UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MAYO LEVORD PICKENS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. 

(8:07-cr-00960-TMC-1)

Submitted: October 25, 2013 Decided: November 8, 2013

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenneth C. Gibson, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Leesa Washington, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Mayo Levord Pickens appeals from the amended criminal 

judgment imposed following our remand of his case to the 

district court for resentencing. See United States v. Pickens, 

480 F. App’x 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). At the 

resentencing hearing, Pickens raised only one argument: that 

the five-year statute of limitations on a defendant’s ability to 

challenge the validity of a prior conviction used to enhance a 

federal sentence, see 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) (2012), should be 

excused, because Pickens intended to assert that his predicate 

conviction — a 1995 South Carolina conviction for possession 

with intent to distribute crack cocaine — was obtained in 

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Pickens 

relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Custis v. United 

States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), for support. 

The district court declined to extend Custis in the 

manner advanced by Pickens and ruled that the five-year 

limitations period set forth in § 851(e) barred his challenge to

the validity of the 1995 conviction. In the alternative, the 

court found that Pickens failed to overcome the presumption of 

regularity afforded his final, prior conviction. The court 

subsequently imposed the mandatory minimum term of 240 months’ 

imprisonment and ten years’ supervised release. 
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On appeal, Pickens asserts that the district court 

erred in rejecting the Custis-based challenge to the five-year 

limitations period. But given the dearth of controlling or even 

persuasive authority to support his argument, we disagree. See, 

e.g., United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(explaining that the defendant’s challenge to use of prior 

convictions based on allegations that they were uncounseled was 

“likely barred by the statute of limitations in 21 U.S.C. 

§ 851(e),” because those convictions “occurred more than five 

years before the government submitted its § 851 information in 

this case”). 

We further note our agreement with the district 

court’s alternative rationale. There is a presumption of 

regularity afforded final criminal judgments, Parke v. Raley, 

506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992), and a defendant who challenges a prior 

conviction used to enhance his sentence in a later offense bears 

the burden of showing that the prior conviction was invalid. 

United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105, 109-11 (4th Cir. 1992). 

To satisfy his burden, Pickens offered only his self-serving 

testimony on the issue. But absent more, we cannot conclude 

that the district court erred in rejecting Pickens’ claim.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s amended criminal judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED