UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LUCKY EMAKPOR , Plaintiff,

v. FIRST COAST SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC. , Defendant. Case No. 1:18-cv-00157 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM ORDER Before the Court are the Defendant’s Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1; the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the case back to the Superior Court of the Dis trict of Columbia, ECF No. 6, which is fully b riefed; and the part ies’ responses to th e Court’s sua sponte Order of March 15, 2018 seeking briefing on the timeliness of the Defend ant’s removal, ECF Nos. 10 and 14. Upon consideration of the pleadings, relevant law, related legal memoranda in opposition and in support, and the entire record, I find that r emoval was untimely. This matter will be remanded to the Superior Court of the District o f Columbia. On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff Lucky Emakpor filed his pro se claim in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the Dis trict of Columbia, seeking at least $3,600 in funds allegedly im properly withheld from his paycheck. Certified Copy of Transfer Order and Docket Sheet, ECF No. 4, at 5, 7. First Coast removed the case to federal court on January 24, 2018, citing federal question juri sdiction. Not. of Removal ¶ 6. First Coast stated that removal was timely as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) as it received the summons and complaint on December 26, 2017, and th at jurisdiction andvenue are proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Id . ¶¶ 2, 5-7

. Mr. Emakpor, still pro se at the time, opposed First Coast’s assertion of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. for Remand. Because the Superior Court docket showed that service had been effectuated on November 22, 2017, seemingly making First Coast’s removal untim ely by over a month, I ordered First Coast to explain why removal was timely. Minute Order March 15, 2018;

see also Def.’s Response in Supp. of Timely Removal, ECF No. 10. Mr. E makpor, through retained counsel, has filed an o mnibus response to First Coast’ s opposition to the motion to remand and its response to First Coast’s explanation as to w hy removal was timely. Pl.’s Omnibus Response to Def.’s Opp. t o Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, ECF No . 14. A notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days after the re ceipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based”. 28 U.S. C. § 1446(b). Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, Williams v. Howard Univ ., 984 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 1997), and on a motion to remand, the defendant bears the burde n of proving that the court has jurisdiction. Phillips v. Corrections Corp. of America , 407 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). In this case, I do not need to determine whether the Court’s fe deral question jurisdiction is properly invoked because First Coast clearly re moved the matter beyond the statutorily-prescribed time peri od. Per District of Columbia C ode,

Actions shall be commenced in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch by the filing of a statement of claim . . . . The clerk of the Bran ch shall, at the request of an individual, prepare the statement of claim and other papers required to be filed in an action in the Branch . . . . A copy of the statement of claim and verification shall be made a part of the notice to be served upon the defendant named therein. The mode of service shall be by the United Statesmarshal, as provided by law, or by registered mail or by certified mail with return receipt[.] D.C. Code § 16-3902. Mr. Emakpor’s Complaint, which he complet ed using Small Claims Form 11, provided a sworn statement of the claim and gave notic e of a date and time for a hearing to be held on the clai m. Certified Copy of Transfer Or der and Docket Sheet, 5-7. The Complaint also included a Deputy Clerk’s signature to attes t to receiving Mr. Emakpor’s statement of the claim. Id . at 5. Mr. Emakpor paid for service of the

statement of claim to be made by certified mail, and the Superi or Court docket shows that the receipt of service by certified mail was filed on November 22, 2017. Id. at 4, 14-15. Thus, it appears that service of process was properly prepared and executed. First Coast does not contest that certified mail receipt was fi led on November 22, 2017, or that the recipient of ser vice, Incorp Services, Inc., is First Coast’s registered agent

in the District of Columbia. D ef.’s Response in Supp. of Timel y Removal ¶¶ 2,4. Rather, First Coast appears to blame its registered agent for not provi ding it with the appropriate

documents. Id . ¶ 4 (“While Incorp . . . is Fir st Coast’s registered agent in the District of Columbia, First Coast did not receive any notice or copy of Pla intiff’s Complaint in November 2017.”); id. ¶ 5 (“On December 21, 2017, Incorp notified First Coast that a hearing had been scheduled for January 11, 2018 . . . Incorp pr ovided First Coast notice of the hearing, but nothing else.”). This is unacceptable. Servi ce by certified mail is valid upon delivery to a person qualified to receive the certified ma il, such as a registered agent.

See Small Claims R. 4(c)(2). 1 Regardless of when First Coast alleges that it received the

1 Available at https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/rul es-superiorcourt/Small%20Claims%20Rule%2 04.%20Service%20of%20Process.pdf