IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-51026

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ELDRIDGE VANDERHORST HILLS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:09-CR-49-1

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Eldridge Vanderhorst Hills appeals pro se his conviction and sentence for

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

and 924(a)(2). Hills represented himself at trial after waiving his right to courtappointed counsel. Uncontradicted evidence at his trial indicated that police

officers Robert Rush and Chris Polidoro responded to a report of aggravated

robbery at a hotel and that Polidoro found a gun in a hotel room in which Hills

was an occupant. Over Hills’s objection, Rush and Polidoro testified that Hills

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 12, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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admitted at the scene that the gun belonged to him and that he had possessed

it for about two weeks.

Hills first contends that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy

Clause and the principle of collateral estoppel because his federal prosecution

occurred after the dismissal of a state charge against him for possession of a

firearm by a felon under TEX.PENAL CODE § 46.04. This argument is unavailing,

as the United States and Texas are separate sovereigns and were permitted to

independently bring separate prosecutions to vindicate their own interests. See

United States v. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767, 771-74, 776 (5th Cir. 2002).

Second, Hills argues that the district court erred in denying his pretrial

motion for depositions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15. The

information sought by Hills through the depositions was not material to his case,

and the district court’s denial of the motion did not constitute an abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 148-49 (5th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1994).

Third, Hills contends that the Government violated Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to fulfill his discovery requests. De novo review

applies to this argument. See United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 386 (5th

Cir. 2005). To prevail on his Brady claim, Hills must establish that “(1) the

prosecution did not disclose evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the

defense; and (3) the evidence was material—i.e.,there is a reasonable probability

that if the government had disclosed the evidence, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. The Government provided open file discovery

to Hills, and he makes no assertion that the Government actually possessed the

information underlying his Brady argument. See United States v. Edwards, 442

F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2006). Additionally, his assertion that the information

would have been material is merely speculative. Hills has not shown that the

Government committed a Brady violation.

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Fourth, Hills contends that his indictment was defective because grand

jury testimony given by Polidoro was determined in state court to be

inadmissible. According to Hills, the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over his case due to his defective indictment. Even if Hills’s

allegation concerning the state court ruling were true, the issue whether grand

jury testimony would have been admissible under state law does not implicate

the sufficiency of Hills’s federal indictment or the district court’s subject matter

jurisdiction over his prosecution. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630

(2002); United States v. Jacquez-Beltran, 326 F.3d 661, 662 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003).

With the benefit of liberal construction, Hills also argues that his

indictment was defective because it failed to allege an essential element of his

offense, namely that the firearm in his case traveled in or affected interstate

commerce. Hills preserved this argument, and it is reviewed de novo. See

United States v. Shelton, 937 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1991). “To establish a

violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must prove three elements beyond a

reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a

felony; (2) that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or

affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336, 341

(5th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.

207 (2010). We have determined that the language used in Hills’s indictment

was sufficient to allege the interstate commerce element of a § 922(g)(1)

violation. See Shelton, 937 F.2d at 142-44. Hills’s challenges to the sufficiency

of his indictment and the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction are

unavailing.

Fifth, Hills complains of the district court’s decision to overrule a number

of objections by him to the testimony of Rush, Polidoro, and Dannece Jenkins,

one of two individuals found in the hotel room with Hills. Hills has failed to

sufficiently brief any argument regarding why the district court’s rulings were

erroneous on the merits and has thus waived any such challenge. See United

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States v. Green, 508 F.3d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 2007). To the extent Hills argues

that Federal Rules of Evidence 801, 802, 803, and 404(b) are ineffective because

they conflict with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 and 2072, his argument is meritless. See

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 & n.7 (1996) (discussing history of enactment

of Federal Rules of Evidence); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)

(same).

Sixth, with the benefit of liberal construction, Hills contends that the

evidence was insufficient with respect to the element of possession of the

firearm. The testimony of Rush and Polidoro indicated that Hills admitted that

the gun belonged to him and had been in his possession for two weeks, and

Jenkins testified that the gun belonged to Hills. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the firearm belonged to Hills, in satisfaction of the

element of possession. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

Seventh, Hills contends that the district court failed to consider jury

instructions requested by him. This court reviews preserved errors regarding

jury instructions for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the jury

charge, as a whole, leaves the court with “substantial and ineradicable doubt

whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.” United States

v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). There is no abuse of discretion with respect to the denial of a

requested jury instruction “where the instructions actually given fairly and

adequately cover the issues presented by the case.” United States v. Simkanin,

420 F.3d 397, 410 (5th Cir. 2005). Hills does not indicate what instructions were

requested by him or how the district court’s jury charge was inadequate. He has

not shown that the district court abused its discretion with respect to his

requested jury instructions. See Lucas, 516 F.3d at 324; Simkanin, 420 F.3d at

410.

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Eighth, Hills contends that his right of access to the courts was violated

when the district court refused his request for access to a law library and instead

appointed standby counsel to answer his legal questions. Insofar as this point

of error may be construed as a challenge to his conviction on the ground that

Hills was prevented meaningful self-representation, rather than a claim for

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hills’s argument is unavailing given the

availability of standby counsel to answer his legal questions. See Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 830-31 (1977); Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 769

(5th Cir. 1996); Sellers v. Collins, 92-4761, 1993 WL 543311, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec.

15, 1993) (unpublished); see also 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3.

In his last challenge to his conviction, Hills contends that he received

ineffective assistance of standby counsel because his standby counsel failed to

obtain the dismissal of his case on double jeopardy grounds. Hills acted as his

own counsel at trial and therefore is not entitled to relief on his claim of

ineffectiveness of standby counsel. See United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34,

55 (5th Cir. 1998).

Regarding his sentence, Hills first argues that the district court erred in

assessing a base offense level of 24 under the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Under § 2K2.1(a)(2), a defendant’s base offense level

is 24 “if the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to

sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense.” The district court’s application of § 2K2.1(a)(2)

rested on the fact that Hills’s criminal history included a Texas conviction in

2009 for assault on a public servant and a South Carolina conviction in 1999 for

distribution of crack cocaine.

Hills reiterates his contention in the district court that his 2009 assault

conviction should not have been considered for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2) because

it remained pending on appeal at the time of his sentencing. With respect to

preserved errors, “[t]his court reviews the district court’s application of the

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Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v.

Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 708 (5th Cir. 2010). The felony convictions that are

considered for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2) are those convictions that are counted

separately and assessed criminal history points under § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).

§ 2K2.1, comment. (n.10). The fact that Hills’s 2009 assault conviction was

pending on appeal did not exclude it from being counted under § 4A1.1(a). See

§ 4A1.2(l). Thus, Hills has not shown that the district court erred in relying on

his 2009 assault conviction for purposes of establishing his offense level under

§ 2K2.1(a)(2).

Hills also argues that his 1999 conviction for crack cocaine distribution,

for which he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, should not have been

considered under § 2K2.1(a)(2) because it was over ten years old at the time of

his sentencing. Because this argument was not raised in the district court, it is

reviewed for plain error only. See United States v. Perez, 585 F.3d 880, 886 (5th

Cir. 2009). Hills’s 1999 conviction for crack cocaine distribution was properly

counted under § 4A1.1(a), see § 4A1.2(e)(1), and thus served as a proper basis for

assessing his base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(2), see § 2K2.1, comment.

(n.10). Hills’s challenges to the calculation of his base offense level are

unavailing.

Next, Hills challenges the district court’s assessment of the four-level

enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6). This argument was preserved in the district

court. To obtain an enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6), the Government was

required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Hills possessed the

firearm in connection with another felony offense. Coleman, 609 F.3d at 708.

For purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6), a district court’s determination of the relationship

between the firearm and another offense is a factual finding reviewed for clear

error. Coleman, 609 F.3d at 708. “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if

it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id.

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The district court was permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the

evidence, and those inferences are factual findings reviewed for clear error. See

id. It was plausible to find that Hills committed another felony offense that was,

or had the potential of being, facilitated by his firearm possession in light of

evidence at his trial indicating that Hills took $50 from an individual with the

agreement to provide the individual with powder cocaine and then kept the

money without furnishing the cocaine, which prompted the report of aggravated

robbery fielded by Rush and Polidoro. See § 2K2.1, comment., (n.14(A)). Thus,

Hills has not shown that the district court clearly erred in finding that the

enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6) was applicable.

Hills also challenges the enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6) on the ground

that the testimony establishing that he committed another felony offense was

inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This argument is

unavailing. “In the sentencing context, a district court may consider any

relevant evidence without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence

applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of

reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Coleman, 609 F.3d at 709 n.4

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hills has not shown that the

district court erred with respect to his conviction or sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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