J-S51044-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KAYEEJAH OAKLEY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

THOMAS RICHARD CLARK,

Appellant No. 3000 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 26, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No.: 140100583

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2016

Appellant, Thomas Richard Clark, appeals from the trial court’s August 

26, 2015 order entering judgment in favor of Appellee, Kayeejah Oakley, 

and denying his motion for post-trial relief.1 Specifically, he claims that the 

court should have granted post-trial relief because it erred in granting 

Appellee’s motion in limine. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant purports to appeal from the August 26, 2015 order denying his 

post-trial motion. “An appeal from the denial of post-trial motions is 

interlocutory and not a final appealable order.” Sagamore Estates Prop. 

Owners Ass'n v. Sklar, 81 A.3d 981, 983 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). However, the prothonotary also entered judgment on August 26, 

2015. “The entry of judgment sufficiently perfects our jurisdiction, and we 

may proceed to consider the appeal on its merits.” Id. We have corrected 

the caption to reflect that Appellant is appealing from the judgment entered. 
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We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our 

review of the certified record and the trial court’s December 15, 2015 

opinion. On January 9, 2014, Appellee filed a breach of contract action 

against Appellant alleging that he breached an oral contract between the 

parties when he refused to deliver title to a Porsche Panamera after Appellee 

made all required payments to him. 

Prior to trial, the court considered two motions in limine filed by 

Appellee. The first, filed May 13, 2015, sought to preclude introduction of 

evidence from unrelated criminal proceedings involving the parties. The 

second, filed May 15, 2015, sought to preclude evidence in the form of text 

messages, which he contended were produced after the discovery deadline 

had passed. Appellant filed an answer to the first motion, but failed to file 

an answer to the second motion, in contradiction of the court’s pretrial 

order, which required a response to motions within ten days of service.2 

(See Order, 5/04/15). On June 11, 2015, the court denied Appellee’s 

____________________________________________

2 The relevant portion of the pretrial order provides: 

(4) Motions in Limine shall be filed and served upon all 

opposing counsel not later than fifteen (15) days before jury 

selection for trial. . . . Respondent(s) shall file and serve an 

answer within ten (10) days thereafter. If Motions in Limine

have been resolved or are uncontested, the trial judge should be 

notified immediately.

(Order, 5/04/15).
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motion to preclude evidence of criminal proceedings. (See N.T. Hearing, 

6/11/15, at 11; Order, 6/11/15). With respect to Appellee’s motion in limine

seeking to preclude the text message evidence, it found that counsel had 

nearly one month to answer, and yet failed to file a response or opposition 

to the motion. Therefore, it granted the motion and precluded evidence of 

the text messages. (See N.T. Hearing, 6/11/15, at 11-13; Order, 6/11/15). 

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.

The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 12, 2015. At trial, Appellee 

testified that in July 2012, he was in the market for a new car. (See N.T. 

Trial, 6/12/15, at 46). However, because his credit score was so low, he 

was unable to obtain financing for a loan. (See id. at 47). At the time, 

Appellant and Appellee were close friends. (See id. at 45). 

Appellee testified that when he found out that he was unable to 

purchase the car in his own name, he asked Appellant, “let me just put it in 

your name and then put the rest of the loan in your name, and let me pay it 

off, and then once it’s paid off, you give me the title and I will put the car in 

my name.” (Id. at 49). Appellee intended to pay sixty-thousand dollars as 

a down payment for the car. (See id. at 50). Thereafter, he agreed to pay 

off the car as quickly as possible by giving Appellant “lump sum payments 

every chance that [he] got[,]” and to make the payments either directly, in 

person to Appellant, or by depositing the payments into Appellant’s bank 

account. (Id.; see id. at 169-70). Appellee claims that pursuant to their 

agreement he was responsible for paying off the car before Appellant 
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purchased a new car, which he anticipated would happen in one or two 

years. (See id. at 49-50, 134). 

On July 5, 2012, Appellant and Appellee went to the Main Line Porsche 

dealership and purchased the vehicle. Appellee paid the agreed to 

$60,000.00 down payment. (See id. at 53). Appellant obtained financing 

for the $35,000.00 balance due on the car through Gateway Lending, the 

dealership’s finance company. (See id. at 54-55). The loan had a sixtymonth term at a twelve and one-half percent interest rate, which resulted in 

monthly minimum payments of $764.57. (See id. at 56-57).

In his trial testimony, Appellant testified that he and Appellee agreed 

that if Appellee gave him “[h]alf the money down on the car, collateral for 

the remaining balance of the car and [payment of the balance] in six 

months[,]” Appellant would sign for the loan. (N.T. Trial, 6/15/15, at 46). 

He testified that after he and Appellee purchased the car, Appellee gave him 

a Rolex watch, which was worth at least twenty-five thousand dollars, as 

collateral. (See id. at 50). He and Appellee had a falling out in October 

2012, after which they agreed that Appellant would give Appellee back the 

watch, Appellee would “cash it out,” meaning that he would sell the watch, 

and use the money to pay off the loan. (Id. at 54; see id. at 52-54). 

Appellant testified that from June through December 2012, Appellee 

made cash deposits of varying amounts into his bank account for the car 

loan, and in January 2013, Appellee gave him $9,000.00 in cash as 

payment. (See N.T. Trial, 6/12/15, at 195-96). Appellee’s deposits all 
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exceeded the minimum loan payment. (See id. at 200). Appellant 

conceded that in November 2013, Appellee paid him $9,080.00, which he 

confirmed was the final amount due on the loan. (See id. at 206-07). 

However, Appellant did not pay off the loan from Gateway Lending, because 

he perceived the agreement between the parties to have required the loan 

to be paid off in six months, by December 2012. (See id. at 170, 208). 

Appellant had the car repossessed from Appellee in November 2013. 

(See N.T. Trial, 6/15/15, at 58). He later sold the car for fifty-one thousand 

dollars. (See id. at 93). Appellant agreed that Appellee paid approximately 

ninety-five thousand dollars on the car; however, he explained that he did 

not give him any money back after he sold the car because Appellee had 

breached their contract. (See id. at 91). Appellant did not make an oral or 

written motion for a directed verdict at the close of evidence. 

On June 15, 2015, the jury arrived at a unanimous verdict finding that 

a contract existed between the parties, Appellee satisfied his obligations 

under the contract, and Appellant breached his obligations. (See id. at 

170). The jury awarded Appellee damages of $60,000.00. (See id. at 171). 

On June 25, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief, in 

which he sought a new trial or alternatively, entry of judgment in his favor. 

He argued that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion in limine. 

In his brief, Appellant also attempted to obtain a directed verdict pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 226. See Pa.R.C.P. 226(b) (“At the 

close of all the evidence, the trial judge may direct a verdict upon the oral 
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or written motion of any party.”) (emphasis added). On August 26, 2015, 

the trial court denied Appellant’s motion and entered judgment in favor of 

Appellee. 

This timely appeal followed. Pursuant to the trial court’s order, 

Appellant filed his timely statement of errors complained of on appeal on 

December 24, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court entered its opinion 

on December 15, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises two questions on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court’s August 26, 2015, order was an 

abuse of discretion and error of law when it denied [Appellant’s] 

[p]ost-trial motion seeking a new trial due to the trial court’s 

granting of [Appellee’s] [m]otion in [l]imine which precluded the 

entry at trial of various text messages exchanged between the 

parties which were germane to the underlying transaction at 

issue[?]

2. Whether the trial court’s August 26, 2015, order was an 

abuse of discretion and error of law when it denied Appellant’s 

[p]ost-trial motion seeking entry of judgment pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(a)(2) because had the various text messages 

been admitted at trial, the jury would have likely returned a 

verdict in favor of Appellee [sic] [?]

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).3

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3 We note that Appellant attempts to raise an additional issue in his brief 

challenging the denial of an alleged motion for a directed verdict. (See

Appellant’s Brief, at 13). However, this issue was not raised in his 

statement of questions presented, nor can it be inferred therefrom. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Appellant also failed to raise it in his statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. Accordingly, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our standard of review concerning denial of a post-trial motion is wellsettled.

[O]ur standard of review when faced with an appeal from 

the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is whether the 

trial court clearly and palpably committed an error of law that 

controlled the outcome of the case or constituted an abuse of 

discretion. In examining the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner, to reverse the trial court, we must 

conclude that the verdict would change if another trial were 

granted. Further, if the basis of the request for a new trial is the 

trial court’s rulings on evidence, then such rulings must be 

shown to have been not only erroneous but also harmful to the 

complaining parties. Evidentiary rulings which did not affect the 

verdict will not provide a basis for disturbing the jury’s 

judgment. . . .

Moreover, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within 

the sound discretion of the trial court. In reviewing a challenge 

to the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by 

the trial court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law.

Blumer v. Ford Motor Co., 20 A.3d 1222, 1226 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed 

verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. 

We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of 

discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Moreover, after careful review of the certified record, we find that 

Appellant failed to make an oral or written motion for a directed verdict at 

the close of the evidence. See Pa.R.C.P. 226(b); Haan v. Wells, 103 A.3d 

60, 68 (Pa. Super. 2014) (reasoning that failure to move for directed verdict 

results in waiver of right to seek judgment n.o.v.); (see also N.T. Trial, 

6/15/15, at 98-101). Accordingly, this issue is waived. 
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case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is 

the same as that for a trial court.

Drake Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Polyflow, Inc., 109 A.3d 250, 258–59 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citations omitted). Furthermore, “post-trial relief may not be granted 

unless the grounds therefor, (1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial 

proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of 

fact or conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method at 

trial[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b).

In both of Appellant’s issues, he argues that the trial court erred and 

abused its discretion when it granted Appellee’s motion in limine because 

Appellant failed to respond to the motion.4 (See Appellant’s Brief, at 7-12). 

Although he alleges the trial court’s error prejudiced him at trial because it 

resulted in the jury not viewing all of the evidence, he does not provide any 

pertinent discussion concerning whether such error controlled the outcome 

of the case. (See id. at 9-11). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to develop 

any pertinent argument that invokes the applicable standard of review. See

Drake Mfg. Co., Inc., supra at 258–59; Blumer, supra at 1226. 

Appellant’s issues are waived and would not merit relief.

____________________________________________

4 Appellant failed to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring 

the argument section in his brief to be divided into as many parts as there 

are questions to be argued, with pertinent discussion and citation of 

authority concerning each point. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Accordingly, and 

because his questions both concern the trial court’s abuse of discretion in 

granting Appellee’s motion, we discuss Appellant’s issues together.
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A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is 

subject to an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. 

Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie 

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will 

not reverse the court’s decision absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found 

merely because an appellate court might have reached a 

different conclusion, but requires a manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, 

or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. 

In addition, to constitute reversible error, an evidentiary 

ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or 

prejudicial to the complaining party.

Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d 682, 690–91 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 123 A.3d 331 (Pa. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 557 

(2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion in limine after Appellant 

did not file a response objecting to the motion within the ten days provided 

by the court’s order. (See Order, 5/04/15). In fact, Appellant failed to file 

any response to the motion within the nearly one-month period after the 

motion was filed before the court heard argument, and “could provide no 

reason for [his] failure to respond at the trial [c]ourt hearing on [m]otions in 

[l]imine.” (Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 2). As such, the trial court’s 

decision to grant Appellee’s unopposed motion in limine was not manifestly 

unreasonable, or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See 

Parr, supra at 690–91. 

Furthermore, the record is clear that “[Appellant] offered ample 

testimony in his own behalf, and evidence in his own behalf. The jury, as 
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fact finder, did not believe him.” (Trial Ct. Op., at 4). Rather, “[s]ufficient 

evidence was adduced at trial that [Appellant] had the Porsche on which 

[Appellee] had put a down payment of $60,000.00 repossessed without 

consent or knowledge of [Appellee], had converted money [Appellee] had 

given [him] to pay off the car loan, and had sold [Appellee’s] car without 

remunerating [him].” (Id. at 6).

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s 

motion for post-trial relief where Appellant has failed to demonstrate an 

abuse of discretion or error of law, which controlled the outcome of the case. 

See Drake Mfg. Co., Inc., supra at 258–59; Blumer, supra at 1226. 

Appellant’s issues do not merit relief.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/12/2016