2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-16-2002

Walker v. Horn

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket No. 01-1905

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Walker v. Horn" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 279.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/279
PRECEDENTIAL 

 Filed April 16, 2002 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 01-1905 and 01-1957 

MICHAEL TYRONE WALKER 

v. 

MARTIN HORN, Commissioner of Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections; JEFFREY BEARD, Deputy 

Commissioner of Treatment at Pennsylvania Department 

of Corrections; KENNETH KYLER, Superintendent at 

SCI-Camp Hill Prison; MARTIN LASKY, Medical Director of 

SCI-Camp Hill Prison; WILLIAM W. YOUNG, Medical 

Doctor of SCI-Camp Hill Prison; WILLIAM WARD, Unit 

Manager of SCI-Camp Hill Prison; ARTHUR AUXER, 

Associate Manager of SCI-Camp Hill Prison 

 Arthur Auxer, 

 Appellant at No. 01-1905 

MICHAEL TYRONE WALKER 

v. 

MARTIN HORN, Commissioner of Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections; JEFFREY BEARD, Deputy 

Commissioner of Treatment at Pennsylvania Department 

of Corrections; KENNETH KYLER, Superintendent at 

SCI-Camp Hill Prison; MARTIN LASKY, Medical Director of 

SCI-Camp Hill Prison; WILLIAM W. YOUNG, Medical 

Doctor of SCI-Camp Hill Prison; WILLIAM WARD, Unit 

Manager of SCI-Camp Hill Prison; ARTHUR AUXER, 

Associate Manager of SCI-Camp Hill Prison 

 Martin Lasky, 

 Appellant at No. 01-1957 

 

APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. No. 96-cv-00518) 

 District Judges: The Honorable Yvette Kane 

 The Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 

Argued January 24, 2002 

BEFORE: NYGAARD and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges , 

and SLEET,* District Judge. 

(Filed April 16, 2002) 
 Randall G. Gale, Esq. (Argued) 

 Thomas, Thomas & Hafer 

 305 North Front Street 

 PO Box 999 

 Harrisburg, PA 17108 

 Counsel for Appellant 

 at No. 01-1957 

 Michael A. Farnan, Esq. (Argued) 

 Department of Corrections 

 55 Utley Drive 

 Camp Hill, PA 17011 

 Counsel for Appellant 

 at No. 01-1905 

 Thomas M. Place, Esq. (Argued) 

 150 South College Street 

 Carlisle, PA 17013 

 Counsel for Appellee 

_________________________________________________________________ 

* Honorable Gregory M. Sleet, District Judge for the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 

 2 

 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 

These are two appeals from denials of summary judgment 

on the basis of qualified immunity. Appellee, a prisoner, 

filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 asserting that 

his constitutional rights were violated when he was force 

fed, allegedly after agreeing to end a fast. Two Defendants 

claim they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The 

District Court denied their motions for summary judgment, 

and they have appealed. Because the District Court’s order 

is based upon the existence of an issue of fact, we lack 

appellate jurisdiction and will dismiss both appeals. 

I. 

In interlocutory appeals from denials of summary 

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we must 

accept the District Court’s set of facts as given. See 

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995). Therefore, we 

have taken the following facts nearly verbatim from the 

District Court’s opinion and the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation: 

Appellee, Michael Tyrone Walker, was a prisoner in the 

Special Management Unit at the Pennsylvania State 

Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. He was confined in 

his cell twenty-three hours a day. He exercised in his cell 

by doing calisthenics at least sixty minutes each day and 

exercised outside of his cell each weekday for forty to fifty 

minutes by jogging and doing calisthenics. 
Walker is a practicing member of the Nation of Islam, a 

sect of the Islamic religion, which follows the teachings of 

Elijah Muhammad. During past years while incarcerated, 

Walker engaged in fasts for various periods of time as part 

of his sincerely-held religious beliefs. While fasting, he 

drinks liquids including juice, water, coffee, and iced tea, 

but eschews solid food. Members of the Nation of Islam fast 

during Ramadan and at other times during the year in 

accordance with the teachings of Elijah Muhammad. 

 3 

 

On August 22, 1995, Walker began such a fast. During 

the period from August 26, 1995 to August 30, 1995, 

Walker was examined by Dr. William W. Young. Dr. Young 

weighed Walker, took his blood pressure, listened to his 

breathing, and examined his eyes. Dr. Young did not seek 

to extract Walkers’s blood for testing, nor did he urge 

Walker to cease fasting or discontinue exercising. However, 

on one occasion Walker, upon request, provided the 

medical department with a urine sample. 

Walker has frequently fasted during his incarceration and 

on numerous occasions has engaged in fasts of three to 

fifteen days long. This time, however, the Department of 

Corrections, SCI-Camp Hill, sought an ex parte injunction 

from the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, 

Pennsylvania, which would authorize the medical staff at 

SCI-Camp Hill to force feed Walker. Walker told Dr. Young 

that he was on a religious fast. Nonetheless, the complaint 

alleged that Walker was simply on a "hunger strike." An 

affidavit by Appellant Dr. Martin Lasky was attached to the 

application for injunctive relief. 

The only information considered by the Court of Common 

Pleas was Dr. Lasky’s affidavit of August 30, 1995 in which 

he stated that, based upon his observation, Walker 

"appeared somewhat lethargic, slow walking and spoke with 

a slight slur." Dr. Lasky stated that these observations 

"could be the effects of starvation and dehydration" and 

that unless Walker received nutrition and hydration"as 

soon as possible," he would suffer serious harm and 

"possibly death." Walker was not given a medical 

examination by Dr. Lasky, but Dr. Lasky did speak to 

Walker through his cell door before giving the August 30, 

1995 affidavit. 

On August 31, 1995, the Court of Common Pleas entered 

an order authorizing the medical department to force feed 

Walker. The court also entered orders on August 31, 1995 

scheduling a hearing for September 5, 1995 and appointing 

counsel to represent Walker at the hearing. At the 

September 5, 1995 hearing, the preliminary injunction was 

continued upon agreement of the parties. 

On August 31, 1995, Dr. Lasky came to Walker’s cell and 

 4 

 
told him that the medical department had obtained a court 

order permitting them to force feed him. Walker informed 

Dr. Lasky that he was fasting for religious reasons. Dr. 

Lasky told Walker that he would be forced-fed. Shortly 

thereafter, Walker was taken from his cell to the infirmary. 

He was stripped and strapped to a hospital bed with ankle 

and wrist restraints. A chest strap was used to prevent him 

from moving on the bed. As Walker was being strapped to 

the hospital bed, he told Ward, Auxer,1 Dr. Young, and Dr. 

Lasky, who were all standing near the bed, that he was 

willing to stop his fast to avoid being force fed. Auxer told 

Walker that his decision to eat solid food came too late to 

avoid being force fed. Then, nurses under Dr. Lasky’s 

supervision inserted a plastic tube through Walker’s nose 

and into his stomach. 

Walker informed medical personnel that he did not 

eat meat or milk products as both foods caused his 

stomach to be upset. Notwithstanding that warning, and 

acknowledging that Walker’s medical records verified that 

he was a vegetarian, Dr. Lasky told Walker that he would 

be force fed the foods that were being served to the general 

prison population. Walker was then force fed liquefied liver 

and mashed potatoes containing milk. 

Sometime after the force feeding of the noon meal, Walker 

again told medical personnel including Dr. Lasky that he 

was willing to cease his fast and that certain foods caused 

his stomach to be upset. Dr. Lasky told Walker that the 

feeding tube would not be removed from his body and that 

he would be required to eat the evening meal with the 

feeding tube in place. When informed that the evening meal 

would include spaghetti with meat, Walker again told Dr. 

Lasky that eating meat caused his stomach to be upset. 

Once again, ignoring Walker’s warning, Dr. Lasky told 

Walker that he would be required to eat the food being 

served to the general population. Under the threat of force 

feeding being resumed if he refused, Walker ate the meal. 

Understandably, the presence of the feeding tube caused 

Walker great discomfort each time he swallowed. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Auxer was the Associate Manager of the Special Management Unit at 

SCI-Camp Hill. 

 5 

 

During the night, after being required to eat the meal 

with meat, Walker vomited. He was still restrained by wrist 

and chest restraints which significantly limited his 

movement. So, the vomiting caused him to gag and choke. 

The following morning, Walker asked Dr. Lasky to remove 

the feeding tube. Dr. Lasky refused and told Walker that 

the tube would remain in his body until at least the next 

day after breakfast. Walker was required to eat three meals 

on September 1, 1995, and breakfast and lunch on 

September 2, 1995, with the feeding tube in his body. 

Throughout this period, he continued to be strapped to the 
bed by ankle and wrist restraints. He was released from the 

restraints only for short periods of time during the day. 

Walker claims that Appellants’ conduct violated his rights 

under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Walker also claims that Appellants violated the Religious 

Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C.S 2000bb. The 

District Court dismissed the RFRA claim on December 31, 

1997. Walker seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and 

compensatory damages from Appellants in their individual 

capacities. 

Appellants filed numerous pre-trial motions, and a 

Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation. 

After considering the parties’ objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, the District Court issued its 

Memorandum and Order. The only motions relevant to this 

appeal are the summary judgment motions of Auxer and 

Dr. Lasky who both argue that they are immune from suit 

under the doctrine of qualified immunity. 

The District Court denied summary judgment to Auxer 

stating: 

 [W]e believe that plaintiff ’s statement in his affidavit 

 and deposition that he told defendant Auxer that he 

 would stop his fast in order to avoid being force fed is 

 sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on 

 the plaintiff ’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

Similarly, the District Court denied summary judgment to 

Lasky stating: 

 There are also genuine issues of material fact 

 surrounding the various conversations between the 

 6 

 

 plaintiff and defendant Lasky and defendant Lasky’s 

 conduct in response thereto. Accordingly, we find that 

 the instant record raises genuine issues of material 

 fact surrounding defendant Lasky’s actions with 

 respect to plaintiff ’s claims under the Eighth 

 Amendment. 

As illustrated above, in each case the District Court’s 

decision turned upon the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. 

II. 

A. 

As an initial matter, we must consider whether we have 

jurisdiction over these appeals. We have recently 

summarized the relevant law and its background in In re 

Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. 

denied, 531 U.S. 1126 (2001): 
 As a general rule, the federal appellate courts have no 

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review 

 interlocutory decisions such as a denial of summary 

 judgment. Nevertheless, the collateral-order doctrine 

 excepts a narrow range of interlocutory decisions from 

 the general rule. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 

 Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed.1528 

 (1949). To fall within the doctrine, an interlocutory 

 decision must conclusively determine the disputed 

 issue, the issue must be completely separate from the 

 merits of the action, and the decision must be 

 effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 

 judgment. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 

 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed.2d 351 (1978). 

 The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the 

 collateral-order doctrine to hold that orders denying 

 absolute immunity are reviewable on interlocutory 

 appeal. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 731, 102 

 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1982) (finding appellate 

 jurisdiction over denial of president’s claim to absolute 

 immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 99 S. 

 7 

 

 Ct. 2445, 61 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1979) (reviewing claim of 

 immunity under Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. 

 United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 

 2d 651 (1977) (reviewing claim of immunity under 

 Double Jeopardy Clause); see also Carver v. Foerster, 

 102 F.3d 96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1996). In doing so, the 

 Court has explained that absolute immunity creates 

 not only protection from liability, but also a right not to 

 stand trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 

 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985). If required 

 to await final judgment on the merits of the underlying 

 action before seeking appellate review, the appellant 

 would irretrievably lose the right not to stand trial in 

 the first place. See id. Thus, interlocutory review of the 

 Appellants’ absolute immunity claims is necessary to 

 preserve the protections such immunity affords. 

 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court extended the collateral- 

 order doctrine to include denial of claims to qualified 

 immunity. See id.; see also Brown v. United States, 851 

 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, denial of 

 qualified immunity falls within the collateral-order 

 doctrine only to the extent the denial turns on an issue 

 of law. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 

 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed.2d 238 (1995); see also Grant v. 

 City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1996) 

 ("To the extent [that] they turn on an issue of law, 

 decisions denying public officials qualified immunity 

 are considered final under the collateral order 

 doctrine.") (emphasis added). Generally, the relevant 

 issue of law is whether the right the defendant is 

 alleged to have violated was "clearly established" at the 

 time the defendant acted or failed to act. See Behrens 

 v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L. 
 Ed.2d 773 (1996). Where, however, denial turns on the 

 sufficiency of the evidence, it may not be appealed until 

 the district court enters final judgment in the case. See 

 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151. 

In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d at 373-74. Thus, we 

only have jurisdiction over the District Court’s order 

denying qualified immunity to the extent that it involves an 

issue of law. 

 8 

 

Furthermore, as we discussed in In re Montgomery 

County, the Supreme Court has given us clear guidance on 

the limits of our jurisdiction in these sorts of appeals. In 

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), the Court held that 

when a District Court rests its denial of summary judgment 

on the basis of qualified immunity on the existence of a 

genuine issue of fact, then we have no jurisdiction. Id. at 

307. In those instances where the District Court denied 

summary judgment for a purely legal reason, we do have 

jurisdiction, but we must adopt the facts assumed by the 

District Court. Id. at 319. 

B. 

Application of the law to this case is quite simple. In both 

the cases of Auxer and Dr. Lasky, the District Court denied 

summary judgment because it found the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Walker’s Eighth Amendment 

claims turn on whether Auxer and Dr. Lasky knew that 

Walker had agreed to eat to avoid being force fed. The 

District Court found this fact in dispute. We cannot, in an 

interlocutory appeal of this nature, consider whose version 

of the facts is correct. This is not an ordinary appeal from 

summary judgment where we would apply the same 

standard as the District Court to determine whether 

summary judgment was properly granted. Instead, this is 

an interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment 

on the basis of qualified immunity. We must accept the 

District Court’s version of the facts, and we only have 

jurisdiction to review questions of law. Since the District 

Court’s decision turned upon the existence of genuine issue 

of material fact, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal 

and must dismiss it.2 

III. 

In sum, and for the reasons given above, we will dismiss 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. Appellants do not, and could not persuasively, argue that they are 

entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts that the District Court 

accepted for the purposes of deciding their motion for summary 

judgment. 

 9 

 
A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

 10