PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 07-4230

MARK E. PHILLIPS, a/k/a Mark L.

Aaron,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.

(1:05-cr-00165-JFM)

Argued: September 25, 2009

Decided: November 24, 2009

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges,

and Damon J. KEITH, Senior Circuit Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Keith

joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellant. Joyce Kallam McDonald, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Denise C. Barrett, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Mark Phillips was convicted, after a jury trial in

the District of Maryland, of securities fraud, mail fraud, wire

fraud, and access device fraud. He now appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court erred under the Fourth

Amendment in denying his motion to suppress evidence

seized pursuant to a search warrant. According to Phillips, the

agents executing the search warrant exceeded the warrant’s

scope by seizing items not expressly named therein. 

After careful consideration, we reject Phillips’s claim. We

hold that the warrant’s inclusive language was reasonably

read by the agents to encompass the seized evidence and that

the agents’ seizures were therefore permissible. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment. 

I.

A.

In early 2003, the United States Postal Inspection Service

began a fraud investigation of appellant Mark Phillips. The

investigation revealed that over a period of approximately

three years, Phillips had fraudulently applied for several credit

cards, using his father’s identity and declaring a false income.

Phillips then used those fraudulent credit cards to make

2 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
expensive purchases. Among other items, Phillips bought several pieces of stereo, exercise, and computer equipment, collectible coins, a pool table, a telescope, and a samurai sword.

Ultimately, Phillips accumulated hundreds of thousands of

dollars of credit card bills and either did not attempt to pay

those bills or attempted to pay with bad checks. 

Investigators at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service also

uncovered other fraud perpetrated by Phillips. For example,

Phillips possessed two driver’s licenses, each with his own

photograph, address, and date of birth, but each with a different name: Mark Le Roy Aaron and Mark Edwards Phillips.

Additionally, investigators learned that Phillips had opened an

account for frequent gamblers at an Atlantic City casino using

his father’s social security number and had made over

$28,000 in cash withdrawals on that account. A criminal

search history revealed that Phillips had previously been

arrested on state charges of theft by deception and issuing bad

checks. 

During the course of the investigation, postal inspection

agents also became aware that Phillips was the "CEO and

Founder" of a business called Phydea, which provided online

financial stock reports. Some of Phillips’s fraudulent purchases helped to fund Phydea. For example, he used a fraudulent credit card to pay Interland Web Hosting for the hosting

and maintenance of his business’s website, Phydea.com, and

he used a fraudulent card to purchase advertisements for Phydea, which appeared in Investor’s Business Daily. Also, Phillips frequently used Phydea’s corporate name in connection

with his credit card fraud. For instance, Phillips bought entertainment equipment with a fraudulent VISA card using the

internet address Phydea.com; Phillips made a purchase on

eBay using the e-mail address phydea@earthlink.com; Phillips fraudulently applied for an American Express card using

the e-mail address CEO@PHYDEA.com; and when applying

for the same American Express card, Phillips misstated his

income as $1 million and misstated Phydea’s annual revenue

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 3
as $10 million. Unbeknownst to the postal inspectors at the

time, however, Phillips was using Phydea in connection with

more than just credit card fraud; he was also using it and a

related investment vehicle, Phydea Equity Fund, as part of an

elaborate securities fraud scheme. 

In July 2003, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service sought a

search warrant for Phillips’s Maryland residence. The magistrate judge approved the search warrant, finding probable

cause for violations of access device fraud (18 U.S.C.

§ 1029), fraud in connection with identification documents

(18 U.S.C. § 1028), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344). 

The search warrant and incorporated affidavit authorized

the seizure of a wide range of items and documents. Specifically, Part I of Attachment A described items and services

purchased using fraudulent credit cards. It contained a number

of specific examples, "including but not limited to"

"[p]ayments to Interland Web Hosting for the hosting of a

webpage titled PHYDEA.com." Part II of Attachment A listed

"[i]tems that relate to or constitute evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§§ 1028, 1029 or

1344, as described in the Affidavit." Like Part I, Part II listed

numerous examples "including but not limited to" the following relevant categories: 

Category A: Mail, books, records, receipts, notes,

ledgers and other papers . . . relating to fraudulent

conduct and financial crimes, including but not limited to those documents and records relating to payments to Interland Web Hosting for the hosting of a

webpage titled PHYDEA.com.

Category C: Books, records, receipts, bank statements and bank records . . . relating to fraudulent

conduct and financial crimes.

4 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
Category D: Checks, pass books, bank checks and

any other items evidencing the obtaining, secreting,

transfer, concealment and/or expenditure of money.

Category J: [C]redit cards, in any form and credit

card account numbers, payment device and/or

account numbers of any kind. 

The affidavit also set forth additional details relating to Phillips’s case and the evidence of his fraud. 

Prior to executing the search warrant, Inspector Judy Starliper, the head of the investigation, thoroughly briefed all

agents on the facts of Phillips’s case. Her operations plan

summarized the investigation and informed the agents that

Phillips "has a webpage called PHYDEA.com and uses the

same e-mail address to make his purchases." Each agent was

provided a copy of Attachment A listing the items to be

seized. During this briefing, another agent, Inspector David

Reardon, informed the team that he had received a complaint

from an aggrieved investor in Phydea Equity Fund, an entity

related to Phydea, and therefore requested that the agents alert

him if they saw anything relating to Phydea or Phydea Equity

Fund during the search.

Immediately following the briefing, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service team executed the search warrant. During the

search, Inspector Reardon himself identified several documents relating to Phydea and Phydea Equity Fund. He noted

that these documents contained personal identifying information "which was in many regards what Inspector Starliper was

looking for in an identity fraud situation" and potentially

related to many of the fraudulent credit card purchases made

using Phydea’s name. To err on the side of caution, Inspector

Reardon brought the documents to the attention of his superiors, and Inspector Starliper telephoned the United States

Attorney’s office to seek guidance on whether the Phydea and

Phydea Equity Fund documents were seizable. After reading

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 5
the warrant and accompanying affidavit, the Assistant United

States Attorney concluded that the warrant authorized their

seizure. 

In executing the warrant, the agents seized a number of

documents and records that not only helped confirm the

investigators’ suspicions of credit card fraud but also revealed

to the investigators for the first time the full extent of Phillips’s securities law violations involving Phydea and Phydea

Equity Fund. Among these seized documents and records are

several categories of evidence that Phillips now contests: documents and records relating to Phydea, including invoices for

the Phydea advertisements appearing in Investor’s Business

Daily; documents and records relating to Phydea Equity Fund,

including the files of individual investors; and some of Phillips’s own financial records, including his bank statements. 

B.

In April 2005, the United States charged Phillips with

thirty-five counts of securities fraud (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)), mail

fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1314), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), and

access device fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2)). A federal grand

jury indicted Phillips on all counts. Prior to trial, Phillips filed

a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the

search warrant. He argued that the contested seizures fell outside the scope of the warrant, because the warrant did not

explicitly mention those items. 

Following a four-day evidentiary hearing, in which the district court heard testimony from a number of witnesses, the

district court denied Phillips’s motion to suppress. In reaching

its decision, the district court made the following findings.

First, it found that the seizure of Phydea-related documents

was proper, because those documents were seized "in connection with the credit card investigation." In so finding, the

court noted that Phillips had used several fraudulent credit

cards to make purchases in connection with Phydea and that

6 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
Phillips had misstated Phydea’s income on a fraudulent credit

card application. Second, the district court held that the agents

were justified in seizing documentation relating to Phydea

Equity Fund, because at the time of the search, it was unnecessary to draw fine distinctions between the two entities of

Phydea and Phydea Equity Fund. Third, the district court concluded that Phillips’s personal financial records were seizable,

because they were relevant to demonstrating his income,

which he misstated on a fraudulent credit application. Significantly, the district court concluded that the seizing agents at

all times throughout the search acted in "good faith" and

"acted responsibly, reasonably and sensibly." 

Following the district court’s denial of Phillips’s motion to

suppress, the seized evidence was admitted, and Phillips was

tried by a jury. Ultimately, Phillips was convicted on all

counts and sentenced to 121 months in prison. Phillips now

appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. 

II.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual

findings for clear error. United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346,

349 (4th Cir. 2009). 

A.

Phillips makes a variety of claims, some of which appear

to merge and overlap. Phillips contends that the postal inspectors’ seizures exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The

gist of his argument is that the warrant authorized the seizure

of items on the basis of probable cause for criminal charges

relating to credit card fraud and identity fraud. Therefore,

Phillips claims, the seizure of items relating to securities fraud

was not authorized by the terms of the warrant. This argument

fails for reasons of both law and fact. 

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 7
A search conducted pursuant to a warrant is limited in

scope by the terms of the warrant’s authorization. Walter v.

United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (plurality); see also

United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 555 (4th Cir.

2000). However, a search warrant is not a "constitutional

strait jacket." United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195,

1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotations omitted). In interpreting search warrants, we must heed the

Supreme Court’s reminders to employ a "commonsense and

realistic" approach, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,

108 (1965), and avoid "‘hypertechnical’ scrutiny . . . lest

police officers be encouraged to forgo the warrant application

process altogether." United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371,

380 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236

(1983)). These fundamental legal principles apply not only to

determining the validity of a warrant but also to assessing its

scope. United States v. Srivastava, 540 F.3d 277, 290, n.16

(4th Cir. 2008).

Mindful of these considerations, we are confident that the

contested seizures in this case fell comfortably within the

warrant’s scope. Even those seized documents forming the

cornerstone of Phillips’s securities law violations were authorized by the language of the warrant, which is broad and permissive. Part I of Attachment A, for example, contains an

extensive list of fraudulently purchased items, including,

among other things, "[a] 1901-S Morgan Silver Dollar," "[a]

Celestron Nexstar 8 GPS telescope," "[a] Canon GL2 3 Chip

Camcorder," "[a] pool table," and "[a] CD/Record Player."

Part I does not stop there, however. It includes not only the

items themselves but also "evidence of appliances, devices,

furniture, equipment, property, items generally, and services

that represent purchases using credit cards obtained by fraud

and/or proceeds of other forms of fraud or financial crimes."

(emphasis added). Because Phillips purchased Phydea advertisements in Investor’s Business Daily with a fraudulent credit

card, the invoices relating to the purchase of that advertising

service thus fall within the scope of Part I as "evidence of . . .

8 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
services that represent purchases using credit cards obtained

by fraud."

The language used in Part II of Attachment A is even more

comprehensive, describing "[i]tems that relate to or constitute

evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C.

§§§ 1028, 1029 or 1344." Part II gives some specific examples of such evidence but cautions that those examples do not

constitute a complete listing, using the phrase "including but

not limited to." Moreover, the categories of evidence in Part

II are broadly inclusive, describing, among other types of documents, "[m]ail, books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers and

other papers," "computerized electronic records," "bank statements and bank records," and "[c]hecks, pass books, bank

checks." 

The remainder of the contested seizures falls within the

ambit of Part II’s inclusive language. For example, Phillips’s

personal financial records were seizable because they were

evidence that Phillips did, in fact, misrepresent his individual

income on a credit card application. Phillips claims that,

because he applied for the credit card in his father’s name, he

misstated only his father’s income, which could not be verified with his own financial records. However, officers could

not be expected to parse that sort of distinction on the spot,

especially since Phillips added himself as an authorized user

to the same credit card. Similarly, many Phydea and Phydea

Equity Fund documents fall within the broad language of Part

II, since these documents were relevant to proving that Phillips misstated not only his personal income but also his company’s income on a credit card application. The individual

investor files, for example, were relevant to this inquiry,

because the amount that investors invested in Phydea or Phydea Equity Fund was tied directly to the companies’ revenue

and expectations of revenue. 

