12420 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

Airworthiness Directive 2013–0267, dated 

November 6, 2013, for related information. 

You may examine the MCAI in the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2013&-0828-0001. 

(2) For Airbus service information 

identified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS— 

Airworthiness Office—EAL, 1 Rond Point 

Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, 

France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 

5 61 93 45 80; email airworthiness.A330- 

A340@airbus.com; Internet http://

www.airbus.com. For Messier-Dowty service 

information identified in this AD, contact 

Messier-Dowty: Messier Services Americas, 

Customer Support Center, 45360 Severn 

Way, Sterling, VA 20166–8910; telephone 

703–450–8233; fax 703–404–1621; Internet 

https://techpubs.services/messier-dowty.com. 

You may view this service information at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

19, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–04892 Filed 3–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. 

This proposed AD was prompted by 

reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 

valves discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This proposed AD would 

require revising the maintenance or 

inspection program to include new 

airworthiness limitations. We are 

proposing this AD to detect and correct 

latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve 

to the engine, which could result in the 

inability to shut off fuel to the engine 

and, in case of certain engine fires, an 

uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

wing failure. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by April 21, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Office 

(phone: 800–647–5527) is in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: (425) 917–6509; 

fax: (425) 917–6590; email: 

rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposal. Send your comments to 

an address listed under the ADDRESSES

section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA– 

2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013– 

NM–237–AD’’ at the beginning of your 

comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

We have received reports of latently 

failed fuel shutoff valves discovered 

during fuel filter replacement. 

Deficiencies in the valve actuator design 

have resulted in latent failures of the 

fuel shutoff valve to the engine. This 

condition, if not detected and corrected, 

could result in latent failures of the fuel 

shutoff valve to the engine, which could 

result in the inability to shut off fuel to 

the engine and, in case of certain engine 

fires, an uncontrollable fire that could 

lead to wing failure. 

FAA’s Determination 

We are proposing this AD because we 

evaluated all the relevant information 

and determined the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of the same 

type design. 

Proposed AD Requirements 

This proposed AD would require 

revising the maintenance or inspection 

program to include new airworthiness 

limitations. The airworthiness 

limitations would allow an operator to 

perform the operational check as either 

a maintenance action or a flightcrew 

action. The flightcrew or maintenance 

crew would monitor the engine spar 

valve lights for a few seconds 

immediately after moving the engine 

fuel condition levers. Flightcrews can 

perform this operational check while 

starting the engine or while shutting 

down the engine. Maintenance crews 

can do this operational check as a 

separate action that does not require 

actual starting of the engine. 

This proposed AD would require 

revisions to certain operator 

maintenance documents to include 

these new inspections. Compliance with 

these inspections is required by section 

91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)). For 

airplanes that have been previously 

modified, altered, or repaired in the 

areas addressed by these inspections, an 

operator might not be able to 

accomplish the inspections described in 

the revisions. In this situation, to 

comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the 

operator must request approval of an 

alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) in accordance with the 

provisions of paragraph (i) of this 

proposed AD. The request should 

include a description of changes to the 

proposed inspections that will ensure 

the continued operational safety of the 

airplane. 

Interim Action 

We consider this proposed AD 

interim action. The manufacturer is 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 12421 

currently developing a modification that 

will address the unsafe condition 

identified in this proposed AD. Once 

this modification is developed, 

approved, and available, we might 

consider additional rulemaking. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this proposed AD 

affects 450 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this proposed AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $38,250 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

the DOT Regulatory Policies and 

Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 

1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Amend § 39.13 by adding the 

following new airworthiness directive 

(AD): 

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA– 

2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013– 

NM–237–AD. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

We must receive comments by April 21, 

2014. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all The Boeing 

Company Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and 

–400ER series airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 2823, Fuel Selector/Shut-off Valve. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered 

during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 

this AD to detect and correct latent failures 

of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which 

could result in the inability to shut off fuel 

to the engine and, in case of certain engine 

fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

wing failure. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection 

Program 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection 

program, as applicable, to add airworthiness 

limitation numbers 28–AWL–ENG, 28–AWL– 

MOV, and 28–AWL–APU, by incorporating 

the information specified in Figure 1, Figure 

2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD 

into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of 

the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 

The initial compliance time for 

accomplishing the actions specified in Figure 

1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD is within 7 days after accomplishing 

the maintenance or inspection program 

revision required by this paragraph. 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL– 

ENG.

ALI .... DAILY ...... 767–200, –300, and –300F 

airplanes.

Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational 

Check. 

Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with 

a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent fuel shut off to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
12422 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued 

AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description 

Perform one of the following operational checks of the Fuel Spar Valve 

position indication (unless checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector): 

A. Operational Check during engine shutdown 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. 

a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is 

moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair 

faults as required (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual 

(AMM) 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. 

a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is 

moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair 

faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

B. Operational check during engine start 

1. Do an operational check the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. 

a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is 

moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair 

faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. 

a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is 

moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the right SPAR VALVE 

disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair 

faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

C. Operational check without engine operation 

1. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead Panel are in the 

OFF position. 

2. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST 

PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel. 

3. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle 

Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

4. Make sure L and R ENG STAR Selector Switches on the Overhead 

Panel are in the OFF position. 

5. For airplanes with PW4000 series engines without SCU, make sure 

the EEC MAINT ‘‘L ENG POWER’’ and ‘‘R ENG POWER’’ switches on 

the right side P61 maintenance panel is in the ‘‘NORM’’ position. 

6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. 

a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the 

RUN position and wait 10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. 

b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the 

CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control 

stand illuminates and then goes off. 

d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair 

faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

7. Operational check the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. 

a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the 

RUN position and wait 10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. 

b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the 

CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. 

d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair 

faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker was collared in step 

C.2., remove collar and close. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 12423 

FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) MOV ACTUATOR INSPECTION

AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–MOV ALI .... 10 DAYS .. 767–400ER series 

airplanes.

Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection 

Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed 

MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator would prevent 

fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists 

for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform an inspection of the Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator position (refer to 

Boeing AMM 28–22–00). 

NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator is located behind latch panel 551 DB 

(left engine) and latch panel 651 DB (right engine). 

1. Make sure the Engine Control Switch is in the CUTOFF position. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in 

the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any MOV actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer 

to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in 

the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any MOV actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer 

to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: APU FUEL VALVE POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description 

28-AWL-APU .. ALI .... 10 DAYS .. ALL ........................ APU Fuel Valve Position Indication Operational Check 

Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed 

MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent 

fuel shut off to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists 

for an APU fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform the operational check of the APU Fuel Valve position indication (unless 

checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector) 

A. Do an operational check of the APU Fuel Valve position indication. 

1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the APU using standard practices. 

2. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) 

position. 

3. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of fuel in the Left Main Tank. 

4. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the ON position and wait 

10 seconds. 

5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the OFF position. 

6. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel illuminates and then goes 

off. 

7. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02). 

NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–02 if APU is not required for 

flight. 

(h) No Alternative Actions and Intervals 

After accomplishment of the maintenance 

or inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACOAMOCvRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: (425) 917–6509; fax: (425) 917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

18, 2014. 

Ross Landes, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–04893 Filed 3–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS