J-A16017-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

ARTHUR MONTGOMERY AND BARBARA 

J. MONTGOMERY, HUSBAND AND WIFE,

 Appellees

 v.

R. OIL & GAS ENTERPRISES, INC.,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 

 No. 1164 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 1, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County

Civil Division at No(s): Civil No 392-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2017

Appellant, R. Oil & Gas Enterprises, Inc., appeals from the judgment 

on the pleadings against it and in favor of Appellees Arthur and Barbara 

Montgomery (the Montgomerys) entered on July 1, 2015. We affirm.

This matter involves interpretation of a lease agreement entered into 

by the parties’ predecessors in interest. The certified record reveals the 

following. On August 11, 1975, Donald and Melvena MacDonald (the 

MacDonalds) entered into an oil and gas lease agreement (the Lease) with 

Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation (Quaker State). The Lease permitted 

Quaker State to drill for and produce oil and gas on 240 acres of land1the 

 

1 The 240 acres covered by the Lease consisted of several different tracts of 

land, at least some of which were sold by the MacDonalds to other 

landowners at some point after the MacDonalds entered into the Lease.
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MacDonalds owned in Venango County. The duration was for a period of 10 

years, and as long thereafter as oil and gas could be produced in paying 

quantities. 

Venango County, Pennsylvania, the location of the leasehold, sits atop 

a geological formation known as the Onondaga Formation (the Formation). 

The Formation is made up of limestone strata that lie under a layer of 

Marcellus black shale and above a layer of Oriskany sandstone.2 The Lease 

itself makes no distinction between oil and gas interests above and below 

the Formation. Rather, the terms of the Lease grant the lessee exclusive 

drilling rights to any oil and gas found under the 240 acres of surface land 

covered by the Lease.

On January 14, 1991, as a result of Quaker State’s assignment to 

Pennsylvania General Energy Corp. (Pennsylvania General), Appellant’s 

predecessor in interest, of Quaker State’s oil and gas interest in the area 

above the Formation, two distinct subsurface estates were created: Area A, 

above the Formation, and Area B, below the Formation. Quaker State 

retained the oil and gas rights for Area B. On January 26, 2009, 

Pennsylvania General conveyed its interest in Area A to Appellant, R. Oil and 

Gas Enterprises, Inc. 

 

2 See Bradford Willard, The Onondaga Formation in Pennsylvania, 44 Journal 

of Geology 578, 578 (1936), available at

http://www.jstor.org/stable/30067366.
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In 2010, the Montgomerys purchased 32.218 acres of the MacDonald’s 

land. The Montgomerys’ land was a portion of the 240 acres of surface land 

covered by the Lease. On April 10, 2014, after observing Appellant’s 

representatives and equipment on their land, the Montgomerys filed the 

instant action against Appellant seeking a declaration that Appellant no 

longer possessed oil and gas rights to the subsurface estates below their 

tract of land. Specifically, the Montgomerys averred that the Lease was 

“terminated by the terms and provisions of said Lease, including but not 

limited to the provision that requires the production of oil or gas in paying 

quantities and/or upon the failure of [Appellant] to make rental payments as 

required.” Complaint, 4/10/2014, at ¶ 15. 

Thereafter, Appellant filed an answer, which contained new matter 

asserting, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the 

Montgomerys’ lawsuit because of the failure to join indispensable parties. 

On August 22, 2014, the Montgomerys filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. After briefing and oral argument on the motion, the trial court 

granted judgment on the pleadings to the Montgomerys. This timely appeal 

followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents four issues for our review.
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1. Whether [the] trial court’s order terminating a portion of an oil 

and gas lease should be reversed when the [L]ease is not 

severable?

2. Whether [the] trial court order granting a motion for judgment 

on the pleadings to terminate a portion of an oil and gas lease 

should be reversed when parties which are indispensable parties 

to the lawsuit are not named as either plaintiffs or defendants?

3. Whether the trial court improperly granted a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings in favor of the [Montgomerys], 

terminating a portion of an oil and gas lease, even though a 

question of fact remained whether oil or gas could be produced 

from real estate governed by the [L]ease?

4. Whether the trial court improperly considered statements made 

in a consent order and agreement when deciding the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In the first and second issues raised on appeal, the substance of 

Appellant’s argument is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

over this controversy because the Montgomerys failed to join indispensable 

parties. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Montgomerys’ Land was 

not severable from the 240 acres of surface land covered by the Lease. 

Appellant’s Brief at 19. Therefore, Appellant argues, the owners of the 

remaining surface land covering the leased property are indispensable 

parties. Additionally, Appellant argues even if the Montgomerys’ Land is 

severable from the 240 acres of surface land covered by the Lease, the 

subsurface oil and gas estates are not severable; thus, the party that 
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purports to own the oil and gas rights to Area B3is an indispensable party. 

Id. at 21. 

Our standard of review of these issues is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. See Seneca Res. Corp. v. S & T Bank, 122 A.3d 374, 

380 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that whether a lease is severable is a 

question of law subject to de novo review); see also N. Forests II, Inc. v. 

Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 28–29 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted) 

(“The failure to join an indispensable party is a non-waivable defect that 

implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 

94 A.3d 402, 406 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted) (providing that 

whether a trial court possesses subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 

law subject to de novo review). 

It is well-settled that “[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons 

shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be 

affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of 

persons not parties to the proceeding.” 42 P.S. § 7250(a).

Our Supreme Court has previously determined:

[U]nless all indispensable parties are made parties to 

an action, a court is powerless to grant relief. Thus, 

the absence of such a party goes absolutely to the 

court’s jurisdiction. A party is indispensable when his 

 

3

For simplicity, we hereinafter refer to this party as Quaker State, although 

Quaker State may have since assigned its interest in Area B under the Lease 

to a different party. 
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or her rights are so connected with the claims of the 

litigants that no decree can be made without 

impairing those rights. A corollary of this principle is 

that a party against whom no redress is sought need 

not be joined. In this connection, if the merits of a 

case can be determined without prejudice to the 

rights of an absent party, the court may proceed.

The determination of an indispensable party question 

involves the following considerations:

1. Do absent parties have a right or 

interest related to the claim?

2. If so, what is the nature of that right 

or interest?

3. Is that right or interest essential to 

the merits of the issue?

4. Can justice be afforded without 

violating the due process rights of absent 

parties?

Bastian v. Sullivan, 117 A.3d 338, 343 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and 

footnotes omitted).

One of the major factors involved in a determination of whether a 

party is indispensable in a lease context is whether the lease is severable. 

With respect to the Lease’s severability, we are mindful of the following. 

In determining whether an oil and gas lease is severable ... there 

is no bright line rule requiring that a court first find that the 

intent of the parties is unclear as to entirety/severability before 

it may look to factors such as the conduct of the parties and the 

character of the consideration to determine whether an 

agreement is entire or severable. The central task is to 

ascertain the intent of the parties. That intent may be apparent 

from the explicit language of the lease or it may be obvious from 
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a construction of the agreement, including the nature of the 

consideration. In short, principles of construction may reveal the 

intent of the parties no less than the actual language addressing 

entirety/severability. Thus, absent express language that a 

lease is entire, a court may look to the lease as a whole, 

including the character of the consideration, to determine the 

intent of the parties as to severability and may also consider the 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease, the 

conduct of the parties, and any other factor pertinent to 

ascertaining the parties’ intent. The court need not make a 

specific predicate finding of ambiguity before undertaking the 

inquiry; indeed, if the contract were crystal clear as to the 

parties’ intent, severability likely would not be a contested issue.

Seneca Res. Corp., 122 A.3d at 381 (internal alterations, quotation marks, 

ellipses, footnote, and citations omitted; emphasis added). 

In Seneca Res. Corp., this Court determined that the oil and gas 

lease at issue was not severable. In so doing, we focused on the language 

of the lease and the intent of the parties, noting that

[the lease was entered on January 1, 1962 pursuant to an 

agreement (the Agreement) the between the successors in 

interest to the appellant landowners and Seneca]. In the 

Agreement, the parties identified the total land to be leased as 

25,000 acres. Additionally, in 1974, the [appellant landowners] 

assigned their rights to certain acreage implicated by the Lease 

to Koppers Company, Inc. (“Koppers”). In the Assignment, the 

[appellant landowners] clearly stated that the conveyance was 

subject to the rights provided [to the original lessee] under the 

Lease. Importantly, the [appellant landowners] stated that under 

the Lease, they “leased unto [the original lessee] 25,000 acres 

of land for the exploration and development of oil and gas under 

the terms and conditions therein set forth[.]” These documents 

evidence that the [appellant landowners] understood that the 

“leased premises” includes 25,000 acres, not separate and 

severable operated and unoperated acreages.
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Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). Thus, because the Agreement and the 

Assignment both identified the same acreage and rights, this Court 

concluded that the lease was intended to be entire and, therefore, was not 

severable. Id. at 385.

In the instant case, the Lease states, in relevant part, as follows.

...the lessor in consideration of the sum One Dollar in hand paid, 

the receipt of which is hereby acknowledge [(sic)], and in further 

consideration of the covenants and agreement hereinafter 

contained on the part the lessee to be kept and performed, 

hereby leases and grants unto lessee, its successors and 

assigns, together the exclusive right to drill wells and operate 

thereon to produce, save and take care said products, all for the 

term of Ten years from the date hereof and as long thereafter as 

oil and gas is or can be produced in paying quantities.

* * * 

The lessor further grants to the lessee all rights of way 

over said premises necessary for the purposes aforesaid, with 

the right to lay pipelines for the transportation thereon and 

thereover of oil, gas or water from said premises or other lands 

operated by the lease, to run electric and telephone lines over 

the leased premises, to erect necessary buildings thereon, and 

to remove all machinery, fixtures and buildings placed thereon 

by the lease; the right to use free from royalty, sufficient oil, gas 

and water produced from the premises for all operations thereon 

(provided that it finds said water at its own expense); the right 

to subdivide and release the premises and the right to 

surrender this lease at any time and thereupon be discharged 

from all obligations, covenants, and conditions herein contained.

* * *

It is mutually agreed that upon the surrender of this lease 

by the lessee, the same shall thereafter be null and void. This 

lease shall be binding upon and extend to the parties hereto and 
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their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and 

assigns.

Complaint, 4/10/2015, Exhibit B (emphasis added).

The Lease is distinguishable from that evaluated by this Court in 

Seneca Res. Corp. First, unlike the lease in Seneca Res. Corp., the 240 

acres at issue herein consisted of a number of distinct parcels. Further, the 

terms of the Lease specifically grant the lessee the right to “subdivide and 

release” the property. Lease at ¶ 4. Additionally, the final paragraph 

provides that the Lease terms are “binding upon and extend to the parties 

hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and 

assigns.” Id. at ¶ 13. 

The parties do not dispute that the original lessors, the MacDonalds, 

by deed dated February 17, 2010, sold 32.318 acres of the leased property 

to the Montgomerys. Although the Lease does not mention the Onondaga 

Formation, Appellant admits that it acquired an interest in Area A in 2009, 

but “the interest of the lessee in the Lease below the top of the Onondaga 

formation [Area B] were [(sic)] retained by Quaker State ... in an exception

and reservation found in an Assignment dated January 14, 1991[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. Thus, the actions of the parties, coupled with the 

language of the document, support a finding that the Lease is severable, 

both with respect to surface land ownership and to the ownership of oil and 

gas rights above and below the top of the Onondaga Formation. 
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In granting the Montgomery’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

the trial court determined that, with respect to Appellant’s interest in Area A, 

(1) the Lease had expired under its own terms prior to Appellant’s ownership 

and (2) Appellant’s predecessor in interest, Harmony Oil and Gas Company 

(Harmony), had abandoned the Lease. Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/2015, at 7-

15. A review of the record demonstrates that the court’s decision affected 

only Appellant’s interests and “did not disturb the rights of any other 

interests of the [L]ease,” in particular because the Lease had lapsed due to 

abandonment. Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/2015, at 7 (unnumbered). 

Moreover, the court’s order makes no restriction on any other leaseholder’s 

rights and no other parties are necessary to dispose of the claims raised 

herein. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s determination that it had 

subject matter jurisdiction over this case as the merits could be determined 

without prejudice to the rights of an absent party. 

Accordingly, because the Lease is severable and because the court’s 

order is properly confined to the Montgomerys’ claim, Appellant’s argument 

that this action must fail for failure to join indispensable parties is without 

merit.

In its third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting 

the Montgomerys’ motion for judgment on the pleadings because “a factual 

question remains [as to] whether oil or gas can be produced in paying 
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quantities.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. We address this claim mindful of the 

following.

Our scope of review on an appeal from the grant of 

judgment on the pleadings is plenary. Entry of judgment on the 

pleadings is permitted under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1034, which provides that after the pleadings are 

closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, 

any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a 

demurrer. It may be entered when there are no disputed issues 

of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. In determining if there is a dispute as to facts, the court 

must confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant 

documents. On appeal, we accept as true all well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint. 

On appeal, our task is to determine whether the trial 

court’s ruling was based on a clear error of law or whether there 

were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly be 

tried before a jury or by a judge sitting without a jury. 

Neither party can be deemed to have admitted either 

conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. Moreover, in 

conducting its inquiry, the court should confine itself to the 

pleadings themselves and any documents or exhibits properly 

attached to them. It may not consider inadmissible evidence in 

determining a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Only when 

the moving party’s case is clear and free from doubt such that a 

trial would prove fruitless will an appellate court affirm a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings.

Altoona Reg’l Health Sys. v. Schutt, 100 A.3d 260, 265 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The trial court rejected Appellant’s argument, holding instead that 

from the pleadings it was clear no oil or gas had been produced in paying 
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quantities on the Montgomerys’ Land since 2001 and Appellant’s predecessor 

in interest had breached the implied obligation to explore and develop the 

property “with reasonable diligence.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/2015, at 7-

12. Thus, the court held that the Lease is “null, void, and of no force and 

effect pertaining to [the Montgomerys’ Land].” Id. at 14. We agree with the 

well-reasoned opinion of the trial court and, following our review of the 

certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that 

the opinion of the Honorable Robert L. Boyer states findings of fact that are 

supported by the record, evidences no abuse of discretion or errors of law, 

and thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes of Appellant’s third 

issue and supporting argument. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s 

opinion, at pages 7 through 14, filed on June 30, 2015, as our own. 

Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court improperly considered 

statements made in a March 9, 2009 consent order and agreement between 

Appellant and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 

(DEP) when deciding the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant’s 

Brief at 26-30. The consent order outlines an agreement Appellant made 

with the DEP to purchase wells, including those on the Montgomerys’ Land, 

which had previously been deemed “abandoned” during Harmony’s 

ownership. Appellant’s Answer and New Matter, 5/13/2014, Exhibit 1 at 1. 

Pursuant to this agreement, Appellant acknowledged that Harmony, in 
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violation of a prior agreement with the DEP, had failed to plug or produce 

668 wells. Id. at 1-2. Appellant’s request to purchase those wells and bring 

them into compliance with any relevant environmental statutes was granted, 

and an order was entered which set forth the obligations of both parties, 

including civil penalties that would arise for non-compliance. Id. at 2-9. The 

record reflects that the challenged document was attached in its entirety to 

Appellant’s answer and new matter, filed on May 13, 2014. Appellant’s 

Answer and New Matter, Exhibit 1. 

As noted above, in determining whether to grant a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, the court “must confine its consideration to the 

pleadings and relevant documents” properly attached thereto. Altoona 

Reg’l Health Sys., 100 A.3d at 265. Here, the trial court relied in part on 

the consent order and agreement to determine that the wells were 

abandoned prior to Appellant’s acquisition. Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/2015, 

at 14. However, Appellant argues that, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Evidence 408, offers of compromise are inadmissible when offered to prove 

liability; thus, the consent order and agreement could not be considered 

when ruling on the Montgomerys’ motion. See Pa.R.E. 408(a). The Rule 

provides as follows.

(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not 

admissible--on behalf of any party--either to prove or disprove 

the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a 

prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:
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(1) furnishing, promising, or offering--or accepting, 

promising to accept, or offering to accept--a valuable 

consideration in compromising or attempting to 

compromise the claim; and

(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise 

negotiations about the claim.

(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another 

purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating 

a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a 

criminal investigation or prosecution.

Pa.R.E. 408.

We disagree with Appellant that use of the consent order and 

agreement to support granting judgment on the pleadings violated Rule 408. 

The Montgomerys herein are not parties to the consent order and agreement 

between Appellant and the DEP. Additionally, the consent order and 

agreement at issue has no bearing on whether the Montgomerys’ Land 

remains subject to the Lease. As the trial court explained,

[t]he Commonwealth Court addressed non-parties to COAs 

in City of Chester v. PUC, 773 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. [Cmwlth]. 

2001), wherein the Commonwealth Court noted the problems 

with a PUC consent decree, the court itself was not bound by 

that consent decree. As a judicial entity, this court is similarly 

not bound by the COA between Appellant and the DEP. Likewise, 

Appellee was not a party to the Consent Order and Agreement, 

and therefore would not be bound by its terms, following the 

principle of contract law that a non-party cannot be bound 

without consent.

A decision by a Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board 

directly deals with the language seen in the COA at bar. In Mary 

E. Collier & Ronald M. Collier v. Commonwealth et al., 2012 
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WL 2950743 (Pa. Env, Hrg. Bd. 2012), the Board entertained an 

argument by the plaintiffs challenging identical language in a 

similar Consent Order [and] Agreement. Acknowledging that the 

Board could not determine whether or not the provision would be 

admissible before the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County, 

the Board nevertheless stated the Colliers could not be bound by 

the COA, under the principles stated in City of Chester....

Certainly, the court in deciding this matter does not need 

the [DEP’s] authorization in deciding the factual basis of a case. 

Further, the Montgomerys were not parties to the agreement 

between the COA between the DEP and Appellant. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/2015, at 8-9 (unnumbered).

Moreover, we find disingenuous Appellant’s argument that the 

language of the consent order itself, which provides that “[t]he Parties do 

not authorize any other persons to use the Findings in this Consent Order 

and Agreement in any matter or proceeding,” bars its use in this proceeding. 

As the trial court pointed out, “the [Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing] 

Board note[d] that [this] language does not prohibit the use of the COA in 

other matters, but only that such use is done without authorization” of either 

party. Id. at 8 (unnumbered). Appellant ostensibly violated this provision 

by attaching the consent order and agreement to its own pleading, and 

relying upon the information contained therein in its defense of the 

Montgomerys’ suit. Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s attempt 

simultaneously to rely on and distance itself from the consent order and 

agreement. Finally, we acknowledge the trial court’s statement that it

“relied on more than just the COA in reaching its determination.” Trial Court 
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Opinion, 11/4/2015, at 9 (unnumbered). This is borne out by the trial court’s 

June 30, 2015 opinion. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

judgment entered against Appellant.

Judgment affirmed. The parties shall attach the trial court’s June 30, 

2015 opinion to this memorandum in the event of further proceedings.

Judge Shogan joins.

Judge Olson files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2017
1 

Summary Judgment on 'October 29, 2014. 

Judgment on the Pleadings. Subsequently, this court held argument on Plaintiffs' Motion· for 

Thomas A. Pendleton, Esquire, filed a Response and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 

about August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in this matter. On 

September 12, 2014, counsel for the Plaintiffs, William J. Cisek, Esquire, filed a Brief in Support 

of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On October 20, 2014, counsel for the Defendant, 

New Matter on May 13, 2014. Plaintiffs filed a Reply to New Matter on June 11, 2014. On or 

Action in Trespass on April 10, 2014. Defendant, R. Oil & Gas Enterprises, filed an Answer and 

Procedural History 

Plaintiffs, Arthur Montgomery and Barbara J. Montgomery, husband and wif~, 

commenced this lawsuit by filing a two-count Complaint sounding in Declaratory Judgment and 

now make the following disposition of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 

argument on this motion on October 29, 2014. We have considered the arguments made together 

with tbe pleadings filed by the pro se parties and, after consulting the appropriate authorities, 

OPINION OF COURT 

AND NOW, this ';)() day of June, 2015, the court has before it the Motion .for 

Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Plaintiff in the above captioned matter. We heard 

R. OIL & GAS ENTERPRISES, lNC., 

Defendant. 

ARTHUR MONTGOMERY and BARBARA 

J. MONTGOMERY, Husband and Wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. Civ. NO. 392-2014 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF VENANGO COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA --~-- 

v I v I I VI \I I I, 1nm, ti' II IO 

. , 

Circulated 02/17/2017 11:12 AM
2 

demanded that Defendant, R. Oil & Oas Enterprises, Inc., cease activity on the subject property, 

See Assignment of Leasehold Interest. Following Plaintiffs' purchase of the property in 2010, 

Plaintiffs noticed activity on the 32.318 acre premises in early 2014. As a result of observing this 

activity, Plaintiffs secured legal counsel. Next, Plaintiffs, by letter dated March 12, 2014, 

Assignor makes no warranty as to. its title of those leasehold 

interests set forth in Exhibit "A11 and further makes no warranties 

or representations as to the validity of said leases. 

Harmony Oil & Gas Company, Inc. This assignment stated the following provision: 

Assignment of Faith Woideck, as President of Sterart Run Co .• Inc., and sole shareholder of 

purchased said Lease by Assignment of Leasehold interest dated January 26. 2009, by 

The subject Macdonald Lease was assigned on multiple occasions. The Defendant 

extent of the Montgomerys' interest in the premises acquired pursuant to the deed. 

Recorder of Deeds Office of Venango County on September 3, 1975, in Deed Book 771, page 

57. The Oil Lease consisted of 240 acres, 132 perches, the premises of which were owned by 

numerous land owners .. The Montgomerys purchased 32.318 acres by Deed dated February 1.7, 

2010, recorded on February 18, 2010, in Deed Book 569, page 47. The parties disagree as to the 

Macdonald and Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation, on August 11, 1975, and recorded in the 

abandonment. The Lease was entered into by and between Donald A. and Melvena P. 

Montgomerys, is null, void, and terminated both by the provisions of said Lease and by 

Allegheny Township, Venango County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks a court 

determination that an Oil and Gas Lease, dated August ll, 1975, now owned by the 

pleadings, and the parties' respective briefs. This lawsuit arises out of an Oil and Gas Lease in 

The following factual allegations of this case are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 

Factual Background 

II" LI I \J 

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3 

It is agreed, however, and this lease is made on the condition, that 

it shall become null and void and all rights hereunder shall cease 

and determine, unless work for the drilling of a well is commenced 

on said premises within ninety days from the execution of this 

lease and prosecuted with due and reasonable diligence, or unless 

the lease shall pay to the lessor in advance every three months until 

work for the drilling of a well is commenced, the sum of twentyfive cents per acre, that is Sixty Dollars, for each three months 

during which the commencing of such work is delayed 

See Oil and Oas Lease (emphasis added). The Lease further expounds on the uprimary term" as 

follows: 

respect to the "primary term" of said Lease: 

