J-S11001-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.H. AND E.H., 

PARENTS

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3125 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered September 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-45-DP-0000055-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 29, 2019

Appellants, T.H. (“Mother”) and E.H. (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”), 

appeal from the permanency review order that continued the dependency and 

foster care placement of their daughter, D.H. (“Child”), born in October of 

2005. The order further denied Parents’ request that Child be returned to 

their care and that her primary permanency goal be changed from subsidized 

permanent legal custodianship (“SPLC”) back to reunification. After careful 

review, we affirm.

The trial court fully set forth the facts of this case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion, but we summarize some of the relevant factual and procedural history 

as follows. Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/18, at 1-10. Child was diagnosed with 

oppositional defiant disorder (“ODD”) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder (“ADHD”), for which she was prescribed several medications and for 
J-S11001-19

- 2 -

which she has an individualized education program (“IEP”) at her school. N.T., 

6/29/18, at 8-9.

In 2016, Parents and Child lived with Paternal Grandmother in her 

home. Id. at 10. In April that same year, Child, who had been prescribed 

melatonin for sleep issues, ran out of medication. Mother went to a pharmacy 

and, after consultation with a clerk about non-prescription medication, 

purchased Benadryl. Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/18, at 1. Although Child was 

under twelve years old, Mother administered a dosage intended for a twelveyear-old. Id. As a result, Child became unconscious. Id. Mother attempted 

to wake Child by slapping her, resulting in bruising over her right eye and on 

her thigh. Id. When Child did not wake, Mother placed her in a cold shower 

and alerted Father and Paternal Grandmother. Id. Rather than calling 911 

or taking Child to the nearest hospital, the family drove Child to a regional 

hospital further away. Id. At the hospital, Child’s body temperature was 

measured at 94 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. A criminal investigation was 

commenced, but no charges were filed as a result. Id. Nevertheless, a Child 

Protective Services (“CPS”) investigation concluded with Mother’s indication 

for causing injury to Child. Id.

After a shelter care hearing on April 19, 2016, Child was removed from 

Parents’ custody and placed in foster care. Child was adjudicated dependent 

on April 25, 2016, with an initial permanency goal of reunification. 

Permanency review hearings were held in July of 2016, October of 2016, 
J-S11001-19

- 3 -

January of 2017, April of 2017, July of 2017, October of 2017, January of

2018, June of 2018, and August of 2018. The October 2017 permanency 

order first established a primary permanent placement goal as SPLC, although 

a concurrent goal remained reunification.1

Parents originally participated in programming through Justice Works 

from July of 2016 through February of 2017. N.T., 6/29/18, at 47-48. The 

programming consisted of nurturing parenting, case management, and visit 

coaching. Id. Services were closed out in February of 2017 because Parents 

had not made significant progress, and Child was not safe in the home at that 

time. Id. at 67-68, 70.

Regarding Parents’ compliance, they have worked to address their 

employment issues, attended therapy and received counseling, and attended 

parenting classes. N.T., 6/29/18, at 44-45. Although there are no real safety 

issues with the home itself, the Monroe County Office of Children and Family 

Services (“CYS”) continued to have safety concerns regarding Parents’ 

interactions and behaviors. Id. at 9-10.

Child is anxious around Parents to the point that she picks her skin, 

causing open wounds. Id. at 31, at 37, 41-42; N.T., 8/22/18, at 43-47, 55-

56. Child expressed anxiety to her caseworker about being alone with 

Parents. N.T., 6/29/18, at 40. Child’s foster mother reported that after visits 

____________________________________________

1 Parents did not appeal the goal change at that time.
J-S11001-19

- 4 -

and telephone calls from Parents, Child has a spike in negative behavior, and 

that she will sometimes refuse to answer the telephone if Parents call. Id. at 

43.

On March 8, 2018, Parents filed a petition seeking to terminate Child’s 

care plan, return Child to Parents’ care, or alternatively, to hold a hearing to 

determine whether the permanency goal should be changed. Petition, 3/8/18, 

at 1. Parents argued that they complied with the family service plans and that 

they were being deprived of their rights under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 2. 

