UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil No. 12-1413 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(February 27, 2015) 

Plaintiff Kwaku Attakora filed suit against Defendants the District of Columbia and 

Mannone A. Butler alleging that the Defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiff’s employment 

with the District of Columbia on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the District of Columbia 

Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1403.01 et seq. Plaintiff further alleges that the 

Defendants interfered with and/or retaliated against Plaintiff’s exercise of his rights under the 

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.1

 The Court granted in part 

Defendant District of Columbia’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and 

dismissed Plaintiff’s FMLA claim without prejudice. Mem. Op. (May 8, 2013), ECF No. [28]. 

The Court subsequently dismissed Defendant Butler from this suit after determining that Plaintiff 

failed to ever properly serve Defendant Butler. Mem. Op (Dec. 5, 2013), ECF No. [52], at 6; 

Minute Order (May 8, 2014). Accordingly, the only claims remaining before the Court are 

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 In response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff withdrew Counts Three 

and Four of the Amended Complaint, alleging unlawful discrimination based on the Plaintiff’s 

age. 

KWAKU ATTAKORA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

 Defendant. 
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Plaintiff’s claims against the District of Columbia that he was discriminated against because of 

his national origin in violation of Title VII and the DCHRA. Presently before the Court is 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File 

Sur-Reply.2 As Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply is unopposed, the Court shall 

GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion and consider Plaintiff’s sur-reply amongst the pleadings filed in this 

case. Upon consideration of the pleadings,3

 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a 

whole, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons stated 

below. 

I. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff is an African-American male of Ghanaian descent. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1. Beginning 

in April 2008, Plaintiff worked as a Senior Statistician for the District of Columbia Criminal 

Justice Coordinating Council (“CJCC”). Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Mannone Butler was appointed the interim 

Executive Director of CJCC for three to four months in 2010 and again at the beginning of 2011 

before being appointed CJCC’s Executive Director in May 2011. Id. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 8, 14, 21. 

On June 6, 2011, Plaintiff was called into Butler’s office where Michael Scott from the District 

of Columbia Human Resources Department “formally terminated him.” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 24. The 

 2

 ECF No. [69]. 

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 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. [63]; 

Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Def.’s Stmt.”), ECF No. [63-2]; 

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 

[67]; Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Stmt.”), ECF No. [67], at 3-17; Plaintiff’s Response to 

Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. Stmt.”), ECF No. [67-1]; Defendant’s Reply to 

Plaintiff’s Opposition to its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. [68]; 

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“Def.’s Resp. Stmt.”), ECF No. [68-1]; 

Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s SurReply”), ECF No. [69-1]. 
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parties do not dispute that Butler was the “sole decision maker in the termination of [Plaintiff].” 

Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 27; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5; Def.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 27. 

Defendant offers the following reason for Plaintiff’s termination: 

Plaintiff was terminated due to changes in the CJCC's operational needs and 

Plaintiff’s inability to perform according to the needs of the agency. These needs 

had changed from the time of Plaintiff’s initial employment in 2009. Plaintiff’s 

reliance on the guidance and expertise of the Executive Director of the CJCC and 

CJCC staff to perform his job functions undermined his effectiveness and 

usefulness to the agency. In particular, Plaintiff did not: 1) possess subject matter 

experience in the area of criminal and juvenile justice; 2) identify statistical or 

research analyses to address the broad range of challenges faced by the District’s 

criminal and juvenile justice system; 3) independently provide relevant innovative 

research recommendations to CJCC’s Executive Director; and 4) possess the 

ability to authoritatively present or explain research findings and 

recommendations. 

Def.’s Resp. to Interrog. 5, Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. [63-6]; see also Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 6-7. 

Plaintiff seeks to rebut Defendant’s alleged non-discriminatory reason for terminating 

Plaintiff with three categories of evidence. First, Plaintiff points to evidence of “derogatory 

slurs” made by Butler against Africans and other actions and inactions taken by Butler that 

Plaintiff alleges reveal her discriminatory bias. Second, Plaintiff proffers evidence of Butler’s 

allegedly longstanding degrading and disparate treatment of Plaintiff. Third, Plaintiff points to 

evidence that Defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff is a 

“subjective, manufactured and post hoc rationale.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. 

Plaintiff does not offer any direct evidence of discrimination, only circumstantial, and 

none of the evidence to which Plaintiff points stands out as clearly discriminatory. Nevertheless, 

after thoroughly reviewing the evidence presented by both parties, the Court cannot find that 

Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, especially since the evidence presented at 

the summary judgment stage must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, 
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with all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 

(1986). The district court’s task is to determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to [the trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. In their pleadings and the deposition 

testimony and responses to interrogatories attached to their pleadings, both parties provide very 

little detail to support their assertions that Defendant was motivated by either discriminatory or 

non-discriminatory reasons in terminating Plaintiff. The parties also do not respond to many of 

the arguments and evidence raised by their opposing counsel. As a result, the Court is unable to 

come to any conclusions about why certain actions were taken or not taken by Defendants. 

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that this is a close 

case and that reasonable triers of fact could draw “divergent yet justifiable inferences” from the 

evidence provided. Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“If material facts are 

at issue, or, though undisputed, are susceptible to divergent inferences, summary judgment is not 

available.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, many of the inferences the parties ask the Court to 

draw from the evidence in the record are dependent upon credibility determinations that are the 

function of a jury, not a judge deciding a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 255. Accordingly, the Court finds it most appropriate to allow a jury to determine 

whether Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination is pretext for 

national origin discrimination. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 880 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (internal quotations omitted), overturned on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 

1998) (en banc) (“[i]n discrimination cases summary judgment must be approached with special 

caution” and be reviewed under a “heightened standard”). 
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II. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ 

 COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE