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67–253PDF 2011

A REVIEW OF NASA’S SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011 

Serial No. 112–29 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Tuesday, July 12, 2011 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Charles F. Bolden Jr., Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

The Honorable Charles F. Bolden Jr., Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration ................................................................................... 60 

(1) 

A REVIEW OF NASA’S SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph Hall 

[Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 
2 
3 

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

A Review of NASA’s Space Launch System 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011

10:00 A.M. TO 12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Hearing Purpose 

The original intent of the hearing was to examine NASA’s selection of a heavylift launch system (‘‘Space Launch System’’) that will be used to launch future crew 

and cargo flights beyond low Earth orbit. Members would have had an opportunity 

to ask questions regarding cost, schedule, capabilities, and justification for the selected design. However, on July 7, a senior NASA official publicly stated that a final 

decision on SLS won’t be announced until ‘‘late this summer.’’ In light of NASA’s 

continuing delays (the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 required a decision and report by mid-January 2011), the hearing will instead provide an opportunity for 

NASA to explain why it has failed to reach a decision, what analyses still need to 

be completed, and when the Space Launch System decisions will be forthcoming. 

Witness 

• The Honorable Charles F. Bolden Jr., Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

Background 

The Bush Administration and the NASA Authorization Acts of 

2005 and 2008 

In the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident the Bush Administration 

proposed a new vision for space exploration, following the retirement of the Space 

Shuttle, which would extend human capabilities beyond low Earth orbit for the first 

time since 1972. In the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 Congress directed NASA 

to ‘‘establish a program to develop a sustained human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor program, to promote exploration, science, commerce, and 

United States preeminence in space, and as a stepping-stone to future exploration of 

Mars and other destinations.’’ [P.L. 109–155] 

Subsequently, NASA created the Constellation program (consisting of the Ares 1 

rocket and Orion crew capsule, the Ares 5 heavy lift launcher, and the Altair lunar 

lander) that was designed to accommodate this stepping-stone approach, and was 

Congressionally-authorized by the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 ‘‘to ensure that 

activities in its lunar exploration program shall be designed and implemented in a 

manner that gives strong consideration to how those activities might also help meet 

the requirements of future activities beyond the Moon’’ and a range of future destinations ‘‘to expand human and robotic presence into the solar system, including the exploration and utilization of the Moon, near Earth asteroids, Lagrangian points, and 

eventually Mars and its moons.’’ [P.L. 110–422] 

The Obama Administration 

In NASA’s FY 2010 budget proposal the Obama Administration maintained the 

Congressionally-authorized policy of returning Americans to the Moon and noted 

that, ‘‘Funds freed from the Shuttle’s retirement will enable the Agency to support 

development of systems to deliver people and cargo to the International Space Station 

and the Moon,’’ and, ‘‘The Agency will create a new chapter of this legacy as it works 

to return Americans to the Moon by 2020 as part of a robust human and robotic 

space exploration program.’’ Yet in spite of these assertions the Administration 

eliminated funding for continued development of the Altair lunar lander and the 
4 

Ares 5 heavy-lift launch vehicle, and cut more than $3 billion from NASA’s five year 

Exploration Systems budget, relative to the FY 2009 budget request. 

At the time of the FY 2010 budget proposal the Administration established an 

independent review committee chaired by retired Lockheed Martin executive Norman Augustine. The Review of Human Spaceflight Plans Committee delivered its 

final report in October 2009 with the overarching conclusion that ‘‘ Meaningful exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline’’ 

but that ‘‘Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less-constrained budget, 

increasing annual expenditures by approximately $3 billion in real purchasing power 

above the FY 2010 guidance.’’ 

Despite the Augustine Committee’s finding that the FY 2010 budget profile was 

insufficient for meaningful human space exploration, the next year the administration reduced the FY 2011 Exploration Systems budget to $4.3 billion, which was 

$1.8 billion below the FY 2010 runout plan. Hence, it appeared that ‘‘ Funds freed 

from the Shuttle’s retirement.’’ would not be provided by the Administration to ‘‘enable the Agency to support development of systems to deliver people and cargo to the 

International Space Station and the Moon.’’ 

In NASA’s FY 2011 budget request the Administration proposed canceling the 

Constellation program, claiming it was ‘‘ trying to recreate the glories of the past 

with the technologies of the past.’’ Then at a speech at the Kennedy Space Center 

on April 15th 2010, the President said that with respect to the Moon, ‘‘ the simple 

fact is, we have been there before. There is a lot more of space to explore . . . ’’ He 

announced that the U.S. would send humans to an asteroid by 2025, followed by 

a human mission to orbit Mars by the mid 2030s. 

On July 6, 2011 during a Twitterr Town Hall webcast, President Obama expressed his vision for exploration this way, ‘‘. . . let’s ultimately get to Mars. A good 

pit stop is an asteroid. I haven’t actually—we haven’t identified the actual asteroid 

yet, in case people are wondering. But the point is, let’s start stretching the boundaries so we’re not doing the same thing over and over again. But rather, let’s start 

thinking about what’s the next horizon. What’s the next frontier out there and you 

know, but in order to do that we’re going to need some technological breakthroughs 

that we don’t have yet.’’ 

In lieu of Constellation, the Administration’s FY 2011 budget sought to fund development of ‘‘commercial crew’’ transportation services (three or four, according to 

NASA), and postpone construction of human exploration systems for a least five 

years, instead pursuing additional propulsion research and technology development. 

Despite repeated requests by both the House Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

throughout 2010, NASA failed to provide a credible plan justifying their proposal. 

As a result, after extensive review and debate, Congress in its 2010 NASA Authorization Act reversed the Administration’s approach and directed the agency to build 

upon the capabilities of the Shuttle and Constellation programs and immediately 

begin developing the SLS and MPCV. 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 [P.L.111–267] 

Last year Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which was signed 

by the President on October 11, 2010 [P.L.111–267]. The Act provided policy guidance and recommended funding levels for three years, and called for a National 

Academy ‘‘review of the goals, core capabilities, and direction of human space flight, 

using the goals set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the 

NASA Authorization Act of 2005, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, the goals 

set forth in this Act, and goals set forth in any existing statement of space policy 

issued by the President.’’ The review is to be completed by next year. 

Congress again reaffirmed the policy of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (42 

U.S.C. 16761(a)), ‘‘that the United States shall maintain an uninterrupted capability 

for human space flight and operations in low-Earth orbit, and beyond, as an essential instrument of national security and of the capacity to ensure continued United 

States participation and leadership in the exploration and utilization of space.’’ 

[§201(b)] 

Section 202 (a) stated that, ‘‘The long term goal of the human space flight and 

exploration efforts of NASA shall be to expand permanent human presence beyond 

low-Earth orbit and to do so, where practical, in a manner involving international 

partners.’’ Section 301(a)(1) stated, ‘‘The extension of the human presence from lowEarth orbit to other regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit will enable missions to 
5 

the surface of the Moon and missions to deep space destinations such as near-Earth 

asteroids and Mars.’’ 

Section 2(9) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 states, ‘‘While commercial 

transportation systems have the promise to contribute valuable services, it is in the 

United States’ national interest to maintain a government operated space transportation system for crew and cargo delivery to space.’’ 

As a result, the Act provided $10.8 billion (through FY 2013) to continue developing a Shuttle- and Constellation-derived launch system (newly designated the 

Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle) that would also assure a 

national capability to access the International Space Station for the U.S. and our 

international partners in case commercial proposals fail to materialize or Russian 

Soyuz vehicles are unavailable. The Act also directed NASA to proceed immediately 

with its development with the goal of making the system operational by 2016. 

Congress envisioned that the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi Purpose 

Crew Vehicle (MPCV) would get maximum benefit from the more than $10.3 billion 

that had been spent (up to that time) on the Constellation program. Constellation 

had achieved a number of developmental milestones including the successful flight 

tests of the Ares 1–X and the Orion launch abort systems, and a ground demonstration of the new five-segment solid rocket motor that was to power the Ares 1 and 

Ares 5 launchers. The SLS and MPCV were to continue to focus on developing the 

advanced human safety features of the Orion project, and be capable of evolving into 

a heavy lift launch system that could eventually carry 130 tons to orbit to enable 

human exploration beyond Earth orbit. 

NASA was directed to provide a report to Congress by January 9, 2011, describing 

the SLS and MPCV including ‘‘. . . the assumptions, description, data, and analysis 

of the systems trades and resolution process, justification of trade decisions, the design factors which implement the essential system and vehicle capability requirements.the explanation and justification of any deviations from those requirements, 

the plan for utilization of existing contracts, civil service and contract workforce, supporting infrastructure utilization and modifications, and procurement strategy to expedite development activities through modification of existing contract vehicles, and 

the schedule of design and development milestones and related schedules leading to 

the accomplishment of operational goals established by this Act.’’ [Section 309] 

In November 2010, NASA issued a series of small ($650,000) study contracts to 

13 companies to provide industry inputs to the heavy lift studies. Initial responses 

were obtained in late February 2011 and final replies in late April 2011. 

In January 2011, Administrator Bolden sent a letter to the Committee that said, 

‘‘Unfortunately, a 2016 first flight does not appear to be possible within projected FY 

2011 and out year funding levels, although NASA is continuing to explore innovative 

procurement and development approaches to determine whether it can come closer to 

this goal.’’ 

According to briefings by senior NASA officials in May 2011, the report is expected to include, 1) the basic framework for a ‘‘capability driven architecture’’ and 

concept of operations that provides the ‘‘strategic context for exploration of multiple 

destinations,’’ 2) an analysis of the cost and benefits of proposed vehicle designs for 

the SLS and MPCV and alternatives, 3) analysis of the current Ares, Shuttle and 

Orion contracts for the applicability to the future development program, and 4) 

analysis of potential acquisitions approaches. 

NASA has contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton to perform an independent cost 

assessment. The results were due in May 2011 for inclusion as part of the final report. In May 2011 senior NASA officials expressed confidence that the final report 

would be completed by June 20th, this was later changed to July 8th. NASA’s report 

to Congress is now more than six months late. NASA is awaiting final approval 

from OMB. 

Continuing delays have already resulted in the loss of thousands of highly skilled 

aerospace jobs, and threatens to do costly damage to the U.S. industrial base. On 

March 30, 2011 in testimony before the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee hearing on A Review of NASA’s Exploration Program in Transition, the Chairman of the 

Corporate Membership Committee of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics testified that, ‘‘. . . the space industrial base is not FACING a crisis; we 

are IN a crisis. And we are losing a National Perishable Asset.our unique workforce.’’ 
6 

FY2011 Full Year Continuing Resolution 

On April 15, 2011 a full year continuing resolution established spending levels for 

the balance of FY 2011. As noted in the table below, for the Space Launch System, 

amounts provided are slightly above authorized levels. Subsequently, on June 15th 

NASA provided Congress with an operating plan based on the continuing resolution 

(FY11 CR column below) and gave notice that ‘‘(A)dditional information on NASA’s 

progress in selecting an architecture and acquisition strategy will be provided to Congress in the Updated Report on MPCV and SLS in summer 2011.’’ Agency officials 

are now suggesting that the information won’t be available until late summer at the 

earliest. 

Recent FY 2012 Appropriation Activity 

On July 7th the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 

Science, and Related Agencies reported an FY 2012 appropriations bill providing a 

total of $3.65 billion for Exploration Systems, that included the following provision: 

‘‘ Provided, that not less than $1,063,000,000 shall be for the multipurpose crew vehicle to continue existing vehicle development activities to meet the requirements described in paragraph (a)(1) of section 303 of Public Law 111–267, and not less than 

$1,985,000,000 shall be for the heavy lift launch vehicle system which shall have a 

lift capability not less than 130 tons and which shall have an upper stage and other 

core elements developed simultaneously.’’ 
7 

Chairman HALL. Charlie, are you ready? Everybody ready down 

the road here? Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will 

come to order. Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled, 

‘‘A Review of NASA’s Space Launch System.’’ In front of you, of 

course, are the same packets contained in the written testimony, 

biography, and truth in testimony disclosure for today’s witness, 

Administrator Charles F. Bolden. 

And we will have opening statements. I recognize myself for five 

minutes for my opening statement. 

Good morning, and today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘A Review of 

NASA’s Space Launch System,’’ and our witness is NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden. 

As a preface to the formal portion of my statement, I want to 

first congratulate all the men and women at NASA and its contractors for the successful launch of STS–135. The Shuttle launch was 

viewed by tens of thousands of people on hand in Florida and millions more around the world, including a packed crowd in this 

hearing room, and it was a bittersweet moment to watch the last 

flight of the Shuttle Atlantis lift off from Kennedy Space Center. 

General, your team did an outstanding job, and we all look forward to welcoming this crew safely home probably some time next 

week. 

Several weeks ago as our Committee began planning for this 

hearing, we had every expectation that NASA would have announced its Space Launch System architecture well before today, 

with the goal that the Committee Members would have the opportunity to ask questions regarding cost, schedule, capabilities, and 

the like. Indications we had received from NASA throughout the 

spring clearly suggested that a decision would have been rendered 

prior to today. Sadly, such is not the case. 

Nine months ago the President signed the NASA Authorization 

Act. Provisions in the bill clearly directed, clearly directed NASA 

to provide us with decisions to tell Congress of their decisions on 

the selection of the crew vehicle and the launch system design by 

January 9, 2011. That date was considered attainable given the 

previous investment and substantial progress made by NASA in vehicle engineering, design, and demonstrations that had already 

been achieved by the Constellation Program. 

The Act also included the goal of reaching operational capability 

for the core elements not later than December 31, 2016, because 

that date seemed realistic for the now-canceled Constellation System, and it also reflected Congress’ deep concern that we needed 

to have a back-up capability in place should commercial launch vehicles fail to materialize. 

Instead, on January 15, Congress received a ‘‘preliminary report,’’ that emphasized its selection of prototype vehicle designs but 

did not commit the agency to their construction. The report was 

careful to note, and I quote, ‘‘NASA hopes to finalize its acquisition 

decisions as early as spring of 2011, details that will be included 

in a follow-on report to Congress.’’ We are well into summer, and 

no such report has been sent. 

So today, 6 months later, and with the final space shuttle mission now underway, instead of an informed discussion on the attributes and trades on the selection of a Space Launch System, we 
8 

will be left with little more than an explanation of decision-making 

processes still to be completed. 

Our letter of invitation asked you, Charlie, to describe the design 

of the launch system, how much it would cost, the budget profile, 

its performance, when it would be ready, and the types of missions 

it would enable. General Bolden, the fact that we do not have a 

final decision on the SLS and the supporting documents that the 

invitation letter requested represents almost an insult to this Committee and to Congress. 

We will try our very best throughout this hearing to accommodate the agency’s failure and the failure of the White House to answer congressional requests and to give us the information that we 

are entitled to have. But to be clear, this failure reflects poorly on 

the Administration and its space program. I can’t help but feel that 

this Administration has let down the thousands of men and women 

who have devoted their careers to the space program as well as heroes such as Neil Armstrong, Mike Collins, Buzz Aldrin, Gene 

Cernan, Tom Stafford, and they go on and on and many, many others, known well to all of us, who risked their lives blazing the trail 

of space exploration and some who lost their lives and others who 

continue to maintain an unwavering dedication and devotion to the 

cause. 

We have a record littered with requests by Congress for information over the last two years. We have waited for answers that have 

not come. We have pleaded for answers that have not come. We 

have done our best to be fair with you and with this President, who 

set out to delay the next step in our Nation’s human space exploration program and by doing so has jeopardized the Space Station 

in the process. 

It is a shame that for many of us that simply want to preserve, 

protect, and defend our leadership in space, that is all we ask for, 

that is what we want, that we see NASA paying for rides to the 

Space Station from countries that may not have our best interests 

at heart. 

We have run out of patience. I realize and I believe that you are 

the person who has to bear the brunt of this President’s bad decisions. I would like to believe you have told him what he ought to 

do, and I would like to believe that he didn’t pay any attention to 

you. The White House has done you wrong. But nonetheless, you 

have to answer for these continued failures. I would like to point 

out today that this Committee reserves the right to open an investigation into these continued delays and join the investigation initiated by the Senate. It is a shame we have to even consider or be 

thinking about doing that. 

Moving forward I think that it is important to note that we support all of the people engaged in developing the next heavy-lift vehicle as well as those who are working on the commercial cargo 

and crew contracts; people who are working every day to keep 

America at the forefront of human spaceflight. It is these engineers, these technicians and scientists who, despite the absence of 

good leadership from the White House, strive to dream big and 

carry on the legacy of those that came before us, before them and 

before us. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:] 
9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RALPH HALL

Good morning. Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘A Review of NASA’s Space Launch 

System’’, and our witness is NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden. 

As a preface to the formal portion of my statement, I want to first congratulate 

all the men and women at NASA and its contractors for the successful launch of 

STS–135. The Shuttle launch was viewed by tens of thousands on hand in Florida 

and millions more around the world, including a packed crowd in this hearing room, 

and it was a bittersweet moment to watch the last flight of the Shuttle Atlantis lift 

off from Kennedy Space Center. 

General, your team did an outstanding job, and we all look forward to welcoming 

the crew safely home next week. 

Several weeks ago as our Committee began planning for this hearing, we had 

every expectation that NASA would have announced its Space Launch System architecture well before today, with the goal that Committee Members would have the 

opportunity to ask questions regarding cost, schedule, capabilities, and the like. Indications we had received from NASA throughout the spring clearly suggested that 

a decision would have been rendered prior to today. Sadly, such is not the case. 

Nine months ago the President signed the NASA Authorization Act. Provisions in 

the bill clearly directed NASA to provide Congress with decisions on the selection 

of the crew vehicle and launch system designs by January 9, 2011. That date was 

considered attainable given the previous investment and substantial progress made 

by NASA in vehicle engineering, design, and demonstrations that had already been 

achieved by the Constellation program. 

The Act also included the goal of reaching operational capability for the core elements not later than December 31, 2016 because that date seemed realistic for the 

now-canceled Constellation system, and it also reflects Congress’ deep concern that 

we needed to have a back-up capability in place should commercial launch vehicles 

fail to materialize. 

Instead, on January 15, Congress received a ‘‘Preliminary Report’’ that emphasized its selection of prototype vehicle designs, but did not commit the agency to 

their construction. The report was careful to note, and I quote: ‘‘NASA hopes to finalize its acquisition decisions as early as Spring of 2011—details that will be included in a follow-on report to Congress.’’ We are well into summer and no such report has been sent. 

So today, six months later, and with the final space shuttle mission now underway, instead of an informed discussion on the attributes and trades on the selection 

of a Space Launch System, we’ll be left with little more than an explanation of decision-making processes still to be completed. Our letter of invitation asked you to describe the design of the launch system, how much it would cost, the budget profile, 

its performance, when it would be ready, and the types of missions it would enable. 

General Bolden, the fact that we do not have a final decision on the SLS and the 

supporting documents that the invitation letter requested represents an insult to 

Congress. 

We will try our best throughout this hearing to accommodate the agency’s failure 

and the failure of this White House to answer Congress and give us the information 

that we are entitled to have. But to be clear, this failure reflects poorly on the Administration and its space program. I can’t help but feel that this Administration 

has let down the thousands of men and women who have devoted their careers to 

the space program as well as heroes such as Neil Armstrong, Mike Collins, Buzz 

Aldrin, Gene Cernan, Tom Stafford, and many, many others who risked their lives 

blazing the trail of space exploration. Some who lost their lives, and others who continue to maintain an unwavering dedication and devotion to the cause. 

We have a record littered with requests by Congress for information over the last 

two years. We have waited for answers that have not come. We have pleaded for 

answers that have not come. We have done our best to be fair with you and this 

President, who set out to delay the next step in our nation’s human space exploration program and by doing so has jeopardized the Space Station in the process. 

It is a shame that for many of us that simply want to preserve, protect, and defend our leadership in space that we see NASA paying for rides to the Space Station 

from countries that may not have America’s best interests at heart. 

We have run out of patience. I realize that you are the person who has to bear 

the brunt of this President’s bad decisions. This White House has done you wrong. 

But nonetheless, you must answer for these continued failures. I would like to point 

out today that this Committee reserves the right to open an investigation into these 

continued delays and join the investigation initiated by the Senate. It’s a shame we 

have to consider doing that. 
10 

Moving forward I think that it is important to note that we support all of the people engaged in developing the next heavy-lift vehicle as well as those working on 

the commercial cargo and crew contracts; people who are working every day to keep 

America at the forefront of human spaceflight. It is these engineers, technicians and 

scientists who, despite the absence of good leadership from this White House, strive 

to dream big and carry on the legacy of those that came before them. 

I now recognize the Gentle-lady from Texas for her opening statement. 

Chairman HALL. I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas for 

her opening statement. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and let me welcome you, Administrator Bolden. I want to congratulate you and the entire Shuttle team on the truly spectacular 

launch of the Space Shuttle Atlantis. I watched video right here in 

this room last Friday, and I can assure you that the room was 

packed with enthusiastic supporters of all ages, and I know I speak 

for all of my colleagues when I say that we wish the crew of 

Atlantis a safe and successful mission. 

As you know, you have been called to testify on NASA’s plans to 

develop the vehicles that will enable future human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, vehicles that have been authorized and funded by Congress. However, as you also know, and will testify today, 

that you still don’t have an approved plan to share with us. 

As a result, I expect that you will be on the receiving end of a 

lot of unhappiness and irritation expressed by many Members here 

today, and that includes me. It is unfortunate because the fault 

doesn’t lie with you. It is my understanding that you have had a 

plan ready to announce for some time, but you haven’t been able 

to get the final okay to make it public. And that said, it is now past 

time for a decision and a plan to be announced. 

Three successful NASA Authorization Acts enacted by Democratic and Republican Congresses and Presidents alike over the 

past six years have directed NASA to undertake a program of 

human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and the most recent of 

those Authorization Acts directed NASA to move expeditiously to 

develop the heavy-lift launch vehicle and crew capsule needed to 

enable those exploration missions, as well as to provide back-up capability in support of the International Space Station. 

In short, Congress is not asking NASA to build a rocket without 

a mission as some have claimed. Instead, we are asking NASA to 

build the system this Nation will need to carry out the exploration 

program authorized by successive Congresses and Presidents. 

As I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, the Shuttle Program is drawing to a close. There are many talented men and 

women who have worked on that program and on the now cancelled Constellation Program who want to continue to contribute to 

our Nation’s leadership in space exploration, but they don’t know 

what, if anything, is going to be there for them to work on in the 

coming years. There are impressionable young people, students, 

some of whom were here last week, looking with so much inspiration and hope in their eyes, but now we don’t know whether there 

is even going to be a human spaceflight program when they get out 

of school. I even talked with some about their wishes of becoming 

an astronaut, and there are international partners who wonder 

why the United States appears to be adrift and ready to walk away 

from this global leadership in human spaceflight. 
11 

I suspect that this state of affairs pains you as much as it does 

me, but I have been around long enough to believe that we can do 

better, and I think that you believe that we can do better as well. 

So I hope that when this hearing is over, you will strongly convey 

to those in the Administration who are dithering that this is time 

to move forward and let NASA get on with the task that the Nation has asked to be undertaken. 

I have been asked by many news outlets about the future, and 

sitting on this Committee they certainly expect me to know the answer, but I do not. At this critical juncture we need to move ahead 

expeditiously to build a Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose 

Crew Vehicle in a way that makes use of the human spaceflight 

skills and knowledge base that NASA has worked so hard to 

achieve over the years and to inspire the next generation of explorers, engineers, and scientists. 

I firmly believe that if we lose this talent, it won’t be just to another State or another agency. It will be to another country, and 

to those of my colleagues on the Majority side who are critical of 

the Administration’s stewardship of NASA, I also hope that you 

will convey to your colleagues in Congress that NASA cannot do 

what we have asked it to do if its budget keeps getting cut. The 

proposed appropriations level for NASA is one that if enacted will 

simply add more stress to an agency and dedicated workforce that 

is already trying to do more with less. At the end of the day, this 

will put America on a path to relinquish its space leadership. I 

would hate for that to happen, and I don’t believe that you want 

it to happen as well. 

But we all need to recognize that votes on funding have consequences. Chairman Hall, I am so glad that you are supportive of 

this program, and I appreciate you calling this hearing today. 

Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning, and welcome Administrator Bolden. I first want to congratulate 

you and the entire Shuttle team on the truly spectacular launch of the Space Shuttle Atlantis. I watched a video feed of that launch in this same hearing room last 

Friday, and I can assure you that the room was packed with enthusiastic viewers 

of all ages. I know I speak for all my colleagues when I say that we wish the crew 

of Atlantis a safe and successful mission. 

Administrator Bolden, as you know, you have been called to testify on NASA’s 

plans to develop the vehicles that will enable future human exploration beyond lowEarth orbit-vehicles that have been authorized and funded by Congress. However, 

as you also know-and will testify today-you still don’t have an approved plan to 

share with us. As a result, I expect that you will be on the receiving end of a lot 

of unhappiness and irritation expressed by many Members here today. That’s unfortunate, because the fault doesn’t lie with you. It’s my understanding that you have 

had a plan ready to announce for some time, but you haven’t been able to get the 

final okay to make it public. 

That said, it is now past time for a decision and a plan to be announced. Three 

successive NASA Authorization Acts-enacted by Democratic and Republican Congresses and Presidents alike over the past six years-have directed NASA to undertake a program of human exploration beyond low Earth orbit. And the most recent 

of those Authorization Acts directed NASA to move expeditiously to develop the 

heavy-lift launch vehicle and crew capsule needed to enable those exploration missions-as well as to provide backup capability in support of the International Space 

Station. In short, Congress is not asking NASA to build a rocket without a mission, 

as some have claimed. Instead, we are asking NASA to build the systems this na-
12 

tion will need to carry out the exploration program authorized by successive Congresses and Presidents. 

As I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, the Shuttle program is drawing 

to a close. There are many talented men and women who have worked on that program and on the now-cancelled Constellation program who want to continue to contribute to our nation’s leadership in space exploration-but they don’t know what, if 

anything, is going to be there for them to work on in the coming years. There are 

impressionable young students-some of whom were in this hearing room last week 

to see the Shuttle lift off-who were inspired by the space program to study math 

and science, but who now don’t know whether there is even going to be a human 

space flight program when they get out of school. And there are our international 

partners, who wonder why the United States appears to be adrift and ready to walk 

away from its global leadership in human space flight. Administrator Bolden, I suspect this state of affairs pains you as much as it pains me. 

But I’ve been around long enough to believe that we can do better, and I think 

you believe that too. So I hope that when this hearing is over, you will strongly convey to those in the Administration who are dithering that it is time to move forward 

and let NASA get on with the tasks that the nation has asked it to undertake. At 

this critical juncture, we need to move ahead expeditiously to build the Space 

Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle in a way that makes use of the 

human spaceflight skills and knowledge-base NASA has worked so hard to achieve 

and that inspires the next generation of explorers, engineers, and scientists. 

And to those of my colleagues on the Majority side who are critical of the Administration’s stewardship of NASA, I also hope that you will convey to your colleagues 

in Congress that NASA cannot do what we are asking it to do if its budget keeps 

getting cut. The proposed House CJS appropriation level for NASA is one that, if 

enacted, will simply add more stress to an agency and dedicated workforce that is 

already trying to do ‘‘more with less’’, and at the end of the day will put America 

on a path to relinquish its space leadership. I would hate for that to happen, and 

I don’t believe you would want it to happen either, but we all need to recognize that 

votes on funding have consequences. 

Chairman Hall, I am glad that we are holding today’s hearing, and I look forward 

to Administrator Bolden’s testimony. Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman HALL. And I thank you for your good opening remarks, 

and I agree with you on the budget cuts. 

Now, I am going to take advantage of being the Chairman to 

make a statement. Some time many years ago when I was a Democrat, and I was a ranking Democrat, and I think Mr. Sensenbrenner might have been the Chairman then, the Republican 

Chairman, Al Gore, who was Vice-President, told us we had to cut 

the budget 25 percent. He told everyone that, and I talked to Al, 

and I said, I doubt seriously that the Chairman nor do I know how 

to cut the budget on people whose lives are in danger. Who could 

we get to help us? 

And I think he suggested Administrator Goldin, I believe was the 

Administrator at that time, and we talked to him and told him we 

had to have a 25 percent cut. This is just my recollection. I can be 

wrong, because I am 88 years old, and I wake up every morning 

in kind of a new world sometimes, but I remember this conversation very well when we asked Mr. Goldin, and he said, yes, he 

would cut it. 

Mr. Goldin did cut it, but he didn’t cut it 25 percent. He cut it 

34 percent. Really and truly. NASA hasn’t been the same since 

that time. So you can have too dang many cuts, and I am like that 

senator that said don’t tax me, tax that man behind the tree. They 

cut the wrong budget, and we are suffering from it today. We got 

to work together and try to work a way out of it. 

I thank you, Ms. Johnson, for your statement. 
13 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

And at this time—— 

Ms. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. Yes. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Before we proceed. 

Chairman HALL. Go ahead. Sure. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I would like to ask unanimous consent that Representative Sheila Jackson Lee be allowed to sit on the dais today 

and participate in questions. She hasn’t arrived yet, but she made 

this request after our Committee Members finished their questions. 

Chairman HALL. When she gets here, we will let her sit down. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman HALL. And let her ask questions. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman HALL. After our Members. Okay. 

At this time I would like to introduce our witness, Charles F. 

Bolden, Jr., a friend of mine for a lot of years, a man I have admired and respected. Was appointed NASA administrator by President Obama and sworn in on July 17, 2009. He is an astronaut 

having flown on four Shuttle missions, including the mission that 

deployed the Hubble Space Telescope. Prior to being appointed administrator, Mr. Bolden served in the United States Marine Corps 

for 34 years. During his service he was an aviator, having flown 

100 missions in South East Asia during the Vietnam War. 

And he was a test pilot. He held a number of commands. Mr. 

Bolden retired from the Corps with the rank of major general. He 

is a true patriot. We are glad to have him before us here today, 

and we welcome you, Charlie. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and Members 

of the Committee. I thank you all for the opportunity to appear 

here today to discuss the future of NASA’s human spaceflight program, a future that I believe is very bright. 

And before I continue with my formal comments, I do have to say 

you have the correct person here to cast blame. I want to make 

that very clear. I really appreciate everybody’s continuing willingness to excuse me for our shortcomings, but it is really important 

for everybody on this Committee and everybody watching this hearing to understand that I am the leader of America’s space program. 

I am the leader of the greatest space program in the world today, 

and so I am here in that capacity to testify and to try to be as honest and open as I can with you and answer as many questions as 

I can. I understand everybody’s frustration, but you have the right 

guy here to criticize. It is not the President. It is me. 

Our new system will stand on the shoulders of the successful 

Shuttle Program to which thousands of American men and women 

have contributed their passion and expertise to ensure America’s 

preeminence in space exploration. I appear before you today 4 days 

after an historic milestone in America’s spaceflight program; the 
14 

launch of Atlantis on the STS–135 mission, the final flight of the 

Shuttle Program. 

The brave men and woman of STS–135 safely docked with the 

International Space Station on Sunday, joining the list of dozens of 

American astronauts who have been living and working in space 

continuously for the past decade aboard the orbiting outpost. The 

station is the pinnacle of our current achievement, a stepping stone 

to the rest of our solar system. 

Some say that this final Shuttle mission will mark the end of 

America’s 50 years of dominance in human spaceflight. As a former 

astronaut and the current NASA administrator, I am here to tell 

you that American leadership in space will continue for at least the 

next half century because we have laid the foundation for success, 

and as we say at NASA, failure is not an option. 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 gave NASA a clear direction and in line with our 2011 Appropriations Bill, we are moving 

aggressively and enthusiastically to plan future exploration. We appreciate the significant bipartisan effort behind the law and look 

forward to working with you to shape a promising future for 

human spaceflight. 

Our post-Shuttle human spaceflight plan also focuses on utilization and operation of the ISS, establishing a U.S. commercial cargo 

and crew capability to reach this national laboratory and making 

critical, prioritized investments in the technologies that will help 

us win the future. 

We have to get out of the business of owning and operating lowEarth orbit transportation systems and hand that off to the private 

sector, exercising sufficient insight and oversight to ensure safety 

of our astronauts. 

As you all know, our next generation human spaceflight, the 

Space Launch System, or SLS, and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 

or MPCV, will transport astronauts to multiple destinations beyond 

low-Earth orbit. 

Our first goal is to target an asteroid by 2025. Our destinations 

could include cis-lunar space such as the Earth-Moon Lagrange 

points, the lunar surface, and eventually Mars and its moons. 

I understand the interest of many Members of Congress, including Members of this Committee, in seeing that we move quickly. 

I share that interest and urgency as do the thousands of NASA employees and contractors who stand ready to build a new system, 

but we cannot rush a critical decision that will drive NASA’s activities for several decades. We must be respectful stewards of taxpayer dollars. 

As I have said time and time again, our new systems must be 

affordable, sustainable, and realistic. One of the most important 

lessons we learned from Constellation is that a Space Launch System will only be successful if multiple Congresses and multiple Administrations provide adequate funding. 

In late May after careful analysis and deliberations by my senior 

management team, I accepted the Orion-based reference vehicle design first outlined in NASA’s January, 2011 report to Congress as 

the agency’s MPCV. Orion was already being built to meet the requirements of a deep-space vehicle, and our contract with Lockheed 

Martin Corporation maps well to our capsule requirements. 
15 

We have also been working expeditiously to complete assessments of SLS design options and develop a final integrated proposal for it and the MPCV Orion. Of course, we were constrained 

in this work to some degree by the 2010 Appropriations Law, which 

required us to continue funding Constellation Era contracts. 

We are making progress towards selecting a technical design approach that will be evolvable over time to meet our goals and be 

consistent with the law. In parallel to technical decisions we are 

developing new ways of doing business to keep costs down and insure agility, efficiency, and sustainability. We are revising the 

management of our requirements, contracts, and projects and incorporating approaches to ensure affordability in the near term and 

over the long run. 

To accomplish all this is required—all that is required to mount 

MPCV and SLS, NASA put together a series of teams to evaluate 

and compare various options and evaluate the risks, uncertainty 

and relative advantages and disadvantages of alternatives for this 

integrated system. 

We have also sought input from industry and are considering an 

early flight program for SLS to make the most of what we know 

early on. We know that SLS must be capable of accessing many regions of space beyond LEO and be capable of lifting the MPCV. It 

also must be able to initially lift 70 to 100 metric tons to LEO 

while ultimately being evolvable to a lifting capacity of 130 metric 

tons or more. 

The SLS must also have commonality of systems between core 

and upper stage and modularity of elements. The system should 

also be flexible and strengthen our industrial base. On June 20 I 

approved a specific design that our experts believe is the best technical path forward for SLS. That was an important step but not a 

final decision. Our experts, as well as an independent team from 

Booz Allen Hamilton, are now developing cost estimates. We need 

a credible path to preliminary design review or PDR on our best, 

most flexible approach based on budget assumptions and our best 

estimates on what its cost, what this cost and how it fits with projected budgets. 

It would be irresponsible to proceed further until we at least 

have good estimates. I have shared that design with the Office of 

Management and Budget and others at the White House. Like me, 

they are eager to see the results of our cost estimates. We know 

that this program will likely cost tens of billions of dollars over 

many years, so this will likely be the most important decision I 

make as the NASA administrator, and I want to get it right. 

