111TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 111–676 

DISCOUNT PRICING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2009 

DECEMBER 8, 2010.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. CONYERS, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 3190] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 3190) to restore the rule that agreements between manufacturers and retailers, distributors, or wholesalers to set the price 

below which the manufacturer’s product or service cannot be sold 

violates the Sherman Act, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill 

do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 5 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 6 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 6 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 6 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 6 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 6 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 7 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 8 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 8 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 8 

Additional Views ...................................................................................................... 9 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
2 

1 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 

2 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 

3 In his dissent in Leegin, Justice Breyer estimated that even if only 10 percent of manufacturers engaged in minimum retail price fixing, the annual retail bill for the average family of 

four would increase by between $750 and $1,000. 551 U.S. at 926. 4 15 U.S.C. § 1. 

5The Supreme Court first crafted the per se standard in the context of horizontal agreements, 

i.e., agreements among competitors. See e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 

(1898); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 6 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). 

7 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). 

8Factors to be considered in a rule-of-reason analysis include the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, the condition of the business before and after the restraint was imposed, and the nature of the restraint and its actual and probable effects. The 

history of the restraint, the threat posted, the reasons for adopting the remedy, and the ends 

sought to be obtained are also to be taken into consideration. Chicago Board of Trade v. United 

States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 9 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 3190, the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 

2009, is intended to undo the harm to consumers stemming from 

the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.1 In Leegin, the Supreme Court overturned 

96 years of antitrust jurisprudence by reversing its 1911 decision 

in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.,2 which had expressly prohibited agreements between manufacturers and distributors or retailers establishing a minimum retail price for the 

manufacturers’ products. Critics of the Leegin decision expect it to 

result in increased prices charged to consumers.3 H.R. 3190 would 

negate the Leegin decision by again making any such agreements 

a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.4

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

RETAIL PRICE FIXING AND THE LEEGIN DECISION

‘‘Rule of Reason’’ Analysis vs. ‘‘Per Se’’ Prohibition 

Alleged antitrust offenses are generally subject to one of two 

classes of review, either a per se or rule-of-reason analysis. The category of analysis is significant both in terms of a policy judgment 

and as an evidentiary burden of proof. 

Per se offenses 5 consist of a limited number of business practices 

deemed so harmful to competition that proof of the practice itself 

establishes an antitrust violation without further analysis. Per se 

prohibitions are generally limited to ‘‘conduct that is manifestly 

anticompetitive,’’ 6 that would ‘‘always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.’’ 7

On the other hand, rule-of-reason offenses reflect a recognition 

that some types of business practices are not always anticompetitive, and may be, on balance, either procompetitive or anticompetitive depending upon the factual circumstances. 

Rule-of-reason analysis requires a more in-depth look at the 

practice in question in order to weigh the competitive effects.8 Such 

an analysis generally involves expensive and time-consuming economic research and analysis. 

Leegin Overturns the Per Se Precedent Set By Dr. Miles 

In its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles,9 the Supreme Court held that 

an agreement between a manufacturer of proprietary medicines 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
3 

10The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in 

restraint of trade, as well as acts of monopolization. 11Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894, quoting Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 723. 12The State attorneys general who filed the amicus brief were from AK, AR, CT, DE, FL, HI, 

ID, IL, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, 

OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, UT, VT, WA, WV, and WY. 13 Joseph Pereira, Price-Fixing Makes Comeback after Supreme Court Ruling, Wall St. J., 

Aug. 18, 2008, at A1. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 E-Tailers Take on Price Fixing, Consumer Electronics Daily, Dec. 5, 2008. 17Don Davis, How the Supreme Court Fractured Online Pricing, InternetRetailer.com, Nov. 

2008, http://www.Internetretailer.com/article.asp?id=28293. 

and its dealers to fix the minimum price at which its medicines 

could be sold was illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 For 

the next 96 years, Dr. Miles stood for the proposition that agreements between manufacturers and retailers that established a minimum price for the manufacturers’ products were illegal on their 

face. In antitrust parlance, the case established a per se prohibition 

on vertical minimum price restraints, alternately referred to as ‘‘resale price maintenance,’’ or minimum retail price fixing. 

In its 2007 Leegin decision, the Supreme Court overturned Dr. 

Miles, holding that minimum retail price fixing would henceforth 

be judged under the rule of reason, on a case-by-case basis. In a 

5–4 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, acknowledged that setting minimum retail prices could have anticompetitive effects, but concluded that it could also have procompetitive 

benefits, and that a per se prohibition could not be justified, as it 

could not be ‘‘stated with any degree of confidence that retail price 

maintenance ‘always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output.’ ’’ 11 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 

and the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a joint amicus brief in 

favor of overturning Dr. Miles’ per se prohibition; 37 State attorneys general filed one in favor of affirming it.12

The effect of Leegin is that minimum retail price agreements are 

no longer per se prohibited by law. This does not mean that these 

agreements are now necessarily always legal; they are instead subject to a case-by-case rule-of-reason analysis. 

Minimum Retail Price Fixing in the Wake of Leegin 

Nearing the 3-year anniversary of Leegin, there are a number of 

indications that mandatory minimum retail price policies are becoming more common, with an adverse impact on consumer 

prices.13

• ConsumerWorld.org, which provides price comparisons for consumers, has found numerous minimum retail price policies imposed upon retailers by manufacturers of baby goods, consumer 

electronics, home furnishings, and pet foods.14

• BabyAge.com reported that 100 of its 465 suppliers dictate minimum retail prices.15 As a result, the Internet retailer had to increase prices 20 to 40 percent on several popular products.16

• Demand Inc., an Internet-only retailer of ergonomic office accessories, reported that at least 50 percent of its products now have 

a manufacturer-imposed minimum retail price, compared to 10 

percent in 2006.17


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
4 

18 Id. 19 Id. 20Greg Beck, Companies Claim Right to Interfere with eBay Auctions for Charging Too Little, 

Consumer Law & Policy Blog, July 17, 2007, http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2007/07/leeginand-ebay/comments/page/2/. 21 50 Stat. 693 (1937). 22 66 Stat. 632 (1952). 23 In the interim, many States had repealed or curbed their fair trade statutes; in four States, 

the statutes had been declared unconstitutional; and in five States, ‘‘non-signer’’ clauses had 

been declared unconstitutional. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis, 517 (1974). 24S. Rep. No. 94–466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1–3 (1975). 25 1212 Cong. Rec. 1268 (Jan. 23, 1975). 26 89 Stat. 801 (1975). 

• Seventy-five percent of eHobbies’ products now have a manufacturer-imposed minimum retail price.18

• HomeCenter.com has lost millions of dollars in sales because of 

minimum retail price policies imposed by manufacturers, such as 

lighting manufacturer L.D. Kichler, that have made the Internetbased retailer less competitive than it used to be.19

• Two lawsuits have been brought against eBay by manufacturers 

for selling their products below a manufacturer-dictated minimum price.20

Congress’ Previous Involvement in the Retail Price-Fixing Issue 

Congress has involved itself directly in the formulation of enforcement policy in the area of minimum retail price fixing on a 

number of occasions. 

First, during the Depression, a number of States, as part of a 

general move toward price controls in response to the distressed 

business climate, enacted so-called ‘‘fair trade’’ laws permitting a 

manufacturer to enter into agreements with retailers stipulating 

the minimum price at which its products could be sold. Congress 

passed the Miller-Tydings Act 21 in 1937 to exempt agreements permitted under the State fair trade laws from the antitrust laws, followed by the McGuire Act 22 to extend coverage of the exemption 

to imposition of a ‘‘fair trade’’ price agreement even on retailers 

who had not signed it. 

By the 1970’s, State fair trade laws had come under increasing 

disrepute as anticompetitive, and unwarranted by any legitimate 

business purpose.23 Studies conducted by the DOJ under President 

Nixon indicated that retail price fixing sheltered by State fair trade 

laws inflated prices for the affected goods by between 18 and 27 

percent, and that eliminating the fair trade laws would save consumers $1.2 billion.24 The Ford Administration’s DOJ called for repealing the fair trade laws, as did the FTC. Ronald Reagan, then 

a columnist for the Copley News Service, condemned retail price 

fixing in a column reprinted in the Congressional Record, arguing 

that it stifled competition, added to inflation, and was bereft of consumer benefits.25

In the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Congress repealed 

the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act.26 In doing so, it examined and rejected various asserted justifications for minimum 

retail price fixing, including assertions that it helped encourage retailers to provide additional services, helped protect small businesses, and helped new businesses enter the market. Congress conVerDate Mar 15 2010 05:47 Dec 09, 2010 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR676.XXX HR676

tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
5 

27 465 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1984). 28Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Appropriations 

Act, 1984, § 510, Pub. L. No. 98–166, 97 stat. 1102–03 (1983). 29Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986, § 605, Pub. L. No. 99–180, 99 stat. 1169–71. 30 Antitrust Enforcement, Some Initial Thoughts and Actions, Address by Assistant Attorney 

General Anne K. Bingaman before Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, August 

10, 1993. 31Pub. L. No. 107–273, §§ 11051–60, 116 Stat. 1856. 32The Leegin Decision: The End of the Consumer Discounts or Good Antitrust Policy? Before 

the Subcomm. On Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the H. Comm. On the 

Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (statement of Richard M. Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/aai- 

%20Leegin,%20’senate%20test%20by%20RB,%207-30-07l080120071016.pdf (quoting Memorandum from the Antitrust Modernization Comm. Single-Firm Conduct Working Group 16 (December 21, 2004)). 

cluded that minimum retail price fixing served little purpose other 

than to inflate prices. 

