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AHMADINEJAD’S TOUR OF TYRANTS AND IRAN’S

AGENDA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 2, 2012

Serial No. 112–123

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Norman A. Bailey, Ph.D., president, Institute for Global Economic Growth 

(former Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela, Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence) ...................................................................................... 14

Mr. Michael A. Braun, managing partner, Spectre Group International, LLC 

(former Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration) ................... 24

Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue ................................... 41

Jose Azel, Ph.D., senior scholar, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American 

Studies, University of Miami .............................................................................. 47

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Norman A. Bailey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 17

Mr. Michael A. Braun: Prepared statement .......................................................... 26

Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement .............................................................. 43

Jose Azel, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................... 49

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 73

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement ................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Allyson Schwartz, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement ..................................... 76

(1)

AHMADINEJAD’S TOUR OF TYRANTS AND 

IRAN’S AGENDA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and my good friend the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, 

I will recognize for 3 minutes the vice chair and ranking member 

of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, and then the 

chair and ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia for their opening remarks. 

I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 

minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And without objection, your entire testimony 

will be made a part of the record. Members may have 5 legislative 

days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to 

the length limitation in the rules. 

And before I recognize myself, I would like to say to Mr. Burton, 

who announced that he will not be running for reelection, that we 

have cherished his job in our committee. I have been a better person for having known him and have shared wonderful moments 

with him and a good friendship, and we will miss your wise guidance, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, thank you very much. And I wish my——

[Applause.] 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, and I only wish my wife 

were here to hear you say those nice things about me. [Laughter.] 

And I want to say I am going to miss all of my Democrat buddies 

over there. I know they will miss me. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, we hope that her health improves, and I know that she will do a lot better with you at her 

side. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We will keep her in our prayers. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The chair now recognizes herself for 7 

minutes. Through a series of hearings and classified briefings, this 

2

committee has exercised due diligence and oversight to examine 

the threat to U.S. national security posed by Iranian and Iraniansponsored activities in our own Western Hemisphere. 

The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, stated this 

week, and I quote, ‘‘Iranian officials, probably including supreme 

leader Ali Khamenei, have changed their calculus and are now 

willing to conduct an attack in the United States.’’

The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, as you see 

over there, with Ortega, with Castro, with Correa, that many believe can destabilize the hemisphere. These alliances can pose an 

immediate threat by giving Iran, directly through the IRGC, the 

Quds Force, or its proxies, like Hezbollah, a platform in the region 

to carry out attacks against the United States, our interests, and 

our allies. 

Some may question the congressional focus on the Iran-Latin 

America nexus, because they wrongly believe that Iran’s influence 

in the region is exaggerated. But let us analyze what has occurred 

in Latin America due to the actions of the Iranian regime. 

Iran’s Ahmadinejad recently returned from his tour of tyrants 

trip to visit Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador. Media reports have indicated an increased presence of Iran’s Quds Force in 

these countries and offices of Iran’s intelligence services surfacing 

throughout the region. 

The fact that the military arm of a state sponsor of terrorism has 

its operatives within multiple countries in our hemisphere is certainly cause for alarm and merits congressional focus. In October 

of last year, we learned of the attempted plot by the Quds Force 

to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador on U.S. soil using individuals 

they thought were from the violent Mexican Zeta drug cartel. 

Two months later, the Spanish language network Univision aired 

a documentary that depicted a 2007 cyber attack scheme by the 

Iranian Ambassador in Mexico, diplomatic officials from the Embassies of Venezuela and Cuba, and undercover Mexican students 

who were posing as extremists. 

The principals involved in this plot wanted to infiltrate U.S. Government computer systems in the White House, FBI, CIA, and two 

nuclear facilities. A Venezuelan diplomat connected with the plot 

later became the Venezuelan Consul in my area in Miami, Florida. 

Shortly after the documentary aired, my congressional colleagues 

and I sent a letter to the Department of State requesting an investigation of these claims and asking that if the Venezuelan Council 

was found to be involved in this plot that she be designated persona non grata and be expelled from the United States. Last month 

we thanked the State Department, because it expelled the consul 

back to Venezuela. 

In May of last year, the Iranian Defense Minister was in Bolivia 

to inaugurate a military training school for ALBA countries financed by the Iranian regime. Meanwhile, Interpol has in place an 

arrest warrant for the Iranian Defense Minister in connection with 

the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, the Jewish Community Center. 

Additionally, in order to further expand their influence and extremist propaganda, Iran just launched a Spanish language channel that airs in Latin America and Spain. Further compounding 

3

the problem is the increasingly diverse and extensive activities of 

Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah. The synergy between Hezbollah and the 

drug cartels in Latin America makes for a very powerful enemy 

and one that is challenging to identify. 

Our law enforcement agencies focusing on narcoterrorism and 

terrorist financing have had success in penetrating these operations and gaining a better understanding of the nature, the extent, and the evolution of the links between Hezbollah and drug 

trafficking organizations. 

Recently, our DEA led an undercover investigation called Operation Titan, which exposed a vast criminal network operating a 

drug money laundering pipeline through West Africa to Europe, 

the Middle East, and Colombia. In addition, last year we learned 

of the investigations led by the U.S. into the Lebanese Canadian 

Bank that discovered a complicated web of high-ranking Hezbollah 

officials involved in a South American cocaine trafficking trade. 

Hezbollah has maintained a significant footprint in the Americas, 

including the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, 

to help fund raise for their criminal activities. Media reports have 

indicated that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the master-mind of 9/11, 

spent some time in the tri-border area in the late ’90s with Islamic 

extremists in the region helping to raise more funds for terrorist 

attacks. 

In Colombia, we have witnessed how another foreign terrorist organization, the FARC, is heavily involved in narcotics trafficking in 

South America. Therefore, it is not new to learn that terrorist organizations are actively using the drug trade and other existing 

criminal networks to raise funds and carry out their operations. 

Since the Western Hemisphere is a hub for drug trafficking, the 

possible combination of threats creates a clear and present danger. 

Last month at the State of the Union, President Obama ignored 

the security concerns stemming from the region and the importance that Latin America plays to our economic prosperity and our 

national security. 

The administration’s policy of dialogue with Iran has failed, and 

a similar approach toward the ALBA countries in the region will 

fail as well. When asked about Iran’s activities in the Western 

Hemisphere, Director Clapper, who I cited at the beginning, noted 

this week that ‘‘there is more to unfold here.’’

This committee stands committed to unfolding the threats posed 

by Iran in the Western Hemisphere. We will continue to zero in on 

those concerns and engage all pertinent U.S. Government agencies 

to ensure proper resources are being dedicated to counter these 

threats against U.S. national security rather than wasted on unaccountable and corrupt governments. 

And with that, I am pleased to yield to my friend, the ranking 

member, Mr. Berman of California, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And before I start, I want to join you in expressing both my sadness and my appreciation to Dan Burton, our colleague for the entire time I think that I have been on this committee, and that has 

been a few years. And behind that crusty exterior is really a very 

pleasant and likable guy, a sweet guy. And I have enjoyed working 

with him and talking with him over the years, and I am glad that 

4

we will be able to continue doing that for the next year, and wish 

him very well. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

Mr. BERMAN. The behavior of the Iranian regime poses a significant danger to its own people, its neighbors, and the security of the 

United States. Tehran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, its 

continued support for international terrorism, and its abuse of 

basic human rights, require the United States to maintain extreme 

vigilance in countering these threats. 

Though our goal has not yet been reached, thanks to the leadership of this Congress and the Obama administration, more pressure has been placed on the Iranian regime than ever before. The 

increasingly isolated Government of Iran has extended its tentacles 

far and wide in search of friends and resources. Today we will investigate Iran’s dealings in the Western Hemisphere and what 

these actions signify for the national security of the United States. 

President Ahmadinejad just concluded his sixth trip to the region, which took him to Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Nicaragua, 

where he apparently accrues frequent visitor points. I can only assume that if any of the remaining 31 countries in the region would 

have had him, he would have visited there too. The Ahmadinejad 

trip has clearly succeeded in causing a great deal of agitation in 

this country regarding the Iranian threat in our hemisphere and 

suggests that our President is not—cause suggestions that our 

President is not doing enough to counter it. 

From Ahmadinejad’s perspective, that alone may have made his 

trip worthwhile. The political posture on this topic is not harmless. 

I believe it does us all a real disservice by obfuscating what is real 

and what is not. As I have said before, given that the stakes are 

so high, it is critical we get this analysis right. 

Iran is arguably the foremost threat to United States interests 

in the world. A nuclear Iran would be a significant threat not only 

regionally but globally. I know that if Iran is in our neighborhood, 

they are up to no good. 

Iran was complicit in the horrific bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in the 

first half of the 1990s. The recent discovery of a twisted Iranian 

plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington is, 

frankly, not a mind-bending surprise. 

Add to this our intelligence community’s assessment of Iran’s increasing willingness to conduct an attack on U.S. soil, as our chairman has pointed out. So my specific interest this morning is to sift 

through the facts, discuss with the experts before us, what about 

Iran’s relationship with the nations of our hemisphere should be of 

serious concern to us, and how the Iranian President’s recent trip 

plays into those concerns. 

President Obama, in a recent interview with a Venezuelan newspaper, wondered aloud what the Venezuelan people hope to gain 

from a relationship with a country as isolated, repressive, and outright dangerous as Iran. I wonder, too. A cursory survey of what 

Iran actually brings to the table of the four countries he visited indicates it is littered with promises that go unfulfilled. Factories go 

unbuilt, ports go undredged, humanitarian aid goes undelivered. 

5

Importantly, this time Brazil closed the door to him after welcoming him for years. As for the charge that the administration is 

asleep at the switch, that is nonsense. President Obama has himself stated that his administration will continue to monitor Iran’s 

activities in the Western Hemisphere closely, and I have no reason 

to doubt his word. 

My own interactions with high-ranking officials in several U.S. 

agencies, including the State Department, the Drug Enforcement 

Agency, FBI, Treasury, and the intelligence community, have reassured me that our Government is fully attentive to this matter. It 

is clear that our President and his administration understand what 

is at stake. 

I have heard a wide range of explanations regarding the purpose 

and timing of the recent Ahmadinejad trip. Some have painted it 

as a veritable invasion, some say it was a visit from an isolated 

and beleaguered leader to another isolated and beleaguered leader—Chavez—to distract from both of their troubles at home. Perhaps it was to shore up trade relationships, but Iran’s trade with 

this part of the world is meager. For example, Brazil’s trade with 

Iran, by far the biggest in the region, only amounts to 4⁄10 of 1 percent of Iran’s total trade. 

Even if our gut tells us that the Ahmadinejad-Chavez brotherhood is mostly political theater, it would be foolish to minimize 

Iran’s interest in our hemisphere. But it is equally important to get 

it right. 

I strongly support efforts to solidify the rigorous sanctions regime 

against Iran in our hemisphere. But it seems to me that given the 

complexity of relationships with and among countries in our own 

hemisphere, a careless U.S. overreaction to the Ahmadinejad trip 

could harm that goal more than the trip itself. 

So what should we do? We should be alert to Iran’s attempts to 

circumvent sanctions and its efforts to curry favor with regional 

countries to loosen those sanctions. We should pay particular attention to technology or, more likely, raw material transfers that 

might further Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

We should continue to monitor intelligence links, watch the Iranian Diplomatic Corps, given its historical involvement in nefarious 

acts. We should keep a close watch on financial transactions in this 

region that might involve Iran, both where they come from—say, 

for instance, drug proceeds—and where they go, such as funding 

the terrorist organization Hezbollah or the despotic, increasingly 

desperate Syrian regime. 

The chaotic nexus of drug money and terrorism in this region deserves a close look, as it is a fertile place for bad things to happen 

on a significant scale. The best way to prevent Iran from gaining 

influence in the Western Hemisphere is to continue to strengthen 

our relationship with the vast majority of countries in the region 

who, when push comes to shove, will prefer good relationships with 

the United States over those with Iran. That means we need to be 

both watchful and smart and only shout when we need to. I hope 

we are up to the task. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman, 

for your statement. 

6

Mr. McCaul of Texas, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere is recognized. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I would like to take 

a point of personal privilege and also say, Danny-boy, what an 

honor it has been to serve with you, and you will be missed by all 

of us. Thank you. 

Madam Chair, I would like to commend you for holding this 

timely and necessary hearing. For years we have watched as Iran 

has stepped up its involvement in the Western Hemisphere. As vice 

chair to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, I assure 

you that the threats from Tehran in our part of the world have not 

gone unnoticed and will not be unanswered. 

Whether it is financing terrorism, the foiled plot to use Mexican 

drug cartels to kill the Saudi Ambassador, undisclosed direct 

flights between Caracas, Damascus, and Tehran, cyber plots 

against U.S. nuclear facilities, the launch of Iran’s Spanish language TV channel, or Ahmadinejad’s cozy relationship with Hugo 

Chavez in Venezuela and the Castro regime in Cuba, Iran has repeatedly demonstrated that its goals are to intimidate America in 

its own hemisphere. And we know from Operation Titan that 

Hezbollah is tied to transnational drug trafficking organizations—

a very dangerous and lethal combination. 

Just last week Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that Iran 

is only a year away from producing a nuclear weapon. Our closest 

allies in the Middle East, the Israelis, have announced today that 

Iran could make four bombs by further enriching uranium that has 

already been stockpiled. And as a result, Iran is increasingly isolated in the world. The impacts of these sanctions on its banks and 

oil industry has backed Iran into a corner. 

But clearly Ahmadinejad sees Latin America as a new market for 

diplomatic and economic activity. Of course he also sees the region 

as fertile new grounds for plots against the United States and our 

allies. As the chair has recognized, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, recently testified that Iran may now be 

willing to conduct an attack on the United States. That is unacceptable, that a wounded and desperate Iran would be as brazen 

to use the Western Hemisphere as a staging ground for attacks 

against American citizens on U.S. soil. 

What I hope to get out of today’s hearing is a keener understanding of Iran’s capabilities and objectives in the Western Hemisphere, and to hear from our witnesses about what they think the 

Congress and the administration can do to counteract Iran’s growing influence in our region. 

One proposal that I have introduced is a bill to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist—foreign terrorist organization, which would give the United States more authorities to 

go after them in this hemisphere. 

Madam Chair, with that, I would like to again thank you for 

your leadership on this issue. And with that, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. McCaul, for 

your statement. 

And now we will hear from Congressman Engel of New York, the 

ranking member on the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. 

7

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chair. I am glad 

our committee is holding this hearing. I, too, want to congratulate 

my good friend Dan Burton. Dan is a member’s member, collegial, 

and I cherish our friendship through the years. Dan, we are going 

to miss you, but we are going to enjoy this next year with you. 

This is important, what we are doing today. It is important to 

take a look at Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s trip through the 

Western Hemisphere. It is important to ask the questions: Why is 

he taking so much time to buzz through the region? What is Iran 

getting out of this? What are the four Western Hemisphere nations 

getting out of this? 

First, the bad news. Ahmadinejad has found like-minded souls in 

the leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. In their 

dislike for the United States, the leaders of these countries are now 

willing to meet with one of the world’s worst. You know the saying, 

‘‘The enemy of my enemy.’’

More concerning, Iran’s ties with Venezuela are opaque at best. 

It is hard to know what the Iranians are doing stomping around 

this South American country. We do know there have been planes 

back and forth—Venezuela, Syria, and Iran. What a nexus of rogue 

states. 

And we must not forget what Iran has done in this hemisphere. 

Bombings in the 1990s of the AMIA Jewish Cultural Center and 

the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the recent effort to murder 

the Saudi Ambassador only serve to remind us of the danger which 

Iran can bring. Still, not all of the signs are bad. In Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff has wisely chilled the warmth shown to the 

Iranian leader by former President Lula da Silva. 

Today Brazil votes for resolutions condemning Iran and the U.N. 

Human Rights Council. Ahmadinejad’s media advisor complained 

recently that ‘‘the Brazilian President has been striking against everything that Lula has accomplished’’—that is a quote. Well, if she 

has done that, good for her. 

Further, the other successful major democracies in the region 

want nothing to do with the Iranian mischief. Chile, Colombia, and 

Mexico are shunning the Iranian despot. So why are the Iranians 

messing around in the region? What do they get out of it? 

I think the answer was best summed up by the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, when he testified 2 days ago in 

the Senate. He said, ‘‘Ties with Tehran offer some regional governments a means of staking an independent position on Iran, thereby 

mitigating its isolation while also attempting to extract Iranian financial aid and investment for economic and social projects.’’

I think he is right. Given Iran’s history and the pressure they 

are facing due to their dangerous nuclear weapons program and 

the sanctions, we need to be extra-vigilant in monitoring Tehran’s 

presence in our region. However, we also need to carefully weigh 

all of the intelligence, the good with the bad, and reach a sober and 

balanced conclusion. 

The good news is this region is much more than Iran and drugs. 

Let us not forget that we just passed free trade agreements with 

Colombia and Panama, and that we have deep cultural, political, 

social, and economic ties with many of the countries. 

8

So, Madam Chair, thank you for this hearing. It is very, very important to focus on this. Thank you for focusing on Iran, and we 

will continue to focus on them and keep an eye on the big picture 

in our region. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Engel. 

And now we would like to hear from Congressman Chabot, the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And before making my 

comments, I would also like to include my best wishes to our colleague Dan Burton. I followed in his footsteps on this committee, 

because he was the ranking Republican on the committee, and now 

I chair it. 

But thank you and best wishes to you, Dan. And you are an Indianian, a Hoosier, and I am a Buckeye, and if we are not brothers, 

we are at least close cousins. So, you know, I wish you the best. 

Thank you. 

And thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. As chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, I frequently 

hear about the threats posed by Iran and the global terrorist networks that it supports. The possibility, however, of an Iranian 

threat emanating from Latin America is particularly troubling. 

The threat posed by the Iranian regime take on new and more 

dire geostrategic significance when coupled with the potential for 

alliances with oppressive anti-American regimes in our own hemisphere. These regimes could in turn provide Tehran with additional 

bases of operations from which to assault American interests. 

This possibility is especially threatening in light of the recent 

Iranian terror plot here in Washington, DC, which our intelligence 

community believes is evidence that the leadership in Tehran feels 

increasingly emboldened in its plans to undermine American interests and those of our allies. 

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently testified 

before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Iranian leadership is now ‘‘more willing to conduct an attack in the United States 

in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.’’

We are having enough trouble combatting Iranian meddling on 

the other side of the globe. The last thing we need is for Tehran 

to be able to more easily threaten the American homeland and pose 

an even greater threat to the American people. This prospect harkens back to the days of the Cold War when all of a sudden we were 

no longer separated from our enemies by oceans but face threats 

in our own backyard. 

I hope our witnesses here today will be able to shed light on the 

threats Iran poses in the Western Hemisphere, as well as what 

steps the United States should take to mitigate these threats. 

Thank you, and I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. And 

Mr. Burton was reminding me he is—we are all on different committees, and he is going to have the Fast and Furious hearing 

going on, and I know that the Transportation Committee is marking up their big bill today. So we will see a lot of our members not 

9

here today, but it does not mean that we don’t care deeply about 

the topic. 

Thanks for that reminder, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Ackerman is recognized. He is the ranking member of the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. But first, Madam Chair, I, too, would 

like to join in and pay my respects to Dan Burton with whom I 

have slugged through the last three decades. Unlike Howard, I 

think under that exterior of a crusty, cantankerous old man is really a crusty, cantankerous old man. [Laughter.] 

Dan, you have been an absolute challenge to us, but truly a delight and a treasure on this committee, and we are truly going to 

miss you. 

Tehran, it scarcely needs to be said, is up to no good. Iran’s partnership with Venezuela, as well as its ties to Cuba, Nicaragua, and 

Ecuador, are rightfully of concern, and we should be closely monitoring developing in these relationships to counter their efforts at 

sanctions-busting, money laundering, regional subversion, and further development of the narcoterrorist infrastructure in the hemisphere. 

Iran’s presence in the Western Hemisphere is totally lacking in 

legitimate economic or political interest. Unlike the nations in Levant and the Arabian Gulf, which have for decades sought a security partnership with the United States to balance against the 

threat of Iranian radicalism, hegemonism, and subversion, the nations of the Western Hemisphere have no natural ties to Iran and 

do not fear us. 

The fact is, for almost all of them, the United States has been 

their partner in efforts to stabilize the region against the threats 

of subversion, terrorism, and external domination. 

So Tehran’s outreach to the nations of the Western Hemisphere 

is justifiably met with suspicion and grave doubts about Iran’s intentions. A nation that is the world’s principal state sponsor of terrorism, that is responsible for the subversion throughout the Middle East, that has spent billions to avert Arab-Israeli peace through 

the most disgusting acts of terrorism, that every day for years has 

defied the clearly expressed will of the entire international community to meet its nuclear non-proliferation treaty obligations and 

come clean about their illicit military aspects of its military program, can’t be accepted as a legitimate participant in this hemisphere’s affairs. 

Iran is up to no good, because that is what Iran is always up to. 

Iran is controlled by a radical, theocratic dictatorship with grand 

ambitions and appetites, and these tyrants rightfully see the 

United States as the principal impediment for their success. And 

they should; we are proudly the enemy of all the Ayatollah seek to 

achieve. 

We are opposed to their dreams of hegemony in the Arabian Gulf 

and throughout the Middle East. We bitterly condemn their massive and ongoing violations of the rights of the people of Iran, and 

we will not allow them to destroy Israel or even attempt it. We will 

not allow them to control the region’s natural resources, and, by extension, the world’s economy. And, most importantly, we will prevail. We will win, and they will lose. 

10

Together with our allies and partners, we will ensure the peace 

and contain and ultimately see the Iranian threat crumble and dissolve. The tyranny will end, and their system will join the Soviet 

communism on the ash heap of history. And in the meantime, we 

will be vigilant about these threats in our own backyard. 

Ahmadinejad can rack up all of the frequent flyer miles he 

wants, and he can figure out how to convince the people that tyranny would be better and that the waste of war is superior to the 

fruits of peace. He will continue to find welcome only in the most 

marginal and radical of states, and who can only join him in a little 

nasty mischief along the way to his regime’s ultimate collapse. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. 

And now we will hear from members who wish to make 1-minute 

opening statements, starting with the chairman on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Mr. Burton of Indiana. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for all of the 

nice comments. I really appreciate that. 

Let me just say real quickly, we have had problems in Central 

and South America for a long, long time. We had the Reagan Doctrine under Ronald Reagan. And because of what he did, we 

changed almost all of those countries into democratic institutions, 

their leaders and their countries. 

The problem we have right now is we have, in Venezuela, Chavez 

working with Castro and Ortega and others down there to destabilize this entire hemisphere. This is our front yard, and I really 

appreciate you gentleman being here today, because we really need 

to focus on that. 

We have had Che Guevara down there in the past trying to destabilize the area, and today it is even more dangerous because 

Tehran, and working with Venezuela and Chavez and Ortega, they 

really are a danger. We have a 1,980-mile border between us and 

Mexico, and we had better pay attention to our front yard and do 

it real quickly. 

And with that, thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We all wish the best to Dan. Some join this committee with a strong interest in the Americas; some join with a 

focus on the Middle East. We have to thank President 

Ahmadinejad for showing us that this is one struggle, that those 

who strengthen Castro and Chavez also strengthen Ahmadinejad, 

and vice versa. 

We are asked sometimes, ‘‘Why is Iran’s nuclear program more 

dangerous than that of North Korea?’’ The answer is that Iran has 

worldwide ambitions, expressed in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s, 

expressed recently in an attempt to commit murder and assassination here on our own soil. We can only imagine what a nuclear 

weapon would do. We would see terrorism with impunity on a massive scale. 

Recently, when we saw this attempt at attack on our own soil, 

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dez-Kirk, and now it is time for the administration to fully enforce 

not only that amendment, but the entire Iran Sanctions Act as 

amended by CISADA. 

It is time for us to realize we have run out of time. And as long 

as we only enforce those sanctions that don’t cause any heartburn 

in our allies, then we will avoid heartburn in our allies, but we will 

not avoid a nuclear Iran. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I just want to 

add my voice to those thanking the gentleman from California for 

his service. As a freshman member of this committee, his leadership has been a tremendous help to me, and especially on issues 

such as what we are addressing today. So thank you for that. 

I also want to thank you for taking the opportunity to delve into 

the Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere. I think it is very 

important, and I appreciate your leadership as well. 

And I want to thank the gentlemen for coming. I look forward 

to learning more about what I think is a real threat in our own 

neighborhood. 

And I want to sum up with a quote from a New York Times article of 25 January by Ronen Bergman that says this, ‘‘It is not for 

nothing that it—Iran—is establishing bases for itself in Latin 

America and creating links with drug dealers on the U.S.-Mexican 

border.’’ He goes on to talk about the specific threats, but he ends 

with this. ‘‘This is not a far-fetched scenario.’’ So I am glad we are 

delving into that, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am just also concerned 

about the Iranian presence in the Western Hemisphere, but in particular in North America. Hezbollah, the Party of God, is a Shia 

Muslim group committed to violent jihad. They act as a proxy for 

Syria, for Venezuela, and for Iran. They have a pervasive and 

growing presence in the 20-country region of Latin America, including a presence in 15 cities in the United States and four Canadian 

cities. 

When we inquire about the level of threat by this presence of 

Hezbollah in North America, we are told that we are not to worry 

because their activities are limited to fund raising. Well, that 

doesn’t comfort me. And my sense is when you look at Hezbollah 

and their commitment to the destruction of the state of Israel, that 

is the near enemy. But the far enemy in their minds, in the Iranian—Ahmadinejad’s mind, is the United States. 

So I look forward to the testimony here and hope that we can 

drill down a little bit deeper and assess this threat, because of the 

presence in North America. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Turner of New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is interesting when 

you look at what these people have in common—Ahmadinejad, 

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narcoterrorists, and Hugo Chavez, an old-line Communist. Their 

commonality of interest is their hatred for the United States, their 

hatred for truth, democracy, and freedom. 

So knowing that, we can proceed. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. President 

Ahmadinejad’s charm offensive here in the Western Hemisphere 

ought to be of concern to the United States. He repeatedly extolled 

the virtues of authoritarian regimes. You know, he talked about his 

dear brother Hugo Chavez when he first landed in Venezuela. He 

called Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua his ‘‘brother President.’’ He said 

to the Nicaraguan audience, ‘‘Among all of you, we are at home, 

like brothers.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘I feel like I am with Iranians.’’

In Cuba, he was enormously happy to see the Commandant 

healthy and fit, and, of course, was very cordial to Rafael Correa 

in Ecuador, talking about the fact that Iran was presenting a message of love, affection, friendship, and solidarity with that great nation. 

Coupled with these flowery statements is an economic investment being promised by Iran that may yet produce results. It so 

far has had mixed results, but it needs to be of concern to the 

United States. This is our backyard, and the Iranian charm offensive is not just a superficial endeavor. It may very well represent 

something far more sinister and worthy of U.S. foreign policy consideration. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. Rivera of Florida. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and I want to 

add my words of commendation to a great American patriot, Congressman Dan Burton, for his great service promoting freedom and 

democracy for many, many years. 

And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I look 

forward to their testimony. Throughout the last 3 years, we have 

continued to watch Iran expand its cooperation with state sponsors 

of terrorism and criminal organizations in our own backyard, while 

I believe the Obama administration has stood by idly as a spectator. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen so eloquently stated that Ahmadinejad’s 

tour of tyrants to Cuba was his fifth visit to the region since 2007, 

which I believe shows Iran’s intentions in working with anti-American regimes to continue undermining the interest of the United 

States, which demonstrates how important it is for the Obama administration to work with Congress to develop a range of policy options to contain and prevent Iran’s continued expansion into the region. This should include sanctions and law enforcement indictments against anyone seeking out economic and other arrangements with Iran. 

And with that, I will yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Cicilline? Gone. Mr. Murphy? 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you 

for convening this hearing. As Mr. Connolly said, this is a great 

13

threat to the United States to have the President in our backyard. 

And the question is: What can we do about it? 

Clearly, their ability to play in Latin America is constrained by 

the potential generosity of their government. Our ability to crack 

down on Iran with sanctions, as supported by this President and 

this Congress, constrains their ability to be generous in their support to Latin America countries. Our ability to encourage dissent 

within Iran promotes many people in that country who have very 

bad feelings about the amount of money that goes abroad from 

Iran. 

Our ability as a country both to crack down on sanctions and to 

promote dissent clearly is at the top of the list of the tools at our 

disposal, and I look forward to the panel to give us additional tools. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And our cleanup batter, Mr. Deutch of Florida, is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Berman, for your continued focus on the Iranian regime’s attempt 

to exert influence around the world. And thank you to our witnesses for appearing today. 

Madam Chairman, the latest visit by Ahmadinejad to Latin 

America leaves little doubt the regime is continuing to pursue allies in the region that will assist in its efforts to circumvent international sanctions and avoid isolation. And while we know 

Ahmadinejad has found a willing partner in Chavez, his warming 

relations with Ecuador and Bolivia are evermore troubling, given 

Iran’s history in South America. 

It is no surprise that the mastermind behind the AMIA bombing 

in Argentina, and current subject of an Interpol red notice, Ahmad 

Vidhi, now serves as Iran’s Defense Minister. 

And increasingly troubling is the long-standing and growing 

presence of Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, in the tri-border area. We must 

continue to make it clear, not only to the Iranian regime but to all 

nations, that the U.S. will not tolerate efforts to aid Iran’s illegal 

nuclear program or support its state-sponsored terrorism. 

I appreciate the opportunity, Madam Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And the cleanup batter on our side, Mr. Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We have suspected for 

a long time that the tiny tyrant of the desert, Ahmadinejad, was 

doing more than holding powwows with his comrade Chavez. Now 

we have proof. His terrorist group, Hezbollah, has been money 

laundering for Colombian and Mexican drug cartels since 2006. 

Hezbollah took drug cartel money, bought goods from Asia, and 

then shipped those goods back to Latin America to be sold by the 

drug cartels. Hezbollah made $200 million a year off the scheme 

until our DEA got involved. Undercover agents met a Hezbollah 

drug trafficker in Bogota, and before long it led to a major 

Hezbollah money launderer. 

Last month Federal prosecutors in Virginia announced the indictment of Hezbollah operative Ayman Joumaa, who is now an 

outlaw on the run. The question is: How many more Joumaas are 

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out there? Was this just the tip of the iceberg? And, of course, what 

are we doing about it? 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And now the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First, we 

will hear from Dr. Norman Bailey, who is the president of the Institute for Global Economic Growth. Dr. Bailey previously served at 

the National Security Council and was the former mission manager 

for Cuba and Venezuela at the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence. 

Next, we welcome Michael Braun, a managing partner at Spectre 

Group International. Prior to this position, Mr. Braun served at the 

Drug Enforcement Administration as the chief of operations. 

And I would like to welcome Michael Shifter, the president of the 

Inter-American Dialogue. Previously, Mr. Shifter directed the Latin 

American and Caribbean Program at the National Endowment for 

Democracy. Thank you. 

And, finally, I would like to welcome one of our hometown heroes, Dr. Jose Azel. He is a senior scholar at the Institute for 

Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami—

go Canes, my alma mater—and has written extensively about the 

relationship of Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. 

I would like to remind our witnesses that your entire statements 

have been made a part of the record, and I kindly suggest that you 

summarize your remarks to no longer than 5 minutes each. 

And we will begin our expert testimony with Dr. Bailey. 

STATEMENT OF NORMAN A. BAILEY, PH.D., PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH (FORMER MISSION 

MANAGER FOR CUBA AND VENEZUELA, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE) 

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and members 

of the committee. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Put the microphone—direct it a little 

bit closer to your mouth. Thank you. 

Mr. BAILEY. My testimony today is based upon a paper that was 

published actually yesterday by the American Foreign Policy Council. And even though it was completed less than a month ago, several events have taken place which have signaled—and they have 

all been mentioned by members of the committee, so I am not going 

to go over them again, except to emphasize the appointment of 

General Henry Rangel, a notorious drug facilitator, as minister of 

defense of Venezuela. 

But all of the other things that were mentioned have happened 

since then, so that both Iran and Venezuela have been signaling 

to the United States that they are a threat. We are a threat—they 

are saying, ‘‘We are a threat.’’ And, finally, some important figures 

in the intelligence and security agencies of the United States have 

recognized the fact that we are vulnerable here in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

It has only taken several years for that to penetrate to the U.S. 

Government, with the honorable exception of the Department of 

the Treasury, which has taken many steps over the past few years 

because of this threat to the United States. 

15

For years, the media and the U.S. Government have repeated a 

familiar refrain, that the regime of now-ailing Venezuelan 

strongman Hugo Chavez, however annoying, poses no serious 

threat to the national security of the United States. Compelling 

evidence, however, suggests otherwise, and the most dangerous 

threat to the U.S. from Venezuela results from its facilitation and 

encouragement of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by 

the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

For the last several years, with Venezuela’s assistance, Iran has 

created an extensive regional network of economic, diplomatic, industrial, and commercial activities, with significant effect. 

This economic activism serves several clear strategic purposes for 

the Iranian regime. First, it allows Tehran to circumvent financial 

sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and 

the United Nations, through the use of the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian financial systems. 

Second purpose is to facilitate the funding of radical organizations and guerrilla movements in the hemisphere, such as 

Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the FARC and ELN in Colombia. Iranian sponsorship is not limited to Hezbollah, however, 

but to many of these organizations which are raising funds in the 

Western Hemisphere and plotting against the United States and 

other countries in the Western Hemisphere, as we have heard. 

The Iranian regime has acquired various ‘‘industrial installations’’ throughout Venezuelan territory and elsewhere in Bolivia 

and Ecuador and Nicaragua. Many of these so-called factories actually produce something, but others are used for purposes of drug 

trafficking and storage of weapons. 

The weekly flights between Caracas, Damascus, and Tehran are 

significant. There are no controls at either end, and even though 

these are supposedly commercial flights you cannot buy a seat on 

these flights. 

The illicit shipping of armaments and other prohibited goods and 

energy cooperation. I specifically want to mention the important 

Iranian involvement in drug trafficking through Venezuela to Central America, Mexico, the U.S., the Caribbean, and to Europe, 

through West Africa, is both extensive and well documented. And 

I am sure we will hear more about that from other witnesses. 

Activities of Iran in the Western Hemisphere have gone beyond 

Venezuela, as we have heard, into Ecuador, particularly in the financial area; the opening of Iranian Embassies in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia; and the threat to Panama from the Iranian 

Embassy in Nicaragua; activities throughout Central America and 

in Panama, most specifically. 

The construction of numerous warehouses for drugs amassed is 

a legitimate construction business throughout Central America. 

Trade and investment missions, likewise, have been exchanged 

with Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil, and Argentina has recently 

tried to improve its relationship with Iran. 

What should we be doing? In testimony time and again, particularly to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, then 

chaired by Congressman Engel, who has been a pillar of strength 

on this and similar issues—and thank you very much, Mr. Engel, 

for your activities. My recommendations are the same as they have 

16

been for the last 4 years, because none of them has been put into 

effect. 

One is that attention be paid—and that is one of the few that 

very recently, within the last few weeks, has begun to take place 

in the intelligence and security communities. Secondly, sanctioning 

Venezuelan and Ecuadorian banks for facilitating Iranian evasion 

of the financial sanctions. 

Thirdly, patrols outside the mouth of the Orinoco River, which 

have not taken place, and much of the drug trafficking into the 

Western Hemisphere and into Europe goes out of the Orinoco. And, 

finally, the declaration of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, which has been proven over and over and over again, and 

which would permit the United States and other countries to take 

other measures against Venezuela. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bailey follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. We will tease Mr. 

Engel at great length with that ‘‘pillar of strength’’ comment. 

Mr. Braun. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL A. BRAUN, MANAGING PARTNER, SPECTRE GROUP INTERNATIONAL, LLC (FORMER 

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION) 

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Berman, and other distinguished members of the committee. Let 

me tell you right up front, Madam Chairman, I am not an expert 

on Iran, and I am not an academic. I am a practitioner. I spent 35 

years in law enforcement, 24 with the DEA, and was fortunate 

enough to assent through the ranks and help lead the agency as 

its chief of operation for 4 years and chief of intelligence for 

about—acting chief of intelligence for about a year before that. 

So I am speaking to you from that perspective, and a lot of that 

time, over that 35 years, was spent in some very tough locations 

and environments around the globe. And by the way, in fact, in 

this town as well. 

So what I do know a great deal about, though, is how organized 

crime, terrorist, and insurgent groups operate, and how they collaborate around the world. So how does that relate to this hearing 

focused on Iran and their agenda here in the Western Hemisphere? 

As you have said, Madam Chairman, and others on the committee, just 2 days ago the Director of National Intelligence, James 

Clapper, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on 

Iran’s appeared to at least to be poised to strike the United States 

and our interests abroad. 

How could Iran ever pull off attacks on the United States right 

here at home? Well, I can assure you that if that day comes, two 

of Iran’s proxies will be leading the charge. It will be Quds Force 

and it will be Hezbollah. And the reason for that is because both 

organizations are now heavily involved in both the global cocaine 

and global heroin trade. 

And because of that growing activity in this post-9/11 environment that we are all still living in, because of that growing—because of their growing involvement in that activity, far more of 

their terrorist fighters are now in our neighborhood and more and 

more on our doorstep. It has brought them into this part of the 

world in a large way. 

You can rest assured that these organizations are developing, are 

working hard. They are masters at this. They have done it successfully in many places around the world. But you can rest assured 

that they are developing close relationships with organized crime 

cartels, the most powerful organized crime cartels that have ever 

operated anywhere in the world. And those are the Colombian and 

Mexican cartels, and that, by the way, would include the FARC, 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also a designated terrorist organization. 

When you take into consideration—and this has been mentioned 

by a couple of you—that the Mexican cartels now dominate drug 

trafficking throughout the world, as far as cocaine is concerned, but 

they also dominate the drug trade in the United States. The best 

25

estimates are is that they are well entrenched in over 250 cities 

around our country. 

If anyone thinks for a moment that the Hezbollah and the Quds 

Force has not recognized the strategic importance of that, of those 

cartels being in our communities in 250 cities, and all of the infrastructure that has been built over many, many years to support 

that activity, then quite frankly—and I don’t want to be too crude 

here—but if folks aren’t thinking about that, then they are stupid 

or at least they are naive, because I guarantee you the Quds Force 

and Hezbollah have recognized the strategic importance of all of 

that. 

Interestingly enough, the DNI used an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador here in Washington as a key 

example to support his position that Iran may well be poised to attack here in the homeland. 

The Quds Force operative—or a Quds Force operative and an 

Iranian-American attempted to recruit one or more members of the 

ultraviolet Mexican Los Zetas drug trafficking organization, to 

carry out that attack with all things—for God’s sakes, with all 

things, of a car bomb right here in Washington, DC. If that attack 

had taken place, that car bomb most assuredly would have taken 

out more than just the Saudi Arabian Ambassador. 

And I don’t want to do your jobs for your, and I certainly don’t 

want to speak for you, but I would suggest strongly, the way I see 

it, that is nothing short of an act of war, especially in this 9/11 era 

that—you know, that we are continuing to live through and work 

through. 

Thankfully, by the way, you know, the DEA and the FBI foiled 

that plot, and I believe saved ultimately—potentially saved a lot of 

lives. 

I cannot think of a better example that the director could have 

used as a byproduct of a byproduct that comes about from the 

growing confluence of drugs and terror, something that I have 

talked about for the past 10 years and, quite frankly, not a lot of 

folks were willing to listen in this town. 

Obviously, you are willing to listen, and I want to thank you for 

that. And thank you for your leadership, for calling this committee 

hearing together today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. BRAUN. No, I——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I didn’t know if that was a pause, a 

dramatic pause. 

Mr. BRAUN. No, no, it was just a pause to collect my thoughts. 

But, you know, thanks to that unwillingness and the growing 

drug’s terror nexus, we now have far greater numbers of Quds 

Force and Hezbollah terrorists in our neighborhood and on our 

doorstep, as I have said. 

Finally, that same Quds Force that I have been talking about 

that is obviously prepared to commit acts of war against us right 

here in our homeland is also the same Quds Force that is holding 

the keys to Iran’s strategic missile program, so many experts believe. So I think we need to be asking ourselves another very 

tough, important question, as a result of that. Who is going to be 

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holding the keys to Iran’s nuclear arms program when that albatross hatches in the not-too-distant future? 

Thank you, ma’am. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Shifter, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTERAMERICAN DIALOGUE 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thanks 

to Ranking Member Berman and all members of the committee. I 

am very grateful for this opportunity. 

This is an issue that needs to be taken seriously. No one doubts 

the nature of the Iranian regime. All of its actions that have been 

cited this morning have justifiably made it an international outcast, but these features are antithetical to today’s Latin America, 

which is living through a good moment of self-confidence and democratic politics. 

The region may want more independence from the United States, 

but it also wants to work more closely with the U.S. It has no interest at all in aligning itself strategically with Iran. That would 

be completely counterproductive. 

Iran is trying to expand its support in the region. Ahmadinejad 

did visit four countries on his recent visit to reinforce the few ties 

he still has in the world. But his efforts have not been successful, 

and the four countries he visited—Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, 

and Ecuador—are less and less relevant to regional politics. It is 

telling that Ahmadinejad did not go to Brazil where he traveled in 

2009. Iranian-Brazilian relations have weakened. Moderation and 

pragmatism are increasing in Brazil and throughout the region. 

Iran’s window and point of entry in Latin America has been Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. They have forged a strategic geopolitical alliance. Their aim is to curtail the influence of the United States. 

They have used oil revenues and diplomatic resources to advance 

their objectives. But Chavez has serious problems at home, and 

Ahmadinejad is reportedly also beset by very severe difficulties. 

Iran’s trade with the region has increased, especially with Brazil, 

but it remains insignificant. Many of the economic projects that 

were promised never materialized. On more serious matters, skepticism is warranted and understandable. In the early 1990s, the 

Iranian regime was involved in terrorist actions in Buenos Aires, 

the Israeli Embassy, and AMIA Jewish Community Center. 

I happened to be in Buenos Aires the day of the attack of the 

Israeli Embassy, a few blocks from the Israeli Embassy, having 

lunch. And so I have a strong sense of the impact of that terrorist 

action that day in 1992. 

In October, the U.S. accused Iranian authorities working with 

Mexican drug cartels of directing a plot to assassinate the Saudi 

Ambassador in Washington. There have been more recent allegations about Iran and the region that should be pursued. There has 

been a lot of conjecture and speculation. The nature of Iran’s involvement in Latin America is tentative. The highest standards of 

evidence should apply. 

There have been accusations, for example, about training camps 

for terrorists and support for prospecting uranium in Venezuela 

and Ecuador. These charges have not been substantiated. I am 

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evant intelligence. If they are not, they certainly should be doing 

so. 

There have also been accusations about money laundering 

through the region’s banks to help finance Hezbollah’s activities. 

This is no doubt a serious problem throughout the Western Hemisphere. There needs to be a coordinated effort among law enforcement agencies to address it seriously. 

What should the U.S. do? Well, the Obama administration has 

taken a few steps, including imposing financial sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA oil company for violating U.S. law by 

doing business with Iran. It has rightly been keeping a close and 

careful watch on Iran’s role in the hemisphere. 

There have also been calls for a tougher U.S. stance in the region, but it is important to assess carefully the likely consequences 

of any alternative approach. It is crucial that the U.S. consult 

closely with the major players in Latin America about Iran’s role 

and the best way to respond. 

Ask our friends and allies what they think is going on. They 

surely would not want to risk their hard-earned peace and democracy by allowing the spread of terrorist forces in the region. This 

approach would fit with seeing Latin America not as a threat but 

as a series of opportunities. 

The governments that Ahmadinejad recently visited are not representative of the region. They are marginal and do not pose a 

threat to the United States. The best way to deal with this issue 

and advance U.S. national interest is by working more closely with 

major Latin American players and by keeping a very careful watch. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Azel. 

STATEMENT OF JOSE AZEL, PH.D., SENIOR SCHOLAR, INSTITUTE FOR CUBAN AND CUBAN-AMERICAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI 

Mr. AZEL. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Mr. 

Berman, distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to 

have this opportunity to share my views on the growing Iranian influence in Latin America, and I commend you for calling this hearing on what is often an underestimated and misunderstood threat 

to our national interest. 

Iran is an increasingly important political economic player in 

Latin America. Its influence transcends geography, language, culture, and religion. At the heart of this growing Iranian influence 

is a peculiar trilateral configuration with Cuba and Venezuela. The 

basis of this rather eccentric alignment is not east-west political 

philosophy or a coalition based on congruent economic models or 

north-south ideological affinity. 

Even more perplexing, it is a strategic alliance that transcends 

profound theological differences. What, then, brings together Fidel 

Castro, Marxist-Leninist-atheist; Hugo Chavez, a putative socialist 

Christian; and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a product of Islamic fundamentalism? What allows the Iranian theocracy, so removed from 

Latin America by ethnicity, by customs and values, to play an increasingly influential role in our hemisphere? 

If we answer these questions in terms of the growing economic 

ties among these countries—and there are many, both licit as well 

as illicit and covert—we would be basing our analysis on a straight 

Western economic rationality. We would be mistakenly extrapolating our logical model to the likes of Castro, Chavez, and 

Ahmadinejad. 

A second analytical mistake is to scrutinize Iran’s influence in 

discrete country-by-country terms rather than in terms of the 

synergies and the symbiosis of the Tehran-Havana-Caracas alliance. 

We will further compound our error if we formulate U.S. foreign 

policy in similarly disconnected terms. As world events have repeatedly demonstrated, we eventually gained the socratic insight 

that we know very little of the logical reasoning models of autocratic leaders. Although it may seem that way to us, these countries do not follow an irrational foreign policy. 

The analytical challenge for the United States is to understand, 

in our cultural milieu, actions arising in another. In the case of 

Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela, the unifying point seems to be a virulent hostility toward the United States, liberal democracy, and 

Israel. In other words, the Ahmadinejad-Castro-Chavez nexus is 

fundamentally an anti-American alignment, and as such—and I 

think this is critical—it follows its own logic and its own rules of 

engagement. 

The growing Iranian influence in Latin America, together with 

its Cuban and Venezuelan connection, should be understood in this 

context of an anti-American alliance determined, above all other 

considerations, to undermine U.S. national interest. Cuba and VenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:32 Mar 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020212\72653 HFA PsN: SHIRL
48

ezuela have become the most strident defenders of Iran’s nuclear 

ambitions, and the three countries have formed a strategic partnership to evade U.N. and U.S. economic sanctions. 

Moreover, Cuba’s sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are reportedly shared with Iran and Venezuela. 

The Tehran-Havana-Caracas bloc speaks with a unified anti-American voice at the U.N. and other international forums, in a concerted effort to undermine U.S. influence by any means at their 

disposal. 

In addition to these diplomatic maneuvers, the bloc seeks to increase U.S. economic costs in a variety of ways, from impacting the 

price of commodities to providing support for anti-American and 

terrorist groups, to collaborating with Russia and China in opposing U.S. initiatives, and of course by Iran seeking to become a nuclear power. 

It is within the realm of the possible that should Iran succeed 

in deploying and developing its nuclear capabilities, Venezuela may 

seek deployment on its own territory. This geopolitical alignment, 

if it can be described as ideological at all, is based on an ideology 

of hate toward the United States, Israel, and democratic governing 

principles. 

Distinguished members, the formulation of U.S. foreign policy is 

often imbued with inherent tensions between policies anchored on 

our democratic values and policies based on our national interest. 

In this case, a rare congruence exists for clarity of purpose in a coordinated U.S. foreign policy that blends our support for democratic 

values with our national security concerns. 

First, our foreign policy should pay far more sustained attention 

to Latin America; and, second, unambiguously we should take advantage of this congruence of purpose to be unabashed and not 

timid in supporting opposition to the tyrants that threaten our national interest. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Azel follows:]

49


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51

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you to 

all of our witnesses for excellent testimony. 

I have a question for Dr. Bailey and for Dr. Azel. Dr. Bailey, your 

former employer, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

stated that Iran’s leaders now appear willing to conduct an attack 

within the United States, and that it is ‘‘trying as well to penetrate 

and engage in this hemisphere.’’ Do you agree with Director Clapper’s assertions? And does Iran have the capabilities and the interest to use countries in Latin America as a platform to launch attacks against us here in the U.S.? 

And, Dr. Azel, for you, in your prepared testimony you say that 

the foundation of the Iran-Cuba-Venezuela relationship is an antiAmerican alignment. Because these nations actively work to undermine U.S. interest, what do you think we can expect in the future 

to be their chosen mode of aggression from this alliance against us 

in the United States? Would it be Iran’s nuclear aspirations, Cuba’s 

oil drilling program that just recently started, the upcoming Venezuelan elections, et cetera? 

So, Dr. Bailey, we will start with you. 

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you very much for the question, Madam 

Chair. Yes, Iran certainly has the desire and it increasingly has the 

capability of threatening the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Several of these possibilities have been mentioned. 

I would also add the threat to the Panama Canal to close the 

canal. They have been talking, of course, about closing the Straits 

of Hormuz for some time. But they have the capability to close the 

Panama Canal. That is clearly a threat to the United States. 

The recent discovery of a plot to mount a cyber-attack against 

the United States, which resulted in the expulsion of the Venezuelan Consul in Miami, and simply the fact that the Venezuelan 

Government now issues passports and Venezuelan identity documents freely to Iranian agents in the Western Hemisphere, permits 

them to travel whenever they want within the hemisphere, and including across the border into the United States, as has been very 

extensively documented. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Azel. 

Mr. AZEL. Madam Chair, the most threatening scenario, of 

course, is a nuclear Iran with a complicit Venezuela that may be 

willing to offer its territory for deployment of Iran’s nuclear weapons. In such a case, we would find ourselves in 1962 all over again. 

But in addition to that scenario, these countries are continuously 

using their influence in all of the international forums to undermine U.S. influence everywhere and to increase our operating 

costs, whether it be by impacting the price of commodities or anything else. 

I am also particularly concerned with the sharing of intelligence. 

As we do know, Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are exceptional, and they are reportedly sharing all of that 

information with Iran. That is a very threatening scenario. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Braun, the attempted 

ploy by the Iranian regime to use agents in the Mexican cartels to 

assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the U.S. was quite 

52

alarming. With your experience at DEA, do you believe that Iran’s 

attempt to carry out a terrorist attack on U.S. soil was an isolated 

incident? Do you think that Hezbollah has a strategic interest in 

Central America and the southwest border? 

Mr. BRAUN. Madam Chairman, I would say that the Quds Force 

and Hezbollah, as I said earlier, are absolute masters at developing 

very close relations with existing criminal organizations throughout 

the world, whether they be powerful drug trafficking cartels, smuggling groups, money launderers, those that develop and provide 

forged documents, passports, and so forth, and they work very, 

very hard to conduct or develop those relations. 

And by developing those relations, it provides them with the ability to operate far from home in our neighborhood, and, as I said 

earlier, on our doorstep. There is no doubt in my mind that they 

have developed close relations or relations with groups like the 

FARC and some other Colombian cartels in Colombia. 

It is important to understand that, you know, one of many 

threats posed by that is, you know, the FARC’s ability to routinely 

construct fully submersible submarines now that are capable of 

moving eight to ten tons of cocaine all the way up into northern 

Mexico. What else could be on those ships? 

They have obviously established or are at least attempting hard 

to establish relations with the Mexican cartels right on our southwest border. For what reason? Because they—you know, they or 

any other terrorist organization are not going to attempt to construct their own smuggling infrastructure into the United States. 

To answer your question, ‘‘Do they have designs on attacking 

us?’’ I believe that they do have. As one of the Congressmen said 

earlier, they are up to no good. And they have got the ability to 

do it, thanks to their relations——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. BRAUN [continuing]. With cartels. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

At least initially for Mr. Shifter and Mr. Braun, a couple of questions. I clearly understand Iran’s interest in its network with cartels, criminal groups, putting Quds Forces closer to the United 

States and in sensitive areas. 

What are the governments that are playing with Iran? What is 

their interest, other than sort of a larger band of brothers with—

joined together by hatred or a dislike for the United States? What 

are they getting? Why is Castro and Ortega and Ecuador, why are 

they—why are the governments here playing with Iran? 

And I will throw out a suggestion, but then I would like you to 

comment. Is this Chavez’s clout, not Iran’s clout, that is getting 

them to go along with this agenda? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. There is no question that the principal 

alliance in this hemisphere is between Ahmadinejad and Chavez. 

And Venezuela has been the window for Ahmadinejad in the hemisphere. And Chavez has money from oil, and he supports the subsidy to Cuba. For example, for a year, I have heard figures of—

really quite striking—$3 billion to $5 billion a year, 100,000 barrels 

of oil a day. 

53

Mr. BERMAN. He is filling the role Russia used to play. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Exactly. He provides that role while he gets something in return, and he gets other things in return, but I think this 

is part of the package. And I think it is the same with Ortega, who 

relies on Chavez as well. So this is——

Mr. BERMAN. But these countries are not getting economic benefits from Iran, as I understand it. 

Mr. SHIFTER. No. 

Mr. BERMAN. Nicaragua has a huge debt to Iran for oil purchases, and Iran hasn’t canceled it or reduced it or anything. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Right. No, nothing. They are not getting benefits at 

all. As a matter of fact, Ahmadinejad went to Rafael Correa’s inauguration in 2007, so that was exactly 5 years ago in January 2007. 

There has been no cooperation from Iran to Ecuador. And I have 

consulted with Ecuadorian colleagues who were very—who were in 

the opposition to Correa; they don’t like Correa. But they said there 

is just—you know, it hasn’t come through. There has been nothing 

that has been delivered despite lots of promises. 

This recent visit was just, you know, there is no sign that populations respond positively to him at all. There is a rejection by 

Ahmadinejad. The governments are doing it, because it is a favor 

to Chavez, and that is the deal that they have. But there is really 

no sense of really any in-roads in the societies of these countries. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Braun, I would like your reaction. But also, is 

there something more you would like to see this administration 

doing to deal with the issues you have raised? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I mean, one of the things that I would say to 

that, Ranking Member Berman, is that I really believe strongly 

that post-9/11, not shortly thereafter, we took the ball off—or we 

took our eye off the ball of the global drug trade and drug trafficking and how it impacts our nation. 

And, consequently, the confluence of—or, you know, the confluence of drugs and terror began to grow, and it is growing now 

at speeds far faster than most in this town want to admit. I am 

not saying that that is the case with this committee. Obviously, it 

is not. But it is moving at speeds far faster than anyone wants to 

admit. 

What we have got to do is we have got absolutely separate and 

distinct strategies, plans, and funding streams for counterterrorism 

and counternarcotics. The two have come together. We are already 

behind the power curve. We need to put our strategies together, 

which would include obviously, you know, the funding that goes 

along with all of that. 

We have got stovepiped directorates within the CIA, the FBI, 

and other parts within Department of Justice and Department of 

Treasury and our intel community. And they need to be communicating far more closely with one another and working more closely together. 

To answer the first question, though, or to make a comment, 

what is amazing—and I think it was you that said that when 

Ahmadinejad shows up in Venezuela there are countless numbers 

of promises made for human aid and that like kind of activity, and 

it is never delivered. But what is delivered, what I see, is the building of organized criminal capacity in Venezuela, Bolivia, along our 

54

southwest border. That appears to me to be one of the things, one 

of the most important things that come out of those meetings. 

If you look at the number of flights that are leaving Venezuela 

loaded with cocaine, headed for the west coast of Africa, ultimately 

making its way into the soft underbelly of Europe through Spain, 

it is mind-boggling. It looks like a mass of red with each one of 

those flights being a single red line. 

If you look at the collaboration between Venezuela and Bolivia 

on the drug trade, this is a multi-billion dollar industry, and I for 

one believe that what it is doing is generating a great deal of contraband revenue that each one of these countries and organized 

crime throughout the region can tap into to move their agendas forward. 

Mr. BERMAN. My time is——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Berman. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. McCaul, vice chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. You know, when I 

worked in the Justice Department on counterterrorism cases, 

Hezbollah—we were—obviously, al-Qaeda was the number one priority, but Hezbollah in many respects has a greater sophistication 

by far. We were always concerned about the presence of Hezbollah, 

much heavier presence in the Western Hemisphere, more so than 

al-Qaeda. 

But we always viewed them as more of a sort of terrorist financing support mechanism rather than an operational cell, for instance. Then, the Saudi Ambassador plot unfolds, and that is a bit 

of a game-changer. Univision does this report on a cyber plot to attack the United States involving the Iranian Ambassador. That became an eye-opener. 

I think, Mr. Braun, as you stated, counterterrorism and counternarcotics have now—the two have come together. And when you 

look at this quote from Hugo Chavez over here, ‘‘Ahmadinejad and 

I are going into the basement now to set our sights on Washington 

and launch cannons and missiles.’’ Now, he said that was a joke, 

but I fail to see that humor in that statement. In fact, there may 

be some truth to that statement. 

So my question is: Have they made the transition from merely 

support to operational? I guess, Mr. Braun, you would be the best 

person to start out on that. 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I think they have—I believe, Congressman, 

they have made the transition, and I would say, again, that it 

has—their ability, you know, to execute is strengthened by the 

close relations that they are working hard to develop with very 

powerful organized criminal organizations in our neighborhood and 

throughout Latin America, as well as with, you know, designated 

terrorist organizations like the FARC. 

These groups allow them to operate freely in our neighborhood, 

and they are getting closer to our doorstep. And if we don’t do 

something about it, and really get serious about it, then, you know, 

I—again, I don’t want to sound too crude, but I think there is—you 

know, there is going to be hell to pay, you know, at some date in 

the not—probably in the not-too-distant future. 

55

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, you know, the conventional wisdom, when we 

get these briefings, I always ask the question, and they say, ‘‘Well, 

you know, the drug cartels would never associate themselves with 

any sort of terrorist organization, because they don’t want the 

blowback that would be associated with that.’’ And yet Operation 

Titan I think pretty well revealed and underscored the fact that 

there is a relationship between the two. 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, there is an unequivocal relationship, and that 

is exactly why I believe General Clapper used the attempted plot—

or the plot to kill or assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to 

the United States. The reason he used that is because he knew he 

could rely on it. It is not just some piece of intelligence or pieces 

of intelligence. 

It is intelligence and information that has been converted into 

evidence that would pass a judicial test in any Federal courthouse 

in the United States. And we have the greatest system of justice 

in the world, in our Federal courts system, and it is not an easy 

thing to get evidence admitted—as you well know based on your 

past experience, admitted into a court of law. So, you know, there 

is an unequivocal connection. 

Let me just mention one thing about Operation Titan, 

anecdotally, that will paint an absolutely clear picture on the 

amounts of money that are generated in the Hezbollah, supported 

and facilitated by Quds Force activity in the growing cocaine trade 

throughout Latin America. 

One small piece of that Op Titan initiative resulted in the delivery of a close—a very close associate and affiliate of the Hezbollah, 

the guy that apparently was in Latin America responsible for putting a lot of these multi-ton loads together, moving them into West 

Africa, and ultimately responsible for collecting massive amounts of 

bulk cash. 

Part of that operation involved the delivery on the part of that 

money launderer to a DEA undercover operative, an agent that 

spoke fluent Arabic, of $36 million in cash. So they were having a 

tough time moving it out of the Western Hemisphere and into Africa and beyond. That agent actually took delivery of $20 million in 

cash as part of that investigation. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I want to make one more point, because my time 

is running out. That is, the Revolutionary Guard, Quds Forces, and 

Iranian intelligence officers, they are here in the United States. In 

my judgment, they are in Mexico. CISEN has told me they can’t 

even quantify. They don’t know how many officers are in their own 

country, and that is probably true throughout Latin America. I 

think expelling these officers would be a very smart idea. 

I think designating the Revolutionary Guard as a foreign terrorist organization, which we were surprised they hadn’t been, 

would be a helpful tool I think from a law enforcement standpoint. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. BRAUN. I would absolutely agree with it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I see my time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. Engel, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere. 

56

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, for wonderful testimony. And thank you, Dr. Bailey, for that 

nice compliment. I very much appreciate it. 

I want to focus on two things. Number one, the sanctions that 

we have imposed on Iran. How have these sanctions against Iran 

affected Iran’s ability to engage with Latin America economically? 

To what extent do you agree with the administration that Iran has 

been unable to establish a financial foothold in the region, largely 

because of U.S. sanctions? And are additional sanctions needed to 

make it harder for Iran to establish a foothold in the region? That 

is one thing. 

And the second thing is I would like to focus on Hezbollah. We 

have looked at Hezbollah fund raising activities in the region, particularly in the tri-border region of Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay, and 

in Venezuela. I am wondering if anyone can enlighten us a little 

bit more about Hezbollah’s current activities in the hemisphere. 

And, Dr. Bailey, why don’t we start with you. 

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Engel. 

In the first place, as far as a financial foothold of Iran in the Western Hemisphere is concerned, it is primarily centered in Venezuela 

and Ecuador at this point. The Iranians established Iranian-controlled banks in both Venezuela and Ecuador. Those banks have in 

fact been sanctioned by the Treasury Department. 

What the Treasury Department has not done is to apply sanctions to Venezuelan and Ecuadorian banks, which are used by the 

Iranians to evade U.S., European Union, and U.N. financial sanctions on Iran. In my opinion, as I mentioned in my recommendations, that is something that I would very strongly recommend that 

the U.S. Government do. 

As far as the financing of Hezbollah is concerned, as you rightly 

point out, a lot of that comes from the tri-border area, although 

less than before, primarily because of fairly successful Brazilian efforts to counter smuggling and money laundering in the tri-border 

area. 

However, they have, as a result, established other centers sometimes with the cooperation of the government in the country involved, particularly in the case of Bolivia and more strongly in the 

case of Venezuela. The center of these activities in Venezuela at 

this point is in the island of Margarita, where the Islamic Cultural 

Center, which never has ballet performances or art exhibits, but 

does have 4-foot-thick concrete walls and armed guards, is the center of these activities in the northern part of South America. 

They extort funds from—and some of them are not extorted, 

some of them are voluntary, from the Arabic communities in these 

countries, which is quite large. But the main funding of Hezbollah 

and other terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Islamic 

Jihad, at this point comes from what Mr. Braun is talking about, 

namely the alliance between the drug traffickers and the terrorist 

organizations. 

The drug traffickers make enormous profits, and the terrorist organizations provide security for them. And as a result, there is a 

symbiotic relationship between the two, which goes—partially goes 

toward funding of the activities of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. 

57

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Shifter, I wanted to hear your comments on it. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. I think that the sanctions regime has 

been effective in preventing the financial foothold, and there have 

been sanctions, as Norm Bailey mentioned. I think the enforcement 

could be maybe a little bit stronger, a little more coordinated, a little more sustained. 

It could do a little bit—and I think, like all governments, like our 

Government, there are different agencies that are more active on 

enforcing the sanctions than others. So I think it has had some 

positive impact, but I think there could be more enforcement. 

On Hezbollah, my sense is that they have been involved in 

drug—smuggling arms, smuggling drugs, and the like, in the region. I think that in terms of their control over sales in Latin 

America, it is an educated guess the extent of it, but I think there 

is really not a lot of very reliable, credible information about how 

much we know. I think we should try to find out more. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Braun, could you comment on what Dr. Bailey 

had said with the drug trafficking? 

Mr. BRAUN. Congressman, the one thing that I would add to the 

doctor’s comments, you know, I would go back to his comment of 

a symbiotic relationship that develops between very powerful drug 

trafficking cartels and terrorist organizations. That is an extremely 

important point, because you can take it a step further. 

With respect to destabilizing already weak governments in many 

places around the world, when you have these two very powerful 

threats occupying the same place at the same time, like the tri-border area of South America, perhaps even some limited regions or 

areas of Mexico, in West Africa and elsewhere, what you have is 

a—what results is a symbiotic destabilization of already weak government, because when the—you know, the cartels are working 

hard with their corruption campaigns to undermine the rule of law. 

That further weakens good governance. 

Oftentimes they resort to attacks, physical attacks on security 

forces, further undermining already weak governance. But the terrorist organizations and insurgents are doing the same thing. So 

when either attacks government, it just weakens it that much 

more, and the other benefits just as much as, you know, the attacking force. And that—you know, we saw it in Colombia. We are seeing it all over West Africa and North Africa. 

We are seeing it in the Afghan-Pakistan region and elsewhere 

around the world. We have got to be doing more to keep these very 

powerful threats from building long-term relations. We have got to 

be getting them apart rather than allowing them to come together. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle 

East and South Asia. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. At the end of last year, 

Iran introduced a new Spanish language television network, 

Hispan TV, to markets across Latin America. Are you familiar with 

that? Could you talk about potential sizes of the audiences and 

what type of reception that this might be receiving now in the region or potentially in the future? And do you anticipate that it 

58

might have a significant effect on public opinion? Just anything 

that you could tell us about that, whoever wants to take that up. 

Anybody familiar with that? 

Mr. AZEL. No, not familiar with the specifics of the programming 

or anything like that. I think we have to wait and see. But I did 

want to take a second, if I could, to address part of Mr. Berman’s 

question earlier having to do with the——

Mr. CHABOT. Well, I don’t know if I want to do that. [Laughter.] 

But let me—if I have time, I will come back to that. Does anybody know about the Hispan TV? Mr. Shifter? 

Mr. SHIFTER. I have heard about it, and I am, just frankly, very 

skeptical that it is going to get much reception in Latin America. 

I mean, it is just starting. That is clearly what—the Iranians have 

that intention, but I don’t think there is going to be a lot of response in the region. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. All right. If you want to make it real quick, 

Mr. Azel. 

Mr. AZEL. Absolutely. 

Mr. CHABOT. Go ahead, Mr. Braun. 

Mr. AZEL. It is only the point that I try to develop that if we look 

for logic in these regimes, we are not going to find logic as we understand logic. This is about odium. This is about hate for the 

United States and democratic governing principles. 

Let us recall, for example, that in 1979 with the victory of the 

Islamic Revolution, Fidel Castro abandoned his long-term support 

for the Communist Party in Iran and embraced the Ayatollah Khomeini at that time. In his mind, the anti-Americanism of the Ayatollah trumped his anti-Communist philosophy, so my point is simply that we should not look for the kind of logic that we employ 

in our analysis. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Mr. Braun? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I would just say that I would agree with my 

co-panelists here to my left that in many places in Latin America 

it probably won’t take hold, but we have to remember that there 

are some locations in South America where you have a rather large 

Middle Eastern population, folks that have migrated from various 

locations in the Middle East, the tri-border area being one of those. 

Cumulatively, you have got several million folks with that kind of 

background, if you will, that are in Latin America. 

So I would be concerned that—and many of those folks, especially in the tri-border area, are young men between the ages of 16 

to 25. They are disenfranchised. They have virtually nothing to 

their name, and that area for one has been a recruiting mecca for 

the likes of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas for many years. 

So, you know, I would be a little bit concerned about that, Congressman. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Thank you. Let me move on to something 

else. This potential, you know, axis of evil—Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela—one of you had mentioned their cooperation with China 

and Russia insomuch as the thing that brings them all together is 

undermining U.S. interest there or around the world. What evidence or anything you could comment relative to Russia and China 

and their coordination or alliance or involvement here? Dr. Bailey? 

59

Mr. BAILEY. Yes, thank you for the question. As far as Russia is 

concerned, it is primarily interested in selling arms, and has been 

selling massive quantities of arms to Venezuela particularly. As far 

as the Chinese are concerned, their involvement in the Western 

Hemisphere has been largely economic—in other words, trying to 

tie up sources of natural resources—minerals, oil and gas, and so 

on and so forth. 

And it is part of their effort throughout the world centered in 

Southeast Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America, to tie up sources 

of natural resources. They have also made investments in various 

areas. I have not seen credible evidence that the Chinese are trying 

to undermine the interests of the United States in the Western 

Hemisphere. I would be much more concerned about their military 

and naval buildup, and so on, in the Far East and in South Asia, 

than I would be about anything they are doing in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

In the case of the Russians, of course, they are always happy to 

do anything that makes the United States look bad, and they sent 

ships to Venezuela, because we sent ships into the Black Sea when 

Russia attacked Georgia, sort of tit for tat sort of thing. But primarily, again, as I say, their principal interest is in selling weapons. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I see my time has expired, 

Madam Chair. I will yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank so much, Chairman Chabot. 

Mr. Deutch, my colleague from Florida is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

MR. Braun, I want to stay on the tri-border area. Iran’s proxy 

Hezbollah has been benefitting financially from the tri-border area 

since the 1980s, mainly from rampant intellectual property theft 

and piracy. Last Congress this committee held a hearing on protecting intellectual property rights overseas, and we looked at efforts to train security personnel in the tri-border area to reduce intellectual property theft and transfers of pirated goods. 

First, can you assess the current state of Hezbollah’s efforts in 

the tri-border area? You talked some about the recruitment for terrorist groups. Could you speak specifically about Hezbollah and 

U.S. efforts to combat that? And, secondly, in your opinion, are 

Hezbollah’s activities in the region still mainly confined to fund 

raising and generating revenue, or is there a significant operational 

presence? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I think there has been a monumental shift, 

and much of this has to do with—quite frankly, with our success 

in prosecuting the global war on terror. Two things have happened—state sponsorship for terrorism has declined significantly. 

Even the amounts of money that Iran are pushing to the 

Hezbollah, it is not dried up, but it is not what it used to be. State 

sponsorship continues to decline, and we have done yeoman’s 

work—collectively, our Government security forces—in identifying 

and significantly disrupting the funding streams from very powerful private donors. 

So for those two reasons, many groups like Hezbollah and many 

other designated terrorist organizations, well over half on our FTO 

60

list now, are involved in one or more aspects of the global drug 

trade. 

In the tri-border area, really, it is where Hezbollah got its start. 

After 9/11, in a significant way, from that area they were acquiring 

relatively small quantities or loads of cocaine. But what we were 

seeing, or what DEA was seeing, just 8–10 years ago, was them acquiring 14, 15 kilograms of cocaine for a $75,000 investment. It 

goes into a couple of suitcases with a passenger. Checked luggage 

ultimately makes its way into Europe or some other location, where 

that $75,000 investment becomes $1 million in profit very quickly. 

And that has since grown at light speed into their wholesale involvement now of moving multi-tons of cocaine out of Latin America. Thank you, Hugo Chavez, and thank you, Evo Morales, for assisting them, but helping them move it into West Africa and then 

onward into Europe and other markets. 

I can’t speak about their involvement in the other kinds of activities, Congressman, that you are focused on, but could certainly give 

you some names of some folks that could help you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. Thanks. 

Mr. Shifter, I would like to go back to a point you made earlier. 

You noted that Brazil is not on the itinerary of Ahmadinejad, and 

though maintaining overall positive relations the U.S. and Brazil 

had some differences of opinion under President Lula, particularly 

Iran. 

Brazil’s failed attempt to stave off last-minute sanctions at the 

U.N. through the fuel swap deal put them at odds with other Western powers. Because they were missing from the agenda, from the 

itinerary, do you see Brazil’s policy now taking a new direction? 

And what influence—most importantly, what influence does Brazil, 

as the economic powerhouse of the region and a U.S. ally, have on 

countries like Bolivia and Ecuador that have chosen to strengthen 

their ties with Iran? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. Well, Brazil is the regional power in 

Latin America, and it does have strong influence. It is on the border with Bolivia. It has investments that have grown throughout 

South America especially, so it has—it is the political and economic 

powerhouse in the region. 

On Brazil’s change, I think there has been some change. I don’t 

want to overstate the change. There is still an economic relationship. Brazil is pragmatic. Brazil sells a great deal to Iran. That 

hasn’t stopped. They sell a lot of food and other products to Iran. 

But there seems to be a distancing with the new government of 

Dilma Rousseff since she came in on January 1 from, you know, 

a year ago with the Iranian—there is a different approach, there 

is a different style. 

She is doing things that the previous government wouldn’t do. 

There was a backlash in Brazil politically to what Lula did. It went 

too far, so she is pulling back. So there is a difference there, but 

I wouldn’t expect Brazil to sort of have sort of a very 

confrontational posture toward Iran. So I don’t want to overstate 

the change either. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina. 

61

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank the witnesses for being here. Just a brief section of statement here. America is a friend and ally to many of our Latin American neighbors. 

We were the first to recognize and welcome Argentina, Peru, Chile, 

Colombia, and Mexico, in the Community of Nations in 1822. We 

have had an excellent military support from our Latin American 

friends, both in World War II and Korea, and most recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The U.S. possesses vital national security and economic interest 

in Latin America, and we strongly resent hostile foreign influence 

in our neighborhood that threatens the peace, security, and tranquility of our own interest and those of our allies. 

I think Dr. Bailey’s written testimony states the issue succulently when he says, ‘‘Iran’s penetration into the region, and 

Venezuelan’s facilitation of it, represents a real and growing security threat to the United States as well as to the rest of the hemisphere.’’ There are some who believe we should abandon the Monroe Doctrine. I could not disagree more, which is why I recently introduced H.R. 3783, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act. 

This legislation requires the administration to detail the presence and activity of Iran, the IRGC, and Quds Force, Hezbollah 

and Hamas in the Western Hemisphere, and to craft a strategy in 

response to those threats that these entities face. 

Now, I want to be clear. This bill does not advocate imperialism, 

and we are not trying to build an empire. We are trying to protect 

American interests and those of our friends and allies here in our 

neighborhood, so to speak. Consider what we know and recap much 

of what is being said today, we know Iran has been building a diplomatic, economic, and security relationship within Latin America. 

We know Iran uses the IRGC directly and indirectly, its Quds 

Force and terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, as 

tools of foreign policy. We know that Iran is a master chess player, 

and recently expanded its public diplomacy outreach to Latin 

America with Hispan TV. We know that the recent DEA success 

of effectively shutting down the Lebanese central bank resulted in 

the indictment of a man at the center of the case who was charged 

with trafficking cocaine and laundering money for the Los Zetas 

Mexican drug cartel. 

Since our country has trouble securing our southwest border, this 

poses a serious concern. We know that the U.S. has sanctioned 23 

Iranian financial institutions, and the EU has instituted a ban on 

Iranian oil. We also know that, as we tighten the noose around 

Iran, we also have assets in Latin America that make for easy targets for Iran—Embassies, consulates, businesses, energy pipelines, 

cultural organizations, and the like. 

We know from Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s recent 

testimony just this week on 31 January that some Iranian officials, 

probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have changed 

their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the 

United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that 

threaten the regime. 

So knowing this, and failing to take action to protect American 

interest, is irrational and foolish. We had the opportunity to 

62

counter Iran’s strategy and alliances in Latin America, and I exhort my colleagues to recognize the threat and seek to work together, united in our desire to protect American security interests. 

This includes working with our Latin American neighbors and our 

closest allies in the region. 

The question I have today is for both Dr. Bailey and Mr. 

Brown—Braun, excuse me. Would you elaborate on what type of 

concrete response needs to occur for our Government to effectively 

counter the extensive web of illicit activity, the nexus between 

narcotrafficking and terrorism, and the strategic connections that 

Iran has made in Venezuela and throughout the Latin American 

area? Dr. Bailey. 

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you very much for that question. I mean, one 

comment I would make to add to what Mr. Braun was talking 

about is that Iran has greatly reduced its contributions to 

Hezbollah and Hamas because of its own financial and economic 

problems. That makes those organizations even more dependent on 

drug trafficking revenues to keep up their activities. 

As far as the activities of Hezbollah particularly, as well as the 

other terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere, they have 

become, as Mr. Braun pointed out, very, very much operational, 

and that is being demonstrated almost on a daily basis. As I mentioned at the very beginning, it is almost as if both Iran and Venezuela and some of the other—and Cuba, and so forth, are saying 

to the United States, ‘‘We are a threat. We are a threat.’’ And people in the United States, for some reason, in many cases don’t want 

to admit that, or don’t want to receive that message. 

The fact that Iranian agents are throughout Central America 

and Panama at this point is extremely significant. From the Embassy in Managua, the Embassy now has 25 ‘‘diplomats’’ because 

of their enormous joint operations between the two countries. That 

is sarcasm. They are all—almost all—agents who are penetrating 

Central America and Panama through Nicaragua. 

As far as financial support is concerned to evade financial sanctions through particularly Venezuela, and to some extent the Ecuadorian financial system, this is something that the United States 

needs to—and the Western world needs to be extremely concerned 

about. 

As I pointed out in my list of recommendations, I think it is very 

important to declare Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism, at 

which point we could stop Venezuelan oil exports to the United 

States, and then they will throw up their hands and say, ‘‘Oh, my 

God, then the price of oil will go through the stratosphere.’’

At the same time we do that, we could release the same quantity 

of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is actually better quality oil than what we get from Venezuela. It would damage 

the Venezuelan Government tremendously. It would do no damage 

to the oil market in the United States. The United States does not 

depend on Middle Eastern oil. It does depend, to some extent, on 

Venezuelan oil, but that can be offset with releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which after all was created for some purpose, although it has never been extensively used for any purpose 

whatsoever. 

63

Mr. BRAUN. Congressman, if I could just quickly say three things 

that I believe strongly we need to get focus on with respect to shoring up security on our front and on our flanks. And those three 

things come in this order: As I said early on, we need to develop 

interlocking strategies that bring counternarcotics and counterterrorism together. 

Much of that is driven by funding. That falls into your ball park. 

I think you can do a lot to drive these—our, you know, myriad security forces within our country together and get them focused on 

the growing confluence of drugs and terror. 

The second thing we need to do is, you know, we are obsessed 

with developing—or, excuse me, we are obsessed with developing 

strategies to defend the one yard line, our southwest border. What 

we need is a defense-in-depth. After 9/11, many of our Government’s resources didn’t dry up, but many of them went to other 

parts of the world, and that is understandable. 

But in many ways, those resources have never been backfilled, 

and we need a lot more DEA agents, we need a lot more FBI and 

IS agents downrange working with their counterparts shoulder to 

shoulder on bilateral investigations, which comes into the third 

point, and this is the most—probably the most important thing I 

can say is——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I was about to cut you off, but I can’t 

do it now, on the most important point. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We need to refocus 

our efforts on the traditional forms of illicit markets that are driven by organized crime. We have taken our eyes off of drug trafficking. In many ways, we have taken our eyes off the smuggling 

of arms in our hemisphere, human trafficking, and those kinds of 

things. If we are focused on those—and we have got the resources 

focused on those threats—we are naturally going to come up 

against the terrorists and the terrorist groups that we should be 

fearing most. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Sherman, the ranking 

member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to comment on the previous questioner’s 

idea of us not buying oil from Venezuela. I think it would have 

much less of an effect, in that I think they could sell it elsewhere. 

And I see one person shaking your head. Are you saying, Mr. Bailey, that China would not be a customer, at a good price, for Venezuelan oil? 

Mr. BAILEY. China is a customer for Venezuelan oil. They could 

not sell it elsewhere for the simple reason that it is extra heavy, 

sulfurous crude, and can only be processed in certain refineries. 

Certain of those refineries exist in Venezuela and in Curacao, but 

mostly the refineries are in the United States. And those, of course, 

would be deprived of——

Mr. SHERMAN. And China could not retrofit its refineries to be 

able to handle this. 

64

Mr. BAILEY. China takes as much oil already from Venezuela as 

it can process. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But the question I asked was: How much work 

would it be for China to change its existing refineries to be able 

to accept more Venezuelan oil? 

Mr. BAILEY. That is the kind of thing that cannot be done overnight. I mean, it——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. BAILEY [continuing]. For that kind of refinery to be built 

takes a long time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Gotcha. And of course an easier thing for us to do 

against Venezuela, if we have them red-handed in terrorism, is to 

take the assets of the oil company they own in our country. 

I don’t know if anybody on the panel can answer this, but it is 

easy to see all the press releases of promised Iranian aid to Latin 

American countries. How much in the last decade has Iran actually 

provided? Not in trade. I mean, buying soybeans that would be sold 

elsewhere hardly accomplishes much. But in terms of free money, 

how much can be documented to have actually been disbursed? 

Does anybody have an answer? Or can we say it is a very de minimis amount? Mr. Bailey. Dr. Bailey. 

Mr. BAILEY. The estimates vary. Iran, as pointed out by Mr. 

Shifter and others, has been promising things to all of—you know, 

to Bolivia, to Nicaragua, to Ecuador, and so on and so forth. Most 

of the actual investments that they have made have taken place—

that they have actually made rather than promised have taken 

place in Venezuela, and that is——

Mr. SHERMAN. And these are investments. This isn’t a donation. 

Mr. BAILEY. These are investments, yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. BAILEY. And the best estimate that I——

Mr. SHERMAN. My question was: Donation, free money. 

Mr. BAILEY. Ah, I am sorry. I misunderstood. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can anybody here say with confidence that there 

is a particular instance when even $1 million has gone from 

Tehran to any Latin American country, gratis, donation, free? 

Whether it be in kind or in currency. 

Mr. BRAUN. I can’t say that, but I can’t restrain myself from saying this, Congressman, I know an informational campaign when I 

see one, an informational campaign for the masses on a visit like 

Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to Venezuela. What I am more concerned about, and what we should all be more concerned about, is 

what is happening in the basement, you know, after they——

Mr. SHERMAN. I know, but I am—so you are saying that the 

United States has allowed it to be thought throughout Latin America that Iran is generous, when in fact as far as we know not $1 

million, or even $100,000, of generosity has yet been disbursed. 

I would hope the CIA could answer the question I have asked 

you. Looking here, you folks can’t tell me one instance when Iran 

distributed any money gratis. I would hope the CIA could more definitively answer that question. And then, we are of course remiss 

in not informing our Latin American friends that we are talking 

lots of sizzle and absolutely no steak. 

Dr. Bailey, you have a comment? 

65

Mr. BAILEY. Yes, with reference to what the CIA is able to do 

and not able to do. One of the things I discovered very quickly 

when I was mission manager for Cuba and Venezuela in the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence is that with two exceptions—Mexico and Colombia—our intelligence assets in Latin 

America can only be described as pathetic. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That may be the case, but if we simply had an allout campaign to say not one penny of aid is going from Iran to 

Latin America, and let them prove it, as far as you four gentlemen 

know they could not point to a single thing that they have done to 

help poor people or economic development in Latin America. 

Mr. BAILEY. That is correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And if you can’t point to anything, we would sure 

like to be able to say that nobody can point to anything. And if they 

surprise us and point to anything, it will be so small that none of 

the four of you have been able to find it and the CIA couldn’t find 

it either. 

Mr. BAILEY. I think your statement is absolutely correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I believe my time has expired. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Rivera of Florida. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I have a question for Mr. Shifter, and then a couple of questions for Dr. Bailey 

and Dr. Azel. We will start with Mr. Shifter. 

During several of the statements that have been made throughout the morning by many of my colleagues, they have laid out in 

detail recent actions by the Iranian regime and by Hezbollah in our 

hemisphere, both in their opening statements as well as in the 

question and answer period. Some of those that were cited included 

the Saudi Ambassador plot; the Mexico plot uncovered by Univision 

which resulted in, as you well know, the expulsion of the Venezuelan Consul; the Lebanese Canadian Bank case. 

However, as I have noticed in the responses to those questions, 

or to those comments by many of my colleagues, and even in your 

testimony, you have stated that the charges of Iran’s influence in 

the hemisphere have not been substantiated or perhaps exaggerated. Is there any further proof, or what further proof would we 

need to substantiate the fact that Iran is attempting in Latin 

America to run counter, or at least to stabilize or hurt U.S. interests? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you, Congressman. There are clearly some 

things that are cited in the testimony, including the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador, which are real and which 

there is evidence and should be of enormous concern. 

I think what the challenge is is to separate what is substantiated 

with what is speculation and conjecture. And there has been a lot 

of conjecture that I cited in my testimony about training of terrorists and other things. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, let us just talk about conjecture and citing of 

evidence. Let us stick to the U.S. intelligence community and the 

law enforcement community. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Right. 

Mr. RIVERA. Is there anything on their part that they have 

brought forward that you believe is conjecture——

66

Mr. SHIFTER. No. 

Mr. RIVERA [continuing]. Or unsubstantiated? 

Mr. SHIFTER. No. On the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement, 

no. But I think there have been things that have been accused that 

haven’t been supported by the law enforcement community that are 

out there, and that I think that are open to question. But in terms 

of what the U.S. law enforcement community has said, I think that 

is——

Mr. RIVERA. And what would you say are the more egregious examples coming from U.S. intelligence and U.S. law enforcement? 

Mr. SHIFTER. What would be egregious examples? Do you 

mean——

Mr. RIVERA. Where it would not be conjecture, where it would be 

substantiated. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, no, everything that has come from U.S. law 

enforcement I think has been substantiated. 

Mr. RIVERA. Such as? 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, in terms of the role of, you know, the Saudi—

the Iranian bank in Venezuela, the attempt on the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. I mean, those things are clear evidence. 

What I was referring to was other things that are part of the debate that haven’t been substantiated, and I would be careful about 

that. 

Mr. RIVERA. Let me ask Dr. Bailey and Dr. Azel—I have seen 

media reports that indicate Hezbollah has possibly set up a base 

in Cuba. What is the nature of this—of these reports and any potential nexus between Havana, Tehran, and Caracas, and the impact it could have on U.S. national interest? I will start with Dr. 

Azel. 

Mr. AZEL. Well, there are of course numerous reports of training 

bases in Cuba that have aided the terrorist networks. There are 

also substantiated reports of Cuban scientists helping with chemical plants, in Tehran for example. So there is really a network of 

things that we can point at with specificity. 

My concern is when we look at these things is, do we have the 

right analytical framework? And whatever the evidence may or 

may not be, what I am trying to emphasize is that we need to understand the threat, not from Iran in discrete terms in each country, but these countries acting in unison. 

When I mentioned earlier that my worst nightmare would be a 

nuclear Iran and a Venezuela willing to accept deployment of those 

weapons in Venezuelan territory, for example, it is within the 

realm of possibility. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, let me do this before you—I only have a few 

seconds left. Dr. Bailey, this issue of the bases, Hezbollah, and involvement in Cuba? 

Mr. BAILEY. It depends on what you mean by ‘‘base.’’ I mean, 

when I talk about a base, I am talking about substantial physical 

infrastructure, and so on. I don’t believe that Hezbollah has established a base in that sense in Cuba. 

The presence of Hezbollah agents in Cuba is well documented, 

and it would be very odd if they didn’t have them there. Has that 

been greatly increased? I don’t know. Quite frankly, I don’t know 

the answer to that, but I——

67

Mr. RIVERA. My time has expired. I will yield back, Madam 

Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Rivera. 

And, Mr. Royce, it is so great to end with your questions. Mr. 

Royce from California is the chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. And actually this hearing 

builds a little bit on a hearing we held last year, and the findings 

of our subcommittee, on the use of Section 311 sanctions to target 

bad banks. This is the tool that was used on the Lebanese Canadian Bank, which was at the center of Hezbollah’s massive money 

laundering effort. 

But Mike Braun was actually at the center of some of DEA’s 

most effective operations, including taking down Viktor Bout. 

Thank you for that. One of the things I wanted to ask you, Mr. 

Braun, was when you think about the use of PATRIOT Act 311 

sanctions, combined with the money laundering investigations, it is 

awfully similar to the methodologies that were used with the Banco 

Delta Asia in order to move against North Korea with respect to 

their illicit activities. 

And there was a little lesson I think in terms of that operation, 

because it was enormously successful in getting the attention of the 

North Koreans and cutting off the supply of hard currency that 

went into that regime. Things got to the point where he couldn’t 

pay his generals, and yet what happened was that the diplomats 

really pulled the plug on that operation. 

There was a situation where we had them dead to rights, and 

they were sweating out the consequences of that freeze, and it was 

the diplomatic effort that got them out from underneath the sanctions. 

I would argue that now is the time, before there is any backsliding on the part of Iran or any attempts, you know, diplomatic 

efforts to try to move it in the opposite direction, now is the time 

to take down as much of Hezbollah’s criminal structure as you can. 

And I was just going to ask you for your view on the similarities 

of this and the lessons learned. 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, with the earlier piece to that—your comments, 

I mean, it certainly wouldn’t be the first time that Federal law enforcement and diplomacy bumped heads, but those things sometimes happen. 

With respect to 311, I believe 311, in the case of the Lebanese 

Canadian Bank that was the first time that that had been used, 

and it needs to be used more often. 

Mr. ROYCE. And I wonder if it could have been used more extensively, because of course what happened was the head of the central bank in Lebanon simply allowed them to move those accounts 

to other banks. Now, there was some success in terms of grabbing 

some of the 200 accounts that were used in money laundering, 

most of it by Hezbollah. But on the other hand, we allowed a public 

official there to get away with lax oversight, and just move it to 

other Lebanese banks. 

I think we should have expanded it, just like in North Korea. 

The expansion was used beyond Banco Delta Asia to any other accounts that were being used by the North Korean regime when we 

68

caught them counterfeiting our money, and with their other illicit 

activities. Should that have been done here? Should we have doubled down in order to make sure that we got all of the perpetrators? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I think we—you know, I think we should have 

doubled down, as you say. But, you know, even more importantly, 

I think it is a weak spot with respect to Federal law enforcement 

in general, you know, and even our greater security apparatus. We 

need to get better at using sanctions like 311 to drive very nefarious organizations and bad guys into the areas where we can hit 

them the most, and we are not doing that. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am glad you said that, because it took us literally 

years to get Treasury to use 311 on North Korea despite—we put 

out a position paper in my office on this. We have been trying to 

drive the use of this, and it was the central bank governor, Mr. 

Solana, who decided to allow those same accounts to morph and 

transfer into the banking system in other banks under his purview. 

We should have expanded this operation while we had them. 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, Congressman, you know, we have talked about 

this before, and I know we are on the same page. But for the benefit of everyone on the committee, you know, when you hit the bad 

guys in the pocketbook, you cause them to change their tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. Any time you cause them to change 

their TTPs, they become more vulnerable. They become more vulnerable; we become more successful. It is something that should be 

used far more often than it is. 

Mr. ROYCE. One last point. Congressman Duncan of South Carolina and I have written legislation that essentially says, ‘‘Wipe the 

board clean. Set aside your pre-conceived ideas on this. Get everyone in a room, all of the agencies in a room, and come up with a 

strategy to deal with Iran’s role in our hemisphere.’’

And I was just going to ask you in closing, putting DEA and 

other law enforcement on this case, mandating that everybody be 

a part of it and coming up with a plan to deal with it, what would 

you think of that strategy? 

Mr. BRAUN. I think it would be a great strategy, and it is—you 

know, it is not Congress’ job, but somebody needs to herd the cats. 

We need to get the right folks into the same room and develop, 

again, robust, interlocking strategies and plans to effect the kind 

of impact that you are talking about. That is what we have got to 

do. 

Mr. ROYCE. Get the agency and DEA together on this. Well, 

thank you very much, all of you, for your testimony today. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Those are excellent suggestions. I think we have some good action items about 

what we could do to help coordinate. Before it is too late, let us 

wake up. 

Thank you so much, gentlemen. Thank you for expert testimony. 

Thank you to our audience as well for helping us along. 

And with that, our committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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