1McLachlan filed applications for DIB and SSI in November 2001 alleging disability due

solely to a back injury (AR 31-32). On January 31, 2003, an ALJ concluded that he was not

disabled (AR 31-38). McLachlan did not seek judicial review of the decision. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX MCLACHLAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 05-164 Erie

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, J.

Plaintiff, Alex M. McLachlan, (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “McLachlan”), commenced the

instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for disability insurance

benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and § 1381 et seq. McLachlan filed applications for DIB

and SSI on March 10, 2003, alleging that he was disabled due to a back injury and depression as

of October 18, 2001 (Administrative Record, hereinafter “AR”, 57-59; 72; 271-273).1 His

applications were denied, and he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

(AR 44-48; 275-278). Following a hearing held April 22, 2004, the ALJ found that McLachlan 

was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance, and was not eligible for SSI

benefits (AR 19). McLachlan’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied (AR 5-7),

rendering the Commissioner’s decision final under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The instant action

challenges the ALJ’s decision. Presently pending before the Court are cross-motions for

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the Plaintiff’s motion and grant

the Defendant’s motion. 

Case 1:05-cv-00164-SJM Document 13 Filed 02/07/06 Page 1 of 13
2

I. BACKGROUND

McLachlan was born on February 13, 1962, and was forty-two years old on the date of the

ALJ’s decision (AR 13; 57). He is a high school graduate, with past work experience as an

employee and owner-operator of a pest control business and an assistant section leader (AR 13;

73). McLachlan concedes that the findings of the ALJ with respect to his physical impairments

are supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s Brief p. 2. Therefore, our discussion will focus

on the medical evidence with respect to his alleged mental impairments.

While undergoing an evaluation for lumbar pain at the Pain Management Center on

March 6, 2003, McLachlan reported feelings of depression without suicidal ideation, extreme

frustration in dealing with his girlfriend’s children, and anger (AR 176).

On May 7, 2003, McLachlan reported depression and anger control issues to Merja

Wright, M.D., his family physician (AR 263). He claimed he lashed out, punched walls, and

locked himself into a room (AR 263). Although he attended counseling, he requested a

psychiatric referral (AR 152, 263). 

McLachlan underwent a psychological disability evaluation performed by Glenn

Thompson, Ph.D., on May 17, 2003 pursuant to the request of the Commissioner (AR 208-216). 

Dr. Thompson reported that McLachlan was quite pleasant, cooperative, engaging, an excellent

historian, and volunteered a great deal of information relevant to the evaluation process (AR

208). McLachlan reported depression since 1999 when his marriage ended and increased

depression following a car accident in August 2001 (AR 209). 

On mental status examination, McLachlan maintained effective eye contact, was not

anxious during the interview, and had normal speech (AR 211). Dr. Thompson found his

affective expression as depressed and angry (AR 212). McLachlan denied rapid mood changes,

hallucinations, delusions or suicidal ideations (AR 212). He was active during the interview with

many illustrations, examples or enhancements to direct questions, which sometimes took the

form of flights of ideas with a great deal of spontaneity (AR 212). His responses to questions

were adequate and goal-directed, although not always directly relevant (AR 212). There were no

loose associations and he was not tangential or distractible (AR 212). Dr. Thompson found his

fund of information to be quite adequate (AR 213). McLachlan evidenced being “quite stressed”

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3

during serial 7 subtraction, but was able to perform serial 3 subtraction without difficulty (AR

213). His memory was below average (AR 214). Dr. Thompson stated that impulse control was

a “big problem” for McLachlan, in that he spent days in his room and came out only for

appointments (AR 214). McLachlan gave two incidents which were merely representative of

several loses of control, and the necessity of effort to maintain control in situations involving

road rage (AR 214). His judgement was quite good regarding efforts to avoid road rage

opportunities, and his response to imaginary situations was very adequate (AR 214). 

Dr. Thompson diagnosed McLachlan with major depression, recurrent, moderate, and

intermittent explosive disorder (AR 214). Dr. Thompson opined that McLachlan’s mental

impairments would result in a “fair” or “good” ability to perform many work-related activities,

but found he had a “poor” ability to interact with supervisors; deal with work stresses; remember,

understand, and carry out complex, detailed or simple instructions; maintain personal

appearance; behave in an emotionally stable manner; relate predictably in social situations; and

demonstrate reliability (AR 215-216). Dr. Thompson indicated that he evaluated McLachlan as

“poor” in the above areas due to his emotional factors (AR 216). He further indicated that his

intellectual abilities and comprehension were adequate, although his thought organization was

sometimes confused and his memory was below average (AR 216). Dr. Thompson opined that

physical factors would play a role in his being able to carry out instructions (AR 216). He further

opined that in light of his physical problems, it was unlikely that “one could expect significant

improvement of foreseeable future” (AR 214). He strongly recommended regular contact with a

mental health professional (AR 214). 

