Filed 5 / 1 4 / 24 Peters v. SDLA Courier Service CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SAMANTHA PETERS,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SDLA COURIER SERVICE, INC.

Defendant and Appellant

. 2d Civil No. B330142 (Super. Ct. No. 56

- 2023

- 00574362

- CU

- OE

- VTA) (Ventura County)

Appellant SDLA Courier Service

, Inc. appeal s from a n order denying its motion to compel respondent Samantha Peters

to arbitrat e wage and hour claims pursuant to a n arbitration provision in her employment agreement

. (Code Civ. Proc., § 12 94, subd. (a).) SDLA contend s the trial court erred in finding
that the transportation worker exemption of section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1) applied

, thereby precluding compelled arbitration

. We affirm.2 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY SDLA is a delivery company in Southern California and

“ makes local

- only deliveries in California for its clients. ” One of
its clients is Amazon Logistics, Inc. SDLA drivers pick up packages at Amazon warehouse s in California and deliver them locally to customers.
Peters worked for SDLA from September 2018 to July
2019. She was hired as a delivery driver and also worked as a dispatcher. 1 She, like other SDLA d elivery drivers, only picked up and delivered packages within California.
When Peters was hired, she signed a Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate Claims (Agreement)

. The Agreement requires that the employee and employer arb itrate all claims or controversies

. It

state s : “ [T] he Company is engaged in transactions involving
interstate commerce and

. . . my employment involves such commerce. As such, I acknowledge that this Agreement is subject
to the Federal Arbitration Act. ”
Peters filed a lawsuit against SDLA, asserting individual
and putative class c laims for alleged wage and hour violations

. SDLA mo ved to compel arbitration of her individual claims

. 2 SDLA argued that the FAA applied to the Agreement and that the transportation worker exemption under section 1 of the FAA

1 T o the extent t he parties dispute whether Peters was a delivery driver throughout her employment , t he trial court found Peter s was a driver

. We defer to the trial court’s factual finding. ( See Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 62, 80.)

2 SDLA also mo ved to dismiss the putative class claims and stay the proceedings

, but those orders are not challeng ed in this appeal.3

was inapplicable. The trial court denied the motion , finding that
th e section 1 exemption to the FAA applied. The court found
Peters to be a “last

- le g Amazon delivery driver[]” who is “considered to be [a] transportation worker [] under the FAA exemption.”
DISCUSSION
SDLA contends the trial court erred in finding that Peters,

as a driver, was “engaged in

. . . interstate commerce” and that the transportation worker exemption (9 U.S.C. § 1) applied

. We disagree

. Because the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration was based on the legal question of whether the FAA applies, we review the order de novo. ( Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co., Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 274, 279 ( Nieto ); Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552, 559 ( Betancourt ).) Section 2 of the FAA provides that contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration” “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Thus, i n most cases, the FAA mandates arbitration
when contracts invo lving int erstate commerce contain an arbitration provision.
But s ection 1 of the FAA provides an exemption from FAA coverage “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce. ” ( 9 U .S.C. § 1.) In determining whether a class of workers are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” the inquiry focuses on the worker and the work they perform. ( Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450, 455

- 4564

( Saxon ) .) T he United States Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 119

- 121, interpreted the phrase “ a ny other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce” to refer to “transportation workers” only, and not employees ge nerally. T he Court did not “provide a complete definition of ‘transportation worker,’ [but it] indicated that any such worker must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders” or be “actively ‘engaged in transporta tion’ of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce. ” ( Saxon

, at p. 458.)
T he question here is whether delivery drivers such as
Peter s , who worked for a n intrastate delivery company

, are exempt from the FAA coverag e under the transportation worker exemption

. Our colleagues in the First District de cided a similar
issue in Betancourt

, supra , 62 Cal.App. 5th 552. The re, the plaintiff was a delivery driver for a company that did the

“ ‘last

- mile deliver y , ’ ” primarily for its client, Amazon.com, Inc

. ( Id

. at p. 5 60 .) The drivers would pick up the Amazon packages
from warehouse s and deliver them to Amazon customers who
lived locally

. ( Ibid

. ) The packages originate d from various
locations within the United States and even foreign countries

, and the re was nothing to indicate that the plaintiff was delivering only packages originating in California. ( Id

. at p. 561.)
The court held that the plaintiff was exempt from FAA coverage under the transportatio n worker exemption because the
deliveries “ ‘were essentially the last phase of a continuous journey of the interstate commerce ’ ” for the out

- of

- state packages to reach their destination to the customer. ( Id

. at p. 559 .) Thus, the plaintiff “w as ‘engage d in interstate commerce through his5

participation in the continuation of the movement of interstate goods to their destinations.’ ” ( Ibid

. ) We agree with Betancourt and conclude that Peters was also engaged in interstate commerce when she participated in the last leg of the delivery of out

- of

- state packages. ( Betancourt

, supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 559, 561.) Contrary to SDLA’s argument, i t is inconsequential that Peters and SDLA delivered only within the state of C ali fornia

. An employee does not need to cross state lines for the exemption to apply. (See Saxon

, supra , 596 U.S. at 46 1 [ concluding that airplane cargo loaders , who do

not cross state or international boundaries, are exempt from the FAA]; Nieto

, supra , 33 Cal.App.5 th at p. 284 [ holding that a delivery driver who only made intrastate deliveries fell within the transportation worker exemption because he delivered beverages originating from out of state].) Peter s’ s delivery of
Amazon packages to its final destination played “a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders.” ( Saxon

, at p. 458.) W ithout last

- leg delivery drivers, such as Peters, the transportation of th ese package s would be incomplete.
Our conclusion is co nsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Rittman n v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 971
F.3d 904 ( Rittmann )

. There, the Ninth Circuit held that a

“ last

- mile ” delivery driver contracted by Amazon was exempt from the FAA

. ( Rittmann

, at p. 921.) T he court interpreted the phrase “engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,” as used in section 1 of the FAA, to include transportation workers employed to deliver goods that originate out of stat e to an in

- state desti nation. ( Rittmann

, at p . 910.) T he court observed the packages do not come to rest at Amazon warehouses

. ( Id

. at p. 916.) Delivery providers , such as the plaintiff, pick up the6

packages from warehouse s and transport them for the last leg to
their destination. T he interstate transaction does not conclude
until the packages are delivered. ( Id

. at p p . 915

- 9 16

. ) Thus, t he
drivers are “engaged in the movement of interstate commerce” because their “transportation of goods wholly wit hin a state are
still a part of a continuous interstate transportation.” ( Ibid

. ) SDLA attempts to distinguish Rittman n b y arguing that
SDLA is a purely intrastate delivery company and not engaged in
interstate commerce . We are not persuaded

. In our view, Peters
and SDLA were engaged in interstate commerce. SDLA drivers performed the last

- mile delivery of out

- of

- state packages to their
final destination and were thus “ still a part of a continuous interstate transportation.” ( Rittma n n , supra , 971 F.3d at p. 916.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT , P. J.

YEGAN , J.Benjamin F. Coats, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Tim L. Johnson and Nikolas T. Djordjevski for Defendant and Appellant. Justice Law Corporation, Douglas Han, Shunt Tatavos

Gharajeh

, Lawrence W. Beall and Christopher Petersen for Plaintiff and Respondent.