they are talking about quite different things. The word “planning,” for instance, can 

mean everything from long-range or contingency to 

strategic or policy to operational planning, depending 

on the circumstances and the particular agency. The 

first category includes everything that is beyond the 

immediate, and may be very general in nature (i.e., a 

discussion of potential futures) or quite specific (such 

as a finely-grained strategy for how to build the force 

that the DoD believes will be necessary for the next 10 

years). The second category is what agencies generally mean by the term “planning,” but here again the 

opportunities for disagreement are vast. Strategic or 

policy planning means planning at its highest level, 

but it can range from a matching of overall means to 

ends with a detailing of pathways to achieve these 

ends, to a much more general document that gives the 

objectives and priorities for a department or even the 

entire government without detailing means, or ways. 

The final category was, before 9/11, the province of 

the military, which has personnel specifically trained 

for operational planning and which is one of the few 
71

government institutions that is regularly asked to 

engage in operations. Given these diverse ways that 

planning might be defined, if simply asked to begin 

“planning,” it is unclear that any two agencies would 

have the same concept in mind.

A broad comparison of planning at State and the 

DoD shows how different the understanding of planning is within just two agencies. At the DoD, planning 

is an integral part of the functioning of the department, 

highly coordinated and sequenced, and describing in 

detail a matching of resources and ends over time. 

The planning cycle begins with the production of the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the military’s basic 

statement of strategy. The issuing of the QDR leads 

to the writing of a series of more detailed documents, 

some biennially and others annually produced, which 

take the guidance from the QDR and other high-level 

strategic statements and determine in great detail how 

particular offices, agencies, and the branches will do 

their part to fulfill the strategic objectives of the department. Planning for military operations (i.e., the 

creation of an operations plan [OPLAN]) is naturally 

well-developed within the DoD and is understood in 

a very precise and highly defined way, consisting of 

specific steps and agreed-upon categories, and leads 

directly to the issuing of orders to carry out the plan. 

Because of its importance to the core mission of the 

military, the methodologies used for operational planning tend to dominate the military’s other forms of 

planning.

Before OIF, State also engaged in planning, but of 

a very different and more general sort than the DoD.3

The office of the Secretary would produce for the department as a whole, a strategy statement which laid 

out the vision and specific objectives for the institution. 
72

Each bureau and office produced its own paper that 

explained, in general terms, how it would implement 

the vision laid out by the Secretary. The departmentwide office dedicated solely to long-term planning 

was (and is) the Policy Planning Staff, but its mission 

has always been to act as “a source of independent 

policy analysis and advice for the Secretary of State,” 

rather than to provide detailed and comprehensive 

planning (in the military sense) for the Department 

as a whole.4

 Given the nature of State’s missions, operational planning was not seen as necessary and, beyond a limited plan for evacuating embassies abroad, 

not widely practiced or even fully understood.

These differences in understanding of planning, 

and operational planning in particular, combined 

with problems in coordination, explain the problematic hand-off between the military and State officials 

at the start of OIF Phase IV.5 The sort of detailed operational planning in which the military routinely engages was nearly unknown at State, and there were 

no professionals on its staff who could be dedicated to 

the task. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the civilian agency that was to 

take over planning and implementing Phase IV, thus 

became dominated by military planners rather than 

State officials as originally envisioned. When asked 

to provide inputs for the overall plan, State analysts 

used their extensive experience to produce documents 

that expressed serious concerns about the potential for 

sectarian violence and the possibility of an insurgency, but they did not generate a comprehensive plan 

that discussed ways and means to deal with these 

challenges. There was, as well, an inability within 

the highly-centralized military planning process to 

integrate this sort of nonspecific input, and thus no 
73

“branch” (i.e., contingency) plan to deal with an insurgency or sectarian violence was created by the DoD 

or the ORHA military planners. Some DoD planners 

even claimed that ORHA was positively discouraged 

from working with other agencies during the pre-war 

planning period.6

 The result was that every agency involved in OIF created its own plans for post-war Iraq, 

did not coordinate its plans with other agencies, and 

believed that the other agencies understood planning 

and the planning process in precisely the same way as 

their own.

In response to the near failure in Iraq, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice implemented a number 

of reforms at State and USAID: the addition of an office to oversee U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts (including planning for these missions), a new office in USAID for military affairs, and 

the creation of a “team” that “engages the Department 

of Defense . . . on global political-military policy issues 

and coordinates strategic planning between the Departments of State and Defense.”7

 She created as well 

the so-called “F Process,” which plans and coordinates 

State and USAID foreign assistance. Current Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton built on these changes with 

the mandating of a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which provides longer-range 

planning and policy guidance, and synchronized 

State planning with that of the DoD. These substantial 

reforms brought, for the first time, resources together 

with planning at State and began to involve State in 

operational planning with the DoD as well. 

The DoD carried out its own internal reforms after 

OIF, was a full participant in the process that led to 

the changes within State and USAID, and also proposed a strategy to reform planning throughout the 
74

interagency. The 2006 QDR called for “strengthening 

interagency operations,” and discussed joint planning 

as a special focus for the military over the next 4 years. 

The QDR recommended in particular greater cooperation between the DoD and other agencies to leverage 

the military’s comparative advantage in planning and 

the issuance of a new document called the National 

Security Planning Guidance to bridge the gap between 

the leadership’s strategic or policy vision and implementation.8

Despite the deep reforms carried out by State, USAID, and the DoD, planning within other parts of the 

national security community was largely untouched. 

Before 9/11, planning across the interagency tended 

to follow the State rather than the DoD model, and this 

remained true after the near failures of OIF. The two 

exceptions to this general rule were, not coincidentally, new institutions created after 9/11: the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). NCTC adopted a WoG 

approach to operational planning, although narrowly 

directed at counterterror (CT) efforts and the new Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), attempted 

to do for the DHS what the QDR does for the DoD 

(but without a full interagency process). Other departments such as Treasury, Justice, and the many agencies within the intelligence community, all of which 

have vital roles to play in the new security environment, have their own separate processes for planning, 

and see them as adequate for the missions that they 

are asked to perform. Even within State and USAID, 

the changes did not deal with operational planning 

beyond post-conflict phases of warfare. Thus despite 

the near catastrophe of OIF Phase IV, an approach to 

planning that will encompass the entire national secu-
75

rity effort of the U.S. has not been realized as of this 

writing.

There are a series of meta-reasons for this failure: 

frictions between the agencies, no lead agency for reform, no mandated planning process or sponsor to 

impose one, and no comparable offices or officials 

dedicated to planning within each agency that could 

coordinate with each other. The frictions come from 

many sources, some of which are related to the need 

for a lead agency. As the 2006 QDR makes clear, the 

DoD sees itself as the obvious institution to shape a 

new planning process. The military’s clear-cut rules 

for creating planning documents, its cadre of professionals who have been specifically trained for the 

task, as well as its experience in bridging the planning 

and implementation gap, seem to make it the obvious 

choice to take the lead on this problem. Yet the very 

confidence of the military creates anxieties and resentments among the other agencies, which have added to 

the delays over the realization of proposals for planning reforms. Other agencies are also not convinced 

that they need reform since, unlike State they have not 

yet suffered a failure comparable to the OIF Phase IV 

experience.9

Lack of a powerful sponsor for planning reform 

helps to explain why the changes that have occurred 

have been piecemeal and partial rather than systemic. 

It is here that the comparison to the Goldwater-Nichols Act is most helpful.10 A series of near catastrophes 

in the 1970s and 1980s convinced both military and 

political leaders that greater jointness between the 

branches of the military was an absolute necessity. 

Yet despite this agreement, it took an act of Congress 

for reforms to move forward, and for the powerful 

Navy and Army, in particular, to cede some of their 
76

prerogatives for the greater good. In much the same 

way, agencies agree that greater coordination and 

cooperation is needed and that, in particular, a better 

process for WoG planning is vital. Despite this agreement , and the funding by Congress of a team to study 

and recommend such reforms (the Project for a National Security Reform [PNSR]), the entire process has 

stalled without the direct attention and support of the 

President or influential members of Congress. 

A final challenge is posed by two related structural issues: a dearth of civilians trained in planning 

and a corresponding dearth of planning offices on an 

equal footing that could coordinate with each other. 

The creation within all the relevant agencies of a cadre 

of civilians who understand and are trained in strategic or operational planning is a necessary precondition for any reforms that will encompass the entire 

national security effort of the U.S. Government. While 

military planners might form the core of such a cadre, 

it is necessary to have civilians who understand the 

operations of their particular agency well and can provide the necessary nexus between the agency and the 

interagency planning process. In much the same way, 

the many existing planning offices lack the uniformity 

in how and what they plan that will allow close coordination between them. Offices can be created by fiat, 

but it will take time to train the cadres necessary to 

man these offices, a fact which again argues for reform 

to begin now.
77

THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT AND WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT PLANNING 

If the complexities surrounding a WoG approach 

to planning create structural and organizational/cultural challenges that must be surmounted, the new 

security environment after 9/11 highlights why reform is so urgently required. Even before the events 

of 9/11, the need for better coordination and cooperation within the interagency was well-understood and 

commented upon by scholars and practitioners.11 The 

terrorist attacks then and afterward, the growth of 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the rise of nonstate threats 

around the globe, and the inadequate capacity of traditional international mechanisms to deal with these 

problems argue more than ever for a transformation 

of how the United States is organized for national security, and the planning processes for national security in particular. 

The most important shift in the security environment is the worldwide and irregular nature of the 

challenges confronting the United States. The evolution of al-Qaeda is but one illustration of how the 

threat from irregular forces is expanding. The group 

that attacked New York and Washington has aspirations both to carry out terrorist atrocities around the 

world and to provoke a global insurgency; and, since 

9/11, it has begun to develop the capabilities to do so. 

In addition to branches in Iraq, Pakistan/Afghanistan, 

Yemen, North Africa, and Somalia, al-Qaeda has allies 

that align themselves with the group’s objectives and 

ideology in Indonesia, India, Central Asia, Chechnya, 

and elsewhere. Al-Qaeda also has numerous individual supporters in many Western countries and within 
78

the United States itself. Planning for a regular war that 

turned irregular in a single country, Iraq stretched the 

capacities of the U.S. Government. Coordinating a 

global CT campaign since 9/11 has been difficult, but 

generally doable. But if the United States must carry 

out a global counterinsurgency, much more will need 

to be done to reshape the national security community 

to confront and overcome the challenge.

A significant implication of the ascendance of irregular threats around the globe is that the United 

States must coordinate the usual elements of American power (the military, State/USAID, and the intelligence community) with other agencies that have not 

traditionally been involved in national security on the 

international stage. To combat insurgencies in places 

like Iraq and Afghanistan, agencies like the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and even the Department of Agriculture 

have been asked to take on new roles and responsibilities and to coordinate their actions with State and 

the DoD. Fighting the drug lord/criminal nexus that 

is spreading across the border from Mexico might require the DHS or the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

and Firearms (ATF) to become involved in operational missions that would benefit from military experience with planning. Building capacity in threatened 

states so that they will be able to protect themselves 

has meant including local police and their expertise 

for training. Police and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents are also the front line for combating 

radicalization within the United States itself, making it even more important for them to have access 

to information and planning that would otherwise 

be irrelevant for their daily work. In this new environment, a deep understanding of the human terrain 
79

(religious beliefs, general culture, languages, tribal 

relationships, and much more) becomes as important 

as knowing the physical terrain, which might require 

adding private sector resources, including U.S. academic and scholarly capacity, to the mix.

Coordinating U.S. agencies to fight a global war is 

daunting enough, but the nature of the new threats 

also requires much more coordination of both planning and action with other nations. The vast range of 

the challenges, and the capacities of potential partners 

to meet them, means that each agency would need 

careful time and attention to see how cooperation and 

coordination could be achieved. At one end of the 

spectrum is the planning necessary to work closely 

with allies such as Britain or Germany in an irregular 

war in Afghanistan. Working with capable partners 

like Mexico to deal with the drug cartels, or with Indonesia and the Philippines to prevent al-Qaeda affiliated groups from growing or spreading is less intense than a war, but made more difficult by the lesser 

capacity of the governments involved. Even more 

demanding is working with fragile countries such as 

Pakistan or Egypt to ensure that indigenous threats 

do not overwhelm the country or spread throughout 

their respective regions. Finally, there are the grave 

difficulties of working with failing states like Somalia 

or extremely weak states like Yemen and Chad, that 

have difficulty defending themselves, let alone stopping a group like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

A serious discussion of internal U.S. planning reforms 

must take into consideration that any new offices, institutions, or processes created must work not only 

across the interagency, but with international partners 

and allies as well.
80

Finally, the events of 9/11 and afterward show 

that the U.S. Government is in dire need of planning 

that goes beyond the immediate. Almost all the strategic planning processes described above are predicated on cycles that run yearly, biennially, or, for a very 

few, every 4 years. Over the past 10 years, much has 

been written about the need for longer-term or contingency planning processes within the U.S. Government, since the planning that exists, even when called 

“long-term,” often becomes focused on vital day-today matters and is ruled by the tyranny of the urgent. 

Perhaps more importantly, there are very few offices 

or people assigned to work on over-the-horizon planning, making it a challenge to find the right locus and 

trained personnel who would take on these tasks, 

since most planners have to be concerned with routine 

tasks or dealing with crises. As others have pointed 

out, a failure to plan beyond today has left the United 

States unprepared for future 9/11s and at the mercy of 

events, rather than being their master.12

There are two sorts of planning that would look beyond these limits: long-term and contingency. Longterm planning would provide analysis and context 

for trends or events beyond the near-term that might 

be threats to the United States. This sort of planning 

might also suggest general ways to prepare the country to meet these challenges. There are a few offices that 

provide certain types of long-term planning, including the National Intelligence Council, which prepares 

unclassified reports with a 20-year time frame, and the 

DoD’s policy planning shop (now under the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense [DASD] for Strategy), 

which among other tasks provides long-range forecasting. Their analyses are not, however, well integrated into other interagency planning processes, nor 
81

does every agency have a relevant office that could 

coordinate with these entities. There is not, in other 

words, a systemic effort to provide well-coordinated 

planning for the long-term across the interagency.

Contingency planning is supposed to anticipate 

gaps in U.S. strategic planning, (i.e., Donald Rumsfeld’s ”unknowns unknowns”), and to prepare the 

country for high-impact/low-probability events.13

When the United States does not pay attention to 

contingency planning, it can find itself dealing with 

crises and bolts out of the blue that leave the country 

without time to spend on a well-considered response. 

Once again there are several offices that are concerned 

with potential future threats (especially within the 

DoD), and that provide general concepts for dealing 

with them; but as with long-range planning, there is 

little interagency coordination and few other offices 

dedicated to this question. Even the DoD tends to do 

well with branch planning within an OPLAN, but less 

well with contingencies that are full of unknowns and 

therefore fall outside the range of detailed operational 

planning.

Any reforms to WoG planning would need to consider how to include, in an organic and systematic way, 

realistic and feasible planning for both contingencies 

and the long-term. For this particular sort of planning, 

each of these terms is vital: organic, since the planning 

would need to come from within each of the agencies 

and reflect their knowledge bases of future potential 

threats; systematic, since it would be across the interagency and as uniform and coordinated as possible; 

realistic, to avoid wild theorizing; and feasible, that is, 

creating plans that have some reasonable chance for 

application in the real world.
82

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

The relatively disorganized state of planning within the interagency, combined with the greater needs 

of the new security environment, mean that there has 

never been a larger gap between supply and demand 

for planning within the U.S. Government. Not long after OIF, a number of experts proposed that there be a 

new Goldwater-Nichols reform to reorganize the government’s national security system and, among other 

things, implement the sort of planning that the new security challenges required.14 As mentioned above, the 

ambitious PNSR was set up and funded by Congress 

to diagnose the fundamental problems that might exist and to propose a transformation in how the United 

States organizes to carry out the vital role of protecting itself. After months of work, the PNSR proposed 

a radical series of reforms—including wide-ranging 

changes to the strategy and planning processes within 

the government.15

Unfortunately, the Congress has thus far been unable to carry through the restructuring proposed by 

the PNSR and others. Despite this failure, it is worth 

discussing the minimum changes that should be put 

into place to create the necessary preconditions for 

planning reform. A first step, and one that would 

meet the most imperative needs, is the creation of 

comparable offices dedicated to carrying out planning 

within each relevant agency. Existing policy planning 

and strategy offices in the agencies would be the basis 

for the new organizations, but they would need to be 

standardized in composition, and the importance of 

their mission should elevate them administratively 

within each organization. Thus the heads of these offices should answer directly to the principal for the 
83

agency and coordinate their activity through the NSC 

interagency committee process. 

Because strategic, long-term, and contingency 

planning is needed across the interagency, the offices 

would be dedicated to these tasks, rather than to operational planning. The main objective for the offices 

would then be to produce planning documents, consistent throughout the government and coordinated 

in time, sequencing, format, and process with each 

other. The papers would need to be more than just 

broad descriptions of department policy, but should 

instead be detailed plans to guide the operation of the 

agency and its coordination with other agencies, along 

with general guidance to prepare the department for 

extraordinary events or longer-term trends. The NSS, 

already mandated by Congress, would form the starting point for an agency’s planning process, but even 

this seminal policy platform will need modification. 

Rather than simply listing the national security objectives of the Executive Branch, the NSS will need to 

be supplemented by a document that establishes priorities, ways, and means—including specific resourcing—for achieving these objectives, and include as 

well a strategic assessment of the risks of action and 

inaction. It follows that the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) will need a planning office as well, and 

must be included organically in the new national security planning process. 

The simple writing of planning documents will 

not, however, ensure that particular policies are, in 

fact, carried out by either individual agencies or by 

the government as a whole. Thus the other main objective for these offices must be to follow up and report 

back to their principals on the implementation of their 

guidance. There are offices within some agencies that 
84

provide follow-up on specific issues, but there is far 

less assessment of progress on implementing the overall strategies of the agencies, and none that assesses 

progress across the interagency. The reports from the 

assessments would provide the basis for reworking 

strategic and contingency plans, providing the necessary flexibility for the planning process.

The obvious institution to coordinate planning 

across the interagency is a new directorate within the 

NSC staff, which would oversee, as well, implementation and work through frictions that are certain to appear. As others have suggested, this will require that 

the office be headed by at least a senior director and 

perhaps even a Deputy National Security Advisor, to 

increase the influence of the new directorate and to 

make clear that its mission is given priority.16 The office would coordinate the writing of the NSS as well as 

the supplementary National Security Planning Guidance

(NSPG) already recommended by the DoD and other 

observers. This seminal document would provide the 

detailed matching of means and ends necessary to 

implement the NSS, and thus be the backbone for the 

more finely grained documents produced by each of 

the agencies.

The new NSC directorate should also be charged 

with developing over-the-horizon strategies, including long-range policy forecasting and a series of strategic contingency plans. These documents, coordinated 

with the other planning offices, would provide the basis for guidance and implementation papers, similar 

to those created through the regular planning process, 

but somewhat less detailed and more flexible, given 

the longer time frames and conditional nature of the 

scenarios discussed.
85

The final purpose of the directorate is to provide 

periodic net assessments of national security policy 

implementation across the government. Conducted 

with the aid of the individual agency planning offices, 

the assessment would include a re-examination of assumptions and strategic objectives and recommendations for adjustments to the NSS, the NSPG, and other 

plans developed by the agencies. To allow fresh perspectives on policy, the process might include outsiders such as the Defense Policy Board, which already 

has the necessary clearances and access to provide 

well-informed advice. The military once again has 

experience with these sorts of assessments, which are 

generally carried out by commanders in the field every 6 months, and this might provide a guide for the 

timing of these regular assessments. The creation of 

a strong feedback loop will increase the flexibility of 

the planning and execution processes, and will introduce necessary fine-tuning of resourcing, emphases, 

and guidance from leadership. It will also, for the first 

time, provide the President with a detailed overview 

of how well his policy vision for U.S. national security 

is being executed.

The composition of the new planning offices is vital, given the multiple tasks that they will be asked 

to carry out. Strategy development (including contingency planning), strategic planning, and implementation oversight each require quite different skill sets 

and previous experience. The offices would thus need 

to include a mix of personnel: strategic thinkers, strategic planners, and practitioners working together as 

a close-knit unit. Strategic thinkers would be asked 

to match means and ends, weigh the risks of action 

and inaction, conceptualize long-term strategies, and 

envision scenarios for contingencies. Academics in 
86

universities or think tanks might be the best source 

for members of this group. Planners would take the 

concepts of the thinkers and generate detailed plans 

for implementation. They would need to be trained in 

strategic and perhaps operational planning, using as a 

model the U.S. experts in this field—the military—and 

would therefore most likely be drawn from that institution. The practitioners should have long experience 

in how the government works and would follow up 

with the other offices in their own agency on progress 

made in carrying out the strategies produced by the 

planning office.

CONCLUSION

Many of the proposals described above seem commonsensical and several (with variations) have been 

proposed by the PNSR and other keen observers of 

the U.S. national security system. The fact that there 

is an obvious need for reform, multiple proposals for 

how to carry it out, and yet little has been done to realize a WoG approach to planning suggest that two 

elements are still missing: the necessary desire for reform and sponsors who would be able to mandate it. 

With the exception of the DoD, State, USAID, and the 

new organizations created after 9/11, there has been 

little appetite for reform from the agencies that make 

up the national security system of the United States. 

This is unsurprising, since wide-ranging transformations of the government are rarely carried out without 

a serious failure in policy that pushes the system to 

seek change. Even then, there can be little movement 

without the support and constant pressure of powerful patrons—either the President himself or members 

of Congress—who would take on the project and see it 
87

through. Lacking a desire for reform and sponsors for 

change, the United States may have to again experience systemic failure before there is enough pressure 

to transform how the country carries out planning for 

its own survival.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. The Conference was titled “U.S. Military Operations 

in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation.” Summaries of 

some of the papers presented and discussion is available from 

www.sais-jhu.edu/merrillcenter-original/Iraq_Panel2_Summary.pdf. 

For good analyses of Phase IV planning and its problems, see Olga 

Oliker, Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and 

the Occupation of Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008; Gregory 

Hooker, Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Washington, 

DC: WINEP, 2005; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard 

E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation 

of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2007, pp. 158-187.

2. The latest iteration of the NSS is available from www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_

strategy.pdf.

3. This is not to be critical of State, since the way that planning 

occurred there fit the mission that the Department was designed 

to fulfill.

4. The official description of the Policy Planning Staff is available from www.state.gov/s/p/.

5. There were other issues internal to the military and its training and culture responsible for the failures of Phase IV planning. 

These have been pointed out by many observers and noted in one 

of the official histories of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the 

New Campaign. The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, March 2003-January 2005, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute Press, 2008, throughout, but especially pp. 66ff.
88

6. Ibid., p. 71.

7. Available from www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt/ and www.

state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm#mission.

8. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, pp. 84ff.

9. This section is taken from personal experience of the author 

while in government.

10. For an in-depth look at the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the 

need for reform, see Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, Reorganizing 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Westport 

CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.

11. One result of this foment was the Hart-Rudman Commission, which issued a series of reports on how to reform the 

National Security interagency, including strategic planning, to 

meet the new challenges of the 21st century. See United States 

Commission on National Security/21st Century [Hart-Rudman 

Commission], “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for 

Change. The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National 

Security/21st Century,” Washington, DC, February 15, 2001.

12. Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, “Strategic 

Planning for U.S. National Security: A Project Solarium for the 

21st Century,” The Princeton Project on National Security, 2006.

13. Or “black swans:” see Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The 

Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2007.

14. One of the purposes of the Princeton Project on National 

Security, available from www.princeton.edu/~ppns/; and also proposed by a similar project, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” run by 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, available from 

csis.org/program/beyond-goldwater-nichols.

15. “Forging a New Shield,” PNSR, December 2008, available 

from pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf; 

and “Turning New Ideas Into Action,” Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), September 2009, available from www.pnsr.

org/data/files/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf.
89

16. For a wide-ranging discussion of how to organize for strategic planning, see Daniel Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia: The Role 

of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: 

The Brookings Institution Press, 2009. The essays by Will Inboden 

and Peter Feaver, “A Strategic Planning Cell on National Security 

at the White House”; and Aaron Friedberg, “Strengthening U.S. 

Strategic Planning,” argue in particular for a location in the White 

House for the new institution.

91

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT IS DESTRUCTION,

AND OTHER THINGS YOU WEREN’T TOLD AT 

SCHOOL

Michael Ashkenazi

INTRODUCTION: WHO, WHAT, AND WHY ARE 

WE “DEVELOPING”?

In virtually all seminal writing on development, 

development is viewed as a good thing.1

 Indeed, who 

could argue against better education, health care, employment, eradication of disease, and personal security? At the same time, some of the obvious targets for 

development—the leadership, and indeed the rank 

and file of underdeveloped societies—seem to be the 

most virulently opposed to development. A large (but 

unknown) proportion of Afghans, Sudanese, and other Africans seem to be at the forefront of the resistance 

to development. They resist—passively or actively—

the package called “development” (though always 

happy to receive some of its material gifts) sometimes 

to the point of violence. The Muslim world in particular is seen as a hotbed of anti-development activity.2

Afghanistan, where the U.S. Government and people 

are hugely involved, seems to move backward with 

every step forward. Clearly, we need to try to examine where the fault lines lie between what the subjects 

of development want (or do not want) to receive and 

what those acting in development want to give.

It is useful at the start to distinguish between development as a (cultural and political) idea, and development as a human activity. The former, as all 
92

ideological positions, is subject to interpretation and 

reinterpretation, and thus to argument and debate. 

The latter is a matter for organizational analysis. 

Development as an activity is a multibillion dollar 

industry with two objectives: a humanitarian objective—to reduce misery from poverty and lack of modern practices, policies, and technology in those sectors 

of humanity which currently have not achieved some 

minimally accepted standard (such as the Millennium 

Development Goals); and a security objective—to 

reduce security threats by the have-nots against the 

haves. As such, development can be seen as one tool 

in military efforts at post-war stabilization, notably in 

asymmetric conflicts, e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq.

Analytically, I argue that development as it is 

conceived of in the West (the primary agent of development) starts with the systematic, intentional, and 

irreversible destruction of many features of the to-bedeveloped society and economy. As Michael Rosberg 

notes, this is driven by idealism—a poorly explored 

“social conscience theory”—which is based more on 

the moral view of the developer than on the identified needs and wants of the developing.3

 This kind of 

idealism-driven development, and the destruction it 

wreaks, can be a major cause, and is almost always a 

contributing cause, to resentment on the part of the 

to-be-developed when cardinal tenets of their culture are threatened. I demonstrate this argument by 

reference to both examples and analytical structures. 

In the last section of this chapter, I return to the issue 

of the whole of government (WoG): those in developing countries and those in the developed countries, to 

show how difficult the concept is to operationalize.
93

DEVELOPMENT AND THE “WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT”

While my major interest is in development, this interest relates to the issue of WoG as well. Starting as result of September 11, 2001 (9/11), American and other 

governments expressed an interest in, and the need 

for, a WoG approach to security and to development, 

in which programs will cross-cut agency and ministerial boundaries,4

 eliminating duplication, ensuring 

program continuity in the face of intradepartmental 

budget limitations, and bringing multiple viewpoints 

to bear. While the need for such coordination and interagency cooperation is palpable, I would argue that 

they are manifestly impossible: The functional vertical 

segmentation of governments is not arbitrary, but the 

result of some fundamental social rules.5

It is also worthwhile considering that where either 

development or government reform are concerned, 

WoG has two perspectives: the developing donor, and 

the development recipient; that is, as it may be, the 

governments of the United States and Afghanistan, 

or Germany and South Sudan, or Britain and Sierra 

Leone. Thus utilizing a WoG approach by the donor 

party needs to be matched by the recipient government as well.

It is with the recipient government(s) that I am 

concerned here. Since the major thrust of the WoG 

approach is somewhere within the semantic domains 

of change, development, and reform, it is on development that I focus most of my attention. In this chapter, 

I want to highlight and illustrate some of the problems 

of assuming that applying a WoG approach to development will be effective in the developing countries’ 

governments. Much the same argument could be 
94

made about the donor country’s government as well. 

Put bluntly, and somewhat more forcefully, the WoG 

approach is unlikely to work because there are some 

fundamental issues that need to be addressed first.

The Normative Paradigm of Development and Its 

Goals.

The normative paradigm of development (that is, 

the minimal set of elements that virtually all who have 

thought of as development would consider valid) operates at two distinct clusters of ideas. First, development is a process which has an effect on the wellbeing of individuals. Second, development is a process 

which has an effect on the wellbeing of the body politic. Ultimately, individual development will enhance 

political development, and/or political development 

will enhance individual development.

Beyond those points, development is a contested 

term. For the dyed-in-the-wool capitalist, development is about promoting and enhancing capitalism in 

states that have balance of payments deficits, lack industrial capacity, or have low gross national products 

(GNP). For liberals, development is about changing 

the entire range of social institutions in order to create 

social wellbeing at the individual or communal level.6

What is worth noting is the disconnect—sometimes by oversight—of the relationship, if any, between political development (using the term without 

prejudice) and economic development: The second is 

somehow supposed to follow once the first has been 

attained, but the mechanism is obscure.7

 I argue here 

that a further dimension is also missing: What to this 

chapter is critical, is the issue of the impact this social 

tinkering called development, has on essential social 
95

institutions. As I show here, this tinkering, however 

well-meant, has a major effect on often disregarded 

issues of any given culture. These may appear to be 

minor (to the onlooker), but of great import to the subject of this activity. 

Simplifying the Concept of Development.

What does development actually do? I want here 

to simplify (perhaps over simplify) the development 

paradigm into a series of propositions:

• Underdevelopment is an economic condition 

where individuals/groups are unable to enjoy 

the benefits which individuals/groups in developed countries enjoy.

• These benefits fall into two classes: immediate 

levels of goods and services, and the ability to 

sustain that level of goods and services for the 

long term.

• In practice, development functions in three interrelated institutions: the political (including 

democratization and the right of choice), security (including adherence to the rule of national 

law and legally binding law enforcement), and 

the economic/material (including engaging 

in economically viable occupations, definite 

property ownership, and responsible fiscal 

behavior).

• Sustaining development, as well as attaining it, 

requires a level of popular education: political, so that people can identify their rights and 

work to ensure them those rights; security, so 

that people can ensure their own and others’ 

security; and economic, so that people will 

know how to function as economic persons to 

their best (and thus the collective’s) benefit.
96

• Development agents work to enhance and encourage abilities in those three domains, as well 

as to ensure that these practices/resources/

abilities are sustainable.

Clearly as the causal arrow points, this argument requires some examination of context. As Myrdal notes, 

development is a total package: one cannot pick and 

choose, and certainly he feels that if implementation 

requires major modifications in existing institutions, 

then so be it.8

 Parenthetically, Marxist development 

theory would probably make the same argument. 

Essentially, classic development therefore: (a) sees 

a society’s institutions as a single whole; and (b) therefore acknowledges, even demands that that whole 

shift entirely into more developed modern institutional layouts. The results being obvious to the observer, 

the costs are negligible (to the observer). Here, I want 

to devote some time to these costs as they appear to the 

subjects of development.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES OF HUMAN 

SOCIETY

The argument I provide here relies heavily on 

some of the fundamentals of how human societies are 

organized and, in order to ensure that we are speaking the same language, this section provides a very 

brief (and somewhat superficial) overview of a way to 

discuss these fundamentals. I also accept the fact that 

another social analyst might use different terms and 

dispute my view. However, the framework presented 

here remains a powerful means to examine human 

interactions, and, inter-alia, provide some predictive 

strength to the analysis. I rely heavily for some of this 
97

analysis on my predecessors, notably Barbara Myerhoff and Raymond Firth.9

 It is also useful to remember 

two things about social analysis: First, any kind of social analysis tends to focus on a particular level of abstraction for its analytical force. Thus an analysis at the 

level of very abstract social entities, e.g., ethnic groups 

and nations, cannot easily be compared to analyses at 

the level of interpersonal interaction. Second, often 

the level of analysis is a matter of where the analyst 

feels most comfortable, not necessarily an abstract 

or disinterested position. In this section I shall move 

from a very abstract level to a much more concrete 

one, endeavoring to state clearly the level dealt with.

Some Theory First: Structure and Organization, 

Determinacies and Indeterminacies.

For analytic convenience (and because we are unable to deal with the multiplex of meanings, and simultaneity of social activity) we group human activities into institutions: patterned ways that groups of 

humans have evolved to deal with some fundamental 

existence problems that all are faced with. This is, however, an analyst’s tool: a presentation of reality, and 

sometimes not an effective one. Firth noted that we 

can see human institutions as structures (apparently 

static entities) or organizations (dynamic interactions) 

according to analytical choice, though it is difficult for 

mere humans to think of, let alone describe, the simultaneity of these views, somewhat like the difficulty of 

thinking of light as both particles and waves.10

Anthropologists, at least, tend to talk of institutions. Kinship and marriage (the regulation of reproduction and its consequences), politics (the contest for 
98

the right to regulate human activities), and economics 

(the organization of production, exchange, and consumption) among others are all “institutions”—basically, patterned ways of doing things. These have 

some freedom of play (how one actually goes about 

ensuring reproduction, for example) but are severely 

constrained by different societies in many ways (e.g., 

gay marriage). Institutions therefore have embedded 

within them processes that preserve the structure, and 

yet simultaneously have some other processes that 

create change. Virtually all institutions are dynamic: 

They change over time. 

To examine the fundamental processes of all human societies, I want to follow Myerhoff who has 

argued for what she called the “porridge pot” theory 

of society.11 Myerhoff’s argument relies on two basic 

social processes she calls determinacy and indeterminacy. Determinacies are those processes which build 

up repertoires of regularity in any individual human 

or group’s behaviors. In essence, these are the norms 

of which any institution is made up. Determinacies 

confer a social advantage: They allow individuals 

to predict what other social beings are doing. This is 

critical: If I extend a hand, I expect it to be shaken. If I 

drive at 55 mph, it is because I can predict others will 

do the same, and there will be penalties for those who 

do not. However, in every society there are processes 

of indeterminacy operating simultaneously with determinacies: You stick out your hand, expecting a similar 

response; I reach for your wallet. You drive at 55 mph; 

I drive at 70 and slip by the railway crossing while 

you wait impatiently. Cumulatively, indeterminacies 

break down the regularities that determinacies build 

up, thus bringing about change—somewhat like a 

pot of porridge that forms lumps (determinacies) un-
99

til broken down by a spoon (indeterminacies), while 

other lumps are forming elsewhere. 

These two processes happen simultaneously, 

sometimes in the same social institution, with individuals and groups dynamically working to shore up 

some parts of their social world, and to destroy other 

parts. This implies that like a light particle that is also 

a wave, all social structures are both dynamic and 

static and, constructive and deconstructive at the same 

time. This perspective allows the observer, at least abstractedly, to tie together the most abstract level of nations, cultures and communities, with the intermediate abstraction of social institutions, and the concrete 

activities of individuals and their personal networks 

of association.

In the final analysis, all this sociological verbiage 

boils down to the acts of individuals. Individuals act, 

and are acted upon simultaneously, not by institutions 

nor by social structures, but by other individuals, interacting with them and the material world through 

many channels simultaneously. Nevertheless, and 

even though many people will state and believe that 

they are unique and their activities are sui generis, one 

can clearly identify repetitive patterns in human behaviors. Here, too, one can see that in some instances 

individuals support the status quo (whatever that 

might be), in other words, support determinacy processes, and at other times try to destroy it, creating 

indeterminacy. 
100

Production and Reproduction in the Development 

Paradigm.

Production (in the larger sense of ensuring the survival of individuals and their society) and reproduction

(ensuring the survival of a society over time) are the 

two fundamental human activities upon which all 

others are based. Production and reproduction are always regulated, with agreed-upon (within the society) 

degrees of freedom, which may be great or little. For 

example, development is always associated with engaging and harnessing the whole of a population (not 

just the government) in development, which in turn 

implies much about gender equality in access to development benefits. However, as I shall show below, 

this can pose insurmountable barriers for both development and, ultimately, the whole of a government.

Reproduction is never haphazard, always regulated. As in all forms of reproduction practiced by humans, one can identify two fundamental social rules: 

(a) No marriage may take place within a socially defined group (otherwise known as the universal incest 

rule); (b) Men decide (otherwise known as the male 

domination rule).12 It is useful to note at the outset that 

Fox’s rules are not ideological statements, but empirical ones, identifiable in the overwhelming majority of 

societies we have information about; whether this is 

a good or bad thing is a different discussion. Each of 

these statements needs some amplification. 

All societies have rules about who is excluded, 

who is preferred, and who is included in the pool of 

potential mates for marriage. Prescriptive rules—who 

is forbidden—tend to be stricter of course. Nevertheless, proscriptive rules can also play a major role, for 

instance in the Arab world, ensuring that resources are 
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kept within the patrimonial group of brothers. This 

makes sense notably in a world in which most people 

one comes into contact with can become hostile (often 

legitimately so, by social rules) for what in other societies might be considered minor transgressions. 

All societies also have bias towards the dominance 

of men. Even in societies such as modern Sweden 

that claim gender equality, a careful analytical scheme 

would disclose that this is not the case. Thus, in virtually all societies we know, the preferences of men 

dominate, and it is the male point of view that takes 

precedence in matters of reproduction.

Pashtun Family and Marriage and the Schooling 

of Women.

The relationships between men and women in Afghan society are complex, and worthy of study. Here 

I extract from what those more knowledgeable than I 

have written into a simple set of propositions:

1. Men control women’s fertility absolutely, and 

treat it as a political (one can create alliances by transferring fertility rights) and economic (one can sell the 

fertility rights) resource.

2. Women create a risk for men and their reputation when this fertility is not under control.

3. Thus women need to be controlled by men to as 

great a degree as is feasible.

4. The value of a girl child lies therefore largely in 

the fertility potential she represents; threats to that potential can have very serious economic and political 

consequences.

Now, against these, let us consider the possibility 

of offering women/girls an education—part of essen-
102

tially non-negotiable development theory.13 Educate a girl 

child, and an Afghan wali (an Islamic term which essentially means the guardian of a minor, including a 

woman) is faced with a real problem: For a great deal 

of her time, a girl child will not be under control. Conceivably, the education the child receives will allow 

her to be able to offer additional economic benefits 

to her allied family and spouse, but there is no fertility 

benefit whatsoever, and it is the issue of fertility that is 

at stake. In other words, looking at the issue from the 

Afghan perspective—all risk, no gain. Note that what 

a wali offers is not his charge as a person: That plays a 

minor role in the marriage institution. What he offers 

is control of her fertility—an immutable quality that 

cannot be improved upon, but given human biology, 

can be easily threatened.

In theory, of course, one could change the institution. To give a fanciful example from other societies, 

if proven fertility (having had children) was more 

valued in Afghan society than total fertility control 

(including virginity and chastity), female education 

would be less problematic. But changing the reproduction institution, which is fundamental to Afghan 

society, would change the entire society radically to 

the point that it would be a different society.

From the Afghan cultural perspective, the introduction of the discussion about human rights, the defense of women, and the defense of little girls might 

strike individual resonance, but culturally, the efforts 

to ensure that a man does not have his full rights in 

marriage is an attack on the real fundamentals of cultural life. Not only that, but a quick scan through the 

development literature would appear, to an unbiased 

eye, let alone an Afghan one, as truly triumphalistic 

since fundamental change of a cherished institution 
103

(male dominance) is more or less an important sub 

theme.14

Unsurprisingly, as I argue here, the average Afghan individual is very easily able to identify with an 

anti-developmental perspective, since very early on 

he is exposed to the idea that this is out to destroy 

not some superficial cultural practice, but the very 

bases—political, economic, reproductive and social—

of his life.

Cattle Raiding and Marriage in Southern Sudan.

Another example, from a rather different post-conflict development area, is that Southern Sudan is riven 

by linguistic (which also means cultural) distinctions, 

with some 400 local languages playing a part in the 

mosaic. One of the larger people groups within Southern Sudan are the Nuer (about 3/4 million people) 

divided into several smaller, occasionally competing, 

sub-groups. Given the natural surroundings (a scrub 

bush, with shallow soils that do not permit plough 

agriculture; annual flooding; and high temperatures), 

the Nuer economy is based largely on cattle (supplemented by some subsistence crops, and more recently, 

urban labor). The Nuer are polygamous, with wealthy 

older men having up to several tens of wives. Nuer 

social structure is a dynamic in which cattle and women play a dominant mutual role as exchange objects. 

Cattle are raised by men and used by them to purchase wives. The wives produce sons, who, in turn, 

must produce cattle to buy wives. Men to whom one 

is related by male descent are critical for survival because aggression is highly valued in Nuer society, and 

local quarrels and feuds are common, for which one 

needs as many allies as possible, one’s brothers and 
104

sons being the best allies. Feuds and quarrels occur for 

two reasons: the theft of cows (remember, more cows 

allow for purchase of more wives, and thus for greater 

authority and power) and the theft of wives (if one is 

relatively poor in cattle, one can steal a woman; and 

of course, nonpayment of bride-price leads to quarrels 

and feuds and is viewed as a form of theft as well). It 

needs to be emphasized that for the Nuer as for their 

cultural relatives, the Dinka, the only cattle that can be 

used for bride-price are cattle that have been raised, 

or cattle that have been stolen. Bought cattle, from, for 

example, the proceeds of construction labor, are ineligible.15

This dynamic—cattle to wives to sons to more 

cattle—characterizes Nuer society to an extraordinary 

degree. The process, in fact, defines who is a “real” 

Nuer, for example, in contrast to their linguistic relatives the sedentary Shilluk, or to “fishing Nuer” who 

live mainly on Nile fish.16 Ecologically speaking, the 

system is relatively well-balanced, and has allowed 

the Nuer historical opportunities for dominance 

throughout central Southern Sudan. 

Now, let us consider this through the lens of development. In 2005, a mission from the U.S. 4F Club visited Southern Sudan, and, among their recommendations was the establishment of cattle ranches along the 

lines (presumably) of the visitors’ central and western 

U.S. heritage. Presumably, monogamy played a part, 

as did suppression of cattle rustling. Unsurprisingly, 

this initiative never saw the light of day. We cannot 

lose track of the idea that raiding, polygamy, and cattle 

are an essential part, in fact the defining characteristic, of 

the Nuer as a people. So, the question is which elements 

of Nuer society is one going to “develop”? Because, 

and this needs to be kept in mind, any change in these 
105

three major factors will destroy Nuer society—for the 

better or the worse is irrelevant. From the perspective 

of the majority of Nuer, these are values worth fighting for.

The Tale of Rinderpest.

As an example of the social and material destructiveness of development, in the 1970s, after much effort, a Swiss charity managed to introduce and implement an inoculation program against rinderpest (a 

common and deadly cattle disease) into Southern Sudan. The program was largely a success by 1993, notwithstanding the civil war.17 Rinderpest is an insect 

borne-disease, particularly prevalent in forested areas. 

The southern, forested part of Southern Sudan (current Central, Western, and Eastern Equatorial states) 

has been settled for millennia by farmers, who burn 

new fields out of the bush every few years. By 2005, 

however, and continuing to today, these farmers have 

been under constant pressure by development. In the 

first instance, swidden farming has a bad reputation 

among modern agricultural specialists, since it is seen 

as destructive and inefficient. No less important in the 

Sudanese context, the forested areas which were of 

no interest to the transhumant cattle herders—Dinka, 

Toposa, Nuer, Murle, and others—because of the rinderpest, are now open for exploitation. Development 

in one area, and the cultural prejudices of the development agencies, have meant that the Bari-speaking and 

other farmers are, effectively, losing their livelihoods 

and ways of life. Unsurprisingly, they are somewhat 

prejudiced against some aspects of development.
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IS DEVELOPMENT GOOD FOR HUMAN 

SOCIETIES? A SUMMARY OF THE OBJECTIONS

I have noted above that for analytical purposes social scientists identify and characterize human societies in the form of regular patterns of activity, which 

we call institutions. The reality is, of course, that these 

institutions are merely analytical illusions (or aids, if 

we want to be charitable). In reality, all institutions 

intertwine, supporting one another, while at the same 

time offering individuals and groups within a society 

means and ways to manipulate the rules: processes of 

determinacy and indeterminacy.

Is Development Good?

So is development good? Well, that obviously depends on one’s perspective (a trite conclusion), but 

it is worth examining further. Development is a slippery concept, not least because it originates in, and is 

a child of, Western perceptions. The closest we have 

ever gotten to a universal (or at least value neutral) 

definition of development are the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). This is not to say that they are 

either perfect or unimpeachable, but the MDG at least 

have the virtue of measurability: They are empirical 

rather than being ideological. The American idea that 

development implies “being like us because we are the 

most developed” and, of course, similar versions from 

other countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), 

the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 

and the Nordic countries, are highly ideological and 

must be treated with caution. These ideas represent 

what Rosberg calls “morals based development.”18

Even the MDG, however, hide within them the seeds 
107

of destruction of complex, often finely balanced cultural institutions which we tamper with only to destroy. Provide the Nuer with more cattle than they 

need, and raiding increases, not declines, because bred 

cattle are plentiful, and lose their appeal. Remove the 

cattle entirely, and substitute some other productive 

activity, and, as the Nuer argue, they will no longer 

be Nuer and the Nuer are as passionately attached to being 

Nuer as Americans are to being American. 

Given that: (a) institutions are all fundamentally 

and deeply intertwined; and that (b) the contest between determinacy and indeterminacy is a constant, 

development is inherently destructive. This would 

not pose a problem but for the causes of determinacy: 

the need to be able to predict. We all want the convenience of being able to predict the next social move of 

our social peers. That is our comfort zone, from which 

we venture only when we can perceive a definite personal advantage. These determinacies are expressed 

in what we call culture: basically, sets of determined 

patterns we are used to and feel comfortable with, 

which we feel will be retained “forever” and within 

which we can be free to see to our own comfort. We 

are passionately attached to these cultures, not because they are inherently of value: That is a superficial 

explanation. We are attached to them because they 

are so fundamental to our comfort. Development will 

inevitably destroy many aspects of any given developing culture. As such, it will inevitably be resisted, because it is not possible to pick and choose. Change the 

economic fundamentals, and the kinship and marital 

consequences will emerge as well: Change only arises 

from the ashes.
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WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT, CONFLICT 

MANAGEMENT, AND CONFLICT MANAGERS

What does all of the destruction of development 

have to do with WoG, conflict, and conflict management? In this section, I will make reference mainly to 

the “receiving” government (that is, the “underdeveloped”) with which I am more familiar, but the same 

principles can be applied to the donor government 

and its attempts to institute a WoG approach.

Governments in the Development Game: “Natives” 

and “Stabilizers.”

Governments may not be the best development 

agents because they have multiple, sometimes conflicting objectives. Consider that a government policy 

is likely to differ in its priorities from the policies of 

an external peacekeeping or stabilizing force. In fact, 

even the definition of development may differ quite 

radically.

Well, what do governments want? Primarily a government wants two things: control over the domain of 

force, and a steady income to finance its goals. In the 

modern world, both of these depend highly on ensuring that the government and its state can keep up with 

the Joneses technologically: The monopoly of force 

superficially depends on a state’s ability to possess 

armed forces that can outgun any competition, and 

subsistence economies are losers in the long-run economic sweepstakes. However, technological upkeep, 

in turn, depends highly on a pyramid of education, 

social “rationalization,” and adaptability to change—

all of these constituting ongoing threats to the current order, in other words, these are all processes that 
109

bring about indeterminacy. As indeterminate processes 

whose outcome the average individual cannot foresee, they 

are going to be strongly resisted by anyone (which 

means virtually everyone) who feels out of their comfort zone (that is, out of their ability to predict).

This is true even within government (including its 

instruments of force: the armed services). Yes, many 

individuals will feel comfortable with this or the other 

aspect of a new developmental process, because, at the 

individual level, some individuals are always entrepreneurial and able to find opportunities.19 However, 

the vast mass of people exploit only those opportunities which clearly benefit them, thus allowing for only 

a very slow process of breakdown of the “traditional” 

system. Remember, from each individual’s perspective, cheating (i.e., producing indeterminacies) works 

only if everyone else is playing by the rules (i.e., producing determinacy). Radical change causes most individuals to freeze, like rabbits in a headlight: “How 

can I exploit this opportunity?” becomes “How do I 

maintain at least my status quo?” Determinacies are 

adhered to. 

It would be surprising not to find this occurring 

in the armed forces as well. Given, for example, the 

cases in Afghanistan and Sudan where being armed 

is a traditional form of activity with clear and known 

rewards. Armed men will be driven towards following well-known patterns that yield results that can 

be predicted, and are therefore desirable, rather than 

taking risks by following untried and untested new 

paths, such as engaging in peaceful pursuits. 

To a lesser or greater degree, this is followed within the civil side of government as well. Government 

managers (that is, the key personnel for change) are 

as reluctant to face organizational change as any other 
110

managers.20 Thus while they may subscribe to prevailing policies at least publicly, they are as likely as any 

other individual to resist them in private. We need 

therefore to reach, finally, the sinews of the WoG—its 

people.

Managers in the Development Game: “I’m Exempt, 

Of Course.”

While studies of managers in developing countries 

often attribute to them a “western” existence,21 this 

needs to be taken with caution. Alex Inkeles’ very wide 

study of modernization focused on attitudes towards 

modernization.22 He pointed out that the concept of 

modernization is a composite of many elements, in 

which modern attitudes clash with traditional ones in 

the same person. In this case, development should be 

seen as a form of modernization. 

It must be kept in mind that government managers 

are not exempt from social rules. Those responsible 

for development in a given country are themselves 

subject to producing both determinacy and indeterminacy: They expect to be able to predict others, while 

allowing themselves tactical leeway to be unpredictable. However, indeterminacy at this analytical level 

can be seen to be largely egocentric: “How can I take 

advantage of the situation.” I in this case do not want 

the system to change, and, in fact, I will resist such 

change overtly or covertly as the situation requires, 

since I am familiar with it and its rules. I merely want 

to exploit it insofar as I can. In other words, while for 

some aspects of development (or in the terms used here, 

in some institutional clusters) a government employee 

will be supportive of development, once the fact that 

development will affect all social institutions dawns, 
111

he may very well oppose the foreseen changes—violently.

Given this analytical picture, it is hardly surprising 

that there is resistance to development. It is built into 

the system. To make things worse, it is built in at both 

input and output ends. So let us consider output of 

change for a moment.

Rewards for Development.

What are the rewards for development for the individual government actor/official concerned? One 

of the major interesting features of both the American 

and the Chinese Communist systems is the emphasis 

on financial reward. To quote Deng Xiaoping, “Getting rich is glorious.”23 While there are similarities in 

the purposes to which riches are put in China and the 

United States, there are also many differences—something worth considering. So what are the rewards for 

development?

We have already noted that for governments (a collective illusion we can, nevertheless, view as a single 

body for a given level of analysis) the keys remain the 

monopoly of force, and the financial sinews to fulfill 

objectives, including the monopoly of force. But is this 

true of the elements that make up government—the 

“workers in the vineyard”? What rewards do they get?

Primarily, I would argue, the rewards for developing governments’ employees—the people who actually do or do not carry out policies decided upon by 

their superiors—need to be examined very carefully. 

The first substrate is clearly money—cash, or in other 

words, a salary. This is far more complex than can 

be discussed here, since it involves relative rewards, 

payoffs, perceptions of equity, and other peripheral 
112

issues. Crucially, however, the cash itself constitutes 

only part of the reward. Once the cash is secured, what 

next? With the exception of a few eccentrics, money is 

not an inherent reward. It is what can be done with 

money that causes gratification. A case in point is Somali pirates. One way of identifying a Somali pirate, 

I have argued, is that they are able at a fairly young 

age to acquire additional wives: a critical marker for 

wealth and maturity in Somali society. Similar identifying markers could be found for male Sudanese 

bureaucrats (multiple wives, cattle herds, farming estates). I imagine one could identify similar features of 

Afghan bureaucrats who appear “successful” in their 

own cultures (a large chaykhana24 would certainly be 

on the list).

It is useful to note that each of these examples is 

nondevelopmental: Part of the cultural baggage of 

development is gender equality, and thus monogamy 

and cattle should be replaced by corporate shares and 

stocks, and large areas devoted to the entertainment 

of male guests for political purposes would no doubt 

offend the idea of equality. The critical point here, 

however, is that many of the individuals in the countries concerned are aware that development may well 

threaten these coveted rewards. After all, rewards 

are coveted because they are scarce. So while a government agent may support development policies as 

lip service (one of the array of survival techniques everyone learns) he/she may well be, at the same time, 

implacably opposed to the implications that development brings, that he/she is aware of, but the outside 

developer is not. Education of women will threaten 

the monopoly on fertility (Afghan version) or the ability to participate in cattle exchange and growth (Sudan version). In both cases, for the external developer, 
113

the challenge will be to find some way to modify the 

rewards which means destroying the old system of rewards, that is, the old cultural values. Alternatively, as 

is the case in reality, the outside development agency 

assumes unthinkingly that higher economic rewards 

will be used in much the same way, and for the same 

purposes as he/she would use them, and thus that the 

reward is not a problem.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Putting together what has been said here with the 

findings of others, notably Gilbert Rist and Rosberg, 

leads to conclusions at four levels.25

1. At the theoretical level of social conscience that 

motivates a WoG approach to development, there is 

going to be fundamental if unexpressed opposition to 

the fiat of getting everyone behind the approach.

2. At a slightly lower level of abstraction are Rist’s 

two fundamental arguments: that economic success is 

bought by the coin of self-definition, and that there is 

an assumption of growth without limit.26 Both because 

of demographics (birth rate) and because there is always a resource limitation, this is not going to happen. 

Someone will always have the short end of the stick.

3. At another, still lower level of abstraction and 

growing concreteness, is the issue of development as 

destruction as presented here and the consequent resistance that this causes.

4. Finally, is the power of greed: People in developing areas utilize strategies for survival which, on 

the whole, are egocentric. When they use cooperative 

strategies, they do succeed (e.g., Vietnam, China).
114

I am not a great believer in the unalloyed benefits 

of development for a number of reasons. Primarily my 

suspicion is pointed at governments. Notably, the motives for governments, and for the people who make 

them up, as well as their citizens or subjects, are very 

different. Nevertheless, development is worthwhile, 

because of moral and philosophical, as well as material reasons. Like fire, development makes a good servant, but a very bad master. As such, we need to address developing anyone with a great deal of caution. 

We need to understand first of all that development is 

not an unalloyed good. In fact, while there are overt 

individual and collective benefits, these may well be 

perceived, by the subjects of development, to be outweighed

by negative consequences.

Second, when we examine the benefits and drawbacks of development, we need to be clear about the 

level of analysis. What benefits government does not 

necessarily benefit those in it, and may well be viewed 

as utterly destructive by Joe Bloggs in the street. This 

in turn implies that a careful teasing out of the different analytical levels is critical for development to 

occur with lessened resistance.

Third, and slightly more positively, parsing the 

perceived benefits and drawbacks allows us also to 

identify, to some degree, individuals who might support or oppose development. However, and this is a 

critical point, by-and-large such individuals are those 

who see some positive benefit to themselves—junior 

people seeing in change an opportunity to supersede 

their superiors, or senior officials who foresee economic opportunities in social upheavals, for example 

in the discontinuity from the previous social and cultural regime, in other words, from indeterminacy. 
115

Such individuals are double-edged swords, as examples from Afghanistan’s power structure show.27

Critically, therefore, whether one does or does not 

adopt a WoG approach is a secondary issue, in my 

opinion. Given that development is likely to affect all areas of life, the involvement of the entire governmental 

structure in development issues is in effect, a tautology. Governments and their structures are essentially 

at the same time institutions (in government’s guise 

as an arena for political contestation) and an organizational expression of social institutions (economics, socialization, etc.). To take this a step further, insofar as 

security is linked to development (and we have seen 

that it is: Development creates resistance for reasons 

discussed above, and this resistance is often violent), 

the resistance to development is easily mobilized 

within government, where the conflict between determinacy and indeterminacy in both inputs and outputs 

can be at its sharpest, because government agents/

functionaries are at a position to do something, not 

just resist passively.

What is crucial is to understand how within government structures and organizations inputs and 

outputs affect individual perceptions and reactions. 

One needs to assume the following axiom: “Every 

development activity has both negative and positive 

consequences.” What this means, essentially, is that 

a clear and detailed mapping of development activities—what is known more-or-less systematically as a 

“do no harm” approach—needs to be carried out for 

all levels of a development activity. Note, for example, the provision of water sources for households in 

a settlement—a development activity par excellence.28

However, what role does the traditional (highly polluted, distant, inconvenient) water system play? Are 
116

you affecting ownership? What about the time spent 

(by women, one might add) on getting water, or the 

social exchanges at the well side which might be crucial for social cohesion?

There is no cut and dried formula for assessing 

whether there will be support or opposition to development as a whole (notwithstanding attempts to implement a “no harm” strategy). What can be examined 

with a high degree of validity is the potential opposition to or support for specific projects. This requires: 

1. Carefully examining the social dynamics of people who might be affected by the project for the short 

and the long term. 

2. Assessing the benefits and disadvantages in their 

terms.

3. Negotiating strategies which will mitigate deleterious features to those who will suffer them. 

Finally, only if the development agent is able to 

demonstrate clearly and in an unbiased fashion that: 

(a) The development activity, whatever it is, outweighs doing nothing; and (b) that there are sufficient 

resources (including that most difficult to estimate—

long-term developer willpower); and (c) that there are 

clear indicators of when to stop—only then may it be 

necessary and wise to force development through.

Final Words.

I believe I have highlighted three major issues in 

this chapter: First, development is a complex activity 

that can be and must be analyzed in great detail and 

at many levels to ensure success rather than failure. 

To me, success means that the human condition—perhaps measured grossly by the MDG, perhaps using 
117

other measures—be improved for individuals. This is 

not wishy-washy liberalism, but a cold-blooded recognition that more complex human structures are 

emergent properties of smaller atoms representing individuals, who, as individuals as well as in the collective, can make or break development, and that greed 

trumps morality over time and space.

Second, governments are not where it is at. Assuming that the locus of success, in Afghanistan or 

anywhere else is at the governmental level is heading 

for failure. Governments are made up of people, who 

may be simultaneously enthused by one aspect of development and disgusted by another; be honest with 

personal monies and relationships and corrupt with 

public funds; and utilize and excuse violence while 

preaching peace and tolerance. And this may be just 

one person. 

Third, development agencies repeatedly focus on 

their own problems, not the problems of the subjects 

of development. They may be aware of the problems 

of their colleagues in other departments or programs 

within their own government while viewing these simultaneously as working in the same direction and as 

competitors for funds, posts, and kudos. In a similar 

vein, the solutions to underdevelopment are, more often than not, lazy solutions. Rather than doing proper 

spadework, developers apply tried-and-tested solutions from their own experience to problems with superficial similarity in other contexts; and they screw up. 

Whether one involves part of government or the 

whole of government to solve problems in, say, Afghanistan, would make, in my opinion, very little difference. Analytically-speaking, what has been done 

is merely to look for the issues and solutions at the 

same level of analysis. Whereas, the real problem, and 
118

the real solution (however lengthy, difficult, time and 

treasure-consuming it is) lies at a different analytical 

level entirely. 

REFERENCES

Alatas, S. F. 1997. “Islam And Counter Modernism: Towards 

Alternative Development Paradigms,” in Masudul Choudhury, 

ed. Islamic political economy in capitalist-globalization: An agenda for 

change. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Utusan Publications & Distributors. International Project on Islamic Political Economy Universiti 

Sains Malaysia.

Ashkenazi, Michael. 2009. “Made in the Developed World: 

Piraterie, Fischfang und Giftmüll in Somalias Gewässern” [Made 

in the Developed World: Piracy, Fish Theft, Waste Disposal in 

Somali Waters], in P. Hippler et al. eds., Friedensgutachten, Berlin, 

Germany: Lit Verlag, 2009, pp. 149-160.

Bailey, R. G. 1989. “An appraisal of the fisheries of the Sudd 

wetlands, River Nile, southern Sudan.” Aquaculture Research, Vol. 

20, No. 1, pp. 79–89.

Bell, Gerald D. 1967. “Determinants of Span of Control.” 

American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 100-109.

Blaut, J. M. 1973. “The Theory of Development.” Antipode, 

Vol. 2, No. 5, pp. 22-26.

Firth, Raymond. 2005. Elements of social organization. London, 

UK: Routledge.

Fox, R. 1983. Kinship and marriage: an anthropological perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 

Giustozzi, Antonio. 2003. Respectable Warlords? The Politics of 

State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan. Crisis States Programme 

Development Research Centre Working Paper Series 1, No. 33.
119

Gleitsmann, Brett A., Margaret M. Kroma, and Tammo Steenhuis. 2007. “Analysis of a rural water supply project in three communities in Mali: Participation and Sustainability.” Natural Resources Forum 31, pp. 142-150.

Inkeles, Alex, and D. H. Smith. 1970. “The fate of personal adjustment in the process of modernization.” Journal of Comparative 

Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 81-114.

Inkeles, Alex, and David H. Smith. 1983. Exploring individual 

modernity. New York: Columbia University.

Kay, G. B. 1975. Development and underdevelopment: A Marxist 

analysis. London, UK: Macmillan. 

Keren, Michael, and David Levhari. 1979. “The Optimum 

Span of Control in a Pure Hierarchy.” Management Science, Vol. 

25, No. 11, pp. 1162-1172.

Korten, David, with Frances Korten. 1972. Planned change in 

a traditional society: Psychological problems of modernization in Ethiopia. New York: Praeger.

Kurtenbach, Sabine, and Matthias Seifert. 2010. “Development Cooperation after War and Violent Conflict—Debates and 

Challenges.” INEF Reports 100/2010. Duisburg, Germany: University of Duisburg-Essen.

Makhoul, Jihad. 1999. “Development from Below: An Exploratory Study of the Concept and Process of Development From 

Lay People’s Point of View.” University of Wollongong Thesis 

Collection. Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia: University 

of Wollongong.

Moghadam, Valentine M. 1992. “Patriarchy and the Politics of Gender in Modernising Societies: Iran, Pakistan And 

Afghanistan.” International Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1, 1992, 

pp. 35 -53.

Myerhoff, Barbara. 1977. “Secular ritual: Forms and meaning.” Pp. 3-25 in S. F. Moore and B. Myerhoff, Secular ritual. Assen, 

The Netherlands: Van Gorcum.
120

Normile, Dennis. 2008. “Rinderpest: Driven to Extinction.” 

Science, Vol. 319, No. 5870, pp. 1601-1609.

Obeid, R. A. 1990. “Islamic Theory of Human Development.” 

The Encyclopedia of Human Development. Chicago, IL: Pergamon.

Piderit, Sandy Kristin. 2000. “Rethinking Resistance and Recognizing Ambivalence: A Multidimensional View of Attitudes 

toward an Organizational Change.” The Academy of Management 

Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 783-794.

Richards, Alan. 2003. “Modernity and Economic Development: The ‘New’ American Messianism.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 

10, No. 39, pp. 56-78. 

Rist, Gilbert. 1997. The History of Development. Cape Town, 

South Africa/London, UK: University of Cape Town Press/Zed 

Books.

Rosberg, Michael. 2005. The Power of Greed: Collective action in 

international development. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: University 

of Alberta Press.

Tavakolian, Bahram. 1984. “Women and Socioeconomic 

Change among Sheikhanzai Nomads of Western Afghanistan.” 

Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 433-453. 

Torres, Carlos C. 1972. “The Managerial Entrepreneur: Necessary Catalyst for Development.” Philippine Sociological Review, 

Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 380-384.

UNGA 2000. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 

55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration. New York: United 

Nations.

Williamson, Oliver E. 1967. “Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size.” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75, No. 2, 

pp. 123-138.
121

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Gunnar Myrdal, “What is Development?” Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1973, pp. 729-736. 

2. Alan Richards, “Modernity and Economic Development: 

The ‘New’ American Messianism,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 

39, 2003, pp. 56-78.

3. Michael Rosberg, The Power of Greed: Collective action in international development, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: University of 

Alberta Press, 2005.

4. Tom Christensen and Per Laegried, “The Whole of Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,” Public Administration 

Review, November/December 2007, pp. 1059-1066. 

5. To consider the span-of-control issue in hierarchical organizations, see Gerald D. Bell, “Determinants of Span of Control,” 

American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, No. 1, 1967, pp. 100-109; Michael Keren and David Levhari, “The Optimum Span of Control 

in a Pure Hierarchy,” Management Science, Vol. 25, No. 11, 1979, 

pp. 1162-1172; Oliver E. Williamson, “Hierarchical Control and 

Optimum Firm Size,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75, No. 

2, 1967, pp. 123-138.

6. There are, of course, other definitions. For an Islamic definition, see S. F. Alatas, Islam And Counter Modernism: Towards Alternative Development Paradigms, in Masudul Choudhury, ed., Islamic 

political economy in capitalist-globalization: An agenda for change, 

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Utusan Publications & Distributors, 

1997; International Project on Islamic Political Economy, Universiti Sains Malaysia; M. S. Salleh, in ibid. For a Marxist definition, 

see G. B. Kay, Development and underdevelopment: A Marxist analysis, London, UK: Macmillan, 1975; among others. 

7. See Rosberg for a detailed discussion of this particular disconnect.

8. Myrdal.
122

9. Barbara Myerhoff, “Secular ritual: Forms and meaning,” S. 

F. Moore and B. Myerhoff, eds., Secular ritual, Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1997, pp. 3-25; Raymond Firth, Elements of 

social organization, London, UK: Routledge, 2005.

10. Firth.

11. Myerhoff.

12. R. Fox, Kinship and marriage: an anthropological perspective, 

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

13. See United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 

1325, S/RES/1325 (2000); and United Nations General Assembly 

(UNGA) 2000 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 55/2, 

“United Nations Millennium Declaration.” 

14. Lauryn Oates, Taking Stock Update: Afghan Women and Girls 

Five Years On, London, UK: Womankind Worldwide, 2006. 

15. Sharon E. Hutchinson, Nuer Dillemas: Coping with Money, 

War, and the State, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 

1998.

16. R. G. Bailey, “An appraisal of the fisheries of the Sudd 

wetlands, River Nile, southern Sudan,” Aquaculture Research, Vol. 

20, No. 1, 1989, pp. 79–89.

17. Dennis Normile, “Rinderpest: Driven to Extinction,” Science, Vol. 319, No. 5870, 2008, pp. 1601-1609.

18. Rosberg.

19. Sidney M. Greenfield, Arnold Strickon, and Robert T. 

Aubey, Entrepreneurs in Cultural Context, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979. 

20. Sandy Kristin Piderit, “Rethinking Resistance and Recognizing Ambivalence: A Multidimensional View of Attitudes 

Toward an Organizational Change,” The Academy of Management 

Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2000, pp. 783-794.
123

21. Carlos C. Torres, “The Managerial Entrepreneur: Necessary Catalyst for Development,” Philippine Sociological Review, 

Vol. 20, No. 4, 1972, pp. 380-384.

22. Alex Inkeles and D. H. Smith, “The fate of personal adjustment in the process of modernization,” Journal of Comparative 

Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1970, pp. 81-114; Alex Inkeles and David 

H. Smith, Exploring Individual Modernity, New York: Columbia 

University, 1983.

23. Otto Schell, To Get Rich is Glorious: China in the 80s, New 

York: Pantheon Books, 1984. Though there is no direct evidence, 

the quote is attributed to Deng.

24. In gender-segregated Afghan society where women of a 

household are not allowed to come into contact with male guests, 

hospitality is conducted in a chaykhana (tea house) which every 

influential man (or group of brothers) builds to entertain male 

guests and as a demonstration of wealth and prestige. The larger 

and more elaborate the chaykhana, the more the owner is claiming 

social and political ascendancy.

25. Gilbert Rist, The History of Development, Cape Town, South 

Africa/London, UK: University of Cape Town Press/Zed Books, 

1997; Rosberg.

26. Rist.

27. Antonio Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of 

State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, Crisis States Programme 

Development Research Centre Working Paper Series Vol. 1, No. 

33, 2003.

28. Brett A. Gleitsmann, Margaret M. Kroma, and Tammo 

Steenhuis, “Analysis of a rural water supply project in three communities in Mali: Participation and Sustainability,” Natural Resources Forum 31, 2007, pp. 142-150.

125

PART II

127

CHAPTER 5

WHERE DOES WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT

MEET WHOLE OF SOCIETY?

Lisa Schirch

In response to the challenges in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, top U.S. military and political leaders elevated 

the importance of stabilization activities such as development, called for strengthened civilian capacities, 

and put more resources toward civil-military cooperation. The U.S. Government is ramping up efforts 

to create this whole of government (WoG) approach. 

This chapter argues that WoG is not enough. Stabilization and security require a “whole of society” or 

comprehensive approach including the interests and 

perspectives of diverse sectors of civil society. 

Research for this paper included five focus group 

dialogues between 140 people, including equal numbers of military personnel from U.S. and International 

Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, staff of civil 

society organizations in the United States and Afghanistan, and university professors and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) working on civil-military relations across Africa and Asia. The research took place 

between 2010 and 2011. The research project was 

led by the author of this chapter, the director of the 

university-based program called 3P Human Security, 

and a partnership exploring peace building policy 

at Eastern Mennonite University. Co-sponsors of the 

dialogues included the University of Notre Dame, 

U.S. Institute of Peace, National Defense University, 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the 

U.S. Army War College, and the International Secu-
128

rity Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. The research 

dialogues explored perceptions of commonalities; differences; tensions; and potentials for collaboration, cooperation, and communication between military and 

civil society personnel.

A comprehensive approach, according to U.S. military stability operations doctrine,1

 integrates cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. 

Government, intergovernmental agencies and NGOs, 

multinational partners, and private sector entities such 

as civil society organizations (CSOs) to achieve unity 

of effort toward a shared goal. But in this comprehensive approach, civilian government, civilian contractors, CSOs, and the civilian public are very different 

kinds of civilians, each requiring a different form of 

relationship and communication with military forces. 

The intense challenges of coordinating government 

civilians with military personnel and the increasing 

use of civilian contractors confuses and overshadows 

the distinct nature of how an independent civil society relates to military forces and plays important roles 

in democratization, good governance, stability, and 

peace. The current WoG approach ignores a large part 

of the equation necessary for peace and security, how 

government and military forces will relate to local and 

international civil society efforts related to development and peace. 

Based on a series of five dialogues between civil 

society and European and U.S. Government and 

military personnel, this chapter provides an orientation to the perceptions, tensions, and opportunities 

between civil society organizations and government 

and military personnel in conflict-affected regions.2

Current tensions between government and military 

personnel on one hand and many civil society actors 
129

on the other, make it impossible to achieve a comprehensive approach. While many CSOs play important 

roles in peace and security, they are best able to play 

these roles when they are independent from government and military forces. A whole of society approach 

recognizes the key roles civil society plays in building 

security from the ground up and gives civil society 

space and independence to play these roles without 

being tightly coordinated with government or military forces. A comprehensive approach that respects 

the independent roles of civil society is most likely 

to enable their contributions to stability and security. 

This chapter makes the case for a more robust conception of civil society, a better understanding of historic 

civil society-military tensions, and a set of recommendations to address these tensions.

MILITARY STABILIZATION EFFORTS AND 

CIVIL SOCIETY

U.S. military personnel increasingly conduct humanitarian, development, and peace building activities to achieve stabilization effects under a new Department of Defense Directive3

 that puts stabilization 

on par with warfighting. In this new emphasis on 

stabilization activities, military forces use activities 

frequently referred to as “winning hearts and minds” 

(WHAM) or “quick impact projects” (QIPs)4 to achieve 

a variety of impacts related to their stabilization mission. Military personnel listed the following goals for 

such activities.

• Functions of Military-Led Development for 

Stabilization:

— Address Drivers of Instability: to address 

perceived root causes of violence. For exam-
130

ple, developing job creation programs such 

as rebuilding factories or large public works 

projects to address unemployment.

— Win Loyalty of Local Population for Local 

Government: to gain support of local populations for U.S. and Coalition efforts to support the local government.

— Win Loyalty of Local Elites/Host Nation 

Support: to supply local elites with public 

goods such as humanitarian aid, schools, 

or bridges so as to increase and extend the 

state’s local legitimacy and authority.

— Gain Access/Information: to provide an opportunity to gain access to and information 

about local populations.

— Force Protection/Undermine Insurgent Recruitment: to convince local populations of 

U.S. military goodwill, and reduce their incentive to attack military forces.

—Humanitarian Access: to provide humanitarian assistance in insecure areas where the 

United Nations (UN) and NGOs are not able, 

as per Geneva Conventions.5

Historically, military strategy advised on how to 

“pacify” civil society. Today, in contrast, building civil 

society is a key element in reconstruction and stabilization strategies. Military leaders list “building civil 

society” and “local ownership” as important elements 

in their stabilization strategies and seek NGOs as implementing partners to carry out these projects with 

government or military funds. The North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) policy states: “The immediate purpose 

of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-
131

operation of the NATO commander and the civilian 

authorities, organizations, agencies, and population 

within a commander’s area of operations in order to 

allow him to fulfill his mission.”6 Current U.S. counterinsurgency guidance identifies empowering local 

populations to interact effectively with their own government as key.7

But many CSOs do not want military or government representatives to call them or use them as “force 

multipliers” since they believe this approach makes 

them soft targets for armed opposition groups. Many 

CSOs conducting humanitarian aid, development, 

and peace building vehemently oppose military involvement in these activities, and some are withdrawing from all contact with military personnel. Many 

claim that military efforts in these activities more often undermine rather than complement efforts by civil 

society in places like Afghanistan.8 Residual military 

references to more widespread “population control 

and pacification” as well as the metaphor of “human 

terrain” continue to raise suspicions, misunderstandings, or confusion of military objectives by CSOs.9

Furthermore, CSO research calls for examining the 

underlying assumptions about and effectiveness of 

QIP and WHAM efforts.10 Civil society organizations 

claim some stabilization activities using humanitarian and development programs endanger their safety; 

undermine sustainable development; are not cost-effective; and lead to unintended, counterproductive effects.11 While military personnel focus on short-term, 

quick-impact relief and development efforts to reduce 

immediate national security threats, CSOs generally take a long-term, relationship-based approach. 

Civilians do not yet have the capacity to coordinate 

massive humanitarian relief efforts and acknowledge 
132

there may be a temporary role for the military in extreme cases or in situations where military capacity to 

rebuild factories and roads is beyond the scope of any 

CSO. However, very little research or consultation 

mechanisms exist to help deconflict military stabilization from CSO peace and development work.

TOWARDS A BROADER CONCEPTION OF 

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 

While there is growing interest in a comprehensive 

approach that includes partnerships with civil society, 

a lack of knowledge of and antagonism toward civil 

society pose challenges to this approach. In Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the U.S. WoG developed programs to rebuild the Iraqi and Afghan states, but largely neglected local society leaders working on development and 

peace in these countries. The overwhelming efforts to 

achieve some semblance of a WoG approach meant 

personnel focused more on internal coordination with 

other U.S. civilians or military personnel and devoted 

relatively less energy to listening closely to and working with local civil society.

This approach fundamentally misunderstood and 

devalued the importance of local civil society and the 

importance of having local consent and cooperation in 

efforts to build a stable and democratic country in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. An active local civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. CSOs 

work both in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and in oversight of 

the state to hold it accountable for its responsibilities 

and transparent governance.12 Speculatively, without 

an active and strong civil society pushing for accountability in the United States, for example, there would 
133

likely be a much greater level of corruption. The same 

is true also for Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.

CSOs are groups of citizens not in government that 

organize themselves on behalf of some public interest. CSOs include religious and educational groups, 

media, community-based organizations (CBOs), business and trade associations, traditional and indigenous structures, sports associations, musicians, artists, 

and more. CSOs conduct a wide variety of activities 

including humanitarian aid, economic development, 

health, agriculture, human rights, conflict resolution, 

participatory governance, and security sector reform, 

as well as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and fostering moderation and coexistence. Some 

CSOs contribute to a comprehensive approach to 

countering extremism and terrorism by conducting 

conflict assessments, providing aid, development, 

and deradicalization to vulnerable groups, helping 

reconcile divided groups, and fostering participatory 

governance and security sector reform. 

NGOs are a type of CSO. There are several types 

of NGOs: humanitarian, religious, developmental, 

human rights, research, environmental and peace 

building. There are both local NGOs (LNGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs). Many NGOs hold several 

mandates. NGOs must meet specific legal requirements for organizational oversight and accountability.

In the five dialogues that were researched for this 

chapter, military personnel shared their concerns and 

perceptions of civil society organizations, especially 

INGOs who many saw as naïve, lacking patriotism, 

self-righteous, illegitimate, or corrupt. CSO challenges mirror those found in the state itself; there are 

incapable and corrupt CSOs operating in the midst of 

legitimate CSOs. Some CSOs also exacerbate conflict 
134

and violence by failing to recognize complex local 

dynamics. CSOs also experience limitations in their 

ability to maintain consistent funding due to donors’ 

shifting priorities, evaluate their work in complex 

settings with multiple variables, and deal with growing government repression restricting CSO activities. 

Those CSOs that work on peace building are currently 

threatened with imprisonment if members communicate with groups like the Taliban or insurgent groups 

in Iraq, even if the goal of the communication is to 

move the group away from violence.13

The dialogues illustrate that it is important for 

military and government personnel to build relationships with diverse civil society leaders from both the 

local society and INGOs operating in the country. 

Civil society has no single representative, and CSOs 

do not agree on all issues. For-profit entities and nonprofit NGOs conflict over the missions and motivation 

guiding their work. LNGOs and INGOs often differ 

in their long-term commitment to the local context. 

Local CSOs’ strengths lie in their cultural, linguistic, and socio-political knowledge of and long-term 

commitment to the local context. International CSOs’ 

strengths lie in their technical knowledge, capacity 

building, broader resources, experience across contexts, and ability to advocate to international policymakers. INGOs often hire talented local staff at salaries higher than local government or CSOs can afford. 

This can create parallel governmental structures that 

undermine local capacity. International CSOs and the 

military both increasingly articulate the goal of “local 

ownership,” and both struggle to operationalize it by 

involving local people in the upfront assessment and 

design of programs.14
135

One of the primary tensions between government, 

military, and civil society members in the dialogues 

was the distinction between CSOs acting as government contractors or as independent partners. Most 

CSOs make a distinction between the nonprofit work 

they do, motivated by the humanitarian values and 

principles detailed in Figure 5-1, and for-profit contractors who exist to help the state carry out its mission. CSOs assert that they are independent, impartial, and even neutral in the way they interact with 

communities, addressing human needs and working 

with communities to achieve locally-driven development and peace efforts to improve their lives. Often, 

these are not in contradiction with government plans. 

But in the midst of a war, development projects become politicized, and it can be difficult for CSOs to 

work with military and government funds and projects. CSOs assert that their space to operate independently from government and the military is shrinking, 

with more armed actors targeting CSOs who collaborate with government and military counterinsurgency 

plans. CSOs find themselves as the “soft targets” of 

this soft power approach where CSOs are the “force 

multipliers” and “implementing partners” of government-designed projects. They lament the loss of “humanitarian space,” as defined by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which refers to the ability to 

pursue humanitarian missions without fear of attack 

and while maintaining independence, impartiality, 

and freedom of movement. The term does not refer to 

physical space but to the clarity of civilian roles.
136

Figure 5-1. Principles of Civil Society 

Humanitarian, Development, and Peace Building.15

Many CSO efforts follow a set of principles aimed 

to reduce human suffering and increase the quality of life. Often termed “humanitarian principles,” 

many also apply to CSOs involved in development 

and peace building. Not all CSOs follow these principles. Military personnel interviewed for this project 

expressed confusion over the definitions of independence, impartiality, and neutrality in the dialogues 

that informed this chapter. Many perceived CSO 

claims to neutrality as insincere since many CSOs accept government funds. But CSOs in the dialogues insisted they can both follow their principles and accept 

funds where a shared goal exists and that taking these 

funds does not mean that CSOs agree with all governHumanitarian Imperative: to save lives, alleviate suffering, 

and uphold dignity.

Independence: to make decisions, program plans, and 

strategies free from political goals.

Impartiality: to provide resources regardless of the identity 

of those suffering.

Partial to Human Rights: to work in support of the human 

rights of all people.

Neutrality: to not take sides in armed struggles.

Do no harm: to avoid harming others intentionally or unintentionally.

Accountability: to consult and be accountable to local people and long-term sustainability.
137

ment policy or are government agents. CSOs make a 

distinction between broadly supporting good governance and development but remaining politically independent and not supporting a specific government 

or political party. 

TENSIONS BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY AND 

NATIONAL SECURITY

In conflict-affected regions, also known as “nonpermissive settings,” key tensions and differences 

between CSOs and the U.S. military and government 

center on how they define and pursue security. All actors see the need for stability and security. But when 

asked “stability for whom and for what purpose?” 

their perceptions diverge. A whole of society comprehensive approach requires first getting agreement on 

the goals of stability missions. This requires addressing the tensions between two different security paradigms.

A “human security” paradigm emphasizes the 

safety of individuals and communities. It recognizes 

the interdependence between shared security threats 

facing people around the world. Human security 

includes civilian protection, fostering stable, citizenoriented legitimate governments with participatory 

democracy, human rights, human development, and 

peace building. It requires a locally led, bottom-up approach including civil society and local government 

that works, when necessary, with civilian-led, legitimate, multilateral actors.

“National security” paradigms, on the other hand, 

traditionally prioritize political and economic interests 

of the state deemed central to the nation’s survival or 

way of life. The 2010 National Security Strategy of the 
138

United States also names key U.S. values in freedom, 

human rights, and democracy.16 For example, the narrative of national security interests harnessed both 

economic and humanitarian dimensions when the 

uprising in Libya threatened supply from Libyan oil 

fields at the same time as Gaddhafi’s forces used brutal repression of Libyan citizens. But in other places, 

such as the early days of the uprising in Egypt, U.S. 

policymakers cited U.S. national interests in stability, 

even though Egyptian citizens were calling for the 

ousting of the current regime. This illustrated the tensions between U.S. national interests and the human 

security of those abroad.

Some military and CSO leaders think human security and national security need not contradict and, 

in fact, often overlap. These leaders want military 

services to focus on population-centric security.17 Human security and national security often do overlap; 

transnational threats from natural disasters, diseases, 

trafficking of humans, weapons proliferation, extremist groups, and drug trafficking challenge both national security and human security. But it is not clear 

which takes precedence in situations like the people’s 

movement for democracy in Egypt or Nigeria when 

U.S. values in democracy and freedom conflict with 

U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. With wider 

consultation, the two approaches could better complement each other.

But there are also other questions of legitimacy and 

consent. Both local and international CSOs question 

the legitimacy of security missions, national or international, when military forces act without the consent 

of local populations, and when no legally enforceable 

mechanism exists to hold forces accountable to legitimate local political decisionmaking bodies. CSOs cite 
139

a long legacy of military forces acting against the interest of local citizens to achieve access to resources 

or geo-political gains. Greater consultation with CSOs 

before and during military interventions could help 

achieve greater legitimacy, consent, and collaboration 

on human security goals.

Yet another tension is civilian casualties inflicted 

in enemy centric warfare. The U.S. Government gives 

military services the authority to use both kinetic (violent) and nonkinetic (nonviolent) means to detect, deter, and destroy an enemy. U.S. military actions are 

subject to international laws such as the Geneva Convention that include provisions to do the least amount 

of harm and reduce civilian casualties. Counterinsurgency emphasizes population-centric security, focusing on the safety of local citizens. Many CSOs focus 

exclusively on human security and make explicit commitments to do no harm. Civilian casualties and human rights violations increase CSO-military tensions 

and highlight the tensions between a human security 

and national security approach.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE COMPREHENSIVE 

APPROACH

Any comprehensive approach or unity of effort requires unity of understanding and unity of mission.

Local CSOs often complain that international actors 

do not take the time to consult with local civil society to discuss local social, political, and economic factors. They balk at military human terrain teams and 

complain that the “we know best” attitude ignores 

democratic principles and the will and capacity of local CSOs to provide cultural advice. Military personnel on the other hand, may wish to consult CSOs, but 
140

have no way of identifying whom they should consult. 

Underfunded and understaffed U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) offices are also often 

unaware of local NGO capacity. The comprehensive 

approach cannot have a unity of effort including CSOs 

until there is a shared understanding of the causes 

driving conflict and violence and a transparency of 

where national security interests and human security 

overlap and where they do not. 

CSOs see communication, not integration, as necessary for a comprehensive approach. Many CSOs resist terms that name them as “force multipliers” or requests for them to “coordinate” with or “implement” 

a mission and strategy perceived as different from 

their own. However many CSOs do recognize the benefits of policy dialogue and communication with government and military personnel. Yet few consultation 

structures exist to engage with those CSOs willing to 

provide policy advice, share conflict assessments, or 

discuss overlapping human security goals (see Figure 

5-2).

Figure 5-2. Consultation Structure.

Government

Conflict

Assessment

Government

Planning

Implementation:

e.g., COIN's 

Shape,
141

MECHANISMS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY-MILITARY 

RELATIONS

Civil society-military relations differ according to 

the local context. In many countries, civilian governments control the military. In others, there is no democracy, and the military controls the government. 

Context, history, and each specific mission shape civil 

society-military relations. 

Humanitarian CSOs identify a spectrum of civilmilitary relationships that exist at the operational 

level (see Figure 5-3). The type of CSO-military relationship depends on whether missions align, or there 

is sufficient humanitarian space for CSOs to maintain 

their principles.18 The first category, “curtail presence” 

refers to situations (such as during the height of the 

Iraq war) when civil society-military relations disappear and it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate in 

the same space as armed personnel because of a lack 

of security and humanitarian space. The other categories, defined by the UN Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), represent a range 

of levels of contact or communication between representative CSOs and military personnel. Some nonhumanitarian CSOs also use these categories to decide 

on their level of interaction with military personnel.
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Figure 5-3. Operational Level Civil-Military 

Relationships.

CSO-military communication happens informally 

and formally. Where there is no coordinating body, 

groups coordinate informally when working in the 

same area, or groups coordinate via “Heineken diplomacy” as individual people build relationships over 

an informal drink in a public bar. Coordination by 

command refers to some type of government Civil 

Military Operations Center (CMOC) or international 

coordinating agency (e.g., UN OCHA) that has legitimacy through formal authority, through the rewards 

for being coordinated (e.g., funding) or the punishments for not following commands (e.g., denial of access to certain areas or refugee camps). Given CSO humanitarian principles of independence, coordination 

by command has not worked in places like Afghanistan, Haiti, or Rwanda. More often, there is a degree of 

coordination by consensus when a recognized coordination body builds consensus among diverse actors 

to work in ways that complement rather than conflict. 

(See Figure 5-4.)

Curtail 

Presence

Where it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate safely, 

international CSOs may pull out and local CSOs may go 

into hiding.

Coexistence/

Communication

Where CSOs, government and military operate in the same 

space but their missions do not align, only basic communication on logistical details takes place.

Coordination

Where CSOs, government and military missions partially 

align, there may be some basic coordination to promote 

CSO core values in human security.

Cooperation

Where CSOs, government and military missions partially 

or fully align, there may be collaboration on joint projects, 

particularly in disaster relief or demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration/reconciliation (DDR).
143

In Rwanda, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office 

(UNREO) successfully led coordination by consensus. Co-leaders 

from UN and NGO backgrounds were able to facilitate participatory style of meetings in a neutral location separate from UN 

military offices.

In Ghana, CSOs, government, and security forces coordinated rapid response to potential violence via a “National Architecture for Peace.” During the 2008 elections, civil society leaders 

mediated between political candidates to deescalate impending 

election-related violence.

In the Philippines, Filipino military leaders attended training at a civil society-led peace building institute on negotiation, 

mediation, and peace processes. Military leaders then asked for 

a peace building training program for thousands of military personnel.

In Thailand, civil society worked with the military to write 

the national security policy for the southern border provinces 

from 1999 to 2003. The process of developing this strategy together changed how top military leaders saw their role in supporting 

a human security agenda.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. State Department and International 

Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan have a staff person with the title “NGO Liaison.” The ISAF NGO Liaison helped 

build momentum around a successful CSO pilot police program 

to improve sector security reform (SSR) and police-community 

relations.

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties consults with a 

group of approximately 20 Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, and 

Somali community leaders. DHS draws on this group for crisis 

rapid response phone consultations, for broad community consultations to identify concerns and brainstorm solutions, and to 

develop DHS cultural competency.

Figure 5-4. Examples of Coordination and 

Cooperation Models.
144

AN AGENDA FOR CIVIL SOCIETY-MILITARY 

DIALOGUE ON HUMAN SECURITY

As part of this research, a year-long set of five 

dialogues between local civil society, international 

NGOs, U.S. military forces, and U.S. Government 

personnel, identified an agenda for addressing the 

tensions preventing and opportunities for improving 

civil society-military/government partnerships in a 

comprehensive approach. These included developing a research agenda, discussing options for operational mechanisms, training, joint work on budget and 

legislative issues, and a look at a longer-term human 

security commission to continue to build a more effective whole of society approach that can help overcome 

some of the shortcomings of the more limited WoG 

approach identified in this chapter. This chapter closes 

with some concrete recommendations for addressing 

the obstacles to a comprehensive whole of society approach advocated here.

Research.

1. The Relationship Between “Security” and “Development.” A wide array of research demonstrates 

an association between low levels of development and 

the likelihood of violent conflict. Yet the underlying 

assumption that development contributes to stabilization and security is not yet proven. CSO efforts in war 

zones over many decades have often had little impact 

on conflict dynamics. Research suggests that harnessing development programs for stabilization and counterinsurgency goals is often counterproductive, endangering and undermining long-term development 
145

and peace building, wasting development funds, and 

inadvertently fueling both corruption and insurgency.19 Local CSOs ask: “Do they think we’re stupid?” 

suggesting that local people tend to see through simplistic hearts and minds programs.20 During interviews conducted for this project, military personnel, 

on the other hand, cite specific positive outcomes from 

their hearts and minds QIPs, though to date it is difficult to find research documenting these outcomes. Future research should examine specifically the complex 

relationship between development and security and if and 

how development contributes to either short-term stabilization or longer-term human security.

2. Integration vs. Civil Society Space. Many development actors argue that development best contributes to both national and human security goals 

when it is free from short-term political and security 

imperatives. In other words, they argue that development and defense goals should be separate. The 

comprehensive approach assumes stabilization requires integrating development with security efforts. 

Is it possible to design effective short-term stabilization programming that contributes toward long-term 

development goals and vice versa? Future research 

should examine the perceived benefits of the integration 

model to security/stabilization, the costs of this model to 

humanitarian and civil society space, and the alternatives 

to the existing civil military integration model.

3. The Relationship Between Stabilization Programs and NGO Insecurity. The number of NGO 

personnel targeted and killed each year is increasing. 

Many assume an increase in the use of development 

activities for stabilization, and confusion between 
146

military and CSO personnel, coupled with shrinking humanitarian and civil society space, are making 

NGOs the “soft targets” for armed opposition groups. 

Military personnel question this assumption, pointing 

to the increased attacks by insurgents against all kinds 

of civilians. Future research should document the relationship between military hearts and minds QIPs and NGO 

insecurity.

Operational Mechanisms.

1. Mechanisms for Multi-stakeholder Consultations. CSOs, civilian government, and military personnel do not have adequate forums for information 

exchange, monitoring of civil-military guidelines, or 

general discussion of issues related to conflict assessment, planning, and implementation. Future research 

should examine which mechanisms could provide a forum 

for CSOs to share conflict assessments, advise on policy options, or address field-level issues with the U.S. Government and military.

2. Mechanisms for Funding CSOs. The Department of Defense (DoD) administers up to 25 percent 

of U.S. development assistance. U.S. military commanders use the Commanders Emergency Response 

Fund and Provincial Reconstruction Teams to influence CSOs to implement hearts and minds QIPs with 

military funding. This places some CSOs in a dilemma 

of balancing their need for resources with principles 

of responding impartially to human need and being independent from government, which they perceive as essential to their security and access to local 

populations. Many CSOs will only accept funds from 

civilian donor agencies that allow the CSOs to inde-
147

pendently identify program plans through impartial 

needs assessments. Future research should examine 

what alternative funding mechanisms, such as channeling 

development dollars through Embassy development offices, 

national governments, or international donor pools, could 

best address this dilemma.

3. Development of Shared Standards. CSOs, governments, and military personnel all share similar 

challenges of fostering local ownership and accountability, and monitoring what is working and what is 

not in their efforts. While CSOs oppose military-led 

development, they do argue that such development 

should at the very minimum be transparent. Any 

transfer of resources for humanitarian assistance or 

development programs into a community can foster 

corruption and unintentionally give legitimacy to 

unpopular local leaders and armed groups. Future 

research could examine whether developing shared 

standards could help to build civil-military transparency 

on program effectiveness, cost, and sustainability.

Training.

1. “Conflict Sensitive Development” Training for 

the Military. Despite decades of development expertise, even many CSO development projects still fail 

to address causes of poverty and do more to fuel local conflict than mitigate it. Development and peace 

building CSOs have undergone extensive training 

in a “Do No Harm” methodology to avoid negative 

impacts of their work.21 The Australian and United 

Kingdom (UK) Departments for International Development co-train civilian and military personnel to understand the potential for harm in the development 
148

process and provide basic guidance for QIPs. Given 

broad concerns on military-led hearts and minds QIPs, future training for the U.S. military could include principles 

for a conflict-sensitive approach to development, known to 

NGOs as “Do No Harm,” to deconflict military approaches 

to short-term stabilization and long-term civil society development processes.

2. Training on CSO-Military Relations: Missing 

Guidance. While a number of civil-military guidelines exist to clarify humanitarian NGO and military 

interaction, guidance on military involvement in development and peace building is missing. Despite 

high-level endorsement, there is still minimal wider 

understanding or monitoring of these existing guidelines. Civil society organizations are reluctant to establish guidelines for military involvement in areas 

they contest, such as development and peace building. 

Yet the increasing number of military personnel conducting development creates urgency for short-term 

pragmatic agreements. Moreover, in the broader field 

of peace building, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on SSR, 

and DDR call for civilian oversight and participation 

working with military personnel when shared goals 

exist.22

Both CSOs and the military suffer from a lack of 

training and capacity for managing their interactions. 

Knowledge of existing humanitarian NGO guidelines 

and International Humanitarian Law is lacking. Quick 

field guides for U.S. military personnel that address 

issues with nonhumanitarian CSOs and the use of 

development and peace building activities for shortterm stabilization goals are absent. Future research 

could examine what curricula and training opportunities 
149

could assist CSOs and the military to advance their understanding of the issues outlined in this chapter.

Legislation and Budget.

1. Legalizing Civil Society Humanitarian, Development, and Peace Building Efforts. Current War on 

Terror legislation makes it impossible for many CSOs 

to play positive roles in countering extremism, fostering democracy and providing civilian oversight of 

SSR and DDR. CSO contact with groups on terror lists 

is illegal, even when that work aims to end violence 

via negotiation training or DDR activities. Future research could examine what the military and CSOs could 

do to help educate Congress about the roles of civil society in countering extremism and the need for more precise 

legislation that would permit the work of legitimate CSOs 

with groups on terror lists.

2. Budgeting for Comparative Advantage. The 

2010 UN CIMIC Policy calls for military personnel to 

support the creation of “an enabling environment . . . 

maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors 

operating in the mission area.”23 CSOs want military 

personnel to focus on population-centric security, not 

development. CSOs and military personnel generally 

agree that civilian agencies do not yet have the size capacity to address all the humanitarian, development 

and peace building needs in complex conflict settings 

and military organizations do not have the skill capacity for these tasks. CSOs believe there is no quick military fix to this problem, as these forms of assistance 

require extensive expertise to be effective and to avoid 

negative impacts. Future research could examine what 

CSOs and military officials could do together with Congress 
150

to create an institutional plan and funding mechanisms to 

address the lack of civilian size capacity.

Human Security Commission.

1. Broader Research and Dialogue on Human Security. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Admiral 

Michael Mullen both called for “demilitarizing U.S. 

foreign policy.” Addressing the tensions between 

CSOs and military personnel in the United States 

requires a dialogue including Congress, the administration and civilian agencies, the international community, and the many for-profit contractors who also 

work on security and development. How does the 

United States balance its own national interests when 

they conflict with broader global human security and 

without the distracting influence of those motivated 

by profit or power? Future projects could include setting up a Human Security Commission, congressional 

hearings, or a whole of society dialogue process to examine 

national security and global human security.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. See US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, 

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008. 

2. See the following publications resulting from these dialogues: Lisa Schirch, “Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security,” Washington, DC: 3D Security Initiative, 2011; Lisa 

Schirch, Civil Society and the U.S. Government in Conflict-Affected 

Regions: Building Better Relations for Peacebuilding,” Washington, 

DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010.

3. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 

Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 

2007. 
151

4. See UK Stabilization Unit, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), New 

York: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 

2004, p. 19; QIPs Policy Directive, New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, February 12, 2007. 

5. The goals listed above were gleaned from the comments 

of various military personnel involved in the five focus groups 

which were the main basis for this chapter.

6. Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping 

Mission (UN-CIMIC), New York: United Nations Office of Military Affairs, Policy and Doctrine Team, October 2010.

7. U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 2009.

8. See, for example, Matt Waldman, “Caught in the Conflict: 

Civilians and the International Security Strategy in Afghanistan,” 

A briefing paper by 11 NGOs operating in Afghanistan for the 

NATO Heads of State and Government Summit, April 3-4, 2009, 

p. 14; Ashley Jackson, “Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan,” Oxfam, Afghanistan, 

2010.

9. Anthropologists’ Statement on the Human Terrain System 

Program, Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association, 

January 26, 2010.

10. Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022 , “Winning ‘Hearts 

and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,” March 2010.

11. “The US Military’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance,“ Washington, DC: InterAction, January 2011.

12. High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society, and Global Governance, Paper by Panel Chairman Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 

2004. 

13. See David Cortright with George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar, 

and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, “Friend not Foe: Civil Society and 

the Struggle Against Violent Extremism,” South Bend, IN: Kroc 

Center for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre 

Dame, 2008.
152

14. Several of the civil society-military dialogues for the research for this chapter revealed these tensions.

15. These principles are drawn from a wide range of materials on NGOs. For a good example of the discussion, see Hugo 

Slim, “Relief agencies and moral standing in war: principles of 

humanity, neutrality, impartiality and solidarity,” Development in 

Practice, Vol. 10, Nos. 3-4, August 1, 2000.

16. National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, 

DC: The White House, May 2010.

17. Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, The Ultimate Weapon 

is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace, 

New York: Public Affairs, 2010.

18. Edwina Thompson, “Principled Pragmatism: NGO Engagement with Armed Actors,” Monrovia, CA: World Vision International, 2008.

19. See, for example, P. Fishtein, “Winning Hearts and Minds? 

Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Balkh Province,” Medford, MA, Feinstein International 

Center, Tufts University, November 2010. See also A. Wilder, 

“Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan, 1979-

2009: In the Grip of Conflict, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, December 2009.

20. See, for example, M. Bradbury, “Do they think we’re stupid? Local perceptions of ‘hearts and minds’ activities in Kenya,” 

Humanitarian Practice Network, July 2010.

21. Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace—

or War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, February 1999.

22. Security Sector Reform and Governance, Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005.

23. UN-CIMIC Policy, Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions, New York: United Nations, October 2010.
153

CHAPTER 6

SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM

IN WEAK OR FRAGILE STATES:

A THREEFOLD CHALLENGE TO THE

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

Fouzieh Melanie Alamir

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The issue of whole of government (WoG) approaches has been high on the agenda of debates on 

international conflict management and crisis response 

in recent years. Interestingly, very similar debates 

have been taking place in several national arenas as 

well as international fora, including big international 

organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the 

European Union (EU). The international attention 

attributed to the topic leads to the question on the 

prospects, challenges, and limits of WoG. Beside this 

immanent perspective, this chapter will also reflect 

upon whether WoG approaches can help us to better 

achieve political end states. 

In doing so, the WoG approach comprises three dimensions that require separate consideration as they 

touch upon three separate and completely different, 

though interacting policy arenas which are characterized by specific actors, procedural mechanisms and 

organizing principles: 

1. The recipient country’s political system. 

2. The donor country’s political system. And,

3. The system of international crisis response. 
154

Weak or fragile states pose a particular challenge 

since they usually lack the institutional and political preconditions to apply a WoG approach. Even in 

Western donor countries, policy coherence between 

the different departments involved in international 

conflict management is more often than not wishful 

thinking rather than best practice. Finally, the system 

of international crisis response is primarily shaped by 

national and organizational interests that are not conducive to comprehensive policy approaches. Hence, 

the challenges of a WoG approach differ considerably 

in these three policy arenas and therefore require specific coping strategies. 

In order to elicit the prospects and challenges of a 

WoG approach in practice, recent international security system reform (SSR)1

 efforts will serve as suitable 

examples. Programmatic papers of SSR, according to 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines,2

 explicitly recommend WoG as 

one of the primary implementing principles for SSR 

programs and activities. Moreover, SSR processes and 

projects in many parts of the world provide ample experiences and reference cases. 

Following a definition of the WoG approach, a 

brief outline is given on the concept of SSR before 

scrutinization of the challenges of WoG by arenas and 

deriving recommendations on coping strategies. The 

following arguments will draw on practical case examples for illustrative purposes but, due to the given 

space limits of this chapter, will not go deeper into the 

cases and analyze details.
155

WHAT CHARACTERIZES A WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT APPROACH?

The term whole of government is, though widely 

used, not based on a commonly accepted definition. 

The least common denominator is an understanding 

of WoG as policies that have been conceptualized, decided, and implemented by legitimate state actors in 

a coordinated fashion. The Australian Management 

Advisory Committee defines it as: 

Whole of government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a 

shared goal and an integrated government response to 

particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program 

management and service delivery.3

However, public services in advanced industrialized societies such as security, health care, social 

services, or critical infrastructures are, to a growing 

extent, delivered and/or operated by nongovernmental actors or different formats of public-private 

partnerships. Moreover, hardly any modern political 

decisionmaking process can be conceived of without 

civil society interests and perspectives being taken 

into account. It is therefore doubtful whether the strict 

exclusion of nonstate actors in a definition of a WoG 

approach is useful. In particular with regard to international conflict management and crisis response 

where nongovernmental actors play an essential role 

in achieving policy goals, it seems more adequate to 

develop a WoG definition by coming from the procedural side rather than from the actor’s side. In this 

perspective and for the purposes of this chapter, WoG 

will be defined as:
156

policies and/or public services as a result of a coordinated process of cross-departmental and cross-organizational decision making, program design, implementation, and evaluation. State actors are the lead 

and primary actors of a WoG approach, but nonstate 

actors can be included at all stages of the policy cycle 

as long as they share the overarching policy goals and 

contribute in the spirit of a unity of effort.

According to this definition, the main features of an 

ideal WoG approach are: 

• a common understanding of a shared responsibility by all actors involved;

• a common understanding of the political issue at 

stake;

• a coordinated process of problem analysis, including all relevant perspectives;

• a coordinated process of political decisionmaking based on shared political goals and a common 

stocktaking of resources, ways, and means;

• a coordinated process of program design, providing for goal orientation, complementary integration of the single strands of activities, and efficiency of the overall effort;

• a coordinated process of program implementation, 

avoiding duplication and unintended effects as 

well as unity of effort;

• a coordinated process of permanent evaluation 

and adaptation, if necessary, assuring effectiveness of activities over time.

Apart from the definition, it may seem useful to 

add some remarks on the question of why and what 

for. Taking into account that international conflict 

management and crisis response is confronted with 

complex interdependencies between political, security, economic, and social factors, WoG approaches 

help to improve coherence and interface management 
157

among these overlapping dimensions. In addition, a 

confusing multitude of actors represent divergent interests and goals as they are acting on different levels 

in overlapping fields of action with varying mandates 

and roles. Moreover, the actors differ in terms of their 

pace of activities, levers and instruments, skills and capacities, as well as institutional cultures. Against this 

backdrop, improved coordination via WoG approaches is needed to reach common political objectives and 

intended end states, to ensure a goal-oriented and 

effective use and an even distribution of resources, 

to guarantee transparency and credibility, to avoid 

contradictions or collision of activities, and to prevent 

duplication of activities. In other words, the WoG approach is designed as a vehicle to improve how we are 

doing things.

WHAT IS SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM?

The origins of the concept of security system reform can be traced back to the late 1990s, when issues of conflict, peace, and security pushed on the 

international development policy agenda. Against 

the background of a growing awareness of the security-development nexus and the importance of good 

governance as a factor for successful and sustainable 

poverty reduction and development, the SSR concept 

was a practical answer to the immediate needs to improve human security and the more long-term needs 

to strengthen state capacities to provide security and 

rule of law. 

In the commonly accepted understanding, the security system encompasses: 

• the legislative bodies (adopt laws and exert parliamentary control);
158

• the judiciary and penal system (prosecute breach 

of law and execute court decisions);

• the executive authorities such as ministries and 

national security advisory bodies (provide 

policy guidelines and monitor core security actors);

• the core security actors for domestic affairs such as 

police, intelligence services, disaster response 

agencies, border guards, and customs authorities (enforce law and maintain public order);

• the core security actors for external affairs such as 

armed forces and gendarmerie (defend state 

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and population);

• nonstatutory forces such as militias, private security companies, etc. – not part of the state institutional setting, but part of the system; (pursue 

particular interests); and,

• last but not least, civil society actors such as 

unions, media, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), etc. (represent and articulate societal 

security interests vis-à-vis the state).

Based on this understanding, security system reform is a concept aimed at four central objectives:

1. Improve democratic governance: The security 

system needs to operate on the basis of rule of law in a 

transparent and politically accountable fashion.

2. Improve delivery of security and justice services: The security system must strengthen capacities to 

ensure law enforcement and to safeguard basic safety 

and security needs of the population.

3. Create local leadership and ownership: SSR will 

not succeed unless it is driven by local people and organizations. And,
159

4. Ensure sustainability: Better delivery of security 

and justice services must not break down when foreign assistance ends.

If we were to sketch a model of a democratically 

controlled and effective security system as the normative reference of SSR, it could be outlined as follows:

• The security system in general: 

— operates in compliance with the given constitution and with international law;

— receives a separate and adequate share of 

the state budget for the performance of its 

tasks; and,

— is managed according to principles of transparency, proportionality, economy, effectiveness, and efficiency.

• The institutions and actors of the security system are: 

— functionally specialized and organizationally autonomous;

— willing and able to think and act as a network despite a clear assignment of competencies and tasks; and,

— adequately furnished with financial resources, infrastructure, material, technology, and 

staff.

• The actors/personnel of the security system: 

— are recruited through a transparent process, based on professional suitability criteria and open to all those who meet these 

criteria;

— are adequately remunerated so that there is 

little vulnerability to corruption;
160

— have a professional understanding of their 

role as service providers in the field of security and public order; and,

— identify positively with the professional role 

assigned to their service and receive public 

recognition.

• Civil society is: 

— in a position to understand and critically 

evaluate the tasks and processes of the security system;

— capable of articulating its own security 

needs and interests; and,

— able and willing to assist and cooperate with 

the security system, where possible and 

necessary.

It is important to point out that the concept of SSR 

puts high emphasis on the systemic nature of the security system. Numerous linkages between and within 

the different sub-sectors of the security system with a 

complex mutual impact structure require that reforms 

take into account the interdependencies. Comprehensive approaches are therefore an inherent requirement 

of security system reform efforts.

CHALLENGES OF A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT 

APPROACH IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF 

WEAK OR FRAGILE STATES

By weak or fragile states, we refer to countries 

which lack the capacity to meet citizens’ basic needs 

and expectations such as the provision of public safety 

and security, maintenance of rule of law, and provision of basic services and economic opportunities for 
161

their citizens. For the purposes of this chapter, we do 

not need a more differentiated concept distinguishing 

types of fragility, but our definition includes post-conflict countries at the stage of state and nation-building, 

as well as states in decline.

The structure and policy processes of a national security system are shaped by the constitutional framework, the history, the regional security environment, 

and the constellation of political forces, as well as the 

political culture of a country. The security system 

constitutes one of the cornerstones of the identity of a 

country and builds the heart of the survivability of the 

state. This explains why most weak or fragile states display an imbalance between the defensive, respectively 

repressive functions of the security system (defense 

against internal and external threats, preservation of 

the political and economic system, law enforcement, 

safeguarding of national sovereignty, assertion of the 

state monopoly of force) and its protective functions 

(provision of political oversight, conflict prevention, 

protection of individuals and minorities) to the detriment of the latter. This implies in most cases a predominance of the executive branch, a judiciary that is politically dependent, and/or dysfunctional, marginalized 

parliaments, a weak or disorganized civil society, and 

a political culture characterized by fear, lack of pluralism, etc. The security system does not only mirror the 

(weak or fragile) governance system as a whole, but 

it shapes and perpetuates the governance system and 

its shortfalls to a large extent. This explains why SSR 

is crucial for long-term stabilization and sustainable 

development of conflict prone countries.

The demand for a WoG approach to SSR in a recipient country refers to four dimensions: 

1. The local agents of reform (representative and 

willing to cooperate). 
162

2. The goal of the SSR program (comprehensive 

and based on shared goals). 

3. The program design (taking due account of 

cross-sectoral interdependencies). And,

4. The procedures of implementation (inclusive 

across relevant actors and institutions). 

Regarding the agents of WoG, we have to ask not 

only who are the drivers of reform, who are supporters, and who are beneficiaries, but also who are opponents or possible spoilers, who will win and who will 

lose, who is included, and who is left aside? Liberia is 

a good example for SSR in a post-conflict environment 

after a protracted civil war which left state structures, 

civil society, and the economy in ruins. After signing 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement4

 in 2003, initial 

SSR efforts in the transition period from 2003-05 suffered from the lack of a consensus within the political 

elite and a weak local ownership. Hence, the transitional government was able to provide neither for a 

discernible national security policy nor for a coherent 

and comprehensive national framework for SSR. The 

buildup of the military was practically completely 

donor-driven and implemented by a U.S. private company (DynCorps). Police reform was supported by the 

UN, but remained piecemeal and was conducted without corresponding efforts in reforming the judicial 

system. As a consequence, the overall pace of reforms 

was slow, and the SSR endeavor was imbalanced. It 

was only after the first post-conflict elections in October 2005, that newly elected President Ellen Sirleaf 

tasked the Governance Reform Commission in 2006 to 

take a lead role in SSR by providing professional and 

intellectual leadership, holding widespread consultations with all affected groups of the state and society, 
163

and by developing a National Security Strategy on this 

basis. Under the lead of this interagency body, the SSR 

process gained a more comprehensive domestic political base and some momentum. However, steering and 

coordination of the whole process have been widely 

left to external donors, and big challenges remain to 

be solved.5

Taking into account that political landscapes in 

weak or fragile states are often polarized and/or fragmented, it is highly unlikely to find political partners 

who are strong enough to launch and implement comprehensive SSR reforms while not driven by particular group or party interests. SSR approaches in weak 

or fragile states, where divergent group and institutional interests were reconciled on the basis of shared 

responsibilities and common political goals are hard 

to find. If so, they are rather the result of SSR attempts 

than its starting point, such as in Liberia. This dilemma can hardly be overcome by external donors so that 

the only option of coping is to undertake thorough 

analyses of the stakeholders in advance and to be well 

aware of the risks and possible consequences of the 

choice of political partners in the longer run. 

With regard to the goal of an SSR program, we 

have to consider its breadth and depth, as well as the 

political process that led to goal formulation. Is the 

program courageous enough to address structural 

deficits of the security system or is it rather incremental in ambitions? Does it really tackle sensitive issues? 

Are the goals based on a broader political debate and 

also shared by those who will be negatively affected 

by the reforms? Indonesia provides a good example of 

an SSR process that was mainly driven by local elites. 

Since the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1997, SSR 

has been put on the agenda as an integral part of the 
164

Indonesian democratization process. Driven mainly 

by the military, SSR initially focused on depoliticization of the military and the formal separation of the 

military and the police. The military has formally withdrawn from day-to-day politics and from parliament, 

while it has also addressed substantial structural and 

programmatic reforms such as the establishment of a 

civilian defense minister, the publication of a defense 

white paper, a defense doctrine and strategy, and new 

regulations for procurement. Moreover, it has taken a 

politically neutral stance in general elections, and efforts have been made to reduce the role of the military 

in the economy. Notwithstanding these remarkable 

achievements, the military still has a big role to play 

in Indonesian politics, especially at the local level, 

and its economic power is still prevalent. Apart from 

the successful formal separation of the police from 

the military, police reform has been slow due to lack 

of resources and political will, and there is still too 

much overlap between police and military activities. 

Judicial reform lags behind. Political oversight bodies 

lack expertise in security issues and civil society organizations still play a minor role in SSR. The overall 

SSR process has lost momentum in recent years. As 

the proponents for SSR have not extended their political base to include a broader range of civilian interest groups, the reforms remain military biased, lack a 

comprehensive framework, and tend to remain incremental pertaining to more thorough reforms.6

The Indonesian SSR process has taken place against 

the backdrop of peace and relative regional stability, 

drawing on established state and governance structures. Despite these beneficial preconditions, the initial military sponsorship has not yet been transformed 

into a more inclusive ownership structure. So is it re-
165

alistic then to demand a comprehensive and inclusive 

process of political goal formulation in a weak or fragile state? The structural deficits of political systems in 

weak or fragile states are even less conducive to inclusive processes of political goal formulation and to 

comprehensive approaches of reform. Therefore it is 

highly unrealistic to assume a WoG approach by weak 

or fragile countries’ governments in formulating goals. 

From the perspective of international assistance to SSR 

processes, one faces a dilemma as political consensus 

and a culture of inclusion and compromise cannot be 

imposed by external actors. On the one hand, there is 

a high demand and need for local ownership; on the 

other, this implies that reform processes will be driven 

by particular interests and thereby remain to a high 

degree contingent in their goals and approaches. Even 

if programs are highly donor-driven, local agents will 

have to take over some time sooner or later. Efforts to 

raise awareness and facilitate change may have some 

impact, but at the end of the day there is not much 

that can be done by external actors to stimulate more 

inclusive processes of goal formulation in partnering 

governments of recipient states.

A WoG approach in SSR program designs should 

be measured by the degree of interconnection of the 

different strands of activity, and the embeddedness of 

the program in a broader reform context. If a program 

aims, for example, at strengthening the operational capacities of core security actors, does it take into account 

aspects of political accountability, professionalization, 

and responsiveness to people’s needs? If a program 

focuses on one sector only, e.g., on police reform, does 

it consider the interdependencies between the police, 

the justice and penal system? The examples of Liberia 

and Indonesia, although the former has been highly 
166

donor-driven, and the latter driven by domestic actors, have displayed a considerable degree of compartmentalization of the SSR process and imbalances 

between the different strands of reform. Taking into 

account what has been said with regard to the local 

agents and political goals of many SSR processes, it is 

consequently not very likely to find efforts of comprehensive programming by local elites of weak or fragile 

states. Partly due to a lack of concepts and knowledge, 

but primarily due to the dominance of particular interests and as a result of the deficient governance system and its consequences, SSR programs under conditions of a fragile political and security situation, tend 

to be focused on strengthening operational capacities 

of the military and/or police, and tend to neglect judicial reform, political oversight agencies, and human 

security aspects. International donors can try to raise 

awareness of their partners or might even be tempted 

to condition their support, but as long as there is a lack 

of domestic actors able and willing to promote the security governance and human security aspects of SSR, 

external pressure will come to nothing.

Finally, procedures of implementation are a reflection and function of the local agent structure, goals, 

and program designs. If there is no broad base of local stakeholders following a common vision, SSR programs will consequently rather reflect particular interests and be a result of internal power plays. Hence, 

procedures of implementation reflect this and usually 

suffer from the deficiencies of the political system of 

the weak or fragile recipient country. Donor countries 

can, to a certain extent, influence procedures of implementation by facilitating or demanding cross-sectoral 

approaches or the inclusion of civil society groups. 

Therefore they should have both a thorough under-
167

standing of all relevant and affected actors as well as 

independent communication channels with these actors.

The consequences of a lack of functioning governance structures and procedures are evident. In order 

to be sustainable and successful, SSR requires a minimum of functioning institutions. This is the dilemma 

in weak or fragile states. Moreover, SSR often takes 

place in situations of insecurity, no peace, no war, or 

ongoing conflicts at least in some areas of the country. 

In coping with this dilemma, SSR programs should 

put particular emphasis on trying to create and/or 

strengthen local ownership. This implies very careful 

stakeholder analyses and also explicit consideration of 

how to deal with reluctance or resistance to reform. For 

post-conflict contexts, stabilization is crucial, although 

it is important to consider institution and capacity 

building aspects right from the start and to embed 

them in a long-term strategy. Any one-sided focus on 

military reform or on the strengthening of operational 

capacities of the security forces without ensuring political oversight and control should be very carefully 

weighed against the possible unintended negative effects. International donors might take the role of facilitators of cross-departmental and interagency debates. 

In weak or fragile states, where governance structures 

are declining and/or ruling elites corrupt and clinging to power, it is important to rely more on nongovernmental actors and to build on already existing local 

initiatives focusing in human security aspects. Facing 

the dilemmas of SSR in weak or fragile states, careful 

analysis and weighing of pros and cons might lead donors to not engage directly in SSR projects, but rather 

in programs that aim to strengthen civil society and 

civilian governance capacities in general.
168

CHALLENGES OF A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT 

APPROACH IN THE DONOR COUNTRIES’ 

POLITICAL SYSTEMS 

The demand for WoG in implementing SSR programs does not only apply to recipient countries, 

but also to the approach of donor countries in their 

process of decisionmaking, allocating resources, programming, and implementing SSR programs. In this 

perspective, WoG refers to the level of domestic policy coherence, i.e., interdepartmental and interagency 

consultation, coordination, and cooperation among 

the national agencies and actors involved; and in all 

phases of the project cycle. 

As the national political systems of major Western 

donor states are too different to be generalized, this 

chapter will concentrate on the example of Germany 

as a donor country. Four departments are usually 

involved when it comes to German contributions to 

international SSR efforts: The political lead agency 

for all civilian and military activities abroad is the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Military contributions to international SSR programs such as training of military personnel, military counseling or other 

supporting roles, is led by the Ministry of Defense 

(MoD). Contributions to international police reforms 

such as training, counseling, or mentoring, are conducted under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of 

Interior (MoI). All other capacity-building measures 

are led by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 

Development (MoECD). The latter relies on both governmental and nongovernmental agencies to implement programs and activities. Although the division 

of roles and responsibilities seems to be theoretically 
169

clear, there have been numerous shortfalls of interdepartmental and interagency policy coherence in actual 

practice.

This will be demonstrated by looking at the German engagement in the Afghan SSR endeavor since 

2002. At the outset, German military contributions to 

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 

the German lead role for police reform in Afghanistan, 

as well as German humanitarian contributions, were 

generally decided under the auspices of the MoFA, 

but implemented independently by the respective 

line ministries. The sole unit with an overall picture of 

German governmental contributions to reconstruction 

in Afghanistan was the Task Force Afghanistan in the 

MoFA. When the debate on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) gained momentum in 2003 and Germany decided to get involved, the issue of improved 

interagency coordination came on the agenda, coinciding with a general rise of development activities 

in Afghanistan. Although the German PRT concept 

combined the diplomatic, the military, the police, and 

the development strand of activities under a common 

umbrella, in fact civilian development representatives 

physically stayed outside the barracks, while the other 

three representatives shared shelter in military compounds. Lines of reporting remained stove-piped via 

the respective line ministries. Areas and issues of activities were neither coordinated nor complementary. 

It took several years until the departments involved 

developed genuine interagency coordinated activities 

such as common funds and complementary projects 

in the context of the PRT framework. Only with the 

takeover of the ISAF Regional Command North by the 

Germans in 2006 did German civil and military contributions begin to concentrate in that region and be 

successively streamlined. 
170

The reasons for the slow progress in interagency 

coordination and cooperation were complex. First 

of all, the departments have a strong say in shaping 

German policies, and there is no tradition of systematically tackling strategic issues in a concerted, crossdepartmental approach.7

 Secondly, West German 

sovereignty in foreign and security policy matters had 

been restricted by the provisions of the General Treaty 

between the four Allies and the Federal Republic of 

Germany (1955), until the Two Plus Four Settlements 

in late 1990 resulted in the unified Germany gaining 

her full sovereignty. Accordingly, West Germany 

maintained a comparatively low foreign and security 

policy profile during the Cold War period, concentrating on economic integration into Western Europe 

and relations with the former German Democratic 

Republic. Hence, there was no need and no precedence for systematic cross-departmental coordination 

in the field of foreign and security policy due to the 

historic restrictions of German sovereignty for many 

years. Thus, knowledge of each other, viable working 

relations, and cross-cutting networks were weak or 

lacking. In addition, there was a lack of institutionalized interagency consultation or coordination bodies 

at all levels. Finally, as the line ministries have their 

own pace and principles of project implementation, 

the criteria, rhythm, and focus areas had to be successively readjusted. This was particularly challenging for the MoECD which usually pursues long-term 

projects with a long-term presence on site, relying 

on local partners, used to keeping distance from the 

military, working in flat hierarchies, and building on 

the trust of the local population. In contrast, the police 

and the military are used to rather short-term presence in barracks, separated from the population, self-
171

reliant in logistics, and used to working in strong hierarchies. Moreover, the logic of military stabilization 

and civilian reconstruction did not easily harmonize, 

particularly in the wake of a steady deterioration of 

the security situation on the ground. Altogether and 

taking into account the given constitutional and institutional preconditions of German foreign and security 

policy, the German departments reacted slowly, but 

did well in adjusting to the challenges of improved 

coherence in delivering SSR contributions in Afghanistan. As indicated above, common situational awareness and cross-departmental information sharing and 

decisionmaking have been considerably improved. 

Coordinating bodies have been installed at the State 

Secretary level and below, and a denser network of 

exchange or liaison officers between the four ministries involved has facilitated day-to-day coordination. 

In addition, common training and exercises as well as 

common pre-deployment preparations enable a better understanding of the common effort in advance. 

These achievements were partly due to growing pressure on the ground; partly a consequence of a growing 

awareness, intensive political debates, and demands 

on the domestic front; and partly they were simply the 

result of a normal learning process.

One might argue that a lack of coherence within 

the political systems of donor countries is not so important, since SSR usually takes place in highly complex settings with numerous international governmental and nongovernmental agencies involved. And 

in fact, seen from the perspective of goal attainment in 

the recipient state, WoG at the level of domestic donor 

state procedures does not make too big a difference. 

But seen from a national donor perspective, civil and 

military contributions to international SSR processes 
172

are part of the overall foreign and security policy of a 

country and require proof of effectiveness in outcome 

as well efficiency in the use of scarce national resources vis-à-vis the national legislature and the constituencies. Besides, improved interagency coherence at the 

national level helps strengthen the stance and credibility, particularly vis-à-vis the different partners in 

the recipient country, but also within the international 

donor community. 

As the German example has shown, WoG approaches in the domestic political system of a donor 

country can be improved within the given constitutional constraints and in the longer run, when the 

domestic and external pressure are high enough. One 

lever for improving coherence has been the systematic facilitation and institutionalization of interagency 

consultation and information flow at the earliest possible stage of the project cycle. Another measure has 

been the conduct of cross-departmental trainings and 

exercises. The OECD DAC additionally recommends 

developing an overall policy for fragile states, conducting joint interagency analyses and assessments, 

developing joint country-specific operational strategies, clearly defining political leadership (respectively 

the lead and coordinating roles), and creating incentives for cooperation.8

 In general, all procedural measures should be accompanied by deliberate efforts to 

create a new mindset of common interests and crossdepartmental responsibility. This might even induce 

positive spillover effects for other policy arenas.
173

CHALLENGES OF A COMPREHENSIVE 

APPROACH IN THE SYSTEM OF 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS RESPONSE

The demand for a WoG approach at the international level seems to be a contradiction in itself, since 

the international community is not a unified actor 

with a common legal, institutional, and cultural point 

of departure, comparable to a nation-state. Therefore, 

it would be more precise to speak of a comprehensive 

rather than a WoG approach in this respect. Characteristics of an ideal comprehensive international approach to crisis response are:

• common political goals and strategies in order 

to ensure unity of effort;

• a division of roles and responsibilities between 

civil and military actors with regard to tasks 

and fields of action in order to ensure best use 

of expertise and resources; and,

• a coordinated implementation of activities regarding the pace and the focus areas of the activities in order to avoid duplication or overlap 

of efforts as well as blind spots.

The system of international crisis response mirrors 

the characteristics of the international system in general. Policies and activities are driven by nation-states; 

their perceptions, interests, and political or financial 

capacities; and their willingness to engage, while the 

system lacks a binding framework specifying who engages where, why, with what, how, and for how long. 

This applies to the overall setting of the international 

engagement as well as to the development strand of 

international aid. With regard to the overall setting, 

there are no clear rules and regulations as to which 
174

organization should be the lead or whether a task 

lies in the responsibility of civilian or military actors. 

Military operations might be conducted under the aegis of the UN, NATO, the EU, the African Union, or 

temporary coalitions of willing states; and it is rather 

political and situational factors than a systematic division of tasks that drive the decision for one format 

or the other. Concerning SSR processes, particularly 

in unstable security contexts, it is not easy to define 

whether and to what extent SSR tasks are a military or 

a civilian responsibility. This often leads to a blurring 

of civilian and military activities with a tendency of 

military stabilization operations to take over policing 

and even development tasks. With regard to the development strand of activities, coordination is only a 

little better. Although the UN, the EU, and the OECD 

DAC have been quite successful in creating international standards, mainstreaming certain topics, and 

harmonizing donor activities, their recommendations 

are not binding and there is no reasonable division 

of labor between the UN, the EU, and major national 

donor states. In many cases, organizational competition, duplication of efforts, or simple uncoordinated 

parallelism of activities prevail. Besides, there is an 

unmanageable scope of governmental and nongovernmental agencies, the latter often working on behalf 

of national governments or international organizations. Moreover, as far as nongovernmental agencies 

are concerned, competition for resources sometimes 

impedes their willingness to coordinate or cooperate.

SSR in Afghanistan is a clear example of the flaws of 

the international system of crisis management. It had 

started as a highly ambitious undertaking built on five 

parallel pillars with different lead nations: buildup of 

the Afghan National Army under U.S.-lead; buildup 
175

of the Afghan National Police under German lead; judicial reform under Italian lead; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD&R) under Japanese 

lead; and counternarcotics under British lead. Lacking 

an overarching vision of the future security system 

and in the absence of a steering body, the lead nation 

concept resulted in an uneven pace of reform with 

heterogeneous dynamics evolving in each pillar. Furthermore, important linkages among the SSR pillars 

as well as between SSR and the overall reconstruction 

process were neglected. As the Afghan stakeholders 

have never come close to developing a shared vision 

of the political end state of reconstruction nor of the 

priority SSR needs, the whole process was primarily 

donor driven despite the declared principle of Afghan 

ownership.9

As a consequence, the emerging security system 

in Afghanistan is marked by many imbalances and 

deficiencies. While the buildup of the armed forces is 

generally considered to have been successful in terms 

of operational capabilities, the oversight and control 

mechanisms have been neglected. The buildup of the 

police lags behind in many respects—numbers, capabilities, countrywide presence, professionalism, and 

most of all with a view to trust in the population. Originally a police task, police reform has become to a large 

part a military business due to the lack of international 

police capacities. The pace of judicial reform has been 

very slow and suffering from lack of resources, skilled 

personnel, and the challenges of the duality of traditional and modern forms of justice. Moreover, the important linkages between police, justice, and penal reform have long been almost completely left aside. The 

DD&R process, and the subsequent Disarmament of 

Illegally Armed Groups program, have, in sum, been 
176

unsuccessful as the black market still provides arms 

and weapons in abundance, and armed groups have 

had no shortage in supplies. Besides, the labor market 

can hardly absorb ex-combatants and offer alternative 

livelihoods. Counternarcotics efforts could not stop 

the establishment of a viable transnational network of 

masterminds, traders, producers, and more and more 

also consumers of poppy or related products. Despite 

the reduction of the number of poppy cultivating 

provinces, the overall cultivation output could not be 

cut back. At large, the whole SSR process has not sufficiently been coordinated with other major areas of 

the Afghan reconstruction process such as governance 

reform, education, improving livelihoods, rebuilding 

infrastructure, etc. Inherently, the focus of the SSR endeavor has been on strengthening military capacities 

while the whole reconstruction process, against the 

backdrop of a growing insurgency threat, has been 

security biased to the detriment of improving governance capacities and livelihoods.10

These shortcomings were well-recognized, and 

the donor community undertook remarkable efforts 

to improve overall coherence and coordination on the 

basis of the Afghanistan Compact.11 Numerous coordinating bodies evolved bottom up at Kabul, provincial, and district level, encompassing overall reconstruction and SSR issues as well as SSR sector specific 

coordination needs. However, coordination efforts on 

site were constrained by diverging political interests 

in the donor capitals. Above all, the move towards 

improved international coherence and more inclusion of the Afghan Government came at a time when 

dynamics on the ground had already shifted towards 

the worse. Given the political setting of interests and 

perceptions in 2001, it was unrealistic to expect a com-
177

prehensive donor strategy based on common political 

goals and a common vision on the future of Afghanistan. Taking into account the development of the international approach to Afghanistan,12 it cannot take 

us by surprise that coordination mechanisms evolved 

only successively and bottom up.

Therefore, coping strategies to improve international donor coherence require first and foremost 

more coordinated comprehensive analyses, more 

consideration of long-term possible effects and risks, 

more long-term strategic approaches, and more integration of in-depth expertise at the political-strategic 

level during the decisionmaking and planning phase. 

But as we know, this is highly unlikely to be realized. 

More pragmatic recommendations would focus rather on the establishment of international interagency 

fora for consultation and coordination at strategic, 

operational, and on-site tactical levels at the earliest 

possible stage. Coordination mechanisms and steering bodies should, ideally, be part of UN mandates. 

Institutionalization of interagency consultation and 

coordination via standardization (handbooks, guidelines, check-lists, establishment of consultation mechanisms, provision of obligatory procedures, etc.) can 

at least partly overcome the high personnel turnover 

and the associated loss of knowledge. Bilateral agreements at political headquarter level between the major 

agencies involved (memoranda of understanding, letters of intent, or other provisions) can facilitate and 

channel cooperation at field level. In order to improve 

mutual knowledge and understanding among organizations and agencies and to strengthen the will for 

cooperation, common interagency preparatory training and exercises have proven to be of high value. 
178

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

For assessing the prospects and challenges of a 

WoG approach in the context of international conflict management strategies, in particular with view 

towards weak or fragile states, we have broken the 

concept down to three separate, but interacting policy arenas: the recipient state’s political systems, the 

domestic political system of the donor states, and the 

system of international crisis response. In order to further operationalize the WoG concept, we have chosen 

recent security system reform efforts in different parts 

of the world as examples to demonstrate the particular challenges of practically applying WoG in the different policy arenas.

Regarding the political system of recipient states, 

we face a fundamental challenge when demanding a 

WoG approach: The structural governance deficits of 

weak or fragile states make any WoG approach to security system reforms from within the recipient partners in general highly unlikely. Bearing in mind that 

local ownership and sensitivity to local political dynamics and culture are crucial to launching successful and sustainable SSR processes, these deficits can 

neither be circumvented nor overcome by choosing a 

donor-driven approach. This is so first, because donor 

engagement is always limited in scope and time, and 

the initiative will have to pass to local agents of reform 

sooner or later. Secondly, donors always depend on local actors to implement their projects and thus cannot 

escape the given institutional setting, power constellation, and political culture in the recipient state. Finally, any donor-driven approach will be restricted by 

the structural conditions of the international system of 

crisis response as the international donor community 
179

is itself struggling hard to achieve greater coherence. 

A donor-driven approach to SSR therefore provides 

no guarantee for more comprehensive SSR programs, 

for higher inclusiveness, or for better coordination of 

activities. External influence on reform processes, particularly in weak and fragile states, will always remain 

limited. Therefore, the coping strategies that were 

recommended above may help to minimize the risks 

for international donors or may broaden the range of 

possible positive options, but there is no definite strategy to successfully tackle or overcome the governance 

deficits in weak or fragile states. SSR under such circumstances is and can only be like building the ship at 

sea. After all, in the face of the numerous institutional, 

political, infrastructural, economic, and cultural impediments to reform in the political systems of weak 

or fragile recipient countries, the lack of a WoG approach seems to be of rather secondary importance.

The challenges of WoG in the political system of 

donor countries are of a completely different nature. 

As shown above, there are levers for practically improving interagency coherence in the overall approach 

to international crisis response of a donor country 

within certain limits. However, we should be realistic about the possible effects of improved coherence 

in this arena. Seen from the perspective of a donor 

country, interagency coordination and cooperation 

are of high importance in terms of political accountability regarding effectiveness and efficiency of engagement vis-à-vis the domestic audiences. Besides, 

domestic policy coherence is a means to strengthen 

the assertiveness of a state in international contexts. 

But seen from the perspective of goal achievement in 

international SSR programs, it is doubtful whether the 

application of WoG approaches in domestic processes 
180

of positioning and decisionmaking of donor countries 

really make a remarkable difference. Even if national 

approaches of donors strictly adhered to WoG principles, they could hardly shape the overall international 

approach to crisis response since the latter follows its 

own mechanisms and rules. Hence, the above recommended coping strategies are helpful with regard to 

the policy processes and interests of donor countries, 

but will have only very limited impact on the outcome 

of SSR programs in recipient countries.

The system of international crisis response is, as 

depicted, highly contingent on situational factors and 

power constellations of the major national donors 

involved. In the first instance, international crisis response policies do not follow the needs articulated by 

recipient countries, but the interests and capacities of 

donor countries in the light of their perceptions of the 

needs. In addition, when taking into consideration the 

limited external possibilities for exerting influence especially in weak or fragile states, one has to be realistic 

about the possible impact of international assistance 

and crisis response. Under this caveat, however, pragmatic efforts to improve international interagency 

coherence in program designs and implementation 

could make a difference. The recommendations above 

for improving coherence will not guarantee better 

outcomes of SSR processes, but will considerably improve international delivery of assistance and thus 

help to enhance the chances for better outcomes.

In sum, we can state that the notion of WoG as a 

practical guideline for international crisis response 

policies is appealing in theory, but elusive and very 

difficult to apply in actual practice. The findings of this 

chapter may seem somewhat disillusioning as they 

lead to the conclusion that possibilities to improve 
181

WoG approaches in the three interacting policy arenas 

of international conflict management are highly limited, particularly with regard to the most important 

one, namely the domestic arena of recipient states. 

The target audience of the WoG debate is primarily 

located in the capitals of donor states and strategic 

headquarters of international organizations, while its 

impact on practical outcomes in reform processes in 

recipient states is confined. Limitations, however, do 

not mean that efforts to improve coherence according 

to the given recommendations are pointless. To the 

contrary, identifying the limitations of practical applicability of the WoG concept helps to avoid wrong 

expectations and to localize its value and relevance as 

a primarily normative concept, targeted to policy processes in and among donor countries. 

So far, WoG can be regarded as a set of principles 

and procedural measures in international conflict 

management that, within the depicted limits, may help 

us implement strategies, programs, and activities in a 

better way. However, it seems very doubtful whether 

it can also help us do the right thing. Particularly when 

we take the international engagement in Afghanistan 

since 2001, which largely triggered the recent debate 

on WoG approaches, it may seem that the WoG debate 

has somewhat replaced a more thorough reflection of 

the strategic goals and their feasibility in Afghanistan. 

The international donor community should therefore 

not forget to critically reflect on what we do rather than 

to delve too deeply into how we do it.
182

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Some relevant players speak of security sector rather than 

security system reform. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development and Assistance Committee 

(OECD-DAC), which has issued major programmatic papers on 

security system reform (SSR) and can thus be regarded as a reference institution in terms of conceptualizing SSR, uses the term 

“security system reform.” For the purpose of this chapter and 

with regard to the assumed development perspective of international conflict and crisis management, we also adhere to the term 

“security system reform.” It stresses the systemic nature of the 

security system, i.e., the complex interdependencies between the 

different elements of the security system and points to the fact 

that reform efforts of the security system can only be successful if 

they take these interdependencies into account.

2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 

(OECD) Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and 

Governance, Paris, France: OECD Development Cooperation Directorate (DAC), 2005.

3. “Connecting Government. Whole of Government Responses to Australia ́s Priority Challenges,” Management Advisory 

Committee, Commonwealth of Australia 2004, p.1.

4. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 

Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia 

(MODEL) and Political Parties,” Accra, August 18, 2003, United 

States Institute for Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection, 

available from www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_

agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf.

5. See, for example, Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia,” 

Occasional Papers No. 9, Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for 

the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, December 2005, available from www.dcaf.ch/Publications/; Thomas Jaye, “An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia,” Report to the 

Governance Reform Commission (GRC) of Liberia, September 

23, 2006; Mark Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia. Mixed Re-
183

sults from Humble Beginnings, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2008, available from www.

strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub855.pdf; International

Crisis Group, “Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform,” Africa Report No. 148, January 13, 2009, available from 

www.observatori.org/paises/pais_67/documentos/148_liberia___

uneven_progress_in_security_sector_reform.pdf.

6. See, for example, Riskal Sukma and Edy Prasetyono, “Security Sector Reform in Indonesia. The Military and the Police,” 

Clingendael Institute, Working Paper No. 9, February 2003, available from www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030200_cru_

working_paper_9.PDF; Muhammad Najib Azca: Security Sector 

Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case 

of Ambon, Indonesia, Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict 

Resolution, August 2004, available from www.berghof-handbook.

net/documents/publications/dialogue2_azca.pdf; Riefqi Muna, “Local Ownership and the Experience of SSR in Indonesia,” Timothy 

Donais, ed., Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Geneva, 

Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 

Forces, LIT, 2008, pp. 233-251; Country Profile Indonesia, Waterloo, 

Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation 

(CIGI), Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, 2010.

7. The German political decisionmaking process is governed 

by three principles: the chancellor principle, stipulating that the 

chancellor defines the political guidelines of the government; 

the Cabinet principle, according to which political decisions are 

taken by all members of the Cabinet; and the departmental principle. According to the latter, the German Constitution endows 

the heads of departments with considerable power as independent and responsible actors for their area of competency within 

the framework of general guidance by the chancellor. In terms 

of hierarchy, the chancellor principle tops the departmental principle, which remains embedded in the Cabinet principle. In fact, 

however, the balance between the chancellor, the Cabinet, and the 

ministers is highly influenced by contingent factors such as the 

constellation between the coalition parties, the personality and 

standing of the major actors, etc.

8. See “Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 

DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD DAC 2006.
184

9. See, for example, Mark Sedra, “Security Sector Transformation in Afghanistan,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 

of Armed Forces, Working Paper 143, Geneva, Switzerland, 2004; 

Antonio Giustozzi, “Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan,” Donais, ed., Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, pp. 

215-231.

10. For overall assessments of the SSR process in Afghanistan, 

see, for example, Fortschrittsbericht Afghanistan zur Unterrichtung 

des deutschen Bundestages (Progress Report on Afghanistan to the German Parliament), December 2010, available from www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/583368/publicationFile/155891/110704-

Zwischenbericht.pdf; jsessionid=06279A6CkFFFAA94EF53D0701168

46C2D; Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

April 2011.

11. “The Afghanistan Compact,” the London Conference on 

Afghanistan, January 31 to February 1, 2006, available from www.

nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf.

12. For more details, see Fouzieh Melanie Alamir, “The International Approach to Afghanistan—Could We Have Done 

Better?” Gerhard Justenhoven, ed., Afghanistan in der Sackgasse?

(Afghanistan in the Dead End?), Hamburg, Germany: Institut für 

Theologie und Frieden, 2011.
185

CHAPTER 7

A WHOLE LOT OF SUBSTANCE

OR A WHOLE LOT OF RHETORIC?

A PERSPECTIVE ON A

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

TO SECURITY CHALLENGES

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

The Department [of Defense] supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to addressing 

national security challenges. The desired end state 

is for U.S. Government national security partners to 

develop plans and conduct operations from a shared 

perspective. 

 Quadrennial Defense Roles

 and Missions Review Report, 20091

INTRODUCTION

In the U.S. Government, the “whole of government” mantra is firmly embedded in official rhetoric 

as the idea-du-jour. Moreover, as the quote above indicates, in the national security realm particularly, it is 

officially considered a bedrock principle. 

Indeed, the Obama administration—building on 

themes developed previously by the Bush and Clinton 

administrations2

—explicitly incorporates a whole of 

government (WoG) approach in the National Security 

Strategy issued in May of 2010.3 In the administration’s 

conceptualization, a WoG approach in the national security sphere essentially involves, among other things, 

greater coordination across government agencies, and 

a marked expansion of diplomatic and civilian devel-
186

opment capabilities. Military and civilian institutions 

are, the strategy insists, to “complement each other 

and operate seamlessly.”4

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly trace the 

application of the WoG approach to security issues, 

highlight a few of its strengths and weaknesses, and 

examine the potential unintended consequences. It 

will argue that while a WoG approach certainly has its 

merits, it is not—and never will be—a panacea. Moreover, this chapter contends that in some instances a 

unilateral approach, that is, one that wholly or primarily relies upon a particular agency, is the preferred 

or only practical alternative. The chapter will also 

suggest that when extended to the domestic context, 

a WoG approach strategy may be unsettling, and even 

counterproductive, to the Nation’s long-term strategic 

and political interests.

Finally, this chapter advocates considering a WoG 

approach as just one tool in the smart power toolbox. 

It argues that as such, a WoG approach is most effective when selectively employed, and not as a default 

in all circumstances.

IRREGULAR WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WoG 

APPROACH

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently observed, for “well over a decade, there has 

been widespread concern that the U.S. government 

lacks appropriate civilian ‘tools’ to carry out statebuilding tasks in post conflict situations.”5

 Operations 

in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere were cited 

as examples of situations where it fell to America’s 

armed forces to perform a variety of state-building 

tasks “such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance.”6
187

The February 2011 report points out:

The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match 

the military’s superior planning and organizational 

capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the 

military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and 

nation-building contribution, even though some believed 

that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks,

especially those tasks involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs [nongovernmental organizations].7

Still, the current impetus for a WoG approach is 

much traceable to reconstruction and stability issues 

arising out of the irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defined by the Pentagon as a “violent struggle 

among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant population(s),”8 irregular war was exactly what the Department of Defense 

(DoD) found itself fighting after toppling the Baathist 

government of Iraq, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 

The DoD may have anticipated security issues, but 

it seems clear that it nevertheless expected that once 

the conventional fight ended, the task of physically reconstructing the country and rebuilding its economic 

societal institutions—essential elements of strategic 

victory in irregular war—would be the responsibility 

of other government agencies and the international 

community. 

Things, however, did not work out that way. According to analyst Gordon Adams, although “whole of 

government” was among the “buzz words” that arose 

in direct response to the post-major combat operations 

stage in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD found itself: 
188

frustrated by the absence of a significant, flexible, 

well-funded civilian capacity at the State Department 

and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], able to take responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization after U.S. combat operations concluded.9

That, it seems, was enough for the DoD to take matters into its own hands.

DoD authorities responded by attempting a rather 

significant re-orientation of the armed forces to fill the 

perceived post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization capability gap. In late-2005, the DoD issued a directive entitled Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR).10 Designed to 

support President Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44,11 this watershed policy document (designated Department of Defense Directive 

[DoDD] 3000.05) declared that stability operations are 

a “core U.S. military mission” and one that, according 

to the directive, was to be “given a priority comparable to combat operations.”12

That document was followed in 2008 by the Army’s 

own Stability Operations manual which implemented 

the DoD policy.13 The Army’s manual contained an 

explicit definition of the WoG approach, describing it 

rather amorphously as an “approach that integrates 

the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government to achieve unity of effort 

toward a shared goal.”14

In accord with DoDD 3000.05, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) did not use WoG approach 

terminology, but said as much in declaring that:
189

The Department of Defense cannot meet today’s complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to 

bear all elements of national power at home and to 

work in close cooperation with allies and partners 

abroad.15

These sentiments were echoed in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Roles and Missions Review Report16 wherein 

the DoD affirms its support for the “maturation of 

whole-of-government approaches to national security 

problems,” adding that any solution such an approach 

produces will “be based on employing integrated flexible, mutually-supporting interagency capabilities.”17

For its part, the 2010 QDR is replete with specific references to the WoG approach.18

In the meantime, however, the Army and the Marine Corps also issued their counterinsurgency (COIN) 

doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, which became the 

“bible” for operations in Iraq and later Afghanistan.19

A multifaceted document subject to a myriad of interpretations, it was popularly imagined as a kinder, 

gentler way of achieving success in COIN situations 

by eschewing violence against insurgents in favor of a 

population-centric strategy aimed at winning “hearts 

and minds,” much through nation-building and reconstruction efforts. Journalist Steve Coll described it 

thusly in the New Yorker:

[Popular] among sections of the country’s liberalminded intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students—complex, blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy 

them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a 

doctrine with particular appeal to people who would 

never own a gun.20
190

It is also a doctrine that, on the face of it, is perfectly 

suited to a WoG approach. In fact, it devotes an entire 

chapter to integrating civilian and military efforts.21

Nevertheless, the doctrine makes it clear that nationbuilding tasks are essential for COIN success and, if 

necessary, the military must endeavor to accomplish 

them even in the absence of civilian partners. That circumstance occurred. For example, commanders were 

obliged to turn to their “in-house counsel” (uniformed 

military lawyers called Judge Advocates or “JAGs”) 

for even such activities as rule of law reconstitution—

a task that would appear to be better conducted by 

civilian personnel.22

Unsurprisingly, therefore, when DoDD 3000.05 

was re-issued in 2009, the DoD acknowledged the importance of civilian partners, but reiterated that the 

DoD must be prepared to take the “lead” in such activities as establishing civil security and civil control, 

restoring essential services, repairing, and protecting 

critical infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian 

assistance until it is feasible for another agency to take 

over.23

THE MERITS OF A WoG APPROACH

Taken at face value, the notion of exploiting all the 

government’s potential in the service of national security is eminently reasonable and wise. Plainly, national defense is the most basic rationale for government. 

Our own Constitution cites “provide for the common 

defence” as one of the key responsibilities of government.24 Accordingly, the judicious bringing to bear of 

government’s full range of capabilities is consistent 

with the fundamentals of good government and wise 

defense policy.
191

Perhaps most important—but not often discussed—are the merits of the military not doing 

many of the nation-building and reconstruction tasks. 

Among other things, if not engaged in nation-building, the military could concentrate on its institutional 

responsibility for national defense, particularly with 

respect to existential threats which nation-building 

and reconstruction do not address.25

After all, the role of the armed forces is, as the Supreme Court put it, “to fight or be ready to fight wars 

should the occasion arise.”26 Moreover, the Court 

points out that “[t]o the extent that those responsible 

for performance of this primary function are diverted 

from it . . . the basic fighting purpose of armies is not 

served.”27 Therefore, when the armed forces divert 

resources and—of even greater concern—focus, to the 

conduct of operations not intrinsic to warfighting, 

their ability to conduct bona fide combat operations 

inevitably degrades.

There are, however, other important factors favoring a WoG approach. As talented as military personnel are, it seems obvious that the more facets of 

the U.S. Government that can be brought to bear, the 

more likely there will be an injection of an authentic 

expertise when the task is not a traditionally military one. On the other hand, while the armed forces 

may have manpower and resources to address many 

nation-building tasks, that does not necessarily mean 

that they possess the range and depth of experience 

required to solve the convoluted problems arising in 

civil society. 

As just one example, consider that the military is 

instinctively authoritarian and, as the Supreme Court 

has drily observed,”the army is not a deliberative 

body,” rather “it is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.” How could such 
192

an organization have the experience and mindset to 

establish courts and legislatures where the essence of 

their function is deliberation? 

In addition, there is another important consideration, which is the psychological impact on the host 

nation of a foreign military leading these efforts. 

Many in America’s military seem blissfully unaware 

of the image they may unintentionally present when 

they serve as the “face” of the United States in nationbuilding endeavors. One can only imagine what the 

residents of a failed nation think when they see people 

in uniforms—not civilian officials—as the ones who 

are the main representatives of the United States in 

the reestablishment of their society’s institutions, to 

include those expected to exercise civilian control of 

the armed forces.28 Regrettably, the population may 

assume, for example, that it is military direction (as 

opposed to civilian leadership) that leads to success 

in the modern world. This could have unwanted political consequences over time if the electorate comes 

to perceive the armed forces as preferable to civilian 

leadership.

Closer to home, there are other benefits to removing the armed forces from the conduct of nation-building activities not directly involving physical security 

or military operations against insurgents. Specifically, 

the long-term involvement in such activities in Iraq 

and Afghanistan may be causing a subtle but troubling 

change in the perspective of members of America’s 

armed forces. In 2006, historian Douglas Porch—citing the work of British historian Hew Strachan—made 

this melancholy observation:

Politicians who engage in nation building endeavors, 

especially those with a counterinsurgency dimen-
193

sion must be prepared to deal with the political and 

military professional fallout. This includes the evolution of a stab-in-the-back as a guiding principle of 

civil-military relations and its leaching into domestic 

politics—that is, the belief that, in modern counterinsurgency warfare, win or lose, the military ends up 

feeling betrayed by the civilians.29

We may be beginning to see this phenomenon, 

much because of the way operations have been conducted in current wars. As this writer has observed 

elsewhere:

Given responsibility not only for security, but also for 

governance, education, and economic development 

in wide swaths of territory in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

a generation of US officers has become accustomed to 

being ‘warrior kings’.30

As such, there is a real risk that even after their nationbuilding duties in contingency areas end, military officers may want to arrogate to themselves decisionmaking that democracies leave to civilians.

A disturbing manifestation of what might be an 

emerging mindset is found in an October 2010 article 

written by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Andrew 

Milburn that was published in the prestigious military 

journal, Joint Force Quarterly.

31 Milburn made the unprecedented argument that military officers have the 

obligation to disobey even lawful orders if they subjectively decide that such orders are “likely to harm 

the institution writ large—the Nation, military, and 

subordinates—in a manner not clearly outweighed by 

its likely benefits.”32 While the notion of disobedience 

of lawful orders is an anathema to most officers, it is 

nevertheless true, as journalist David Wood observes, 

that many uniformed officers today are chafing for a 
194

“bigger role in [the] policy decisions” that historically 

have been the province of civilian decisionmakers.33

Importantly for a WoG approach analysis, Wood 

maintains that the “current unrest among midcareer 

officers is new” and reasons that:

today’s majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels grew 

up in counterinsurgency warfare, leading men into 

combat as young platoon leaders and having to create 

new ways of operating in dangerously complex political and social environments never imagined by their 

elders.34

As such, it may be that traditional—and critical—concepts of appropriate civil-military relations are under 

stress at least to some degree because of the nationbuilding tasks which military officers have had to perform in the absence of civilian capability that a WoG 

approach might otherwise provide. 

In short, a WoG approach that displaces reliance 

upon the armed forces as the principle agent of nationbuilding and post-conflict reconstitution may well 

serve the interests of the targeted nation by better portraying the role of civilians in a democracy, serve the 

interests of the U.S. armed forces by allowing greater 

focus on its quintessential warfighting responsibilities, 

and also serve American society itself by ameliorating burgeoning civil-military tensions. Nevertheless, 

implementing a WoG approach effectively involves 

substantial challenges.

WoG APPROACH CHALLENGES

Although Congress has grappled with the idea 

of building civilian capability for nation-building 

for most of the decade, numerous difficulties still ex-
195

ist to implementing a WoG approach—not the least 

of which are inadequate resourcing and authority.35

In 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created within the 

State Department with a mission statement that would 

seem ideally suited to relieving the military of much 

of its current responsibility. S/CRS is supposed to:

lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government 

civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict 

situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can 

reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, 

and a market economy.36

The centerpiece of the S/CRS effort is the Civilian 

Response Corps (CRC). Drawing experts from eight 

Federal departments or agencies, the CRC is a “group 

of civilian federal employees who are specially trained 

and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis 

or emerging from conflict.”37 Although Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton applauds the fact that in just 2 

years the ranks have grown to over 1,000 civilian responders, the reality is that only 250-300 can deploy at 

any given time.38

It is difficult to understand how such a relatively 

small group—not much larger than a couple of companies of soldiers—could possibly obviate the need 

for substantial military involvement to accomplish the 

same tasks. After all, Iraq39 and Afghanistan40 are both 

nations of more than 29,000,000 people. Even with reserves—which Congress has not funded—the whole 

CRC was never contemplated to number more than a 

few thousand persons.
196

According to the S/CRS, “many analysts have expressed doubt about S/CRS ability and capacity to 

carry out its mission.”41 Some of that doubt is blamed 

on a “perceived lack of funding by Congress,” but 

there are also misgivings about an “anti-operational 

social culture in the State Department.”42 There seems 

to be real difficulty with a program that depends upon 

large numbers of highly-expert civilians voluntarily

agreeing to serve in austere and dangerous circumstances. This appears to be an impediment, with troubling and perhaps intractable implications for future 

operations.

As evidence of this issue, consider a 2007 New York 

Times article reporting that many diplomats and Foreign Service employees of the State Department refused assignments to Iraq.43 Steve Kashkett, vice president of the American Foreign Service Association, 

insisted that “there remain legitimate questions about 

the ability of unarmed civilian diplomats to carry out 

a reconstruction and democracy-building mission in 

the middle of an active war zone.”44

As a result, the Times says that those employees 

who did agree to deploy “tended to be younger, more 

entry-level types, and not experienced, seasoned diplomats.”45 The former head of S/CRS recognizes the 

problem and admitted in a March 2010 interview that 

“the State Department must shed the ‘risk-averse culture’ it adopted in the mid-1980s.”46 He added, “Obviously, you cannot ignore risk, but we need to be willing to manage risk rather than simply avoid it.”47

Other government employees seem to carry a rather robustly different sense of entitlement when serving in war zones, and this can complicate a WoG approach. For example, a 2008 audit found that Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents were improperly 
197

paid millions of dollars in overtime while on 90 days 

of temporary duty in Iraq.48 This investigation found 

that the agents billed the government on average 

$45,000 overtime pay, often for simply watching movies, exercising, or even attending parties.49

Civilians clearly want to be well paid if they work 

in dangerous areas. Journalist Nathan Hodge writes 

that when anthropologists, hired to conduct analysis 

of the “human terrain” in Iraq and Afghanistan, were 

converted from “well-compensated contractor status” 

to government employee status, “around a third of the 

program’s deployed workforce quit.”50

Besides manning issues, recent reports from Afghanistan about program execution are not encouraging.51 Critics insist that S/CRS remains poorly funded 

and is often ignored.52 Consequently, reporter Spencer 

Ackerman says that in Afghanistan “American diplomacy and development work in conflict areas remains 

largely a military job.”53 He says that U.S. soldiers—

not American civilians—”politic with local potentates 

on reconstruction projects.”54 Thinking beyond the 

specific difficulties with S/CRS, the issue may become 

this: Can a WoG approach work at all in the U.S. Government?

Analyst Todd Moss has his doubts. The former 

State Department official acknowledges that a WoG 

approach may work in other nations, but has reservations about its prospects in the United States. Moss 

says:

in the United States—with its sprawling federal structure and huge agency staffs and budget—just getting 

everyone around one table is perhaps too much to ask. 

The interagency process in any country is a strain. 

[Managing those tensions is actually what policymaking is all about.] Yet the process can become convolut-
198

ed and bogged down when the scale is out of whack. 

Simply put: when you have too many people at the 

table, nothing gets done.55

It may be that a WoG approach can suffer from 

a form of the same malady as that which debilitated 

American corporations late in the last century, that 

is, over-diversification. Many companies acquired 

widely-diverse businesses and put them under the 

umbrella of a single conglomerate, apparently thinking that the mutual support of the whole would be 

stronger and more profitable than the individual 

parts. One can readily see how such thinking would 

resonate with WoG approach goals. Unfortunately, it 

often does not work.

Notwithstanding what might be called a “whole 

of business” approach, the Economist observes that the 

idea “went out of fashion in the 1980s and 1990s . . .

when companies began to see again the virtues of 

‘sticking to their knitting’.”56 Sometimes, it seems, a 

single-focused entity is better at a specific task than an 

assemblage of actors with assorted backgrounds. Conglomerates that did succeed were ones that expanded 

but did not stray far from their core competencies. The 

chief executive of Bombardier, a Canadian manufacturing firm that acquired new businesses, did so by 

ensuring that “each new sector we entered shares certain fundamental similarities.”57

This may mean that a WoG approach may need 

modification, or at least clarification. Not every security issue needs—or profits from—the application of 

all the tools in the proverbial toolbox. In some circumstances, a WoG approach may be exactly the wrong 

strategy; not every agency has the requisite core competencies to add value to the resolution of a particu-
199

lar national security issue. If it is necessary to have a 

bumper sticker for such a more nuanced approach, 

then smart power may be it.

THE BETTER CONCEPTUALIZATION FOR THE 

WAY AHEAD?

Secretary Clinton’s articulation of smart power 

shows it is related to, but not exactly coterminous with, 

a WoG approach. Although she does not claim to have 

invented the smart power term, in her 2009 confirmation testimony she defined it as using the “range of 

tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, 

political, legal, and cultural” to address international 

issues.58 It does not seek to bring every tool to bear in 

every instance; rather, smart power is about “picking 

the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.”59 Importantly, Clinton says that under a smart 

power approach, “diplomacy will be the vanguard of 

foreign policy.”60

To be sure, Clinton is not foreswearing a WoG 

approach; however, she does seem to conceive it differently than has previously been the case. Writing in 

the November/December 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, 

Secretary Clinton elaborated on her smart power concept and its distinct emphasis on civilian power:61

By drawing on the pool of talent that already exists in 

U.S. federal agencies and at overseas posts, the United 

States can build a global civilian service of the same 

caliber and flexibility as the U.S. military.62

In addition to its civilian focus, there is much about 

the particulars of smart power worth noting carefully. 

As already observed, it recognizes that sometimes 
200

“picking the right tool” suffices. If the number of participants can be minimized, the hazards of navigating 

the interagency coordination process that concerned 

Mr. Moss might diminish.63 Moreover, it suggests that 

there can be affirmative benefits of discrete approaches by separate government agencies. Consider the U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM) experience.

 AFRICOM might be considered one of the most 

aggressive models of at least a modified form of a WoG 

approach. Established in 2007, it represents an innovative effort by the DoD to address the varied needs of 

a multifaceted continent.64 It sees itself as a “different 

kind of command” because it is fashioned with a: 

much more integrated staff structure . . . that includes 

significant management and staff representation by 

the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), and other U.S. government 

agencies involved in Africa.65

One of the most unique aspects of AFRICOM is its 

leadership arrangements. Unlike any other military 

organization, it designates a State Department ambassador as its “co-equal” deputy.66 Notwithstanding the 

language of co-equality, AFRICOM makes it clear that 

the ambassador’s military counterpart—a Navy admiral—exercises command authority in the AFRICOM 

commander’s absence only because “U.S. law does 

not allow a State Department official to hold military 

command authority.”67 Despite the absence of legal 

authority to command, AFRICOM says the “co-equal” 

State Department official nevertheless “directs” a variety of military activities, including disaster relief and, 

somewhat mysteriously, “security sector reform.”68

The precise distinction between a civilian with authority to “direct” and a military officer empowered 
201

to “command” is unexplained and puzzling. While no 

one questions the value of close working relationships 

with the Department of State, there is a point at which 

the intermingling in pursuit of an undifferentiated 

WoG approach becomes an unproductive infatuation 

that could dangerously confuse the military chain of 

command in a crisis. Even more importantly, it may 

send the wrong message about our diplomats around 

the globe whose legal status and safety depends upon 

the perception and reality that they are noncombatant 

civilians apart from our military forces.

According to a 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, various stakeholders 

raised similar issues. They were concerned that AFRICOM “could blur traditional boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense.” 69 Likewise, the 

S/CRS reports “mixed feelings” among many about 

AFRICOM:

While many at the State Department and USAID welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to 

organize complex operations, there also is concern 

that the military may overestimate its capabilities as 

well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are 

not a core part of its mandate.70

Both the GAO and the S/CRS also report concerns 

that the size of the DoD “could dominate U.S. activities and relationships in Africa” to the detriment of 

foreign policy.71 Essentially, the apprehension was 

that the command might unproductively “militarize 

diplomacy and development” on the continent.72 In 

response, AFRICOM emphasized a WoG approach—

with some success.73 A subsequent GAO report 

showed AFRICOM made progress, but effective collaboration remains a daunting issue despite the re-
202

markable integration of representatives of some 27 

agencies.74

The best intentions can, nevertheless, create issues. 

For example, apparently AFRICOM originally saw 

as part of its mission the task to “improve accountable governance” of African states.75 Exactly what that 

was supposed to mean remains unclear, but when 

the most fearsome military in the world starts talking 

about “improving” what it may decide is a sovereign 

nation’s accountability, it is no wonder that the command has yet to find a home in any country on the 

continent. The notion of Americans “improving” governments via a military command is an understandably alarming concept to many nations, especially in 

the shadow of U.S. ”regime change” operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.

No doubt it is a worthy aim of the United States 

to assist nations with bettering their governments, but 

this is a classic example of an area where America’s 

armed forces ought to steer clear, and a WoG approach is affirmatively counterproductive. Africa has 

an unfortunate history of militaries “improving” governments by crushing the existing ones in the name 

of reform. AFRICOM certainly would not do so, but 

the juxtaposition of an intent to “improve accountable 

governance” with a military command invites untoward perceptions. Such a task may be appropriate for 

diplomats and civilian agencies to facilitate, in concert 

with other nations, international bodies, and NGOs, 

but not our military.

Clearly, the case for a U.S. military command focused on Africa is a good one, but trying to mix the 

armed forces and all it implies with activities better 

carried out via a distinctly diplomatic or civilian entity is obviously problematic. In this instance it ap-
203

pears that smart power must suggest a disaggregation 

of the respective functions that might better serve U.S. 

interests than the present WoG approach formulation. 

Mating a military entity with a diplomatic function 

could too readily serve to create unnecessary suspicions about U.S. intentions.

AFRICOM is not, however, the only example of 

questionable utilization of WoG approach-style thinking (if not precise application of WoG approach terminology). Specifically, recent domestic counterterrorism 

efforts have employed a WoG approach. Despite what 

Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith calls “strong 

sub-constitutional norms against military involvement in homeland security,”76 the powerful technical 

surveillance capabilities of the DoD National Security 

Agency (NSA) have increasingly been brought to bear 

domestically to ferret out terrorism threats, as well as 

to address growing risks to cyber security.

Unfortunately, to the extent a WoG approach involves the military in domestic security activities, history does not provide much encouragement. In the 

1960s, for example, military intelligence officers, in the 

name of national security, were enlisted to collect personal information on tens of thousands of Americans 

who, in reality, “posed no real threat to national security.”77 The military deployed—domestically—”more 

than 1,500 plainclothes agents to watch demonstrators, 

infiltrate organizations, and circulate blacklists.”78 As 

a result of the ensuing furor, congressional oversight 

increased,79 and legislation such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted.80

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of September 11, 

2001 (9/11), NSA capabilities were used for domestic 

surveillance in contravention to FISA requirements. 

When this illegal activity was revealed, the NSA was 
204

sued successfully, and on December 2010 was ordered 

to pay $2.5 million in attorney fees and damages.81 Despite this experience, the NSA recently signed a firstof-its kind WoG approach-style agreement with the 

Department of Homeland Security to collaborate in 

protecting civilian infrastructure from cyber attacks.

82 Although steps are being taken to protect privacy, 

civil liberty advocates remain skeptical.83

All this is important because if such domestic 

WoG approaches to security strategies involving the 

military go awry, they could put in jeopardy vital government interests. The U.S. armed forces are an allvolunteer force (AVF) depending upon the affection 

and respect of the American people to ensure that sufficient high-quality recruits choose uniformed service. 

Currently, the military enjoys extremely high levels 

of public confidence84 and respect,85 and that contributes immeasurably to the military’s ability to sustain 

itself.86

If that confidence and respect is compromised by 

perceptions about illegal military involvement in activities that implicate civil liberties, the consequences 

for the AVF may be serious. Too many potential recruits may not want to involve themselves in a military organization that may appear to be improperly 

infringing upon the rights of citizens. Thus, as efficient 

as a WoG approach may be in this arena, on balance it 

may nevertheless be prudent as a matter of policy to 

develop the necessary capabilities fully independent 

of the armed forces. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

To be sure, a WoG approach should certainly be 

considered in devising solutions to the complex secu-
205

rity challenges of the 21st century. Yet it is those very 

complexities that counsel against the undifferentiated 

application of the concept. Clearly, the WoG approach 

should not devolve into an insistence—or assumption—that every entity of government has some role 

to play in every national security issue. As discussed, 

there are real merits in keeping certain activities separate and, in any event, some activities are inappropriate assignments for the armed forces. Hence, in smart 

power terms, a WoG approach is just an option among 

several, and one that may—or may not—be appropriate for a given situation.

Although it is largely beyond the scope of this 

chapter, some mention should be made as to the effectiveness of a WoG approach in its most common 

and controversial application in the national security 

arena: post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. It 

is an article of faith among purveyors of contemporary COIN theory that such WoG approach-oriented 

activities are indispensible to a population-centric 

strategy.87 That strategy, encompassed in FM 3-24,

88

aims to win the loyalty of the populace to the central 

government the counterinsurgents are supporting by 

facilitating that government’s nation-building programs.

Bernard Finel, a Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the American Security Project, points out 

that critics argue that a: 

population-centric COIN [strategy] requires building 

responsive governmental structures, promoting economic growth, and eliminating endemic corruption—

objectives that have almost never been successfully 

accomplished in the long, doleful history of international development.89
206

Increasingly, experts like Finel argue that an enemycentric approach is more effective and better suited to 

American interests. It unapologetically aims to neutralize the insurgents directly as a means to force “a 

negotiated solution”—a result Finel argues is “consistent with the vast majority of conflicts in history.”90

In an interview coinciding with the release of 

his new book, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the 

Way Out of Afghanistan, former DoD official-turnedembedded–writer Bing West offers an unvarnished 

assessment. Asked about the effectiveness of billions 

spent on reconstruction, West says:

From [Afghan President] Karzai to the villagers, the 

response has been rational: take or steal every dollar 

the Americans are foolish enough to give away. In the 

US, the Great Society and the War on Poverty created 

a culture of entitlement and undercut individual responsibility. We exported that failed social philosophy 

to Afghanistan.91

Indeed, West is harshly dismissive of nation-building and the military’s role in it:

For 10 years, in Afghanistan, our new COIN doctrine 

has focused upon building a nation, and has not been 

successful. The COIN doctrine says our troops are 

expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors. I 

believe that is deeply flawed. Our military, despite 

the exhortations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

should not be a Peace Corps.92

West’s view, albeit undiplomatically stated, seems 

to be consistent with the majority of Americans who 

now consider the war in Afghanistan as something 

the United States should “not be involved in.”93 This 

writer has long believed that the armed forces should 
207

focus on the all-important task of warfighting, and 

avoid a variety of deleterious effects that can arise 

when the military becomes enmeshed in nation-building and related tasks, as part of a WoG approach or 

otherwise.94

Still, none of this is to say that a WoG approach is, 

per se, flawed. It ought to always be considered when 

addressing the multifaceted security issues of the 21st 

century. Again, filtering its utility through the smart 

power lens will likely find many opportunities where 

it can be profitably employed. It is the overly-mechanistic application of the concept of a WoG approach 

that can be the source of mischief and misdirection. 

In the end, there is no substitute for wise contemplation of which situations can profit from a WoG approach, and which are most optimally addressed by 

another, single-entity tool. Such measured analysis of 

specific situations will ensure that the WoG approach 

methodology maintains substantive vitality and does 

not devolve into another exercise of empty pseudostrategy. In that way, it can be a whole lot of substance, 

and not simply a whole lot of rhetoric.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM), Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2009, available from http://www.defense.gov/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_

v26Jan.pdf.

2. See Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict 

Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

February 2, 2011, available from opencrs.com/document/RL32862/. 
208

3. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, pp. 14-16, available from www.whitehouse.gov/

sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Serafino, p. 1.

6. Ibid.

7. Serafino, p. 4 (italics added).

8. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 8, 2010, as amended through December 31, 2010, p. 189, 

available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. 

9. Dr. Gordon Adams, Interagency and National Security Reform: The Road Ahead, Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, 

June 9, 2010, p. 52.

10. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 

Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005, available from www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/

sss_1_080106_dod.pdf (hereinafter DoDD 3000.05, 2005).

11. President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, Washington, DC: White 

House, December 7, 2005, available from http://crc.usaidallnet.gov/

document/national-security-presidential-directive-44-nspd-44.

12. DoDD 3000.05, 2005, para. 4.1.

13. Ibid., para. 1-17. When the DoDD was reissued, the phrasing was recalibrated to say “the Department of Defense shall be 

prepared to conduct stability operations with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” See note 23, para. 4a.
209

14. Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008, para. 1-17, available from usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf. 

15. Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, p. 83, available from www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf. 

16. QDRM, p. 31.

17. Ibid.

18. Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, available from http://www.defense.

gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

19. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 15, 2006; also designated as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, 1, Counterinsurgency, December 15, 2006, available from www.scribd.com/

doc/9137276/US-Army-Field-Manual-FM-324-Counterinsurgency.

20. Steve Coll, “The General’s Dilemma,” The New Yorker, September 8, 2008, available from www.newyorker.com/

reporting/2008/09/08/080908fa_fact_coll?currentPage=all.

21. FM 3-24, Chap. 2.

22. See, for example, The JAG Corp and the Rule of Law Reform: 

Q & A with Brigadier General Thomas Ayres L’91, Philadelphia, 

PA: University of Pennsylvania Law School, September 21, 2010, 

available from www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/news/archives/2010/09/

qa_with_brigadier_general_thomas_ayres_l91.html. 

23. U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 Stability Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

September 16, 2009, para. 4a (3), available from www.dtic.mil/whs/

directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. 

24. U.S. Constituion, Preamble, Washington, DC.

25. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974), available from 

supreme.justia.com/us/417/733/case.html.
210

26. U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11,17 (1955) available 

from supreme.justia.com/us/350/11/case.html. 

27. Ibid.

28. See for instance, Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 

2006, pp. 5-25.

29. Douglas Porch, “Writing History in the ‘End of History’ 

Era—Reflections on Historians and the GWOT,” Journal of Military History, October 2006, p. 1078.

30. Anna Mulrine, “Can Troops Get Too Much Love? Military 

Struggles with a Dark Side on Veterans Day,” Christian Science 

Monitor, November 10, 2010, available from www.csmonitor.com/

USA/Military/2010/1110/Can-troops-get-too-much-love-Militarystruggles-with-a-dark-side-on-Veterans-Day. 

31. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Milburn, U.S. Marine 

Corps, “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 59, 4th Quarter, October 2010, p. 101, 

available from www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_101-

107_Milburn.pdf. 

32. Ibid. (Italics in original).

33. David Wood, “Military Officers Chafe for Bigger Role in 

Policy Decisions,” Politics Daily, October 4, 2010, available from 

www.politicsdaily.com/2010/10/04/military-officers-chafe-for-biggerrole-in-policy-decisions/. 

34. Ibid.

35. See Serafino.

36. U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization, About Us, available from www.

state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm#mission.
211

37. Ibid., at Civilian Response Corps, available from www.

state.gov/s/crs/civilianresponsecorps/index.htm. 

38. This is according to John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State. See Greg 

Bruno, Waiting on a Civilian Surge in Afghanistan, Washington, 

DC: Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2010, available from 

www.cfr.org/afghanistan/waiting-civilian-surge-afghanistan/p21785

(interview with the Hon. John E. Herbst). 

39. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook - Iraq, 

February 14, 2011, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. 

40. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook - Afghanistan, February 11, 2010, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. 

41. Serafino, p. 21.

42. Ibid.

43. Helene Cooper, “Many U.S. diplomats refuse to work in 

Iraq - Africa & Middle East,” New York Times, February 7, 2007, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/world/africa/08ihtweb.0208diplo.4516120.html. 

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Bruno. 

47. Ibid.

48. “FBI Agents Billed $45K Apiece for Iraq OT,” Associated 

Press, December 18, 2008, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/

id/28299590/ns/world_news-mideast/n_africa/. 

49. Ibid.
212

50. Nathan Hodge, Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation 

Builders, New York: Bloomsbury, 2011, p. 255.

51. See notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text.

52. Spencer Ackerman, “Reconstruction Chief Quits, Putting 

‘Civilian Surge’ in Doubt,” Danger Room, September 28, 2010, 

available from www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/reconstructionchief-quits-putting-civilian-surge-in-doubt/#. 

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Todd Moss, Too Big to Succeed? (W)Hole-of-Government 

Cannot Work for US Development Policy, Washington, DC: Center 

for Global Development, October 5, 2010, available from blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/10/too-big-to-succeed-why-whole-ofgovernment-cannot-work-for-u-s-development-policy.php. 

56. “Idea: Diversification,” The Economist, October 7, 2009, 

available from www.economist.com/node/14298922.

57. Ibid.

58. Secretary of the Department of State Hillary Rodham 

Clinton, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 13, 2009, available from www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2009a/01/115196.htm. 

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian 

Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” 

Foreign Affairs, p. 13, available from http://www.devex.com/en/news/

leading-through-civilian-power-redefining-american/70521.

62. Ibid., p. 16.
213

63. See Moss, and accompanying text.

64. See generally, Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic 

Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, November 10, 2010, available 

from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf. 

65. About U.S. Africa Command, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, available from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.

asp. 

66. See Biography, Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, Deputy to the 

Commander for Civil-Military Activities, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Africa Command, available from www.

africom.mil/holmes.asp.

67. See Biography, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, Deputy to 

the Commander for Military Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Africa Command, available from www.

africom.mil/moeller.asp.

68. Ibid.

69. Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the 

U.S. Africa Command, GAO-09-181, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, February 2009, p. 3, available from 

www.gao.gov/new.items/d09181.pdf. 

70. Ploch, p. 6.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 4.

74. Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration 

Could Strengthen DoD’s Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2010, www.gao.

gov/new.items/d10794.pdf. 
214

75. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): Questions and Answers, 

Press Release, Embassy of the United States (Cameroon), U.S. Department of State, October 2, 2007, available from yaounde.usembassy.gov/u.s._africa_command_africom_questions_and_answers.html. 

76. Jack Goldsmith, The Cyberthreat, Government Network Operations, and the Fourth Amendment, Washington, DC: Governance 

Studies at Brookings, December 8, 2010, p. 10, available from 

www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/1208_4th_amendment_goldsmith/1208_4th_amendment_goldsmith.pdf. 

77. Stephan Dycus et al., “The Military’s Role in Homeland 

Security and Disaster Relief,” National Security Law, 4th Ed., 2007, 

p. 960.

78. Ibid.

79. See Brit Snider, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Some 

Reflections on the Last 25 Years, Durham, NC: Duke University, 

Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, 2003, available from 

www.law.duke.edu/lens/downloads/snider.pdf. 

80. 50 U.S.C. §1801-1862, 2008.

81. Paul Elias, “Judge Orders Feds to Pay $2.5 million in Wiretapping Case,” Washington Post, December 21, 2010, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/21/

AR2010122105307.html. 

82. Joint Statement by Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano on 

Enhancing Coordination to Secure America’s Cyber Networks, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 13, 2010, available from www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13965. 

83. William Matthews, “DoD to Protect Some Civilian Infrastructure,” Defense News, October 18, 2010, p. 6.

84. Lydia Saad, “Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup, Inc., July 22, 2010, available from www.gallup.

com/poll/141512/Congress-Ranks-Last-Confidence-Institutions.aspx.
215

85. “Honesty/Ethics in Professions,” November 19-21, 2010, 

Gallup, Inc., available from www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx.

86. Cf. Dan Blottenberger, “All Branches Meet Military Recruiting Goals,” Stars & Stripes, January 14, 2011, available from 

www.stripes.com/news/all-branches-meet-military-recruiting-goals1.131869#. 

87. See, for example, Octavian Manea, “Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach: Notes on the British 

Army Field Manual Weltanschauung,” Small Wars Journal, January 24, 2011, available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/

counterinsurgency-as-a-whole-of-government-approach.

88. See FM 3-24, and accompanying text.

89. Bernard Finel, “A Substitute for Victory: Adopting a New 

Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, 

April 8, 2010, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66189/

bernard-finel/a-substitute-for-victory. 

90. Ibid.

91. Michael Few, “The Wrong War: An Interview with Bing 

West,” Small Wars Journal, February 21, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/679-few3.pdf. 

92. Ibid.

93. CBS News Poll, February 11-14, 2011, reporting that 54 

percent of Americans believe the United States should not be 

involved in the war in Afghanistan, PollingReport.com, available 

from www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.

94. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters, Winter, 1992-93, p. 2, available 

from www.uwec.edu/sfpj/Origins.pdf. 

217

CHAPTER 8

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT IN DIPLOMACY

AND DEVELOPMENT:

WHOLE OR HOLE?

James Stephenson

On December 15, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton released the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Report (QDDR).1

 While much of the attention of the international development community was 

focused on what role the QDDR would articulate for 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), its embrace of the whole of government (WoG) 

approach to diplomacy and development seemed to 

pass almost unnoticed. Arguably, this is because in the 

implementation of U.S. foreign assistance WoG has 

grown like a fungus for over a decade. Since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), it has become the modus 

operandi—WoG on steroids—for U.S. efforts to bring 

stability in conflict, post-conflict, and fragile states 

that may fall victim to conflict. As the QDDR states, 

ambassadors are now chief executive officers (CEOs) 

of complex interagency missions.2

 Where USAID once 

had almost sole responsibility for foreign assistance, 

more than a dozen agencies and government organizations now have their own mini-foreign aid offices, 

all ostensibly under chief of mission authority or at 

least a “unified effort,” the term used where the military is present and not under chief of mission authority. Further, the military has become ever more deeply 

engaged in stability operations that are indistinguishable from civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts, even in theaters where there is no obvious need 
218

for a uniformed presence, such as the Horn of Africa. 

Embassies are larger, with disparate agencies competing for foreign aid dollars, often working at cross-purposes. (In one West African country, the U.S. Africa 

Command [AFRICOM] funded a host country agency 

the country team was trying to abolish.) The proponents of WoG embrace the logic that the application 

of more human and bureaucratic resources ipso facto

results in the efficient production of a better product—that competition engenders rigor. But does it? Is 

there any empirical evidence that the vast bureaucracies we created in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are 

any more effective than the far smaller, flatter country teams we used in the past? Are domestic agencies 

really very good at foreign assistance and in foreign 

operating environments? Are ambassadors, by training and experience, prepared to be CEOs of “complex 

interagency missions?” Finally, with the imperative 

to cut deficits and the federal work force, does the 

QDDR, which calls for staff increases at the Department of State (State) and USAID, offer a sustainable 

business model?

These questions are particularly relevant, given 

President Barack Obama’s promise in the State of the 

Union address on January 25, 2011, to overhaul the 

federal bureaucracy and consolidate its functions; 

while the Republican opposition promises to trim 

the federal workforce and specifically the size and resources of State and USAID, reversing the recent trend 

to increase the size and resources of both. The President spoke of the “fur ball”—my words—of overlapping federal rules, responsibilities, and jurisdictions. 

There are currently some 17 federal departments and 

agencies engaged in some form of foreign assistance—

e.g., the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the 
219

Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, 

the Trade and Development Agency, the departments 

of Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, Health and Human 

Services, Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS), the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Centers 

for Disease Control (CDC), and—the largest of all—

the Department of Defense (DoD)—to name a few. 

Foreign assistance has become the poster child for 

WoG, even though the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

established USAID to consolidate all foreign assistance activities under a single federal agency to eliminate the polyglot of competing federal departments 

and agencies that foreign assistance had by then become.3

 What was seen as a vice in 1961, some now celebrate as a virtue—WoG—and posit that the world of 

diplomacy and development has become so complex 

that no single department or agency can meet its challenges. (Great Britain came to precisely the opposite 

conclusion over a decade ago in creating the Cabinet 

Department For International Development, separate 

from the Foreign Office.)

The intellectual debate over where responsibility 

for international development should reside in the 

federal government will continue, unabated by the release of the QDDR. However, our burgeoning deficits 

and national debt concerns are likely to eclipse that 

debate, pushing us toward the model most effective 

and cost efficient. The proponents of smaller government might argue that the outsourcing of State and 

USAID responsibilities to other federal agencies is 

cost effective; that WoG eliminates duplication and 

redundancy. (Why does USAID need agriculture experts when the Department of Agriculture already has 

them?) Or, they could argue that USAID and the miniforeign aid offices in other departments and agencies 
220

be merged into the State Department. Or, as the development purists argue, the clock could be turned 

back to 1961 and USAID could be re-empowered as 

an autonomous agency with near sole responsibility 

for foreign assistance.4

 There may be other options, 

including the status quo, with fewer resources.5 Unfortunately, many of the “experts” who will weigh in 

are academics or politicians who never served in the 

State Department, USAID, an American embassy, or 

even abroad. You may ask, “So what?” In answer, I 

point you to the military.

Last year, I had the privilege to contribute to the 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), under 

the direction of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The 

CCJO looks 10-20 years into the future and tries to 

conceptualize what will characterize the demands and 

components of the wars we may have to fight. From 

the concept follows doctrine. From doctrine follows 

force structure, planning, procurement of equipment 

and systems, logistics, etc. Defining and articulating 

the concept is the work of scores of both uniformed 

and civilian personnel from varied backgrounds, 

who have experienced our current and past wars first 

hand. Even so, defining the components of the concept is exceedingly difficult, frustrating, and conducive to heated debate. There are four components to 

the CCJO: Combat, Security, Engagement, and Relief 

and Reconstruction. It seems simple, but what do the 

terms mean? How do they overlap? Does relief support combat? Is not engagement part and parcel of 

reconstruction? Participants came to the table with 

different constructs, prejudices, and opinions, but all 

had field experience and expertise relevant to one or more 

components. The process of give-and-take defined 

and articulated the concept. Finally, the production of 
221

the CCJO was not a political process whose outcome 

was predetermined by bureaucratic turf wars or power struggles, as was the case with State’s QDDR and 

the competing vision of the National Security Staff’s 

Presidential Study Directive. It was a sober, multidisciplinary attempt to prepare the joint services and 

country for future conflict.

Whether policies and practices that emanate from 

Washington evolve fairly rapidly, e.g., the repeal of 

“Don’t ask—Don’t tell” or the QDDR, the manner of 

their evolution matters far less than their impact and 

effect in the field—downrange for the military, at the 

country team level for civilians. As most of my experience in foreign assistance has been gained overseas, 

I confine my observations about WoG to its effects in 

the field, and begin with an observation of how country teams used to operate—until OIF.

“BEFORE, WE KNEW EACH OTHER AND HAD 

VAST EXPERIENCE”

The generic country team used to consist of the 

Ambassador, a handful of State Department Foreign Service Officers, the Defense attaché(s), USAID 

(where there was an assistance program), the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), and perhaps representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 

and Treasury.6 Either military or civilian experts, such 

as military cooperation or anti-narcotics, sometimes 

augmented this core team, as needed. In conflict and 

post-conflict countries, country teams were generally 

even smaller, usually to restrict the number of personnel put in harm’s way. Further, because most civilians 

preferred not to serve in dangerous conflict/postconflict posts, there existed a small cadre of personnel 
222

who, by choice, spent their careers serving in conflict 

environments. It was a tight, proficient fraternity, but 

often called on other agencies or the private sector to 

augment it with specific professional skills. It worked 

very well—from Central America to Eastern Europe, 

the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa.

In preparation for this chapter, I interviewed a 

well-respected, career ambassador, without attribution, because I wanted candor. When asked if ambassadors were prepared to be “CEOs of complex 

interagency missions,” the Ambassador replied that 

chiefs of mission had always been CEOs and sometimes were susceptible to empire building. However, 

embassies now have more agencies, represented by 

individuals who have no concept of what it means to 

be under chief of mission authority and whose loyalty 

is to their agency. That and the current push for whole 

of government give them license to operate independently. Domestic agencies have different, less precise 

reporting standards and requirements, and their unapproved reports often get into the decision process in 

Washington. With more agencies, ambassadors have 

to exercise more control, requiring, for example, that 

defense attachés obtain chief of mission clearance on 

all cables. When asked if WoG sometimes means that 

no one is in charge, the Ambassador responded that 

too often the wrong person is in charge, and that there 

has been a proliferation of responsibility and leadership to inexperienced agency personnel who have no 

commitment to the Mission, are not team players, and 

do not understand that country teams are enablers. 

This problem is compounded by powerful Combat 

Commands, such as Central Command (CENTCOM) 

and AFRICOM, that often attempt to operate independently in direct conflict with Mission policies and 
223

programs, and have to be reined in. The Ambassador 

closed with the lament, “Before, we knew each other 

and had vast experience—we were a team.”

These observations tracked very closely with my 

own experiences in Grenada, El Salvador, Lebanon, 

and Serbia/Montenegro, where we had small missions of highly experienced individuals that operated 

as a team—a sometimes fractious team, but one that 

understood the conventions of being part of an embassy country team. That dynamic changed with OIF 

and the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).7

 Although the CPA was headed by a former 

career diplomat and benefited from the services of a 

handful of talented senior Foreign Service officers, it 

answered to and was staffed by the DoD. The CPA 

was a hybrid precursor to WoG that reluctantly utilized a few government agencies, such as USAID and 

the Department of the Treasury, but mainly relied 

on individuals—thousands of them—who were temporarily hired under U.S. Code Title 5 Section 3161, 

which gives temporary federal organizations hiring 

authority.8

 Most came from the private sector, and a 

very large proportion had never been overseas, much 

less worked in the most difficult venue of foreign assistance—conflict. So many inexperienced actors with 

so many individual agendas led to chaotic program 

design and implementation. There are critics and defenders of the CPA, but all might agree that the CPA 

was a completely new model, more an occupier and 

surrogate for governance than an enabler of Iraqi governance and development. It only lasted 14 months, 

but when State succeeded the CPA, it inherited most 

of its structure, many of its 4,000 personnel, and its 

philosophy that more is better. Months before the 

CPA ended, State Department plans were already far 
224

advanced to build and staff the largest embassy in the 

world. Seven years later, it still is the largest—but Afghanistan is catching up.

It is conventional wisdom that the Bush administration under-resourced both the kinetic and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to support its efforts 

in Iraq, effectively enabling the resurgence of the Taliban insurgency. The failings of the coalition and the 

Afghan government are far too complex to attribute 

simply to inadequate resources. In fact, the resurgence 

of the Taliban did not take hold until late 2005, 4 years 

after it was driven from power. One could argue that 

had early and sustained stabilization and reconstruction efforts focused more at the village level, rather 

than on building a strong central government from 

the top down, conditions for the return of the Taliban 

may not have ripened. Afghanistan has never had a 

strong central government, and indeed its rural population generally views central authority as an intrusive foreign presence. Nevertheless, the response of 

the Obama administration was a massive increase in 

troop levels and a concurrent five-fold increase in U.S. 

Government civilians to carry out stabilization and 

reconstruction. The late Richard Holbrooke, Special 

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK), was the architect of the civilian expansion, effectively creating a new bureaucracy within the State 

Department in Washington, Kabul, and Islamabad. To 

meet the demand for personnel, both State and USAID 

were forced to deplete personnel resources at other 

missions and resort to temporary hires, often people 

with little relevant experience. Other agencies, such as 

the Department of Agriculture, also contributed to the 

buildup, but a very large number of personnel were 

temporary State hires, due to a shortfall from State, 
225

USAID, and other agencies. It is too soon to tell if 1,250 

civilians, distributed between the embassy fortress in 

Kabul, four regional centers, forward operating bases, 

and provincial reconstruction teams, will have enough 

impact on the lives of rural Afghan villagers to turn 

them away from the Taliban; but the evidence so far 

seems to the contrary. There is growing evidence that 

the large foreign presence and sheer volume of U.S. 

assistance is actually fueling corruption and instability, creating conditions favorable to the Taliban.9

 In 

culturally complex operating environments, doing 

less—smarter—and enabling an indigenous process of 

change is usually more effective than the blunt instrument of dollars and more bodies, particularly when 

their presence is unaccompanied by a viable strategy 

and plan of implementation.

SUSTAINABILITY OF WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT ABROAD

Since the bombings of the American embassies 

in Lebanon, Nairobi, and Dar Es Salaam, mandatory 

standards for construction of embassies worldwide 

have made them very expensive, fortress-like compounds, with a fixed amount of office space. In dangerous places like Iraq, compounds often include both 

offices and living quarters, further increasing the cost. 

(The new embassy in Baghdad cost over $700 million 

to build, reportedly over $1 billion a year to run, and 

does not have sufficient space for all agencies.)10 In 

recent testimony before Congress, Ambassador James 

Jeffrey testified that State currently has a staff of 8,000 

in Iraq, but in 2012 will expand to 17,000, comprised 

mostly of contractors, and will require operating costs 

of $3 billion a year.11 In Islamabad, the U.S. Embassy 
226

is undergoing a $1 billion expansion to accommodate 

the increase in staff mandated by the late Mr. Holbrooke. The increased official American presence in 

Pakistan—3,555 visas issued to U.S. diplomats, military officials and employees of “allied agencies” in 

2010—fueled a backlash of Pakistani popular opinion 

that the country is being overrun by American agent 

provocateurs. This perception was compounded by 

the recent killing of two Pakistani nationals by U.S. 

diplomat Raymond Davis, who, it turned out, is a CIA 

contractor.

Embassy compounds are designed at a point in 

time based upon the needed facilities to support current and planned increases in staff. Once constructed, 

they are rarely conducive to easy or inexpensive additions. When USAID began hiring new employees 

under its Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), 

which aims to at least double the size of its Foreign 

Service corps, it planned to place the new hires overseas following training in Washington. Unfortunately, 

those plans immediately ran up against the space 

limitations endemic to almost all American embassies. 

Ambassadors at numerous posts refused to accept the 

DLIs, as they are known, because they literally had 

no place to put them. USAID’s personnel expansion 

is undoubtedly necessary, but it was begun before the 

current fiscal crisis. The new House Republican majority has already signaled that it will push for reductions in foreign aid, and that will undoubtedly include 

scaling back USAID’s expansion plans. USAID is an 

integral part of U.S. diplomacy and development. It 

is much harder to make that case for the myriad other 

agencies with mini-foreign aid offices and spigots that 

WoG embraces. Carrying $14 trillion in debt and annual budget deficits in excess of $1 trillion, the U.S. 
227

Government cannot afford WoG abroad, and it cannot 

afford the resource-intensive approaches used in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Moreover, Congress will 

no longer support those approaches when a leaner, 

more streamlined approach to diplomacy and development will not only work, but work more effectively.

A BETTER MODEL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan was determined 

to thwart the expansion of communism in El Salvador, in spite of a deeply skeptical Congress over which 

hung the unpleasant memory of the war in Vietnam. To 

garner funding from Congress, Reagan was forced to 

agree that military advisors to the El Salvador Armed 

Forces (ESAF) would be limited to no more than 55 

personnel in country at any time. This Milgroup, as 

it was called, could train and advise, but was strictly 

forbidden from engaging in combat or accompanying 

trainees in field operations. USAID was informally 

limited to 36 Foreign Service Officers and approximately an equal number of expatriate personal service 

contractors. The Embassy staff was even smaller. Initially, the military viewed the Milgroup limitation as 

a severe challenge, bordering on mission impossible. 

Most of the 55 advisors were highly trained special operations forces, fluent in Spanish, culturally adapted, 

and vastly experienced. The Milgroup did not have 

the numbers to win the war for the Salvadorans, so 

was forced to enable the ESAF by slowly turning it 

into a professional army that could, in time, defeat the 

Farabund Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency.12 On the civilian side, the State Department 

and USAID made the time consuming investments to 

enable the Salvadorans themselves to bring about the 
228

social, economic and political reforms needed to convert an almost feudal system into a viable democracy. 

Again, State and USAID officers were highly experienced, culturally adapted professionals. For most, it 

was not their “first rodeo,” and they were there for 

the long haul. To be sure, military training outside 

of El Salvador augmented the Milgroup effort in El 

Salvador, and U.S. intelligence gathering and sharing 

aided the ESAF; but the Milgroup and civilian personnel restrictions turned out to be a serendipitous driver 

that forced the United States to enable the Salvadorans themselves to save their country. It took 12 years 

and cost the United States $4 billion and approximately 20 American lives; but it resulted in a negotiated 

peace agreement, the conversion of the FMLN into a 

loyal democratic opposition, and a vibrant economy 

supported by good governance and the rule of law. It 

was the projection of smart power 30 years before that 

term came into use.

Since 2002, the United States has invested over $130 

billion in security, economic, and governance assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This amount 

does not include military operations but does include 

security assistance and training performed by the military. For fiscal year (FY) 2012, the administration has 

requested $3.2 billion in operating expenses just for 

the State Department and USAID in Iraq. Since 2002, 

the United States has provided more than $55 billion 

for Afghan security, governance, and development, 

and over $18 billion to assist Pakistan, according to 

the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO)—and 

there is no end in sight.13
229

There is no question that State Department and 

USAID personnel need to be augmented if they are 

to meet their responsibilities for diplomacy and development and the projection of smart power. Unfortunately, the vision embraced by the QDDR and 

WoG is neither smart nor fiscally sustainable. Neither 

every problem nor every solution is an El Salvador, 

but if we start with the premise that diplomacy and 

development should be practiced by a highly trained 

and experienced cadre of enablers, the methodologies 

and costs will be fiscally sustainable, and WoG will 

be relegated to the diminished role it should have in 

overseas operations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power, Washington, DC: Department of State, available from www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/.

2. Ibid., Executive Summary.

3. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, available 

from www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf.

4. Raymond Malley, “U.S. Foreign Economic Assistance in 

Perspective,” Foreign Service Journal, December 2010, p. 15.

5. Noam Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, Capacity for Change, 

Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, 

Washington, DC: Brookings and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2010.

6. Department of State, Washington, DC: Department of State, 

available from www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php.

7. Department of State, The Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, Wash-
230

ington, DC: Department of State, available from fpc.state.gov/

documents/organization/48620.pdf.

8. U.S. Code, Title 5, available from from http://www.law.

cornell.edu/uscode/text/5.

9. Afghanistan Forum, available from afghanistanforum.

wordpress.com/2010/04/04/andrew-wilder-winning-hearts-and-minds/.

10. Alexandra Valiente, available from https:// 

alexandravaliente.wordpress.com/2011/06/24/permanent-u-s-iraq-andafghanistan-occupations-planned/.

11. The United States in Iraq: Options for 2012, Washington, DC: 

United States Institute for Peace, May 16, 2011, available from 

www.usip.org/files/resources/The_United_States_in_Iraq.pdf.

12. Major Paul P. Cale, “The United States Military Advisory Group In El Salvador, 1979-1992,” Small Wars Journal, Vol. 13, 

available from smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cale.pdf.

13. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Foreign Operations, Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 3, 2011, p. 4, available from http://www.

gao.gov/products/GAO-11-419T.
231

CHAPTER 9

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF:

WHAT’S MISSING IN WHOLE OF 

GOVERNMENT APPROACHES TO NATIONAL 

SECURITY

Jack A. LeCuyer

The United States must navigate an environment in 

which traditional organizations and means of response 

to global challenges may be inadequate or deficient. 

Indeed, the ability of the Nation to successfully compete in global issues is being tested in ways that were 

unimaginable until recently. To succeed, the United 

States must integrate its ability to employ all elements 

of national power in a cohesive manner. In order to 

deal with the world as it is, rather than how we wish 

it were, the National Security Council must be transformed to meet the realities of the new century.1

Memorandum from the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs

OVERVIEW

A whole of government (WoG) approach to national security at every level must begin at the top of 

the U.S. national security system, where the National 

Security Council (NSC) and the National Security 

Staff serve as the de facto hub of the national security 

system. Although the national security environment 

has changed dramatically since the NSC was created 

in 1947, the United States has not changed the fundamental way it manages our national security system 

or the role of the NSC staff/National Security Staff 

as strategic managers of the national security system 
232

to meet the challenges and opportunities of the new 

global environment. The National Security Staff remains focused on the urgent and crisis management 

rather than the long-term strategic view. A deliberate 

National Security Staff design based on strategic management functions, processes, and best practices will 

improve the balance between departmental and the 

necessary WoG practices required for the global security environment of the 21st century and ensure that 

the NSC is the strategic manager for improving the performance, adaptability, and efficiency of the overall 

national security system in achieving those national 

security goals and missions that contribute to our longterm prosperity and security. This chapter will answer 

three questions: Why have we not been able to achieve 

effective WoG national security efforts at the strategic 

level? What do we need to achieve them? How likely 

is it that we will be able to get what we need? The 

repeated failures of the current system over the last 

20 years are compelling reasons to explicitly recognize this strategic management function as the crucial 

lynchpin of our national security system. A National 

Security Staff culture focused on policy development, 

and the urgent (crisis management) at the expense of 

the important, and reinforced by significant underresourcing contributes to this lack of management at 

the strategic level. Initial steps by the Barack Obama 

administration offer hope for change but require a determined effort to imbue the NSC with strategic management functions and then resource it to accomplish 

them. Progress in resourcing the National Security 

Staff to accomplish the strategic management of WoG 

efforts to achieve desired national security outcomes 

will be increasingly important in our efforts to achieve 

success in stabilization and peace-building efforts.
233

THE CHANGING GLOBAL SECURITY 

ENVIRONMENT

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of 

the Cold War in 1991 created a strategic vacuum that 

is characterized by what Erik Peterson has defined as 

the seven revolutions in population, resource management, technology, information and knowledge, economic integration, conflict, and governance as issues 

that embody both opportunity and risk for the United 

States.2 With containment of the Soviet Union no longer the raison d’être of our national security system, 

and the rise of competing major economic powers, 

achievement of America’s strategic goals of prosperity and security would now have to be achieved in a 

global context in which U.S. hegemony in the western 

world was replaced with competition and cooperation 

in many nontraditional sectors now truly linked globally in real-time because of advances in technology, 

and in which true power often lies beyond the hands 

of traditional federal government entities.3

Today’s modern global security environment of the 

post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) world and the financial meltdowns of 2008 is characterized by complexity, 

uncertainty, speed, and real-time interconnectivity in 

domains that require WoG responses. No longer can 

we afford to view national security through the narrow lenses of military security and diplomacy against 

a background of state-to-state relations as we did during the Cold War. The dimensions of national security 

now include the global issues of economic security, 

environmental security, homeland security, pandemics, transnational terrorism, failing and failed states, 

rising states such as South Sudan, regional instability, 

cyber-terrorism, and the potential use of weapons of 
234

mass destruction (WMD). The United States depends 

on a networked global information grid and supply 

chain that is increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic 

attack. The global economy means that actions of a 

single actor, governmental or nongovernmental—e.g., 

Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s—can have significant 

and immediate global impact. Transnational nonstate 

criminal and ideological organizations, leveraged by 

technology and exploiting ungoverned spaces, have 

found new and increasingly sophisticated means of 

attack. Global climate change, demographics, and 

rising global demands for finite resources raise serious concerns over the availability of food, water, and 

other resources that threaten economic and political 

stability around the world and require new strategically agile and integrated WoG institutional responses 

to preserve our national security and prosperity. 

However, these massive changes in the global national security environment have not resulted in a corresponding change in the fundamental way that the 

United States manages its national security interests at 

the strategic level from the way that they were managed during the Cold War. As one national security 

practitioner recently remarked, 

In many ways, Washington today is a lagging indicator of how we should address national problems. Our 

national security system is vintage 1947—a basic linear industrial age system. It is much like the Sears and 

Roebuck Catalog sales of the 1950’s trying to compete 

with today’s Amazon’s online “one-click shopping.” 

Our enemies are franchises while we operate our government and national security system as a regulated 

steel mill of the last century.4
235

DEFINING WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT 

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF OUR 

NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST 

CENTURY

Barriers to interagency collaboration and WoG approaches are inherent throughout the current national 

security system. In a 2005 report, the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) found that: 

The federal government faces a series of challenges in 

the 21st century that will be difficult, if not impossible, 

for any single agency to address alone. Many issues 

cut across more than one agency and their actions are 

not well coordinated. Moreover, agencies face a range 

of barriers when they attempt to work collaboratively.5

A more recent GAO assessment in June, 2010, noted that while some progress has been made: 

The federal agencies involved in national security will 

need to make concerted efforts to forge strong, collective partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions 

that leverage the expertise and capabilities across the 

community. Sustained and inspired attention is needed to overcome the many barriers to working across 

agency boundaries. Strengthening interagency collaboration—with leadership as the foundation—can help 

transform our U.S. government agencies and create a 

more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.6

It is useful to have an analytical framework to 

guide the discussion on the dimensions and minimum 

degrees of integration required for a WoG approach 

by organizations and individuals at each level—the 

strategic, the operational, and the tactical—in the fu-
236

ture national security system.7 In 2007, the National 

Security Professional Development Integration Office 

(NSPD-IO) was established to help coordinate NSPD 

activities related to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 134348

 (National Security Professional 

Development) to develop a corps of national security 

professionals. It developed one such framework to 

display the dimensions and degrees of integration in 

WoG approaches as the following hierarchy:9

• Collaboration: Execute departmental and 

agency tasks jointly;

• Cooperation: Execute departmental and agency tasks in pursuit of common goals;

• Coordination: Solicit and respond to input 

from other departments and agencies;

• Consultation: Inform others who may need to 

know; and,

• Communication: Disclose information, plans, 

opinions/perceptions.

This hierarchy of progressive steps toward achieving integration—or WoG approaches—is important 

because it establishes precision in terms and expectations and who is accountable in departmental and 

agency actions at every level. It also points to problems 

when several of these terms are used interchangeably 

to define the responsibilities of the NSC in the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended).10

In the fast-paced and complex global security environment of the 21st century, it is axiomatic that at the 

strategic level, virtually all national security challenges 

require an integrated WoG approach across a variety 

of interagency and, in some cases, intergovernmental 

and private sector actors and equities. At the strategic 

level—in the interagency space between the President/Ex-
237

ecutive Office of the President (EOP) and the departments 

and agencies—integration or WoG efforts must be at the 

level of collaboration—the execution of national security 

tasks and missions jointly—between the multiple stakeholders to ensure that activities are defined by presidential 

policy and the President’s national security strategy and 

planned, resourced, implemented, overseen, and assessed in 

a holistic manner. Strategic WoG collaboration requires 

all-source intelligence, national security and interagency staff ownership and review, decisionmaking, 

and accountability freed from the interests of specific 

departments or lowest common denominator, short-term 

perspectives that can be passed off as cooperation or coordination. 

At the operational level—the departments and 

agencies—many 21st century national security challenges require cooperation—execution of separate tasks 

in pursuit of a common goal—and, in some cases, interagency and intra-agency collaboration among various 

bureaus and offices will be necessary as well. For cases 

in which cooperation is required, strategic collaboration

in Washington should ensure that separate operational activities are designed and executed to complement and reinforce one another.

11

Similarly, in the field at the “pointy end of the 

spear,” or tactical level of stabilization and peacebuilding efforts, coordination—the solicitation and 

response to input from others—and cooperation must 

combine to achieve the collaboration required for the 

minimum requirements of field WoG interoperability. 

This means the ability of people, organizations, and 

equipment from separate departments and agencies 

to work together at all levels, and of leaders to exercise 

initiative in mutual support, including the ability to 

draw upon each other’s information and expertise.12
238

A CONTINUING PATTERN OF FLAWED WHOLE 

OF GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

Unsurprisingly, our national experience since the 

fall of the Berlin Wall confirms that the lack of a true 

WoG approach to national security at the strategic level cascades to the operational and tactical levels, particularly in the domains of stability and reconstruction 

efforts in pre- and post conflict situations. Is there reason for optimism that this situation might change for 

the better? The answer to this overarching question 

lies in the answers to these questions: Why have we 

not been able to achieve effective WoG efforts at the 

strategic level? What do we need to achieve collaboration at the strategic level? How likely is it that we will 

be able to get what we need?

One way to assess the performance of the national 

security system since the end of the Cold War is to review specific cases of its operation. As part of its 2008 

landmark study, Forging a New Shield, the Project on 

National Security Reform (PNSR) conducted a total of 

107 case studies that represent one of the most extensive collections of U.S. national security decisionmaking and policy implementation assessments ever compiled. More than half of the events studied took place 

since the end of the Cold War in a national security 

system that remains basically unchanged. Of the cases 

occurring in and after 1990, 71 percent ended up with 

negative evaluations, reflecting both relatively high 

levels of interagency competitiveness, as opposed to 

collaboration and WoG approaches, and high cost (financial and political) to low benefit ratios.13 In many 

of these cases, there is little evidence of any serious 

effort at end-to-end strategic management and serious 
239

assessment or attempts by senior national security officials to capture lessons learned for the future either 

during or following the events. Three examples suffice to demonstrate this pernicious and enduring pattern in stability and reconstruction operations.

Panama.

The first WoG challenge to be faced in President 

George H. W. Bush’s much celebrated “New World 

Order” in 1989 was that of Panama, an abiding security concern for the United States for nearly a decade. 

The importance of a structured, cooperative process 

[and the cascading effect] to levels below the NSC 

principals became evident early on, when the highlevel national security decision-making process clearly broke down over Panama.14

The State Department responded by negotiating with 

Noriega over his departure from Panama, while Justice Department prosecutors investigated his involvement in drug-trafficking. The Central Intelligence 

Agency [CIA] reportedly, was also in contact with 

him. The Defense Department [DoD] pursued another 

security priority, maintaining bases and training in 

Panama. None of this activity was coordinated. All of 

it together merely helped persuade Noriega that he could 

outlast a confused United States. Ultimately, all of these 

U.S. government efforts failed . . . . Finally, the United 

States invaded Panama to remove Noriega at a cost 

of 23 American lives, at least several hundred Panamanian lives, and great damage to the Panamanian 

economy.15 (emphasis added)

This pattern of lack of WoG or interagency cooperation prior to the Panama military operation (Operation JUST CAUSE) was replicated in the aftermath 
240

when integration of U.S. efforts on the ground were 

complicated by a dysfunctional U.S. embassy and 

complete lack of pre-invasion interagency planning 

for how to “win the peace.” 

The Balkans. 

Emblematic of the performance of the U.S. national 

security system since the end of the Cold War is the 

observation of European Union Special Envoy Carl 

Bildt, who noted the dysfunction of the U.S. national 

security system during the Balkans crises of the mid 

and late 1990s. He stated that “the so-called interagency process in Washington often took on all of the 

characteristics of a civil war, the chief casualty of which 

was often the prospect of coherence and consistency in the 

policies to be pursued.”16 (emphasis added) In the Bosnia 

crisis, Deputies Committee disagreements were supposed to be elevated to President Bill Clinton. However, 

. . . if a clear consensus was not reached at these meetings, the decision-making process would often come to 

a temporary halt, which was followed by a slow, laborious process of telephoning and private deal-making, 

since consensus views, rather than clarity, [were] often 

the highest goal of the process . . . the result was often 

inaction or half-measures instead of a clear strategy.17

Recognizing these difficulties, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 

(Managing Complex Contingency Operations) in May 

1997. While notable in its intended improvements 

over previous interagency WoG planning efforts, departments and agencies resisted this interagency WoG 

approach. Departments complained that the planning 

templates and process were too laborious, too much 
241

like the military, and too detailed to keep pace with 

the fast-breaking events on the ground, both in the 

Bosnia peacekeeping operations and in Haiti. Lack of 

support by the departments and agencies ensured that 

PDD-56 never matured into a standard interagency 

WoG approach for planning and executing complex 

contingencies.18 A follow-on study evaluating PDD-56 

concluded that in peace-keeping efforts in Somalia, 

Haiti, East Timor, and Bosnia, and air-operations in 

Iraq, Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan and Serbia,

The White House has failed to carry out its own written directive to train government personnel to manage 

complex peace-keeping operations. . . . [We have] the 

ironic situation of the NSC, which had the lead in carrying out PDD-56, not following a directive sent out by 

the president it advises . . . and [PDD-56] was largely 

ignored by an administration that has sent American 

troops on a record number of so-called “contingencies” on foreign soil.19

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

This lack of WoG approaches at the strategic level 

in complex contingencies has persisted to the present, 

and even has been exacerbated as the United States 

found itself involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

[At the strategic level in Washington, DC] Defense 

Department officials . . . repeatedly undermined the 

formal NSC process. Defense officials would refuse to 

provide advance copies of decision papers or status 

reports ahead of scheduled meetings or leave copies of reports for further examination. And finally, 

[D]efense officials repeatedly failed to attend scheduled meetings. According to one official, “I have never 

seen more high-level insubordination in almost 30 

years than I have seen in this administration.”20
242

In the field, the cascading effect of this lack of collaboration at the strategic level was most recently vividly 

demonstrated in the use of “high value target teams” 

in Iraq that were patiently nurtured and developed 

by Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus 

over an extended period of establishing personal relationships with a diverse group of agency players in 

the field. While these interagency teams were a major 

catalyst for success at the tactical ground-level during the “military surge” operations in 2007, the team 

members’ parent bureaucracies in Washington were 

not much interested in supporting them. Middle management at the home headquarters and the agencies 

of team members proved to be a significant impediment to information sharing on the ground. According to one senior intelligence service source, if young 

CIA analysts in the field with the teams began using 

the pronoun “we” or explaining what the team leader 

wanted when making requests for support, CIA headquarters would conclude they had “gone native” and 

forgotten their longer-term perspective and the CIA 

mission; the headquarters would then restrict them 

from the more sensitive intelligence.21 The safer the 

area in which an interagency team was based, the 

more pronounced bureaucratic differences became, 

with the Green Zone in Baghdad being the obvious 

example of a bad environment in which the sense of 

a common purpose was undermined. Sadly, once the 

crisis had passed, Washington bureaucracies began to 

lose interest in supporting the teams and to reassert 

their own priorities. By 2008, departments and agencies began pulling back people and cooperation, believing that information sharing and collaboration in 

the intelligence domain had gone too far (a problem 
243

that often confronts Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission with their Country Teams on a routine basis in 

the steady state environment).

Equally serious and depressing, to date, once again, 

there has been no effort to attempt to institutionalize 

the lessons learned from these teams as interagency 

doctrine to be applied to future stability operations.22

Throughout the surge in Iraq, the Bush administration “War Czar,” Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, 

cajoled recalcitrant departments and agencies into 

lending adequate support to the repeated demands of 

Ambassador Chester Crocker for the interagency effort. Both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker 

noted that this was a first—that there was finally someone 

on the NSS [National Security Staff] who could force interagency support to the field from the strategic level.

23 To 

the extent that the interagency teams were effective, 

it was because of a broader national security system 

support for the teams. 

Departments and agencies could hamstring team 

performance by withholding their support. Teams 

whose members lacked organizational “reachback” 

were not very effective either. Consequently the cooperation of parent organizations could not be taken for 

granted but instead had to be actively and doggedly 

pursued by senior leaders in Iraq. . .and by senior 

leaders in Washington. Cajoling support from those 

parent organizations was a major preoccupation of senior leaders in Iraq.24
244

WHY HAVE WE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE 

EFFECTIVE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT 

EFFORTS IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY 

POLICY?

An Enduring Lack of Whole of Government 

Perspectives.

U.S. Government organizations routinely communicate, consult, coordinate and cooperate, but they rarely 

collaborate in a true WoG approach in the sense of suboptimizing individual agency interests for the benefit 

of the larger enterprise.25 Today’s enduring Cold War 

legacy of a national security system is a continuing imbalance between departmental and agency stovepipes 

of enduring strong national security instruments such 

as intelligence and defense and a weak mechanism 

for integrating and implementing national security 

policies that involve other departments and agencies. 

Statutory changes to the national security system (to include the landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation) 

over the years have focused on improving the traditional 

individual instruments of power and their linkages to congressional oversight committees rather than their integration (collaboration) in a WoG effort at the strategic level.

26

Even though there has been belated and wide-spread 

recognition that the dimensions and attributes of our 

national security had long been changing in ways that 

we did not anticipate when the national security system was established, WoG integration across departments and disciplines is still left almost entirely to an 

overburdened President. 

Moreover, the national security interagency system’s current hierarchy of committees developed by 

President George H. W. Bush and Lieutenant General 
245

Brent Scowcroft in 1989 has traditionally focused almost exclusively on policy formulation to the exclusion of other issues27—especially the development of 

an actionable national security strategy, the alignment 

of resources with national security missions, policy 

implementation, and assessment of and accountability for the interagency or WoG performance. A former 

official in the administration of President George H. 

W. Bush, explains why WoG outcomes at the strategic 

level are so elusive:

When it came time for decision, most representatives 

. . . came armed with a mandate to defend at all costs 

their particular bureaucratic sacred cows. But otherwise they were unwilling to support any policy decision, in which they took no interest and voiced no 

opinion. . . . The absence of a crisis or action-forcing 

event could be paralyzing even at Cabinet level.28

Finally, several contemporary experiments in interagency WoG planning at the strategic level have 

been only marginally effective because of significant 

barriers within the national security interagency system. For the last 3 years, the NSC has used the standalone National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate 

of Strategic Operational Planning (NCTC/DSOP) for 

planning and assessments of interagency counterterrorism activities. Importantly, the State Department 

and the CIA initially declined to participate despite 

statutory language, and there has been resistance in 

the White House to implementing reform in this area.29

Both NCTC/DSOP and the Interagency Management 

System (IMS) developed by the Department of State 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/

CRS)30 for the interagency community are, at best, “coalitions of the barely willing” that are seldom used as 
246

departments and agencies have resisted (à la PDD-56) 

and continue to resist these integrative (collaborative) 

WoG efforts to link resources to plans on a multiyear 

basis and provide appropriate personnel incentives 

for individuals working in interagency planning positions. All too often, interagency planning for national 

security missions remains a short-term response to a 

crisis situation that results in ad hoc or inappropriate and reactive, after-the-fact resource alignment 

through discovery learning. 

Designing and implementing effective standing 

national interagency planning systems that take into 

account all instruments of national power that report 

to the President through the National Security Staff 

and NSC is critical to achieving WoG perspectives and 

solutions at the strategic level that then cascade to the 

operational and tactical levels. However, the reality 

is quite different. As one former NSC staff member 

observed, 

[T]he easiest outcome to produce in the interagency 

process is to prevent policy from being made. The 

range of issues, the different policy perspectives of 

the various departments over which the department 

has the lead, and the clash of personalities and egos 

all place a premium on ensuring that the equities of all 

involved agencies are considered, and on building an 

informal policy consensus among the players.31

Panama, the Balkans, military operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and efforts to establish WoG longterm planning and interagency management systems 

confirm that collaboration is a difficult force to harness and institutionalize. In each case, senior leaders 

have had to go around the national security system to 

achieve results. However, “It is not just a function of 
247

good leadership as is often assumed. On the contrary . . .

organizations that want a reliable record of success 

do not rely on personalities to generate unity of effort. 

Neither should the national security system.”32

WHAT MUST WE DO IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE 

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS IN 

POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND 

IMPLEMENTATION?

President Obama, in his 2011 State of the Union 

speech, focused on our nation’s future security and 

prosperity when he asked, “How do we win the future?” He then went on to note, “We can’t win the 

future with a government of the past.”33 And regrettably, that government of the past, at least as regards 

the national security system, is, as former Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates noted, the current “hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by 

our outdated and complex patchwork of authorities 

. . . and unwieldy processes.”34 President Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) appears to address Secretary Gates’ complaint head-on:

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all 

of the tools of American power. . . .This requires close

cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency process so that we achieve integration 

of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, 

policies and strategies. . . . However, work remains to 

foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key 

steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of 

resources with our national security strategy, adapting 

the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, renewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and

coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and 
248

programs that strengthen coordination.35 (emphasis 

added)

The President has identified the goals and outcomes of a transformed national security system that 

must be accomplished. A fundamental question is 

whether the NSC and National Security Staff create 

the strategic management framework for the WoG actions that are required for “winning the future”—and 

achieving our national security and prosperity?

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND STAFF 

PROCESSES

Transformation to a truly collaborative WoG national security system must begin at the top, or strategic level, of the system. Strategic management is the 

high-level management of the national security system and associated processes in the interagency space 

between the President/EOP and the departments and 

agencies, as well as the nonfederal stakeholders. Strategic management, properly employed, leverages and 

integrates all elements of national power in a WoG 

effort at every level to achieve our national security 

goals and objectives. The National Security Advisor 

(NSA) and the National Security Staff constitute the 

de facto hub of the national security system, and as 

such, they must overcome the current problems at the 

staff level and become the active managers of the interagency space within that system. 

However, there is a persistent and excessive focus 

on urgent matters and policy formulation on the front 

end of the strategic management process by a small, 

under-resourced and overwhelmed National Security 
249

Staff. More than one NSA has set out to rectify this 

situation, only to express frustration at being held 

hostage to the current national security system. Lieutenant General Scowcroft, architect of the current NSC 

system, was frustrated in his efforts to imbue his NSC 

Staff with a strategic management perspective. 

I always thought that the NSC, as the agent of the 

President, ought to have a long-range planning function. I tried it both times, and it never worked satisfactorily. Either nobody had time to pay attention to it, or 

you had to grab them when a fire broke out.36

More recently, former NSA Stephen Hadley attempted to achieve strategic management of the 

national security system in the waning days of the 

George W. Bush administration with “Record 2008.” 

However, in this effort at oversight, as simple as it 

was, assessment and accountability for WoG implementation were firmly resisted by members of the 

NSC staff who viewed it as a personal assessment on 

their job performance rather than an assessment of 

the interagency performance in national security mission areas. Hadley recently commented, “I give us a 

B-minus for policy development . . . and a D-minus for

policy execution.”37

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF 

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF

The NSA and the National Security Staff must be 

able to carry out six core management functions to 

successfully manage the integration of the national security interagency system to achieve a WoG effort at 

the strategic level:
250

1. Policy formulation: Develop and harmonize national security policies for presidential approval;

2. Strategy development: Assess capabilities, risks, 

and opportunities and develop a broad national security strategy and national security goals and objectives 

for presidential approval;

3. Planning and resource guidance for policy implementation: In partnership with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), prepare interagency 

planning and resource guidance to the departments 

and agencies to achieve the President’s policies and 

national security strategy for presidential approval;

4. Aligning resources with strategy: In partnership 

with the OMB, ensure that department and agency 

budgets and other resources align with long-term 

strategic objectives for national security missions 

as well as unanticipated nearer-term contingencies 

rather than narrowly defined and often over-lapping 

departmental competencies. Integrated national security mission budget displays should be presented to 

Congress for consideration;

5. Oversight of policy implementation: Ensure 

implementation of presidential decisions to achieve a WoG 

effort across all instruments of national power and the 

accomplishment of national security objectives; and,

6. Assessment of and accountability for interagency and intergovernmental performance: Assess the interagency and intergovernmental accomplishment of 

national security objectives and policy outcomes and 

the implications for policy, strategy, resources, and 

implementation mechanisms.

Today’s relatively stable national security system 

consists of a vast hierarchical network of interagency 
251

committees and groups that support the President as 

chair of the NSC. The Principals Committee consists 

of NSC members (statutory as well as those identified 

by executive order) absent the President, and is the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. A Deputies Committee supports the Principals Committee by preparing 

policy materials for more senior review, overseeing 

subordinate interagency groups, and managing dayto-day crises. Functional and geographic Interagency 

Policy Committees (IPCs) at the assistant secretary 

level and sub-IPCs coordinate the details of development and implementation of particular policy areas 

(or national security missions) in preparation for senior review.38

Since 1953, each President has begun his term of 

office by issuing a document that outlines the national security system for his administration. Without exception, these foundational documents have 

been anchored on the National Security Act of 1947 

(as amended) and begin with the language “to advise 

the President as to the integration of domestic, foreign, and 

military policies relating to national security.” President 

George W. Bush went on to further state: 

The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all 

aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, 

and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council [NEC]). The National Security Council 

system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and 

implementation of those national security policies.39

What the previous principal organizing documents 

for the National Security Council have not done since 
252

President Eisenhower’s Solarium Project and design 

of the NSC Staff in 1953 is to define the national security 

system in terms of the areas of strategic management competencies or functions that should underwrite the NSC’s 

(and by extension, the Homeland Security Council’s)

work to support and advise the President in the role 

of integrator of a WoG national security system. Early 

on, the Obama administration moved to begin to define the strategic management function in stages and 

to establish the NSA and the National Security Staff as 

the strategic managers of the national security system. 

Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1) (Organization of the National Security System) identifies the NSC 

as “the principal means for coordinating executive 

departments and agencies,” firmly situates authority 

over the interagency at lower level, and effectively establishes the NSA and National Security Staff as the 

key WoG integrators at every level of the four-tiered 

NSC system.40 General James Jones’ memorandum on 

“The 21st Century Interagency Process” was directed 

at setting the stage for an active role for the NSC and 

its staff to manage the national security system and 

reflected his expectations of how the national security process should be structured and run based on 

his earlier discussions with the President-elect.41 The 

memo defined the role of the NSC and, by extension, 

the NSC staff as managing a “process that is strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable—all in order to 

advance the national security interests of the United 

States.”42

Finally, Presidential Study Directive-1 (PSD-1) 

(Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Findings and Recommendations) further empowered 

the strategic management role of the NSC and its staff 

previously promulgated in PPD-1 by a major structur-
253

al realignment that combined the separate Homeland 

Security Council (HSC) and NSC staffs into a unified 

National Security Staff that would strengthen the U.S. 

government’s ability to develop and implement policies that comprehensively address the full range of 

transnational security challenges threatening the security of our country and the safety of our citizens in 

the 21st century.43 The PSD-1 decision memo focused 

on policy implementation and creating a WoG culture 

within the National Security Staff in its roles of:

• Serving as honest brokers and arbiters among 

the departments and agencies;

• Ensuring proper management of and response 

to crises while ensuring that the National Security Staff will not “go operational” [a recommendation of the Tower Committee Report in 

1987];

• Inculcating a culture of inclusion and integration into the [National Security] Staff; and,

• Institutionalizing a culture of collaboration across 

the interagency and the intergovernmental cast 

of players to ensure a team approach to solving 

multidisciplinary security challenges (emphasis added).44

These changes to the National Security Staff organizational design were presented as requiring no additional resources. In practice, the newly constituted 

National Security Staff remains focused almost exclusively on policy—that which is fun and exciting—and 

can be spun into a constant crisis mode through the 

systemic Staff cultural lens that focuses on the urgent 

rather than the important. Although there is a nod 

to the concept of oversight of policy implementa-
254

tion through the Deputies Committee and the IPCs, 

the National Security Staff organization promulgated 

by PSD-1 is an extremely flat one comprised of very 

thinly resourced directorates that currently have little, 

if any, capacity to go beyond policy formulation, response to an incessant torrent of national security crises, and staffing of the President. 

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND 

NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF AS STRATEGIC 

MANAGERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

SYSTEM: THE NEXT STEPS

Taken together, PPD-1, General Jones’ memorandum, and PSD-1 confirm the conceptual role of the 

National Security Staff as the President’s manager of 

the interagency national security system. In varying 

degrees, the major departments in the national security system are beginning to take steps through their 

quadrennial reviews to establish a more functional, 

performance-oriented management with regard to 

their core functions. The independent panel chartered 

by Congress to review the DoD Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) and the PNSR have recommended reform measures that would require the National Security Staff to formally accept and acknowledge what is 

already a de facto reality—strategic management of 

the national security system as the basis for its advisory role to the President. 

It is reasonable to extrapolate to a series of organizing principles to guide the National Security Staff in 

its role of strategic management of the national security system in fulfillment of the advisory functions for 

the NSC outlined in the National Security Act of 1947 

(as amended). These principles include:45
255

• The National Security Staff drives the national 

security interagency system to meet 21st century national security opportunities and challenges.

• The National Security Staff maintains both focus on long-range strategic management (the 

important) and day-to-day activities (the urgent) to support the President and crisis management.

• The National Security Staff operates from a 

WoG and presidential perspective rather than 

a department or agency-specific perspective.

• The National Security Staff leverages and integrates all instruments of national power across 

the full spectrum of national security management functions. Those functions include policy 

formulation, strategy development, alignment 

of resources with strategy, oversight of policy 

implementation, and interagency performance 

assessment and accountability.

• The National Security Staff collaborates with 

transparency vis-à-vis the departments and 

agencies and, as appropriate, state, local, tribal, 

private sector, and nonprofit entities. 

• The National Security Staff, through its role as 

chairs of the IPCs, leverages a robust structure 

of interagency mechanisms outside the EOP to 

develop strategic WoG options and plans for 

senior national security decisionmakers.

A deliberate National Security Staff organizational 

and process design based on the strategic management functions described earlier in this chapter, will 

improve the balance between departmental and the 

necessary WoG practices required for the global secu-
256

rity environment of the 21st century. Strategic management of the national security system to achieve a WoG 

effort at the top of the system involves management 

of the end-to-end processes of policy formulation (the 

political guidance from the President), the strategy 

to achieve those policy goals, planning and resource 

guidance to the departments and agencies, alignment 

of departmental resources with national security missions, oversight of implementation, and assessment of 

and accountability for interagency outcomes. 

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE 

TO TRANSFORM THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

STAFF TO PERFORM THE STRATEGIC 

MANAGEMENT FUNCTION OF OUR 

NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM?

The lack of a tradition of management of the national security system and WoG perspectives described 

earlier is gradually being replaced with a growing 

sense of awareness of the need for active WoG management at the strategic level. This is tempered by the 

enduring concern and recognition in PSD-1 that the 

National Security Staff should not conduct operations 

that would distract the Staff from its strategic focus 

and system management responsibilities. Agreement 

on the assessment and assignment of the strategic management role and functions we expect from the National Security Staff is the first critical step in defining the staff 

organization, the personnel requirements for the staff, 

and the staff processes to assist the President in integrating the interagency and intergovernmental efforts 

on a WoG basis at the strategic level in our national 

security system. This analysis does not intend to suggest that the strategic management functions in the 
257

interagency space outlined in this chapter require a 

super-department that would preempt the statutory 

authorities and prerogatives of Cabinet officers. It 

does confirm that meeting the statutory requirements 

of the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) to 

advise the President in the complex environment of 

the 21st century through strategic management of the 

national security system requires that the National Security Staff (and by extension the OMB) be sufficiently 

and effectively resourced to perform these management functions.

Resourcing the National Security Staff (and the 

OMB). 

The National Security Staff historically has remained very small relative to its system management 

functions. Since 1989, Presidents have begun their 

terms by down-sizing the National Security Staff, only 

to increase staff levels later on, if only to deal with the 

demands of crisis response and staffing for the President. 

However, the size of the National Security Staff—or at 

least the allocation to the strategic WoG management 

tasks since 1991—has not been and is not now adequate 

to the needs of the national security system. In terms 

that sound very much like President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1939 Brownlow Commission46 in its report on 

the increasing burdens of presidential management of 

government affairs, the 9/11 Commission noted with 

regard to the NSC staff:

Even as it crowds into every square inch of available 

office space, the NSC staff is still not sized or funded 

to be an executive agency. . . . Yet a subtler and more 

serious danger is that as the NSC staff is consumed by 

these day-to-day tasks, it has less capacity to find the 
258

time and detachment needed to advise a president on 

larger policy issues.47

Reasons for small staff size have included an imputed presidential desire not to be increasing the bureaucracy as well as the Cabinet departments’ interest 

in limiting the President’s capacity to manage them—

but most especially an attempt by Congress to limit 

the President’s power by limiting direct staff support 

and especially staff that is exempt from congressional 

oversight and confirmation.48

The result of insufficient resourcing is that the National Security Staff has very limited capacity to deal 

with a wide range of long-term or strategic WoG issues, and, by default, is focused almost exclusively on 

policy formulation while jumping from crisis to crisis 

and the daily inbox driven by the 24–hour news cycle.49

This rapid pace continues to burn out staff, resulting 

in rapid turnover, thus reducing the capacity for institutional memory. As one NSC staffer described, “We 

stay late every night, work weekends—basically on 

24/7.”50 Moreover, this limited staff capacity has often 

resulted in the failure to anticipate and prevent issues from 

turning into crises or conflicts that could have been prevented or ameliorated. 

This traditional approach and concerns continue 

in today’s newly constituted National Security Staff. 

Although White House officials say that they have 

explicitly planned for the stress that a major and extended crisis abroad will place on their policymaking 

structure, some acknowledge that it is impossible to 

know whether they are truly prepared. Says one senior White House aide, “At some point, maybe sooner 

rather than later, we’re going to screw up mightily on 

something, and then we’ll see how everyone reacts.”51
259

Recent events on the Korean Peninsula and in Tunisia, 

Egypt, Libya, and the Middle East, as well as the U.S. 

response to the Japanese earthquake and tsunami only 

reinforce this concern. In an interview with experts 

on the National Security Staff, when asked whether 

the U.S. Government had contingency plans in case 

the Hosni Mubarak regime were to collapse in Egypt, 

NSC officials had to admit they did not.52 Strategic 

surprise followed by “re-discovery learning” during 

crisis management continues to dominate the national 

security system at the strategic level. 

Small staff size only tends to reinforce the traditional policy-based culture of the National Security 

Staff and undermine the broader intent of PDD-1, the 

Jones Memo, and PSD-1. Consequently, policy formulation and crisis management remain “sexy,” intellectually addictive, and convey access to the President. 

Strategy, long-term thinking, and forward engagement to identify threats, risks and opportunities, and 

assessments of current policies are “boring” and have 

little traction within a policy-dominated culture that is 

focused on the urgent, and is increasingly, staffing the 

President. Former NSA General James Jones makes 

the point more directly: “The White House National 

Security Council is ill-organized to prepare for the future. The National Security Staff is geared to respond 

to the crisis of the day. You wind up becoming more 

tactical instead of strategic.”53

A significant indicator of the need for and the expectation by the departments for this strategic management of the interagency space by the National Security 

Staff comes from the recent Department of State/U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR) and its focus on defining State/USAID core 
260

competencies, instituting performance-based management, and frequent references to “in conjunction 

with or under the guidance from the National Security 

Staff.”54 Absent institutional reform and a laser-like 

focus on WoG approaches at the top of the national 

security system—strategic management by the NSA 

and the National Security Staff—that cascades to the 

departments, the hopeful and long-awaited QDDR reforms are doomed to failure in the same sense that the 

independent panel noted for the DoD QDR. 

Design and sizing of the National Security Staff to 

support the NSC’s statutory requirement to advise the 

President on the integration, or WoG, aspects of national 

security require that the staff be resourced and designed 

so that it can accomplish core strategic management functions effectively and efficiently. Key system management 

functions or WoG perspectives cannot be permitted to 

languish due to the lack of a properly resourced and designed National Security Staff.55 Even in a time of budget 

austerity, the President deserves a fully resourced staff 

of national security professionals commensurate with 

his national security responsibilities. With a true WoG 

approach at the strategic level, the beneficiaries will be 

both the nation and those whom we ask to implement 

our national security strategy at the tactical level and in 

the field. 
261

A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE FOR “WINNING 

THE FUTURE”

The track record since the end of the Cold War in 

stability and reconstruction efforts is one of continued 

inability to achieve a WoG management at the strategic level. A significantly under-resourced National 

Security Staff, and a staff culture focused on policy development and the urgent at the expense of the important contributes to this lack of strategic management. 

Initial steps by the Obama administration offer hope 

for change but require a determined effort to imbue 

the National Security Staff with strategic management 

functions and then resource it to accomplish them. 

An objective assessment of additional staff required for the National Security Staff and the OMB 

to perform the WoG strategy development, resource 

alignment, implementation oversight, and interagency assessment functions to support and sustain 

the QDDR as well as the other quadrennial reviews 

and after-action reviews of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

“Arab Spring” should be conducted with the help of 

outside management experts as soon as possible.56 The 

White House should work with Congress to provide 

for transparency and the additional funding and manpower to ensure effective strategic management of the 

national security system in the interagency space by 

the NSA and the National Security Staff. Even a doubling of the size of the new combined National Security Staff, given the nature of the work expected at that 

level, is a very reasonable price for the WoG coherency and consistency of our national security system 

at the strategic level. 

Absent a WoG coherency at the strategic level, we 

cannot expect it at the operational and tactical levels 
262

in stability and peacebuilding operations as a matter 

of routine. The repeated failures of the current system 

over the last 20 years are compelling reasons to explicitly recognize this strategic management function 

as the crucial lynchpin of our national security system. President Obama has clearly identified the NSC/

National Security Staff strategic system management 

function in the two organizational documents—PDD1 and PSD-1—he has issued thus far. This strategic 

system management can be done within the intent of 

the language of the National Security Act of 1947 (as 

amended) as described earlier. Formalizing the role of 

the NSA and proper resourcing of the National Security Staff as advisors to the President and the strategic system managers of the national security system 

through executive order and budgetary processes are 

strategic imperatives whose time has come if we as a 

country are to “win the future.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs General James L. Jones, “The 21st Century 

Interagency Process,” March 18, 2009, available from foreignpolicy.

com/files/nsc_memo_21.pdf (hereinafter “Jones Memo”). General 

Jones was a member of the Guiding Coalition for the Project on 

National Security Reform prior to becoming the National Security 

Advisor in December 2009.

2. Erik Peterson, Seven Revolutions Initiative, Washington, DC: 

The Global Strategy Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2007.

3. See Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, November/December 2010; Soft Power: 

The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, a 

member of the Perseus Books Group, 2004; and Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Co-Chairs, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007.
263

4. Major General William A. Navas, Jr., former Director of the 

National Security Professional Development Integration Office 

(NSPD-IO) during remarks at the roll-out of the Project for National Security Reform’s (PNSR) The Power of People: Building an 

Integrated National Security Professional System for the 21st Century, 

a report completed in compliance with Section 1054 of the National Security Authorization Act of 2010. 

5. Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 21, 2005, available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d0615.pdf.

6. John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office (GAO), in testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, June 9, 2010, 

GAO-10-822T, p. 3.

7. See also Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New 

Shield, Washington, DC: Project on National Security, November 

2008, glossary (hereafter cited as FANS); and Results-Oriented Government.

8. In 2007, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13434 in recognition of the need for increased focus on identifying, training, and educating National Security Professionals 

(NSPs) who can work effectively and efficiently in interagency 

settings. To date, efforts to implement the executive order have 

been largely uncoordinated and shaped by individual agencies 

that have suggested a lack of administration guidance in the 

“strategic pause” between administrations and which lack a more 

systemic approach to this important national security endeavor.

9. Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People: 

Building an Integrated National Security Professional System for the 

21st Century, Washington, DC: Project on National Security, November 2010, pp. 76-77.
264

10. Section 402 of the National Security Act of 1947 reads: 

National Security Council: The function of the 

Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and 

military policies relating to the national security 

so as to enable the military services and the other 

departments and agencies of the Government to 

cooperate more effectively in matters involving 

the national security. . . . In addition to performing such other functions as the President may 

direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the Government relating to the the national security, it 

shall, subject to the direction of the President. . . .

(emphasis added)

11. In the case of post-combat Iraq, the military’s securityfocused effort had to, at a minimum, be done in cooperation with 

other agencies’ efforts to promote good governance, economic 

development, and the like. Military operations and civilian surge 

operations enable each other’s success. The synergistic effect of 

both became greater than the sum of their separate efforts.

12. Successful field interoperability involves a wide variety 

of activities including equipment and protocols for communications, a culture of sharing that is encouraged by senior leadership, 

the ability to provide or exchange resources without legal or other 

inhibitions, common understanding of intents and capabilities, 

and clear standards for accountability that are also agile enough 

to embrace and expect cross-functional and interagency mutual 

support. In other cases, such as with Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRTs) and Field Advanced Civilian Teams, collaboration 

may be required in field settings as well.

13. FANS, pp. 91-101.

14. Ibid., pp. 183-184.

15. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

16. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia,

London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988, p. 387.
265

17. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: The Modern 

Library, 1999, p. 81.

18. FANS, p. 78.

19. Rowan Scarborough, “Study hits White House on peacekeeping missions,” The Washington Times, December 6, 1999, p. 

A-1.

20. David Auerswald, Chap. 2, “The Evolution of the NSC 

Process,” in Roger L. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., Navigating the Labyrinth of the National Security Enterprise, Washington, 

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011, p. 46.

21. See Christopher Lamb and Evan Munsing, Secret Weapon: 

High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation, Washington, DC: National University Press, 2011, p. 46; Interview with 

intelligence community official, October 29, 2009.

22. Ibid.; and Thomas E. Ricks, “The surge’s ‘secret weapon’: 

Lessons of interagency high-value targeting teams,” Foreign 

Policy, January 28, 2012, available from ricks foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2011/03/25/the_surges_secret_weapon_lessons_of_interagency_

high_value_targeting_teams.

23. Lamb and Munsing.

24. Ibid.

25. See “Organizing for National Security,” Inquiry of the 

Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senator Henry M. 

Jackson, Chairman for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 1961, p. 17; Arnold Kanter, quoted in 

Ivo Daalder and I. M. (Mac) Destler, “Arms Control Policy and the 

National Security Council,” Oral History Roundtables, March 23, 

2000; Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the 

Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe,1989-1992, 

Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997, pp. 

22–23; Vincent A. Auger, “The National Security System After the 

Cold War,” in U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Pittsburgh, 

PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, p. 60; FANS, pp. 121-128.
266

26. This basic imbalance has only been exacerbated in the 

decades following the 1947 act. Since then, there have been numerous statutory modifications to the national security system, 

all of which reflect the basic pattern of consolidating, disaggregating, or creating new national security organizations dedicated 

to one area of expertise or another. From The Mutual Security 

Act of 1951, which created the Mutual Security Agency, to the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that completed the military unification originally embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 

(as amended) to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, to the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 

2004, which created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—these are the most obvious examples of this effort to reinforce “stovepipes” in the executive branch and their relationships 

with congressional oversight committees. 

27. The current national security system at the strategic level, 

created by President George H. W. Bush and Lieutenant General 

Brent Scowcroft, remains largely unchanged, with four levels of 

organizational bodies composed of Secretary, Deputy Secretary, 

Assistant Secretary, and working-level officials. The policy formulation process continues to be dominated by clashes of department-specific perspectives and frequently (a) fails to move 

issues to conclusion, (b) results in least-common-denominator 

truces among departments without the President being informed 

of disagreements, (c) produces weak policy recommendations being forwarded to the President, or (d) forces principals to operate 

around the national security system altogether.

28. Hutchings, pp. 22–23.

29. See Project on National Security Reform, Toward Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons from the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, Washington, DC: Project on National Security, February 2010.

30. For a description of the Department of State Office of the 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Interagency Management System, see https://crs.state.gov/Pages/Home.

aspx. See Cody M. Brown, Roundtable Report: Role of the National 

Security Council, ABA Legal Affairs Roundtable Series on National 

Security Transformation, Washington, DC, January 2011, p. 22, for 
267

remarks of a former Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization who noted during his comments at the ABA Legal Roundtable that:

. . . [I]ntegration was achieved through interagency negotiations across the different agencies. At the resource 

level, the Office “didn’t quite solve it”. . . . because of 

pressure applied on the appropriators by USAID, the 

Office continues to be funded through two separate accounts in USAID and the State Department. Nevertheless, the Office was able to create a unified budget, but 

operations were not as smooth as they would otherwise 

be with a single funding stream. . . . 

At the crisis response-level, i.e., execution, “the results aren’t 

so good,” he noted. To solve the “perpetual inefficiency of our 

government in responding to crises,” the Office created the Interagency Management System which was approved by all of the 

relevant departments, “ but of course it has never been used.” In 

explaining why the system has never been used, he remarked: 

we operate in an inefficient way because it is politically 

convenient. When a crisis erupts, anyone who has a plausible stake in that crisis and enough political clout will 

grab a piece of it. And as a consequence, you have multiple working groups and multiple senior groups, multiple 

chains of information and chains of command all doing 

duplicative work that cuts against each other.

31. Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador 

Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Research Report, October 8, 2010 Annual Update), Washington, DC: Industrial College 

of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, p. 39. 

32. Lamb and Munsing. 

33. Barack Obama, State of the Union Speech, January 25, 2011, 

available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
268

34. Robert M. Gates, remarks at The Nixon Center, Washington, DC, February 24, 2010, available from www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425.

35. National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, 

DC: White House, May 2010, p.14, available from www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

36. Brent Scowcroft, quoted in Ivo Daalder and I. M. (Mac) 

Destler, “The Role of the National Security Advisor,” Oral History Roundtables, October 25, 1999, available from www.cissm.umd.

edu/papers/display.php?id=265.

37. Bob Woodward, “Secret Reports Dispute White House 

Optimism,” Washington Post, October 1, 2006, available from

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/30/

AR2006093000293.html.

38. Brown, Legal Roundtable, pp. 5-7.

39. National Security Presidential Decision-1: Organization 

of the National Security System, Washington, DC, available from 

www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm.

40. Presidential Policy Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, Washington, DC, February 13, 

2009, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf.

41. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, New York: Simon & 

Schuster, 2010, p. 39. 

Jones said he had seen the Bush NSC up close. It was 

understaffed [and] under-resourced . . . . The national 

security adviser had little clout and failed to think strategically by plotting out the detailed steps and plans of 

a policy for a year or two. This was the biggest missing 

piece in the Bush operation. The national security adviser 

had to develop measurements to ensure reasonable progress was being made toward the goals. If not, the plans 

had to be revised—radically if necessary. Too much 

policy was on automatic pilot. Second, Jones said, the 

national security adviser had to find a way to get results 
269

without “micromanaging”’ what the departments and 

agencies should do. . . . What sealed the deal for Jones 

was a promise Obama made. If he accepted, Obama said 

that on national security issues, “I will always ask your 

opinion or judgment before I do anything.” It was a personal pledge. To the former commandant of the Marines, 

whose motto is “Semper Fidelis” (“Always Faithful”), it 

meant everything. 

42. Jones memo.

43. Decision Memo, “Approval of PSD-1 (Organizing for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism) Findings and Recommendations,” May 8, 2009, p. 2; Project on National Security 

Reform, unpublished White Paper, Designing the National Security Staff for the New Global Reality, Washington, DC, November 

2010, p. 6.

44. Presidential Study Directive-1 (PSD-1), Organizing for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, May 8, 2009, available 

from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf.

45. Jack A. LeCuyer and Nancy Bearg, Designing the National 

Security Staff for the New Global Reality, un-published paper for the 

Project on National Security Reform, Washington, DC, November 

2009, p. 9.

46. See Samuel I. Rosenman, “Summary of the Report of the 

Committee on Administrative Management, January 12, 1937,”

Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 5, New 

York: Random House, 1941, p. 674. 

The New Deal had led to an extraordinary expansion of 

the functions of the federal government, and with this expansion, the management burdens of the President. Faced 

with these expanded responsibilities, FDR created the 

President’s Committee on Administrative Management 

(the Brownlow Committee) to study ways to improve the 

management of executive affairs. The committee noted 

that “[T]he formal march of history depends more upon 

effective management than upon any other single factor” 

and that “the President of the United States, managing 
270

the biggest business in the world, now has less assistance...than many State Governors, city managers and 

mayors, and executives of even small private concerns.” 

47. “The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States,” 9/11 Commission Report, New York: W. W. Norton 

& Company, Inc., 2004, p. 32.

48. LeCuyer and Bearg, p. 6.

49. David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the 

National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, New 

York: Public Affairs, 2005, p. 459.

50. Michael D. Shear, “In West Wing: Grueling Schedules, Bleary Eyes,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/12/

AR2009071202081.html.

51. Michael Crowley, “The Decider,” The New Republic, August 12, 2009, available from www.tnr.com/article/the-decider.

52. Charles Levinson, Margaret Coker, and Jay Solomon, 

“How Cairo, U.S. Were Blinded by Revolution,” The Wall Street 

Journal, February 2, 2011, available from online.wsj.com/article/SB1

0001424052748703445904576118502819408990.html.

53. Sandra Erwyn, “U.S. Still in Denial About 21st Century Threats, Says Former Obama National Security Adviser,” 

National Defense Blog Post, April 18, 2011, available from www.

nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=383.

54. See U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Leading Through Civilian Power, the First 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC: 

Department of State and USAID, December 2010.

55. “I thought that President Clinton made a terrible mistake 

in proclaiming that he was going to cut the size of the staff. . . . I 

include cutting the NSC staff as a mistake because people work 

so hard there that you fry them after a while if you don’t have a 

staff of sufficient size.” Anthony Lake, quoted in Ivo Daalder and 

I. M. (Mac) Destler, “The Role of the National Security Adviser.”
271

56. General Jones, in informal conversations in January 2010, 

estimated that 75-90 additional National Security Staff professionals, as well as plus-ups for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to focus on the management side of the house, would 

be needed to resource the effort to institutionalize the role of the 

National Security Advisor (NSA) and the National Security Staff 

as the strategic managers of the national security system for the 

President. In a session at the Stimson Center on June 15, 2011, 

General Jones was even more explicit and suggested that a National Security Staff level of 300-350 was required to move the 

Staff from its narrow tactical focus to a strategic one. This discussion mirrors the thoughts expressed in Bob Woodward’s Obama’s 

Wars, cited in endnote 41, indicating that the National Security 

Staff was overworked and undermanned.

273

PART III

275

CHAPTER 10

LESSONS FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN—

LOOKING FROM OUTSIDE THE BOX

Christopher Holshek

The American-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated many lessons. Among these 

is the need for superior civil-military and whole of 

government (WoG) approaches. However, many international interventions outside of Iraq and Afghanistan—with which Washington, but not much of the 

rest of the world, has been obsessed—already entail 

aspired levels of comprehensiveness and collaboration in whole of society settings. They are contextualized in radically different “security” paradigms. This 

is a paramount insight for American policymakers and 

practitioners looking to apply “lessons” from Iraq and 

Afghanistan. “Winning hearts and minds,” central to 

American counterinsurgency, has often proven more 

counterproductive than effective, and techniques and 

tools like provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have 

more limited application in places like sub-Saharan 

Africa, home to the greatest concentration and frequency of both intrastate and nonstate conflict for at 

least the past decade. There may in fact be as much, 

if not more, to learn from the current transition-topeace effort in Liberia with respect to the upcoming 

drawdown in Afghanistan as the other way around. 

All of this is best understood by looking from outside 

the box.
276

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN—OPERATING ON 

FAULTY STRATEGIC SOFTWARE

First and foremost, the strategic culture which 

the U.S. Government in general and the military in 

particular has operated with has been largely out of 

synch with the changed global security “ecosystem.” 

The adjustment process has been slow and not always 

smooth. As far back as the peacekeeping operations 

of the 1990s, military interventions have been bedeviled by the nettlesome problem of finding balance in 

the working relationship between military and civilian actors and the “hard” (or coercive) and “soft” (or 

persuasive) inflections and instruments of power that 

they largely represent, though not necessarily monopolize. In response to the demands of the “asymmetric” 

and more hostile and complex operations environments following September 11, 2001 (9/11), the U.S. 

military in particular has looked to incorporate more 

of the latter as a combat multiplier. The realization, 

especially with respect to the early debacles in Iraq, 

was that: “Winning the peace is harder than winning a 

war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace. 

. . . Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but is even more so in a global information age.”1

Subsequent characteristically American national security approaches to foreign engagements have been 

heavily rooted in the Cold War, and U.S. engagements 

in Iraq and Afghanistan have been threats-based, postconflict, and counterinsurgency-centric.

While the American military in particular has 

done a remarkable job of adapting to the challenges 

presented in asymmetric operational environments, it 

has been slowly realizing it has not so much had to 

think outside the box than to understand the box it 
277

has already been operating in. Beyond the difficulties 

in relearning counterinsurgency operations and the 

now-familiar tensions between military and civilian 

actors, particularly humanitarian relief organizations, 

there is mounting evidence, for example, that hearts 

and minds campaigns and the application of humanitarian assistance and development aid within a 

(national) security context have not only exacerbated 

these tensions, but are turning out to be counterproductive as a whole. In U.S. doctrine, “hearts” means 

persuading people that their best interests are served 

by (counterinsurgency) success, while “minds” means 

convincing them that the counterinsurgency force can 

protect them and that resisting is pointless.2

 Yet, the 

problem with applied counterinsurgency in Iraq and 

Afghanistan is that it has tended to view protection of 

the civilian population and as a means to an end (defeating insurgents), a tactic versus a strategy that risks 

calling into the question the legitimacy of the whole 

operation.

In Afghanistan, this national security psychology culminated in a huge distortion of aid—quantitatively, as the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) funds nearly doubled to $1.2 billion 

in fiscal year 2010, far exceeding the U.S. Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID) global education budget of approximately $800 million; and qualitatively, as CERP has been conducted under the rubric 

of the 2009 U.S. Army handbook, Commander’s Guide 

to Money as a Weapons System.

Beyond military operations, the U.S. national security paradigm permeates development and makes it 

subservient to security interests. This is not new: “National security interests have always had a major influence over development assistance priorities, most 
278

notably during the Cold War,” a hallmark article in 

Foreign Policy’s December 2009 issue observed: 

But never has aid so explicitly been viewed as a weapons system—a fact that is having a major impact on 

the development assistance policies and priorities of 

the United States and indeed of many other Western 

donors.3

Yet despite counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine’s heavy reliance on the assumption that 

aid wins hearts and minds, not to mention the billions of dollars spent on it, there is remarkably limited 

evidence from Iraq or Afghanistan supporting a link 

between aid and stability. The faith in this assumption is eroding in the face of considerable comparative 

research and historical evidence reaching the opposite 

conclusion—the social forces that development and 

modernization often unleash can be destabilizing, if 

not accomplished in proper cultural context. The major factors perceived to be fueling insecurity have little 

to do with a lack of tangible and measurable social services or infrastructure (from a Western perspective). 

Instead, one of the main reasons given by both Iraqis 

and Afghans for the insurgency was a disconnected, 

corrupt, and unjust government.

This is not to say that the problems with the hearts 

and minds approach to aid and security have not been 

encountered outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, in reference to Kenya, Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman state the following:

The idea that, by delivering aid, the U.S. military can 

change people’s perceptions about the United States 

is premised on very simplistic assumptions. It is naive 

to assume that a project or series of small projects are 
279

sufficient to change people’s perceptions, convictions, 

and values, regardless of the historical and contemporary local, regional, and global sociopolitical and 

economic context. As we found in this study, attitudes 

are influenced by a multitude of factors beyond the 

scope of aid projects, such as the relationship between 

the target population and the Kenyan state, their selfperception as Muslims, local leadership, the media, 

and, more importantly, their perception of the impact 

of U.S. foreign policy, both globally and in Somalia. 

Acceptance of aid does not automatically translate 

into acceptance of the policies or beliefs of the entity 

providing the assistance. . . . One of the most widelyvoiced criticisms by people of the hearts and minds 

activities is their limited scale. Many are so small that 

they can have no discernible impact on poverty by 

themselves and, to many people, appear as little more 

than a public relations exercise. As a public relations 

exercise, their impact is undermined because people 

view the limited level of assistance provided as indicative of a lack of serious intent to improve their welfare 

and develop their communities. People in northern 

Kenya perceive the U.S. to be an economic superpower and believe they could do more.4

Accordingly, the instruments reflecting the militarization of foreign policy through the securitization of aid such as PRTs have likewise drawn mixed 

results, primarily because they have been tactical or 

operational fixes to essentially strategic problems but 

also because they reflect a security psychology incongruent to the problem. Despite the proclaimed efforts 

to civilianize PRT operations, for example, there is 

scant evidence that civilianization is a priority or that 

changes on the ground are keeping pace with the policy level. In Afghanistan, military engagement with 

civilian agencies through forums for civil-military relations dialogue continues to be pro forma, with dis-
280

appointing outcomes and inadequate follow-up based 

on concerns raised by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Afghan stakeholders.5

 Other somewhat more successful tactical and operational tools, 

such as the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework 

developed by USAID and the Department of Defense 

(DoD), have limited application outside of Iraq and 

Afghanistan—they may be able to be used, but with 

great care. In another example:

The civil-military guidelines developed by the Kabulbased Agency Coordinating Body on Afghan Relief 

(ACBAR) outline humanitarian principles as well as 

a protocol for NGO-military interactions in Afghanistan. These principles are fully consistent with the 

USIP [United States Institute for Peace]-facilitated 

“Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces 

and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations 

in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.”These 

guidelines provide some clarity to humanitarian assistance. They are less clear on the protocol for broader 

civil-military relations on peacebuilding, development, and security sector reform activities.6

Fortunately, there has been a learning curve of 

sorts. Shortly after taking over as Commander of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus noted: “At the end of the day, it’s 

not about their embrace of us, it’s not about us winning hearts and minds; it’s about the Afghan government winning hearts and minds.”7

 With that remark, 

he may have signaled a subtle but significant change 

in the civil-military nexus in counterinsurgency, “stability operations,” and “irregular warfare.” (A curious 

term—what is “regular” warfare, and is every application of military power a form of “warfare?”) In 
281

other words: it is not about “us”; it’s about “them.” 

Similarly:

Anne-Marie Slaughter, [former] director of policy 

planning at the State Department, [said that] Afghanistan is ‘the petri dish‘ for the administration’s strategy 

on weak and failing states. And by that she means the 

Obama team’s embrace of a nation-building plan that 

puts development in a place equal to security. Development must be understood less as providing aid than 

as building government capacity. ‘That’s the shift,’ she 

says. ‘There’s a big emphasis not just on delivering services, which happens through contractors and NGOs, 

but enabling the government to provide the services.’8

Indeed, many of the lessons being learned by the 

U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan are also being learned in 

other theaters and regions, such as in the Horn of Africa and by the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM). 

There are two main reasons for this. One is because 

many of the people serving in those places also served 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, drawing upon their experiences there; and the vast wellspring of collected data 

and knowledge from those operations (but hardly any 

others). More importantly, it is because the strategic 

culture that has nurtured them, and U.S. approaches 

to reducing threats to stability in Africa, is the same 

culture that has been applied to operations that have 

preoccupied the U.S. national security and military 

establishments over the past 10 years. Herein lies 

the fundamental issue to transferring lessons or best 

practices from, say, Kabul, Afghanistan, to Kinshasha, Democratic Republic of the Congo—they are essentially borne out of a Weltanschuung predicated on 

a view of security now very much in the minority in 

most of the rest of the world. Put another way, the: 
282

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were conceived (in 

2003 and 2001 respectively) as conventional military 

conflicts, and they remain substantially affected by 

that initial conception. . . . It is very difficult, halfway 

through an as yet incomplete war, to shift direction if 

for the previous several years you have been shooting at people you are now offering to protect. It lacks 

credibility.”9

Even in the Obama era, at a time of increasing difficulty to justify foreign aid in the face of fiscal pressures, the threat-based, U.S.-centric national security 

paradigm continues to contextualize American foreign engagement: 

Obama has persistently argued that addressing the 

poverty and misery of people in remote places is a 

U.S. national interest. But the case he has made is, like 

Bush’s, limited to the threat of terrorism and does not 

have much to say about, for example, the threat that 

collapsing states pose to more stable neighbors.10

 Unlike for the United States, terrorism is not the most 

feared result of collapsing states. For many in P.M. 

Barnett’s gap area, especially outside of Afghanistan 

and Iraq, “the threat of terrorism is a low priority relative to their other security concerns.”11 A running joke 

in Africa is that, if you want the United States to get 

involved in your country (i.e., spend money there), 

just say that al-Qaeda is there—much like many African strongmen during the Cold War would draw the 

United States in with the specter of Soviet or Chinese 

involvement, and to some extent still do with respect 

to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United 

States, of course, this is also the way to obtain congressional appropriation of security assistance or foreign 
283

aid funding—a main driver, no doubt, of the militarization of foreign policy and securitization of aid.

While some lessons may be transferrable, Iraq or 

Afghanistan cannot be a petri dish for dealing with 

fragile and failing states elsewhere in the world, because the learning process is the result of moving toward a paradigm with a priori cognitive assumptions 

about security long existent in much of the rest of the 

world. In places like Africa, which represent the bulk 

of security and development challenges, “human security” and civil society challenges such as poverty 

and food security, rule-of-law and justice, governance, 

economic development and job creation, and public 

health contextualize the security problem there, calling for more conflict prevention, peace (versus stability) operations, and comprehensive, whole of society 

approaches (versus whole of government [WoG]). Development, appropriately done, is therefore not just 

equal to security, it is security.

The human security paradigm focuses on the referent for security as the individual or community rather 

than the state (e.g., “It is about the security of Angolans, not the security of Angola”12). It is inherently 

people-centric, emerging from a post-Cold War, multidisciplinary understanding of security involving a 

number of research fields, among them, development 

studies and humanitarian intervention. The United 

Nations Development Program’s Human Development 

Report 1994 is considered a cornerstone publication, 

citing economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security as its main components—precisely how most underdeveloped nations, 

particularly in Africa, define security for them writ 

large.13 Intrastate security, provided largely by the 
284

rule-of-law system, involving police, justice, corrections, and legal representation, is far more important 

than a military to protect from external threats. Yet, 

the overwhelming concentration of U.S. security sector assistance is on defense sector reform and foreign 

military assistance in terms of operational training 

and hardware.

To further understand why the national security 

paradigm has little efficacy in much of the 21st century ecosystem and places where most of the lessons 

from Iraq and Afghanistan may not directly apply, it 

is worth noting two things. First, the national security approach is essentially state-centric, designed to 

deal with threats emerging from peer competitors and 

other state-related risks. Yet, the majority of conflicts 

since the end of World War II have been increasingly 

intrastate, as Figure 10-1 shows.14

Figure 10-1. Trends in State-Based Armed Conflicts

by Type, 1946-2006.
285

The recent people-powered intrastate movements 

in North Africa and the Arab world stand in further 

contrast to Iraq and Afghanistan, with the demonstration of a bottom-up generated, soft-power-driven 

change, and the clear implications for the role that 

outside powers like the United States may (or may 

not) be able to play. 

As we have seen, freedom is better promoted through 

SharePoint than at gunpoint, and the relationships 

between peoples are more important than between 

governments. Bush may have broken the eggs in the 

Middle East, but Obama has the opportunity to help 

make the omelet.15

The second phenomenon is that, while nonstate 

conflicts are on the rise, the majority of these are in 

Africa—where the nation-state is hardly the established operating organizing principle of governance 

(and in some places may never be) and where the majority of conflicts, fragile, and failing states are concentrated globally—as Figure 10-2 depicts.16 Although 

nation-states retain the unique advantage of being 

able to coordinate and apply the full range of power 

elements, growing seams and actors between nationstates present increasing vulnerabilities and threats. 

Within these nonstate seams, however, are not only 

the greatest threats to national security in the 21st century, but also the greatest opportunities, among them 

international governmental, nongovernmental and 

private sector civil society organizations, which have 

proliferated in number, variety, and capability.
286

Data Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ 

Human Security Report Project (HSR) Dataset.

Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced more non-state armed 

conflicts than all other regions combined. Europe was free nonstate conflict between 2002 and 2008

Figure 10-2. Trends in Nonstate Armed Conflicts

by Region, 2002-08.

Still, national security approaches may not be entirely inappropriate to tackling transnational armed 

threats such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, astride at 

least four African nations or international criminal organizations—some of which may be linked to extremist groups and involved in the trafficking of humans, 

weapons, rare commodities such as diamonds, and 

drugs—constitute both national security and human 

security challenges. In any case, this calls for wider 

and deeper consultation and more collaborative, regional approaches than previously—and with hard 

power clearly ancillary to soft power, not vice-versa, 

as has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could 

therefore mean, as AFRICOM is instituting, a role for 
287

the military that is more supporting than supported 

(meaning civilian leaders are in greater charge), and 

adopting nonmilitary methods:

Military planners can avoid negative outcomes by relying on the humanitarian ‘do no harm’ principle. In 

the context of the CJTF-HOA, and other similar missions, the do no harm principle suggests the following 

four guidelines. First, military projects should complement the work of civilian organizations, rather than 

duplicating or ignoring it. Second, focusing on the 

long-term sustainability of projects will ensure that 

any goodwill generated does not quickly evaporate. 

Third, military forces should also target their efforts 

to areas in which they hold a comparative advantage, 

such as disaster relief, logistics, and operating in insecure environments. Fourth and finally, hearts and 

minds operations should attempt to project an appearance of relative neutrality and humanitarian services 

separate from overt counterinsurgency activity. While 

one cannot expect a military operation to adhere to 

the NGOs’ values of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, the ‘do no harm’ philosophy can provide 

a helpful metric for evaluating outcomes from both a 

humanitarian and political standpoint.17

There is, indeed, much to be learned about comprehensive and collaborative approaches in multilateral, human security situations from the approach of 

what has become known as civil society organizations 

which: 

. . . generally take a long-term, relationship-building 

based approach to development. Because of security, 

political and economic pressures, U.S. government and 

military officials often attempt shorter-term, quickimpact development. The challenge is to design shortterm programming that contributes toward long-term 
288

goals and to design long-term programming that supports short-term objectives.”18

In other words: thinking globally while acting locally (or thinking strategically while acting tactically).

IT IS A MULTINATIONAL WORLD OUT THERE

The second major consideration in determining 

whether and how lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan 

may apply to other places has to do with the far greater imperative for collaborative as well as comprehensive approaches to fragile states. In Africa, the United 

States is never in the lead and rarely the dominant 

player. Very often, the United Nations (UN) (which 

maintains six of its 15 peacekeeping missions in Africa) and regional organizations, such as the African 

Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS), are seen as mediating or 

arbitrating entities with respect to conflict resolution 

and conflict prevention. In addition to these dominant 

players there is an array of bilateral and nonstate actors that also help to shape the outcome in Africa—the 

United States among one of many. Security engagements are more multinational then lead-nation, guided by corresponding policy rule-sets and operational 

models.

Thus, U.S.-centric WoG formulations, such as defense, diplomacy, and development (The Three Ds), 

do not constitute the model for which most of the 

donor community for security, humanitarian, or development assesses and implements its programs and 

projects. “Peacebuilding,” a word still seeking a consensus definition in the U.S. foreign and national security policy establishments, is the predominant term, 
289

as is “comprehensive approaches.” Meanwhile, at the 

Pentagon, “peacekeeping” and other “peace support 

operations,”—terms not very widely used to begin 

with—have been supplanted by “stability operations,” an expression very much posited on a national 

security model of security.

There is another important distinction between 

American and other approaches to security. Unilateral 

regime take-down and wholesale counterinsurgency 

operations in post-conflict environments are not the 

norm outside the Iraq-Afghanistan box—nor will they 

be. And both the United States and other international 

actors are learning that peacebuilding is most effective 

when done preemptively, i.e., in conflict prevention. 

In collaborative, human security environments, influence is more important than power, engagement more 

than response, and sustainability more than stamina.

Fortunately, Washington’s view of the world, at 

least from a policy standpoint, appears to be adapting 

to these realities, especially in the oft-overlooked role 

of (strategic) communications:

. . . if the Obama administration continues to embrace 

its role as a global convener, it should be careful not to 

repeat the past mistake of appearing to put the United 

States at the center of every global challenge, focusing 

too much on “us” and not enough on “them.”. . . The 

goal is not simply to be liked. It is to be more influential 

and therefore more effective at lower cost. In a world where 

foreign public opinion has ever greater impact on the 

success or failure of vital American national interests,

it should be weighed in making policy decisions and 

should shape how the United States pursues its policies and how U.S. leaders talk about American policies. Listening, understanding and engaging makes 

for better policy, helps to avoid unnecessary conflicts, 

and should ideally allow policymakers to foresee and 
290

pre-empt objections to policies that sound worse in the 

field than they do in Washington.19

Specifically with respect to engaging the world’s 

premier multinational organization, the 2010 National 

Security Strategy, under the rubric of “Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement,” notes: 

In recent years America’s frustration with international institutions has led us at times to engage the UN 

system on an ad hoc basis. But in a world of transnational challenges, the United States will need to invest 

in strengthening the international system, working 

from inside international institutions and frameworks 

to face their imperfections head on and to mobilize 

transnational cooperation.20

The National Security Strategy additionally affirms 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s anticipation of the 

need for greater military collaborative engagement 

capabilities, recognizing the growing mission to build 

partnership capacities as a strategic economy-offorce measure. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR), he points out in numerous places that: 

America’s interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international system. 

. . . America’s power and influence are enhanced by 

sustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and 

new partnerships, building cooperative approaches 

with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international institutions such as the United 

Nations. . . . Moreover, military forces must be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian 

and international partners. . . . Strong regional allies 

and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their 

capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or 
291

escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be 

required.”21

U.S. collaboration on a multinational level is not 

only more appropriate to the transformed security 

environment of the 21st century, generating greater 

strategic and operational capital, particularly in terms 

of soft power which has far greater currency in human 

security settings. In an era of burgeoning resource 

restraints, it is also more cost-effective. Echoing the 

theme of building partner capacities and multinational engagement as a strategic economy-of-force 

measure, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice more 

pragmatically explained that: 

. . . UN peace operations are a crucial tool for managing international crises in which the only alternatives 

might otherwise be doing nothing at all or direct U.S. 

military intervention. . . . UN peacekeeping is also 

cost-effective for the United States: instead of paying 

100 percent of the costs for a unilateral deployment, 

the United States pays about one-fourth of the costs 

for UN peacekeeping, with other UN members collectively sharing the burden for the rest.22

(It should also be taken into consideration that 

UN peacekeeping forces work at operational costs 

far below that of U.S. and many NATO forces. The 

reimbursement rate for UN peacekeepers set by the 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is at 

around $1,200 per line soldier per month—much less 

than the pay and benefits for a U.S. soldier.) In fact, 

the most effective, low-cost, high-reward (and most 

underutilized) U.S. multinational military engage-
292

ment program is the 30 or so U.S. military observers 

serving in UN missions.23

LEARNING TO DO MORE WITH LESS

This leads to the third major consideration. Resources for creating sustainable peace have been more 

limited outside the Iraq-Afghanistan box, which has 

received more money in security assistance and development aid from the United States and other donor 

nations than the rest of the world together. In 2010, 

the United States provided $1.7 billion and $3.3 billion 

in foreign aid to the Near East and South and Central 

Asia, respectively; it provided $648 million to Africa, 

$448 million to the Western Hemisphere, $631 million to Europe and Eurasia, and $158 million to East 

Asia and the Pacific.24 This does not even include the 

nearly one trillion dollars of military-related costs for 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, as the 

United States has poured money into the Iraq-Afghanistan box, China in particular has seized the opportunity cost to gain greater influence in Africa and Latin 

America—China’s foreign assistance and economic 

projects in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia 

grew from less than $1 billion in 2002 to $27.5 billion in 

2006 and $25 billion in 2007, with the largest increase 

in Africa.25 In the meantime, “. . . direct U.S. [military 

or police] involvement in UN field missions has dwindled while involvement of other ‘21st century centers 

of influence’, among them China, has grown. . . .”26

Donor entities working in such regions as Africa 

have never had the luxury of the scale of these kinds of 

financial resources. As the U.S. fiscal crisis grows, the 

more creative and collaborative approaches borne out 

of such restraints, such as microfinancing, are more 
293

commonplace than the typically American reflex to 

“throw money at the problem.” And money is turning 

out not to be everything: 

Our research suggests that the failure to win Afghan 

hearts and minds is not because too little money has 

been spent. In fact, money has been part of the problem. Spending too much money with too little oversight in insecure environments is a recipe for fueling 

corruption, delegitimizing the Afghan government, 

and undermining the credibility of international actors. But policymakers also ignore the most obvious, 

effective, and quickest way to reduce corruption: reduce funding, especially in the most insecure areas, to 

levels more in line with what Afghanistan can absorb.27

In addition to throwing money at the problem, another U.S. tendency, whether in the military or foreign 

aid communities, has been to place a disproportionate 

amount of faith in physical or:

. . . technical solutions to complex social and economic 

development problems and of the appropriateness 

and transferability of U.S. values and experience. This 

over confidence meant that too little attention was 

paid to local circumstances and values in the preparation and execution of aid activities.28

Aid workers in Africa and other regions where a human security paradigm has long been at work are 

much more familiar with constraints like the primacy 

of cultural context and absorptive capacity issues that 

their counterparts in Iraq or Afghanistan have more 

recently discovered.

Moreover, the United States is entering a new era 

of relative strategic scarcity, where more traditional 

resources to shape and influence events more to its lik-
294

ing are less at its disposal. By a number of measures, it 

is a country of deepening public and private debt and 

declining competitiveness. Beyond reducing America’s throw-weight diplomatically, culturally, and (of 

course) economically this loss of relative financial and 

commercial power is also translating into an end of 

unilateral freedom of action. Asymmetric threats seen 

in Iraq and Afghanistan have already mitigated much 

of the longstanding U.S. advantage in hard power, 

while peer and near-peer competitors are better able 

to bankroll their own agendas. Perhaps most importantly, as information technologies and the lessons of 

low-tech, low-cost socio-cultural and information enterprises, such as those that brought on the uprisings 

in North Africa and the Middle East, present equalizers to traditional, industrial-era forms of power.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, traditional American bias toward coercive 

or hard power in general, albeit more expedient and 

more measurable, has also shown counterproductive 

costs and risks. Hard power is more resource-intensive, zero-sum, reactive, and short-term (i.e., tactical). 

Soft power, more appropriate to collaborative, human 

security settings, is more economical, renewable, engaging, synergistic, and long-term (i.e., strategic). It 

ultimately generates more peaceful, stable, and profitable outcomes, has further-reaching effects, is less 

costly and risk-intensive, and introduces more feasible, acceptable, and sustainable strategic options—as 

long as they are approached strategically. Indeed, the 

more collaborative, comprehensive, softer, and human security approaches, borne in part out of forced 

frugality, found in Africa and other places may now 

come more naturally to U.S. policymakers and practitioners, under far greater budgetary limits, as they 
295

look to transfer their own experiences with the balance of soft and hard power in Iraq and Afghanistan 

elsewhere. In this regard, there may be much to learn 

from those who have already worked much longer in 

that paradigm.

U.S. involvement, for example, in low-level counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines, has long 

taken the approach of following local lead in civil action programs. “Filipino doctors, dentists, and veterinarians come in to provide free care. Of utmost 

importance . . . is putting a Filipino face on all these 

operations.”29 Perhaps even more illustrative of the 

shifting paradigm is the U.S. response to Haiti, where 

the military clearly played a supporting role and the 

U.S. Government sought to work within multilateral 

frameworks rather than expend the resources to create a parallel structure:

Early on, the United States decided not to create a 

combined Joint task force. With the UN already on 

the ground, a robust multinational force was in place. 

In addition, MINUSTAH countries contributing additional resources and personnel already had links 

to their local UN representatives. Creating a combined 

Joint task force would have conflicted with those efforts. Instead, Joint Task Force-Haiti deployed to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response 

operations. The purpose of Joint Task Force-Haiti was 

to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term 

human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and 

USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities 

that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for 

relief and reconstruction are best left to nonmilitary 

government agencies.30
296

LEARNING FROM LIBERIA

Perhaps U.S. policymakers and practitioners can 

learn the greatest lessons from truly multinational 

settings where the United States is one among many 

players. As the U.S. transitions from a “military mission to a civilian-led effort”—as the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee terms it—in Iraq and prepares to 

undergo a similar conversion in Afghanistan, it may 

be instructive to examine a similar case study where 

there is a transition from military-intensive post-conflict peacekeeping to civilian-led peacebuilding with 

the aim of preventing a return to conflict in the major 

multinational intervention in Africa led by the United 

Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which is regarded as the most integrative of UN field missions. 

In January 2008, UNMIL commenced its drawdown of forces parallel to the Government of Liberia’s implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), using the UN Development Assistance 

Framework (UNDAF) and other collaborative plans 

and tools designed to help build the capacity of the 

Liberian government, particularly at the county level, 

to deliver essential public services, among them security, governance, the rule-of-law, and economic and 

social development. The intent was to reach these 

conditions, articulated in a series of benchmarks, by 

the general election of October 2011, thus marking the 

end of drawdown and beginning the third and final 

UNMIL phase of withdrawal, characterized by local, 

civilian directed peacebuilding focused on self-sustainable development to supplant security-intensive, 

military-based peacekeeping operations.31 The United 

States, in comparison, is facing same sort of transition 

management challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan.
297

In recognition of its role in underwriting this transition process, the UNMIL peacekeeping force’s approach to civil-military coordination (CIMIC), for instance, changed substantially, based on the constant 

concern regarding “the increasing dependence of the 

Government of Liberia on the assets of the Force. . .”32

The greatest risk for security and stability during the 

drawdown in Liberia has been that the dependency 

on the international presence in general and the UN 

military in particular persists as force capability diminishes. This dependence creates potentially destabilizing effects that risk the investment and sacrifices 

that many made in an attempt to bring lasting peace 

to Liberia—this is similar to the situations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.

In fairness, however, opportunities in Liberia to facilitate transition to self-sustained peacebuilding have 

been better than in Iraq or Afghanistan. This is so for 

a variety of reasons: the relatively peaceful and stable 

situation enduring from earlier phases; the substantial development assistance presence still residing in 

Liberia; a central Liberian government with a strong 

leadership and a well-developed, home-grown, and 

locally developed transition plan; well-developed 

collaborative relationships and coordination mechanisms emphasizing integrated mission coordination 

under the “delivery as one” concept and viewing 

CIMIC as one among a number of mission coordination management tools; as well as a government and 

population that thinks positively of the international 

presence, due in no small part to an effective public 

information campaign. 

Still, the UNMIL approach to CIMIC, which has 

become the model for the new UN-CIMIC policy for 

UN peacekeeping forces, is particularly interesting. 
298

Recognizing that peace support operations involve an 

operational environment that is largely psychological 

rather than kinetic, UNMIL CIMIC emphasizes building both capacity and confidence in numerous ways 

beyond merely public relations. It directs that Liberians will be visibly in the lead of capacity-building 

efforts or events such as medical outreaches, even if 

most of the effort is resourced by the UN military force. 

In clear support of governance and security sector reform, when feasible, it also involves local military and 

police in CIMIC projects in order to build their capacity and, more importantly, promote public confidence 

in the government by transitioning the psychological 

capital of public trust in UNMIL to maintain security 

to Liberian government institutions. As General Petraeus would say, it’s up to the Liberians to win hearts 

and minds.

Albeit going through its own learning processes, 

the CIMIC approach in Liberia takes into account the 

central issue of the two essential functions of any civilmilitary concept regardless of its name, place, or type 

of operation: how to manage the interaction between 

civil and military players; and most importantly, how 

to transition the process, as described above, in human 

security terms. The clear connectivity between security and development is consistent with the complex 

and interconnected environment and the integrated 

mission approach. Moreover, it establishes the role of 

the military as the enabler to the peace process, duplicating the civil-military relationship desired in democratic societies, and marking an unambiguous path to 

the end state of all peace operations—self-sustained 

peace and appropriately effective civil society.

Another outstanding feature of the Liberian example is the role of bilateral players, especially the 
299

U.S. Country Team, which has often worked collaboratively with the Government of Liberia and UNMIL to enhance their goals common to U.S. national 

interests, especially security sector reform, but also 

with those of international partners, to include China, 

in fostering civil society and economic development. 

With regard to security sector reform, for which in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1506 

the United States has responsibility for defense sector reform, the Country Team has applied Secretary 

of Defense Gates’s admonition that, beyond the traditional national security centric tendency to focus 

almost exclusively on operational development of the 

armed forces:

. . . there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills 

and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long 

term.33

In Liberia, the Office of Security Cooperation is synchronizing AFRICOM’s Operation ONWARD LIBERTY program designed to enhance military institutional leadership and the DoD’s Defense Institution 

Reform Initiative (similar to the Ministry of Defense 

Advisory program in Afghanistan) to build institutional capacity among the staff of the Ministry of Defense by providing civilian oversight. Perhaps most 

importantly, the synchronization of these programs 

will help improve civil-military linkages and foster 

the civil-military relationship often missing in fragile 

civil societies. The U.S. Embassy would also be wise 

to capitalize on UNMIL’s best practices and stature in 

order to enhance the civilian staff components of their 

counterpart ministry through mentoring and advising 
300

in order to build capacity as well as confidence—multilateralism with a human face.

BUILDING PEACE IS BUILDING 

RELATIONSHIPS

In the human security environments of places 

like Liberia, perhaps the most important lesson being 

learned, with profound implications for everything 

including programming and budgeting to deployment and stationing policies, is that the work in such 

settings is fundamentally centered around building 

relationships on a human and not just institutional 

level, requiring sustainability more than stamina.

Fundamentally, in peace or war we need to trust one 

another. We learn to trust each other through building 

a strong relationship, personal and professional. That 

is the key to building an effective team that works toward a common purpose. In Haiti, this proved to be the 

case within our own military and with our interagency 

partners, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign 

partners. When tough issues were encountered, their 

strong relationships broke down the barriers.34

When looking at the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, there is indeed much to be valued—not so much 

for what actually is applicable to other places and 

situations, but more for what should not be done. In 

the larger box of global human security, Iraq and Afghanistan are cases apart from Liberia. This is more so 

because of context and not content, partnership more 

than predominance, strategy more than operations 

and tactics, and human interaction more than organizational enterprises. 
301

Finally, how Americans understand the contextualization of security interventions in the larger, 

more collaborative and complex world beyond Iraq 

and Afghanistan should not only have profound 

and far-reaching implications for U.S. WoG engagements around the world. It could also help reshape 

the American approach to national security writ large 

back at home, not just because the world outside our 

previous boxes is forcing us to, but because we can no 

longer afford any other way:

’We have always been able to win ugly by throwing 

money at a problem, but that is no longer the case,’ Locher said. ‘We have lost our margin for error and we 

are headed for a decade of austerity, when even great 

programs are being killed. The times call for a national 

security system that is effective, efficient, participatory 

and agile. Unfortunately, we don’t have it—we have 

the opposite of that, a system that is archaic, designed 

63 years ago, that still clings to Cold War concepts. At 

PNSR we have a saying, ‘How can we secure our children’s future with our grandparents’ government?’ 

We are not going to win the future with that government.’35

 This should be seen as an opportunity more than 

a threat, for which a dynamic, multicultural country 

like America whose national ethos is e pluribus unum

is most ideally suited. What one refuses to experience 

positively, one will most certainly experience negatively.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 

Politics, New York: BBS Public Affairs, 2004, pp. x, xii, 1.
302

2. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, December 2006, Appendix 

A, p. A-26.

3. Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, December 2009, available from 

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/01/money_cant_buy_america

_love.

4. Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, Winning Hearts and 

Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya, Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2010, Executive Summary, pp. 5, 70.

5. Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Mirwais Wardak, Idrees 

Zaman, and Annabel Taylor, Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations, London, UK: British and Irish Afghanistan Agencies Group (BAAG) and European 

Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA), 2008, p. 77.

6. Lisa Schirch, “The Civil Society-Military Relationship in 

Afghanistan,” Peacebrief 58, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 24, 2010, pp. 3-4.

7. General David Petraeus, transcript of interview with David Gregory on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” August 15, 2010, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38686033/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/.

8. James Traub, “In the Beginning, There Was Somalia,” Foreign 

Policy, July-August 2010, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/in_the_beginning_there_was_somalia?page=full.

9. Shannon Beebe and Mary Kaldor, “The Ultimate Weapon Is 

No Weapon,” New York, BBS Public Affairs, 2010, p. 9.

10. Traub.

11. Bradbury and Kleinman, p. 212. The reference to Barnett 

is with respect to his description in The Pentagon’s New Map of the 

non-developed world as the “gap,” versus the “core.”
303

12. Beebe and Kaldor, p. 5.

13. Mahbub ul Haq et al., Human Development Report 1994, 

United Nations Development Programme, Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 1994.

14. See the Human Security Report (HSR) Project’s Human Security Report 2009/2010, Simon Fraser University, available from 

www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx. 

Figure 10-1 is from the report available from http://www.hsrgroup.

org/.

15. Christopher Holshek, “The 21st Century’s 1989?” 

The Huffington Post, February 14, 2011, available from www.

huffingtonpost.com/christopher-holshek/the-21st-centurys1989_b_822613.html. 

16. Human Security Report 2009/2010, Figure 10-2, is from 

the report available from www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/

HSR20092010/Figures/20092010Report_Fig11_1_TrendsNonStateArmedConflictsRegion.jpg.

17. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Winning Hearts and Minds in the 

Horn of Africa,” Harvard International Review, May 2008.

18. Schirch, “The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan,” p. 4.

19. Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lynch, America’s Extended 

Hand—Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement 

Strategy, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 

June 2010, pp. 10-12, 16.

20. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, p. 13.

21. Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2010, pp. iv, xiv, 7, 

10. 
304

22. Susan Rice, “Progress Report by the United States Mission to the United Nations, A New Era of Engagement, Advancing America’s Interests in the World,” New York: U.S. Mission to 

the United Nations, April 29, 2010, available from www.usun.state.

gov/briefing/statements/2009/april/126495.htm.

23. Reimbursement rates for peacekeepers are not openly 

published by the UN; however, in addition to the author’s personal knowledge, there are numerous sources that quote figures 

of just over $1,000 plus specialty pay and other allowances for 

the lowest-ranking soldiers. See also “Peacekeeping,” Wikipedia, 

available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peacekeeping.

24. See Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 

150, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009, available from www.state.gov/documents/

organization/122513.pdf.

25. Thomas Lum, China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin 

America, and Southeast Asia, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, February 25, 2009, Summary.

26. Christopher Holshek, “U.S. Military Observers and 

Comprehensive Engagement,” Small Wars Journal, Vol. 10, February 2011, available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/usmilitary-observers-and-comprehensive-engagement.

27. Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy 

America Love,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, December 2009.

28. Andrew Wilder, “Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan,” Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In 

the Grip of Conflict, December 2009, p. 143.

29. Stew Magnuson, “U.S. Special Forces Target Hearts and 

Minds,” National Defense, February 2008, available from www.

nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/February/Pages/U2357.

S2357.Special2357.aspx.

30. Lieutenant General P. K. Keen, Major General Floriano 

Peixoto Vieira Neto, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Nolan, Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, and Commander Joseph Alt-
305

house, “Relationships Matter—Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” Military Review, May-June 2010, p. 8.

31. For an excellent discussion and critique of UNMIL’s approach to peacekeeping-peacebuilding, see Wilfred Gray-Johnson, “Assessing the United Nations Approach to Post-Conflict 

Peacebuilding in Africa: The Mission in Liberia,” Conflict Trends, 

Issue 3, 2009, pp. 11-18.

32. UNMIL Force HQ Concept of Operations for the Conduct 

of Operations by the UNMIL Force for the Period January 1-December 31, 2008, p. 3.

33. Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: 

The Future of U.S. Security Assistance, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 

3, May-June 2010.

34. Keen et al., p. 10.

35. James R. Locher III, President and CEO of the Project on 

National Security Reform, quoted in Kathryn Boughton, “National Security Expert Who Spoke in Kent Says bin Laden Outcome the Exception; National Security System Flawed,” Litchfield 

County Times, May 2, 2011, available from www.countytimes.com/

articles/2011/05/02/news/doc4dbf1e831ef1e702049372.txt.

307

CHAPTER 11

CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMING:

A SOLUTION?

William J. Flavin

Leading through civilian power saves lives and money. With the right tools, training, and leadership, our 

diplomats and development experts can defuse crises 

before they explode and create new opportunities for 

economic growth. We can find new partners to share 

burdens and new solutions to problems that might 

otherwise require military action. And where we must 

work side by side with our military partners in places 

like Afghanistan and Iraq and in other fragile states 

around the world, we can be the partner that our military needs and deserves.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton1

Can successful civil-military teaming solve many 

of the problems associated with current conflicts: state 

fragility, crisis in governance, insurgent attacks, and 

threats to public order from criminals and spoilers? 

This chapter considers several past and current examples of civil-military teaming, it identifies what constituted a successfully team, and it demonstrates what effect that team had on solving the conflict. This chapter 

reviews several case studies, the first, the 1946-57 time 

frame in Malaya, considered by many as the best example of successful civil-military teaming; the second, 

the 1967-73 period in Vietnam, particularly the Civil 

Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 

(CORDS) initiative; and, finally, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative in Afghanistan from 

2002 to the present. Each of these case studies describe 
308

some common elements of success and identify the 

pitfalls and shortcomings inherent in the civil-military 

teaming approach. 

CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMING: CONTEXT AND 

PROBLEMS

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), the Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and the Department of Defense 

(DoD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) all agree that 

a whole of government (WoG) approach is necessary 

to achieve national objectives. The QDR panel identified the need for a WoG approach in support of a 

comprehensive approach to address the most pressing 

national security problems. 

The need for enhanced—whole of government capabilities will be driven by the complex operating conditions, strong potential for civilian interaction, and the 

need in many cases to work closely with the agencies 

of a foreign government. It is in the interest of the Department of Defense to work closely with the National 

Security Council, the State Department, State/AID 

[Agency for International Development], and DHS 

[the Department of Homeland Security] to develop 

support for more enhanced civilian capability and for 

putting into operation—Whole-of-Government and 

Comprehensive Approach solutions to security challenges. . . .Before any type of contingency arises, U.S. 

governmental efforts typically rely on the U.S. State 

Department and other interagency interactions with 

the host nation on a day-to-day basis, including the 

military through the ongoing and routine activities of 

the Combatant Commands. This persistent engagement is required up to and through the end state of 

a contingency or crisis, and thereafter. A crisis or 

conflict will require the addition and integration of—
309

whole-of-government and Comprehensive Approach 

capabilities. Although civilian agencies have historically held the lead role in maintaining and developing 

international relationships, the need to deploy civilian 

and international personnel in settings of—security 

insecurity (e.g., post-conflict states, failed states) requires a more integrated approach in terms of partnership with the military forces.2

The value of civil-military teaming to achieve a 

comprehensive approach has been validated by all 

of the observers of international crises for the last 60 

years. Virtually all of the studies, guidelines, policy, 

and doctrinal manuals have identified WoG leading 

to a comprehensive approach as the basic foundation for success in addressing weak and fragile states, 

transnational criminal enterprises, and global financial or global biological threats. The 2006 U.S. Army 

Field Manual (FM) 3-24 , Counterinsurgency, devotes an 

entire chapter to the integration of civilian and military activities. The recent U.S. Army FM 3-07, Stability Operations, identifies two levels of effort, WoG and 

comprehensive.

A whole-of-government approach is an approach 

that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government 

to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the 

cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies 

of the United States Government, intergovernmental 

and nongovernmental organizations, multinational 

partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of 

effort toward a shared goal.3

The United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) 

have set as a goal the achievement of a comprehensive 
310

approach (Integrated Mission for the UN) to develop 

a shared vision among all of the relevant stakeholders. 

All of these organizations have attempted to achieve 

this goal over the last 10 years with varying degrees of 

success. They all agree that the problems of the world 

cannot be solved by military means alone. At times, a 

military effort may be necessary but is never sufficient 

to achieve sustainable peace and stability. Yet, as a result of the events that unfolded since World War II, 

the U.S. Government has ended up with a large and 

well-resourced military instrument of power that is 

out of proportion to the other instruments of power 

of the U.S. Government. It is an instrument that can 

generate a great deal of capability and capacity and 

therefore has assumed many civil tasks over time. Yet 

in all this, the military itself recognizes that the civil 

sector needs to be the final arbiter. The challenge is 

to operationalize the concept and engage with other 

agencies to achieve the best outcome.

William Olson has written extensively on this 

topic. Based on experience and study in this area, 

he provides the following cautions about a WoG approach. This first and primary is that the U.S. Government was designed to ensure that power should not 

be consolidated in the hands of the few to protect the 

liberty and freedom of the many. There are obstacles 

embedded in the U.S. Governmental system that work 

against the very coordination that is needed, however, 

to attempt to overcome these obstacles may require a 

significant political price; one that most are unwilling 

to pay. This presents a challenge because institutions 

are organized as stovepipes and are provided requisite authorities and funding that reinforce separation. 

Over time, the U.S. bureaucracy has grown into a maze 

of overlapping, redundant, and conflicting structures 

that has compounded the challenge.4
311

Coordination occurs in a context that is different for 

each agency or involved player. Different agencies 

have different missions, decision making cycles, organizational structures, cultures, habits and practices, 

incentive structures, and legal constraints and imperatives. This institutional environment limits what agencies can do, but those limits are different for different 

agencies and can come into play in unpredictable 

ways.5

But the process is not the goal; it is the outcome. 

There is a limit to coordination. In attempting to coordinate the various stakeholders within a complex system you run the risk of exacerbating the problem and 

degrading the effectiveness of some of those stakeholders. At times the outcome may not require that 

all stakeholders be involved, and indeed the involvement of those stakeholders from every level, strategic 

to tactical, may be detrimental. Organizations are optimized to deliver much needed services, such as in 

the areas of governance, conflict resolution, and generating private enterprise. They can lose some of their 

efficiency by close cooperation and coordination. But 

while this is so for the civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations, the military needs coordination with these 

agencies to accomplish its mission. The missions today, as described above, require a civilian component, 

but all do not require a military component. This leads 

to the interesting situation where the DoD pushes for 

coordination with other agencies who at times do not 

see the same need to coordinate. This can lead to fears 

that the DoD is attempting to dominate the situation 

and force other agencies to adopt their management 

procedures—the militarization of foreign affairs. 
312

Money turns planning into action. Money flows 

into each of the separate institutions with their individual authorities to spend. Cross-governmental 

teams have rarely been given separate fiscal authorities. There have been some concepts that pool the 

monies of several agencies. The United Kingdom (UK) 

has done so by pooling the monies of Defense, the Department for International Development (DIFID), and 

the Foreign and Commonwealth departments into a 

Security Sector/Conflict Prevention concept; consequently, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton have recommended 

the idea for new, permanent, shared DoD-State resources and authorities for conflict prevention, postconflict reconstruction, and security assistance.

However, the Executive Branch does not have 

the sole authority for the obligation of Federal funds. 

Congress is a key player in that they appropriate and 

authorize funds in ways that are different from the 

Executive Branch. Programs and timing of congressional funding can directly impact any attempt to gain 

a WoG let alone a comprehensive, response. Congress 

must be considered to be part of the solution. Consequently, coordination and cooperation are essential, 

and if programs are not executed with adequate resources, the results will lead to frustration or, worse, 

the idea that something has happened when it has not.
313

CASES

Malaya.

Dear Lyttelton

Malaya

We must have a plan.

Secondly we must have a man.

When we have a plan and have a man we shall succeed: not otherwise

Yours Sincerely

Montgomery (F.M.)6

In 1946, after World War II, the British returned 

to Malaya and attempted to re-impose rule with the 

creation of the Malayan Union.7

 But, they found a Malaya shaped by Japanese occupation that opposed a 

return to prewar ways. The British had lost their previous influence and authority, and the occupation had 

fueled ethnic tensions and nationalistic inclinations. 

Chinese and Indian minorities refused to be ruled by 

the Malay, and the Malay opposed giving the Chinese 

and Indians the vote and equal rights as the Malayan 

Union required. Capitalizing on these tensions, the 

Malayan Communist Party, founded in 1930 from primarily Chinese groups, organized resistance to British 

Colonial rule using Maoist protracted insurgent war. 

The Communists’ objective was to defeat the will of 

the British to maintain the colony by undermining its 

legitimacy and economic investments. 

The British initial response was neither comprehensive nor coordinated. European inhabitants of 

Malaya demanded immediate action and protection 
314

as they were driven off their plantations and mines 

by insurgent violence. In response to demands, the 

British military reacted with force, seeing the solution as a purely military one with little need to bother 

with political, informational, or economic factors. The 

search and destroy approach, in the eyes of the British 

military, was sufficient; therefore, it negated the need 

to develop a civil-military team or to develop a comprehensive strategy. 

The Malayan Emergency, officially declared in June 

1948, was at first waged by the British as a conventional war, with soldiers seeking to hunt down and contain the Chinese Malayan guerillas, now reconstituted 

as the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA). 

The Malayan police force was not considered to have 

an operational role and the civil administration was 

left ignorant of military affairs. This was a campaign 

led by and carried out by the British Army, with limited support from the Royal Air Force and no input 

whatsoever from the various layers of civilian governance. By 1950, however, these methods seemed to be 

failing.8

The idea of a coordinated interagency command 

in Malaya was first proposed on February 23, 1950, 

when Sir Henry Gurney, the British high commissioner in Malaya, sent a telegram to Arthur Creech 

Jones, the Colonial Secretary. Based on his experiences 

elsewhere, he advocated a linked up WoG approach. 

Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed 

as the chief of operations and developed what would 

be known as the Briggs Plan that was to be followed at 

all levels of government. Briggs stressed throughout 

that any operations undertaken by the army or police 

had to be under civil control, had to be within the law, 

and the purpose for which they were being conducted 
315

had to be clearly articulated to the local population. 

The framework had been described, but organization 

and leadership were still needed. 

The plan did not go far enough. No one person 

was placed in charge of all the civil and military efforts. The police and the military could still operate 

separately with no overarching authority. After the 

murder of Sir Henry Gurney, General Briggs recommended that the Director of Operations have full and 

undivided control of all emergency policy, strategy, 

and tactics in Malaya. This was approved by London 

and the office of British High Commissioner, Secretary, and Director of Operations were merged. But 

Briggs became sick, and eventually General Sir Gerard 

Templer was appointed to the new office. 

Templer stuck to the Briggs Plan as much as he 

could, but he developed and got approval for a structure that could execute the framework that Briggs 

had developed. For example, he consolidated all 

intelligence around one individual who would be 

responsible for coordinating the activities of police 

intelligence, naval intelligence, army intelligence, air 

force intelligence, and political intelligence. His role 

would include giving advice to each of these organizations, as well as being “completely responsible for 

collation and evaluation of all the intelligence available and for its presentation to those concerned in the 

proper form.”9

 He also changed the organizations of 

the Police Force, Special Branch, Information Services, 

the Home Guard, and created a Combined Emergency 

Planning Staff. 

With emphasis on the Special Branch of the Police 

as the primary intelligence gathering arm, security of 

the people, and focus on civil action, the institutional 

military was uneasy with the arrangement until re-
316

sults supported the concept. Templer was a military 

man, he understood the culture of the military, and 

was able to fight against it if necessary. It helped that 

the Home Secretary as well as the new Prime Minister, 

Winston Churchill, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery supported him.10

The UK successfully conducted a COIN campaign by creating a WoG plan and then developing 

the structure and procedures for executing that plan. 

The key to success was appointing the right individuals to lead and support efforts with political will and 

resources while having the wisdom from London to 

allow the field to execute the program successfully. 

All of the agencies involved had to sacrifice some of 

their sovereignty and accept institutional risk. Malaya 

was indeed a special case given the time, location, social, demographic, and political situation, but the outcome could have been quite different had the WoG 

approach not been used. 

Malaya was what we call today a comprehensive 

approach that emphasized civil-military teaming coordinated at all levels in the country. The focus was 

on the population, building legitimacy and local capacity to provide the population good governance. 

It succeeded because there was a workable plan that 

established a framework, structures that were able to 

execute that plan, a platform for all stakeholders—including the local nationals—to be a part of the solution, a leader with the appropriate understanding and 

personality, resources, and a National Government in 

London that provided the requisite authorities but not 

direct interference. 
317

Vietnam—CORDS

In strong contrast to the sheer conventionality of 

most aspects of the GVN/US response, it (CORDS) 

did eventually prove possible to set up and carry out 

a major US/GVN wartime program specifically designed to meet many of the atypical problems of the 

people’s war in South Viet Nam. 

Robert Komer11

As the British realized in Malaya in 1950, Washington, and especially the President, realized by 1967 that 

things were not going well in Vietnam, and something 

dramatic had to be done. Ambassador Henry Cabot 

Lodge, in his opening remarks at the 1966 Honolulu 

Conference before the Presidents of the United States 

and South Vietnam stated:

We can beat up North Vietnamese regiments in the 

high plateau for the next twenty years and it will not 

end the war—unless we and the Vietnamese are able 

to build simple but solid political institutions under 

which proper police can function and a climate be created in which economic and social revolution, in freedom, are possible.12

Several studies completed in 1965 and 1966, most 

notably the “Program for the Pacification and LongTerm Development of Vietnam” (PROVN), written by 

the U.S. Army, all concluded that no two U.S. Government agencies shared a common vision or common 

approach on how to solve the problem of the conflict. 

All of the studies noted that pacification, as Ambassador Lodge outlined in his Honolulu talk, should be 

a major focus, and to that end the U.S. Government 

needed to rationalize the missions, roles, and priori-
318

ties of all the U.S. agencies. Naturally, each agency, as 

well as the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, objected to those 

parts of the studies that impinged on institutional 

interests. President Lyndon Johnson was frustrated 

with the lack of action and appointed Robert J. Komer 

as a special assistant, giving him a strong mandate to 

tighten and strengthen the pacification program and 

deal with institutional resistance. 

As in Malaya, having the right person in the lead 

at the right time was essential. Komer, who was running the Middle East shop in the National Security 

Council (NSC) along with William Colby, the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Far East Division Chief, ensured that key reports outlining the shortcomings of 

the conflict in Vietnam made it to key decisionmakers 

in Washington, DC, despite the censors in the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). These 

reports, along with the advice from Ed Lansdale and 

Ambassador Lodge, outlined the need for an effective pacification program and provided the catalyst 

for Komer, with the direct support of the President, to 

propose forming the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) as a combined 

civil-military team under the direction of the military. 

Again, success was based on a supportive policy, a 

workable structure, well-developed procedures, dedicated resources, and the right leadership. In CORDS, 

the U.S. military would be in charge of both civilian 

and military operations. Historically for the United 

States, it was rare to have civilians operating in a military chain of command. Komer was the first ambassador to serve directly under a military commander and 

have command responsibility for military and civilian 

personnel and resources. One of the innovations of 

the CORDS program was that all agencies agreed to 
319

have their performance evaluation reports written by 

the leadership of CORDS. Civil and military personnel wrote each other’s efficiency reports and shared 

resources, leading to the type of unity of purpose that 

provided positive results. This, coupled with support 

from the highest levels, integrated the programs of the 

military, the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), the United States Information 

Agency (USIA), and the Department of State. Additionally, CORDS was built as an organization that 

could directly lobby for and receive resources. The 

subordinate agencies were assigned, not attached, so 

that the funds used by CORDS were pooled and not 

located in each agency’s individual stovepipes.13

The agencies agreed to sacrifice some of their 

sovereignty and resources to CORDS in support of 

pacification, because they were successful in having 

pacification defined so that some of their key programs remained outside of that definition, thus beyond CORDS control. For example, Komer insisted 

that land reform should be a major part of pacification under CORDS, but USAID succeeded in retaining 

control of that program. Komer finally gave up trying. 

The CORDS program, as a successful civil-military 

team, was effective in rationalizing country-wide 

pacification in its own operational stovepipe, from the 

tactical through the operational levels. Unlike Malaya, 

no individual or organization coordinated all governmental activities in Vietnam. The prerogatives of 

parent institutions, their cultures, and approaches remained factors that prevented a truly comprehensive 

approach. Each of the separate agencies of the U.S. 

Government continued to have separate programs 

running in Vietnam so there was no way around this 

at the operational level. CORDS constituted only one 
320

staff directorate out of five within MACV. Additionally, the MACV commanders in Vietnam, both General William Westmorland and his successor, General 

Creighton Abrams, ensured that there would be no 

linking of the pacification program with military combat operations.14

The existing military advisors for the Vietnamese 

Army, and special units like Special Forces and Rangers, remained outside of the control of CORDS. The 

best CORDS could offer was a bureaucratic overlay 

that facilitated better communication. The rift between 

regular military forces and the civilians and irregulars 

whose primary focus was on counterinsurgency and 

pacification, in particular, remained a problem. Ken 

Quinn, a Foreign Service officer with no military training who served four tours with CORDS in the Mekong 

Delta, posed the dilemma this way:

 There was always a little cultural difference between 

civilian and military [agencies], but one of the great 

lessons of CORDS was that it was not just the different 

colors of your clothes but where you sat that made a 

difference in your attitudes. The Army guys who were 

in the MACV team, and I generally saw eye to eye, but 

it was a different view than Army guys in the same 

town who were advisors to the ARVN 9th Division. 

The two groups saw different wars from different perspectives with different counterparts.15

Bruce Kinsey, a Foreign Service officer working 

for CORDS in Long An, recalled similar problems. 

Despite generally good relations between personnel 

working for CORDS, he remembered miscommunications with the regular military that had very real and 

tragic consequences: 
321

There was a village that I worked with like crazy. I 

had a cadre team in there. We strung up barbed wire 

and threw down tin cans on the perimeter so if the 

guerrillas came in you could hear them more easily. 

And we set up a school and the VC blew it up. It was 

fighting tooth and nail. The Third Brigade of the Ninth 

Division came in and set up at the end of the road that 

went through this hamlet. They ran these huge deuceand-a-half trucks through there, full of garbage, and 

ammunition, and god knows what else. They were 

scared to death, so they ran them at fifty miles an hour. 

They killed like eleven Vietnamese kids. I talked to 

those people until I was blue in the face. And I put up 

signs saying, “U.S. Drivers—Friendly Hamlet—Slow 

Down” and they wouldn’t.16

No civil-military teaming effort can be successful without host nation buy-in. Ensuring continual 

linking with the host nation as part of the effort can 

mean the difference between success and failure. In 

Vietnam, after Tet 1968, the Vietnamese Government 

under Nguyen Van Thieu was not interested in partnering in the countryside in civil programs in support 

of the CORDS efforts. Six months after Tet, he finally 

accepted a CORDS pacification campaign to push the 

government out to the countryside. But the implementation of this program by the Vietnamese government was more designed to secure their political 

future. What was learned in Vietnam, as in Malaya, 

is that even with successful civil-military teaming, 

unless it encompasses the comprehensive approach 

countrywide, including the host nation, success will 

be elusive.

Unlike the UK in Malaya, the U.S. governmental 

solution to Vietnam never embraced a comprehensive approach that emphasized civil-military teaming coordinated at all levels throughout the country. 
322

Instead, all of the separate agencies of the U.S. Government continued to protect their own institutions, 

fearful of each other and especially concerned of being 

overcome by the much larger DoD. CORDS, operating in its own “lane,” was the exception. It focused 

on the population, built legitimacy and local capacity 

to provide the population good governance, security, 

and economic opportunity. The CORDS program succeeded in its own lane because it developed a workable plan and a bureaucratic structure that was able to 

execute that plan, it had a leader with the appropriate understanding and personality, it had resources, 

and it had a President in Washington that provided 

the requisite authorities but did not directly interfere 

once the program was launched. However, in 1968 

when Komer left, the Military Assistance Command 

used that opportunity to ensure that Ambassador 

William Colby, his replacement, stuck closely within 

the boundaries of the programs and reduced CORDS 

former independence. British Field Marshall Bernard 

Montgomery was correct in that you have to have the 

“man” to succeed at civil military teaming.17

Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Afghanistan’s experiment with civil-military teaming more closely resembles Vietnam than Malaya. But 

as in the other two cases, the United States came to 

realize that no progress was going to be made in Afghanistan until all of the agencies of the U.S. Government could work together. As General David Petraeus 

wrote to all of the U.S. Government agencies upon assuming command, there would be no pure military 

solution for the Afghanistan conflict. The solution, 

he wrote, lies in contributing to a “team of teams” to 
323

achieve unity of effort with diplomatic, international 

civilian, and Afghan partners to conduct a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign.18

The initial focus of the U.S. national guidance for 

Afghanistan was on destroying the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, infrastructure, and other terrorist 

groups; convincing or compelling states and nonstate 

organizations to cease supporting terrorism; and providing military support to humanitarian operations. 

The focus was not on conducting a comprehensive approach toward addressing the drivers of conflict and 

building local Afghan capacity to transform conflict to 

obtain a viable peace. Instead, the U.S. national planning guidance focused on combat operations and was 

clear that the U.S. military would not participate in 

nation-building. In June 2002, following the deployment of the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180 

(centered on the XVIII Airborne Corps), it became 

clear that success in Afghanistan was tied to the support of a viable state and the operational concept 

slowly shifted toward stability operations. One of the 

key organizations to carry out this new direction was 

the PRT.19

The civil-military teaming concept that was 

launched in Afghanistan in December 2002 consisted 

of U.S. interagency personnel based around an Army 

Civil Affairs lead that would also include representation from the Afghan government. The PRT’s mission 

was: to facilitate information sharing among various 

agencies; to strengthen and extend Afghanistan governmental influence; to provide advice and assistance; 

and, to provide a safer environment by assisting with 

the regional development of the Afghan Nation Army 

(ANA) and local Afghan law enforcement authorities. 

The mission encompassed three major objectives: ex-
324

tend the authority of the Afghan central government; 

improve security; and, promote reconstruction. The 

PRT’s role is to ensure that international efforts are 

in line with the host nation’s development intentions 

and, in doing so, assess and, if possible, mitigate the 

constraints to development. As the security environment improves, the PRT is intended to be phased out 

as stabilization and reconstruction programs shift to 

longer-term development programs. The PRT will 

cease to exist when normal development operations 

can be carried out without its assistance.20

There are structural differences between the PRTs 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. PRTs in Afghanistan typically consist of 50 to 100 members, with only three or 

four representatives from civilian government agencies. Though an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel or Navy 

Commander leads the PRT, he does not have authority over non-DoD personnel. In Iraq, PRTs are similar in size but have a slightly smaller percentage of 

military personnel, and a Department of State officer 

directs the PRT. However, many DoD officers are still 

obligated to fill slots normally considered within the 

purview of civilian agencies. Additionally, there are 

multiple PRTs from different nations, each with their 

own procedures and objectives, working in their own 

sectors further compounding the problem.21

All of the studies of the PRTs conclude that they 

are not effective civil-military teams, and that there is 

no comprehensive approach at the operational level 

that even comes close to the level of coordination and 

cooperation in either Malaya or Vietnam. There is neither the structure nor the management procedures in 

theater to achieve the comprehensive approach that 

is required for success. Each country and the separate 

national and international funds, agencies, and or-
325

ganizations continue their own programs in parallel 

with the PRTs whose activities may be coordinated 

with kinetic military operations. Both in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, the shortcomings of Vietnam have not only 

been replicated but magnified. 

Unlike CORDS, there is no unifying structure at 

all levels to coordinate the civil military approach of 

the PRTs. This has translated into a lack of clear operational guidance and the ad hoc nature of most of 

the programs and approaches. Unlike CORDS, where 

the efficiency reports of the members were written by 

CORDS members, each agency retains its own control 

in the PRTs. Civilian members sometimes have dual 

or triple loyalties. Civilian agency personnel answer 

to the PRT commander or team leader, to a line of operations (such as rule-of-law) director or agency mission director housed at the Embassy, and/or to their 

home agency in Washington. It is sometimes unclear 

whether a civilian agency representative is a member 

of the PRT or an agency liaison to the PRT. Neither the 

Department of State nor the DoD commander has been 

given authority over the members of the PRT who are 

from other agencies, so progress is made by consensus, if possible. The lack of central command for the 

PRT mirrors the larger problem in all of Afghanistan 

where multiple chains of command (embassy, U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan [USFOR-A], Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, International Security Assistance Forces [ISAF], and allies) often lead to 

confusion and disagreement over mission goals.22

There are no Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 

that all of the agencies have agreed to, therefore each 

agency uses its own set of procedures and approaches. 

Often, because the military runs the operational cell 

and has available funds, they call the shots thus giv-
326

ing the PRT a decidedly military bent. Because there 

is no official doctrine or tactics, techniques, or procedures for PRTs either in the United States or NATO, 

each theater and PRT rotation has to work out its own 

approaches based on previous handbooks, lessons 

learned, and desk-side guides. There is no doctrinal 

guidance on how PRTs are to conduct a collaborative 

planning and management process. The ISAF Handbook is the most frequently cited source for a PRT 

mission statement, and the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned (CALL) has issued a more detailed PRT Playbook containing tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(which they are in the process of revising), while the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) produced a PreDoctrinal Research White Paper on PRTs. However, 

there does not appear to be one U.S. Governmentsanctioned mission statement that is universally accepted. In Iraq, the only objectives provided to PRTs 

were in a set of metrics known as the Maturity Model, 

which measures provinces’ performance in five areas: 

rule-of-law, governance, reconciliation, political developments, and economics. Though a useful tool in 

theory, its application is varied throughout the field 

and is subjective per the individual perspectives of 

team leaders. The result is that there is little continuity 

among PRT and within PRTs, particularly as the personnel rotate in and out on a frequent basis.23

Unlike CORDS, there are multiple sources of funding for the PRT, each with its own constraints and 

restraints, reflecting the agendas of the parent agencies. The situation has been termed by the Center for 

Complex Operations (CCO) report, “convoluted.” The 

bulk of PRT funding is provided by USAID and by 

military units (primarily through the Commanders 

Emergency Response Program [CERP]). These two 
327

organizations exert direct control or provide substantial influence over the majority of U.S. PRT civil sector 

development projects and programs. From the CERP, 

the DoD elements can draw funds originally designed 

for a quick impact to stabilize an area and provide a 

bridge to long-term development, with relative ease. 

USAID personnel have access to the Local Governance and Community Development Program Fund 

(LGCD). Securing these resources, however, tends 

to be difficult and time-consuming. The Department 

of State recently established a Quick Reaction Fund 

(QRF) for its officers in Iraq. However, these funds are 

programmed according to each agency’s priority, and 

there is no standard process for the collaborative resourcing, coordinating, and prioritization of funding 

for PRT projects. The result has been those with the 

most ready access to the money calls the shots—most 

often the military. Ultimately, PRTs often choose projects based on the convenience of funds and the vision 

of providing agencies rather than addressing either 

the drivers of conflict or the structural grievances. 

This creates tensions between DoD whose original 

focus for the expenditure of funds was to “win the 

hearts and minds” by funding quick impact programs 

that would provide the most visibility for the money 

in an information campaign and USAID whose focus 

is long-term development with little interest in shortterm “hearts and minds” projects. Both organizations 

are under much pressure from their respective institutions to demonstrate progress, especially the military, 

because of a greater push to show immediate success. 

This fact, coupled with the strict statutory and regulatory guidelines that constrain the money flow, makes 

agencies disinclined to concede control without the 

achievement of an immediate tangible benefit to the 

parent institution.24
328

As in CORDS and Malaya, the involvement of the 

host nation is critical, as such, the PRTs have a spotty 

record. Often the local nations are not involved in PRT 

planning, because of the transitory nature of the personnel in the PRTs and its lack of a coherent approach 

among all of the ISAF PRTs, establishing the close 

working network with the host nation that is critical in these situations is extremely difficult. During 

interviews with key personnel in Iraq in 2008, many 

Iraqis at the provincial level were not aware of what 

the PRTs were trying to accomplish. Many saw them 

as part of the military force or just a place to leverage 

to get resources when they could not get them from 

their own government. The extent to which the PRTs 

were included in provincial processes varies widely. 

This is unlike the processes set up in Malaya where 

there was vertical and horizontal uniformity among 

all of the management and coordinating mechanisms. 

At times, the funding itself can get in the way of host 

nation development.25

Many civilian members of PRTs see CERP-funded 

programs as no longer necessary, and that the types 

of projects funded by CERP and the process by which 

CERP is spent undermines the capacity-building mission they see as paramount: In the meeting with the 

commanding general, we said, This is a little counterproductive, because we’ve been telling the Iraqis that 

the money’s running out and we’ve been using it as 

an opportunity to promote good governance, that they 

can’t expect windfalls, they need to plan rationally and 

now you want us to turn around and say, Oh, each one 

of the PRTs has $50-60 million, and we have to spend 

it fast! That completely blows our good governance 

message out of the water.26
329

However, the PRTs are only part of what should 

be a comprehensive operational level approach, but 

the approach at the operational level is also flawed. 

Much of the success depends on personal relationships among individuals, and not the authorities, policy, processes, and mechanisms. There are disconnects 

among the U.S. military, allies, PRTs, U.S. Embassy, 

UN, other national embassies, other NGOs, and private contractors—all attempting to deal with the host 

nation. No overarching comprehensive approach exists. No formalized process has ever existed regarding 

the lines of communication and hierarchy between the 

PRT office at the embassy and the PRTs and their personnel in the field. Like so many other aspects of PRT 

planning and activities, American personnel working 

at the PRTs around Afghanistan have never known 

what to expect from their Embassy counterparts—

leading to a great deal of confusion and frustration as 

each side strives to carry out its duties. Given the general ability of UN missions to maintain longer-term 

operations in host countries, PRT members should 

consistently try to search for and encourage areas of 

overlap between their own activities and those of UN 

bodies in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to increase 

the sustainability of potentially shared projects. 

The PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq have no doctrine that establishes a conceptual framework, no established structures that are able to execute activities 

within that framework and provide a platform for all 

stakeholders, including helping the local nationals to 

be a part of the solution. There is no single leader at 

either the operational or strategic level, with the appropriate access to higher authority and resources 

that is able to pull all of the various separate agencies 

together in a holistic manner. There is insufficient hu-
330

man capital to fill the teams with the correct capability. The concept of some structure, like a PRT, nested 

within an overall comprehensive approach at the operational level appears to be valid but the devil lies in 

the details, particularly in the execution.

Case Conclusions.

When civil-military teaming works from the strategic through the tactical level, it enhances a comprehensive approach that can enable the host nation to 

deal with the sources of conflict, improve local capacity, and build the foundation for a viable peace. But 

there are few examples of such success. A long practice in both the UK and the United States of subordinating military action to civil authority proved to be 

insufficient to create effective civil-military teaming. 

In the cases described above, certain best practices 

have been identified that have improved such teaming. These practices have been codified in the last few 

years, notably, in the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction by the United States Institute 

of Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and 

Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and in The Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook 

developed by the Applied Physics Lab at Johns Hopkins in support of U.S. Special Operations Command. 

These practices are identifying the right leadership 

and are developing human resources for the team; 

obtaining key authorities, agreements, and processes; 

developing a shared understanding of the problem 

and vision of the goal; obtaining and managing resources through appropriate structures and processes; 

and ensuring host nation ownership. 
331

In Malaya, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, having the 

right leader supported by the best team made all the 

difference. There have been several U.S. Government 

initiatives to improve the processes across all agencies 

of government for the selection and education of key 

personnel. Two of the principal initiatives are: the National Security Professionals, established by executive 

order in 2007 to develop a cadre of government-wide 

personnel to lead and execute coordinated, effective 

national security operations; and the Interagency 

Management System (IMS) established by presidential 

directive and approved by the Deputies Committee of 

the NSC in March 2007 to establish a means to successfully integrate the instruments of national power. 

Both have established educational and training programs open to all government agencies. There is even 

a proposed bill in committee, House Resolution 6249, 

submitted on September 29, 2010, by then Congressman Ike Skelton, former chairman of the House Armed 

Services Committee, to mandate a system to educate, 

train, and develop interagency nation security professionals across the government. If passed into law and 

funded, it will be a catalyst.27

However, these governmental initiatives are limited and the RAND Corporation has identified two 

problematic issues. First, the lack of civilian and military capacity to perform these stability tasks and second, the need for the United States to project a U.S. 

Government civilian face rather than a military one to 

support U.S. foreign policy goals. There is little slack 

or flexibility in the civil capacity of the U.S. Government. Unlike the military, the civilian organizations 

are fully committed all the time and have no excess 

capacity for training and preparation for emerging 

crises. This has been recognized and the Department 
332

of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has designed a Civilian Response 

Corps (CRC) to meet some of this need. Currently it is 

partially funded and slowly recruiting members. The 

DoD realized that it had limited capacity to advise the 

defense ministries of other countries and initiated the 

Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) to address 

that shortfall. 

 While civilian agencies clearly have many of the capabilities required in [Security, Stability, Transition, and 

Reconstruction] SSTR operations, they lack capacity. 

The two primary DoD interagency partners, DoS and 

USAID, are relatively small organizations with limited 

surge capacity to support large-scale, complex SSTR 

operations. In fact, based on the numbers and availability of appropriate personnel, the organic capacity 

of the Army in stability operations (most of all, Civil 

Affairs) can dwarf the capacity of USAID and DoS. 

Moreover, numbers alone tell only a part of the story. 

There is a very different orientation between the civilian agencies and the military. The former’s organizational focus is on the steady state, while the latter’s 

focus is contingency response.28

The development of in-house expertise in the U.S. 

Government, both civil and military, will take time, 

and there is no certainty that the appropriate capacity 

or capability will be available when needed. As the 

contracting business has expanded, talent has shifted 

from the military, academic, and governmental agencies toward the contractors. Now the only place some 

of the expertise exists is in the private sector. 

As all of these government agencies have increasingly relied on contractors for additional support so 

much so that we must now now consider contractors 

as part of the civil-military team. Contractors, many 
333

who use local nationals, can provide critical knowledge of the terrain, culture, language, social and political structures, as well as have special skills in the 

stability sectors. As Sam Meiss, a career Naval Officer 

and a contractor in Afghanistan and Iraq has observed:

There is an inherent and growing core of talent available within the ‘contractor’ community—who possess a deep reservoir of realistic knowledge, skills, 

abilities with an inherent capacity to provide physical 

sustainment to the full range of tasks to be accomplished by not only the Theater Command, but [also 

by] other USG Agencies, Coalition Partners and relevant members of the International Community and 

contributing members of Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs]. Against the backdrop of the urgent need for sustainable successes at all levels of the 

challenges in Iraq [and in Afghanistan], the role of a 

truly knowledgeable contractor base can and should 

be appropriately leveraged into this complex mix of 

challenges and imperatives. . . . The huge impact of a 

truly knowledgeable core of culture, language, social, 

political, economic structure of the environment are 

monumental in consequence to ‘get it right’ in the execution of the Theatre Campaign, from the contributing U.S./Coalition military, political, economic, health 

and development communities.29

The burden is on the contacting agency to ensure 

that the knowledge is indeed present and appropriate. This is especially the case if the contracting agency 

is directly supporting the host nation and its institutions. It is incumbent on the contracting agency to insist on getting that key expertise. The military and the 

other agencies of government must also be prepared 

to handle this contracting. As the Ganser Report, released in November 2007, and a number of other reports have stated, neither the Army nor other federal 
334

agencies were prepared to transition to an expanded 

contracting approach that, in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, increased their contracting work load by 

over 600 percent. These organizations need a cultural 

transformation on how to appropriately use contracting to accomplish their mission.30

Contracting agencies can provide the U.S. Government with more flexible options than can be achieved 

inside the federal system. Contractors will use best 

business practices that will emphasize the most efficient and effective methods, processes, and activities to accomplish the task. Contracts can be quickly 

adapted to changing circumstances, and packages of 

expertise can be tailored to meet situations to provide 

economy-of-force and force multiplier functions, if 

done properly. As needs become apparent, as they 

will in the fluid moments of a post conflict stability 

operation, the U.S. Government can reach back, using the correct contracting vehicle, obtain, and apply 

the expertise needed. USAID has recognized this for 

years, and the majority of their efforts are provided 

through implementing partners, be they private enterprise or NGOs. 

However, there are factors that can make contracting inflexible. Unlike the case above, there are practices of using multiple agencies, multiple contractors, 

and multiple flows of money. These practices confuse 

unity of effort and obscure accountability. Contractors 

work for money and are motivated to maintain their 

contact even if it might not meet the client’s needs or 

has ceased to embody best business practices. This 

can become counterproductive because it will have a 

direct effect on the people and the government of the 

host nation, thus affecting the development of capacity and legitimacy. The struggle over the training of the 
335

Afghanistan Police is a case in point, where various 

agencies squabbled over who should have the lead 

and what the outcomes should be.31

Leaders need the authorities and processes to bring 

their programs into action. In 2007, as part of the presidential initiatives, the S/CRS developed a WoG reconstruction and stabilization planning and execution 

process to be applied at multiple levels, from the field 

to Washington, DC. This integrated planning process 

has been exercised by civil-military teams at Joint 

Forces Command and several combatant commands 

and is the basis for a planner’s course, presented regularly in Washington, DC, that prepares civilians and 

military personnel to deploy into a crisis area. As a result of the response to the Haiti Earthquake, where this 

process was not used, this initiative is being reviewed 

and the DoD, the Department of State, and USAID 

are working on a Three Ds Planning Guide to codify 

what has been learned. The three agencies agree that 

getting the appropriate agreements, authorities, and 

approaches in place is essential but, as outlined in the 

examples provided above, institutional equities must 

be considered.32

Another key is to establish a unity of purpose based 

on a shared vision of what the problem is that needs to 

be addressed. In 2008, the Deputies Committee of the 

National Security Council endorsed the Interagency 

Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) as a key tool 

for all agencies to use in achieving an agreed upon assessment of the problem. This framework is a USAID 

product based on World Bank assessments. The ICAF 

is a framework that can be used to help people from 

different U.S. Government departments and agencies 

work together to reach a shared understanding of a 

country’s conflict dynamics and reach a consensus on 
336

potential entry points for additional U.S. Government 

efforts. This assessment will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in 

the host country or region. 

Another tool that has been developed and is being 

used in Afghanistan is the District Stability Framework (DSF). It is a methodology designed for use, by 

both military and civilian personnel, to identify the 

underlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of 

instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness 

of programming. It is employed to gather information 

using the following lenses: operational environment; 

cultural environment; local perceptions; and, stability/instability dynamics. This information then helps 

identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust programming that is intended to diminish the causes of 

instability or conflict. It remains to be seen if these 

tools will be institutionalized.33

Early resources, judiciously applied, can produce 

quick and visible results and lead to increasing host 

nation ownership. Malaya solved the resource problem by centralizing management, but it has been a 

challenge in each of the other conflicts discussed in 

this chapter. CORDS had a uniformed resource flow, 

but the PRTs do not. Funding has been a source of division and contention that at times limits the impact 

of civil-military teams. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the other agencies of government have been reluctant to t relinquish their institutional prerogatives. 

In 2007, the Interagency Management System for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S IMS) was created to provide an organizational structure for a WoG 

approach to crisis situations, not only to plan but also 

to manage the resources. It is an institutionalized sys-
337

tem of interagency bodies that manages WoG stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations. 

However, although exercised in several combatant 

command exercises, the IMS, as such, has not been 

used as intended outside of the exercises. S/CRS has 

deployed parts of the IMS to provide key functions to 

the Country Team and the combatant command. For 

example, in 2008 in Afghanistan, S/CRS put together 

a civil-military team, the Integrated Civilian-Military 

Action Group (ICMAG), that served as a planning 

staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. It was essential in 

developing the regional and provincial Civilian-Military plans in regional Command-East and South and 

also part of the ISAF team that developed the overall 

U.S. Government Civilian-Military Campaign Plan 

for Support of Afghanistan. In August 2009, ICMAG 

evolved within the Political-Military Affairs section 

of the U.S. Embassy into the Civilian-Military Plans 

and Assessments Sub-Section (CMPASS). These IMS 

structures and concepts provide opportunity to explore civil and military teaming, and with the publication of the Department of State’s QDDR, the IMS has 

been reevaluated as not being flexible enough and will 

be revised. 

At the tactical level, the PRTs have been a fixture of 

our approach for over 10 years, and some type of PRT 

concept has been used by many at least since the 1950s 

when the French developed the Section Administrative 

Specialisee (SAS) in Algeria.34 The PRTs are still ad hoc 

organizations and, as of yet, have not been considered 

as a concept worthy of either force design or doctrine 

development. The structure, personnel, policy, and 

procedures have been created over time and published in various hand books and studies, but these 

lessons have not migrated into doctrinal publications. 
338

By all studies and accounts, there is some utility to 

such an organization; therefore, the U.S. Government 

needs to look at Afghanistan and Iraq and project toward future needs. RAND has done several studies on 

the need to look at the PRTs and have recommended a 

civil-military teaming vision for the future. 

The IMS conceived a type of civilian PRT called 

the Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs). FACTs 

are primarily local, on-the-ground operational and action entities whose tasks are to establish a U.S. presence, provide direct information about conditions on 

the ground, and support R&S operations conducted 

at a provincial and local level. They are flexible, scalable teams responsible for a range of operations in 

governance, security, rule-of-law, infrastructure, and 

economic stabilization to provide the Chief of Mission (CoM) with maximum capacity to implement 

R&S programs. As required, they may coordinate the 

field execution of projects that involve the activities 

and resources of not only the U.S. Government, but 

also foreign governments, the UN, other international 

governmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, or host 

nations (HN). While remaining under CoM authority, FACTs may integrate with U.S. or foreign military 

forces to maintain unity of effort. In this regard, FACTs 

build upon the lessons learned from PRTs established 

for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but their role 

in assessments, plan revisions, and sub-national field 

level planning is also important. 

The FACT concept offers an opportunity to look 

beyond the PRTs of Iraq and Afghanistan and consider this as a WoG development that could be the basis 

for civil-military teaming at the implementation level. 

It is an opportunity to rationalize and formalize what 

has been ad hoc by conducting parallel force design 
339

force development with the other agencies of the U.S. 

Government. As the U.S. Government reorients itself 

in the wake of the QDDR with declining resources, it 

needs to look at some of the concepts that have been 

proposed and subject them to intense scrutiny.35

CONCLUSIONS

The three cases above demonstrate that without 

the HN taking ownership, there is no hope for success. While writing The Guidelines for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction, the USIP reviewed all of the literature 

and interviewed many practitioners around the world 

and all agreed that HN ownership was the key, crosscutting principle. The international community can 

impose stability, but only the locals can achieve a sustainable peace. The civil-military team must understand the local context and craft programs and operations that are sensitive to that context. Even in Malaya, 

where the UK had been for years, the British initially 

did not appreciate the changes that had occurred as a 

result of World War II. 

Without context, fostering ownership will be difficult, but that is the ultimate responsibility for the civilmilitary team. This means allowing local and national 

governments and civil society to lead and partner in 

the planning and implementation. This starts at the 

top, and General Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry state:

Through the Kabul Process and Afghan National 

Priority Programs and other sector strategies, the 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA) has articulated its priorities. The U.S. efforts 

in Afghanistan support those priorities, which are 
340

reflected throughout this document. The Plan, which 

incorporates Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development, 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and other U.S. agencies‘ priorities and strategies, integrates joint and interagency 

elements under one umbrella, oriented toward a common mission. The plan is also intended to communicate USG priorities to the international community 

and the Afghan Government.36

The challenge is in implementation. The PRTs are 

designed to have Afghans involved in their process, 

but a great deal depends on selecting the right people 

with the appropriate skills but, as we have seen, the 

recruiting and training programs coupled with the 

personal rotation policy are inadequate. 

As long as the focus of the civil-military team is on 

the population, building legitimacy and local capacity 

to provide the population good governance, success 

is possible. Having a workable plan that establishes: 

a framework plan; developing structures and procedures that can execute that plan; providing a platform 

for all stakeholders, especially for the local nationals 

to be a part of the solution; and, selecting a leader 

with the appropriate understanding and personality 

along with adequate, resources and support from the 

National Government; are the minimum essential requirements for success.
341

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s QDDR Town Hall, updated on December 15, 2010, available from http://secretaryclinton.

wordpress.com/2010/12/15/secretary-of-state-hillary-clintons-qddrtown-hall/.

2. Steven J Hadley et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs for the 21st Century, The Final Report 

of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 

DC: USIP, 2010, p. 37.

3. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008, pp. 1-4. 

4. William J Olson, “Interagency Coordination: The Normal 

Accident or the Essence of Indecision,” in Gabriel Marcella, ed., 

Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 

2008, p. 223.

5. Ibid., p. 229.

6. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, IL: University of 

Chicago Press, 2005, p. 87.

7. The British Military Administration assigned Sir Harold 

MacMichael to gather the Malay state ruler’s approval for the 

Malayan Union. They agreed, though most sources believed that 

their agreement was given very reluctantly and perhaps from fear 

they would be dethroned. The rulers (sultans) gave all powers 

to the British Crown except for religious matters. Ariffin Omar, 

Mangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945-

1950, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1993. 

8. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, “The Interagency Process and 

Malaya: The British Experience,” The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute (CSI), 2008, p. 95.

9. Ibid., p. 102; Nagl, p. 74.
342

10. Joel Hamby, “Civil-Military Operations Joint Doctrine and 

the Malayan Emergency,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 2002, p. 

61; Nagl, p. 74.

11. Nagl, p. 166.

12. Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganization for Pacification Support, Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 

1999, p. 23.

13. Major John Rogan, “Improving Interagency Coordination 

and Unity of Effort: An Organizational Analysis of the Contemporary Provincial Reconstruction Team,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010, p. 23; Scoville, p. 66.

14. Richard Weitz, “CORDS and the Whole of Government 

Approach: Vietnam, Afghanistan and Beyond,” Small Wars Journal, February 4, 2010, p. 7; Scoville, pp. 67, 82.

15. Jeffrey Woods, “Counterinsurgency, the Interagency 

Process, and Vietnam: The American Experience,” in Kendall 

Gott, ed., The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI), 

2008, p. 110.

16. Ibid.

17. Scoville, p. 83.

18. General David Petraeus, “Letter to the Soldiers, Sailors, 

Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of NATO’s International Security 

Assistance Force,” July 4, 2010. 

19. William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, Observations on Civil Military Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations institute (PKSOI), 2004, p. ix.

20. CJCMOTF, “Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept,” 

briefing slides, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 3, 2003. The detailed 

mission of PRTs is:
343

Assist in marginalizing causes of instability by: 

Forming and facilitating information sharing bodies that support the Interim Transitional Government of Afghanistan 

(ITGA) thus stimulating and enhancing local, regional, and 

national reconstruction efforts. Create a more safe and secure 

environment by monitoring/assessing/reporting on military, political, civil reform efforts.

Facilitate negotiations to defuse local and inter-regional tensions. 

Assist, as required, with regional development of Afghan National Army and local Afghan law enforcement/security sector authorities.

Facilitate information sharing between National/international/local organizations and agencies

ITGA Security sector and military (Afghan and Coalition). 

Facilitate/strengthen/extend ITGA influence through interaction with political, military and community leaders. 

Provide expert advice, as needed, to local leaders/officials 

in the province. Monitor local and regional situation via conducting frequent patrols in both civil and security sectors.

Monitor, assist, and report on United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan-Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration [UNAMA-DDR] process. 

Report information on: Government operations, Infrastructure improvements, Intra-regional commerce, Health care/

basic human needs, Security Operations, Economic improvement. 

Afghan acceptance of the rule of law/ arbitration of disputes 

in a non-violent and peaceful manner. 

Report on local/provincial leader’s acceptance of the ITGA. 
344

Handbook: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Observations, Insights, Lessons, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons 

Learned (CALL), November 2010, p. 5. 

21. Lawner, pp. 22-23.

22. Center for Complex Operations (CCO), PRT Interagency 

Lessons Learned Project October 2010, Washington, DC: National 

Defense University (NDU) Press, October 2010, pp. 5-8.

23. Ibid., pp. 18-24. 

24. Ibid., pp. 17-20; Flavin, p. 20; Lawner, p. 24. 

25. Terrence Kelly, “PRT Lessons from IRAQ,” in Christopher 

M. Schnaubelt, ed., Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in 

Semi-permissive Environments, Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, June 2009, p.113.

26. CCO, p. 18.

27. Civilian Personnel Management Service Webpage, available from www.cpms.osd.mil/lpdd/NSPD/NSPD_index.aspx; U.S. 

Congress, House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act of 2010, H.R. 6249, 111th Cong., 

as introduced by the House, September 29, 2010. 

28. Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke 

Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, and Zachary Haldeman, Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Arroyo Center, 2009, p. 20; see also Nora Bensahel, Olga 

Oliker, and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009.

29. Sam Meese, “A Contractor on the Battlefield: Observations and Opportunities,” Carlisle, PA: PKSOI, three unpublished 

research papers.

30. Dr. Jacques S. Gansler et.al., “Urgent Reform Required: 

Army Expeditionary Contracting,” Report of the Commission on 

Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
345

Operations, Washington DC: Department of the Army, October 

31, 2007, pp. 11, 18, 22.

31. Christine Spolar, “Military Training of Afghan National 

Police Mired in Contract Dispute,” Huffington Post Investigative Fund, February 22, 2010, available from www.huffingtonpost.

com/2010/02/22/military-training-of-afgh_n_471519.html; T. Christian Miller, Mark Hosenball, and Ron Moreau, “The Gang That 

Couldn’t Shoot Straight,” Newsweek, March 19, 2010, available 

from www.newsweek.com/id/235221.

32. 3D Planning Guide: Working Draft 2011, Washington, DC: 

Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency 

for International Development, 2011; D. Guha-Sapir, T. Kirsch, 

S. Dooling, and A. Sirois, Earthquake Interagency Lessons Learned 

Workshop Report June 22, 2010, Washington, DC: USAID, 2010.

33. Joint Publication 3-07 Signature Draft Stability Operations, 

Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 2011. Annex A explains the 

various assessment tools. 

34. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace; Algeria 1954-1962, 

New York: Viking Press 1977, pp. 108-109. The Section Administrative Specialisee (SAS) corps was created to take back the countryside. It consisted of 400 detachments of small teams led by 

an army captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs. 

The team was to deal with all aspects of life in the countryside 

from development to agriculture, to justice, to health, to building 

schools. They were successful in keeping the countryside out of 

the conflict and were seen by the National Liberation Front – Algeria (FLN) as a major threat. 

35. Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Suffolk, VA: 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, February 17, 2010, p. II-4; State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Afghanistan: Continued Planning Support,” Washington DC: Department of State, 

December 22, 2010, p. 2. 

36. United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan: U.S. 

Forces Afghanistan and U.S. Embassy Afghanistan, February 

2011, p. i. 

347

CHAPTER 12

ETHICAL LESSONS ON MAXIMIZING

PRIVATE CONTRACTOR VALUE

IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Doug Brooks

Mackenzie Duelge

INTRODUCTION

Private sector contracting has become an integral 

part of modern international operations, and in Afghanistan and Iraq contracting has been largely fruitful, despite some well-publicized problems and the 

enormous difficulties inherent to reconstructions in 

the midst of violent conflicts. Casual observers may 

not perceive that the biggest problems faced by private contractors are not ethical problems of fraud or 

abuse, but rather are grander problems of waste. This 

waste stems from poor contract design and management, and is neither new nor unforeseen, but can be 

difficult and time intensive to address. The lessons 

learned from past experience in stability operations 

have not always been heeded, and the consequences of 

failing to heed those lessons have plagued reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the 

government’s contracting capacity has not always 

matched the ambitious goals set by the presidential 

administration in office at the time, and this mismatch 

has resulted in a lack of clarity and consistency. In 

spite of these problems, the level of support for the 

troops has been unmatched in history, and significant 

support, reconstruction, and development goals were 

achieved in the midst of war.
348

This generally positive perspective is not just an 

industry perspective; it is shared by government investigative and research organizations such as the 

Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 

and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), who, while citing many failures and 

problems, are all largely in agreement that contracting 

in Afghanistan and Iraq has functioned reasonably 

well. When discussing private security contracting, 

problems are generally split into three categories: 

waste, fraud, and abuse. By far the biggest drain on 

stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has come 

as a result of waste.1

 Waste is a problem on the clientside of the process that includes failures of planning, 

coordination, contract oversight and management, 

flexibility, and communication. The greatest longterm value of all the commissions and investigative 

generals will be their influence on improving these 

structural aspects of future contingency operations 

that will be conducted by the U.S. Government and 

the larger international community.

This chapter examines the role of the private sector 

in reconstruction and stability operations through several lenses. First, the chapter reviews how the general 

attitude toward contractors has hindered the ability of 

the contractors to perform and how this attitude has 

interfered with the overall success of stability operations. Next, the chapter provides a discussion of the 

weaknesses of the government-private sector partnership. Then, the chapter outlines the future of private 

sector contractors in stability operations. Finally, an 

analysis is provided on how this role fits into the over-
349

all picture to recommend not only a course of action 

vis-à-vis contractors, but also the kind of overall structure that best utilizes all of the resources available in 

stability, peacekeeping, and military operations.

Most contingency contractors will agree that there 

is much that can be done to tackle fraud and abuse, 

but limiting waste requires structural improvements 

in the conduct of contingency operations. Political 

constraints, preferences for speed over efficiency, and 

interagency and interorganizational noncooperation 

hamper the ability of the actors to address and begin 

to solve the waste issue. As is the case in all international operations, private sector security operations 

are not the product of a single agency, organization, 

or government. Goals are set by one agency, budgets 

by another, and the ground rules for operations may 

be set by yet another. All of these requirements must 

then be met by the private contractor, whose future 

contracts may depend more on compliance than on 

success. The many facets of private sector-government 

collaborations mean that a new, successful, cooperative model cannot simply integrate governments and 

governmental agencies, but must also include those 

who work with the government, but who are not a part 

of it. While setbacks and failures can cost the stability 

operations industry millions of dollars and sometimes 

the lives of their employees, avoidable problems also 

cost the international community time, resources and 

ultimately human lives on a far more catastrophic 

scale. 

The role of the private sector in Afghanistan and 

Iraq has been misunderstood by many analysts and 

journalists, and thus, predictably, it has also been 

mischaracterized by the media (albeit sometimes intentionally to ensure a sensational impact). There has 
350

been an improvement in recent coverage, especially 

since the heady days of 2004-08 when coverage of the 

industry was dominated by glaringly exaggerated accounts focused on Western private security companies 

(PSCs). Western employees of PSCs earned the majority of the media coverage while comprising a tiny percentage of the actual contractors (less than 3 percent)2

working in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is no wonder that 

any subsequent analysis was skewed as a result. 

Recently, it is interesting to note that while the proportion of contractors engaged in security operations 

has increased (to almost 20 percent in some places3), 

media coverage of the private sector has shifted focus to logistics, construction, demining, training, and 

other essential stability activities. It is possible that the 

shift to more positive (though only marginally so) coverage of private security is the result of a transition to 

more reconstruction-centric roles for the contractors.4

These more mundane activities lead to stories that do 

not have quite the same flair, but they also represent 

the bulk of the industry operations and value, and 

comprise the largest potential for poor planning and 

waste. It seems then, that media coverage has shifted 

to topics where it has the greatest potential to help repair the most significant problem facing private security operations.

The problematic coverage of private sector stability 

operations in academia and the media has hampered 

constructive, rational discussion of the optimization 

of private sector actors’ work in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The discussion has long focused on issues of fraud and 

abuse and has failed to take on the more difficult questions of role definition for contractors in stability operations and waste minimization. The discussion going 

forward needs to determine where the private sector 

can provide the greatest value to stability operations, 
351

while ensuring ethical behavior at the same time. Serious analysts and academics have taken a long-term 

view of the role of the private sector in security operations; they have looked beyond Afghanistan and 

Iraq. Even accepting the realities of private security 

operations, the lessons learned from Afghanistan and 

Iraq have enormously positive potential to influence 

future international stability operations. Many laws, 

regulations and guidelines are being developed as a 

direct result of experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

and if the wrong lessons or inappropriate rules are 

applied to future situations, then future contingency 

operations will be doomed before they even begin. 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT NEEDS AN 

ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT

Many commentators have expressed concerns 

about the propriety of for-profit firms working in 

conflict or post-conflict environments. These concerns 

have in the past turned the issue of private sector 

work into an emotional debate. Contractors are sloppily called “mercenaries” by the press, and are routinely accused of profiting from war, destruction, and 

suffering.5

 This attitude ignores the fact that stability 

operations are essential if international efforts are to 

have any chance of success in the future, not just in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, but in places like Cote d’Ivoire, 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and even 

Haiti. There are roles that private sector firms are far 

better equipped to fill than are any other kind of organizations including governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The reality is that there are 

no practical substitutes for a central private sector role 

in undertaking the thousands of necessary tasks vital 

to success.6
352

Some have claimed that the inclusion of security 

firms in security operations has amounted to the 

privatization or the outsourcing of policy.7 Obviously, it is not policies that are being privatized; it is 

execution of those policies. Private sector actors do 

not make the strategic decisions and in fact have little 

influence at the policy level. They are brought in to 

execute successfully those decisions, and often the 

means and preferences for carrying out the plan come 

from their government clients with surprisingly rigid 

requirements and little leeway for tactical flexibility. 

There has been much speculation that private firms 

are influencing political decisions about interventions, 

but there is a remarkable dearth of evidence that any 

such influence is being applied.8

 Often, criticism of the 

role of the for-profit industry misses its target because 

the real aim of the criticism is the larger policy of intervention, and the private sector is merely a convenient 

vehicle for such criticism.

The watchdog group, Taxpayers for Common 

Sense, has embraced a typical “blame the contractors” 

perspective. In their reports on contractors in Iraq, 

the group cited GAO reports to warn against contractor fraud and abuse.9

 While it is certainly important 

to work against fraud and abuse and the GAO does 

highlight certain concerns in those areas, the report 

also indicated that the most critical problem plaguing 

contractor involvement is waste, not fraud or abuse. 

According to the GAO report, waste costs accrue from 

poor planning, bad designs, poorly written government contracts, poor government management, and 

other similarly draining errors.10 Indeed, Commissioner Clark Irwin of the CWC emphasized that point 

when he commented, “Waste is a bigger issue than 

fraud or abuse . . . bad planning, bad coordination—

those are probably the biggest problems.”11 Fraud and 
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abuse are the headline-grabbers, and no one is arguing that they should be ignored, but the larger problem cannot be ignored either. In fact, addressing some 

of the waste issues, especially those related to improving management and contractual flexibility will make 

it much harder for any contractor to get away with 

fraud or abuse. Sensationalistic rhetoric may be useful 

for high profile stories but it leaves the far larger and 

more costly issues unaddressed.

Serious researchers have indeed recognized that 

the private sector has always had a role in conflicts 

and especially in reconstruction operations. The United States has tapped into the capabilities of the private 

sector to support everyone of their military operations since the beginning of its existence. The data on 

contractors throughout American history shows that 

reliance on contractors has varied, depending on the 

nature of the conflict and the status and strength of the 

military of the time. Figure 12-1 clearly demonstrates 

this relationship:

Figure 12-1. Presence of Contractor Personnel

During U.S. Military Operations.
354

Obviously some previous conflicts have involved 

more contractors than do the current operations. 

Though the ratio of contractors to military personnel 

is at an all time high of 1:1, a ratio that was previously 

matched in the Balkans, the high ratio makes sense, 

considering the nature of the missions. Stability operations require significantly more reconstruction and 

development than do typical conflicts and thus favor 

a larger civilian role. It makes little economic and operational sense to have highly trained combat soldiers 

from the U.S. all-volunteer military building schools 

or guarding sewage plants when they have strategic 

military objectives to attend to. The lowest ratio (1:55) 

was in the First Gulf War, which involved virtually no 

reconstruction or infrastructure development at all.12

One of the results of the fear and hostility toward 

contractors is that contracting operations often suffer 

a “death by a thousand cuts.” In the face of fear that 

contractors are taking advantage of the government 

or are wresting control from the government, representatives in Congress push executive departments 

for ever more detailed reports on contractor errors. In 

turn, the departments pressure their contract officers 

(those responsible for managing public-private contracts) who pressure their contract officer representatives (CORs) for the same minute reporting of issues. 

This intense scrutiny shifts the focus of the contractors 

and government managers alike away from the success of the mission and the policy and toward finding 

and preventing ever more harmless errors. Instead of 

spending time carrying out the mission, the contractors must watch their every move to ensure that they 

will not lose their contract over a single error, inappropriate personal action, or unverifiable cost, no matter how insignificant.13
355

This emphasis on minutiae to the overall detriment 

of the mission has been called “vengeance contract 

management.”14 This term comes from the idea that 

all too often, any deviation from the contract draws 

immediate reprisals against the contracting company, due to political hostility and suspicion toward 

the firm, the private sector in general, or even the 

larger geo-political mission itself. Any experienced 

organization working for a government expects multiple audits and sometimes micro-oversight on highprofile contracts; however, the nature of contingency 

operations means that circumstances on the ground 

can change quickly. The evolving realities in the field 

and the constantly fluctuating levels of risk can delay 

or frequently necessitate contract modifications. Unforeseeable problems will always arise in conflict and 

post-conflict situations, but unfortunately, in an era 

with this kind of vengeance contract management, the 

constant scrutiny can land these problems on the front 

page of the New York Times. Once public and government opinion has turned against the contractor, there 

may no longer be the time or ability to actually solve 

the problem. Perhaps worse yet, this vengeance contract management may go to its logical extreme and 

actually provide an incentive for concealing problems. 

When the emphasis is on blame rather than finding a 

solution, the operation, the taxpayer, the policies, and 

eventually, the local population in the area of operation, will suffer the consequences.15

FERRETTING OUT THE PROBLEM

As the saying goes, “where there’s smoke, there’s 

fire,” even if the fire is a lot smaller than expected. So, 

while contracting operations have suffered from pub-
356

lic and government scrutiny, the reality is, of course, 

that the scrutiny has revealed that all is not perfect in 

contracting operations. The goal, then, should be to 

determine the real problems and find ways to solve 

them, both in advance and in hindsight. A number of 

oversight agencies and investigators have identified 

the biggest problems suffered in contracting operations, and despite documented cases of fraud and/or 

abuse, the reports agree that the biggest problem is 

waste. 

The Gansler Report of 2007 makes four key recommendations. 16 They include: improving the quality and prestige of the Army contracting community; 

improving the structure of contracting offices to facilitate control and responsibility; and, engaging the 

support of the legislature to ensure effectiveness. The 

report strives to identify the problems of military 

contracting, and to correct them for future engagements. Overall, the report emphasizes the continuing 

importance of private sector contractors to the military and post-conflict operations. In acknowledging 

this importance, the Gansler Report also indicates 

that contractors are not being effectively used. When 

identifying the problems with military contractors, 

the Gansler Report briefly mentions issues like fraud 

and abuse, but mainly focuses on issues of contract 

management, and treats contract management as a far 

bigger and more worthwhile problem to address. Not 

only does the report insist that contract management 

reform is immediately necessary, but it also cites the 

experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq as evidence of 

the changes that need to be made. The Gansler Report 

cites financial management, civil-military cooperation, contracting and contract management, and training and education, among other things, as the major 
357

problems between the military and the private sector 

in current operations. 

In some senses, the Gansler Report, and the reforms that followed, rejected a WoG approach. The 

report recommended the consolidation of military 

contracting into a new, larger, and better trained office. Where it might have argued for more intense 

oversight, it instead argued for increased flexibility. 

The SIGIR, Stuart Bowen, has gone a step further 

and argued for a single government office to handle 

contingency contracting.17 In fact, the Gansler Report 

grasped the unique nature of contingency operations 

and attempted to inject changes that are vital to effective contracting in conflict, post-conflict, and disaster 

relief operations.

The report insisted on the importance of putting 

contract officers on the ground to interact with the 

contractors. This is a kind of oversight that allows 

for rapid contractual modifications to address fastchanging events typical to conflict and reconstruction situations. While the segregation of contracting 

into its own office shows a general rejection of WoG 

principles, the report also talks about the importance 

of integrating contractors into the overall military 

and post-conflict operations of the government. The 

Gansler Report says that these operations depend on 

a variety of players who come from both the private 

and public sectors. The argument for greater cooperation and integration between the military, agencies, 

and contracting firms is actually one that embraces 

WoG principles. This seemingly conflicting perspective has some intriguing implications for WoG that we 

will explore in our conclusion.

The Gansler Report is not the only detailed report 

that attempts to discover the real problems with secu-
358

rity contracting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and worldwide 

stability operations. In 2008, Congress established a 

Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC). The 

CWC was essentially created in response to some of 

the more sensational reports of fraud and abuse cited 

above. After much investigation, the CWC largely 

agreed with the Gansler Report that contract management is the real problem plaguing contractors and the 

government alike.18 While certainly fraud and abuse 

occur (as they do in nearly every business), it is waste 

that is the most stunning problem in regards to the 

work of the contractors. The CWC report points out 

that many contracts have been awarded without 

knowing if a contractor has the physical capacity to 

monitor and adequately bill for services performed. 

These companies lack the ability to record what they 

have done, what they have spent, and what their services are worth under their contracts. These business 

system deficiencies have led to at least $13 billion of 

disputed charges from contracting firms. Some were 

the result of simple errors, but others were true cases 

of waste where money was spent unnecessarily. As 

the report says, “Without pre‐award audits, the risk 

grows that contracts will be awarded to unqualified 

bidders and that contract prices may be unreasonably 

high.”19

Another factor that contributes to the problem of 

waste is the problem of absentee oversight, which is 

particularly severe in Afghanistan. More often than 

not, contracts in Afghanistan are monitored remotely, 

meaning that there is no contract officer on the ground 

to allow the contractors to adjust their mission or to 

reallocate their funds more effectively. CORs—often 

military officers quickly trained for the role—have 

been used to fill some gaps, but in reality they have 
359

limited experience and ultimately no authority. 

Changes, therefore, take time and cannot be effected 

as immediate responses to changing conditions. This 

means money is spent on objectives that are unnecessary, and once the money is spent, it cannot be unspent.20

Further supporting the notion that poor contract 

management is the biggest problem and a primary 

source of waste were significant findings of both the 

Gansler Report and the CWC Reports, and that fraud 

and abuse are largely the result of poor contract management. When oversight is provided at a distance 

and delayed, and enforcement is spotty, the opportunities for fraud and abuse increase. Effective contract 

management provides appropriate oversight as well 

as the flexibility needed to help minimize waste. In the 

end, while it is fraud and abuse that grabs the headlines, it is contract management that can actually ensure operational success.

WHERE DO CONTRACTORS FIT IN?

The whole point of utilizing the private sector is 

for the client to gain capacity and/or services faster, 

better or cheaper, or some combination of those traits. 

The Gansler Report explains:

[T]imely and efficient contracting for materiel, supplies 

and services in support of expeditionary operations, 

and the subsequent management of those contracts, 

are and will be a key component of our achieving success in future military operations. Contracting is the 

nexus between our warfighters’ requirements and the 

contractors that fulfill those requirements—whether 

for food service, interpreters, communications operations, equipment repair, new or modified equipment, 
360

or other supplies and services indispensable to warfighting operations. In support of critical military operations, contractor personnel must provide timely services and equipment to the warfighter; and the Army 

contracting community must acquire those services 

and equipment effectively, efficiently, and legally.21

Obviously, the private sector has much inherent 

strength that can be applied to stability operations. 

The ability to provide jobs and training, along with 

the know-how to increase the economic capacity of 

underdeveloped areas means that private contractors 

can make a real difference in complex and dangerous 

situations. The need for private sector services is obvious when one realizes that no government has all the 

skills and capacities in-house that are needed for even 

modestly-sized stability operations. 

Although the U.S. Government has some of the 

most comprehensive procurement and contract management guidelines of any government in the world, 

it is still clear that the clients who make the most costeffective utilization of private sector services are other 

private firms. Governments and government agencies 

do not have financial incentives for success and at the 

same time are bound by a number of strict, often arcane rules and operational limitations. Governmental 

contracting does not incentivize innovation or flexibility the way profit-centric private sector business does. 

In spite of these limitations, there are things that governments can do to ensure better, more efficient, and 

more ethical services.

As mentioned earlier, “where there’s smoke, 

there’s fire.” The headlines tell us that there are some 

ethics issues, and the fact that there are huge projects 

that are never completed, or get completed but never 

used, tells us there are some waste issues as well.22 But 
361

there are also some innovation issues. Too often government contracts not only outline the mission, but 

also dictate the precise manner in which the mission 

must be accomplished. This eliminates flexibility and 

also precludes innovation. Unfortunately, the default 

procurement method in U.S. contingency contracting is known as “lowest price, technically acceptable” (LPTA) contracting. LPTA contracting means 

that so long as the competing private firms meet the 

minimum requirements of the mission, the contract is 

by law awarded to the lowest bidder. The idea is to 

ensure that the government is not being cheated on 

the price of materials and services, but that is often 

not the only result. The award is made regardless of 

the quality of service that the firm can provide. In 

addition to rewarding lower-capability companies, 

LPTA forces more capable firms to cut elements out 

of their bids that would have added quality to their 

services. Things that get eliminated include: enhanced 

personnel vetting; more qualified hiring; improved 

equipment; and, a number of other things that help 

avoid operational problems. An alternative to LPTA 

is to use a “best value” determination. Best value determinations allow a procurement officer to select a 

proposal based on how well it meets the goals of the 

overall operation. Best value rewards firms who are 

better at ensuring quality and innovation and with 

more impressive historical track records. Best value 

contracting means that the government gets the best 

bang for its buck, rather than just the least possible 

bucks. In the larger picture, we should keep in mind 

that U.S. policies in contingency operations have very 

real political and humanitarian stakes that are put at 

enormous increased risk by entrusting policy implementation to the lowest bidders all of the time.
362

The CWC thought that this issue was important 

enough to issue a special report advocating for best 

value contracting, especially for private security services, but the concept should be expanded as it makes 

sense for all contingency services.23 The Project on 

Government Oversight (POGO) and other government watchdogs disagreed with this recommendation, which is naturally in line with their mission of reducing the costs of government programs and waste. 

They continue to press for LPTA in service contracts, a 

stance that may be contributing to many of the complications handicapping U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. Contractors are forced to strive to meet the very 

minimum requirements, because winning LPTA contracts requires that they need to be at least one dollar 

cheaper than their competitors.24 Some in the industry 

describe this reality as a disastrous, government-induced, “race to the bottom,” in quality scenario. Many 

of the well-publicized failures can be traced directly to 

quality issues, something confirmed in numerous and 

extensive private conversations with company executives of the firms that were highlighted in reports related to Afghanistan contracting and specifically in regards to the much derided Kabul embassy contract.25

Most quality companies accept the reality of enhanced 

oversight, and willingly submit to nearly continual 

audits of their operations and progress.26 Indeed, the 

point has frequently been made that good oversight 

and accountability rewards the better firms. Most established companies have entire departments focused 

on nothing except compliance, and alert clients will 

quickly eliminate low-end companies attempting to 

cut corners or use smoke and mirrors to mask capability flaws. Thus, effective oversight and accountability 

is beneficial to better companies and the industry as a 
363

whole. Oversight is not always easy in stability operations, but when done properly, oversight makes the 

client and contractor alike more effective and efficient. 

The contracting experience, however, can be damaged 

when the client, in this case the government, prefers 

low price to high quality, and demands high quality 

without the funding to backup the demand.

Holding companies (and individuals) accountable 

for violations rewards the more professional companies to an even more welcome degree and it is no coincidence that more than 50 companies have joined the 

International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) 

and agreed to abide by the ISOA Code of Conduct.27 In 

fact, any reputable company should have no problem 

abiding by its terms. The ISOA Code of Conduct was 

first drafted in 2001 and is a living document originally created by NGOs, human rights organizations, 

and academics, and has been updated every few years 

to include clarifications and to address previously 

unforeseen concerns.28 The private sector support for 

self-policing reveals both an interest by many in the 

industry to ensure an ethical industry, as well as recognition that ethics have market value to enlightened 

clients. Anyone can bring a complaint against an ISOA 

member company based on the Code of Conduct, and 

the complaint will be heard by the ISOA Standards 

Committee. As a trade group, the goal of the Code is 

not to remove errant member companies out of the 

Association (although the bylaws allow that kind of 

penalty should accused firms be unusually recalcitrant), but instead, the goal is to work with those firms 

to ensure they return to compliance. The ISOA Code 

and accountability mechanism can never replace governments and legal courts, but its robust utilization 

demonstrates that the industry can have a useful and 
364

effective role in self-policing operations in weak and 

failed states where normal legal structures are feeble 

or absent altogether.

Industry has supported additional accountability 

efforts as well, including support for the creation of the 

Montreux Document, an initiative led by the Government of Switzerland and the International Committee 

of the Red Cross.29 The Montreux Document has been 

affirmed by more than 30 governments including 

Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, South Africa, the United 

Kingdom (UK), and the United States. The Montreux 

Document clarified international law as it applies to 

international personnel working for contingency contractors. The final step was the International Code 

of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC), a 

follow-up to the Montreux Document that focused 

specifically on private security companies.30 What 

makes the ICoC so exciting is that the largest clients 

(U.S. and UK Governments) have both indicated that 

they will only hire firms who have signed the ICoC 

and agreed to the accountability system, which was 

still under construction as of September 2011. Once 

the ICoC accountability system is up and running, the 

incentive for both PSCs and international clients will 

be to provide higher quality services than ever before. 

The ICoC is intended to expand beyond just PSCs at 

some point in the future. The ICoC has far more international recognition than the ISOA Code, and already 

scores of PSCs have signed to indicate their acceptance 

of the ICoC. At some point the ICoC may even make 

the ISOA Code of Conduct redundant, but until that 

day comes, ISOA will continue to maintain, enforce, 

and upgrade their Code as well.

Finally, it should be noted that industry associations, especially ISOA, have been consistent in their 
365

support for improved accountability for civilians 

accused of crimes in conflict and post-conflict environments. ISOA has publically supported expansions to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 

(MEJA)31—the primary tool for holding civilian contractors accountable during contingency operations 

on scores of cases addressed by the U.S. Department 

of Justice since 2001—as well as the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) which has yet to be 

passed but will expand to fill some of the loopholes 

left by MEJA.32

Competition is healthy and useful; however, ensuring competition in contingency operations can be 

problematic. Contingency contracting involves operating in extreme environments: weak and failed states; 

in conflict and post conflict areas; and, in disaster relief 

operations.33 Few companies have the capacity to fulfill such contracts and are prepared to do the liability 

management necessary for success. The pool of competitors is further diminished by non-mission requirements (i.e., past performance records, demonstration 

of certain accounting standards, etc.), and by arbitrary 

factors required by Congress including location of 

headquarters, nationality of personnel, or size of firm. 

Much has been done to diminish the competition even 

before we come to the issue of competitor capability 

and operational time constraints. For example, there 

are obvious benefits to hiring local companies; local 

companies will have a better working knowledge of 

the area, will be better able to attract the support of 

the local population, and perhaps most importantly, 

will be able to maintain programs and equipment vital to ongoing stabilization once the intervention has 

ended. Unfortunately, without mentoring, it is rare 

that local companies in impacted nations are able to 
366

adequately provide the necessary services and capabilities in the necessary scale and quality required. 

More often than not, local companies lack expertise 

and the technological capacity to adequately support 

many of the missions, and perhaps more significantly, 

they almost always lack the capability to adhere to 

the reporting and oversight requirements set by the 

U.S. Government. Indeed, while missions often favor 

local firms for contracts, ensuring proper observance 

of the thousands of rules, regulations, and guidelines 

on everything from sexual harassment to ethnic nondiscrimination, and an ability to provide the myriad 

reports and audits necessary is difficult indeed. This 

issue is often addressed through the utilization of 

Western prime contractors that then subcontract to 

local firms that they can mentor and guide through 

the complex contracting process. Nevertheless, there 

are already too many factors that limit the number of 

companies that are willing and able to support these 

missions with the visibility and capability that is often 

demanded.

The alternatives to continuously competitive contracts are the much derided sole-source contracts. 

These are contracts which are, by definition, “urgent 

and compelling,” and for which only one contractor 

is qualified or immediately available, so the bidding 

process is skipped to save resources and especially 

time. Time is often critical in stability operations and 

to wait for a full-blown competitive bid process that 

can take months (or years!) when the training, medical 

clinic, road, or security for an ambassador is needed 

immediately could end in disaster for the mission. 

Sole-sourcing obviously has the potential to be abused, 

and the hostility that sole-sourcing has attracted has 

undermined the government’s ability to carry out its 
367

policies and objectives. Indeed, the media has never 

quite understood which companies are actually solesourced and which are actually cost-plus.34 More confusing, in Iraq quite a few contracts that were “solesourced” were actually existing contracts that needed 

to be rapidly expanded to support the operation. For 

example, if the original design of a facility turns out 

to be too small or otherwise inappropriate for the 

mission, the government could exercise the urgent 

and compelling tool to draw-up a larger contract so 

the company that won the original competition could 

build the facility in a hurry. Considering all the pressure to begin and then complete the reconstruction, 

it is hardly surprising that sole-sourcing was utilized 

instead of recompetition. Nevertheless, woe unto the 

government official involved in sole-source contract 

modifications months or years later when the auditors and investigators who are not familiar with the 

urgency of the issue at the time decide the contract 

may have been inappropriate.35

We have discussed what contractors can do, how 

best to choose a contractor, but there is still the issue 

of contractor compensation. There are two basic ways 

to contract with a firm: cost-plus and fixed price. Costplus contracts are awarded as the cost of the operation 

plus a certain profit percentage, generally between 1 

and 10 percent, with a potential bonus of about 2 percent as an incentive for particularly quick or effective 

work. Cost-plus contracts have drawn much criticism, 

mainly focused on the Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP) III, the contract that provided logistical support to the U.S. Army from 2001 to 2010, 

and ended up being valued at more than $30 billion. 

Awarded to KBR in 2001 (a subsidiary to Halliburton 

at the time), it was perhaps the most criticized con-
368

tract of the past decade. It faced endless allegations 

about war-profiteering, failure to deliver, and contract 

padding, among other accusations. It did not help that 

a former chief executive officer (CEO) of Halliburton 

was also the vice president, Dick Cheney, a lightning 

rod for liberal and anti-war dissent. There were accusations that KBR purchased more expensive fuel then 

necessary in order to pad its margins, that it served 

tens of thousands more meals than were necessary, and 

many other charges.36 Most of the allegations proved 

to be meritless, and eventually much of the reality behind the headlines was revealed as bad policy executed according to bad contracts. 37 The contractors were 

easy targets to place blame for many problems simply 

because they were the executors, but also because they 

cannot and will not finger their government clients no 

matter how egregious the problem. There are two reasons no contractor will blame the government client. 

First, they are often constrained by contractual guidelines requiring written permission before publicizing 

any information; and second, because criticizing the 

largest client in the world is simply not good for their 

long-term business prospects.38

The LOGCAP III cost-plus contract had a profit 

margin of only 1 percent (with a potential bonus margin of 2 percent for speed or quality) and required KBR 

to tie up tens of millions of dollars to fund projects 

prior to monthly reimbursement.39 In order to meet 

the obligations of the cost-plus contract, the company 

used its own funds in advance to be reimbursed at the 

end of the month. However, if costs were challenged, 

there could be a delay in repayment, and sometimes 

such repayments were left incomplete while further 

inquiries were conducted. Despite the size of the contract, it is questionable if there was much profit at all 
369

for KBR on this contract, especially considering the 

lost interest on advanced funds pending payment, 

which ate into the razor thin profit margin. It is rather 

revealing, and too often ignored, that Halliburton 

rid itself of KBR in the midst of the LOGCAP III contract—in fact, KBR had become a gigantic, high-risk, 

resource-intense operation that barely made a dime.40

Various holds were put on government payments to 

the contractor due to allegations of fraud and abuse, 

something that is not unusual in chaotic conflict and 

post-conflict environments, but most were ultimately 

resolved. For example, in testimony to the CWC, the 

Defense Contract Audit Administration (DCAA) admitted that it had withheld $553 million on LOGCAP 

III payments, but eventually at least $439 million of 

the discrepancies were resolved and paid.41 The failure of Congress to pass necessary spending legislation 

sometimes left KBR to go for weeks or months without 

payment. The company could legally have stopped 

working on the contract, which would have significantly hampered the policy effort in Iraq, but instead 

the company essentially loaned the government funds 

at no interest until the legislation was passed. A case 

could be made that the LOGCAP III contract was the 

best deal ever for American taxpayers, and certainly 

the quality of service for the troops was remarkable in 

light of the circumstances.42

Most companies actually prefer fixed price contracts to cost-plus contracts. Fixed price contracts give 

companies a higher profit margin, albeit with additional risk. Fixed price contracts are not always ideal 

in fluid contingency operations when risks and conditions are rapidly changing and often require expensive contract modifications to adjust to those changes. 

Fixed price contracts usually require a greater knowl-
370

edge of conditions and costs then is generally available 

during contingency operations. Nevertheless, if the realities of contingency operations are understood well 

enough, fixed price contracts can be used successfully. 

Fixed price contracts in contingency operations may 

be ideal for concrete, specific operations, and where 

there is a fair understanding of variables, but if the 

risk is high, contractors have offset that by building in 

larger margins to deal with contingencies. Operations 

that are less defined or subject to great change due to 

circumstances make more sense to be prepared as a 

cost-plus contract.43

CONCLUSIONS—HOW TO MAKE IT WORK

International interventions of some form or another are going to continue, as we have seen in the past 

or currently in Libya or in Somalia. The international 

community continues to condone and support interventions in dire situations, though they remain controversial.44 Clearly, some have been more beneficial than 

others, but the better, faster, and more effectively that 

the international community is able to engage in these 

interventions, the more positive the humanitarian and 

political results; thus the private sector is too valuable 

a tool to ignore. It would be hypocritical to recognize 

this yet not support high quality and professionalism 

among the contractors tasked to carry out the policies. 

Afghanistan and Iraq were operations on a scale rarely 

seen, and the role of the private sector was expanded 

and tested to a level never before imagined, while the 

size and capability of the oversight community lagged 

far behind.45 While reconstruction and stability operations have been largely effective despite the enormous 

challenges that these missions faced, ultimately no 
371

level of effectiveness can overcome unresolved political complications and barriers. Nevertheless, if future 

operations embrace the lessons learned and include a 

focus on quality, best value, and improved oversight 

that rewards the better companies, then contractors 

will become a more reliable and valuable partner. Ultimately, contractors are not there to make policy decisions for the governments and international community, but they are there to make their policy decisions 

more effective and successful.

To be truly effective, contingency operations require a working partnership of the government and 

private sector. The nature of this partnership requires 

organization, oversight, cooperation, proper incentives, and transparency. This is why the question of 

private sector contracting is bound so tightly with 

questions of intervention management and WoG policy. It is obvious that the private sector is necessary 

to interventions like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as 

well as less high-profile operations such as those in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti. Those 

who argue for WoG approaches to international interventions claim that interagency redundancies and 

competition along with a lack of communication hamper the success of interventions. In some ways, then, 

it seems contrary to the Gansler Report recommendation to embrace a WoG approach to contracting. In 

truth, however, the struggles of the contracting world 

may provide insights into an overall balanced WoG 

approach. 

The Gansler Report’s recommendation to consolidate contract management government-wide is 

in many ways a classic WoG approach. The idea is to 

put contracting into the hands of those who are most 

qualified to manage contracts. Consolidation could 
372

help minimize one of the most severe problems in 

contracting: waste. However, the Gansler Report and 

others also recommend putting contract managers 

on the ground near interventions. The two recommendations together suggest a hybrid approach to 

contracting that may have other applications. Perhaps 

rather than a pure WoG approach, it would be better 

to unify communications and record keeping, while 

keeping the work on the ground divided among those 

most qualified to do it. Most writers either accept or 

reject WoG approaches, but the unique circumstances 

of private sector contracting suggest a third way that 

allows agencies and private companies the latitude 

to maintain their specialties, while also establishing 

better communications and a more unified policy 

and purpose. Under such a hybrid approach, the 

administrative functions, including communication 

and record keeping, between the various groups and 

agencies could be consolidated into a single unit. The 

administrative unit could serve as a hub for the more 

specialized agencies, groups, and companies which 

would continue to serve their on-the-ground functions, but could do so with a minimum of interagency 

politics. With all of the information thus consolidated, 

the sharing of information and changes in conditions 

could be communicated to the appropriate parties 

quickly. Of course, sharing would have to be subject 

to certain policies and rules, but it could be the job of 

the administrative hub to be experts on this element. 

The administrative hub would also be able to help prioritize the needs of the various agencies so that urgent 

matters do not get lost in a mountain of paperwork. 

This kind of hybrid approach could not only help 

eliminate waste, but it could also improve oversight, 

flexibility, and ethical behavior.
373

It may be years before we will see a return to the 

pragmatic and effective partnerships that existed in 

U.S. support for international peacekeeping prior to 

September 11, 2001 (9/11). Journalists and watchdog 

organizations make their reputations by ferreting out 

fraud and abuse while virtually ignoring the larger issues of waste, impairing the hope for rational, pragmatic improvements. It will be difficult to get the 

government-private sector relationship back on an 

even footing where the partnership focuses again on 

genuine policies and mission goals instead of the current reality of vengeance contract management. The 

examples of the ISOA Code of Conduct, the Montreux 

Document, and the ICoC are indicative of the tangible 

interest from the industry in tackling operational concerns head-on. This kind of self-policing should be 

taken seriously as an effort to eliminate the distractions of headline grabbing anecdotes. Industry criticism is welcome when it is constructive, but damning 

contingency contracting without an alternative is simply counterproductive to good policy.

The final report from the CWC46 has added yet 

more ideas to the mix and fueled both contingency 

contractor champions and detractors. While highlighting that waste continues to be the largest drain on 

reconstruction budgets as opposed to fraud or abuse, 

it also makes crystal clear that the U.S. Government 

has no realistic option to using contractors in all of its 

future stability operations. It is also clear that most 

projects are, in fact, successful, but there is much that 

can be done to ensure less waste and more success. 

This is fully consistent with the conclusions of this 

chapter. Governmental support for quality and ethics 

in the contractors tasked with carrying out its policies 

will pay far more dividends than simply hiring the 
374

cheapest firms available no matter what the trade-off 

is in quality and professionalism. If effective policies 

mean shortening conflicts and less humanitarian suffering, then contractor quality should matter far more 

to the government than it has thus far in Afghanistan 

or Iraq.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. Although rarely highlighted in media reports, a general perusing of testimony emphasizes the dominant problem of waste 

over fraud and abuse. This issue was specifically raised by Naveed Bandali, “Improving Oversight of Contingency Operations: 

A Conversation with the SIGIR, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.,” Journal of 

International Peace Operations, Q&A Section, Vol. 6, No. 6, MayJune 2011, p. 24.

2. The most comprehensive numbers for contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq come from the U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker 

(SPOT) database run by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense, Program Support, available from www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/

hot_topics.html. The DoD employs the vast majority of contractors, 

although the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also employ many which have not 

yet been incorporated into the SPOT database. Note that the numbers in the database have been challenged by some journalists and 

academics (notably T.X. Hammes at the National Defense University (NDU), see csis.org/event/benefits-united-states-governmentsemployment-armed-contractors-iraq-and-afghanistan-outweigh-,

a debate where Colonel Hammes challenges the veracity of the 

database). While imperfect, the numbers seem to be reasonably 

accurate and the accuracy of the reports has been improved. Furthermore, there does not appear to be anything else with a better 

level of accuracy available at this time.

3. DoD contractors are tracked by the SPOT database, available from www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/hot_topics.html.
375

4. See, for example, Bill Chappell, “Afghanistan’s Ban on 

Security Firms May Halt Rebuilding, Relief Work,” NPR Online, October 21, 2010, available from www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2010/10/21/130735968/afghanistan-s-ban-on-security-firms-mayhalt-rebuilding-relief-work.

5. Even the once respected New York Times continues to use 

the derogatory “mercenary” label for contractors, a practice long 

discarded by other professional media sources and serious academics. For example, see Mark Mazzetti and Emily B. Hager, 

“Blackwater Founder Forms Secret Army for Arab State,” New 

York Times, May 15, 2011. Academic Deborah Avant wrote in 

Foreign Policy, “The term ‘mercenary’ describes a wide variety of 

military activities, many of which bear little resemblance to those 

of today’s private security companies,” from “Think Again: Mercenaries,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, July 2004. See also Volker Franke, 

“Service Versus Profit,” Journal of International Peace Operations, 

Vol. 7, July-August 2011, available from web.peaceops.com/; Volker 

Franke and Marc von Boemcken, “Guns for Hire: Motivations and 

Attitudes of Private Security Contractors,” Armed Forces & Society, 

forthcoming.

6. At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report, Washington, DC: Commission on Wartime 

Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, June 2009; Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Washington, 

DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, August 31, 2011, available from www.wartimecontracting.gov.

7. Examples include Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign 

Policy, New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale University Press, 

2009; see also Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War & Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, New 

Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2010.

8. Stanger, One Nation Under Contract.

9. Laura Peterson, “Troop Surge Dollars Must be Watched,” 

Taxpayers for Common Sense, December 3, 2009, available from 

taxpayer.net/projects.php?action=view&category=&type=Project&pr

oj_id=2982.
376

10. Richard Lardner, “US oversight of war-zone contractors 

labeled weak,” Washington Post, February 22, 2011, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/

AR2011022205739.html.

11. Scott Canon, “Black & Veatch’s fog-of-war contract in Afghanistan,” Kansas City Star, February 19, 2011.

12. Chappell’s NPR article hints at the critical role of the private sector in reconstruction. This is particularly striking from 

a news outlet that has criticized private security in the past. See 

“Afghanistan’s Ban on Security Firms May Halt Rebuilding, Relief Work,” NPR Online, October 21, 2010. 

13. For a more detailed essay on this concern, see Doug Brooks, 

“Vengeance Contract Management,” Journal of International Peace 

Operations, Vol. 4, No. 6, May-June 2009, p. 4.

14. Ibid.

15. See Doug Brooks, “Shifting the Blame,” Journal of International Peace Operations, Vol. 5, No. 6, May/June 2010.

16. “Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 

Management in Expeditionary Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 24, 2007. General Jacques Gansler 

was the chair of the authoring commission, and the report is most 

commonly referred to as the “Gansler Report.”

17. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., “Applying Lessons Learned from 

Iraq: A Proposal for a New Office for Contingency Operations,” 

Journal Of International Peace Operations, July-August, 2010, available from web.peaceops.com/archives/740#more-740.

18. At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan; Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing 

Risks.

19. Ibid.
377

20. For example, as cited in the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) report, a new dining facility was contracted for 

in Iraq, despite the fact that the old dining facility was being repaired and only one project was necessary, but money was spent 

on both.

21. Gansler Report, p. 3.

22. For a summary of some of the most infamous examples of 

waste, fraud, and abuse, see Bruce Burton and Lauren McLean, 

“The Black and White of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse,” Defense 

AT&L, March/April 2009.

23. “Special Report on Embassy Security Contracts: lowestpriced security not good enough for war-zone embassies,” CWC 

Special Report 2, Washington, DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting, October 1, 2009, available from www.wartimecontracting.

gov/docs/CWC_SR2-2009-10-01.pdf.

24. Danielle Brian, “CWC Findings on Embassy Guards Fiasco 

Amount to ‘Blame Shifting’,“ Project on Government Oversight, 

October 6, 2009, available from pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2009/10/

cwc-findings-on-embassy-guards-fiasco-amount-to-blame-shifting.

html.

25. The CWC report cites a number of situations in which contractors lacked the suppliers, skills, or personnel to achieve the 

goals set in their contracts. The Burton and McLean article also 

hints at quality control issues.

26. In fact, companies in the industry undergo regular audits 

when working for the U.S. Government, and while these normally came from their contractor officers and maybe the Defense 

Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract 

Audit Administration (DCAA), as well as the inspectors general of the organization they work with (DoD, DoS, State, USAID, 

Corps of Engineers, etc.), since 2003, the audits and inspections 

have markedly increased with the creation of the CWC, Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and additional reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 

Congressional Research Service (CRS), and numerous congres-
378

sional investigations. In fact, numerous, repetitive audits and inspections are recognized as part of the job and the cost of doing 

business with the U.S. Government.

27. The latest version is available on the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) webpage, available from www.

stability-operations.org.

28. Information on the origins of the ISOA Code of Conduct is 

available from stability-operations.org/index.php. 

29. Montreux Document, Geneva, Switzerland: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2011, available from www.eda.admin.ch/

psc.

30. International Code of Conduct (ICoC) information is online, available from www.icoc-psp.org/.

31. For a good understanding of the origins of Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), see Major Joseph R. Perlak, 

“The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Of 2000: Implications For Contractor Personnel,” Military Law Review, Vol. 169, 

September 2001.

32. Information on Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 

(CEJA) can be found on the Human Rights First website, “Senate Judiciary Committee Passes Bill on U.S. Civilian Contractor Accountability Abroad,” June 23, 2011, available from www.

humanrightsfirst.org/2011/06/23/senate-judiciary-committee-passesbill-on-u-s-civilian-contractor-accountability-abroad/.

33. Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, p. 46.

34. “U.S. Wasting Billions While Tripling No-Bid Contracts 

After Decade of War in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Democracy Now, September 2, 2011, transcript available from www.democracynow.

org/2011/9/2/us_wasting_billions_while_tripling_no.

35. This information comes from numerous conversations 

and interviews with private sector management coming from operations in Iraq.
379

36. “DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: DOD’s Lack 

of Adherence to Key Contracting Principles on Iraq Oil Contract 

Put Government Interests at Risk,” GAO-07-839, Washington, DC: 

Government Accountability Office, July 2007. The report shows 

the complexities of contingency contracting and the fluid negotiations in a cost-plus contract. Few have read the KBR perspective 

on the meals issue, which was eventually, largely, accepted by the 

government. See, “Halliburton Says War-Time Conditions Make 

It Hard To ‘Guess Who Is Coming To Dinner’,”available from 

www.halliburton.com/news/archive/2004/corpnws_020204.jsp.

37. While the policy aspects are probably beyond the scope 

of this volume, a thorough reading of GAO and CWC reports reveal significantly more problems on the government contracting 

side than on the contractor side. See also Christopher Shays and 

Michael Thibault, “Reducing waste in wartime contracts,” Washington Post, August 28, 2011.

38. More information on this can be found in Brooks, “Vengeance Contract Management,” p. 4.

39. Russell Gold, “The Temps Of War: Blue-Collar Workers 

Ship Out For Iraq, Halliburton Jobs Pay Well, If You Don’t Mind 

Danger; Camping—With Mortars,” Wall Street Journal, February 

5, 2004, p. 1.

40. Loren Steffy, “Halliburton Hasn’t Been Making Out Like 

a Bandit,” Houston Chronicle, August 22, 2006; see also “KBR Announces Separation from Halliburton and Appointment of New 

Board Members,” Houston Chronicle, April 6, 2007. 

41. April Stephenson, Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency, in testimony to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, May 

14, 2009.

42. Steve Schooner, Professor of Government Procurement Law 

and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program, 

George Washington University, interview, May 19, 2005, by Frontline, “Under the circumstances, I give KBR unbelievable marks.” 

Transcript available from (quote not included in actual documentary)www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/

schooner.html; also see Anthony Bianco and Stephanie Anderson 
380

Forest, “Outsourcing War: an Inside Look at Brown and Root,” 

Business Week, September 15, 2003.

43. A good analysis of contract types can be found in Patrick 

Cullen and Peter Ezra Weinberger, “Reframing the Defense Outsourcing Debate: Merging Government Oversight with Industry 

Partnership,” Washington, DC: Peace Operations Institute, 2007.

44. Book review by Seth G. Jones, “How To Fight a War When 

It’s Not Yours,” Review of Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, Can 

Intervention Work, New York: Norton, 2011, Washington Post, September 4, 2011, p. B7.

45. Steven Kelman and Steven L. Schooner, “Scandal or Solution?” Government Executive, November 7, 2005.

46. Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks. 
381

CHAPTER 13

MULTIETHNIC CONFLICTS IN

U.S. MILITARY THEATERS OVERSEAS:

INTERCULTURAL IMPERATIVES

Gregory Paul P. Meyjes

We inhabit a multipolar world in which ethnocultural tensions fester, in which “intercivilizational” 

strife lurks, and where local populations use destructive and communicative tools that compete with those 

of states. More often than not, intergroup controversies are based on language, religion, race, or ethnicity—perennial properties of poignant primacy for 

group meaning and identity. The conflicts that make 

headlines and cause headstones today are chiefly ethno-cultural in origin as predicted.1

 Whether current 

global trends weaken or motivate ethno-nationalism 

is vigorously debated, with two seemingly opposite 

processes, global homogenization and heterogenization, concurrently observed.2

 Despite the ubiquity of 

the globally dominant, minority populations persist in 

asserting themselves, often defying displacement and 

disadvantage against a backdrop of violence by man 

and/or nature. In the second millennium’s waning 

years, armed clashes were largely state-internal,3

 especially in what are slightingly called “fragile” states, 

such wars carry serious international security connotations, including the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and terror.4

 Those in strategic studies and international relations thus acutely feel the 

need to come to grips with ethno-cultural and related 

forms of communal friction. Yet, whether U.S. troops 

surge or dwindle in number, whether defense budgets 
382

wax or wane, whether a military or whole of government (WoG) approach is taken, the exorbitant U.S. 

interventions overseas and the policies that underpin 

them are only as viable as their conceptual underpinnings permit. 

Post-Cold War grand theories of international relations have insufficiently accounted for the state of affairs discussed in the previous paragraphs. Fukuyama 

tells of a new world without ideological polarization, 

unified through Pax Americana, democracy, and international cooperation5

—the end of “history” in the 

sense of Hegel’s progressive dialectics.6

 In lieu of such 

globalized Occidentalism, “offensive realism” champion Mearsheimer presages conflict as usual—multipolar state rivalry for hegemony in the interest of national security.7

 Rejecting both Western universality 

and zero-sum state dominance, Huntington describes 

a world of “civilizational” tectonic rupture, where economic globalization need not imply Westernization, 

where democratization may serve indigenization, and 

where military intervention can fuel local resistance.8

To explain and predict inter-ethnic conflict in global 

perspective—a precondition for evidence-based intervention strategies—social theory must grasp the 

nature of both ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations. 

The three influential theories identified above do not 

meet this standard. However dissimilarly applicable 

to geopolitics, they all offer but a bird’s eye viewpoint 

of relations between countries, regions, and civilizations—failing to drill down to the heart of the matter, 

ethnicity at the local level at which it occurs. To rally 

our best collective judgment to comprehending and 

sustainably reducing ethnic conflict requires a multisectoral stance in which philosophical, empirical, and 

practical insights are harnessed across a number of 
383

disciplines. An expanded model is called for. To anticipate and respond to inter-ethnic hostilities, it must 

include a grasp of ethno-cultural reality tout court. Instead of a mere top-down view, it will also have to reflect ethnic, state, and global realities from the cultural 

ground up. This contribution is dedicated to such an 

eventual framework. Following this introduction, the 

first section (“What Culture?”) briefly reviews the nature of culture and ethnicity. The next section (“What 

Competence?”) looks at certain efforts by the U.S. 

armed services to acquire the requisite cultural skill. 

The remaining half is devoted to a handful of recommendations for progress in this vein (“What Imperatives?”), with concluding remarks (“What Next?”). 

WHAT CULTURE?

As the way in which human groups inwardly and 

outwardly represent their assumed inherited identity, “culture” is seen as that ensemble of properties, 

practices, and comportments through which their “genius,” the essence of their particular way of collective 

life, is passed on. Of the physical, socio-institutional, 

and ideational elements of culture, it is the latter, its 

value set, that is deemed of greatest import.9 Through 

it, each culture subliminally creates a group-mediated 

experience of the world. Thus understood, culture 

symbolizes social meaning at its most visceral. Like 

the acquisition of the native tongue, it is transferred 

through a largely subconscious process called enculturation,

10 as distinguished from socialization, defined 

as the conscious transmission of in-group know-how. 

In this sense, culture is both the prism through which 

we experience social life and the prison to group selfawareness we unwittingly inhabit. Typologically, the 
384

elitist distinction between “high” and “low” culture 

of the Eurocentric Romantic period11 has made way 

for a recent revisiting of the contrast between “objective” and “subjective” culture.12 The former refers to 

the positive, observable aspects of the distinctiveness 

of groups, the latter to the inner workings of cultures, 

the value orientations that motivate and define their 

social and physical attributes. Ceteris paribus, subjective culture so dictates human consciousness as to 

inhibit awareness of its workings and so determines 

a particular worldview as to essentially guarantee ethnocentrism. Hidden in plain sight, it forms the heart 

of all ethno-cultural groups, dominant and nondominant alike.

Awareness of the social construction of culture is 

rooted in centuries of thought. For instance, through 

the work of Herder, von Humboldt and other 19thcentury German philosophers, language has come to 

be accepted as primus inter pares among cultural attributes, in part because of its link to cognition and 

worldview. Due to the critical role of language in creating cultural identity, failure to honor language rights 

or “linguistic human rights” is seen as “one of the 

important factors which can contribute to inter-ethnic 

conflict—and often does.”13 Similarly, the relation between religion and culture,14 and between religion and 

war, has been the object of scholarly attention for centuries, if not millennia. Huntington regards religion as 

“a central defining characteristic of civilizations.”15 In 

the Middle East, sub-state religious ethnicities have 

attracted growing scholarly interest—for instance, in 

Shi’a resistance to Sunni dominance of post-SaddamHussein Iraq; in cyclical violence between Sunni, Shi’a, 

and various Christians in Lebanon; and in the mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood and Copts against 
385

Hosni Mubarak in Egypt during the “Arab Spring.” 

Reviewing ethno-religious wars in light of Durkheim16

and other theorists, Fox concludes that religion serves 

four social functions. “First, it provides an interpretative framework, or belief system, for understanding 

the world. Second, it contains rules and standards of 

behavior which guide the actions of believers. Third, 

religions are generally associated with institutions that 

transmit religious frameworks from one generation to 

the next. Finally, religion can legitimize all forms of 

action.”17 In concert, these factors all but guarantee the 

ethno-cultural relevance of religion. Religion can both 

foment and aid the resolution of conflicts18—ranging 

as it does from motivating violent extremism, to faithbased peacemaking,19 to the preventive promotion of 

interfaith tolerance and equality.20

Largely overlapping with culture, the term “ethnicity” emphasizes belonging, kinship, ancestry, and 

identity.21 Rather than objective truths, ethnicities are 

subjective, which makes them real whether based 

in myth or externally validated fact. Ethno-national 

conflicts need not be grounded on accurate information; they need only be culturally real. For instance, 

the long-standing tension between tens of millions 

of Urdu speakers and hundreds of millions of Hindi 

speakers is as ethno-nationally real as it is linguistically illusory, the distinction depending almost entirely 

on whether the same pre-Aryan language is written in 

the Nagari (Hindi) or the Arabic (Urdu) script for religious reasons.22 However elusive, complex, or dynamic, ethnicity endures as a key meaning-giving reality. 

It can prevail even when the original ethnic markers 

have disappeared or been replaced.23 Ethnicity is also 

acknowledged as a powerful vehicle for political mobilization. Moreover, it need not be undermined by 
386

mobility or inter-ethnic contact; it is often perpetuated 

through in- and exclusive practices.24 That cultural differences tend to be inseparable from social disparities 

is often overlooked. Mainstream accounts habitually: 

(a) ignore the essence of ethnicity; (b) downplay its 

societal indicators; and/or, (c) deny the attitudes and 

practices that often inexorably link the two. Some authors reject ethnicity outright, deeming that economic, 

institutional, political, territorial, or material interpretations adequately explain the conflicts in question.25

Others disavow the collective nature of ethnic identities, seeing them as merely demagogic channels for 

the ambitions of political leaders. On the whole, however, cultural minorities themselves are not thus confused. Especially for those in conflict, the stifling combination of difference and disparity lies at the heart 

of the matter. Minority ethnic groups choose conflict 

when motivated in the interest of self-preservation. 

Reductionist external accounts lack the cultural selfawareness to capture the essence of ethnic conflicts 

and provide adequate responses. On average, one out 

of two countries in the world currently faces ethnocultural conflicts. Horowitz, pursuing a kinship-based 

theory of ethnic strife, describes dozens such conflicts 

in emerging and developing economies.26 Given the 

approximately 100 cases worldwide where ethnocultural minority groups are engaged in violent existential struggles today27 and the grave security implications, we must consider ethno-cultural identities, 

and the conflicts to which they can lead, to be far from 

academic in nature. Their lacking recognition, consideration, and policy integration are critical omissions in 

international relations, the redress of which is of vital 

urgency and consequence. The following discussion 

flows from this position. 
387

WHAT COMPETENCE?

As if to substantiate Winston Churchill’s reported 

backhanded compliment that one “can always count 

on the Americans to do the right thing, after they have 

exhausted all the other possibilities,” the U.S. armed 

services are pushing for the cultural knowledge they 

spent most of history neglecting. Anthropologists 

have been sporadically called upon in the past to provide information on U.S. enemies of war28—generally 

to their professional dismay.29 Up to a decade or two 

ago, only members of U.S. armed services Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) units, tasked with public (dis)information of the enemy, were expected to 

understand foreign cultures. U.S. Armed Forces were 

usually neither asked to learn much about enemy cultures nor interact extensively with locals abroad. These 

days, the use of cultural outreach skills, e.g., General 

David Petraeus’ counterinsurgency calling card both 

in Iraq and Afghanistan,30 have become part of the 

“new normal.” In the 21st century, foreign operations 

hinge in part on the inclusion on local knowledge and 

on protracted interaction with cultural groups as different as they are distant from those at home.31

Ethno-cultural issues are complex, interdisciplinary expertise is in short supply, and foreign interventions present a host of cross-cultural challenges. 

Merely at the level of an individual service member 

in organizational context, McDonald identifies many 

levels of cultural complexity: (a) the person’s own cultural identity; (b) the home culture of the other U.S. 

team members; (c) the culture of the team itself; (d) 

that of the military, within which; (e) embedded civilians may not be attuned to military culture; (f) the 
388

institutional cultures of other agencies or armed services with which the individual interacts; (g) as well as 

the personal, institutional, and macro-social cultures 

of the international coalition partners in theater.32

Such challenges are further compounded when, as 

in Afghanistan, armed interventions take place using 

blended international forces, across wide cultural distances and civilizational divides, in societies marked 

by ethno-cultural conflict, and with incongruous 

power disparity between “donor” and “host” society. 

This further begs the question as to whether, and if so 

where, to seek the relevant competencies with which 

to shorten foreign missions and boost their success. 

Language schools are, at best, reluctant newcomers 

to the field of cultural competence; diversity training is mostly concerned with the rights of individuals 

in Western organizations; and intercultural training 

is the traditional purview of study abroad and business-to-business etiquette training for expatriates. In 

matters of culture, how can the U.S. military achieve 

clarity of ends, ways, and means—if at all? Culturally, 

who could, or should, learn what to optimize for the 

success of such costly, extended, and highly unpredictable military missions overseas? 

Urged by Washingtonian policymakers, the U.S. 

armed services have sought to innovate. As the Petreus counterinsurgency doctrine suggests,33 the military 

has attempted to turn a corner from its traditional 

“boots on the ground,” “shock and awe” national security stance, toward inclusion of the subtler, more 

socially-engaged human security approach that asymmetrical, irregular, and ethnic conflicts ostensibly 

dictate. Perplexity at the array of considerations and 

skills pertinent to the cultural marketplace may persist. Yet a host of avenues have been suggested, and 
389

some pursued, to rise to the cultural challenge. These 

range from phrase-based language warm-ups, via cultural profiling, immersion programs, to calls for a special civil-military force, appeals to assorted experts, 

new academic positions, publications, ministerial appointments, and so forth. For instance, the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command’s (USJFCOM) Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) initiated an online training program to promote language and cultural understanding between 

Afghan and U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) military troops. Participants are meant to acquire key certain words, phrases, and behaviors. To 

teach such skills like combining verbal greetings with 

a handshake, a “gesture wizard” and virtual coach 

were added. The efficacy of such advanced electronic 

enhancements over the old foreign-language phrasebook is yet to be determined. Going back via de Saussure34 to von Humboldt and Herder, linguistics has 

known for over half a century35 that natural language 

is communicated creatively—speech is based on the 

creative use of internalized rules—rather than on the 

repetition of memorized phrases. Human intelligence 

(HUMINT) in cross-cultural contexts requires sensitive rapport-building under conditions of violence, 

inequality, resistance, and distrust. While the services 

may not easily overcome their institutional propensity 

for “technology overmatch,” to roll out “off-the-shelf” 

gadgetry in response to the complex cultural challenges at hand, is hardly an auspicious way to pursue 

policy and pay a pretty penny from the public purse—

regardless of how cost-effective cultural expertise may 

be compared to military hardware. 

When it was noted in the early 2000s that the U.S. 

war effort in Iraq suffered from poor local intelligence 

and that in Afghanistan insurgents were emphasized 
390

over the local society, a response was to create a small 

new experimental program. Five-person Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) consisting of linguists, anthropologists, political scientists, and other social scientists 

were assigned to Army and Marine units in embedded forward positions.36 Compiling and interpreting 

data through interviews and observations and the 

like, HTTs were meant to provide field commanders 

with a better understanding of the local populace in 

order to augment military effectiveness and lessen 

conflict. With training in regional studies, language, 

Islam, army command structure, military culture, and 

counterinsurgency, HTTs can train brigade personnel 

and provide institutional memory when units are replaced. Along with program management, the experienced cultural advisors of the HTTs are supported 

by Reachback Research Centers (RRC) stateside to 

analyze data and supply maps and other technology 

(MAP-HT) back to the field. The HTTs also have access to an international network of social-scientists, 

human terrain analysis teams ( HTAT), program development teams (PDTs), and an academic consortium.37 The overall Human Terrain System (HTS) thus 

constructed represents a free-standing cultural intelligence system to some and a joint intelligence addition 

to traditional state and military intelligence services to 

others.38 In theory, the model is relatively well-rounded. In practice, legion problems are reported, such 

as the constraints of practicing academic field work 

in wartime, communication between service personnel and social scientists, tensions between academic 

freedom and military secrets, ethical issues involving 

the use of research subjects overseas, and so forth.39

Yet the perceived operational success of this $60 million HTS graduate-level warfare program led to its 
391

expansion as of 2007 in both the Iraqi and Afghan theaters.40 With a few dozen combat brigades in theater, 

each with several thousand personnel, the question is 

whether to further expand the experimental proof-ofconcept HTS or whether efforts of a different kind are 

also needed. In case of the latter, what else needs to be 

understood and done? 

Whether military support assignments concur 

with the professional ethics and methodology of social scientists remains an open question. Despite their 

avowed interest in opponents’ cultures and acquiring 

culture-general skills, there are limits to the support 

the services can expect from anthropologists. In the 

course of the 20th century, with the notable exception of the Third Reich, linguists resisted connecting 

the features of individual languages to a presumed 

hierarchy of cognitive abilities. Instead, they en masse,

consider all language varieties cognitively equal. Likewise, anthropology has largely discarded the study of 

cross-cultural similarity and/or comparison, despite a 

few very notable exceptions,41 since neither diffusion 

nor origination of cultural traits in multiple locations 

was found to adequately account for such similarities. 

Instead, through ethnography, the anthropological 

study of culture42 has focused on particularity, which 

leads to cultural relativism rather than culture-general 

insight. Consequently, and: 

paradoxically, few anthropologists are in agreement 

as to what to include under the general rubric of culture. While it will be denied, much depends on the 

anthropologist’s own culture, which exerts a deep and 

abiding influence not only over how anthropologists 

think but over where they draw the boundaries in 

such matters.43
392

It is inherently difficult to interrogate the ideational tools, including those enshrined in one’s language, 

on which one relies for perception. One’s subjective 

culture colors the view of others.44 Whereas such engrained cultural myopia facilitates our in-group effectiveness it also limits communication between cultures—and prevents us from noticing this dilemma 

due to its subconscious nature. Anthropology being 

outward-looking, anthropologists, like enculturated 

adults in general, resist questioning their worldview 

in relationship to that of others. “Like everyone else, 

anthropologists use models, and some models are 

more fashionable than others.”45 Anthropological bias 

in favor of cultural specificity and humanity’s subconscious ethnocentrism thus conspire to largely limit 

the development of models suited to meta-culturally 

informed interventions in foreign and inter-ethnically 

charged environs.

Military rhetoric in favor of cultural-general skills 

notwithstanding, its cultural competency model has 

essentially remained two-dimensional—us versus 

them. Culturally-specific skills and information about 

them are added to operations by us to raise the effectiveness of the latter and limit harm, especially to us. 

The adequacy of this two-tiered approach to cultural 

competency is questionable. The following are among 

the factors that make predominant reliance on culturally-specific knowledge problematic: 

• Minority cultural identities are often ambiguous, multilayered, and/or unstable.46 While 

this makes them no less relevant, it renders 

training in language phrases and gestures less 

than adequate. A two-dimensional approach 

merely creates the illusion of adequacy. Regardless of how much ethnographic data one 
393

amasses, one can never learn the detail needed 

to effectively operate in fluid, foreign, old, and 

complex areas of ethnic tension and resistance. 

A more profound approach is needed.

• Learning about the other without cultural selfscrutiny means learning objective detail rather 

than to penetrate the subjective core of the 

exchange. Service members are no ethnographers, and such “culture learning”47 does not 

sufficiently critique the culture of the learners 

themselves who as a result are apt to perpetuate simplistic, laughable, or harmful stereotypes unlikely to truly build inter-ethnic trust.

• Deep ethnographic knowledge about individual cultures takes ethnographers, or teams 

of ethnographers, years to acquire. The time 

factor reduces its applicability to military interventions. With thousands of ethnicities 

worldwide,48 the HTS effort would have to be 

exponentially expanded, over a great many 

years, with continual updates, to produce an 

endlessly detailed data bank of potential use to 

interventions in the ever-changing multiethnic 

societies of which virtually all of humanity is 

comprised. Even then, the effective use of such 

information would be operationally and politically demanding.

• An objective-culture approach to learning 

about its foes increases an occupying force’s 

one-sided dependence on informants. The culturally-embedded attitudes of informants can 

be at cross-purposes, motivating them to disinform. Indeed, the often considerable power 

imbalance inherent in military interventions, in 

addition to the perspective of irrelevant or un-
394

wanted cultural imposition, can render reliance 

on local informants fallacious, exploitative, or 

both.

• To what does a culturally-specific approach 

aspire? Is it: (a) the managerial convenience 

of purchasing training modules; (b) the objectivity of measurable training outcomes; or, (c) 

real-life communication between members of 

different ethno-cultural traditions? If it is the 

latter, learning about the other and mimicking phrases is unlikely to yield desired results, 

since no deep communication can take place. If 

it is one of the former, the results are unlikely to 

lead to cultural competence that can neutralize 

destructive developments.

WHAT IMPERATIVES?

