MARITIME SECURITY

Coast Guard Needs to 

Improve Use and 

Management of 

Interagency 

Operations Centers

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2012

GAO-12-202

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-202, a report to 

congressional requesters

February 2012

MARITIME SECURITY

Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management 

of Interagency Operations Centers

Why GAO Did This Study

The Coast Guard—a component of the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS)—is responsible for establishing

Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) 

in response to provisions of the 

Security and Accountability For Every 

(SAFE) Port Act of 2006. IOCs are

designed to, among other things, share 

maritime information with the Coast 

Guard’s port partners (other agencies 

and organizations it coordinates with).

To facilitate IOCs, the Coast Guard is 

implementing an informationmanagement and sharing system

called WatchKeeper. GAO was asked 

to assess IOC and WatchKeeper 

implementation. This report addresses

the extent to which (1) DHS and the 

Coast Guard have implemented IOCs, 

(2) port partners use WatchKeeper and 

the Coast Guard has facilitated its use 

to enhance IOC capabilities, and (3) 

the Coast Guard has adhered to 

established guidance in defining 

WatchKeeper requirements and its 

associated cost and schedule. GAO 

analyzed laws and documents, such as 

implementation plans, and interviewed 

Coast Guard and port-partner officials 

at the first four sectors (field locations)

where WatchKeeper was implemented. 

The results of the four sector visits are 

not generalizable, but provide insights. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Coast 

Guard collect data on port partners’ 

access and use of WatchKeeper; 

develop, document, and implement a 

process on how to incorporate portpartner input; implement requirementsdevelopment practices; and revise the 

cost estimate and the integrated 

master schedule. DHS concurred 

subject to the availability of funds.

What GAO Found

DHS and the Coast Guard did not meet the SAFE Port Act’s requirement that 

IOCs be established at high-priority ports by October 2009, in part because the 

Coast Guard was not appropriated funds to establish the IOCs until 14 months

after enactment of the law, and the definition of an IOC was evolving during this 

period. However, the Coast Guard plans to establish IOCs at all 35 of its sectors. 

According to the Coast Guard’s analysis of sector status reports, none of its 

sectors have achieved IOCs with full operating capability. According to the Coast 

Guard’s Chief of IOC Implementation, as well as its Information Sharing

Executive Agent, continued support is needed from DHS to increase port-partner 

participation and the success of the IOC initiative. DHS has recently begun to 

support efforts to increase port-partner participation and further IOC 

implementation, such as facilitating the review of an IOC management directive. 

It is too early to determine, though, if and when IOCs will achieve their intended 

goal of sharing information and coordinating operations with port partners. 

The Coast Guard has granted WatchKeeper access to port partners at 11 of the 

12 sectors where it has been installed, but more than 80 percent of those port 

partners did not log on from July through September 2011. As of October 2011, 

the Coast Guard no longer collects data on port partners’ access and use of 

WatchKeeper. Without such data, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to 

determine whether WatchKeeper is facilitating the IOC program in meeting its 

goals of improving information sharing and coordination of joint operations. GAO 

interviewed 22 port partners who were not using WatchKeeper. Of those 22, the 

most frequently cited reason (by 7 port partners) is that it does not help them 

perform their missions. The Coast Guard primarily consulted with Customs and 

Border Protection when developing WatchKeeper, but did not solicit input from all 

port partners. Without developing, documenting, and implementing a process on

how it will incorporate port partners’ feedback into future WatchKeeper 

requirements, the Coast Guard does not have reasonable assurance that 

WatchKeeper will satisfy the needs of port partners and facilitate IOC goals. 

The Coast Guard has not defined WatchKeeper requirements, cost, and 

schedule in accordance with established guidance. For example, the Coast 

Guard designed and developed the initial WatchKeeper segment without first 

defining the specific functions that the system is to perform. Further, the Coast 

Guard has not developed a reliable cost estimate to guide and inform the 

WatchKeeper investment. For example, the estimate does not include all 

government costs, such as related program-management costs. Also, 

WatchKeeper development and deployment has not been guided by a reliable 

schedule of the work needed to be performed and the key activities that need to 

occur. In particular, the schedule does not link all activities so that the project 

office can determine how a slip in a particular task may affect other related tasks, 

or the overall schedule. Project officials attributed these limitations to an 

aggressive IOC development schedule, limited resources, and competing 

priorities. As a result, these limitations increase the risk that WatchKeeper 

capabilities will not meet mission needs and will not be delivered on time and 

within budget. 

View GAO-12-202. For more information, 

contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 

or caldwells@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Letter 1 

Background 7

Coast Guard Did Not Meet the Required Deadline for Establishing 

IOCs, but Has Made Progress 10

WatchKeeper Is Not Being Used by Majority of Port Partners; 

Monitoring Participation and Soliciting Input Could Help 

Improve System 21

Coast Guard Has Not Adhered to Established Guidance in Defining 

WatchKeeper Requirements, Cost, and Schedule 28

Conclusions 37

Recommendations for Executive Action 39

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40

Appendix I GAO Interviews with Port Partners 43

Appendix II Reasons Why Port Partners Are and Are Not Using WatchKeeper 44

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 46

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49

Related GAO Products 50

Tables

Table 1: Number of Port Partners with WatchKeeper Access by 

Sector, as of September 2011 22

Table 2: GAO Interviews of Port Partners with Access to 

WatchKeeper 43

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Figures

Figure 1: Information WatchKeeper Provides to the Coast Guard 

and Port Partners 12

Figure 2: IOC Implementation Status by Sector 17

Figure 3: Average Percentage of IOC Implementation across Coast 

Guard Sectors, for Four of the Five IOC Elements, as of 

October 2010 18

Figure 4: Number of Port Partners Logging On to WatchKeeper 

During September 2011 23

Figure 5: Percentage of Port Partners Logging On to WatchKeeper, 

June through September 2011 24
Page iii GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Abbreviations

ATS Automated Targeting System

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CMMI® Capability Maturity Model®

Board

Integration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GIS Geographic Information System

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IM IPT Information Management Integrated Project Team

IOC Interagency Operations Center

ISGB Information Sharing & Safeguarding Governance

JHOC Joint Harbor Operations Center

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

MDA maritime domain awareness

MUC Maritime Unified Command

OFO Office of Field Operations

SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of

2006

SANS Ship Arrival Notification System

SEI Software Engineering Institute

WBS work breakdown structure 

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Page 1 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 13, 2012 

Congressional Requesters

To protect the nation's ports and waterways, the federal government 

strives to balance the need for mitigating security threats with minimizing 

disruption to the marine transportation system. Maritime security threats 

include the use of containerized cargo vessels to transport weapons of 

mass destruction; explosive-laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels 

to smuggle people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband. To help 

secure the nation’s marine transportation system against a potential 

terrorist attack or other harmful actions, maritime security stakeholders 

(port partners) seek to achieve maritime domain awareness (MDA)—the 

effective understanding of anything in the maritime environment that 

could affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United 

States.1

The Coast Guard, the lead Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

component for MDA efforts, shares MDA information with federal, state, 

local, and tribal officials as an integral part of its efforts to secure the 

nation’s marine transportation system against potential terrorist attacks. 

According to the Coast Guard’s Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, 

and Stewardship, the complexity and challenges of the maritime 

operating environment require that government agencies at all levels and 

stakeholders with maritime interests work together to achieve common 

objectives through increased coordination of efforts.

The federal government has actively sought to enhance maritime 

security, but recognizes that no single department, agency, or entity holds 

all of the authorities and capabilities necessary to fully achieve effective 

MDA. 

2

 

1

Port partners include federal agencies and armed services such as U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. 

Navy; state and local organizations such as port authorities, state law enforcement, and 

local law enforcement; and private-sector organizations such as marine exchanges.

Specifically, the 

Coast Guard has ongoing partnerships with federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. For example, at the federal level, the Coast Guard 

works with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to: ensure that 

vessels arriving from overseas, their crews and passengers, and their 

2

U.S. Coast Guard, The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and 

Stewardship (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

cargo are not security threats; and defend U.S. maritime borders against

smugglers attempting to bring people, drugs, weapons, and other illegal 

contraband into the country. Further, at the state and local levels, the 

Coast Guard works with law enforcement agencies to, among other 

things, ensure the security of port operations and passenger ferries. 

To increase its MDA capabilities, the Coast Guard is monitoring maritime 

activities, collecting intelligence, analyzing the threat environment, and 

sharing this information with port partners. One of these actions comes at 

least in part in response to provisions of the Security and Accountability 

For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, which required the establishment of 

Interagency Operational Centers for port security to be incorporated in the 

implementation and administration of, among other things, maritime 

intelligence activities, information sharing, and short- and long-range 

vessel tracking.3 In July 2007, the DHS Assistant Secretary for Legislative 

Affairs reported to Congress that the Coast Guard’s acquisition project 

Command 21—originally named Command 2010, later named Command 

21, and finally named the Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) project—

would meet the Safe Port Act requirements for IOCs in 24 high-priority 

Coast Guard sectors.

4

 

3

Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884, 1892-93 (2006).

The IOC project is, in part, designed to provide 

capabilities to increase MDA, automate data gathering, and provide 

decision support. Additionally, as originally designed, the IOC project was 

also to provide enhanced physical facilities and sensors to establish radar 

and camera coverage throughout ports. The IOC project also includes the 

development of an information management and sharing system, called 

WatchKeeper, that is to link information with operations to support 

situational awareness, joint planning, and mission execution. As the 

Coast Guard has moved ahead on the IOC project, it has established 

physical facilities for the colocation of port partners in some IOC 

locations. At these locations, WatchKeeper can be used to support the 

coordination that takes place among those agencies. The Coast Guard is 

also establishing IOC capabilities virtually—that is, sharing information 

and coordinating with port partners through an Internet web portal—and is 

4

Coast Guard sectors run all Coast Guard missions at the local and port level, such as 

search and rescue, port security, environmental protection, and law enforcement in ports 

and surrounding waters, and oversee a number of smaller Coast Guard units, including 

small cutters, small boat stations, and Aids to Navigation teams.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

using WatchKeeper as an important information sharing tool to 

accomplish this.

You requested that we analyze the Coast Guard’s management of the 

IOC concept and whether it properly integrates port partners’ capabilities, 

concerns, and needs. As a result, this report addresses the following 

questions:

• To what extent have DHS and the Coast Guard implemented IOCs? 

• To what extent are port partners using WatchKeeper and to what 

extent has the Coast Guard facilitated its use to enhance IOC 

capabilities? 

• To what extent has the Coast Guard adhered to established guidance 

in defining WatchKeeper requirements and its associated cost and 

schedule?

To address the first objective, we analyzed pertinent provisions of the 

SAFE Port Act, as amended. We analyzed status reports provided by 

each of the 35 Coast Guard sectors and compared the Coast Guard’s 

analysis of those status reports with the IOC requirements as defined in 

an internal Coast Guard message from the Assistant Commandant for 

Capability, and a draft annex to the U.S. Coast Guard Sector 

Organization Manual.

5

 

5

U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Organization Manual, COMDTINST 

M5401.6 (March 2008). The annex to this manual containing the IOC guidance is 

expected to be promulgated in January 2012.

On the basis of our review of the sectors’ status 

reports and interviews with the Coast Guard official who developed the 

criteria for the IOC requirements and analyzed the status reports, we 

determined the Coast Guard’s analysis was reasonable to use for the 

purposes of our review. We interviewed Coast Guard officials in the Office 

of Shore Forces responsible for IOC requirements, as well as Coast 

Guard officials responsible for IOC implementation at their respective 

sector locations. We also conducted site visits to the five sectors where 

WatchKeeper was first implemented—Charleston, South Carolina; 

Hampton Roads, Virginia; Jacksonville, Florida; Detroit, Michigan; and 

San Diego, California. While the results of our site visits to these sectors 

cannot be generalized across all 35 Coast Guard sectors, we chose these 

locations to allow us to observe firsthand the status of IOC 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

implementation efforts. To evaluate the support DHS has provided to the 

Coast Guard for IOC implementation, we interviewed the Coast Guard’s 

Chief of IOC Implementation and the Coast Guard’s Information Sharing

Executive Agent. We also interviewed officials from DHS’s Information 

Sharing & Safeguarding Governance Board, the board providing support 

for IOC implementation. Further, we assessed DHS’s involvement against 

criteria in the Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing 

Strategy,

6

To address the second objective, we used the Coast Guard’s monthly 

log-on data to determine the number of port partners to whom the sectors 

provided WatchKeeper access and the extent to which these port 

partners accessed WatchKeeper. On the basis of our interviews with the 

Coast Guard officials responsible for the log-on data and review of 

responses provided by the Coast Guard’s Research and Development 

Center on how the data are collected and maintained, we determined that 

the data from January 2011 through May 2011 were not reliable to 

determine the number of times port partners logged on to WatchKeeper 

since more log-ons were counted than should have been. However, we 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to use for interview 

selection of port partners who had or had not logged on. In contrast, we 

determined that the data from June 2011 through September 2011 were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting the number of 

WatchKeeper users and respective number of WatchKeeper log-ons per 

month since the Coast Guard resolved the miscounting issue beginning 

with the June 2011 data. 

which states that DHS should promote information sharing with 

federal partners.

Also, to address the second objective, we interviewed Coast Guard sector 

officials about the actions they took to increase their local port partners’ 

use of WatchKeeper. We also interviewed 39 port partners at the first four 

sectors where WatchKeeper was implemented—Charleston, South 

Carolina; Hampton Roads, Virginia; Jacksonville, Florida; and Detroit, 

Michigan. We selected port partners to interview based on the Coast 

Guard’s WatchKeeper log-on data from January 1, 2011—when the data 

were first collected—through March 31, 2011—the most recent data 

available at the time of the selection. At the four sectors, we requested 

 

6

DHS, Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 18, 2008).
 

Page 5 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

individual interviews with all port partners who had logged on to 

WatchKeeper to determine their perspectives on benefits derived from 

WatchKeeper, areas for improvement, if any, and the extent to which the 

Coast Guard has facilitated its use. In addition, we conducted focus 

groups and interviews with port partners who had been granted access 

to—but had not accessed—WatchKeeper to gather information on the 

reasons why they had not accessed WatchKeeper. To ensure the focus 

group participants represented each agency that had officials with access 

to WatchKeeper, we randomly selected participants within the four 

sectors, based on their agencies. While the results from our interviews 

and focus groups are not generalizable to all of the Coast Guard’s port 

partners, they provided us accounts of how they perceived 

WatchKeeper’s capabilities and potential benefits. 

To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard solicited input from 

port partners during initial development of WatchKeeper, we analyzed 

documentation, including the Interagency Operations Process Report: 

Mapping Process to Requirements for Interagency Operations Centers

and Interagency Operations Centers Concept of Operations,

7 and 

meeting minutes of sessions the Coast Guard held at select sectors, and 

discussed port partners’ involvement with officials in the Office of Shore 

Forces responsible for IOC implementation. We assessed the Coast 

Guard’s involvement of port partners against criteria in the Department of 

Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy8 and Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government.

9

To address the third objective, we analyzed relevant documentation, such 

as the IOC project Operational Requirements Document, the Functional 

Requirements Document, the Systems Requirements Document, the 

Capability Development Plan, and compared them to selected criteria 

from the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model® 

See appendix I for a list of 

port partners included in our individual interviews and focus groups at the 

sectors we visited.

 

7

These documents are marked For Official Use Only and are not available to the public. 

8

DHS, Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy (April 2008). 

9

GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 2009).
 

Page 6 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Integration for Acquisition,

10 to determine whether the Coast Guard fully 

defined requirements prior to designing, developing, testing, and 

deploying WatchKeeper; sufficiently prioritized WatchKeeper 

requirements; effectively managed requirements; and maintained 

traceability between operational requirements and system requirements. 

To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard had developed a 

reliable cost estimate for the IOC project, we evaluated the June 2010 

life-cycle cost estimate relative to the four characteristics of a reliable 

estimate, as defined in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.

11

These four characteristics call for estimates to be comprehensive, welldocumented, accurate, and credible, and the practices address, for 

example, the assumptions and source data used. We then characterized 

the extent to which each of the four characteristics was met as either Not 

Met, Partially Met, or Met.12 To determine the extent to which the Coast 

Guard had developed a reliable schedule for the IOC project, we 

analyzed the IOC project integrated master schedule as of May 2011 

because it was the most current schedule available at the time of our 

review, and we characterized our schedule findings into three categories: 

(1) comprehensive, (2) controlled, and (3) current.13 Specifically, we 

analyzed the schedule against four of the key schedule estimating 

practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide that represent 

the foundational elements of a reliable schedule.14

 

10Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI)® for 

Acquisition, ver. 1.2 (Pittsburgh, Penn., November 2007).

In conducting our 

analysis, we used commercially available software tools to determine 

whether the schedule, for example, included all critical activities, a logical 

11GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

12“Not Met” = Coast Guard provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion.

“Partially Met” = Coast Guard provided evidence that satisfies some, but not all, of the 

criterion.

“Met” = Coast Guard provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion. 

13Comprehensive is characterized as logically sequenced activities spanning the scope of 

work to be performed that are included in the schedule so that the full picture is available 

to managers. Controlled is characterized as the use of a documented process to manage 

changes to the schedule so that the integrity of the schedule is assured. Current is 

characterized as regularly updating ongoing activities using a formal process so that 

managers can readily know the status of the project.

14GAO-09-3SP. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

sequence of activities, and a critical path.15

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 to February 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Also, we interviewed project 

officials to determine the processes in place for developing, updating, 

maintaining, and controlling the schedule. For each area, we interviewed 

project officials to obtain clarification on the practices, and to determine 

the reasons for any deviations.

Congress showed continuing interest in the development of IOCs shortly 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the Consolidated 

Appropriations Resolution, 2003,

16 funding was appropriated specifically 

for such a center in Charleston, South Carolina. That center, known as 

Project SeaHawk, brought together agencies, including the Coast Guard, 

CBP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Navy, and state and 

local law enforcement agencies, to improve transportation security. 

Shortly thereafter, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 

200417

The Coast Guard and the Navy also recognized the need to work 

together to ensure port security and developed local joint harbor 

operations centers (JHOC), which were to share information, improve 

awareness of port activities, and coordinate operations. These were 

originally created by local Coast Guard and Navy units, before the SAFE 

Port Act IOC requirement was enacted, to increase the security of naval 

vessels at their home ports. Later, in August 2005, the Coast Guard and 

required the Commandant of the Coast Guard to report on the 

implementation and use of joint operational centers for security at certain 

United States ports.

 

15The critical path represents the chain of dependent activities with the longest total 

duration in the schedule. If any activity on the critical path slips, the entire project will be 

delayed.

16Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 53 (2003).

17Pub. L. No. 108-293, 118 Stat. 1028, 1082 (2004).

Background 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Navy signed a memorandum of agreement that officially established 

JHOCs to build upon the resources available to each service to produce 

better awareness of conditions and activities in ports with a large Navy 

presence. Eventually, JHOCs were established in Hampton Roads, 

Virginia; Jacksonville, Florida; San Diego, California; and Seattle, 

Washington. While these JHOCs were originally established as a means 

to improve information sharing and operational effectiveness between the 

Coast Guard and the Navy, other federal, state, and local port partners 

also began to operate within these centers. For example, CBP and the 

San Diego Harbor Patrol were also located in the San Diego JHOC.

In addition, the Bush administration expressed the need for port security 

stakeholders to work together. In particular, the National Strategy for 

Maritime Security, issued in September 2005, stated that agencies 

working to ensure maritime security should colocate in multiagency 

centers to facilitate direct interaction and efficient use of limited 

resources. Additionally, the strategy directed the agencies to develop 

well-defined coordination protocols and communication mechanisms for 

operating jointly. 

Meanwhile, the Coast Guard began an initiative to help facilitate meeting 

its needs related to IOCs. In September 2005, the Coast Guard sent a 

request to DHS to authorize the initial phase of an acquisition project 

called Command 2010. Command 2010 was to improve the Coast 

Guard’s capabilities for surveillance, decision and mission support, and 

multiagency collaboration. To improve the Coast Guard’s surveillance 

capabilities in critical ports and coastal regions, Command 2010 was to 

provide a network of radar, cameras, and other sensors. To improve its 

decision and mission support capabilities, the Coast Guard planned to 

develop an information system—called WatchKeeper—that would provide 

situational awareness to Coast Guard personnel through displays of 

information gathered from sensors, as well as Coast Guard and port 

partner information sources. To improve collaboration, Command 2010 

was also to include a web-based portal to allow port partners to access 

the same data displayed for the Coast Guard on WatchKeeper and allow 

joint access to Coast Guard and port partner operations schedules. The 

portal was to include collaboration functions, such as document 

management and message boards. Given these capabilities, Command 

2010 was to support both IOCs where in-person coordination is possible 

and the virtual operations center concept as envisioned by the joint 

operations center working group. Virtual operations centers are in place 

when information sharing and operational coordination with port partners 

at separate locations occurs through the use of tools—in the case of 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Command 2010, and as it evolved later to Command 21 and the IOC, on 

an Internet web portal.

Then, in 2006, the SAFE Port Act was enacted, which mandated that 

IOCs for port security be implemented at all high-priority ports within 3 

years.18 Under the SAFE Port Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

was to utilize, as appropriate, the characteristics of existing centers and 

provide for the participation, along with the Coast Guard, of other federal, 

state, local, and private-sector port security stakeholders, among other 

things.19 Amendments to the IOC provisions in the Coast Guard 

Authorization Act of 2010 included adding that such centers should 

provide for the physical colocation of the Coast Guard and other 

stakeholders, where practicable.20

In June 2007, shortly after passage of the SAFE Port Act, the Coast 

Guard began a broader initiative to coordinate port-security efforts. 

Specifically, CBP and the Coast Guard formed a joint operations center 

working group that was to improve near- and long-term efficiency and 

effectiveness of joint field operations. The working group visited select 

Coast Guard and CBP field units to gather firsthand knowledge of Coast 

Guard and CBP working relationships. According to the working group, 

the site visits revealed interagency coordination was already occurring in 

ways deemed most appropriate by local field commanders. Also, the 

working group conducted a survey of Coast Guard and CBP field 

commanders that highlighted, among other things, that in-person 

collaboration is desirable for more-effective Coast Guard and CBP 

relations, but that virtual operations centers should be considered when 

in-person coordination was not feasible.

Among other things, the 2010 act also 

required that the IOCs include information-management systems and 

sensor-management systems. 

 

18The SAFE Port Act did not define the term “high-priority ports,” but in response to a 

reporting requirement included in the act, DHS stated that its list of priority ports was 

based on factors including risk-assessment scores, port-criticality ratings, Department of 

Defense and Department of Justice partnership priorities, and business factors such as 

investments in facilities and sensors.

19The SAFE Port Act named pilot IOCs in Miami, Florida; Norfolk/Hampton Roads, 

Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; and San Diego, California; and a virtual operation 

center at the Port of New York and New Jersey. Subsequent amendments to the IOC 

statutory provisions deleted the specific listing of these particular IOCs. 

20Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905, 2990 (2010).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

The Coast Guard received $60 million of funding that Congress directed 

to the IOC project in annual fiscal year 2008 appropriations to begin the 

process of establishing IOCs.21 The Coast Guard received an additional 

$14 million in congressionally directed appropriations from fiscal years 

2009 through 2012 for IOC implementation.

22

The Coast Guard did not meet the October 2009 deadline enacted in the 

SAFE Port Act to establish IOCs; however, the Coast Guard is 

establishing IOCs at all 35 of its sectors, although none of them have 

achieved full operating capability. According to the Coast Guard’s Chief of 

IOC Implementation and its Information Sharing Executive Agent, 

continued support is needed from DHS to increase port-partner 

participation and the success of the IOC initiative. DHS has recently 

begun to support efforts to increase port-partner participation and further 

IOC implementation.

The Coast Guard did not meet the SAFE Port Act’s deadline to establish 

IOCs at high-risk ports within 3 years of enactment, in part because it was 

not appropriated funds to establish the IOCs until fiscal year 2008—14 

months after enactment of the law, and because the definition of a fully 

operational IOC was evolving during this period. According to the Coast 

Guard, unexpected and unreliable funding sources created the challenge 

in scheduling and meeting planned milestones as each change required 

cost and schedule adjustments. However, funding was provided nearly 2 

years before the required deadline, and in our analysis of the Coast 

Guard’s actions leading up to the deadline, development of the IOCs was 

not prioritized until the deadline passed. The Coast Guard made several 

 

21H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Committee Print on H.R. 2764 / Public Law 

110-161, Division E – Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, at 

1060-62 (2007), accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 

110-161, 121 Stat. 2042 [2007]). 

22H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Committee Print on H.R. 2638 / Public Law 

110-329, Division D – Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, at 647 

(2008), accompanying the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2009 (Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008)); H. R. Conf. Rep. 

No. 111-298, at 86-90 (2009), accompanying the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009)); H. R. Conf. Rep. 

No. 112-331, at 979 (2011), accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 

(Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2011)). 

Coast Guard Did Not 

Meet the Required 

Deadline for 

Establishing IOCs, but 

Has Made Progress

Coast Guard Did Not Meet 

the SAFE Port Act IOC 

Deadline, and Its 

Definition of an IOC Has 

Evolved
 

Page 11 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

changes to its efforts to develop IOCs from 2007 through 2009. For 

example, in its July 2007 letter to Congress on the budget and costsharing analysis of implementing the IOC requirements of the SAFE Port 

Act, DHS reported changing the name of the project—from Command 

2010 to Command 21. In this letter, the DHS Assistant Secretary for 

Legislative Affairs stated that Command 21 was the Coast Guard 

acquisition project that was to provide the IOC capability required by the 

SAFE Port Act. This acquisition project was to provide informationmanagement tools to improve interagency coordination, enhance 

awareness, and automate anomaly detection. Command 21 was to 

accomplish these tasks by facilitating interagency cooperation, 

information sharing, and joint, port-level operations through the use of 

WatchKeeper; as well as providing a sensor network and facility upgrades 

to facilitate multiagency operations and provide space for port partners.

Figure 1 depicts the type of information that WatchKeeper provides to the 

Coast Guard and port partners. 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Figure 1: Information WatchKeeper Provides to the Coast Guard and Port Partners

In March 2008, the Coast Guard reported that physical colocation with 

port partners was preferred, but interagency coordination and cooperation 

would also occur virtually. These virtual interactions would be facilitated 

by sharing information through WatchKeeper. However, 36 of 39 port 

partners we spoke with expressed views on physical and virtual

colocation, and 31 of those 36 port partners expressed benefits to being 

colocated with the Coast Guard. For example, one port partner working at 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

the IOC in Charleston, South Carolina, stated that sharing space with the 

Coast Guard allows for easier communication with Coast Guard officials 

because they are just down the hall. He also said that the Coast Guard's 

policy of rotating officials every 3 years could hinder the success of virtual 

IOCs because relationships with the local Coast Guard representatives 

will not have been established. Another port partner we spoke with said 

that the virtual IOC in Hampton Roads, Virginia, has been effective 

because there are weekly in-person meetings that allow trust to be built, 

which facilitates the virtual meetings conducted using WatchKeeper. 

While there are clearly disadvantages to not being colocated, Coast 

Guard officials stated that funding levels prevented it from pursuing 

physical IOCs beyond locations in San Francisco, California; New 

Orleans, Louisiana; and Wilmington, North Carolina. 

The Coast Guard communicated changes to Command 21 in a 2008 

letter to congressional appropriations committees. In the letter, the Coast 

Guard Commandant further refined the implementation of Coast Guard 

efforts to meet its IOC mandate. In particular, he stated that the Coast 

Guard planned to install the WatchKeeper information-management tools, 

the sensor network, and facility upgrades at the 24 Coast Guard sectors 

that encompassed the nation’s high-priority ports. All 35 sectors would, at 

a minimum, receive WatchKeeper. Additionally, user feedback based on 

the initial installations would be used as a guide to finalize requirements. 

Also in 2008, the IOC plans changed from having a separate 

collaboration portal to share information on WatchKeeper with port 

partners to building that communications mechanism as a part of 

WatchKeeper. 

In August 2009, the Coast Guard established four implementation 

segments for what it was now calling the IOC/Command 21 project.23

• Segment 1: Provide a standardized information-management solution 

(WatchKeeper) focused on integrated vessel targeting, operations 

planning, and operations monitoring and interoperability. 

At 

that time, the segments were:

• Segment 2: Provide integrated sensor management with linkages to 

existing sensors. 

 

23By October 2009, the Coast Guard began calling the acquisition project the Interagency 

Operations Centers project—or IOC project.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

• Segment 3: Provide expanded sensors to fill gaps in situational 

awareness. 

• Segment 4: Upgrade existing facilities to support interagency 

planning and operations, including space allocation for key port 

partners.

While these actions represented the initial planning steps of developing 

the IOCs, the Coast Guard did not provide sector commanding officers 

with guidance on the required elements for an IOC until March 2010, 5 

months after the deadline to establish the IOCs. Coast Guard officials 

stated that this was because the initial focus was on the acquisition of 

WatchKeeper and not the IOC initiative as a whole. In March 2010, the 

Assistant Commandant of Capability sent a message to the sectors 

outlining the five elements an IOC needs to function optimally. Described 

below, these five elements constitute the Coast Guard’s definition of a 

fully operational IOC. 

1. Clearly defined governance and membership, including documented 

agreements regarding which agencies will participate, in which ways, 

where, and when. 

2. Joint, coordinated operational activities (e.g., inspections, vessel 

boardings, patrols, and exercises) as appropriate. 

3. Shared visibility of the operational schedules of maritime assets and 

known events. 

4. A regular schedule of coordination meetings with federal, state, and 

local port partner representatives from each member agency. 

5. Shared access to interagency information-management systems (e.g.,

WatchKeeper) where they are in place. 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

As of October 2010, 32 of the 35 sectors had made progress in 

implementing IOCs, but none of the IOCs had achieved full operating 

capability.24

• initial operating capability: sectors that have met 30 to less than 55 

percent of the criteria; 

According to the Coast Guard, the sectors expressed 

concern that when they provided the information to Coast Guard 

headquarters in October 2010, they were unaware of how their progress 

would be measured and, therefore, omitted pertinent information on 

actions that meet the five IOC elements. The Coast Guard plans to 

reevaluate the sectors’ progress in 2012. The Coast Guard analyzed the 

sectors’ October 2010 status reports using criteria it developed for each 

of the five required IOC elements previously discussed. Specifically, each 

sector was assigned points on a scale of 1 to 100 in terms of the progress 

it has made toward meeting the criteria associated with the first four IOC 

elements (all except WatchKeeper), with 100 being the highest. Each 

sector was then placed in one of the following categories based on the 

average number of points it received for the first four IOC elements: 

• initial-advanced operating capability: sectors that have met 55 to 

less than 80 percent of the criteria; or 

• final operating capability: sectors that have met 80 percent or more 

of the criteria. 

According to the Coast Guard’s analysis of the 35 sectors, as of October 

2010, 3 have not achieved initial operating capability for their IOCs, 22 

had achieved IOC initial operating capability, 10 had achieved IOC initialadvanced operating capability, and none had achieved IOC full operating 

capability. Of the 10 Coast Guard sectors that have achieved IOC initialadvanced operating capability, 5 were recognized by the Coast Guard in 

2008 as sectors with a high degree of collaboration with port partners. In 

particular, these sectors had established a means to coordinate with their 

port partners prior to the Coast Guard developing the five IOC elements, 

and in some cases prior to the October 2006 enactment of the SAFE Port 

Act IOC requirements. For example, during our site visit to Coast Guard 

Sector San Diego—the sector that had made the greatest progress in 

meeting the IOC requirements—we observed port partners coordinating 

 

24The September 2010 request is the most recent request the Coast Guard has made to 

its sectors to determine their progress in implementing IOCs. 

The Majority of Sectors’ 

IOCs Have Achieved Initial 

Operating Capability; Prior 

Collaboration Is a Key 

Determinant of IOC 

Progress 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

joint operations during one of the Maritime Unified Command’s (MUC) 

weekly meetings. The MUC is an alliance of federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies that addresses threats in San Diego’s maritime 

domain, such as drug and alien smuggling. We also observed the JHOC 

where MUC members can coordinate joint operations and exchange 

information. Figure 2 below depicts the IOC implementation status of 

each of the 35 Coast Guard sectors. 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Figure 2: IOC Implementation Status by Sector

Note: WatchKeeper implementation is as of September 2011. IOC implementation status is as of 

October 2010, at which time no sector had achieved final operating capability.

The results of the Coast Guard analysis of the first four IOC elements 

indicate that sectors have made the greatest progress in achieving 

regularly scheduled coordination meetings (element 4), followed closely 

by joint coordinated operations (element 2), and shared visibility of 

schedule and assets (element 3). The sectors have made the least 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

progress in clearly defining IOC governance (element 1), with sectors, on 

average, achieving 29 percent of this criteria. Figure 3 depicts the 

progress the sectors have made, by element, based on the average of 

the individual sector percentages.

The fifth IOC element involves sectors utilizing and providing their port 

partners access to WatchKeeper. The extent of capabilities that 

WatchKeeper provides the sectors is not part of the Coast Guard’s 

measure of IOC implementation. Since sectors are unable to control 

when WatchKeeper will be implemented at their respective locations, the 

Coast Guard is analyzing the sectors’ progress in meeting this element 

separately from the other four IOC elements. 

Figure 3: Average Percentage of IOC Implementation across Coast Guard Sectors, for Four of the Five IOC Elements, as of 

October 2010

In September 2009, the Coast Guard released initial WatchKeeper 

capabilities to Sector Charleston, South Carolina. However, in March 

2010, an operational test and evaluation revealed limitations in the 

maturity of the technology. As a result, the Coast Guard halted further 

deployment of WatchKeeper to additional IOC locations. In May 2010, 

DHS authorized the IOC project to release WatchKeeper as a technology 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

demonstrator to all 35 IOC locations.25

The Coast Guard IOC Project Manager stated that the Coast Guard does 

not expect to proceed with Segments 3 and 4 of the IOC project—the 

addition of new sensors and building new facilities—beyond the planning 

proposals for five sectors and the construction at three locations because 

of funding uncertainties.

By August 2010, the Coast Guard 

stated that Segment 1 of the IOC project—made up of the WatchKeeper 

Technology Demonstrator—would initially be released to 17 sectors, and 

then to the remaining 18 if there was a positive cost-benefit to doing so. 

As of September 2011, the WatchKeeper Technology Demonstrator has 

been implemented at 12 sectors (see fig. 2 above). The Coast Guard 

anticipates that it will implement the WatchKeeper Technology 

Demonstrator at five more sectors by April 2012. According to the Coast 

Guard’s Acquisition Program Baseline, implementing WatchKeeper at the 

remaining 18 sectors is to be complete by March 2017. As sectors 

receive WatchKeeper, the Coast Guard plans to measure their progress 

based on the extent to which they are both utilizing WatchKeeper and 

providing access to port partners. As of September 2011, the first two 

sectors to receive the WatchKeeper Technology Demonstrator—

Charleston, South Carolina, and Hampton Roads, Virginia—granted the 

greatest number of port partners access to WatchKeeper (53 and 62 

respectively). The port partners granted access by these sectors include 

officials from federal, state, and local agencies. 

26 

According to the Coast Guard’s Chief of IOC Implementation and its 

Information Sharing Executive Agent, continued support is needed from 

DHS to increase port-partner participation and the success of the IOC 

initiative. The SAFE Port Act IOC provision does not compel port partners 

to participate in IOCs, so although DHS delegated authority for IOC 

implementation to the Coast Guard, it cannot implement IOCs in isolation. 

According to the Coast Guard’s Chief of IOC Implementation, DHS 

agencies developed an IOC Concept of Operations in 2006, but the effort 

 

25A technology demonstrator can be used to define requirements, verify system designs, 

evaluate technology maturity, or support deployment decisions.

26The design and survey work was performed at Sectors Detroit, Honolulu, Lake 

Michigan, Mobile, and St. Petersburg. The construction, reconfiguration, or outfitting was 

performed at Sectors New Orleans, San Francisco, and Wilmington. 

DHS Has Recently Begun 

to Support Port-Partner 

Participation and Further 

IOC Implementation
 

Page 20 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

floundered since other DHS agencies were not willing to sign the 

agreement. According to Coast Guard officials, once DHS delegated 

responsibility for the development of IOCs to the Coast Guard, the 

department did not provide any support or guidance on how to implement 

IOCs. According to a DHS Information Sharing & Safeguarding 

Governance Board (ISGB) official, the ISGB was not aware the Coast 

Guard needed support until mid-2011.

In July 2011, the Coast Guard requested that the ISGB adopt the IOC 

initiative as an information-sharing priority initiative. The ISGB approved 

this request and directed the board members to assist in formulating 

information-sharing and access policy and standardized procedures for 

IOCs, through a DHS IOC Integrated Process Team with representation 

from all DHS offices and components who have experience specific to 

information sharing with non-DHS partners. According to Coast Guard 

and ISGB officials, in August 2011, the ISGB solicited comments on a 

draft management directive authored by the Coast Guard to instruct DHS 

agencies to participate in IOCs. The directive was issued in December 

2011. 

While the Coast Guard and DHS are working to increase participation at 

IOCs, the Coast Guard has experienced challenges in maintaining portpartner participation at its physical IOC locations. According to ISGB 

officials, obtaining DHS support for IOCs is a first step in building IOC 

participation. Subsequent steps involve obtaining support from non-DHS 

federal agencies, as well as state and local agencies. The experience to 

date with non-DHS agency involvement at current IOCs has been mixed. 

For example, the Navy, which was a partner at the JHOCs, has 

withdrawn its watchstanders from these locations. In at least one JHOC 

location (Jacksonville, Florida), the Coast Guard also lost the use of the 

facility that was used as the JHOC, as well as access to the Navy’s 

sensor network. Coast Guard officials told us that these events occurred 

due to funding constraints and other priorities. In contrast, in at least one 

other JHOC location (Hampton Roads, Virginia), the Navy is working with 

the Coast Guard sector there to develop and implement a full scale IOC. 

Similarly, while the Joint Terrorism Task Force left the SeaHawk facility in 

Charleston, South Carolina, when funding for SeaHawk was moved from 

the Department of Justice to the Coast Guard, the task force maintains a 

representative at the facility. The ISGB plans to assist the Coast Guard 

with establishing information-sharing agreements with state and local 

agencies and utilizing the White House–based Information Sharing and 

Access Interagency Policy Committee as a mechanism for obtaining 

support from non-DHS federal agencies. However, it is too early to 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

determine how successful these efforts will be in facilitating the IOC’s role 

in sharing critical information among port partners.

The Coast Guard has granted WatchKeeper access to port partners at 11 

of the 12 sectors where it has been installed, but the majority of those 

port partners with access were not using the system frequently, with more 

than 80 percent of port partners not logging on to the system from July 

through September 2011. Port partners have expressed mixed views on 

the usefulness of WatchKeeper and would like to see additional features 

and information incorporated to enhance its capabilities. The Coast Guard 

has recently taken action to increase WatchKeeper log ons by its port 

partners, but could do more to obtain input on port partners’ needs in 

order to increase their WatchKeeper use.

Coast Guard sectors granted WatchKeeper access to 233 port partners 

as of September 2011, as shown in table 1. However, most of these port 

partners were not logging on.

WatchKeeper Is Not 

Being Used by 

Majority of Port 

Partners; Monitoring 

Participation and 

Soliciting Input Could 

Help Improve System

More Than 80 Percent of 

Port Partners Are Not 

Logging On to 

WatchKeeper, and Coast 

Guard No Longer Has an 

Approach for 

Systematically Monitoring

System Use 

Port Partners’ Use of 

WatchKeeper 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Table 1: Number of Port Partners with WatchKeeper Access by Sector, as of 

September 2011

Coast Guard sector

WatchKeeper 

installation date 

Number of port 

partners

Charleston February 2010 53

Hampton Roads June 2010 62

Jacksonville September 2010 19

Detroit October 2010 31

San Diego January 2011 4 

Puget Sound February 2011 28

New York March 2011 14

Long Island Sound May 2011 1 

Boston June 2011 5 

Miami July 2011 12

Key West July 2011 4

San Juan August 2011 0 

Total 233

Source: GAO using information provided by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Our analysis of WatchKeeper log-on data shows that of the 233 port 

partners who had access to WatchKeeper for any part of September 2011 

(the most recent month for which data were available), 192 (about 82 

percent) did not log on to the system, 35 (about 15 percent) logged on 

between 1 to 5 times, and 6 (about 3 percent) logged on more than 5 

times.27 Figure 4 depicts the number of port partners who logged on 

during the month of September 2011.

 

27Since port partners have no opportunity to log on to WatchKeeper until after access is 

granted, those who are granted access late in a month may, therefore, not have an 

opportunity to log on until the following month.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Figure 4: Number of Port Partners Logging On to WatchKeeper during September 

2011

Although Coast Guard officials have increased the number of port 

partners with access to WatchKeeper across its sectors, a gap remains 

between those with access and those logging on to WatchKeeper, as 

shown in figure 5. For example, from June through September 2011, the

Coast Guard added from 6 to 26 new users each month, but the 

percentage of users with access who logged on to WatchKeeper 

remained at 18 percent for July through September 2011. 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Figure 5: Percentage of Port Partners Logging On to WatchKeeper, June through 

September 2011

The Coast Guard IOC Project Manager entered into an internal contract 

with the Research and Development Center to measure and report 

monthly on the number of WatchKeeper accounts held and log ons to the 

system by the Coast Guard and port partners. The first report was issued 

related to activity occurring during January 2011 and continued to be 

issued monthly through September 2011. After the September report was 

issued, the contract expired and as of November 2011, the Coast Guard 

has not determined whether it will enter into any future contracts to collect 

similar data. Therefore, the Coast Guard no longer has an approach in 

place for systematically monitoring port partners’ use of WatchKeeper. 

Leading federal practices for performance management require federal 

agencies to (1) measure progress toward achieving their goals, (2) 

identify which external factors might affect such progress, and (3) explain 

why a goal was not met.28

 

28GAO, Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program 

Performance, 

Without a means to determine to what extent 

(1) sectors are providing port partners WatchKeeper access and (2) port 

GAO/GGD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2000).
 

Page 25 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

partners are using WatchKeeper, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to 

determine whether WatchKeeper is facilitating the IOC initiative in 

meeting its goals of improving information sharing and coordination of 

joint operations. 

Most of the 39 port partners we interviewed expressed mixed views on 

the usefulness of WatchKeeper and provided examples of other features 

and information that they would like to see incorporated to enhance its 

capabilities.29 We interviewed 17 port partners who used WatchKeeper, 

and they provided us with a variety of reasons for why they are using 

WatchKeeper. Among them, 8 port partners stated that they use 

WatchKeeper to obtain information on vessels—such as which port a 

vessel is coming from or arriving at—to perform their own missions; 8 port 

partners stated that they use WatchKeeper features—such as the 

Geographic Information System (GIS)30

Although 17 of the 39 port partners we spoke with are using 

WatchKeeper, 21 port partners provided us with a variety of reasons as to 

why they are not using WatchKeeper.

—to perform their own missions; 

and 5 port partners said they use WatchKeeper as a tool to facilitate 

coordination with the Coast Guard during vessel targeting meetings. See 

appendix II for more information on port-partner views about reasons they 

use the system.

31

Port partners we interviewed provided examples of other features and 

information that they would like to see incorporated into WatchKeeper to 

Among them, 7 port partners 

stated that WatchKeeper does not help them perform their own missions; 

5 stated that they are able to obtain and share information with Coast 

Guard officials in-person; and 5 port partners said that they are not able 

to access all features of WatchKeeper because of a firewall. See 

appendix II for more information on port partners’ responses. 

 

29A total of 39 port partners with access to WatchKeeper at sectors agreed to participate 

in interviews and focus groups with us. See app. I for a list of the port partners we 

interviewed.

30GIS displays a ship’s locations based on its automatic identification system, which is a 

maritime digital-communication system that continually transmits and receives vessel data 

over very-high frequencies to identify and track vessels.

31A total of 22 port partners we interviewed are not using WatchKeeper. One port partner 

did not provide a reason why not. 

Port Partners’ Views of 

WatchKeeper 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

enhance its capabilities and, thus, increase the benefits of WatchKeeper 

to users other than the Coast Guard. Specifically, of the 39 port partners 

we interviewed, 19 provided us feedback on the features or information 

they would like added to WatchKeeper. Adding crew and passenger 

information, which is contained in the Coast Guard’s Ship Arrival 

Notification System (SANS),32 was the most requested, with 8 of the 19 

port partners desiring this information. The second-most-requested 

information and features, each cited by 4 port partners, was the inclusion 

of information from CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS),33 and the 

inclusion of sensors.

The Coast Guard has recently taken steps to increase port partners’ use 

of WatchKeeper. For example, the Coast Guard has offered port partners 

training on WatchKeeper. Of the 39 port partners we interviewed with 

access to WatchKeeper, 35 reported that they had been offered training 

by the Coast Guard. In addition, the Coast Guard established an 

information-technology help desk that WatchKeeper users can call or email for support, which has assisted port partners. Further, during the 

course of our review, in June 2011, the Coast Guard began reaching out 

to its port partners by means of an online survey to obtain feedback on 

their use of WatchKeeper and to solicit information on areas for 

improvement. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to increase the 

information available to port partners through WatchKeeper. According to 

Coast Guard officials, they are aware that port partners want access to 

crew and passenger information through WatchKeeper and they are 

developing different levels of access rights to allow for certain port 

partners to have access to such information while limiting the access to 

 

32The SANS database is populated with Notice of Arrival information provided by vessels 

96 hours prior to entering U.S. territorial waters. Coast Guard Command Centers can 

access this database to gather vessel, crew, cargo, and company information concerning 

ships entering their area of responsibility. 

33CBP uses ATS—a mathematical model that uses weighted rules to assign a risk score 

to arriving cargo shipments based on shipping information—to help identify and prevent 

potential terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. ATS is used by 

CBP to review documentation, including cargo manifest information submitted by the 

vessel carriers on all U.S.-bound shipments, and entry data (more detailed information 

about the cargo) submitted by brokers, to develop risk scores that help identify containers 

for additional examination. 

Coast Guard Has Taken 

Action to Increase Port 

Partners’ Use of 

WatchKeeper, but Could 

Enhance WatchKeeper Use 

by Soliciting More PortPartner Input 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

others.34

According to the Coast Guard, it consulted with CBP and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) when developing the initial 

requirements for WatchKeeper. However, the Coast Guard did not solicit 

input from all port partners prior to developing requirements for 

WatchKeeper. For example, our review of meeting minutes from site visits 

conducted by an IOC working group to Sectors Jacksonville and New 

Orleans indicate that CBP officials were present in Jacksonville and CBP, 

ICE, port, local emergency-preparedness, state police, and harbor police 

officials were present in New Orleans, but the Coast Guard did not solicit 

input from these other port partners.

Additionally, in May 2011, the Coast Guard and CBP—a portpartner agency—agreed that exchanging information would be beneficial 

to both agencies. In a July 2011 memo, the Coast Guard IOC Project 

Manager identified certain information (e.g., hazardous cargo manifests) 

from CBP’s ATS to include in WatchKeeper. In October 2011, CBP and 

Coast Guard officials met to plan the information exchange, estimated to 

occur in May 2012.

35 According to Coast Guard officials, 

port partner involvement in the development of WatchKeeper 

requirements was primarily limited to CBP because WatchKeeper grew 

out of a system designed for screening commercial vessel arrivals, which 

is a CBP mission. However, according to the Interagency Operations 

Process Report: Mapping Process to Requirements for Interagency 

Operations Centers, the Coast Guard identified many port partners as 

critical to IOCs, including other federal agencies (e.g., the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation) and state and local agencies.36 Moreover, the 

Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy states 

that DHS shall “ensure that DHS technology platforms evolve to facilitate 

appropriate mission-based information sharing with Federal, State, local, 

territorial, tribal, private sector and foreign partners.”37

 

34These changes are being made to reflect differences among port partners’ authority to 

receive personally identifiable information.

In addition, GAO’s 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that, 

“management should ensure there are adequate means of 

35The IOC working group also conducted a site visit to Sector New York, but the Coast 

Guard was unable to locate the meeting minutes from this visit. 

36This document is not available to the public. 

37DHS, Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy (April 2008). 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

communicating with and obtaining information from external stakeholders 

that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals.”38

The Coast Guard has identified port-partner participation as important to 

a successful IOC, recognizing that without it, there will highly likely be a 

significant consequence to the success of the IOC initiative. Without a 

process to obtain and incorporate port-partner input into the development 

of future WatchKeeper requirements, the Coast Guard does not have 

reasonable assurance that WatchKeeper will satisfy port partners’ needs, 

and facilitate mission-based information sharing to achieve the goals of 

the IOC project.

The Coast Guard has not adhered to established guidance in defining 

WatchKeeper requirements, cost, and schedule, which are fundamental 

to delivering a system on time and within budget. In particular, the Coast 

Guard has not (1) effectively developed and managed WatchKeeper 

requirements, (2) developed a reliable cost estimate to guide and inform 

the WatchKeeper investment, and (3) developed a reliable project 

schedule to develop and deploy WatchKeeper. 

Well-defined and managed requirements are a cornerstone of effective 

system development and acquisition. According to the Software 

Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model® Integration

(CMMI®) for Acquisition, effective requirements development and 

management include, among other things, (1) developing and 

documenting requirements before initiating design and development; (2) 

prioritizing requirements to ensure that those most critical to stakeholders 

and users are addressed early; and (3) ensuring forward and backward 

traceability between higher-level business requirements and moredetailed system requirements.39

The Coast Guard has not implemented these three aspects of effective 

requirements development and management. First, the Coast Guard did 

 

38GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

39SEI, CMMI® for Acquisition. 

Coast Guard Has Not 

Adhered to 

Established Guidance 

in Defining 

WatchKeeper 

Requirements, Cost, 

and Schedule

Coast Guard Has Not 

Effectively Developed and 

Managed WatchKeeper 

Requirements 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

not fully define requirements prior to designing, developing, testing, and 

deploying WatchKeeper. Recognized guidance calls for first defining 

business requirements that describe how users will interact with the 

system, and user needs in terms of what the system is to do and how it is 

to do it, to ensure that the developed system satisfies user needs.40

Although the Coast Guard developed draft high-level business 

requirements for WatchKeeper, it did not define the specific functions that 

the system is to perform, and as noted above, it did not elicit input from all 

port partners in developing the high-level requirements. Coast Guard 

officials acknowledged that they should have developed requirements 

before designing and developing WatchKeeper, but stated that there was 

not enough time between receiving project funding in fiscal year 2008 and 

the SAFE Port Act’s deadline to establish the IOCs (and its informationmanagement and sharing system—WatchKeeper) in 2009. The lack of 

well-defined business requirements describing how WatchKeeper was to 

operate and how users were to interact with WatchKeeper prior to its 

design and development contributed to its failed operational testing and 

subsequent deployment of the initial IOC project segment as the 

Technology Demonstrator, and ultimately, to deploying a system that 

does not fully meet user needs.41

Second, the Coast Guard did not sufficiently prioritize requirements to 

ensure that requirements most critical to stakeholders and users are 

addressed early and overall user needs are satisfied. According to project 

officials, they grouped WatchKeeper requirements into 17 categories that 

reflect similar functionality and placed each of the 17 categories into one 

of four “buckets”—Bucket 1 (“must have” requirements), Bucket 2 

(“important” requirements), Bucket 3 (no description), and Bucket 4 

(“unfunded” or “unexecutable” requirements). However, while the project 

office has prioritized the 17 categories of requirements, the priority of 

individual requirements is unclear. For example, of the remaining 256 

requirements, 67 (about 26 percent) have been classified as Bucket 1

and 51 (about 20 percent) as Bucket 2.42

 

40SEI, CMMI® for Acquisition. 

However, 108 (about 42 

41The WatchKeeper Technology Demonstrator is a Technology Demonstrator 3, which is 

conducted in the intended operational environment and is used to support a project’s 

production/deployment decisions. 

42Remaining requirements are those functional requirements that project office 

documentation indicated are planned for Segment 2 and service pack 4. Service packs 

are used to enhance or upgrade the deployed Technology Demonstrator functionality.
 

Page 30 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

percent) have been classified as both Bucket 1 and Bucket 2, which 

diminishes the benefit of prioritization. By assigning each requirement a 

single priority (that is, Bucket 1, 2, 3, or 4), the project office would be 

better able to determine the order in which business requirements should 

be implemented to ensure that the most critical requirements are 

addressed, especially given project officials stated concern about future 

project funding. 

Third, the Coast Guard has not demonstrated adequate traceability 

between its business requirements (e.g., operational and functional 

requirements) and system requirements.43 Traceability of requirements is 

tracking the requirements from the inception of the project and agreement 

on a specific set of business requirements to development of the lowerlevel system requirements, detailed design, and test cases necessary for 

validating the requirements. Tracing a requirement throughout the 

development life cycle provides evidence that the requirements are met in 

the developed system and ensures that the product or system will work 

as intended. Requirements must be traceable forward and backward 

through the life cycle. The Coast Guard’s Requirements Generation and

Management Process recognizes the importance of traceability, stating 

that requirements are to be traceable throughout design, development, 

and test to ensure that users receive the desired capabilities.44 According 

to project officials, traceability is maintained in the project’s Functional 

Requirements Document and the System Requirements Document.45

 

43Business requirements (e.g., operational and functional requirements) describe how 

users will interact with the system, what the system is to do, and how well it is to do it. 

System requirements provide the level of detail needed for system developers to design 

and build the system. 

According to this documentation, 244 of the 355 functional requirements 

(about 69 percent) were traceable backward to a higher-level operational 

requirement and 242 of 355 functional requirements (about 68 percent) 

were traceable forward to lower-level system requirements. However, 

only 181 of the 355 functional requirements (about 51 percent) were 

traceable backward to both a higher-level operational requirement and 

forward to a lower-level system requirement. Moreover, an additional 61 

44U.S. Coast Guard, Requirements Generation and Management Process, Pub 7-7, ver. 

1.0 (Mar. 19, 2009). 

45Interagency Operations Centers, Functional Requirements Document, v. 1,1 (May 12, 

2010); and Interagency Operations Centers, Systems Requirements Document, v 1.0 

(Sept. 12, 2011). 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

functional requirements were traceable to a system requirement, but were 

not traceable to an operational requirement. This raises questions about 

the genesis of these 61 functional requirements, given that functional 

requirements should be derived from higher-level operational 

requirements. Without ensuring that requirements are fully traceable, 

including ensuring that all lower-level requirements are traceable to a 

higher-level business or user requirement and all higher-level business 

requirements are traceable to lower-level system requirements, the 

program office does not have a sufficient basis for knowing whether the 

scope of the system will satisfy user needs.

According to project officials, these requirements management limitations 

are due to the aggressive schedule and limited resources for developing 

and deploying IOCs. However, without well-defined and managed 

requirements, the Coast Guard runs the risk of encountering cost 

overruns and schedule delays, and deploying a system with limited 

functionality and that does not meet user mission needs, as was the case 

with WatchKeeper. 

According to relevant guidance, a reliable cost estimate is critical to 

successfully delivering major information technology systems as well as 

major system increments such as IOC Segments 1 and 2.46

The estimated life-cycle cost estimate, dated June 2010, for the IOC 

project is approximately $1.6 billion. To be reliable, the cost estimate 

should possess all four characteristics, each of which is summarized 

below. The IOC cost estimate is not reliable because it does not fully 

satisfy the four characteristics of a reliable estimate. Specifically: 

A reliable 

cost estimate provides the basis for informed investment decision making, 

realistic budget formulation, meaningful progress measurement, and 

accountability for results. Our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide

identified four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable cost estimate: 

comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. 

• The estimate is not comprehensive. To be comprehensive, the cost 

estimate should include a work breakdown structure (WBS) that 

defines the detailed work that must be accomplished to develop the 

 

46GAO-09-3SP. 

Coast Guard Has Not 

Developed a Reliable IOC 

Project Cost Estimate 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

project

The IOC project does not have a comprehensive project WBS that 

defines all the detailed work activities needed to accomplish the 

project’s objectives. In addition, project officials provided 

documentation that shows the use of at least four different WBSs, 

each of which is inconsistent with one another. Moreover, the Coast 

Guard does not have any documentation that outlines the activities 

that need to be completed by its development organization. Without 

this documentation, it will be difficult for the project office to determine 

if the development organization is able to deliver the desired product 

or if that product will meet the Coast Guard’s needs. This raises 

questions about whether all necessary activities to accomplish the 

IOC’s objectives have been captured, and are reflected in the cost 

estimate. Additionally, the cost estimate identifies costs associated 

with the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of the IOC project 

as well as contractor-related costs, but it does not include all 

government costs, such as those related to systems engineering and 

program management. Project officials said that they should have 

included these costs in the estimate and said that they will include 

them in any life-cycle cost updates. In addition, the estimate includes 

many, but not all, of the general assumptions that were used in the 

development of the cost estimate. For example, it does not discuss 

any potential cost limitations associated with the IOC project, 

participating agency support, and government-furnished equipment. 

Moreover, there are critical differences in the assumptions presented 

in the cost estimate and those presented in the independent cost 

estimate (as discussed later in this section). For example, the cost 

estimate assumes a different refresh cycle for different system 

hardware components, such as cameras and radars; whereas the 

independent estimate assumes the same refresh cycle for all 

hardware. 

and include all government and contractor costs over the 

project’s life cycle—program inception through design, development, 

deployment, and operation and maintenance to retirement. It should 

also reflect all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions and 

provide sufficient detail to ensure that cost elements are neither 

omitted nor double counted. 

• The estimate is not well-documented. To be well-documented, the 

cost estimate should state the purpose of the estimate; provide 

program background, including a system description; specify the 

scope of the estimate (in terms of time and what is and is not 

included); and describe the estimating methodology and rationale. 

Further, management should be briefed on how the estimate was 
 

Page 33 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

developed and provide its approval of the estimate obtained in order 

for the estimate to be considered valid. 

The IOC project cost estimate includes the purpose, description, and 

scope of the project. However, it does not adequately describe the 

estimating methodology and rationale used to document the cost 

estimate. In particular, the estimate does not include information 

about how the specific cost elements are defined, and many of the 

cost elements do not include key details, such as calculations used to 

develop the estimate, links to the input data, or identification of cost 

drivers. Further, the estimate did not document contingency reserves 

and the associated confidence level for a risk-adjusted cost 

estimate.47

• The cost estimate is not accurate. To be accurate, the cost 

estimate should be timely and updated to reflect changes in technical 

or program assumptions and new phases or milestones. In addition, 

steps should be taken to ground the estimate in documented 

assumptions that can be verified by supporting data and a historical 

record of actual cost and schedule experiences on comparable 

programs. Further, the estimate should be adjusted properly for 

inflation. 

 

The IOC project cost estimate has not been updated to reflect 

material project changes since the estimate was developed and 

approved. For example, the estimate does not reflect the decision to 

not fund Segments 3 and 4. In December 2010 and again in January 

2011, DHS management directed the project office to revise the cost 

estimate to reflect the reduced set of requirements and to support the 

costs included in the Acquisition Program Baseline.48

 

47A risk-adjusted cost estimate has additional funding for unexpected costs added to the 

estimate (called management reserve) that covers expected costs above those projected 

by the contractor and unexpected costs in solving problems. It provides more-realistic 

expectations because risks have been examined and quantified and the resulting 

information provides probabilities associated with achieving various cost levels. 

As noted below, 

project officials stated that the estimate has not been revised due to 

the lack of project resources. Further, the quality of key data is limited. 

Instead of relying on historical costs from similar projects, the estimate 

was based, in part, on the knowledge of subject-matter experts. In 

48The Acquisition Program Baseline summarizes the project’s cost, schedule, and 

performance parameters, expressed in measurable, quantitative terms that must be met in 

order to accomplish the project’s goals.
 

Page 34 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

addition, the estimate specifies the inflation table used in developing 

the estimate, but it does not include the actual inflation numbers. 

• The estimate is not credible. To be credible, the cost estimate 

should discuss any limitations in the analysis due to uncertainty or 

biases surrounding the data and assumptions. Major assumptions 

should be varied and other outcomes computed by conducting a 

sensitivity analysis to determine how sensitive the estimate is to 

changes in the assumptions. Risk and uncertainty inherent in the 

estimate should be assessed and disclosed including ensuring the 

estimate has been risk-adjusted. An independent cost estimate should 

also be developed to determine if other estimating methods produce 

similar results. 

The IOC project cost estimate was not informed by the results of a 

sensitivity analysis of the key cost drivers. According to the estimate, 

a risk and uncertainty analysis was completed. On the basis of this 

analysis, the current life-cycle cost estimate has approximately a 40 

percent chance of being met. However, the estimate does not include 

the associated confidence level for a risk-adjusted cost estimate and 

related contingency funds. An independent cost estimate was 

completed for the IOC project, which was about $200 million more 

than the cost estimate. However, project officials were unable to 

explain how the differences in the two cost estimates were reconciled.

In September 2010, the project office developed an Acquisition Program 

Baseline for the IOC project, which focuses on a reduced set of 

requirements and includes a revised cost figure to acquire, develop, and 

deploy WatchKeeper Segments 1 and 2. According to the baseline, the 

acquisition costs for Segment 2 were derived using a “design to cost” 

strategy due to out-year budget constraints, and changes were made to 

the cost estimate assumptions that resulted in reduced sustainment costs 

for both segments. Project officials stated that the Acquisition Program 

Baseline costs are grounded in the information presented in the life-cycle 

cost estimate. However, the baseline does not identify the specific 

assumptions that were changed, and project officials could not provide 

any documentation of the assumptions used to develop the estimate. 

Therefore, given the weaknesses in the IOC cost estimate identified 

above and the absence of documented assumptions for the Acquisition 

Program Baseline, the reliability of the baseline cost estimate is 

undetermined. Project officials said that the IOC project cost estimate is 

not accurate and needs to be updated, and that those updates would also 

be made to the baseline; however project officials did not have any time 

frame for updating the estimate. Project officials attributed the limitations 
 

Page 35 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

in the cost estimate to a lack of project resources and competing 

priorities. However, without a reliable cost estimate, the Coast Guard 

does not possess complete information on which to base informed 

investment decision making, understand system affordability, and develop 

justifiable budget requests.

The success of an acquisition program depends in part on having a 

reliable schedule of when the project’s set of work activities and milestone 

events will occur, how long they will take, and how they are related to one 

another. According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, for 

a schedule to be considered reliable it should, at a minimum, be

• comprehensive, with logically sequenced activities spanning the 

scope of work to be performed so that the full picture is available to 

managers; 

• controlled, with a documented process for changes to the schedule so 

that the integrity of the schedule is assured; and

• current, with the progress on ongoing activities updated regularly so 

that managers can readily know the status of the project.49

The May 2011 integrated master schedule, which was the most current 

version available for our review, is not reliable because it does not fully 

satisfy any of the three characteristics. Examples of how these practices 

were and were not met are provided below. 

 

• Comprehensive. As previously stated, the IOC project officials have 

not developed a comprehensive work breakdown structure (WBS), 

which would provide all activities that need to be performed in order 

for the project to meet its objectives. Further, the schedule does not 

include key efforts associated with Segment 1 system-engineering 

activities including the development and delivery of the first two 

service packs, and Segment 2 deployment activities including 

training.50

 

49

Also, the schedule does not include logically sequenced 

activities. Specifically, of the 140 activities that remain to be 

GAO-09-3SP. 

50Service packs are used to enhance or upgrade the deployed Technology Demonstrator 

functionality.

Coast Guard Has Not 

Developed a Reliable IOC 

Project Schedule
 

Page 36 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

completed, 115 (about 82 percent) are not linked with associated 

activities. Without these linkages, activities that slip early in the 

schedule do not transmit delays to activities that should depend on 

them, and a critical path cannot be determined, which means that 

management is unable to determine how a slip in the completion date 

of a particular task may affect the overall project schedule.

51

• Controlled. The project office has not implemented a change-control 

process that preserves a baseline of the schedule so that progress 

can be meaningfully measured. Project officials said that the IOC 

project schedule has not been baselined. Nonetheless, they stated 

that they follow the configuration-management process as 

documented in the February 2010 IOC Configuration Management 

Plan when there are significant delays or when additional work 

activities are added to the schedule. These officials also stated that 

the configuration control board is notified of smaller date changes or 

delays, and noted that the IOC Project Manager chairs the control 

board. While these efforts may provide some insight into schedule 

changes, if the schedule is not appropriately baselined, project 

officials do not have an adequate basis upon which to measure the 

project’s progress. 

Also, 52 

of the 140 activities (37 percent) are constrained so that they cannot 

begin earlier than scheduled, even if previous work has been 

completed ahead of schedule. Additionally, of the 140 remaining 

activities, only 40 have resources attached to them, making it difficult 

for management to make appropriate decisions regarding project 

resources (e.g., reallocating resources). 

• Current. The project office does not have a documented process for 

maintaining the schedule. Project officials stated that the schedule is 

maintained by the IOC project team and reviewed at the biweekly 

Information Management Integrated Project Team (IM IPT) 

meetings.52

 

51The critical path represents the chain of dependent activities with the longest total 

duration in the schedule. If any activity on the critical path slips, the entire project will be 

delayed.

According to these officials, updates to the schedule are 

done manually based on information received either verbally or by email from the development organizations (i.e., Command, Control, 

52According to the IM IPT Charter, the integrated project team is responsible for, among 

other things, monitoring the IOC project’s cost and schedule and reporting associated 

risks to the Project Management Integrated Project Team. 
 

Page 37 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

and Communications Engineering Center and the Operations Support 

Center). However, project officials stated that they do not have any 

information about the quality of the development organizations’ 

schedules upon which they depend to update the overall project 

schedule, noting that they do not know whether the activities in these 

schedules are properly linked. Without this information, the project 

office does not have assurance that the data they are using to update 

the schedule are reliable, and as noted above, is not in a position to 

determine the effect of any schedule slippage on the overall schedule.

Project officials said that reasons for the schedule weaknesses include 

the lack of documented processes and appropriate resources, including 

knowledge of scheduling practices, for developing and maintaining the 

schedule. Without a reliable schedule that includes all activities necessary 

to complete Segments 1 and 2 of the IOC project, the Coast Guard 

cannot accurately determine the amount of time required to complete 

these segments. Moreover, the Coast Guard does not have a basis for 

guiding the project’s execution and measuring progress, thus reducing 

the likelihood of meeting the project’s completion dates. 

Collectively, the weaknesses identified with the project’s integrated 

master schedule increase the risk of schedule slippages and related cost 

overruns and make meaningful measurement and oversight of project 

status and progress, as well as accountability for results, difficult to 

achieve. In the case of the IOC project, this risk has been realized. For 

example, according to the October 2009 IOC Project Management Plan, 

Segment 1 was to be deployed to all 35 sectors by March 2011 and 

Segment 2 by December 2015. According to the Acquisition Program 

Baseline, which was approved by DHS in September 2011, Segment 1 is 

now to be deployed to 17 of the 35 sectors by June 2012, and to the 

remaining 18 sectors and Segment 2 to all 35 sectors by March 2017. 

Moreover, the IOC project manager told us that the project has continued 

to experience schedule delays. According to the IOC project manager, 

the Coast Guard is developing a systematic approach for developing and 

maintaining the IOC project integrated master schedule. By developing an 

integrated master schedule for delivering WatchKeeper that addresses 

the key schedule estimating practices, the Coast Guard will be better 

positioned to remain on schedule and on budget as well as achieve 

accountability for results.

The Coast Guard is continuing its efforts to establish IOCs at 35 locations 

designed to meet the SAFE Port Act IOC requirement and share MDA Conclusions 
 

Page 38 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

information with its port partners. However, there are three factors that 

jeopardize such centers meeting their purpose to improve information 

sharing and enhance MDA across federal, state, and local port partners.

• The first factor is delays and a lack of interagency participation in 

developing the IOC concept. While we found that the Coast Guard 

has recently worked to better define IOCs and track their 

implementation at their sectors, the agency still faces challenges in 

getting other port partners to participate. Since DHS has recently 

become formally involved to improve interagency participation in 

IOCs, we are not making any recommendations relative to this issue.

But we believe it is too early to tell if such recent efforts will be 

successful in making sure that the IOCs serve as more than Coast 

Guard–centric command and control centers.

• The second factor is that most port partners are not logging on to 

WatchKeeper—the information-sharing tool designed to assist 

coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partners. While we 

have seen some recent efforts by the Coast Guard to learn more 

about its port partners’ needs, most occurred after the initial rollout of 

the WatchKeeper system. Yet recently, the Coast Guard has ended 

its effort to learn the extent of WatchKeeper usage by port partners 

and has not determined whether it wants to collect such information in 

the future. Without the knowledge of how successful it is in promoting 

port-partner usage of WatchKeeper, the Coast Guard will not be able 

to determine whether WatchKeeper is facilitating the IOC program in 

meetings its goals. Additionally, without a documented process that 

describes how the Coast Guard will obtain and incorporate portpartner feedback into the development of future WatchKeeper 

requirements in place and implemented, the Coast Guard risks 

deploying a system that lacks needed capabilities and, thus, limits 

port partners’ ability to share information and coordinate in the 

maritime environment.

• The third factor is weak management of the IOC acquisition project, 

which increases the program’s exposure to risk. In particular, 

fundamental requirements-development and management practices 

have not been employed; costs are unclear; and the project’s 

schedule, which is to guide program execution and promote 

accountability, has not been reliably derived. By implementing key 

requirements-development and management practices, revising the 

life-cycle cost estimate for delivering WatchKeeper capabilities, and 

developing an integrated master schedule that addresses the key 

schedule-estimating practices, the Coast Guard could reduce the risk 
 

Page 39 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

that WatchKeeper will cost more to develop and deploy than 

necessary. Moreover, the Coast Guard could reduce the risk that it 

will have a system that does not meet Coast Guard and port-partner 

user needs and expectations.

Without improvements in the involvement of other federal, state and local 

agencies, the use of WatchKeeper by port partners, and the management 

of the acquisition, the Coast Guard may not achieve its goals of 

interagency maritime integration and cooperation, and the IOCs and 

WatchKeeper might only serve the Coast Guard as opposed to the 

interagency concept intended by Congress. 

To help ensure effective implementation of WatchKeeper and maximize 

its use among port partners, we recommend that the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard direct the IOC Project Manager to take the following two 

actions: 

• collect data to determine the extent to which (1) sectors are providing 

port partners WatchKeeper access and (2) port partners are using 

WatchKeeper; and

• develop, document, and implement a process to obtain and 

incorporate port-partner input into the development of future 

WatchKeeper requirements. 

To address the risks facing the Coast Guard in its acquisition and 

deployment of WatchKeeper, we recommend that the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard direct the IOC Project Manager to take the following three 

actions:

• implement key requirements-development and management practices 

to include 

(1) defining and documenting requirements, including eliciting user 

needs from all relevant port partners, before initiating key design 

activities, (2) prioritizing remaining requirements to ensure critical 

port-partner needs are addressed, and (3) tracing bi-directionally 

between higher-level operational requirements and lower-level system 

requirements; 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
 

Page 40 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

• revise the IOC project life-cycle cost estimate for delivering 

WatchKeeper capabilities to reflect the four characteristics of a 

reliable estimate discussed in this report; and

• develop an integrated master schedule for delivering WatchKeeper 

that addresses, at a minimum, the key schedule-estimating practices 

discussed in this report.

We provided draft copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland 

Security, Defense, and the Attorney General for review and comments. 

The Departments of Defense and Justice did not provide official written 

comments to include in the report. DHS provided official written 

comments, which are reprinted in appendix III. In response to our first 

recommendation DHS concurred and stated that the Coast Guard office 

responsible for IOC requirements will provide reporting parameters for the 

WatchKeeper system administrator to collect and report. In response to 

our second recommendation DHS concurred and stated that the Coast 

Guard is conducting surveys of all users four months after WatchKeeper 

delivery in a port, and IOCs will also identify additional requirements to be 

forwarded to the IOC project manager. Regarding our third, fourth and 

fifth recommendations to improve the management of the IOC acquisition, 

DHS concurred with all three. The department noted that their 

concurrence was subject to the availability of funds in the President's 

Fiscal Year 2013 Budget. Specifically, the department noted that the 

Coast Guard's Capital Investment Plan of acquisition priorities was 

subject to change due to a number of factors. DHS stated that it will 

continue to evaluate acquisition priorities in the context of, among other 

things, Coast Guard mission needs. In addition, DHS provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland 

Security and Defense, and the Attorney General; and interested 

congressional committees as appropriate. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 41 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Stephen L. Caldwell

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
 

Page 42 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

List of Requesters

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Chairman

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable John L. Mica

Chairman 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo

Chairman

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Candice S. Miller

Chairwoman

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Don Young

House of Representatives
Appendix I: GAO Interviews with Port Partners

Page 43 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

This appendix provides further details on the port partners we interviewed 

at the Coast Guard sectors we visited as part of the field work for the 

second objective (see table 2).

Table 2: GAO Interviews of Port Partners with Access to WatchKeeper

Sector Agency/organization

Type of interview 

and number of 

port partners 

interviewed

Total port partners 

interviewed

Charleston, South Carolina U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

Office of Field Operations (OFO)

Individual (6)

Focus group (3) 9 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Individual (1) 1 

U.S. Army Individual (1) 1 

Charleston County Sheriff’s Office Marine

Patrol 

Individual (2)

2 

Total 13

Jacksonville, Florida CBP OFO Individual (1) a b

Focus group (4) 5 

Total 5

Hampton Roads, Virginia Joint Terrorism Task Force Individual (2) 2 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Focus group (2) 2 

CBP OFO Individual (4)

Focus group (1) 5 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Individual (1) 1 

Virginia Port Authority Individual (1) 1 

City of Norfolk Harbor Patrol Unit Focus group (1) 1 

Virginia Marine Resources Commission Focus group (1) 1 

Total 13

Detroit, Michigan CBP OFO Individual (5) 5 

CBP, Border Patrol Individual (1) 1 

St. Clair County Office of Homeland 

Security/Emergency Management 

Focus group (2) 

2 

Total 8 

Total port partners 

interviewed 39

Source: GAO.

a

At the time of our visit to Sector Jacksonville, CBP was the only agency to which the Coast Guard 

had granted access to WatchKeeper.

b

Appendix I: GAO Interviews with Port 

Partners 

At the time of our visit, one port partner had accessed WatchKeeper.
Appendix II: Reasons Why Port Partners Are 

and Are Not Using WatchKeeper

Page 44 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

This appendix provides port partners’ views on why they are and are not 

using WatchKeeper. Port partners we interviewed expressed mixed views 

on the usefulness of WatchKeeper.1

• 8 port partners stated they use WatchKeeper to obtain information on 

vessels (e.g., which port a vessel is coming from or arriving at) to 

perform their own missions;

We spoke with 17 port partners who 

provided us with a variety of reasons for why they are using 

WatchKeeper: 

• 8 port partners stated they use WatchKeeper features (e.g., 

Geographic Information System [GIS]

2

• 5 port partners use WatchKeeper as a tool to facilitate coordination 

with the Coast Guard during vessel targeting meetings;

) to perform their own missions; 

• 3 port partners use WatchKeeper’s GIS to perform joint operations 

with the Coast Guard; and

• 2 port partners use WatchKeeper to perform tasks assigned to them 

by the Coast Guard.3

Twenty one port partners4

• 7 port partners stated WatchKeeper doesn’t help them perform their 

own missions; 

provided us with a variety of reasons as to why 

they are not using WatchKeeper, and we summarized their responses 

into seven categories:

 

1

A total of 39 port partners with access to WatchKeeper at four sectors agreed to 

participate in interviews and focus groups with us. See app. I for a list of the port partners 

we interviewed.

2

GIS displays a ship’s locations based on its automatic identification system, which is a 

maritime digital communication system that continually transmits and receives vessel data 

over very-high frequencies to identify and track vessels.

3

Some port partners provided multiple reasons they are using WatchKeeper, therefore the 

number of port partners associated with the reasons does not add to 17.

4

A total of 22 port partners we interviewed are not using WatchKeeper. One port partner 

did not provide a reason why not. 

Appendix II: Reasons Why Port Partners Are 

and Are Not Using WatchKeeper
Appendix II: Reasons Why Port Partners Are 

and Are Not Using WatchKeeper

Page 45 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

• 5 port partners stated they are able to obtain and share information 

with Coast Guard officials in-person;

• 5 port partners stated they are not able to access all features of 

WatchKeeper because of a firewall;

• 3 port partners stated they do not want to spend time transferring 

information (double entry) from their agencies own systems into 

WatchKeeper;

• 2 port partners stated they are unable to use WatchKeeper in the 

classified space in which they work;

• 2 port partners stated they are too busy to log on; and

• 1 port partner stated that WatchKeeper information is available 

through other systems (e.g., the Coast Guard’s Ship Arrival 

Notification System provides information on arriving vessels).5

 

5

Some port partners provided multiple reasons they are not using WatchKeeper, therefore 

the number of port partners associated with the reasons does not add to 21.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 46 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 47 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 48 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 49 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad and Deborah 

Davis, Assistant Directors, and Jonathan Bachman, Analyst-in-Charge, 

managed this review. Lisa Canini, Mary Fike, Nicholas Jepson, and Karl 

Seifert made significant contributions to the work. In addition, David 

Powner and Timothy Persons provided technical assistance with 

information-technology issues; Michele Fejfar and Steven Putansu 

assisted with design and methodology; Karen Richey and Tisha 

Derricotte assisted with cost-estimating and scheduling analysis; Geoffrey 

Hamilton provided legal support; Jessica Orr and Lara Miklozek provided 

assistance in report preparation; and Muriel Brown and Joshua Ormond 

developed the report’s graphics. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 50 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Planning and 

Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2011.

Coast Guard: Opportunities Exist to Further Improve Acquisition 

Management Capabilities. GAO-11-480. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 

2011.

Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address 

Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened.

GAO-11-195. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2011.

Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 

Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97. 

Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.

Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define How It Plans to Meet Its 

State and Local Mission and Improve Performance Accountability. 

GAO-11-223. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but 

Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. 

GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.

Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record. 

GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.

Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port 

Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship 

Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 2010.

Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism 

Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but 

Additional Efforts Are Needed. GAO-10-41. Washington, D.C.: December 

18, 2009.

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products

Page 51 GAO-12-202 Maritime Domain Awareness

Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but 

the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. 

Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.

Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were 

Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672. 

Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One 

Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation's 

Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.

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