[Cite as State ex rel. Chasteen v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-1848.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State ex rel. Adam Chasteen, : 

 Relator-Appellant, : 

 No. 13AP-779 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 12CVH10-13004)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 1, 2014 

 

Adam Chasteen, pro se. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Peter L. Jamison, for 

appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

SADLER, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Relator-appellant, Adam Chasteen, appeals from the judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of 

respondent-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} According to appellant's complaint for mandamus relief, appellant was 

incarcerated at the Madison Correctional Institution ("MaCI") at all times relevant to this 

action. The complaint, filed pursuant to R.C. 149.43, alleges appellee refused to fulfill 

appellant's request for public records. Specifically, appellant's complaint alleges that 
No. 13AP-779 2 

appellant made several public records requests through MaCI's kite system seeking MaCI 

policy 3A-16 that pertains to Inmate Bed Moves.1 According to the complaint, appellant 

requested MaCI policy 3A-16 through the kite system on August 10, 21, 23, and 29, 2012. 

In addition, the complaint alleges that on August 27, 2012, appellant sent a letter via 

certified mail requesting the following: 

a) A complete and full copy of each and all policies and 

documents associated with the "Madison Correctional 

Institution Policy List (2012)" 

b) ODRC Standards of Employee Conduct (most recent 

version) 

c) A copy of a contract made between the ODRC and the 

LexisNexis Company for a service called "LexisNexis Custom 

Solution/Rehabilitation and Corrections" which facilitates 

access to LexisNexis published materials for ODRC prison law 

libraries; as well as copies of any notes, correspondence 

(electronic or otherwise), memoranda, or any other record 

that pertains to the negotiation, terms, and conditions of the 

above-mentioned contract. 

d) A copy of a contract made between the ODRC and the Dell, 

Inc. Company for use of Dell Computers in ODRC facilities; as 

well as copies of any notes, correspondence (electronic or 

otherwise), memoranda, or any other record that pertains to 

the negotiation, terms, and conditions of the abovementioned contract. 

(December 23, 2012 Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus, 2.) Alleging none of his 

requests were fulfilled, appellant seeks a writ of mandamus ordering appellee to prepare 

and produce the records requested by appellant and to do so without cost. Appellant also 

seeks statutory damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees. 

{¶ 3} Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it fully 

complied with appellant's public records request and that statutory damages were not 

appropriate. Appellee asserted its employees answered appellant's requests made 

pursuant to the kite system. Additionally, appellee asserted it responded to appellant's 

 

1 The kite system is used within the institution to facilitate communications between inmates and prison 

personnel. 
No. 13AP-779 3 

August 27 public records request with a written response dated October 5, 2012. Appellee 

supported its motion for summary judgment with copies of its responses to appellant's 

inquiries, as well as supporting affidavits. Appellee filed a memorandum contra, but did 

not submit any evidence in accordance with Civ.R. 56. After the matter was fully briefed 

by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision granting appellee's motion for summary 

judgment. 

{¶ 4} In granting summary judgment to appellee, the trial court concluded 

appellee presented evidence that it made MaCI policy 3A-16 available for inspection and 

copying in the prison library. With respect to appellant's August 27 public records request 

and appellee's response thereto, the trial court concluded the evidence submitted by 

appellee demonstrated compliance with Ohio's public records law. In conclusion, the trial 

court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 5} This appeal followed, and appellant brings three assignments of error for 

our review: 

I. The trial court * * * erred by finding that ODRC complied 

with relator's public records request and failed to comply with 

Civ.R. 56. 

II. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to 

relator ODRC. 

III. The trial court erred by finding appellant's public records 

requests to be overbroad in scope. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

{¶ 6} We review a summary judgment motion de novo. Koos v. Cent. Ohio 

Cellular, Inc., 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588 (8th Dist.1994), citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711 (4th Dist.1993). When an appellate court reviews a 

trial court's disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as 

the trial court and conducts an independent review, without deference to the trial court's 

determination. Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107 (10th 

Dist.1992); Brown at 711. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any grounds the 
No. 13AP-779 4 

movant raised in the trial court support it. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 

41-42 (9th Dist.1995). 

{¶ 7} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate 

only under the following circumstances: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to 

be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and 

(3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. 

Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978). 

{¶ 8} "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial 

court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the 

trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element 

of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). " 'The 

requirement that a party seeking summary judgment disclose the basis for the motion and 

support the motion with evidence is well founded in Ohio law.' " Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio 

St.3d 421, 429 (1997), quoting Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115 (1988). Thus, 

the moving party may not fulfill its initial burden simply by making a conclusory assertion 

that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Dresher at 293. 

{¶ 9} Rather, the moving party must support its motion by pointing to some 

evidence of the type set forth in Civ.R. 56(C), which affirmatively demonstrates that the 

nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Id. If the 

moving party has satisfied its initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C), then "the nonmoving 

party * * * has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, 

summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Id. 
No. 13AP-779 5 

B. First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

concluding that it was reasonable for appellee to send its October 2009 response to the 

address appellant provided in his public records request. This argument pertains to 

appellant's August 27 public records request seeking the four items previously outlined in 

this decision. 

{¶ 11} The purpose of the Ohio Public Records Act "is to expose government 

activity to public scrutiny, which is absolutely essential to the proper working of a 

democracy." State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Petro, 80 Ohio St.3d 

261, 264 (1997), citing State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe, 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 355 (1997). 

Scrutiny of public records allows citizens to evaluate the rationale behind government 

decisions so government officials can be held accountable. White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 420 (1996). R.C. 149.43 must also be construed liberally in 

favor of broad access and any doubt must be resolved in favor of disclosure of public 

records. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374 (1996). 

{¶ 12} R.C. 149.43 pertains to availability of public records and provides, in 

pertinent part: 

(B)(1) Upon request and subject to division (B)(8) of this 

section, all public records responsive to the request shall be 

promptly prepared and made available for inspection to any 

person at all reasonable times during regular business hours. 

Subject to division (B)(8) of this section, upon request, a 

public office or person responsible for public records shall 

make copies of the requested public record available at cost 

and within a reasonable period of time. If a public record 

contains information that is exempt from the duty to permit 

public inspection or to copy the public record, the public office 

or the person responsible for the public record shall make 

available all of the information within the public record that is 

not exempt. When making that public record available for 

public inspection or copying that public record, the public 

office or the person responsible for the public record shall 

notify the requester of any redaction or make the redaction 

plainly visible. A redaction shall be deemed a denial of a 

request to inspect or copy the redacted information, except if 

federal or state law authorizes or requires a public office to 

make the redaction. 
No. 13AP-779 6 

(2) * * * If a requester makes an ambiguous or overly broad 

request or has difficulty in making a request for copies or 

inspection of public records under this section such that the 

public office or the person responsible for the requested 

public record cannot reasonably identify what public records 

are being requested, the public office or the person 

responsible for the requested public record may deny the 

request but shall provide the requester with an opportunity to 

revise the request by informing the requester of the manner in 

which records are maintained by the public office and 

accessed in the ordinary course of the public office's or 

person's duties. 

(3) If a request is ultimately denied, in part or in whole, the 

public office or the person responsible for the requested 

public record shall provide the requester with an explanation, 

including legal authority, setting forth why the request was 

denied. If the initial request was provided in writing, the 

explanation also shall be provided to the requester in writing. 

* * * 

(C)(1) If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a 

public office or the person responsible for public records to 

promptly prepare a public record and to make it available to 

the person for inspection in accordance with division (B) of 

this section or by any other failure of a public office or the 

person responsible for public records to comply with an 

obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section, the 

person allegedly aggrieved may commence a mandamus 

action to obtain a judgment that orders the public office or the 

person responsible for the public record to comply with 

division (B) of this section, that awards court costs and 

reasonable attorney's fees to the person that instituted the 

mandamus action, and, if applicable, that includes an order 

fixing statutory damages under division (C)(1) of this section. 

If a requestor transmits a written request by hand delivery or 

certified mail to inspect or receive copies of any public record 

in a manner that fairly describes the public record or class of 

public records to the public office or person responsible for 

the requested public records, except as otherwise provided in 

this section, the requestor shall be entitled to recover the 

amount of statutory damages set forth in this division if a 

court determines that the public office or the person 
No. 13AP-779 7 

responsible for public records failed to comply with an 

obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section. 

{¶ 13} Together with its motion for summary judgment, appellee submitted an 

affidavit of T. Austin Stout, appellee's assistant chief counsel. According to Stout's 

affidavit, appellant's August 27 public records request was received on or about August 31. 

Stout averred he responded to appellant by letter dated October 5 and addressed the letter 

to appellant at MaCI, the address appellant included in his August 27 public records 

request. A copy of Stout's letter was attached to his affidavit. 

{¶ 14} With respect to appellant's first requested item, i.e., policies and documents 

associated with MaCI's policy list, appellee responded that (1) the request was overbroad, 

and (2) its policies were available in the institution's law library. Regarding appellant's 

second requested item, i.e., appellee's standards of employee conduct, appellee stated that 

such item was available in the institution's law library. As for the contract between 

appellee and LexisNexis, appellee responded that said contract would be provided upon 

payment of copying costs and postage costs totaling $10.49. In response to appellant's 

fourth requested item, which was a contract between appellee and Dell, Inc., appellee 

stated that no such record existed. Stout averred in his affidavit that his correspondence 

was sent to appellant via U.S. Postal Mail on October 9, 2012 and was addressed to 

appellant at MaCI. 

{¶ 15} In his memorandum contra to appellee's motion for summary judgment, 

appellant challenged "the validity and truthfulness" of Stout's assertion that appellee 

responded to appellant's August 27 public records request. (May 3, 2013 response, 3.) 

Additionally, appellant stated he was released from MaCI on September 30, 2012; 

therefore, even if Stout was truthful in his assertion that appellee mailed a response to 

appellant, he would not have received it because he was no longer incarcerated after 

September 30, 2012. Appellant also argued that use of regular mail was in error as 

appellee should have mailed its response via certified mail. 

{¶ 16} The evidence provided by appellee established that appellee's response to 

appellant's August 27 public records request was sent to the address appellant provided in 

his request. Though contending appellee was being untruthful in this assertion, appellant 

provided no evidence to the contrary. With respect to his argument that, because he was 
No. 13AP-779 8 

no longer incarcerated in October, appellee should have directed its response to a 

different address, the record is devoid of any allegation or evidence suggesting that 

appellant provided appellee with the new address. Further, appellant does not direct this 

court to any portion of the statute or related case law requiring a public office or public 

official to search for a new and changed address of the person requesting public records. 

Likewise, appellant has not directed this court, nor has this court's research revealed, any 

language in R.C. 149.43 or related case law requiring that a response to a public records 

request be sent by way of certified mail. 

{¶ 17} Upon review of the record, we conclude appellee met its burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the issue of whether 

it responded to appellant's August 27 public records request. Civ.R. 56(E) states that 

when a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the nonmoving 

party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but, instead, 

must point to or submit some evidentiary material that demonstrates a genuine dispute 

over a material fact. Todd Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87. 

Appellant having failed to satisfy his reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth 

specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact existed for trial, we find no 

merit to appellant's first assignment of error. 

{¶ 18} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. 

C. Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues summary judgment in 

favor of appellee was inappropriate. The essence of appellant's second assignment of 

error is that, despite the sworn statements of appellee's employees indicating its policies 

were made available in the institution's library, "many ODRC Policies were not available 

to the inmate population through the law library." (Appellant's brief, 7.) Thus, appellant 

does not contend that making the requested items available to inmates in the institution's 

library would not be sufficient; rather, appellant contends appellee is untruthful in its 

assertion that the policies were made available at all. According to appellant, this is 

evidenced by the number of kites he sent in August 2012. 

{¶ 20} With its motion for summary judgment, appellee submitted the affidavit of 

Tim Brunsman, the warden's assistant at MaCI. Brunsman averred the attached kites and 
No. 13AP-779 9 

corresponding responses were true and accurate copies of records kept by MaCI in the 

ordinary course of business. According to this evidence, appellant was informed that he 

was permitted access to MaCI policy 3A-16 and that the library had been notified of the 

same. Additionally, appellee submitted the affidavit of Randall Hawk, the librarian at 

MaCI's law library. Hawk averred that "[o]n or about August 28, 2012, Jondrea Parrish of 

MaCI Inspector Institution Services directed Library Staff to make MaCI Policy 3A-16 

available to inmates," and that "[u]pon receiving this directive, on or about August 28, 

2012, MaCI library staff made MaCI Policy 3A-16 available to all inmates at the 

institution." (Hawk Affidavit, 1.) 

{¶ 21} Appellant contends the trial court attributed "substantial weight" to 

appellee's affiants without consideration of the affiants chosen by appellant. While 

appellant directs this court to his initial and supplemental witness disclosure, appellant 

concedes he "was unable to procure any affidavits by inmate witnesses." (Appellant's 

brief, 7.) In fact, appellant submitted no affidavits or any other evidence in accordance 

with Civ.R. 56 for the trial court's consideration. Thus, contrary to appellant's contention, 

the trial court did not weigh the evidence as the only evidence submitted by way of 

affidavit was that submitted by appellee. 

{¶ 22} Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

D. Third Assignment of Error 

{¶ 23} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in 

concluding his August 27 public records request for "a complete and full copy of each and 

all policies and documents associated with the 'Madison Correctional Institution Policy 

List (2012)' " was overbroad. We disagree. 

{¶ 24} " '[I]t is the responsibility of the person who wishes to inspect and/or copy 

records to identify with reasonable clarity the records at issue.' " State ex rel. Morgan v. 

New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, quoting State ex rel. Fant v. Tober, 

8th Dist. No. 63737 (Apr. 28, 1993), affirmed, 68 Ohio St.3d 117 (1993). Further, the Ohio 

Public Records Act never contemplated that any individual would have the right to receive 

a complete duplication of files kept by government agencies. State ex rel. Daugherty v. 

Mohr, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-5, 2011-Ohio-6453, ¶ 33, citing State ex rel. Zauderer v. 

Joseph, 62 Ohio App.3d 752 (10th Dist.1989). Instead, if a request for records is 
No. 13AP-779 10 

unreasonable in scope, and if it would interfere with the sanctity of the record-keeping 

process, courts have held that the request is overbroad. Id. 

{¶ 25} For example, in Daugherty, this court held that a public records request for 

"all the DRC and LoCI policies, e-mails, or memos, concerning whether prison officials 

are authorized to 'triple cell' inmate into segregation" was overbroad. Id. at ¶ 7. Quoting 

Zauderer, the Daugherty court reasoned that " '[a] general request, which asks for 

everything, is not only vague and meaningless, but essentially asks for nothing. At the 

very least, such a request is unenforceable because of its overbreadth. At the very best, 

such a request is not sufficiently understandable so that its merit can be properly 

considered.' " Id. at ¶ 34, quoting Zauderer at 756. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio has determined that a public records request for any and all reports is too broad. 

State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312 (2001); see also State ex rel. Glasgow v. 

Jones, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 2008-Ohio-4788 (even though the representative had been in 

office only six months, request for all work-related e-mail messages, text messages, and 

correspondence of a state representative during her entire tenure overbroad because it 

impermissibly sought what approximated a complete duplication of the representative's 

files); State ex rel. Dehler v. Spatny, 127 Ohio St.3d 312, 2010-Ohio-5711 (public records 

request for all records relating to a prison quartermaster's orders for and receipt of 

clothing and shoes for a period of over seven years was also an improper, overbroad 

request); State ex rel. Davila v. Bellefontaine, 3d Dist. No. 8-11-01, 2011-Ohio-4890 

(request for all reel-to-reel tapes made for the entire 15 years that the recording system 

was in daily use was overly broad). 

{¶ 26} In the present case, appellee informed appellant that his request for "each 

and all policies and documents associated" with MaCI's policy list was overbroad and did 

not specifically identify the records sought. Additionally, appellee informed appellant that 

its policies were available in the institution's law library. Though appellant denies that 

said policies were made available to him, as discussed in our disposition of appellant's 

previous assignments of error, appellant has not presented any evidence in support of his 

contention. 

{¶ 27} After review, we find no error in the trial court's determination that 

appellant's request for "each and all policies and documents associated with" MaCI's 
No. 13AP-779 11 

policy list was overbroad and unenforceable. Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of 

error is overruled. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 28} Having overruled appellant's three asserted assignments of error, the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur. 

_____________________________