HUMANITARIAN AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

ASSISTANCE

Project Evaluations 

and Better 

Information Sharing 

Needed to Manage the 

Military’s Efforts

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2012

GAO-12-359

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-359 a report to 

congressional committees

February 2012

HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT 

ASSISTANCE 

Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing 

Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts

Why GAO Did This Study

In recent years, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has increased its 

emphasis and spending on 

humanitarian assistance efforts outside 

of war and disaster environments. 

From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, 

DOD obligated about $383 million on 

its key humanitarian assistance 

programs. Because civilian agencies, 

such as the Department of State and 

United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) also carry out 

many assistance efforts, DOD’s efforts 

require close collaboration with these 

agencies. This report was conducted 

as part of GAO’s response to a 

statutory mandate and reviewed 

(1) DOD’s management of two key 

humanitarian assistance programs—

the humanitarian assistance program 

funded through its Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

(OHDACA) appropriation and its 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

program—and (2) the extent to which 

DOD, State, and USAID have visibility 

over each others’ efforts. To conduct 

this review, GAO analyzed funding and

program information, and interviewed 

officials at DOD, State, USAID, 

nongovernment organizations, and 12 

U.S. embassies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD update its

humanitarian assistance program 

guidance, improve data management, 

and conduct project evaluations, and 

that DOD, State, and USAID improve 

information sharing. GAO also 

suggests that Congress consider 

clarifying DOD’s role in humanitarian

assistance efforts. DOD partially

agreed with the recommendations, and 

State and USAID agreed with the

recommendations addressed to them. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) management of its key humanitarian 

assistance programs reflects both positive practices and weaknesses:

• Alignment with strategic goals. DOD aligns its humanitarian assistance 

project planning with the goals outlined in U.S. and departmental strategies, 

and has clearly established processes for implementing its projects. 

• Interagency project coordination. DOD has taken steps to coordinate with 

the Department of State (State) and the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) on projects, such as seeking 

concurrence on project proposals and embedding representatives from their 

agencies at its combatant commands, but coordination challenges remain. 

• Poor data management. DOD does not have complete information on the 

status or actual costs of the full range of its Overseas Humanitarian, 

Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects. In addition, Humanitarian and 

Civic Assistance project data in DOD’s database differ from what DOD 

reports to Congress. 

• Limited program evaluations. From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD 

had not completed 90 percent of the required 1-year post-project evaluations 

for its OHDACA projects, and about half of the required 30-day evaluations 

for those projects, and thus lacks information to determine projects’ effects.

• Limited program guidance. DOD’s primary guidance for the OHDACA

humanitarian assistance program is limited, is not readily accessible to all 

DOD personnel, and has not been updated for several years.

Furthermore, DOD, State, and USAID do not have full visibility over each others’ 

assistance efforts, which could result in a fragmented approach to U.S. 

assistance. There are several initiatives under way to improve information 

sharing, including one directed by the National Security Council. However, no

framework, such as a common database, currently exists for the agencies to

readily access information on each others’ efforts. Moreover, the potential for 

overlap exists among agencies’ efforts in four areas: (1) health, (2) education, 

(3) infrastructure, and (4) disaster preparation. For example, both USAID and 

DOD are conducting health care projects in Yemen and building schools in 

Azerbaijan. Overlap may be appropriate in some instances, especially if agencies 

can leverage each others’ efforts. However, given the agencies’ informationsharing challenges, there are questions as to whether DOD’s efforts are an 

efficient use of resources since USAID serves as the lead U.S. development 

agency. State and USAID officials said that DOD’s humanitarian assistance 

efforts can be beneficial, especially when responding to disasters or supporting

foreign militaries. However, officials said DOD’s efforts can have negative 

political effects, particularly in fragile communities where even small gestures, 

such as distributing soccer balls to a particular population, can be interpreted as

exhibiting favoritism. While DOD’s funding for humanitarian assistance is small 

relative to the billions spent by State and USAID, its programs are expanding. 

Given interagency information challenges, the fiscally-constrained environment, 

and the similarity of agencies’ assistance efforts, DOD and the other agencies 

involved in foreign assistance could benefit from additional direction from

Congress on DOD’s role in performing humanitarian assistance in peacetime 

environments. 

View GAO-12-359. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD’s Humanitarian Assistance Program Management 

Incorporates Positive Practices, but Several Weaknesses Hinder 

the Effective Use of Resources 11

Information-Sharing Challenges and Potential for Overlap among 

the Agencies’ Efforts Could Result in a Fragmented Approach to 

U.S. Assistance Efforts 26

Conclusions 40

Matter for Congressional Consideration 41

Recommendations for Executive Action 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 51

Appendix II DOD’s Obligations for Humanitarian Assistance Efforts by Combatant 

Command 59

Appendix III Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Africa Command’s Area of 

Responsibility 61

Appendix IV Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Central Command’s Area of 

Responsibility 62

Appendix V Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. European Command’s Area of 

Responsibility 63

Appendix VI Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Northern Command’s Area of 

Responsibility 64

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Appendix VII Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Pacific Command’s Area of 

Responsibility 65

Appendix VIII Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Southern Command’s Area of 

Responsibility 66

Appendix IX Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Appendixes III-VIII 67

Appendix X Comments from the Department of Defense 73

Appendix XI Comments from the Department of State 80

Appendix XII Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 83

Appendix XIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 86

Tables

Table 1: State and USAID Representatives within DOD’s 

Combatant Commands 14

Table 2: Key DOD, State, and USAID Information-Sharing 

Initiatives 28

Table 3: List of Organizations Contacted 56

Figures

Figure 1: Completed Construction of a Primary School in Vietnam 6

Figure 2: DOD’s OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance 

Program Obligations 7
Page iii GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 3: DOD Soldier Provides Medical Treatment to a Woman in 

Latin America While Engaging in an HCA Medical 

Readiness Activity 9

Figure 4: DOD’s Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations 10

Figure 5: Completed HCA Projects Reported to Congress as 

Compared with HCA Projects Marked “Completed” in 

DOD’s Database, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2009 18

Figure 6: Estimates of Post-Project Evaluations for OHDACA 

Projects Costing over $10,000 for Fiscal Years 2005 

through 2009 21

Figure 7: Potential for Agency Overlap in Some Peacetime 

Humanitarian and Development Assistance Efforts 34

Figure 8: Similar USAID and DOD Health Efforts in Yemen 36

Figure 9: DOD’s OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance 

Obligations by Combatant Command for Fiscal Years 2005 

through 2010 59

Figure 10: DOD’s Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations 

for Projects Conducted within the Combatant Commands’ 

Geographic Areas for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010 60

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

HCA Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

USAID United States Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 8, 2012

Congressional Committees

While much attention has been paid to U.S. military efforts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) has also increased its 

emphasis and spending on humanitarian assistance efforts outside of war

and disaster environments in recent years. DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts include constructing schools, digging water wells, 

preparing communities for natural disasters, and helping local populations 

obtain medical care. DOD policy states that stability operations—which 

include providing humanitarian assistance—are a core U.S. military 

mission that the department shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency 

equivalent to that of its combat operations.1 From fiscal years 2005 

through 2010, DOD obligated about $383 million for its two key 

humanitarian assistance programs2 outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.3

This report was conducted as part of GAO’s annual response to the 

mandate found in Public Law 111-139, Title II, section 21 (2010), which 

requires us to report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in federal 

government programs. We examined the U.S. military’s role in conducting

Civilian agencies, such as the Department of State (State) and the United 

States Agency for International Development (USAID) carry out 

assistance efforts on a larger scale than DOD to build and sustain more 

secure and prosperous nations or provide economic or development 

support. Thus, DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts require close 

collaboration with these federal agencies to avoid potential duplication, 

unnecessary overlap, or fragmentation, and to maximize the return on the 

U.S. government’s investment in foreign assistance.

 

1

This policy was initially established in DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for 

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Nov. 28, 2005). 

The directive was subsequently reissued in modified form as DOD Instruction 3000.05, 

Stability Operations (Sept. 16, 2009).

2

While DOD conducts a variety of humanitarian assistance programs, DOD’s two key 

humanitarian assistance programs are (1) the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid humanitarian assistance program and (2) the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 

program. In this report, we refer to both programs together as DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts. 

3

Figure is in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

humanitarian assistance outside of war or disaster environments, 

including its management of humanitarian assistance efforts and its 

collaboration with State and USAID.4

 Specifically, we reviewed (1) DOD’s 

management of two key humanitarian assistance programs—the 

humanitarian assistance program funded through its Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation5

To conduct our work, we reviewed relevant documents, including 

guidance, legislation, and data related to DOD’s OHDACA and HCA 

programs. We chose to focus on these two key humanitarian assistance 

programs based on interviews with officials from the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency; the Joint Staff; and the Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability 

Operations. We conducted interviews with officials from various DOD 

offices involved in planning and implementing DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts, including the geographic combatant commands and 

Special Operations Command. We also gathered and reviewed guidance, 

strategies, and data from State and USAID and contacted officials from a 

wide range of offices and a selection of 12 U.S. embassies. We selected 

2 embassies within each of DOD’s six geographic combatant commands’ 

areas of responsibility that received the largest amount of OHDACA 

funding from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To understand how much 

DOD has spent on its humanitarian assistance efforts, we obtained 

DOD’s obligations for the OHDACA and HCA programs from fiscal years 

2005 through 2010. Specifically, for the OHDACA humanitarian 

assistance program obligations, we analyzed data from DOD’s Program 

Budget Automated System and determined these data to be sufficiently 

reliable for presenting obligations from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To 

and its 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) program—and (2) the extent to 

which DOD, State, and USAID have visibility over each others’ assistance 

efforts to avoid duplication, unnecessary overlap, or fragmentation.

 

4

Our prior work has identified critical management steps and practices that can help 

agencies to achieve success, including aligning efforts to strategic goals, coordinating with 

stakeholders, collecting complete and accurate data, measuring performance, and 

developing policies to help achieve results.

5

The OHDACA humanitarian assistance program is one component program funded by

the OHDACA appropriation. This report reviews only the OHDACA humanitarian 

assistance program, which will subsequently be referred to in this report as the OHDACA 

program. We did not evaluate DOD’s other programs under OHDACA, such as the 

humanitarian mine action program and the foreign disaster relief initiative. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

determine DOD’s obligations for the HCA program, we used information 

from DOD’s annual reports to Congress on the program for the same time 

period.6

 

6

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 report to Congress was in draft form and had not been submitted 

to Congress at the time of our review. 

To assess DOD’s management of its humanitarian assistance 

programs, we obtained and reviewed DOD directives, reports, and 

guidance on management practices, as well as guidance, instructions, 

and other documents on interagency coordination between DOD and 

State and USAID. To assess the completeness of DOD’s OHDACA and 

HCA project data, we obtained and analyzed data from DOD’s Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System to identify 

discrepancies and determine the accuracy of data entered in the system. 

We assessed these data for reliability and determined that the data were 

not sufficiently reliable for presenting cost and project status data, but 

were sufficiently reliable to present examples of DOD humanitarian 

assistance efforts. We discuss these data issues in this report. To assess 

the extent to which DOD measures the performance of its completed 

humanitarian assistance projects, we analyzed a generalizable random 

sample of DOD’s OHDACA projects that DOD identified as likely to have 

been completed and that cost more than $10,000 to determine the extent 

to which DOD had recorded that performance of required project 

evaluations had been conducted after the projects were completed. We 

interviewed agency officials from the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands to discuss the 

accuracy and completeness of project data in DOD’s Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database and 

challenges to completing project evaluations. To assess the extent to 

which DOD, State, and USAID have visibility over each others’ assistance 

efforts to avoid duplication, unnecessary overlap, or fragmentation, we 

reviewed guidance and documentation on information-sharing initiatives 

and interagency collaboration practices, and interviewed agency officials 

about their information-sharing practices and challenges. We also 

analyzed DOD, State, and USAID project data to identify areas of 

potential overlap between the agencies, and interviewed DOD, State, 

USAID, and nongovernmental organization officials about the potential 

positive and negative consequences of DOD’s involvement in 

humanitarian assistance efforts.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 through 

February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on 

our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.

DOD operates two key humanitarian assistance programs: (1) the 

humanitarian assistance program funded through its OHDACA 

appropriation7 and (2) the HCA program.8 Projects for both the OHDACA 

and the HCA programs are generally planned and implemented at the 

geographic combatant command level, with initial project proposals 

developed at the embassy (country) level (see apps. II through VIII for 

information on each DOD geographic combatant command’s OHDACA 

and HCA funding and efforts and app. IX for information in non-interactive 

form). In addition, DOD’s Special Operations Command conducts 

humanitarian assistance efforts through its Civil Military Support 

Elements, in support of DOD’s geographic combatant commands.9 DOD’s 

humanitarian assistance efforts have been largely performed outside of 

Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

7

The OHDACA humanitarian assistance program is one component program funded by 

the OHDACA appropriation. This report reviews only the OHDACA humanitarian 

assistance program, which will be referred to in this report as the OHDACA program. We 

did not evaluate DOD’s other programs under OHDACA, such as the humanitarian mine 

action program and the foreign disaster relief initiative. 

8

DOD defines HCA as assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. 

forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises limited to certain specific 

purposes. Additionally, the assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that 

incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Joint Publication 3-57, Civil 

Military Operations (July 8, 2008).

9

Special Operations Command stated that it does not receive humanitarian assistance 

funding but that its forces may execute projects with funding provided to the combatant 

commands. 

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

DOD uses authority provided in section 2561 of Title 10 of the United 

States Code to conduct its OHDACA program. The program is managed 

by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, while the initial planning, 

prioritization, and implementation of projects are generally coordinated by 

the geographic combatant commands.10 DOD issued its most recent 

guidance on the OHDACA program in 2009 to provide a framework that 

the geographic combatant commands can use to evaluate the 

appropriateness of potential humanitarian assistance projects.11

• improving DOD visibility, access, and influence while building and/or 

reinforcing security and stability in a host nation or region;

DOD’s 

humanitarian assistance efforts are aimed at

• providing disaster mitigation training and/or bolstering host nation 

capacity to avert humanitarian crises and response to disasters; and

• generating collaborative relationships with a host nation’s civil society 

as well as positive public relations and goodwill toward DOD.

In addition to advancing U.S. defense interests, DOD’s policy guidance 

states that humanitarian assistance efforts should address the 

humanitarian needs of the targeted population. As part of the OHDACA 

program, DOD conducts efforts that include disaster preparedness 

projects; basic construction; digging or improving water wells and other 

sanitation and drinking water projects; repairing/building rudimentary 

infrastructure such as roads or bridges; and the renovation of public 

facilities, such as schools, hospitals, clinics, and orphanages (see fig. 1).

 

10The Defense Security Cooperation Agency fosters security cooperation programs vital to 

U.S. national security to build trust and influence in peacetime, to have access to regions 

of the world during times of crisis, and to ensure interoperability with coalition partners 

during times of conflict. Security cooperation programs provide financial and technical 

assistance, ensure transfer of defense materiel, provide training and services to friendly 

countries and allies, and promote military-to-military contacts.

11Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and 

Interdependent Capabilities, Policy Guidance for DOD Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Program (HAP) (November 2009).

OHDACA-Funded 

Humanitarian Assistance 

Program
 

Page 6 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 1: Completed Construction of a Primary School in Vietnam

Notes: Kien Quoc Primary School is an OHDACA-funded school construction project in Vietnam that 

was completed in July 2010. This photograph illustrates a portion of a ceremony in which DOD turned 

over the completed school building to the local Vietnamese government.

From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DOD obligated about $328.4 million 

to support the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program. In fiscal year 

2005, DOD obligated about $45.2 million as compared with about 

$72.4 million in fiscal year 2010, which represented an increase in 

obligations of about 60 percent over the time period12 (see fig. 2). Over 

this 6-year time period, DOD’s Pacific and Southern Commands obligated 

the highest amounts—about $93.8 million and $75.8 million dollars, 

respectively (see app. II).

 

12Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 2: DOD’s OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Program Obligations

Notes: Figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program, as 

distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars.

DOD conducts its HCA program using authority provided in section 401 of 

Title 10 of the United States Code. The HCA program was managed by 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency through 2010, and Joint Staff 

officials said that the program has been managed by the Joint Staff since 

January 1, 2011. Initial planning, prioritization, and implementation of 

projects are generally coordinated by the geographic combatant 

commands. Two DOD instructions and implementing guidance provide 

direction for the HCA program.13

 

13DOD Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance (HCA) Program (Jan. 27, 1995); DOD Instruction 2205.02, Humanitarian and 

Civic Assistance Activities (Dec. 2, 2008); and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

Policy/Programming Guidance for FY 2008 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) 

Projects and Activities (May 1, 2007).

Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance Program
 

Page 8 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

U.S. armed forces personnel participate in HCA efforts for strategic, 

operational, or tactical purposes that support military objectives while 

concurrently reinforcing skills required for the operational readiness of the 

forces executing an HCA mission. According to DOD guidance, when 

engaging in HCA efforts, U.S. military occupational specialists will provide 

services relevant to their specialties. For example, for HCA medical 

projects, DOD should utilize U.S. military doctors, dentists, nurses, 

pharmacists, or health administrators as appropriate. Furthermore, 

according to DOD, under existing guidance prescribed by the Secretary of 

Defense, HCA efforts should, among other things,

• promote the security interests of the United States and the host nation 

as well as the specific operational readiness skills of the members of 

the U.S armed forces who participate in the efforts;

• complement, and not duplicate, any other form of social or economic 

assistance that may be provided to the host nation by any other U.S. 

department or agency;

• assist the civilian population, that is, projects cannot benefit any 

individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary 

activity; and

• be approved by the U.S. ambassador to the foreign country where the 

activity will occur or by the U.S. Secretary of State.

HCA projects include basic construction and repair of public facilities; 

construction of surface transportation systems; construction of basic 

sanitation facilities; drilling wells for water; and the provision of medical, 

dental, surgical, and veterinary care (including education, training, and 

technical assistance) in rural or underserved areas of a foreign country 

(see fig. 3).
 

Page 9 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 3: DOD Soldier Provides Medical Treatment to a Woman in Latin America 

While Engaging in an HCA Medical Readiness Activity

From fiscal years 2005 through 2010 DOD obligated about $75.1 million 

in support of the HCA program. The obligations for the HCA program are 

about one quarter of the amount of the funds obligated to the OHDACA 

humanitarian assistance program, although obligations for DOD’s HCA 

program have increased by about 75 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 

2010.14 In fiscal year 2005, DOD obligated about $8.5 million compared 

with about $14.9 million in fiscal year 2010 (see fig. 4). Over this 6-year 

period, obligations were the highest for HCA projects in DOD’s Southern 

and Pacific Commands’ geographical areas, at about $32.5 million and 

$21.9 million, respectively (see app. II).

 

14Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. These figures do not include some costs 

associated with HCA activities, such as costs for transportation and military personnel. 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 4: DOD’s Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations

Note: Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars.

In addition to the OHDACA and HCA programs, DOD conducts other 

humanitarian assistance-type efforts, such as HIV/AIDS treatment and 

prevention assistance to foreign military personnel and their families. For 

example, from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DOD obligated about 

$477.3 million to the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR) and about $27.3 million on its Defense Health Program for 

HIV/AIDS efforts.15

 

15Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars and do not include all of the 

administrative costs associated with these programs. 

DOD also conducts efforts to help nations in Africa 

and Asia respond to an influenza pandemic, using $15 million provided by 

USAID for efforts from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. In addition, DOD 

has created a coordination group to develop global health guidance for 

the department and examine DOD’s role in global health efforts.

Other Humanitarian 

Assistance-Type Efforts
 

Page 11 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

DOD’s management of its two key humanitarian assistance programs—

OHDACA and HCA—has incorporated positive practices, such as 

aligning project planning to U.S. and departmental strategic goals and 

collaborating with State and USAID on individual projects. However, DOD 

is unable to determine whether it is using its resources efficiently and 

effectively because of three key weaknesses in management oversight: 

(1) incomplete project information because of data management 

problems, (2) the absence of post-project evaluations for determining the 

effects of DOD’s efforts, and (3) limited guidance for the OHDACA 

program. 

Recognizing that strategic plans are the starting point and underpinning 

for setting program goals, DOD has generally aligned its OHDACA and 

HCA project planning to U.S. and departmental strategic goals, and it has 

clearly established processes for project implementation. DOD’s policy 

guidance supports the use of DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts to 

achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy goals. Moreover, DOD’s 

Guidance for Employment of the Force and its Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan require each geographic combatant command to produce a theater 

campaign plan and specific posture requirements for its given area of 

responsibility.16

 

16According to the Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan for FY 2008, CJCSI 3110.01G (Mar. 1, 2008), each of the geographic 

combatant commanders is required to produce a theater campaign plan. Furthermore, 

each geographic combatant commander, except the Commander of U.S. Northern 

Command, is also required to develop theater posture plans as annexes to the theater 

campaign plan.

Combatant command officials told us that they link the 

goals of their humanitarian assistance projects to specific goals or 

objectives identified in the command’s theater campaign plan or in DOD’s 

overarching strategic planning guidance. For example, Northern 

Command officials said they develop a prioritized list of potential 

humanitarian assistance projects each year based in part on identified 

missions, goals, and priorities from the command’s theater campaign 

plan. Similarly, Central Command stated that requirements for its 

OHDACA projects are derived from the command’s theater campaign 

plan objectives.

DOD’s Humanitarian 

Assistance Program 

Management 

Incorporates Positive 

Practices, but Several 

Weaknesses Hinder 

the Effective Use of 

Resources 

DOD Aligns Humanitarian 

Assistance Project 

Planning to Strategic Goals 

and Has Clearly 

Established Processes for 

Implementing Projects
 

Page 12 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

In addition, DOD has clear processes in place for planning, prioritizing, 

and implementing OHDACA projects. Policies, procedures, techniques, 

and mechanisms that enforce management’s directives are an integral 

part of an entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability 

for stewardship of government resources and achieving effective 

results.17 The overall OHDACA program is managed by the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency, while the planning, prioritization, and 

implementation of projects generally are coordinated through the 

geographic combatant commands. Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

officials explained that their office provides funding for the OHDACA 

program to the combatant commands in response to annual budget 

requests submitted by the commands. They said that when providing 

funds, they review factors such as the commands’ past funding levels and 

how commands have executed past funding. The Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency also reviews and approves all individual projects that 

cost more than $10,000, and officials explained that its review considers 

the justifications for a command’s project proposals and whether a project 

is aligned with the command’s strategic guidance. The initial planning and 

development of OHDACA projects for all of the combatant commands, 

except for Northern Command, are generally conducted at the country 

level with input required from USAID officials.18

 

17GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

Some of the commands 

permit project proposals to be initiated by host nations or other 

government agencies, such as USAID. The processes for prioritizing 

individual OHDACA projects vary across the commands. For example, 

Pacific Command has recently developed an activity prioritization process 

that involves assigning points for the degree to which a project meets 

established criteria, while at Central Command, officials said that projects 

are prioritized according to the assets available to execute a project in a 

given country. Many of the commands use entities such as the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers or the Naval Facilities Command to implement their 

projects.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

18Officials from Northern Command explained that their projects are developed at the 

combatant command level rather than the country level because DOD staff at the 

embassies in Mexico and the Bahamas generally did not have enough time to plan 

humanitarian assistance efforts. The officials acknowledged that it would be better for the 

projects to be developed at the country level because there would be greater familiarity 

with the country’s needs. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

The HCA program was managed by the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency through 2010, and Joint Staff officials said that the program has 

been managed by the Joint Staff since January 1, 2011. Joint Staff 

officials explained that they serve in a quality assurance role to ensure 

that projects have been coordinated among the combatant commands, 

interagency stakeholders, and host nations. They also said that the Joint 

Staff reviews and approves HCA projects. The overall planning, 

prioritization, and implementation of HCA projects generally are 

coordinated by the geographic combatant commands, similar to the 

OHDACA program.19 Initial project planning and development at all of the 

combatant commands are generally conducted at the country level, with 

input from State officials, and the processes for prioritizing and 

implementing HCA projects can vary across the commands. For example, 

Pacific Command’s business rules require the same approach for 

prioritizing, approving, and implementing HCA projects that it uses for 

OHDACA projects, as discussed above, and European Command 

explained that it budgets its projects through the command’s typical 

operation and maintenance budgeting process.

Over the past several years, DOD has taken several steps to coordinate 

with State and USAID when planning and implementing its humanitarian 

assistance projects. For example, DOD guidance on its OHDACA 

program states that DOD will seek USAID concurrence on project 

proposals early in the project identification process, and certain 

information concerning that collaboration will be documented in DOD’s 

project database. Moreover, DOD’s guidance on its HCA program states 

that combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that HCA 

projects that cost more than $10,000 are conducted with the approval of 

the Secretary of State or his/her designee. DOD has representatives from 

USAID or State embedded within each of its geographic combatant 

commands, and it has placed liaisons at State and USAID offices (see 

table 1). Officials from all three agencies said that these interagency 

personnel at the commands have helped improve coordination with DOD, 

although the roles and quantity of these interagency personnel may be 

limited. For example, some State and USAID officials explained that their 

advisors assigned to DOD’s combatant commands are able to report on 

 

19Northern Command officials said that they do not conduct HCA activities, and no HCA 

projects for the command were reported to Congress from fiscal years 2005 through 2009; 

therefore, this discussion applies to the remaining five geographic combatant commands.

DOD Is Coordinating with 

State and USAID When 

Implementing Projects, but 

Challenges Remain
 

Page 14 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

what is happening in their respective areas of responsibility but cannot 

make decisions or speak on behalf of their home agencies.20

Table 1: State and USAID Representatives within DOD’s Combatant Commands 

Moreover, 

according to USAID officials, USAID made the decision to begin sending 

lower-ranking officials to serve as development advisors in most of the 

combatant commands because of staffing shortages. Officials from both 

USAID and DOD said that this decision could negatively affect 

interagency collaboration at the commands because DOD tends to place 

a heavy emphasis on rank, and lower-ranking USAID officials may not 

have as much access to senior command leadership.

Combatant command State USAID Total

Africa Command 10 3 13

Central Command 3 3 6 

European Command 3 2 5 

Northern Command 3 0 3 

Pacific Command 5 2 7 

Southern Command 7 2 9 

Sources: DOD and USAID.

Notes: Personnel are stationed at the combatant commands’ headquarters. Also, USAID officials 

identified additional positions at some of the combatant commands, but these positions are currently 

vacant.

Each of the 12 U.S. embassies we contacted cited examples of efforts to 

promote interagency coordination. For example, the U.S. embassy in 

Kenya has created an Executive Steering Group consisting of officials 

from State, USAID, and DOD who meet monthly to discuss DOD’s 

humanitarian assistance projects and other efforts that intersect with 

larger diplomatic and development objectives. Similarly, the U.S. 

embassies in the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova have established 

assistance working groups made up of interagency officials who meet at 

least weekly to coordinate U.S. government assistance efforts, including 

DOD’s humanitarian assistance projects, across the embassy. Several 

other embassies that we contacted have also established interagency 

groups to facilitate coordination, such as those in Albania, Peru, Uganda, 

and Djibouti. In addition, DOD’s Pacific Command has begun its “3Ds 

 

20USAID said that representatives from its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are 

authorized to make decisions and speak on behalf of the office.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Forward” initiative intended to improve coordination among DOD, State, 

and USAID efforts in the Asia Pacific region.21

Despite all of these various collaboration efforts, DOD faces challenges in 

interagency collaboration on its humanitarian assistance projects. 

Specifically, many officials stated that interagency collaboration tends to 

be personality driven; when staff are replaced, relationships have to be

rebuilt and progress can be lost. Moreover, coordination on DOD’s 

humanitarian assistance projects can be difficult given the differences in 

total numbers of personnel among DOD, State, and USAID. DOD has 

about 30 times more personnel than State and USAID combined.22

USAID officials said that their agency has staffing shortages, and it can 

be a burden on USAID personnel to have to coordinate and provide 

expertise to DOD on DOD’s humanitarian assistance projects. Officials 

also said that the frequent rotation of personnel can lead to continuity 

challenges.

DOD does not have complete information on the full range of 

humanitarian assistance projects it conducts, which creates uncertainty 

as to whether DOD is able to provide accurate, complete project 

information to other offices within the department, to interagency 

stakeholders, or to Congress.

DOD does not know the status of all of its OHDACA projects—such as 

when a project is going to be implemented, when it is in progress, or 

when and if it has been completed—or the actual costs of nearly one in 

three of its OHDACA projects because it does not consistently update 

project information in its database, the Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared Information System. It is important that agencies have 

complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document 

 

21In the initiative name, “3Ds” stands for defense, diplomacy, and development. The 

initiative aims to identify and coordinate Pacific Command, State, and USAID efforts in the 

region. For example, in Vietnam, Pacific Command recommended coordinating with State 

and USAID on the command’s school-building programs, including consulting with USAID 

to determine appropriate school construction sites. 

22These personnel figures are intended to provide a general understanding of the differing 

sizes of the agencies and do not represent the number of officials dedicated to 

humanitarian assistance efforts. 

DOD Does Not Have 

Complete Information on 

the Full Range of Its 

Humanitarian Assistance 

Projects

DOD Does Not Know the Status 

or Actual Costs of All of Its 

OHDACA Projects 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

performance, and support decision making.23 Our analysis of a DOD list 

of OHDACA projects24

In some cases, DOD may have better information about its OHDACA 

projects at the country level. When we sought information from some 

DOD personnel stationed at U.S. embassies who were responsible for 

OHDACA projects in those countries, officials at some embassies were 

able to provide us with additional details about whether projects had been 

completed. For example, officials from the U.S. embassies in Bangladesh 

and Moldova were able to provide us with more recent information than 

that found in DOD’s database about the current status of projects. 

However, officials from U.S. embassies in Indonesia, Kenya, and Uganda 

that had been marked as “completed” in DOD’s 

database found the data to be incomplete and inaccurate. For example, 

DOD’s list indicated that 35 projects had been completed by Pacific 

Command in fiscal years 2005 through 2010, fewer than had been 

completed by each of the other combatant commands except for Northern 

Command. Yet Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that 

Pacific Command was one of the two commands that conducted the most 

projects in the same time frame. In addition, the total cost recorded in the 

database for these 35 projects was about $5 million, while Pacific 

Command’s actual obligation for its OHDACA projects during this same 

period was almost $89 million. In response to our efforts to clarify these 

discrepancies, the officials acknowledged that the number of projects that 

had actually been completed was likely underrepresented in the list. They 

explained that DOD personnel do not consistently update the projects’ 

status in the database, and thus many projects that were completed had 

probably not been reflected as such in the database. Officials from 

several combatant commands confirmed that keeping DOD’s database 

updated was a challenge because of issues such as having a limited 

number of personnel available to work on OHDACA projects. However, 

without updated project information, DOD does not have accurate 

information to make program management decisions or report information 

to other agencies or to Congress.

 

23GAO, Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, GAO-09-680G 

(Washington, D.C.: July 2009), and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 

1996).

24This list of projects was provided to us by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

which manages the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

responded to our inquiries with the same information that was available in 

DOD’s database—which may not have been accurate.

In addition to not knowing the status of all of its projects, DOD does not 

know how much it has spent on some OHDACA projects because its 

database is not consistently updated with actual cost information after 

projects have been completed. Across all of the geographic combatant 

commands from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, DOD had not updated its 

database with projects’ actual cost information about 30 percent of the 

time for projects that were identified as completed.25 Although DOD 

officials said that the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 

Information System database is not used for financial management 

purposes,26

DOD’s database also does not provide complete information about HCA 

projects, with information in the database differing from what has been 

reported to Congress. DOD is required to submit reports annually to 

the database contains fields for estimated and actual project 

costs that officials said should be updated by personnel at the combatant 

commands. DOD officials explained that this project cost information is 

intended to be used for program management purposes, so that they can 

review the extent to which the projects’ actual costs differed from the 

projects’ estimated costs identified when they were submitted for 

approval. DOD officials acknowledged that the combatant commands do 

not consistently update the cost information in the database. They also 

said that maintaining accurate project cost information in the database is 

a challenge because information cannot be automatically pulled in from 

DOD’s financial management systems.

 

25Across all of the combatant commands, we found that DOD’s database had not been 

updated with actual cost information for 25 percent of projects marked as completed in the 

database for fiscal year 2007, or 49 out of 196 projects; 32 percent of projects for fiscal 

year 2008, or 119 out of 373 projects; 38 percent of fiscal year 2009 projects, or 130 out of 

341 projects; and 24 percent of fiscal year 2010 projects, or 104 out of 429 projects. 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the data for fiscal years 2005 

and 2006 might not be reliable because they had been imported into the Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System from a legacy system, so we 

excluded those 2 fiscal years from this analysis.

26DOD uses another database, the Program Budget Automated System, for financial 

management purposes. However, cost information in this database is itemized only to the 

combatant command level, and thus does not provide visibility over the costs of individual 

projects.

DOD’s Data on HCA Projects 

Differ from Those Reported to 

Congress 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Congress on its HCA program.27 Officials from the Joint Staff and the 

combatant commands told us that they use the Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared Information System database to manage and track 

their HCA projects.28 However, we found that the number of HCA projects 

marked as completed in DOD’s database was far fewer than the number 

of completed HCA projects that were reported to Congress each year 

from fiscal years 2007 through 2009,29

Figure 5: Completed HCA Projects Reported to Congress as Compared with HCA 

Projects Marked “Completed” in DOD’s Database, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2009

which raises concerns about how 

HCA project records are being updated and tracked in DOD’s database. 

Figure 5 shows the number of completed HCA projects identified in 

DOD’s reports to Congress as compared with the number of HCA 

projects marked completed in DOD’s database.

Notes: At the time of our review, DOD had not submitted a report to Congress on fiscal year 2010 

HCA projects. Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the data for fiscal years 

2005 and 2006 might not be reliable, so we excluded those 2 fiscal years from this analysis.

A Defense Security Cooperation Agency official said that the HCA project 

information reported to Congress was provided by each combatant 

command to the agency, and agency officials did not know from where 

 

27The annual report is required to include a list of the countries in which HCA activities 

were carried out during the prior fiscal year, the type and a description of the activities 

performed in each country, and the amount expended in carrying out each activity.

28Northern Command officials said that they do not conduct HCA activities, and no HCA 

projects were reported to Congress for the command from fiscal years 2005 through 2009; 

therefore, this discussion applies to the remaining five geographic combatant commands.

29Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the data for fiscal years 2005 

and 2006 might not be reliable because they had been imported into the Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System from a legacy system, so we 

excluded those 2 fiscal years from this analysis.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

the combatant commands obtained the information. However, when we 

asked officials from each of the combatant commands where they record 

information about their HCA projects, they all responded that they use the 

Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database 

to manage their HCA projects. Our analysis of the information in DOD’s 

database showed that the HCA data in the database varied by combatant 

command. For example, the database showed that only 2 HCA projects 

had been marked completed for Pacific Command and 6 projects had 

been marked completed for Southern Command from fiscal years 2007 

through 2009. However, DOD’s reports to Congress listed at least 81 

completed projects for each of these commands in each fiscal year over 

the same time frame. The HCA project data in the database appeared to 

be more comprehensive for Africa, European, and Central Commands 

from fiscal years 2007 through 2009, in that the number of projects 

marked completed or funded in the database was generally closer to the 

number of projects included in the report to Congress. Our analysis of the 

information in DOD’s reports to Congress also showed that some 

inaccurate information about HCA projects may have been reported. For 

example, DOD’s fiscal year 2008 report to Congress included 

descriptions for what appeared to be the same projects in both Tanzania 

and Uganda that were reported for both DOD’s Africa and Central 

Commands. However, an Africa Command official stated that the projects 

should have been listed only for Central Command in DOD’s report to 

Congress because Central Command funded the projects.30

DOD’s combatant commands generally continue to program and budget 

for new projects, even though DOD lacks complete information in its 

database about past OHDACA or HCA projects. Officials said that DOD is 

currently in the process of updating its guidance for both of its 

humanitarian assistance programs, which provides the department a 

timely opportunity to develop procedures to ensure that the information in 

its database is complete, accurate, and consistent. However, without 

requiring complete data on its humanitarian assistance efforts and 

imposing consequences, such as requiring complete data on previous 

projects as part of the approval process for new projects, DOD may not 

have essential information to inform future planning about its projects and 

 

30Africa Command was designated fully operational on September 30, 2008, and 

consolidated responsibilities for DOD activities in Africa that had previously been shared 

by Central, European, and Pacific Commands. 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

will not be well positioned to provide accurate information about its 

humanitarian assistance efforts to interested parties.

DOD is not consistently evaluating its projects, and therefore it cannot 

determine whether its humanitarian assistance efforts are meeting their 

intended goals, having positive effects, or represent an efficient use of 

resources.

DOD has established project evaluation requirements but is not 

consistently following them. For the OHDACA program, DOD guidance 

states that “after-action reviews,” or project evaluations, are to be 

conducted for all projects within 30 days of project completion.31 For 

projects costing more than $10,000, a second evaluation should be 

conducted 1 year after project completion to document sustained 

outcomes. We drew a generalizable random sample of OHDACA projects 

that DOD identified as likely to have been completed and that cost more 

than $10,000. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, we 

estimated that 1-year evaluation reports were not completed for 90 

percent of these projects, and that the 30-day evaluation reports were not 

completed for about half, or about 53 percent of these projects (see fig. 

6).32

 

31Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and 

Interdependent Capabilities, Policy Guidance for DOD Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Program (HAP). 

Officials across DOD acknowledged that project evaluation was an 

area of weakness and cited several reasons why the department was not 

consistently performing project evaluations, including lack of personnel 

available to conduct evaluations, difficulties visiting project sites because 

32To determine this estimate, we analyzed the presence of completed project evaluations 

in the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System in a generalizable 

random sample of 97 OHDACA projects, out of a total of 579 projects, from the list of 

projects funded by the combatant commands from fiscal years 2005 through 2009 that 

DOD identified as likely to have been completed and that had costs greater than $10,000. 

All estimates based on our sample are subject to sampling error. The margin of error for 

these estimates is no more than plus or minus 10 percentage points at the 95 percent 

level of confidence. In addition, we estimate that 10 percent of the projects identified as 

likely to have been completed had not in fact been completed, meaning that no 

assessments were due at the time that we reviewed the project files. 

DOD Is Not Consistently 

Evaluating Projects and 

Cannot Be Certain Its 

Projects Are Effective

Project Evaluation 

Requirements Are Not 

Consistently Followed
 

Page 21 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

of political instabilities within some countries, and confusion concerning 

the amount of funding available to perform project evaluations.33

Figure 6: Estimates of Post-Project Evaluations for OHDACA Projects Costing over 

$10,000 for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009

Notes: Figure is based on a generalizable random sample of projects that DOD identified as likely to 

have been completed. The margin of error for these estimates is no more than plus or minus 10 

percentage points at the 95 percent level of confidence. In addition, we estimate that 10 percent of 

the projects identified as likely to have been completed had not in fact been completed, meaning that 

no assessments were due at the time that we reviewed the project files.

Because of concerns over the completeness and reliability of data in 

DOD’s database of HCA project information, we did not generate and 

analyze a sample of HCA projects from the database. However, it is also 

likely that DOD is not conducting evaluations for HCA projects. DOD’s 

combatant commands are required to prepare midyear and end-of-year 

reports that cover all HCA projects conducted during those time frames, 

and to broadly assess their overall HCA efforts within 2 fiscal years. Joint 

Staff officials told us that they did not monitor whether evaluations of HCA 

projects have been completed prior to January 1, 2011, when they began 

managing the HCA program, and that completing the evaluations is a 

 

33This confusion concerning the amount of funding available to perform project 

evaluations is caused by the misperception that OHDACA funds cannot be used to 

conduct project evaluations, as discussed later in this report. 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

combatant command responsibility. Joint Staff officials said that they are 

currently reviewing project evaluations at each combatant command, and 

that beginning in February 2012, they plan to address project evaluations 

in their monthly teleconferences with the commands. However, officials 

from several combatant commands told us that evaluations of HCA 

projects are often not completed or that there is minimal follow-up after 

projects are completed. While one of the purposes of HCA projects is to 

train military personnel, Joint Staff officials said that determining the longterm effects of their projects is important and that they plan to propose 

language emphasizing the importance of long-term project evaluations in 

DOD’s updated HCA policy guidance. The lack of consistent project 

evaluations appears to be a long-standing problem in the HCA program. 

In 1993, we reported that DOD’s combatant commands were not 

evaluating their HCA programs. Moreover, we reported that HCA projects 

did not always meet the host country’s needs, and that some projects 

were not being maintained or used. We recommended at that time that 

the commands evaluate their HCA projects and determine their 

effectiveness, and that DOD ensure that projects contribute to U.S. 

foreign policy objectives and have the full support of the host nation.34

Agency managers need performance information to ensure that programs 

meet intended goals, assess the efficiency of processes, and promote 

continuous improvement.35 Without consistently evaluating its projects, 

DOD lacks information to demonstrate tangible positive or negative 

effects of many of its projects. Furthermore, Congress needs information 

to determine whether a program is working well in order to support its 

oversight of agencies and their budgets. Officials from many of DOD’s 

combatant commands told us that humanitarian assistance projects help 

them gain access and influence in foreign nations, build valuable 

relations, or promote stability in foreign countries or regions. For example, 

DOD officials asserted that vaccinating cattle in Uganda helps 

counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, but they did not provide any 

documentation to support this position.36

 

34GAO, Department of Defense: Changes Needed to the Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance Program, 

Moreover, we have previously 

GAO/NSIAD-94-57 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2, 1993).

35GAO/GGD-96-118. 

36DOD’s fiscal year 2008 report to Congress on its HCA efforts describes a project that 

involved assisting the Ugandan government in providing healthy livestock to civilians 

relocating from internally displaced persons camps to their former villages, but does not 

mention how the project relates to efforts to combat terrorism in Somalia.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

reported instances of unintended consequences because of problems 

such as the lack of information on past DOD projects.37

Although there is widespread consensus among DOD offices and all of 

the geographic combatant commands that project follow-up is an area of 

weakness, DOD has not assessed its evaluation process or requirements 

to determine whether changes are needed to employ a more risk-based 

evaluation approach in order to strategically allocate resources. Given 

concerns expressed by officials from several combatant commands 

regarding the costs associated with conducting project evaluations and 

their resource limitations, it may be inefficient to evaluate some of DOD’s 

lower-cost humanitarian assistance projects, as there might not be a 

sufficient return on investment to justify the expenses associated with 

performing the follow-up. We have advocated for a comprehensive risk 

management approach as a framework for decision making that assesses 

the values and risks of various courses of action as a tool for reexamining 

defense programs, setting priorities, and allocating resources, and that 

provides for the use of performance measures to assess outcomes.

For example, 

DOD officials had discovered a dilapidated school in Kenya with a placard 

noting that the school had been donated by the department. However, the 

existence of the school was unknown to current DOD staff in the region, 

and its poor condition could promote unfavorable views of the U.S. 

military. While DOD officials, for example, expressed confidence that 

such instances were no longer occurring, without consistently evaluating 

projects, DOD cannot be certain of project consequences—whether 

positive or negative.

38

Moreover, officials from several combatant commands said that it is 

difficult for them to measure the long-term effects of DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts. However, several resources exist that DOD could 

potentially leverage to assess its humanitarian assistance efforts over the 

Under such a risk-based approach, it is possible that not all humanitarian 

assistance projects would need to be evaluated.

 

37GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa 

Task Force, GAO-10-504 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

38GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005), 

and Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk-Based 

Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).

DOD Has Not Addressed Lack 

of Project Evaluations or 

Assessments of Long-Term 

Effects
 

Page 24 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

long term.39 For example, in 2011, the RAND Corporation developed the 

Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DOD Humanitarian 

Assistance Projects that was designed as a guide for planning and 

executing project assessments for both OHDACA and HCA projects. 

Some combatant command officials said that they were aware of the 

RAND Corporation handbook and were beginning to use it. In addition, 

State and nongovernmental organization officials suggested that DOD 

examine resources such as the Sphere Project,40 which has developed 

minimum standards to achieve in humanitarian response as well as key 

indicators that can be used to show whether a standard has been 

attained. Furthermore, USAID requires performance management plans, 

which are tools to plan and manage the process of monitoring, evaluating, 

and reporting on progress toward achieving its assistance objectives. It 

has also developed performance indicators in areas such as democracy 

and governance and for the HIV/AIDS programs to help assess their 

progress.41

Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials said that the new version 

of DOD’s project database, the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Shared Information System, will have expanded features that will better 

enable DOD to capture whether the long-term goals of its humanitarian 

assistance projects have been met. For example, the agency stated that 

in developing the new version of the database, particular attention has 

been paid to facilitating and simplifying ease of use in order to encourage 

the capture of relevant data from users. Specifically, officials said that 

there will be check boxes to indicate whether project evaluations have 

been completed, and the database will automatically send e-mail 

messages to project stakeholders to alert them of the need to complete 

USAID and State both recently issued new evaluation policies 

that emphasize the importance of project follow-up.

 

39We did not independently evaluate these resources to assess how they might be 

applied to DOD’s efforts.

40The Sphere Project was initiated by a group of nongovernmental organizations and the 

Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. Its goal in developing the standards was to 

improve the quality of humanitarian response and enhance the accountability of the 

system. The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in 

Humanitarian Response, 3d ed. (2011).

41We have previously reported on challenges in monitoring and evaluating some of 

USAID’s projects. See GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance 

Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID’s Agricultural Programs, 

GAO-10-368 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010).
 

Page 25 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

the required evaluations. In addition, the officials said that the database 

will contain specific evaluation questions based on the project’s goals. 

These aspects of the database were still under development at the time 

of our review, and thus we were unable to review the evaluation 

questions or assess whether they will incorporate some of the indicators 

mentioned above. While these changes, if implemented, could help 

address some of DOD’s project evaluation weaknesses, until DOD 

reviews its project evaluation requirements to make any necessary 

changes, measures the long-term impact of its efforts, and consistently 

conducts its required evaluations, the department will be unable to 

determine whether these efforts are an effective use of DOD’s resources 

in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment.

DOD has not issued a departmental instruction to guide the OHDACA 

program. The two primary sources of guidance that DOD uses for the 

OHDACA program—a policy cable and a chapter in DOD’s security 

assistance management manual42

DOD has issued two departmental instructions for the HCA program, 

which receives less funding than the OHDACA program. As a 

departmental practice, DOD issues instructions for certain programs, 

which establish policy or provide general procedures for implementing 

policy. Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials explained—and 

—have not been updated in several 

years. The guidance is limited and not easily accessible to all DOD 

personnel, which could contribute to misinterpretation. For example, 

several officials told us they believed that OHDACA funds could not be 

used to perform assessments of completed humanitarian assistance 

projects. While there are some restrictions on the use of OHDACA funds 

for program evaluation, DOD attorneys confirmed that two required 

OHDACA project evaluations—at 30 days and at 1 year after project 

completion—could be properly funded as part of the OHDACA program. 

Furthermore, the cable, last updated in 2009, is only disseminated to a 

limited number of people and is not readily accessible to all DOD 

personnel. Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials also 

acknowledged that the guidance in the security assistance management 

manual, last updated in 2003, is out of date and does not reflect the 

current operating environment.

 

42DOD, Security Assistance Management Manual, DOD 5105.38-M, ch.12 (Oct. 3, 2003). 

DOD’s Guidance for Its 

Largest Humanitarian 

Assistance Program Is 

Limited
 

Page 26 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

officials from several combatant commands agreed—that issuing a 

departmental instruction would be helpful in ensuring that everyone 

shares a common understanding of the humanitarian assistance program, 

the processes and guidelines for these projects, and the roles and 

functions of the relevant players and agencies. Moreover, an instruction 

could help facilitate consistency in program implementation, which is 

especially important given the frequent rotations of military personnel. 

Officials indicated that DOD is in the process of reexamining the existing 

guidance and plans to issue an instruction and updated guidance for the 

OHDACA program in early 2012. Until DOD issues an instruction and 

updated guidance for the ODHACA humanitarian assistance program, 

there could be continued confusion or inconsistency in how the 

combatant commands implement the program.

DOD, State, and USAID do not have full visibility over each others’ 

assistance efforts, which could result in a fragmented approach to U.S. 

assistance. While the agencies have various initiatives under way to 

share information about their humanitarian or development assistance 

efforts, they face two main challenges: (1) the initiatives are not 

interoperable or coordinated across the agencies and (2) the agencies 

use different terminology to describe similar assistance efforts. Without 

full visibility over each others’ efforts, the potential exists for unnecessary 

overlap in U.S. assistance efforts, which ultimately raises questions about 

DOD’s expanding role in providing humanitarian assistance.

Various initiatives are under way to improve visibility over the agencies’ 

assistance efforts, but there is no framework, such as a common 

database, to readily share information across the agencies. DOD 

guidance requires collaboration and coordination with USAID, and with 

State as appropriate, when planning humanitarian assistance efforts.43

 

43Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and 

Interdependent Capabilities, Policy Guidance for DOD Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Program (HAP), and DOD Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program. 

Our prior work has also cited the importance of information sharing to 

Information-Sharing 

Challenges and 

Potential for Overlap 

among the Agencies’ 

Efforts Could Result 

in a Fragmented 

Approach to U.S. 

Assistance Efforts

Initiatives Are Under Way 

to Improve Interagency 

Information Sharing, but 

Challenges Remain
 

Page 27 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

facilitate interagency collaboration on national security issues.44

Interagency information sharing can be especially important given the 

shift toward transnational threats that may require a broader perspective 

to effectively plan and implement humanitarian assistance efforts. For 

example, issues such as pandemic outbreaks, disaster response and 

management, and food security are all complex issues that necessitate 

coordination across the agencies. In addition, we have identified as a 

good collaborative practice the need to establish compatible policies, 

procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries, 

including compatible standards and data systems.45

DOD, State, and USAID recognize the need to improve information 

sharing, and they have begun to take steps to address the challenge. For 

example, officials within the agencies are attempting to enhance workinglevel coordination through efforts such as the 3D Planning Group,46 which 

aims to examine DOD’s, State’s, and USAID’s different strategic planning 

efforts. The 3D Planning Group works to develop an environment where 

the agency officials can resolve interagency planning challenges and 

institutionalize processes to improve collaboration on interagency 

planning. However, according to participants, the planning group is an ad 

hoc effort—participation is voluntary, outside of other responsibilities, and 

it may not be a high priority for the agencies. Moreover, as shown in table 

2, the agencies have various technological initiatives under way to 

improve information sharing.

 

44GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National 

Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).

45GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

46In the initiative title, “3D” stands for defense, diplomacy, and development. 

Several Initiatives Are in 

Progress to Improve 

Information Sharing, but They 

Lack Coordination
 

Page 28 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Table 2: Key DOD, State, and USAID Information-Sharing Initiatives

Information-sharing 

initiative Goals Lead agency Participating agencies Intended audience

Foreign Assistance 

Dashboard

Collect and provide all 

U.S. government foreign 

assistance information in 

a standard, accessible, 

and easy-to-use format

Initiative directed by the 

National Security 

Council and 

implemented by State 

and USAID

Currently limited to State, 

USAID, and the 

Millennium Challenge 

Corporation 

General public, foreign 

nations, Congress, U.S. 

government agencies, and 

donors

Foreign Assistance 

Coordination and 

Tracking System 

(FACTS Info)

Collect and report data 

on PEPFAR foreign 

assistance funding for 

HIV/AIDS a

State and USAID All PEPFAR 

implementing agencies

Currently limited to 

PEPFAR implementing 

agencies, with the intent 

to share information with 

all FACTS Info users 

Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared 

Information System

Manage the life cycle of 

DOD’s OHDACA-funded 

and HCA humanitarian 

assistance projects

DOD DOD supplies project 

data; State and USAID 

have access to review 

data

DOD and U.S. 

government agencies

Global Theater Security 

Cooperation 

Management 

Information System 

Link all of the combatant 

commands’ and DOD 

components’ security 

cooperation efforts in 

one system

DOD Initially limited to DOD Initially to be an internal 

database for DOD, with 

the intent to share 

information across all 

interagency partners

Foreign Assistance 

Database

Compile and report U.S. 

foreign assistance data 

annually

USAID Nineteen agencies Donor countries from the 

Development Assistance 

Committee of the 

Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and 

Development; the 

database is also available 

to the general public 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, and USAID data.

Notes: PEPFAR is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. PEPFAR is led by State, but is 

an interagency effort to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS around the world.

DOD’s two key humanitarian assistance programs are the humanitarian assistance program funded 

through DOD’s OHDACA appropriation and the HCA program, which is funded by the military 

services through their operation and maintenance funds appropriations.

a

While these initiatives may help improve information sharing, many 

involve similar stakeholders and audiences, and officials told us that 

currently the various agencies’ initiatives are not interoperable or 

coordinated. For example, State officials told us that there is some 

overlap between the data compiled for the Foreign Assistance Database 

and those compiled for the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. Furthermore, 

while the Foreign Assistance Dashboard and Foreign Assistance 

FACTS Info supports U.S. foreign assistance budget formulation and execution for State and USAID, 

and enables the management of planning and reporting requirements, and is not limited to PEPFAR 

data. We chose to highlight the use of FACTS Info to share PEPFAR data as an example of how the 

system can be used to share information.
 

Page 29 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Database will contain information from the same data request, it is not 

expected that the two systems will be able to share information, and 

officials from DOD, USAID, and State confirmed that their informationsharing initiatives are not interoperable with other agencies’ initiatives. 

Officials responsible for the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, Foreign 

Assistance Coordination and Tracking System, and Global Theater 

Security Cooperation Management Information System said that as these 

systems are refined, their intended audiences will expand to include many 

of the same participants and users, and thus coordination will be critical in 

order to avoid unnecessary overlap.

Officials said that interagency information sharing can be challenging at 

the agency headquarters level because communication can be informal, 

ad hoc, or personality driven. For example, State officials said that the 

agencies generally do not share information or communicate their 

budgetary plans for humanitarian and development assistance. Officials 

from DOD, State, and USAID thought that the extent to which interagency 

communication occurs tends to be personality driven and can vary based 

on the individuals involved. Furthermore, DOD officials said that 

collaboration can be difficult because when new staff members arrive, 

they have to rebuild relationships to facilitate information sharing, and 

progress in coordinating humanitarian assistance projects across the 

agencies can be lost. USAID officials also stated that coordination with 

DOD varies by country and can depend largely on how well stakeholders 

within the country share information. According to National Security Staff, 

different agencies have said that there would be benefits to having 

information about all U.S. government foreign assistance efforts readily 

available in a centralized manner, but that there are challenges to 

developing a framework for formal interagency information sharing 

because the agencies collect data on their efforts differently and the data 

are not always readily available.

However, our outreach to 12 U.S. embassies identified practices at the 

country level to facilitate information sharing among DOD, State, and 

USAID officials, and all cited specific examples of positive collaboration 

and coordination occurring within the embassies. For example, officials 

from the U.S. embassy in Bangladesh engage in weekly working group 

meetings in which DOD, State, and USAID officials plan, prioritize, and 

coordinate how to implement humanitarian assistance efforts in the 

country. Officials cited examples of cooperation between USAID and 

DOD to build cyclone shelters and provide medical relief to poor 

populations as instances where information sharing across the agencies 

has led to the effective coordination of efforts. U.S. embassy officials in 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Kenya said that as a result of the information sharing that occurs during 

their interagency working group meetings, they were able to ensure that 

DOD and USAID did not duplicate each others’ efforts to sponsor 

exchanges among religious figures in Kenya. However, there may also be 

information-sharing challenges at the embassy level. For example, 

officials from the U.S. embassy in Indonesia cited several challenges to 

interagency collaboration, including the lack of formalized coordination 

and information-sharing mechanisms.

Officials from DOD, State, and USAID told us that a basic challenge 

affecting their ability to share information is that the agencies use different 

terminology to describe similar assistance efforts. To facilitate 

collaboration, agencies need to address the compatibility of standards, 

policies, procedures, and data systems that will be used in the 

collaborative efforts. Collaborating agencies may need to find common 

ground while still satisfying their respective operating needs.47

DOD officials explained that the terminology they use to describe their 

efforts is derived from their legislative authority to perform humanitarian 

assistance, and DOD and USAID officials said that DOD uses 

“humanitarian assistance” rather than “development assistance” to ensure 

that the department is not perceived as performing development efforts 

that are outside of its legislatively prescribed areas of responsibility. In 

Yet the use 

of different terminology among federal agencies as well as 

nongovernmental organizations can hinder communication and can be 

especially challenging with the frequent rotation of personnel. For 

example, according to DOD officials, DOD uses the term humanitarian 

assistance to describe its strategically planned assistance, such as 

OHDACA-funded and HCA efforts. DOD also conducts foreign 

humanitarian assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or endemic conditions. By contrast, USAID and State 

refer to immediate, life-saving relief as “humanitarian assistance” but 

other capacity building efforts as “development assistance.” According to 

State, the international community—including nongovernmental 

organizations, national governments, the United Nations, and other 

international organizations—generally use the same terminology as 

USAID and State when referring to their assistance efforts. 

 

47GAO-06-15. 

Agencies Use Different 

Terminology to Describe 

Similar Efforts
 

Page 31 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

addition, officials from DOD, State, and USAID said they use different 

terminology to refer to similar efforts, in part because they do not have the 

same goals or funding sources for their efforts. However, officials from all 

three agencies agreed that this differing terminology is an obstacle to the 

effective sharing of information. For example, DOD officials who were 

engaged in implementing some of DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts 

told us that differences in terminology can create challenges in 

understanding the scope and nature of each others’ efforts. State officials 

said that the differing terminology creates challenges to setting goals or 

objectives when planning with each other. USAID officials said that an 

interagency working group was formed a few years ago to try to develop 

a common terminology, but the task proved too difficult and the group 

dissolved. Several officials agreed that having a better understanding of 

other agencies’ terminology for assistance efforts would facilitate 

information sharing or collaboration across the agencies.

Without guidance to understand each others’ terminology and a 

framework to effectively share information, the agencies do not have full 

visibility over each others’ assistance efforts, which could lead to “stovepiped” planning, uninformed budgetary decisions, and a fragmented 

approach to the U.S. government’s humanitarian and development 

assistance efforts.

DOD conducts humanitarian assistance efforts to advance U.S. military 

interests, but performs efforts similar to those of State/USAID. Without full 

visibility over each others’ efforts, the potential for unnecessary overlap 

may exist.48

DOD generally conducts humanitarian assistance efforts through its 

OHDACA and HCA programs to advance U.S. military interests, and its 

efforts can primarily be grouped into four sectors of assistance: health, 

education, infrastructure, and disaster preparation. DOD’s humanitarian 

 

48For the purposes of our review, we are combining the activities performed by State and 

USAID because while USAID performs a significant amount of foreign assistance 

activities, it performs them in close coordination with State and some projects are funded 

by State. 

DOD Has Military Goals 

for Humanitarian 

Assistance, but Potential 

for Overlap Exists with 

State and USAID in Four 

Key Areas

DOD Has Several Goals for 

Humanitarian Assistance 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

assistance efforts are aimed at improving DOD visibility, access, and 

influence while building and/or reinforcing security and stability in a host 

nation or region; providing disaster mitigation training and/or bolstering

host nation capacity to avert humanitarian crises and response to 

disasters; and generating collaborative relationships with a host nation’s 

civil society as well as positive public relations and goodwill toward DOD. 

DOD’s combatant commands identified additional goals for the 

humanitarian assistance program. For example, Africa Command stated 

that by improving the living conditions of local populations, some 

humanitarian assistance programs may help in countering terrorists or 

violent extremist organizations. European and Southern Command 

officials stated that a primary goal of their humanitarian assistance 

programs is to gain access to certain areas in order to engage with local 

governments, militaries, and populations in support of U.S. strategic 

objectives. Central Command officials said that a benefit of performing 

humanitarian assistance is that in addition to building the capacity of a 

foreign nation, the efforts can also build trust and confidence of the local 

populations in their government. One of the primary goals of DOD’s HCA 

program is to promote operational readiness skills of U.S. 

servicemembers, along with improving basic economic and social needs 

of foreign nations.

In comparison, State and USAID, as the lead agencies for foreign 

relations and development, respectively, generally perform similar 

development assistance efforts as DOD, but on a much larger scale to 

benefit foreign nations and advance development goals. For example, to 

further its diplomatic mission, State provides assistance to build and 

sustain more democratic, secure, and prosperous foreign nations that 

respond to the needs of their people. State’s efforts address a wide range 

of foreign policy issues, including those related to climate change, 

counterterrorism, democracy and human rights, economics, energy 

security, food security, health, narcotics, trafficking in persons, and 

women’s issues. USAID, to further its development mission, provides 

economic, development, and disaster response assistance around the 

world in support of U.S. foreign policy and development goals. USAID 

provides assistance in areas such as agriculture, democracy and 

governance, economic growth and trade, the environment, education and 

training, global health, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. 

Overall, State and USAID obligated almost $50 billion to certain 
 

Page 33 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

development assistance efforts outside of Iraq and Afghanistan from 

fiscal years 2005 through 2010.49

Although the agencies have different reasons for conducting their 

humanitarian assistance or development efforts, they perform similar 

efforts in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, and disaster 

preparation, and without full visibility over each others’ efforts, there is the 

potential for some overlap (see fig. 7).50

Our review of DOD’s humanitarian assistance projects from 2005 through 

2010 revealed that DOD and State/USAID are engaging in similar efforts 

within the four sectors. For example, DOD and State/USAID are 

performing similar education projects by building schools and supplying 

school supplies, and they are both improving health care by training 

medical personnel, building hospitals, and providing medical supplies and 

vaccinations. DOD and State/USAID are also performing similar 

infrastructure projects, such as drilling wells and constructing sanitation 

facilities, and similar disaster preparation projects by training first 

responders and helping communities establish plans to respond to natural 

disasters.

Overlap in efforts may be 

appropriate in some instances, especially if agencies can leverage each 

others’ efforts. In other instances, overlap may be unintended, may be 

unnecessary, or may represent an inefficient use of U.S. government 

resources. For example, USAID officials said that the agencies’ having 

differing goals for assistance can create foreign policy challenges in 

sending a clear and coherent message to the country receiving 

assistance.

 

49USAID officials identified the following development assistance accounts as comparable 

to DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts: the Economic Support Fund account; the 

Development Assistance account; Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia; the 

Global Health and Child Survival account; and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance funds 

for preparedness and disaster risk reduction.

50It is important to note the distinction between overlap and duplication. While we found 

that the potential for overlap exists—that is, the agencies are performing similar types of 

efforts, sometimes in the same geographic areas—we did not find examples of actual 

duplication of specific projects conducted by DOD and State/USAID. However, State and 

USAID officials cited past instances of apparent duplication, such as DOD drilling water 

wells or building schools and clinics near the same areas in which USAID was performing 

similar services. 

DOD’s Efforts Could 

Potentially Overlap with Those 

of State/USAID
 

Page 34 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 7: Potential for Agency Overlap in Some Peacetime Humanitarian and 

Development Assistance Efforts

Notes: Graphic does not represent a numerical calculation.

For the purposes of our analysis, we defined health care efforts as providing medical care, 

assistance, and education on basic health care issues, building hospitals and clinics, or providing 

medical equipment; education efforts as training teachers, providing school supplies, or building 
 

Page 35 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

educational facilities; infrastructure efforts as drilling wells and building roads, bridges, or rudimentary 

structures; and disaster preparation efforts as helping foreign nations plan for, prepare for, and 

respond to natural disasters.

We also found several examples of overlap in the types of efforts 

conducted by DOD and USAID within specific countries. For example, in 

Haiti, both USAID and DOD have performed efforts to improve disaster 

response preparation: USAID has worked with the Haitian government to 

improve early warning systems and develop comprehensive plans to 

prepare and respond to disasters, and DOD has developed an 

earthquake preparedness program for internally displaced Haitians. DOD 

has also performed disaster preparation efforts in Indonesia, where 

USAID is developing disaster risk reduction programs to support U.S. 

government climate change goals in the country. Officials from the U.S. 

embassy in Indonesia stated that the efforts between DOD and USAID on 

their disaster management efforts will need to be well coordinated to 

prevent duplication because there is not currently a formal method for the 

agencies to coordinate and communicate about these efforts. In Yemen, 

USAID has renovated health clinics and provided medical supplies to 

support pre- and postnatal care and other basic health care services, 

while DOD has used mobile health care clinics to provide basic medical 

care to rural populations (see fig. 8). In addition, both DOD and USAID 

have built schools and education facilities in Azerbaijan and have worked 

to upgrade and rehabilitate water wells in Pakistan.
 

Page 36 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 8: Similar USAID and DOD Health Efforts in Yemen

Officials from DOD, State, USAID, and nongovernmental organizations

identified some areas where they believed that DOD is well suited to 

provide foreign assistance, such as providing military-to-military 

assistance to foreign militaries or helping foreign nations respond to 

natural disasters in their countries. For example, DOD provides militaryto-military support by educating foreign militaries on HIV/AIDS treatment 

and prevention and training them in disaster response techniques. 

Officials from State, USAID, and nongovernmental organizations also 

stated that DOD’s greater resources, personnel, and logistics support 

capabilities can be helpful when responding to a disaster. In addition, 

State and nongovernmental organization officials said that with its greater 

resources and personnel, DOD could help to fill gaps in areas not met by 

State and USAID efforts because of differences in the agencies’ 

capacities. For example, nongovernmental organization officials said that 

DOD’s greater capacity can be beneficial when undertaking large 

infrastructure projects, such as constructing roads and bridges. An official 

from State cited similar benefits, stating that DOD can be helpful when 

civilian capacity is overwhelmed or when rapid infrastructure projects are 

necessary to repair roads and bridges, which would then help facilitate 

civilian relief efforts. USAID officials also said that DOD can play an 
 

Page 37 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

important role in supporting USAID’s development work by providing 

security for USAID staff in hostile environments, such as in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, where USAID staff are unable to move as freely.

DOD has recognized that, in the past, mistakes have occurred within its 

humanitarian assistance programs, and DOD officials said they have tried 

to incorporate lessons learned into the programs’ management. However, 

officials from State, USAID, and nongovernmental organizations cited a 

number of potential negative consequences that could result from DOD 

performing humanitarian assistance efforts. Officials from DOD, State, 

and USAID said that some DOD personnel may lack expertise and 

education on performing development assistance-type work in foreign 

nations.51

• European Command officials said that DOD had built a hospice care 

center for HIV/AIDS patients in a town in the Ukraine that was 

received negatively based on the local community’s perspective on 

the disease. Officials said that because these cultural sensitivities 

were not considered, the local community was not supportive of the 

project and European Command did not achieve the intended goal of 

gaining access and influence in the Ukraine.

Officials from USAID and State also said that because of 

DOD’s military goals for humanitarian assistance efforts, the department 

may view its efforts from a more short-term, security-oriented perspective, 

as compared with the long-term, development-oriented perspective 

generally taken by civilian agencies. For example, the officials said that 

DOD may not fully consider the potential political or social implications of 

performing humanitarian assistance projects in a country, which could 

lead to unintended consequences or misused resources. A State official 

explained that foreign assistance is often provided to fragile communities 

with complex dynamics, and even seemingly small projects, such as 

distributing soccer balls or candy, can have consequences, such as 

neighboring villages interpreting the U.S. government as favoring one 

community over another. Officials cited a few examples where negative 

effects had occurred because of DOD projects:

• U.S. embassy officials in Uganda said that DOD personnel had built a 

library but did not ensure staffing of a librarian or provide books and 

 

51We have previously reported that DOD personnel lack expertise in performing 

development assistance-type work in foreign nations. See GAO, Defense Management: 

Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s 

Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010), and GAO-10-504. 

Potential Negative Effects 

Heighten Concern about DOD’s 

Efforts
 

Page 38 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

bookshelves. The library sat empty for a year before USAID 

renovated the structure as a war memorial and research center for 

victims of the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency.

• U.S. embassy officials in Lebanon described an incident in which 

DOD officials did not coordinate with USAID on a school renovation 

project and demolished a portion of the school’s roof that had 

previously been built by USAID.

USAID and nongovernmental organization officials also stated that DOD’s 

involvement in humanitarian assistance efforts to advance military 

interests like counterterrorism or global security can cause distrust among 

the communities receiving assistance. Moreover, officials from several 

nongovernmental organizations expressed concern about experiencing 

distrust from the local population or having their safety jeopardized when 

DOD personnel perform humanitarian assistance efforts. Furthermore, 

State, USAID, and nongovernmental organization officials stated that 

DOD’s projects may not be well sustained because they may not be 

monitored and evaluated once they are completed. We have previously 

reported on similar concerns about the sustainability of USAID’s projects 

because of challenges in monitoring and evaluating some of their 

development projects.52

GAO is required to identify federal agencies, programs, and initiatives that 

may have duplicative goals or activities in order to assist Congress as it 

reexamines federal priorities and policy decisions in a fiscally-constrained 

environment. The current legislation guiding DOD’s OHDACA program 

was originally enacted in the early 1990s and has been amended several 

times, most recently in 2003, but does not provide detailed guidance on 

DOD’s role in providing humanitarian assistance. The legislation allows 

DOD to, among other things, use funds authorized for humanitarian 

assistance to provide transportation of humanitarian relief and for other 

humanitarian purposes worldwide. DOD’s various humanitarian 

assistance efforts currently performed under the OHDACA program are 

carried out under this authorization. Moreover, DOD’s OHDACA program 

has grown by about 60 percent from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 even 

though it faces several management issues cited in this report. DOD’s 

Quadrennial Defense Review states that while DOD can and should have 

 

52GAO-10-368. 

DOD’s Role in 

Humanitarian Assistance 

May Need Reexamination
 

Page 39 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

the expertise and capacity to perform capacity-building activities in foreign 

nations, civilian leadership of humanitarian assistance, development, and 

governance is essential.53

In some cases, DOD has recognized that some humanitarian assistancetype projects may be better performed by civilian agencies. For example, 

a Southern Command official stated that the command suggested a 

reduction in its 2011 OHDACA funding for its humanitarian assistance 

program because the Combatant Commander had perceived that certain 

routine humanitarian assistance efforts (such as building schools and 

hospitals) would be better performed by USAID. The Southern Command 

Commander instead wanted to focus the command’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts and funds on helping foreign nations respond to natural 

disasters. In addition, USAID officials cited examples in which DOD 

transferred funding to USAID to perform humanitarian assistance efforts. 

For example, in Sri Lanka in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DOD transferred 

OHDACA funding to USAID to build schools, hospitals, and clinics; and in 

Morocco, USAID officials said that, in fiscal year 2009, DOD transferred 

funding to USAID when the agencies learned that they were performing 

similar infrastructure projects in the country.

State officials expressed concern that DOD’s 

involvement in foreign assistance has increased significantly, especially 

with its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, officials from 

DOD, State, and USAID all suggested that Congress provide additional 

clarification on the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the agencies 

involved in humanitarian and development assistance.

While there is limited guidance on DOD’s role in performing humanitarian 

assistance activities, the U.S. government has clearly identified the 

importance of development to achieving the nation’s strategic goals and 

the agencies responsible for development activities. For example, the 

Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development highlights the 

importance of development activities toward achieving U.S. national 

security interests and expresses a commitment to rebuilding USAID as 

the lead U.S. agency for development.54

 

53Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (February 2010).

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review further states that State and USAID are called upon 

to lead and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives (as set forth in the 

54The White House, Fact Sheet on U.S. Global Development Policy (Washington D.C.: 

Sept. 22, 2010).
 

Page 40 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

National Security Strategy and the Presidential Policy Directive on Global 

Development) through diplomacy and development, with USAID serving 

as the lead agency for development.55 While USAID is described as the 

lead agency for development assistance, USAID planning officials told us 

that in their view they do not have the ability to control or monitor DOD’s 

humanitarian assistance efforts. Without visibility or oversight over DOD’s 

humanitarian assistance projects, it can be difficult to determine whether 

DOD’s projects necessarily or unnecessarily overlap with those of the 

other agencies and whether DOD’s projects are achieving their desired 

goals. Given several factors—the fiscally-constrained environment, the 

President’s recently expressed commitment to rebuilding USAID as the 

lead U.S. development agency, and the similarity of assistance efforts 

being performed by DOD, State, and USAID—DOD and the other 

agencies involved in foreign assistance could benefit from additional 

direction from Congress on DOD’s role in performing humanitarian 

assistance in peacetime environments. Such additional direction could 

help maximize the use of resources and reduce the potential for the 

unnecessary overlap of efforts. 

At a time of severe budget challenges, improved management and an 

examination of the U.S. military’s expanding role in providing 

humanitarian assistance outside of wartime or disaster environments are 

warranted. DOD aligns its two main peacetime humanitarian assistance 

programs, OHDACA and HCA, with its departmental strategic goals and 

coordinates projects with USAID or State. However, until DOD addresses 

several management weaknesses—such as inaccurate project 

information, absent project evaluations, and limited departmental 

guidance—it cannot readily inform the Congress or the U.S. taxpayer as 

to whether its humanitarian assistance efforts represent the most efficient 

and effective use of resources. Moreover, employing a risk-based 

approach to project evaluations and consistently measuring the long-term 

effects of its humanitarian assistance efforts could help DOD determine 

whether its efforts are achieving their goals and having lasting benefits, or 

whether changes are needed in the planning or implementation of its 

projects.

 

55Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Leading Through 

Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010).

Conclusions 
 

Page 41 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

On a broader level, while the funding devoted to DOD’s humanitarian 

assistance efforts outside of Iraq and Afghanistan is small relative to 

State’s and USAID’s larger-scale development programs, DOD has 

nonetheless spent hundreds of millions of dollars over the past few years 

on efforts that could potentially overlap with those conducted by the 

civilian agencies. As the boundaries continue to blur between U.S. 

diplomacy, development, and defense efforts, interagency information 

sharing becomes paramount. Working together to develop a common 

terminology and framework to share information on their respective 

humanitarian and development assistance efforts could provide DOD, 

State, and USAID with an increased understanding of each others’ 

programs as well as improved transparency, enhanced interagency 

planning, and a more efficient use of U.S. tax dollars for foreign 

assistance. Notwithstanding the importance of improving interagency 

communication, potential for overlap among some DOD efforts and those 

of State and USAID is still likely to exist even with the establishment of a 

framework to readily share information. In some cases, overlap among 

the agencies’ efforts may be appropriate. However, given the current 

budget climate and concerted efforts by the administration and Congress 

to reduce government spending, a congressional examination of the 

legislation governing DOD’s OHDACA program could help clarify the 

intended role of DOD in performing humanitarian assistance, taking into 

account the efforts of the civilian agencies and budgetary circumstances.

As part of an examination of multiple programs and government functions 

at a time of fiscal constraint, and to help reduce the potential for overlap 

among agencies’ efforts, Congress should consider the role of DOD in 

conducting humanitarian assistance efforts and consider amending the 

legislation that supports the OHDACA program to more specifically define 

DOD’s role in humanitarian assistance, taking into account the roles and 

similar types of efforts performed by the civilian agencies. If Congress 

chooses to modify the legislation, Congress may wish to consider 

clarifying the different terminology used by DOD, other federal agencies, 

and the international community regarding such efforts.

To improve the management of DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts 

and ensure that projects are having lasting, beneficial effects, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to help improve 

consistency in program implementation by issuing a departmental 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 42 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

instruction and updating accompanying guidance on DOD’s OHDACA 

humanitarian assistance program. In issuing the updated guidance, 

the department may wish to consider further clarifying the use of 

OHDACA funds for specific project evaluation purposes.

• Direct the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to take the 

following actions: 

• Require that the combatant commands and other DOD users of 

the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 

System database provide complete and timely updates to 

OHDACA humanitarian assistance project information within the 

system. 

• Employ a risk-based approach to review and modify project 

evaluation requirements for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program to measure the long-term effects of humanitarian 

assistance projects, and take steps to ensure compliance with the 

requirements.

• Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take the following 

actions:

• Require that the combatant commands and other DOD users of 

the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 

System database provide complete and timely updates to HCA 

project information within the system.

• Employ a risk-based approach to review and modify project 

evaluation requirements for the HCA program to measure the 

long-term effects of projects and take steps to ensure compliance 

with the requirements.

To improve transparency and oversight and to maximize the benefits 

derived from U.S. government resources devoted to humanitarian and 

development assistance efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of 

Defense and State and the Administrator of USAID take the following two 

actions:

• Develop a framework to formalize interagency information sharing on 

humanitarian/development assistance efforts, such as a common 

database. Such a framework could involve selecting an existing 

initiative, such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, to be used by all 

agencies for their assistance efforts or taking steps to facilitate 

interoperability among the agencies’ existing independent 

mechanisms.
 

Page 43 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

• Collaborate to develop guidance that provides a common 

understanding of the terminology used by DOD, State, and USAID 

related to their humanitarian and development assistance efforts.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, the Office of 

Management and Budget, and the National Security Staff for review and 

comment. DOD partially agreed with our recommendations and cited 

some actions that it was taking to address the issues we identified in this 

report. State and USAID agreed with the two recommendations 

addressed to State, USAID, and DOD to improve interagency 

transparency and oversight, and also cited some actions that the three 

agencies were taking to address these concerns. The National Security 

Staff did not provide comments. DOD’s comments are reprinted in 

appendix X, State’s comments are reprinted in appendix XI, and USAID’s 

comments are reprinted in appendix XII. Technical comments were 

provided separately by DOD, State, USAID, and the Office of 

Management and Budget and were incorporated as appropriate.

DOD partially agreed with our first recommendation that DOD issue a 

departmental instruction and update guidance on the OHDACA 

humanitarian assistance program to improve consistency in program 

implementation. The department said that it is currently in the process of 

updating the policy guidance for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, with the intent to use this guidance as the foundation for a DOD 

instruction on humanitarian assistance. DOD further stated that the 

updated guidance will clarify current guidance requiring the combatant 

commands to assess the performance and effectiveness of humanitarian 

assistance projects in meeting their intended objectives. We note in our 

report that DOD is in the process of reexamining the existing policy 

guidance for its humanitarian assistance projects, and agree that the 

updated guidance should serve as the foundation for a DOD instruction to 

provide consistency in program implementation, clearly distinguish the 

processes and guidelines for humanitarian assistance projects, and 

identify the roles and functions of relevant stakeholders and agencies. 

However, the department is unclear when the guidance will be finalized 

and when a formal DOD instruction will be developed or issued. Without 

clear guidance on how the combatant commands should implement and 

evaluate the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program, there will likely 

continue to be confusion and inconsistency in the program’s execution. 

Moreover, the department’s response does not clearly state whether the 

updated guidance will clarify the ability to use OHDACA funds to conduct 

project evaluations, which was a source of confusion identified by the 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 44 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

combatant commands and DOD officials. The department also noted in 

its response that we had addressed the recommendation to the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability 

Operations in our draft report but that this official does not issue 

departmental instructions. We agree with DOD’s comment and have 

updated our report to state that the Secretary of Defense should direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to issue the departmental 

instruction and accompanying program guidance.

DOD partially agreed with our second recommendation that the 

combatant commands and other DOD users be required to provide 

complete and timely updates on OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

projects in the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 

System database. The department stated that it recognizes that providing 

complete and timely updates to its database is a concern, and that the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency has begun developing a second 

version of the database to address these deficiencies for data beginning 

in fiscal year 2012. The department also stated that it believes the new 

database, the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 

System 2.0, will address the concern of ensuring complete and timely 

updates, and that there is no need to direct the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency to implement a requirement for users to update the 

database. The department further noted that it intends to utilize the 

capabilities of the new Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 

Information System to tie humanitarian assistance funding for the 

combatant commands and other DOD users to the completion of timely 

information in the system. Our report acknowledges that the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency is developing a new version of the 

Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System but noted 

that many of the improvements to the system are still under development 

and unproven at this time. We agree that many of the planned 

improvements for the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 

Information System, such as e-mail alerts to users to update evaluations 

and simplifying the ease of using the database, could make for a more 

complete management and reporting system. Our review also states that 

requiring complete data on previous projects could be included as part of 

the process for approving new projects to ensure that combatant 

commands and DOD users are updating information about their 

humanitarian assistance projects. However, we remain concerned that, 

without explicit guidance from the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency—the OHDACA program manager—or a set time frame for 

complete data on humanitarian assistance projects to be entered into the 

Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System, the 
 

Page 45 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

department may continue to program and budget for new efforts without 

complete and accurate information about projects’ costs, status, and 

effects.

DOD also partially agreed with our third recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency to employ a risk-based approach to review and 

modify project evaluation requirements for the OHDACA humanitarian 

assistance program to measure the long-term effects of humanitarian 

assistance projects and to take steps to ensure compliance with the 

project evaluation requirements. In its response, the department stated 

that it is in the process of refining its project evaluation requirements, and 

current efforts include identifying ways to make project evaluations less 

burdensome to encourage completion, establishing methods to ensure 

compliance with evaluation requirements, and refining data collection 

methods to make project evaluations more useful. According to DOD, key 

components of these efforts are expected to be completed by the third 

and fourth quarters of fiscal year 2012. The department also noted that 

given the lack of project evaluation data currently available, it may take 

some time to formulate a complete and reliable risk-based approach to 

project evaluation requirements, and more data must first be collected. 

We agree that the efforts identified by DOD are necessary to ensure 

compliance with project evaluation requirements and accurately measure 

and monitor the long-term effects of the department’s humanitarian 

assistance projects. Furthermore, we understand that implementing a 

comprehensive risk-based approach may take some time, and as our 

report noted, it will be important for the department to consider changes 

to its current evaluation process to more strategically allocate resources, 

as it may be inefficient to evaluate some lower-cost humanitarian 

assistance projects. We maintain that until the department reviews and 

updates its project evaluation requirements, and ensures compliance with 

the requirements, it will be unable to determine whether its efforts are 

achieving their goals, or whether the projects are an effective use of 

DOD’s resources in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment.

DOD agreed with our fourth recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to require the 

combatant commands and other DOD users to provide complete and 

timely updates on HCA projects in the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Shared Information System database. The department stated that since 

taking responsibility for the HCA program in January 2011, the Joint Staff 

has begun making improvements to address management issues 

identified in our review. Its response states that the release of the 
 

Page 46 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

upgraded version of DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 

Information System database in December 2011 standardizes input for 

project reviews and improves communication and coordination within 

DOD and across other agencies. As noted in our review, there are 

significant differences between the HCA data reported in the Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System and the data 

reported to Congress, despite the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Shared Information System being used by each of the combatant 

commands to record information on its HCA projects. Moreover, we 

reported that DOD officials were uncertain where the combatant 

commands obtained the information on HCA projects that was reported to 

Congress. While upgrades to the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 

Shared Information System represent a positive step toward improving 

communication and coordination over the HCA program, until the 

department establishes and enforces requirements for the combatant 

commands to enter complete data on their HCA projects in the database, 

the department risks not having the information necessary to plan its 

projects and may continue to provide incomplete information to Congress 

on its HCA activities.

DOD also agreed with our fifth recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to employ a riskbased approach to review and modify project evaluation requirements for 

the HCA program to measure the long-term effects of projects and to take 

steps to ensure compliance with the project evaluation requirements. The 

department noted that the Joint Staff has made improvements in the 

management of the HCA program, including addressing data gaps and 

coordinating with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations to revise the HCA 

guidance. In addition, the department stated that the Joint Staff has 

established monthly teleconferences with the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency, and the combatant commands to clarify 

policy guidance and discuss best practices. We noted these monthly 

teleconferences in our report, as well as the Joint Staff’s intention to begin 

reviewing project evaluations for each combatant command starting in 

February 2012 as positive steps. The department also stated that in 

January 2012 the Joint Staff would begin developing an updated version 

of the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System for 

HCA projects, and additional guidance for assessing HCA projects, to be 

informed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s concurrent riskbased approach for evaluating project effectiveness. The department’s 

response also notes that the Global Theater Security Cooperation 
 

Page 47 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Management Information System may provide a solution to the problems 

of reporting and tracking HCA projects; however, according to DOD 

officials, this system is still under development with no identified time

frame for implementation. We state in our report that the lack of 

consistent HCA project evaluations is a long-standing problem that will 

require additional guidance and enforcement by the Joint Staff to ensure 

that HCA projects are effective at both training military personnel and 

contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives. While progress is being 

made to establish assessment guidance and begin consistently reviewing 

whether the combatant commands have completed required project 

evaluations, these actions alone may not result in an increased number of 

completed evaluations. Until there is clear guidance and enforcement of 

project evaluation requirements, the department will continue to lack 

information about the long-term effects of its HCA projects, and the Joint 

Staff and Congress will be challenged to provide oversight to determine 

whether the program is meeting its intended goals and represents an 

effective use of resources.

DOD, State, and USAID agreed with our sixth recommendation that the 

three agencies develop a framework to formalize interagency information 

sharing, such as using a common database, for humanitarian and 

development assistance efforts. DOD, State, and USAID noted that the 

agencies have taken steps to improve information sharing across the 

agencies, which we cite in our report, and that all three agencies will 

continue to explore additional venues to coordinate their efforts. DOD 

stated that it will engage with State and USAID to determine what 

information-sharing mechanisms could be used to enhance information 

sharing, and noted that it has already taken some steps to do so by 

providing State and USAID with access to DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared Information System database. They also noted that 

DOD’s database has a framework in place to be able to share data with 

systems such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, and that attributes in 

the Foreign Assistance Dashboard could be adopted in the Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System to facilitate 

information sharing. While our report notes that DOD’s database is not 

currently interoperable with State and USAID’s databases, it is 

encouraging that there are opportunities for the agencies to restructure 

their systems to facilitate information sharing as our report recommends. 

State’s response noted that it is currently in discussions with DOD and 

USAID about broadening the Foreign Assistance Dashboard to include 

DOD’s efforts, and that it is working on developing country-specific 

strategic plans to facilitate coordination and planning across the agencies. 

We note in our report that information sharing, planning, and coordination 
 

Page 48 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

appear to work well at the country level, but a standardized approach to 

information sharing across the agencies is needed for full visibility over 

each others’ humanitarian and development assistance efforts. USAID 

stated that it will continue to explore information-sharing opportunities 

with DOD and State, but said that there are challenges to sharing 

information because each agency has separate databases that are not 

integrated, a challenge we recognize in our report. Our report 

underscores that the development of a framework to formalize 

interagency information sharing, in the form of a common, interoperable 

database, is necessary to improve coordination of each of the agencies’ 

programs, as well as to prevent overlap and an inefficient use of 

resources.

DOD, State, and USAID also agreed with our seventh recommendation 

that the three agencies collaborate to develop guidance that provides a 

common understanding of the different terminology used by DOD, State, 

and USAID to describe their humanitarian and development assistance 

efforts. DOD stated that although the agencies use different terminology 

because of differences in their authorities and mission sets, that a better 

understanding of the terms the agencies use would help to facilitate 

coordination on similar types of projects. DOD further stated that it will 

work with State and USAID to identify a scope and time frame for issuing 

guidance on a common terminology. We state in our report that DOD’s 

terminology is derived from DOD’s legislative authority to perform 

humanitarian assistance, and officials from DOD, State, and USAID 

agreed that differences in the agencies’ terminology are an obstacle to 

basic communication and information sharing. For example, State noted 

in its technical comments that while DOD uses different terminology to 

ensure that it is not perceived as performing development efforts that are 

outside of its legislative authority, DOD’s activities do not conform with the 

definition of humanitarian assistance used by State, USAID, and the 

international community, and this can be a barrier to cooperation across 

the agencies. USAID noted that development and humanitarian 

assistance are the domain of the civilian authorities, with a limited role for 

DOD where its unique capabilities are needed. USAID stated that 

clarification of distinct objectives, conditions, and terms of engagement of 

civilians and military in what is called humanitarian assistance by both 

DOD and USAID would be helpful, and new terminology would also help 

distinguish the distinct goals and roles and responsibilities. State and 

USAID both stated that the agencies are working toward improving 

collaboration and coordination across the agencies through the 3D 

Planning Group, and that this group could potentially work to develop 

guidance on a common set of terminology. We recognize efforts of the 3D 
 

Page 49 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Planning Group in our report, but note that officials from the group said it 

is an ad hoc effort that is not a high priority for the agencies. Our report 

highlights that the use of different terminology can hinder communication 

across the agencies, and we maintain that without guidance that 

promotes a better understanding of each others’ terminology, the 

agencies are at risk of taking a fragmented approach to their 

humanitarian and development assistance efforts.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the 

Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix XIII. 

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 50 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John Kerry

Chairman

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chairman

The Honorable Howard L. Berman

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 51 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

To conduct our work, we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) 

guidance, including the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review; DOD 

guidance on the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

(OHDACA) humanitarian assistance and Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance (HCA) programs; and the combatant commands’ theater 

campaign plans and other command guidance. We also reviewed 

relevant legislation authorizing the OHDACA and HCA programs found in 

sections 2561 and 401 of Title 10 of the United States Code, respectively. 

We chose to focus on these two key DOD humanitarian assistance 

programs based on discussions with officials at the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 

Stability Operations. During the course of our review, we contacted 

officials at a wide range of agencies and offices, including officials at 12 

U.S. embassies. Our selection of embassies consisted of 2 embassies 

located with each combatant command’s geographical area of 

responsibility that resided in countries with the largest amounts of 

OHDACA-funded humanitarian assistance projects from fiscal years 2005 

through 2010. We decided to limit the scope of our review of other federal 

offices to the Department of State (State) and United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) because DOD guidance for its 

OHDACA and HCA programs provides requirements for coordination with 

these agencies. We met with officials at the Department of Health and 

Human Services early during the review before making the decision to 

limit the scope to State and USAID.

To understand how much DOD had obligated for its OHDACA 

humanitarian assistance efforts, we analyzed data from DOD’s Program 

Budget Automated System and determined these data to be sufficiently 

reliable for presenting obligations from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To 

determine DOD’s obligations for the HCA program, we used information 

from DOD’s annual reports to Congress on the program for the same time 

period.1

 

1

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 report to Congress was in draft form and had not been submitted 

to Congress at the time of our review. 

We limited our analysis to DOD’s obligations in fiscal years 2005 

through 2010 because DOD issued guidance in 2005 that emphasized 

the importance of stability operations, which include humanitarian 

assistance, and DOD officials also told us that data prior to fiscal year 

2005 may not be reliable. We also included context information on other 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 52 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

selected DOD military-to-military humanitarian assistance-type efforts that 

help improve the well-being of foreign populations, including HIV/AIDS 

efforts. We performed data reliability checks on the information DOD 

officials gathered from financial databases by requiring officials to 

complete questionnaires about data entry and quality control procedures. 

We determined that the data were reliable to present annual obligations 

for DOD humanitarian assistance for fiscal years 2005 through 2010.

To understand the strategic goals and assistance efforts of State and 

USAID, we reviewed guidance and documents from these agencies, 

including the fiscal years 2007-2012 State/USAID joint strategic plan; 

State’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review; the 

USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015; several U.S. embassy mission 

resource strategic plans and country operational plans; State and 

USAID’s evaluation policies for their programs; and USAID descriptions of 

programs within specific countries.

2

To assess DOD’s management of the OHDACA and HCA programs, we 

considered successful management practices, as identified in our prior 

work. Specifically, we identified critical management steps and practices 

that can help agencies to achieve success, including (1) aligning projects 

to strategic goals and establishing procedures and mechanisms, 

(2) coordinating with stakeholders, (3) collecting complete and accurate 

data, (4) measuring performance, and (5) developing policies to help 

achieve results. To determine the extent to which DOD aligned projects to 

strategic goals, established processes for its programs, coordinated with 

interagency stakeholders, and established guidance, we analyzed 

relevant documents and interviewed DOD, State, and USAID officials at 

the headquarters and combatant command levels. To assess DOD’s 

We also reviewed a fact sheet on the 

2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and relevant 

legislation on foreign assistance. We met with State and USAID officials 

to identify funding accounts for development efforts similar to those 

performed by DOD, and obtained State and USAID obligations by funding 

account for fiscal years 2005 through 2010. We analyzed USAID’s and 

State’s obligations by account and fiscal year to identify these agencies’ 

total spending on development assistance activities comparable to the 

humanitarian assistance projects performed by DOD.

 

2

Each of USAID’s country profiles, which are posted on www.usaid.gov, provides an 

overview of the agency’s programs in a particular country. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 53 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

processes and guidance for the OHDACA and HCA programs, we 

reviewed relevant statutes; DOD directives, instructions, joint 

publications, and other guidance; and Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency and combatant command guidance, business rules, and other 

documentation pertaining to the OHDACA and HCA programs. To assess 

coordination of projects with stakeholders, we analyzed documentation, 

such as guidance, organizational charts, budgetary documents, and 

interagency memorandums of understanding, and other relevant 

documents, and determined the number of interagency personnel located 

at each of DOD’s geographic combatant commands. In addition, we 

interviewed officials from many DOD offices involved in these two 

programs, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense’s Office of General Counsel, and each of DOD’s six geographic 

combatant commands and its Special Operations Command, as well as 

officials from State and USAID at both the headquarters and combatant 

command levels, to obtain their perspectives on DOD’s processes, 

guidance, and coordination in planning and implementing its humanitarian 

assistance efforts.

To evaluate DOD’s information management of its humanitarian 

assistance projects, we analyzed reports from DOD’s Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database of all 

OHDACA and HCA projects that were identified as completed in the 

database from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.3

 

3

The reports provided by DOD included all projects that had a status of “completed” in the 

“team status” database field.

To determine the extent 

to which OHDACA project information was complete and accurate in the 

database, we reviewed a report of OHDACA projects that had been 

marked as completed, and noted that the number of projects listed for 

some combatant commands was small compared to what we had 

expected based on our discussions with DOD officials. We then 

compared the total amount of funding for OHDACA projects conducted by 

each combatant command in the reports of completed projects to the total 

obligation amounts that appeared in the program funding data provided 

by DOD officials and identified discrepancies. To determine the extent to 

which actual costs for OHDACA projects were recorded in DOD’s 

database, we analyzed the reports of OHDACA projects that had been 

marked as completed in the database from fiscal years 2007 through 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 54 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

2010.4 We determined that actual cost information was present in the 

database if the actual cost field contained any value greater than $1.5 To 

determine the extent to which DOD had complete and accurate data 

about its HCA projects, we compared the total number of HCA projects 

that had been marked as completed in the Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared Information System HCA project reports to the total 

number of completed projects identified in DOD’s HCA reports submitted 

annually to Congress in fiscal years 2007 through 2009.6

To assess the extent to which DOD conducted its required project 

evaluations, we analyzed a generalizable random sample of OHDACA 

projects. We began with the reports from DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared Information System database of projects from fiscal 

years 2005 through 2009 that were marked as funded by the combatant 

commands, because Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials said 

that this would provide a more comprehensive list of projects than the list 

of projects marked as completed. We then excluded from that all projects 

that recorded either an actual cost value of $10,000 or less, or if no actual 

cost information was available, projects that had an estimated cost of 

$10,000 or less in the database, because DOD guidance does not require 

a 1-year project evaluation for those projects. We also excluded projects 

that had a status of “canceled” by the combatant command in the 

database, because a Defense Security Cooperation Agency official told 

us it was likely that such projects had not been implemented and thus 

project evaluations would not have been conducted. Of the 579 projects 

that remained after these exclusions, we sampled 97 projects for review. 

Because different samples could have provided different estimates, we 

Although we 

found that data on project status and cost were not sufficiently reliable for 

our report, we did determine that the data were reliable for the purposes 

of presenting examples of humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by 

DOD.

 

4

Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the data for fiscal years 2005 

and 2006 might not be reliable because they had been imported into the Overseas 

Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System from a legacy system, so we 

excluded those 2 fiscal years from this analysis.

5

We reviewed the “actual cost” database field in DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian 

Assistance Shared Information System database for all OHDACA projects that had been 

marked with a status of “completed” in the “team status” database field.

6

At the time of our review, DOD had not yet submitted an HCA report to Congress for 

fiscal year 2010, so that fiscal year was excluded from this analysis.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 55 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

expressed our confidence in the precision of our particular sample results 

as a 95 percent confidence interval. The margin of error for these 

estimates is no more than plus or minus 10 percentage points. This is the 

interval that would contain the actual population values for 95 percent of 

the samples that we could have drawn. Two analysts independently 

reviewed DOD’s complete database files for these 97 projects to 

determine whether the 30-day and 1-year project evaluations were 

present. Because the database did not specifically identify whether a 

project evaluation was a 30-day or a 1-year evaluation, we exercised our 

judgment to categorize the assessments based on factors such as the 

nature of the information in the evaluation and the date the evaluation 

was completed. The two analysts compared their results, and all initial 

differences regarding the categorization of the assessments and their 

presence were discussed and reconciled. Because of concerns about the 

completeness and reliability of data in DOD’s database of HCA project 

information, we did not generate and analyze a sample of projects from 

the database.

To analyze the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have visibility 

over each others’ assistance efforts to avoid duplication, unnecessary 

overlap, or fragmentation, we reviewed documentation related to various 

information-sharing initiatives and interviewed relevant officials from 

DOD, State, USAID, and the National Security Staff to discuss the 

initiatives and information-sharing challenges, including the use of 

differing terminology among the agencies to describe similar assistance 

efforts. To identify the potential for overlapping efforts among the 

agencies, we identified DOD’s humanitarian assistance projects by 

sector—for example, health, education, infrastructure, and disaster 

preparation—from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 and examined 

information on State/USAID’s development efforts within geographical 

regions and countries to determine if State/USAID had performed similar 

types of projects in the areas as DOD. For the purposes of our review, we 

combined the activities performed by State and USAID because while 

USAID performs a significant amount of foreign assistance activities, it 

performs them in close coordination with State and some projects are 

funded by State. To identify specific examples of overlap between DOD 

and USAID’s efforts in the same country, we compared DOD’s projects in 

a country to those performed by USAID in the same country, and found 

examples of similar activities being performed in the four sectors. We did 

not evaluate whether overlap would have positive or negative effects. We 

interviewed relevant officials from DOD, State, USAID, the Office of 

Management and Budget, the National Security Staff, and 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 56 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

nongovernmental agencies to identify potential benefits and 

consequences to DOD’s humanitarian assistance program.

In addressing our objectives, we contacted officials representing a wide 

range of offices (see table 3).

Table 3: List of Organizations Contacted

DOD

 DOD offices/agencies

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

International Health Division

Joint Staff

National Guard Bureau

Naval Facilities Engineering Command

Naval Health Research Center

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and 

Readiness

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 

Stability Operations

a

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Pacific Command Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 

Assistance

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

 Combatant commands

Africa Command

Central Command

European Command

Northern Command

Pacific Command

Southern Command

Special Operations Command

State 

 Bureaus/offices

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 57 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance

Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 

 U.S. embassies

Albania

Bahamas

Bangladesh

Haiti

Indonesia

Kenya

Kyrgyz Republic

Lebanon

Mexico

Moldova

Peru 

Uganda

USAID

Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning

Office of Military Affairs

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

Select regional bureaus

Senior development advisors stationed at various combatant commands

USAID/East Africa Mission - Djibouti

Other U.S. government organizations

National Security Staff

Office of Management and Budget

Department of Health and Human Services

Nongovernment organizations 

InterAction

Refugees International

b

Source: GAO.

a

We contacted the International Health Division of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness.

b

InterAction is an alliance of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations with more than 

190 members working in developing countries around the world. We met with InterAction 

representatives from six nongovernment organizations that engage in a variety of development 

assistance-type efforts globally.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 58 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 through 

February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: DOD’s Obligations for 

Humanitarian Assistance Efforts by Combatant 

Command

Page 59 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Figure 9 represents DOD’s obligations by geographic combatant 

command for efforts under the OHDACA program from fiscal years 2005 

through 2010. Over this 6-year period, DOD’s Pacific and Southern 

Commands obligated the highest amounts, about $93.8 million and 

$75.8 million, respectively.

Figure 9: DOD’s OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Obligations by 

Combatant Command for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010

Notes: Figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program, as 

distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars.

Combatant commands and their corresponding areas of responsibility are identified as follows: U.S. 

Africa Command (Africa); U.S. Central Command (Middle East and Egypt); U.S. European Command 

(Europe and Israel); U.S. Northern Command (North America and the Bahamas); U.S. Pacific 

Command (Asia and the Pacific region); and U.S. Southern Command (Central America, South 

America, and the Caribbean).

U.S. Africa Command was not fully operational until 2008, so U.S. Africa Command’s obligations for 

the OHDACA-funded humanitarian assistance program are from fiscal years 2008 through 2010. 

Also, obligations for U.S. Central Command do not include funding to Iraq and Afghanistan with the 

exception of one project performed in Afghanistan, which DOD recorded at a cost of $27,000.

Figure 10 represents DOD’s obligations for HCA projects conducted 

within its geographic combatant commands’ areas of responsibility from 

fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Over this 6-year period, obligations were 

Appendix II: DOD’s Obligations for 

Humanitarian Assistance Efforts by 

Combatant Command
Appendix II: DOD’s Obligations for 

Humanitarian Assistance Efforts by Combatant 

Command

Page 60 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

the highest for HCA projects in DOD’s Southern and Pacific Commands’ 

geographical areas, about $32.5 million and $21.9 million, respectively.

Figure 10: DOD’s Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations for Projects 

Conducted within the Combatant Commands’ Geographic Areas for Fiscal Years 

2005 through 2010

Notes: Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars.

Combatant commands and their corresponding areas of responsibility are identified as follows: U.S. 

Africa Command (Africa); U.S. Central Command (Middle East and Egypt); U.S. European Command 

(Europe and Israel); U.S. Pacific Command (Asia and the Pacific region); and U.S. Southern 

Command (Central America, South America, and the Caribbean). U.S. Northern Command (North 

America and the Bahamas) does not engage in humanitarian and civic assistance efforts.

U.S. Africa Command was not fully operational until 2008. Dollar amounts in fig. 10 include projects 

performed in Africa from fiscal years 2005 through fiscal years 2010, even though projects were 

managed by other combatant commands in Africa prior to fiscal year 2008. Also, obligations for U.S. 

Central Command do not include funding for efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Page 61 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Appendix III: Humanitarian Assistance

Efforts in U.S. Africa Command’s Area of

Responsibility

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Overview

U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) operates in 

52 countries on the African 

continent. The continent faces 

a wide range of challenges, 

including poverty; high birth 

rates; an increasingly large 

youth population; pandemic 

disease; and transnational 

threats, such as violent 

extremism, piracy, and 

narcotics trafficking. AFRICOM 

has conducted humanitarian 

assistance projects in the 

areas of health, education, 

infrastructure, and disaster 

preparation. 

Fundinga

Spending on AFRICOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has increased 

in recent years. Obligations for these efforts under AFRICOM’s

OHDACA program increased from about $7.5 million in fiscal year 

2008 to about $11.4 million in fiscal year 2010. In addition, AFRICOM 

spent about $16 million on HCA projects during the same time period. 

AFRICOM is also receiving a total of $7.5 million from USAID from fiscal 

years 2008 through 2012 to help African nations respond to an influenza 

pandemic.

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo).

Select AFRICOM and USAID Projects

Servicemembers unload cases of books for the 

Damerjog Schoolhouse in Djibouti. DOD delivered 

1,400 books and 14 bookcases.

a

All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program.
Page 62 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

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Overview

U.S. Central Command’s 

(CENTCOM) area of 

responsibility comprises 20 

countries in three subregions: 

(1) Central and South Asia; (2) 

Southwest Asia, and (3) the 

Arabian Peninsula. Over the past 

several years, CENTCOM has 

been engaged in combat efforts 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other 

challenges within CENTCOM’s 

area of responsibility include 

the lack of progress in achieving 

comprehensive Middle East 

peace, social, and economic 

instability; expanding youth 

populations; piracy; arms 

smuggling; human trafficking; 

narcotics; and weapons 

proliferation. CENTCOM 

has conducted humanitarian 

assistance projects in the areas of 

health, education, infrastructure, 

and disaster preparation outside 

of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Fundinga

Spending on CENTCOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has fluctuated 

in recent years. Obligations for these efforts under CENTCOM’s 

OHDACA program were about $15.3 million in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal 

year 2007, funding peaked at about $16.7 million and then dropped to 

approximately $4.1 million in fiscal year 2010. In addition, CENTCOM 

spent $342,870 on HCA projects outside of Iraq and Afghanistan during 

the same time period. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo).

Select CENTCOM and USAID Projects

U.S. and local officials cut the ribbon to the 

Birdik Village School in Kyrgyzstan. U.S. military 

personnel and Kyrgyz citizens worked together to 

renovate the school in 2009.

a

All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. This figure includes one project performed in Afghanistan, which DOD 

recorded at a cost of $27,000.

Appendix IV: Humanitarian Assistance

Efforts in U.S. Central Command’s Area of 

Responsibility
Page 63 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

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Overview

U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM) is responsible for U.S. 

military relations with the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and 51 countries in 

Europe, as well as parts of Asia 

and the Middle East. Countries in 

EUCOM’s area of responsibility 

face challenges such as 

transnational and indigenous 

terrorism, ballistic missile threats, 

and ensuring cybersecurity 

among U.S. allies. EUCOM 

has conducted humanitarian 

assistance projects in the areas of 

health, education, infrastructure, 

and disaster preparation. 

Fundinga

Spending on EUCOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has fluctuated 

in recent years. Obligations for these efforts under EUCOM’s OHDACA 

program were about $9.1 million in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2008, 

funding dropped to about $5.2 million and then increased to about $16.6 

million in fiscal year 2010. In addition, EUCOM spent about $4.3 million 

on HCA projects during the same time period. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo).

Select EUCOM and USAID Projects

Hungarian and U.S. Army engineers work together 

to replace the roof of the Zalahalap Elementary 

School in the Hungarian village of Tapoica.

a

All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program.

Appendix V: Humanitarian Assistance

Efforts in U.S. European Command’s Area

of Responsibility
Page 64 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

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Overview

U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) conducts 

homeland defense, civil support, 

and security cooperation to 

defend and secure the United 

States and its interests. 

NORTHCOM is also responsible 

for supporting U.S. civil authorities 

and state national guard units 

in responding to natural and 

man-made disasters within the 

United States. NORTHCOM’s 

area of responsibility includes 

the United States, Canada, 

Mexico, and the Bahamas. 

Challenges in NORTHCOM’s 

area of responsibility include 

transnational criminal 

organizations responsible for 

illicit trafficking of drugs, people, 

money, and weapons. In addition, 

NORTHCOM has conducted 

humanitarian assistance projects 

in Mexico and the Bahamas in 

the areas of health, education, 

infrastructure, and disaster 

preparation. 

Fundinga

NORTHCOM’s humanitarian assistance program under OHDACA began 

in fiscal year 2008. Obligations for these efforts under NORTHCOM’s 

OHDACA program were $437,507 in fiscal year 2008 and more than $2.9 

million in fiscal year 2010. NORTHCOM does not conduct HCA projects 

within its area of responsibility. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo).

Select NORTHCOM and USAID Projects

U.S. Northern Command donates school supplies 

to a primary school in the Bahamas as part of a 

humanitarian assistance project.

a

All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program.

Appendix VI: Humanitarian Assistance

Efforts in U.S. Northern Command’s Area of 

Responsibility
Page 65 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

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Overview

U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM) operates in 36 

countries in the Asia Pacific 

region, which encompasses 

about 50 percent of the 

world’s population. This 

region faces several threats, 

including those posed by North 

Korea’s nuclear and missile 

capabilities; transnational 

violent extremist organizations; 

China’s significant military 

modernization with unclear 

intent; territorial disputes; 

transnational criminal activity; 

and humanitarian crises, such 

as pandemics, famines, and 

natural disasters. PACOM 

has conducted humanitarian 

assistance projects in the 

areas of health, education, 

infrastructure, and disaster 

preparation. 

Fundingb

Spending on PACOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has increased 

in recent years. Obligations for these efforts under PACOM’s OHDACA 

program increased from about $17.3 million in fiscal year 2005 to about 

$19.9 in fiscal year 2010. In addition, PACOM spent almost $22 million 

on HCA projects during the same time period. PACOM is also receiving 

a total of $7.5 million from USAID from fiscal years 2008 through 

2012 to help nations in the Asia-Pacific region respond to an influenza 

pandemic.

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo).

Select PACOM and USAID Projectsa

a

This map does not include Antarctica, which is also included in Pacific Command’s area of responsibility.

b

All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program.

Appendix VII: Humanitarian Assistance

Efforts in U.S. Pacific Command’s Area of

Responsibility

With the help of local Cambodians, Navy 

engineers work to complete a well-drilling 

humanitarian and civic assistance project as part 

of the Pacific Partnership 2010 exercise.
Page 66 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

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Overview

U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) operates in 

Central America, the Caribbean, 

and South America. These 

regions face challenges such as 

poverty, illicit trafficking, natural 

disasters; and violent extremist 

organizations. SOUTHCOM 

officials stated that its role in 

humanitarian assistance has 

greatly expanded over the 

past 5 years, in part because 

of increased awareness of 

the command’s program. 

SOUTHCOM has conducted 

humanitarian assistance 

projects in the areas of health, 

education, infrastructure, and 

disaster preparation. 

Fundinga

Obligations for humanitarian assistance efforts under SOUTHCOM’s 

OHDACA program have fluctuated from about $3.5 million in fiscal year 

2005 to a height of about $21.4 million in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 

2010, the most recent year for which data are available, SOUTHCOM 

obligated about $17.5 million for its OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

efforts. In addition, SOUTHCOM spent almost $32.5 million on HCA 

projects during the same time period. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo).

Select SOUTHCOM and USAID Projects

a

All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 

program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program.

Appendix VIII: Humanitarian Assistance

Efforts in U.S. Southern Command’s Area

of Responsibility

Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS 

Comfort is pushed from the pier by tugboats 

after completing nearly a week of medical aid 

in Trinidad and Tobago as part of the 4-month 

humanitarian deployment to Latin America and 

the Caribbean, providing medical treatment to a 

dozen countries.
Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text 

for Appendixes III-VIII

Page 67 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Select AFRICOM and USAID Projects (see app. III)

Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and 

Text for Appendixes III-VIII 
Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text 

for Appendixes III-VIII

Page 68 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Select CENTCOM and USAID Projects (see app. IV)
Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text 

for Appendixes III-VIII

Page 69 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Select EUCOM and USAID Projects (see app. V)
Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text 

for Appendixes III-VIII

Page 70 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Select NORTHCOM and USAID Projects (see app. VI)
Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text 

for Appendixes III-VIII

Page 71 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Select PACOM and USAID Projects (see app. VII)
Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text 

for Appendixes III-VIII

Page 72 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Select SOUTHCOM and USAID Projects (see app. VIII)
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 73 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

We received DOD’s 

comments on January 23, 

2012
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 74 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 75 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 76 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 77 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 78 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 79 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix XI: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 80 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Appendix XI: Comments from the 

Department of State
Appendix XI: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 81 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix XI: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 82 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix XII: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 83 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

Appendix XII: Comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development
Appendix XII: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 84 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix XII: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 85 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance
Appendix XIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 86 GAO-12-359 Humanitarian and Development Assistance

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Assistant Directors Alissa Czyz, 

Marie Mak, and James Michels; and Renee Brown, Justin Fisher, Lonnie 

McAllister, Meghan Perez, Steven Putansu, Amie Steele, Cheryl 

Weissman, Michael Willems, and Richard Winsor made major 

contributions to this report.

Appendix XIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(351534)
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