Permanency review hearings concerning the petition were held on June 29, 

2018, and August 22, 2018.2

Parents and Child’s guardian ad litem submitted briefs for the court’s 

consideration. On September 18, 2018, the court entered the permanency

review order that is the subject of the instant appeal. The court found that 

Child’s placement continued to be necessary and appropriate; Parents had 

made moderate compliance with their permanency plan and towards 

alleviating the circumstances necessitating the original placement; CYS had 

made reasonable efforts to finalize Child’s permanency plan; reasonable 

efforts were made to comply with the family finding requirements of 

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1149; placement in the home was contrary to the welfare of Child; 

____________________________________________

2 Anthony Quaranta, Amy Carr, Nancy Wenzel, and Marcia Coronata testified 

for CYS. Child testified in camera. Parents called Ana Velez, Cherrell Gaynor, 

and Paternal Grandmother to the stand and testified on their own behalf.
J-S11001-19

- 5 -

Child’s placement was the least restrictive placement meeting the needs of 

Child; and Child’s placement goal should continue as placement with a legal 

custodian, with a concurrent goal of return to parent or guardian. Order, 

9/18/18, at 1-3.

Parents timely appealed on October 17, 2018. Initially, they failed to 

contemporaneously file their statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued an order on 

October 18, 2018, allowing Parents ten days from the date of entry of the 

order to file their statement. Parents complied and filed their statement of 

errors that same day.3 The trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on 

December 18, 2018.

On appeal, Parents raise the following issues for our review:

A. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record when it found that 

the parents’ compliance with the family services plan was 

“moderate”?

B. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record when it found that 

“[CYS] meets with the Parents and counselors together to discuss 

concerns”?

____________________________________________

3 While the initial notice of appeal was defective, we need not dismiss the 

instant appeal because Parents later filed their statement, there was no 

allegation of prejudice from the late filing, and appellate review was not 

impeded. In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. Super. 2009); Cf. J.P. v. 

S.P., 991 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding that the appellant waived issues 

for appeal by failing to comply with the trial court’s order directing her to file 

a Rule 1925(b) Statement within twenty-one days); cf. J.M.R. v. J.M. 1 A.3d 

902 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding the same, except as to an order of this Court).
J-S11001-19

- 6 -

C. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record when it found that 

“[t]here has been moderate progress toward alleviating the 

circumstance which necessitated the original placement”?

D. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record when it found that 

“[CYS] has satisfied the requirements of [Pa.R.J.C.P. 1149] 

regarding [f]amily [f]inding”?

E. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record when it found that 

visitation with [P]arents is adequate in that they have one 

supervised visit weekly in the community?

F. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record by finding that 

[C]hild remains dependent?

G. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record when it failed to 

provide an opinion fully addressing and evaluating the body of 

evidence submitted by Parents or relevant statutes, codes or legal 

precedent?

H. Did the [c]ourt commit error at law or abuse its discretion by 

making a finding not supported by the record or law when it found 

that the “placement is the least restrictive placement that meets 

the needs of the child and there is no less restrictive alternative 

available, in that the child’s needs are being met[,”] where there 

is another capable custodial parent (and Grandparent) available 

and there was no family fact finding or family group decision 

meeting held?

Parents’ Brief at 2-4.

With regard to dependency cases:

[t]he standard of review which this Court employs in cases of 

dependency is broad. However, the scope of review is limited in 

a fundamental manner by our inability to nullify the fact-finding of 

the lower court. We accord great weight to this function of the 

hearing judge because he is in the position to observe and rule 

upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear 
J-S11001-19

- 7 -

before him. Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule 

his findings if they are supported by competent evidence.

In re N.A., 116 A.3d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2015). Thus, we employ an 

abuse of discretion standard. In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

We have further noted:

[w]hen a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper 

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on what 

the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved. 

Moreover, although preserving the unity of the family is a purpose 

of the [Juvenile] Act, another purpose is to “provide for the care, 

protection, safety, and wholesome mental and physical 

development of children coming within the provisions of this 

chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he relationship 

of parent and child is a status and not a property right, and one 

in which the state has an interest to protect the best interest of 

the child.”

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some citations omitted). 

When the court removes a child from his or her home, our Rules of Juvenile 

Court Procedure provide that the court must determine whether “the child’s 

placement is the least restrictive placement that meets the needs of the child, 

supported by reasons why there are no less restrictive alternatives 

available[.]” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1242(C)(3)(c); see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 1514(A)(2).

During a child’s dependency:

[t]he standard against which visitation is measured . . . depends 

upon the goal mandated in the family service plan. Where . . . 

reunification still remains the goal of the family service plan, 

visitation will not be denied or reduced unless it poses a grave 

threat. If . . . the goal is no longer reunification of the family, 

then visitation may be limited or denied if it is in the best interests 

of the child or children.
J-S11001-19

- 8 -

In re C.B., 861 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting In re B.G., 774 

A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. 2001)).

Regarding the disposition of dependent children, the Juvenile Act (“the 

Act”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6351(e)-(g), provides the criteria for a permanency plan 

and the review thereof. The Act provides that permanency review hearings 

should be conducted within six months of removal from the parents’ care, and 

within six months of each prior permanency hearing until the child is returned 

to her parents or removed from the jurisdiction of the court. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6351(e)(3)(i). The purpose of these hearings is to review the permanency 

plan of the child, determine the date by which the goal of permanency might 

be achieved, and consider whether placement continues to be best suited to 

the safety, protection, and physical, moral, and mental welfare of the child. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e)(1). At the conclusion of the permanency review 

hearings, the court must issue an order determining a disposition best suited 

to the safety and protection, as well as the physical, mental, and moral welfare 

of the child. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(g).

The Act provides, in relevant part, that the trial court should determine 

the following at each permanency hearing:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with 

the permanency plan developed for the child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
J-S11001-19

- 9 -

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement 

goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might 

be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the 

permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

* * *

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22 

months or the court has determined that aggravated 

circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need to remove the child from the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need 

not be made or continue to be made, whether the county agency 

has filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to 

adopt the child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to 

the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling reason 

for determining that filing a petition to terminate parental 

rights would not serve the needs and welfare of the child; 

or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with necessary 

services to achieve the safe return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian within the time frames set forth in the

permanency plan.

* * *

(12) If the child has been placed with a caregiver, whether the 

child is being provided with regular, ongoing opportunities to 

participate in age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate 

activities. In order to make the determination under this 

paragraph, the county agency shall document the steps it has 

taken to ensure that:
J-S11001-19

- 10 -

(i) the caregiver is following the reasonable and prudent 

parent standard; and

(ii) the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to engage in 

age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities. 

The county agency shall consult with the child regarding 

opportunities to engage in such activities ... .

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f). Based upon the analysis made under Subsection (f), 

the trial court should determine the appropriate placement for the child. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(.1). A trial court is not required to itemize its findings as 

long as it considers the various factors of Section 6351(f), concludes that 

reunification is not the appropriate placement goal, and provides reasons for 

its conclusion that are supported by the record. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010). During permanency reviews, the statute mandates a focus 

on the child’s best interests, and the safety, permanency, and well-being of 

the child take precedence over all other considerations. In re S.B., 943 A.2d 

973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008); In Interest of: T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 623-

624 (Pa. Super. 2018).

With regard to the definition of “reasonable efforts,”

[b]ecause the focus of the Juvenile Act is on the dependent child, 

as opposed to parents, any services for parents must directly 

promote the best interests of the child. In re J.R., 875 A.2d 

[1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2005]. “By requiring only ‘reasonable 

efforts’ to reunify a family, the statute recognizes that there are 

practical limitations to such efforts.” Id. at 1118, n. 5 (citing 43 

Pa.C.S. §§ 6351(e) & (f)). “It is not sufficient for the court to find 

simply that an action will promote family reunification; the court 

must also determine whether the action constitutes a reasonable

effort towards reunification.” Id. (emphasis in original). This 

Court has stressed that the agency is not expected to do the 

impossible and is not a “guarantor of the success of the efforts to
J-S11001-19

- 11 -

help parents assume their parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing In re J.W., [578 A.2d 

952, 959 (Pa. Super. 1990)]).

In Interest of C.K., 165 A.3d 935, 942 (Pa. Super. 2017). The first eighteen 

months of a child’s placement is crucial for establishing services. Id. at 944.

Additionally, during dependency cases, the Rules of Juvenile Court 

Procedure require that the trial court engage in family finding, in relevant part, 

in the following manner:

A. Court’s inquiry and determination.

(1) The court shall inquire as to the efforts made by the county 

agency to comply with the family finding requirements pursuant 

to 62 P.S. § 1301 et seq.

(2) The court shall place its determinations on the record as to 

whether the county agency has reasonably engaged in family 

finding.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1149. The official comment to the rule further explains that

efforts by the county agency may include, but are not limited to 

whether the county agency is or will be: a) searching for and 

locating adult relatives and kin; b) identifying and building positive 

connections between the child and the child’s relatives and kin; c) 

when appropriate: i) supporting the engagement of relatives and 

kin in social service planning and delivery of services; and ii) 

creating a network of extended family support to assist in 

remedying the concerns that led to the child becoming involved 

with the county agency; d) when possible, maintaining family 

connections; and e) when in the best interests of the child and

when possible, keeping siblings together in care.

The extent to which the county agency is involved in the case 

when a child is still in the home is dependent on several variables 

and specific to each case. In some instances, the county agency 

is more involved and actively engaged in family finding because 

the child needs support services or could be removed from the 

home. The search in these instances is used to find resources to 
J-S11001-19

- 12 -

help keep the child in the home by preventing removal, or to find 

resources if removal becomes necessary.

Id., cmt. (emphasis added).

With a goal change petition, the trial court 

considers the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan 

developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal 

for the child might be achieved.

In Interest of A.N.P., 155 A.3d 55, 67 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re 

A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

Here, Parents raise eight issues challenging the trial court’s 

permanency-review order and the determinations made therein. Parents’ 

Brief at 2-4. Essentially, they argue that continued dependency and a 

permanency goal of SPLC is not warranted where Parents were making 

progress in addressing the issues that led to Child’s dependency, that CYS did 

not make reasonable efforts at reunification, and that placement was not the 

least restrictive alternative available. Id. at 30-59. Many of these arguments 

repeat and rephrase previous issues. Further, we note that many of Parents’ 

arguments contain no citation to any legal authority, and accordingly risk 

waiver. S.M.C. v. W.P.C., 44 A.3d 1181, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2012); Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a). However, we decline to find waiver in this instance. Nevertheless, 

Parents’ claims do not merit relief.
J-S11001-19

- 13 -

We address Parents’ first, third, and sixth issues together for ease of 

analysis. Parents contend that the court abused its discretion in finding that 

Child remained dependent. Parents’ Brief at 46. Parents claim that they are 

in substantial, not moderate, compliance with their family services plan; that

the circumstances leading to the original placement were alleviated; that CYS 

did nothing to further the concurrent goal of reunification; and that even if 

their compliance was only “moderate,” compliance is not the sole factor the 

court must consider. Id. at 30-34, 36-43, 46-53.4 Essentially, Parents 

disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the evidence of record and the 

credibility determinations made regarding Parents’ testimony. Id. at 52.

The trial court addressed its finding of dependency and the placement 

goal in the following manner:

In this case, we continued [Child’s] dependency and foster 

placement and retained the current placement goal because the 

evidence convinced us that doing so was in her best interests. In 

summary, as of the date the most recent review hearing 

concluded, [Child] had continuously been dependent and in care 

for 28 months. During the first 18 months, despite the services 

provided by CYS and Justice Works, Parents made little progress. 

As a result, the goal was changed to SPLC in October of 2017. 

Over the next 10 months or so, Parents have made some 

progress. However, their progress has not been enough for them 

to demonstrate, even at a visit, that they are currently ready to 

parent [Child] properly and safely. In this regard, Parents still 

____________________________________________

4 Parents raise additional arguments, namely, that their due process rights 

were violated and that they were not given a fair hearing. However, because 

Parents fail to cite any legal authority in support of this position, or further 

elaborate upon the alleged due process violations, they have waived the 

arguments for purpose of appeal. S.M.C., 44 A.3d at 1189; Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a).
J-S11001-19

- 14 -

fight at visits, are not yet on the same page regarding coparenting, and are still developing their parenting and coping 

skills. Despite their testimony and belief to the contrary, Parents 

have not been able to transfer what they have learned, or what 

they are learning, to visits or other settings outside of their 

counseling sessions.

Very significantly, given the history of this case and the 

conduct of Parents during visits, anticipation of upcoming visits 

causes [Child] anxiety to the point that she picks at her skin, 

[Child] has concerns about being alone with Parents, there is a 

spike in [Child’s] negative behaviors after both visits and phone 

calls, and that [Child] sometimes does not want to answer the 

phone when she sees that it is Parents who are calling.

Additionally, Parents have not progressed to the point where

they are self-sufficient, generally or in their ability to parent 

[Child]. Parents currently rely on Paternal Grandmother for 

housing, for guidance, and, apparently, at least in part for 

financial support. There is no question that Paternal Grandmother 

is the support that Parents would need to parent [Child], at least 

at any time in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, Parents still 

argue with Paternal Grandmother during or resent her presence 

at visits and at times recoil against her parenting advice.

During the two and one-third years that [Child] has been 

dependent, foster families, not Parents, have cared for her. While 

[Child]’s behaviors at first necessitated two or three placement 

changes, she has now been in her current foster home for more 

than 18 months with a family in whose care she has made great 

strides, that cares for her, and who want to be a permanent 

resource for her. In this regard, although [Child] still has 

behavioral issues and emotional and educational needs, while in 

her current foster placement her behaviors have “subsided 

tremendously” and she is being transitioned out of a partial 

hospitalization program into a less restrictive special education 

classroom in her home school. [Child] still loves her parents and 

wants to continue to see and have a relationship with them, but 

has also expressed that she would like to be adopted by her foster 

family and, in any event, realizes that she will need to remain in 

her foster home.5

5 According to Parents and their attorney, [Child] has 

also stated that she wants to go home to Parents. It 
J-S11001-19

- 15 -

is interesting that Parents and their attorney point this 

out since counsel argued at [the] hearing that [Child] 

was not competent to testify and even took the 

position that the [c]ourt should not speak with her. 

Not surprisingly, when we spoke with [Child] she had 

trouble staying focused or on point. For clarification, 

we did not base our finding that interaction and 

anticipated interaction with Parents causes [Child] 

anxiety and increases negative behaviors on our in 

camera discussion with [Child]. Rather, we based 

those findings on the evidence presented by others, 

including the testimony of the CYS caseworker, the 

CYS visit supervisor, and [Child’s] therapist, reports 

from the foster parents, and the observations and 

arguments of the GAL.

Simply put, on paper, Parents have checked off most of the 

boxes regarding their service plan goals. However, Parents’ 

recent compliance has not been accompanied by progress which, 

when viewed in context of the history of this case, objectively 

demonstrates their ability to properly and safely parent [Child], to 

ensure her mental, physical, and emotional well-being, and to 

promote her best interests. Moreover, while most boxes have 

been checked, interaction with Parents still causes [Child] anxiety. 

In contrast, [Child] is doing well in her foster home where she is 

improving behaviorally and her safety, well-being, and everyday 

needs are being met.

* * *

As noted, Parents and their attorney spent significant time 

attempting to relitigate and downplay the initial overdose incident. 

However, the time for doing so is long past. The incident occurred 

and [Child] was adjudicated dependent in April of 2016. Any 

challenge to the initial dependency determination should have 

been made long ago.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/18, at 13-16.

Here, while the trial court did indeed find Parents in only moderate 

compliance with the permanency plan, this finding was not the sole reason 

Child’s dependency was continued and Parents’ request for a placement 
J-S11001-19

- 16 -

change denied. Although the trial court did not itemize its findings, it 

examined the relevant, mandated statutory factors in depth, including the 

continuing necessity for and appropriateness of placement, the extended 

length of time Child had been in care, and the extent of progress Parents made 

towards alleviating the circumstances that led to the placement – namely, 

Parents’ poor judgment regarding medical and parenting decisions of Child. 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190; 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f). Additionally, Parents’ goals 

were to obtain stable employment and housing, but Parents have been unable 

to achieve this goal without the assistance of Paternal Grandmother.

Although Parents argue that the trial court’s findings are not supported 

by the record and that the court did not make specific credibility 

determinations, a thorough examination of the notes of testimony provides 

otherwise. Essentially, Parents disagree with the fact that the trial court 

credited the testimony of caseworkers rather than the testimony of Parents, 

particularly with regard to certain contested issues such as the cause of Child’s 

anxious habit of picking her skin. This, however, is a credibility determination, 

and where the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, we will not 

disturb them on appeal. N.A., 116 A.3d at 1148. Accordingly, we discern no 

error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s thorough analysis and 

conclusions regarding dependency and placement goals.

Parents’ second issue challenges the court’s findings that CYS had made 

reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan. Parents’ Brief at 24. In 
J-S11001-19

- 17 -

so arguing, Parents contend that the court erred in determining that “the 

Agency meets with the Parents and counselors together to discuss concerns” 

because there was minimal record evidence to support this conclusion. Id. at 

34. Parents argue that they were not informed of medical, dental, and school 

appointments related to their daughter, and that CYS caseworkers did not 

meet with their counselors. Id. at 35.

However, as noted above, CYS is not expected to “do the impossible” as

long as the services provided are reasonable efforts and such services are 

provided within an appropriate period. C.K., 165 A.3d at 942. Here, CYS did 

indeed provide services promptly to assist Parents, including supervised 

visitation, caseworker services, visit coaching, case management services, 

and parenting classes. Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/18, at 4. The trial court 

noted that in the first fifteen to eighteen months of Child’s placement – a 

critical time after which a termination petition may be filed – Parents had made 

little substantive progress to the point that services were discontinued. Id. 

Parents have provided no definition of “reasonable efforts” or case law to 

suggest that the services provided to them did not rise to the level of 

reasonable efforts. At this juncture, reunification is no longer the primary 

goal. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse of 

discretion in finding that CYS made reasonable efforts towards reunification. 

N.A., 116 A.3d at 1148; L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174.
J-S11001-19

- 18 -

In their fourth issue, Parents argue that CYS did not satisfy the 

requirements of Pa.R.J.C.P. regarding family finding. Parents’ Brief at 43. 

Parents assert that there was evidence that Child’s relatives were present in 

the courtroom and were willing to serve as a placement resource, but they 

had never been contacted for a meeting with CYS, nor was any evidence 

presented that CYS had engaged in family finding as mandated by “best 

practices” under law. Id. at 43-44.5 Essentially, Parents contend that the 

trial court’s determination that CYS had engaged in family finding was 

contradicted by the record and testimony. Id. at 44.

As noted above, the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure require that the 

court engage in family finding, including inquiry into the efforts made by the 

county agency to comply with the family finding requirements pursuant to 62 

P.S. § 1301 et seq. Pa.R.J.C.P. 1149. These efforts may include, but are not 

limited to, searching for and locating adult relatives and kin, identifying and 

building positive connections among the child, child’s relatives, and kin, and 

____________________________________________

5 Parents point to their letters to CYS sent in July of 2018 and August of 2018, 

requesting family group decision-making meetings, as proof that CYS did not 

engage in family finding. Parents’ Brief at 44. The July 27, 2018, and August 

7, 2018, letters addressed to CYS are included in Parents’ reproduced record, 

but they do not appear in the certified record. Although the letters were 

admitted as R-26 and R-27 into evidence, the responsibility rests upon Parents 

to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete. In re G.T., 897 

A.2d 1197, 1198 (Pa. Super. 2006). Here, it appears that none of the exhibits 

entered into evidence during the hearings were included in the certified 

record.
J-S11001-19

- 19 -

when appropriate, supporting the engagement of relatives and kin in social 

service planning. Id., cmt.

The record reflects the court found that CYS satisfied the requirements 

of Pa.R.J.C.P. 1149 regarding family finding in orders dated July 7, 2016; 

October 13, 2016; January 12, 2017; April 6, 2017; July 13, 2017; 

October 12, 2017; January 4, 2018; June 29, 2018; and September 18, 2018. 

In each of these orders, the court directed CYS to continue to engage in family 

finding until ordered otherwise. There is no evidence that CYS did not comply 

with these orders.

The first indication in the record that Parents challenged this contention 

was in their proposed permanency review order, filed with the court 

September 7, 2018. In that proposed order, Parents averred that there were 

“two” relatives that could have served as potential resources, but did not name 

said relatives, nor did they elaborate upon CYS’ failure to contact them, or cite 

to any relevant statutory authority or law in their memorandum of law. 

Memorandum of Law, 9/7/18, at 1-25; Proposed Order, 9/7/18, at 1-2. At 

the hearings, Parents’ counsel did not raise the issue of family finding, either 

as placement resources or as a potential family group, and counsel asked 

Parents no questions regarding potential family members, either as placement 

resources or as members of a desired family group. On cross-examination, 

when questioned regarding additional “family group members,” Father 

responded, “Possibly my brother . . . he lives in Nazareth or has a Nazareth 
J-S11001-19

- 20 -

address. I’m not sure exactly what county.” N.T., 8/22/18, at 137-138. 

Additionally, on cross-examination, Mother stated that an additional family 

member she would want present at family group as “my Aunt [B.]” Id. at 

156. Mother added, “There’s not a whole lot of family members that I consider 

blood family members but we do have family friends that we consider 

blood . . . .” Id.

Parents raise the issue specifically, and for the first time, in their 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Concise 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 10/18/18, at ¶ 4. Based on the 

above, we conclude that Parents failed to properly raise this issue before the 

trial court, and have accordingly waived it for purposes of appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

In their fifth issue, Parents argue that the trial court committed an error 

of law and abuse of discretion when it found that once-weekly supervised 

visitation was adequate. Parents’ Brief at 45. Parents argue that because the 

reason for Child’s placement has been eliminated, there is no reason Child 

cannot return to Parents’ home for weekly visits. Id. Parents contend that 

this treatment does not allow them to show “they can put what they have 

learned in parenting class into practice.” Id. at 45-46. 

Here, while Child’s goal remained reunification, visitation was provided. 

In July of 2016, Parents had once-weekly supervised visitation with Child. 
J-S11001-19

- 21 -

Permanency Review Order, 7/7/16, at 2. In October of 2016, Parents had 

supervised visitation with Child in the community. Permanency Review Order, 

10/13/16, at 2. In January of 2017, Parents had once-weekly visitation with 

Child in their home. Permanency Review Order, 1/12/17, at 2. In April of 

2017, Parents had once-weekly supervised visitation, location unspecified. 

Permanency Review Order, 4/6/17, at 2. In July of 2017, Parents had twiceweekly supervised visits in the community. Permanency Review Order, 

7/13/17, at 2-3. At no time during the pendency of this case is there any 

indication of record that Parents objected to or filed a request for a change in 

visitation.

As noted supra, if the goal is no longer reunification, then visitation may 

be limited or denied if it is in the best interests of Child. C.B., 861 A.2d at 

293. In October of 2017, Child’s goal was changed from reunification to 

placement with a legal custodian. Permanency Review Order, 10/12/17, at 1-

2. At that time, Parents’ visitation remained twice-weekly supervised visits in 

the community. Id. Insofar as orders following the goal change show, 

visitation remained twice-weekly supervised visits in the community and at a 

minimum once per week. Permanency Review Order, 1/4/18, at 1-2; 

Permanency Review Order, 6/29/18, at 1-2; Permanency Review Order, 

9/18/18. Here, visitation was not substantially altered from what it had been 

during the pendency of the case. Further, it was in the best interest of Child 

for visitation to be limited to supervised and outside of the home, as evidence 
J-S11001-19

- 22 -

was presented that showed that visits caused Child anxiety, to the point that 

she would pick at her skin and occasionally refuse to answer telephone calls 

from Parents. C.B., 861 A.2d at 293. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in setting visitation as 

“supervised visitation with [Child] at a minimum once per week in the 

community.” Permanency Review Order, 6/29/18, at 1-2; Permanency 

Review Order 9/18/18, at 1-2; N.A., 116 A.3d at 1148; L.Z., 111 A.3d at 

1174.

In Parents’ seventh issue, they argue that the court erred and abused 

its discretion by failing to provide an opinion fully addressing and evaluating 

“the body of evidence” submitted by Parents or relevant statutes. Parents’ 

Brief at 53. They contend that they were deprived of due process and did not 

receive a fair hearing. Id. at 53-54. Parents argue that they were not 

adequately notified of what they must do to satisfy CYS, pointing to the trial 

court’s observation that Parents had not completed psychological evaluations 

as proof of a due process violation. Id. at 56. Initially, we note that Parents 

have, again, failed to cite any case law discussing due process claims. 

Accordingly, they have risked waiver of this argument. S.M.C., 44 A.3d at 

1189; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Regardless, this issue is without merit.

As noted above, in dependency cases, after permanency review 

hearings the court must issue orders continuing, modifying, or terminating 

placement or other disposition best suited to the safety, protection and 
J-S11001-19

- 23 -

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(g). The 

statute also provides the findings of fact necessary for such orders. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6351 (e), (f), (f.1). In the instant case, the trial court’s permanency review 

order comports with the statute. A permanency review order is not the avenue 

through which Parents may obtain an extensive discussion of the evidence, 

relevant case law and statutory authority, or claims of error. To this end, the 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on appeal is the appropriate avenue for more 

through discussions of the court’s order and the reasoning behind it. A 

thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion was issued in this case that discussed and 

weighed the evidence, made credibility determinations, and set forth the 

appropriate case law. Parents, of course, disagree with the court’s findings 

and credibility determinations. As the trial court notes, “it is clear that Parents 

take issue with [the court’s] findings and conclusions because [it] did not view 

the evidence in the manner they advocated and [the trial court’s] findings do 

not agree with their proposed findings. This does not allege, much less 

establish, error.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/18, at 18.

As discussed above, we do not discern an error of law or abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that continued dependency and a 

permanency goal of SPLC best suited Child’s interests. N.A., 116 A.3d at 

1148; L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174. 

Finally, Parents argue that the trial court committed an error of law or 

abused its discretion by finding that SPLC is the least restrictive placement 
J-S11001-19

- 24 -

available to Child. Parents’ Brief at 58. Parents argue that because Mother 

offered to move out of the house for six months, Child should be allowed to 

return to the home. Id. Parents argue that CYS did not prove that Child 

remained dependent from March 2018 through August 2018, and that it did 

not consider any other alternatives to foster care. Id. at 59.

Parents’ contention is without merit. As discussed extensively above, 

Child was adjudicated dependent and remained dependent throughout the 

proceedings of this case. Regardless, we address Parents’ contention that 

SPLC is not the least restrictive placement available to Child. Here, the 

evidence established that Parents were unable to pass a parenting class 

through Justice Works. Although Parents have been attending counseling, 

visitation supervisors and caseworkers have not seen any application of 

parenting skills or the results of said counseling during Parents’ visitation. 

Parents still argue with each other and Paternal Grandmother, resort to 

physical discipline too quickly, and Mother is still too controlling of Child and 

dismissive of Father. Child exhibits signs of anxiety before and after visits 

with Parents, and seems ambivalent about her own placement preferences.

Finally, we note the following observations of the trial court:

Parents have offered to have Mother move out of Paternal 

Grandmother’s home if [Child] is returned. They believe this 

ameliorates any safety concerns. For the reasons set forth above, 

we did not and do not view this as a viable option at this time. 

Parents, individually or collectively, need to make more progress, 

internalize what they have learned and are learning, and 

ameliorate, if not completely erase, the conduct that causes 

[Child] anxiety before return in any context may be considered. 
J-S11001-19

- 25 -

This is especially true given the length of time this case has been 

open and the stability [Child] has and the progress she is making 

in her current foster home.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/18, at 18-19. We discern no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s reasoning or in its conclusion that SPLC is the least restrictive 

alternative available to Child at this time. N.A., 116 A.3d at 1148; L.Z., 111 

A.3d at 1174.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/29/19