Congress strongly reaffirmed its bipartisan support for the per se 

prohibition against minimum retail price fixing during the 1980’s. 

After the Reagan Administration DOJ filed an amicus brief in 

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co.27 urging the Supreme Court 

to overturn Dr. Miles, Congress, as part of the FY 1984 appropriations bill that included DOJ funding, expressly prohibited the DOJ 

from using any funds to advocate overturning the per se prohibition.28 The prohibition was reinstated as part of the FY 1986 appropriations resolution 29 and remained in every DOJ-funding appropriations bill thereafter until FY 1992, when the prohibition 

was dropped only after personal assurances from the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust that the Department would not revive 

its effort to undermine the per se prohibition. 

With the change of Administration in 1993, the Department 

quieted the issue by reaffirming its support for the per se prohibition and its intent to actively enforce it.30 Only two-and-a-half 

years before the Court decided Leegin, the Antitrust Modernization 

Commission, tasked in legislation sponsored by then-House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner with conducting a 

comprehensive review of the state of the antitrust laws,31 declined 

to examine retail price fixing because there was ‘‘a relatively low 

level of controversy on the subject.’’ 32

HEARINGS

On April 28, 2009, the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 

Courts and Competition Policy held 1 day of hearings on the effect 

of the Leegin decision on competition in the retail environment. 

Testimony was received from Pamela Jones Harbour, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; Thomas G. Hungar, Partner, 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Tod Cohen, Vice President and 

Deputy General Counsel, Government Relations, eBay, Inc.; and 

Richard Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust 

Institute, with additional material submitted by the National Consumers League; the Consumer Federation of America; Consumers 

Union; U.S. Public Interest Research Group; Amazon.com, Inc.; the 

American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law; and the Consumer Electronics Association. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
6 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On July 30, 2009, the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition 

Policy met in open session and ordered the bill H.R. 3190 favorably 

reported, with an amendment, by voice vote, a quorum being 

present. On January 13, 2010, the Committee met in open session 

and ordered the bill H.R. 3190 favorably reported without amendment, by a voice vote, a quorum being present. 

COMMITTEE VOTES

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that there were 

no recorded votes during the Committee’s consideration of H.R. 

3190. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 

Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this 

report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new 

budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the bill, H.R. 3190, the following estimate and comparison prepared 

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, March 5, 2010. 

Hon. JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Chairman, 

Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3190, the ‘‘Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009.’’ 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz, who 

can be reached at 226-2860. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF, DIRECTOR. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable Lamar S. Smith. 

Ranking Member 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
7 

H.R. 3190—Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009. 

H.R. 3190 would prohibit agreements between manufacturers 

and wholesalers, distributors, or retailers to set minimum prices 

for a product or service. The bill would negate the effects of a 2007 

Supreme Court decision (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 

PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)) that permits minimum price 

agreements in certain cases. 

Based on information from the Department of Justice, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would have no significant effect 

on the department’s spending to handle cases involving minimum 

price agreements. 

Pay-as-you-go procedures would apply to the legislation because 

violators of the bill’s provisions could be subject to civil and criminal fines. Criminal fines are deposited as revenues in the Crime 

Victims Fund and later spent. However, CBO estimates that any 

additional revenues and direct spending would not be significant in 

each year. 

H.R. 3190 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in 

the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect 

the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

Prohibiting contracts between manufacturers and wholesalers, 

distributors, or retailers to set minimum retail prices would impose 

a private-sector mandate as defined in UMRA. Any existing or future contracts that set such prices would be a violation of anti-trust 

law. 

The cost of that mandate would be any forgone net income resulting from prohibiting such agreements; however, how such prohibitions would affect industry income is uncertain for several reasons. Although a large number of firms could be affected by the 

mandate, contracts involving pricing policies are confidential and 

can vary widely across markets. Further, the cost of the legislation 

would be mitigated to some extent because several states already 

prohibit such contracts and because firms could continue to use 

noncontractual policies that have the effect of setting minimum resale prices. Because of those uncertainties, CBO cannot determine 

whether the costs would exceed the annual threshold established in 

UMRA for private-sector mandates ($141 million in 2010, adjusted 

annually for inflation). 

The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Mark Grabowicz (for 

Federal costs) and Marin Randall (for the private-sector impact). 

The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 3190 will negate 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, 

Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. and restores the per se prohibition established 

in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons., Co., holding any 

agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer, wholesaler, or 

distributor establishing a minimum price for the sale of a product 

or service is a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
8 

33 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution. 

ADVISORY ON EARMARKS

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 3190 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9 of rule XXI. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by the 

Committee. 

Sec. 1. Short title. Section 1 designates the short title of the bill 

as the ‘‘Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009.’’ 

Sec. 2. Prohibition on Minimum Resale Price Maintenance. Section 2 makes any agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor establishing a minimum price for 

the manufacturer’s product or service a violation of section 1 of the 

Sherman Act. 

The term ‘‘agreement’’ is to be read synonymously with ‘‘contract, 

combination, or conspiracy’’ as used in section 1 of the Sherman 

Act, and is intended to be read consistently with the limitations on 

intra-enterprise conspiracy as held in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.33

Sec. 3. Effective Date. This section establishes the bill’s effective 

date as 90 days after the date of enactment. Thus, agreements subject to challenge under the bill will be per se illegal if entered into, 

or still in effect, 90 days after the date of enactment. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
9 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

I have strong reservations about the effect of H.R. 3190 on the 

market. I believe this legislation is imprudent. It is a wholesale 

prohibition against any price agreements between a manufacturer 

and a retailer. This change in law lumps together all market participants, without regard to their pricing power in the marketplace. 

It is unfortunate, since there is a simple and effective solution to 

this shortcoming of the original bill that would provide for protection of consumers against unfair market practices while recognizing the needs of businesses, big and small, to protect their products in the marketplace. 

At the time of the mark up of H.R. 3190, I offered an amendment 

to provide two standards of review for minimum price agreements 

between manufacturers and retailers. If the price setter had market power, the price agreement would be a per se violation of the 

Sherman Antitrust Act. If the price setter did not have market 

power, then the court must apply the rule of reason standard set 

by the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 

PSKS, Inc. in 2007. 

I think Leegin got it right, partially. But the court can only use 

the tools it is given. My amendment was the middle ground. It refined and curtailed the Supreme Courts’ application of the rule of 

reason standard to recognize antitrust concerns regarding market 

participants with market power who negotiate minimum price 

agreements with retailers. My amendment recognized our desire 

and the need to protect the consumers from unfair price-setting 

and promote competitive pricing process. 

On the other hand, my amendment also recognized that there 

more than one dynamic in the marketplace, not just consumer as 

a price-taker. Another dynamic is between the retailer/distributor 

and the manufacturer. A manufacturer in retail environment has 

but one product (i.e. a suitcase, a computer, an iPod). The retailer, 

on the other hand, has a plethora of choices. Normally, a retailer, 

if you don’t go to the Apple store, has Apple, BlackBerry, Samsung, 

and so on. In fact, most retailers, particularly the large retailers 

and the retailers that are in support of this legislation, have all the 

brands. 

If you are a retailer and you have the ability to take the most 

expensive brand, the best brand, the one that has the most demand 

and advertize it in limited quantities at a reduced price, and then 

when shoppers come in your store enticed by the low price, you 

have created traffic at the expense of the perceived value of that 

product. You have diluted the perceived value of the product in the 

process. You also, of course, have the ability to raise and lower that 

price to suit your whim. You have all the options. 

A manufacturer, again, has but one product, the product that 

they are presenting in the way that they would like to present it. 

If that manufacturer—and this was the crux of my amendment— 

has market power, then we should hold that manufacturer to the 

higher standard. But for a small manufacturer, a start-up, the little guy, it may be the only way to get the attention of the market 

to price their product where it belongs, realizing that it may sell 

less but it will sell to a discerning customer who appreciates the 

advantage, the quality, the unique characteristics of their product. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS
10 

If that is the decision of the manufacturer with their product, their 

intellectual property, the thing that they created and brought to 

market, if that manufacturer does not have antitrust considerations, if they have no market power, why shouldn’t they be given 

some reasonable control over their own product, with a standard of 

review different from the standard of review we apply to manufacturer which has real market power? Under these circumstances, I 

believe the rule of reason standard set by the Supreme Court in 

Leegin is the right way to analyze the antitrust implications of the 

pricing agreements. The courts are well equipped to make this determination. Market power is not a vague standard. There is a 

huge body of settled antitrust law that tells us what market power 

is. 

The unfortunate effect of this legislation is that it will decrease 

competition in the marketplace by benefitting large retailers and 

manufacturers to the detriment of the small retailers and manufacturers, with the ultimate result of less consumer choice and lower 

product quality. It is my hope that this Committee will reconsider 

this matter in the future to correct its shortcomings. 

DARRELL E. ISSA. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with REPORTS