IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

TIMOTHY MCANDREW, 

Administrator of the Estate of 

MEGHAN MCANDREW, Deceased, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, 

JAMES HOSKIN, and 

JOHN DOES 1-6, 

 Defendants. 

 No. 4:22-CV-00834 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

JANUARY 17, 2024 

I. BACKGROUND 

Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second 

Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Now on 

the third iteration of this suit, Timothy McAndrew has sued Northumberland 

County, Corrections Officer James Hoskin, and six unnamed Corrections Officers 

on behalf of his daughter, Meghan McAndrew, following her death by suicide at the 

Northumberland County Jail. The motion is now ripe for disposition; for the reasons 

that follow, it is granted in part and denied in part. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint, 

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1

 and 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

2

 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’”3

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed 

that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court 

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note of the 

elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations that, 

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of 

truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations” and 

then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”4

 

B. Facts Alleged in the Second Amended Complaint 

The facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, which this Court must 

accept as true for purposes of this motion, are as follows. 

1

 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 

2

 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

3

 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

4

 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). 

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1. The Intake Process and Suicide Watch Protocol 

As noted above, Timothy McAndrew (“Mr. McAndrew”) is the father of the 

deceased, Meghan McAndrew (“Ms. McAndrew”).5

 After being taken into custody 

on February 6, 2022, the Northumberland County Jail (the “Jail”) housed Ms. 

McAndrew until her death five days later.6

 During the intake process, Ms. 

McAndrew indicated that she was an addict and that she had used drugs earlier that 

day.7

 Due to a prior incarceration, the Jail was also aware that she had a history of 

mental illness, including a suicide attempt and a stint in a psychiatric facility.8

 The 

Jail subsequently placed Ms. McAndrew on suicide watch and gave its staff “certain 

‘alerts,’ including that she was to be placed in a cell with only a low bunk and [that] 

she was to be checked every” fifteen minutes.9

 Despite this, her cell had both a top 

and bottom bunk.10 

2. Ms. McAndrew’s Suicide 

Jail staff last checked on Ms. McAndrew at 9:26 a.m. on February 11, 202211

and then failed to perform nine suicide watch checks.12 While unsupervised, Ms. 

McAndrew “fashioned her bedsheet into a noose” and proceeded to hang herself 

5

 See Doc. 31 (Second Amended Compl.) ¶ 2. 

6

 See id. ¶ 11 

7

 See id. ¶¶ 13-16. 

8

 See id. ¶¶ 20-22. 

9

 Id. ¶ 17. 

10 See id. ¶ 18. 

11 See id. ¶ 40. 

12 See id. ¶ 41. 

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“from the top bunk in her cell.”13 Inmates alerted Corrections Officer (“CO”) Hoskin 

“that something was wrong with Ms. McAndrew” at 11:52 a.m. and she was 

pronounced dead after being transported to a hospital.14 

3. Other Suicides 

Ms. McAndrew is not the Jail’s first inmate suicide. Mr. McAndrew identified 

three suicides that occurred at the Jail before his daughter’s death. Andrew Beers 

committed suicide at the Jail on August 13, 2013; no further details regarding the 

circumstances of his death were provided.15 On June 15, 2014, Cyrus Lewis “was 

supposed to be on [fifteen]-minute suicide checks” but “was discovered by other 

inmates approximately one hour after he was last checked by a CO.”16 Mr. Lewis 

had been “housed alone and [had] placed a sheet in front of the window to his cell 

and no CO noticed this for at least one hour until he was discovered by another 

inmate.”17 Finally, Sean Beers committed suicide on September 15, 2021 by 

“hanging himself using the bedsheets provided to him by the Jail.”18 It is not stated 

whether Mr. Beers was on suicide watch, but it is alleged that no investigation 

occurred and no remedial actions were taken following his suicide.19 

13 Id. ¶ 42. 

14 Id. ¶ 40, 43. 

15 See id. ¶ 77. 

16 Id. ¶ 78. 

17 Id. ¶ 79. 

18 Id. ¶¶ 23-24. 

19 See id. ¶ 25. 

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4. Roles of the Defendants 

Northumberland County (“the County”) “owns, operates, manages, directs 

and controls the [Jail] and had the responsibility of adopting policies and 

implementing procedures and practices which would create an environment whereby 

inmates would be safe.”20 The Jail’s COs “are required to monitor and ensure the 

safety of individuals identified as suicidal.”21 The investigative report into Ms. 

McAndrew’s death further states that COs perform the suicide watch checks.22

Hoskin and the six unnamed COs were on-duty the morning of Ms. McAndrew’s 

suicide.23

5. Training in Place at the Jail 

Mr. McAndrew contends that “the Jail did not have any consistent suicide 

prevention training in place” at the time of Ms. McAndrew’s death.24 It is further 

alleged that (1) only “some COs may have been shown a one-hour video on suicide 

prevention”;25 (2) the County “failed to provide COs with training regarding warning 

signs of potential suicides”26 and (3) the “investigative report completed by [the] 

Northumberland County District Attorney’s Office cited only one suicide 

20 Id. ¶ 8 

21 Id. ¶ 69. 

22 See id. ¶ 74. 

23 See id. ¶¶ 39-42. 

24 Id. ¶ 65. 

25 Id. ¶ 67. 

26 Id. ¶ 70. 

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prevention-related policy in place for COs at the Jail: inmates identified as suicidal 

were to be checked by COs every fifteen” minutes.27

C. Analysis 

The Court will first evaluate the constitutional violations asserted in Counts I 

and III of the Second Amended Complaint before proceeding to the state law claims 

brought in Counts II, IV, and V. 

1. Count I –Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments Pursuant to Section 1983 

Ms. McAndrew’s rights as a pretrial detainee are governed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.28 The Court has previously concluded that 

Mr. McAndrew has satisfied the Third Circuit’s three-prong test for determining if 

a pre-trial detainee’s claim “arising from a jail suicide” violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment as asserted against the County and the unnamed COs.29 The Court will 

therefore focus on Defendant Hoskin. 

Although Hoskin’s arguments concerning his lack of personal involvement in 

the constitutional violation and his entitlement to qualified immunity are not overly 

persuasive, he will nevertheless be dismissed with prejudice from this case. Mr. 

27 Id. ¶74. 

28 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 7. 

29 Id. at 12-13. 

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McAndrew failed to respond in his Opposition Brief to any of Hoskin’s arguments 

and in fact endorses his dismissal.30 

2. Count III – Monell Claim 

The Court will instead turn its attention to the Monell claim asserted against 

the County in Count III.31 “Courts have recognized two avenues to municipal 

liability under Monell.”32 “A municipality and its officials acting in their official 

capacities can be sued directly under § 1983 only if an action pursuant to a municipal 

policy, practice or custom directly causes a constitutional tort.”33 “A plaintiff may 

put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or 

her injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality 

that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.”34 

 As noted above, the Court has already concluded that Mr. McAndrew has 

plausibly asserted a constitutional violation of Ms. McAndrew’s Fourteenth 

30 See Doc. 34 (Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second 

Amended Compl.) at 6. 

31 If Mr. McAndrew were to pursue a claim against the unnamed COs in their official capacities, 

these claims would be duplicative of the Monell claim asserted against the County. See Hafer 

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Further, the Monell framework is inapplicable to the unnamed 

COs when they are sued in their personal capacities as Monell is a vehicle for municipal 

liability. See id. The appropriate claim against these individuals is the Fourteenth Amendment 

violation pursuant to § 1983 as asserted in Count I of the Second Amended Complaint. As 

such, the unnamed COs will be dismissed with prejudice from Count III of the Second 

Amended Complaint. 

32 Alexander v. Bucks Cnty., Civ. A. No. 21-CV-4633, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *15-16 

(E.D. Pa. May 2, 2023). 

33 Kelley v. Bradford Cnty., 3:07-CV-1531, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27290, at *20 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 

23, 2010). 

34 Alexander, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *16 (quoting Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 

(3d Cir. 2019)). 

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Amendment rights against the County and the on-duty COs.35 Under the Monell 

framework, this is not the end of the analysis; by contrast, it must also be determined 

whether Mr. McAndrew has adequately alleged that this constitutional violation was 

due to the County’s failure to train its COs. “A municipality may be held liable for 

its failure to train employees only where that failure amounts to ‘deliberate 

indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons’” its employees will “come in 

contact” with.36 “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault ‘requiring 

proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his 

action.’”37 “There are two means of finding such deliberate indifference in a failure 

to train claim: (1) through a pattern of similar constitutional violations providing a 

municipal actor with notice; and (2) ‘single-incident’ liability.”38

 When asserting a failure to train claim based on a pattern of similar violations, 

deliberate indifference is sufficiently pled by showing “(1) municipal policymakers 

know that employees will confront a particular situation[,] (2) the situation involves 

a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling[,] and (3) the wrong choice 

by an employee will frequently cause [the] deprivation of constitutional rights.”39

35 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 12-13. 

36 Gaymon v. Esposito, Civ. A. No. 11-4170, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116159, at *45 (D.N.J. Aug. 

16, 2013) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). 

37 Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)). 

38 Id. at *46. 

39 Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Doe v. Luzerne 

Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011)). 

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“Further, causation between the noticed training deficiency and the injury must be 

shown.”40 

 In the limited circumstances where a single incident is sufficient to put a 

municipality on notice, “the need for training ‘can be said to be so obvious that [a 

municipality’s] failure to do so could properly be characterized as deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights.’”41 The “risk of injury must be a ‘highly 

predictable consequence’ of the municipality’s failure to train and supervise its 

employees.”42 “Even if that showing can be made, the plaintiff still must demonstrate 

that the failure to train ‘proximately caused [the] constitutional injury by identifying 

a particular failure in a training program that is closely related to the ultimate 

injury.’”43 

 Although Mr. McAndrew has now provided information regarding three other 

suicides, as previously noted by the Court,44 a failure to train claim through a single 

incident remains the “most viable Monell theory to come from the” allegations.45

40 Gaymon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116159, at *47. 

41 Alexander, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *23 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n. 

10). 

42 Santiago v. City of Harrisburg, Civ. No. 1:19-CV-898, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50359, at *29 

(M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2020) (quoting Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 

2014)). 

43 Id. at *29 (quoting Buoniconti v. City of Philadelphia, 148 F. Supp. 3d 425, 441 (E.D. Pa. 

2015)). 

44 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 20. 

45 Id. This conclusion is supported by a comparison to other prison suicide cases. The Western 

District of Pennsylvania concluded that “one suicide and two, or perhaps four, suicide 

attempts” prior to the decedent’s suicide “hardly constitutes a spate.” Herman v. Clearfield 

Cnty., 836 F. Supp. 1178, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1993). 

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Mr. McAndrew’s averments in the Second Amended Complaint satisfy the “first 

hurdle” of such a claim: it is highly predictable that inmates on suicide watch in a 

significantly understaffed jail would be neglected.46 In fact, “after ignoring Ms. 

McAndrew for hours, COs were not even the ones to find that she had taken her 

life[;]” her “fellow inmates noticed something was wrong and had to alert” Hoskin.47

Thus, the on-duty “COs completely abandoned an at-risk inmate for hours when she 

most required supervision.”48 This is particularly confounding given that at least one 

other suicide happened under nearly identical circumstances: an individual on 

suicide watch used Jail-provided bedsheets to facilitate their suicide after COs failed 

to perform the suicide watch checks.49 These allegations are sufficient, at this stage 

of the proceeding, to satisfy this initial requirement. 

 To successfully plead causation, Mr. McAndrew must identify “the training 

program that the plaintiff believes is deficient, describe that deficiency, and explain 

how the deficiency caused the” injuries.50 Notably, the Second Amended Complaint 

46 Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 20-21. 

47 Id. at 21. 

48 Id.

49 See Doc. 31 (Second Amended Compl.) ¶¶ 78-79. The Defendants outline at considerable 

length allegations they consider to be missing from the Second Amended Complaint. See Doc. 

33 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second Amended 

Complaint) at 13, 17-18. While this information would indeed be relevant, it is not necessary 

at this stage of the proceeding. Further, much of the suggested information presumably would 

be in the Defendants’ hands and only available through discovery. 

50 Alexander, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76883, at *25. 

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includes new allegations that directly respond to the issues identified by the Court 

in its August 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion.51 

 First, Mr. McAndrew clarifies the role the County plays in managing the Jail: 

it “owns, operates, manages, directs and controls the [Jail] and had the responsibility 

of adopting policies and implementing procedures and practices which would create 

an environment whereby inmates would be safe.”52 Consequently, the County had 

the responsibility to ensure adequate training policies and programs existed at the 

Jail. 

 Next, Mr. McAndrew describes the relevant training programs related to 

suicide prevention and detecting suicide warning signs. He contends that the Jail 

lacked “any consistent suicide prevention training” before Ms. McAndrew’s death.53

Only “some COs may have been shown a one-hour video on suicide prevention”54

and the COs received no “training regarding [the] warning signs of potential 

suicides.”55 The “investigative report completed by [the] Northumberland County 

District Attorney’s Office [also] cited only one suicide prevention-related policy in 

place for COs at the Jail: inmates identified as suicidal were to be checked by COs 

51 See Doc. 29 (Aug. 21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion) at 21. 

52 Doc. 31 (Second Amended Compl.) ¶ 8. 

53 Id. ¶ 65. 

54 Id. ¶ 67. 

55 Id. ¶ 70. 

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every fifteen” minutes.56 Accordingly, Mr. McAndrew has identified with 

particularity the deficiencies in these training programs. 

 Finally, these inadequacies are then linked to Ms. McAndrew’s death. Before 

her suicide, Ms. McAndrew slept for “long periods of time without any lights on in 

her cell,” had “virtually no contact with other inmates” and suffered from withdrawal 

symptoms.57 These “potential warning signs” leading up to her suicide “could have 

been identified if Northumberland County had provided its COs with suicide 

prevention training.”58 Further, it is alleged that the lack in training regarding “the 

necessary precautions to avoid [inmate] suicides” contributed to Ms. McAndrew’s 

placement in a cell alone with access to supplies that facilitated her suicide and the 

corrections officers’ failure to conduct the required suicide checks.59 In light of these 

new allegations, the Court concludes that Mr. McAndrew has adequately pled a 

failure to train Monell claim against the County. 

3. Wrongful Death and Survival Actions – Counts IV and V 

 The Defendants contend that the wrongful death and survival actions brought 

by Mr. McAndrew are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims 

Act” (“PSTCA”). The PSTCA “provides a general grant of immunity to political 

subdivisions, their departments and employees when acting in the scope of their 

56 Id. ¶ 74. 

57 Id. ¶¶ 29-31. 

58 Id. ¶ 72. 

59 Id.. ¶¶ 73, 84-85, 87, 112. 

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employment but provides limited exceptions for such recoveries against political 

subdivisions.”60 

 “The Wrongful Death and Survival Act did not create a new theory of liability 

but merely allowed a tort claim of the decedent to be prosecuted.”61 “As a result, a 

plaintiff must state all the elements of a valid tort” to pursue these claims.62 Here, 

Mr. McAndrew contends that he is permitted to proceed with the wrongful death and 

survival actions because he is alleging constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983.63

Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Third Circuit have decided 

“whether § 1983, independently or in conjunction with state law, may be used by 

survivors when the decedent’s death resulted from a constitutional violation.”64

Although “differing results” have been reached in this Circuit, “I shall take the same 

approach as the Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel [in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania] did in Moyer v. Berks Heim Nursing Home,” and “I will allow these 

claims to proceed.”65 “After discovery, the parties may address the propriety of these 

claims.”66 

60 DeJesus v. City of Lancaster, Civ. A. No. 14-CV-3437, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32453, at *6 

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2015). 

61 Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F. Supp. 2d 656, 674 n. 10 (W.D. Pa. 2012). 

62 Id. 63 See Doc. 34 (Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second 

Amended Compl.) at 15-16. 

64 DeJesus, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32453, at *7 (citing Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okl., 990 F.2d 

1489, 1502 (10th Cir. 1990) and Moyer v. Berks Heim Nursing Home, Civ. A. No. 13-CV4497, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36600 (E.D. Pa. 2014)). 

65 Id. at *7. 

66 Id. 

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4. Count II – Medical Negligence against the “Medical 

Defendants” 

 Mr. McAndrew has not identified whom the “Medical Defendants” are in the 

Second Amended Complaint.67 He will be given two weeks from the date of the 

accompanying Order to show cause as to why this claim shall not be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part. Except to show cause regarding the 

potential dismissal of the unidentified “Medical Defendants,” Mr. McAndrew will 

not be provided any further opportunities to amend this complaint. 

An appropriate Order follows. 

 BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

67 See Doc. 33 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Second 

Amended Compl.) at 19. The “Medical Defendants” similarly were unidentified in the First 

Amended Complaint. See Doc. 20 (First Amended Compl.) ¶¶ 84-87. 

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