That the conflicts in the Middle East and Central 

Asia have been time-, resource-, and manpower-intensive to the Armed Forces of the United States and 

its allies is a platitudinous understatement. Made-formedia questions such as whether the war in Afghanistan represents the longest in U.S. history or whether 

Afghan forces will have taken effective control of security by 2014 are not the only concerns. Drawing on 

a deep well of civilizational, ethno-cultural, religious, 

and political variables, those who would thwart peace 

in Afghanistan on foreign terms remain far from neutralized. While coalition forces prevail in certain areas, 

in much, indeed in most, of Afghanistan the war is far 

from won. The country continues to be destabilized 

by terror attacks, including on U.S. interests and on 

the central government in Kabul. In Afghanistan, alQaeda may be sufficiently haunted by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to consider shifting 
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its operations elsewhere under the direction of Osama 

Bin Laden’s successor, al-Zawahiri. However, what 

does not kill it may strengthen the organization; its 

geographical spread has been linked to growing sophistication, adaptability, and threat. Meanwhile, 

perceptions of the Karzai government’s relevance 

are waning, even as the Taliban once again gains in 

presence, its control moving ever closer to Kabul, as 

it levies its taxes and enforces its brand of justice as it 

goes. With the specter of military defeat looming over 

the allied forces, U.S. decisionmakers ever less subtly 

hint at the need for a negotiated settlement with the 

Taliban, if only to save face. Like British and Soviet 

interventions before, the U.S. alliance in Afghanistan 

is learning the limits of might in the face of cultural 

resistance. As argued above, the international community cannot anticipate, much less contain or resolve ethno-cultural conflict unless and until it acts 

on the basis of an appropriate model. The prevailing 

legal, political, and philosophical frame of reference 

remains state-centered, combined with inconsistent 

and uncritical attention to individual human rights. 

Without a deeper understanding of the role of culture, 

and a model to match, the international community 

cannot but remain unable to lastingly confront ethnocultural conflict, despite the legitimacy of its security 

concerns. To address this, a host of imperatives can be 

identified, most of which defy discussion in this context. Four are outlined below. 

Cultural Self-Awareness.

Any remedy will depend on our perception of 

the problems at hand. Whereas culturally-specific approaches focus on objective-culture information, experts 
396

agree that the first key to competency in cross-cultural 

matters is to develop an understanding of one’s own 

culturally-mediated role, biases, values, and outlook. 

This stems from realization that cultural relativity de 

facto colors our perception of social matters, however 

unaware we may be of it. Hence we must first seek to 

escape the perceptual confinement of our cultural programming. Advanced cultural competency training 

thus first and foremost calls for the development of 

cultural self-awareness, recognition that and possibly 

how our inherited worldview is relative, and that what 

we perceive is not universally true. It is considered “a 

necessary precursor of intercultural learning, that involves recognizing cultural differences,” since without “a mental baseline for their own culture(s)” those 

placed in cross cultural situations “will find it difficult 

to recognize and manage cultural differences.”49

Most of the literature on cultural self-awareness is 

developmental, i.e., psychological, in nature. As levels 

of analysis it distinguishes; the individual, the institution, and the group,50 whereby the latter refers to any 

groups, such as gender or generation, where individuals may be identified. By contrast, to apply a level-ofanalysis approach to international military interventions in ethnically conflicted societies overseas would 

necessitate a sociological orientation. The introduction 

of societal entities is therefore indicated; notably the 

ethno-cultural group as the primary meaning-giving 

entity; the state as a legal-political institution; and, the 

international community. In social context, the following six possible levels can be posited: 

1. Individual culture self-awareness (ICSA) at the 

personal level;51

2. Organizational culture self-awareness (OCSA) 

at the institutional level;
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3. Ethno-cultural self-awareness (ECSA) at the 

group level; 

4. Political culture self-awareness (PCSA) at country or state level;

5. Regional culture self-awareness (RCSA) at the 

area and/or civilizational level; 

6. Global culture self-awareness (GCSA) at the 

worldwide level.

At the personal level, for instance, one should ask 

whether service personnel—if untrained in intercultural concepts and inexperienced in self-reflection on 

matters of culture—could employ self-searching cultural questions to the extent their military mission requires. Organizationally, one could question whether 

the services—their processes, policies, physical attributes, and principles—have been scrutinized for 

effectiveness in ethno-cultural context and adapted 

where possible or indicated. At the next level, is the 

central government ethno-culturally inclusive in that 

it pursues effective policies in that vein? Moreover, 

are there regional or civilizational forces at play—

governmental or nongovernmental—that prejudice 

certain groups over others or that color relationships 

with foreign interventionists? Finally, does the international community, comprised of both civil society 

and governmental forces, recognize the primacy of 

ethnic identity, and work effectively on behalf of ethnically diverse populations to promote a global ecology of peaceful state and inter-ethnic relations rather 

than allow ethnic violence to fester internationally as 

it stands impotently by asking when it will end and 

where it is all heading? We cannot be sanguine in the 

face of such rhetorical questions, as scores of ethnopolitical conflicts attest. 
398

Of the six levels identified above, the two criteria 

that do not refer to political culture, ICSA and OCSA, 

may be considered secondary—not only because both 

individual and institutional cultural training is currently part of HTTs, but because the focus here is on 

collective consciousness. Moreover, of the remaining 

four criteria, RCSA is problematic, since the concept of 

civilization52 is politically tenuous. How, for instance, 

is one to engage the orthodox civilization politically, 

who would be the military point-of-contact for the 

Islamic family of cultures, or what entity represents 

cultural policy in matters of an African nature? As a 

result of the operational weakness of the civilizational 

concept RCSA, it is not further short-listed here. A 

cultural awareness model as it relates to society must 

thus include the following three levels most closely 

linkable to collective decisionmaking. First, any evaluation of international, state-level, and/or ethnic matters as they pertain to inter-ethnic peace and stability 

on the one hand and tension and violence on other 

presupposes self-awareness of one’s ethno-culturallybased outlook. Dominant cultural groups, the normativity of whose worldview may appear to obviate the 

need for self-awareness, may find this particularly 

counterintuitive. Macro-cultural self-awareness, at 

the level of the society or country, is the next level. 

It includes macro-social societal attributes, processes, 

institutions, practices, and norms, with particular reference to the deferential inclusion of cultural groups 

in society. Third, there should be questioning of the 

lens applied to the international community of states, 

nations, and ethnicities, for instance, with regard to 

the role of English, the degree of Westernization, the 

sense of competition between what Huntington calls 

civilizations or regarding the status of sub-state eth-
399

no-cultural groups. Among other things, this requires 

a critical, culturally-aware reading of such seminal internationalization theories as modernization theory,53

hegemony theory,54 and globalization theory.55 To 

claim concern for the international security implications of ethnic conflict without calling into question 

the lens through which the international community 

is being perceived will not do, if the desired result is 

to be the lessening of ethno-cultural tensions in the 

world. In sum, in this triple sense, the development 

of cultural self-awareness as it applies to political collectivity is the first imperative.

Intercultural Competence.

The success of the HTS, however modest, may bolster the view that any knowledge of local groups is 

better than none. Necessary, however, does not mean 

sufficient. Local information, while useful and seemingly adequate to the untrained eye, is the lesser of the 

elements needed. Greater economy, impact, depth, 

and competency require an additional tier or dimension of which the development of cultural self-awareness is but the beginning. 

Significantly more promising than such culture learning is what is called intercultural (emphasis in original) 

learning. Participants in the former may learn something about the target culture, but that kind of culture 

learning usually refers to the acquisition of knowledge 

about, and perhaps even skills in enacting a particular 

foreign culture. Such . . . knowledge is not necessarily 

related to general intercultural competence. . . . To acquire general intercultural competence, one needs to 

have learned some . . . culture-general categories for 
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recognizing and dealing with a wide range of cultural 

differences.56

Intercultural learning, also called meta-cultural, 

or culture-general learning,57 entails the development of skills, abilities, and dispositions with which 

to navigate the dynamics between specific cultures.58

This includes, for instance, negotiating the pitfalls of 

communication between cultures. The main objective 

of intercultural learning is to progressively develop 

master-key skill at bridging the myriad perceptive 

and communicative differences that divide cultural 

groups and define their relations. Significantly, it includes a keen understanding of the recurrent problems 

inherent in social disparities between groups. For, in 

contrast to culture learning, such competency speaks 

to the inner, subjective dimension of ethno-cultural 

identities and relations. Instead of the assembling of 

endless details about countless, often fluid, cultural 

identities, it focuses on the issues to which such details belong, on their significance, interaction, and the 

skills required for their resolution. 

Whereas intercultural competency makes use of 

some culture-specific knowledge, it is less labor-intensive than cultural competency. For instance, the ability to anticipate ethnic tensions and conflicts is thought 

to facilitate early intervention and raise the chance of 

conflict reduction.59 Compared to a two-dimensional 

cultural competency approach, intercultural competency—including knowledge of and skill in interethnic dynamics—is considered a lesser strain on human resources, less expensive to organizations, more 

transferable to new cultural demographics, and more 

likely to lead to sustainable success with stakeholders 

from a variety of cultural backgrounds. Intercultural 
401

competence, by extension, is more apt to allow groups 

to reach societal goals, facilitate the institutional attainment of organizational goals, and empower individuals to achieve personal goals. For instance, to 

design an intercultural competency training program 

in the context of institutional medical care, a 15-point 

scale has been proposed60 comprised of cognitive and 

societal variables: 

• Culture—to acknowledge culture and its impact on thinking and behavior.

• Self—to understand one’s own cultural identity and worldview (i.e., self-awareness).

• Communication—to exchange thoughts and 

feelings with others.

• Prejudice—to recognize prejudice in ourselves 

and others and respond appropriately.

• Empathy—to experience the common humanity behind various cultural perspectives.

• Tolerance for ambiguity—to develop comfort 

with multiple perspectives.

• Power—to appreciate the relevance of power 

differences between groups.

• Conflict management—to address tensions in a 

constructive, fair, and inclusive manner.

• Diversity—to practice and promote cultural diversity throughout the workplace.

• Creativity—to seek solutions based on continuous dialogue and learning.

• Training—to challenge oneself through professional intercultural learning.

• Learning—to remain open to lifelong informal 

intercultural learning.

• Levity—to experience enthusiasm for learning 

and practicing intercultural competency.

• Structure—to create professional processes for 

intercultural competency.
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• Integration—to continually align the variables 

identified above with community practices and 

relations.

In military environments, a less institutional, more 

streamlined, and empirically-validated framework 

may be preferable. From the relevant literature, for instance, nine cognitive development parameters were 

extracted and tested for cross-cultural competence 

(CCC), a term largely interpreted as intercultural 

competence.61 They include: (1) self-efficacy; (2) ethnocultural empathy; (3) openness to new experiences; (4) 

willingness to engage; (5) cognitive flexibility; (6) selfmonitoring; (7) emotional self-regulation; (8) low need 

for cognitive closure; and, (9) tolerance for ambiguity.62 It was noted, for instance, that less advanced performers displayed the need for more cognitive closure 

(i.e., more structure, predictability, and rigidity), and 

that they manifested lower tolerance for ambiguity 

(through ethnocentrism, dichotomous thinking, and a 

penchant for authoritarianism). After testing, a simpler 6-point scale was ultimately developed, comprising: (1) willingness to engage; (2) cognitive flexibility 

and openness; (3) emotional regulation; (4) tolerance 

of uncertainty; (5) self-efficacy; and, (6) ethno-cultural 

empathy. Along such a 6-point variable scale, armed 

services personnel could conceivably be tested and 

trained. 

Service personnel, including high-level decisionmakers who fall short of such intercultural competence, are prone to mistake their own outlook, reality, 

and practices as objective or universally valid—and 

that of others as inherently lacking in comparison. 

Such perceptions are inherently problematic when 

looking from one culture to the next. Cultural univer-
403

sals, to the extent that they exist, cannot be reliably 

perceived from within a particular cultural viewpoint. 

The underlying premise of intercultural competency 

is that no valid judgments, especially about the subjective aspect of other cultures, can be made without it. A 

three-dimensional approach is a sine qua non. Besides 

relatively trivial objective-culture learning about the 

enemy, the greater need is for self-awareness of one’s 

own cultural viewpoint and above all that for training 

in meta-cultural concepts, culture-general issues, and 

intercultural communication skills. Though in part it 

overlaps with the first, intercultural learning in the 

broader sense constitutes the second imperative.

Collective Cultural Rights.

Failure to acknowledge ethno-cultural groups as 

primary, historically-grounded, collectively identified 

human aggregates are the most plausible explanation 

for the current global powerlessness in the face of ethnic conflicts. The blatant shortcomings of the global 

response to the conflict in the Darfur region of the 

Sudan may serve as example. Though tensions had 

been building long before, the international community was unable to conceive of and thus adequately 

respond to, the violence—with its pre-Islamic roots in 

three millennia of Kush Empire—as a state-sponsored 

ethno-Arabist “apartheid” war against Afro-ethnic 

groups in the South, notably the Zaghawa, Masalit, 

and the Furs from which Darfur derives its name. 

From the outset of hostilities in 2003, the global community has vacillated between: (a) exaggerated political deference to the central government, the very instigator of the atrocities; (b) overuse of military terms 

“civil war,” “guerilla,” “militia,” and “rebel” which 
404

speak to the violence without denoting its ethno-cultural source; (c) unsuitably a-cultural economic arguments, since oil revenues have been used to fund the 

ethno-cultural war itself; and, (d) a feeble focus on the 

humanitarian calamity that inevitably resulted from 

the injustice. The conflict is undoubtedly complex in 

its ethno-cultural, religious, and historic dimensions. 

Still, in Darfur the world cannot competently unravel 

that of which it is not culturally aware, it cannot appropriately intervene in what it does not interculturally define, and it cannot effectively resolve what it 

will not politically confront. 

An intercultural competency stance on ethnic 

tension may remind one of human-rights based approaches to international relations63 or human-rights 

transnationalism.64 There is a difference, however. 

Human rights are posited for individual human beings whereas group cultural rights are neither held by 

individual persons nor do they a priori apply across 

groups. By contrast, collective ethno-cultural rights 

are universal only in that they embody the fundamental human need for cultural identity, group membership, and shared values. Though not immune from 

occasional misuse to protect ethno-cultural elites, they 

are intended to protect indigenous and other sub-state 

minority populations within broader society. 

It is only rather recently that the international 

community has sought to recognize cultural matters 

as meriting legal protection. From the 1948 Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights65 onward, the 20th century saw a series of international attempts to formulate 

cultural rights, most limited to individual rights and 

seeking “protection” only against their violation. In 

earlier documents, such as United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 260, the 1948 Convention on 
405

the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, violence against entire ethno-cultural groups was 

repudiated—provided it was terminal. While focus has 

since shifted to a more precise and less fatalistic view 

of cultural rights than defense against outright collective annihilation, this has generally come at the cost of 

the rights of the group as a whole and of the entirety 

of its cultural capital. For instance, the Declaration on 

the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,66 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 

Racial Discrimination of 2000, and the 1998 U.S. International Religious Freedom Act were all designed to 

guard against violations of certain elements of minority culture as opposed to the overall culture, and only 

at the level of the individual rather than the group. 

With regard to “linguistic human rights,” the Council 

of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages67 focused only on languages as forms 

of communication. Formulated in inanimate concepts 

such as “territories,” “media,” and other areas of societal concern, the document is entirely comprised of 

the public responsibilities of states without mention 

of the cultural rights of individuals or groups. When 

several years later the Council of Europe drafted its 

Framework Convention for the Protection of National 

Minorities,68 frequent reference was made to abstractions such as pluralism, diversity, religion, history 

and the like, but provisions for cultural rights, freedoms, and protections were limited only to individual 

minority members. It was not until the latter 1990s 

that the concept of group rights gradually reemerged. 

When dozens of mostly nonstate experts and stakeholders convened in Barcelona, Spain, to draft the 

Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, they did so 
406

in explicit contrast to the age-old unifying tendency 

of the majority of states to reduce diversity and foster 

attitudes opposed to cultural plurality and linguistic 

pluralism. Claiming that states had impeded the recognition of group cultural rights, the resulting Declaration “takes language communities and not states as 

its point of departure,” recognizing a language community as having “developed a common language as 

a natural means of communication and cultural cohesion among its members,” and explicitly formulating 

linguistic rights as collective rights.69

Much remains unresolved. Regarding language 

rights, for instance, legion questions linger such as 

which countries will ratify the Declaration of Linquisitic Rights, which languages qualify for protection, how 

to define a language, what level of protection should 

be offered, and the like. More importantly, the validity 

of individual and especially collective cultural rights 

is far from universally accepted—in part due to perceived tensions between cultural rights and the interests of states and those who control them. Moreover, 

though ethnicity is usually based on a combination 

of factors self-attributed by groups,70 holistic group 

cultural rights are as yet unprotected other than via 

genocide. Scholars also differ in opinion as to whether 

rights efforts ease or fan the flames of ethnic resistance, 

whether postmodernity has rendered the world more 

vulnerable to ethnic polarization, whether the global 

economy can afford to take a laissez faire attitude to 

ethnic war.71 While it remains uncontroversial that the 

international order is strained by its current level of 

ethnic discord, the link to collective cultural rights is 

as yet insufficiently elaborated or established. 

Both actual and conceptual crises must be addressed where they occur. In light of the definition 
407

of culture provided above, “the deliberate attempt to 

impose a culture directly and speedily, no matter how 

backed by good will, is an affront to the human spirit.”72 Many experts regard the recognition of collective 

cultural needs as being central to the promotion of 

ethnic peace. Given the fundamental role of group cultural subjectivity, collective rights cannot be ignored. 

Basic group needs require basic group rights. As an 

international community, we must come to terms 

with the realization that multiethnic societies can only 

stabilize by way of the reasonable satisfaction of their 

own value sets. As nearly 100 current conflicts show, 

the world is replete with ethno-cultural tensions that 

are often age-old, in countries with young, tentative, 

and/or culturally biased central governments; and 

with more or less porous borders. With or without 

foreign troops and/or humanitarian presence, it is futile to expect they will to stabilize on Western terms 

merely because foreign and central governments lavish billions of dollars and millions of tons of ordinance 

on them. “Whether treated to carrots or sticks,” these 

so-called insurgencies “will resist and they will prevail—for such is the nature, and power, of culture.”73

Consequently, the outlook appears bleak for another 

Western effort, lacking in cultural self-awareness, at 

forcing itself on Afghanistan. For international actors 

to competently respond to the inter-ethnic conflicts of 

our age, they must recognize ethnic identity for what 

it is, including the issues that characterize relationships between minorities and mainstreams within and 

between countries—and do so with self-awareness 

and intercultural skill. Sustainable inter-ethnic peace 

depends less on the application of external force, or on 

political machinations, than on the internal perception 

of cultural justice,74 i.e., justice in ethno-cultural per-
408

spective. While it may challenge our worldview and 

lead to a more diverse international order, we must 

therefore consider the international recognition of collective ethno-cultural rights the third imperative.

Sub-State Ethno-Nationalities.

Since the Allied invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan 

respectively dismantled the Saddam Hussein and 

Taliban regimes, the rationale of bringing democracy 

has been frequently evoked. Though the notion of 

externally-imposed democracy may be a contradiction in terms, even observationally the endeavor is 

difficult to construe as successful. With 75 percent of 

the Afghani electorate reportedly participating in the 

2004 presidential elections, the subsequent 2009 elections were low in turnout and high in fraud, violence, 

and intimidation. At the 2010 parliamentary elections 

alleged vote-rigging was even more systemic than 

the year before.75 Globally, the level of corruption in 

Afghanistan is considered third only to Somalia and 

Myanmar, 76 and the country ranks 150 out of 167 countries in the democracy index.77 Iraq, a global fourth in 

corruption and 111th in democracy, rates similarly. 

Seen ethno-culturally, democracy appears particularly distant in Afghanistan. In southern Pashtun-dominated provinces such as Kandahar, the 2009 election 

turnout was so low that hundreds of polling stations 

never opened, even though the incumbent president 

was Pashtun. In the Tajik-dominated northern region, 

comprised of Kundun and seven other provinces, 

talk of secession is in part inspired by proximity to 

Pakistan’s southwestern province, Baluchistan, an 

area of Baluch ethno-nationalist resistance. Scholars 

have long recognized that plural democracy is par-
409

ticularly challenging in multiethnic societies.78 The 

combination of political and ethno-national plurality 

often creates disunity. The ethnicization of political 

parties, the existence of systemic “horizontal inequalities”79 between ethnic groups, the risk of separatism 

on the part of aggrieved ethno-nationals, the polarization and sabotage of elections, and the mobilization 

of ethno-national violence, are among the recognized 

risk factors of multiethnic democracies.80 It has been 

suggested that the risks of cyclical ethnic war may 

be too high a price for the erection of democracies in 

such diverse societies, especially given the youth of 

their often post-colonial central institutions. As the 

signatories to the Declaration of Linquisitic Rights 

recognized, states and collective sub-state rights are 

often at loggerheads, the former considering recognition of primordial nature of the latter anathema to 

their interests and ideology. Whereas a reconstituted 

Taliban may be more dreaded than welcomed by an 

Afghan populace longing for peace, it is doubtful that 

the imposition of ethno-culturally naïve Western-style 

democracy will bring about the country’s security and 

stability. In lieu of the Eurocentric, economically liberalist view of democracy that currently dominates, 

a more flexible, complex, and cooperative model is 

needed that explicitly incorporates the basic rights 

of diverse cultural groups even if their values differ 

from the secular, materialist, late-modernist, putatively acultural model of major world powers. Since 

ethno-cultural rights are indispensable to the stability 

of the larger social order, peace in Afghanistan and 

other areas of the world is unrealistic without such an 

expanded view of the state commonwealth.

At the very heart of the tension between global homogeneity and ethno-cultural specificity lie questions 
410

about the nature of the state in relation to the nation, 

nationalism, and the nation-state as social constructs. 

Conceptualizations of these imagined communities,81

and the nationalist sentiments and actions that drive 

them, vary across centuries, cultures, and ideologies, 

each stressing a variety of socio-psychological, economic, political, technological, or cultural factors.82

Tensions abound between states as sovereign political 

structures, nation-states allegedly comprised of citizens united by cultural characteristics, and nations defined by ethno-cultural group identities that strain toward autonomy. Unlike states, the concepts of nation 

and nationalism can apply at both state- and sub-state 

levels. Therein lies part of the problem. In multiethnic countries, the issue is far from abstract. Whereas 

the world only comprises some 200 states, it contains 

many thousands of ethno-national entities, states’ 

terminological appropriation of international matters 

and UN organizations notwithstanding. Eighty percent of the world’s states are ethnically diverse,83 and 

countries in which states and nations coincide, populated by a single ethno-culturally homogenous group, 

are virtually nonexistent. In all but a theoretical sense, 

the concept of the nation-state lacks worldwide applicability. The self-evident and self-serving way in 

which states—whether on their own reconnaissance or 

supported by other states—ignore sub-state nationalities and promote the illusion of cultural homogeneity 

contrasts with the perceived upward trend in global 

ethno-nationalism. Though it remains to be empirically demonstrated, the discrepancy is difficult to dissociate from the preponderance of ethnic wars currently 

in evidence. Peace in multiethnic states may prove 

elusive unless and until states abandon the largely inapplicable myth of the nation-state and meaningfully 
411

integrate the needs of sub-state ethno-national needs. 

This is particularly the case in so-called “fragile” states 

where lack of state control in the traditional sense is 

seen by dominant powers as a risk to international security, for instance with regard to human-rights abuses, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, disease, 

poverty, or terrorism. However, neither these risk 

factors nor their socio-political meaning are objective 

truths; all depend on cultural valuation. Any attempt 

to address them internationally presupposes cultural 

self-awareness and intercultural skill. The claimed 

“fragility” of states, too, remains a controversial concept, even in Western countries.84 States described as 

fragile, while no doubt challenged in their own way, 

may be more grounded in diverse local culture, more 

dynamic and adaptable, and less prone to obfuscating 

the difference between state and nation. An expanded, 

more culturally flexible view of what constitutes a viable state may be called for. However defined, healthy 

states are needed for the promotion of peace. In global 

perspective, they will rarely be traditionally-defined 

“nation-states.” 

Many theorists assert that culture is not directly 

relevant to states, which they perceive as comprised 

of neutral governments and more or less politicized 

individuals. Not only do claims of a priori inter-ethnic 

neutrality justifying state control smack of rationalizations, states are rarely ethnically neutral, as demonstrated the world over.85 Not only do ethnic groups 

compete for resources, political privileges, and cultural rights; their struggle is rarely equal. Rather than 

practicing neutral impartiality, states tend to standardize the cultural agenda of their dominant ethnicities, whose speech varieties become official, whose 

worldview becomes generalized, and whose implicit 
412

control of the state apparatus becomes normative. In 

a variety of ways, states pursue one of three strategies vis-à-vis nondominant ethnicities: assimilation; 

extermination; or, integration. Assimilation policies 

that affect, for instance, the Sami in Scandinavia, the 

Roma in Eastern Europe, or the Aborigines of Australia are well-documented. State ethnic cleansing policies that practice the disappearing of ethno-cultural 

minorities in favor of the dominant group’s hold over 

the state also remain in evidence around the world. 

Many states pursue integration along ethno-cultural 

lines—whereby nonimmigrant minority groups are 

given some control over their affairs, whether through 

federation, regionalization, or other political accommodations—to co-opt ethnic leadership, or otherwise 

forestall or resolve conflict or secession. Attempts 

have been made to classify approaches to managing 

inter-ethnic conflict. Ranging from consociationalism,86 via federalization, arbitration, integration, to assimilation, secession, ethnic cleansing and genocide, 

certain scholars focus on state actions87 while others 

foreground the experience of sub-state groups, e.g., 

indigenization, accommodation, assimilation, acculturation, population transfer, boundary alteration, 

genocide, and ethnic suicide.88 Many countries are 

challenged by a rise in ethno-nationalism. Democracy is considered in global decline,89 and in light of 

the information age the demise of the state itself has 

been increasingly debated,90 though social media are 

primarily the purview of individuals. The degree to 

which the issues of inter-ethnic disparity, of inter-ethnic dominance, and repression from the perspective 

of cultural justice, drive today’s ethno-nationalism 

remains much underappreciated. The inapplicability 

of the nation-state concept, the inevitability of ethno-
413

national accommodation, the need for cultural selfawareness, and intercultural skill, contribute to a 

new state reality. At the central government level, 

the equitable inclusion of ethnicities as collectivities 

with the framework of the state appears crucial. Statelevel commitment to, recognition of, and reasonable 

legal and or legislative accommodations for the cultural needs of sub-state nondominant ethno-national 

groups is therefore the fourth imperative before us.

WHAT NEXT?

Scores of military, paramilitary, and post-conflict 

operations around the world—from Afghanistan to 

Algeria, Burma to Burundi, Columbia to Congo, and 

so on through the alphabet—have accentuated the 

dearth of an adequate framework. The business of 

forcibly intervening in the affairs of other countries 

is always very delicate. Article 2, Section 4 of the UN 

Charter precludes it, stipulating that members “shall 

refrain in their international relations from the threat 

or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”91 Among justifiable 

exceptions to this maxim, armed responses to humanitarian crises rank more highly, while preemptive 

strikes remain controversial, and preventive wars are 

generally considered less than acceptable. Regardless of cultural context, the absence of internationally 

recognized norms, the inherently patronizing nature 

of forced interventions, and the challenges of postconflict rebuilding further compound the precariousness of armed interventions.92 The question as to what 

to do about inter-ethnic conflict requires an international framework, standards of international law that 

include a cultural, a state-level, and an international 
414

dimension. Such a global charter, one that that takes 

the ethno-cultural minority group as its point of departure, that includes due regard for the prerogatives 

and responsibilities of states, and that also outlines international standards of engagement is to be detailed 

in future research. It will need to be ethno-cultural in 

its substance, political in framework, and in its practical application can combine diplomacy, the military, 

and a WoG approach—a multi-sectoral grouping for 

which the shorthand, “The Three Ds” (development, 

defense, and diplomacy), is often employed. 

In theory, a whole of society approach (WoS), 

whereby civil society organizations (CSOs), including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 

community-based organizations (CBOs), work alongside governmental agencies, could broaden the set 

of capabilities deployed in the interest of peace and 

stability,93 providing access to more relevant tools and 

experts. In the long term, WoG approaches have also 

been shown to yield substantial fiscal savings over 

traditional enemy-centric military interventions. On 

the other hand, variability in state WoG approach 

contexts and commitments,94 as well as differences in 

organizations and political systems, along with the 

greater logistical complexities, and greater personal 

safety risks95 can challenge the efficacy of such broad 

collaborations. Moreover, international comparisons 

of WoG approaches have not explicitly focused on 

culture or intercultural matters,96 implying that even 

under a WoG/WoS approach lacking cultural selfawareness could be of concern. Invasion by the world’s 

most dominant countries inherently raise questions of 

cultural self-awareness. Not only is ethnocentrism endemic to the human condition, power may be directly 

proportional to the illusion of value self-evidence. It 
415

thus seems no coincidence that the WoG approach of 

the world’s only superpower reportedly compares 

poorly in coherence, motivation, funding, and level of 

activity to those of, for instance, Canada, Australia, or 

the United Kingdom.97 In short, though the requisite 

expertise may most easily be found in civil society, 

WoG/WoS approaches the breadth of which carries 

its own liabilities, is no guarantee for intercultural 

competency. With or without it, to confront multiethnic strife in Central Asia or elsewhere requires cultural 

self-awareness and intercultural competence.

In contrast to human security, autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned 

ground vehicles (UGVs) have rapidly become standard features of asymmetrical warfare in the post-bin 

Laden era. Along with Measurement and Signatures 

Intelligence (MASINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), drone technology has improved exponentially 

and, with it, its use in theater. It may appear oddly 

Luddite to emphasize matters of culture, security so 

“soft,” it is largely intangible. Yet nostalgia for the 

U.S. military’s overreliance on technology at the expense of human skills that previously undermined its 

intelligence capabilities is counterindicated. No societal matter escapes some degree of cultural valuation. 

Drone warfare, for instance, may be popular stateside 

since it satisfies the value of putting fewer U.S. lives 

in harm’s way. To think that members of all cultures 

and societies share this value is to lack cultural selfawareness. Drone warfare may adversely affect our 

ability to win hearts and minds overseas because it is 

often seen as cowardly by those whose value set, for 

instance, places a premium on sacrifice, martyrdom, 

or personal courage. Moreover, the collateral damage 

caused by drones is particularly unpalatable overseas, 
416

its political tenability precarious, and its recent tactical successes likely to invigorate anti-U.S. attitudes. 

In volatile ways, any of these factors can cause grave 

long-term security risks for the United States. In a 

world where a landmine costs less than a Starbucks 

coffee and an improvised explosive device (IED) has 

come down to the cost of a McDonald’s meal, those 

who would foment ethnic strife are at an advantage 

over those who would contain it. Not even a droneassisted military is up to the task. The solution is to 

truly engage the values that motivate others and broker a culturally just peace. 

In the U.S. military, the cultural outreach model 

has hitherto been two-dimensional, i.e., to tentatively 

complement national security efforts with objective 

cultural information in theater. Though the HTS has 

presumably made some deployed units more professional at this approach, it is neither qualitatively nor 

quantitatively adequate. Though neither HUMINT 

nor a WoG/WoS approach is as fiscally burdensome 

as traditional warfare, a different quality of effort, 

three-dimensional in nature, is indispensable. Of the 

four imperatives reviewed here: (1) to acquire cultural 

self-awareness; (2) develop intercultural competence; 

(3) recognize collective cultural rights; and, (4) protect 

sub-state ethno-nationalities, myriad details remain to 

be determined. Essentially, however, these challenges 

revolve around: (a) the inevitability of ethno-cultural 

justice as the key to societal peace and stability and, 

by extension, to international security; and, (b) the 

insights, capabilities, and processes essential to meeting the demands of peace and security in a world 

greatly jeopardized by ethnic conflict. Regardless of 

its outcome, the war in Afghanistan thus presents the 

impetus for more sustainable international conflict 
417

management through the imperative establishment of 

ecological relations between the world’s ethno-cultural groups. 

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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?“ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49; Robert D. Kaplan, 

“The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 273, No. 2, 

1994, pp. 44-76.

2. For example, Benjamin Barber, and Andrea Schulz, Jihad 

versus McWorld: How the Planet is Both Falling Apart and Coming 

Together, New York: Ballantine Books, 1996; Joshua A. Fishman, 

“Summary and Interpretation: Post-Imperial English 1940-1990,” 

in Joshua Fishman et al., eds., Post Imperial English. Status Change 

in Former British and American Colonies 1940-1990, Berlin, Germany/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996, p. 639.

3. Dan Smith, “Trends and causes of armed conflicts,” in Alexander Austin, Martina Fischer, and Norbert Ropers, eds., Berghof 

Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin, Germany: Berghof 

Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003, p. 

3; Ted R. Gurr, The Ethnic Basis of Political Action in the 1980s and 

1990s, Working Paper, Minorities at Risk Project, Baltimore, MD: 

Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 

University of Maryland, 1999.

4. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. iv. (Hereafter 

QDR.)

5. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest, No. 16, 1989, pp. 3-18; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History 

and the Last Man, New York, NY: Free Press, 1992.

6. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 

Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1956.
429

7. John Maersheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 

York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2003.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in The 

Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 1997.

9. Edward Sapir, “Culture, Genuine and Spurious,” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1924.

10. Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works: The Science of 

Cultural Anthropology, New York: Knopf, 1948, p. 39ff.

11. See, for example, Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy: 

An Essay in Political and Social Criticism, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974.

12. See, for example, Milton J. Bennett, “Defining, Measuring, 

and Facilitating Intercultural Learning: A Conceptual Introduction to the IJIE Special Issue,” Intercultural Education, Vol. 20, 2009, 

pp. 2-4.

13. Robert Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, eds., Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination, Berlin, 

Germany: Mouton De Gruyter, 1995, p. 7.

14. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: 

Basic Books, 1973, pp. 87-125.

15. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 

World Order, p. 4.

16. Emile Durkheim, Durkheim on Religion, Atlanta, GA: 

American Academy of Religion, 1994.

17. Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth 

Century, Lanham, MD: Lexington,. 2002, p. 29.

18. Bridget Moix, “Matters of Faith: Religion, Conflict, and 

Conflict Resolution,” in Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, 

eds., The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, San 

Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2006.
430

19. Robert L. Ochola, The Acholi Religious Leaders‘ Peace Initiative in the Battlefield of Northern Uganda: An Example of an Integrated, 

Inculturated, and Ecumenical Approach to Pastoral Work in a War Situation, Unpublished Diploma Thesis, Innsbruck, Austria: Theology, University of Innsbruck, 2006.

20. Universal House of Justice (UHJ), The Message to the World’s 

Religious Leaders, London, UK: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 2002.

21. The three predominant theories of ethnicity are: (a) primordialism, and its corollary essentialism, which claims that ethnicity is historically defined via given existential markers such as 

place or race; (b) perennialism holds that ethnicities are historically defined and thus subject to constant change; and, (c) constructivism denies a basis in externality and sees it as a strictly 

negotiable social construct. “Geertz primordialism,” moreover, 

holds that the elements of identity need not truly be “primordial,” as long as they are so defined by groups. Anthony D. Smith, 

Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press. 1999, p. 13. 

22. Abdul Jamil Khan, Urdu/Hindi: An Artificial Divide, New 

York: Algora, 2006.

23. See, for example, Kathleen A. Ethier and Kay Deaux, “Negotiating Social Identity when Contexts Change: Maintaining 

Identification and Responding to Threat,” Journal of Personality 

and Social Psychology, Vol. 67, No. 2, August 1994.

24. Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social 

Organization of Culture Difference, Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1969, p. 9.

25. See, for example, Charles King, “The Myth of Ethnic Warfare: Understanding Conflict in the Post-Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 6, 2001.

26. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA: 

University of California Press, 1985. 
431

27. Dan Smith.

28. See, for example, Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and 

the Sword, Peabody, MA: Mariner Books. 2005; David Price, Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American 

Anthropology in the Second World War, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

29. Franz Boas, “Scientists as Spies,” The Nation, December 20, 

1919; Marc W. D. Tyrrell, Ph.D., “Why Dr. Johnny Won’t go to 

War: Anthropology and the Global War on Terror,” Small Wars 

Journal, Vol. 7, February 2007; Roberto González, American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain, Chicago, IL: 

University of Chicago & Prickly Paradigm, 2009.

30. Sarah Sewall, John A. Nagl, David H. Petraeus, and James 

F. Amos, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

31. See, for example, John W. Jandora, “War and Culture: A 

Neglected Relation,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1999, 

pp. 541-556; Anthony C. Zinni, “Non-traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” in Joseph L. Strange, ed., Capital “W” War: A Case 

for Strategic Principles of War, Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps 

War College, 1998, pp. 267-ff.

32. Daniel P. McDonald, A Brief Note on the Multi-layered Nature of Cross-Cultural Competence, Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2008.

33. Sewall et al.

34. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, London, UK: Duckworth, 1983.

35. See, for example, Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of 

Syntax, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.

36. González.
432

37. See American Anthropological Association (AAA), Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology, with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities (AAA), Final Report on The 

Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program, Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 2009.

38. Priest and Arkin argue that the post-9/11 intelligence construct—comprising in excess of 1300 facilities, close to 2000 private 

companies, and close to a million individuals with “Top Secret” 

security status—has become a “fourth branch” of government far 

too unsurveyable, lacking in transparency, dependent on contractors, and too expensive to be efficient, reliable, or even effective. 

Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise 

of the New American Security State, New York: Little, Brown and 

Company, 2011.

39. AAA.

40. Human Terrain Teams Preliminary Assessment, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007. (Hereafter HTT.)

41. Geertz, 1973.

42. See, for example, Edward Tyler, Primitive Culture, New 

York: J. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1920.

43. Ibid.

44. See, for example, Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 

Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954.

45. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, New York: Doubleday, 

1977.

46. See, for example, William Safran, “Non-seperatist Policies 

Regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 15, 

No. 1, 1994, pp. 61-80.

47. Bennett, “Defining, Measuring, and Facilitating Intercultural Learning.”
433

48. The number of attested ethnolinguistic traditions in the 

world—not counting religious or racial-phenotypal groups—varies considerably, i.e., from around 3,000 (Florian Dua Coulmas, 

Sprache und Staat: Studien zur Sprachenplanung und Sprachpolitik, 

Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 1985) to approximately 5,000 

(John Edwards, Multilingualism, London, UK/New York: Routledge, 1994) to between 6,000 and 7000 (Phillipson and SkutnabbKangas) to exactly 6,703 (Barbara F. Grimes, Ethnologue, Dallas, 

TX: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1996). Paradoxically, despite 

the record cases of language death reported, languages appear to 

be increasing in number as traditional distinctions between languages and dialects are fine-tuned.

49. Bennett, “Defining, Measuring, and Facilitating Intercultural Learning,“ p. S4.

50. Ibid., pp. S3-S4.

51. Only the ethno-cultural identity to which individuals subscribe is intended here.

52. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 

World Order, 1997.

53. D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the 

Middle East, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958.

54. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London, UK: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 

55. Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global 

Culture, London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd., 1992.

56. Bennett, “Defining, Measuring, and Facilitating Intercultural Learning,” p. S4.

57. W. B. Gudykunst and M. R. Hammer, “Dimensions of Intercultural Effectiveness: Culture Specific or Cultural General?” 

International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1984, 

pp. 1-10.
434

58. Sources alternatingly refer to cultural, cross-cultural (Bennett, 1998), multi-cultural (James Green, Cultural Awareness in Human Services: A Multi-Ethnic Approach, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 

Allyn & Bacon, 1998), insurgent multicultural (D. Wear, “Insurgent multiculturalism: Rethinking How and Why We Teach Culture in Medical Education,” Academic Medicine, Vol. 78, 2003, pp. 

549–554), trans-cultural (Fernando Ortiz, Contrapunteo Cubano Del 

Tobacco y el Azúcar (Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar), Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), intercultural (A. E. Fantini, 87 Assessment Tools of Intercultural Competence, Brattleboro, 

VT: School for International Training, 2006), culturally responsive 

(G. Gay, Culturally Responsive Teaching: Theory, Research, & Practice, New York: Teachers College Press, 2000), culturally relevant 

(Heather Coffey, Culturally Relevant Teaching, Chapel Hill, NC: 

University of North Carolina, 2008), culturally sensitive (Yvonne 

Asamoah, Innovations in Delivering Culturally Sensitive Social Work 

Services: Challenges for Practice and Education, New York: Routledge, 1997), culturally appropriate (Leon Epstein, Culturally 

Appropriate Health Care by Culturally Competent Health Professionals: International Workshop Report, Hashomer: The Israel National 

Institute for Health Policy and Health Services Research Health 

Services Research, 2007); and/or, culturally competent (Jerry V. 

Diller and Jean Moule, Cultural Competence: A Primer for Educators, Belmont, CA: Thomason Learning, 2005) initiatives. Such a 

perplexing range of formulations may flummox the most wellintended armed services professional.

59. Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 10.

60. Gregory Paul P. Meyjes, A Guide to Intercultural Health 

Care: Serving African Americans, Unpublished manuscript, Denver, CO: Kaiser Permanente, African American Center of Excellence, 2010. Also, see Richard D. Bucher and Patricia L. Bucher, 

Building Cultural Intelligence (CQ): Nine Megaskills, Upper Saddle 

River, NJ: Pearson, 2008.

61. Karol G. Ross, Carol A. Thomson, Daniel P. McDonald, 

and Meagan C. Arrastia, The Development of the CCCI: The CrossCultural Competence Inventory, Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense 

Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2009.
435

62. Ibid.

63. See, for example, Hans C. Köchler, “World Order: Vision 

and Reality,” in David Armstrong, ed., Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXXI, New Delhi: India, Manak, 2009, pp. xxiii-564.

64. See, for example, Sally Merry and Mark Goodale, The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local, 

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

65. Eleanor Roosevelt, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 2000.

66. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 

of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, United Nations General 

Assembly, Resolution 36/55, New York: United Nations Organization, 1981.

67. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, 1992.

68. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, 1995.

69. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, 

Paris, France: UNESCO, 1996.

70. Six very general categories have been cited for defining 

an “ethnic community:” 1. a name; 2. a belief in common ancestry; 3. historical memories; 4. a shared culture; 5. attachment to 

a past or current territory; and, 6. self-identification as a group, 

Anthony D. Smith as quoted in Brown, p. 5; Kallen’s distinction 

between the right of the group as a category, the cultural rights 

of the group, and the right to national collectivity may also prove 

useful, Evelyn Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada, New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

71. See, for example, Wilma A. Dunaway, “Ethnic Conflict in 

the Modern World-System: The Dialectics of Counter-Hegemonic 

Resistance in an Age of Transition,” Journal of World Systems Research, Vol. IX, No. 1, 2003, pp. 3-16.
436

72. Sapir, p. 328.

73. Gregory Paul P. Meyjes, “Plan ‘C’ Is for C ulture: Out of 

Iraq, Opportunity,” Landpower Essay, Vol. 7, No. 4, Arlington, VA: 

Association of the United States Army, June 2007.

74. Gregory Paul P. Meyjes, “Language and Universalization: a ‘Linguistic Ecology’ Reading of Bahá’í Writ,” The Journal of 

Bahá’í Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1999, pp. 51-63.

75. Scott Worden, “Afghanistan: An Election Gone Awry,” 

Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2010, pp. 11-25.

76. TI, Corruption Perception Index, Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2010.

77. Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat, London, UK: 

The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010.

78. Brown, p. 9.

79. F. Stewart, ed., Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, Basingstoke, UK: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

80. See, for example, Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 681-

684.

81.Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London, UK: 

Verso, 1965.

82. See, for example, E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, UK: Basic Blackwell, 1983; E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 1990; Stearns, “Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis,“ Journal of World 

History, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 57-74; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 1995.
437

83. David Welsh, “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict,” 

Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1993, pp. 63-80.

84. Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown report that internationally: 

the concept is most popular among development ministries, which use it to describe a subset of poor countries where weak governance and state capacity are 

impediments to pro-poor growth. Foreign and defense 

ministries tend to be more skeptical, finding the term a 

distraction from concrete challenges of crisis response 

and post-conflict reconstruction. Foreign ministries are 

especially sensitive to the potential diplomatic fallout 

of publicly labeling particular sates as ‘fragile.’ 

Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its 

parts? Assessing “Whole of Goverment” Approaches to Fragile States, 

New York: International Peace Academy, 2007, pp. 128-129. 

85. Meyjes, “Plan ‘C’,” 2007: 

Governments often claim that overbearing policies 

are necessary to avoid inter-ethnic strife, but rarely 

are they disinterested. Consequently, minority issues 

fester, only to reappear later. The . . . Iraqi government 

concedes that its partisanship, including regarding its 

security forces and sectarian violence, has aggravated 

the instability of the society it represents. To leave certain minorities seriously aggrieved is to plant the seeds 

of revenge. It leaves them little choice but resistance, 

and it can lead to centuries of cyclical conflict. 

86. A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.

87. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Introduction: The 

Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict,” in John McGarry 

and Brendan O’Leary. eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London, UK: Routledge, 1993, pp. 1-40.
438

88. John Coakley, “The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 13, 

No. 4, 1992, pp. 343-358.

89. Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat.

90. See, for example, Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline 

of the State, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Richard 

N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., No More States? Globalization, National Self-determination, and Terrorism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.

91. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International 

Court of Justice, New York: United Nations Organization, 1978.

92. See, for example, Stephano Recchia, “Just and Unjust 

Postwar Reconstruction: How Much External Interference Can Be 

Morally Justified?” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 

2009, pp. 165–187.

93. Lisa Schirch, “Where Does Whole of Government Meet 

Whole of Society?” In this volume.

94. Whole Government Approaches to Fragile States, Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

2006.

95. Schirch.

96. Whole Government Approaches to Fragile States, pp. 7-11.

97. Patrick and Brown.
439

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

FOUZIEH MELANIE ALAMIR is an independent 

consultant for governance, peace and security. She is 

a political scientist who has been working on issues 

of regime transformation, international conflict and 

crisis management, peace building, and governance 

for more than 15 years in different functions. Her previous assignments have been at the University of the 

German Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Staff and 

Command College as a research associate and lecturer 

from 1997-2002, as a desk officer in the Military Policy 

Division of the German Federal Ministry of Defense, a 

Program Manager at the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (a development organization), and as 

Head of Comprehensive Security at IABG, a private 

high technology and consulting enterprise with focus 

on security and defense. In 2011, Dr. Alamir established 

her own consultancy company offering research, consulting, and training services in the thematic field of 

governance, peace, and security, serving clients from 

ministries, the armed forces, and the police, as well as 

several other security, emergency response, and development agencies. Her international deployments 

covered Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Ghana, and 

Indonesia, among others. Dr. Alamir is familiar both 

with military and civilian thinking and approaches to 

peace building, conflict and crisis management, combining academic perspectives with experience in governmental agencies and in private business from the 

politico-strategic to the project/tactical field level. 

MICHAEL ASHKENAZI has been a Project Leader and Senior Researcher at the Bonn International 

Center for Conversion (BICC) since 2004. At BICC, 
440

he has led the TRESA program to design and publish 

universal training materials on small arms and light 

weapons (SALW) control. Prior to coming to work for 

BICC, Dr. Ashkenazi was professor of Anthropology 

and Deputy Academic Dean (Regents College, London), Senior Lecturer (Gyosei College, Reading University), Research Fellow (Japan Centre, University of 

Birmingham), Visiting Fellow (NASA-Ames), Visiting Professor (Department of Anthropology/School 

of Management, University of Calgary), and Senior 

Lecturer (Hebrew University). He previously served 

in the U.S. Army, reaching the rank of captain; his 

Army duties included posts as infantry platoon, and 

company commander and in field and staff positions. 

Dr. Ashkenazi is Associate Editor of Encyclopaedia of 

Ground Warfare (ABD-Clio). He has taught and supervised graduate and undergraduate students, and 

is author and editor of several academic volumes, as 

well as scholarly papers. 

DOUG BROOKS is President of International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), a nongovernmental, nonprofit, nonpartisan association of service 

companies dedicated to providing ethical services to 

international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian rescue, stabilization efforts, and disaster 

relief. Mr. Brooks has worked as a teacher in Kambuzuma Township in Harare, Zimbabwe, at the Library 

of Congress, at the National Archives, and the Institute 

of International Education (IIE). Previous to founding 

ISOA, he was an academic fellow at the South African 

Institute for International Affairs in 1999-2000. Mr. 

Brooks holds a B.A. in history from Indiana University and an M.A. in history from Baylor University, with 

additional doctoral studies at the Graduate School of 
441

Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. 

ROBERT H. “ROBIN” DORFF joined the Strategic 

Studies Institute in June 2007 as Research Professor 

of National Security Affairs where he currently holds 

the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. 

He previously served on the U.S. Army War College 

(USAWC) faculty as a Visiting Professor (1994-96) and 

as Professor of National Security Policy and Strategy 

in the Department of National Security and Strategy 

(1997-2004), where he also held the General Maxwell 

D. Taylor Chair (1999-2002) and served as Department 

Chairman (2001-04). He has been a Senior Advisor 

with Creative Associates International, Inc., in Washington, DC, and served as Executive Director of the 

Institute of Political Leadership in Raleigh, NC (2004-

06). Dr. Dorff is the author or co-author of five books, 

and numerous journal articles and book chapters. Dr. 

Dorff holds a B.A. in political science from Colorado 

College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science 

from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., is a Visiting Professor 

of the Practice at Duke Law School and the Associate Director of its Center on Law, Ethics and National 

Security. Prior to retiring from the U.S. Air Force as 

a major general in June of 2010, General Dunlap assisted in the supervision of more than 2,500 military 

and civilian attorneys worldwide. His 34-year career 

included tours in both the United Kingdom and Korea, and he deployed for military operations in Africa 

and the Middle East. Totaling more than 120 publications, his writings address a wide range of topics 

including various aspects of national security law, air-
442

power, counterinsurgency, cyberpower, civil-military 

relations, and leadership. General Dunlap speaks frequently at professional conferences and at numerous 

institutions of higher learning, including Harvard, 

Yale, MIT, UVA, and Stanford, as well as National Defense University and the Air, Army, and Navy War 

Colleges. He serves on the Board of Advisors for the 

Center for a New American Security. General Dunlap 

received his undergraduate degree from St. Joseph’s 

University (PA), a law degree from Villanova University, and is a distinguished graduate of the National 

War College.

MACKENZIE DUELGE is a member of the Georgia Bar Association. Her research interests include 

counterterrorism, the education/conflict nexus, and 

the role of contractors in international interventions. 

Ms. Duelge holds a J.D. from Emory University and 

an M.A. in International Affairs from the Catholic 

University of America. She is working on a Ph.D. in 

international conflict management at Kennesaw State 

University. 

WILLIAM FLAVIN became the Directing Professor of the Doctrine, Concepts, Training and Education 

Division at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), located at the U.S. 

Army War College in Carlisle, PA, in July 2007. Before 

this assignment, he was a senior foreign affairs analyst 

with Booz Allen Hamilton on contract to assist the PKSOI for doctrine development. From 1995 to 1999, he 

was a colonel in the U.S. Army serving as the Deputy 

Director of Special Operations for the Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe at the Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Powers Europe. Colonel Flavin holds a B.A. in 
443

history from the Viginia Military Institute (VMI) and 

an M.A. in history from Emory University. He was a 

senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies for his Army War College year and then 

taught at the Army War College. 

VOLKER C. FRANKE is Associate Professor of 

Conflict Management and Director of the Ph.D. program in International Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University. From 2006-08, he served as 

Director of Research at the BICC, one of Germany’s 

premier peace and conflict research and capacity 

building institutes. From 1998-2007, he was Director 

and Managing Editor of the National Security Studies Case Studies Program at Syracuse University’s 

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Dr. 

Franke is the author of Preparing for Peace: Military 

Identity, Value-Orientations, and Professional Military 

Education (Praeger, 1999) and more than 30 journal 

articles, book chapters, case studies, and research reports on issues related to peace and security studies, 

conflict management, civil-military relations, development policy, and social identity. He is also the editor 

of Terrorism and Peacekeeping: New Security Challenges

(Praeger, 2005) and Security in a Changing World: Case 

Studies in U.S. National Security Management (Praeger, 

2002). Dr. Franke holds an M.A. in political science 

and sociology from Johannes Gutenberg University in 

Mainz, Germany, a Master of Public Administration 

degree from North Carolina State University, and a 

Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University’s 

Maxwell School. 
444

MARY HABECK is an Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies (SAIS), where she teaches courses on military history and strategic thought. Before 

coming to SAIS, she taught American and European 

military history at Yale University from 1994 to 2005. 

Dr. Habeck was appointed by President George Bush 

to the Council on the Humanities at the National Endowment for the Humanities (2006-12), and in 2008-09 

she was the Special Advisor for Strategic Planning on 

the National Security Council staff. Dr. Habeck holds 

a B.A. in international studies, Russian, and Spanish 

from Ohio State University and an M.A. in international relations and a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. 

CHRISTOPHER HOLSHEK, Colonel (retired), 

U.S. Army (Reserve) Civil Affairs, has 25 years of civil-military operations experience at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in joint, interagency, and 

multinational settings across the full range of operations. He commanded the first U.S. Army Civil Affairs 

battalion to deploy in support of Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM. His final tour of duty prior to retirement 

after 30 years in the Army was as the Military Representative at the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Military Affairs for U.S. European 

Command/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe. He has served with the United Nations (UN) 

in military capacities, such as the Senior U.S. Military 

Observer and Chief, Civil-Military Coordination at 

UN Mission in Liberia from January 2008 to July 2009. 

He also served in civilian capacities with the UN as a 

logistics officer with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia and with the UN Mission in 
445

Kosovo as Political Reporting Officer. In more recent 

years, he has been a consultant associated with DynCorp International, Creative Associates, the Institute 

for Defense Analyses, and the Naval Postgraduate 

School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations. He is currently a Senior Associate with the Project on National 

Security Reform and the Liberia country project manager for the Defense Institution Reform Initiative. 

ROBERT KENNEDY, a former senior government 

official, is a Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, 

Atlanta, GA, since January 2003. His previous assignments include director of the joint German-American 

George C. Marshall European Center for Security 

Studies in Germany; Civilian Deputy Commandant, 

NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy; Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies at the 

U.S. Army War College; researcher at the U.S. Army 

Strategic Studies Institute; and Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. 

Kennedy was an enlisted man in the Army and a command pilot on active duty with the U.S. Air Force and 

later with the reserve forces. 

JACK A. LeCUYER, a retired U.S. Army Colonel, is 

a Distinguished Professor holding a Minerva Chair at 

the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 

in Carlisle, PA. His previous assignments have been 

as a Distinguished Fellow with the Project on National 

Security Reform (PNSR) with lead responsibility for 

PNSR’s efforts in design of the new National Security 

Staff, alignment of strategy and resources, and design 

of the Next Generation State Department. Colonel 

LeCuyer has been a strategic planner and Special As-
446

sistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; 

the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern 

Command; and two Army Chiefs of Staff. He played 

a major role in the post-Vietnam transformation of 

the Army into today’s world class organization. He 

served as an Olmsted Scholar in Florence, Italy; White 

House Fellow with duty in the White House Office of 

Intergovernmental Affairs; Army Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States; Senior Army Fellow 

at the Brookings Institution; and Executive Director of 

the White House Fellows Foundation and Association. 

GREGORY PAUL P. MEYJES is Associate Professor of Linguistics in the Department of Inclusive Education at Kennesaw State University, and President 

of Solidaris Intercultural Services LLC, an intercultural and international consulting firm with a focus 

on language, religion, and race/ethnicity. Previous 

assignments included Professor of foreign languages 

at North Carolina State University (1990-2001); Fulbright Lecturer/Researcher in Sociolinguistics at the 

University of Conakry in Guinea, West Africa (1998-

2000); and Visiting Professor for Intercultural Education and Internationalization at Middle Tennessee 

State University (2007-08). Dr. Meyjes holds a doctorate in linguistics from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, and graduate credentials in 

political science, socio and applied linguistics, and 

international relations from the Universities of Heidelberg (Germany), Lancaster, Oxford, Essex (United 

Kingdom), and the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation (Netherlands). 
447

LISA SCHIRCH is the founding director of the 3P 

Human Security, a partnership for peacebuilding policy; and Research Professor at the Center for Justice 

and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University. 

3P Human Security Initiative is a policy voice for civil 

society to foster peacebuilding through more extensive diplomatic initiatives, smarter development strategies, and human security-oriented defense strategies. 

A former Fulbright Fellow in East and West Africa, 

Dr. Schirch has worked in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, 

Taiwan, Ghana, Kenya, Brazil, and 15 other countries. 

She is a frequent public speaker and has TV and radio 

experience discussing U.S. foreign policy. Dr. Schirch 

is the author of 5 books on peacebuilding and conflict 

prevention. She holds a B.A. in international relations 

from the University of Waterloo, Canada, and an M.S. 

and Ph.D. in conflict analysis and resolution from 

George Mason University. 

JAMES STEPHENSON is the Senior Advisor for 

Stabilization and Reconstruction at Creative Associates International, Inc. Dr. Stephenson is a retired 

Senior Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID). His USAID 

assignments included 13 months as Mission Director 

in Iraq; Senior Advisor to the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; Mission Director in Serbia/Montenegro and Lebanon; 

and in various positions in Egypt, Barbados, Grenada, 

El Salvador, the Philippines, and Washington, DC. 

He frequently lectures at the military service colleges 

and various universities, and trains deploying units 

in counterinsurgency. Before joining USAID, Mr. Stephenson practiced law in Columbia, SC. He holds a 

bachelor’s honors degree in English literature and a 

juris doctorate from the University of South Carolina. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editors

Dr. Volker C. Franke

Dr. Robert H. Dorff

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE