This project was supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice 

Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile 

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of 

view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily 

represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Executive Staff

Daniel Rosenblatt

Executive Director

James McMahon

Deputy Executive Director

Project Staff & Consultants

Susan Weinstein

Principal Author

Carrie Corsoro

IACP Project Assistant

Andrew Corsoro

IACP Visual Designer

William Sorukas Jr.

Focus Group Support 

IACP Visiting Research Fellow

Chief Inspector, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)

John Firman

IACP Research Center Director

Gene Voegtlin

IACP State Associations of Chiefs of Police 

Division Director

Danielle Ouellette

IACP Final Report Editor

Matthew Seaman

Focus Group Support 

IACP Research Center Directorate Intern

Cliff Keenan

Focus Group Facilitator

Deputy Director – DC Pretrial Services Agency

1
Acknowledgments

The International Association of Chiefs of Police project staff would like to acknowledge the following individuals 

for their strong support of the development of this pretrial issues report: 

	We are grateful for the programmatic and financial support provided by the Bureau of Justice Assistance 

(BJA), in particular the guidance provided by Kim Norris, Senior Policy Advisor for BJA. Her in-depth 

understanding of pretrial issues and her passion to see improvements made were critical factors in the 

success of this effort. 

	We’re also grateful for the leadership of Tim Murray, Executive Director of the Pretrial Justice Institute 

(PJI). His vision of pretrial issues is a systemic one, and he fully appreciated and supported bringing law 

enforcement and pretrial experts together in a policy-making arena to learn from one another and arrive 

at ideas for change. 

	To ensure the quality of this final report, the IACP reached out to our own Research Advisory Committee 

(RAC), asking Chief Jeanne Miller of the Davidson, North Carolina Police Department to review the final 

draft before it was released. Her insights were of great value as we finalized this document and ensured its 

relevance to IACP membership. 

	To achieve a successful dialogue among the focus group participants, IACP, PJI, and BJA reached out 

to D.C. Pretrial Services Director Cliff Keenan to facilitate that event. Mr. Keenan brought his prior 

experience as a law enforcement officer and his substantial expertise in pretrial issues to his facilitator 

role, ensuring a thoughtful and meaningful discussion among all participants. 

	Ultimately the focus group of law enforcement, pretrial, and justice leaders was the key investigative arm 

of this project. Thus we are particularly indebted to all of our participants (listed in detail in Appendix A) 

whose ideas, concepts, and suggestions for change make up the entire content of this report. 

The IACP thanks all of the above individuals for allowing us to explore the relationship of law enforcement 

leadership and pretrial release decision making, and to help us arrive at the observations and recommendations 

reported in this document. 

2
1. Introduction

On November 29, 2009, Maurice Clemmons, a convicted felon with a lengthy criminal record that included 

numerous violent offenses, executed four police officers in Lakewood, Washington while they were preparing 

for their shifts. Rather than being a rare and isolated incident, the events that led up to this tragedy are not that 

uncommon in our criminal justice system. 

Previously classified by the Washington State Department of Corrections as at a “high risk to reoffend,” on May 

9, 2009, Clemmons assaulted two Pierce County sheriff’s deputies after exclaiming, “I’ll kill all you bitches.” 

He was released from jail the following day, without ever having seen a judge, after posting $1,700 with a local 

bail bondsman to satisfy his $40,000 bond on these assault charges. Two days later, on May 11, 2009, Clemmons 

raped a 12 year-old girl. Upon his arrest for the rape, a court-ordered mental health evaluation deemed him to 

be “dangerous” and said that he “presented an increased risk of future criminal acts.” A Pierce County judge set 

bail on the rape charges at $150,000, ultimately allowing the release of Clemmons and his dangerous behavior 

into society. On November 23, 2009, Clemmons again paid only a fraction of his bond, this time $8,000 to Jail 

Sucks Bail Bonds. On November 26, 2009, Clemmons told several people that he planned to murder police 

officers. Three days later, he did . . . (New York Times, “Tacoma Suspect Said to Threaten to Shoot Officers,” 

December 1, 2009).

The safety of these slain officers and the community at large may not have been jeopardized if the criminal system had taken into account the danger that the defendant posed to the community rather than simply his financial 

means to post bail. The killings in Lakewood are just one example of crimes, including the shooting of other 

police officers, committed by defendants who were released on financial bond without consideration for whether 

or not they pose a danger to society or whether or not they will return for their court appearances. As a result of 

the Clemmons case, Washington State legislators, local prosecutors, and the bail bond industry have teamed up 

to change the “largely unregulated bail-bond business” (Seattle Times, “Lax Bail System Helped Clemmons Get 

Out of Jail,” June 6, 2010). 

A suspect’s release or detention pending trial currently is not based on an informed assessment of whether or not 

he or she is a danger to society and or is likely to return to court for trial, but on whether the suspect has enough 

money to bail himself or herself out of jail. (Pretrial Justice Institute website at www.pretrial.org.)

“We are allowing dangerousness rather than assessing dangerousness.”

 - PJI Executive Director Timothy Murray at the April 14, 2010 Focus Group

The Maurice Clemmons incident is just one example of how across the United States, law enforcement has had 

little, if any, role in determining whether a defendant should be released back into the community pending trial. 

Surprisingly, in only a handful of jurisdictions does law enforcement play a role in helping a judge determine 

who should and should not be released back into society. Public and officer safety and defendant accountability 

are the foremost considerations in the issue of pretrial release. Considering this significant gap, various leaders 

in the justice field felt that the time has come for law enforcement to become a part of the dialogue on pretrial 

release and eventually to take its appropriate leadership role in improving the pretrial system. 

 1. The officers who were killed were Tina Griswold, Ronald Owens, Mark Renninger and Greg Richards. 

 2. A Detroit police officer was killed by a suspect with a lengthy criminal record, including battling with law enforcement, and who was recently released on a 

$30,000 bond. (The Detroit News, “Suspect Has Long Record of Probations,” May 4, 2010). Two police officers were killed and one was wounded by a man who was 

released on $33,000 bond for an earlier carjacking in a neighboring jurisdiction. (Washington Post, “Officer Fatally Shot Outside Police Station,” May 9, 2006; and 

Washington Post, “A Year Later, Sully Station Still Healing,” May 8, 2007. See also, Orlando Sentinel, “Flaws Allow Accused to Escape Justice,” January 8, 2001 

(Two defendants out on pretrial release for stabbing an elderly man killed a police officer in a barrage of bullets.); and New York Times, “Two Pentagon Police Officers 

Shot; Gunman Killed,” March 4, 2010.) 

3

 1

2
In response, on April 14, 2010, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), in collaboration with 

the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice and the Pretrial 

Justice Institute (PJI), convened a focus group of criminal justice professionals to discuss the issue of setting bail 

and supervising suspects released into the community pending trial. The group consisted of police executives 

from large, medium, and small jurisdictions; prosecuting attorneys; academic researchers and scholars; judges; 

and defense attorneys. (The complete list of attendees is attached as Appendix A.) The consensus among the 

group was that law enforcement can and should play a leadership role in addressing the issues relative to the 

pretrial process, particularly those that directly affect public and officer safety and defendant accountability.

“They are letting the scariest people out. It is more dangerous than it needs to be right now.” 

Orlando Sentinel, “Flaws Allow Accused to Escape Justice,” January 8, 2001

2. Background

Across the country, police officers often complain that a suspect is back on the street before the officer completes 

the arrest paperwork. When citizens see the “bad guy” who was just arrested back on the street, they often ask 

law enforcement why. The answer is often simply because the defendant was able to pay his or her way out of 

jail. This issue and many others relevant to pretrial recourse were the reasons for the IACP to convene the pretrial focus group meeting. 

Before documenting the work of focus group participants, the concerns they articulated, and the final recommendations they offered, it is first important to set the stage with pertinent background information on bail, the 

bail bond industry, pretrial release programs, and the relevant case law and statutes that govern these activities.

A Brief History of the Bail System

Rooted in English common law, bail was intended to ensure that a defendant returned to court for trial. However, beginning in the early 1900s, scholars and practitioners began to reevaluate the financial bail process. They 

started to question a system that bases pretrial release or detention on whether the suspect can pay money (often obtained through ill-gotten means), without regard to the danger the suspect may present to the community 

(Beeley, Arthur L., The Bail System in Chicago, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927: reprinted, 1966). 

In 1961, the Vera Institute of Justice was established to study the effectiveness of a bail system that based a 

suspect’s liberty solely on financial status. Vera created the first pretrial screening program in the country, the 

Manhattan Bail Project, which demonstrated that a defendant could be released and return to court for trial based 

on factors that included strong ties to the community rather than his or her ability to pay the bail amount. In 

1966, the United States Congress passed the Bail Reform Act, which set forth conditions of release based on 

appearance risks rather than money (The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146, et. seq.). Finally, in 1984, 

Congress expanded the 1966 Act by adding whether a suspect poses a danger to the community as a determination of bail (The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et.seq.). 

4
The Current Pretrial System

“Using only monetary bail is basically like rolling the dice at the cost of public safety.” 

 – Senior Judge Truman A. Morrison at the April 14, 2010 Focus Group

The bail laws in the United States are not typical of those throughout the rest of the world. Many U.S. jurisdictions use preset fees arranged by the type of charge (e.g., $2,500 for burglary or $5,000 for manslaughter in Orange County, Florida) to determine whether a suspect should or should not be released back into the community. 

Accused felons, therefore, are often released on bail with little or no attention paid to their criminal histories, 

their danger to society, or whether they are likely to become fugitives. According to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice for Pretrial Release, 3rd edition, 2007, bail is generally set in “a 

routinely haphazard fashion” (ABA Standards, Introduction commentary, p. 31) and “when bail amounts are 

fixed solely on the basis of the charge, information relevant to assessing the real risk of nonappearance or pretrial 

crime is never considered” (ABA Standard 10-1.7 commentary, p. 51). In addition to the ABA, the Association 

of Prosecuting Attorneys, the National District Attorneys Association, and the National Association of Counties 

have formally called for rational, safe, and transparent pretrial release based on a risk assessment rather than on 

the suspect’s financial means. 

Overview of Case Law, Statutes and Studies

 “We cannot continue to operate without a rational and transparent pretrial system.”

 – Police Chief Margaret Ryan at the April 14, 2010 Focus Group

Case Law

The seminal case on the issue of bail and pretrial release is United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), which 

held that detaining a suspect based on the suspect’s potential danger to the community if released is appropriate and outweighs the suspect’s individual right to liberty (Salerno, p. 748). Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 

decision in Salerno, courts were not allowed to consider a defendant’s dangerousness or the community’s safety 

when setting bail. If a judge felt that a defendant was too dangerous to be released, the judge would be forced to 

set an inordinately high bail amount, hoping that the defendant would not be able to meet such a financial burden. 

It is important to note, however, that many states have not followed the Supreme Court’s Salerno decision to allow danger to be considered in denying release. 

Another important case is Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that someone 

“arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail . . .” and that bail cannot be set at a sum higher than an 

amount reasonably calculated to ensure that the defendant gives “adequate assurance that he will stand trial and 

submit to the sentence if found guilty” (Stack, p. 2). Furthermore, in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), 

the United States Supreme Court held that bail is not an absolute right and may be denied if there is a “reasonable 

foundation” to do so (Carlson, p.541). 

State Statutes 

The bail laws in each state and territory vary widely, except for one commonality: they all accept cash as a condition of pretrial release. As a matter of fact, a small number of jurisdictions set financial bail as the only condition 

of pretrial release. Approximately 40 jurisdictions allow a court to consider the dangerousness of the defendant. 

Of those, fewer provide the court with pertinent information about the defendant, including prior criminal history 

or fugitive status. 

5

3

3. For a complete listing of the laws, log on to the Pretrial Justice Institute’s website at www.pretrial.org. 
Pretrial Release Studies and Financial Bail

“It’s hard to explain to citizens when someone out on bail commits another crime. 

They often ask, ‘Why was this guy out when he already committed a crime?’” 

– James C. Quinn, Senior Executive Assistant District Attorney, at the April 14, 2010 Focus Group

In 1985, a study conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency found that supervised pretrial 

release programs (i.e., those that include governmental oversight of defendants released from pretrial custody) 

are the most effective ways to ensure that defendants appear for all of their court hearings and do not commit additional crimes while back in the community. The study also found that, in the longrun, these types of programs 

save jurisdictions money on the costs of pretrial detention (Austin, James, et. al. “The Effectiveness of Supervised Pretrial Release,” Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 31, No. 4, October 1985, pp. 519-537). Subsequently, other 

studies have suggested that financial bail is not a reliable predictor of whether a defendant will appear in court or 

remain free of crime while out on bail. Rather, a defendant’s prior criminal history; prior court appearances; and 

interviews of defendants, witnesses, and arresting officers are the best predictors. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 

Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, 

Special Report, November 2007; and Goldkamp, John, et. al., Personal Liberty and Community Safety: Pretrial 

Release in the Criminal Court, New York: Plenum Publishing, 1995).

According to the ABA, “financial bail is not an appropriate response to concerns that the defendant will pose a 

danger if released. Money bail should not be used for any reason other than to respond to a risk of flight” (ABA 

Standard 10-1.4(d) commentary, p.44). ABA Standard 10-1.4 strictly proscribes the practice of setting very high 

financial bail when a defendant poses a risk of dangerousness (ABA Standard 10-1.4, p 42). The commentary 

to Standard 10-5.3(a) furthers the philosophy of the ABA that financial bond should be severely restricted to 

“when no less restrictive, nonfinancial release condition will suffice to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court” 

and “prohibits the setting of financial conditions of release in order to prevent future criminal conduct or protect 

public safety” (ABA Standard 10-5.3(a) commentary, p. 111). 

Based on these studies, various national organizations have determined that financial bail has little or no bearing 

on whether a defendant will return to court and remain crime-free. Yet, many jurisdictions continue to use it as a 

litmus test for release. The reason may simply be due to the fact that financial bail has been in place for centuries 

with little public sentiment for changes to the existing system.

The Commercial Bail Industry

“In England, Canada, and other countries [Australia, India, South Africa], agreeing to pay a 

defendant’s bond in exchange for money is a crime akin to witness tampering or 

bribing a juror – a form of obstruction of justice.” 

New York Times, “Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in the U.S.,” January 29, 2008

According to BJS, two million defendants are released annually from pretrial detention by approximately 14,000 

commercial bail agents throughout the United States (BJS, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, 

Special Report, p. 4). Only the United States and the Philippines allow the use of private bail bondsmen (Orlando 

Sentinel, “Flaws Allow Accused to Escape Justice”). Despite the recommendations of the ABA to abolish commercial bail (ABA Standard 10-1.4 commentary, pp. 42-47), only four states (Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and 

Wisconsin) have done so thus far. The District of Columbia, Maine, and Nebraska have limited the use of commercial bail activity as well (BJS, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, Special Report, p.4).

6
How the Commercial Bail System Works 

A commercial bail bondsman, usually with the backing of an insurance company, promises to pay a defendant’s 

bail to the court in the event that the defendant does not appear in court. The bondsman charges the defendant 

a nonrefundable fee of usually 10 percent. The bondsman’s focus, from a purely business model, is on how 

much money will be made to profit the company versus broader concerns like public safety. One bail bondsman 

admitted that he will not accept $500 bond cases (usually set in cases involving lesser offenses) because it is not 

financially worth his while (Orlando Sentinel, “Flaws Allow Accused to Escape Justice”).

If a defendant, while out on bail, is arrested for another crime, the bondsman no longer owes the court the original bail amount, and the bondsman can also choose to post bail in the second case. Accordingly, defendants with 

a high bond amount because of their risk of committing another crime before trial are often of more interest to 

bail bondsmen (“The Truth about Commercial Bail Bonding in America,” The National Association of Pretrial 

Services Agencies, Advocacy Brief, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2009, p. 3).

“It’s really the only place in the criminal justice system where a liberty decision is governed by a profit-making 

entity that will or will not take your business,” said Temple University Professor of Criminal Justice John Goldkamp (New York Times, “Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in the U.S.”). Because of this, the ABA set 

forth the following rationale for abolishing compensated sureties: (1) A defendant’s ability to post financial bail 

“through a compensated surety is completely unrelated” to public safety risks, as a commercial bondsman is not 

obligated to try to prevent criminal behavior. (2) Decisions “regarding which defendants will actually be released 

move from the court to the bondsmen. It is the bondsmen who decide which defendants will be acceptable risks 

– based to a large extent on the defendant’s ability to pay . . . .” (3) Decisions of bondsmen are “made in secret, 

without any record of the reasons for these decisions.” (4) Compensated sureties unfairly burden those who cannot afford the nonrefundable fees, while cash-rich drug dealers, robbers, and gang members can easily pay for 

their freedom (ABA Standard 10-1.4(f) commentary, pp. 44-47). 

Accordingly, in many instances, the commercial bail industry is making the decisions about who should or 

should not be released. However, any system that makes pretrial release decisions should, at least, ensure public safety and hold defendants accountable and, at best, save taxpayer money. It is therefore important that law 

enforcement review and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various pretrial release mechanisms and 

pretrial services programs. 

4. Like any for-profit business, some bail bondsmen put their products “on sale,” requiring the defendant to pay as little as one percent of the set bail, with a promissory note for the remaining money. Thus, a suspect with a $500,000 bond for a violent offense can be released for as little $5,000. Baltimore, Maryland, State’s 

Attorney Patricia Jessamey called this a mockery of the justice system. (“The Truth about Commercial Bail Bonding in America,” The National Association of Pretrial 

Services Agencies, Advocacy Brief, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2009, p. 3) See also, Baltimore Sun, “In Maryland, Many Get Discount on Bail: Cut Rate Bonds Set Dangerous People Loose, Critics Say,” February 20, 2008. 

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3. Pretrial Services Programs

II.

	ensuring the safety of the public and the officers entrusted to protect the public,

	providing supervision to defendants awaiting trial,

	ensuring that defendants return to court, and 

	reducing jail overcrowding, thereby reducing costly expenditures of public resources for construction 

and maintenance of new jail facilities. 

Supervision of Defendants and Safety of the Public

In the mid 1960s, a handful of jurisdictions around the country began to look at factors other than financial 

ability to determine whether or not to release a suspect prior to trial. In 1968, the first pretrial services program, 

which still exists today, was developed in Washington, D.C. “In addition to interviewing, collecting background 

information, verifying information, producing reports, and making recommendations to the court, the pretrial 

services program began supervising defendants on various release conditions” (Pretrial Justice Institute website, 

“History of Pretrial Services Programs,” www.pretrial.org). 

Government run and publicly funded, a properly planned and operated pretrial services program can assess the 

risks associated with releasing (or not releasing) a defendant and supervising that individual throughout the entire 

pretrial process. These programs can help judges make informed release decisions by providing comprehensive 

and important information on each defendant. Through research-based tools that assess a defendant’s likelihood 

of appearing in court and remaining crime-free while on pretrial release, “pretrial programs provide a costeffective and safe method for recommending release into the community” (Jail Population Management: 

Elected County Officials’ Guide to Pretrial Services, National Association of Counties, September 2009, pp. 

7-8). According to the ABA, these agencies “should perform an information, collection, and analysis function, 

a recommendation function, and a monitoring function” (ABA Standard 10-1.10(a) commentary, p. 56). 

Pretrial programs consist of the following five operational elements: 

(1) The screening of everyone arrested and booked into the jail; 

(2) The interviewing and investigation of a defendant prior to the defendant’s first appearance before a 

judicial officer; 

(3) The use of research-based risk assessment tools to guide appropriate release decisions that ensure public 

safety and the defendant’s return to court; 

(4) The supervision of, and regular reporting on, any defendant who has been placed on pretrial release; and 

(5) Reminders to defendants of upcoming court appearances and other appointments (Jail Population 

Management, National Association of Counties, p. 8; and ABA Standard 10-4.2 commentary, p. 86). 

Appointments may include drug testing, counseling, or evaluations (National Association of Counties’ 

website, “Pretrial Services Reduce Costs, Improve Public Safety,” www.naco.org). 

II. As supervised pretrial release programs have grown and developed over the past several decades, their vision 

has clarified. The goals and objectives of effective pretrial released programs include

8

5

5. The investigation includes a defendant’s prior criminal record; prior behavior on bond; community ties; and employment history, 

among other things.
According to the ABA, the decision to release or detain a suspect prior to trial “should have defined goals, clear 

criteria, adequate and reliable information, and fair procedures” (ABA Standards, General Principles commentary, 

p. 5). Through pretrial services, pretrial release can be tailored to the circumstances of each individual defendant, 

providing valuable information on whether or not to release a defendant. Those who can safely be released will 

be released; and those who pose a risk will be detained. 

Pretrial services programs can provide for public safety by monitoring defendants awaiting trial. While 

protecting the community and the police officers that serve it, pretrial programs also can save tax money spent 

on unnecessary pretrial incarceration. 

Minimizing Fugitive Status

Once an individual fails to appear, he or she moves to fugitive status. Warrants are issued for the individual’s 

arrest. While many defendants simply fail to appear and continue about their day-to-day affairs, others become 

fugitives bent on avoiding the justice system entirely. They become mobile and opportunistic, preying on 

innocent citizens by committing additional crimes against persons and property in order to sustain their flight 

from justice. Unable to hold jobs, they become even more dangerous, supporting their existence through the 

commission of more crimes, leaving additional victims in their wake.

Critical to the law enforcement community, the investigative resources to rearrest and in some cases extradite 

these fugitives is costly, both to the law enforcement agencies and their governments. In fact, not all law 

enforcement agencies are financially able to extradite fugitives who are located and arrested outside their 

jurisdictions, causing problems for the original arresting agency, the rearresting agency, and, of course, the public 

if the fugitive cannot be detained and is released. Effective pretrial screening and, in many cases, preventive 

detention addressed next can help reduce this problem.

Preventive Detention

In circumstances in which pretrial incarceration is deemed necessary, preventive detention needs to be imposed 

to uphold community safety because of the potential risk of reoffending by those defendants who pose such risk. 

Participants at the April 2010 focus group commented that the failure of the current system in many states was 

most acute when it came to the release of such dangerous defendants due to their ability to make bond.

Preventive detention legislation provides a safer approach than attempting to use money bond to address the 

pretrial dangers of defendants awaiting trial. Preventive detention laws empower the court to consider pretrial 

danger when making release decisions, and enable the prosecutor to seek detention without bail for select 

defendants after an evidentiary hearing in which the court assesses the strength of the case coupled with the 

defendant’s past behaviors. The court must find that no condition or combination of conditions of supervision 

will provide reasonable assurance of community safety in order to grant detention. For example, statutes in 

the District of Columbia, and even federal courts, call upon an array of supervision conditions — including 

preventive detention — designed to protect the community. As a result of these laws, money bond is no longer 

used in the hope that the defendant, especially a dangerous one, will not be able to post it. The result can lead to a 

decrease in a defendant reoffending, deterrence in bail-jumping, and ultimately the protection of the community

Defendant Accountability 

“Accused criminals by the thousands escape justice.” 

 -- Orlando Sentinel, “On the Run: Florida’s Fugitives,” January 7, 2001 

The April 2010 focus group suggested that regardless of the pretrial release modality in any given case, the 

defendant must be held accountable in terms of supervision. The participants expressed interest in the notion that 

complete forfeiture be ordered in money bond cases when a substantive violation of the terms of a defendant’s 

release has occurred, such as the defendant’s failure to appear in court or his or her rearrest for a new offense. 

9
Similarly, participants felt that defendants released to supervision conditions should be held accountable in 

regard to those conditions, and that sanctions be applied by the court for any violations to those terms.

Pretrial services programs can provide defendant accountability, in comparison with financial bond where the 

sole determining factor as to whether or not a defendant is released back into the community is money. Many 

police chiefs and criminal justice experts have noted that people of varying levels of dangerousness are being 

let out on financial bond, and essentially, nothing is being done to monitor these suspects who are released into 

the community. This can ultimately lead to law enforcement having to “do the job twice,” by first making the 

original arrest and then by having to apprehend the defendant again when he or she becomes a fugitive through 

willful failure to appear in court. BJS found that one in four defendants who failed to appear in court remained 

a fugitive one year later (BJS, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, Special Report, p. 8). 

Moreover, BJS data show that supervised pretrial release programs produce favorable re-arrest and appearance 

rates (BJS, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, Special Report, p. 10). 

Defendants currently released on financial bond often commit additional crimes or become fugitives. Presumably, 

because there are so many perceived holes in the existing pretrial justice system, they feel that they can commit 

other crimes or fail to appear in court with little or no consequences. Effective pretrial services programs, 

however, can provide swift and certain consequences to those who do not comply with the conditions of their 

pretrial release. Also, jurisdictions that ensure that bail-jumping statues, which make willful failure to appear a 

separate crime, are enacted and vigorously prosecuted, which can help deter and bring appropriate punishment 

to those defendants who do fail to appear in court. With rapid sanctions for noncompliance of these conditions, 

pretrial services programs can send a message to violating defendants and to the community at large that no one 

will be allowed to flee justice.1

Cost Savings

Pretrial services programs can not only promote defendant accountability, but also cost savings. Estimates 

show that the American tax system supports pretrial detention at a rate of $25 million per day or $9 billion per 

year (“The Truth about Commercial Bail Bonding in America,” The National Association of Pretrial Services 

Agencies, Advocacy Brief, pp. 8-9). Community-based supervision has proven to be less costly than secure 

detention. It is, however, not without its own costs. Therefore, jurisdictions must decide whether to spend money 

on building and operating more jails or shift a portion of those resources to the implementation and operation of 

a comprehensive pretrial services program. Individual state and county cost benefit analyses suggest that pretrial 

services programs can, in the long-run, save taxpayer money. 

A study of 10 counties with pretrial services programs in North Carolina found that, among other things, each 

county spent approximately $6.04 per defendant per day on pretrial release, but would spend approximately 

$57.30 per defendant per day to keep those same defendants detained. The total cost savings of pretrial services 

versus pretrial incarceration amounted to a little more than $1,050,000 per county per year (Jail Population 

Management, National Association of Counties, p. 9). Similarly, Maine conducted a study that demonstrated 

that one pretrial services staff member, who costs taxpayers $50,000 per year saves between $250,000 and 

$1,320,000 per year on detention costs (National Association of Counties’ Website, “Counties Look for Money, 

Alternatives to Bail,” www.naco.org). Lastly, the Miami Herald reported that Broward County, Florida, would 

save taxpayers approximately $110 per defendant per day if it had a pretrial services program (Miami Herald, 

“In Tallahassee, Broward-inspired Bail-bond Bailout Could Break Us,” April 17, 2010). 

 

III. Law Enforcement’s Role in the Pretrial Release Process

6. See Seals v. United States, No. 03-CO-51, slip. op. (D.C. Feb. 11, 2004). (The Appellate court upheld a three-year sentence for 

contempt of court for not following the conditions of pretrial release, based on the defendant’s criminal history and non-compliance 

with the court). 

10

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The April 14, 2010, focus group began its dialogue on the role that law enforcement should play in the discussion 

and development of pretrial services. The first and overriding observation was that it is imperative that police 

executives continue to address this issue. At the conclusion of the meeting, the group suggested that the IACP, 

PJI, and BJA convene a national summit to discuss further actions and to resolve the issues addressed by the 

focus group members. This national summit can bring national and local law enforcement leaders together to 

develop best practices and model legislation on the issue of pretrial release. 

It is important to note that the group arrived at the summit recommendation after a full day of careful and 

thoughtful dialogue on all pretrial release, detention, and bond issues. One observation that carried through most 

of the day’s work was the incredible complexity of the pretrial detention and release issues facing the U.S. justice 

system. Many of the issues raised and debated fueled the idea for a larger summit, since participants quickly 

realized that there were no quick, simple answers to the complex problems being discussed. Some examples of 

those issues, and potential courses of action, include the following: 

	The balancing of release decisions versus detention decisions; e.g., what set of criteria will ensure that 

the right people are released (those assessed unlikely to fail to appear and/or commit new crimes while 

on bond) and that the wrong people (those assessed as likely fail to appear and to commit new crimes) 

are detained until trial 

	The varying size, budgets, and resources of the some 18,000 local law enforcement agencies in the 

United States as they attempt to gather information pertinent to pretrial release and detention decisions 

by the courts, particularly the many smaller agencies with less than 25 officers 

	The potential for regional, unified central processing center models where all arrestees can be effectively 

evaluated for release or detention status, and how these centers could function in a more cost-effective 

manner to support local law enforcement agencies and their respective local justice systems 

	Determination of consequences (beyond financial) for those who fail to return to court on their court date, 

in particular, “bail jumping” laws that allow charging defendants with an additional crime 30 days after 

their failure to appear 

	The need for shared wisdom from the many other professional organizations representing the law 

enforcement community, in particular, leadership organizations like the National Sheriff’s Association, 

police unions, and all others with a stake in bail/pretrial release reform 

	The impact of pretrial release and detention decisions on public and officer safety, and also on public and 

officer perception, including potential witness or victim intimidation before trial when the defendant is 

allowed to return to the community inappropriately 

	Balancing current bond system decisions with the urgent need for dangerousness assessment and, in 

particular, looking at the many variations across the U.S. on how (or whether) dangerousness is assessed 

4. Law Enforcement’s Role in the Pretrial 

 Release Process

11
Based on the discussions from the IACP focus group, members felt that many questions remain unanswered and 

need to be addressed with respect to pretrial matters before law enforcement can take a position on the subject. 

Some of those questions include the following: 

(1) What level of involvement should law enforcement leaders provide in these pretrial services programs, 

and how can they help to support an effective pretrial system so that there are no backlogs? 

(2) How can we ensure that pretrial release decisions are based upon the individual risks posed by each 

defendant, rather than on a bond schedule that merely takes into account the title of the charge? 

(3) Is it feasible to insist that pretrial program outcomes, such as appearance, rearrest, and completion rates, 

be published regularly? 

(4) How can the arresting officers involved work more closely with the local prosecutor to ensure appropriate 

release conditions that are designed to minimize failure-to-appear rates and future crimes? 

(5) How can we advocate for state bail legislation that takes into account officer and public safety and 

provides the court with safe alternatives in dealing with defendants whose potential danger to the 

community cannot be reasonably assured through supervision and monitoring? 

These are just a few of the many issues that law enforcement leaders would take up at any future national policy 

summit on this topic. 

The ideas that emerge from a summit can then be presented to a wide variety of audiences that are examining 

criminal justice issues. For example, Congress is currently considering legislation (S.714) originally proposed 

by the IACP and now being supported by Senator Jim Webb (D-VA)2

 to establish a National Criminal Justice 

Commission. If enacted, this legislation will task the commission with conducting a comprehensive examination 

of various aspects of the criminal justice system, including pretrial processes. The views and expertise on pretrial 

issues expressed at the national summit would provide the commission with critically needed information and 

direction as it undertakes its review. 

Focus group members felt that law enforcement’s attention to pretrial release issues is timely and critical. Police 

executives have not always been involved in the pretrial services dialogue. Yet, as the major stakeholder in 

protecting the community and the officers that serve it, the members realized that now is the time for law 

enforcement leadership to meaningfully discuss how to help improve the pretrial process. As with any new 

endeavor, the members acknowledged that some in the profession may be uncomfortable with, and perhaps 

resist, the change that may come with the dialogue. However, as we learned through the transition to community 

policing more than 30 years ago, different can also mean better. 

IV. Conclusion 

7. The IACP has advocated for the creation of such a commission for more than two decades, similar to that of the 1965 Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement 

and the Administration of Justice, which built the framework for many of the highly effective law enforcement and public safety initiatives that have been in place for 

almost the last half century. 

12

7
Given the number of issues discussed at the focus group and the difficulty of each, participants realized that 

arriving at conclusive findings or consensus recommendations at the end of the focus group was not a viable 

option, but that a call for a much more in-depth effort and a national law enforcement policy summit made a great 

deal of sense. Given that the primary duty of law enforcement is to protect the community, it makes sense for 

law enforcement leaders to be contributing members in pretrial release policy and procedure development that 

would ensure that a defendant’s danger to society and the likelihood of his/her appearance in court are equally 

considered. Law enforcement’s voice in pretrial system development can help to create rational and transparent 

release programs.

Throughout the U.S. justice system, defendants will continue to be released after their arrests and before their 

trials. Because of this release, their next actions and decisions may directly affect officer and citizen safety. 

Focus group members had a clear vision that in the future, law enforcement should and can play a critical role 

in supporting and guiding rational criteria for pretrial release and in helping to reduce system failures. This 

future role can only occur if law enforcement leaders are 1) aware of and fully understand the laws, policies, 

and practices of pretrial release in their jurisdictions, and 2) appreciate their role as critical stakeholders in 

helping to influence pretrial policy. Law enforcement leaders also can improve community and officer safety and 

defendant accountability by elevating the discussion of these issues to the national level. BJA, IACP, and PJI are 

committed to the issue and support the concept of a national policy summit to ensure that law enforcement can 

significantly contribute to this important topic. 

At the time of publication of this report, the United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 

with the principle support of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), has inaugurated plans for a National Policy 

Summit on Pretrial Justice slated for early 2011. From this early information, it is clear that DOJ’s intent is to 

address pretrial issues on a global scale. To support this important work, IACP and PJI will continue to work 

closely with our BJA counterparts to ensure that the national law enforcement summit called for in this report is 

designed and held after the larger policy summit so that it can further the recommendations that will doubtless 

emerge from the DOJ/OJP systemwide effort. 

The ultimate goal of each of these efforts will be identical: to make certain that another tragedy like the one in 

which four Lakewood, Washington, police officers were slain by an individual at high risk for reoffending, who 

was nonetheless out on bail, will never happen again. 

5. Conclusion

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APPENDIX A

IACP/BJA/PJI PRETRIAL ISSUES FOCUS GROUP MEETING

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010

IACP HEADQUARTERS

515 NORTH WASHINGTON STREET

ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314

MEETING PARTICIPANTS

Deputy Director Cliff Keenan

D.C. Pretrial Services Agency

633 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 1120

Washington, DC 20004

Phone: (202) 220-5649

Cliff.Keenan@psa.gov

Executive Director Timothy Murray

Pretrial Justice Institute

927 15th Street NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (202) 638-3080

tim@pretrial.org

Division Chief Tracie Keesee PhD

Research, Training and Technology

Denver Police Department

1331 Cherokee Street

Denver, CO 80204-4507

Phone: (720) 913-6522

Tracie.keesee@denvergov.org

Colonel Gerald Perry

Investigative Services

Memphis Police Department

201 Poplar Ave 12th Floor

Memphis, TN 38103

Phone: (901) 636-3799

gerald.perry@memphistn.gov

Commander Linda M. Rosato-Barone

Acting Assistant Chief

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police

1203 Western Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15233

Phone: (412) 323-7800

linda.barone@city.pittsburgh.pa.us

Chief Margaret Ryan

Dryden Police Department

16 South Street, P.O. Box 820

Dryden, NY 13053

Phone: (607) 844-8118

Chief100@dryden-ny.org

Captain Ryan Remmers

Watertown Police Department

119 S. Maple St

Watertown, SD 57201

Phone: (605) 882-5238

rremmers@watertownpd.com

Syndi Guido

Director, Policy Office

Pennsylvania State Police

1800 Elmerton Avenue

Harrisburg, PA 17110

Phone: (717) 772-0905

sguido@state.pa.us

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Chief Cathy Lanier

Metropolitan Police Department

Government of the District of Columbia

300 Indiana Avenue NW, 5th Floor

Washington, DC 20001

Phone: (202) 737-4404

cathy.lanier@dc.gov

Senior Executive Assistant District Attorney 

James C. Quinn

Queens District Attorney’s Office

125-01 Queens Boulevard

Kew Gardens, NY, 11415

Phone: (718) 286-6230

JCQuinn@queensda.org

Chief Operating Officer Steven Jansen

Association of Prosecuting Attorneys

1615 L St. NW, Suite 650

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: (202) 861-2482

steven.jansen@apainc.org

John Goldkamp, PhD

Department of Criminal Justice

Temple University

Gladfelter Hall, 5th floor

1115 W. Berks Street

Philadelphia PA 19122

Phone: (215) 204-7918

goldkamp@temple.edu

The Honorable Truman A. Morrison III

Senior Judge

Superior Court of D.C.

Moultrie Courthouse

500 Indiana Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20001

Phone: (202) 879-1060

dysont@dcsc.gov

Director of Research David Carroll

National Legal Aid & Defender Association

1400 Connecticut Ave. NW, Ste. 900

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: (202) 452-0620 ext 233

d.carroll@nlada.org

Chief Operating Officer Cherise Burdeen

Pretrial Justice Institute

927 15th Street NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (202) 638-3080

Cherise@pji.org

Lynn Overmann

Access to Justice Initiative

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 3340

Washington, D.C. 20530

lynn.overmann2@usdoj.gov

Chief Deputy John L. Ford, III

Davidson County Sheriff’s Office

506 Second Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37201

Phone: (615) 862-8170

Ford@dcso.nashville.org

Chief Steve Martin

Hopewell Police Department

300 North Main Street

Hopewell, VA 23860

(804) 541-2282

smartin@hopewellva.gov

BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE

Senior Policy Advisor Kim Norris

Bureau of Justice Assistance

810 Seventh Street NW, 4th Floor

Washington, DC 20531

Phone: (202) 307-2076

Kim.Norris@usdoj.gov

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IACP STAFF/CONSULTING STAFF

Director of Research John Firman 

International Association of Chiefs of Police

515 N. Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

Phone: (703) 836-6767 ext. 207

firmanj@theiacp.org

Susan Weinstein

Grand Strategies, Inc.

4821 43rd Street NW

Washington, DC 20016

Phone: (202) 363-0014

spweinstein@hotmail.com

Chief Inspector William Sorukas Jr.

United States Marshals Service

Fellow – IACP Research Directorate

515 N. Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22134

Phone: (703) 836-6767 ext. 264

Sorukas@theiacp.org

Captain Seref Onder

Turkish National Police

IACP Visiting Fellow

515 N. Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

Phone: (703) 836-6767

onder@theiacp.org

Research Center Intern Matthew Seaman

International Association of Chiefs of Police

515 N. Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

Phone: (703) 836-6767 ext. 803

seaman@theiacp.org

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