On May 23, 2003, Richard A. Heil, Ph.D., a state agency reviewing psychologist,

completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form and concluded that McLachlan had a moderate

degree of limitation in his activities of daily living, in maintaining social functioning, and in

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, with no repeated episodes of decompensation 

(AR 230). On the same date, Dr. Heil completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment form (AR 217-218). Dr. Heil concluded that McLachlan was not significantly

limited in his ability to remember locations and work-like procedures; understand, remember,

and carry out very short and simple instructions; sustain an ordinary routine; work in

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4

coordination with others; make simple work-related decisions; ask simple questions; be aware of

normal hazards; and travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation (AR 217-218). He

further concluded that McLachlan was only moderately limited in his ability to understand,

remember, and carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended

periods; perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual;

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based

symptoms; interact appropriately with the general public and co-workers; accept instructions and

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; maintain socially appropriate behavior;

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; and set realistic goals or make plans

independently of others (AR 217-218). 

In making this assessment, Dr. Heil reviewed Dr. Thompson’s evaluation and opinion,

but declined to give his opinion full weight due to inconsistencies with the medical and nonmedical evidence (AR 219). Dr. Heil found that Dr. Thompson’s assessment revealed only a

snapshot of McLachlan’s functioning, and was an overestimate of the severity of his limitations

(AR 219). He noted that McLachlan’s basic memory processes were intact, he was able to carry

out very short and simple instructions and make simple decisions, was able to maintain

concentration and attention for extended periods, and although his frustration tolerance was low,

he had the ability to get along with others in the workplace (AR 219). Dr. Heil opined that

McLachlan was capable of understanding and remembering instructions, concentrating,

interacting with others, and adapting to changes in the workplace (AR 219). He concluded that

he was able to meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a sustained basis despite

the limitations resulting from his impairments (AR 219). 

On June 23, 2003, McLachlan attended an intake session at Stairways Behavioral Health

Outpatient Clinic, and an initial psychiatric evaluation was scheduled for the following month

(AR 250). On June 30, 2003, McLachlan reported to Dr. Wright that progress was being made

for his psychiatric condition at Stairways (AR 261). 

On July 16, 2003, McLachlan underwent an initial psychiatric evaluation performed by

Sean Su, M.D., at Stairways (AR 251-253). McLachlan presented with complaints of depression,

mood swings and irritability (AR 251). He complained of a dysphoric mood, insomnia, appetite

Case 1:05-cv-00164-SJM Document 13 Filed 02/07/06 Page 4 of 13
2The GAF score considers psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness. Scores between 50 and 41 indicate “[s]erious 

symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious

impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep job).” 

See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR 34 (4th ed. 2000). 

5

disturbances, difficulty concentrating, increased anxiety and irritability, poor energy level,

anhedonia, and feelings of hopelessness, helplessness and worthlessness (AR 251). He claimed

to have occasional visual and tactile hallucinations regarding spiders, and had an intense fear of

spiders (AR 251). McLachlan stated that he was treated for depression by his family physician in

1999 with Celexa following his divorce which helped, but he quit taking it due to sexual side

effects (AR 251). He denied any recent suicidal or homicidal ideations (AR 251). He reported a

significant history of physically assaultive behavior towards others, but claimed he was now only

verbally agitated (AR 251). He further reported a significant history of substance abuse, and

stated that he continued to use marijuana, but “[n]ever more than once a day” (AR 252). 

On mental status examination, Dr. Su found his speech coherent and goal-directed (AR

252). His mood was depressed and his affect somewhat dysphoric and anxious at times, but he

exhibited no markedly bizarre or delusional thinking (AR 253). He denied any hallucinations,

other than reporting a history of occasional visual and tactile hallucinations regarding spiders,

and denied any obsessions or compulsions (AR 253). Dr. Su found his long-term and short-term

memory was intact, he was of average intelligence, and his insight and judgment was fair (AR

253). Dr. Su diagnosed McLachlan with mood disorder, rule out major depressive disorder, and

a history of polysubstance abuse (AR 253). He prescribed Lexapro, an antidepressant, and

Trazodone for his insomnia, and outpatient psychiatric treatment through Stairways (AR 253). 

Dr. Su assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 50 (AR 253).2 

On September 24, 2003, McLachlan reported his sleep difficulties were being addressed

with a psychiatrist (AR 258). 

Progress notes from Stairways dated October 21, 2003 indicated that McLachlan had not

returned to the clinic since his initial evaluation on July 16, 2003 (AR 249).

Finally, on February 18, 2004 Stairways progress notes showed that McLachlan

complained of persistent depression, social withdrawal, and poor energy level on December 13,

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6

2003 (AR 248). Medication changes were made, and consistent attendance was encouraged in

order to evaluate the effectiveness of his medications (AR 248). 

McLachlan and Frances Kinley, a vocational expert, testified at the hearing held by the

ALJ on April 22, 2004 (AR 279-305). McLachlan testified that he saw Dr. Su for medication

checks and had just started therapy two weeks prior (AR 285). He took Trazodone and

Wellbutrin for his mental impairments (AR 286). His medications helped with his sleeping

issues, and he was “slightly better” in his ability to interact with people (AR 286; 290). 

McLachlan further testified that he stayed away from “the rest of the world” three to four days

per week and avoided crowds since he became easily agitated (AR 294). He claimed he suffered

from poor concentration and short term memory problems (AR 294).

The ALJ asked the vocational expert if work existed for an individual of McLachlan’s

age, education, and work history, who was limited to light work with some restrictions, and who

was further limited to simple, routine, repetitious tasks with one- or two-step instructions

performed in a low-stress environment, defined as work requiring few decisions, and no more

than occasional contact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors (AR 300). The vocational

expert testified that such an individual could perform work as a general office clerk, stock

inventory clerk, and a mail clerk (AR 301). The vocational expert further testified that if such

individual missed work two or more times per month on a regular basis, he would be incapable

of performing competitive work (AR 303). In a post-hearing interrogatory, the vocational expert

opined that a person with the limitations as set forth in Dr. Thompson’s report would be unable

to work (AR 115). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision which found that McLachlan 

was not entitled to a period of disability, DIB or SSI within the meaning of the Social Security

Act (AR 12-19). His request for an appeal with the Appeals Council was denied making the

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner (AR 5-7). He subsequently filed this

action. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the determination of the Commissioner unless it is not supported

by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence does not mean a large or

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7

considerable amount of evidence, but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Richardson v.

Parales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It has been defined as less than a preponderance of evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Jesurum v. Secretary of the

United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

Title II of the Social Security Act provides for the payment of disability insurance

benefits to those who have contributed to the program and who have become so disabled that

they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Title

XVI of the Act establishes that SSI benefits are payable to those individuals who are similarly

disabled and whose income and resources fall below designated levels. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). A

person who does not have insured status under Title II may nevertheless receive benefits under

Title XVI. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). In order to be entitled to

DIB under Title II, a claimant must additionally establish that his disability existed before the

expiration of his insured status. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (c). The ALJ found that McLachlan met the

disability insured status requirements of the Act (AR 18). SSI does not have an insured status

requirement. 

A person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is unable

to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine when an individual meets

this definition:

In the first two steps, the claimant must establish (1) that he is not

engaged in “substantial gainful activity” and (2) that he suffers

from a severe medical impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 140-41 (1987). If the claimant shows a severe medical

impairment, the [Commissioner] determines (3) whether the

impairment is equivalent to an impairment listed by the

[Commissioner] as creating a presumption of disability. Bowen,

482 U.S. at 141. If it is not, the claimant bears the burden of

showing (4) that the impairment prevents him from performing the

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8

work that he has performed in the past. Id. If the claimant satisfies

this burden, the [Commissioner] must grant the claimant benefits

unless the [Commissioner] can demonstrate (5) that there are jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Ferguson

v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3rd Cir. 1985).

Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 117.

The ALJ resolved McLachlan’s case at the fifth step. At step two, the ALJ determined,

inter alia, that his depression and personality disorder were severe impairments, but determined

at step three that he did not meet a listing (AR 14). At step four, the ALJ determined that he

could not return to his past work, but retained the residual functional capacity to perform light

work with some restrictions, and was limited to no more than simple, routine, repetitious tasks,

with one- or two-stop instructions, performed in a low-stress environment, defined as work

requiring few decisions, and more than occasional contact with the public, co-workers and

supervisors (AR 15). At the final step, the ALJ determined that McLachlan could perform the

jobs cited by the vocational expert at the administrative hearing (AR 17). The ALJ additionally

determined that his allegations regarding his limitations were not totally credible (AR 18). 

Again, we must affirm this determination unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

McLachlan contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Thompson’s findings as to his

functional limitations. Dr. Thompson opined that McLachlan would have a “poor” ability to

interact with supervisors; deal with work stresses; remember, understand, and carry out complex,

detailed or simple instructions; maintain personal appearance; behave in an emotionally stable

manner; relate predictably in social situations; and demonstrate reliability (AR 215-216). Dr.

Thompson was a consulting psychologist, having examined McLachlan pursuant to the request of

the Commissioner. The treating physician rule does not apply to a consulting physician’s

opinion. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3rd Cir. 1993) (doctrine had no application to

physician who examined claimant once). Nonetheless, the Commissioner’s regulations do

acknowledge that, as a general principal, opinions from examining sources are given more

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9

weight than opinions from non-examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. 416.927(d)(1). The

regulations do not require however, that in every case, an examining physician’s medical opinion

must be favored over that of a non-examining physician. Instead, the Commissioner considers a

number of competing factors, such as, inter alia, the extent to which the opinion is supported by

a logical explanation and the extent to which the source’s opinion is consistent with the entirety

of the evidence. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1)-(6).

We find that the ALJ evaluated Dr. Thompson’s opinion consistent with the above

standards. The ALJ considered Dr. Thompson’s opinion based upon his psychological evaluation

of McLachlan, and concluded that his opinion was unsupported by the findings from his mental

status examination and other evidence in the record (AR 16). The ALJ pointed to the fact that

Dr. Thompson found McLachlan was an excellent historian, was socially engaging, had no

impairment in communication, speech, memory or thought processes, and displayed a great deal

of spontaneity in his presentation (AR 16). The ALJ found Dr. Thompson’s limitations

inconsistent with McLachlan’s intact thought processes (AR 16). The ALJ gave more weight to

the opinion of Dr. Heil, the state agency reviewing psychologist, whose opinion he found more

thorough and consistent with the medical record and McLachlan’s daily activities (AR 16). He

noted that McLachlan testified that his medication had resulted in more effective control of his

mental health and that his interpersonal relationships were better (AR 16). Finally, the ALJ

observed that McLachlan had not undergone more aggressive mental health treatment, such as

inpatient hospitalization or emergency room treatment (AR 16). 

We reject McLachlan’s argument that the ALJ improperly used his “lay opinion” in

rejecting Dr. Thompson’s opinion. To the contrary, the ALJ fulfilled his obligations under the

regulations and compared his opinion in light of his own examination and other evidence in the

record. McLachlan claims that the ALJ’s inability to understand what he saw as an “ambiguity”

in the opinion required him to seek “answers” to his questions from Dr. Thompson. Plaintiff’s

Brief p. 15. The ALJ however, apparently felt that the record was sufficiently developed for

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10

purposes of ruling on McLachlan’s claim. Section 416.912(e)(1) provides that the

Administration will take action to re-contact medical sources and obtain additional medical

information where the existing evidence is insufficient to determine whether a claimant is

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(e)(1). We believe the ALJ could permissibly render a decision

based upon the evidence in the present record without further development and, therefore, find

no error in the ALJ’s failure to re-contact Dr. Thompson for further clarification under the

circumstances here. 

McLachlan also argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the opinion of Dr. Heil, the state

agency reviewing psychologist, in rejecting Dr. Thompson’s opinion. Dr. Heil opined that

McLachlan was capable of understanding and remembering instructions, concentrating,

interacting with others, and adapting to changes in the workplace, and concluded that he was 

able to meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a sustained basis despite the

limitations resulting from his impairments (AR 219). We note that it is long-settled that the

findings of a non-examining physician may be substantial evidence defeating contrary opinions. 

Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3rd Cir. 1991) (ALJ did not err in rejecting opinion of

treating physician in favor of opinions from state agency physicians, where treating physicians’

opinions were conclusory and unsupported by the medical evidence). 

Here, McLachlan claims that since Dr. Heil did not have the benefit of subsequent

treatment notes, his opinion is entitled to less weight. The later medical evidence consisted of

Dr. Su’s psychological evaluation, and treatment notes from Stairways dated July 16, 2003

through April 2, 2004. Although these records were not reviewed by Dr. Heil, they were 

reviewed by the ALJ, who specifically discussed these records in fashioning McLachlan’s

residual functional capacity (AR 16). Even if the state agency reviewing psychologist had had

the benefit of these later records, they do not support McLachlan’s contentions that his

limitations prevented him from performing substantial gainful activity. While Dr. Su assessed

McLachlan with a GAF score of 50, this was at the initial evaluation and prior to any treatment. 

Case 1:05-cv-00164-SJM Document 13 Filed 02/07/06 Page 10 of 13
11

Moreover, on mental status examination, Dr. Su found his speech coherent and goal-directed, his

long-term and short-term memory was intact, and he was of average intelligence with fair insight

and judgment (AR 253). Treatment records reveal only two visits after Dr. Su’s initial evaluation

wherein McLachlan complained of depression, but medication changes were made to address his

complaints (AR 248-249). We therefore find no error in this regard. 

McLachlan further claims the ALJ erred in relying on his “sporadic and transitory”

activities in rejecting Dr. Thompson’s opinion. It is well established in this Circuit that

“disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms

of human and social activity” nor does “sporadic and transitory activity ... disprove disability.” 

Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971 (3rd Cir. 1981). Here, however, the ALJ did not rely solely

on his daily activities in finding that he had the capacity to engage in a limited range of light 

work. In fashioning his residual functional capacity, he also relied upon the lack of findings from

Dr. Thompson’s mental status examination, the state agency psychologist’s opinion, the lack of

aggressive treatment, and the fact that McLachlan testified that his symptoms were better with

medication (AR 16). The ALJ’s evaluation was completely consistent with the requirement that

in determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity, an ALJ must consider “all relevant

evidence in the case record, including medical evidence and relevant nonmedical evidence, such

as observations of lay witnesses of an individual’s apparent symptomatology, an individual’s

own statement of what he or she is able or unable to do, and many other factors that could help

the adjudicator determine the most reasonable findings in light of the evidence.” SSR 96-5p

(1996), 1996 WL 374183 *5. We therefore find this argument meritless. 

Finally, McLachlan claims that the ALJ failed to accurately portray his limitations in his

hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. The law is well established that “[w]hile the ALJ

may proffer a variety of assumptions to [a vocational] expert, the vocational expert’s testimony

concerning a claimant’s ability to perform alternative employment may only be considered for

purposes of determining disability if the question accurately portrays the claimant’s individual

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12

physical and mental impairments.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3rd Cir. 1984). In

other words, “[a] hypothetical question must reflect all of a claimant’s impairments that are

supported by the record; otherwise the question is deficient and the expert’s answer to it cannot

be considered substantial evidence.” Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3rd Cir. 1987),

citing, Podedworny, supra. See also Wallace v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 722

F.2d 1150 (3rd Cir. 1983). However, “[a]lthough hypothetical questions posed by an ALJ to a

vocational expert must reflect a plaintiff’s impairments, an ALJ need not include every

unsubstantiated assertion of limitation in his hypothetical question.” Wilson v. Sullivan, 1991

WL 311910 at *4 (W.D.Pa. 1991), citing Chrupcala, supra. Rather, he must include “only those

limitations supported by objective medical evidence.” Id.

McLachlan contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical erroneously failed to include the

limitations set forth in Dr. Thompson’s opinion, namely, that he was unable to interact with

supervisors, deal with work stresses, remember, understand, and carry out complex, detailed or

simple instructions, maintain personal appearance, behave in an emotionally stable manner, and

relate predictably in social situations. Because we have already determined that the ALJ’s

rejection of Dr. Thompson’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence, it was not error for

the ALJ to reject the expert’s testimony on this issue. In any event, the ALJ accommodated

McLachlan’s functional restrictions by restricting him to work which consisted of simple,

routine, repetitious tasks with one- or two-step instructions performed in a low stress

environment, with nor more that occasional contact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors

(AR 300). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision will be affirmed. 

An appropriate Order follows. 

 

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13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX MCLACHLAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 05-164 Erie

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of February, 2006, and for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying Memorandum Opinion, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.

8] is DENIED, and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 11] is

GRANTED. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff, Alex McLachlan. The clerk is directed to

mark the case closed. 

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. 

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