We must first pin down the cost of specific technical design that 

I have proposed. Just as importantly we must then see how these 

costs fit into the larger NASA budget so that we can continue to 

do exceptional work in robotic exploration, science, and aeronautics. 

Last week’s House Subcommittee mark of our 2012 Appropriations Bill was another stark reminder that we are making this critical decision in exceptionally challenging fiscal times. 

I commit that we will re-double our efforts to keep this Committee informed of our progress. While I would hope to have a final 

decision to announce this summer, the absolute need to make sure 
16 

our SLS program fits within our overall budget constraints suggests that it may take longer. While we are going through the process on that decision, we are continuing to make investments such 

as the following. 

Assembly of the Orion Ground Test Article was recently completed, and it is being prepared for a series of ground-based, environmental tests to validate the Orion design and computer models. 

The former Ares project has focused their development efforts on 

technologies and processes that could be utilized in the eventual 

SLS configuration, including vehicle avionics, J–2X engine testing, 

first stage motor testing, the developmental motor 3, and installation of upper-stage tooling applicable to large diameter tanks. 

The J–2X engine is fully assembled and installed in the A–2 Test 

Stand at NASA’s Stennis Space Center. The engine began a series 

of ten test firings on July 6. 

Significant progress has been made in the modifications to Pad 

B at Launch Complex 39. There are new fiber optic cables replacing the copper wire, and by the way, we recovered $621,000 from 

scrap copper. New digital control systems for the pad utilities and 

a state-of-the-art lightning protection system that helped us clear 

the Shuttle during STS–135 processing. This has been done in continued preparation for a clean pad multi-user capability, including 

SLS. 

Although NASA must still finalize an integrated test flight plan, 

based on the President’s fiscal year 2012, budget request, NASA is 

currently targeting the first uncrewed SLS development flight for 

late 2017 to support a crewed mission by the early 2020s and a 

visit to an asteroid in 2025. 

We look forward to working with the Congress as we finalize our 

strategy for achieving human spaceflight to many destinations in 

our solar system. I share your sense of urgency about moving forward but ask for your continued patience as we together build an 

affordable, sustainable, and realistic Space Launch System. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolden follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES F. BOLDEN JR., 

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Hall and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today to discuss the future of NASA’s human spaceflight program, 

and in particular the progress NASA is making on developing the next-generation 

human spaceflight transportation systems known as the Space Launch System 

(SLS) and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), as well as their associated mission and ground support elements and other programs. 

With passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111–267) on October 

11, 2010, NASA has a clear direction for our human spaceflight programs. NASA 

appreciates the significant effort made in advancing this important bipartisan legislation, and we look forward to working with you to shape a promising future for 

our Nation’s human spaceflight programs. With the enactment of the FY 2011 FullYear Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112–10), NASA is aggressively moving 

forward with our next-generation human spaceflight system development efforts as 

authorized. 

The President’s FY 2012 budget request continues to focus Agency efforts on a 

vigorous path of innovation and technological development leading to an array of 

challenging and inspiring missions to destinations with an incredible potential for 

discovery, increasing our knowledge of our solar system, developing technologies to 

improve life, expanding our presence in space, increasing space commerce, and en-
17 

gaging the public. The request supports an aggressive launch rate of about 40 missions from FY 2011 through FY 2012, including U.S. and international flights to the 

International Space Station (ISS) as well as science missions flown to Earth orbit 

and beyond. Within the human spaceflight arena, our foremost priority is safely and 

productively conducting our current human spaceflight endeavor. The FY 2012 

budget request also maintains a strong commitment to human spaceflight beyond 

low-Earth orbit (LEO) via a capability-driven architecture that will focus on increasingly complex missions as we develop the technical expertise to reach destinations 

ever deeper into our solar system. At present, as designated by the President, our 

initial destination for a human mission is a crewed flight to an asteroid by 2025, 

followed by a human mission to Mars in the mid-2030s. Our post-Shuttle human 

spaceflight plan also focuses on utilization and operation of the ISS and on establishing a U.S. commercial cargo and crew capability to reach this National Laboratory. It establishes critical priorities and invests in the technologies and excellent 

science, aeronautics research, and education programs that will help us win the future. 

In terms of our next-generation human spaceflight system, the SLS and MPCV 

will be capable of transporting astronauts to multiple destinations beyond LEO. The 

capabilities provided by these two vehicle systems are necessary for all activities beyond LEO. While our plan calls for the initial destination for human flight beyond 

LEO to target an asteroid by 2025, other destinations could include cis-lunar space 

such as the Earth-Moon Lagrange points, the lunar surface, and eventually Mars 

and its moons. All of these places hold incredible information for us—information 

that we probably do not even know exists at this point. Compelling missions to advance exploration will be enabled by coupling these spacecraft systems with others 

needed for particular missions. This journey begins with the SLS and MPCV as the 

first important core elements of the evolutionary exploration approach to accomplishing a broad spectrum of missions. 

To date, as NASA has reported to the Committee, the Agency has determined that 

the beyond-LEO version of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle is NASA’s new 

MPCV, and as such, the current Orion contract with Lockheed Martin Corporation 

is being used through at least the development phase of the vehicle. 

NASA has been working expeditiously to complete assessments of SLS design options and develop a final integrated proposal for MPCV/Orion and SLS. NASA has 

been conducting detailed technical analysis since the enactment of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, and is working towards selecting a technical approach that 

will meet the intent of the SLS configuration described in the NASA Authorization 

of 2010 and enable the Nation to conduct a sustainable program of exploration. 

NASA’s intent is that the design would evolve over time to meet the end goals of 

the SLS configuration in the Authorization Act. NASA is exploring strategic approaches that would be adaptable to modifications in annual funding and still make 

significant progress toward the end design. The SLS and MPCV teams are continuing to develop an integrated development plan that will be affordable in the 

near term and over the long run. In doing so, we are striving to design an evolvable 

and interoperable human spaceflight transportation system that will serve us for 

decades to come as we explore multiple compelling mission destinations. Due diligence will ensure the best value for the taxpayer with respect to cost, risk, schedule, 

performance, and impacts to critical NASA and industrial skills and capabilities in 

this multi-billion dollar endeavor. 

While NASA has made significant progress to date on both the SLS and the 

MPCV, much work remains ahead for the Agency, as we finalize development plans 

and acquisition decisions per normal Agency processes for the SLS-decisions that 

must remain consistent with NASA’s Strategic Plan and Agency commitments, as 

well as the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. 

In a constrained budget environment, NASA knows how important it is to identify 

ways to make our programs and projects more efficient, so finding and incorporating 

these efficiencies remains a primary goal. We have embraced the challenge to deliver human spaceflight systems for lower cost, and the opportunity to become more 

efficient, innovative and agile in our programs. For example, we are revising the 

management of our requirements, contracts, and projects and incorporating approaches to ensure affordability in the near term and over the long run. This includes the use of focused insight/oversight, specifying to industry—where appropriate —what we need instead of how to build it, designing for cost-effective operations, increasing the use of common components and parts, and wisely consolidating infrastructure. 

The remainder of my testimony will address progress made to date on the SLS 

and MPCV Programs, as well as outlining the work ahead of us in order to ensure 
18 

that we develop systems that reflect the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 using an 

affordable, sustainable and realistic approach. 

However, before I explore those topics, I would like to take a moment to personally recognize the thousands of NASA civil servants and industry team Members 

who have worked selflessly for countless hours, often under difficult circumstances 

and in a turbulent environment, to make our human spaceflight programs and 

projects productive and successful. In the days ahead, these incredible and talented 

employees will continue to do whatever it takes to make sure that the United States 

remains the world’s leader in human spaceflight. After all, they do not know how 

to commit to anything less. I would also like to thank the Committee for its continued strong support for NASA’s human spaceflight programs and their value to the 

Nation, especially as we work hard to finalize details of a well-thought-out strategy 

for our next-generation human spaceflight programs. 

An Integrated Launch System: A Work in Progress 

Over the last several months, NASA has been evaluating options for developing 

an integrated and incremental development approach for the SLS, MPCV and the 

associated ground operations that will be capable of achieving progress in an incremental manner while also reflecting the goals and objectives of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, the FY 2011 Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 

112≥10), and in a sustainable manner. 

In order to accomplish this task, NASA put together a series of teams to develop 

an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) that would meet future human spaceflight goals 

established by law and by Administration policy. In general, an AoA is a study intended to aid decision making by comparing various options and illuminating the 

risk, uncertainty, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternatives 

being considered to satisfy a mission need. 

The AoA process produced many important results that will help inform NASA’s 

final decision for the architecture approach for SLS by evaluating various technical 

designs. This SLS process has also sought to incorporate input from industry via 

a broad area announcement which collected industry suggestions and comments 

that have proven to be very useful in the design development process. NASA’s goal 

is to develop an SLS architecture that represents the best ideas from industry and 

NASA. 

NASA is currently evaluating the potential options for future missions that could 

enable continued progress toward longer-duration, beyond-LEO destinations. NASA 

is strongly considering an early flight test program, not unlike that we are conducting with our commercial partners for the evolving LEO capability. Such a program has many benefits, such as earlier access to data that could inform future design iterations or be applied to other programs, etc. and could also mitigate gaps 

in the current NASA industrial base and workforce skills. If implemented, NASA 

believes that this early mission strategy could effectively utilize and evolve existing 

capability (workforce, hardware, and contracts) to begin the next human exploration 

venture quickly. Over the next months, NASA will continue to evaluate this type 

of integrated strategy, including cost and schedule, through normal Agency program 

formulation activities, and we will continue to keep Congress apprised of our 

progress. Final acquisition decisions for the SLS are expected in the next couple of 

months, and we will provide those to Congress as soon as they are available. 

Very early on in this process, I directed that we complete an Independent Cost 

Assessment (ICA) of our integrated SLS/MPCV development approach—particularly 

in terms of the Agency’s initial cost and schedule estimates for the SLS. This ICA 

work is ongoing. I want to have a sanity check on our cost and schedule estimates 

before we make a final commitment to what will be a critical, but expensive venture 

for our nation. NASA has contracted with the firm of Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. to 

perform this work, and final results from the company are expected in late July/ 

early August. To be clear, the ICA will only have the fidelity that reflects the maturity of the SLS architecture concepts described above. I have also chosen not to do 

comparative cost estimates of all the alternatives to enable the assessment to focus 

on some of the most promising alternatives. Since the SLS proposal is still considered to be in the pre-formulation phase, the initial assessment will be a rough order 

of magnitude (ROM), which is typical of pre-formulation planning that occurs before 

a decision is made to baseline and fund a program. Official baselining of a program 

occurs upon successful completion of the Preliminary Design Review, when system 

requirements are fully defined and system design concepts are mature. It is at this 

point that the Agency will commit to an established life cycle cost and schedule. 
19 

The MPCV Program 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directs that NASA develop an MPCV that 

continues the advanced development of the human safety features, designs, and systems in the Orion Project. 

The MPCV will transport the crew from the Earth’s surface to a nearby destination or staging point and return the crew safely back to the Earth’s surface at the 

end of a mission. The MPCV will provide all services necessary to support a crew 

of up to four for up to 21-day missions (for very long beyond-LEO missions, such 

as exploration of near-Earth asteroids or other planetary bodies, additional elements—a space habitation module for example—will be included to provide long-duration deep space habitation capability). 

Mounted on top of the SLS for launch and ascent, the MPCV will be capable of 

performing abort maneuvers to safely separate from the launch vehicle and return 

the crew to the Earth’s surface. The MPCV will also be capable of performing inspace aborts if conditions require the immediate safe return of the crew. MPCV will 

include the necessary propulsive acceleration capability to rendezvous with other 

mission elements and return the flight crew from the destination to the Earth’s surface. In-space operations, such as rendezvous and docking and extravehicular activities, will be performed with the MPCV in conjunction with other mission elements. 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 requires that the MPCV be capable of efficient and timely evolution—something that has been in practice throughout the design process for the Orion vehicle. Continuing this process for MPCV will allow for 

an incremental or ‘‘block’’ development and mission capability approach. This will 

allow for early progress to be made on the fabrication of key design aspects, depending on available funding, while utilizing early testing to buy down risks associated 

with subsequent block configurations. Each test cycle will also provide an opportunity to on-ramp or off-ramp capabilities as the design evolves. 

In late May, and after careful analysis and deliberations by a senior management 

team, I decided to accept the Orion-based reference vehicle design, first outlined in 

NASA’s January 2011 report to Congress, as the Agency’s MPCV. As part of my decision process, I determined that the Orion was already being built to meet the requirements of a deep-space vehicle and that the Agency’s current Orion contractual 

partnership with Lockheed Martin Corporation maps well to the scope of the MPCV 

requirements outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. Therefore, the current contract will be used at least for the development phase of the MPCV. 

Moving forward, work on the MPCV will focus only on the deep-space design. 

While the MPCV could be called upon to service the ISS—a backup requirement established by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 —it should be well understood 

that utilizing the MPCV for routine ISS transportation would be a very inefficient 

and costly use of the MPCV deep-space capability. NASA is confident in the ability 

of our commercial and international partners to provide all currently foreseen support for the ISS. Therefore, there is no intention to conduct routine LEO missions 

with the MPCV. 

It is important to point out that my decision regarding MPCV does not reflect a 

‘‘business as usual’’ approach for the Agency. Over the last year, the NASA/Lockheed Martin team has shown exceptional creativity in finding ways to keep costs 

down by implementing new management techniques, technical solutions and innovation within the Orion Project. Since the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was signed 

into law, the Orion government and industry team has assessed and implemented 

additional affordability initiatives that have reduced Design, Development, Test and 

Evaluation costs and enabled schedule acceleration. These initiatives include but 

are not limited to: 

• Furthering the incremental approach to building and testing vehicle capabilities; 

• Streamlining Government oversight and insight; 

• Reducing formal deliverables and simplifying processes while retaining adequate rigor; 

• Utilizing high fidelity engineering development units in lieu of flight-equivalent 

hardware in test facilities and labs; 

• Consolidating test labs and re-use of test articles; and, 

• Enhancing the approach for spacecraft processing by employing applicable 

Space Shuttle processes and certified Shuttle personnel. 

Over the last year, NASA developed and executed plans for an incremental development approach for the Orion, due in large part to the constrained fiscal environment. This approach deferred work on some systems while focusing on core compo-
20 

nents and systems that could be applicable to MPCV, with the aim of attempting 

to enable incremental test flights and subsequent upgrades to full operational capabilities as quickly as the budget profile allows. In doing so, NASA deliberately 

prioritized Constellation funds, including those for Orion, to maximize their use in 

support of transition to SLS and MPCV. Examples are listed below. 

• Assembly of the Orion Ground Test Article (GTA) was recently completed, with 

the GTA being prepared for a series of ground-based environmental tests to 

validate the Orion design and computer models. The GTA is undergoing vibration and acoustic testing this summer, and will undergo drop testing at Langley 

Research Center Water Basin Facility in Virginia this fall. Data collected from 

GTA testing will be incorporated into MPCV development efforts so as to result 

in a safe, reliable and affordable human-rated crew capsule. Design work for 

the subsequent test article is also proceeding, including conducting periodic 

technical reviews. In FY 2012, testing on the GTA will be completed. Fabrication work and assembly work for the following test article will also be well underway. 

• A new sensor technology has been developed that will allow easier, safer, and 

more affordable on-orbit rendezvous and docking to the ISS for future spacecraft, including the MPCV as well as commercial cargo and crew providers. The 

Orion Vision Navigation System (VNS) is an advanced Light Detection And 

Ranging (LiDAR) -based relative navigation sensor with performance specifications unmatched in today’s relative navigation sensor market. The VNS uses 

cross-cutting technology that has been developed in partnership with commercial vendors and is applicable to future spacecraft requiring rendezvous and 

dockings, as well as terrestrial commercial applications. In May 2011, NASA 

tested the VNS system aboard STS–134. During this test, a prototype docking 

camera provided a resolution 16 times higher than the current Space Shuttle 

docking camera. Once completed, the VNS system should be able to provide rendezvous data to approaching vehicles as far away as three miles, which is three 

times the range of the current Shuttle navigation sensor. 

• During the last year, progress continued on the construction and outfitting of 

Orion support facilities. NASA is now in the process of deciding how and when 

these facilities will be used by the MPCV Program. 

NASA is hoping to be able to launch an initial uncrewed test flight of an integrated early version of the SLS and the MPCV as early as 2017. 

The SLS Program 

The SLS will be the Nation’s first exploration-class, heavy-lift launch vehicle since 

the Saturn V and will serve as the critical next step beyond the Space Shuttle and 

three decades of LEO operations. 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directs that NASA develop an SLS that is 

capable of accessing cis-lunar space and other regions of space beyond LEO. The Act 

also states that the SLS must be capable of lifting the MPCV, and that the SLS 

must be able to initially lift 70–100 metric ton (mT) to LEO, while ultimately being 

evolvable to a lifting capacity of 130 mT or more. As such, the SLS flights will be 

capable of lifting the MPCV and other exploration flight elements into space for missions to the Moon, Lagrange points, asteroids, and ultimately to Mars. The MPCV 

design will be optimized for beyond-LEO exploration, and while contingency utilization for the ISS is a possibility, consistent with the Authorization Act of 2010, doing 

so would represent a highly inefficient vehicle usage. 

In January 2011, NASA announced that it had chosen a Reference Vehicle Design 

for the SLS derived from Ares and Space Shuttle hardware. That concept vehicle 

utilized a LOX/LH2 core, five-segment solid rocket boosters, and a J–2X-based 

Upper Stage as the 130-mT version of the vehicle—evolvable from the 70–100-mT 

version. As envisioned, this Reference Vehicle Design would allow for use of existing 

Shuttle and Ares hardware assets in the near term, with the opportunity for later 

upgrades and/or competition for eventual upgrades in designs needed for affordable 

production. However, NASA has continued to study other alternative architectures 

as part of its due diligence. In so doing, NASA has identified several characteristics 

that the ultimate SLS design may include. 

• Evolvable development: While our initial development efforts would focus on 

the 70–100-mT lift capability, in parallel, we would plan to capitalize on 

synergies between Core Stage and Upper-Stage design and manufacturing, 

thereby allowing us to develop some of the upper-range capabilities for an even-
21 

tual 130-mT vehicle at the same time, as funding permits. Doing so is actually 

a fairly natural, evolvable progression in terms of developing these capabilities. 

• Commonality of systems: The use of common elements (e.g., common propellants, common manufacturing, and common avionics and control systems) 

across the entire SLS can enable the same or similar equipment and manufacturing to be used for both systems. This makes more efficient use of the infrastructure and increases throughput through manufacturing. This ultimately can 

lower costs. 

• Modularity of Elements: With the availability of three stages (Core, First, 

and Upper) to work with, NASA could structure each specific launch vehicle to 

achieve specific requirements such as thrust capability. Doing so would allow 

NASA to capitalize on cost savings. For example, if a specific mission did not 

need 130 mT in thrust capability, NASA could potentially save funds by not 

having to use booster stages on that mission. In addition, modularity offers the 

benefit of metering development costs commensurate with available funding levels. 

• Industrial Base: We would work with the space launch community in general 

in an effort to help strengthen the overall industrial base. 

• Flexibility: Although the SLS is expected to be costly to fly, it will have an 

unmatched payload capacity. The ability of the SLS to carry either the MPCV 

or large cargo also allows the SLS to carry robotic payloads for science or national security missions, although there are currently no requirements for such 

large payloads. The additional volume and lift capability could allow designers 

to either simplify the spacecraft by choosing to reduce deployments or eliminate 

the need for costly weight reductions;, to take advantage of the additional volume and lift capability to enable more capable missions; or to increase the duration and frequency of launch windows for planetary missions. To ensure that 

we have kept other agencies informed with our future plans for launch systems, 

we have provided periodic briefs on the progress of our SLS and MPCV deliberations to their senior leadership. 

To be clear, as previously stated, much work remains ahead for the SLS team. 

We are working hard to finalize the analysis on the best option for venturing beyond 

LEO as quickly as possible and at the lowest near-term development cost. 

Currently, NASA has procurement teams mapping SLS requirements (those outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and those we are currently developing). For the SLS, NASA is reviewing each element of Ares (First Stage, Upper 

Stage, Upper Stage J–2X engine, and avionics) and Shuttle Program contracts 

(Space Shuttle Main Engines, External Tank, SRB) to determine whether the new 

SLS requirements would be within scope of current contracts. At the same time, 

NASA is assessing SLS competition options, including the potential degree of competition. 

Although NASA must still finalize an integrated test flight plan, based on the 

President’s FY 2012 budget request, NASA is targeting that the first uncrewed SLS 

developmental flight or mission could take place in late 2017 to support a crewed 

mission by the early 2020s and a visit to an asteroid in 2025. This target date also 

depends on how quickly acquisition decisions are made so that physical development 

work can begin on SLS elements and integration processes. 

NASA is strongly considering an early mission/test flight strategy that would include early flights that would begin with a lift capacity in the 70–100 mT range, 

sufficient to get out of LEO with meaningful mission content, with the first flight 

targeted for the end of 2017 and the second flight targeted for 2021. Therefore, the 

70–100 mT flight configuration will offer early development of the Core Stage, continuation of the Orion-based design as the MPCV, an Upper Stage/kick motor capability that will enable a series of development missions/test flights beyond LEO, and 

use of existing solid rocket boosters. 

Early test flights for the SLS, if carefully planned, could enable NASA to reduce 

development risk, drive innovation within the Agency and in private industry, and 

accomplish early exploration objectives. I have stressed to the SLS team that we 

must make every test flight count in a constrained budget environment; that is why 

the NASA teams are still working to develop an integrated SLS/MPCV test flight 

schedule that will be part of an overall incremental development approach consistent with anticipated cost constraints. 

Moving forward on the SLS, one of NASA’s greatest challenges will be to reduce 

the development and operating costs (both fixed and recurring) for human 

spaceflight missions to sustain a long-term U.S. human spaceflight program. We 

must plan and implement an exploration enterprise with costs that are credible and 
22 

affordable for the long term under constrained budget environments. As such, our 

development efforts also will be dependent on a realistic budget profile and sufficiently stable funding over the long term, coupled with a successful effort on the 

part of NASA and our eventual industry team to reduce costs and to establish stable, tightly-managed requirements. 

Additionally, the SLS Program will continue to examine ways to increase efficiency and agility to deliver an affordable and achievable heavy-lift system as soon 

as possible. Examples being considered in formulating SLS plans include the following: 

• Consolidating infrastructure wisely; 

• Using common parts and common designs across the Government to reduce 

costs; 

• Ensuring requirements are appropriately specific and also that requirements 

applied to NASA crew launch vehicles are similar to those provided to our eventual commercial crew partners, thereby ensuring that NASA vehicles are not required to meet more substantial requirements than commercial crew vehicles 

and vice versa; 

• Conducting insight/oversight activities of our contract partners in a smarter 

way, thereby using our resources more appropriately to focus on the high-risk 

items; and 

• Ensuring that there are no unique configurations or developments that do not 

end up directly supporting the final system. 

NASA has continued to make progress on developing a crew launch vehicle over 

the last year. Due to legal restrictions that have since been rescinded, NASA had 

been prevented from terminating any Constellation-related work. However, in the 

meantime, the Agency was able to prioritize Constellation work that had a high 

likelihood of feeding forward into the new SLS and MPCV Programs. 

For example, during FY 2011, the former Ares Project worked closely with SLS 

planning team to focus their development efforts on technologies and processes that 

could be utilized in the eventual SLS configuration, including vehicle avionics, J– 

2X Engine testing, First Stage motor testing (Development Motor-3), and installation of Upper Stage tooling applicable to large-diameter tanks. At the same time, 

the former Ares Project deferred activities that were Ares-I-dependent, including a 

ground vibration test article and design of Upper Stage component hardware, such 

as the reaction control system. 

The J–2X engine is an example of significant progress made during FY 2011 that 

could be directly applicable to the SLS Upper Stage engine. The J–2X engine is fully 

assembled and installed in the A–2 Test Stand at NASA’s Stennis Space Center and 

has been readied for its first round of testing. The engine began a series of 10 test 

firings on July 6 and testing will occur over several months. Collected data will 

verify the engine functions as designed. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, Americans and people worldwide have turned to NASA for inspiration throughout our history—our work gives people an opportunity to imagine what 

is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn those dreams into real achievements 

for all humankind. 

With the passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA has a clear direction and is making plans for moving the Agency forward. Today, we have a roadmap 

to even more historic achievements that will spur innovation, employ Americans in 

fulfilling jobs, and engage people around the world as we enter an exciting new era 

in space. NASA appreciates the significant effort that has gone into advancing this 

bipartisan legislation. 

Let me assure you that NASA is committed to meeting the spaceflight goals of 

the Nation and fulfilling the requirements of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. 

As such, we are committed to developing an affordable, sustainable, and realistic 

next-generation human spaceflight system that will enable human exploration, scientific discovery, broad commercial benefits, and inspirational missions that are in 

the best interests of the Nation. We look forward to working with you and other 

Members of Congress as we finalize our strategy for achieving human spaceflight 

to many destinations in our solar system. 

Chairman Hall and Members of the Committee, I would like to conclude my remarks by thanking you again for your continued support for NASA and its human 

spaceflight programs. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the 

other Members of the Committee may have. 
23 

Chairman HALL. I thank you, and I tell the Members that we did 

not set a 5-minute request of you because of the importance of this 

meeting and the importance of the questions and the answers we 

ask. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. We are at a crossroads trying to preserve our 

Space Station, and we are going to take all the time we really need. 

I would remind the Members of the Committee, though, that we 

are limited to five minutes, and try to stay within five minutes, 

and I will stay within my five minutes. 

So the Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. Mr. Bolden, recently a senior NASA official, I think it was Ms. Garver, NASA 

Deputy Administrator, was talking about the agency’s human 

spaceflight program. It was quoted in the press as saying, and I 

quote, exact quote, ‘‘We have a program, we have a budget, we 

have a destination. We are just putting finer points on the rocket 

design.’’ 

That was in the Washington Post, July 2, 2011, and I am trying 

to reconcile these comments with your testimony this morning, and 

it leaves me a little confused. Your testimony highlights work still 

to be done. 

Let me reread her announcement. ‘‘We have a program. We have 

a budget, we have a destination. We are just putting fine points on 

the rocket design.’’ 

Your work is still to be done, including cost assessments. It will 

take a couple of months to complete probably. Yet another senior 

agency official suggests virtually all the decisions have been made 

except for a couple of minor tweaks to the rocket’s design. 

Can you reconcile these two views? You both just can’t be right. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we are all right, and 

I will try to explain that. We do have a program, and we have a 

very well-defined program right now for space exploration. It is a 

program that features a Space Launch System or a heavy-lift 

launch or heavy-lift rocket that will start at a 70 to 100 metric ton 

capability evolving to 130 to 150 metric tons. It has an MPCV 

which is already—the design for which has already been selected, 

and it has a ground launch system that we—I tried to point out 

some of the things that have already been done with that system 

at the Kennedy Space Center. 

We have engines on the pad at Stennis that will be involved in 

this system. We have a budget because you all gave it to us in the 

form of the 2010 Authorization Act supplemented by the 2011 Appropriations Budget. 

So with that budget and the President’s 2012 proposal to you is 

what we are basing our program and our timelines on, and those 

timelines include what I gave to you. The President continually 

says that he has laid down the gauntlet for me. He has told me 

that he wants humans around an asteroid in 2025. I am going to 

put a satellite called DAWN around this—the Asteroid Vesta the 

end of this week as a precursor for sending humans there. Not that 

asteroid. We don’t know what asteroid we are going to visit in 

2025. It is too far out, but we will determine what that is. But we 

do have a program, we do have a plan. You have given us a budget, 

and I am very confident that we are going to be able to execute. 
24 

Chairman HALL. Well, our confidence is shaken some by the inaction, not just this year but last year. The NASA Authorization 

Act of 2010 directs NASA to design the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle to, ‘‘provide an alternative means of delivery of crew and cargo 

to the International Space Station in the event of other vehicles, 

whether commercial vehicles or partner-supplied vehicles, are unable to perform that function.’’ 

However, since your announcement last May I have heard conflicting reports about NASA’s compliance with this requirement. So 

is the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle being designed as backup crew 

support for the Space Station? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, it is not being designed as backup 

crew support, however, it is as a vehicle that is designed for deepspace exploration, it can function as a backup for crew rescue. 

Chairman HALL. It is not being designed, but it is being designed. 

Mr. BOLDEN. No, no, no, sir. You asked if it was being designed 

as a backup for low-Earth orbit operations, and my response is it 

is not being designed as such. Its design is as a deep-space exploration vehicle. What that means is when we go to deep space and 

return to Earth, having to go through its atmosphere, the energy 

that we have to absorb or dissipate, the speed at which we reenter, 

the pressures on the vehicle are much higher than they are on a 

low-Earth orbiting vehicle. 

So if I design it for low-Earth orbit operations, it can’t function 

in deep space. If I design it for deep space, it can function in lowEarth orbit, very inefficient, a waste of the government’s money, 

but it will be able to do that. So it will have the capability of serving as a backup should it be needed. 

I would not advise that, and if we have to use it that way, it 

means one of two things have happened. Either all the commercial 

entities have gone bankrupt and quit, or we have had an accident 

involving a commercial vehicle. Those are the only two reasons that 

I can foresee using Orion as a low-Earth operating vehicle, and I 

don’t—I hope neither of those happens. 

Chairman HALL. My time is up. I yield back and recognize Ms. 

Johnson for her five minutes. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolden, I am still a little bit confused, but let me just ask 

this. How will the decision on the final SLS architecture affect the 

government and contractor aerospace workforce? Will we require 

more people? Will a lot of people be laid off, or will the decision stabilize the current workforce and potentially create new jobs? Or 

what is your projection? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, the sooner we make the decision, 

the more I can say we will stabilize the workforce at whatever level 

it happens to be then. We are in the process of a seven-year, very 

well thought out transition plan from phasing out the Shuttle, 

which was decided by the previous Administration, not this one. 

My job is to execute a decision made by my predecessors, and I am 

on the verge of doing that next week when we land STS–135, and 

when people hear wheels stop, it will mean I have done my job. 
25 

And I will be a very happy camper because my pledge when I 

became the NASA Administrator was to safely fly out the Shuttle. 

That is not done yet. So I still have work to be done. 

Once we put the next program into place, jobs will begin. We will 

begin to bring people back on at some rate. Right now we are trying to help people transition to other places in the aeronautics, in 

the aerospace workforce, and we are having success at that. We 

placed 1,000 workers with the Embraer down in Melbourne, Florida. We have put some other workers with an automobile company 

in Melbourne, Florida. That is work that NASA is trying to facilitate, but we don’t do that. 

I am trying to get people in Brevard County in the State of Florida to go out and recruit to bring businesses into the space coast. 

I am trying to get people around the country, in Houston, in Salt 

Lake City, other places, I need help, you know. My job is not to 

go out and recruit. I need for the states to do a little bit also. 

Ms. JOHNSON. One other question. The Space Station has been 

a wonderful achievement. Are we going to leave all of that maintenance to Russia, or how are we going to handle it? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, we have budgeted in all of the 

budgets that you all have approved for us and in the President’s 

proposed budget for 2012, we have budgeted to fly the Space Station through 2020. We have done technical evaluations to determine if we can fly it longer, and we think we can. Americans will 

be in space operating at least through 2020. 

So I need to clarify once and for all, I hope, we are not abandoning human spaceflight. We have a big job to do in operating the 

International Space Station for the next nine years at least. I just 

selected or just approved the assignment of American astronauts to 

fly on the International Space Station through 2015, 2016. We have 

more astronauts to be assigned, and in fact, they asked me, Houston asked if they could go out and recruit more astronauts to operate on the International Space Station because they anticipate they 

are not going to have enough. 

So anybody who thinks we are abandoning human spaceflight, 

that is not the case. The kids you talked about who want to be astronauts, they are not going to make Shuttle because it is going, 

but they will walk on Mars, you know, provided we work together. 

I hope I am not the only optimist in the room. I have faith in 

American industry, and I know we can do this. So if it seems like 

I am naı ̈ve or Pollyannaish, I am not. I am just optimistic, and I 

have faith in American industry. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. I am depending on you not to let me 

down. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I won’t. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One thing is for sure. The United States Marine General is not Pollyanna. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. General, it is rather disconcerting 

to take a look at the NASA budget over the years. I have been here 

22 years, and I have seen so many decisions that led to nothing 
26 

frankly, except the expenditure of billions of dollars, and I remember the X–33 Venture Project that there was big decisions made. 

We were going to do that over the DCX, and what we ended up 

with was spending a lot of money and getting nothing out of it. 

And there are other programs like that. And a number of these 

times that we have seen decisions made based on, frankly, pressure 

from Congress, not just decisions made by the Executive Branch. 

Right now we are trying to make some fundamental decisions 

that will carry our country forward for over a long period of time. 

The Russians I understand have been using the Soyuz since 1966, 

and it still is a very viable system, transportation system. We have 

Delta, Atlas, EELVs. These rocket systems are still very capable of 

conducting space missions, are they not? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, they are very capable, but I would 

point out the Soyuz spacecraft, which looks the same on the outside, the last two flights on Soyuz with our astronauts aboard have 

been new spacecraft for all intensive purposes. They have new avionics. One of the reasons we could not do a fly-around to take a 

picture of the stack when we had every vehicle known to man there 

was because we were not—we could not bring ourselves to be comfortable that a brand new vehicle could be backed off, flown around 

the stack and—to take photographs before we had had some more 

in-depth study. 

So it is a new vehicle. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And their approach has been to perfect it, 

perfect the vehicle. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Their approach is unlike ours. We do revolutionary 

stuff. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. BOLDEN. They do evolutionary stuff. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And sometimes evolutionary stuff may be actually more cost effective than doing revolutionary stuff that 

doesn’t work. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I don’t disagree with you, and if you 

look at the SLS and the MPCV, it is a hybrid of evolution and revolution. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let us just note that when we are— 

we are now being, you know, stampeded into building this mega 

new rocket rather than utilizing the systems that we have, you 

know, and trying to find a way to accomplish the same mission 

with the rockets that we do have. In other words, putting things 

into orbit and doing the work up there and then moving on rather 

than to keep doing everything in one big rocket. 

If we spend money that might be done more cheaply by utilizing 

the systems we have, is this what—is the price that we are paying 

things like the telescopes and the cleaning up the space debris and 

maybe even some deep exploration projects, are we not spending 

money that should be going to some of those other goals in space? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I don’t think so. If you look at the 

Hubble Space Telescope, I am partial you know, I cannot put—you 

can’t put a dollar sign on the value of Hubble and what it has done 

for humankind and our understanding of our universe. We rewrite 

textbooks every day. 
27 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, one dollar sign you can put on it, General, is if we spend all of our money on a huge vehicle that may 

or may not be absolutely necessary, the money won’t be there for 

the—what is the modern version of the Hubble Telescope. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I am not going to go back and forth, 

but, you know, if I don’t build a heavy-lift launch vehicle, we don’t 

have an exploration program. This President has given us an opportunity to hit the restart button. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No. You don’t have a human exploration program. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I am a big fan of human exploration. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would suggest that we may want to 

explore with human beings in the far, in the distant future, but if 

insisting on exploring deep space with human beings eats up billions of dollars that we don’t have for Hubble Telescopes and cleaning space debris, which is a vitally-important mission, that needs 

to be looked at. We are then chasing after goals that are so far in 

the distance that we are cutting out the things that we can do 

today. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, in preparation for this hearing I listened this morning, I went to the web, the Kennedy Center, Kennedy Library website, and I listened to the debate, again, you have 

heard me tell this story, but between Kennedy and James Webb, 

a Marine, who was the NASA Administrator at the time, and this 

debate took place on September 16, 1963, and it was about where 

NASA should go because President Kennedy said, and I quote, 

‘‘Space has lost a lot of its glamour,’’ and he asked the NASA Administrator what we should do, and Administrator Webb said we 

should focus on science. And they argued. They literally yelled and 

screamed, and it came down to moon versus Mars versus science. 

Guess who won? The President and we went to the moon. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, and who knows what we would have 

done with the science in the meantime. 

Mr. BOLDEN. We have done the science. 

Chairman HALL. Would the gentleman yield? The gentleman 

from California yield to me? 

Aren’t you saying that continue to go the Station and keep our 

program there and plan those long voyages but not spend the 

money on them other than planning, and planning can cost whatever the Congress says we can spend? We can’t go to the moon 

until our folks can go to the grocery store. That is just hard-cold 

facts, and kind of what you are saying is the economy is going to 

tell us when we can do that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are right now at a point where we have 

to make tough decisions here at home, Mr. Chairman, and there 

are some things in space that are absolutely necessary for us to do, 

and by the way, I happen to believe space debris is one of them, 

although nobody seems to be paying attention to that. 

And if we instead set our goals on spending money for goals that 

are 20 years down the line in terms of sending a man to Mars or 

something like that and ignore those absolute necessary costs that 

are right on us today, we are doing a big disservice to this generation and future generations because we won’t accomplish those 

long-term goals. 
28 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu. 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much, 

Major General Bolden, for being here. I thank you for your 34 

years of service in the Marine Corps and your very able service 

now as NASA Administrator and also congratulations on a very 

successful launch. 

I find it very commendable that you are taking responsibility for 

many of the decisions that have been made in the last couple of 

years, but I think that we are all aware that just as President Kennedy prevailed in the discussions with Mr. Webb, that there is a 

President that you answer to just as your parallel space agency 

had, and Russia answers to someone in Moscow, and that his Chinese compatriot or colleague listens to someone at the head of the 

government in Beijing. 

And I think that some of those decisions that have been made 

do go up a little bit higher in the chain, and I am not completely 

onboard with some of them. I see my job, part of it, I have been 

a passionate advocate for making sure that in the relationship of 

competition and cooperation between different countries, as I have 

said before, that the dominant language of space or that the language of space be English and not Russian or Chinese, just as the 

language of aviation is English. 

I think it is very, very important that we continue to have that 

vision and so I don’t want to encourage you to be anything other 

than a loyal soldier, but I do ask this of you; to either today or soon 

give me, give this Committee a high-end number, not what the Administration has asked for, not what the Congress has authorized, 

but what is a high-end number for what NASA needs to fully fund 

a deep-space human exploration program. 

Because I am not sure that this Committee has seen that number yet, and it is not that we will ultimately be able to fund at that 

number, but it is very, very important to have that goal. Because 

just as you have taken responsibility, General, I think that it is incumbent upon us in the United States Congress to know that we 

are ultimately responsible for not fully funding space exploration at 

the levels that you all can use, and if you would care to comment 

on that or if you have a number in your head today, I am happy 

to hear it. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I don’t have a number in my head 

today, and I will take it for the record, and I will be glad to get 

that to you, but you do point out several things. 

Decisions with reference to our space program are in three baskets. There is technical, and I generally am the one that makes 

those. There are policy decisions, which generally go to the President, and he—and I act as one of his consultants, and then there 

are budget decisions, and you and the President work those in consultation as we are seeing over these past weeks. 

Mr. WU. He hasn’t asked me very recently, but I look forward to 

it. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Well, I think you have some representatives with 

him, so my job is a little bit easier right now I think. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much. I yield back the balance of my 

time. 
29 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time, he yields back. 

Recognize the older gentleman, Mr. Bartlett, for five minutes. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Younger than you, though, sir. Thank you very 

much. 

I am going to be the devil’s advocate for a moment, and I want 

to put my context—my comments in context. I was involved a bit 

more than a half century ago in the first suborbital primate flight 

with Monkey Able and Monkey Baker. I was at Pensacola, Florida, 

then. I was involved with training of the first astronauts as they 

came to Pensacola for the slow rotation room in the human centrifuge, and when they came to the Navy Yard in Philadelphia for 

work with pressure suits and so forth. 

There were three huge benefits to our country as a result of putting a man on the moon, and the first of these was national image. 

That was enormously important. Second of those was spin-offs, and 

you can point to a large number of spin-offs in the technology developed in putting a man on the moon. And the third and maybe 

the most important benefit to our country was that it captured the 

imagination of our people and inspired our young people to go into 

careers of math, science, and engineering. 

I do not know how much that contributed to our winning the 

Cold War, but those millions of young people that were inspired to 

go into the science, math, and engineering, at least some of those 

were available to our military efforts that permitted us to bury the 

Soviet Union with our progress in armaments. 

Help us make the argument, sir, that we need to continue funding these programs, because today if there are spin-offs, I don’t 

hear of any of those, sir. And clearly nobody is capturing the imagination of our people, inspiring our young people to go into careers 

of science, math, and engineering, because this year the Chinese 

will graduate seven times as many engineers as we graduate. We 

face huge deficit problems in our country. Our deficit is a half trillion dollars more than all the money we vote to spend. We are laboring to try to come up with cuts that equal the deficit, but the 

cuts would be over ten years. The deficit is just this year. Even the 

Ryan budget doesn’t balance for 25 years and balances then only 

if you assume what I think are unrealistic assumptions about cost 

growth because we are up against a world ceiling at 84 million barrels of oil a day. 

Help us, sir, to go out to our constituents and convince them that 

we still ought to be spending money in spaceflight for humans. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I appreciate that, and I think we 

should be, and I can tell you that if you look at spin-offs, there are 

thousands still each year that come from space exploration. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I don’t know of those, sir, and I don’t think—we 

are doing a terrible job of messaging this. You know, these are very 

dangerous missions. If one out of every 60 times I got in my car 

I died, I don’t know how often I would get in my car, sir, but that 

is—we have had, what, 120 some missions. Two of them have 

ended up killing everybody on the mission. We have made this 

seem so darn ho hum that people hardly turn on their television 

anymore to watch these really spectacular things. We have done a 

very bad job of messaging this, have we not? 
30 

Mr. BOLDEN. We have done a great job of making it look 

easy—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yeah. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —which is detrimental to—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. We have indeed, but that it is not easy, sir. 

Mr. BOLDEN. It is not easy at all. 

Mr. BARTLETT. One out of every 60 times you get in your car you 

die, how often would you get in your car? This is tough stuff, sir. 

Mr. BOLDEN. It is. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And we have made it seem very ho hum. 

Mr. BOLDEN. But when you ask about spin-offs, if I just look at 

medical imaging, we have a young researcher out at Jet Propulsion 

Lab working on synthetic aperture radar for the Mars Lander. The 

technology there has now been parlayed into use for discovering 

breast tumors. Never expected to use it that way, and the list goes 

on and on of things like that. 

We are working diligently in NASA to try to facilitate other 

agencies’ ability to talk to young kids about the fun of math, 

science, engineering. We are really focused on STEM education and 

trying to instill a desire for young people to get into that type of 

work. We send people into schools, we downlink every, almost 

every day, conversations between astronauts on the International 

Space Station and students in some school around the country. We 

do that because we understand how critical it is to get our kids interested in science and math. We are failing as a Nation. 

You know, I wish I could take the blame there alone but I can’t. 

We are failing as a Nation in inspiring kids to want to get into 

science, engineering, and math. They all want to be business people, because they all want to become millionaires right away, and 

they can’t do that. They want it bad, and they get it bad. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You know, I have a lot of constituents who have 

lost their jobs, and if they haven’t lost it, they know somebody who 

has, and I have a tough time selling to them that we need to spend 

billions putting a man—you know, I think we do, sir, because I 

think we need to have the best image in the world. I think we need 

to capture the imagination of people and inspire our young people, 

but, you know, you need to help us make this sale to the American 

people, because we have a tough time doing it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio, Mrs. Fudge. 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

so much for being here, Mr. Bolden. 

Two quick questions. Under the plan that is being devised, Mr. 

Administrator, will NASA Glenn and another entities maintain the 

same role and responsibilities they currently have with SLS as we 

did under Ares I and we were supposed to do under Ares V? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, as I mentioned to you before, my 

plan right now is that the programs that—the tests that would be 

conducted at Glenn particularly for MPCV, Orion will still plan to 

be conducted there, so I don’t—I see Glenn staying as strong and 

important as they have been in the development of future exploration systems. 
31 

Ms. FUDGE. Okay, and just to follow up on the MPCV, you received the letter, and we thank you for responding to the Ohio Delegation, and you stated that scheduling costs are now going to 

drive the MPCV testing as opposed to safety requirements which 

drove the testing before. 

Could you please just clarify that for me? 

Mr. BOLDEN. If I said that in a letter, then I misspoke. I hope 

I did not tell you that scheduling costs was going to out—override 

safety. 

Ms. FUDGE. No, not override it but, well, I mean, you stated that 

the scheduling costs would drive how MPCV is tested, and this 

does represent a shift from Constellation because during—which 

safety requirements really drove testing. And if I—I may have read 

it incorrectly, Mr. Administrator. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I hope so. 

Ms. FUDGE. We can talk about it. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am, but safety is always paramount, and 

we do testing to try to enhance safety, enhance reliability, and the 

quality of our system. So you will not see a derogation or a degradation in our emphasis on safety. 

If I talked about scheduling costs having an impact, it is because 

as we, as I alluded to earlier, the less money I have to put on a 

program means the longer it is going to take me to do that program unless I can significantly de-scope it to get it done in the 

timeframe that I originally identified for you. One of the reasons 

that I am being very cautious about bringing numbers to this Committee or to any other Committee of the Congress is because I don’t 

want to end up where we were with Constellation. I don’t want to 

bring you an un-executable program. I am very confident that the 

path on which we are presently proceeding I will be able to bring 

you a program that is affordable, sustainable, and makes sense. I 

am not there yet, to be quite honest. 

I am the one that asked, when I talk about my responsibility, to 

give me a sanity check, for example, when we started this whole 

thing, I told my team that I wanted independent cost assessments, 

ballpark figures, not detailed numbers because we don’t ever know 

details. Another lesson we learned. You don’t—I should not give 

you a hard number on cost and scheduling until I get what is 

called PDR, preliminary design review. If I give you a hard number 

before that stage, I can almost guarantee you I am wrong. 

Congresswoman Edwards is shaking her head because she has 

been there, and she knows. So don’t let me bring you a number 

that is a hard number on anything prior to us getting the PDR on 

any system, particularly multi-billion dollar system. If I come in 

and tell you that, then you throw me out because I am lying. Or 

I am really pulling it out of you know where. So I am not going 

to do that, and it frustrates everybody. 

I am trying to get a ballpark figure right now, a random order 

of merit for what this program is going to cost, and I am just not 

there yet. I need to have—we have Booz Allen looking at the SLS, 

and we have a plan for them giving us a, you know, an independent assessment of whether we are in the ballpark. We may 

have missed something. I don’t think so because preliminary word 
32 

is they think we—what we plan and the way we plan to approach 

it is pretty good. 

But we have a ways to go before I can bring you hard numbers, 

so don’t let me do that. 

Ms. FUDGE. Is there anything else you would like to say? My 

questions are complete. I thank you for your answers, and I thank 

you for your service. It is always a pleasure to have you testify before this Committee. I know that your task is difficult. 

Mr. BOLDEN. It is fun. 

Ms. FUDGE. You call it fun. When I go home, I call it difficult. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Nobody is shooting at me, and I don’t have a 100- 

pound pack on my back. 

Ms. FUDGE. Well, that is true. 

Mr. BOLDEN. So this is fun. 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you so much, Mr. Administrator. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Fleischmann, the gentleman from Tennessee, for five minutes. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, it is a 

privilege to be here today to hear this from you. I thank you. I also 

want to thank you. NASA personnel have come to my office and 

have already met with me to help bring me up to snuff on this. I 

am a lawyer by profession, but I really, really love this stuff, so I 

thank you for their visit and your presence here today. 

I have a few questions, sir. You were talking, I think, about the 

human mission into deep space and mentioned Mars and perhaps 

some other locations, an asteroid. It seems to me that a lunar trip, 

a moon trip, might be a little bit easier, it has been done before. 

Where is that in the pecking order, and what is NASA’s plans with 

regard to a lunar trip, sir? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Under the flexible path approach that we intend to 

use, we have very hard destinations and set by the President, an 

asteroid in 2025, Mars in 2030, but there may be reasons, I anticipate there will probably be reasons to go back to the lunar surface 

for a period of, a short period of time just to make sure that we 

have everything we need before we head off to Mars. 

You know, the moon is a couple of days away, and today with 

technology rovers that we have developed and tested in the desert 

over a number of years now, we can put a couple of astronauts on 

the surface of the moon and have them roam and range over the 

moon to do research or experimentation and then get them back, 

you know, in a couple of days. When somebody heads off to Mars, 

I can’t turn them around and bring them back in a couple of days. 

So it is unlikely that we will experience an Apollo 13 if we have 

that kind of failure on the way to Mars. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Yes, sir. Are there any other destinations? We 

talked about Mars, the moon, an asteroid. Anything else, sir? 

Mr. BOLDEN. We talk about—things that we talk about with our 

industry, as a matter of fact, are what we call geosynchronous orbit 

as a stepping stone to going to some of these distant places for 

things like satellite repair. Those are technological developments. 

If you can get to geosynchronous orbit, then you can, you know, you 

can get to deep space. 
33 

So but we don’t need a 130-metric-ton vehicle to do that. You 

could do that with a 70-metric-ton vehicle. You could do that with 

some of the vehicles that we have today, but they are not human 

rated, so, you know, there are a number of places. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Yes, sir. The President in his State of the 

Union was kind enough to mention ORNL, that is the lab in my 

district in Oak Ridge, fascinating place, and it is wonderful to represent the lab. Do you know of any role that they may have in deep 

space research, or is there any plans for our national labs to—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, let me take it for the record. I do not know personally of what Oak Ridge is doing. When I think about national 

labs, we are always collaborating with them in one way or another, 

and I am certain there is something, but I don’t know, and I will 

get back to you. 

Mr. FLEISCHMANN. Thank you. It is a pleasure. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. McNerney, the gentleman from California, for five minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am over here. Good 

morning. Thank you for coming and testifying. I know you realize 

this wasn’t going to be an easy session, and I appreciate your emotional attachment to the Space Shuttle Program. It means a lot. 

I am a little confused about what was submitted by NASA to the 

OMB versus what was submitted to Booz Allen. Could you kind of 

go into that a little bit so we will get an understanding in the Committee here? 

Mr. BOLDEN. What we submitted to OMB as a part of the decision making process was a decision memorandum from me that 

outlined the technical design of a vehicle that I would propose. 

Booz Allen is the consulting firm that I have asked to take a look 

at that technical proposal and tell me whether or not the schedule 

and cost that I have—that my folk have made is reasonable, 

whether it makes sense. 

And they go, you know, so they are in work right now trying to 

help us determine an independent cost assessment. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So was what you submitted to OMB sufficient 

in terms of information for them to make an assessment of the 

cost? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I would like to think so. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. And have they—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. You would to ask—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. —given you an estimate of when they will give 

you their numbers? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Well, it is not, Congressman, it is not that—it is not 

just like that. We are working back and forth just as we work with 

the Committees, and we work with your staffs. We are actually 

coming up and briefing the staffs every time. Every time I make 

a preliminary decision, a technical decision, I generally try to have 

somebody come up here and sit with the staffs and tell them, you 

know, here is what we are doing or where we are going. I can’t give 

you details because, as I said, every decision has three pieces to it; 

the policy, the budget, and the technical part. 
34 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So you don’t and can’t really give us an estimate 

of when OMB’s numbers will be available? 

Mr. BOLDEN. That was what I said in my testimony. As much as 

I would love to say I am going to do that by the end of this month 

or the end of next month, I am not comfortable making that commitment to you right now because I don’t have the results of the 

independent cost assessment that I asked for. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. I am going to change directions a little bit. 

Some folks criticize the SLS Program as a rocket to nowhere. 

Could you give us a roadmap of what we might accomplish with 

that hardware when it is available that would be noteworthy and 

make us proud? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Early in the program even before we have a capability of putting humans on it, we are hopeful, and that is the 2017 

timeframe that I mentioned before, we would like to use that to 

boost an early version of the MPCV into space and get it to speeds 

faster than it would be going when it came back from the International Space Station, for example, so that we can do the same 

thing that I required Elon Musk and SpaceX to do back last December, you know. Put his rocket, put his capsule into orbit, have 

it orbit Earth a few times, come back, and survive. That is what 

I required him to do before I would go any farther, and he did that. 

I am now requiring me to put my MPCV, not into orbit, but put 

it somewhere, whether it goes around the moon and comes back, 

but I need it to accelerate, I need to accelerate it to a velocity that 

is equivalent of what it would be going when it comes back from 

the moon, from an asteroid, from Mars and be able to survive reentry and safe splashdown. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, those are good scientific goals, but they 

are not something that is going to sparked the imagination. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, they do, sir. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, I hope you are right. 

Mr. BOLDEN. They spark the imagination of a young kid that 

wants to be an aeronautical engineer and figure out, you know, 

hypersonic—who wants to be involved in hypersonic research to determine whether a vehicle can survive reentry from speeds in excess of 17,500 miles an hour. If a kid is interested in that, that is 

pretty exciting. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. What fraction of the population? 

But, you know, there is always a certain tension between, as Mr. 

Rohrabacher explored there a minute ago, between manned and 

unmanned space programs, and I think you are probably biased in 

that from your experience. 

Could you give us a little bit of, from your perspective, of what 

the advantage of human space exploration and expenditures are? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I wouldn’t say I am biased. I would 

say I am informed, and my—what I have learned in my time is 

that, for example, when we went to the moon, the astronauts had 

been highly trained in geology. They knew exactly what rocks to 

look for. However, some of the more interesting rocks that they 

brought back were not ones they were sent to get because a robot, 

while it has capability of doing anything we tell it to do, and we 

can train them to do pretty good stuff, a robot does not have intel-
35 

lect yet. A robot can’t look around and see a piece of rock and say, 

boy, that is really interesting. They didn’t tell me to bring this 

back, but I think I am going to take it anyway. 

We have to have robotic precursors. You know, I am going to 

launch the Mars Science Laboratory to Mars in November. That is 

going to do an incredible amount of work. We are doing things with 

our international partners that are going to go ahead of humans. 

It will be some time before we are capable of putting humans on— 

in any of these places that I am sending precursors right now. I 

would not send a human to Vesta, for example, even if I could. 

That is why DAWN is going there in less than a week. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. I think I have expired here. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yield back. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. I yield. 

Chairman HALL. All right. The Chair at this time recognizes the 

Chairman of our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, Mr. 

Palazzo, from Mississippi, for five minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

leadership. I also share your sentiments and concerns on SLS, the 

delays, but it was encouraging to see the American people focus on 

the final launch of Atlantis. It demonstrated that our Nation does 

love our space program, they love the American exceptionalism 

that it brings. I do think that the—a lot of the American people 

were left with a lot of questions, and that is what, where, when, 

and how, and hopefully with this Committee and others and along 

with NASA and the rest of Congress will be able to help find those 

answers with the Administrator. 

Sir, you said many times that we need to test before we launch. 

What then is the agency’s fiscal year 2012 test infrastructure plan? 

Mr. BOLDEN. In fiscal year 2012, right now we will continue a 

lot of engine testing, both on commercial rocket engines as well as 

the engines that we are developing. As a part of my proposal on 

a heavy-lift system, America does not have the expertise that we 

once had in what is called LOX rocket fuel or LOX–RP propulsion 

systems. 

So I have asked that we try to find money to begin development 

of a LOX–RP system. There are a lot of people that would love to 

see us use LOX–RP instead of LOX hydrogen. We don’t have that 

capability anymore, and when we talk about stepping back for 

awhile and waiting for things to catch up, the reason we don’t have 

the expertise is because when we got ready to build Shuttle, the 

Nation made a critical decision, and it decided it was going to go 

with LOX hydrogen as its focus, and we put LOX–RP aside. Russians do it very well, because they chose that system. 

So those are some of the things I hope to do. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Can you just elaborate on why it is important to 

test before you launch? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Because you don’t want to have something happen—it is sort of the way people put it. I would much rather be 

on the ground wishing I were in the air than in the air wishing 

I were on the ground. When I test on the ground, as we did with 

the AJ–26, we have had incredible success testing the AJ–26 for 

aero jet and orbital. We had a mishap with the AJ–26 engine. I 

would much rather have that occur and find out that there is some-
36 

thing wrong than have it occur on the test—on the launch platform 

at Wallops where the Nation has a significant investment in the 

infrastructure there. 

You know, so it is really important that we test things to see if 

we can wring out all the potential problems before we put it on a 

vehicle or try to put it in space. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I have a question regarding the fiscal year ’11, operating plan that was recently sent to Congress. The three-page 

spreadsheet noted as enclosure one indicates that the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and the Space Launch System are due to receive 

amounts that are quite close to amounts stipulated in the continuing resolution, but details provided in enclosure two suggests 

that resources will be moved out of the Space Launch System line 

to other projects and activities. 

It is unclear to me even being a CPA exactly where and how 

much money is actually moving from SLS to support activities and 

other accounts. So for the record I request that NASA provide a detailed accounting of exactly how much money will be expended on 

development of SLS hardware, how many money is being moved to 

other accounts, the distribution of funding by center, the names of 

those accounts and for what purpose, and how much money is 

planned to be rolled into fiscal year 2012. 

Would you please provide this information? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, I will take that for the record and provide it. 

As a precursor, however, what you are talking about is ground systems for SLS, and unlike Constellation where we had separate programs, in the SLS the ground systems are rolled into the program, 

so the cost is in SLS, not any separate program the way it was 

with Constellation. 

Mr. PALAZZO. But you will provide that? 

Mr. BOLDEN. But we will provide the information that you requested. 

Mr. PALAZZO. All right, because, you know, of course, I make that 

request, Mr. Administrator, just because, you know, we have to 

capture America’s imagination, and we also need to ensure the 

public support and Congressional support, and we need to be able 

to back that up, and it must be earned. 

And I do have a little bit of time left. I would just like to—why 

an asteroid? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Well, why an asteroid? Asteroids tell us a lot about 

Earth, tell us about our own Earth, but the most important reason 

an asteroid is because one of these days, I will go back to what my 

friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, talks about, and we do need to be aware 

of the fact that one of these days one of these rocks that is orbiting 

the sun that we don’t know a lot about is going to come perilously 

close to Earth, and one of these days it may actually hit Earth. 

And you all laugh when I tell you about it, but I don’t want any 

of us to be dinosaurs, because I think we all know that if an asteroid makes it through our atmosphere of any significant size and 

impacts Earth, then it is going to be a dark day, and it could spell 

the end of civilization as we know it in the greatest, to the greatest 

extent. 

So when people talk about near-Earth objects and needing to understand what they are and what they can do, they are not crazy. 
37 

They are people who just have a concern about the planet, as do 

I. In the National Space Policy one of my charges with the Secretary of Defense is to determine how we protect the planet against 

near-Earth objects, how we protect the planet against things. 

We live in a big universe, and some people live under the big sky 

theory or the big space theory that there is a lot of stuff out there 

but none of it will ever hit us. You have heard more in the last two 

weeks about near misses on the International Space Station than 

you have probably heard in your life, and that is just because people are becoming aware as we wind down the Space Shuttle Program, you know, that there are threats to the International Space 

Station, there are threats to anything we put in orbit because there 

is a lot of stuff out there. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you, and I yield back what time I don’t 

have left. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back his time. 

For your information, 10 or 15 years ago we had a hearing on 

asteroids, and we found out for the first time that sometime in the 

’80s, mid ’80s, an asteroid just missed Earth by about 15 minutes, 

and no one knew it until it was here and gone. Go back and read 

that, and you will get some information on it. 

Thank you. At this time I think I want to recognize Mrs. Edwards. Yeah. I am going to. For five minutes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not really sure 

what to make of that. I will say thank you, Administrator Bolden, 

and I just want to share with you. I was, over the 4th of July holiday I was out at Assateague, just camped out under the stars with 

five year old, ten year old, you know, six year olds, and we were 

looking up at the sky, and we were looking at the constellations, 

and we were just chatting, this group of young people who were so 

excited to be able to see out there in all of its wonder. And one of 

the little boys said, I want to go out there. That is what I want 

to do. That is who I want to be, and without any prompting at all, 

and it made me think as we then approached the last launch of the 

Shuttle Program, that there is so much more to do. 

And I know that you share that passion, and I do, too, and so 

when you say to this Committee that we are not abandoning our 

human spaceflight program, I want that to be true to those young 

people who were looking up at the stars, and not just because of 

the sheer joy of being out in space, but because our space exploration program tells us something about ourselves, it helps us to 

see ourselves and our relative place in this universe in a very different kind of way. 

And so I am concerned, and I think the timeliness of this hearing 

is really appropriate, in another part of the Capitol, the House Appropriations Committee right now I think is considering the 2012 

appropriations budget for NASA. So it is appropriate that we are 

talking about this program and the fiscal responsibilities that we 

share for it, but at the same time that same Committee is looking 

at the elimination of the James Webb Space Telescope, and that is 

the next area of exploration for us that like the Hubble will tell us 

so much about our universe. 

And so on the one hand we have some who argue for the continuation of human spaceflight, but on the other hand, others say, well, 
38 

we should invest more in things that are not part of the human 

spaceflight program but that are science, and we can’t have it 

every way. I think that we—I happen to be one of those who believe that we need multiple legs of a stool to investigate our universe. 

So I understand that you approved the decision on the SLS design and you are basically ready to go and your plan was delivered 

to OMB. Can you tell me which engineers, scientists, aerospace 

people over at OMB are holding up their decision to get it over here 

and over to you so that you can begin work? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, I wouldn’t say anybody is holding 

up a decision. I would say they are evaluating just as we always 

do in this deliberative process, and there are engineers at OMB, by 

the way. They are pretty smart people. I hate to say that, but there 

are. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I guess my point, though, is that there was a 

promise that we would have, you know, something that was a 

workable plan that you could move forward on and so that there 

was some certainty and stability both within the agency and in the 

private sector. We were told that would be the spring, and then it 

was later in the spring, and then it was closer to the launch of the 

Atlantis, and now we are hearing perhaps, I don’t know, some time 

this summer. 

And we are months and months away from the report of the Augustine Committee, where we knew that it was time to construct 

or some thought a different direction. There have been multiple 

hearings here on Capitol Hill. We have looked at an authorization. 

I mean, when are we go going to be ready to go? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, I hope I can bring you something 

with all deliberate speed, but with all deliberate speed in this town 

sometimes is not as fast as we would like. I would say if you compare the delivery of the decision, the ultimate decision on MPCV, 

that was relatively fast in the grand scheme of the way that we 

generally operate with major programs like that, and I think while 

everyone is impatient and thinks we are not moving on SLS, we 

have made incredible progress. You know, we are almost there. We 

are getting there, but in the course of starting this effort to today, 

our budget has, I think as everybody in this Committee recognizes, 

it has constantly deteriorated. When we started this, the President’s 2011 budget, I would have been at $20 billion next year. We 

are not going to be there, and so we have had to go back, and I 

have had to de-scope, I have had to put—I put a ceiling on my 

technical team that put them under a lot of pressure. There are 

some of them sitting in this room right now who wish that Congressman Wu’s request that somebody could find me all the money 

in the world because they are really working hard to try to find a 

way to live within our means, to live within the 2012 proposed 

budget of the President, which has already been, if you look at the 

House proposal I got to go back again to the drawing board and 

figure out what to do. 

So we are working with all deliberate speed, but when things 

keep changing, then we have to go back and make adjustments. 

Otherwise I can’t bring you an affordable, sustainable, realistic program. 
39 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I hope we can 

bring the Administrator back because five minutes is just not long 

enough. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I have to yield. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Oh. Okay. I thought you were going to let me talk 

about James Webb. Okay. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady finally yields back. Good questions, though, and we always appreciate you. You are a good Member. 

The Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Cravaack for five minutes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Major General, it is refreshing, sir, to have you here today and 

with your military perspective with coming in and saying it is not 

the President, it is me, the buck ends with me, and I just can’t tell 

you how much I appreciate that, sir, and you are bringing that 

military perspective to the table. 

I also appreciate your need for good information in means good 

information out. So I understand your diligence on what you are 

trying to do to ensure that we have the right answers to the questions that we are bringing you up here today and making sure that 

you don’t arbitrarily misguide us on what your vision is. So I commend you for that, sir, and I definitely appreciate that as well. 

One of the big things I think a lot of us are asking themselves 

in the back of the mind in these critical financial straits we are in 

is the return on the investment of going into space. And I still remember as a young kid watching the launch. I am a pilot as well. 

Wendy Lawrence is a classmate of mine from the Naval Academy, 

Brent Jett, both classmates. So I understand space, and I understand the need to go into space, but in this critical situation I am 

looking for that return on investment. 

And in your statement you mentioned that you had been working 

with other agencies, and they are interested in the SLS Program. 

I was wondering what is your relationship with the DOD, and is 

the DOD interested in the SLS Program and what it can bring to 

bear for them? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I had a discussion with a representative from DOD 

this morning to make sure I did not overstep or over-speak, and so 

while I would not say that they have definitive plans for SLS, what 

they are most impressed with and what they are encouraging us 

to press on and make a decision soon is because of its importance 

to the Nation’s space industrial base. 

That is not trivial. You know, we are seeing our space industrial 

base erode, sometimes slowly, sometimes more rapidly, and that is 

important for me and for DOD and for the entire national security 

establishment because the people that are affected worse are the 

sub-tier subcontractors. The primes have lots of stuff to do, but it 

is the sub-tier people that we are concerned about. People that 

make instruments, for example, or make strain gages, or circuit 

breakers. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So what do you think is the chief threat to our 

national security in space right now? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Our economy. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Interesting. 
40 

Mr. BOLDEN. I agree with my classmate Mike Mullen, the chairman. National—our economy is the biggest threat to the Nation 

right now. We have got to—one of the reasons that I struggle every 

day is because I know what I want to do, and I know what my 

agency can do, but I am realistic, and you know, although we represent less than half of a percent of the federal budget, we have 

got to take our share of cuts like everybody else. I hate to say that, 

but I want to do it smartly, and I want to be able to, you know, 

for people to feel proud of what we do. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I appreciate that, sir, and I want to support you 

any way I can. Thirty-four years in the Corps, I would follow you 

anywhere, sir, but—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you for your service. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. —you know, based on your assessment, how can 

Congress help you to overcome your challenges? I understand the 

economy, I understand the nature of making sure you get the right 

money, but how can we best help you in achieving these goals, because I do believe that in the national security interest that these 

goals need to be achieved. 

Mr. BOLDEN. It goes without saying that a firm, consistent budget is always helpful. The biggest thing, you know, I have—I can’t 

fix a problem that started eight years ago and persisted over eight 

years. I don’t care how much you give me, you know. We in the Administration, this Congress, the American people, we all stood back 

and watched the Constellation Program just die a slow death, you 

know. I can’t correct that. I would love to. President Obama can’t 

correct that. But he set us on a course right now that I think is 

the right course. I support the course we are on, you know, or I 

would be gone. I could be with my grandkids. People don’t like it 

when I say that, but, you know, there are other things I could do, 

but I love this. I love what I do, and I love my people. 

You know, we have got tough choices to make, and as a Nation, 

but what I tell people is as long as I am the NASA Administrator, 

we are not going to back down from human spaceflight. Now, I may 

not be able to do it the way I want to do it, but we will find a way 

to do it, and it will be safe and efficient and we will live within 

our means, but we cannot forsake science, and I spend pennies on 

aeronautics. So, you know, I am always torn because I—if you give 

me $100 million for aeronautics tomorrow, let me tell you, if you 

want to see return on investment, I can do that, but I don’t even 

have time to talk about aeronautics because, you know, everybody 

is focused on SLS and stuff like that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Well, sir, thank you very much for your service 

and thank your grandkids for us because we are glad you are here, 

and I yield back, sir. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Wilson, the gentlelady from Florida, for five minutes. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Welcome. Good morning. 

How are you? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Doing fine. Thank you. 

Ms. WILSON. It is good to see you. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Always good to be here. 
41 

Ms. WILSON. I don’t know if you remember but back in, it might 

have been ’92 or ’93, you were in Miami with a bunch of school kids 

at Miami Northwestern Senior High School. 

Mr. BOLDEN. My aunt was the librarian. 

Ms. WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes. 

Ms. WILSON. And—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. I do remember. 

Ms. WILSON. I was a school board member sitting next to you 

and then the next day we were on the front page of the newspaper. 

So being a principal from Florida and because of the proximity, 

space travel is very relevant in the school districts of Florida, and 

our children have always been excited since they take multiple 

field trips all the time to Cape Kennedy. 

And I just wanted to find out, will there be any international collaboration with spaceflights, and how have you set that up, and 

what can we look forward to with the Russians and, you know, everyone else being involved in this, and how do we explain this to 

the kids in our schools? 

Mr. BOLDEN. International collaboration is critical to everything 

that we do, particularly when we talk about long-term plans for exploration, for deep-space exploration. No nation, no single nation 

can explore deep space alone. So it is going to require international 

collaboration. All of our partners, our international partners in the 

International Space Station, there are five big agencies. The European Space Agency has 19 members, so I don’t envy them. They 

are all struggling as we are financially right now, trying to decide 

how do we put collaborative programs together to do Mars exploration as precursors for human missions there. And we are all 

working to that end. 

We all collaborate on education because we all suffer the same 

problem. It is not—this is not an American calamity, the lack of interest in STEM-related courses on the part of school children. It is 

a world-wide issue. 

You know, when the Congressman talked about the thousands of 

people going into engineering in China, well, they got billions more 

people than we have, so it is not surprising that they have more 

going into engineering. They have a bigger pool from which to 

draw. It is not that more kids are interested in engineering. It is 

the numbers are much more massive, and they are doing things. 

So, yeah, we have got to work hard. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you. Specifically, talk to me a little bit about 

Russia. You know, we hear Russia, we know the old Russia. What 

is the new Russia? 

Mr. BOLDEN. The new Russia is an incredibly valuable partner 

for us. They are a major partner on the International Space Station. I would say if you want to say how does Space Station exist 

today, it exists today because of our collaboration with the Russians. The first two elements of what is now the International 

Space Station were Russian because their components were ready 

before we were. When we lost Columbia on February 1, 2003, we 

didn’t have a way to get American astronauts to the International 

Space Station, and we didn’t want to de-person it, de-man it. The 

Russians were there, and with Soyuz they took our crews for al-
42 

most three years while we went back and worked on making Shuttle available. 

And since that time they have been the primary provider of 

transportation for our crews to and from the International Space 

Station. So, you know, they are still a very good partner. 

But we also have incredible international partners in the Europeans and the Japanese and the Canadians. The Canadians have 

great expertise in robotics. You are going to see us do some time 

soon, we are going to do a refueling exercise, robotic refueling on 

the International Space Station. The thing that is going to do it is 

going to be Dexter, and Dexter is a Canadian-built robot. 

So, you know, international collaboration is critical. 

Ms. WILSON. Just one little follow up. We keep hearing about 

Russia and aggression from Russia, and I am just wondering has 

there been any thought placed as to what happens if this aggression becomes intolerable? How will that affect the Space Station? 

Is it so entwined that we need their support forever? 

Mr. BOLDEN. If I do my job and when I was in the military, if 

my counterparts there do their job, we won’t have the problem that 

you perceive, but, you know, as long as we continue to work collaboratively with the Russians on the International Space Station, 

hopefully, you know, we will play an inadvertent diplomatic role. 

You know, the Russians during the end of the Cold War, I believe, came about partially because of the collaboration that we had 

with the Soviet Union in the Apollo-Soyuz test project. When I talk 

to my dear friend, Sergei Krikalev, with whom I flew on Shuttle, 

my last flight, Sergei, you know, went to space his first flight as 

a citizen of the Soviet Union from Stalingrad and came back to 

Earth as a citizen of Russia from St. Petersburg. So things change. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you. I believe I am over. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman HALL. Gentlelady is over. 

The Chair recognizes Mo Brooks, gentleman from Alabama, for 

five minutes. And Ms. Wilson, you were pretty well on time. Thank 

you for that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to focus on something that came out of the Commerce, Justice, and Science and Related Agencies Appropriations 

Subcommittee last week. Are you familiar with the vote that they 

had on either Wednesday or Thursday concerning the NASA budget? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I am painfully familiar. 

Mr. BROOKS. And as I understand it, NASA would be cut roughly 

1.6 billion, a little bit more than that; James Webb Space Telescope—if I understand correctly from media reports—would be zeroed out. Overall, in your judgment, what would be the impact on 

NASA if the CJS Subcommittee proposal for NASA becomes governing law? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I try to make a point of not dealing 

in conjecture. So I will say a couple of things. One is all my planning right now is based on the 2010 Authorization Act as supported 

by the 2011 Full Year Continuing Resolution looking to the President’s 2012 budget proposal. If what you say happened, it goes 

without saying that my efforts to keep the gap between the end of 
43 

the shuttle era and an American capability to take humans to 

orbit, if not close it, as I think we are starting to do, I would not 

be able to do that. The gap between the end of shuttle and another 

American capability to take humans to the International Space 

Station would increase and it is untold how much that would increase. 

If I had to sacrifice science, which I would not choose to do, you 

know, something like the James Webb Space Telescope that—when 

we started Hubble, dark energy didn’t exist. At least we didn’t 

know about it. When we launched Hubble, there was no such thing 

as extrasolar planets. So those kinds of discoveries would probably 

go lacking unless some other nation stepped forward and did it. 

Mr. BROOKS. Are you familiar enough with the CJS proposal to 

be able to itemize for us the impact it has on specific NASA programs? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Other than James Webb we know would be zeroed 

out. But if you would, please, illuminate us. 

Mr. BOLDEN. So I will take it for the record and bring it back 

to you, but there—it is across the board. 

Mr. BROOKS. For the fiscal year 2011 budget, Congress proposed $1.8 billion for the Space Launch Systems program. How much of 

a role is a Marshall Space Flight Center supposed to play in the 

SLS? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, Marshall is critical. Marshall is where I house 

the program office for the SLS. The SLS program is at the Marshall Space Flight Center. They will lead the development of the 

heavy-lift launch vehicle and its ground system is in coordination 

with the Kennedy Space Center. They will integrate the vehicle or 

be a part of the integration of the SLS with the MPCV that heads 

the program office for the—at Johnson Space Center so—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Out of that 1.8 billion, how much does Marshall 

need in order to fulfill the mission as you envision with respect to 

SLS? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Robert Lightfoot was telling me he would tell me 

more. I—you know—— 

Mr. BROOKS. More than what? 

Mr. BOLDEN. More than any number I give him. But of the 1.8 

billion—the 1.8 billion, again, is for the entire SLS system, which 

includes ground systems, everything else, and I will have to get 

back to you. I will get to you for the record. While the SLS program 

office manages all that money, all of the money is not spent or obligated in and around, you know, Huntsville. It goes all over the 

country so—but I—we can get you a breakdown on what is going 

to be in Huntsville and what is going to be in Florida and what 

is going to be in Mississippi and other places. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, you shared with us the critical nature of the 

Marshall Space Flight Center and SLS program. Are you in a position today to tell me exactly how much of that 1.8 billion is scheduled to be spent on Marshall efforts? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I am not in a position to tell you specifically how it is going to be broken out, but as the program office—with program management responsibility at Marshall, they 

will manage all of the money that is designated in the line item 
44 

for the SLS. So if it is 1.8 billion, it is all managed out of the SLS 

program office at Marshall. 

Mr. BROOKS. My staff has been receiving information that out of 

1.8 billion it might be as little as 65 million that would, in fact, be 

spent at Marshall on the development of their part of the SLS system. Do you have any insight that you can share with us on whether that is right or wrong? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I doubt that that is correct. I think 

that is a misunderstanding, but I will take it for the record and get 

back to you. 

Mr. BROOKS. If you would, I would very much appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair 

recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Mr. Bolden, for being here today and for your lifetime of service to 

our country. It is really something that we all admire and we are 

grateful both to you and to your grandchildren for continuing to 

serve us. 

We are in a dicey time economically. We know that. We have a 

need to get our budgets in order. We know that as a country. We 

are having a disagreement on how to do that now, but we will do 

that. We will accommodate that. And I believe that there is every 

reason to believe we will continue to have a vigorous science program in this country because otherwise we won’t even have a future economically. And in that science budget, I certainly include 

NASA. 

As you probably know, I come from Silicon Valley and there is 

a lot of innovation going on there all of the time. And so my question for you is how can, in a strategic sense, we design with the 

capacity to incorporate innovations that are already underway but 

are not yet ready for implementation? For example, there is an article in Aerospace America in February of this year that outlines 

a program that I have been following now for several years, which 

is a paraffin-based fuel that has been developed with the help of 

NASA Ames, Stanford University, and the Space Propulsion Group, 

and they are about to launch within the next couple of years with 

this new paraffin-based fuel. What the article indicates is that this 

fuel is going to lower the cost of a whole variety of systems. It is 

not going to be suitable just for replacement of boosters. They are 

going to be suitable for building in upper stages a wide variety of 

applications, and it is going to affect the lower cost. The design is 

different because of the burn rate and the capacity. I know that 

SpaceX is—I know they are not necessarily in Silicon Valley per 

se—is also doing some innovative things. 

So I guess the question is generic. How does the government, 

which tends to be—I don’t mean this as criticism; it is just the nature of government—a little more stodgy I guess than the private 

sector, incorporate these innovations without holding up the design 

overall? 

Mr. BOLDEN. That makes plenty of sense and that is exactly 

what we are trying to do. We—I have a chief technologist, Dr. 

Bobby Braun, who is a Professor at Georgia Tech and, you know, 

still spends time there, but his task or his challenge from me is to 
45 

make sure that we don’t miss out on technological development, 

technological innovations, capabilities that are out there. Congressman Clarke, I reminded or I pointed out to him the last time I was 

here that he and the citizens of Detroit should be very proud of the 

fact that they produced Robonaut 2, R2. That is innovation in the 

field of robotics. It is now—R2 is now on the International Space 

Station and will live there for the life of the International Space 

Station. And that came from a collaboration between General Motors and the Johnson Space Center. We are always looking for innovative ways to do things. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, specifically, are you taking a look at the paraffin-based fuel issue? I know there has been testing with the Air 

Force, as well as at NASA Ames as part of the planning for this? 

Mr. BOLDEN. We at NASA are not looking at alternative fuels because that is not what we do. What we look at and what I am certain Ames is probably doing—I am not familiar with the specific 

one that you mentioned—but what most of my research centers 

like Ames, Langley, Glenn do is they take emerging technologies 

and try to help industry develop systems that can use that. So 

when you talk about paraffin-based fuel—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, SpaceX is going to use it on their next 

launch but—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. I don’t know. You know—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, that—according to the article. But could I 

just do this—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. I don’t think so. If they are, you know, I—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. I am just reading what the report said in Aerospace America. 

Mr. BOLDEN. They use a LOX/RP engine and so I don’t know. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, could I ask you this? Would you look into 

this paraffin-based issue for me and get back to me on it? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. We will. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. BOLDEN. We will. Thank you. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Adams, for 

five minutes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, actually. It is still morning, Administrator Bolden. And I, too, want to thank you for your service to our country. 

You know, I want to reiterate something that you and I have just 

spoken about I am sure several times. I always say it every time 

and that is my problem isn’t that we cancel constellation. I understand why that happened. My problem is that we didn’t have a viable plan set forth when we did so. And in doing so, we lose our preeminence. We lose some ability if not a lot of ability. And I heard 

my colleague talk about the spinoffs. Well, I have the 2010 Spinoff 

book sitting on my desk in my office prominently displayed so that 

people can see the innovation, the creation, and the advancements, 

and the jobs created from this program. So when I sit and listen, 

I hear you say comments like ‘‘the sooner we make a decision.’’ You 

are right. The sooner we make a decision. 
46 

You—we go back and forth about affordable, sustainable, and it 

has to make sense, but we still haven’t made a decision so we don’t 

know if it is affordable, sustainable, and it makes sense. The deliberate speed of this town, well, then why the deliberate speed to end 

without an Option B? I understand budget priorities. I understand 

all of this, but I also understand that this is the first time in decades—decades that the United States has no way to get American 

astronauts flying on American rockets built by American engineers 

and scientists into outer space. And it concerns me that NASA 

seems okay with that. That is where I am on this. I—you know, 

what is the intention of the Administration to assist our constituents with imminent layoffs as a reflection of the poor planning 

after the Constellation cancellation. 

You realize that we have over nine percent unemployment and 

we have more and more layoffs coming in Central Florida where 

I represent. And I heard you say that you are working with the 

communities and the State and I commend you for that. 

I would like to know what are you doing with them? Because I 

have been speaking with them also. I know of the two programs 

you referenced in that, but we still have a lot more people going 

to lose their jobs in an economy that is flailing and an unemployment rate that is 9., what, 2, three percent. Each day I hear of 

more unemployment. So I just need to know, when can we see the 

plan? When will we see that plan? When will NASA follow through 

with last year’s authorization bill? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, we are carrying out the provisions 

of last year’s authorization bill each day. And I tried to mention 

some of that in my remarks. 

A couple of things. You know, we are proceeding—if you look at 

the timelines that I have given you, a capability of putting humans 

in space aboard an American spacecraft by the 2015, 2016 timeframe, if you look at where we were with Constellation at the time 

that the recommendation went to the President to terminate Constellation, we were looking at 2016, 2017, maybe 2018. So somehow, we are actually ahead of when we would have been with Constellation in terms of getting beyond low Earth orbit. We at least 

now have a vision that would enable us to go not only back to the 

moon with a system that can get us down to the surface but to 

other places. We could not do that with Constellation. 

We have made significant changes. In Constellation, we are 

going to be relying on two vehicles to get crew—a separate vehicle 

for crew and a separate vehicle for cargo. Every time you introduce 

another system, that is more risk. And while, you know, some people say, well, it is safer for the crew, that was a step that we didn’t 

necessarily need to take. And so when you look at the SLS, it is 

a system that carries crew and cargo. So we went from two vehicles 

required for a mission to one vehicle required. 

You know, as I said before, the decision that I am working under 

now was made more than eight years ago. It was a decision made 

by the prior administration. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Again, the SLS, we are still waiting for that information, and that is why we are having this hearing today. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, Congresswoman. I understand that. 
47 

Mrs. ADAMS. And so when can we truly expect—several people 

have asked that question and we kind of have a vague—can you 

give us a clear timeframe, something—I mean you say it is at 

OMB. Can we have that same information? Can the Committee 

have that information? When can we expect to see something? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, there are things that I can share 

with this Committee, and I would gladly do that to let you know 

where we are. And we will make arrangements to do that. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Could you do that, please? 

Mr. BOLDEN. But I would say, because some of it is proprietary 

to the companies involved, then it is not stuff that can be shared 

publicly. It should not be in the New York Times. But we will work 

to get that to the Committee. 

But you mentioned the fact that for the first time in decades we 

have no capability. I would have to remind you that between Apollo 

and Shuttle, you know, the last time we flew an Apollo spacecraft 

with humans on it was the mid- to late 1970s and we didn’t fly 

Shuttle until ’81. And that was with a plan. It took us longer than 

we thought. You know, we were down for two years after Columbia, 

down for two years after Shuttle. Had it not been for the Russians, 

we would have not had a capability to get humans in space. So we 

are looking at a redundant capability of putting humans in space. 

With Russians, we hope to have a couple of American companies 

that will be able to do that so that we are not caught again where, 

when we lose a vehicle, we don’t have an American capability to 

get to space. 

So we have been here before, unfortunately. It is not the first 

time. But we are trying to get us to the point where we have the 

capability to do this. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. ADAMS. I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady makes a good point and yields 

back. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Sewell from Alabama for five minutes. 

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome. It is great to see you again, Mr. Administrator. 

My question is really about the timeline, the budget for SLS. The 

proposed budget for fiscal year 2012, as you indicated, is 1.8 billion. 

And as you know, the Marshall Space Center in Huntsville, Alabama, is likely to be very important in creating those components. 

And so my question is is it realistic—is the fiscal year 2012 

amount, 1.8 billion, sufficient to fully fund SLS and the heavy-lift 

vehicle? And I know that the timeline has moved a bit, that it was 

2016; it is now 2017. I really want you to talk a little bit about the 

achievability of the timeline. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, if I can go back and just make one 

adjustment. The time—the 2016 time was the time that you all 

told me you wanted to have a capability to do that. And at the 

time, I expressed some concern as to whether I could do that given 

the budget climate. 

Ms. SEWELL. Um-hum. 
48 

Mr. BOLDEN. The budget climate has deteriorated since we had 

that initial conversation. So 2017 for an initial capability to fly the 

vehicle, that is not human-rated. That—we are still talking about, 

you know, late this decade, early ’20s, before we have a humanrated vehicle, but we think we are going to be able to do that. Is 

the budget sufficient? When we made the recommendation on what 

should be in the budget to the President, I did not take the largest 

amount. I took the minimum that I thought we could do the program. I took the minimum that I thought we could do commercial 

crew and cargo, and that has caused quite a bit of consternation 

that I have discussed with this Committee and the Science Committee and the Appropriations Committee before that, you know, I 

would love to have more money for commercial crew to give me 

some assurance that we can facilitate their success. It is not there, 

so I—what I did was I took what I figured was the minimum 

amount that would get me to a viable commercial capability, the 

minimum amount that I thought would get me to a viable space 

launch system and MPCV, and that is what you see in the 2012 

budget. So given that level of funding, we can do what we said we 

can do. 

Ms. SEWELL. How will that affect Marshall’s Space Center? How 

does the bottom line—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. If everything goes as planned, Marshall will have 

some robust activity coming up. They are anxious to get back into 

building rockets and doing that kind of thing. They recently had a 

shell-buckling test—— 

Ms. SEWELL. Um-hum. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —that excited everybody there because it showed 

us that we overbilled, that—it showed our commercial partners 

that perhaps they overdesign and overbill because we found that, 

you know, things are stronger than we really think they are. 

Ms. SEWELL. Right. I wanted to move a little bit to talking about 

components in the SLS. Some have argued that the development 

of new components is more expensive and time-consuming than 

using existing components for SLS. With the tight NASA budget, 

it is cost-efficient to have a competition on the boosters’ phase of 

the SLS as some individuals have recently suggested? And would 

this potential competition impact cost and the schedule? 

Mr. BOLDEN. One of the things that we have recommended that 

I can share in the design, if you will, of the new SLS, in an effort 

to try to speed things along and utilize as much as we can of existing technology while preserving the space industrial base for some 

time is a desire to utilize existing solid rocket boosters—— 

Ms. SEWELL. Right. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —until we can hold a competition, which I have directed—we try to do as soon as possible—where all comers can 

compete to include a LOX/RP capability. And I have said before I 

want to find the money to seed money for American manufacturers 

to at least take the risk at producing LOX/RP engines for a booster. 

So the eventual booster for the final SLS could be solids, could be 

liquids of two forms—LOX/hydrogen, LOX/RP—or if there is paraffin-based, I mean it might be that. It is going to full and open 

competition if I can do what I would like to do. 
49 

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you very much. I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair recognizes Dr. Harris, the gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. And thank you very much, 

General Bolden, for all the service you have given to the country 

over a long and illustrious career now capped heading an agency 

that I think is going to have some very difficult decisions to make. 

First of all, I want to thank the Agency for everything they are 

doing at Wallops Island. It is a big boon to the economy of the First 

Congressional District of Maryland, which is only about 10 miles 

away or so from it. 

Let me just follow up with a question that Chairman Hall asked 

at the beginning and which I think I am getting the handle on. In 

the 2010 authorization, NASA was instructed to take the MPCV 

and use it as a backup vehicle to get to the International Space 

Station, but your testimony today is that that is really probably not 

going to be ready until around 2020, is that correct, for man flight? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, it is—you know, the date that the 

MPCV is ready for a human flight will be sometime between probably 2017 and 2020. 

Mr. HARRIS. Well, 2017 is when the unmanned flight—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. That is when we plan to fly an unmanned 

flight—— 

Mr. HARRIS. Unmanned. So realistically, it is about 2020. So— 

and my understanding is the International Space Station is really 

only projected right now to be used through 2020. I mean it can 

go until 2028 or so, but only to 2020. So realistically, the MPCV 

really will never be a backup vehicle. 

Mr. BOLDEN. If we go beyond—there are a number of ifs—— 

Mr. HARRIS. Yeah, if we go beyond—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. —that I usually—well, I mean—— 

Mr. HARRIS. We don’t go beyond 2020. Realistically, it won’t be 

a realistic backup. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Well, that is probably safe to say that. 

Mr. HARRIS. That is what I imagined. So the Russians now—we 

kind of depend upon the Russians for all our manned space flights 

it looks like until a commercial alternative—and what is the—is it 

realistic that we will have a commercial alternative to delivering 

our astronauts to the space station for 2020? 

Mr. BOLDEN. It is realistic that we will have a capability by 

2015. 

Mr. HARRIS. By 2015. So it looks like for a four-year window or 

so we are going to depend upon the Russians? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HARRIS. And my understanding—I think I read it somewhere—they are kind of charging us a whole lot more than they 

used to on that—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. No, sir. They are actually not. 

Mr. HARRIS. Right. Okay. 

Mr. BOLDEN. The latest contract that we signed with the Russians was essentially what we had signed before plus inflation. And 

yet, the thing that I try to keep people—to help people understand 

it is not just for a ride. It is for training because our crewmembers 
50 

fly as crewmembers of the Soyuz Spacecraft. Generally, an American will be the flight engineer. We have never had an American 

fly as a commander of a Soyuz, but they do the flight engineer duties. They—one of the reasons we want to bring the capability of 

sending humans to space on an American-made vehicle is just to 

reduce the amount of time that I lose an astronaut to Russia for 

training. 

Mr. HARRIS. Sure. 

Mr. BOLDEN. You know, that is one of the things that is unattractive, if you will, to a young astronaut with a family is having 

to spend two years of their time back and forth to Russia. You 

know, that is—it is not attractive. 

Mr. HARRIS. Absolutely. No, thank you very much on that. 

But with, again, with regards to the MPCV, it looks like we are 

not going to be able to fulfill that, you know, the requirement of 

the 2010 law to use—actually have that available as a backup. We 

will depend upon the commercial rockets and, of course, the Russians as backups it looks like. 

Mr. BOLDEN. My hope is that we will have more than one commercial—more than one American-made capability to take humans 

to space by the 2015/2016 time frame. 

Mr. HARRIS. Okay. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Which would give us three alternatives. 

Mr. HARRIS. Well, thank you very much. And again, thank you 

for your service. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back. 

I say to the very patient Ms. Jackson Lee, if you can wait five 

more minutes, the Chair is going to recognize Mr. Clarke for five 

minutes. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I would like to yield a minute of my time to the good gentleman 

from Oregon, Mr. Wu. 

Mr. WU. I thank the gentleman from Michigan. 

Dr. Bolden, I just want to piggyback on two things, one is the 

paraffin engine as mentioned by Ms. Lofgren. I met with Brian 

Cantwell, the head of Aeronautics and Astronautics years ago and, 

you know, his claim is that they have solved a lot of the problems 

associated with paraffin technology. I brought this to the attention 

of your predecessor and he went right to those problems and, you 

know, I just encourage you to personally take some interest in this 

because what is momentum to one person is inertia to another. 

The other item is what you mentioned about people wanting to 

become millionaires. And I would hope—not NASA but somebody 

else—kind of take a look at how many people proportionately become millionaires when they want to become an investment banker 

and anybody else because just as it is kind of seductive to try to 

become the next Tiger Woods or a basketball player or whatever, 

we need to start drawing people into things like science and engineering just as NASA drew the best and brightest back in the ’50s 

and ’60s. And I would really like to see that again. And I just want 

to throw that out. 

And I thank you, Mr. Clarke. I appreciate it. 
51 

Mr. CLARKE. You are welcome. 

Administrator Bolden, I just wanted to follow up on a question 

that was posed by the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms. Edwards, regarding the James Webb Space Telescope. In light of some of the 

facts here, there could be huge job losses throughout 22 States, 

maybe 8,000 scientist jobs at risk here. Can you comment on the 

appropriateness of cancelling the support of the Webb Telescope? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I have tried to explain what I think 

is the importance of James Webb in terms of opening new horizons 

far greater than we got from Hubble. I would only say that for 

about the same cost as Hubble in real year dollars, we will bring 

James Webb into operation. You know, it is—we have made significant changes in management in the program, changes at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Our contractor has done the same. Seventy-five percent of the hardware has already been delivered, and 

it is in the President’s 2012 budget. So I guess the only other comment I could make was that it is a valuable commodity in NASA’s 

stable of science projects. 

Mr. CLARKE. I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back. 

I hate to tell Ms. Jackson Lee but I have to follow the rules. 

Chairman Smith, I recognize you for 5 quick minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me follow up, Mr. Bolden, on your last comments about the 

James Webb Space Telescope. Isn’t the real problem here that 

OMB has not given your Agency flexibility when it comes to the 

budget? It sort of straight-lined the James Webb telescope rather 

than give you all the flexibility to maybe frontload it since 75 percent of the development has been done? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, we are still in process of developing 

our re-plan for James Webb, which would include a revision to 

what we think is needed in the budget. When we helped develop 

the 2012 budget, that is where we were marching with Webb at the 

time. 

Mr. SMITH. But you support full funding? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I will support the funding that we will bring forward in our re-plan, which I have had an opportunity to see and 

which we have pre-briefed to our source—to our SRB, our outside 

review board. 

Mr. SMITH. And would it help you if OMB gave you more flexibility? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I always have a certain amount of 

flexibility. I go back to the decision-making process. You know, I 

have to go to them for consideration of issues pertaining to the 

budget that I don’t have a full grasp of. 

Mr. SMITH. I would never admit that, but we will hope you can 

do the best you can for the—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. I am doing—I will do the best I can. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I will. 

Mr. SMITH. Second question is this: there have been two independent assessments, I understand, of the Agency’s morale and 

trust in its organizational leadership. Can you give this Committee 

the results of those assessments that have been done? 
52 

Mr. BOLDEN. I am not sure of which ones you speak, so I will 

take it for the record and get it back—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —but I can tell you when I travel around the Agency, most recently on the afternoon of the launch last Friday—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —at a cookout at the Kennedy Space Center where 

I had an opportunity to circulate among the workforce—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —many of whom will not be working several weeks 

from now, they were upbeat. Their attitude was very positive and 

they—— 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bolden, I am sure that is the case. That is also 

anecdotal. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yeah. 

Mr. SMITH. These assessments, one was done by the former senior engineer for the Hubble Space Telescope, Charlie Pellerin, and 

another by the management consulting firm McKinsey. Are you familiar with those assessments, those studies? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I contracted for the one for McKinsey and Charlie 

Pellerin used to—I mean still works for us, I think, so I will—as 

I said, I will take it for the record and bring you the results of 

those—— 

Mr. SMITH. You will give me some results for those assessments? 

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Bolden. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Chairman HALL. All right. The Chair is really pleased to recognize the gentlelady from Houston, Texas, Mrs. Jackson Lee for 5 

or 6 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and the 

Ranking Member, Ms. Johnson, for your kindness in indulging me 

on a Committee that I had the privilege of serving on for 12 years 

and still have a great affection and respect for the work that is 

done by this great Committee. And, of course, one of its jurisdictional responsibility is NASA. 

Before I dive into my questions, Mr. Administrator, let me thank 

you for your keen hospitality for a very emotional and moving experience on last Friday as Atlantis pushed past all doubts, all 

weather threats, and did what we expected her to do, which is to 

launch beautifully, and to the men and women that are now in 

space and utilizing the space station. We wish them well as they 

by-step space junk and do the great work that they have done over 

the years. 

I also would like to personally thank Mr. Glenn Posey. I have 

never seen a human being work as hard as he did and Karl 

Stehmer, who was excellent in his work. And these are the kinds 

of personnel that don’t say no and recognize the importance of a 

Member who is able to see firsthand the work of NASA. And Members who were there, I know, appreciated their kindness. 

Let me follow the line of questioning of my good friend, Congressman Bartlett, as a strong advocate of human space exploration. I 

can’t cite the tenure that he has but I am really concerned the next 

generation of physicists and astronauts of many training, whether 
53 

it is medicine, but just those who aspire to believe that it is important for men and women to go into space. 

I am concerned about the messaging in what we have said. And 

you made a very valid point. We have been down conspicuously in 

our recent times with the Columbia and Challenger and either use 

another vehicle or we are not actually going into space. This should 

be characterized as that. My understanding is we are in this position because we did not fully fund Constellation when we had every 

opportunity to do so. And so now we are in a period where we are 

looking at the Space Launch System, but the message is not getting to the American people that we are still vibrant, we are still 

engaged. Tell me what NASA Johnson—Houston’s role is now 

going to be with the Space Launch System and, if any, the MPCV. 

We are told that there are four contractors in Houston, and what 

is their role in filling the gap? Because we will expect thousands 

of layoffs in the Fall that are going to come about. They are mostly 

contractors. But what will be Houston’s role as we go forward? 

And let me ask this other question. I have legislation. We are 

still in pain about the choice of the shuttle, and my legislation is 

a compromise. It indicates a loaner to be a partner to the other anchored iconic city or area that was leading in space that was Florida. There is no competition to Houston’s role in the beginning of 

our space history. It is deserving—it would finish the historical 

story, but I think my effort—it doesn’t have to even be legislation— 

of loaning—and I know there is some talk about the remains of— 

or the remains of some of the tragedies that occurred. I don’t want 

to speak for or against that. I welcome that thought. But I am talking about an actual shuttle being loaned to the Houston Space 

Johnson area. 

If you can go forward on the first question of Houston’s role now 

upcoming and then on the space shuttle loaner program. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, thank you very much. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And thank you for your long and ongoing service. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you. And I appreciate your specific mention 

of the employees, particularly, again Posey and Karl Stehmer who, 

unfortunately, is in the room when you said that. So I have no idea 

what that is going to cost me. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will put some funding in the budget for it. 

Mr. BOLDEN. They are two people who represent the 17,000 plus 

people in the civil service portion of NASA and then the almost 

40,000 contractors who are incredibly dedicated, who are motivated 

and come to work every day because they love what they do. 

When you ask about JSC, JSC will continue to play a critical role 

in everything that has to do with human space flight. They have 

the program office for the MPCV. They will be working cooperatively with the Kennedy Space Center that will have the program 

office for commercial crew. Astronauts will continue to train at the 

Johnson Space Center, train and live in Houston for the foreseeable 

future. As I mentioned, we just recently named additional crews for 

the International Space Station. They will train and work out of 

Houston. And the development of the MPCV, its test profile and everything else, its integration to the SLS will be headquartered 

down in—— 
54 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So will we see the ramping-up of employees 

that are now losing jobs? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Over time it is our hope that you will see everything bottom out and you will see a ramp-up in jobs back in all of 

our space communities. What I think you will also see over time 

is that as we are able to successfully facilitate the success of commercial space entities, you will see that those companies become 

represented in the Houston area, in the space coast area, in other 

areas around the country. You know, we signed an agreement 

down at the Kennedy Space Center last week with Mark Sirangelo, 

the CEO of Sierra Nevada to utilize the engineering expertise of 

the Kennedy Space Center. He had signed one with Johnson Space 

Center, with Ames, and with Langley. And that is what we are 

looking for is more cooperation between—among the commercial 

entities and our—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We are looking for jobs and people with expertise—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Exactly. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. —so that we can—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Exactly. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. —continue to be leaders in science and technology. 

Mr. BOLDEN. There are three things that I tell people all the 

time and I promise this Committee. One is that the United States 

will maintain its leadership in exploration. The second one is that 

we will do everything in our power to facilitate the success of an 

American capability of taking humans to space on American-built 

rockets using American innovation. That is critical for us. And then 

the third thing is that we are going to do deep space exploration. 

Given the President’s 2012 budget, we have a timeline on which we 

are going to do that that I talked about in my comments. If we get 

less funding, we will still do that but the time may stretch out. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. A loaner vehicle? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I don’t really have a comment on that, Congresswoman. I am waiting—you know, we have a plan in place and we 

intend to carry out that plan, but—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I will just end on this note. I 

am continuing to press for Houston’s historical position in space to 

be rewarded and respected. And so I will continue to reach the 

President and anyone else to say that we need a shuttle, however 

it can be placed appropriately. And I thank you for letting me press 

this issue and I will press it again with you in the coming weeks. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. Thank you. And thank you for your patience. 

And thank you for coming back to the Committee that you served 

long years on. 

Ms. Johnson and I have agreed to give Mr. Rohrabacher 1 

minute additional. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. Have 10 seconds that is gone. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me just note that I am for human 

presence and enterprise and utilization and even human settlement in space. I am not so sure about human exploration versus 

robotic exploration. 
55 

But the question I have for you that I wanted to make sure we 

got this down, the development costs of actually achieving a refueling capability, which would give us further capabilities in space, 

how does that match up with the cost—the new cost of developing 

a new huge rocket? Could we—is it about the same, is it less, or 

what is the—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I will have to take that for the record 

because that is a study that I am certain is somewhere, you know, 

over in the headquarters building, but I am not aware of that. I 

have not asked for that information, but I will get it to you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would appreciate that because it does go 

right to the heart of the matter of what strategy we will have, of 

whether you have to launch right from the Earth with everything 

or whether or not we should start developing the capabilities of refueling and then going on with further missions that wouldn’t necessarily require a huge rocket that requires that much fuel. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I don’t have the answer and I will get it for the 

record. But I will tell you in the ongoing evaluation that I asked 

in coming to the conclusion that I did on the SLS, we looked at 

multiple scenarios, one of which was, you know, flight-to-Earth 

orbit or what we call an Earth-orbit rendezvous. And it turned out 

that that was not as economical nor as reliable as the single flight, 

beyond-Earth orbit rendezvous, the way that we envision it now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOLDEN. But I will get you the information. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman HALL. Gentleman has a promise. Gentleman’s time is 

up. 

Mrs. Johnson has asked for a minute. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I simply want to thank the Administrator and also express my 

appreciation for this program and all it has done for the Nation 

and the world and for every possible person involved. And I don’t 

see this, though I am troubled about the ending of a program, but 

rather the launching of new horizons and horizons that we will all 

see as much benefit as we have seen in the past of our shuttle system. And I want to thank you again for being here, for being persistent, and you deserve a break. Thank you. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Mr. WU. And Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask for a minute, 

but I want to thank you—— 

Chairman HALL. Please don’t. 

Mr. WU. But I want to thank you anyway—— 

Chairman HALL. No, you have a minute. 

Mr. WU. No, no. I want to thank you anyway because I know you 

would have given it to me. Thank you. 

Chairman HALL. I thank Mr. Bolden for your very valuable testimony. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, may I have 30 seconds? 

Chairman HALL. I have a closing statement here that I have to 

make. 

Mr. BOLDEN. May I ask for 30 seconds before your closing statement? 

Chairman HALL. Sure. Yes, sir. 
56 

Mr. BOLDEN. And, you know, we have—I have said a lot about 

who is responsible for what, and I am ultimately responsible to the 

President, but, you know, I have served in the Space Agency under 

five Presidents, starting with President Reagan, and I think people 

need to look at what our present President has done in terms of 

support for the space program. You know, I did not—I can’t remember—and certainly this happened—a President who has taken 

the personal interest in the program the way that President 

Obama has. When he and his family came to the Cape after we did 

not launch STS–134 and spent quite a bit of time with the crew, 

the families, the workers there, I mean, and we had cancelled already that day, that spoke volumes. The commendatory message 

that he sent to our employees Friday afternoon after the launch of 

STS–135 and continued his promise and his challenge to us to send 

humans to an asteroid in Mars is more than I can remember from 

any of the total of five Presidents for whom I have worked. So I 

do like to give credit where credit is due. 

Chairman HALL. I thank you. I don’t agree with you, but I do 

thank you. 

General Bolden, I would just implore you to get a final decision 

out as soon as you can, tomorrow, maybe, day after, whenever you 

can. But Congress takes a real high priority on closing the gap and 

having a backup system, and given all that has been achieved 

under the Constellation program, good or bad, mistakes were made 

and all that I know, but it shouldn’t take a year’s worth of deliberations to come up with an architecture that at some time, in 

some respects resemble components of Constellation or whatever 

follows Constellation. We have a workforce, we have an industrial 

base that is critical to our Nation’s security and economic well 

being, and their future is being heavily impacted by NASA’s indecision. 

And whoever wrote this for me also said I hope you will take 

that message back to the White House. I am not saying I hope you 

take that message back to the White House because you opened 

your statement saying the buck stopped with you. I don’t really 

truly agree with that, but I do say to you because of your service 

and because of your outstanding—your heroic service to this country, the years you gave, you put your life in the hands of battling 

the enemy and people have admired you. Three times you were 

strapped to one of our spacecrafts, didn’t know for sure—positive 

that you were going to get back—four times. People admire you 

and almost worship you and you have always been capable of 

friendship, and I think that is the reason that we have tried to be 

factual with our questions here, not mean or unkind, but trying to 

extract—and not asking, we are begging for information. 

As Mrs. Adams said, who represents an area that she is fearful, 

you know, and anxious and asking you when, when? And you said 

if you look at this or look at that or if you look at the Constellation, 

I just urge you to look at Congress and what Congress has asked 

you to do already—— 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman HALL. —and has been agreed by both sides. Help us. 

And thank you for your time. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you, sir. 
57 

Chairman HALL. And at this time, we do close out—Members of 

the Committee will have additional questions for you, Mr. Bolden. 

I will ask you to respond to them. And the record will remain open 

for two weeks for additional comments from Members. And we 

thank you. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(59) 

Appendix I 

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