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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re K.S.

No. 18-1090 (Putnam County 18-JA-24)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother K.S., by counsel Christopher C. McClung, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Putnam County’s September 6, 2018, order terminating her parental rights to K.S., who is sixteen 

years old.1 The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by 

counsel S.L. Evans, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem 

(“guardian”), Lisa A. Estes, filed a response on behalf of the child in support of the circuit 

court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her an 

improvement period.

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This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In April of 2018, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition that alleged petitioner had 

a history of drug addiction and relapsed in the months preceding the petition’s filing. According 

to the DHHR, petitioner would become paranoid and have “hallucinations of people after her”; 

had “conversations with people that [were] not there”; and believed “cameras were in the photos 

in the home and . . . smash[ed] them to destroy the cameras.” Police were called due to 

petitioner’s behavior on several occasions and “suggested a mental hygiene.” The DHHR alleged 

 

1Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. 

Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 

(2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles 

L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2Petitioner raises no assignment of error regarding the circuit court’s termination of her 

parental rights. 

FILED

May 24, 2019

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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that petitioner’s behavior scared the child. Despite both petitioner’s boyfriend and the child 

providing statements about petitioner’s behavior, she continued to deny that she ever heard 

voices or spoke to people who were not present. Petitioner initially denied drug usage but 

eventually admitted to using half a gram of methamphetamine daily during the course of the

Child Protective Services (“CPS”) investigation. Petitioner also informed the CPS worker that 

“people can still be good parents and use drugs or alcohol.” Additionally, during the 

investigation, petitioner accused the CPS worker of conspiring with her boyfriend to fabricate the 

allegations against her. A CPS worker’s conversations with the child outside petitioner’s 

presence corroborated her erratic, paranoid behavior and established that the child had called law 

enforcement about the behavior approximately five times. 

The petition further alleged that, in February of 2018, petitioner was arrested for 

obstructing an officer and assault on an officer. These charges stemmed from law enforcement’s 

response to a domestic incident between petitioner and the child that began due to the child’s 

intention to file a mental hygiene petition against petitioner. When law enforcement arrived, 

petitioner attempted to strike an officer and further fought with officers when restrained. Prior to 

the petition’s filing, CPS arranged for petitioner to receive services to assist with her substance 

abuse and related issues. Petitioner agreed to undergo certain services, but the child later 

contacted CPS to inform them that petitioner was continuing to behave erratically. The child had 

left the home to stay with a friend, and petitioner contacted police to report the child had run 

away. After the child returned to the home, law enforcement responded to an incident wherein 

petitioner “was hitting the child.” CPS attempted to implement a temporary protection plan but 

petitioner refused to sign the document. As a result, CPS took emergency custody of the child 

and filed the instant petition. At a subsequent preliminary hearing, the circuit court ratified the 

DHHR’s emergency custody of the child. 

In May of 2018, the DHHR presented multiple witnesses at an adjudicatory hearing who 

testified regarding the petition’s allegations. The circuit court also took in-camera testimony 

from the child. Petitioner moved for visitation with the child, but the circuit court held the 

motion in abeyance. This was based, in part, upon a pending domestic violence protective order 

in place against petitioner on behalf of the child and her uncle, with whom she had been placed. 

The circuit court continued the hearing until July of 2018. Petitioner appeared for the continued 

adjudicatory hearing even though she was incarcerated. The DHHR presented additional 

witnesses who testified concerning the petition’s allegations. Based on the evidence, the circuit 

court adjudicated petitioner as an abusing parent based upon her “regular and frequent use[] of 

methamphetamine” and the fact that this abuse “seriously impaired her parenting skills and 

abilities.” 

In August of 2018, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing. Petitioner did not appear 

for the hearing, even though she was no longer incarcerated, but was represented by counsel. 

Despite notice of a multidisciplinary team (“MDT”) meeting held before the dispositional 

hearing, petitioner failed to appear for that meeting as well. Based upon the evidence, the circuit 

court found that petitioner “failed to acknowledge or address any of her behaviors that led to 

being adjudicated an abusing parent.” The circuit court further found that petitioner continued to 

behave erratically and was not amenable to treatment. Accordingly, the circuit court found that 

there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially 
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corrected and that the child’s welfare required termination of petitioner’s parental rights. As 

such, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental rights. It is from the dispositional order 

that petitioner appeals.3 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Upon review, the Court finds no 

error in the proceedings below.

In support of her assignment of error, petitioner argues that “she would be able . . . and 

willing to comply with the terms and conditions of an improvement period” and that she 

demonstrated as much by clear and convincing evidence below. She further asserts that she “was 

not able to participate in DHHR services during a portion of the proceedings due to 

incarceration.” As such, she asserts that it was error for the circuit court to deny her an 

improvement period.4 We note, however, that petitioner cites to no evidence in the record to 

 

3The child’s father is deceased. The permanency plan for the child is a legal guardianship 

with the current foster family. 

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In support of this assignment of error, petitioner also argues that she “disputes the 

allegations of substance abuse issues that affect her ability to parent her child, the validity of the 

claims made by the child, and that she was abusing and/or neglectful of the child.” We note, 

however, that petitioner has not set forth a separate assignment of error regarding the sufficiency 

of the evidence upon which she was adjudicated. Pursuant to Rule 10(c)(3) of the West Virginia 

Rules of Appellate Procedure, a petitioner’s brief must contain a “list of the assignments of error 

that are presented for review, expressed in terms and circumstances of the case.” Additionally, 

petitioner provides no relevant authority concerning adjudication in abuse and neglect 

proceedings, no citation to the record to establish what evidence, if any, she believes was 

insufficient in regard to her adjudication, and no argument wherein she asserts how the circuit 

court’s factual findings and legal conclusions at adjudication are erroneous. Rule 10(c)(7) 

requires that

(continued . . . )
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support her assertion that she proved she was likely to fully comply with services. On the 

contrary, the record shows that petitioner could not satisfy this burden and that the circuit court 

did not err in denying petitioner an improvement period. 

The decision to grant or deny an improvement period rests in the sound discretion of the 

circuit court. See In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015) (“West Virginia 

law allows the circuit court discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent an improvement 

period.”); Syl. Pt. 6, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) (“It is within 

the court’s discretion to grant an improvement period within the applicable statutory 

requirements . . . .”). We have also held that a parent’s “entitlement to an improvement period is 

conditioned upon the ability of the parent/respondent to demonstrate ‘by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the respondent is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.’” In re:

Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 215, 599 S.E.2d 631, 638 (2004). Petitioner has cited no evidence to 

support her assertion that she was likely to fully comply with an improvement period. Instead, 

the record shows that petitioner “failed to acknowledge or address any of her behaviors that led 

to be being adjudicated an abusing parent.” As this Court has previously held, 

[i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be 

acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth 

of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the 

perpetrator of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable 

and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s 

expense.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting Charity H., 215 W. 

Va. at 217, 599 S.E.2d at 640).

 

[t]he brief must contain an argument exhibiting clearly the points of fact and law 

presented, the standard of review applicable, and citing the authorities relied on . . 

. [and] must contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on appeal . . . .

The Court may disregard errors that are not adequately supported by specific 

references to the record on appeal.

Additionally, in an Administrative Order entered December 10, 2012, Re: Filings That Do Not 

Comply With the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court specifically noted that “[b]riefs that 

lack citation of authority [or] fail to structure an argument applying applicable law” are not in 

compliance with this Court’s rules. Further, “[b]riefs with arguments that do not contain a 

citation to legal authority to support the argument presented and do not ‘contain appropriate and 

specific citations to the record on appeal . . .’ as required by rule 10(c)(7)” are not in compliance 

with this Court’s rules. Here, petitioner’s brief in regard to this argument is inadequate as it fails 

to comply with Rule 10(c) and our December 10, 2012, administrative order. Accordingly, the 

Court will not address this argument on appeal.
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Further, petitioner attempts to rely on her incarceration during the proceedings to argue 

that she could not have complied with services during that period. However, she fails to 

recognize that, following her release from incarceration, she did not attend an MDT meeting in 

order to address the issues that necessitated the petition’s filing and additionally failed to attend 

the dispositional hearing. As such, the circuit court found that petitioner’s “failure to appear at 

[the dispositional] hearing is further evidence of her lack of compliance.” Therefore, petitioner’s 

argument regarding the impact of her incarceration on her ability to comply with services is not 

persuasive. Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the circuit court’s denial of petitioner’s 

request for an improvement period. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

September 6, 2018, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: May 24, 2019

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison