* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

s hould not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 98-20403

Summary Calendar

_______________

ANNE W. ROBINSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-96-H-3702)

_________________________

January 19, 1999

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: *

In this title VII employment discrimination case, Anne

Robinson appe als a summary judgment in favor of defendant Baker

Hughes Oil f ield Operations, Inc. (“Baker”). Because Robinson

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Baker's

proffered evidence of a nonretaliatory motive, we affirm.2 I.

Robinson worked for Teleco Oilfield Services, Inc. (“Teleco”),

f rom January 1984 until she was laid off in July 1986. In 1989,

she was rehired as an assembler. In June 1992, Baker purchased

Teleco and relocated Robinson from Connecticut to Houston, Texas,

where she was assigned to work as an electronic assembler.

F rom 1993 through 1996, Connie Desiata served as Robi nson’s

supervisor. Desiata testified that she noticed recurrent job

performance problems with Robinson and that Robinson reacted

defensively to constructive criticism. At one point, Robinson

claimed that her co-workers had sabotaged her work product, a claim

that was not substantiated by Baker's investigation. Robinson’s

co-workers began to complain of difficulty in working with her.

On a more objective level, Desiata documented Robinson’s poor

han dback record. “Handbacks” are products returned to the

assembler on account of their sub standard assembly. Between

September and December 1995, only 15 of Robinson’s 37 assembled

products were deemed acceptable, and Robinson’s 68% handback rate

far exceeded Baker’s workmanship standards.

In February 1996, the “Le ad Night Person” position became

available in Houston, and Robinson applied for it. Her application

was rejected, and Desiata explained to her that this was because of

her performance and conduct. Robinson was upset and suffered an

anxiety attack requiring hospitalization. She also claims that she

was denied the position b ecause of her race: Robinson is black,

and the co-worker who was promoted to the Lead Night Person3

position was not black.

In the days following the Lead Night Person annou ncement,

Robinson showed up at work sporadically and spoke to Desiata in

abusive terms. Robinson was warned that her conduct would not be

tolerated and that her quality of work needed to improve. Baker

arranged for an additional workmanship training class for Robinson;

she was upset by this, calling it punishment. Following the

recommendation of Robinson’s doctor, Baker placed Ro b inson on

short-term disability lea ve and sought a less stressful position

for her.

On April 3, 1996, Robinson filed a discrimination charge with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that

Baker had discriminated against her when it failed to assign her to

the Lead Night Position. On April 29, Robinson returned to work in

the repair group, a transfer Baker had arranged i n its effort to

accommodate her condi tion. Baker contends that Robinson’s work

performance and conduct problems persisted, leading to her firing

on May 17, 1996. Robinson contends that this was in retaliation

for her complaint to the EEOC.

II.

Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee in

retaliation for his exercise of title VII rights. M attern v.

Eastman Kodak Co.

, 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

,

118 S. Ct . 336 (1997). The elements for a title VII claim are:

(1) an employee’s exercise of his title VII rights; (2) the4

employer’s decision to take adverse employment action; an d (3) a

causal connection between the employee’s title VII activity and the

adverse action. Id.

The parties do not dispute that the first two of these

elements have been satisfied. The sole issue is whether Baker’s

action against Robinson was causally connected to the EEOC claim.

To withstand a motion f or summary judgment, a title VII

plaintiff must first establish the prima facie elements of his

claim. See H all v. Gillman

, 81 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1996).

Robinson has done so: The satisfaction of elements one and two is

undisputed, a nd the satisfaction of the third element can be

inferred from the proximity of the EEOC complaint to the discharge.

See Swanson v. General Servs. Admin.

, 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 366 (1997).

Following the presentment of a prima facie case, a title VII

defendant is entitled “to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its disparate treatme nt of the

plaintiff.” H all

, 81 F.3d at 37. That is, Baker had an

opportunity to rebut the inferenc e that the third element of

Robinson’s claim SS causation SS has been established. Baker

successfully availed itself of this opportunity by explaining that

Robinson was fired not because of the EEOC complaint but because of

poor workmanship SS an explanation fully supported by the record.

“[O]nce [an] employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the

plaintiff must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer5

that retaliation was the real motive.” S wanson

, 110 F.3d at 1188.

This Robinson utterly failed to do. Instead, she asserts that

Baker has never rebutted the inference of retaliatory motive, for

Baker’s explanation does not account for b oth the adverse action

and its timing. More specifically, Robinson avers that Baker has

failed to explain why it discharged her when it did.

Robinson’s argument does not hold water. The record indicates

that Baker had good reason to fire her for poor workmanship and

attitude since, at the very least, December 1995. Thus, Baker

would have been justified in firing Robinson at any time during

1996, and the interposition of an EEOC claim did not undermine the

legitimacy of Baker’s decision. To hold otherwise would give even

the worst of employees a means of protection against discharge via

the filing of frivolous title VII claims.

Moreover, Baker’s explanation did go specifically to the

timing of its decision to terminate Robinson: She was terminated

only after she failed to perform satisfactorily in a different

capacity in another department. Baker gave Robinson several

“second chances” to improve her performance and fired her only

after she had failed to avail herself of yet another one of these

opportunities.

Because Robinson has not established a genuine issue of

material fact wit h regard to the credibility of Baker’s asserted

reason for firing her, summary judgment was the appropriate vehicle

for disposing of her claim. S ee Hall

, 81 F.3d at 37; Ray v. Tandem

Computers, Inc.

, 63 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that6

“bald assertions of . . . discrimination are inadequate” to rebut

a title VII defendant’s reaso nable explanation). The judgment is

AFFIRMED.