alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
          THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCAIL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
          THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATMENTS FOUND TIN THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-K
          FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             64
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   2,853
<ALLOWANCES>                                       95
<INVENTORY>                                       236
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                4,395
<PP&E>                                         20,872
<DEPRECIATION>                                  8,995
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 16,639
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           7,762
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                       250
<COMMON>                                        4,909
<OTHER-SE>                                     (4,096)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   16,639
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               27,579
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  28,816
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (48)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                980
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,169)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (532)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,637)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  (150)
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,787)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.43)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.43)
        

</TABLE>
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3502 

To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to prevent consumer reporting 

agencies from furnishing consumer reports under certain circumstances, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 13, 2023 

Mr. REED (for himself and Mr. HAGERTY) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to prevent consumer reporting agencies from furnishing consumer reports under certain circumstances, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Homebuyers Privacy 

5 Protection Act’’. 

2 

•S 3502 IS

1 SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF PRESCREENING REPORT RE2 QUESTS. 

3 Section 604(c) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 

4 U.S.C. 1681b(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 

5 following: 

6 ‘‘(4) TREATMENT OF PRESCREENING REPORT

7 REQUESTS.— 

8 ‘‘(A) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: 

9 ‘‘(i) INSURED CREDIT UNION.—The 

10 term ‘insured credit union’ has the mean11 ing given the term in section 101 of the 

12 Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C 

13 1752). 

14 ‘‘(ii) INSURED DEPOSITORY INSTITU15 TION.—The term ‘insured depository insti16 tution’ has the meaning given the term in 

17 section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 

18 Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)). 

19 ‘‘(iii) RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE

20 LOAN.—The term ‘residential mortgage 

21 loan’ has the meaning given the term in 

22 section 1503 of the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Li23 censing Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5102). 

24 ‘‘(iv) SERVICER.—The term ‘servicer’ 

25 has the meaning given the term in section 

3 

•S 3502 IS

1 6(i) of the Real Estate Settlement Proce2 dures Act of 1974 (12 U.S.C. 2605(i)). 

3 ‘‘(B) LIMITATION.—If a person requests a 

4 consumer report from a consumer reporting 

5 agency in connection with a credit transaction 

6 involving a residential mortgage loan, that 

7 agency may not, solely on the basis of that re8 quest, furnish that consumer report to another 

9 person unless that other person— 

10 ‘‘(i) has submitted documentation to 

11 that agency certifying that such other per12 son has, pursuant to paragraph (1), the 

13 authorization of the consumer to whom the 

14 consumer report relates; or 

15 ‘‘(ii)(I) has originated the current res16 idential mortgage loan of the consumer; 

17 ‘‘(II) is the servicer of the current res18 idential mortgage loan of the consumer; or 

19 ‘‘(III)(aa) is an insured depository in20 stitution or insured credit union; and 

21 ‘‘(bb) holds a current account for the 

22 consumer to whom the consumer report re23 lates.’’. 

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6208

MELVIN EARL SWANSON, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

COUNTY OF PICKENS, Government; JOHN W. DEJONG,

Pickens County Public Defender,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-01-4485-13-AK)

Submitted: April 9, 2002 Decided: April 29, 2002

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Melvin Earl Swanson, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Melvin Earl Swanson, Sr., appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001) complaint

without prejudice. Because Swanson may refile his complaint to

allege he has exhausted his state court remedies, we dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not a final,

appealable order. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local

Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Eddie Rufus YATES v. CITY OF FT. LAUDERDALE.

No. 37945.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       3,499,104
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             3,220,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 21,394,698
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                     81,107,868
<ALLOWANCE>                                    881,669
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             118,567,940
<DEPOSITS>                                 104,442,057
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,588,375
<LONG-TERM>                                     76,924
<COMMON>                                     2,782,625
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        2,446,200
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,231,759
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             118,567,940
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              8,622,293
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            1,161,216
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               195,785
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             9,979,294
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           4,444,300
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,489,515
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        5,489,779
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  145,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              16,592
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,221,474
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,421,085
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,442,022
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,442,022
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.24
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.38
<LOANS-NON>                                     51,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                   126,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               868,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  177,000
<RECOVERIES>                                    46,000
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              882,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           882,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
#### GOODYEAR SERVICE STORES v. Elverdia Roberson QUAVE.

No. 49933.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 1, 1978.

Megehee, Brown & Williams, Larry A. Smith, Pascagoula, for appellant.

William B. Jones, Pascagoula, for appel-lee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Merle F. Palmer, Judge.

Before SMITH, P. J., and ROBERTSON and LEE, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-16-00481-CR 

Kevin Reid Althouse 

v. 

The State of Texas 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

From County Criminal Court No. 9 

of Tarrant County (1477886) 

April 20, 2017 

Per Curiam 

(nfp) 

JUDGMENT 

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed. 

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
EXHIBIT
32





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C.  SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Progreen Properties, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 31, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jan
Telander, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: (1) The Report
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.





/s/
      Jan TelanderJan
      Telander, President, Chief Executive Officerand
      Principal Financial OfficerDecember
      14, 2009
REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008REVISION A • 09/01/2008
#### F. R. E., INC., a Florida corporation, Apellant, v. CITY OF BOCA RATON, Florida, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, and Myron B. Phipps, et al., Appellees.

No. 72-917.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 15, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1973.

Evelyn R. Flack of Law Offices of Evelyn R. Flack and Sales, Metzger & Christiansen, Palm Beach, for appellant.

Jerome F. Skrandel, City Atty., Boca Raton, Malcolm Anderson, West Palm Beach, and Gerald E. Dwyer of Hallman, Meeker & Sanson, Boca Raton, for appel-lees.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff property owner filed an action challenging the validity of a zon*49ing ordinance. The effort was rejected and we approve the findings and decision of the trial court and say that no reversible error has been demonstrated.

Additionally, we are of the opinion that the property owner had such notice and forewarning of the pending enactment of the ordinance, — coupled with the conduct of the owner, — as would prevent it from invoking equitable estoppel against the defendant City. See City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 47; Sharrow v. City of Dania, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 274.

Affirmed.

OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Varian Semiconductor Equipment Associates, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended January 2, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), the undersigned Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  |  |  |  |                                                     
|------------------------ |  |  |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|Dated: February 10, 2009 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ ROBERT J. HALLIDAY                              
|                         |  |  |  |  |  | Robert J. Halliday                                  
|                         |  |  |  |  |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
EASTERN FEDERAL LANDS ACCESS PROGRAM

Application 

Number Project/Facility Name Project Type Federal Land Unit Accessed Applicant County

NC-01 Replacement of Bridge No. 80 on State 

Route 1737 Bridge Replacement

U.S. Forest Service - 

Nantahala National 

Forest

NC Department of 

Transportation Jackson

NC-04 Replacement of Bridge No. 73 on State 

Route 215 Bridge Replacement U.S. Forest Service - Pisgah National Forest

NC Department of 

Transportation Transylvania

NC-07 Replacement of Bridge No. 46 on State 

Route 215 Bridge Replacement U.S. Forest Service - Pisgah National Forest

NC Department of 

Transportation Transylvania

NC-09 NC 12 Improvements and Drive to New 

Inlet Access Area Driveway Construction

U.S. Fish & Wildlife 

Service - Pea Island 

National Wildlife 

Refuge

NC Department of 

Transportation Dare

NC-10 Gateway Trail Connection Trail Construction

National Park Service - 

Kings Mountain 

National Military Park

Cleveland County Cleveland

The Programming Decisions Committee (PDC) responsible for the North Carolina Federal Lands Access Program (FLAP) has selected its initial, multiyear 

Program of Projects. The projects identified for programming for the North Carolina FLAP are listed below in no particular order, and include:

North Carolina Program of Projects for Fiscal Years 2013-2014
EASTERN FEDERAL LANDS ACCESS PROGRAM

Application 

Number Project/Facility Name Project Type Federal Land Unit Accessed Applicant County

NC-12 Tsali Recreation Area Helipad Helipad Construction

U.S. Forest Service - 

Tsali Forest Service 

Recreation Area

Swain County Swain

The next step in the process will be to develop project agreements between Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division and the State/Local Agency 

partners. The amount of funds allocated will depend on finalizing these agreements. Funding for these projects is not guaranteed. Funding beyond FY 

2014 is dependent on reauthorization of the Access Program by Congress. The North Carolina PDC does not have a firm date for the next call for projects 

under the Access Program, but another call is anticipated within the next year. If you have any questions please contact David Payne, Access Program 

Manager, at 571-434-1543 or email at David.Payne@dot.gov.
NO. 07-01-0486-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL D

	MAY 15, 2002

	______________________________

	EUSEBIO MARTINEZ, APPELLANT

	V.

	POTTER COUNTY, ET AL., APPELLEES

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

	NO. 13,031-E; HONORABLE ABE LOPEZ, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.

	Samuel Brown Silverman appeals from the trial court’s order granting taxing entities of Potter County excess proceeds from an order of sale in the amount of $5,059.45.  Presenting two issues, he contends (1) the trial court’s ex parte hearing denied him due process resulting in reversible error because he was not given notice under Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in a contested case where pleadings were properly served and a hearing date was set; and (2) the trial court’s failure to respond to a timely and proper request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is presumed harmful where Potter County, et al. was awarded ex parte all of the excess proceeds.  For the reasons expressed herein, we reverse and remand.

	In 1999, judgment was entered against Eusebio Martinez and Olga Martinez for delinquent taxes on a parcel of real property and an order of sale for real property ensued to satisfy the debt.  An excess of $5,059.45 was deposited with the Potter County Clerk on August 23, 1999 and a notice of excess funds was given to Martinez.  Stonehenge FASA, Texas JDC, L.P., the legal and equitable beneficiary of a deed of trust securing the purchase-money lien of the property against which taxes were assessed, assigned its lien to Silverman, who filed a petition to claim $3,014.07 of the excess proceeds.  On August 28, 2001, the trial court ordered that Silverman recover $3,014.07 of the excess proceeds.  On September 4, 2001, the trial court set aside its August 28 order and granted a new hearing on the ground that the taxing entities had not been given notice of the hearing.  Thereafter, Potter County filed a motion to release the entire amount of excess funds.  Without notice to Silverman, on September 10, 2001, the trial court ordered the excess proceeds be released to the taxing entities of Potter County.

	By its brief, Potter County candidly acknowledges and stipulates that the trial court’s order of September 10, 2001 be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the ground that no reporter’s record of the hearing was made.  Agreeing with Potter County, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings.

						Don H. Reavis

						    Justice

Do not publish.
#### Harold Edwin EASTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-372.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 16, 1971.

Raymond E. LaPorte, of Ragano & La-Porte, Tampa, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and P. A. Pacyna, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

McNulty, judge.

This appeal is from a conviction on each count of a six-count information charging violations of the Florida Securities Law, Ch. 517, F.S.A. Counts one, three and five alleged the unlawful sale by appellant of unregistered securities on January 29, 1969, February 8, 1969 and November 20, 1968, respectively. Counts two, four and six charged that appellant did unlawfully “engage in business as a dealer,” without being registered as such dealer, on each of the above dates. He was sentenced to two years on each of the six counts, to run consecutively.

Appellant urges reversible error in both the conviction and the sentencing, but upon examination of the arguments with respect to the convictions we find them to be without merit. Reversible error does appear, however, in the imposition of the six sentences.

It is patent from the informations and the evidence at trial that each charge of unlawful sale was coupled with a companion charge of unlawfully engaging in business. It is also apparent that each such pair of charges arose from the one transaction. Put another way, the only evidence of “engaging in business” without registration, on any given date charged, was the charged unlawful sale of securities on that date. Thus, each of counts one and *295two constitute a facet of one transaction; and the identical pairing may be made of counts three and four and of five and six, making three transactions in all.

Now, while each count charges a different “offense,” it is well settled that “[i]n Florida, where an information contains more than one count, but each is a facet or phase of the same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed * * 1 That is to say, a single transaction may violate two statutes and thus constitute two separate offenses; but, while convictions may he had on each, only one sentence is appropriate. In this case, therefore, it was error to impose more than one sentence for the same transaction on each of the three specified dates.

Accordingly, the judgments and convictions are affirmed, hut the sentences are vacated and the cause is remanded with directions that the appellant be presented to the trial court and properly sentenced in accord herewith.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

PIERCE, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.

1

. Yost v. State (Fla.App.1971), 243 So.2d 469, 69 So.2d 766. 471. See, also, Williams v. State (Fla.1953),
<PAGE>

Ex-10.52
Recruiting Agreement between the Company and Jack King


                                  EXHIBIT 10.52


April 26, 1999


Mr. Jack King
Southcourt, Ltd.
Irvine, CA 92602

RE: TELEGEN RECRUITMENT

Dear Jack,

Pursuant to our earlier conversations, Telegen Corporation is prepared to
compensate you as provided in this letter for your assistance in recruiting
senior management for the Company. Should Telegen hire an individual for a
senior management positions who was introduced to the Company by you, the
Company will pay you a finder's fee equal to five percent (5%) of the first
year's gross cash compensation. This finder's fee would be paid to you in the
form of post-reorganization Telegen common stock, the amount to be calculated
based upon the price of the common stock sold in our next offering and payable
upon confirmation of our Plan of Reorganization.

Thanks for again for your assistance.

Best regards,

/S/ JESSICA L STEVENS

Jessica L. Stevens
President/CEO



AGREED:

   /S/ JACK KING
------------------------