IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs at Jackson May 5, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERRY LYNN PRIEST

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Warren County

No. F-13963 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2014-02116-CCA-R3-CD – Filed October 1, 2015

The Appellant, Terry Lynn Priest, pled guilty to theft in an amount more than $1,000 and 

less than $10,000. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to five years in the 

Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial 

court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

Robert S. Peters, Winchester, Tennessee (on appeal); and Steve Roller, McMinnville, 

Tennessee (at trial), for the Appellant, Terry Lynn Priest.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant 

Attorney General; Lisa Zavogiannis, District Attorney General; and Taffy Seagraves, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On June 14, 2013, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted the Appellant on two 

counts of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D 

felony. On June 2, 2014, the Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft of property 

valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 in exchange for the dismissal of the other 

count. As the factual basis for the plea, the State recited the following:
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The facts that gave rise to the indictment are that Ms. 

Gina Waters puchased a Toyota Camry, I believe, from [the 

Appellant] in August[] 2011. She put $1,000.00 down and 

paid the sales tax and agreed to make payments on it. She did 

make her payments. She was given a drive-out tag that day. 

There was no title given to her at that moment. She never 

received – there was no title ever produced in order for her to 

get her tags. In December[] 2011 she had a wreck. There 

was still no title produced and the insurance company would 

not pay out on the vehicle because there was no title produced 

so effectively she was deprived of her vehicle and her money 

at that point. The transaction did occur in Warren County. 

The plea agreement provided that the Appellant would be sentenced as a Range II, 

multiple offender but that the trial court would determine the length and manner of 

service of the sentence. 

At the sentencing hearing, Trooper George Scott Dickson testified that he was 

assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP). 

His division was responsible for state investigations of automobile thefts. Trooper 

Dickson testified that the regional office had received more than a dozen complaints from 

the sheriff’s office, the district attorney’s office, and investigators about the number of 

drivers who had been stopped by troopers and found to be “driving vehicles without any 

paperwork.”

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 Following an investigation, the THP learned that the vehicles were 

originating from Gaw’s Auto Mart (“Gaw’s”), an automobile wholesaler in Cookeville. 

Trooper Dickson spoke with employees at Gaw’s and learned that the Appellant had 

purchased a number of vehicles “on floor plan credit” and that Gaw’s had retained the 

titles to the vehicles until Gaw’s was paid by the Appellant. 

Trooper Dickson said that initially, Gaw’s had a good working relationship with 

the Appellant; he would take five or six vehicles, then, after he paid for them, he would 

take five or six more cars. Over time, the Appellant fell behind on his payments and 

began promising to pay “next time.” Gaw’s stopped doing business with the Appellant in 

2011. 

Trooper Dickson said that several purchasers were advised to file claims with the 

Appellant’s bonding company. Trooper Dickson explained that car dealers were required 

 

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Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-3-127(a) provides, “It is a Class C misdemeanor for any person 

to fail or neglect to properly endorse or deliver any certificate of title to the department, a transferee, or 

other person lawfully entitled to the certificate of title.”
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to post a bond in order to be licensed. Two people who bought cars from the Appellant

filed claims against his bond and received money from the bonding company. 

On cross-examination, Trooper Dickson said that “floor planning” was a common 

practice among automobile dealers. Trooper Dickson acknowledged that in 2008, car 

dealers and other businesses were adversely affected by the economic crisis. Trooper 

Dickson conceded that if the Appellant’s customers did not pay him for their cars, “it just 

ha[d] a domino effect.” 

On redirect examination, Trooper Dickson said that during the “economic 

downfall,” he did not investigate any other complaints that reached the “criminal level.” 

He said that he had been unable to track down all of the cars the Appellant sold without a 

title. 

The victim, Sherry Gina Waters, testified that she purchased a 2003 Toyota from 

the Appellant. The purchase price of the car was around $7,000. The victim paid the 

Appellant $4,000 in cash, gave him a set of rings as a $1,300 payment for the car, and 

arranged to pay $150 per month until the balance was paid in full. She consistently paid 

on time and was still paying for the car on December 24 when she was involved in a 

wreck. Her insurance company would not pay for the damage because the victim had 

never been given the title to the car. She repeatedly asked the Appellant for the title; the 

Appellant said that he would get it for her, but he never did. 

