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S. HRG. 112–336 

TESTIMONY ON WHETHER THE CHIEF, 

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, SHOULD BE A 

MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 10, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

TESTIMONY ON WHETHER THE CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, SHOULD BE A

MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

NOVEMBER 10, 2011

Page 

Johnson, Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, General Counsel, Department of Defense ........ 6 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ............ 10 

Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff ................................................................................................................... 12 

Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army ............................. 14 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations ......................... 16 

Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps ...................... 17 

Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force ....................... 20 

McKinley, Gen. Craig R., USAF, Chief, National Guard Bureau ........................ 22 

(III) 

(1) 

TESTIMONY ON WHETHER THE CHIEF, 

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, SHOULD BE A 

MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, 

Shaheen, Blumenthal, Inhofe, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, and Graham. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; 

Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 

staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff 

director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Hannah I. Lloyd, 

and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Bryon Manna, assistant 

to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to 

Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Lindsay Kavanaugh, 

assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; 

Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, 

assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles 

Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to 

Senator Ayotte; and Andrew King and Sergio Sarkany, assistants 

to Senator Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to receive testimony on whether the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) should be a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 

2 

I believe that this hearing is a first, the first time that we have 

had every member of the JCS testify at a single hearing. Each of 

them has appeared before us individually and in different combinations, but never all together. 

In addition to all the members of the Joint Chiefs, we have the 

Department of Defense (DOD) General Counsel, and we have the 

CNGB with us today. We welcome each of you to this hearing. We 

look forward to your testimony on a very important issue. 

The role of the National Guard, as well as the role of the other 

Reserve components, has grown significantly since September 11, 

2001. Substantial numbers of National Guardsmen and reservists 

have deployed to and continue to serve in combat operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Large numbers have served multiple tours. Many have given 

their lives in service to our Nation, and many more have returned 

with wounds of war. Their service has been outstanding, and we 

commend them for their dedication, courage, and patriotism. 

The National Guard has also risen to the challenge by serving 

in diverse Homeland defense and civil support missions. The Reserve components have made a highly successful transition from a 

Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. 

The question of whether to include the CNGB as a member of 

the JCS is a complex issue with significant policy implications. To 

properly address this issue requires an understanding of the role 

of the National Guard, the role of the JCS, and the role of the 

CNGB. I believe that we have the right witnesses before us today 

to help us understand all aspects of this issue. 

When individuals enlist or accept a commission in a State National Guard unit, they simultaneously enlist or are commissioned 

in the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States, which are components of the 

Army and the Air Force. These individuals retain their status as 

State Guard members unless and until they are ordered to active 

Federal service, and they revert to State status upon being relieved 

from Federal service. 

There is a third hybrid status, commonly referred to as ‘‘Title 32 

status,’’ where the members are in a federally funded State status. 

I understand that Mr. Johnson, the DOD General Counsel, will discuss some of the ramifications of these different statuses in which 

members of the National Guard serve. 

The composition of the JCS is defined by statute and consists of 

the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the Military Service Chiefs 

of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Chairman of 

the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the 

Secretary of Defense. 

The other members of the Joint Chiefs may submit to the Chairman advice in disagreement with or in addition to the advice presented by the Chairman, and the Chairman must present that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice. 

Additionally, the other members of the Joint Chiefs provide military advice when requested by the President, the National Security 

Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. A member of the Joint Chiefs may make recommendations 

3 

to Congress relating to DOD after first informing the Secretary of 

Defense. 

I am looking forward to the testimony of the members of the JCS 

as they provide more information on the role that the Joint Chiefs 

play in our national security, how the interests of the Army and 

Air National Guard are addressed by the Joint Chiefs, and how the 

CNGB interfaces with the JCS. 

The National Guard Bureau is a joint activity of DOD. By statute, it is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining 

to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United 

States, and the Air National Guard of the United States between 

the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force 

and the several States. 

The CNGB is a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense 

through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by 

the Secretary of Defense. He is also the principal adviser to the 

Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army and to 

the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of 

the United States. 

Beginning in 2009, when the position of the CNGB was increased 

to a four-star rank, the CNGB was given a standing invitation to 

attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs. I look forward to General 

McKinley’s testimony to further elaborate on the role and function 

of the CNGB and how that relates to the role and function of the 

JCS. 

At Congress’ direction, the Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves addressed the issue that we are looking at today, and 

they did so in its second report to Congress, dated March 1, 2007. 

The commission recommended against making the CNGB a member of the Joint Chiefs. 

This is what that commission said, ‘‘The commission does not 

recommend that the CNGB be a member of the JCS on the grounds 

that the duties of the members of the JCS are greater than those 

of the CNGB. For example—and this is a long quote from that commission report. 

‘‘For example,’’ they said, ‘‘the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is not responsible for organizing, manning, training, and 

equipping the National Guard to the same extent as are the Service Chiefs of Staff. The qualifications to be selected as a Service 

Chief of Staff,’’ they said, ‘‘also are materially different from and 

more rigorous than those for selection to be Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau.’’ 

Moreover, they said that ‘‘making the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau a member of the JCS would run counter to 

intraservice and interservice integration and would reverse 

progress toward jointness and interoperability. Making the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau a member of the JCS would be fundamentally inconsistent with the status of the Army and Air National Guard as Reserve components of the Army and the Air 

Force.’’ 

4 

Finally, the commission concludes that this proposal ‘‘would be 

counter to the carefully crafted organizational and advisory principles established in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.’’ 

Now I note that Congress has implemented many of the recommendations of that commission, including the following: increasing the grade of the CNGB from lieutenant general to general and 

making him a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through 

the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces. 

Another of their recommendations, which was implemented by 

Congress, was establishing the National Guard Bureau as a joint 

activity of DOD, enhancing the functions of the National Guard 

Bureau to include assisting the Secretary of Defense and coordinating with other Federal agencies, the adjutants general of the 

States, and the combatant command with responsibility for the 

U.S. Homeland, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). 

We require that at least one deputy of NORTHCOM—again, the 

combatant command with responsibility for the United States— 

that at least one deputy be a National Guard officer in the grade 

of lieutenant general, and we have increased the number of unified 

and specified combatant command positions for Reserve component 

officers. 

We all are grateful to the witnesses, to the men and women with 

whom they serve for service to our Nation. We thank the witnesses 

for being with us today. 

Before calling on Senator Inhofe, I will note that we have two 

votes today scheduled for 12:05 p.m., I believe. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe that is right. I looked back in the 8 years I spent in the 

House and the 17 years in the Senate. This is the first time that 

all members of the Joint Chiefs are here. So this is kind of a neat 

deal. 

I think the greatest trust that is placed upon Congress by the 

American people is to provide for their security and maintain a 

strong national defense. Our Constitution gives Congress specific 

national security authorities—to declare war, raise and support armies, provide for the Navy, establish rules and regulations for our 

military forces, and organize and arm the militias in the States. 

Chairman LEVIN. I hate to interrupt you, Senator Inhofe, but we 

do have a quorum here now, and we have some business that we 

can attend to if we can interrupt your statement. 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. Let us do that. 

Chairman LEVIN. There is a quorum now present, and we were 

about to lose that quorum, by the way. So that is why I am interrupting our friend, Senator Inhofe. 

I ask the committee to consider a list of 4,022 pending military 

nominations. All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably 

report these? 

Senator INHOFE. I so move. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

5 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. [No response.] 

Chairman LEVIN. The motion carries. 

Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. You bet. Well, anyway, let me just mention that 

I have had—we are all close to all the branches, the Active, the Reserve, the Guard—and I don’t think there is a person up here on 

this committee who hasn’t had very close relationships with Active 

Duty and have visited quite often in the areas where they are stationed, they are deployed. 

In my case, we have 3,000 members of the Oklahoma 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, our Oklahoma National Guard. I went 

down when they were deployed from Camp Shelby in Mississippi 

and talked to them and then left about 3 weeks later and talked 

to them over in Afghanistan. I know that it is one where you have 

probably a closer relationship because they are sitting there in your 

hometown, and you visit with them, General McKinley, and so, I 

know that that happens. 

I have very close friends in Oklahoma 45th, they weren’t deployed until July, and yet we have lost 14 of our people over there. 

One was Chris Horton—his wife worked in my office. 

I remember so well during the August recess going into a small 

town in Oklahoma where she was there, and we were making arrangements; I was getting ready to go to Afghanistan so I could 

meet with Chris Horton, her husband, and 2 days before I left, he 

was killed in action. These are things that we are all very, very 

close to the people in all the Services. 

Earlier this week, our Oklahoma 45th helped in capturing Bari 

Ali, a mid-level insurgent leader in Afghanistan, and his brother, 

as well as weapons and hand grenades, tactical fighting gear, and 

cell phones that were there. They did it without firing a shot. 

They did great work over there. Their efforts will lead to a stable 

Afghanistan and prevent insurgents from gaining safe haven. 

Our National Guard has transitioned from a strategic to an 

Operational Reserve Force. This means that the National Guard 

has to be trained and equipped the same as our Active units and 

the Reserves. It also means that we must fully integrate our Active 

and Reserve components so they can seamlessly execute any mission this country asks them to do. 

I am proud of the contributions that have been made and the 

sacrifice that our military and their families have made and continue to make. We have made a lot of progress. I think General 

McKinley will probably have this—I read part of his statement— 

in terms of the relationship between the Guard and the Active 

units. 

I have to say, I think this might be the first time that I can remember ever coming to a committee hearing—I had dinner the 

other night with Bud Wyatt, the Air Guard Chief, and he started 

talking about this. I said, ‘‘Bud, leave me alone here. We are going 

to have a hearing. Let me hear from everybody at the same time.’’ 

I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, this might be the only time 

I have ever come to a hearing where I am really open on this. I 

want to hear the answers, and we have specific questions. 

6 

I think this is going to be a very helpful hearing, and I appreciate your holding it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

We are hearing from members of our family. These witnesses are 

part of our family, our American family and this Senate committee’s family. We are personally close to each of you, and we have 

a difficult policy decision to deal with. We do that as family members. 

While there may be differences, and there obviously are, that is 

what democracy is all about. We need to consider these as members of one unit with all having the same mission, which is the security of this country. You all have that mission, and we all have 

that mission. 

We are going to call on our witnesses today in the following 

order. First will be the General Counsel to DOD, Jeh Johnson. 

Then will be the Chairman of the JCS, General Dempsey. Then 

will be the Vice Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Winnefeld. Then 

will be the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno; our Chief 

of Naval Operations, Admiral Greenert; the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, General Amos; the Chief of Staff for the Air Force, 

General Schwartz; and the CNGB, General McKinley. 

So let us start with you, Mr. Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEH C. JOHNSON, GENERAL COUNSEL, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify here 

today. 

You have asked me to discuss a provision of the proposed legislation that would make the CNGB a member of the JCS. 

At the outset, I will tell you that there are no outright legal barriers to enacting this legislation. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits it, and the Joint Chiefs are a statutory creation. Congress 

can, therefore, change the membership of the Chiefs by statute if 

it so desires. 

I believe it is important, however, that the committee be aware 

of some of the legislation’s legal implications and complexities. Before I get to those, here is some general legal background on the 

National Guard, the CNGB, and the JCS. Mr. Chairman, you alluded to some of this in your own remarks. 

The National Guard is a unique entity that operates at different 

times under Federal and State authorities. All members of the 

Guard are members of both the State National Guard and the Federal National Guard of the United States. The Army and Air National Guards of the United States are two of the six Reserve components of DOD. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserves are the other four Reserve components. 

Members of the National Guard can serve in three distinct 

statuses, each of which has differing responsibilities and authorities. First, National Guard members may serve in what is known 

as State Active Duty. State law dictates when Guard members assume this status. 

Typical State Active Duty missions include first responder responsibilities after a natural disaster. The State pays for and the 

7 

Governor of that State commands the National Guard when it is 

on State Active Duty. DOD plays no direct role in that status. 

Second, National Guard members may be ordered to duty under 

title 32 of the U.S. Code, which I will call title 32 duty. When the 

Guard performs title 32 duty, it is performing federally funded 

military training subject to Federal standards or domestic missions, both of which are under the command and control of the 

State Governor. Examples of Title 32 missions include post-September 11 airport security, southwest border security, and counterdrug support. 

Third, DOD may call the National Guard to Federal service, including in times of national emergency, as authorized by law. National Guard members ordered to Active Duty lose their status as 

members of the National Guard and become members of the Reserves of the Army or the Reserves of the Air Force. For example, 

this is the status of Guard members who have been called to serve 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

DOD both commands and funds the Guard when it is in Federal 

service. Thus, at different times, the National Guard may act as either a State or a Federal entity. 

Indeed, many of the functions the Guard performs are under neither the command nor the control of DOD. Rather, for much of 

what the Guard does, State Governors are in command. When the 

National Guard does act in Federal service, it does so as part of 

the Reserves of the Army or the Air Force. 

The CNGB does not command the National Guard acting in any 

of these three statuses. Rather, by Federal statute, the CNGB acts 

as a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on all matters 

involving federalized National Guard forces. He also has the statutory duty to advise the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff of the 

Army and the Air Force on all National Guard matters. 

A DOD directive further explains the CNGB’s authorities and responsibilities, consistent with guidance provided by Congress. 

Now some legal background on the JCS. The JCS serve as the 

senior military advisers to the President, the National Security 

Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs are currently composed of six statutory 

members: the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the Chiefs of the 

four Services. 

The Service Chiefs have a broad range of leadership and command responsibilities that extend throughout their respective Services, encompassing both the Active and Reserve components of the 

Service. Each of the Service Chiefs is the senior military officer of 

their respective Service. 

Against this backdrop, I turn to the proposed legislation, which 

would make the CNGB a member of the JCS. As a matter of practice, the CNGB currently attends meetings of the Joint Chiefs, as 

does the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 

The purpose of the proposed legislation is, thus, to make the 

Chief of the Guard Bureau’s attendance at Joint Chiefs meeting a 

statutory entitlement, with its attendant statutory authorities and 

responsibilities. In connection with the legislation, I make two 

points. First, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense ReorVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
8 

ganization Act of 1986 struck many carefully crafted balances of 

both intraservice and interservice equities. 

The CNGB represents only the Army and Air National Guards, 

and the proposed legislation would thus alter some of GoldwaterNichols careful balances by: (a) for example, altering the fact that 

each Service is statutorily represented by one Service Chief in the 

Joint Chiefs, and (b) providing only two of DOD’s six statutory Reserve components with additional Joint Chiefs representation. 

Second, elevating the CNGB to represent National Guard equities to the Joint Chiefs could create legal confusion as to whether 

the Army and the Air Force Chiefs of Staff continue to represent 

their total force. Current law requires the CNGB to advise the 

Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff on all National Guard matters. 

Finally, I note that you have already received letters from the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Service Chiefs that detail 

their concerns with the proposed legislation. The Chairman, the 

Vice Chairman, and the Service Chiefs are far more conversant 

than I with respect to the operational and administrative consequences of adding the CNGB to the Joint Chiefs. 

From my perspective, I hope that any legislation does not add 

ambiguities with respect to authorities in the place where we can 

tolerate such ambiguity the least—at the top of the Service hierarchies, especially in a time of war. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear here today, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. JEH CHARLES JOHNSON

Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, thank you for the opportunity to testify here 

today. 

You have asked me to discuss a provision of the proposed ‘‘National Guard Empowerment and State-National Defense Integration Act of 2011’’—specifically, the 

provision that would make the CNGB a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before 

I get to the specifics of the proposal, however, I thought it might be helpful to the 

committee if I provided some general legal background on the National Guard, the 

CNGB, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The National Guard is a unique entity that operates at different times under Federal and State authorities. All members of the Guard are members of both their 

State National Guard and the Federal National Guard of the United States. The 

Army and Air National Guards of the United States are two of the six Reserve components of the Department of Defense; the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps Reserves are the other four Reserve components. 

Members of the National Guard can serve in three distinct statuses, each of which 

has differing responsibilities and authorities. 

First, National Guard members may serve in what is known as ‘‘State Active 

Duty.’’ State law dictates when Guard members assume this status; typical ‘‘State 

Active Duty’’ missions include first responder responsibilities after a natural disaster. The State pays for, and the State Governor commands, the National Guard 

when it is on ‘‘State Active Duty.’’ The Department of Defense plays no direct role. 

Second, National Guard members may be ordered to duty under title 32 of the 

U.S.C., which I will call ‘‘Title 32 Duty.’’ When the Guard performs ‘‘Title 32 Duty,’’ 

it is performing federally-funded military training subject to Federal standards or 

domestic missions, both of which are under the command and control of the State 

Governor. Examples of ‘‘title 32’’ missions include post-September 11 airport security, southwest border security, and counter-drug support. 

Third, the Department of Defense may call the National Guard to ‘‘Federal service,’’ including in times of national emergency, as authorized by law. National Guard 

members ordered to active duty lose their status as members of the National Guard 

and become members of the Reserves of the Army or the Reserves of the Air Force. 

For example, this is the status of Guard members who have been called to serve 

9 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense both commands and funds the 

Guard when it is in ‘‘Federal service.’’ 

Thus, at different times, the National Guard may act as either a State or a Federal entity. Indeed, many of the functions the Guard performs are under neither the 

command nor the control of the Department of Defense; rather, for much of what 

the Guard does, State Governors are in command. When the National Guard does 

act in Federal service, it does so as part of the Reserves of the Army or Air Force. 

Thus, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not command the National 

Guard acting in any of its three statuses. Rather, by Federal statute, the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau acts as a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense 

on all matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces, and he also has the 

statutory duty to advise the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and 

Air Force on all National Guard matters. A Department of Defense Directive further 

explicates the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s authorities and responsibilities, 

consistent with guidance provided by Congress. 

Finally, I will briefly provide some legal background on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the senior military advisers to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs are currently composed of six statutory members: the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Chiefs of the four Services. The 

Service Chiefs have a broad range of leadership and command responsibilities that 

extend throughout their respective Services, encompassing both the Active and Reserve components of the Service. Each of the Service Chiefs is the senior military 

officer of his respective Service. 

Against this backdrop, I turn to the proposed legislation, which would make the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I understand that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau currently attends meetings of 

the Joint Chiefs. The purpose of the proposed legislation is thus to make the Chief 

of the Guard Bureau’s attendance at Joint Chiefs meetings a statutory entitlement, 

with its attendant statutory authorities and responsibilities. 

There are no outright legal barriers to enacting this legislation. Nothing in the 

Constitution prohibits it, and the Joint Chiefs are a statutory creation. Congress can 

therefore change the membership of the Chiefs by statute if it so desires. 

I think it is important, however, that the committee is aware of some of the legislation’s legal implications and complexities. Here I make two points. 

First, I note that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986 struck many carefully crafted balances of both intraservice and interservice equities. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau represents only the Army 

and Air National Guards, and the proposed legislation would thus seem to me to 

alter some of Goldwater-Nichols’s careful balances by, for example: (a) altering the 

fact that each Service is statutorily represented by one Service Chief in the Joint 

Chiefs; and (b) providing only two of the Department of Defense’s six statutory Reserve components with additional Joint Chiefs representation. 

Second, elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to represent National 

Guard equities to the Joint Chiefs could create legal confusion as to whether the 

Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff continue to represent their total force. Current 

law already requires the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to advise the Army 

and Air Force Chiefs of Staff on all National Guard matters. 

In closing, I would note that you have already received letters from the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs that detail their concerns with 

the proposed legislation. Although Congress legally could make the proposed 

change, the much more important question would seem to be whether it should. 

With respect to this latter question, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Vice Chairman, and the Service Chiefs are far more conversant than I with respect 

to the operational and administrative consequences of adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the Joint Chiefs. From my perspective, I only hope that any 

legislation does not add ambiguities with respect to authorities in the place where 

we can tolerate such ambiguity the least: at the top of the Service hierarchies, especially in time of war. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear here today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. 

General Dempsey? 

10 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Senator 

Inhofe. 

I want to point out before we begin, I appreciate the spirit of the 

family metaphor you used for this. I do want to make a point that 

as we have talked about this, Craig McKinley has been in the room 

in every instance. So everything we have done to try to talk about 

this among ourselves has been done with the CNGB present. I 

thank you for the opportunity to continue that discussion here with 

you today. 

I would also like to thank my colleagues at the table. We share 

a bond of trust with each other and with the Nation that will be 

sustained regardless of how we answer the question before us 

today. 

Let me be clear, I am both an admirer and an advocate for the 

National Guard. Our entire Reserve component makes an indispensable contribution to our national security. 