Further, because Phillips used his personal bank accounts

to write bad checks, and, moreover, wrote bad checks to

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 9
credit card companies, the agents were justified in seizing his

"bank statements and bank records." In cases of financial

fraud, "the financial records of a suspect may well be highly

probative of violations of a federal fraud statute." Srivastava,

540 F.3d at 292 (citation omitted). To be sure, not every item

that falls within the language of the warrant will prove probative in a future criminal prosecution, but that is not the point.

The language of the warrant is inclusive for this very reason,

namely that the evidentiary significance of each and every

item may not be instantly apparent. 

Phillips, however, urges a reading of the warrant’s language that defies the "commonsense and realistic" interpretation demanded of us. His position would require us to hold

that an item reasonably encompassed by the terms of the warrant somehow falls outside its scope because the item is probative of charges other than those initial charges set forth by

the warrant. In his case, Phillips argues that because the warrant was issued for various credit card offenses, the seized

items relevant to securities fraud as well should somehow be

suppressed. This is not the law. Courts have never held that

a search is overbroad merely because it results in additional

criminal charges. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.

463, 482-84 (1976). Often, a single piece of evidence will be

probative of multiple crimes, especially in cases like this one,

which involve intricate, interweaving, and extensive financial

fraud schemes.

Our recent opinion in United States v. Srivastava, 540 F.3d

277 (4th Cir. 2008), is instructive. There, we addressed a situation in which officers’ execution of a warrant issued for

medical billing fraud turned up evidence of tax fraud. Id. at

281-83. The defendant cardiologist contested the seizure of

personal tax records under a warrant issued to investigate his

business’s medical billing practices. Id. at 290. The court

found this argument unpersuasive in light of the significant

nexus between his personal and business operations. Id. Noting that the defendant operated his business as a Subchapter

10 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
S corporation, thereby passing business income through to

himself as an individual for tax purposes, we explained: "In

such circumstances, it is difficult to realistically define a

bright line between ‘personal financial records’ and ‘business

records.’ . . . Rather, it is consistent with both common sense

and realism to deem the financial records relating to the medical practice as being nearly synonymous with the financial

records of [him] individually." Id.

Here, too, Phillips’s fraudulent schemes were interrelated

and the evidence of each intermingled. The various schemes

were mutually reinforcing: Phillips’s misrepresentations of his

own identity, among other things, enabled him to obtain

fraudulent credit cards; his credit card fraud underwrote his

securities fraud, facilitating the purchase of advertisements

intended to lure investors into his illegitimate business; and

the misstated "income" from that illegitimate business helped

him fraudulently obtain credit cards. Just as Phillips overstated the success of his companies to credit card companies

in credit card applications, so too he overstated the success of

his companies to investors in advertisements. On these facts,

it is unsurprising that items seized under the warrant supported multiple charges of fraud. 

B.

Phillips next argues that the only items that fall within the

scope of a warrant are those that are explicitly named and precisely catalogued. For example, notwithstanding the "including but not limited to" language, Phillips suggests that the

only Phydea documents that were seizable under the warrant

were those mentioned by name: "[p]ayments to Interland Web

Hosting for the hosting of a webpage titled PHYDEA.com."

For other items to be seizable, the warrant must have been

more particularized. 

Contrary to Phillips’s contention, law enforcement officers

may seize an item pursuant to a warrant even if the warrant

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 11
does not expressly mention and painstakingly describe it. See

Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to

hold "that only those items particularly described in [a warrant] may be seized without regard to the facts and circumstances of the particular case") (internal quotations and

citation omitted). A warrant need not — and in most cases,

cannot — scrupulously list and delineate each and every item

to be seized. Frequently, it is simply impossible for law

enforcement officers to know in advance exactly what business records the defendant maintains or how the case against

him will unfold. 

Indeed, especially in cases such as this one—involving

complex crime schemes, with interwoven frauds — courts

have routinely upheld the seizure of items described under a

warrant’s broad and inclusive language. See, e.g., United

States v. Jacob, 657 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1981). For example,

in Andresen v. Maryland, the Supreme Court upheld the seizure of an extensive array of documents under a warrant that

authorized the seizure of items "together with other fruits,

instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time]

unknown." 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976). This circuit has similarly allowed the seizure of a "broad range of things" on the

basis of language permitting officers to seize "fruits, evidence

and instrumentalities of false claims submissions" and items

"including, but not limited to" business records. Srivastava,

540 F.3d at 280, 289. The warrant in the case at bar bears

striking similarities to those upheld in the aforementioned precedent. 

The rationale for these holdings is straightforward. In cases

of this sort, investigators must "follow the money" to gradually unravel the lengthy paper trail left by a defendant’s illegal

operations. See Srivastava, 540 F.3d at 291-92. As the

Supreme Court explained, complex fraud cases often require

investigators to assemble a "jigsaw puzzle" by piecing

together "many bits of evidence" that, "taken singly, would

show comparatively little." Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480-81, n.

12 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
10. For "in the context of a fraud investigation, the relevant

evidence will in many instances be fragmentary, discovered in

bits and pieces, and thus difficult to either identify or secure.

Standing alone, a particular document may appear innocuous

or entirely innocent, and yet be an important piece of the jigsaw puzzle that investigators must assemble." Srivastava, 540

F.3d at 291. In choosing to uphold contested seizures pursuant

to inclusive language, courts have insisted that the "complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid

detection." Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480-81, n.10; see also

Srivastava, 540 F.3d at 291.

We thus decline to allow Phillips to create a safe harbor

from the complexity of his schemes. His crimes were multiple

and intricate. Phillips perpetrated his crimes in-person, by

U.S. mail, by telephone, and on the Internet. He lied about his

name, income, and social security number; he used a fake

driver’s license; he ran up costly bills with fraudulent credit

cards that he never paid off; he funded a gambling habit with

a stolen identity; and he wrote countless bad checks. To

investigate and prosecute crimes of this nature, the government may need a diverse and extensive set of documents at

its disposal. The language of the warrant anticipates that very

possibility. The warrant thus sufficiently authorized the seizure of the contested evidence here, even if that evidence was

not specifically listed and meticulously described.*

*We reject as well Phillips’s related argument that at the time the agents

seized the Phydea-related records, the agents had no reason to connect

Phydea with Phillips’ alleged credit card and identity theft schemes. In

fact, Attachment A mentioned "Phydea" by name twice, the head postal

inspector’s operation plan explained that Phillips "ha[d] a webpage called

PHYDEA.com and use[d] this same email address to make his purchases,"

and the incorporated affidavit mentioned the name "Phydea" ten times,

including an explicit statement that Phillips used a fraudulent credit card

to "execute several transactions involving PHYDEA.com." As the district

court explained, "there was perfectly good reason for the Phydea records

to be seized in connection with the credit card investigation. And I find

that." 

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 13
C.

Finally, Phillips argues that the agents executing the search

warrant acted unreasonably by failing to distinguish between

Phydea and Phydea Equity Fund at the time of the search.

Even assuming that the Phydea documents were properly

seized, Phillips contends, the Phydea Equity Fund documents

were not, because the affidavit set forth no facts connecting

these documents to Phillips’s alleged fraud and in fact never

even mentioned the name "Phydea Equity Fund." Thus, Phillips asserts that the agents’ seizure of those documents was

unreasonable. We hold otherwise. 

The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness, and the "relevant inquiry is whether the search and

seizures were reasonable under all the circumstances." United

States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 557 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also United States

v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1988). In determining

whether officers executing a search warrant acted reasonably,

courts must examine only those "facts available to the officers

at the time." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987).

Reasonableness does not, by definition, entail perfection.

Rather, the reasonableness inquiry acknowledges the ambiguous and often dangerous circumstances confronting officers in

the process of executing search warrants and therefore affords

officers "some latitude for honest mistakes." Id. at 87; United

States v. Patterson, 278 F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2002); see

also Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87 (The Fourth Amendment

demands "sufficient probability, not certainty.") (citation and

internal quotations omitted). 

The district court likewise found as a fact that the original search was

in no way a "subterfuge" for drumming up a securities fraud case out of

allegations of credit card fraud. As the district court stated, "I find as a fact

that absolutely did not occur." 

14 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
In examining the information available to the agents at the

time of the search, we agree with the district court that "the

search was entirely reasonable and constitutional." Only with

the benefit of hindsight are we now able to definitively ascertain a document’s ultimate significance. And we now know,

after a full jury trial and on appeal, that the Phydea Equity

Fund records were probative primarily of securities fraud

rather than the initial charges against Phillips. However, given

Phydea’s clear connections to Phillips’s alleged fraud, and

given Phydea Equity Fund’s obvious relationships to Phydea

(the least of which is its partially shared name), the agents

acted reasonably in their seizure of both Phydea and Phydea

Equity Fund documents. 

In fact, this is what the district court found after conducting

a four-day evidentiary hearing, which included testimony

from all of the executing agents. The district court explained

why it was unnecessary for the agents to distinguish between

Phydea and Phydea Equity Fund: 

Let me mention here the reason I think Phydea can

be referred to generically. This is not GM and

GMAC. . . . [The] fact of the matter is that he’s got

Phydea.com, Phydea, whatever the various Phydea’s

names are, one can reasonably infer that, for purposes of the seizure, . . . distinctions between, . . . at

the stage of the search, . . . the different entities or

LLC’s or corporations did not have to be drawn.

So I think the agents acted entirely reasonably and

constitutionally in not making fine distinctions at

that stage between the Phydea entities.

To require agents to make fine-tuned distinctions between

the two entities, and whatever other permutations of company

structure might exist, is to hold them to too high a standard.

The agents in this case, like all law enforcement officers who

execute a search warrant, labored under limitations of time

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 15
and knowledge. Experienced counsel may spend weeks and

months sifting through voluminous documentary evidence in

an effort to reconstruct the modus operandi of a criminal operation. The agents lacked the time, the training in principles of

accounting and business structure, and the sense of context to

perform a comparable task. Nor would we want them to.

Demanding perfection "would substantially increase the time

required to conduct the search, thereby aggravating the intrusiveness of the search." United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d

1343, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). A prompt exit from the premises accompanied by a

few excusable, "honest mistakes" is far preferable to officers’

encampment in a residence while they relentlessly scrutinize

each and every item they encounter. As the Second Circuit

noted in upholding the wholesale seizure of "fur coats . . . and

other finished fur products" in a fur store, "the task of identifying and seizing the specific garments would have required

a legion of fur experts to perform the task in a reasonable

period." United States v. Scharfman, 448 F.2d 1352, 1353-54

& n.1 (2d Cir. 1971). 

None of this is to suggest that the agents had free rein to

ransack and take what they liked. The search was for a purpose which the agents were not free to exceed. But "general,

exploratory rummaging," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443, 467 (1971), was not what happened here. As the

district court found, the agents "acted responsibly, reasonably

and sensibly." Their actions were, in the words of that court,

"the reverse of cavalier" and at all times "measured and

appropriate." To the extent that any mistakes were made, the

district court found that they were "absolutely good faith mistakes." The only documents taken were financial documents,

and indeed the agents left many financial documents behind.

Consequently, we hold that the seizure of the evidence in this

case, including that of the Phydea Equity Fund records, was

constitutionally sound. 

16 UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS
III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is 

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS 17