WITNESSETH, That the lessor in consideration of the sum of One 

Dollar in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledge, 

and in further consideration of the covenants and agreement 

hereinafter contained on the part · of the lessee to be kept and 

performed, hereby leases and grants unto the lessee, its successors 

and assigns, together with the exclusive right to drill wells and 

operate thereon to produce, save and takecare of said products, all 

for the term or Ten years from the date hereof and as Jong 

thereafter as oil and gas is or can be produced from said land 

in paying quantines, 

Specifically, the subject MacDonald Oil & Gas Lease· set forth the following pr~vision with 

or gas can be produced from the land governed by the Lease, the Lessee is obligated to pay the 

Lessor the sum of $60 every three months. Defendants assert that they attempted to pay Plaintiffs 

the amount of $128 on May 13, 2014, for their 32 acre interest, but this amount was rejected. 

& Oas Lease,~ 1 (emphasis added). Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Lease provide that, as long as oil 

The Lease contains a primary term of ten (10) years from August 11, 1975, and "as long 

thereafter as oil or gas is or can be produced from said land in paying quantities." See Oil 

Plaintiffs filed their action on April 10, 2014. 

activities on the premises after receipt of the correspondence. As a result of Defendant's actions, 

and further to execute a surrender of the subject Macdonald Lease. Tue Defendant continued 

fl' vi IO IV I \I I I •• 1nn1, 
4 

the wells had not been produced for at least twelve (12) months and/or were missing the 

equipment necessary for production. Id. (emphasis added). Prior to the Defendant entering into 

Order and Agreement explicitly states that the subject wells were "abandoned wells" because 

See Consent Order and Agreement (emphasis added). Additionally, paragraph F of the Consent 

On December 4, 2001, Hannony Oil & Gas, Inc. and Faith 

Woideok entered in a Consent Order and Agreement ("2001 

Agreement") with the Department to address violations concerning 

668 abandoned wells in Venango and Forest Counties. In this 

agreement, Harmony Oil & Gas, Inc. and Faith Waldeck agreed to 

plug or produce all of these wells over the next 10 years. 

Harmony Oil & Gns has not plugged or produced any wells 

over the last five years. 

both parties, is paragraph C of the Consent Order, which states: 

on the subject Lease. Of particular interest to this court, as it relates to the arguments raised by 

Id. In February 2008, Defendant approached the Pennsylvania Department of Envitonmental 

Protection ("DEP") to purchase some 385 of the 668 wells included in a Consent Order and 

Agreement of December 4, 2001, between Harmony Oil & Oas, Ino. and the DEP. Defendant, in 

March of 2009, entered into a Consent Order and Agreement with the DEP regarding the wells 

It is mutually agreed that should the first well drilled by the lessee 

be nonproductive of oil or gas in paying quantities or should all . wells drilled and operated by the lessee . on said premises become 

· nonproductive and be plugged and abandoned, then this lease in 

either event shall continue in full force and effect for one year 

thereafter, and if the lessee, prior to the end of said year, shall 

either commence to drill a well on said premises and oil or gas is 

found in paying quantities, or in lieu of commencing such well 

shall pay the lessor, at the same rate and times in the same manner, 

the rental above stated until such well is commenced, this lease 

shall be continued in full force and effect for the remainder of the 

term above stated and so long thereafter as oil or gas can be 

produced in.paying quantities. 

Id. Finally, the Habendu.m clause reads: 

•VI..., I • I 11 Hiit 
s 

the March 9, 2009 Consent Order and Agreement with the DEP, Defendant acquired the 

Harmony Oil & Gas Wells, including the Wells on the subject MacDonald Lease, but purchasing 

same by Assignment of Leasehold Interest dated January 26, 2009. 

Analysis 

The relevant standard for rendering judgment on the pleadings is well known. In ruling 

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all of the opposing party's factual allegations must be 

viewed as true. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Ortho-McNeil.Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

52 A.3d 498 {Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2012). The purpose of the motion for judgment on the pleadings is 

to expedite justice. Wark & Co v, Twelfth & Sansom Corporation, 107 A.2d _856 (Pa. 1954), 

Only those facts that have been specifically admitted by the opposing party may be considered 

against it. Buehl v. Beard, 54 A.3d 412, 415 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2012) (citing Bergdoll v. Kane, 

694 A.2d 1155. 1157 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1997)). The court may consider only the pleadings 

themselves and documents properly attached thereto. Id. A grant of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings requires that there be no genuine dispute on a material fact and that judgment is clear 

on the law. Board, 54 A.3d 415 (citing Pennsylvania Association of Life Underwriters v. Foster, 

608 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1992)). 

14A lease is in the nature of a contract and ls controlled by principles of contract 

law." T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jodlicka, 42 .A.3d 261, 267 (Pa. 2012). As such, a lease 

must be construed in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement as manifestly expressed, 

and "[t]he accepted and plain meaning of the language used, rather than the silent intentions of 

the contracting parties, determines the construction to be given the agreement" Id. (quoting J.K. 

Willison v. Consol. Coal Co., 536 Pa. 49, 637 A.2d 979, 982 (1994)). The party seeking to· 

terminate the lease bears the burden of proof. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated: 

Iv,..., r •.,. 1n1,11 ff' Of IO 
6 

Typically, ... the habendum clause in an oil and gas lease provides 

that a lease will remain in effect for as long as oil or gas is 

produced "in paying quantities." Traditionally, use of the term. "in 

paying quantities" in a habendum clause of an oil or gas lease was 

regarded as for the benefit of the lessee, as a lessee would not want 

to be obligated to pay rent for premises which have ceased to be 

productive, or for which the operating expenses exceed the 

Within the oil and gas industzy, oil and gas leesesgenerally contain 

several key provisions, including the granting clause, which 

initially conveys to the lessee the right to drill for and produce oil 

or gas from the property; the habendum clause, which is used to fix 

the ultimate duration of the lease; the royalty clause; and the terms 

of surrender .... 

462, 469 (Pa. 2006). 

interpreted by the finder of fact," The Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v, Allstate Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 

"unambiguous contracts are interpreted by the court as a matter of law, ambiguous writings are 

facts. Kane v, State Farm Fire & Cas. c« 841 A.2d 1038, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct 2004). While 

they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of 

Commtssion, 708 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. Commw. 1998), and contractual terms are ambiguous if 

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, Sun Co. Inc. v. Penn Turnpike 

McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982). 

clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone. Steuart v. 

Gary Corp. v. Warfel Constr. Co., 734 A.2d 926, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). When a contract is 

is to be ascertained front the document itself when the terms are clew- and unambiguous." Glen· 

Neal D. Ivey Co. v. Franklin Associates, 87 A.2d 236, 239 (Pa. 1952), The "intent of the parties 

It is a rule of universal application that in construing a contract 

each and every part of it must be taken into consideration and 

given effect if possible, and that the intention of the parties must be 

ascertained from the entire instrument. An interpretation will not 

be given to one part of a contract which will annul another part of 

it. . 

1v1 v, •,. it Of IO ,n1n, 
7 

Abandonment is a question of fact, to be determined· by the nets 

and intentions of the parties. Al, unexplained cessation of 

operations for the period involved in th.is case gives rise to a fair 

the Court held: 

(C.A.3). 1n the 1899 Pennsylvania of Supreme Court case of Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 44 A. 555, 

Penneco Pipeline Corporation, et al., v. Dominion Transmtssion; Inc .• 2008 WL 4005111 at ""36 

an oil and gas interest is subject to the doctrine of abandonment. 

Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 44 A. SSS (Pa. 1899). After recognizing 

that an implied covenant to develop an oil and gas leasehold with 

reasonable diligence arises, the Court has held that there :Is an 

implied obligation on the lessee to proceed with the exploration 

and development of the property with reasonable diligence 

"according to the usual course of business," and failure to do so · 

amounts to an abandonment. Id at 556. The Supreme Court 

pronounced in Aye that an "unexplained cessation of 

operations ... give[s] rise to a fair presumption of abandonment, 

and, standing alone and admitted, would justify the court in 

declaring an abandonment as a matter of law." Id In Clark v. 

Wright, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with a property on 

which a single natural gas well had been drilled. 166 A. 77 5. The 

well was abandoned some years later. After the well was 

abandoned, the lessee-operator sat idly by and conducted no 

further operations. The Court upheld a claim of abandonment 

declaring that: An oil or gas well. from which no oil or gas is 

produced and marketed within a reasonable length of time is 

as no well at all to a\ lessor dependent upon such acts for his 

compensation. Under these circumstances, a conclusion of 

surrender is an equitable one. 

subject to the doctrine of abandonment. Specifically, the court stated: 

WL 4005111 (C.A.3), recognized the general principle that an oil and gas leasehold interest is 

The case of Penneco Pipeline Corporation, et al., v. Dominion Transmission. Inc., 2008 

Abandonmen: 

Phillips, 42 A.3d at 267-268. 

income. More recently, however, and as demonstrated by the 

instant case, these clauses are relied on by landowners to terminate 

a lease. 

Iv,..,, ." , 1nn11 If II I~ 
8 

1899), the clause under consideration reads: "as long thereafter as oil or gas is found in the land 

described in paying quantities." The remuneration which the lessor was to obtain for the use of 

Id. Two leading cases in this State illustrate these rules. In Cassell v. Crothers, 44 A. 446 (Pa. 

[w]here [a] lessor's compensation is a definite and fixed amount 

unrelated ta· the volume of production, the duration of the lease is 

not measured by the length of time the mineral is actually 

extracted and marketed; but by the time dtuing which the lease 

provides that the lessor shall receive the fixed rental. Under these 

latter circumstances, it can make no difference to lessor whether 

100 or 1,000,000 cubic feet of gas is produced. 

of the lease." Clarkv. Wright, 166 A,· 775, 776 (Pa. 1933). By contrast, 

volume of production, the period of active production of oil or gas is the measure of the duration 

terms of the governing lease. Hec,s/ey v. KSM Energy, Ine., et. al., 52 A.3d 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2012). Our Supreme Court bas long held that "[w)here a lessor's compensation is subject to the 

two gas and oil leases terminated due to lack of production and failure to adhere to the express 

Clause because upon "oil or gas" being produced, . a fee simple determinable is created in the 

lessee, and the lessee's right to extract oil or gas becomes vested. Id at 267. 

Recently, our Superior Court has decided a case seeking a determinaticn as to whether 

term has passed, the "thereafter" language becomes the operative provision of the Habendum 

purpose of exploration and development. Phillips, 42 A.3d at 267 (Pa. 2012). After the primary 

Aye. 44 A. at 556. Proof of abandonment can be established by circumstantial evidence. Eckel v. 

Elsworth 92 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1952). A record may evidence an abandonment of the subject lease 

by reason of non-activity for a term of years. Id. at 177. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

explained that the title conveyed in an oil and gas lease is inchoate, and is initially for the 

presumption of abendonmeat, and, standing atone and admitted, 

would justify the court in declaring an abandonment as matter of 

law ... 

