COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

WILLIAM EDWARD LALIK 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1855-99-3 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 MAY 9, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 

 Peter H. White (Leisa Kube Ciaffone; Hunton & 

Williams; Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Jeffrey S. 

Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 William Edward Lalik (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial for contempt of court in violation of Code § 18.2-456(5). 

On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 

the existence of "a definite and express order" of the court and 

the requisite intent to disobey such alleged order. Finding no 

error, we affirm the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 
 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the 

record "'in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving 

it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. In so 

doing, we must discard the evidence of the accused in conflict 

with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible 

evidence favorable to the Commonwealth . . . .'" Watkins v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998) 

(citation omitted). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight 

accorded the testimony, and the inferences drawn from the proven 

facts are matters to be determined by the fact finder. See Long 

v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

The judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless 

plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence. See Code § 8.01-680. 

I. 

 On the afternoon of July 27, 1999, defendant, a Roanoke 

elementary school principal, appeared voluntarily before the court 

as a witness for a local teacher, then on trial for "solicitation 

of a felony." Defendant had previously advised both the teacher 

and his attorney that defendant was required to attend a meeting 

elsewhere at 3:00 p.m. However, with the "court appearance 

supposed to be around 1:00 p.m.," defendant "thought he could do 

both." 

 Defendant arrived at the courthouse several minutes before 

1:00 p.m. and was first called to testify at "approximately" 

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1:45 p.m. After several questions on direct examination, the 

court interrupted the proceedings briefly to consider an objection 

by the Commonwealth, releasing defendant from the witness stand 

with the following admonition: 

Mr. Lalik, if you'll step down and step 

outside and we'll call you back in, in just 

a second. 

 Within five to ten minutes, around 2:00 p.m., defendant was 

recalled and resumed the witness stand. However, further issues 

pertaining to his testimony soon confronted the court, 

necessitating a second interruption of trial at "about" 

2:10 p.m. Again, defendant was released from the witness box 

and instructed by the court: 

Mr. Lalik, would you please step down and 

step outside. We'll call you back in one---

in just a second. 

 After waiting outside the courtroom for approximately ten 

minutes, defendant advised Roanoke Sheriff's Sergeant J.P. Dame 

of his 3:00 p.m. appointment and requested Dame to "see . . . 

the judge and . . . defense attorney" and "let them know [he] 

really needed to leave." In response, Dame recalled to 

defendant that "the Judge had basically told him to go outside 

and wait a minute and he would get him back . . . as soon as 

possible." Nevertheless, Dame acceded to the request, spoke 

with the trial judge, and reported to defendant that "it would 

be a few minutes." 

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 Dame testified that defendant then "said something about 

leaving," and Dame answered, "[you don't] want to ride in a 

one-way brown taxi . . . and sort of laughed." Defendant 

admitted responding, "That sounds like a great ride, something I 

wouldn't want to do." Dame explained that his comment 

referenced "being arrested and brought to jail if [defendant] 

didn't wait . . . and testify," and defendant acknowledged that 

he "understood it" to mean "somebody would . . . come after me." 

However, when "nothing [had] happened by 2:40 p.m., defendant, 

although admittedly "familiar with court proceedings" and aware 

he "had not . . . completed [his] testimony," departed the 

courthouse for his meeting.1

 At a later hearing on the instant offense, defendant 

recalled that he "didn't understand" the court's instructions to 

him "as an order," rather "just a statement" "to go out and 

wait." He further testified that he construed Dame's mention of 

a "brown taxi" as "light conversation," not a "serious . . . 

possibility." Defendant acknowledged "concern[] about leaving 

and not finishing the testimony . . . that was important" but 

was "conflicted" by "something important in [his] own life . . . 

to deal with." 

 1

 As a result of defendant's absence from the criminal 

trial, the court subsequently declared a mistrial and initiated 

the subject prosecution. 

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II. 

 Code § 18.2-456(5), in pertinent part, invests "courts and 

judges" with the power of contempt, together with summary 

punishment, for "[d]isobedience . . . of . . . [a] witness . . . 

to any lawful . . . decree or order of the court." Thus, "[a] 

trial court 'has the authority to hold an offending party in 

contempt for acting in bad faith or for willful disobedience of 

its order.'" Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 696, 406 

S.E.2d 666, 669 (1991) (citation omitted). This "principle 

applies to the oral orders, commands and directions of the 

court" as well as written orders. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 

181 Va. 520, 537, 25 S.E.2d 352, 359 (1943). An adjudication of 

contempt will be reversed "only if we find that [the court] 

abused its discretion." Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 

704, 427 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1993). 

 Defendant first argues that the words spoken by the judge, 

"please step down and step outside[,] [w]e'll call you back 

. . . in just a second" did not constitute an order. He relies 

upon French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704, 127 S.E.2d 137 (1962), in 

support of the principle that "'[t]he process for contempt lies 

for disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be

decreed'" and that "there must be an express command or 

prohibition." Id. at 710, 127 S.E.2d at 141 (citation omitted). 

However, the facts of the instant appeal are easily 

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distinguishable from French, an erroneous contempt conviction 

resulting from a failure to pay money, despite the absence of a 

predicate "command or direction." Id.

Here, the court's command to defendant was clear: "step 

down and step outside." The court will "call you back . . . in 

just a second." Significantly, a like directive by the court, 

which preceded the subject order by only minutes, had been 

honored by defendant and followed by resumption of his 

testimony. In both instances, although the court did not 

designate the instruction as an order that defendant "wait," the 

import of the words is made manifest by both definition and 

context. Clearly, nothing in the record would suggest to 

defendant that he was free to elect whether to go or stay.2 The 

court, therefore, correctly concluded, "as a matter of fact[,] 

that it was a valid order of the court." 

Thus, confronted with an unambiguous command by the court, 

the evidence supports the further finding that defendant 

intentionally disobeyed the order. The record discloses that he 

appreciated the importance of his presence to the proceedings, 

was aware that his testimony was incomplete and recall to the 

 2

 Defendant's argument that the absence of a subpoena 

compromises the sanctity of the order is without merit. Persons 

"present in court may . . . be called upon to testify although 

. . . not . . . served with a subpoena," thereby becoming 

witnesses before the court and subject to attendant 

jurisdiction. Robertson, 181 Va. at 532, 25 S.E.2d at 357. 

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witness stand was eminent and that consequences would result if 

he absented himself from the courthouse. Such circumstances 

provide ample support to the court's factual finding that 

defendant "understood what was going on" and "knew [he was] 

violating the court's order." 

Accordingly, we find that the evidence supported the 

conviction and affirm the trial court. 

 Affirmed. 

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