Throughout our Nation’s history and certainly in the decade 

since September 11, we have depended on our citizen soldiers and 

airmen to help defend us, our allies, and our interests. At home 

and abroad, the National Guard serves with courage, discipline, 

skill, and distinction. 

I am proud to be the chairman of our total Joint Force—Active 

and Reserves, civilian and families. I take seriously my responsibility to give voice to their achievements and to their needs. I ensure their voice, including the voice of the CNGB, is heard. 

This said, I join the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs 

in counseling against making the Chief of the National Guard a 

statutory member of the JCS. There is no compelling military need 

to support this historic change. Two primary concerns lead me to 

this conclusion—representation and accountability. 

First, our success as a Joint Force is due in large measure to our 

ability to integrate the Active and Reserve components so that they 

are indistinguishable on the battlefield. I believe we have accomplished this because the Service Chiefs of the Army and Air Force 

are the single voice for their respective Services. 

With the Service Secretaries, they bear sole responsibility for 

making the key resource decisions that produce an organized, 

trained, and equipped force, and this includes the National Guard 

and Reserve components. The proposed change could undermine 

this unity of effort. 

Each of our Services has a Reserve component, but only the 

Army and the Air Force have a National Guard. This proposal will 

also create a situation among our Reserve component forces whereby two of the six, as Mr. Johnson mentioned, would be represented 

differently, creating what could at least be the perception of inequity. 

My second and more important concern, though, is one of accountability. Each of the Joint Chiefs is subject to the civilian oversight of a single appointed and confirmed Secretary. The CNGB 

has no such oversight. 

Elevation to the JCS would make him equal to the Service Chiefs 

without commensurate accountability. This seems to me to run 

11 

counter to the carefully crafted organizational and advisory principles established by Goldwater-Nichols. 

I don’t find the argument to change the composition of the JCS 

compelling. It is unclear to me what problem we are trying to solve. 

Here is what I do know with certainty. The CNGB has and will 

continue to attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs that I chair. I want 

and I need him in the tank. 

The Chief provides valuable insights and experience for matters 

of importance to the National Guard and, therefore, the Nation. 

This advice is also carefully considered when the Army and Air 

Force Chiefs make decisions that affect their Service. The CNGB 

has a voice, and it is heard. 

Over the last 10 years, the relationship between our Active and 

Reserve components has grown into a well-integrated fighting 

force. You really can’t spot the difference between Active and Reserve component soldiers or airmen. We are and we will remain 

one force. 

Again, I would like to thank the committee for its continued support to all of our men and women in uniform, as well as their families, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA 

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the proposal to make the Chief of National Guard Bureau a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would also like to thank my 

colleagues at the table. We share a bond of trust with each other and the Nation 

that will be sustained regardless of how today’s question is answered. 

Let me be clear, I am both an admirer and an advocate for the National Guard. 

Our entire Reserve component makes an indispensable contribution to our national 

security. Throughout our Nation’s history, and certainly in the decade since the September 11 attacks, we have depended on our citizen soldiers and airmen to help defend us, our allies, and our interests. At home and abroad, the National Guard 

serves with courage, discipline, skill, and distinction. 

I am proud to be their Chairman—the Chairman of our total Joint Force—Active 

and Reserves, civilian and families. I take seriously my responsibility to give voice 

to their achievements and needs. I ensure their voice—including the voice of the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau—is heard. 

This said, I join the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs in counseling 

against making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a statutory member of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no compelling military justification to support this 

historic change. Two primary concerns lead me to this conclusion—representation 

and accountability. 

First, our success as a Joint Force is due in large measure to our ability to integrate the Active and Reserve components—they are indistinguishable on the battlefield. I believe this is because the Service Chiefs of the Army and Air Force are the 

single voice for their respective branches. With the Service Secretaries, they bear 

sole responsibility for making the resource decisions that produce an organized, 

trained, and equipped force. This includes the National Guard and Reserve components. The proposed change could undermine this unity of effort. Each of our Services has a Reserve component but only the Army and Air Force have a National 

Guard. This proposal will also create a situation among our Reserve Forces whereby 

two of the six Reserve components would be represented differently creating at least 

a perception of inequity. 

My second and more important concern is one of accountability. Each of the Joint 

Chiefs is subject to the civilian oversight of a single appointed and confirmed Secretary. The CNGB has no such oversight. Elevation to the JCS would make him 

equal to the Service Chiefs without commensurate accountability. This proposal 

runs counter to the carefully crafted organizational and advisory principals established in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

The argument to change the composition of the JCS is simply not compelling. It’s 

uncertain to me what problem we’re trying to solve. 

12 

Here is what I do know with certainty. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

has and will continue to attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs that I chair. I want 

and need him in the Tank. The Chief provides valuable insight and experience for 

matters of importance to the National Guard and the Nation. This advice is also 

carefully considered when the Army and Air Force Chiefs make decisions that affect 

their service. The CNGB has a voice and it is heard. 

Over the last 10-years, the relationship between our Active and Reserve components has grown into a well integrated fighting force. You can’t spot the difference 

between Active and Reserve component soldiers or airmen—we are and will remain 

one force. 

Again, I would like to thank the committee for its continued support to ALL our 

men and women in uniform, as well as their families. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Dempsey. 

Admiral Winnefeld? 

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD JR., USN, VICE 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Inhofe, distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Let me start by saying how much I honor and have a deep appreciation for the men and women of our Nation’s entire Reserve component, including the fine citizen soldiers and airmen of our National Guard for their incredible contributions to our Nation’s defense and security, as well as their considerable sacrifices both at 

home and abroad. 

There should be no doubt that I am a huge supporter of and believer in America’s National Guard, and I have a personal connection to the Guard. Indeed, when I was nominated to be the commander of NORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD), my first call was to my friend and soon-to-be 

partner, General Craig McKinley. 

While there, I worked very closely with my Guard partners and 

the Council of Governors to bring to life the dual-status commander 

concept. We migrated more chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear response to the Guard while I was at NORTHCOM. With 

the help of the National Guard Bureau, we brought more guardsmen into the NORTHCOM headquarters, including doubling the 

number of National Guard flag officers in the headquarters. 

When I walked around my NORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters, I could not have told you who was a guardsman and who 

was not. I wouldn’t want it any other way. 

Along the way, I have come to count many of the States’ adjutants generals as my personal friends. It was not by chance that 

my first speaking engagement as Vice Chairman was at the National Guard Association of the United States annual conference 

this past August. 

During my time as Vice Chairman thus far, we have been successful in bringing the CNGB into more senior-level DOD forums. 

I have personally advocated for the expansion of the State Partnership Program, which I think is so important to our country. 

I fully advocate elevating the position of the Deputy CNGB to 

three-star rank and would happily support a future NORTHCOM 

commander being a guardsman, as well as key component commanders being guardsmen, though I do not believe the law should 

13 

go any further than it already does in specifying which components 

hold which billets. I have put my money where my mouth is in support of the Guard, and they can count on my continued support. 

Nonetheless, and despite my support for this great institution, I 

am concerned about the pending National Guard Empowerment 

Act legislation regarding full membership of the CNGB on the JCS. 

The spirit of jointness kindled by the Goldwater-Nichols reform 

legislation is truly alive and has served our Nation well and reflects the wisdom of Congress. I do not believe it needs to be fixed, 

and we don’t need to take a step backward in the unity of effort 

that that legislation did so much to promote. 

As General Dempsey said, the Service Chiefs who serve on the 

JCS have great responsibility for manning, training, and equipping 

both the Active and Reserve components of their Services. The 

CNGB, despite being my great friend and for whom I have great 

respect, does not have the same level of responsibility or command 

authority, and we should not send the signal that we have two different U.S. Armies or U.S. Air Forces. 

Second, while this legislation may send a very positive message 

to the terrific men and women of the Guard, I am concerned that 

it will send a negative message to the remaining 46 percent of our 

Nation’s Reserve component that they are somehow of lesser importance and that future decisions could be taken at their expense. I 

hear that from some members of the Title 10 Reserve components 

whom I have asked. 

Third, some may believe that this legislation would provide a 

tangible benefit by empowering the Guard with a vote on the JCS. 

Mr. Chairman, I would tell you there is no voting process on the 

Joint Chiefs. Instead, we all provide our best military advice to the 

Chairman, who then formulates his advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. 

We already receive fantastic military advice from General 

McKinley, who, as General Dempsey said, is always invited to that 

table, just as we do from the Commandant of the Coast Guard, who 

is also always invited to that table, although the Coast Guard is 

not asking for similar legislation. 

In the end, I am not sure what is broken and what we are fixing. 

But I also would assure you, as General Dempsey did, Mr. Chairman, I would assure the members of this committee—because we 

are, indeed, a family—that my colleagues and I will do everything 

to prevent this issue from driving a wedge between our fantastic, 

capable, and brave National Guard and the rest of the U.S. military’s fantastic, capable, and brave Active and Reserve components. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear this morning. 

Thanks again for your continued support and that of your staff for 

our men and women in uniform, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the Armed Services 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Let me say at the outset, I honor the men and women of our National Guard for 

their incredible contributions to our Nation’s defense and security, both abroad and 

14 

at home, there should be no doubt that I am a huge supporter of and believer in 

America’s National Guard. 

When I was nominated to be the Commander of U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command, my first call was 

to my friend and partner, General Craig McKinley. 

While there, I worked closely with my Guard partners on bringing to life the Dual 

Status Commander concept, and migrating more chemical, biological, radiological 

and nuclear response capability into the Guard. With the help of the National 

Guard Bureau, we brought more guardsmen into the NORTHCOM headquarters, including, two additional general officers. When I walked around my NORTHCOM 

headquarters, I could not have told you who was a guardsman and who was on active duty, and I liked it that way. 

It was not by chance that my first speaking engagement as Vice Chairman was 

at the National Guard Association of the United States annual conference this past 

August. During my time as Vice Chairman, we’ve been successful in bringing the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau into more senior-level DOD forums. I have advocated for expansion of the State Partnership Program. I fully advocate elevating 

the position of the Deputy Chief of the National Guard Bureau to three star rank, 

and would happily support a future commander of NORTHCOM and key 

NORTHCOM component commanders being guardsmen, though I do not believe the 

law should go any further than it does in specifying which components hold which 

billets. 

I have put my money where my mouth is on support for the Guard, and they can 

count on my continued support. Nonetheless, and despite all my support for this 

great institution, I am concerned about the pending National Guard Empowerment 

Act legislation provision regarding full membership of the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The spirit of Jointness kindled by the Goldwater Nichols reform legislation is 

alive, and has served our Nation well. I do not believe it needs to be fixed. The Service Chiefs who serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have great responsibility for 

manning, training, and equipping both the Active and Reserve components of their 

services. They also provide Title 10 military advice on strategy and the use of force 

to the Chairman, the Secretary and the President. The Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau does not have commensurate responsibility, nor should we send the corrosive signal that we have two different U.S. Armies and two U.S. Air Forces. 

Second, while the legislation may send a positive message to the terrific men and 

women in the Guard, I’m concerned that it will send a very negative message to 

the remaining 40-plus percent of our Nation’s Reserve component that they are 

somehow of lesser importance, and that future decisions could be taken at their expense. 

Third, some may believe this legislation would provide a tangible benefit by empowering the Guard with a vote on the JCS. Mr. Chairman, there is no voting process on the Joint Chiefs. Instead, we all provide our best military advice to the 

Chairman, who then formulates his advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the 

President. We already receive fantastic military advice from General McKinley, who 

is always invited to that table, just as we do from the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard, who also is at the table. Yes, statutorily we have the right of dissent through 

the Chairman and Secretary to the President, but that is very, very seldom used. 

In the end, however this is resolved Mr. Chairman, I can assure the members of 

the committee that my colleagues and I will do everything we can to prevent this 

issue—despite having been elevated to this level—from driving a wedge between our 

fantastic, capable, and brave National Guard and the rest of the U.S. military. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, thank you so much. 

General Odierno. 

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, 

other members of the committee. It is an honor to be here in front 

of you, as always, today. 

I have had the opportunity both in my current position, and in 

my previous positions to see firsthand the power and capabilities 

of the total Army. The performance, selfless service, and dedication 

15 

of our Active component, our Army National Guard, and our Army 

Reserves all have contributed directly to our successes. I am proud 

and humbled that I am currently the Chief of Staff of the U.S. 

Army, the total Army. 

The Reserve component connects the Army to the American people. The Guard and Reserve soldiers that live and work in over 

3,000 communities have shared the burdens of war, with over 900 

killed in action and more than 7,500 wounded. They are a critical 

component of the Joint Force and connect us to Main Street America. 

We have built a strong relationship between all of our Army components, and I would argue probably the strongest we have ever 

had. It is our goal to sustain and increase this momentum as we 

move forward. But with all due respect to the CNGB, my good 

friend Greg McKinley, with whom I have the utmost respect for 

and have worked closely with on numerous critical issues, I am 

bound to communicate my explicit opposition to this post as a 

member of the JCS. 

First, representing only two of the six Reserve components, the 

Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, at the JCS level 

will create confusion, imbalance, and potentially challenge interoperability. It would run counter to intraservice and interservice 

integration and negatively impact the progress we have made toward jointness. 

Second, the proposed legislation would complicate the central 

principle of civilian control of our Nation’s military. This proposal 

risks creating a bifurcated force—one focused internally, another 

focused abroad. It is important that we have clear authorities and 

responsibilities to ensure effective employment of the total force. 

Third, this could lead to divided or redundant force management, 

funding, modernization, and training and doctrine, creating a high 

level of complication and friction. 

The Reserve component forces will continue to play a critical role 

in our national security strategy, and the advice of the CNGB will 

always be, as it has been, extremely valuable and essential within 

the context of our total Army in a balanced joint portfolio. The integration of the regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the 

Army Reserves has proven over the last decade to be unbeatable 

on the battlefield and irreplaceable at home and abroad. Now, more 

than ever, we are truly one Army, and we cannot sacrifice the fact 

that we are truly one Army as we face many critical challenges 

ahead. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for 

allowing me the opportunity to appear before you and for your support, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Odierno follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee. 

I have seen first-hand the power and capabilities of the Total Army. The performance, selfless service, and dedication of both the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserves have contributed directly to our successes. 

The Reserve component connects the Army to the American people. The Guard 

and Reserve soldiers that live and work in over 3,000 communities have shared the 

16 

burdens of war, with over 900 killed in action and more than 7,500 wounded. They 

are a critical component of our Joint Force and connect us to ‘‘Main Street America.’’ 

We have built a strong relationship between all of our Army components; probably 

the strongest we have ever had. It is our goal to sustain and increase this momentum as we move forward. 

With all due respect to the Chief of National Guard Bureau—with whom I have 

worked closely on a variety of critical issues—I am bound to communicate my explicit opposition to this post as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for several 

reasons. 

First, representing only two of the seven Reserve components—the Army National 

Guard and the Air National Guard—at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, will create 

confusion, imbalance, and challenge interoperability. It would run counter to intraservice and inter-service integration and negatively impact the progress we’ve made 

toward jointness. 

Second, the proposed legislation will complicate the central principle of civilian 

control of our Nation’s military. This proposal risks creating a bifurcated force—one 

focused internally and another focused abroad. It is important that we have clear 

authorities and responsibilities to ensure effective employment of the Total Force. 

Third, this could lead to divided or redundant force management, funding, modernization, training, and doctrine creating a high level of complication and friction. 

The Reserve component forces will continue to play a critical role in our National 

Security Strategy and the advice of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will 

always be—as it has been—extremely valuable and essential within the context of 

our Total Army in a balanced Joint Portfolio. 

The integration of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves 

has proven—over the last decade—to be unbeatable on the battlefield and irreplaceable at home and abroad. Now, more than ever, we are truly one Army. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for allowing me the 

opportunity to appear before you and for your support. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Odierno. 

Admiral Greenert. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to comment on and to testify in the 

matter of including the CNGB as a member of the JCS. 

I fully support continued participation by the CNGB in Joint 

Chiefs deliberations, particularly regarding the issues that deal 

with or affect the National Guard. Our National Guard Chief, General McKinley, who we really do consider a brother in the tank, has 

made notable input and provided valuable contributions to issues 

of importance to those of us serving in the tank and DOD. I think 

this relationship should continue. 

However, in my opinion, making the CNGB a member of the JCS 

adds unnecessary complexity to the principle of unity of command. 

Unlike the Service Chiefs, the CNGB does not represent a branch 

of Service, nor is he responsible for organizing, manning, training, 

and equipping the National Guard to the extent of the Service 

Chiefs and their respective Services. 

Making the CNGB a member of the Joint Chiefs may also insert 

an ambiguity regarding the status of the Army National Guard and 

the Air National Guard as Reserve components of the Army and 

Air Force, respectively. This could create a perception that the National Guard is a separate service, and that perception could instigate an inequality sense among the National Guard and its Army, 

Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve counterparts. 

17 

I appreciate the committee’s longstanding support for the men 

and women of the Navy, and I look forward to continue working 

with this committee as we address the challenges we face, both for 

the Nation and for our Navy. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM JONATHAN GREENERT, USN 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the matter of including the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS). 

Making the CNGB a member of the JCS adds unnecessary complexity to the principle of ‘‘unity of command’’, and could confuse the intended clear and unambiguous 

source of best military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President. 

In my opinion, the Service Chiefs (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) 

should continue to be held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative 

branches of government for the readiness and combat effectiveness of all personnel 

in their respective Services, and for the welfare of all their respective 

servicemembers and families. I believe they are best positioned to report to the 

President and Congress on their Services’ readiness and preparation for military 

missions that support our national interests. 

After 10 years of war, the Guard and Reserve are more fully integrated with our 

Active component than ever before. Today’s synergy of effort is outstanding and unprecedented. Making the CNGB a member of the JCS could create ambiguity in the 

chain of command and erode this momentum. 

This assessment is consistent with the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves Second Report to Congress—which recommended the CNGB not be made 

a member of the JCS. 

Making the CNGB a member of the JCS may insert ambiguity regarding the status of the Army and Air National Guard as Reserve components of the Army and 

Air Force and create the appearance the National Guard is a separate Service. This 

could also introduce an inequity between the National Guard and its Army, Marine 

Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve counterparts. 

I concur with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the CNGB’s advisory 

roles under 10 U.S.C. 1050(c) are essential and sufficient. The CNGB should continue to advise the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other 

matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, I fully support continued CNGB participation in JCS deliberations that deal with issues that affect the 

National Guard, and to provide insight on National Guard concerns. 

I appreciate the committee’s longstanding support of the men and women of the 

Navy. I look forward to continue working with the committee as we address the 

challenges we face as a nation and as a service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Admiral. 

Next, General Amos. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT 

OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, fellow committee members, thank you for the opportunity to provide my advice on whether the CNGB should become a voting member of the 

JCS. 

In my view, there should be no change to the status quo. Let me 

first acknowledge my colleague, General Craig McKinley, the current CNGB, and the many men and women who have faithfully 

served in our States’ National Guard units. 

They have served our Nation and their States well for many decades, for this and much more, we owe them our great debt of gratitude. 

By virtue of its limited role in DOD and its supporting role in 

Army and Air Force affairs, the CNGB lacks the requisite broad inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
18 

sight into all levels of strategic planning for JCS membership. Additionally, the CNGB’s dual mission and State focus creates an unavoidable conflict of interest inconsistent with voting membership. 

In this sense, voting membership would introduce irrevocable 

State interest into an inherently Federal activity and process. 

CNGB membership in the JCS could complicate unity of command 

for both the Army and the U.S. Air Force. 

Congress intended the current structure ensures that the Service 

Chiefs are singularly accountable to the executive and legislative 

branches of the Government for the combat readiness of their respective Services, to include their Reserve components. I think it 

is critical that we safeguard this unity of command. 

Lastly, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force are best 

suited to advise on the most effective employment of their supporting elements. Under law, the National Guard has a supporting 

relationship with the Army and Air Force when federalized as their 

Reserve component. 

Providing JCS membership to the CNGB creates unnecessary 

leadership duplication in the JCS, contrary to Congress’ longstanding policy. This duplication could unfairly amplify Army and 

Air Force concerns and create a representational imbalance prejudicial to the Reserve components other than the National Guard. 

The CNGB’s advisory voice in the JCS is appropriate and adequate 

as it currently stands. 

Thank you for the opportunity to offer this statement, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC 

Thank you for the opportunity to address with you the important question of 

whether the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), should be a member of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). I cannot overstate the dedication and bravery of our Reserve Forces in the current fight. Because of their contributions and sacrifices, there 

is an understandable desire to extend to our Reserve Forces an appropriate level 

of recognition. While I would support almost any effort to provide such well-deserved recognition, I do not think that changing the national command structure is 

a necessary or appropriate tribute. In my view, the CNGB’s current, limited supporting role is an appropriate one inasmuch as the CNGB lacks the overarching 

strategic insight necessary for JCS membership. I also believe that CNGB membership would create unnecessary duplication within the Department of Defense (DOD) 

and the JCS, complicate unity of command within the Army and Air Force, fragment the Reserve community, and create uncertainty with regard to National Guard 

leadership. 

Although the National Guard is without doubt a key player in today’s conflicts, 

I believe the CNGB lacks the requisite insight into all levels of strategic planning 

by virtue of his limited role in DOD, and more specifically, Army and Air Force affairs. The JCS provides direct military advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In order 

for the JCS to carry out this duty, its members must be able to address the strategic 

direction of the Armed Forces. They must be capable of preparing strategic plans, 

to include plans which conform with resource levels; preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans; performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces; preparing contingency plans conforming 

to the guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense; advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support); establishing and maintaining a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each command to carry out missions; and providing advice concerning the extent to which the program recommendations and 

budget proposals of DOD conform with the priorities established in strategic plans 

and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified 

19 

combatant commands. Additionally, JCS members provide advice concerning doctrine, training, and the education of the Armed Forces. The JCS’ responsibilities 

therefore require a leadership structure that is wholly dedicated to the national defense, and thoroughly knowledgeable of the processes that resource and develop our 

defense strategies and the programs and resources required to develop and maintain 

responsive capabilities. The staffs of each Service Chief gain this detailed understanding through multi-layered integration with the joint staff and key DOD staffs. 

The integration of the staffs is a key enabler of success. The preparation of strategic 

and other plans outlined above therefore requires much more than the ability to 

cast a vote; it requires participation at every level and an undivided focus. With its 

dual mission, supporting role, and state focus, the CNGB is not structured for full 

participation in the roles set for the Chiefs in Title 10. Accordingly, I do not believe 

the CNGB has the currency or capability to assume the necessary level of engagement requisite for JCS membership. 

Additionally, contrary to Congressional policy, including the CNGB into the JCS 

would create unnecessary duplication within the JCS because the federalized National Guard, as the Army and Air Force’s Reserve component, serves a supporting 

role. This duplication could result in an unfairly amplified representation of Army 

and Air Force concerns. It will also create a representational imbalance with regard 

to Reserve affairs in favor of the federalized National Guard. The Army and Air 

Force Chiefs of Staff are best suited to equitably advise on the most effective employment of their supporting elements. 

Moreover, providing full voting membership to the National Guard Bureau—an 

organization not primarily responsible for the planning and execution of national 

strategy—would not only be unprecedented; it would be an extraordinary ‘‘solution’’ 

to an unclear problem. When Congress established DOD, it codified a policy that 

called for eliminating unnecessary duplication in the DOD. Congress designed this 

policy, which exists in Title 10 today, in effort to seek more effective, efficient, and 

economical administration not only in the DOD but in the National command structure. 

The role of the National Guard, when executing a Federal mission, is to fold in 

with and execute missions in support of the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. In 

preparation for these missions, and in recognition of its supporting role, the Guard 

is permitted to train with these Services and at their schools. 

For title 32, non-federalized National Guard matters, the CNGB serves as the 

principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS. In this title 32 capacity, no unnecessary duplication exists because the CNGB is uniquely situated to 

channel communications between the several States and the Secretary of Defense. 

Where Congress federalizes the National Guard, however, the CNGB serves as the 

principle advisor to the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force Chief of Staff. Due to the importance of 

this supporting role, the CNGB appropriately maintains an advisory voice within 

the JCS. This structure is intuitive; it reflects the manner in which Congress intended to use the federalized National Guard and Air National Guard as the Army’s 

and Air Force’s Reserve component. 

As noted in the recent JCS letter to this committee, CNGB membership in the 

JCS would also complicate unity of command for both the Army and the Air Force 

and contribute to Service balkanization. The current organizational structure ensures that the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative branches of Government for the 

readiness and combat effectiveness of their respective Services, including their Reserves. This is as it should be, and this is what Congress intended when it created 

the existing structure. Unity of purpose and of command is crucial in both the preparation and employment phases of the Armed Forces. When it comes to making decisions for the defense of the Nation and the preparations necessary for the achievement of its national objectives, success requires single-mindedness. 

Also as noted in the JCS letters to this committee, elevating the role of the CNGB 

would further segment one community of reservists—a community that is already 

challenged with executing its dual mission. When the National Guard is federalized, 

the command relationship between the CNGB and the Army Chief of Staff and the 

Air Force Chief of Staff mirrors the Navy and Marine Corps’ unified command relationship for their Reserve components. Marine Forces Reserve, for example, as the 

Reserve component for the Marine Corps, is organized, trained, and equipped under 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This Service identification and matriculation 

enhances unity of command and the cohesion of combat units. In my interactions 

with Marine reservists, I’ve noted their pride and motivation in simply continuing 

their service to the Nation as marines. I applaud the lack of cultural distinction between Active Duty and Reserve marines, and I am confident that this same motivaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
20 

tion also drives reservists in other Services to step forward. The proposed elevation 

of the CNGB risks fracturing the successful dynamic that our forces have achieved 

by diluting the understanding of the supporting and supported command relationships, and unbalancing the appropriate preparation of our Active and Reserve 

Forces. 

Lastly, I believe that CNGB membership on the JCS could create an unhealthy 

ambiguity in the responsibility for leading the men and women of the National 

Guard. As a Service Chief, I fully subscribe to the notion that I am singularly accountable for the welfare of all marines and their families, Active and Reserve. As 

Commandant of the Marine Corps, I have the same responsibility to the Marine 

Forces Reserve as I do to the regular forces. 

The missions for which all marines are trained and equipped is unified with the 

command structure that leads them. The families that decide to stay with the Corps 

know whose job it is to ensure their best care: it is mine. Bifurcating leadership, 

however, might lead to critical leadership gaps recognizable only after some future 

failure occurs. Most concerning, these gaps could affect the responsibility of caring 

for these troops and their families. For the sake of our reservists and their families, 

we cannot afford such a risk. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Amos. 

General Schwartz. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members 

of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to offer my 

views today. 

On behalf of the men and women of the U.S. Air Force, I thank 

you for your ongoing support of our servicemembers and, importantly, their families. 

I join my colleagues in definitively stating that the CNGB is a 

very important senior leader under our total force construct. 

Through his role in advising the Secretary of the Air Force directly 

and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the JCS, the 

National Guard Bureau Chief is a daily contributor to many of the 

consequential decisions that are made by the total force leadership. 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides the Bureau Chief’s advisory 

role and preserves unified service leadership. This advisory role 

and the Bureau Chief’s relationship to each Service continues to be 

important and is currently appropriate in the performance of organizing, training, and equipping functions for which the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs are singularly responsible. 

But because the National Guard Bureau Chief does not represent 

a single or separate branch of Service, making him or her a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs would reach beyond the appropriate role for the Bureau Chief. Because the Bureau Chief’s advisory role to the Service Secretaries and Chiefs is for all National 

Guard matters, including notably those that are related to the Federal service of the National Guard, providing statutory Joint Chiefs 

membership to the National Guard Bureau Chief would disrupt the 

lines of authority and representation that are already in place for 

the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force. Therefore, the current 

arrangement should not be altered. 

The Joint Chiefs exist in large part to provide military advice on 

the employment of Federal forces. Total force employment considerations are best served by those who possess supervisory and moral 

authority over fielded forces; who organize, train, and equip perVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
21 

sonnel of all components of each Service; and who are responsible 

as force providers to the combatant commanders. 

Consequently, the National Guard Bureau Chief’s membership 

on the Joint Chiefs presents issues concerning his or her appropriate role in offering advice on the employment of the Armed 

Forces in a designated title 10 role. Moreover, beyond the established relationships among the military services, interactions with 

the interagency and international partners also could be confused. 

Existing law and policy provide appropriate roles and requirements for the CNGB. His or her authorities, augmented by the JCS 

Chairman’s standing invitation to the Bureau Chief to attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs, ensure that the Chief of the Bureau will 

continue to have a strong voice and will remain an essential and 

a highly valued partner for any Air Force Chief of Staff or Joint 

Chiefs team. 

But for the foregoing reasons, the CNGB should not be included 

as a statutory full voting member of the JCS independent of service 

leadership. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members of the committee, 

I thank you for your time. We look forward to your questions. 

If I may, sir, I would like to publicly recognize and state our admiration and respect for our teammates from the U.S. Marine 

Corps, who celebrate their 236th birthday today. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF 

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) is a very important senior leader in our Total Force construct, and through his role in advising the secretaries of 

the Air Force and the Army directly, and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). CNGB is a daily contributor to many of the consequential decisions that are made by the Total Force leadership. 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. § 10502(c)) provides for CNGB’s principal advisory role, through CJCS, to SECDEF for matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces. By contrast, his advisory role to the Service Secretaries and 

Chiefs is for all National Guard matters—notably, including those that are related 

to the Federal service of the National Guard. Providing statutory JCS membership 

to CNGB will blur this crucial distinction. 

The CNGB relationship to each service is important and currently sufficient in 

the performance of the organizing, training, and equipping functions for which the 

Service Secretaries and Chiefs are singularly responsible. But because CNGB does 

not represent a single or separate branch of Service, making CNGB a statutory 

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would reach beyond the appropriate 

CNGB role and disrupt the lines of authority and representation that are already 

in place for the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and Air Force. This current effective 

arrangement should not be altered. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff exists, in large part, to provide military advice on employment of Federal forces. Total Force employment considerations are best served 

by those who possess supervisory and moral authority over field units; who organize, train, and equip personnel of all components of each Service; and who are responsible as force providers to the combatant commands. Consequently, CNGB 

membership on the JCS presents issues concerning his or her appropriate role in 

offering advice on employment of the Armed Forces in a designated title 10 role. 

Moreover, beyond the established relationships among the Military Services, interactions with interagency and international partners also could be confused. 

Existing law and policy provide appropriate roles and requirements of CNGB and 

the National Guard Bureau. The authorities of CNGB, augmented by CJCS’s standing invitation for CNGB to attend all JCS meetings, ensure that CNGB will continue to have a strong voice, and will remain an essential and highly valued partner 

for any Air Force Chief of Staff and the Joint Chiefs. But, for the reasons above, 

22 

CNGB should not be included as a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

independent of service leadership. 

Chairman LEVIN. Happy birthday, General Amos. [Laughter.] 

General AMOS. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Didn’t know you were that old, but——[Laughter.] 

General AMOS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. We congratulate you and all the marines. 

Thank you, General Schwartz. 

General McKinley? 

STATEMENT OF GEN. CRAIG R. MCKINLEY, USAF, CHIEF, 

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 

General MCKINLEY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me take a point of personal pride in thanking you for cohosting a Public Broadcasting Service special that will be seen tonight, ‘‘Where Soldiers Come From,’’ honoring eight of your soldiers 

from the upper peninsula of Michigan. 

Senator Inhofe, thanks for your support of the 45th. Your relationship with your Oklahoma National Guard is one to be emulated, as all the other members of this great committee. 

All the distinguished members of this committee, it is an honor 

to be sitting before you today to provide my opening comments on 

the matter at hand. 

I admire all the Service Chiefs, the Vice Chairman, and the 

Chairman very, very much. I can tell you that our relationship will 

not be broken by the testimony given here today, and I thank them 

for the honor of letting me be part of this dais today. 

Mr. Chairman, for me to be here today to provide my personal 

views on whether the CNGB should be a member of the JCS, I am 

sitting here believing now in the 21st century, after 3 years in the 

job as CNGB and 11 total years serving in the Pentagon, that it 

is now in the best interests of the American people for the CNGB 

to be made a full member of the JCS. 

While the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and 

resulting DOD initiatives made important fundamental changes in 

the role of the CNGB and the Bureau, only full JCS membership 

for the CNGB will ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities 

of the non-federalized National Guard are considered in a planned 

and deliberate manner that is not based upon ad hoc or personal 

relationships but is, instead, firmly rooted in the law and the national strategy. 

The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into 

account when making military contingency plans, when allocating 

scarce readiness resources, and when advising the President, the 

Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency response options. Homeland defense and civil support must be at the core of 

our National strategy due to the changing threat environment, one 

that is asymmetrical and more dangerous within our homeland 

than at any time in our history. 

It is for those reasons now that I now believe that the CNGB 

should be a member of the JCS. Our Nation’s military planning 

23 

and resourcing would be vastly improved, in my opinion, more comprehensive, more effective, and more efficient. 

I do not personally support a change in the Title 10 relationships 

among the Services and the Army and the Air Guard, nor do I support the National Guard becoming a separate service. We in the 

National Guard are all very proud members of the U.S. Army and 

the U.S. Air Force. 

The issue at hand, in my opinion, does not in any way impact 

unity of command, which will remain unchanged; or fragment the 

Reserve component, as only the National Guard has a dual Federal/State mission; or create uncertainty, in my opinion, with respect to National Guard leadership, which clearly resides in our 

Governors and adjutants general when the Guard is non-federalized and with the Federal commanders when it is. 

Nor does it increase the risk, in my opinion, of over-representation of any Service at the highest levels of our military. Rather, 

this would add to the JCS in an enduring manner the expertise 

and knowledge of the CNGB as it pertains to the National Guard 

in its non-federalized role in the defense and safety of the homeland. 

Indeed, the CNGB, who is a Title 10 officer under the law, and 

the DOD directive pertaining to the National Guard should be 

counted on as the Federal officer best postured to advise the JCS 

and their clients on the capabilities of the non-Federal National 

Guard. 

I have read the letters of the Service Chiefs submitted to your 

committee, and I provided the Chairman of the JCS a copy of this 

DOD directive on Monday. These letters and other comments focus, 

whether directly or indirectly, primarily on five discrete themes: 

budget authority; the CNGB’s statutory advisory role as it currently exists, that it is sufficient; that the National Guard could become a separate service or will be somehow advantaged over the 

other Reserve components; maintaining Title 10 command authority; and, finally, civilian oversight. 

In the area of budget authority, the CNGB plans, programs, and 

administers the budgets of the Army and Air National Guard, and 

I am directly responsible for nearly $28 billion annually. I am the 

appropriation sponsor for the Army National Guard Military Personnel Account, Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Military Construction (MILCON), and the Air National Guard Military Personnel Account, O&M, and MILCON. 

By law, the CNGB is responsible for the entire planning, budgeting execution, and accounting of these appropriations. The CNGB 

competes for, defends, and validates the requirements for the above 

appropriation and submits budget materials through the Services 

to DOD. 

The CNGB is required to provide an annual financial report to 

Congress that states how the specific National Guard appropriations funding was spent. 

In my regard as a statutory adviser, there is sufficient and significant difference between the CNGB’s principal adviser authorities and the JCS members’ military adviser authorities. The JCS 

members advise the President, National Security Council (NSC), 

Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The JCS 

24 

members may also submit advice or an opinion, in addition to the 

advice presented by the Chairman. 

Additionally, the President, NSC, Homeland Security Council, 

and Secretary of Defense may request advice directly from the JCS 

members, and JCS members may make recommendations to Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. In contrast, the 

CNGB advises the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces. 

The CNGB must declare an interest in order to have a voice on 

these limited matters. Without statutory JCS membership, the 

CNGB’s role in the JCS is ad hoc, as determined by each successive 

Chairman. 

In regards to separate service or advantage over other Reserve 

components, the National Guard is unique, thanks to Article 1, section 8, clauses 15 and 16 of the U.S. Constitution and title 32 of 

the U.S. Code. It is unlike the other Reserve components, which 

can perform title 10 duties under title 10 command authority. 

The National Guard performs the same title 10 duties when federalized, plus diverse non-Federal duties and State duties under 

State command authority. The command chains are unambiguous. 

The other Reserve components have no analogy to the National 

Guard’s non-federalized duties and command authorities. 

The non-Federal National Guard’s missions include, but are not 

limited to, air defense, ballistic missile defense, weapons of mass 

destruction response, disaster response, counterdrug support, border security, airport security, and national special security events. 

In regard to unclear title 10 command authority, the issue discussed today, in my opinion, would not alter title 10 command authorities or accountability over federalized National Guard forces. 

There would be no change to the title 10 authorities of the Service 

Secretaries or the Service Chiefs. Conversely, they would take on 

no new title 32 responsibilities. 

The CNGB is not, nor would he be, within the title 10 chain of 

command for Title 10 National Guard forces. When federalized, National Guard forces are and will remain under the command of 

Federal commanders. 

Total force integration would not be compromised. If anything, it 

would be enhanced by greater situational awareness of Title 32 National Guard missions, capabilities, and leadership on which the 

CNGB is uniquely qualified to advise. Total force integration would 

also benefit from enhanced understanding of the homeland defense 

and civil support missions that are performed by non-federalized 

National Guard forces. 

In regards to civilian oversight, since 2008, under the provisions 

of the DOD directive, the CNGB is under the authority, the direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary normally exercises authority, direction, and control through the Secretaries of the Army and of the Air Force for matters pertaining to 

their responsibilities in law or DOD policy. 

To conclude, much has changed since 2008. The National Guard 

Bureau is now a joint activity of DOD, and the CNGB has enhanced authorities short of JCS membership, and for those, we are 

very appreciative. 

25 

Yet the CNGB still does not have an institutional position from 

which I can advise the President, the NSC, the Homeland Security 

Council, and Congress on non-federalized National Guard forces 

that are critical to homeland defense and civil support missions. 

Adding the CNGB to the JCS, in my opinion, would ensure that 

in the post-September 11 security environment the National 

Guard’s non-federalized role in homeland defense and civil support 

missions will be fully represented in all JCS deliberations. This 

would not detract, in my opinion, in any way from its other critical 

JCS functions. 

Without statutory membership on the JCS, the CNGB’s ability to 

participate in deliberations is determined solely by the discretion 

of the Chairman. I believe this role should be established in law. 

This view is also fully shared by former assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security Paul McHale, who has consented to 

let me inform you that he, like me, did not have this opinion several years ago, but now agrees that the CNGB should be made a 

full member of the JCS. 

In my role as the channel of communication for the States, the 

territories of Guam, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, I would be remiss without speaking on behalf of 

the 54 adjutants general. In a letter I would like to submit for the 

record, Mr. Chairman, the adjutants general have provided their 

unqualified support for placing the CNGB on the JCS. 

I appreciate very much again sitting with these distinguished 

gentlemen on this dais and the opportunity to discuss this issue 

with you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General McKinley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. CRAIG R. MCKINLEY, USAF 

OPENING REMARKS

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the committee; I am honored to appear before you today, representing 465,000 citizen-soldiers and airmen in the Army and Air National Guard, an organization that is historically part of the foundation of our great democracy. America’s National Guard 

remains ready, reliable, and accessible. As members of an operational force, regularly used by the President and State Governors, the soldiers and airmen of the National Guard contribute daily to our Nation’s overseas and domestic security objectives. I thank you for the opportunity to discuss the possibility of making the Chief, 

National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS). I would like to address some of the issues surrounding this debate. 

THE NATIONAL GUARD AS A RESERVE COMPONENT

The National Guard of the United States is by statute a Reserve component of 

the U.S. Army and Air Force, and representation on the JCS would not degrade that 

relationship. We are very proud of our history with and lineage to the U.S. Army 

and Air Force. Never have we contemplated abandoning our historical ties, and suggestions that adding the CNGB as a JCS member would create a separate military 

service are divisive and unfounded. Pride in our Service affiliations is a core competency of the National Guard. The Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force would 

continue to prescribe the training of the National Guard, procure its equipment, and 

validate its requirements. The Directors of the Army and Air National Guard would 

continue to participate in planning and budgeting meetings as representatives of the 

Reserve components of those Services. 

THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Statutorily, the CNGB is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through 

the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard matters that are not under the authority and direction of the Secretaries or the Chiefs 

26 

of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. As the ‘‘channel of communications,’’ the 

CNGB is the most current and knowledgeable source of information within the Federal Government about the National Guard in its non Title 10 roles, and is thus 

the best single source of advice for leaders about unique Guard-related matters, particularly those which are critical to homeland defense. 

UNIQUE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Two unique roles that stand out are the CNGB’s expertise in the National Guard’s 

employment and deployment for domestic purposes, and experience in the vitally 

important interagency collaboration needed for domestic response in the homeland. 

Indeed, roughly 70 percent of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) response to Weapons of Mass Destruction is comprised of National Guard forces. Threats faced by the 

United States have significantly grown since the 1990s, especially in the decade 

since September 11 when America herself became a battleground. Domestic response in the homeland is a matter of national security with international ramifications. In light of these changes, the duties of the JCS were adjusted; in 2006, providing military advice to the Homeland Security Council was added to the JCS statutory responsibilities. The CNGB is uniquely positioned to both provide situational 

awareness of State and Federal military forces operating in unity of effort in the 

homeland and to ensure that resourcing decisions fully consider the domestic mission. Adding CNGB as a full member of the JCS would be the next logical step to 

improve the Joint Chiefs’ ability to provide the best possible military advice to civilian leaders. 

The CNGB’s advice and opinion are also uniquely relevant because DOD policy 

charges CNGB with responsibility to ‘‘facilitate and deconflict the use of National 

Guard forces among the States to ensure that adequate and balance forces are available and responsive for domestic and foreign military operations, consistent with national security objectives and priorities.’’ Whereas the Service Chiefs provide definitive advice as to the capabilities of their Federal Reserve component to perform foreign military operations and domestic title 10 missions, only the CNGB can speak 

with authority on the strategic balancing required to ensure that the National 

Guard forces of 54 States and territories have the capability to perform their Federal missions and their domestic title 32 and State missions. 

NATIONAL GUARD BUDGET

Under U.S. Code, title 10, chapter 1011, which establishes the National Guard 

Bureau, the Secretary of Defense-approved charter (DOD Directive 5105.77) specifies CNGB’s functions and responsibilities, both as identified in the statute and others. Relative to National Guard budgets and capabilities, the DOD Directive indicates the CNGB shall: 

(a) Plan, program, and administer the budget of the Army National Guard of the 

United States and the Air National Guard of the United States. The CNGB 

is directly responsible for nearly $25 billion annually, and is the appropriation 

sponsor for National Guard Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, 

Military Construction, and Procurement (via National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Appropriation), and thus responsible for producing a President’s 

budget submission to Congress for these appropriations. 

(b) Supervise the acquisition and supply of Federal property through the U.S. 

Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFO) appointed under section 708 of title 32, 

U.S. Code. The USPFO’s work directly for the CNGB and provide the Federal 

oversight and accountability of Federal funds and property issued to the 

States, Territories, and District of Columbia, to ensure compliance with the 

Purpose and Anti-Deficiency Acts as well as with diverse DOD directives and 

regulations. 

Although the CNGB has clearly delineated budgetary authority, this authority 

and responsibility are not necessary to perform JCS members’ statutory duties, 

which include providing military advice to the President, the National Security 

Council, the Homeland Security Counsel, and the Secretary of Defense. This advisory role is separate and distinct from the role they fulfill in leading and administering their respective Services, whose budgets are ultimately the responsibility of 

the Service Secretaries. Duty as a Joint Chief is additive to, and not a function of, 

Service responsibilities. 

SIMILAR EXAMPLES

Considering the example of the Navy and Marine Corps Chiefs both being members of JCS contradict any contention as to a separate Service being divisive, or a 

27 

Service having authority without accountability. The Marine Corps is part of the 

Department of the Navy and their budget request to Congress is included inside the 

Navy request. Yet no one would argue that the marines are hindered by this construct in being able to articulate their requirements or deliver their unique capabilities. The CNGB has a similar departmental-level role, and, as outlined above, also 

possesses significant budget authorities and responsibilities. 

CLOSING REMARKS

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General McKinley. 

That letter will be made part of the record, as will a statement 

of Senator Rockefeller, who has also asked that his statement be 

made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

28 


n10ful1.eps
29 

[The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on whether the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be a 

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thanks to all of the Chiefs of our Armed 

Forces—both Active Duty and Reserve—for being here today. There is no question— 

as a matter of both principle and of national security—that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be elevated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Guardians 

of Freedom Act, which passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives on 

May 25, would accomplish this goal. I hope that today’s hearing will lead to swift 

action on this important legislation, and I look forward to the testimony of each of 

the witnesses. 

It is important to acknowledge that the role of the National Guard has evolved 

over the last 10 years. Since September 11, National Guardsmen have mobilized 


n10ful2.eps
30 

more than 700,000 times to support overseas and domestic missions. They have 

played an essential role in the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq and are a critical Operational Reserve for our Armed Forces. Today’s National Guard accounts for 

more than 460,000 servicemembers from every State in the Union—roughly 25 percent of all of our 1.9 million-member force. 

The Guard has also become an essential part of our Nation’s response to both 

man-made and natural disasters. This August, when Hurricane Irene slammed the 

East Coast, the National Guard responded by calling up over 11,000 soldiers and 

airmen from 24 States to coordinate the relief efforts. Our Guard is being trained 

to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological attacks. It is being 

trained to deal with pandemics. It is asked to be the first on the scene after major 

earthquakes, snowstorms, and hurricanes. These Homeland defense responsibilities 

will continue to increase, as well. 

The National Guard also brings capabilities and efficiencies to the table that we 

need in these tough economic times. For example, the Air National Guard provides 

35 percent of the total Air Force capability for 7 percent of the cost. The Army National Guard provides 40 percent of the Army’s capability for just 11 percent of the 

Army budget. Together, 464,900 members of the National Guard provide a capable, 

operational and affordable military force—at just 6 percent of the Pentagon’s annual 

budget. 

The absence of the National Guard from the Joint Chiefs of Staff has very real 

consequences. Full membership of the National Guard in the Joint Chiefs could 

have better prepared the marines’ response to the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, our 

Nation’s initial response to the September 11 attacks, or our response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office called into question the 

Army National Guard’s ability to carry out its domestic mission. Then, just like now, 

there is no permanent system in place to replenish necessary equipment once it is 

removed from Guard units in individual States. The Pentagon has required National 

Guard units to leave behind critical equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan. A drastic 

shortfall in equipment levels has led to a drop in mission readiness. As a result, 

the Guard’s ability to respond to domestic emergencies has been severely inhibited. 

I find it hard to believe this would be the case if the Guard had a seat at the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

With no seat at the table, the National Guard Chief must rely solely on active 

duty military leaders to make funding decisions. Under the circumstances, General 

McKinley can do nothing to stop the Joint Chiefs if they put recommend cutting a 

key program or ignore an opportunity to maintain critical operational capability. 

In many ways, the Guard has earned the right to be in the room. Today, the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau wears four stars. He attends regular Joint Chiefs 

meetings. While I understand that General McKinley enjoys a good relationship 

with Chairman Dempsey, personalities can’t be everything. Now, it’s time to give 

the National Guard a seat at the table. We need to make sure the National Guard 

has the voice it needs—not just to protect its capability, but because of its increasingly active role in overseas operations, because of its role in homeland security initiatives, and because of the cost efficiencies it can offer in these turbulent economic 

times. 

Ultimately, I understand that change is hard. Some may argue that these changes 

are not necessary. Some may argue that the National Guard does not deserve a seat 

at the table, that the National Guard is well-represented on the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, or that the National Guard has the resources it needs. 

Critics may say that elevating the National Guard would provide a ‘‘second voice’’ 

to the Army and Air Force. That is wrong. The National Guard’s participation would 

be no different than that of the Marine Corps, which is both part of the Navy and 

has its own seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today, as we all know, the Commandant is a valued member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and no one would argue 

that his advice over the last 30 years has not been valuable. 

Some may counter that elevating the National Guard could muddy the Guard’s 

dual commitments to member States and the Federal Government. In reality, it 

would not alter lines of authority, but better enable the Guard to provide unfiltered 

advice on its capabilities and resources. The Guard wouldn’t just have its domestic 

responsibilities—it would have the capabilities, clout, and access to do them better. 

Critics may also say that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has no budgetary authority, but that argument is misleading. The role of the Joint Chiefs is to 

provide sound, useful advice to the President. In fact, the perspective of the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau could save our country billions of dollars. Earlier this 

year, for example, the Air National Guard Bureau offered a proposal that would 

have saved up to $42 billion. Unfortunately, the Air Force dismissed it almost imVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
31 

mediately—likely, I’ve been told, for turf reasons. That would not have happened 

had the Chief of the National Guard Bureau been able to make his case, offer his 

perspective, and share his expertise with our planners at the Pentagon. The National Guard can help the Pentagon cut costs without cutting capabilities—but only 

if it is an equal partner in the decision-making process. 

Some may argue that a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would give the National 

Guard too much influence at the Active-Duty components’ expense. But we know 

better than that. Look at the size of the Services’ congressional liaison staff, the 

military fellows in our offices and the attaches in the halls—or even the number 

of Senators, including many on this Committee, who are former Active-Duty 

servicemembers. An enhanced role for the National Guard would not diminish the 

Active-Duty Services’ clout among lawmakers. 

Now is the time to give the National Guard the voice it needs on the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and to give the President a broader perspective of the capabilities and resources at his disposal. Now is the time to use all of the tools in our arsenal to create a more secure Homeland. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee—thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to swift passage of the Guardians of Freedom Act. 

Thank you to my good friend, Senator Leahy, for his leadership on this important 

issue. 

We have given the National Guard the right to be in the room. Now, let’s give 

them a seat at the table. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let us have a 6-minute first round for questioning here so we can perhaps all get a round in—there are a lot 

of us here—before the votes, and then if we need a second round, 

we can take that. 

Mr. Johnson, let me ask you first about a statement in your prepared statement where you say that the proposed legislation would 

alter some of the Goldwater-Nichols careful balances by altering 

the fact that each Service is statutorily represented by one Service 

Chief in the Joint Chiefs and providing only two of DOD’s six statutory Reserve components with additional Joint Chiefs’ representation. 

Now, you also said that elevating the CNGB to represent National Guard equities to the JCS, in your words, could create legal 

confusion as to whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff 

continue to represent their total force. Now, can you tell us what 

potential legal confusion could result that you are referring to? 

Mr. JOHNSON. 10 U.S.C. 10502 spells out the role of the National 

Guard Bureau and the CNGB. The CNGB, in his advisory capacity, 

has principally two functions. One is to advise the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman on matters involving non-federalized 

Guard. The second component of that is to be the adviser to the 

Service leadership of the Army and the Air Force on matters concerning the Federal Guard. 

The way this statute breaks it out, 10 U.S.C. 10502, when we are 

talking about the Guard in Federal status, the law contemplates 

that the CNGB will represent those interests to the Service leadership and to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. But 

when we are talking about the State Guard and the State Guard 

role, the CNGB advises the Secretary of Defense. 

This legislation that you have before you will not change any of 

that. So, if the CNGB is now also a member of the Joint Chiefs, 

he is, on the one hand, an adviser to General Schwartz and General Odierno on matters concerning the Federal Guard, but he also 

now has an independent seat on the Joint Chiefs as an adviser to 

the President and the Secretary and the National Security Council 

32 

on the very same matters. So it creates an issue of dual representation. 

Second, as I think the Chairman alluded to, when the CNGB is 

advising with respect to the non-federalized National Guard, he is 

representing the interest of the State National Guard, who are 

commanded by the Governor of each of those States. So it creates 

a dynamic—which I am not saying is necessarily wrong or right— 

but it creates a dynamic where the interest of the State Guard, the 

Governors, has a seat at the Joint Chiefs advising the President, 

the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Chairman LEVIN. This perhaps is a related question to you, General McKinley. Under title 10, the CNGB is the principal adviser, 

among others, to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force on matters relating to the National Guard, 

the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States. 

My question is this. Is there not an inconsistency with an adviser 

participating as an equal with the principals whom he is advising, 

as you would be as a member of the JCS, along with the Chief of 

Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force? 

General MCKINLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the best way to answer that is to look at the Empowerment Act and the NDAA of 2008, which established the DOD directive that Secretary Gates signed in 2008 directing the conduct of 

my job. If I could read from the organization and management 

piece which you refer to, it says that the CNGB is under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary normally exercises his authority and direction and control 

through the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force for matters 

pertaining to their responsibility in law. 

The second section I would like to just refer to is that as the 

principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman 

of the JCS, it allows me and directs me to advise on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces. 

So I think the answer to your question is, in my opinion, my personal opinion, it doesn’t raise inconsistencies wearing that hat and 

that this DOD directive following the NDAA Act of 2008 gave me 

the authorities to do just what I addressed in my opening statement. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Dempsey, in your opening statement 

you made reference to the fact that the Services have never been 

closer to their Reserve components, and separating them by title 

risks creating unnecessary friction in the ranks. Can you tell us 

why it is and what you meant when you said that separating the 

Reserve components from the Services create unnecessary friction 

in the ranks? 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. 

The issue for me is let us call it one of branding. Does a soldier 

see himself as a soldier? Does a guardsman see himself as a soldier 

first or a guardsman first? 

It seems to me that where we are today as a force, we are where 

we are because we have all seen ourselves as branded by a single 

Service Chief and his subordinate leaders into soldier, sailor, airVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
33 

man, marine, and, for that matter, coast guardsman, as the Vice 

mentioned. 

I am just not sure that establishing, Craig’s cautions notwithstanding, I think that the way this will resonate through the 

force—forget about the leadership you see before you—but the way 

this could resonate through the force is that we have kind of separated ourselves, and our brand is no longer as clear and defined as 

we would like it and need it to be. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I recall, General McKinley, back when we were working on the 

2009 NDAA, the issue at that time was the three-star versus fourstar. I was trying to remember and talking to my staff just a 

minute ago about what the arguments were. 

I do recall the perception argument, that those in the field—and 

I heard that firsthand. But I also recall that—I got the impression 

that if we made that change, and that was in the 2009 NDAA, that 

that would resolve a lot of these problems. I didn’t hear that we 

would want to come along with another change in the relationship. 

Do you remember that, or would you like to comment as to what 

benefits came with changing that from a three- to four-star? 

General MCKINLEY. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

I obviously took this position in November of 2008. I was a beneficiary of the legislation that passed before I became the CNGB. 

Much has improved and much has been given to me in terms of 

my access to the Chairman and to participate in major meetings 

affecting the Services, the National Guard, the Army and the Air 

Guard. 

I do remember the discussion of the grade, and I do work very 

closely with the other Reserve component chiefs—Jack Stultz in 

the Army Reserve, Dirk Debbink in the Navy Reserve, Steve Hummer in the Marine Corps Reserve, and Charlie Stenner in the Air 

Force Reserve. It is important not to get imbalanced. 

I would just suggest that the 468,000 members of the National 

Guard who reside in the States and the territories look to me as 

their representative and their channel of communications to DOD. 

But the willingness of the men sitting before you to allow me to 

communicate and to conduct discourse with them and to interact 

with them has significantly improved since I became the Chief of 

the Bureau in 2008. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

General Odierno, tomorrow I am going back to your old place, 

Fort Sill, where you started, I think, in the middle 1970s and have 

had several tours there. I will be participating in their veterans 

celebration tomorrow morning. I know that they will be discussing 

this at that time. 

The question I would have of you because, after asking you, I 

want to ask General Schwartz the same thing. Have you seen, in 

terms of the Army, you have the Guard coming in, fighting side by 

side with you guys, with any difference in equipment or capability 

or resources between the Guard and the Active Duty Army? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would tell you that we have made 

great strides over the last 7 to 10 years in improving the capability, 

34 

more importantly, the equipping of the National Guard. In our assessment, by October 2012, the National Guard will have achieved 

about 92 percent of their total equipping necessary, and in the Active component, we will be at 92.5 percent. 

I think that sends a strong message about how we have been 

able to equip. I think I would just comment that understanding the 

total Army is incredibly important as we walk our way through 

this. We have to have all these different components. 

You have to have an Active component that is ready and prepared to respond immediately at a certain readiness level. We need 

our National Guard prepared and capable of responding, and they 

have to be able to work together at all times. 

We have been able to work that over the last several years, and 

I think we have gotten the right solution, as our Army has been 

taxed with many, many deployments. I worry that we will lose the 

one, single voice that has driven us here if we move forward. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I just wanted to ask the question. On the 

equipment, the quality of the resources used, are they the same? 

General ODIERNO. They are. 

Senator INHOFE. They are. 

General Schwartz, I would ask you the same thing, because I am 

active in aviation, I can remember back some time ago when we 

were going to the Block II and the F–16. You had the two engines, 

the 220 and the 229, I believe the 229 having greater thrust. 

When deployments were necessary, as I recall, it was my State 

of Oklahoma and the State of Ohio where they were not able to get 

for their deployment the 229 engines, which provided greater 

thrust. As a result of that, and I am going from memory now, I believe they deployed together as a unit and took only the 229s from 

Ohio and from Oklahoma, which was a disparity in how they are 

treated in terms of equipment. 

I would say, number one, is my memory correct? Number two, 

has that been corrected? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Inhofe, generally speaking, the equipage of the Active Duty, the Guard, and the Reserve is common. 

There are some anomalies with regard to aircraft configuration 

based on their maturity, and so on and so forth. 

We have not corrected or normalized every single configuration 

in every one of our aircraft, but I think the point is, is that the Air 

Guard in the U.S. Air Force has always been an Operational Reserve. It has always shared the same readiness with their Active 

Duty and Air Force Reserve counterparts. That is still the case, 

and that certainly is our conviction going forward. 

Senator INHOFE. But there was a disparity at that time in that 

particular aircraft. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there was a difference in the engines. 

There is a difference in the configuration of airplanes as they are 

produced. Certainly, it is the intent of the Air Force to equip the 

National Guard so that they remain an Operational Reserve. 

Senator INHOFE. Are we in better shape on that issue now than 

we were back then? 

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely. 

Senator INHOFE. I think that is right. Do you agree with that, 

General McKinley? 

35 

General MCKINLEY. Sir, we have worked closely with General 

Wyatt, as the director of the Air Guard, in trying to achieve the 

proper balance in equipage of our National Guard. I can attest over 

my 38 years in the Air Force that the Air Guard today has the oldest legacy fleet in its history. 

I am concerned, as I am sure the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

is, over future modernization plans that we can have the balanced 

force that has made the Air Force and the Air National Guard so 

close throughout its history. I am concerned about the future capitalization of the Air National Guard. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

My time is up. But I would like for the record, in writing for a 

later time, if you would respond to the—three of the witnesses 

talked about the confusion—the word ‘‘confusion.’’ I would like to 

have you respond for the record on that particular issue. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In earlier testimony, the word ‘‘confusion’’ was used to describe a potential ‘‘confusion as to whether the Army and the Air Force Chiefs of Staff [would] continue to 

represent their total force.’’ 

Placing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would 

not confuse whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff represent their total 

force. It would not alter title 10 command authorities over federalized National 

Guard forces. There would be no change to the title 10 authorities of the Service 

Secretaries or Service Chiefs; conversely, they would take on no new title 32 responsibilities. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is not, nor would he be, within 

the title 10 chain of command for title 10 National Guard forces. When federalized, 

National Guard forces are, and will remain, under the command of Federal commanders. Total Force integration would not be compromised; if anything, it would 

be enhanced by greater situational awareness of title 32 National Guard missions, 

capabilities, and leadership on which the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is 

uniquely qualified to advise. Total Force integration would also benefit from enhanced understanding of the Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions that are 

performed by non-federalized National Guard forces. 

General MCKINLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you for being here. 

I guess I would say that on this interesting and important question, I am a member of the Jim Inhofe open-minded caucus because 

I am undecided. So this discussion has really been very helpful. 

I wanted to get on the record just some basic facts. I will start 

with you, General McKinley. What is the number of personnel in 

the Army and Air Guard? 

General MCKINLEY. We have approximately 468,000 combined, 

between Army and Air. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. I don’t know that you would know it. 

I would ask General Dempsey, how about in the other Reserve 

components? What is the number there? 

General DEMPSEY. The only one I have committed to memory is 

the Army Reserve, and that is about 208,000. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, for the Air Force, 71,000 on the Air 

Force Reserve, 106,000 and change on the Air National Guard. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Admiral, how about the Navy Reserve? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sixty-five thousand, Senator. 

36 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. General Amos? 

General AMOS. Sir, 39,600 Marine Reserves. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Pretty definitive answer right there. Thank 

you. 

Okay. Clearly, there is a larger number in the Army Guard and 

Air, but there is not inconsequential numbers in the other Reserve 

components as well. Obviously, some of us think about the Coast 

Guard Reserve, which is another part of the Reserve component. 

Let me ask this question, and I think I am probably focused on 

it here because of the other hat I wear on the Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee. I wanted to begin this discussion with you, General McKinley. 

I take it that we start with the understanding that the other Reserve components don’t have non-Federal responsibilities. Correct? 

General MCKINLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. This is an interesting issue, as I am sure 

you all know, because there is, of course, from our home States, we 

are getting tremendous support for putting the National Guard Bureau commander in chief on the JCS. There is a lot of support here 

in Congress, but obviously, there is a lot of opposition in the military. 

One of the unique functions here, and I want to ask you to talk 

a little more about it than you did in your opening statement, is 

these what I would call ‘‘homeland defense missions’’ that are part 

of the Guard’s responsibility—disaster response, border security, et 

cetera. 

In some of the discussions I have had with folks at home about 

this I think involve a concern that those homeland defense missions, which are obviously critical to our national security, are not 

receiving sufficient attention from the Joint Chiefs now, and that 

if you were on the Joint Chiefs, they would receive more attention. 

So I wanted you to respond to that or say anything you want about 

that unique function. Then ask General Dempsey if you would 

speak from the perspective of the JCS. 

General McKinley? 

General MCKINLEY. I think that I am not critical of the other 

Service components, Army or Air Force, in representing homeland 

security. I just think it is the unique capability of the CNGB, with 

its relationship to the 54 adjutants general who work for the Governors, that intricate and delicate relationship, that allows me to 

provide the best, and that I should be a focal point. 

Our intergovernment relationships with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, those types of relationships that are built at the community level are significant. I wouldn’t expect but wouldn’t be surprised if the Chiefs of the Services know a lot about it. I just think 

we are uniquely qualified with our role in title 32 in State Active 

Duty to operate in the statuses in the several States that we represent. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Would you say that that is one of the major 

reasons why you support putting the CNGB on the Joint Chiefs? 

General MCKINLEY. As I said in my opening statement, Senator 

Lieberman, that is really where I am zeroing in on, is to instituVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
37 

tionalize the role of the National Guard Bureau Chief in becoming 

that spokesperson through the JCS, through the Chairman to the 

Secretary of Defense to give my best military advice when asked 

so that we don’t miss a beat in this very new age of asymmetric— 

I got it right this time—asymmetric challenges that face our Nation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. 

Remember, the Joint Chiefs are statutorily responsible for the 

federalized portion of our defense, and the JCS would normally get 

its advice on Homeland security matters through NORTHCOM. So 

you may want to ask Admiral Winnefeld. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a good point. 

General DEMPSEY. But—and the point there is that NORTHCOM 

would then—the impact statement, if you will, that Craig is talking 

about right now would come to us through the Service Chiefs. The 

Joint Chiefs would compare the impact on the Services with the demand that would be articulated by NORTHCOM, and we would figure out what to do. This adds another voice into that mix that, 

frankly, I don’t believe we need. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral, I would invite you into this, both 

on the direct point and also just to pose a second kind of question 

for you. 

It is true that as General Dempsey just said, that the JCS, obviously, have focused I would say the overseas responsibility to protect our national security. On the other hand, the very reconstitution of NORTHCOM involves, post-September 11, an assumption of 

some responsibility for Homeland defense in the Pentagon that was 

a bit different than before. 

Would you agree, and how does that reflect on this matter that 

we are discussing this morning? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. Well, Senator, I think September 11 certainly was a wake-up call that was the genesis of NORTHCOM. Of 

course, NORAD existed all along. 

He does represent, as do the other combatant commands from 

the other various regions of the world, represent his theater in 

terms of what the title 10 needs are, whether it is intelligence or 

action on the ground or readiness or what have you. He does a 

good job of that, the current commander. 

I can’t speak for the last commander. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We can. [Laughter.] 

Admiral WINNEFELD. In partnership with DHS, there is an essential partnership there that does have the ability to respond in 

the event of a disaster or a security issue, sir, from your position 

as the chairman of that committee. 

We also have a number of other robust relationships. I would 

point out the wisdom of Congress in encouraging the department 

to establish—to work with the Governors and the Council of Governors. We get very good advice and guidance, frankly, from the 

Council of Governors. I also would tell you we get great advice from 

Craig on matters that have to do with title 32 State Active Duty 

and the like and how the Guard, like other Reserve components 

and other components of the military, can contribute to a Homeland security issue. 

38 

So I think we have a pretty good situation where we are getting 

the advice we need. We have a good commander in the field for this 

who works closely with his civilian counterparts at DHS. 

As I pointed out in my remarks, I am not sure what is broken 

that we need to fix. We have a good system going now. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Will we be able to submit questions for the record as a followup? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Senator BROWN. Because 6 minutes really isn’t—— 

Chairman LEVIN. We will also have a second round for questioning if we need it. 

Senator BROWN. Great. 

Chairman LEVIN. As you suggest, questions for the record will be 

welcomed. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

I am looking at a letter from General Amos and Admiral 

Greenert. Paragraph three of the letter says that CNGB does not 

represent a branch of Service nor is CNGB responsible for organizing, manning, training, and equipping the National Guard to 

the extent of the Service Chiefs. 

I have to respectfully disagree. Pursuant to, obviously, the DOD 

directive as to the responsibilities of what the Guard, in fact, does, 

they are responsible for entire cradle-to-grave planning program, 

budgeting, and execution of these budgets; provides the President’s 

budget submission for each of the appropriations, which goes to 

Congress; validates those requirements; provides the annual financial reports to Congress. It is, in fact, the Service Chiefs that don’t 

have any of that budget responsibility. 

Was there a misstatement in your letter there? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, Senator, the point that I was making 

in the letter, we, the Service Chiefs, testify to or are held accountable to Congress for the execution of those budgets as well. We 

have budget submitting offices—pardon me—in the Navy who do 

similarly that you just listed there, that—— 

Senator BROWN. Yes, but you said specifically they are not responsible at all, and in fact, that is not correct. That being said, 

I would like to just shift gears a little bit. 

Mr. Johnson, you indicated that you felt that maybe it would create confusion as to who represents the Army and Air Force. I have 

reference letters and General Odierno’s ‘‘confusion’’ and ‘‘imbalance;’’ obviously, General Schwartz, ‘‘confusing lines of authority;’’ 

and you, sir, Admiral Greenert, ‘‘complicated unity of command.’’ 

I mean, is there really any question as to what the chain of command is with the Joint Chiefs? Obviously, General McKinley will 

go through General Odierno, and General Schwartz to General 

Dempsey. There is no chain of command breach at all. I think it 

is very clear. 

In addition to that, I don’t think there is any question that the 

title 10 command authority wants to change. I don’t believe the 

39 

Guard or General McKinley in his capacity as seeking a seat wants 

to change that at all. He wants, and I believe—I don’t want to 

speak for him. But I guess I will just ask you, sir. You don’t want 

to change the title 10 command authority at all, do you? 

General MCKINLEY. No, sir. As I said in my opening remarks, 

that is working well for us. 

Senator BROWN. There is no confusion as to who, you have to go 

through the chain of command, is there? 

General MCKINLEY. I have no confusion. 

Senator BROWN. With regard to the total force integration, do 

you feel that that would be benefited by you having a seat at the 

table? 

General MCKINLEY. It is improved greatly, as the Service Chiefs 

have testified. It can only get better. 

Senator BROWN. Is there any question that you in your capacity 

of having a seat at the table would be the person that could best 

advise not only—in any capacity through any of the Service Chiefs 

or the President or anybody on the domestic mission and what the 

non-federalized units would be able to do, especially in light of the 

homeland security issues that we are facing? 

Is there anyone else better qualified than you in your capacity 

to do that? 

General MCKINLEY. These are all talented gentlemen in front of 

you, sir. I think it is my role and responsibility to be that person. 

Senator BROWN. I would agree with you. Just to follow up on 

what Senator Inhofe said, General Schwartz. On the fighter aircraft issue, is it a fair statement that due to the effort to save 

money with the Air Force, the Guard units are going to be eviscerated when it comes to aircraft. Especially I have heard and others have commented that The Adjutant Generals (TAG) can’t gain 

access to the plans as to what wings will be affected, how many 

aircraft are going to be lost. 

Isn’t that another reason to have somebody like General McKinley at the table that can advise those TAGs and others as to what 

the plan is for the Air Force in the Guard units? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Brown, that is not a role of the Joint 

Chiefs. But beyond that—the reality is that if the Air National 

Guard is going to be eviscerated, so will the Active Duty and the 

Reserve. We are getting smaller together. That is what is underway here. 

I would emphasize the point that we are now the smallest Air 

Force we have ever been. Because of that, those reductions that 

occur because of diminishing resources, which we all face, will be 

shared by all the components. 

Senator BROWN. Well, it is interesting. That is another reason 

why we need to get back to the table and get the Select Committee 

to work so sequestration doesn’t come in and dramatically affect 

that more. 

What this reminds me of, in doing history and, obviously, being 

in the military and just understanding the relationship between 

the Marines and the Navy, this is very similar. The Marines, you 

have General Amos here, who we all have tremendous respect for. 

He is at the table, and yet he does all his budgeting through the 

40 

Navy and everything basically flows through the Navy to him in 

some respect. 

I am trying to—— 

General AMOS. Sir, that is not correct. We do our budgeting 

through the Department of the Navy. I am an equal Service Chief, 

along with the Chief of Naval Operations. The Secretary of the 

Navy controls the budget. 

Senator BROWN. Right. So how would that be different than General McKinley wanting that same type of opportunity that you 

have, actually, in working through the Guard? How would that be 

any different? 

General AMOS. Well, I can’t speak to the budgeting of the Guard 

aspect, but we are a Service. We have been one for 236 years. 

When the Marine Corps got its seat at the table in 1978, we had 

been fighting our Nation’s battles as a Service for over 200 years. 

That is different. The Guard is not a Service. 

Senator BROWN. My time is up. I have other questions. I have 

to get to another meeting and come back. I am looking forward to 

Senator Graham’s as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Brown. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General McKinley, your reputation for professionalism and skill 

and dedication precede you. So thank you for your service. 

Having just 2 weeks ago visited the 43rd Military Police Brigade 

in Afghanistan and the 143rd Airlift Wing in Afghanistan, the 

service of the National Guard, Army and Air, is not only commendable, but essential to the Nation’s security. 

But as I look at title 10, U.S.C. 10502, the first step in getting 

your job is getting recommended by a Governor. Is that correct? 

General MCKINLEY. The process by which they select the Chiefs 

does require the Governor’s nomination. That is correct. 

Senator REED. So looking ahead, effectively, some Governor is 

going to have to be either the nominator or vetoer of a member of 

the JCS. Is that correct? 

General MCKINLEY. I think the initial submission of the name 

goes to the Departments of the Army and the Air Force for vetting, 

and they submit a name each to the Secretary of Defense so that 

they can recommend to the President. That is my understanding of 

the process, sir. 

Senator REED. But as the law goes, the Governor will essentially 

recommend the National Guard Bureau Chief, who will, if this 

statute passed, be by law a member of the JCS. So some to-be-announced Governor will be selecting a member of the JCS, in effect. 

General MCKINLEY. It is correct, sir, that we hold dual statuses 

in the National Guard and that we must be confirmed as a Federal 

officer and a member of the State. You are right. 

Senator REED. So would you be adverse to eliminating the gubernatorial recommendation, since this statute would create a position 

on the JCS, which I don’t see a gubernatorial—particularly since 

it is kind of a random process of which Governor would be doing 

it. Would you object to those changes? 

41 

General MCKINLEY. Senator, I think the Chairman can establish 

the process to pick my successor. I will finish my 4-year statutory 

term in 2012. So we are on the verge of doing that. I have no objections to doing that. 

Senator REED. So you would not object to eliminating a gubernatorial recommendation for the CNGB? 

General MCKINLEY. I personally would not. No, sir. 

Senator REED. Okay. Now, let me ask you, to what extent do you 

have authority over the actual budgets of the non-Federal units 

and the actual policies of the non-Federal units that you would be 

advising the Joint Chiefs on? 

General MCKINLEY. As we work within the Service lines, with 

our staffs here in Washington, through the Army National Guard 

Readiness Center and the Air National Guard Readiness Center, 

which work with the Army and the Air Force as we prepare the 

budget, once those budgets are approved, we are given the funds 

and push those out to the States. 

Senator REED. You are talking about Federal funds, which we 

appropriate. I am talking about the non-Federal activities of the 

Guard. Can you direct a TAG or a Governor to increase their 

spending or to change the configuration of their forces? 

General MCKINLEY. No, sir. That is their responsibility. 

Senator REED. You are going to be advising the JCS on non-Federal functions which you have no authority to affect on the ground. 

General MCKINLEY. The constitutionality of my role would be 

that the Governors and their TAGs decide what small percentage 

of the budgets are given through the State. It is the large preponderance of funds, 98-plus percent, which are Federal funds given 

to the Guard. 

Senator REED. But they are Federal funds that we provide in anticipation of units being federalized to perform Federal missions 

that fall clearly—and I don’t think you dispute this—within the 

chain of command of the Service Chiefs and, ultimately, General 

Dempsey and the Secretary of Defense. 

General MCKINLEY. The Federal missions certainly are as you 

stated, but the State missions are under the command and control 

of the Governor. 

Senator REED. Right. But as I understand this whole procedure 

is to give you access to talk about those State missions, which you 

effectively don’t have any control of because you can’t force them 

to change their budgets. You can’t force them to take particular 

people and make them—you have no say in who is running the 

show. 

In fact, there is one State in which the TAG is elected by popular 

vote, one State in which he is elected by the assembly. Just raises 

serious questions, I think, about what you are going to do on the 

Joint Chiefs that you cannot do effectively and perhaps more effectively now. 

But let me conclude just simply by saying once again, you have 

done a superb job and your colleagues in the Guard and Reserve. 

I must tell one story. I was out with General McBride, the TAG 

in Rhode Island, and I was asking what units he was commanding, 

the 43rd Military Police Brigade. When he mentioned my old batVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
42 

talion of the 82nd Airborne Division, I knew this was one Army 

and one Air Force. 

We want to get this right, and I think there are some serious 

questions here. 

Thank you very much. 

General MCKINLEY. Thanks, Senator Reed. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to follow up, General Amos, on what Senator 

Brown had asked you about. Isn’t it true that in 1978 the Chairman of the JCS opposed having the Commandant of the Marines 

be a member of the JCS? 

General AMOS. Senator, I don’t know whether he did or not. I 

just know that it became law in 1978. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, if I would represent to you, certainly, Admiral Greenert, that your predecessors, Admiral Holloway and Admiral Hayward, at the time opposed having the Commandant of 

the Marines before the Chairman and JCS, I assume you would 

disagree with that position now? 

Admiral GREENERT. I certainly would, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. I assume that having the Commandant is incredibly valuable on the Chairman of the JCS and that it has not 

resulted in any confusion on the role of the Navy with respect to 

the Marine Corps and advising the Chairman? 

Admiral GREENERT. No, ma’am, it has not. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you have any reason to believe that General 

McKinley or his successors would not be able to draw any distinctions clearly as to what the appropriate role he would have if a 

member of the JCS? 

Admiral GREENERT. General McKinley may not. Most of my concern, as stated, is really what is in the force. How do the forces see 

it? Is there a clarity of, again, the unity of command? Who is ultimately accountable for the budgeting, the source of the budget to 

Congress, to the Secretary of Defense? 

It is really a lot of what Chairman Dempsey stated before, not 

what we can work out, because we work fine in the tank. It is very 

clear how we can work together. It is what is the perception out 

there and perhaps confusion. 

Senator AYOTTE. I certainly have great confidence in all of you 

and the tremendous service that you have that whatever decision 

Congress makes, that it will be very clear to our service men and 

women as to the chain of command. I know that all of you will 

work very well together, as you do now, on behalf of our country, 

and we deeply appreciate it. 

General Dempsey, I wanted to follow up on something that Admiral Winnefeld had stated. Do you also support the potential of 

making the next commander of NORTHCOM a Guard officer? 

General DEMPSEY. I do. But I also would add that I would rather 

that none of that be legislated because it is my job to find the best 

athlete available. It is also my job to grow the athletes who are 

competitive to do those jobs. 

Senator AYOTTE. But certainly it would be an appropriate athlete 

to have a Guard officer as a candidate for that position? 

43 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, do you think it would be right not to bring forward the NDAA for the first time in 50 years in the history of our 

country this year? 

General DEMPSEY. No, Senator. I think we should have a NDAA 

as soon as possible. 

Senator AYOTTE. Is that very important to our military and to 

what you need to accomplish? 

General DEMPSEY. It is, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, sir. 

General Schwartz, on a different topic, and I just feel the need 

to ask about this. I am deeply troubled by the reports about what 

has happened at the mortuary at the Dover Air Force Base. I am 

sure you would agree with me, this is outrageous that remains of 

our soldiers would be put in a landfill and not treated with the appropriate dignity and honor which they deserve. 

Can you tell me where we are with this and how we are going 

to ensure that this never happens again? Most importantly, those 

who have participated in this outrage are going to be held accountable? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Ayotte, first of all, let me clarify the 

allegation about putting remains in a landfill. These were portions 

prior to 2008 which were sent away from the Dover mortuary to 

a funeral home for cremation, which is an authorized method of 

dealing with remains, particularly those that are separated from 

the larger portion of remains returned to the family. 

After that, the results of the cremation came back to the mortuary, were sent to a medical support company for incineration. So 

you had cremation, then incineration, and it was at that point that 

this medical support organization placed the residuals from that effort to a landfill. 

In 2008, the Air Force came to the conclusion that that was not 

the best way to deal with those remains, and so it is now done in 

the traditional fashion of burial at sea. It has been that way since 

2008. It will continue to be that way in the future. 

Let me just conclude by saying the Secretary of the Air Force, 

Mike Donley, and I take personal responsibility for this. Our obligation is to treat our fallen with reverence and dignity and respect 

and to provide the best possible support and care for their families. 

That is our mission. The people who did not fulfill our expectations 

were disciplined, and there is no doubt what our expectations are 

today. 

Senator AYOTTE. General Schwartz, I appreciate your updating 

on that. When I think about the fact that we have Veterans Day 

tomorrow, this is so important that we obviously treat the remains 

of our fallen with dignity and respect. I know that you share that 

concern as well. 

Please know that members of this committee will be there to 

support you in any way, to make sure that the families know that 

we certainly won’t allow this to happen again. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Akaka. 

44 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to add my welcome to our very distinguished panel 

of witnesses that we have today, on the eve of Veterans Day. I 

thank you and the men and women you lead in serving our country 

and defending our freedoms. 

I have read that most of you are opposed to elevating the Guard 

Bureau Chief to the JCS. I want you to know that while I might 

disagree on this issue, I have the complete respect for you and the 

opinions that all of you hold. 

Let me take a moment to say that, understandably, change is not 

always a welcome concept. In the evolution of the JCS, there has 

been significant opposition to structural changes. However, there is 

precedent in changing the composition of the JCS to account for 

readiness, policy, and budgetary issues. 

For example, in 1953, President Truman signed the law to add 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the JCS to discuss issues 

related to the Marines. It was controversial at that time, but several years later, the Commandant was elevated to full voting member status. Today, I think we would all agree that making the 

Commandant a voting member was the correct decision. 

While the National Guard is not a separate Service, it does have 

a complex set of needs based on the dual missions it must be prepared to execute. Guard members are in every State and for the 

last decade have been heavily involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

No one better understands their requirements than the CNGB. 

Future force structure adjustments will have a direct impact on the 

task and missions the Guard will be asked to perform. I am sure 

they will be asked to do more, and not less, in the future. 

Now making the CNGB a full-fledged member will update the 

structure of the JCS to reflect the operational reality in wars overseas, as well as in homeland defense and security missions. It 

would also enhance the effectiveness of the total force. 

No one knows exactly what the next conflict will entail, but we 

can be confident that we will again call upon the 460,000 men and 

women of the National Guard to do their part. I believe that elevating the CNGB to the JCS is something that is overdue and will 

show our guardsmen and their families that they are a true partner. It will also let them know that their voices and views will be 

represented at the highest levels of Government. 

General Dempsey, you have stated that the CNGB will be invited 

to attend JCS meetings as long as you are Chairman. I think this 

is great for cooperation and transparency and overall effectiveness 

of the group. 

However, I am concerned that if a future Chairman is not as inclusive as you are, the CNGB would be left out in a Pentagon hallway while relevant discussions take place in the tank. Do you 

think, General Dempsey, that an CNGB advice to the Secretary of 

Defense would be different if he were a full-fledged member versus 

an invited nonmember? If so, how different is it? 

General DEMPSEY. First, Senator, thanks for remembering that 

it is the day before Veterans Day, and I was hopeful to get a 

chance to mention that at the end, but thanks very much for that. 

45 

I don’t know whether his advice would change. I also want to 

make it clear that I am not the first Chairman to include the 

CNGB. My predecessor certainly did that as well. 

It seems to me to be a reasonable assumption that we would continue to do that no matter who the Chairman was, and I don’t 

know whether his advice would change. I don’t know what additional influences might be brought to bear. I just can’t answer that 

question hypothetically. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, General. 

General McKinley, the Guard has carried a tremendous load for 

this country to include their efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the 

future, I am certain the National Guard will again be called to 

serve abroad while continuing its required domestic missions. 

Can you say something about how things would improve for both 

the Guard and the total force should the CNGB be given a seat at 

the table? 

General MCKINLEY. I can assure you, Senator Akaka—and congratulations to you also for being the recipient of the Harry S. Truman Award recently. I can assure you that we have made significant progress over the last 8 years in terms of the transparency 

and integration. 

I will not dispute the fact that this Chairman and the former 

Chairman have opened their doors willingly. I am concerned that 

that continue, and I believe it needs to be institutionalized to ensure that that service continues. 

I also believe, like what is going on in your home State right 

now, in Hawaii, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 

summit is going on. Your National Guard is being heavily used in 

security and administrative duties. I need to be able to service that 

issue unfettered to the top, and I think the seat will give me the 

advantage, as my fellow Service Chiefs, the Service Chiefs who sit 

before you have, to go in an unfettered fashion and give those types 

of homeland security issues to the Chairman and, if requested, by 

the Secretary of Defense. Those are very important things. 

We have about seven more NSSEs in the upcoming 8 months 

that I feel the CNGB should be fully integrated with, so that we 

can dedicate the forces—as you have 5,000 members of the National Guard in Hawaii—to the task. I think elevating and institutionalizing the position will give me a better opportunity to fulfill 

my responsibilities. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General McKinley. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having the hearing. 

This has been very informative. I appreciate all of you. I respect 

you greatly, appreciate the comments you have made and the advice you are giving. This is ultimately up to Congress and the 

President to decide what to do. 

General Amos, pound for pound, do you agree the Marine Corps 

is the best fighting force in the world? [Laughter.] 

General AMOS. Yes, sir. We celebrate that today on our birthday. 

46 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, good. I agree with you. Do you agree 

with me the only thing older than the Marine Corps when it comes 

to defending America is the citizen soldier? 

General AMOS. Sir, I believe that is true. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So I am here to tell everybody, I appreciate it, but the citizen soldier’s time has come. You are going to 

get a seat at the table, General McKinley, if I have anything to say 

about it. 

We are long into this fight as a Nation. The first shot was fired 

by the citizen soldier. It is time for the citizen soldier to be sitting 

at the table, not just for political reasons, but for substantive reasons. So let us talk a little bit about substance. 

General Dempsey, do you agree that one of the great threats 

America faces is not just attack from a foreign enemy, but from nature and natural disasters? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. When it comes to front-line service 

against natural disasters and the havoc it can reap on the American people, do you agree the National Guard is the front-line 

force? 

General DEMPSEY. Generally law enforcement, then National 

Guard, then Active—— 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to uniformed personnel? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I do. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. General McKinley, Hurricane Irene, is 

that right? Is that the name of the last big hurricane? 

General MCKINLEY. That was our latest event, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Tell me, who talked to you about Hurricane Irene? 

General MCKINLEY. I was consulted by the assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul Stockton, and that was the 

extent of my discussions. 

Senator GRAHAM. Did anybody from the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs call you and ask, ‘‘Hey, what is going on?’’ 

General MCKINLEY. No, it was incumbent upon me to pass that 

information up, but nobody made that call. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So did anybody from the White House 

call you? 

General MCKINLEY. No, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. All right. So if you believe that the Nation is 

threatened by natural disasters and the front-line uniformed force 

is the National Guard, I would like to have you sitting there—not 

by invitation, by the way. General Dempsey, you are a very fine 

man, but if you got ticked off at him, could you tell him to get out 

of the room? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I could. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Good. Well, at the end of the day, I 

think you need to be in the room with some weight behind you, not 

just an invitation. 

Now let us talk about the structure of the State-Federal responsibility. Who talks more to the adjutant generals of each State, you 

or General McKinley, General Dempsey? Who has more contact? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t have any contact with the adjutant 

generals. 

47 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Well, if you believe that the adjutant 

generals who have responsibilities over the National Guard, if you 

don’t have any contact with them, how much contact do you have, 

General McKinley? 

General MCKINLEY. Daily. 

Senator GRAHAM. All right. If you can’t tell them how to spend 

their money, you can at least tell the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

if you are in the room, what is going on. Don’t you think it would 

be important institutionally, beyond the life of you and General 

Dempsey, to have somebody in that room advising the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs exactly what is going on in the States? 

General MCKINLEY. I think in a post–9/11 world, it is essential. 

Senator GRAHAM. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Now let us talk about the history of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when it comes to supporting legislation 

that we now all agree is important. Do you agree that the Marine 

Corps, being a voting member of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

hasn’t give the Navy two votes? Do you agree with that, General 

Amos? 

General AMOS. It has not given the Navy two votes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, that was the big concern. Senator Webb 

was your biggest advocate. That was a real fight back in 1978, that 

if you put the Commandant on, all hell’s going to break loose. The 

Navy is going to run the world. 

Well, that did work. I don’t think the National Guard being in 

the room is going to change the world as we know it—only for the 

better. 

Now, Mr. Johnson, headlines are made at every hearing. Is the 

headline from this hearing, ‘‘Obama administration opposes putting 

the National Guard Bureau Chief on the Joint Chiefs?’’ 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, you have heard the best military advice 

from—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I am going tell you what Vice President 

Biden said in 2008 when he spoke to the National Guard conference in Baltimore. ‘‘It is time for change. Change begins with 

giving the Guard a seat at the table, that table in the Pentagon 

where the Joint Chiefs sit.’’ 

President Obama’s campaign document, ‘‘Blueprint for Change,’’ 

page 55, if you want to read it. I haven’t read it, and I will be the 

first one to admit to it. But this part I do like. 

‘‘Obama will restore the readiness of the National Guard and Reserves. He will permit them adequate time to train and rest between deployments, provide the National Guard with equipment 

they need for foreign and domestic emergencies. He will also give 

the Guard a seat at the table by making the Chief of the National 

Guard a member of the JCS.’’ 

Has he changed his mind? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Not to my knowledge—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, don’t you think when he said that, he 

thought long and hard about this, and he came to conclude, as a 

prospective commander in chief, this would be a good idea? You are 

not here to tell us he is wrong, are you? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The President and the Vice President are above 

my pay grade. 

48 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I think they are wrong a lot, but I think 

they are right on this. 

Now let us talk about Goldwater-Nichols. How many of you believe it works? Who believes it doesn’t work? Speak up. Nobody. All 

right. Let me give you a little history. 

There is an article that I read called ‘‘The Campaign for Goldwater-Nichols’’ by John T. Correll. I will read a brief excerpt. 

‘‘The bill was being prepared and had been written in final draft, 

and Senators Nunn and Goldwater go to have a meeting with the 

Joint Chiefs. Admiral Crowe was the new chairman. He supported 

it. But during that meeting, everyone else opposed and said in no 

uncertain language. The hot-tempered Goldwater took their criticism as attack on his efforts to make improvements and roared, ’If 

you think you can bully Sam and me, you are mistaken.’ 

‘‘The next day, he got eight letters from the Pentagon talking 

about how bad of an idea this would be. Senator Goldwater said, 

‘I will not be deflected or sidetracked in this effort, even if I get 

a letter a day from everyone in the Pentagon.’ ’’ 

The only reason I mention that is that the institution resisted 

Goldwater-Nichols, the institution resisted having the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

I think we should consider the time has come, given post-September 11 duties of the National Guard, to have a seat at the table. 

It doesn’t change command authority, doesn’t turn the world upside 

down. 

But if any group ever deserved recognition now, it is the members of the National Guard. Their voice needs to be heard, not 

through invitation, but by us saying, ‘‘You have a seat.’’ 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You can all relax. I am not going to try to top Senator Graham. 

But as a former Governor—and I know there are two other former 

Governors seated here—we have had that special, unique relationship with the Guard. Now we have a relationship with the entire 

military, the total force. 

I suppose having called out the Guard on occasions, that it gives 

me a special feeling of a relationship with the Guard, going back 

to my adjutant general, the late Stanley Heng, who was an outstanding military officer and an outstanding TAG. In addition, 

since I have been in the U.S. Senate, I have had a relationship 

with former TAG Gene Lempke and the current Adjutant General, 

General Lyons. 

The relationship is clearly a unique one from the standpoint that 

has been described by everyone so far of having a Federal and a 

State component to the relationship. It isn’t like any other branch 

of the Service or any branch of the Service in particular. It is 

unique to the Guard. 

It would be unique if it applied to one of the other branches, not 

just the Air Guard or the Army Guard, but if there was another 

Guard, it would be the same situation. General McKinley, you said 

in your letter, ‘‘The CNGB is uniquely positioned to both provide 

situational awareness of State and Federal military forces operVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
49 

ating in unity of effort in the Homeland and ensure that resourcing 

decisions fully consider the domestic mission.’’ 

I think you are right about that, and I think, as we have looked 

back, we have seen at times that the Guard has not been adequately resourced. I am not going to suggest that that will go on 

indefinitely in the future because we are seeing the change to an 

Operational Reserve that will have to be adequately resourced. 

But I can tell you that as Governor, I would feel much better 

that that resourcing would occur if I knew that the head of the 

Guard was seated at the table. It doesn’t take anything away from 

any of you, distinguished as you are and committed to the total 

force and to the total security of our country, both at the Homeland 

and nationally, internationally, as well. 

I understand that change is difficult. It is not easy to come by. 

Whether or not something occurred 20 years ago or not probably 

doesn’t necessarily mean that we can’t look at it today in light of 

the changes that the Guard has gone through as we have seen it 

throughout these last 10 to 12 years. 

General Schwartz, I do have a question—because I know that 

part of the requirement for adding CNGB is at least a recognition 

that his advice would be more critical than ever heading into a period of budget austerity. I know as you are looking toward your future requirements for the Air Force, how are you going to work 

with General McKinley to have a total force approach in terms of 

your resources and your readiness? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Nelson, I think it is important to say 

at the outset that the Joint Chiefs is not a resource forum. It is 

a strategic forum for, again, employment of the Armed Forces and 

for providing best military advice in that context. There are other 

resource fora in the department where the CNGB clearly has a seat 

at the table. 

But with regard to the Air Force specifically, Craig McKinley’s 

Deputy, Lieutenant General Bud Wyatt from the great State of 

Oklahoma, is our principal staff officer regarding National Guard 

matters. He and his people have complete access to all of our internal activities with regard to the headquarters, whether it is 

resourcing, whether it is making decisions on equipment, and so on 

and so forth. 

Additionally, we have offered—and the adjutants general will 

take us up on this—to have a presence on what we call our Air 

Force council, which is the senior-most resourcing activity within 

our headquarters. The bottom line is that the Air National Guard 

has a consistent seat at the table for internal deliberations. 

We certainly interact with Craig, as I think he will verify, on all 

matters, including management of senior officers. This is a partnership between us. But I would go back to first principles in that the 

Joint Chiefs is not a resourcing fora. 

Senator NELSON. No, I understand. But the recommendations 

that you make are based on what you think the resources that you 

would require and are necessary for carrying out your mission. So 

whether it is establishing the resources or making the recommendations, you still have to discuss what resources are necessary, in your opinion, for you to be able to carry out your mesVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
50 

sage—or your mission. General McKinley obviously has a role 

there. 

I would assume that would be true, General Odierno, with the 

Army Guard as well? 

General ODIERNO. Senator, as we develop the Army budget every 

year, there is complete transparency. The Guard plays a critical 

role in developing our budget. So that happens today, and this 

change does not impact that at all. That will happen today and will 

always happen, no matter whether he becomes a member of the 

JCS or not. 

Senator NELSON. I commend you all on your ability to sit at a 

table and disagree, but not be disagreeable, and appreciate very 

much your input. Obviously, it is a challenge to try to decide how 

to best take care of our national defense. You do it every day, and 

we appreciate and thank you for your service, particularly as we, 

on this eve of Veterans Day, go home and speak to our veterans 

at home. 

Thank you all. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. I think it has been very 

healthy for this discussion. 

General Dempsey, has any former Chairman of the JCS supported this legislation? 

General DEMPSEY. Not to my knowledge, Senator, no. 

Senator WEBB. Mr. Johnson, has any current or former Secretary 

of Defense supported this legislation? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I have no knowledge of that, Senator. 

Senator WEBB. Do you have any knowledge of anyone supporting 

it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I don’t have knowledge of the contrary either. Correct. 

Senator WEBB. All right. I would like to start by saying I think 

that anyone who is saying that citizen soldiers are not at the table 

right now is being unnecessarily divisive and, I think, unfair to the 

stewardship and leadership of the Army and the Air Force. Citizen 

soldiers are at the table. 

They have been respected throughout the entire history of this 

country. When we talk about the operational changes since September 11, and we all have great appreciation for that, but at the 

same time we need to recognize that throughout history the National Guard has frequently answered the call. 

If you looked at the number of the forces that came from the National Guard in World War I, World War II—100,000 National 

Guardsmen went to Korea—this has always been the case. I think 

particularly since the total force concept was announced—and I 

had the privilege of being the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs at a time that we were really working these matters out—the National Guard has really been able to have an input 

in a very measurable way. 

I believe this legislation is unnecessary. I would like to respond 

to some of the comments that have been made about the Marine 

Corps and my role, which I am very proud of, by the way, in terms 

51 

of articulating the legitimacy of the Marine Corps role in Joint 

Chiefs. 

I wrote an article in 1972—hard to believe this. This article has 

been circulated by the proponents of this legislation. I wrote it for 

the Marine Corps Gazette. I was a 25-year-old captain of the Marine Corps. I am flattered, by the way, that somebody remembered 

this article from 39 years ago. 

But at the same time, the most important aspect of that article 

was that the Marine Corps is a separate Service. To state the obvious, take a look at General Amos and Admiral Greenert. They are 

wearing different uniforms. 

The Army National Guard has a history of being trained and 

equipped as a part of the U.S. Army. The Air National Guard has 

a history of being trained and equipped as a part of the U.S. Air 

Force. That is conceptually an entirely different matter. 

I don’t believe that the JCS have been failing to represent the 

interests of the Army Guard in the Army or the Air Guard in the 

Air Force. General Dempsey, would you say there has been any indication of that? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely no indication. Not only is there no 

indication, it just isn’t accurate. They are represented by the two 

Service Chiefs. 

Senator WEBB. Would you also agree that the Guard is as well 

represented as the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve? 

General DEMPSEY. I do, Senator. 

Senator WEBB. Would there be any justification for adding the 

Reserve Chiefs as members of the JCS? 

General DEMPSEY. I would recommend against it for the same 

reason I recommend against adding the Guard. 

Senator WEBB. With respect to non-Title 10 obligations, I have 

an observation from having spent 3 years being Secretary Weinberger’s principal adviser on Guard and Reserve matters. There are 

a number of other jurisdictions in which non-Title 10 obligations of 

the National Guard are considered, and some of them, to be quite 

frank, are jealously guarded by the political processes of the Governors. I certainly don’t think they are in any way disregarded. 

To make a further point on this, we do have an Assistant Secretary of Defense who is responsible for Homeland security matters 

and is a direct adviser to the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. Chairman, I would just have to say that I am opposed to this 

legislation. I believe it is unnecessary. I don’t see a value, and I do 

understand the complications. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have more respect than I can ever describe for the guy that is 

sitting to my immediate left here for a myriad of reasons, including 

his incredible service to our country as a member of our armed 

services and as a Marine. I also appreciated the incredibly effective 

cross-examination that Lindsay Graham did. You can tell he has 

spent some time in the courtroom. 

I do think that this is a difficult question, and the only thing I 

want to point out with Mr. Johnson is I have looked at your testiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
52 

mony very carefully, Mr. Johnson, and it appears to me that you 

have not said whether or not you support or oppose this legislation 

but have rather asked to make sure that it is not legally ambiguous. Is that a correct characterization of your testimony? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I am not here to state a policy position one 

way or the other. I was asked to attend to point out the legal implications and potential ambiguities of this becoming law. I think 

that, as you have noted, I have laid that out in my prepared remarks. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just wanted to put that on the record because I was a little surprised that we were going to campaign materials as part of this hearing. It seems like we have enough politics around this building. It doesn’t seem like we have to bring it 

into this hearing also. 

I want to specifically for a minute, General Schwartz, go to the 

situation at Dover. I don’t want to dwell on how hard this has to 

be for you and the leadership at the Air Force. No one needs to convince me that you want to get this right at Dover. 

I will tell you what I do want to bring to your attention, and I 

have done so with a letter today, and that is the finding of the Office of Special Counsel. So people understand what the Office of 

Special Counsel is, it is an investigatory and prosecution-oriented 

agency whose primary responsibility under our law is to be independent of all of the agencies and protect whistleblowers. 

What I am concerned about is their investigation into what the 

Air Force did in response to the whistleblowers. Specifically, the 

fact that the IG of the Air Force, failed to admit wrongdoing in 

their report. While I understand people have been moved around 

as a result of the problems that have occurred because of the mishandling of the sacred remains of the fallen, I am not sure that 

they have been held as accountable, for example, as what we saw 

happen at Arlington Cemetery in connection with that heart-breaking incompetence. 

What I want to make sure is that there is an independent investigation as to whether or not the IG shaded it a little bit because 

everyone was feeling protective of the institution, for all the right 

reasons. The vast majority of people who serve at Dover and who 

do this work I am sure do it with a heavy heart, but with a passion 

for getting it right. 

But when we have a circumstance like this arise, I want to make 

sure that the inspector generals are not so busy looking after the 

institution that they fail to point out wrongdoing, which was not 

ever acknowledged, and that there is accountability for the people 

involved. So, I want you to address the special counsel’s report as 

it relates to the Air Force investigation. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator McCaskill, there clearly were unacceptable mistakes made. Whether they constitute wrongdoing is 

another matter entirely. 

When you look at a situation like this, you look at the facts of 

the case, as an attorney might say. You look at the context in 

which the event or the mistakes occurred, and you also consider 

the demands that are placed on individuals and organizations. 

53 

With respect to accountability, we also had an obligation to ensure that the statutory requirements for due process were followed. 

We did that precisely. 

I can only speak for the case of the uniformed officer, but the 

uniformed officer received a letter of reprimand. We established an 

unfavorable information file. We removed him from the command 

list and his anticipated job as a group commander at Shaw Air 

Force Base was redlined. This is not a trivial sanction. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand that is not a trivial sanction. 

I am worried that there was a conclusion that there was not an obligation to notify the families in these instances. Obviously, this 

deals with more than uniformed personnel, and obviously, the Secretary of the Air Force is also copied on the letter that I sent today 

calling for this independent investigation. 

What happened at Arlington, nobody was intentionally 

mismarking graves. They were mistakes, too. I just want to make 

sure that we have really clear eyes while we have full hearts about 

the right, aggressive need for investigations by inspector generals 

in circumstances like this. 

Thank you very much, and thank all of you for being here today. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me, first of all, thank each and every one of you. It is very 

impressive to have the leaders of the Services of the greatest defense of a country one could ever hope to live in, and I appreciate 

it. The respect you all have for each other is evident, and I appreciate that also. 

I must say that my experience as a Governor, which I think is 

the greatest honor that I could ever have bestowed upon me as a 

citizen of the great State of West Virginia is to be Governor of my 

great State, and also with that having a close relationship with my 

Guard. That close relationship, you get a title as Governor, which 

is commander in chief, which is a little bit much, if you will. But 

I can assure you that watching the performance of my Guard and 

the guardsmen that I have met all over this country is unparalleled 

to anything I have been witness to. 

I had the chance also to travel with other Governors, and we 

would go, and you all would be so kind to take us over to visit in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. We would go in and be able to say thank you 

to our troops for the Services they gave. To a ‘‘T’’ I will say this. 

Every one of the commanders of every base that we attended and 

visited, they would make a point to come up to me and say, ‘‘I want 

to tell you of the expertise, the professionalism, the commitment 

that your guardsmen have and what an asset they are to our command.’’ 

With that, I would say that I didn’t see the difference. I really 

didn’t. I never really thought about why it hadn’t been looked upon 

equally at the Pentagon or the Joint Chiefs. 

I have thought about this quite a bit since then. I know change 

is hard. Being in the positions, I have had to make a lot of decisions, and I know it comes very, very hard. The thing I would ask, 

and whoever would want to answer this—and General Dempsey, 

you might want to start with yourself. Do any of you believe—and 

54 

I think you can tell there has been some wonderful questions here 

and some wonderful testimonies. Senator Graham does such an expert job of holding his emotions back and his feelings. 

But with that being said, do any of you believe that this legislation—and I believe it will be passed—that you would have a hard 

time cycling and being able to do the job that you are charged with 

doing at the level that needs to be done for the defense of our country? 

General DEMPSEY. I will start, Senator. Thanks for the opportunity. 

Also, you are the second Senator to sort of imply that we are 

averse to change. We are, I promise you, one of the most changeoriented organizations you are going to see appear before you at 

any time. That change will be clear to you, as you see the effect 

of some of the budget decisions that are being made. 

So we are not averse to change, nor are we resistant. In fact, this 

body charges us to give you our personal best military advice. That 

is what you are getting today. You are getting it because we have 

a system in place right now that actually works remarkably well. 

We have one Army. We have one Air Force. 

I don’t know what impact this will have. Therefore, you are sensing some reluctance on our part to embrace something. It could be 

that nothing changes. That would be the best possible outcome. But 

then one might say, well, if nothing is going to change, why are we 

changing? 

I would say the decision before you is one of context, the context 

of adding Craig McKinley to the Joint Chiefs, which, in some ways, 

would be a powerful symbol to our citizen soldiers. I got that. 

But the other context is the, for me, more compelling argument 

about turning to Ray Odierno and saying, ‘‘I want soldiers from 

you,’’ and I don’t care if they are Active, Guard, or Reserve. 

So I don’t know the answer to your question, Senator. But I am 

concerned about it. 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, let me just say this. I have the utmost 

confidence in all of you. I know that you wouldn’t be in the position 

you were if the orders that were evaluated and then accepted and 

then fulfilled. I don’t anticipate anything different from that. 

The thing that I observe is that truly the Guard is the only visible part of our Defense Department right now that the citizens of 

this great country can connect to. If it wasn’t for the Guard, we 

wouldn’t even know there was a conflict. 

But it is the moms and the pops and uncles and aunts and brothers and sisters that get redeployed, and that we are all there, sending them off. Our towns come out, and our States come out. They 

come home, and we welcome them home. We will cry with them. 

We mourn with them when we have a loss of one of our loved ones. 

So they are the fabric of our whole defense system. I think that 

is why some of us are so passionate about this piece of legislation 

to have an equal footing. 

I will finally say this, that there is not—I think you have to be 

as frustrated as maybe myself and other people around this country as they look at the functions of Congress right now. We can’t 

come to agreement on anything. This is one thing I think we are 

agreeing on. Please don’t deny us this moment. [Laughter.] 

55 

Please don’t deny us the chance to come together as Democrats 

and Republicans for the sake of this great country and put America 

first. That is what we are asking. 

So, with that, we might respectfully disagree, but we sure do respect—and hopefully that we respect you at the highest levels. I 

want to thank you, and we hope you would consider this legislation. 

I want to encourage the chairman to make sure that our leader, 

majority leader, knows how important it is for the NDAA—I am 

sure this will be an amendment to that legislation—but for this bill 

to move forward. I know you have been working diligently, sir, and 

I support you 100 percent. We have to get this bill, and I support 

the Guard being a full standing member. 

Thank you so much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

This has been a very important hearing. We obviously have very 

divided views on this committee. I hope we get the bill to the floor. 

I hope we get it to the floor before we get to Thanksgiving. 

In any event, we have commitments that our bill will be coming 

to the floor. I am sure there will be an amendment, and I am sure 

there will be a very vigorous debate on an amendment on this particular issue. 

I think the fact that you have all appeared here today with such 

dignity, such character, and such directness, which we welcome— 

and it is important that we hear the views unvarnished. We got 

them from all of you. 

We got the legal opinion, which is what we sought, which was 

a legal opinion from you, Mr. Johnson. We did not seek policy from 

you, nor do you give policy when you are asked as a lawyer to appear before the committee. 

We are very grateful to you for your service. We thank our vets 

on the eve of Veterans Day, and we will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

HURRICANE IRENE

1. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Winnefeld, during the hearing there was a reference 

to preparations for Hurricane Irene, including the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS). Can you describe the role of the JCS, including The Joint Staff, related to 

preparations for Hurricane Irene, and provide a description of the role and actions 

of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)—the combatant command responsible 

for Homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities—to prepare for natural disasters such as Hurricane Irene? 

Admiral WINNEFELD. As a former Commander of NORTHCOM, I have a great appreciation for the synergy and coordination between the Department of Defense 

(DOD), including the National Guard, and other Federal agencies in response to a 

natural disaster. Hurricane Irene was no exception and indeed showcased a key initiative with—and extensive coordination with—the National Guard and the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The DOD as a whole was proactive in establishing communications early and offering its collective support to the overall response effort. To facilitate enhanced coordination at the senior echelon, the Joint 

Staff stood up a Crisis Management Team responsible for synchronizing efforts of 

the JCS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), NORTHCOM and the NGB 

on requests for assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), the primary coordinating agency for Federal disaster response. 

During Hurricane Irene, the Commander, NORTHCOM exercised his authority 

under the Secretary of Defense-approved Defense Support of Civilian Authority execution order by providing resources requested by Federal FEMA. DOD also apVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
56 

pointed four National Guard officers as dual-status commanders in support of relief 

efforts for Hurricane Irene, marking the first time the dual status commander concept has been implemented in support of a natural disaster. The dual-status commander concept, developed to foster effective and efficient cooperation among Federal and State assets during a domestic incident like Hurricane Irene, allows the 

appointed commander to direct both Federal Active-Duty Forces and State National 

Guard Forces. 

Extensive formal and informal DOD coordination also occurred throughout the response effort. For example, the NGB Director of Operations (J–3) had daily two-star 

level communications with the Joint Staff, J–34, who serves as the Joint Staff lead 

for homeland issues. OSD, Joint Staff, and NGB also participated in daily 

NORTHCOM coordination meetings (three daily) during the response. Lastly, all 

DOD agencies participated in daily FEMA senior leader update meetings. 

NORTHCOM continuously prepares for and exercises its civil support mission 

through policy and product refinement, engagement, conferences, tabletop exercises, 

interagency rehearsal of concept drills, and large-scale exercises. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DUTIES

2. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Johnson, General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, could you 

explain what the official duties of the JCS are, as reflected in the statutes that prescribe those duties? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the duties of the JCS. 

Section 151 provides that the Chairman of the JCS is the principal military advisor, 

and that the other members of the JCS are military advisors, to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the 

JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as he considers 

appropriate. 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. The Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland 

Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also 

military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary 

of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible for advising and assisting the 

President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction 

of the Armed Forces; strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command 

preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, 

training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult 

with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying 

out the Chairman’s functions, duties and responsibilities. 

A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman 

advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, 

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of 

such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, 

as the case may be. 

The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military 

advisers, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the 

Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS 

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider appropriate. 

General ODIERNO. Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(b), the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(c), the members of the JCS are also military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

57 

Under 10 U.S.C. section 153, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

President and the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and 

assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and 

joint doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman’s functions, duties and responsibilities. 

Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(d), a member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) 

may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice 

or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, 

the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of 

Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present 

the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice 

to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or 

the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. 

Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(e), the members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisors, provide advice to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, the 

Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, under 10 U.S.C. section 151(f), after first informing the Secretary of 

Defense, a member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider. 

Admiral GREENERT. The Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to 

the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and 

the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also military advisers to the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary 

of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible for advising and assisting the 

President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction 

of the Armed Forces; strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command 

preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, 

training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult 

with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying 

out the Chairman’s functions, duties and responsibilities. 

A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman 

advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, 

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of 

such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, 

as the case may be. 

The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military 

advisers, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the 

Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS 

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider appropriate. 

General AMOS. Under 10 U.S.C. section 155, the Joint Staff assists the CJCS, and 

subject to the Chairman’s control, other members of the JCS in carrying out their 

responsibilities. The Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support 

the CJCS in providing for the unified strategic direction of combatant forces, unified 

command of combatant forces, and to their integration into an efficient team of land, 

naval, and air forces. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the JCS in accomplishing his responsibilities for: the unified strategic direction of the combatant 

forces; their operation under unified command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. 

3. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Johnson, General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, what is it 

that the law really requires the JCS to do? 

58 

Mr. JOHNSON. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the duties of the JCS. 

Section 151 provides that the Chairman of the JCS is the principal military advisor, 

and that the other members of the JCS are military advisors, to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the 

JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as he considers 

appropriate. 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. The CJCS is the principal military 

adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security 

Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also military 

advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security 

Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary 

of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and assisting the President and the 

Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; 

strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman’s functions, duties and responsibilities. 

A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman 

advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, 

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of 

such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, 

as the case may be. 

The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military 

advisers, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the 

Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS 

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider appropriate. 

General ODIERNO. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary 

of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and assisting the President and the 

Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; 

strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman’s functions, duties and responsibilities. 

A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman 

advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, 

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of 

such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, 

as the case may be. 

The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military 

advisors, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the 

Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS 

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider appropriate. 

Admiral GREENERT. The Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to 

the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and 

the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also military advisers to the 

59 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary 

of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible for advising and assisting the 

President and the Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction 

of the Armed Forces; strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command 

preparedness; requirements, military programs and budgets; and joint doctrine, 

training and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult 

with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying 

out the Chairman’s functions, duties and responsibilities. 

A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman 

advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, 

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of 

such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, 

as the case may be. 

The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military 

advisers, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the 

Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS 

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider appropriate. 

General AMOS. The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The members of the JCS are also military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary 

of Defense, the CJCS is responsible for advising and assisting the President and the 

Secretary of Defense with: providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; 

strategic planning; contingency planning; combatant command preparedness; requirements, military programs, and budgets; and joint doctrine, training, and education. The members of the Joint Chiefs may be required to consult with and provide advice to the Chairman, as he considers appropriate, in carrying out the Chairman’s functions, duties, and responsibilities. 

A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman 

advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, 

the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman must present the advice or opinion of 

such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, 

as the case may be. 

The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military 

advisers, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the 

Secretary requests such advice. 

Additionally, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the JCS 

may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as they consider appropriate. 

General SCHWARTZ. The JCS are military advisers to the President, the National 

Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as 

specified in title 10, U.S.C., subsections 151 (d) and (e). 

Subsection 151(d) provides that a member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) 

may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice 

or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, 

the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of 

Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present 

the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice 

to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or 

the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. 

Subsection 151(e) provides that the members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, 

60 

the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of 

Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, 

the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice. 

4. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Johnson, General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, in light of 

the statutory requirements of the JCS, can you provide your views on how adding 

the CNGB to the JCS would be either consistent or inconsistent, help or not help, 

the JCS’s ability to carry out their statutory responsibilities? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986 struck many carefully crafted balances of both intra- and inter-service equities. The CNGB represents only the Army and Air National Guards, and the proposed legislation would thus alter some of Goldwater-Nichols’s careful balances by, 

for example: (a) altering the fact that each Service is statutorily represented by one 

Service Chief in the Joint Chiefs; and (b) providing only two of DOD’s six statutory 

Reserve components with additional Joint Chiefs representation. 

In addition, elevating the CNGB to represent National Guard equities to the Joint 

Chiefs could create legal confusion as to whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs 

of Staff continue to represent their total force. Current law already requires the 

CNGB to advise the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff on all National Guard matters. 

Finally, any legislation should not add ambiguities with respect to authorities in 

the place where we can tolerate such ambiguity the least: at the top of the Service 

hierarchies, especially in time of war. 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. If I believed that not having the 

CNGB sitting as a member of the JCS would expose the United States to otherwise 

avoidable risk, no matter how small, I would not hesitate to offer my full and unreserved endorsement for his full membership. This should be the litmus test: Would 

the CNGB add something that currently is missing from the JCS’ present organization? As I’ve previously stated before the Committee, the CNGB already participates 

in all JCS meetings and I look to him as a trusted advisor. But my statutory responsibility to the President and Secretary of Defense is to act as the Nation’s principal 

military advisor, and I personally do not believe that the CNGB’s formal membership on the JCS would materially improve the quality or timeliness of my advice. 

I am ably supported by the Service Chiefs and the Vice Chairman, and can already 

count on the expert and frank advice of the CNGB, to aid my deliberations and understanding of the National Guard’s key non-Federalized roles. 

To the extent that the JCS is charged with providing advice on the Federal military capability of the United States, I believe including the CNGB on the JCS with 

a mandate to advise on the National Guard in its non-Federal capacity is inconsistent with the purpose of the JCS. Similarly, were the CNGB to offer his advice 

on the National Guard’s Federal role, this would conflict with his statutory obligation to provide such advice through the Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army 

and Air Force. At the very least, I see the potential for a very confusing and inefficient arrangement being established. 

General ODIERNO. Adding the CNGB to the JCS would complicate title 10 relationships for the Army, confuse the lines of authority and responsibility over the 

Army National Guard, and potentially interfere with the Secretary of the Army’s 

(SecArmy) ability to support the Joint Force. 

Under 10 U.S.C. section 151(e), the members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisors, provide advice to the President, the 

National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, the 

Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice. Under 10 U.S.C. 

section 151(e), the CSA is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on matters 

pertaining to the Army. Addition of the CNGB as a standing member of the JCS, 

creates the potential to skew JCS decision making and advice in favor of (or against) 

the employment of Guard units, adversely affecting the ability of the Army to execute its mission. 

Under 10 U.S.C. section 10502, the CNGB is responsible for the organization and 

operations of the National Guard Bureau; is a principal advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense, through the CJCS, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard 

forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense; and is the 

principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army 

(CSA), and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United 

States, and the Air National Guard of the United States. 

61 

Addition of the CNGB as a standing member of the JCS, may place the CNGB 

in direct conflict with his duties under 10 U.S.C. section 10502 to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and their Chiefs of Staff. 

The ‘‘Total Army’’ concept is well grounded in statute. The ARNGUS and Army National Guard are, by definition, part of the Army while ‘‘in service of the United 

States.’’ The SecArmy has responsibility for organizing and preparing the Army for 

combatant command missions and the CSA is his agent in this respect and is the 

Army’s representative on the JCS. There should only be one voice representing the 

Army’s interests on the JCS. Elevating the CNGB to the JCS creates the possibility 

of friction and differing opinions with respect to the organization, training, and deployment of National Guard forces. To the extent that the CNGB’s advice differs 

from the CSA’s, it may interfere with the SecArmy’s authority to administer the 

Army in the manner he deems best to achieve its mission pursuant to his statutory 

mandate. 

Admiral GREENERT. Making the CNGB a member of the JCS adds unnecessary 

complexity to the principle of ‘‘unity of command’’, and could confuse the intended 

clear and unambiguous source of best military advice to the Secretary of Defense 

and President. In my opinion, the Service Chiefs (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) should continue to be held singularly accountable to the executive and 

legislative branches of Government for the readiness and combat effectiveness of all 

personnel in their respective Services, and for the welfare of all their respective 

servicemembers and families. I believe the Service Chiefs are best positioned to report to the President and Congress on their Services’ readiness and preparation for 

military missions that support our national interests. 

General AMOS. I cannot overstate the dedication and bravery of our National 

Guard and Reserve Forces in the current fight. Because of their contributions and 

sacrifices, there is an understandable desire to extend an appropriate level of recognition to our Reserve Forces. However, I do not think that changing the national 

command structure is a necessary measure. 

Although the National Guard is undoubtedly instrumental in waging today’s conflicts, I believe the CNGB lacks the requisite insight into all levels of strategic planning by virtue of his limited role in DOD, and more specifically, Army affairs. The 

JCS provides direct military advice to the President, the National Security Council, 

the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In order for the JCS 

to carry out this duty, its members must be able to address the strategic direction 

of the Armed Forces. They must be capable of preparing strategic plans (to include 

plans that conform with resource levels); preparing joint logistic and mobility plans 

to support those strategic plans; performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces; preparing contingency plans conforming to the guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense; advising the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, 

logistic, and mobility support); establishing and maintaining a uniform system of 

evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions; and providing advice concerning the extent to which the program recommendations and 

budget proposals of DOD conform with the priorities established in strategic plans 

and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified 

combatant commands. Additionally, JCS members provide advice concerning the 

doctrine, training, and education of the Armed Forces. The JCS’ responsibilities 

therefore require a leadership structure that is wholly dedicated to the national defense, and thoroughly knowledgeable of the processes that resource and develop our 

defense strategies and the programs and resources necessary to develop and maintain responsive capabilities. The staffs of each Service Chief gain this detailed understanding through multi-layered integration with the Joint Staff and key DOD 

staffs. The integration of the staffs is a key enabler of success. The preparation of 

strategic and other plans outlined above, therefore, requires much more than the 

ability to cast a vote. It requires participation at every level and an undivided focus. 

With its dual mission, supporting role, and State focus, the CNGB is not structured 

for full participation in the roles set for the Chiefs in title 10. Accordingly, I do not 

believe the CNGB has the currency or capability to assume the necessary level of 

engagement requisite for JCS membership. 

Additionally, including the CNGB into the JCS would create unnecessary duplication within JCS because the federalized National Guard, as the Army’s Reserve 

component, serves in a supporting role. This duplication could result in an unfairly 

amplified representation of Army and Air Force concerns. It will also create a representational imbalance with regard to Reserve affairs in favor of the federalized 

National Guard. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff are best suited to equitably 

advise on the most effective employment of their supporting elements. 

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Moreover, providing full membership to the National Guard Bureau—an organization not primarily responsible for the planning and execution of national strategy— 

would not only be unprecedented; it would be an extraordinary solution to an unclear problem. When Congress established DOD, it codified a policy calling for the 

elimination of unnecessary duplication in DOD. This policy exists in title 10 today, 

in an effort to seek more effective, efficient, and economical administration not only 

in DOD but in the national command structure. The role of the National Guard, 

when executing a Federal mission, is to integrate with and execute missions in support of the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. In preparation for these missions, 

and in recognition of its supporting role, the Guard trains with these Services and 

at their schools. 

For title 32, non-federalized National Guard matters, the CNGB serves as the 

principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS. In this title 32 capacity, no unnecessary duplication exists because the CNGB is uniquely situated to 

channel communications between the several States and the Secretary of Defense. 

Where Congress federalizes the National Guard, however, the CNGB serves as the 

principle adviser to the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force Chief of Staff. Due to the importance of 

this supporting role, the CNGB appropriately maintains an advisory voice within 

the JCS. Not only is this structure intuitive, it reflects the intent behind current 

policy to use the federalized National Guard and Air National Guard as the Army’s 

and Air Force’s Reserve component. 

General SCHWARTZ. Adding the CNGB to the JCS would be inconsistent with the 

statutory requirements of the JCS and would not help the JCS’s ability to carry out 

their statutory responsibilities. The JCS exists, in large part, to provide military advice on employment of Federal forces. Under existing law, for matters concerning 

National Guard forces operating in a non-Federal capacity, the Chief of the Guard 

Bureau provides the Secretary of Defense with input through the Chairman of the 

JCS. Because the Chief of the Guard Bureau does not represent a single or separate 

branch of Service, making the Chief of the Guard Bureau a statutory member of 

the (JCS) would reach beyond the appropriate authorities of the Chief of the Guard 

Bureau and disrupt the lines of authority and representation that are already in 

place for the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and Air Force. Also, Total Force employment considerations are best served by those who organize, train, and equip 

personnel of all components of each Service, and are responsible as force providers 

to the combatant commands. Consequently, Chief of the Guard Bureau membership 

on the JCS presents issues concerning his or her appropriate role in offering advice 

on employment of the Armed Forces in a designated title 10 role. Beyond the established relationships among the military Services, interactions with interagency and 

international partners could also be confused. 

GUARD AND RESERVE

5. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, please elaborate on how 

including the Chief of the Guard Bureau on the JCS would affect the role, status, 

and relative influence of the other Reserve components, the Army, Air Force, Navy, 

and Marine Corps Reserve. 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. The disproportionate influence of any 

Service component, real or imagined, has the potential for causing some significant 

negative second and third order effects. I am concerned with the perception of inequity among the Reserve component that could stem from the CNGB membership 

on the JCS, and how this might then degrade the balance and unity of effort so deliberately and painstakingly built into our very effective Total Joint Force. For any 

of the Federal Reserves to become (or feel) disenfranchised by what they view as 

the fundamental elevation of the National Guard—in terms of importance and influence—would erode this balance. This would be occurring at a critical juncture in our 

history, when fiscal realities are compelling DOD to seek even greater efficiencies 

from the Total Force and increased reliance on the Reserve component. 

