Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Solomon v. Scholefield, 2015 IL App (1st) 150685

Appellate Court 

Caption

McSTEPHEN O.A. “MAX” SOLOMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 

MICHAEL SCHOLEFIELD, Objector, EDUCATION OFFICERS 

ELECTORAL BOARD, South Suburban Community College of 

Cook County, FRANK M. ZUCCARELLI, ANOTHONY 

DEFILIPPO, and TERRY WELLS, in Their Individual Capacities as 

Members, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-15-0685

Filed

Rehearing denied

March 27, 2015

April 3, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-COEL-37; the 

Hon. Maureen Ward Kirby, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed; mandate issued immediately.

Counsel on

Appeal

McStephen O.A. Solomon, of Hazel Crest, appellant pro se.

Laduzinsky & Associates, P.C., of Chicago (Steven M. Laduzinsky 

and Aisling S. O’Laoire, of counsel), for appellees.
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Panel JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Lavin and Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Petitioner-appellant, McStephen O.A. “Max” Solomon, appeals an order of the circuit 

court of Cook County affirming a decision of the Education Officers Electoral Board (Board) 

invalidating Solomon’s nominating papers for the office of trustee of the board of South 

Suburban Community College of Cook County District 510 (District 510) and removing him 

from the ballot. The Board invalidated Solomon’s petition on two grounds: first, it determined 

that Solomon was not “qualified for the office” within the meaning of section 10-5 of the 

Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 2012)) (Code); and, second, the Board concluded that 

the failure of certain circulators to personally appear before the notary public who notarized 

their signatures on the petition sheets constituted a “pattern of fraud” that required invalidation 

of all the sheets supporting the petition as well as Solomon’s statement of candidacy. We 

reverse. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On December 15, 2014, Solomon filed nomination papers for the office of trustee of 

District 510, a position on the ballot for the April 7, 2015 consolidated election. Solomon’s 

papers included a statement of candidacy representing that he was “legally qualified to hold 

such office” and nine pages of supporting signatures, seven of which were signed by Solomon 

as the circulator and two that were signed by other individuals. The signatures of the 

circulators on each petition sheet were notarized by a notary public, Maria Barlow, who swore 

that the circulators appeared before her on December 15, 2014, and affixed their signatures to 

the petition sheets. 

¶ 4 Objector Michael Scholefield filed his objections to Solomon’s petition on December 30, 

2014. The bases for Scholefield’s objections were that (i) Solomon’s statement of candidacy 

was false because at the time he signed it, Solomon was receiving compensation from District 

510, which meant that his service as a trustee would not be “without compensation” as required 

under section 3-7(e) of the Public Community College Act (110 ILCS 805/3-7(e) (West 2012)) 

and (ii) circulators of Solomon’s petition sheets did not personally appear before the notary 

who notarized their signatures, demonstrating a pattern of fraud and disregard of the Code. 

Scholefield also raised line-by-line objections to the 119 signatures on the petition sheets. (A 

records examination later determined that 78 of those signatures were presumptively valid–28 

more than the minimum 50 signatures required. No issue is raised on appeal regarding 

Solomon’s compliance with the valid signature requirement.)

¶ 5 The Board conducted a hearing on Scholefield’s objections. Solomon is an attorney and an 

adjunct professor who teaches part-time at South Suburban College and who lives in Hazel 

Crest within District 510’s boundaries. He taught and received compensation for the fall 2014 

semester and is currently teaching classes during the spring semester. Solomon is also a 
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member of the South Suburban College Adjunct Faculty Association, a union comprised of 

adjunct faculty at the college. 

¶ 6 Solomon personally circulated and signed seven of the nine sheets containing signatures 

supporting his nomination. Two other individuals, Anthony Brown and Gytara Brooks, each 

circulated and signed one sheet. Barlow is an attorney, a notary public and Solomon’s 

girlfriend. Barlow lives in Chicago and she and Solomon have a law office at 1718 E. 89th 

Street in Chicago. Solomon signed and Barlow notarized his signature on the petition sheets 

circulated by him sometime after midnight on December 15 while Solomon and Barlow were 

at Barlow’s residence in Chicago. According to Solomon, the sheets circulated by Brooks and

Brown were notarized the day before–Sunday, December 14–at the office. But those two 

petition sheets likewise bear a notarization date of December 15. Solomon was asked, “And 

when [Barlow] notarized the petition sheets of Mr. Brown and Ms. Brooks, it’s fair to say they 

were not present, correct?” Solomon replied, “They were because they were notarized the day 

before at the office.” Solomon admitted that Brown and Brooks did not come to Barlow’s 

house in the early morning hours of December 15. 

¶ 7 Following this testimony, counsel for Scholefield informed the Board that he was “gravely 

concerned” about proceeding with the hearing and that he interpreted Solomon’s testimony as 

conceding that Barlow notarized the signatures of circulators who were not physically present. 

Counsel for the Board informed Solomon that “we have an obligation to seriously consider 

whether or not we should file a complaint with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 

Commission” and urged Solomon not to say anything further, informing him of his “right to 

remain silent.”

¶ 8 Despite this dire admonition, Solomon proceeded to explain that he arranged for both 

Brown and Brooks to come to the law office on Sunday, December 14, so that Barlow could 

notarize their signatures. Solomon did not recall whether he was present in the office at the 

time, but had no reason to believe that Brown and Brooks had not personally appeared before 

Barlow to have their signatures on the petitions notarized. Solomon conceded that the date 

Barlow placed on each sheet was incorrect, but argued that such a mistake would not invalidate 

the notary’s certification that the signer appeared before her or affect the validity of his 

nominating papers. 

¶ 9 After Solomon’s testimony, Scholefield rested. In colloquy with the Board, counsel for 

Scholefield stated his belief that Solomon had admitted that Brown and Brooks were not 

present on December 15 when Barlow notarized their signatures and that this evidence 

satisfied his burden of proof regarding the allegation of fraud. With respect to Solomon’s 

eligibility for office, counsel for the Board clarified that the allegation related to compensation 

received by Solomon as an adjunct professor and Scholefield rested with respect to that 

objection as well. 

¶ 10 Solomon then called Barlow to testify. Barlow attested that Solomon personally appeared 

before her to sign the sheets he circulated, although at one point she stated Solomon’s sheets 

were notarized in the office and not at her residence. She could not recall whether she affixed 

her notary seal to Solomon’s sheets before or after midnight on December 14. She further 

testified that Brown and Brooks came to her office on the “weekend” and, after she checked 

both individuals’ identification, both signed their sheets in her presence. On

cross-examination, Scholefield’s counsel asked Barlow whether Brown and Brooks “spent any 

time” with her on Monday, December 15, and Barlow reiterated her recollection that they 
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came to the office on the “weekend.” No further evidence was presented at the hearing. 

Specifically, Barlow was not asked, either by Solomon or by counsel for Scholefield, whether 

the date of her notarization on Brooks’ and Brown’s signatures was correct.

¶ 11 On March 4, 2015, the Board issued its decision invalidating Solomon’s nomination papers 

and removing his name from the ballot. The Board found that the compensation Solomon 

received as an adjunct faculty member violated section 3-7(e) of the Public Community 

College Act, which provides, with respect to board members: 

“Members of the board shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for 

their reasonable expenses incurred in connection with their service as members. 

Compensation, for purposes of this Section, means any salary or other benefits not 

expressly authorized by this Act to be provided or paid to, for or on behalf of members 

of the board.” 110 ILCS 805/3-7(e) (West 2012). 

The Board reasoned that the “compensation” referred to in section 3-7(e) was not “limited to 

that earned specifically as a Member of the Board” and that because Solomon received 

compensation from District 510 in his capacity as an adjunct professor, he was not qualified for 

the office of trustee. The Board further determined that Solomon’s position as an adjunct 

faculty member potentially conflicted with his duties as a member of District 510’s board since 

it was conceivable that as a member of District 510’s board, he could be called on to pass on 

matters relating to salary or other benefits for adjunct faculty. For this additional reason, the 

Board determined that Solomon was not qualified for the position. 

¶ 12 Separately, the Board determined that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the 

finding that the circulators other than Solomon did not appear before Barlow at the time she 

notarized their signatures. Specifically, the Board found that Solomon “admitted that the 

petition sheets of Brooks and Brown were not properly notarized because they never 

personally appeared before Barlow, the notary public.” This admission, according to the 

Board, constituted a “total disregard for the mandatory requirements of the Election Code,” 

which required invalidation not only of the sheets circulated by Brooks and Brown, but also of 

any other documents notarized by Barlow, including the sheets circulated by Solomon and his 

statement of candidacy. Based on its findings, the Board invalidated Solomon’s nominating 

papers and ordered that his name be stricken from the ballot. 

¶ 13 Solomon timely sought review of the Board’s decision in the circuit court and on March 

17, 2015, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. Solomon filed his notice of appeal on 

March 18, 2015, and we granted his motion to accelerate this appeal and to accept memoranda 

in lieu of formal briefs. 

¶ 14 ANALYSIS 

¶ 15 Electoral boards are considered to be administrative agencies. Jackson v. Board of Election 

Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 46; Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers 

Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 209 (2008). Under section 10-10.1 of the Code, a candidate or 

objector aggrieved by the final decision of an electoral board may obtain judicial review of the 

board’s decision in the circuit court. 10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2012). Although the Code does 

not specifically adopt the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2012)), 

the standards governing judicial review of a final decision of an election board are 

substantially the same as those governing review of other agency decisions. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d 
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at 209. In particular, the standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law and mixed 

questions of fact and law are the same. As we recently reiterated in Cunningham v. Schaeflein: 

“This court deems an electoral board’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact to 

be prima facie true and correct, and we will not overturn such findings on appeal unless 

they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citations.] A determination is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly 

evident. [Citation.] Our supreme court has explained that where the historical facts are 

admitted or established, the controlling rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is 

whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, the case presents a mixed question of 

fact and law for which the standard of review is ‘ “clearly erroneous.” ’ [Citation.] An 

administrative agency’s decision is deemed clearly erroneous ‘when the reviewing 

court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) [Citation.] Pure questions of law, including 

questions of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] Additionally, 

where the historical facts are established, but there is a question about ‘whether the 

governing legal provisions were interpreted correctly by the administrative body, the 

case presents a purely legal question for which [the court’s] review is 

de novo.’ [Citation.]” Cunningham v. Schaeflein, 2012 IL App (1st) 120529, ¶ 19. 

Where a circuit court reviews an electoral board’s decision, we review the decision of the 

board, not the circuit court. Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 46; Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 212. 

¶ 16 As in any election dispute, we are mindful of the fact that “ballot [access] is a substantial 

right and not to be lightly denied.” Siegel v. Lake County Officers Electoral Board, 385 Ill. 

App. 3d 452, 460-61 (2008). We must “tread cautiously when construing statutory language 

which restricts the people’s right to endorse and nominate the candidate of their choice.” Lucas 

v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 176 (1997). 

¶ 17 Solomon’s Qualification for Office

¶ 18 The qualifications necessary for a candidate for the office of trustee on the board of an 

Illinois community college are set forth in section 3-7(c) of the Public Community College 

Act: 

“Each member must on the date of his election be a citizen of the United States, of the 

age of 18 years or over, and a resident of the State and the territory which on the date of 

the election is included in the community college district for at least one year 

immediately preceding his election.” 110 ILCS 805/3-7(c) (West 2012). 

There is no dispute that Solomon satisfies the foregoing requirements. Scholefield contended 

and the Board found, however, that the provisions of section 3-7(e) regarding the requirement 

that board members serve “without compensation” impose an additional requirement and that 

Solomon’s admitted receipt of “compensation” as an adjunct professor in District 510 

disqualified him from serving on the board. We disagree. 

¶ 19 As in any case involving the construction of a statute, “[o]ur primary objective is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best indication of legislative intent 

is the language employed by the General Assembly, which must be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning.” Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d 398, 408 (2011). 
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¶ 20 Whether we view this issue as the application of a statutory standard (“serve without 

compensation”) to admitted facts (Solomon’s status as an adjunct professor) under the clearly 

erroneous standard or as a question concerning whether the governing standard was properly 

interpreted by the Board, which we review de novo (see Goodman, 241 Ill. 2d at 404 

(candidate admitted that at the time of filing his petition he was not a resident of the judicial 

subcircuit from which he sought election; question presented was whether the electoral board 

properly interpreted residency requirement in Illinois Constitution; de novo review applied)), 

we come to the same result: Solomon’s receipt of compensation for his services as an adjunct 

professor is legally irrelevant to his qualification to serve as a trustee. Section 3-7(e) means, in 

its plain and unambiguous language, that trustees shall serve without compensation for their 

services as members of the board. Compensation received by trustees from employment or 

other endeavors unrelated to their board service does not disqualify them from serving. 

Further, nothing in section 3-7(c) conditions a candidate’s eligibility for the office of trustee on 

his or her sources of income. Thus, Solomon’s receipt of compensation from District 510 did 

not constitute a valid basis upon which to invalidate his nominating papers. 

¶ 21 The Board further considered whether Solomon’s adjunct professor position could 

potentially conflict with his service as a trustee and, concluding that it could, determined that 

this was an additional ground on which the objection should be sustained. This was error. As a 

creature of statute, an electoral board “may exercise only those powers conferred upon it by the 

legislature.” Delay v. Board of Election Commissioners, 312 Ill. App. 3d 206, 209 (2000) 

(citing Kozel v. State Board of Elections, 126 Ill. 2d 58, 68 (1988)). It is “the unique province 

of the objector” to “raise issues [and] objections” to a candidate’s petition and supporting 

papers. Mitchell v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 399 Ill. App. 3d 18, 27 (2010).

Under section 10-8 of the Code, an objector’s petition “shall state fully the nature of the 

objections to the certificate of nomination or nomination papers.” 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 

2012). The Code does not permit amendments to objections. Siegel, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 456. 

“[W]hen ‘evidence beyond specific objections’ is introduced during the [hearing before the 

electoral board], that evidence must at least bear on some ‘general objection that the candidate 

was called upon to answer’ in the objector’s petition.” Cunningham, 2012 IL App (1st) 

120529, ¶ 33 (quoting Delay, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 209). It is improper for an electoral board to 

raise its own objections to a nominating petition sua sponte. Delay, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 210; 

Mitchell, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 27. 

¶ 22 Examination of Scholefield’s objection reveals that, as it pertains to Solomon’s 

qualifications for office, Scholefield claimed only that Solomon’s receipt of “compensation” 

within the meaning of section 3-7(e) disqualified him from serving as a trustee. Nothing in the 

objection called upon Solomon to address whether his adjunct professor status could conflict 

with his service as a trustee because at some point he might be called upon to vote on salaries 

or other matters relating to District 510’s adjunct professors. Thus, the Board exceeded its 

authority in invalidating Solomon’s statement of candidacy on a ground never raised by 

Scholefield in his objections. Further, as the focus of this issue is a potential future conflict that 

may or may not arise in the future should Solomon be elected, it bears no relationship to the 

Board’s essential function, i.e., protection of the electoral process. See Fortas v. Dixon, 122 Ill. 

App. 3d 697, 701 (1984) (“ ‘when in the course of hearing objections to nominating papers, 

evidence beyond specific objections comes to the electoral board’s attention, it cannot close its 

eyes and ears if evidence is relevant to the protection of the electoral process’ ”).
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¶ 23 Moreover, even if Scholefield’s objection focusing on Solomon’s receipt of 

“compensation” as disqualifying him from office could be construed to encompass this issue, 

we would nevertheless reject it as a basis for sustaining the objection. The Board concluded 

that “[i]f elected, [Solomon’s] active union membership in the South Suburban College 

Adjunct Faculty Association would render him unable to fulfill his duties of office with full 

and impartial loyalty.” But nothing in the record proves, nor could it prove, that Solomon 

would choose to continue in either his professional or union roles if elected to serve as a 

trustee. 

¶ 24 As support for its finding on this point, the Board cited People ex rel. Teros v. Verbeck, 155 

Ill. App. 3d 81 (1987). In Verbeck, the defendant was elected as a member of the Rock Island 

County board and later accepted a position as deputy coroner of Rock Island County. Given 

that (i) one of the duties of the county board was to fix the salary of the county coroner and 

provide a budget for the coroner’s office, and (ii) the deputy coroner’s salary was determined 

by the coroner subject to budgetary limitations established by the county board, the court found 

that the two offices were incompatible. “The potential for influencing [defendant’s] superior’s 

salary and budget and, ultimately, [defendant’s] own salary, without more, renders defendant’s 

offices incompatible.” 155 Ill. App. 3d at 83-84. Further, the court found that because the 

offices were legally incompatible, defendant’s offer to refrain from participating as a county 

board member in matters involving the coroner’s office was not a satisfactory solution. “[T]he 

common law doctrine of incompatibility *** insure[s] that there be the appearance as well as 

the actuality of impartiality and undivided loyalty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The 

remedy was defendant’s ouster from his elected position.

¶ 25 Verbeck does not apply here. First, as Solomon points out, the common law doctrine of 

incompatibility applies in the context of an individual who holds two public offices. See 

People ex rel. Fitzsimmons v. Swailes, 101 Ill. 2d 458 (1984) (county board member and 

township assessor); Verbeck, 155 Ill. App. 3d 81 (county board member and deputy county 

coroner). An adjunct professor is not elected or appointed to that position, but is a part-time 

employee or independent contractor for an institution of higher learning. Second, while a 

circuit court in an action in quo warranto has the authority to order forfeiture of an elected 

position, the legislature has conferred no such authority on an electoral board. Rather, the 

scope of an electoral board’s authority in resolving an objection to nominating papers is to 

determine whether those papers are in compliance with governing provisions of the Code. 

Goodman, 241 Ill. 2d at 411. In effect, the Board’s ruling here imposed a new eligibility 

requirement for trustee candidates: their outside employment or sources of income must never 

pose the possibility of a conflict with their service on the board. This was beyond the Board’s 

authority and we, therefore, reject it as a basis for invalidating Solomon’s certificate of 

candidacy. 

¶ 26 The Challenge to Circulators’ Signatures

¶ 27 As noted above, Scholefield’s second objection related to his claim that the circulators of 

Solomon’s petitions failed to appear personally before a notary to have their signatures on the 

petition sheets notarized as required by section 7-10 of the Code. 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2012) 

(requiring that a circulator’s affidavit “shall be sworn to before some officer authorized to 

administer oaths in this State”). Scholefield argued and the Board found that Solomon 

“admitted” that two of his circulators did not appear personally before Barlow to sign their 
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sheets. “[T]he evidence shows that the Candidate himself, admitted that the petition sheets of 

Brooks and Brown were not properly notarized because they never personally appeared before 

Barlow, the notary public.” No other factual findings are included in the Board’s decision. We

find no such admission in the record and our review of the evidence presented at the hearing 

reveals no other basis upon which we can affirm the Board’s decision on this point.

¶ 28 In a proceeding to contest a nominating petition, the objector bears the burden of proof. 

Carlasare v. Will County Officers Electoral Board, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 15; Hagen v. 

Stone, 277 Ill. App. 3d 388, 390 (1995). We review the Board’s factual findings on this issue 

under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210. 

¶ 29 A circulator’s failure to appear before a notary public to have his or her signature notarized 

on petition sheets is a violation of section 7-10 of the Code and requires, at a minimum, that 

those petition sheets be invalidated. Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board, 79 Ill. 2d 469, 470 

(1980) (“the failure of the circulator to personally appear before the notary public invalidates 

the petition”). If an objector demonstrates a pattern of improper swearing, all sheets signed by 

the circulator and sworn to by the notary will be invalidated. Cunningham, 2012 IL App (1st) 

120529, ¶ 39 (“This court has recognized that where the sheets of a nominating petition 

submitted by a circulator evidence a pattern of fraud, false swearing, and total disregard for the 

requirements of the Election Code, the sheets circulated by that individual should be stricken in 

their entirety. Canter [v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board], 170 Ill. App. 3d [364,] 368 

[(1988)] ***; [citation].”). We have also recognized that the requirement that a circulator 

appear personally before a notary public “ensures the integrity of the circulation process, and 

in turn, the political process.” Id. ¶ 40 (citing Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 532, 537 

(1976)). 

¶ 30 Both Solomon, who testified in Scholefield’s case-in-chief, and Barlow, who was called by 

Solomon, testified that Brooks and Brown came to the law office on the “weekend” before 

Monday, December 15, and signed their sheets in Barlow’s presence. Other than the date of 

December 15 appearing on those sheets, no one ever suggested and, importantly, Scholefield 

failed to present any proof that Barlow notarized these sheets on December 15 outside the 

circulators’ presence and after the circulators had earlier signed them. Solomon, on the other 

hand, signed his sheets in Barlow’s presence during the late evening of December 14 or the 

early morning of December 15. We find no equivocation in Barlow’s testimony on this point; 

she consistently testified all three circulators signed their petition sheets in her presence, 

refuting the precise objection raised by Scholefield. 

¶ 31 Although Scholefield criticized Solomon for not establishing that the December 15 date on 

Brooks’ and Brown’s sheets was a mistake on Barlow’s part, that contention overlooks 

Scholefield’s burden to establish any impropriety in Solomon’s nominating papers. 

Scholefield chose not to subpoena the circulators to testify at the hearing. In any event, if 

Barlow actually notarized the circulators’ signatures on December 14, but mistakenly wrote 

December 15, such mistake would not invalidate the petition sheets assuming the circulators 

appeared personally to sign the sheets in her presence. The essential act required under the 

Code is the personal appearance of the circulator before a notary; the fact that the date on the 

notarization is off by one day does not impugn the integrity of the oath-taking process. 

“Substantial compliance can satisfy a mandatory provision of the Election Code, however, as 

even a mandatory provision does not require strict compliance.” Cunningham, 2012 IL App 
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(1st) 120529, ¶ 23 (transposing numbers of circulator’s address did not require invalidation of 

petitions). 

¶ 32 Scholefield failed in his burden to establish that the circulators did not sign the petition 

sheets in the presence of the notary public as he claimed in his objection. The Board’s contrary 

finding is not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Finding no support for the 

Board’s conclusion that the evidence at the hearing established a pattern of fraud in “total 

disregard for the requirements” of the Code, we hold the Board erred in invalidating the sheets 

signed by Brooks and Brown and, further, in invalidating all of the petition sheets on the 

ground that such a result was necessary to vindicate the integrity of the electoral process. 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION 

¶ 34 We reverse the Board’s decision sustaining the objections to Solomon’s candidacy and 

nominating papers and its determination that Solomon’s name shall not appear on the ballot for 

the consolidated election to be held on April 7, 2015. Due to the proximity of the Board’s 

decision to the election date, and the fact that ballots had already been printed, the circuit court 

ordered the county clerk to issue a notice to voters in District 510 that Solomon had been 

removed from the ballot. In order to counter the effects of this notice, we further direct the 

clerk of Cook County to withdraw that notice from circulation. The mandate shall issue 

immediately. Ill. S. Ct. R. 368(a) (eff. July 1, 2006). 

¶ 35 Reversed; mandate issued immediately.