The victim said that after her accident, she and her sister went to the internet site 

Carfax and 

found out that they [(sic)] was a place that had the title and I 

called them and talked to them and they wouldn’t tell me 

anything. Just said that, yes, they knew about the car and 

seems like they told me they had the title but they couldn’t 

release it until it was paid for and I said, well, I can’t pay for 

it without the title. 

The victim could not recall exactly how much she had paid the Appellant for the 

car. She acknowledged that she received $4,770 from the Appellant’s bonding company. 

On cross-examination, the victim said that she reviewed all of her paperwork and 

receipts before filling out her victim impact statement. She acknowledged that in the 

statement, she said the Appellant owed her $7,541.49 in restitution. 

The Appellant testified that in 1992, he was convicted in federal court of 

conspiracy to traffic marijuana and conspiracy to steal whiskey. He received a sentence 
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of seventy-five months. He served five and one-half years in confinement and five years 

on parole. 

The Appellant said that in 2000, he obtained a license from the Tennessee Motor 

Vehicle Commission to sell used cars. He said that he had been in the used car business 

for approximately fourteen or fifteen years and that he sold an average of 500 cars per

year. The last year his business was open, car sales dropped dramatically, and he had 

trouble paying his debts. The motor vehicle commission inspected his business and gave 

him “some write-ups about record keeping.” He said that the victim was the first person 

to complain about him to the commission.

The Appellant said that Gaw’s was his main supplier of vehicles and that the 

vehicles he bought from them were worth from $50 to $10,000. The Appellant explained 

that Gaw’s billed him for the cars and that he picked up the title after he sold the vehicles. 

The Appellant “salvaged[ or] junked” some of the cars and sold the others. The 

Appellant said that approximately ten percent of his clients paid cash for a vehicle. 

The Appellant said that his business began to decline in 2008 and continued to 

deteriorate until 2011. Around the same time, the Appellant went through a divorce that 

had a “[m]ajor impact” on his finances. He said that he was bankrupt and that he had lost 

the business and his home. After his business closed, he supported himself by logging, 

cutting timber, and repairing old automobiles. The Appellant said that he was willing to 

pay restitution to the victim. 

The Appellant said that he was living with his mother, who was disabled and in 

her mid-80s. The Appellant asked the court to grant him probation. The Appellant said 

that he had never had “issues” with drugs but acknowledged that he had been convicted 

of possession of drugs. 

On cross-examination, the Appellant said that his business was mostly a “buy 

here-pay here lot.” He said that he never performed credit checks on his customers, 

noting that they were usually low income people with no credit. The Appellant said that 

his business began waning in 2008; however, he did not have a problem until the last few 

months of operation. 

Shawn Priest, the Appellant’s son, testified that he worked with the Appellant at 

the car dealership for approximately five years. Priest was not working there at the time 

the victim bought her vehicle. Priest said that customers occasionally complained about 

the cars but that he and the Appellant resolved the complaints by “either trad[ing] them 

something that they could register at the time,” repairing the cars, or returning their 

money. Priest believed the Appellant would comply with the conditions of probation. 
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Priest stated that the Appellant lived with his mother and rented a garage to work on old 

cars. 

The State submitted the Appellant’s presentence report and copies of judgments of 

conviction. The documents reflected that on February 14, 1994, the Appellant was 

convicted in federal court of conspiracy to traffic marijuana and conspiracy to steal Jack 

Daniel’s whiskey. On August 6, 1991, he was convicted in Lincoln County of possession 

of marijuana. On May 26, 1993, he was convicted in Warren County of the possession of 

more than 10 pounds but less than 70 pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or

deliver. On March 31, 1993, he was convicted in Rutherford County of conspiracy to 

deliver more than 10 pounds but less than 70 pounds of marijuana and of the sale of more 

than 10 pounds but less than 70 pounds of marijuana. The presentence report also 

reflected that the Appellant had violated a probationary sentence on two occasions. 

The trial court applied enhancement factor (1), that the Appellant had a previous 

history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to

establish the appropriate range, and enhancement factor (14), that he used a position of 

public or private trust or used a professional license in a manner that significantly 

facilitated the commission or fulfillment of the offense. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-114(1) 

and (14). The trial court applied mitigating factor (1), that the Appellant neither caused 

nor threatened serious bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-113(1). The trial court 

sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to five years. 

The trial court noted that the Appellant’s presentence report reflected that the 

Appellant had violated probation on two occasions. Additionally, the victim in the 

instant case was 74 years old. The court said:

I think probation after having committed the felonies and the 

offenses that you have in the past . . . and essentially 

defrauding this lady, who I won’t say is elderly but she is 74 

years old, in the manner that you did and having violated 

probation in the past I think probation would be improper.

On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative 

sentencing, specifically complaining that the trial court should have considered 

community corrections. 

II. Analysis

Appellate courts review the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence 

imposed by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of 

reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012); see also State v. 
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Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tenn. 2013) (applying the standard to consecutive 

sentencing); State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012) (applying the 

standard to alternative sentencing). In conducting its review, this court considers the 

following factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing 

hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to 

sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct 

involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on enhancement and 

mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of 

the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement 

by the appellant in his own behalf; and (8) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. '' 40-35-102, -103, -210; see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 697-98. 

The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate the impropriety of his sentence. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. ' 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. 

In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court 

should consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:

(1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is 

the sentence that should be imposed, because the general 

assembly set the minimum length of sentence for each felony 

class to reflect the relative seriousness of each criminal 

offense in the felony classifications; and

(2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, 

as appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and 

enhancement factors set out in '' 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.

Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-210(c). 

On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not sentencing him 

to community corrections. Initially, we note that the Appellant did not request that the 

trial court grant community corrections; instead, the Appellant requested probation. 

Nevertheless, the trial court addressed the requirements of alternative sentencing in 

general and probation in particular. 

Generally, an appellant who is an especially mitigated or standard offender 

convicted of a Class C, D, or E felony should be considered a favorable candidate for 

alternative sentencing, absent evidence to the contrary. See Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-

102(6). Although the Appellant was convicted of a Class D felony, he was sentenced as a 

Range II, multiple offender; therefore, he is not considered a favorable candidate for 

alternative sentencing. Nevertheless, an appellant is eligible for alternative sentencing if 

the sentence actually imposed is ten years or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-303(a). 
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The Appellant’s sentence meets this requirement. 

When determining a defendant’s suitability for alternative sentencing, courts 

should consider whether the following sentencing considerations, set forth in Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1), are applicable:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining 

a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the 

seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly 

suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to 

commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have 

frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the 

defendant. 

Additionally, “[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the 

defendant should be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a 

term to be imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-103(5). A defendant with a long history 

of criminal conduct and “evincing failure of past efforts at rehabilitation” is presumed 

unsuitable for alternative sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-35-102(5).

The Community Corrections Act of 1985 was enacted to provide an alternative 

means of punishment for “selected, nonviolent felony offenders in front end community 

based alternatives to incarceration.” Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-36-103(1). Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-36-106(a)(1) provides that an offender who meets all of the 

following minimum criteria shall be considered eligible for community corrections:

(A) Persons who, without this option, would be incarcerated 

in a correctional institution;

(B) Persons who are convicted of property-related, or drug- or 

alcohol-related felony offenses or other felony offenses not 

involving crimes against the person as provided in title 39, 

chapter 13, parts 1-5;

(C) Persons who are convicted of nonviolent felony offenses;

(D) Persons who are convicted of felony offenses in which 

the use or possession of a weapon was not involved;
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(E) Persons who do not demonstrate a present or past pattern 

of behavior indicating violence;

(F) Persons who do not demonstrate a pattern of committing 

violent offenses.

An offender is not automatically entitled to community corrections upon meeting the 

minimum requirements for eligibility. State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1998). 

The trial court’s comments indicate that its denial of alternative sentencing, which 

would include community corrections, was based upon a finding that measures less 

restrictive than confinement had frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the 

Appellant and that he lacked potential for rehabilitation. As we noted earlier, the 

Appellant has numerous prior convictions. Despite receiving probationary sentences, the 

Appellant has continued to reoffend. See State v. Alton Ray Thomas, No. M2006-00815-

CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 465135, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 13, 2007). 

We conclude that, given the Appellant’s criminal record, his failure to rehabilitate, and 

his previous inability to comply with the terms of release into the community, the trial 

court did not err by denying alternative sentencing, including community corrections. 

III. Conclusion

In sum, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE