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i 

68–464 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–63] 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS 

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM 

OUTSIDE EXPERTS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, September 13, 2011, The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from Outside Experts ................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, September 13, 2011 ................................................................................. 43 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN 

YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Boot, Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 9 

Donnelly, Thomas, Resident Fellow and Director, Center for Defense Studies, 

American Enterprise Institute ............................................................................ 6 

O’Hanlon, Dr. Michael E., Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Brookings 

Institution ............................................................................................................. 12 

Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments ............................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Boot, Max .......................................................................................................... 74 

Donnelly, Thomas ............................................................................................. 64 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 47 

O’Hanlon, Dr. Michael E. ................................................................................. 83 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 49 

Thomas, Jim ...................................................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 97 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 97 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. 

MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES 

FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 13, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The committee will come to order. 

I know some are caught in traffic, but we will go ahead and get 

started, and I think we will be fine. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on ‘‘The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military 10 Years After 9/11: Perspectives from Outside Experts.’’ 

As our Nation marked the 10-year anniversary of the attacks on 

our Nation this past Sunday, we remember and commemorate the 

lives lost on that day. We also honor the sacrifices made every day 

since then by our military and their families as our Armed Forces 

continue to fight for our Nation’s safety. 

This hearing is the second in our series of hearings to evaluate 

lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions 

we will soon be making about the future of our force. Last Thursday, we heard from former chairmen and a vice chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today, we will hear from outside experts representing several well-known and highly respected organizations to 

whom our committee regularly turns for accurate and reliable research and analysis. While we will continue to solicit the expertise 

of former and current senior military and civilian leaders within 

the Department of Defense, it is important to gain perspective from 

professionals such as these who make their living conducting the 

type of forward-looking strategic assessments that we seek. 

I remain concerned that our Nation is slipping back into the false 

confidence of a September 10th mindset—believing our Nation to 

be secure because the homeland has not been successfully attacked; 

believing that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by 

budget choices, not strategic ones. 

As members of the Armed Services Committee, we must avoid 

the cart-before-the-horse cliche ́. First, we must decide what we 

want our military to do, and only then evaluate savings within the 

Department. To date, that hasn’t happened. Over half a trillion dol-
2 

lars has been cut from the DOD [Department of Defense] already. 

Nevertheless, if the Joint Select Committee does not succeed in developing and passing a cohesive deficit reduction plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. On top of that looming concern, it remains to be seen 

whether or not additional cuts may be proposed by the Administration even if the super committee is successful. 

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I have two principal concerns that stem from recent military atrophy. The first is 

a security issue. In a networked and globalized world, the Atlantic 

and Pacific Ocean are no longer adequate to keep America safe. 

September 11th taught us that. 

The second is an economic concern. While it is true that our military power is derived from our economic power, we must realize 

that this relationship is symbiotic. Cuts to our Nation’s defense, either by eliminating programs or laying off soldiers, comes with an 

economic cost. The U.S. military is the modern era’s greatest champion of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is time we 

focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of our debt instead of the 

protector of our prosperity. 

With that in mind, I look forward to a frank discussion today. 

Representative Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank the chairman for holding not just this hearing but this series of hearings. I think it is one of the most important challenges that we face on the Armed Services Committee and 

certainly in our national security Department of Defense strategy, 

to figure out how we deal with the budget deficit we face pending 

cuts. But, also, I think our experts agree today, and everyone on 

the panel would agree, that even if we weren’t facing these budget 

cuts and deficit challenges, there is a need to review the strategy 

at DOD. 

A lot has changed in recent years. We are beginning to draw 

down in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have the emergence of all kinds 

of new weapons systems, potential challenges. Certainly, a lot has 

changed since we had the fairly dependable Cold War strategy of 

being able to fight two major regional contingencies at the same 

time. So, no matter our budget picture, it would be appropriate to 

have a strategic review. 

And it is important to point out that the executive branch, the 

President, is going through that strategic review right now, going 

back, looking at where we spend our money in the Department of 

Defense and saying, Where can we find savings? Where should we 

spend it? What should our strategy be? I think that is one of the 

most important things that we are going to have to do on this committee, so I think it is great to hear from outside experts and, 

frankly, from any experts that we can get our hands on. It is going 

to be necessary. 
3 

And it is important to point out that the size of some of the cuts 

that have been talked about on the Department of Defense budget 

would be devastating. I did not support the debt ceiling deal, despite the fact that I felt we should raise the debt ceiling, in large 

part because all of the cuts were dumped on to the nonentitlement 

portion of the spending, unless, of course, the super committee 

manages to do what we have been completely unable to do for the 

last 10 or 12 years and comes up with savings elsewhere. So it is 

all dumped onto the nonentitlement portion of the budget, and defense is over half of that nonentitlement spending. National security spending will be devastated if this plan goes forward, and we 

seriously need to come up with some alternatives to that. 

That said, we can clearly find savings in our national security 

spending; we can clearly find savings in the Department of Defense. Anybody who takes a passing look at the last 10 years can 

clearly find places where we need to spend money better, more effectively. And we could actually save money and be stronger. You 

know, it doesn’t necessarily have to work in the opposite direction. 

And the other point I would like to make is, resources are part 

of a strategy. I am sure absolutely everybody who has ever had to 

look at something where they want to spend money would like to 

say, let’s imagine that money is not a factor. What do we want? I 

mean, that is the standard operating procedure for any program 

you can imagine. It is also completely unrealistic. You have to live 

within the resources that are available to you, and you have to figure out what your strategy should be. 

But the one thing that I absolutely believe is whatever we decide 

in terms of our strategy, we have to make sure we fund it. The one 

thing this committee, this Congress, the President, the Department 

of Defense cannot do is come up with a strategy and ask the men 

and women in our Armed Forces to carry it out and then not give 

them the resources to carry it out. So my personal opinion is you’ve 

got to look at the resources in determining that strategy. Don’t set 

a strategy imagining more resources than you are actually going to 

have. 

And the last point that I think is critical: We have to make 

choices here. And this committee can do a great job, and has done 

a great job, of pointing out where, if you cut this, here is the implication. I think it is very important that we do that, that we make 

it clear the impact that these cuts will have on our ability to protect this Nation. We need to make that argument. 

But if we feel very, very strongly that those proposed cuts are 

going to do irreparable harm to our national security strategy, that 

they should not be made, then we also have an obligation to come 

up with the money so that we don’t make them. And whether that 

is finding cuts in other programs or finding more revenue, that is 

a critical piece of this. 

And, again, everybody who is looking to spend money would like 

to say, ‘‘Well, this is my little piece. I can’t worry about where it 

is coming from; that is your job. I just got to tell you that I have 

to have this.’’ Well, if you have that focus, you are going to look 

up and not have that money if you are in the nonentitlement portion of the budget, because the revenue is the revenue, the entitlements are the entitlements, they are what they are. It takes an act 
4 

of Congress every year and the President to sign it to fund the Department of Defense. 

So if you don’t deal with those other issues, as I have said repeatedly, you wind up being the person last in line at a buffet 

where the food is running out. Not a good situation. So we have 

to talk also about what our revenue should be and what other programs we should cut. 

I look forward to this discussion. I think it is the most important 

thing we are doing right now because it will form our national security policy in the years and decades to follow. 

I thank the chairman for having this hearing and look forward 

to the witnesses’ testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Now, as I mentioned before, we have special witnesses that have 

outside expertise, and I am looking forward to hearing their testimonies. 

First we will hear from Mr. Jim Thomas, Vice President and Director of studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 

Dr. O’Hanlon is still caught in traffic. We will move him to the 

end. 

We will hear next from Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow 

and Director, Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute; and Mr. Max Boot, the Jeane Kirkpatrick Senior 

Fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and then Dr. Michael O’Hanlon, Director of research and 

Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We all look forward 

to hearing your testimony. 

Mr. Thomas. 

STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. THOMAS. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, I just want to underscore 

the importance of your opening comments this morning, that truly 

our national and economic security are intertwined, and it is not 

a question of one or the other but it is a question of how we are 

going to manage both in the years ahead. And the second that I 

think you both stressed was that the cuts that would be anticipated 

by the sequestration trigger truly would be devastating. And this, 

obviously, is in the backs of all of our minds this morning. 

Ten years on from the 9/11 attacks, America finds its military 

forces still engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and conducting combat 

and noncombat operations around the world. But the United States 

does not have the luxury to focus only on the threat posed by Islamic extremists. Three challenges, in particular, will require 

greater attention over the next several decades: The rise of China, 

new regional nuclear powers, and the growing lethality and em-
5 

powerment of other transnational non-state actors besides Al 

Qaeda. 

The security challenges we face in the decade ahead are greater 

than they have been at any time since the Cold War, while the resources to deal with them are tightening by the day. There is a 

need to revise our defense strategy in light of our changing security 

and fiscal circumstances. We have to make choices. Even if we 

didn’t face a grim fiscal outlook, we would still need to make 

choices to address the range of security challenges this Nation 

faces to maintain U.S. military staying power. 

A new strategy might call on allies and partners to do more for 

their own defense, with the United States serving as a global enabler rather than a first responder for every regional crisis that 

comes along. It might place greater emphasis on particular elements of the U.S. military to foster deterrence. Just as President 

Eisenhower’s ‘‘New Look’’ strategy in the 1950s emphasized nuclear 

weapons to deter aggression, the United States today might emphasize Special Operations Forces and global strike capabilities, including cyber capabilities, conventional and nuclear, to deter aggression and coercion. 

The United States, and DOD in particular, should also consider 

revising the force planning construct that directs how we size and 

shape our military forces, moving away from the preparations for 

conducting concurrent large-scale land combat campaigns focused 

specifically on conducting or repelling invasions. Instead, it might 

consider a wider range of contingencies, placing a particular emphasis on one of the most stressing challenges our military faces, 

which might be the elimination of a hostile power’s WMD [weapon 

of mass destruction] capabilities. 

As we look ahead, we should assume that the United States will 

conduct no more than one large-scale land combat campaign at any 

given time. To deal with opportunistic aggression by a third party 

if the United States is engaged in war—the threat that the concurrency principle in our force planning construct historically has 

intended to address—the United States should maintain sufficient 

global strike capabilities, including a deep magazine of precisionguided weapons, to halt invading forces and conduct heavy punitive 

attacks over extended periods of time against any second mover. 

The United States should also consider revising its military roles 

and missions. It should reduce duplication across the Services, including in combat aircraft, unmanned air vehicles, armored forces, 

and cyber capabilities. 

Beyond changes in its strategy and the design of forces, we 

should also look for greater savings and efficiencies in the institutional functions of the Department, including reductions in headquarters staffs. We must also act to arrest personnel growth, cost 

growth, lest DOD follow the path of large American corporations 

that have run into trouble in recent years as their health care and 

pension costs have spiraled out of control, leaving them less competitive. 

We must also safeguard key elements of our defense industrial 

base as a source of strategic advantage. And today, the Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is releasing in advance to 
6 

members of this committee copies of our new report on the defense 

industrial base. 

And, finally, the Department of Defense should develop new 

operational concepts, which serve a vital function as the connective 

tissue between our strategic objectives and the types of forces and 

capability investments that will be needed in the future. 

In closing, let me say that I believe, despite the conventional wisdom that America is in decline, the United States continues to 

enjoy unrivaled strategic advantages and the most favorable position relative to all the other great powers of the day. With ample 

political will and shared sacrifice, I am confident the United States 

can get its economic house back in order while continuing to safeguard the country from those who would harm us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Donnelly. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS DONNELLY, RESIDENT FELLOW AND 

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to the ranking 

member, and the committee. I only lament that this hearing isn’t 

being conducted in front of the ‘‘super committee’’ [Joint Select 

Committee on Deficit Reduction] itself, the folks who really have 

the fate of the U.S. Armed Forces in their hands. So I hope you 

will make this result available to them and urge them to confront 

the issue directly themselves. 

I understand we are a last minute substitute for the former Secretaries of Defense. That gives me an opportunity to frame what 

I want to talk about and what I talk about in my written testimony. So I am going to try to channel what I imagine Secretary 

Perry, William Perry, might have said. I had the good fortune to 

help him out, and the other members of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review Independent Panel, very much a creation of this committee. 

So what I would like to do is try to address the strategic issues 

that you and the ranking member have raised and use the construct that we came up with in the panel as a way to think about 

what the consequences of these cuts, the ones that are already in 

prospect, and the ones that, as Jim suggested, sequestration or a 

similar negotiated outcome would produce out of the super committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your written testimonies will 

be included in the record. Thank you. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And there were four—I mean, in the panel, we very quickly came 

to a dead end once the members realized that the strategy enunciated in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] itself was really 

an empty vessel, not really a guide to planning for the Department. 

And that was an observation that applied not only to the 2010 

QDR but increasingly to the QDR process since it had been initiated. 
7 

The result was that members really kind of had to go back or 

thrust back on their own resources and their own experience. Fortunately, the 20 members were among the most intelligent and experienced public servants and former military officers that had 

ever served this country. And what we decided to do was, essentially, to deduce from the behavior of the United States, from what 

we have actually done in the world since the end of World War II, 

what our de facto strategy is. 

And the members of the panel very much came to the conclusion 

that we are not beginning with a blank sheet of paper, that there 

is no giant risk meter in the sky where we can perfectly calibrate 

the dangers and threats that Americans and American interests 

face in the world. And the best way to think about what we need 

to prepare for is to ask what outcome, what result, the United 

States would like to see, what kind of world would we like to live 

in? And we very quickly came to these four conclusions. 

The number one priority for American strategy has been, remains, and, certainly, 10 years after 9/11, we are reminded that defense of the American homeland is the number one priority. We 

have made a lot of investments and been very lucky and people 

have worked extraordinarily hard to ensure that those 9/11 attacks 

were not repeated. Certainly all of us who work in Washington, one 

of the questions we asked ourselves on 9/11, even before the day 

was out, was, when is the next attack going to be? That is a normal 

response, and the fact that we have avoided that is a result of good 

luck but a lot of effort and a lot of effort on the part of the Department of Defense. It is obviously a multiagency task, but DOD has 

contributed a lot to the fact that we believe ourselves to be safer 

today. 

The second enduring premise of American strategy is access to 

what is normally called ‘‘the commons,’’ the international commons. 

That is a term that was derived mostly in regard to naval and maritime power. That remains true in a world, a globalized world that 

depends on international trade. Not only the United States but the 

rest of the world and the most rapidly modernizing parts of the 

world depend upon the ability to ship goods easily, freely, and 

cheaply. But, obviously, the oceans and the seas are an incredible 

and essential part of American power projection around the world, 

of our posture across the world and, in fact, our entire global position. 

The atmosphere, the air, the skies, is also, like the seas in being 

both an avenue for commerce but an essential component of American military power. Indeed, American airpower has been the signature form of American military power now really since the end 

of World War II. And even our naval forces are largely defined by 

their ability to employ airpower, to be mobile platforms for strike 

aircraft or strike systems. 

But what is true on the seas and in the skies is also true in 

space, near-Earth space, and also in cyberspace now. And particularly when you come to cyberspace, we are spending a lot of money 

trying to figure out what cybersecurity really entails and means, 

and it is still a process of discovery. 

But it is also the case, reasoning backwards, that the failure to 

provide a secure environment for international commerce, which is 
8 

more and more conducted across the Internet, and international 

communications and all the elements of modern life that the Internet is intertwined with, if that is not a safe and secure realm for 

commerce and for military affairs, then there will be geopolitical 

implications. 

Imagine what a genuinely insecure or contested cyber realm 

would look like and what international politics would be like. People would, of course, turn first to the United States to say, Where 

is the answer? Why isn’t it safe for us to conduct our business? But 

then, if we were unable to provide such guarantees, again, I can’t 

imagine in detail. I would defer to experts in this field. But it is 

certainly something worth thinking about and asking ourselves, as 

we prepare to cut and as the newest investments may well be the 

first ones to fall off the plate, what the consequences of that would 

be. 

Two other elements of our strategy are long-enduring, and I 

think, as we look forward, we have to ask ourselves, are we going 

to continue to conduct our business in this way or shape our strategy? 

The first is the balance of power across the Eurasian landmass, 

not to be too pedantic about it: In Europe, in the greater Middle 

East, and in East Asia. We have been in Europe for almost a century. The creation of a stable and peaceful Europe, which is a punctuation mark on 400 years of struggle and conflict, is the result of 

the American victory in World War II and in the Cold War. It is 

a human historic achievement. 

It costs us pennies compared to what it used to. The idea that 

we could somehow reap savings by withdrawing our garrisons in 

Europe I think is just, actuarially or as an accounting matter, not 

the case. But it is also the case that these positions are really useful lily pads for the projection of power elsewhere. There is not an 

operation we have conducted in the Middle East over the past two 

decades that hasn’t relied on either stopping for gas or, for example, returning casualties quickly to very high-end medical facilities 

in Germany. 

If we walk away from those commitments, it is not likely to immediately put the peace of Europe at risk, but it is certainly going 

to make our job more difficult elsewhere. We could not have conducted the operation in Libya, even as compromised as it was, absent access to European facilities and without our European allies. 

The same is true even more so in East Asia. Jim referred in his 

testimony to the challenges that we face in that region. We have 

been withdrawing from East Asia for the last generation, particularly in Southeast Asia. And, not surprisingly, that is the region 

where the Chinese have become more provocative and more aggressive in recent years. 

And, finally, in the Middle East, we are all weary of the wars in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, and for good reasons, although our sacrifices 

at home are nothing compared to the sacrifices of those who are actually fighting the war, who are a very small proportion of our population. But, again, if we step back from the headlines and look at 

the experience of the past 30 years, if I had been an investor in 

a penny stock called U.S. Central Command in 1979, I could have 

retired many times over, because the number of Americans in all 
9 

Services and all capacities who are serving in that region has 

mushroomed, and we have been remarkably successful—again, if 

you step back from the attacks of the day—in terms of creating a 

region that is more peaceful, more stable, and now, surprise, in the 

throes of its own democratic revolution. 

And, finally, there is the component of American strategy that 

should not be undersold, and that is providing for the public good, 

the international common public good, whether it is humanitarian 

relief, even up to the more directly related to our national interest 

tasks of nation- and state-building, and army-building in particular, in states that are new allies of ours and who we wish to 

be our strategic partners for the future. 

Again, I am simply trying to observe how we have acted. Presidents of both parties, often who come into office saying, ‘‘I will 

never do that again; I will control our appetite, and I will lift the 

burden and save money on war and on military expenses,’’ to a 

man, they have reversed course and found that the need for energetic engagement across the world remains the core of American 

strategy. 

So, as we contemplate these cuts, I think the benchmark ought 

to be what our past behavior has been. And you need to ask the 

super committee, and before we collectively as a Nation make these 

decisions, ask which of these missions we are going to shortchange. 

The people who conduct them have been running at full speed for 

quite a while. And as we take away resources from them, their 

ability to succeed is going to be put at risk and so will their lives. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donnelly can be found in the Appendix on page 64.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Boot. 

STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. BOOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Congressman 

Smith. Thank you, members of the committee. Thank you for convening this very important series of hearings. Thank you for inviting us to testify. And thank you, above all, for all you are doing 

to sound the clarion call about the devastating damage that will be 

done to our Nation’s defense and to our standing as a country if 

the full range of budget cuts currently contemplated in Washington 

were actually to be enacted. 

Jim’s colleague Todd Harrison at CSBA [Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments] has calculated that if you add in the cuts 

that have already been made and the cuts that are being contemplated—which, let us remember, is not only a devastating possibility of sequestration but also the loss of the overseas contingency funding as we wind down in Iraq and Afghanistan—if you 

put all that together, according to Todd Harrison of the Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the defense budget could decline by 31 percent over the next decade. That compares with cuts 

of 53 percent after the Korean war, 26 percent after the Vietnam 

war, and 34 percent after the end of the Cold War. 
10 

Now, some will say, ‘‘Good. It is a historical norm that we should 

wind down our military activities and spend the peace dividend 

when wars are over.’’ In the first place, I would observe that it is 

more than curious that we are in a rush to spend a peace dividend 

when there is no peace, when our soldiers every day are still walking outside the wire in Iraq and Afghanistan, facing deadly danger, 

confronting our Nation’s enemies. They are not at peace, our Nation is not at peace, and yet we are rushing to wind down our military activities. 

Beyond that, however, I would put on my hat as not only a policy 

analyst but, first and foremost, as a historian and look at what has 

happened in the past when we have engaged in this activity of cutting defense after what we believe to be the end of hostilities, when 

we suddenly imagine that peace is dawning and we can afford to 

let down our guard. If there is one iron law of American history, 

it is that those cuts have made future wars more likely, and when 

those wars have come, they have made it much more likely that 

we would lose the first battles of those wars, at great cost in blood 

and treasure to our Nation. 

Let me just review that history very briefly with you, noting, to 

begin with, that after the American Revolution our Armed Forces 

shrank from 35,000 men to just 10,000, which left us completely 

unprepared to deal with the Whiskey Rebellion, the quasi-war with 

France, the Barbary wars, the War of 1812, all the conflicts of the 

early 19th century. After the Civil War, our Armed Forces shrank 

from more than a million men to just 50,000, which made it impossible to deal with the threat posed by the Ku Klux Klan and other 

violent terrorist groups seeking to subvert the aims of Reconstruction. 

After World War I, our Armed Forces shrank from 2.9 million 

men to 250,000 in 1928. That made World War II much more likely 

by emboldening aggressors in both Japan and Germany. 

After World War II, our Armed Forces shrank from 12 million 

men in 1945 to 1.4 million in 1950. The Army saw truly steep cuts, 

from 8.3 million soldiers to 593,000. And those that were remained 

were ill-trained, ill-equipped. We paid the cost in 1950 when North 

Korean tanks rumbled across the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] and 

the very first American force to confront them, Task Force Smith, 

was decimated because they had neither the training nor even the 

ammunition to stop this onslaught. 

After the Korean war, our Armed Forces once again declined, 

from 3.6 million men in 1952 to 2.5 million in 1959. The Army lost 

almost half its Active Duty strength in those years. Instead, President Eisenhower thought he could rely on the ‘‘New Look,’’ on nuclear deterrence, to prevent aggression in the future. That strategy 

was not vindicated in the case of Vietnam, where we confronted an 

enemy who could not be stopped by a handheld Davy Crockett nuclear launcher. 

After the Vietnam war, our Armed Forces shrank from 3.5 million personnel in 1969 to 2 million in 1979. This was the era, as 

you all remember I am sure, the era of the ‘‘hollow Army,’’ when 

we had inadequate equipment, discipline, training, and morale, all 

of which emboldened our enemies to aggression, whether it was 

anti-American revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran or the Soviet in-
11 

vasion of Afghanistan. We are still paying the price, by the way, 

in that the anti-American regime in Iran remains very firmly entrenched in power. 

And then, after the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf 

war, our Armed Forces shrank from 2.1 million personnel in 1989 

to 1.3 million in 1999. We are still suffering the consequences of 

that post–Cold War drawdown, which left us with inadequate force 

numbers to deal with contingencies such as the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. As we know, our Armed Forces have been tremendously stressed over the last decade. And it is not only the Army; 

it is the Navy, it is the Air Force, all of which are running their 

equipment ragged, running their personnel ragged by maintaining 

an unsupportable operations tempo. 

This is the point when we should be recapitalizing our Force, as 

called for by the Hadley-Perry Commission. This is when we should 

be building up to make up for the decline in overall American—for 

the lost procurement decade of the 1990s, for the declining stocks 

of weapons systems and the aging of our tanks, aircraft, Navy 

ships, and others. 

It is certainly a time when, as has been pointed out by Tom just 

a minute ago, we are facing numerous threats around the world, 

which would certainly necessitate, if we were looking at things 

from a strategic perspective, a buildup, not a drawdown. When you 

look, certainly, at the fact that China is undergoing double-digit increases in its defense spending every year, that suggests the need 

for enhancing the American deterrent in the Pacific, not drawing 

it down. 

And yet, what are we already engaging in? We are already seeing 

the Department of Defense cut back program after program, 

whether it is the F–22 or the Future Combat System, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle—so many, over the last several years, 

which have been canceled or cut back. So it is not as if the Department of Defense has been exempt from the budget-cutting ax. We 

are already cutting into what I believe to be the muscle of our military defense. The danger now, of course, is that, if sequestration 

occurs, we will start chopping off entire limbs. Either way, our Nation’s defense will not remain whole if this budget-cutting imperative is allowed to run willy-nilly out of control. 

Now, in conclusion, I would note that, all that being said, if it 

were truly the case that the defense spending that we currently 

have were bankrupting the country, if the defense spending were 

truly responsible for the grievous state of our public finances, at 

that point I might very well join the budget cutters and say we 

should cut back, because, in fact, our Nation’s economic wellbeing 

is the ultimate line of defense and the ultimate guarantor of American strength. 

But, as all of you know, that is not the case. Even now, even 

with defense spending having doubled in absolute terms over the 

last decade, we are still spending less than 5 percent of our gross 

domestic product on defense. It is still consuming less than 20 percent of the Federal budget. These are both relatively low figures by 

historic standards, and it is impossible to argue with a straight 

face that defense is bankrupting our country. Clearly, as Congressman Smith mentioned, it is the entitlement problem that we have 
12 

to grapple with. And even if we eliminated the defense budget tomorrow, we would still be left with a dire fiscal situation. 

But instead of dealing with our true fiscal woes, I fear we are 

being distracted by them, again, as Congresswoman Smith noted, 

by the fact that it is relatively easy to go after defense and much 

harder to go after entitlements. And what this raises for me is the 

prospect of a dangerous world that I hope that I will not live to see, 

that I hope that none of us will live to see, which is a world in 

which America is no longer number one, a world in which our primacy is actively challenged, a world of competing power blocks, a 

Hobbesian world where the rule of law becomes a laughingstock, 

where our power is not respected. 

That will be a much dangerous world. And if history is any 

guide, we will pay a very high praise if we allow the waning of our 

military power and we live to see a world such as that. And yet 

I fear that will be the inevitable consequence if sequestration occurs, and perhaps even if not. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. O’Hanlon, I already introduced you as Director of Research, 

Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Sorry you were held up 

in traffic. We will now hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, DIRECTOR OF 

RESEARCH AND SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, and I will 

be brief. I was with a group of Army generals talking about a similar topic out in Fairfax, and that is a long ways with D.C. traffic. 

But my apologies and my appreciation for the opportunity. 

I will just make a couple of brief points. I know some of what 

has already been said, having reviewed some of their writings. 

I think there are ways to do $350 billion to $400 billion or so in 

10-year defense cuts but not trillion-dollar cuts. And that is the 

bottom line for me. 

And I say this based on an ongoing research project that I have 

been conducting where I try to begin with five or six what I consider irreducible requirements for American national security policy. And I think, for example, just to give you a highlight, we don’t 

want to be in a position where we have to choose between protecting the western Pacific as China rises in a promising but challenging way and protecting the Persian Gulf. We don’t want to ask 

the Navy to make that choice. I think it would be fundamentally 

unwise. We don’t want to ask the Army to choose between a potential capability to protect Korea, because as unlikely as war may be 

there it is not impossible, and being able to conduct its ongoing stability efforts in the broader Middle Eastern region. We don’t want 

to have to ask the defense industrial base to make a choice between keeping top-of-the-line excellence in certain technology areas 

like stealth, but not maintaining that excellence in other areas like 

submarines. And yet these are the kinds of choices I believe we are 

forced into if we make trillion-dollar, 10-year cuts. 
13 

If we make half-trillion-dollar, 10-year cuts, it is still hard, it is 

still uncomfortable, but just to give you a quick sampling of the 

kinds of ideas that I think we can consider and that are difficult 

and risky but still, I think, worth looking into at this kind of a moment in our Nation’s fiscal peril, I think we can consider a range 

of ideas that still allow us to maintain these core requirements but 

that, frankly, are going to be tough. For example, consider a ‘‘nuclear dyad’’ instead of a triad. I am open to that. 

Another idea that I think we should be open to, recognizing that 

unmanned drones now allow us to cut back the F–35 procurement 

buy from 2,500 to perhaps something that is only half to two-thirds 

as much, using drones and precision strike munitions instead of 

the number of manned tactical fighters that we previously anticipated. 

Another example of where I think we can be a little bit provocative—and we should be—is to ask the Navy to start considering rotating crews overseas by airplane and leaving the ships forward-deployed for a longer period of time. The Navy has done this with 

mine sweepers, and it has a variant on this for its ballistic missile 

submarines, but it does not do it with its surface combatants, even 

though I believe it could and even though they have done experiments that show that it is doable. Now, you still have to have a 

ship back home for training, but when you go through the math, 

you can actually get 35, 40 percent more utility per ship, at least 

in peacetime. This doesn’t account for the need for a warfighting 

attrition reserve, but in peacetime you can probably do better. 

That is the kind of uncomfortable idea I think the Navy has to 

consider. And I think the Army and Marine Corps are going to 

have to go back to Clinton-era, 1990s-era levels in terms of size and 

overall manpower strength as the war winds down in Afghanistan. 

So I am open to these sorts of things. 

But even if you do these—and these are pretty aggressive, and 

they are going to make a lot of people uncomfortable and add some 

risk to our national security portfolio—I think you can get to $350 

billion, $400 billion in 10-year cuts; you can’t get anywhere close 

to a trillion. And if you go for a trillion, you are playing Russian 

roulette: Which interests do I take a risk on? Which capabilities do 

I forgo? 

And I will leave it at that, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. O’Hanlon can be found in the Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

And I am glad you brought that up. In the Deficit Reduction Act, 

we have $350 billion, and that is what everybody is focused on. But 

it is actually, if you look at the numbers, if you go back to the Secretary when he went to the chiefs and asked them to cut $100 billion, find efficiencies and you will be able to keep that for more important things, when he went back to them, he said, ‘‘Actually, you 

will get to keep $74 billion, and the $26 billion will be used for 

must-pay things you will have to continue with, so you won’t keep 

the whole $100 billion.’’ 

And then when he presented that to us, he said, ‘‘And when we were going through that, we found another $78 billion in cuts that 

we will institute at this point,’’ which went against everything he 
14 

had been saying for the last several years, that we needed to have 

a 1 percent increase going forward just to maintain stability. And 

with the $78 billion, it reduced end strength by 47,000 in the year 

2015 out of the Army and the Marines, but he said we could go no 

further than that without significant cuts in end strength. 

Then the President gave a speech and said we want to cut an- other $400 billion out of defense. All of this has happened in the 

last year. 

And so the Joint Chiefs—I met with Admiral Mullen last week— 

are working on $465 billion in cuts that have not been put into 

place yet, not the $350 billion that we are looking at. And if the 

joint committee is not successful in their operation, then we are 

looking at another half-trillion dollars, which brings us up to the 

trillion that you just said is devastating. 

I thank you, each of you, for your comments and for giving us 

some ideas of things. I think all of us here understand that we had 

to make cuts, but I want to make sure that we understand that we 

are looking at $465 billion in cuts in the last year going forward 

for the next 10 years, which the chiefs have not yet given us what 

that really means. All we are looking at this point are numbers on 

a chalkboard. When we see how that translates down to program 

reduction, end strength reduction, we are going to have to deal 

with that. 

But that has already passed, and we are already grappling with 

that, without getting any further into these cuts. You have provided us a lot of thought-provoking material, and I am sure that 

these are things that we will have to look at as we go forward. 

Could you please, each of you, comment on the likelihood that 

the United States would be able to reduce our military’s commitments? In other words, all of these cuts have been thrown at us 

without any change in strategy. It has been, just pick a number. 

I think we are going to have to look at what the commitment is, 

what do we expect our military to do. 

In light of the expected roles and missions of the military, please 

provide an assessment of the additional risk we assume in fulfilling 

these missions with a substantially reduced force, reductions to operation and maintenance budgets, and cuts to procurement. 

Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I think, as we look ahead, for as bad as our 

fiscal predicament may be, the predicaments that face many of our 

allies are perhaps as bad or even worse. 

I think it would be perilous if the United States were to reduce 

its security commitments around the world. We have maintained 

close ties with allies in Europe and in Northeast Asia for decades, 

and this really has been a source of peace across, as Tom was saying earlier, the Eurasian landmass. And that is not something we 

would want to walk away from. 

The real question is going to be how we reshape our commitments as we look ahead. How do we change the division of labor 

and the bargains that we struck in the post-war world, after World 

War II, and renovate and update them, bring them up to speed for 

the 21st century? 

For the longest time, our allies have been more or less protectorates of the United States. We have extended our nuclear umbrella 
15 

and the cloak and shield of our conventional capabilities to protect 

those allies so that they could flourish as industrialized nations 

and prosper in reconstructing after World War II. But as we look 

ahead, we are going to have to re-craft those bargains and expect 

more of our allies, especially in terms of their own defense. 

And here, I think, we can actually learn from some of the moves 

that some of our competitors have been making. If you look at what 

China has been doing over the past 15 years in terms of building 

up a robust anti-access/area-denial battle network that is really focused on preventing and constraining the power-projection options 

of others, it is possible that our allies could emulate China to some 

extent, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, where they can build 

up their own capabilities to hold at bay those who would do harm 

to them. They can better defend their own sovereignty more effectively than relying on the United States to project power into the 

theater to protect their sovereignty for them. 

So I think this is one of the things that we will have to look at 

in the years ahead. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Just to make one specific point, Mr. Chairman— 

and this is both an indication of where I think we can take a little 

more risk but where we also have to be careful not to go too far. 

As this committee well knows, for 20 years we have been thinking about two major regional conflicts at a time as our planning 

metric. And, in fact, for the last 10 years, we have been fighting 

two at a time as our reality. That raises the question of, what 

should the planning framework be for the future? And, as you 

know, the 2010 QDR essentially reaffirms the two as the number, 

and then it adds on other missions. In the old days, other missions 

used to be thought of as lesser-included cases, to some extent, 

which was probably a misnomer. 

But I think, at this point, we don’t necessarily need to have the 

capability for two all out, simultaneous wars. And that, by itself, 

is a pretty risky proposition, to go from two to one. But I think we 

can consider that, with Saddam gone and with our other threats, 

our fiscal and debt threats. 

But if you are going to go to one, you don’t cut the Force in half. 

You have to be able to sustain ongoing stabilization efforts in 

places, in the broader Middle East in particular, that may remain 

dangerous for quite some time. I am not suggesting another big regime-change operation, but if we even wind up putting one or two 

brigades in a future Yemen contingency or, Heaven forbid, Libya 

or Syria—who knows where these things are headed? Or Afghanistan for a longer period of time than some of us would now like, 

and you add those things to a one-war capability, you still wind up 

with a need for probably 450,000 Active Duty soldiers and 160,000 

Active Duty marines. 

So even if you are prepared to be somewhat radical like that and 

go from two to one as your major regional war planning metric, it 

doesn’t mean that you can do a trillion dollars in 10-year cuts or 

that you can slash the Force. If you are trying to be at all prudent, 

it means something much more modest than that. 

Mr. DONNELLY. It is always worse as far as, you go down the 

line, there are more comments you want to make. I will try to limit 

mine to three quickies. 
16 

First of all, a matter of some facts. We have left the two-war 

force-planning construct two QDRs ago. The late Bush QDR had 

that one-four-two-one, whatever that added up to, but it was a onemajor-war planning construct. And the 2010 QDR had no forceplanning construct whatsoever. Secretary Gates said as much. And 

all the service chiefs complained loudly and long about that fact because they had no yardstick to measure their programs against. 

The other thing I would emphasize—actually, two things—is that 

it is better for us to think of our global strategy as in a holistic 

way, not as a pile, an aggregated pile, of commitments that we 

have picked up. It really is a system. The balance of power in the 

Middle East is critically important to the direction that East Asia 

will take because East Asia depends critically on those natural resources, and particularly energy resources, that come out of the 

Persian Gulf and the region around there. And the world is just— 

a globalized world is a globalized world. 

Finally, Jim’s point about changing the nature of our alliances is 

worth exploring in detail, particularly emphasizing new partners 

and new allies, the ones that we have won in Iraq and Afghanistan—it would be, I think, a strategic myopia to turn our backs on 

those people—but also trying to enlist new partners like the Indians or revitalizing our East Asian alliances, where there has been 

broad peace and stability that has allowed prosperity for the last 

generation but which is now much more strategically up in the air 

than it has been at any time. 

And what that means for us and our programs is that we need 

to be able to really integrate this idea of building partnership capacity from the start. We should never, or only under extreme circumstances, build systems in the future that we can’t share with 

our partners and our allies. And a program like F–35, for example, 

that was structured for exactly that purpose, is now one of the 

strongest reasons for maintaining and recouping that investment is 

to be able to proliferate it among these new partnerships and alliances that we are trying to revitalize. 

Mr. BOOT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think you raise a very important issue about what is the American strategy going forward. And 

what concerns me and I am sure concerns all of you is the lack of 

strategic thinking going along with the budget-cutting process. I 

see very little desire on the part of the Administration or the American people in general to give up any of the major roles that our 

Armed Forces perform around the world. Instead, we are constantly having new missions thrown their way—for example, deposing Qadhafi in Libya, just to name one of many, or providing disaster relief after a tsunami in Japan. It is hard to imagine that we 

would forgo those kinds of missions in the future. 

Instead, I think the far more likely scenario would be that we 

would still be trying to undertake pretty much all of the missions 

that we are currently doing but we would just be doing them on 

a shoestring. We would be hollowing out the Force in order to keep 

this aura of American power but losing the reality of American 

power underneath. 

You know, some of the ideas which are actually presented for 

dramatically redefining the American posture around the world I 

don’t think stand up to much scrutiny. I mean, for example, I know 
17 

just going out and talking to various audiences about budget cuts, 

you often hear questions raised about, well, why do we still have 

80,000 personnel in Europe? I mean, what is the point of defending 

the Germans or the Italians? Why can’t they defend themselves? 

But, in fact, as I think we all know, the primary role of those forces 

is not anymore defending the Germans or Italians; it is simply a 

way that we can be forward-deployed in the areas where our troops 

are most likely to see combat in the future. 

And the fact that we were able to shape events in Libya in recent 

months was due in no small part to the fact that we had those 

bases in Europe, that we can project power into the Middle East, 

into the Central Asia, into areas of—into the zones of conflict in the 

future. And, oh, by the way, it is not necessarily cheaper to bring 

troops home from Europe and to keep them at home, because the 

Europeans contribute to their maintenance in Europe in a way 

they would not do if they were based in Texas. 

So some of these ideas that might be thrown around out there 

for how we can safely contract our missions around the world I 

don’t think stand up to much scrutiny. And then you get into the 

really difficult tradeoffs, the kind that Mike alluded to, about, are 

we going to keep the Persian Gulf open or are we going to deter 

China? I mean, those are truly nightmare choices that I couldn’t 

imagine any administration really making and saying, ‘‘Oh, we are 

going to give up the Middle East,’’ or, ‘‘We are going to give up the 

Western Pacific.’’ 

Of course we are going to try to keep a hand everywhere, but the 

question is, will we have a credible capacity to back up those commitments? And, unfortunately, I think if, as Mike suggested, if we 

face a trillion dollars in cuts, if we face the loss of 30 percent of 

our defense budget over the next decade, we are not going to have 

the capacity to back up our commitments. And then they will be 

exposed as hollow, and our power will become a shadow of itself. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In the interest of getting some other Members in here, I just 

have a couple quick comments. I am not going to ask a question. 

I think all of your comments have been very helpful to the panel, 

certainly to me. And I appreciate some of the insights. 

I just want to focus a little bit on the budget issue, because Mr. 

Boot pointed out defense is 20 percent of the budget and went 

through the list of arguments as to why defense isn’t the problem. 

Let me tell you, everywhere in the budget, every little piece of it, 

the people who advocate for that piece of it have an outstanding 

argument for why their piece of it isn’t the problem. But it all adds 

up. 

So I take a very simple, straightforward approach to this. It is 

a math problem. It is a very simple math problem. If you are 20 

percent of a budget that is 40 percent out of whack, you are part 

of the problem, by definition. If you are 5 percent of a budget that 

is 40 percent out of whack, you are part of the problem. 

Certainly, the entitlements add up to 55 percent, so they get the 

largest share of it, but it depends on how you break those down. 

You know, Social Security is 12 percent, Medicare is 18 percent, 
18 

and you can go through it. But I think what we have done collectively here is, you know, we defend our little corner of it. But the 

whole thing adds up to a big, huge problem. 

And I do appreciate Mr. Boot’s phrase that it is hard to imagine 

that we would make some of the choices that you laid out, and it 

is. But the thing that everyone has got to start to come to grips 

with is, we are going to have to do a whole series of things that 

are unimaginable right now and have been unimaginable. That is 

what the numbers are in front of us. And instead, we spend all this 

time arguing about how, well, we can’t possibly do this because it 

is unimaginable. We are 40 percent out of whack. We are going to 

have to do something that is unimaginable. Now, I don’t want it 

to be too much in the defense area, but it has got to be part of the 

conversation. 

I would correct one thing Mr. Boot said. He said that I stated 

that the problem was entitlements. That wasn’t actually what I 

said. I said that it is all there. What I said was, right now, the only 

portion of the budget that is being targeted for cuts is the nonentitlement portion of the budget. 

And when you take 38 percent of the budget—38 percent of a 

budget that is 40 percent out of whack—and you leave the other 

62 percent out of the conversation and, I believe just as importantly, you leave revenue out of the conversation, revenue that has 

gone down as a percentage of GDP [gross domestic product] by almost 30 percent over the course of the last decade—and just to sort 

of close here with the unimaginable, if you take the overall position, primarily of the majority party, that defense cuts are going to 

be a big problem—and we have heard that, and I agree with that— 

raising revenue is completely off the table. If you do that, you have 

to cut everything else in the budget by almost 50 percent to get to 

balance. 

Now, keep in mind, a chunk of entitlements is retirement pay for 

the military, people who retire from the military. 

I don’t think this committee would be too anxious about going 

after that. So once you take that off the table, you are over 50 percent. 

If you accept that we have to get to balance—and I think, again, 

I think the majority party and I accept that we have to get the balance. So when we are talking ‘‘unimaginable’’ here, it is all unimaginable. We have to start making people aware of that and then 

make those choices. 

Now, I agree with the assessment here; I think defense can take 

a hit. And Dr. O’Hanlon, I think, laid it out fairly well. Right now 

it is taking too big a hit, and we ought to bring some of these other 

folks on to the table. But let’s not imagine that defense isn’t part 

of the problem. It is 20 percent of a budget that is 40 percent out 

of whack. 

With that, I will yield back and look forward to the other questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I would like to point out to Members that, in addition to Mr. 

Thomas’ testimony, CSBA has provided us with copies of their new 

report, ‘‘Sustaining Critical Sectors of the U.S. Defense Industrial 

Base.’’ We have copies for every Member. But, in particular, this 
19 

is a report I hope our new Panel on the defense industry, headed 

by Representative Shuster and Representative Larsen, will dig 

into. 

Thank you for providing this information to the committee. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files 

and can be viewed upon request.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will turn to the committee for questions. 

I will be enforcing the 5-minute rule so as we can get all of the 

Members to have an opportunity to ask their questions. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Our deficit is several hundred billion dollars more than all the 

money we vote to spend. Roughly every 6 hours we have another 

billion-dollar debt, and roughly every 12 hours we have another billion-dollar trade deficit, thanks to our moving to this service-based 

economy. 

We were asking for cuts to be equal with spending, but these 

cuts are over a 10-year period, so the cuts are one-tenth of the deficit. The Ryan budget, which is a very tough budget, doesn’t balance for 25 years, during which time the debt essentially doubles. 

And it balances then only if you make what I think are unrealistic 

assumptions about economic growth, 2.6 percent average. I think 

that will be very difficult. We are up against a ceiling of 84 million 

barrels of oil a day, which hasn’t budged for 5 years now. 

So it is going to be very difficult to take defense off the table, and 

yet it is unthinkable that we would cut defense to the point that 

we are really affecting our national security. 

But we really cannot know what the sufficient support level is 

for defense until we have answered a number of questions. Are we 

going to continue to fight these discretionary wars? Hugely expensive, the most asymmetric wars in the history of the world. Some 

say that we are following Osama bin Laden’s playbook, who wanted 

to engage us in endless, hugely asymmetric wars which eventually 

bankrupt us. At the end of the day, will the benefit really justify 

the cost of these wars? 

We still have troops in more than a hundred countries around 

the world. Do they really need to be there? After half a century 

now, we still have very large numbers of troops in South Korea and 

Germany. A number of people ask, Why are we there? 

We have a huge decision to make relative to R&D [research and 

development] and procurement. If we continue with all of our procurement items now, it will just suck all of the oxygen out of the 

budget, and R&D is really going to be cut. How much R&D are we 

really going to need to protect ourselves in the future? 

We really need to answer a number of questions about the future 

military environment. The deep-strike heavy bomber: Will our 

stealth capabilities really run faster than detection and defenses? 

Are we developing a bomber that is not going to be survivable 20, 

30 years from now? Should it be manned or unmanned? 

Carriers versus missiles: Clearly, a missile is very expensive 

compared to one of our precision weapons, but the care and keeping 

of a carrier task force is just hugely costly. There is no place on 

Earth more than a half hour away from an intercontinental ballistic missile. There are a lot of places on Earth more than a half- 
20 

hour away from our planes on our carriers. What will be that balance? What should we do? 

Access denial and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle or its follow-on: Will we really have the luxury of getting that close to 

shores in the future that we could use a vehicle like this? Should 

we really be developing a follow-on? 

How big should our Pentagon be? Dr. Parkinson noted that the 

smaller the British Navy got, the larger their Admiralty got, which 

is their equivalent of our Pentagon. Does it really need to be that 

big? 

We have 187 F–22s and B–2 bombers. Are they adequate to take 

out air defenses? Do we really need the F–35 and the numbers that 

we are going to be procuring at? 

How do we get an answer to these questions so that we really 

can determine the real needs of our military? 

Mr. DONNELLY. I am happy to go first, if that was a question. 

Mr. Bartlett, you ask, you know, really a fraction of the questions 

that need to be and should be asked and answered. Unfortunately, 

the time is short. As everybody on the panel has observed, we have 

found ourselves unable to address these fundamental strategic and 

operational, budgetary, and programmatic questions in a durable 

and lasting way since the end of the Cold War. The idea that we 

don’t need to have a force-planning construct is a recipe for further 

chaos. 

And, finally, we also can reason backward from just the experience that we have had over the past 20 years and particularly 

since 9/11. My summary analysis of that would be that the military 

that we went to war with after 9/11 was not particularly well-prepared for the mission it got, yet it has adapted and performed quite 

remarkably. I wish the rest of our Government were as adaptive 

and as mentally agile as people in uniform had been. 

And, finally, I would say—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask if you could please respond to 

that for the record. Thank you very much. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 97.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Thomas, on page 6 of your testimony, you note that the defense budget, including war costs, has gone from a little less than 

$400 billion in FY [fiscal year] ’01 to around $700 billion in FY ’11 

in constant dollars. You say that the buildup is markedly different 

from other defense buildups in the past because we didn’t change 

end strength by very much, so it is not like you can let a lot of people go. And then you note that recapitalization and modernization 

plans for large parts of the forces are largely deferred. So the buildup didn’t come from a lot of extra end strength, and it didn’t come 

from a lot of modernization and recapitalization. 

Since 2001, if you take us out to 2011, the defense budget is 76 

percent higher than it was in 2001. And if you take away the OCO 

[Overseas Contingency Operations], if you take away the Iraq and 

Afghanistan spending, and you assume all that is gone, which I 

know you can’t assume, but you take all that away, the core de-
21 

fense budget in constant dollars is 39 percent higher than it was 

in 2001. 

If we didn’t spend it on end strength and we didn’t spend it on 

modernization, where is the money? Anybody have any ideas on 

that? 

Mr. THOMAS. The buildup that we have seen over the past decade really departs from military buildups we have seen in the past, 

in the sense that it really has been, in many ways, a ghost buildup. 

We have not seen increases and large numbers of forces in our active component of the military. We have not seen something like 

the Reagan buildup, where we went out and procured all kinds of 

new systems. With some notable exceptions like the MRAP [Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected], which has been deployed in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, where has the money gone? 

In particular, one of the main leaders in terms of cost growth in 

the Department has been personnel costs—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, with all due respect, let’s talk about that. 

Personnel costs went up by $39 billion—went up by 39 percent. So 

they account for $39 billion of this increase. So, yes, they have gone 

up, but, frankly, had they—that is $39 billion of an increase that 

is $311 billion. So that accounts for a little bit more than 10 percent of it. Where is the rest? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I think that is a great question and a great way 

to phrase it and frame it. I think about $50 billion or $60 billion 

is in what I would call ending the procurement holiday. As you 

know, Congressman, we didn’t spend much in the 1990s on buying 

equipment. We didn’t need to, at that point. But we have had to 

get back to spending roughly a quarter of the defense budget 

on—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Actually, it is actually $27 billion of the $311 billion. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, I think that in—I think it is a little more. 

I think in the 1990s we were averaging in the range of $45 billion 

to $50 billion a year on procurement, and we are now over $100 

billion. 

Mr. ANDREWS. No, procurement was $77 billion in 2001. It is 

$104 billion. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, throughout—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. So that is $27 billion. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Seventy-seven in 2001? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yep. It went from 77 to 101. So it is $27 billion 

out of the $311 billion increase. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, you have the advantage of a book in front 

of you that—the overall 1990s average on procurement was $45 billion to $50 billion. And I am quite confident of that. We needed to 

get that number up by about $60 billion. 

And so I am not really trying to disagree with you. I actually like 

this framing, because I think it does point to where we need to 

look. Because the other point that I was going to get to, where I 

am hopeful that we would be more in agreement, is that there have 

been a number of inefficiencies introduced. There have been some 

sloppy ways of spending money. And I think this builds on Jim’s 

point as well. Some of these things, frankly, have been part of the 
22 

politics of a nation at war with an All-Volunteer Force. I think we 

have put too much money into retirement benefits—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. I wanted ask Mr. Boot a question. He talks about 

the 90,000-some troops in Europe and says that their mission really is not to defend the Europeans; it is to be forward-deployed to 

achieve other defense objectives. 

What defense objectives could not be achieved if that force were 

based on the continental United States instead of Europe? Tell me 

what specific objectives we could not achieve if we moved that force 

here. 

Mr. BOOT. Well, it would be very difficult to carry out operations, 

for example, as we recently did in Libya, if we were flying out of 

the continental United States, unless you were flying a B–2 from 

Missouri, which you can certainly do, but you are not going to be 

flying F–16s, F–15s, A–10s, and so forth. You are not going to be 

operating naval ships to blockade Libya out of Norfolk. You have 

to be forward-deployed to do that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So what if you got rid of all the bases that didn’t 

have air capacity and then just kept the ones that have air capacity? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, you also have to have a point for Army troops. 

For example, troops deploying to the Middle East often go through 

Germany. And troops that are evacuated—badly wounded troops 

who are evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan often go to a medical 

center in Germany, which is much closer to the theater of operations than would be if they were coming back to the United 

States. 

So there are huge benefits that we gain from having forward-deployed bases. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I know my time—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Again—— 

Mr. ANDREWS [continuing]. Is up. I would be happy if the record 

could be supplemented by any of the witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 97.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank each of you for your expertise and being willing 

to come and share with us today. 

I have enormous respect for each of you and for the members of 

this committee, but the ranking member said something that just 

took me back. He said that we had to make some unimaginable 

choices. And I agree with him on that. But I can’t agree that passing an $800 billion stimulus package that didn’t work was unimaginable if we hadn’t have done that. I can’t agree that it was unimaginable to not pass a health care agenda that is hurting our 

businesses and hurting our economy enormously. What is unimaginable is for us not to defend the United States of America. And, 

fortunately, that is what the business of this committee is about, 

regardless of everything else. 

And sometimes I feel like, when we do that, we are in this rhetorical war of apples and oranges, and the public doesn’t see what 
23 

we are doing. Because it is like being on a computer where I 

digitally zoom in to something with specificity and I kind of miss 

the bigger picture. 

And if we could zoom out for just a moment, Mr. Donnelly, you 

mentioned four components that the Independent Panel had looked 

at: Defending the homeland; access to our seas, air, and cyberspace; favorable balance of power across Eurasia; and also the common good. 

Tell me, if you would, all four of you, how do we take away one 

of those components and not have a serious impact on the others? 

Because I hear a lot of that in the rhetoric: Let’s just don’t do anything in Asia, let’s just don’t do anything in Europe, let’s forget 

dominating the seas and air superiority. How do those interconnect 

if we zoom back and look at that bigger picture? 

Mr. DONNELLY. That is a very fine question, and it would require 

more time and more analysis. Figuring out, for example, how China’s rise will be affected by its ability to get resources from not 

only the Middle East, but Africa, but other parts outside of East 

Asia—— 

Mr. FORBES. Then let me ask you to do this. 

Mr. DONNELLY [continuing]. Is an important question. 

Mr. FORBES. Take that for the record, but let’s—— 

Mr. DONNELLY. Will do. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Drill in on China. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Thomas, I know this is where you have been 

an expert. 

We are looking an air-sea battle concept that we have spent 

months trying to see and develop. Do we have the resources to do 

that now, forgetting all the cuts? And if not, what are these cuts 

going to look like, in terms of us creating any kind of air-sea battle 

concept that we can deal with? And what are the implications to 

the defense of the country for that? 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. I think 

it really is terrific because I think there is oftentimes a view that 

everything we talk about—and the reality we face is that, in the 

international security environment, we are constantly going to be 

confronted with new challenges, with new threats that are out 

there, but we are not necessarily going to have additive resources 

to address all of them. So we are going to have to make some 

trades. 

What we have seen with China building up over the last 15 years 

in terms of its anti-access and area-denial capabilities, its submarines, its ballistic and cruise missiles and other forms of precision weaponry, are only the first manifestation of what we are 

going to see in other places around the world—in the Persian Gulf 

and even with non-state actors, like Hezbollah, as they acquire 

some of these systems in the future. 

Across the board, whether you are talking about the Western Pacific or the Persian Gulf or other areas around the world, the operating environments in which our forces are going to fight are going 

to be far less permissive in the future than they have been in the 

past. 
24 

And this is really what concepts like air-sea battle are driving at: 

How do we maintain our ability to project power transoceanically 

as a superpower to these areas where we have vital strategic interests, to defend allies, to ensure the free flow of critical resources 

to and from those areas? That is the real challenge at hand. But 

the concepts, I think, are really critical, providing the intellectual 

guidance that helps us connect the resources with those objectives. 

How are we going to accomplish these things? 

And, in particular, in a world which is going to become increasingly less permissive, how do we think about rebalancing? Some of 

our forces that we have today, some of the capabilities we have 

today really depend on very benign assumptions about the environments in which they are going to fight. They assume that we will 

be able to use forward bases and operate from them. They assume 

that our satellite communications will not be attacked or that our 

cyber networks will not be attacked. These are very fragile assumptions on which to base—— 

Mr. FORBES. What is the implications, any of you, in the 50 seconds I have left, on us not getting that right just with the Pacific 

alone? 

Mr. BOOT. I would just remind committee members that 3 years 

ago, in 2008, RAND was already projecting that by 2020 we would 

not necessarily be able to prevail in a conflict with China over the 

Taiwan Strait. And that was before the unveiling of the J–20 

stealth fighter; that was before China put a new aircraft carrier 

into the water. The balance is tilting very rapidly against us already in the Pacific, even without these major cuts. And that trend 

will be exacerbated with the cuts. 

And you have to think about, what does that mean for our allies? 

People talk about allies doing more. Well, if we have allies like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan doing more, they may well decide 

that they need their own nuclear arms. They may well set off a nuclear arms race with China because they can no longer count on 

American protection. That is a much more dangerous world. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and engaging in 

this discussion. 

Last week, when General Pace was here, along with a panel, he 

testified that we really don’t have a cohesive national security 

strategy. And he suggested we need something akin to an interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act in order to have a coherent national 

strategy—national security apparatus which combines all elements 

of national power. 

I know, Mr. Donnelly, you mentioned that the military became 

very adaptive but the rest of Government has not. 

I wonder if you all could comment, beginning with Dr. O’Hanlon, 

perhaps, but others, what importance do you place on this issue in 

terms of our defense overall and in terms of the budget constraints 

that we are facing today? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, thanks, Congresswoman. A big question. I 

will just maybe make one specific comment. 
25 

On the issue of interagency collaboration, I am sympathetic to 

the idea, but I am not sure that is really the crux of it, because 

I think that the crux of it really is deciding where we have irreducible requirements overseas that we have to be prepared to help 

defend militarily. 

The State Department and other agencies are very important, 

but their costs are so much less, as an order of magnitude, and 

their missions are fundamentally different, that I think if we are 

thinking about first principles on defense spending, this is an important conversation, but I would begin with key interests and 

threats. That is why I start with Korea, the Western Pacific, the 

Persian Gulf. And I don’t want to go into detail on each one. I 

would also add South Asia and possible Indo-Pakistani problems. 

But let me just say one word on Korea because it has come up 

a couple of times. I don’t think the North Koreans are going to 

wake up tomorrow and decide, ‘‘Let’s give it a shot. Let’s try to reunify the peninsula again.’’ That is not the way the war is going 

to begin. That is not the scenario we have to worry about. 

What they might do, like they did last year, is some other kind 

of unprovoked, cold-blooded aggression in which they killed 46 

South Korean sailors out of the blue. They might also intensify 

their uranium enrichment program. They might start talking about 

selling fissile material to overseas groups. By the way, they have 

done some of that before, at least in terms of the technology, the 

underlying technology, if not the fissile material. They might, in 

other words, provoke crises in one way or another. 

What do we do in response? I am not saying we dust off the preemption doctrine and go after them, but I am suggesting that firmness and a demonstrated capability to handle any kind of a conflagration are important. And, also, looking at niche technological 

capabilities where we need to get better, not just hold the line, but 

get better: Missile defense, precision strike against their long-range 

artillery. 

And we also need to be able, if there is, Heaven forbid, a war, 

to get some number of American ground forces there fast, because 

the South Koreans are going to need help in securing the perimeter 

of the country so the existing nuclear arsenal doesn’t escape before 

we can prevent that from happening. The South Koreans can handle the longer-term occupation, assuming that reunification is the 

destination we would be headed toward in this kind of a conflict, 

but they are going to need help at first to make sure those fissile 

materials don’t get loose. 

And so a future Korean contingency, I think, needs to be part of 

our planning framework. And that is just one example of how I 

don’t see an easy ability to discard certain interests or threats. I 

just think we have to be a lot more creative in protecting some of 

these more economically and innovatively. But I don’t think there 

are too many that we can actually discard. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. Boot, did you want to comment? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, I just wanted to add, on the subject of interagency cooperation, which I am very much in favor of, I am very 

much in favor of enhancing the State Department and other civilian capacity to take on some of these tasks which have been given 
26 

to the military, but we have to be realistic about it and understand 

that their capacities are, as Mike suggested, an order of magnitude 

lower than those of the Department of Defense, and they could not 

possibly fill the gap of what the Department of Defense does. 

We are actually going to see a test of that, by the way, in Iraq, 

where currently there are about 46,000 troops. At the end of the 

year, their task is going to be performed by maybe 3,000 troops and 

1,000 State Department personnel. I am very concerned about that 

happening. But if you can imagine that writ-large across the rest 

of the world, I don’t think there is any way that the civilian 

branches of government can make up for what the U.S. military 

does, and not only in terms of fighting and deterring wars, but 

even in the engagement mission and the kind of military exercises, 

the kind of engagement that foreign area officers and others undertake, which are such a vital part of our diplomatic effort overall. 

Mr. DONNELLY. If I could be very quick, I would really worried 

that, in this budget environment, that a lot of the progress that has 

been made over the past 10 years is likely to be lost. The State Department has not resolved, but I think has taken seriously, the 

question of its larger development role, its role in, kind of, statebuilding, if you will, just to use the shorthand terms. 

And, also, I would worry about losing the close integration that 

we have achieved between the intelligence community and the military, best epitomized by the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. As 

Jim kind of suggested in his initial statement, those kinds of capabilities are likely to be things that we will want to have in other 

situations in a very different environment in the future. And I 

think the temptation and, sort of, the bureaucratic impulse will be 

for the departments to protect their core missions. 

Mrs. DAVIS. How would you want to see those issues framed, 

though, so that that doesn’t happen? Because, you know, it is one 

thing for the Defense Department to say, ‘‘Yeah, sure, we want the 

State Department funded,’’ but it is another thing to find out ways 

in which they can economize in order to do that. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Well, as I said, this has not really been resolved 

over the past 10 years. A lot of the progress that has been made 

and has been paid for, kind of, in a year-by-year supplementally 

funded kind of way, there—you know, AID [U.S. Agency for International Development], for example, has not been really refashioned into an appropriate or, really, powerful agency. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today. 

I also want to thank our colleagues on the other side. This really 

has been, again, a bipartisan hearing. In fact, I had to ask Congressman Forbes who had been invited by which party. And so, 

that is the way it should be, because, indeed, the primary function 

of the national government is national defense. 

And, Mr. Donnelly, I appreciate very much your citing victory in 

the Cold War. Truly, people seem to have forgotten how successful 

the American military was with our allies: the greatest spread of 

democracy and freedom in the history of the world. Whether it be 

from Lithuania to Thailand, South Korea to Bulgaria, there are 
27 

dozens of countries today free that have been under authoritarian 

and totalitarian regimes, and the people are blossoming, which is 

good for them and us, and it fulfills the dreams of President 

Reagan of peace through strength. 

With that, briefly, if possible—and it has been touched on—but 

for each one of you, beginning with Mr. Thomas over, what do you 

see as the biggest threats facing the U.S. today? What should the 

U.S. military role be in deterring the threat? And how is our level 

of preparedness? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think, unlike the period after the Second World 

War, where the United States faced one major threat, in terms of 

the Soviet Union and the expansion of Stalinist communism 

around the world, today we face a panoply of threats. But I would 

really pick on three. 

The first is the continued rise of China and particularly the 

growth of its military capabilities that are of concern. China is not 

necessarily an enemy, but we have to be mindful of the capabilities 

that it is developing, as those can challenge our own military and 

strategic position. 

The second is the rise of new nuclear powers—countries like 

North Korea, as Michael discussed, Iran, and others that are 

emerging. If we think about land combat operations in the future, 

the greatest challenge we would face is conducting them in WMD 

environments. 

And the last, really, is, we have seen with Al Qaeda and we have 

learned our lesson since 9/11 in terms of dealing with a non-state 

actor that can use great forms of violence almost like a state. We 

may face others in the future along these lines, and we need to be 

mindful. And I think this places a lot of emphasis on the need for 

a preventive aspect in our strategy, of trying to prevent these small 

groups from emerging, working with others in the world and building partner capacity so that countries can police themselves effectively within their borders and not permit them to become sanctuaries to groups like Al Qaeda. 

Thanks. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Congressman, thank you for the question. I will 

just add a brief word on Iran. 

And it is an interesting question and a reasonable question: 

What kind of a threat does Iran really pose? What would it want 

to do if it had more power and saw us doing less, you know, if it 

saw us retrenching? And, of course, this is a difficult question to 

answer, but I think we can look at a couple of things about Iran’s 

recent behavior and speculate usefully. 

One, it would up the pressure on Israel even more through 

Hezbollah and Hamas. 

Two, it would try to create weak states to its west, as it has tried 

in Iraq for many years. And, of course, it had a war with Iraq, 

which may have left a legacy of mistrust there, but even when Iraq 

was being run by a Shia-majority government after the overthrow 

of Saddam, Iran was more interested in keeping Iraq weak. And 

even after it saw that whatever George Bush’s early preemption 

doctrine might have implied and might have made some Iranians 

worry that they could be next, by ’05, ’06, it was obvious that they 

were not going to be next. This country was not about to embark 
28 

on another preemptive campaign, and yet Iran kept up the arming 

of the Shia militias and even Sunni extremist forces to cause us 

casualties and to keep Iraq weak. 

So I think Iran would welcome a Middle East that is dominated 

by trying to push Israel, at a minimum, out of the West Bank area 

but maybe even out of existence and weakening as many Sunnimajority and even Shia-majority Arab states as it could. And that 

would be its preferred Middle East and the kind of threat we need 

to worry about. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. DONNELLY. I would just agree with what both Mike and Jim 

have said but draw a little bit of a line underneath the question 

about China’s future. 

The rise of a great power within the context of a global system 

is a somewhat unprecedented historical situation. We tend to think 

of China really as an East Asia power. It is already a global actor. 

And even if there is not a direct confrontation with China, I can 

imagine that there will be, essentially, proxy competitions, if not 

conflicts, in other theaters. 

Mr. BOOT. I don’t think I have time to comment, but I basically 

agree with my colleagues. 

Mr. WILSON. Okay. I thank all of you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. O’Hanlon, you were sort of in the middle of your answer to 

Mr. Andrews a while ago, talking about the ghost buildup. And you 

talked about the sloppiness factor, in terms of where some of the 

money went. I am not sure if you had a chance to finish your 

thought, and I wanted to just give you an opportunity to revisit 

that. 

Dr. O’HANLON. That is kind of you, Congressman. And maybe I 

used the word ‘‘sloppy’’ in a little bit of a too quick of a way, because maybe the better word is just ‘‘undisciplined.’’ 

I think there were areas of military compensation, for example, 

where we said, ‘‘Listen, we are a Nation at war, we have an AllVolunteer Force that we are asking to do really unreasonable 

things on behalf of the rest of us, and we are going to err on the 

side of providing more money than we may need in certain areas.’’ 

I am not talking about deployed troops and their families or survivors or the injured. I am talking about, you know—and I don’t 

want to beat on them too much, but sort of the mid-career retiree 

who goes on and maybe winds up, you know, in a job at Brookings 

or runs for Congress or has some other nice income, and they are 

not asked to pay even a basic, normal health-care premium, for example. 

Or a retirement system that, as much as we do understand there 

is deferred compensation in the military, why do we feel that it is 

okay to ask a young person, an enlisted person, to work for 5 or 

10 years and serve the Nation and go in harm’s way, leave the 

military with no retirement whatsoever, but then give a very generous package to a retiring major or colonel? And there are ways 

to reform that system and also save some money in the process. 
29 

These are the kinds of ideas that I think perhaps Congressman 

Andrews and I might agree, in philosophy, that there are some 

needs to relook at some of the decisions we’ve made in the last 10 

to 20 years. And sometimes I think the politics of defense spending 

in a time of war lead us to do things that are not as efficient as 

they should be. That is the spirit of what I was trying to say. And 

I think several tens of billions a year in annual spending are involved in these kinds of things. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, obviously, another piece of the sloppiness 

factor is in procurement. And there has been another spate of stories just in the last couple of months about, you know, embarrassing overpayments by the Army and others for parts that off the 

shelf, you know, would have been a fraction of what—I mean, is 

that just something that is just like the weather, we have to live 

with it. 

I mean, you know, if we are looking at ways to save money, it 

just seems like, you know, waste, fraud, and abuse, which is kind 

of a nice phrase and easy for everybody, but, I mean, is it hopeless 

for us to ever sort of expect to have a system that actually, really, 

you know, the taxpayer would feel total confidence is really working to get the best price? 

Mr. BOOT. If I could just jump in on that, I think you are right 

to talk about the waste, fraud, and abuse and about the runaway 

procurement. We all know it is out there. What I don’t know and 

I don’t think anybody has a great solution for is how do you reform 

that so you can suddenly get more bang for your buck. 

Now, I think there are things you can certainly do at the margin, 

but I think it is unrealistic to expect that we can suddenly wave 

this magic wand and all of the sudden we cut defense spending by 

one-third but still produce the same defense capacity that we were 

producing before. 

At the end of the day, we all decry the huge cost of weapons systems and the rising cost, but we don’t know how to create that cutting-edge capacity at a much lower cost. And I don’t think that is 

going to change in the next 6 months; it is not going to change in 

the next year. All that is going to change is we are going to cut 

back on the top line, and the systems will get cancelled. They are 

not suddenly going to start to be produced for a lot less. 

Mr. DONNELLY. One last shameless commercial for the QDR 

Independent Panel, which addressed this subject directly. 

I was convinced, in listening to that discussion, that the single 

most important thing we could do is procure things in a timely 

fashion. What has really been a killer over the last decade has 

been this protracted development period where the original technologies get overtaken by new technologies, and so bells and whistles are added and added and added and requirements added and 

added and added. 

And things like the F–22 or the Future Combat Systems are perfect examples of those, whereas the previous generation, with the 

F–16 being the perfect example of something that was bought as 

a simple daylight fighter in large numbers and has been revised 

and modified to do a range of missions that was never anticipated, 

is a much better model. 
30 

So a lot of the money that has gone down the rat hole has gone 

to changing our minds, deferring development, with the result that 

we get 187 F–22s for what we originally planned to get 750 aircraft 

for essentially the same amount of money. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Really quick, Dr. O’Hanlon, your recommendation about eliminating one leg of the triad—I mean, we have heard a lot of testimony about rising nuclear states. I mean, how does that sort of 

dovetail? 

And thank you. 

Dr. O’HANLON. No, it is a very good question. I think, Congressman, what I would do, in terms of nuclear capability, I would not 

reduce our forces any faster than Russia reduces its. I would make 

sure that in this period of transition we stay well ahead of China, 

not so much because I anticipate a nuclear exchange, but I just 

don’t want to give China the wrong kind of encouragement or 

wrong ideas about, you know, being able to catch up and all of a 

sudden act the part. And I would make sure that our nuclear weapons are safe and reliable. 

That leads to a number of recommendations, but I think you can 

do that and still take, potentially, one leg out of the triad or at 

least cut back systematically across a couple. 

Mr. BARTLETT. [Presiding.] Thank you. 

I would like to ask members of the panel if you could also watch 

the countdown clock. And when it reaches zero, try to conclude 

your answer as quickly as possible so that we don’t have to rudely 

use the gavel here. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for coming today. 

We have brought up the word ‘‘adaptive’’ many times. I have a 

few questions. I think they pertain more to our Guard and Reserve 

Component, which I think is very adaptive. And from speaking to 

the generals that I deal with in the Guard and Reserve, they tend 

to run a lot more efficiently and cheaper than our traditional 

forces. 

What do you see—and I probably won’t get to each of you—but 

what do you see for the future of the Guard and Reserve as we 

move forward, and how we are implementing them in our fights as 

of now? And also, from the components’ ability, from an equipment 

perspective, pre-9/11 to now also? 

So, Mr. Donnelly, do you want to start? 

Mr. DONNELLY. Yeah, I will try to be quick. 

Really, the adaptability of the Guard and Reserve has surprised 

everybody who would have pretended to be an expert on 9/11. They 

have deployed more frequently, performed more competently, had 

non-deployment rates that are far below what anybody would have 

anticipated. That said—and they have become essentially an operational reserve. The distinction between the Active Force and the 

deploying Guard and Reserve force is much less than it used to be. 

That said, there is still a marginal cost associated with a mobilized—when you use them, that is when the cost, you know, arises. 

It is, again, much less than anybody imagined it would be. These 

guys have adapted and performed and have been deployed over and 
31 

over again and done yeoman work. And I think we still are trying 

to understand what that may mean for future strategy-making. It 

also means that they are not a genuinely strategic reserve; they are 

just on the conveyor belt at a slightly slower pace than the Active 

Force is. 

Mr. THOMAS. If I could just add, I think, as we look ahead, there 

may be some real changes that we can make, and real opportunities, as we think about broader changes in our roles and missions 

across the military in terms of how we would use the Reserve Component. 

New missions that are out there—missions like cyber warfare 

and thinking about operating unmanned air vehicles and other unmanned systems in the future—these may actually be very wellsuited for the use of Guard and Reserve forces in the future, especially given the synergies with some of their civilian occupations. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Just a brief note. I think it is always worth relooking, but I think that, at a time when you are doing sustained 

operations, the economics of it are more or less a wash between the 

Guard and the Active Forces. If you are doing—if you are preparing for the one biggie that may or may not ever happen, then 

I think there is a little bit more of a shift toward the Guard being 

preferential, in some ways, or advantageous. 

But I think, on balance, I feel pretty comfortable with the current mix. But just to back up, I think, Congressman, some of what 

you were driving at, that is a mix that now supports the Guard and 

Reserve more than we used to. And as we draw down from these 

conflicts, I think we have to remember that it took some effort to 

get them to where they are today, and we probably want to keep 

them there, in terms of capability. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Mr. Boot? No? 

Thank you all very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to give Mr. Boot, in particular, one more chance to come 

up with constructive suggestions for defense cuts that could be 

made without endangering American strength. You may dismiss 

some of these ideas as marginal, but I think it is very important 

that every sector of our Government make a good faith effort to 

root out waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Mr. BOOT. Well, Congressman, I think that the Defense Department actually has made a good faith effort, and, as we saw in the 

last 2 years, Secretary Gates either cancelled or reduced numerous 

acquisition programs. I mean, when you look at the—as well as 

closing headquarters, like the U.S. Joint Forces Command, eliminating general officer slots, eliminating the Future Combat System, 

eliminating the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the VH–71 helicopter, the CG(X) cruiser, ending the buy of the F–22 and the C– 

17, ending the Airborne Laser, delaying the aircraft carrier, the F– 

35, littoral combat ships, reducing—vowing to—announcing a reduction in Army and Marine end strength by 47,000 personnel, I 

don’t think anybody can argue that the Defense Department has 

been exempt from cuts. 

In fact, the way I look at it, the Defense Department—— 
32 

Mr. COOPER. I didn’t argue that, sir. 

Mr. BOOT [continuing]. Has already taken—— 

Mr. COOPER. I didn’t say that they had been exempt from cuts. 

I was asking you for constructive suggestions of what could be 

done, going forward, to trim waste from the defense budget without 

endangering American strength. 

Mr. BOOT. I think it would be very difficult to do, as I was trying 

to suggest. I think that the cuts—— 

Mr. COOPER. So you would have no suggestions? 

Mr. BOOT. I don’t. Because I think we have already cut defense 

considerably. We have already—— 

Mr. COOPER. So the military budget is currently perfect? 

Mr. BOOT. No. Nobody argues that the defense budget is currently perfect, but the world is—— 

Mr. COOPER. Well, show me how it is imperfect. 

Mr. BOOT. The world is highly imperfect. There are a range of 

contingencies, Congressman, that we have to be prepared for, and 

I don’t think that there are easy cuts to be made. My colleagues, 

Jim Thomas and Mike O’Hanlon, have—— 

Mr. COOPER. I didn’t ask for easy cuts, I asked for any cuts. Is 

there any waste in the Pentagon budget? And if so, where is it? 

You are a defense expert, you—— 

Mr. BOOT. I think that Secretary Gates went about as far as one 

could possibly go in responsibly cutting back defense programs over 

the last couple of years. I would not be comfortable advocating 

more defense program cuts, which I believe would imperil the security of the United States. 

Mr. COOPER. So any cut at all in the defense budget would imperil the security of the United States? 

Mr. BOOT. I suppose if you had a $5 cut in the Defense budget 

it would not imperil the security of the United States. 

Mr. COOPER. Can you help us identify any of those $5 cuts? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, we already—Congressman, I don’t know why it 

is necessary to identify cuts when we are already cutting a 

record—— 

Mr. COOPER. You are a defense—— 

Mr. BOOT [continuing]. This year alone, as the chairman noted, we are already this year cutting $465 billion from the defense 

budget. I don’t know why there is a need for more defense cuts. I 

certainly don’t see it from a budgetary perspective, and I definitely 

don’t see it from a strategic perspective. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Boot, you are a defense expert, and you know 

that the GAO [Government Accountability Office] has identified the 

Pentagon budget for almost two decades now as one of the highestrisk areas of all of Federal spending, due largely to its 

inauditability, its untraceability. The Bowles-Simpson Commission, 

when they asked Secretary Gates whether they had 1 million defense contractors or privatized outsourcers or 10 million, they 

couldn’t tell the difference. 

Mr. BOOT. Well—— 

Mr. COOPER. The Defense audit agency itself was found guilty of 

not adhering to generally accepted accounting standards. So, lots of 

times, we literally don’t know where the money is going. Is that defensible? 
33 

Mr. BOOT. Congressman, you will find waste, fraud, and abuse 

across all sectors of government. But, as was pointed out here before, I think that the Defense Department is actually the most important department of our Government because it is the one that 

provides for the common defense. And I don’t know any way that 

we can simply take out a line item for waste, fraud, and abuse and 

leave our military capacity intact. 

There are differences and, certainly, arguments that occur on the 

Hill all the time in terms of what is actually wasteful and abuse. 

And we see many instances, when the Pentagon tries to eliminate 

programs, they all have their champions on the Hill, all of them 

arguing that these are not, in fact, pork barrel spending but, in 

fact, vital programs. So I don’t think there is any consensus about 

what constitutes the wasteful programs. 

Mr. COOPER. With your expertise, surely you could help advise 

us on locating areas of, at least, lower-priority spending. 

Mr. BOOT. What I am—— 

Mr. COOPER. Surely you could help us clean up the procurement 

process. Surely you could use your experience and wisdom to trim 

some of the excess. 

Mr. BOOT. Congressman, as I said before, I don’t know how to 

usefully reform the procurement process to save money. Many of 

the procurement reforms we have had in the past have actually 

wound up adding costs rather than subtracting them. I don’t think 

we have any consensus in this town about how to reform procurement so we can do more with less. And that is not going to—— 

Mr. COOPER. So you are giving up? 

Mr. BOOT. We are not going to have a magical way to do that 

in the next year that will—— 

Mr. COOPER. You are giving up? 

