UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MICHAEL PENNY, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-1667 (RMU) : v. : Re Document No.: 22 : U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, : : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION G RANTING THE D EFENDANT ’ S R ENEWED M OTION FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION In this civil action brought pro se under the Freedom of In formation Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, the plaintiff challenges the United States Marshals Serv ice’s (“USMS”) response to his requests for records pertai ning to himself, other individual s and real property. In a prior memorandum opinion, the court denied in part without prejudice the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding th at the defendant had not dem onstrated that the USMS had conducted an adequate search for records in a par ticular database in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA requests. The defendant now renews its motion for summary judgment as to the adequacy of its search. Upon consideration of the partie s’ supplemental submissions, the court grants the defendant’s renewed motion.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The plaintiff commenced this action in September 2008, challenging the USMS’s response to his requests for reco rds pertaining to himself, the execution of a search warrant on August 16, 2006 at 4901 W. Congress St reet in Chicago, Illinois, a lease agreement “between the2 Federal Government & Michael Penny, on or about . . . April of 1989” for the aforementioned property and “any and all records or documents” pertaining to the leasing and occupancy of said property by the plaintiff, Tammy Brown and unnamed individuals during the 1990s. 1 Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of William E. Bordley (“Bordley Decl.”), Ex. A. In December 2008, the defendant moved for summary judgment. See generally Def.’s 1st Mot. for
Summ. J. The court issued a memorandum opinion in September 2009, granting in part and denying in part without prejudice the de fendant’s motion for summary judgment. See generally Mem. Op. (Sept. 15, 2009). Specifically, the cour t granted summary judgme nt to the defendant on its claim that certain FOIA disclosure exem ptions justified the nondisclosure of certain materials otherwise responsive to the plaintiff’s requests. Id. at 5-6. The court, however, denied without prejudice the por tion of the defendant’s motion concer ning the adequacy of the search conducted in response to th e plaintiff’s request. Id . at 6-8. The court spec ifically noted that the defendant had searched its Consolidated Asse ts Tracking System (“CATS”) database only by using an “asset identification number,” rather than other retrieval terms, such as the plaintiff’s name and personal identifier, that it had used when searching othe r databases potentially containing responsive documents. Id . at 6. Because the defendant had provided no basis for concluding that its search of the CATS data base was reasonably calcu lated to locate all responsive records, the court denied without prejudice the de fendant’s motion for summary judgment on this search. Id

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1 A more detailed description of the factual history underlying this case may be found in a prior memorandum opinion of this court. See Mem. Op. (Sept. 15, 2009) at 1-2.3 In October 2009, the defendant filed this renewed motion for summary judgment. See generally Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. With this renewed motion fully briefed, the court turns to the applicable legal sta ndards and the parties’ arguments.

III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on fi le, together with the affidavits , if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood , 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court is to view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving the non-movant the be nefit of all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the record and the be nefit of any doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1970). To determine which facts are “material,” a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248. FOIA affords the public access to virtually any federal government record that FOIA itself does not specifically exempt from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552; Vaughn v. Rosen , 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973). FOIA confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to order the4 release of improperly withheld or redacted information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). In a judicial review of an agency’s respons e to a FOIA request, the defenda nt agency has the burden of justifying nondisclosure, and the court must ascertain whether the agency has sustained its burden of demonstrating that th e documents requested are exempt from disclosure under FOIA and that the agency has adequate ly segregated exempt from non- exempt materials. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Al-Fayed v. CIA , 254 F.3d 300, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Summers v. Dep’t of Justice , 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977). An agency may meet its burden by providing the requester with a Vaughn index, adequately describing each withheld document and explaining the reason for the withholding. Summers , 140 F.3d at 1080; King v. Dep’t of Justice , 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Vaughn , 484 F.2d 820 (fashioning what is now commonly referred to as a “ Vaughn index”). The court may grant summary judgment to an agen cy on the basis of its affidavits if they: [(a)] describe the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, [(b)] demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and [(c)] are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith. Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). B. The Defendant Conducted an Adequate Search for Responsive Records In support of its renewed motion, the defenda nt submits two declarations from William Bordley, Associate General Counsel and FO IA/Privacy Act Offi cer of the USMS. 2 See generally Bordley Decl.; Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J., Supplemental Decl. of William E. Bordley (“Supplemental Bordley Decl.”). Bord ley contends that the defendant conducted a

2 The court previously deemed Bordley competent to testify about the defendant’s search efforts in this case. See Mem. Op. (Sept. 15, 2009) at 5.5 search of its Prisoner Processing and Populati on Management/Prisoner Tracking System and the Warrant Information Network (“WIN”) using the “p laintiff’s name and/or personal identifier, [] asset identification number, and by reference to the items listed pursuan t to his request.” Bordley Decl. ¶¶ 5-7. This search covered the de fendant’s office in the Northern District of Illinois and the USMS Headquarter s Asset Forfeiture Office. Id . ¶¶ 5, 7. Moreover, Bordley states that in respons e to the court’s September 2009 ruling, the defendant conducted an additional search of the CATS database. Supplemental Bordley Decl. ¶ 3. Specifically, Bordley states that on Se ptember 29, 2009, “the USMS CATS Team Leader performed searches for records using the fo llowing identifiers: 1. Michael Penny, 2. 4901 W. Congress Street, Chicago, Illinois [,] 3. Seizur e Warrant No. 89 C 2736 and 4. Civil Case No. 89
C 2736.” Id. ¶¶ 2-3. This supplemental search unc overed two additional pages of responsive records, which the defendant released to the plaintiff on October 6, 2009. Id . ¶ 6 & Ex. J. Bordley further states that “the USMS has conduc ted an exhaustive search in the databases and files . . . where information pertaining to plain tiff’s FOIA request reasonably would be located.” Id . ¶ 7. In his opposition, the plaintiff questions the adequacy of the defendant’s search and speculates that responsive records could be available elsewhere. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. None of the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claims , however, “plac[es] the sufficiency of the identification or retrieval proced ures genuinely in issue[.]” Spannaus v. CIA , 841 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1993); see also Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 475 F.3d 381, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reitera ting that “the fact that a partic ular document was not found does not demonstrate the inadequacy of a search”) (internal citations omitted); Campbell v. Dep’t of6 Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that “[w]hen a request does not specify the locations in which an agency should search, the ag ency has discretion to c onfine its inquiry to a central filing system if additional searches are unlikely to produce any marginal return; in other words, the agency generally need not search every record system”) (internal citation omitted). Thus, based upon the searches Bordley desc ribes in his initial and supplemental declarations, the court concludes that the defendant performed an adequate search for responsive records.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant’s rene wed motion for summary judgment. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued th is 19th day of May, 2010.

RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge