NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

IVAN DE JESUS VIDAL-CASTILLO, 

AKA Angel Garcia, AKA Cedric Guzman, 

AKA Jorge Valenzuela, AKA Juan Jesus 

Vidal, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-50059 

D.C. No. 5:17-cr-00113-PA-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 17, 2019

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District 

Judge.

Ivan Vidal Castillo appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Vidal contends that the district court 1) erroneously

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 10 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

concluded in denying his motion to dismiss the information that his underlying 

deportation was not fundamentally unfair and 2) erroneously applied a sentencing 

enhancement based on prior convictions that were originally felonies but since 

reduced to misdemeanors. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm.

1. The district court properly concluded that Vidal’s due process rights 

were not violated in his 2006 immigration proceedings in denying his motion to 

dismiss the information. Because the Immigration Judge (IJ) “adequately 

explain[ed] the hearing procedures to [Vidal], including what he must prove to 

establish his basis for relief,” Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002), 

Vidal’s due process rights were not violated. As the district court correctly found, 

the IJ “explained voluntary departure to the defendant, gave the defendant an 

opportunity to present evidence, questioned the defendant and his mother, asked 

the defendant why he should receive voluntary departure, and allowed the 

defendant to produce any evidence he thought would be helpful.” We need not

reach the question of whether the IJ erred in concluding that Vidal was ineligible 

for voluntary departure, because the IJ, in the alternative, considered voluntary 

departure on the merits and denied it as a matter of discretion. 

2. The district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(3). Although Vidal’s two post-deportation convictions
3 

at issue were reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to subsequent California state law, 

that did not alter the fact that Vidal was convicted of the felonies “at any time after 

the defendant was ordered deported or ordered removed from the United States for 

the first time.” U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(3) (2016). See United States v. Diaz, 838 F.3d 

968, 972–74 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a sentence enhancement pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. § 841); United States v. Salazar-Mojica, 634 F.3d 1070, 1072–74 (9th Cir. 

2011) (affirming a sentence enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)).

AFFIRMED.