BENJAMIN D. ROLISON,

Appellant,

v.

RACHEL L. ROLISON,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-1135

__________________________/

Opinion filed August 1, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

Terrance R. Ketchel, Judge.

Brian P. North of Kenny Leigh & Associates, Mary Esther, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

THOMAS, J.

Appellant (the Father) appeals a non-final order denying his emergency 

verified motion to compel Appellee (the Mother) to return the parties’ minor 

children to Florida. We affirm the trial court’s order, which correctly found that 

section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2013), Florida’s relocation statute, did not 

apply, as the Mother moved to Georgia before the Father filed for dissolution. 
The Father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and other relief on 

February 21, 2014. On the same date, the Father filed the emergency motion to 

compel the Mother to return their minor children to Florida. The motion alleged 

that the Mother had removed the two minor children from Florida and moved to 

Fort Valley, Georgia, in January 2014, without the Father’s consent or leave of the 

court, in violation of section 61.13001. The motion also asserted that the Father 

was concerned about the minor children’s safety in the Mother’s care in Georgia, 

and requested that the trial court order the children’s return to this jurisdiction and 

enter a temporary parenting plan awarding the Father majority timesharing.

The trial court denied the Father’s emergency motion, finding that section 

61.13001 was inapplicable, because it only applied to a child’s relocation or 

proposed relocation during a pending proceeding. The court noted that the 

emergency motion alleged that the Mother removed the parties’ minor children 

from the jurisdiction in January 2014, before the dissolution proceeding was filed 

in February 2014. 

On appeal, the Father asserts that the trial court erred when it established a 

bright line rule that the relocation statute was inapplicable in a dissolution 

proceeding when a spouse unilaterally relocates before filing a dissolution petition. 

“‘Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review.’” Hahn v. 

Hahn, 42 So. 3d 945, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Murray v. Mariner Health, 

2
994 So. 2d 1051, 1056 (Fla. 2008)). “When construing a statute, an appellate court 

must strive to effectuate the Legislature's intent.” Id. (citing Borden v. East–

European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)). “‘When the statute is clear 

and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for 

legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.’” 

Borden, 921 So. 2d at 595 (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 

64 (Fla. 2005)). 

The relevant language in section 61.13001 is located within the definition of 

the word “relocation,” and states in pertinent part: 

(1) Definitions.-- As used in this section, the term:

. . . . 

(e) “Relocation” means a change in the location of the principal 

residence of a parent or other person from his or her principal place of 

residence at the time of the last order establishing or modifying timesharing, or at the time of filing the pending action to establish or 

modify time-sharing. The change of location must be at least 50 miles 

from that residence, and for at least 60 consecutive days not including 

a temporary absence from the principal residence for purposes of 

vacation, education, or the provision of health care for the child.

§ 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). 

Appellant asserts that the trial court’s ruling has the effect of narrowly 

interpreting the phrase “at the time of filing” to mean after the date of filing, 

arguing that no such bright line rule exists. Appellant maintains that if the 

legislature had intended a bright line rule that the relocation statute only applied to 

3
spousal relocations that occurred after the date of filing a petition, it could have 

done so. Appellant further asserts that the trial court’s interpretation of the 

relocation statute is contrary to the public policy behind the statute, because a 

parent should not be permitted to unilaterally relocate with the couple’s minor 

children.

Although the result here may be troubling, the plain language of the 

relocation statute applies only where a parent’s principal place of residence 

changes “at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing”

(which is not applicable here), or “at the time of filing the pending action.” 

§ 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. The Mother’s location was already in Georgia when 

the Father filed the pending action; as such, in accordance with section 61.13001, 

she did not have to seek permission from the Father or the court to move there. 

We note that this court’s plain reading of section 61.13001 is in accordance 

with the interpretation of at least two other districts. See Essex v. Davis, 116 

So. 3d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); A.F. v. R.P.B., 100 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2011). In Essex, the Fourth District addressed the relocation statute in the context 

of a paternity proceeding. 116 So. 3d at 446. Based upon the definition of 

relocation under section 61.13001(1)(e), and citing the Second District’s opinion in 

A.F. for support, the Fourth District, in dicta, stated that “the mother is correct in 

arguing that if she had already moved to Louisiana prior to the father’s filing of the 

4
petition to determine paternity or any order establishing or modifying time-sharing, 

then she is not subject to the relocation statute.” Id. at 448 (emphasis supplied); 

see also, A.F., 100 So. 3d at 72 (holding that section 61.13001 did not apply to 

court's decision awarding the father majority timesharing, as the father was not 

relocating and already resided in Pennsylvania when the mother's petition for 

majority timesharing and the father's counterpetition were filed).

We note that section 61.13, Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part:

(2)(a) The court may approve, grant, or modify a parenting plan, 

notwithstanding that the child is not physically present in this state at 

the time of filing any proceeding under this chapter, if it appears to the 

court that the child was removed from this state for the primary 

purpose of removing the child from the court's jurisdiction in an 

attempt to avoid the court's approval, creation, or modification of a 

parenting plan.

(Emphasis added.) Of course, we offer no view on the applicability of this section 

here, but acknowledge that the legislature has addressed the issue in a different 

context. Further, in dissolution proceedings, the court may approve a parenting 

plan that would determine, inter alia, time-sharing in accordance with the child’s 

best interests. See § 61.13(2), Fla. Stat. 

Here, the trial court correctly determined that section 61.13001 is 

inapplicable under the facts of this case. Thus, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

RAY and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR. 

5