alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Opinion issued March 14 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals

For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01

- 12

- 00261

- CV

——————————— MARY RUSSELL AND RANDY RUSSELL , Appellant s V.
LAURA CASARES , Appellee

O n Appeal from the 269th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2010

- 22358

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The parties ha ve filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal. No opinion has

issued. Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See T EX

. R.

A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1). We dismiss all other pending motions as moot.2 PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp , and Huddle

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          27,760
<SECURITIES>                                    14,524
<RECEIVABLES>                                   37,251
<ALLOWANCES>                                       986
<INVENTORY>                                     47,285
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               134,785
<PP&E>                                          42,641
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,719
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 231,654
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,547
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       137,452
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   231,654
<SALES>                                        249,517
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               249,517
<CGS>                                          171,859
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  171,859
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                76,869
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (2,183)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,972
<INCOME-TAX>                                    13,838
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (10,866)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (10,866)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.27)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         130,913
<SECURITIES>                                    50,618
<RECEIVABLES>                                   36,821
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,459
<INVENTORY>                                     42,347
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               271,197
<PP&E>                                          68,266
<DEPRECIATION>                                  27,702
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 321,027
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           84,588
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       140,597
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   321,027
<SALES>                                        310,651
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               310,651
<CGS>                                          191,529
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  191,529
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                77,188
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (5,178)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 47,182
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,077
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             40,105
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    40,105
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.99
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.88


</TABLE>
PROMISSORY NOTE
                                December 31, 1998
                                  Dallas, Texas

                                 $10,000,000.00

     For value received,  Dual Holding Company ("Maker"),a Delaware corporation,
promises  to pay to the order of ENSCO International Incorporated ("Payee"), the
principal  amount of  Ten  Million  Dollars  ($10,000,000.00),  with interest as
follows:

     1. All  payments  are to be made at the  office of Payee,  located  at 2700
        Fountain Place, 1445 Ross Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75202.

     2. The principal amount and interest of this Promissory Note are payable in
        full on or before December 31, 2000.

     3. The  principal  amount  shall bear  interest at the rate of five percent
        (5%) per annum, compounded annually.

     4. This  Promissory  Note  may  be  prepaid  in part or in full at any time
        without penalty.

     5. Maker agrees to pay on demand all costs of collection,  legal  expenses,
        and  attorney's  fees  incurred  or  paid by any Holder in collecting or
        enforcing this Promissory Note on default.

     6. No delay or omission on the part of any Holder in  exercising  any right
        under  this  Promissory  Note  will operate as a waiver of such right or
        of any other right under this  Promissory  Note.   A  waiver  on any one
        occasion will not be construed as a bar to or waiver  of  any  right  or
        remedy on any future occasion.

     7. As used in this Promissory  Note, the term "Holder" means Payee or other
        indorsee of this  Promissory Note who is in  possession  of it.  If this
        Note  is signed  by more  than  one  person  in  the capacity of  Maker,
        it shall be the joint and several liabilities of these persons.

     8. It is expressly acknowledged that this Promissory Note is subordinate in
        right of  payment  to  the Securities and to the Senior  Indebtedness as
        such  term  are  defined in the Trust  Indenture  between Maker, certain
        Subsidiary  Guarantors and Shawmut Bank, National Association,  Trustee,
        dated January 15, 1994, and as thereafter supplemented.

                                       Dual Holding Company, Maker


                                       /s/ C. Christopher Gaut
                                       ------------------------------
                                       C. Christopher Gaut, President
#### Frank Marino PORTO, Jr., Petitioner, v. Elizabeth Diane Dobbins KHAN, Respondent.

No. O-24.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 29, 1970.

*175Douglass & Booth, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for respondent.

SPECTOR, Judge.

Petitioner, plaintiff below, seeks review of an order declaring a mistrial on motion of respondent upon the mention of insurance by a witness for the plaintiff.

While the granting of a mistrial during the course of a jury trial is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court, the mere mention of insurance does not always justify a mistrial. The general rule on the subject is stated in 32 Fla.Jur., Trial § 245, at page 508, as follows:

> “Though the introduction in evidence or in argument of the issue of insurance is improper, this does not in every case justify a mistrial. The court will not direct a mistrial unless the jury was thereby influenced in returning its verdict. Thus, even if the subject of insurance is purposely injected into the case, the trial need not for this reason be discontinued, if the court on objection immediately acts to prevent further transgression and cautions the jury to disregard the testimony.”

A reading of the rule makes it clear that whether the mention of insurance properly is the basis for a mistrial depends on the circumstances. Obviously, the evil to be avoided is prejudice to either party. Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, 119 So.2d 296 (Fla.App.1960). Yet, it must be recognized that prejudice does not always arise from the mention of insurance if the jury is properly instructed. Ryder v. Plumley, 138 Fla. 378, 189 So. 422 (1939); Crowell v. Fink, 167 So.2d 614 (Fla.App.1964). Sometimes the mention of insurance may well be material to some factual issue in the case as in Barnett v. Butler, 112 So.2d 907 (Fla.App.1959). No hard and fast rule has yet been pronounced by our courts that can be said to be dispositive of the question in all circumstances. That is why the trial court has broad discretion in the premises with each case subject to being reviewed by the appellate courts in light of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

In view of the foregoing discussion of the applicable law, it does not appear to us that petitioner is without a full and adequate remedy by appeal at which time the appellate court can review all of the circumstances surrounding the trial, including any proffers which may be made relating to the materiality of insurance to the issues in the case. Pullman Company v. Fleishel, 101 So.2d 188 (Fla.App.1958). Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

JOHNSON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 12, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D21-1886 Lower Tribunal No. 04-9765

________________ 

### Robert Marlin, et al. , Appellants,
vs. 

### Jack Burstein, et al. , Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Vivianne Del Rio, Judge. MSP Recovery Law Firm, and Robert Strongarone; Shulman Bastian Friedman & Bui, LLP, and Franklin J. Contreras, Jr. (Irvine, CA), for appellants. Scott Jay Feder, P.A., and Scott Jay Feder, for appellees. Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

WILLIAM LEE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-10425

D.C. No.

1:16-cr-00069-LJO-SKO-10

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 13, 2020

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and GWIN,** District 

Judge.

Defendant William Lee appeals from his conviction and sentence after Lee 

pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit murder in aid of racketeering, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 26 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
affirm.

Lee first challenges his conviction on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 1959 is 

vague because he did not receive the acceptance-of-responsibility sentencing 

reduction despite his plea and admission. Assuming that his vagueness challenge 

is not waived, Lee’s argument is incorrect. Whether or not a district court applies 

the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction following a defendant’s guilty plea and 

factual proffer is not the test for a vagueness challenge. See Schwartzmiller v. 

Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that a statute is void for 

vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 

concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement). Accordingly, we reject Lee’s vagueness challenge.

Lee also challenges his sentence. Lee argues that the district court plainly 

erred by using the wrong cross-reference in calculating Lee’s base offense level. 

The district court used U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5—which applies to “Conspiracy or 

Solicitation to Commit Murder”—and sets the base offense level at 33. Lee argues

that the district court should have used U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1—which applies to 

“Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder”—and sets the offense 

level at 27 if the object of the offense would not have constituted first degree 

murder.

Lee’s sentencing challenge fails. The district court correctly used the 
conspiracy to commit murder cross-reference listed at U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(a). The 

object of Lee and his coconspirators’ conspiracy, as stated clearly in the 

indictment, was first degree murder. Lee admitted to conspiring to commit murder 

at his plea hearing. Thus, the district court used the correct cross-reference.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Varian, Inc. for the period ended
June 27, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date of this certification (the Report), the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Report
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of Varian, Inc.



Dated: August 5, 2008



|                                                       
|-------------------------------------------------------
|                                                       
|/s/ GARRY W. ROGERSON                                  
|Garry W. Rogerson President and Chief Executive Officer



A signed original of this written
statement as required by Section 906 has been provided to Varian, Inc. and will be retained by Varian, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
conjunction with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of International Fuel
Technology, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2008, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”),





I, Stuart
D. Beath, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated:  August
      14, 2008
            By:
            
            /s/Stuart D.
      BeathStuart
      D. BeathChief Financial Officer
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3523 

To end unemployment payments to jobless millionaires. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 14, 2023 

Ms. ERNST (for herself, Mr. TESTER, and Mr. BRAUN) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To end unemployment payments to jobless millionaires. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ending Unemployment 

5 Payments to Jobless Millionaires Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ENDING UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS TO JOBLESS 

7 MILLIONAIRES. 

8 (a) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other provi9 sion of law, no Federal funds may be used to make pay10 ments of unemployment compensation (including such 

11 compensation under the Federal-State Extended Com12 pensation Act of 1970) in a year to an individual whose 

2 

•S 3523 IS

1 adjusted gross income is equal to or greater than 

2 $1,000,000. 

3 (b) COMPLIANCE.—Any application for unemploy4 ment compensation shall include a form or procedure for 

5 an individual applicant to certify that such individual is 

6 not prohibited from receiving unemployment compensation 

7 pursuant to subsection (a). 

8 (c) AUDITS.—The certifications required by sub9 section (b) shall be auditable by the Department of Labor 

10 or the Government Accountability Office. 

11 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The prohibition under sub12 section (a) shall apply to weeks of unemployment begin13 ning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
BALANCE SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1997, AND THE STATEMENT OF OPERATONS FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 27, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY 
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-27-1997
<CASH>                                             640
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      580
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                       1879
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  5934
<PP&E>                                          116078
<DEPRECIATION>                                   23649
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  126434
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            31661
<BONDS>                                          43139
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             7
<OTHER-SE>                                       51627
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    126434
<SALES>                                         229096
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                229096
<CGS>                                           139520
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   187078
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 26888
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                4886
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  11077
<INCOME-TAX>                                      4733
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               6344
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      6344
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.89<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.89<F1>
<FN>
<F1>EARNINGS PER SHARE DATA IS IN ACTUAL DOLLARS.  MULTIPLIER NOT APPLICABLE.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Employees at this year’s Winter Conference were entertained with a slide show presented by the 

daughter of a former project engineer. The late Leonard DeKlotz joined the Bureau of Public 

Roads in 1931 and was a Project Engineer with BPR in the 1930’s. He retired in 1979 after 

over 48 years of service, which at the time was an agency record for continuous service. 

His daughter, Barbara DeKlotz Miller, recalled her early childhood years in Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks. She remembered the nearest “metropolis” to Yellowstone was Cooke City, 

(above) where one could buy gas and groceries, but it was 50 miles to the next nearest town. 

She showed photos of the log cabin where their family lived. The cabin was often chilly, and rodents and other “creepy-crawlies” sometimes found their way inside. Food was kept in an ice 

box and they did the laundry in the kitchen sink, hanging the clothes on a wooden rack to dry. 

Barbara remembered her mother baking berry pies in a reflector oven on top of the wood stove. 

The berries grew near the cabin, but they had to be on the watch for bears while picking them. 

Though Barbara was only two or three years old when they left the parks, the old memories of 

their “camping” life were enhanced throughout her childhood by frequent screenings of home 

movies. It was a happy time, she said, recalling that her mother truly enjoyed those years when 

she was the wife of a Project Engineer, a time when “life was calm and simple.” 

A Postcard from an

Earlier Era
#### 10 Suf Realty, Inc., Landlord, Appellant, *v.*Irving Fins et al., Doing Business as Fins Brothers, Tenants, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

May 28, 1952.

*Margaret Slocum*and *Louis C. Fieland*for appellant.

*Milton Gelman*for respondents.

Final order affirmed, with $25 costs.

Concur: Hofstadter, Eder and Schreibeb, JJ.
EXHIBIT 23.1 a

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

      We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements
Nos. 333-19237, 333-37645, 333-75937 and 333-83797 of Bank United Corp. on Forms
S-3, and Registration Statement No. 333-42765 of Bank United Corp. on Form S-8
of our report dated October 21, 1998, appearing in this Annual Report on Form
10-K of Bank United Corp. for the year ended September 30, 1999.






DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Houston, Texas
December 20, 1999