COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Overton and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

LESTER RONALD BAKER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2737-95-3 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 JUNE 18, 1996 

CATHERINE ANNE DAUGHERTY BAKER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY 

William R. Shelton, Judge Designate 

 David L. Scyphers (Johnson, Scyphers & 

Austin, on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard D. Kennedy (Sturgill, Mullins & 

Kennedy, on brief), for appellee. 

 Lester Ronald Baker (husband) appeals a decision of the 

circuit court which classified property held by husband and 

Catherine Anne Daugherty Baker (wife) and decided other issues. 

Husband raises the following issues on appeal: 

 (1) whether the trial court erred in classifying 

husband's separate property as marital 

property; 

 (2) whether the trial court erred in its 

valuation of the property; 

 (3) whether the trial court erred in classifying 

marital property as wife's separate property; 

and 

 (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to 

award husband child support for the period of 

December 3, 1991 to March 1, 1992. 

 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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A. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 

 "Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be 

set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 

S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). "Unless it appears from the record that 

the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the 

statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal." 

Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 

(1989). 

 Issue (1): Classification of Jewelry and Tools

 As the party seeking to reverse the decision of the trial 

court, husband bears the burden to demonstrate error by record 

proof. Lutes v. Alexander, 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077, 421 S.E.2d 

857, 859 (1992). Husband contends that the evidence demonstrated 

that the jewelry and tools owned during the marriage were his 

separate property. However, credible evidence in the record 

supports the trial court's classification of the jewelry and 

tools as marital property. 

 The parties were married in 1974 and separated in 1991. 

Husband testified that he developed an interest in making jewelry 

as a hobby prior to the marriage. However, husband indicated 

that "five or six years" before 1993, he "became interested in 

[jewelry] because of wanting to create a ring" for a karate 

organization. Husband began to develop his jewelry-making skills 
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and attend gem markets at that time. 

 Thus, there was evidence supporting the trial court's 

determination that the jewelry was marital property. While 

husband indicated he had been interested in making jewelry prior 

to the marriage, his testimony demonstrated that he began to 

invest money and time in the hobby during the marriage. 

Therefore, the court's classification of the jewelry will not be 

reversed. 

 Husband also alleged that the court erred by classifying as 

marital property his separate tools. Wife presented a list of 

tools stored in the parties' garage which she asserted were worth 

$5,475. Husband refuted the value of virtually every item, and 

claimed several items as his separate property. 

 While husband asserts that he used the tools in an 

automobile repair business operated prior to the marriage, 

husband cites no evidence in the record to support this 

statement. "Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or 

citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration. We 

will not search the record for errors in order to interpret the 

appellant's contention and correct deficiencies in a brief." 

Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 238 

(1992). 

 The trial court was entitled to determine the credibility of 

the evidence presented by the parties. Husband has failed to 

demonstrate error in the trial court's classification of either 
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the jewelry or the tools. 
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 Issue (2): Value of Jewelry

 Husband also contends, even if the jewelry was marital 

property, that the court erred in determining its value. Husband 

claimed he never made a profit selling jewelry and would sell it 

at prices "just recoup what my investment was in it, maybe a few 

dollars more." He also testified that he "most certainly had no 

stocks of stones or . . . or excessive amounts of . . . of 

jewelry and all this kind of thing that was already premade." 

 Wife testified in her deposition that husband had cases 

filled with jewelry and gems. Wife estimated that husband had 

120 rings with an average value of $400, and approximately 

$10,000 worth of loose stones and gems. 

 Wife's testimony was corroborated by the deposition 

testimony of her step-father, James William Chandler. Chandler 

indicated he had purchased three rings from husband between 1987 

and 1990. Chandler paid what he believed was "wholesale price" 

of approximately $200 each for two rings and "somewhat more" for 

the third ring. Husband asked Chandler to pay for the rings in 

cash rather than by check. Chandler indicated husband "had quite 

a display" of jewelry, including two display cases with "a lot of 

rings" as well as bags full of rings, necklaces, bracelets, gold, 

silver, and gemstones. 

 The court accepted wife's evidence of the jewelry's value in 

its letter opinion dated April 21, 1994. On July 13, 1994, the 

court noted that it would "neither hear any further evidence nor 
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entertain any further argument of counsel," and directed counsel 

to prepare an agreed scheme of distribution for presentation to 

the court. On June 9, 1995, husband submitted as an attachment 

to a letter to the court what he described as the "actual 

appraisal of the jewelry," which totalled $5,272.83. 

 Husband failed to present any evidence of the jewelry's 

value prior to the court's equitable distribution determination. 

 The trial court was entitled to determine the credibility of his 

testimony as to the extent of his inventory and supplies. 

Chandler's testimony supported the value placed upon the jewelry 

by wife. The trial court was not required to consider husband's 

evidence of the value of jewelry in his possession after the 

parties' separation and after the court's determination of value.

 

 Issue (3): Classification of Wife's Certificates of Deposit

 Wife testified that she had inherited funds which she placed 

into two certificates of deposit worth $50,000 and $45,000. 

Husband failed to present any evidence refuting wife's testimony. 

 The trial court found that the briefs of the parties made "no 

specific mention of a $100,000.00 CD" and that "any such CD was 

never in evidence for the Court to classify or value." 

 Under the Virginia equitable distribution statute, separate 

property includes "all property acquired during the marriage by 

bequest, devise, descent, survivorship or gift from a source 

other than the other party." Code § 20-107.3(A)(1)(ii). Wife 
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testified that the funds were inherited, and husband did not 

dispute that classification. Therefore, we find no error in the 

trial court's determination that wife's inherited funds placed 

into two certificates of deposit were her separate property. 

B. Issue (4): PENDENTE LITE CHILD SUPPORT 

 "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a 

basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with 

the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good 

cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends 

of justice." Rule 5A:18. Under the terms of the pendente lite

support order entered January 27, 1992, wife was ordered to pay 

husband $590 per month commencing March 1, 1992.1 Father's 

counsel, without objection, endorsed the court's order at the 

time it was entered. 

 Therefore, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this 

question on appeal. Moreover, the record does not reflect any 

reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to 

Rule 5A:18. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1 A pendente lite award may give rise to an appealable 

issue which may be pursued upon entry of the final decree. See

Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 853, 407 S.E.2d 339, 342 

(1991).