* F.A. Little, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge, Western District

of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-10162

FREDERICK STRONG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

CITY OF DALLAS; ET AL,

Defendants,

CITY OF DALLAS; BENNIE CLICK, in his personal capacity; MICHAEL

DOERINGSFELD, in his personal capacity; DORA ALICIA SAUCEDO

FALLS, in her personal capacity; RANDY HAMPTON, in his personal

capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(00-CV-1532)

December 11, 2002

Before JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, * District Judge.

PER CURIAM: **

Plaintiff Frederick Strong appea ls the grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendant, the Cit y of Dallas, in his2

Title VII and § 1983 suit for wrongful termination. Because the

district court did not ab use its discretion in excluding the

statistical evidence at issue in this appeal, we affirm the grant

of summary judgment.

I.

This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. Patel

v. Midland Memorial Hospital and Medical Center

, 298 F.3d 333, 339

(5 th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving

party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

II.

Frederick Strong was employed by the City of Dallas as a

police officer. Prior to, and during his employment as a police

officer, Strong worked for and assisted his brother’s used car

sales business, which appears to have engaged in unscrupulous and

possibly fraudulent practices. After a co mplaint from a fellow

officer, the Public Integrity Unit commenced an investigation of

Strong. That investigation revealed ten allegations of wrongdoing

against Stron g, including purchasing cars from auto auctions

without payment, selling a motor vehicle acquired by theft, passing

a forged document to obtain a certified copy of a vehicle title,

failing to submit a request to the City for outside employment,

wearing his uniform while conducting personal business and

attending a civil court proceeding, giving inconsistent statements3

about his ownership of a vehicle, making untruthful statements

about compensation from the sale of a vehicle, and using his

position as a police officer for private gain. These acts violated

the Dallas Police Department Code of Conduct. After a disciplinary

hearing, Strong was terminated. While the United States Attorney

was investigating his actions, he filed this suit, alleging racial

discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment

because it found Strong was unable to demonstrate that the adverse

employment action was the result of racial discrimination.

Strong argues on appeal tha t the district court abused its

great discretion by excluding stati stical evidence that had been

obtained from the Dallas Police Dep artment’s public records

database. Strong alleges that this evidence shows black officers

were statis tically more likely to be disciplined than white

officers. Evidentiary decisions by the district court are reviewed

for abuse of discretion. S t. Romain v. Industrial Fabrication

, 203

F.3d 376, 381 (5 th Cir. 2000). The district court excluded this

e vidence because it was unauthenticated under Rule 901 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. This ruling was correct. There is no

indication of the validity or authenticity of the information

contained in the database on which the statistical analysis is

based. Further, because of the unknown validity of the underlying

data, this evidence cannot be proper summary evidence under Rule

1 006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as Strong urg es.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s4

exclusion of this evidence.

Even if this evidence were rel iable and accepted by the

district co urt, Strong is unable to survive summary judgment

because this evidence is inadequate to establish that his

individual discharge was racially discriminatory. Even if he were

able to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green

, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), ultimately he is unable to

demonstrate that the proffered non-discriminatory reasons for

discharge were untrue. S ee Wallace v. Methodist Hospital System

,

271 F.3d 212, 219-220 (5th Cir. 2 001). Furthermore, he has

offered no evidence that the documented reasons were somehow a

pretext for racial discrimination, a showing he must make by a

preponderance of the evidence. M cDaniel v. Temple Independent

School District

, 770 F.2d 1340, 1346 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,

summary judgment was appropriate in this case.

III.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court

is

AFFIRMED.