V 1-v I - IO IV t , 't 11-\IVI i I ~I 1 b 
9 

effect only so long as production continued. When production ceased, the lease became an atterms of the lease were similar to those terms in Cassell, and the Lease Agreement remained in 

In Heasley, the Court found that a renancy at will existed between the parties because the 

227 A.2d at 165 (quoting Clark», Wright, 311 Pa. 69, 166 A. 775, 776 (1933)). 

of the lessors; that they are not interested in the proceeds of the sale of the gas. Their rights under 

the agreement extended only to the receipt of a stipulated annual rental for each well." Phillips, 

for some time the lessee was not able to find a purchaser for the gas, "but that was not the affair 

bring in a verdict for the defendant on the ground that gas was found i11 paying quantities. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme court affirmed the judgment, and in its opinion stated that it may be that 

indicated the well would produce one million feet per day. TI1e lower court instructed the jury to 

to market any gas during the extended period, but retained it in the well, although the evidence 

gas are found in paying quantities, or the hereinafter described rental is paid." The lessee failed 

right to hold the premises ''for and during the term of two years ... and as much longer as oil and 

v. Apollo Gas Co., 56 A. 876 (1904), wherein, under the terms of the lease, the lessee had the 

The other case, and typical of the second rule as to compensation, is that of Summerville 

in paying quantities becomes susceptible of proof, is a tenancy in the nature of a tenancy at will, 

and if not actually terminated by mutual consent, or continued by mutual consent in order that 

further exploration be made, may be terminated by either party. Cassell, supra. 

his land was on a royalty basis and not on a flat rental basis. The Supreme Court held that in an 

oil lease for a fixed period and "as long thereafter as oil is found in paying quantities," where the 

lessor's compensation is one-eighth of the oil produced, the tenancy as to the surface oftheland, 

after the expiration of the fixed period, and after the fact that oil is not being found and produced 

if ~/ 1 b 
1 'I()/ 1 6 

10 

It is mutually· agreed that should the first well drilled by the 

Jessee be nonproductive of oil or gas in paying quantities or 

should all wells drilled and operated by the Jessee on said 

premises become nonproductive and be plugged and 

abandoned, then this lease in either event shall continue in full 

force and effect for one year thereafter, and if the lessee, prior to 

the end _of said year, shall either commence to drill a well on said 

premises and oil or gas is found in paying quantities, or in lieu of 

commencing such well shall pay the lessor, at the same rate and 

times· in the same manner, the rental above stated until such well is 

. commenced, this lease shall be continued in full force and effect 

Second: To pay quarterly to the lessor, as royalty one-eighth of the 

net proceeds received for the .gas from each and every gas well 

drilled on said premises, the produotion from which is marketed 

off the premises, while the gas from said well ls so marketed. 

*** 

It is agreed, however, and this lease is made on the condition, that 

it shall become null and void and all rights hereunder shall cease . 

and determine, unless work for the drilling of a well is commenced 

on said premises within ninety days from the execution of this 

lease and prosecuted with due and reasonable diligence, or unless . 

the lessee shall pay to the lessor in advance every three months 

until work for the· drilling of a well is commenced, the sum of 

twenty-five cents per acre, that is, Sixty Dollars, for each three 

months du.ring which the commencing of such work is delayed. 

will tenancy, subject to termination by the lessor ~t any time. Heasley, 52 A.3d at 347. In the 

instant case, the Lease Agreement at issue provided the following relevant terms: 

WITNESS ETH, That the lessor in consideration of the sum of One 

Dollar in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledge, 

and in further consideration of the covenants and agreement 

hereinafter contained on the part of the lessee to be kept and 

performed, hereby leases and grants unto the lessee, its successors 

and assigns, together with the exclusive right to drill wells and 

operate thereon to produce, save and take care of said products, all 

for the term or Ten years from the date hereof and as long 

thereafter as oil and gas is or can be produced from said land 

in paying quantities. 

"'""" First: To deliver to.the credit of the lessor, as royalty, free of cost, 

in the pipeline to which tl1e wells of the Iessee may be connected, 

the equal ONE-EIGHTH part of all oil produced and saved from 

the leased premises; and 

VI -v 1- I :JI VI • 't I /'\I'll j 
11 

terms, anticipated rentals to be paid, regardless of production, from the completion of the well 

required the lessor to be paid quarterly, regardless of production. Id. The lease agreement, by its 

Phillips, 227 A.2d at 163-64 (emphasis added). The provisions of the Phillips lease agreement 

While gas is being sold off these premises, providing the gas 

pressure is high enough, first party, i.e. (lessors) may have gas free 

of costs for domestic purposes in one dwelling on said premises to 

the extent of 200,000 cubic feet per year, first party (i.e.,lessors) to 

make the necessary connections and to assume all risk in using 

said gas. 

In Phillips, the lease agreement provided, in relevant part, as follows: 

Sbould any well not produce oil, but produce gas in paying 

quantities, and the gas therefrom be sold off the said premises, the 

consideration to the said first party (f.e.,lessors) for the gas from 

each well fTom which gas is marketed shall be as follows: 

At the rate of$ 200 per year while the well shows a pressure of 

200 or more lbs., per square inch, upon being shut in S minutes in 

2 inch pipe or 30 minutes in larger pipe; at the rate of$ 100 per 

year, while the well shows a pressure of 1 OO· or more lbs., per 

square inch, and less than 200 lbs., per square inch upon being shut 

in S minutes in 2 inch pipe, or 30 minutes in larger pipe; at the rate 

of$ 50 per year while the well shows a pressure of less than 100 

lbs., per square inch, upon being shut in S minutes in 2 inch pipe or 

30 minutes in larger pipe; to be pi\id qunrterly from completion 

to abandonment of well, 

produced in paying quantities, the tenancy became a tenancy at will. 

produced". After the expiration of the fixed period of ten years, and after oil is not found and 

Lease was to last. for a term of ten years and "as long thereafter as oil or gas is or can be 

subject to this litigation is similar to that in Cassell, in that it is based upon production. The 

Lease Agreement do not restrict its duration based upon volume of production. The Lease 

See Oil and Gas Lease (emphasis added). Upon review, we conclude that the provisions of the 

for the remainder of the tenn above stated and so long thereafter 

as oil or gas can· be produced in paying quantities. 

tWf'W I' I 111111/ Tr II/ !.I 
12 

until its abandonment, id. Our Supreme Court accordingly held that the lease> "by its terms 

providing for remuneration to lessors{,] is unrelated· to production of gas and requires payment of 

a fixed rental based upon gas pressure." Id. at 165. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld a 

decree enjoining the landowners from interfering with the lessee's use of its wells. Id. 

By contrast, the Lease Agreement in the instant case set the duration of the lease for ten 

years, and "as long thereafter as oil or gas is or can be produced from said land in paying 

quantities." See Oil and Gas Lease. As we stated above, by this language, the Lease is similar to 

the production agreement described in Caswell. The Lease> by its terms, remained in effect only 

so long as production continued. and when production ceased, the lease became an at-will 

tenancy, subject to termination by the lessor at any time. Sec Phillips, 227 A.2d at 165 

(recognizing that when production cease, the lease lapsed into a tenancy at-will). 

We are left with the conclusion that the subject MacDonald Oil and Gas Lease was 

abandoned by the prior owner Harmony Oil and Gas Company, Inc. That wells on that property 

have not been produced at any time after the year 2001. TI1e aforementioned case law makes 

clear that neither oil nor gas was produced from the MacDonald Oil and Gas Lease in paying 

quantities, and that Harmony Oil & Gas had breached its implied obligation to explore and 

develop the property "with reasonable diligence," The faihue to do· so amounted in an 

abandonment of the Lease. 

Defendant also claims that it has saved the Lease by tendering a check to the Plnintiffs in 

the amount of $12&.00, an amount which Plaintiffs would be due from the inception of the Lease 

Assignment through March 12, 2014. However, this Lease was already abandoned by Harmony 

Oil & Gas prior to its assignment to the Defendant Additionally, we see no evidence in the 

pleadings whatsoever that Defendant· attempted payment of a shut in or deferred royalty to 
13 

Plaintiffs' predecessor in title, although Defendant does have the burden of proving this 

payment. Instead, Defendant did not allege in its Answer and/or New Matter that it paid or 

attempted to pay such an amount to any of the property owners of the original 240 acre 

MacDonald Lease. 

Regardless, even if Defendant suooessfully paid Plaintiffs' a rental payment of twentyfive cents per acre, as detailed in the Habendum Clause in the Lease, the Lease would have been 

extended only "for the remainder of the term above stated", which was for a period often years 

only. The primary term often years expired well before the alleged proffer of payment in 2014. 

Bxptmtion oftlie Lease Term 

The Habendum Clause provided that the Lease shall continue in full force and effect so 

long as oil or gas can be produced in paying quantities. Further, if wells on the subject lensed 

premises became non-productive, then the Lessee may pay a "rental" to the Lessor, as calculated 

in a previous clause of the Lease, until such well is commenced. In the instant case, this rental 

amounts to twenty-five cents per acre . 

.t 

The subject Lease was originally entered into in 1975. Obviously, the ten year primary 

term has long elapsed. Additionally, production of the wells on the subject Lease ceased long 

before this action was commenced. An "abandoned well" is defined as one that has not been used 

to produce, extract, or inject any gas, petroleum, or other liquid within the preceding 12 months, 

or any well for which the equipment necessary for production; extraction, or injection has been 

removed, or any well, considered dry, not equipped for production within 60 days after drilling, 

redrilling, or deepening. 58 Pa.C.S.A. § 3203. The Consent Order and Agreement dated March 9, 

2009, between the Department of Environmental Protection and the Defendant, R. Oil &. Gas 

Enterprises, Inc., evidences that the wells were "abandoned wells", and that "Hannony Oil and 

CJ 

\J f VI IV f \II• I IMIVlt 
14 

Gas has not plugged or produced any wells over thelast five years." See Consent Order and 

Agreement (emphasis added). R. Oil & Gas argues that the Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts 

that support the contention that Harmony did not attempt to plug and produce wells in 

compliance with the Consent Order." See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on 

Pleadings, p.4. The Lease's primary term lasted for ten (10) years from August 11, 1975, and "as 

long thereafter as oil or gas is or can be produced from said land In paying quantities!' It was not 

stated that the wells would be retained so long as Defendants "attempted" to produce oil in 

paying quantities. 

Considering the averments set forth by Defendants h1 its Answer and New Matter, as well 

as omissions of averments, we find the Defendant failed to produce any wells on the MacDonald 

Lease and made no attempt to make shut in or deferred rental payments to any of the property 

owners involves in the Lease. The MacDonald Lease terminated upon its own, unambiguous 

terms and provisions, as well as having been long-abandoned by Harmony Oil and Gas prior to 

the Assignment of said Lease to the Defendant. 

The ultimate failure to produce oil or gas, as well as the failure to comply with the other 

requirements of the Lease, compels this Court to hold that the MacDonald Lease was terminated 

and title reverted to the property owner, who, at this time, are the Plaintiffs, Arthur and Barbara 

J. Montgomery. Production lapsed sometime prior to the year 2001, and the Lease was 

confirmed abandoned by the Department of Environmental Protection's Findings and Order. The 

Court finds that The Oil and Gas Lease between Donald A. and Melvena P. MacDonald and 

Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation is null, void, and of no force and effect pertaining to 

Plaintiffs' premises of 32.318 acres situated in Allegheny Township, Venango County, 

Pennsylvania. 

,..,, ..,, • ·1 1n111r it I 'ti IO 
15 

cJ1.o~ 

Prothonotary f~) 

~Rhtp 

cc: 

BY THE COURT, 

standard to succeed on their M~tion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Accordingly, we will grant 

the Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 

Therefore, in light of the fore~oing analysis, we find that the pleadings themselves and 

documents properly_ attached thereto reveal there to be no genuine dispute on a material foot and 

that judgment is clear on the law. Beard, 54 A.3d at 415. Plaintiffs have met the relevant 

Conclusion 

ft' I VI IO 

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