In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 2, 2024

S24Y0865. IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS LEE ALLEN.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for 

voluntary reciprocal discipline filed by Respondent Curtis Lee Allen 

(State Bar No. 009905), pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules 

of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In his 

petition, Allen, who has been a member of the State Bars of Georgia 

and Florida since 1994, asks this Court to impose a ten-day 

suspension, nunc pro tunc, as substantially similar discipline to a 

ten-day suspension he received in Florida for his conduct in 

representing an insurance company in two cases. In its response, the 

State Bar urges the Court to accept Allen’s petition. We agree that 

a ten-day suspension is appropriate as “substantially similar 

discipline,” see GRPC 9.4 (b) (3), for the suspension Allen received 
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in Florida. Nevertheless, Allen’s petition contains several 

deficiencies that preclude final resolution of this matter at this time.

Accordingly, we reject his petition for voluntary reciprocal

discipline.

To resolve two disciplinary actions pending against him in 

Florida, Allen and the Florida Bar entered into a consent judgment, 

pursuant to which the Florida Supreme Court entered an order on 

December 28, 2023, suspending him from the practice of law for ten 

days, effective January 29, 2024, placing him on probation for one 

year, directing him to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and 

entering judgment against him in the amount of $1,450.10 for the 

cost of the Florida Bar’s action against him.1 Allen states that he 

served his suspension from January 29 to February 7, 2024. The 

State Bar of Georgia then initiated a reciprocal disciplinary action 

against Allen pursuant to GRPC 9.4 (b), and in response, he filed 

1 Although Allen states in his petition that the Florida Supreme Court’s 

order and the consent judgment are “attached,” neither of those documents 

appears in the record before this Court.
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this petition for voluntary discipline. See GRPC 9.4 (b); Bar Rule 4-

227 (b).

In his petition, Allen explains that in the first disciplinary 

matter, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal observed in a 

published opinion that, while representing an insurance company, 

Allen “made argumentative and unprofessional remarks to both the 

insureds and their counsel” while conducting examinations under 

oath. In the second matter, while representing the same insurance 

company in a dispute over attorney fees, he made comments about 

the opposing party and counsel “which were not consistent with the 

high standards of professionalism.” In both matters, he was found 

to have violated Florida Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor 

Misconduct),2 4-4.4 (a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons),3 and 4-

2 Florida Rule 3-4.3 provides in relevant part that “[t]he commission by 

a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may 

constitute a cause for discipline whether the act is committed in the course of 

the lawyer’s relations as a lawyer or otherwise, whether committed within 

Florida or outside the state of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or a 

misdemeanor.”

3 Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer 

may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, 
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8.4 (d) (Misconduct).4 Allen observes that Florida Rule 4-4.4 (a) is 

analogous to GRPC 4.4 (a), but Georgia does not have a disciplinary 

rule equivalent to Florida Rules 3-4.3 or 4-8.4 (d). Allen states that 

in the consent judgment with the Florida Bar, he stipulated to four 

aggravating factors: prior disciplinary history, pattern of 

misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the 

practice of law. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 

(“ABA Standards”) 9.22 (a), (c), (d), and (i). He asserts that the 

Florida Bar stipulated to four mitigating factors: absence of a 

dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems arising 

from or related to his stressful divorce at the time of his misconduct,

full and free disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the 

delay, or burden a third person or knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence 

that violate the legal rights of such a person.” 

4 Florida Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides in relevant part that “A lawyer shall not 

. . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial 

to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous 

indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, 

witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not 

limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, 

disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, 

employment, or physical characteristic[.]”
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disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. See ABA Standards 9.32 (b), 

(c), (e), and (l). He assures the Court that he has taken steps to 

ensure that his future conduct will be professional and will comply 

with disciplinary rules. Accordingly, he requests, as substantially 

similar discipline, that this Court suspend his license to practice law 

in Georgia for ten days, nunc pro tunc and concurrent with his 

Florida suspension, and that the Court allow his reinstatement upon 

the entry of its opinion.

The State Bar responds by agreeing with Allen’s recitation of 

the disciplinary matters against him and by stating that it does not 

contest the facts that Allen expressed remorse for his actions and 

cooperated fully with the Florida Bar. Therefore, the State Bar 

recommends that the Court accept Allen’s voluntary petition and 

impose the requested discipline.

This Court has generally interpreted the Bar Rules governing 

reciprocal discipline to require the imposition of substantially 

similar discipline as was imposed in the other jurisdiction, and here, 

the ten-day suspension Allen requests is identical to the suspension 
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he served in Florida.

5 See In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168, 

177 (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (noting “the nature of reciprocal 

discipline matters[,] . . . wherein this Court must only impose 

‘substantially similar’ discipline”). See also In the Matter of 

Pettinato, 315 Ga. 831, 835-836 (884 SE2d 894) (2023) (accepting 

attorney’s voluntary petition for reciprocal discipline and imposing 

ten-day suspension, which is generally not a disciplinary sanction 

available in Georgia, because the requested suspension was 

“identical” to discipline imposed in Florida). However, we decline to 

accept Allen’s petition at this stage for two reasons. First, although 

Allen’s petition references various documents associated with the 

Florida disciplinary proceeding, no such documents were attached 

for our review. See In the Matter of Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 754 (854 

5 Allen is on disciplinary probation in Florida for one year, but the 

Georgia Bar Rules do not provide for probation as a sanction. However, this 

Court has previously approved reciprocal suspensions “without adding time for 

the probationary period” imposed by other jurisdictions, so this would not 

preclude our acceptance of his petition. See, e.g., In the Matter of Thompson, 

315 Ga. 81, 85 (880 SE2d 214) (2022); In the Matter of Hanzelik, 294 Ga. 727, 

728 (755 SE2d 758) (2014). Instead, as explained below, we reject his petition 

because of his failure to make certain showings in connection with his request 

for reciprocal discipline.
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SE2d 522) (2021) (rejecting attorney’s voluntary petition for 

reciprocal suspension for, inter alia, failing to provide documents 

from his Florida disciplinary proceeding). Second, although Allen 

requests that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates 

he served his suspension in Florida, he has failed to show that he is 

entitled to a retroactive suspension. This Court has held that “when 

an attorney requests entry of a suspension or voluntary surrender 

order nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to demonstrate 

that they voluntarily stopped practicing law, the date on which their 

law practice ended, and that they complied with all the ethical 

obligations implicated in such a decision, such as assisting clients in 

securing new counsel and facilitating the transfer of client files and 

critical information about ongoing cases to new counsel.” In the 

Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010). This 

Court has imposed retroactive suspensions as reciprocal discipline 

when the attorney made a showing that he or she stopped practicing 

law in Georgia while suspended in another jurisdiction, which the 

State Bar did not contest or dispute. See, e.g., In the Matter of Van 
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Dyke, 316 Ga. 168, 177 (3) (886 SE2d 811) (2023) (imposing 

retroactive suspension as reciprocal discipline where attorney 

provided evidence that he stopped practicing law in Georgia in 

February 2019); In the Matter of Thompson, 315 Ga. 81, 85 (880 

SE2d 214) (2022) (imposing retroactive suspension as reciprocal 

discipline where attorney showed that he was not practicing law in 

Georgia and the State Bar indicated that he was on inactive status). 

Here, in contrast, Allen failed to provide any evidence that he 

stopped practicing law in Georgia during his suspension in Florida. 

Accordingly, he has not made the necessary showing to have his 

suspension imposed nunc pro tunc to the dates of his Florida 

suspension. When this Court finds a voluntary petition for discipline 

deficient, our practice is to reject the petition. See In the Matter of 

Thompson, 310 Ga. 753, 654 (854 SE2d 522) (2021) (rejecting 

petition for voluntary reciprocal discipline, even though the State 

Bar recommended the Court accept the petition, due to several 

deficiencies in the petition, including that the attorney referenced, 

but failed to attach, documents associated with his Florida 
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disciplinary proceeding). Accordingly, we reject Allen’s petition for 

voluntary reciprocal discipline.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices 

concur.