Mr. BOOT [continuing]. Allow us to cut the defense budget without losing vital military capacity, something that Bob Gates, Leon 

Panetta, and other leaders have warned about. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. 

I see that my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I am disappointed 

that someone with such noted defense expertise would give up such 

an important task. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the panelists for being here. I certainly have enjoyed 

reading your materials and research in the past. And I think, without a doubt, everyone on the committee here wants to make sure 

that we protect our cherished way of life. I think that we diverge 

when we start to look at the specifics of that. 

And I guess I would challenge in the main direction of the testimony this morning. I really think it comes down to an a priori 

question of what our role should be in protecting our cherished way 

of life vis-a`-vis other countries in the world—Iran, North Korea, 

China, Venezuela—the list—we could go on, certainly of concern, 

but the question is, what would a vibrant republic do in response 

to that? 

From my vantage point, from my experience and my research, if 

we continue on this path of assumptions, there isn’t going to be any 
34 

amount of increase that is successfully going to get it done. We are 

just not. We can find threats until the end of the earth, and we are 

not going to be able to address it. I think there is a fundamental 

question—I mean, look, what would be the point of having a military with the force projection and capability of the Roman legions 

if Rome no longer existed? 

So I think what we really need to do is have an a priori discussion about what it means to protect our cherished way of life in a 

manner consistent for a republic and then do a QDR based on 

those assumptions. And I would maintain that where we would go 

first is looking at how we can better neutralize the extremist 

threat. 

I think that if you look at the intel [intelligence] community, we 

have had a threefold increase in our intelligence agencies and funding. And, in my view, while we have incredible professionals in the 

intel community, we have a system that really confuses and really 

disappoints. And there are many examples; the Christmas Day 

bomber of 2009 is just one illustration. 

And then streamlining the intelligence community and infusing 

it with operations in a manner that I saw tactically and, to some 

degree, operationally as the G3 of Multinational Division-North 

during the surge—highly effective, an integrated joint special operations task force working with conventional forces and local forces 

to neutralize the leadership of Al Qaeda. I don’t see, sort of, a same 

global reach in response when I look at us neutralizing the Al 

Qaeda threat. 

And then, beyond that, taking a look at the way we command 

and control forces, the way we lay down forces, the way we arrange 

our national security. 

So I am concerned, as somebody who looks at this broadly across 

the full spectrum of American life and looking at the priorities that 

we have, that if we continue on this line of thinking, we are just 

going to basically move until we burn out, until we don’t have the 

funds to get done what we need to get done and as we crumble as 

a republic. 

So I guess, you know, challenging the direction of most of the testimony this morning, with all due respect to your incredible research and certainly your publications that stand behind, I would 

be curious to your response to that. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Congressman, very eloquent and provocative and 

useful. Let me just say one thing—well, actually, two. 

First, missions that I would not say we need to be ready for: You 

mentioned Venezuela. I don’t see any need to provoke a fight there. 

Russia: Russia is still prickly and problematic, but I don’t think it 

has a major role in our defense planning; I don’t think it should 

be. I think the Bush administration handled the 2008 Georgia crisis more or less correctly, which was not to brandish our sword. I 

think we have to be willing to say that there are certain parts of 

the world where the risks are too high for the stakes, and we have 

to use the threat of economic sanctions or some other means of trying to defend our values and interests. 

And then, finally, let me say just one brief word about where I 

think the strategy is working. Because you implied that—and I 

think you are right—there is a danger that the price tag could keep 
35 

going up. I think the strategy is basically working at current 

spending levels in regard to China. Now, Jim is right, others are 

right on the panel to say that we have to worry about Chinese capabilities. But the overall strategy, I think, is working. China is becoming an incredibly impressive superpower without using force, at 

least so far, to try to assert itself, and partly because we have been 

so firm and resolute in the Western Pacific and so capable in working with our allies, which is a huge strength of our broader national security policy. 

So I think that is not a situation where the price has to keep 

going up, but I think we’d better be careful about cutting the price 

and the capability too much. 

Mr. DONNELLY. If I may very quickly, I just don’t see it as being 

an unsustainable system. If you look at it as a slice of proportion 

of GDP, of American wealth, the cost of American military power 

has diminished and diminished and diminished, but the extent of 

its effect has been absolutely global. We get an immense bargain. 

And even if you include the war costs, it is less than 5 percent of 

GDP. 

The numbers used by Mr. Andrews mostly reflect the expanded 

size of the American economy. We are wealthier, even allowing for 

the difficulties of the last couple years. We can certainly afford to 

do what we have been doing for the foreseeable future if we choose 

to. 

Mr. GIBSON. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Well, I appreciate their responses, and I guess we will have to continue the dialogue going 

forward. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Donnelly, can we kind of continue where you were? And I am 

very curious, first of all, this statement that you make in your second paragraph in your testimony where you basically do not concur 

with Admiral Mullen’s views that our deficits and debts are the 

greatest security challenges that we face, and you said you are worried about our future prosperity depending first and foremost on 

our future security. 

So it is kind of an open-ended question, but what exactly are you 

saying with that statement? 

Mr. DONNELLY. I am saying that the global trading system, 

which is the source of our economic growth but also the source of 

economic growth around the world, rests on a system of safety and 

security that is essentially provided by the United States—there 

are others who help—and that the costs of trade and the profits 

and the economic growth that accrue from trade would be put at 

risk if the seas, the Internet, the skies, all those common areas, 

and the international politics were more contentious, more ridden 

with conflict, and that our prosperity would suffer from international political competition and the prospect of war. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I am also very interested in the fact that your 

expertise is in China. And I represent Hawaii, and, of course, 

China is—the Pacific is very important to me. 

I happen to believe that when you speak about the stability in 

the Pacific, I know one view of it is that the United States is pro-
36 

viding the stability in the Pacific. The other view is that, because 

the United States is providing a certain amount of stability in the 

Pacific, it permits China to do its economic growth, which is really—and being the number-one trading partner. And that is something that we are not able to really compete in. 

So, in that light, when you say about the United States’ future 

prosperity—and we are doing this stability or we are providing 

something that permits China to now do the economic stability and 

trade—do you see that at some point we are going to have to 

change our focus in the Pacific and become more active in one of 

those areas? 

Mr. DONNELLY. You make a critical point, and I think actually 

both are true. China’s economic rise, its prosperity, would be unimaginable but for the stability and security of the regional trading 

system that is based on American military power. That has been 

a great thing for China; it is a great thing for humanity. Hundreds 

of millions of people who were in abject poverty are now prosperous, and it has been a benefit to the United States and, indeed, 

to the world. 

However, the direction, as Jim and others have pointed out, the 

direction of China’s military modernization is solely in a direction 

that would tend to upset or overthrow the security system now in 

place. And those are two paths—you know, that is a collision 

course, and I don’t think that—that is why I would say that the 

direction that China is taking is the most worrisome aspect that I 

see in the future. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Dr. O’Hanlon, you said something very early in passing. And 

when you came in, you mentioned something that I am very curious about. And you said something about 35 to 40 percent more 

utility on our Navy. And I assume what you were getting at was 

sort of like keeping our—or utilizing our forces sort of like a float. 

That is the way I refer to it. And if I am mistaken, can you please 

explain what you meant when you said 35 percent more efficiency 

with the Navy, especially in the Pacific? 

Thank you. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

The basic idea here is that, I think as you appreciate, especially 

serving from where you do, whenever we send ships from harbor 

off to a distant region, we lose the time in transit, but on top of 

that we also—the Navy enforces a very appropriate policy of no 

more than 6 months away from home station for any sailor, unless 

it is an extreme circumstance. And when you go through the math 

on all of that, plus allow the Navy to then shift crews from one station to another, you know, after a 2- or 3-year billet, and then 

allow for ship repair, you wind up with a situation where the Navy 

needs about, on average, five ships to maintain one steady forward 

deployment in an overseas theater. If we homeport more in places 

like Guam or even Hawaii, we will improve the ratio somewhat. 

But, largely, this is because of the tyranny of distance. 

Whereas if you leave the ship overseas and you have adequate 

local maintenance capability in a port, Singapore or someplace else, 

you can actually leave the ship maybe for 12 to 18 months and 

then you can rotate the crew by airplane. That means the crews 
37 

have to share ships, both on the deployed end and on the training 

end. And it gets complicated. The Navy doesn’t like it for that reason, that there are idiosyncrasies to any ship; they would rather 

have one crew stay with the ship all the time. I think there are 

also, frankly, parochial, budgetary reasons why the Navy prefers 

not to do this. 

But that is what it boils down to. And if you do the rotation by 

sealift—or, excuse me, by airplane, you can actually get 35 percent 

more capability, more days on station for a given number of ships 

in the fleet. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to hear your thoughts about missile defense. I just 

had an opportunity a couple weeks ago to travel to Israel. And 

while we were there, Hamas, from the Gaza Strip, was lobbing 

rockets in there, and it was encouraging to see their ‘‘Iron Dome’’ 

being successful in addressing that. 

And according to a 2010 edition of the annual report of the Director of national security on ‘‘Acquisition of Technology Relating to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ it says, Iran continues, quote, ‘‘developing space launch vehicles which incorporate technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems.’’ And it also said 

North Korea ‘‘continues to pursue the development, production, and 

deployment of ballistic missiles with increasing range and sophistication and continues to develop a mobile IRBM [intermediaterange ballistic missile] as well as a mobile solid propellant ballistic 

missile.’’ 

So, in view of the risk that growing ballistic missile threats pose 

to the United States homeland, do you have concerns about budget 

cuts to missile defense, especially as it relates to the United 

States? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think for all of the reasons you just mentioned, 

ballistic missile defense, as well as defense against even shorterrange guided rockets and even artillery systems, as you talk about 

the Israeli case, these capabilities are only going to become more 

important as we look out ahead. 

One of the key challenges is thinking about how we change the 

cost-exchange ratio between those sorts of systems and the sorts of 

defenses that we will develop and deploy in the future. One of the 

promising areas that we would want to protect among many R&D 

programs as we look ahead, no matter how austere our budget 

cuts, is going to be looking at directed energy weapons systems. 

This is potentially a game-changer that is out there, not only for 

missile defense but for countering swarming naval activity on the 

part of the Iranians and in a host of other fields. 

Mr. BOOT. I would just add that this is not cheap. I mean, this 

is, as you rightly point out, this is a major threat that we face. I 

think the American people expect us to defend ourselves and our 

allies against the threat of missile attacks, certainly the threat of 

WMD attack, but this is on top of all of the other expenses that 

we bear for defending numerous other vulnerabilities. This is just 

another vulnerability that we absolutely have to address. 
38 

And dealing with some of the threats that Jim points out are absolutely accurate: the anti-access threats, the cyber-weapons 

threat, threats to our satellite capabilities, threats to our homeland 

from ballistic missile attacks as well as from terrorist attacks. All 

of these are very real, and they are not going away. And what that 

suggests to me is the impossibility of massive cuts if we are going 

to deal with all of these threats, real or possible, that we face in 

the next few years. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Mr. Donnelly. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Yeah, I would agree with both Max and Jim, particularly on the technology of directed energy. One of the unfortunate cuts of recent years was to the Airborne Laser program, which 

was not a perfect system in many ways but I think was a critical 

program for exploring what direct energy would mean, not just in 

the missile defense role but in the other roles that Jim suggests. 

I just think this problem is metastasizing in ways that we will 

find very difficult to catch up to simply by looking at it as an intercept question. You have to look, I think, at what would happen before launch and try to identify where the launches are likely to 

come from and, particularly when you are talking about China or 

other larger scenarios, what a war, a longer war, after an exchange 

hopefully not of nuclear warheads but of a big conventional barrage, would mean. Would we be able to recover and to make sure 

that that was not a knockout blow, so to speak, that would take 

us out of the war? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you want to comment? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Go ahead. I mostly agree. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Well, we just have 30 seconds. But, even 

without cuts, how do you view our ability to defend ourselves in 

missile defense? Like, from a 1-to-10 scale, how—if 10 being that 

we are ready, we are able to protect and defend ourselves, where 

are we at today? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I will start with a 5. I think we are pretty good 

against—I shouldn’t say we are pretty good—we are getting better 

against low-technology, small-numbers-of-attack threats. We are 

not very good—and I am not sure, frankly, that we would be all 

that good even if we increased the budget in the short term— 

against decoys and other such sophisticated threats. 

Mr. THOMAS. If I could just quickly second the 5. I think that 

some of the key areas where we are going to have trouble as we 

look ahead are going to be in the shorter-range systems that our 

deployed forces are going to face in the field and many of our allies 

are going to face, as well as in terms of the intercontinental capabilities and longer-range capabilities where we are going to see 

salvo attacks, which are going to place far greater premiums on our 

ability to do battle management and command and control to orchestrate our defenses. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I wanted to thank all of our witnesses today. 
39 

I am from Guam, representing Guam, and I am following up on 

Representative Hanabusa’s questions. And they are for you, Dr. 

O’Hanlon. 

In your remarks, you mentioned the dangers of drawing back our 

range of influence and power around the world. You phrased it as 

‘‘coming home from the world.’’ 

Now, can you highlight some areas in the Pacific—and I will 

throw in Asia, as well—theater where we could be more cost-effective in upholding our treaties and our alliances while maintaining 

our ability to project power? 

And, along with that, do you think we presently have enough of 

a presence in the Pacific theater to prepare us for what our longrange national interests will likely be in the region? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Thanks, Congresswoman. 

A couple of things. On the latter question, I think the numbers 

are basically pretty good, but I think the capabilities have to keep 

getting better. And one area we have to worry about—and, again, 

Jim and others have been alluding to this throughout the hearing 

and in their writings—is the threat to airfields from an increasingly precise capability with the Chinese missile force, whether ballistic or cruise. 

And that is not just confined to China; that is a trend in technology. So I think we have to worry about more hardened shelters 

for airplanes. We have to worry about buying aircraft like the F– 

35. Even though I would limit the buy, I would make sure we do 

purchase a number that are capable of operating off of degraded or 

short airfields. And I would make sure we have plenty of equipment to repair airfields as they are struck. And there are a lot of 

other things that need to be done, as well. 

To your first question, capabilities where we could be more efficient, I think one area is putting more attack submarines 

homeported in Guam. I think to the extent the good people of 

Guam are willing to host even more attack submarines—and I realize Guam is already getting a little full with a lot of military capability, but I think it would be, actually, a very good tradeoff, because if one goes through the mathematics on that—and CBO 

[Congressional Budget Office] has done some very nice work here— 

you see that being that close to some of the theaters that we want 

to watch—because, after all, attack submarines are often used in 

the surveillance mode—but that is actually hugely beneficial if you 

are carrying it out from a forward location like Guam rather than 

having to waste all the time going back and forth to the good 

States of California and the like back on the continental 48. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I don’t know what you meant when you 

said Guam is getting full, but I do know we are not going to sink. 

I have one other question that I would like you to answer. Currently, one of the big parts of the budget is the military buildup 

ongoing in Guam. How do you feel about cutting anything from 

that? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I support the buildup on Guam because I think 

it generally is playing to our strengths of focusing on a key theater 

that is important, taking advantage of American territory that is 

more or less in a forward-deployed location but also a little bit removed from the immediate environs where China’s short-term ca-
40 

pabilities are becoming more threatening. And it also spreads, sort 

of, our capabilities around in a wider array of places, which reduces 

our vulnerability to a surprise attack, which is an area I think we 

have to worry more and more about in general. 

And so, for all these reasons, I support expansion of airfields, 

also hardening of airfields, improvement of aircraft shelters, putting things underground like fuel capability so they are safer from 

attack, using airplanes that are capable of using degraded runways, putting more attack submarines on Guam, and, if the Japanese, if our good friends in Tokyo can work this out, actually completing the deal on moving some of the Marines to Okinawa, as 

well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. 

Does anybody else have any comments on that buildup? 

Mr. DONNELLY. Very briefly, I would support it. I am worried 

about putting all our eggs in few baskets. In addition to creating—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Putting—what did you say? 

Mr. DONNELLY. Putting all our eggs in relatively few baskets in 

the theater, you know, just to be frank. 

Ms. BORDALLO. But Guam is ours, too. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Yes, but it will be a target. It is a target. And 

it is easier for the Chinese to make the missile go farther than it 

is for us. 

I think we need to consider a more dispersed posture, a kind of 

week-two or second-day posture, throughout the region, for which 

Guam would be critical but not exactly in the same way that it is 

being considered now. I would like to be in more places. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Anybody else? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, I think Tom makes an important point, which 

is that—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. I just have 28 seconds left. 

Mr. BOOT. Okay. Well, an important point, which is that we talk 

about duplication and streamlining the Department of Defense, 

and there may be budgetary reasons for doing that, but in terms 

of strategic reasons, you actually want to have some duplication, 

you want to have redundancy, so that if, God forbid, the balloon 

goes up and war breaks out and you lose certain assets, you have 

others in place. And so what may seem wasteful in peacetime is actually absolutely necessary when the hostilities actually start. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I apologize that I had 

come in later. We had Director Clapper and Director Petraeus before us in the Intelligence Committee, and I had to attend that 

meeting first. But, in any event, I want to thank you for what you 

have had to say today. And some of the things I may ask may already be covered. 

But I have noticed that, obviously, since the—over the last 10 

years, post-9/11, in addition to our greater reliance on Special Operations Forces, we also have a greater reliance and dependence 
41 

now on cybersecurity, which is an area that I have spent a great 

deal of time on. 

So my question is, are we properly resourced in that area? And, 

as we go forward and we look over the next decade, what areas in 

cyber do we need to be focused more on? Where should we be devoting our resources in that area so we are properly resourced? 

I give President Obama high marks on the way he is handling 

cyber. I am not satisfied that we are where we need to be on the 

broader picture. I think there need to be greater authorities in the 

role of the cybersecurity coordinator—that should be a director’s 

position—and strengths in that area. 

But where should we be most focused in cyber? 

Mr. THOMAS. Last year, the United Kingdom conducted an exhaustive review of its defense programs, and it made substantial 

cuts across the board. What I think is instructive, however, is that 

there was really one area where they actually were increasing 

spending, and that was in the area of cyber, both in terms of cybersecurity as well as thinking about how do you use non-kinetic systems as an adjunct or as a complement to kinetic forms of warfare 

as we look ahead. 

One of the real challenges is how we think about this problem. 

In our war games over the past couple years, everyone emphasizes 

cyber as a growth area where you want to make increased investments. The challenge is actually determining where and what sorts 

of investments you want to make. Do you focus more on a strategic 

capability, both in terms of a strategic defense capability for a critical infrastructure in the United States or potentially as a strategic 

offensive system weapon that you could use against your adversaries? Do you think of it as an adjunct or as a means of suppressing enemy air defenses and going after other networks in the 

future? All of these things are going to have to be thought through. 

I would say that cyber will be incredibly attractive, especially as 

an offensive weapon, for all of the great powers and non-state actors as well. And we would only not make investments in this area 

at our own peril. 

I think the second point that is really critical to keep in mind 

is the intricate relationship between offensive and defensive cyber 

warfare. It will be very difficult to be good defensively if we do not 

think offensively as well, and vice versa. 

Mr. BOOT. I would just reiterate a point that I made in reply to 

the question that Mrs. Hartzler had earlier about missile defense 

and that—totally legitimate and appropriate to worry about ballistic missiles, totally legitimate and appropriate to worry about 

cyber attack. These are all areas where, unfortunately, our capabilities are deficient right now and we need more spending. But we 

can’t just—it is hard, as we have been discussing, to see other 

areas of the budget, of the defense budget, where we can painlessly 

cut and give up other capabilities so that we can enhance these, 

and it is a zero-sum game right now. And it is hard to make the 

case for ignoring the looming threat on cyber or ballistic or other 

looming threats. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yeah. I would also point out to you that, obviously, under President Obama’s administration, we have created 

the new Cyber Command, headed by General Alexander, which I 
42 

think is an important coordination model for bringing the best of 

all the Services together and properly using all the talents that we 

have among the various Services, again, bringing them into a more 

coordinated model. 

Let me, as time is expiring—you know, typically—and this does 

relate to cyber, I think, directly but more broadly, additionally. 

Typically, when faced with budgetary pressures or downward 

trends in top-line spending, research and development programs 

are often among the first areas to experience reductions. 

From your perspective, what impacts, both short- and long-term, 

would a reduction in the current RDT&E [Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation] accounts, particularly basic research, have 

on military capability? 

Mr. DONNELLY. Very quickly, I would just say that I would adjudge that our problem over the past couple of decades has been 

that we have not been able to actually produce what we have invented, and the distinction between what is R&D and procurement 

is a very fine line. We need to be able to produce things in quantities so that they are militarily important. 

And so, what I would be concerned about is the balance both of 

basic science and defense research and development and the ability 

to produce large numbers of systems and capabilities in ways that 

will be important in the real world. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

I thank the panel. I appreciate your time today and your patience and your thoughtful answers to our questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

And, members of the panel, thank you very much for your testimony. 

The committee stands in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

(47) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from 

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

September 8, 2011 

Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee meets this 

morning to receive testimony on The Future of National Defense 

and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from Outside Experts. 

As our Nation marked the ten-year anniversary of the attacks on 

our Nation this past Sunday, we remember and commemorate the 

lives lost on that day. We also honor the sacrifices made every day 

since then by our military and their families, as our Armed Forces 

continue to fight for our Nation’s safety. This hearing is the second 

in our series of hearings to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11 and 

to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about 

the future of our force. Last Thursday, we heard from former 

Chairmen and a Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today, 

we will hear from outside experts, representing several well-known 

and highly respected organizations, to whom our Committee regularly turns for accurate and reliable research and analysis. While 

we will continue to solicit the expertise of former and current senior military and civilian leaders within the Department of Defense, 

it is important to gain perspective from professionals such as these 

who make their living conducting the type of forward-looking, strategic assessments we seek. 

I remain concerned that our Nation is slipping back into the false 

confidence of a September 10th mindset, believing our Nation to be 

secure because the homeland has not been successfully attacked— 

believing that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by 

budget choices, not strategic ones. As members of the Armed Services Committee, we must avoid the cart-before-the-horse cliche ́. 

First we must decide what do we want our military to do, and only 

then evaluate savings within the Department. 

To date, that hasn’t happened—over half a trillion dollars has 

been cut from DOD already. Nevertheless, if the Joint Select Committee does not succeed in developing and passing a cohesive deficit 

reduction plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut 

from our military automatically. On top of that looming concern, it 
48 

remains to be seen whether or not additional cuts may be proposed 

by the Administration, even if the Super Committee is successful. 

As Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I have two principal concerns that stem from recent military atrophy. The first is 

a security issue. In a networked and globalized world, the Atlantic 

and Pacific Oceans are no longer adequate to keep America safe. 

September 11th taught us that. The second is an economic concern. 

While it is true that our military power is derived from our economic power, we must recognize that this relationship is symbiotic. 

Cuts to our Nation’s defense, either by eliminating programs or 

laying off soldiers, comes with an economic cost. 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s greatest champion of life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is time we focus our fiscal 

restraint on the driver of the debt, instead of the protector of our 

prosperity. 

With that in mind, I look forward to a frank discussion. 

Now please let me welcome our witnesses this morning. We have: 

• Mr. Jim Thomas, Vice President and Director of Studies at 

the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; 

• Dr. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior 

Fellow at the Brookings Institution; 

• Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow and Director, Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute; 

and 

• Mr. Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for 

National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Thank you gentlemen for being here today and we look forward 

to your testimony. 
49 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from 

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

September 8, 2011 

I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing here today. As 

we head into this period of budget uncertainty, we appreciate your 

willingness to help us think through our options. 

Our Nation is faced with a long-term, systemic budget dilemma—revenues and expenditures are simply misaligned. We 

don’t collect enough revenue to cover our expenditures. Going forward, it is my belief that we are going to have to fix this problem 

from both ends—spending will have to come down, and we’re going 

to have to fix the revenue problem. 

However, what we need you to help us think through today are 

the implications of a reduction in the defense budget. Defense 

spending makes up about 20 percent of all Federal spending and 

about half of all nonentitlement. Since 9/11, defense spending has 

risen, in real terms, somewhere over 40 percent without counting 

the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like many, if not 

most, of our members here, I share the view that large, immediate 

cuts to the defense budget would have substantially negative impacts to the ability of the U.S. military to carry out those missions 

we assign them, and this is why I opposed the recent agreement 

to raise the debt ceiling. But, I do believe that we can rationally 

evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, 

and the current set of missions we ask the military to undertake 

and come up with a strategy that requires less funding. We can, 

I believe, spend smarter and not just more. 

It is this belief that causes me to congratulate the Administration for undertaking a zero-based review of our defense strategy. 

Undertaking a strategic review at this moment is a rational and 

responsible choice, and I hope Congress will consider its results seriously as we go forward. We on this committee like to say that 

strategy should not be driven by arbitrary budget numbers, but by 

the same token not considering the available resources when developing a strategy is irresponsible and leads inevitably to asking our 

military to do too much with too little. 

I have two hopes for this hearing today and for this entire series 

of hearings. First, I hope the witnesses here today and at future 

hearings can help us think through our national security strategy 

and potential changes. How can we put together a sustainable national defense strategy? If our witnesses were asked, what would 

they tell those undertaking the comprehensive review? What can 

we as a country, we as a Congress, and those who run the Department of Defense do smarter? 
50 

Secondly, it is my hope that these hearings will help illustrate 

to my colleagues and the Nation at large that we have to make 

some serious choices here. Our budget problems must be looked at 

in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about not cutting 

large amounts of funding from the defense budget, something else 

has to give. I share with my colleagues on the other side of the 

aisle the concern that large, immediate, across-the-board cuts to 

the defense budget may well do damage to our national security. 

But I hope that on their part, they will come to share the reality 

that we can’t just wish our problems away, and that if we want to 

avoid large cuts to the defense budget, we’re going to have to address our budget problems comprehensively, through smarter defense spending, reformed entitlements, and yes, new sources of revenue. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

(97) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. DONNELLY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 20.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS 

Mr. BOOT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 

22.] 

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