With respect to the role and status of the Federal Reserves, I do not believe these 

would be affected by membership of the CNGB as they are largely the object of law 

and policy. Whereas the actual or perceived influence of a component might impact 

organizational efficiencies, component roles and status are relatively fixed. The 

Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries bear sole responsibility for the resource decisions necessary to produce an organized, trained and equipped force, and this includes their Federal Reserves and the National Guard. Each Service determines the 

63 

resourcing, readiness, and projected roles for its Reserve component—this fact would 

not be affected by CNGB’s JCS membership. 

General ODIERNO. It is absolutely vital in today’s uncertain and complex strategic 

environment that we maintain One Army. The Secretary of the Army is responsible 

for generating Total Army readiness under a fully integrated set of title 10 processes. There is no benefit to dividing up Army components. 

The JCS serve a vital role to the national leadership, as well as exercising collective judgment regarding future capabilities and requirements. Separating the Army 

interests may lead to improper representation since the CNGB represents only two 

of the seven Reserve components. 

Admiral GREENERT. Making the CNGB a member of the JCS may add ambiguity 

to the status of the Army and Air National Guard as Reserve components of the 

Army and Air Force. The creation of this additional member of the JCS can create 

the appearance that the National Guard is a separate service and potentially create 

inequity between the National Guard and the Navy Reserve component. 

General AMOS. As noted in the JCS letters to this committee (see letters following 

this answer), elevating the role of the CNGB would further segment one community 

of reservists—a community that is already challenged with executing its dual mission. When the National Guard is federalized, the command relationship between 

the CNGB and the Army Chief of Staff mirrors the Navy and Marine Corps’ unified 

command relationship for their Reserve components. The Marine Forces Reserve, for 

example, as the Reserve component for the Marine Corps, is organized, trained, and 

equipped under the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This Service identification 

and matriculation enhances unity of command and the cohesion of combat units. In 

my interactions with Marine reservists, I have noted their pride and motivation in 

simply continuing their service to the Nation as marines. I applaud the lack of cultural distinction between Active Duty and Reserve marines, and I am confident that 

this same motivation also drives reservists in other Services to step forward. The 

proposed elevation of the CNGB risks fracturing the successful dynamic that our 

forces have achieved by diluting the understanding of the supporting and supported 

command relationships, and unbalancing the appropriate preparation of our Active 

and Reserve Forces. 

Including the CNGB into the JCS would create unnecessary duplication within 

the JCS contrary to current policy because the federalized National Guard, as the 

Army’s Reserve component, serves in a supporting role. This duplication could result 

in an unfairly amplified representation of Army and Air Force concerns. It will also 

create a representational imbalance with regard to Reserve affairs in favor of the 

federalized National Guard. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff are best suited 

to equitably advise on the most effective employment of their supporting elements. 

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General SCHWARTZ. Consistent with the unity of effort embodied in our Total 

Force approach, military advice in all matters concerning the U.S. Air Force should 

come from the Chief of Staff. It is not a matter of whether the Chief of the Guard 

Bureau is the most knowledgeable source of information regarding the National 

Guard Bureau, it is whether the Chief of the Guard Bureau is in a position to balance and speak for all the components of the Air Force, of which the National Guard 

Bureau is only one part. In addition, resource decisions that implicate the National 

Guard also implicate all other components of the Services and cannot be addressed 

in a vacuum. They must take into account the simultaneous requirements of all 

combatant commanders (not just NORTHCOM). Indeed, only a holistic service voice 

within the JCS can provide the JCS the integrated representation of the Air Force 

that is needed to capture Total Force capabilities. 

6. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, much has changed over 

the past decade with respect to the role the Guard and Reserve have played in 

DOD’s daily activities and deployments. We will probably never go back to the preSeptember 11 days of the Strategic Reserve. How does this influence the way you 

view this issue? 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. While I devote considerable energy 

on Reserve component aspects of our Joint Total Force, I don’t see how the increased employment of the Reserve component fundamentally is germane to the 

issue of adding the CNGB to the JCS. It does not matter whether the Reserve component is assigned a minimal role and cast as a ‘‘Strategic Reserve’’ or is assigned 

to execute key missions and is postured as an ‘‘operational force’’—Reserve component utilization ultimately is a Service function. 

The organization of our Armed Forces is defined in law. The Army consists of the 

Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Army Reserve, the whole of which is overseen by the Chief of Staff of the Army. Likewise, 

the Air Force is comprised of the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard of the 

United States, and the Air Force Reserve (AFR), the whole of which is managed by 

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. While all the Reserve component chiefs, to include the CNGB, possess significant Service-directed responsibilities related to 

maintaining their components’ readiness, they nevertheless remain but parts of the 

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Total Force. Rising OPTEMPO and increasing interdependence among all components has not altered this fact. 

General ODIERNO. The Army’s intent is to develop and sustain an enduring operational Reserve component. Reserve component forces, both Guard and Reserve, are 

crucial elements of the Army’s overall deployable strength and warfighting team. 

They provide essential operational capabilities and serve specific functions to the 

Total Army. The Reserve component provides necessary capacity to address global 

operational requirements, maximize readiness, and provide rotational availability 

while preserving Homeland Defense and Homeland Security capabilities. The Total 

Army cannot function as it has over the past decade without tightly integrated Active and Reserve Forces. 

Both Active and Reserve components will contribute to Army force requirements. 

The Reserve component will contribute mission trained steady state, Homeland Defense and surge forces. As an Operational Reserve, Reserve component forces maintain readiness levels that enable them to serve as part of an enduring commitment 

to the Total Army operations. 

Admiral GREENERT. I agree that much has changed with respect to the role the 

Guard and Reserve plays in the DOD’s daily activities and deployments. After more 

than a decade of conflict, the Navy Reserve is more fully integrated with our Active 

component than ever before and is no longer strictly a Strategic Reserve, but an integrated part of Navy’s Total Force. The past 10 years have proven that the Navy 

Reserve can operate anywhere along the spectrum of military operations. As long 

as the Navy has assured access to their Reserve component sailors, naval commanders can confidently assign missions to members of the Navy Reserve where it 

makes operational and fiscal sense. This subordination of the Reserve component to 

the Service Chief enables the CNO to be held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative branches of government for the combined readiness and combat 

effectiveness of their service for military missions that support our national interests. Adding the CNGB to the JCS could erode this unity of command for the Army 

and Air Force. 

General AMOS. I believe these facts enhance my position. As noted in the recent 

JCS letter to this committee (see response to question #5), CNGB membership in 

the JCS would complicate unity of command for both the Army and the Air Force 

and contribute to Service balkanization. The current organizational structure ensures that the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative branches of Government for the 

readiness and combat effectiveness of their respective Services, including their Reserves. This is as it should be, and is the intent behind current policy. Unity of purpose and of command is crucial in both the preparation and employment phases of 

the Armed Forces. As it relates to making decisions for the defense of the Nation 

and the preparations necessary for the achievement of its national objectives, success requires single-mindedness. 

CNGB membership on the JCS also could create an unhealthy ambiguity in the 

responsibility for leading the men and women of the National Guard. As a Service 

Chief, I fully subscribe to the notion that I am singularly accountable for the welfare 

of all marines and their families, Active and Reserve. As Commandant of the Marine Corps, I have the same responsibility to Marine Forces Reserve as I do to regular Active-Duty Forces. The missions for which all marines are trained and 

equipped are unified with the command structure that leads them. Bifurcating leadership, however, might lead to critical leadership gaps recognizable only after some 

future failure occurs. Most concerning, these gaps could affect the responsibility of 

caring for these troops and their families. For the sake of our reservists and their 

families, we cannot afford such a risk. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Chambliss, your comments resonate with the experience we have gained over the past decade. Much has changed with respect to the 

role of the Guard and Reserve in our National defense and I would say for the betterment of the Department and the Nation. The Air Force has learned that the operations we have conducted would not have been possible without the superlative 

teamwork of the Total Force. I have walked the flightlines at Balad Air Base in 

Iraq, Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, Dover AFB, and Hickam, and I have met 

outstanding Airmen from across the Nation. I cannot tell the difference between a 

guardsman, a reservist, or an Active Duty airman. All are doing exceptional work 

for this country. 

Our challenge now is to develop and maintain the operational training and capacity we need with a smaller force and fewer dollars while maintaining the edge as 

the world’s greatest air force. The Air Force will stay focused on strategic priorities 

and continue to build a Total Force that improves key capabilities and supports 

strategic priorities while reducing other capabilities we can no longer offer to the 

71 

joint team. Even though it is likely that substantial reductions will be required to 

meet budget projections—including force structure and infrastructure—we will continue to rely on the capabilities of the Total Force Enterprise to meet our mission. 

7. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, does the larger role the 

Guard and Reserve are playing now make a difference when you are considering 

this issue of whether to add the Chief of the Guard Bureau to the JCS? 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. I believe that the overall role of the 

National Guard and Reserve—regardless of how big that role is—really is a separate issue from that of the CNGB’s membership on the JCS. The Services are responsible to organize, equip and train their Reserve components, and the Reserve 

components’ ability to accomplish their assigned missions largely is a function of 

this Service preparation. We unquestionably have depended on our Citizen soldiers, 

airmen, sailors, and marines to help defend the United States as well as our allies 

and national interests to a greater degree than prior to September 11. This dependence is unlikely to fundamentally change in the future. The security threats we face 

at home and abroad, as well as the expectations levied on our military to respond 

to these threats, have increased significantly over the past two decades, and largely 

have driven our increased utilization of the Reserve component for overseas and domestic requirements. But this increased utilization was accommodated within the 

Service Chiefs’ existing authorities. JCS membership clearly was not necessary for 

the CNGB to exercise his statutory duties related to leveraging the National Guard 

in support of DOD’s operational objectives, and I do not believe it will be necessary 

in the future. 

General ODIERNO. The Guard and Reserve are part of the Total Army; Active and 

Reserve component. The number of deployments and the size of their role are not 

central to this issue. The Guard and Reserve have assumed an expanded role over 

the past decade because the Nation needed increased resources from the Total 

Army. As we go forward, their active involvement in contingencies will continue and 

is a vital component of land power within the Joint Force. The efforts of all three 

components of the Total Army need to be integrated. This integration requires one 

civilian and one military leader supported by the Department of the Army staff. Any 

dilution of command unity runs counter to professional military principals and is 

not in the best interest of our Army and the Nation. 

Admiral GREENERT. In my statement to the committee and my testimony on this 

issue, I have thought about and considered the larger role the National Guard and 

Reserve component assumed over the past 10 years and will continue to hold in the 

future. However, I still believe the Service Chiefs (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) should continue to be held singularly accountable to the executive and 

legislative branches of Government for the readiness and combat effectiveness of all 

personnel in their respective Services, and for the welfare of their respective 

servicemembers and families. The Service Chiefs are best positioned to report to the 

President and Congress on their Services’ readiness and preparation for military 

missions that support our national interests. 

General AMOS. As noted in the recent JCS letter to this committee (see response 

to question #5), CNGB membership in the JCS would complicate unity of command 

for both the Army and the Air Force and contribute to Service balkanization. The 

current organizational structure ensures that the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army 

and the U.S. Air Force are held singularly accountable to the executive and legislative branches of Government for the readiness and combat effectiveness of their respective Services, including their Reserves. This is as it should be, and is the intent 

of current policy. Unity of purpose and of command is crucial in both the preparation and employment phases of the Armed Forces. As it relates to making decisions 

for the defense of the Nation and the preparations necessary for the achievement 

of its national objectives, success requires single-mindedness. 

CNGB membership on the JCS could also create an unhealthy ambiguity in the 

responsibility for leading the men and women of the National Guard. As a Service 

Chief, I fully subscribe to the notion that I am singularly accountable for the welfare 

of all marines and their families, Active and Reserve. As Commandant of the Marine Corps, I have the same responsibility to Marine Forces Reserve as I do to regular Active-Duty Forces. The missions for which all marines are trained and 

equipped are unified with the command structure that leads them. Bifurcating leadership, however, might lead to critical leadership gaps recognizable only after some 

future failure occurs. Most concerning, these gaps could affect the responsibility of 

caring for these troops and their families. For the sake of our reservists and their 

families, we cannot afford such a risk. 

72 

General SCHWARTZ. No. Because the CNGB does not represent a single or separate branch of Service, making CNGB a statutory member of the JCS would reach 

beyond the appropriate authorities of the CNGB and disrupt the lines of authority 

and representation that are already in place for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Also, Total Force employment considerations are best served by those who organize, 

train, and equip personnel of all components of each Service, and are responsible 

as force providers to the combatant commands. Consequently, CNGB membership 

on the JCS presents issues concerning his or her appropriate role in offering advice 

on employment of the Armed Forces in a designated title 10 role. Beyond the established relationships among the Military Services, interactions with Interagency and 

international partners could also be confused. 

8. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, can you explain what role 

the Guard and Reserve play in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 

process? 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. The Total Force includes significant 

capability provided by the National Guard. Because the Guard and Reserve use the 

same equipment as the Active component, their requirements are an integral part 

of Service processes. Accordingly, the National Guard Bureau does not have a voting 

member on the JROC. Title 10 equities are advocated by the individual Service 

Chiefs. Additionally, as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System (JCIDS) process, the National Guard Bureau is given the opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that comes before the Joint Staff. 

The Reserves are represented individually by each of their corresponding Services. 

General ODIERNO. The Total Force includes significant capability provided by the 

National Guard. The National Guard Bureau does not have a voting member on the 

JROC. Their requirements and budgets are planned and executed as an integral 

part of Service processes. Their title 10 equities are advocated by the individual 

Service Chiefs. Additionally, as part of the JCIDS process, the National Guard Bureau is given the opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that 

comes to the Joint Staff. 

The Reserves are represented individually by each of their corresponding Services. 

Admiral GREENERT. The Total Force includes significant capability provided by 

the National Guard and the respective Service Reserve components. The National 

Guard Bureau does not have a voting member on the JROC. Their requirements 

and budgets are planned and executed as an integral part of service processes. Their 

title 10 equities are advocated by the individual Service Chiefs. Additionally, as part 

of the JCIDS process, the National Guard Bureau is given the opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that comes to the Joint Staff. 

As the Navy principal to the JROC, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) 

represents Navy’s Total Force (Active and Reserve) perspective for requirements and 

warfighting. 

General AMOS. The Total Force includes significant capability provided by the National Guard. The National Guard Bureau does not have a voting member on the 

JROC. Their requirements and budgets are planned and executed as an integral 

part of Service processes. Their title 10 equities are advocated by the individual 

Service Chiefs. Additionally, as part of the JCIDS process, the National Guard Bureau is given the opportunity to coordinate on every requirements proposal that 

comes to the Joint Staff. 

The Reserves are represented individually by each Service. 

General SCHWARTZ. Under current guidance, the NGB does not have an official 

role in the JROC process. However, the NGB will have an advisory role to the JROC 

Chairman in the revised JROC Charter (CJCSI 5123.01F). The Reserve does not 

have an advisory role in the JROC process. 

Both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) are permanent (voting) members of the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC). 

The AFROC reviews, validates, and recommends approval of all Air Force operational capability requirements. The AFROC directly supports the JROC process. 

In addition, both the Air National Guard and AFRC have the authority to sponsor 

operational capability requirements for capabilities needed to accomplish their assigned missions. 

Finally, the Guard and Reserve have the opportunity to review all Air Force and 

Joint operational requirements documents through the formal staffing process associated with the JCIDS and the JROC. 

73 

9. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, how are Guard and Reserve inputs received and incorporated? 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. As part of the Total Force, National 

Guard and Reserve requirements can be advocated by any combatant command (including and especially NORTHCOM or U.S. Pacific Command), by the individual 

Services, and by other DOD components and agencies. 

General ODIERNO. Reserve components actively participate in both Army and 

Joint requirements forums. They provide essential insights and advice to the Service 

Chiefs and Secretaries on matters that pertain to resourcing and producing an organized, trained and equipped force. The success of our Army is due to the integration 

of our Active and Reserve components to the point they are indistinguishable on the 

battlefield. The integration of the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the 

Army Reserves has proven over the last decade to be unbeatable on the battlefield 

and irreplaceable at home and abroad. We have built a strong relationship between 

all of our Army components, probably the strongest we have ever had. At the Joint 

level, the CNGB has a standing invitation to attend all meetings with the Joint 

Chiefs which will further strengthen our relationship and ensure their voice is 

heard. 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy Active and Reserve warfighting requirements are received and integrated through the Navy’s requirements management process. The 

Chief of Navy Reserve (CNR) and Navy Reserve personnel have the opportunity to 

submit requirements, and to review and comment on Navy requirements in development. The Deputy CNR is invited to all Navy Requirements and Resources Review 

Boards (R3B), the Navy equivalent of the JROC. 

After Navy review, Navy requirements are submitted for Joint Review and JROC 

validation. As the Navy principal to the JROC, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

(VCNO) represents the Navy’s Total Force (Active and Reserve) perspective on requirements and warfighting. 

General AMOS. Our Reserve component submits its requirements through the Marine Corps requirements management process. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) and the MARFORRES staff may also review and comment on 

Marine requirements in development to ensure that the process addresses any criteria unique to the Reserve component. The Marine Corps provides a Total Force 

perspective to the JROC, including requirements arising from MARFORRES. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Reserve components contribute to our national security 

in support of every combatant commander and Air Force core function, delivering 

the right capabilities to the right place at the right time. The Reserve components’ 

contributions to the Joint and Coalition team are felt worldwide. Guard and Reserve 

members have inputs into Air Force decisions at all levels, through the Air Force 

Corporate Structure (AFCS) and throughout Air Force Strategic Planning System 

processes. This integration of effort allows for senior-level cross component discussions to refine our Total Force planning, requirements, programming, budgeting, 

execution, and acquisition efforts. Initiatives are vetted through the AFCS for approval and linked to resource allocation, ensuring the initiatives approved are appropriately funded. The Corporate Structure is the formal Air Force process to inform Air Force senior leaders so they can provide strategic direction on total force 

planning, programming, and execution. The AFR and Air National Guard have 

membership at each level of the AFCS, to include voting members on the Air Force 

Group, Board and Council. The AFCS increases overall management effectiveness 

by applying cross-functional judgment, experience, and analysis to program adjustments in a resource limited environment. The Air Force will continue to refine integration efforts of all three components to ensure the most efficient and effective capabilities are delivered to meet strategic requirements. 

10. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, do you feel those inputs 

are adequately considered? 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. The Services have never been closer 

to their Reserve components. Because they use the same equipment as the Active 

component, National Guard, and Reserve requirements are not normally broken out 

as distinct and separate from the Total Force requirements being considered during 

combined staffing during the JCIDS process, or by the JROC when validating those 

requirements. 

General ODIERNO. Absolutely. Now more than ever we are one Army and an integrated Joint Force that is indistinguishable as a fighting force. The integration of 

the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves has proven 

over the last decade to be unbeatable on the battlefield and irreplaceable at home 

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and abroad. The Reserve component forces will continue to play a critical role in 

our National Security Strategy, and the advice of the CNGB will always be, as it 

has been, extremely valuable to our Army and Joint Forces. The relationship between all of components is the strongest it’s ever been. The Reserve components will 

continue to have a voice in Army and Joint forums to keep the relationship strong. 

They actively participate and provide essential insights and advice to the Service 

Chiefs and Secretaries on matters that pertain to resourcing and producing an organized, trained and equipped force. At the joint level, the CNGB has a standing invitation to attend all meetings with the Joint Chiefs. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, they are adequately considered. There is no distinction 

in consideration of Reserve and Active requirements input into the Navy requirements process or the joint requirements process. 

General AMOS. Yes, they are adequately considered. There is no distinction in the 

consideration of Reserve component and Active component requirements input into 

the Marine Corps requirements process or the joint requirements process. We are 

one fighting force. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. The AFR and Air National Guard (ANG) are an integral 

part of the Total Air Force and we would not be able to do what we do on a daily 

basis without soliciting and incorporating their inputs. The AFR and ANG are Total 

Force partners and are completely embedded in our staffing, planning, and execution of operations on a daily basis. 

11. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno, 

Admiral Greenert, General Amos, and General Schwartz, in your view do the Guard 

and Reserve have any separate and unique requirements, or are their requirements 

essentially the same as the Active Duty’s requirements? 

General DEMPSEY and Admiral WINNEFELD. As part of the Total Force, the National Guard and Reserve make critical contributions to the overall military capabilities of the United States. While the National Guard may have some unique requirements to meet their title 32 missions, all their title 10 missions are met with 

the same equipment used by the other Title 10 forces, whose requirements are determined and addressed through coordination with the applicable combatant command (NORTHCOM or U.S. Pacific Command) and/or Service. 

General ODIERNO. As part of the Total Force, the National Guard and Reserve 

make critical contributions to the overall military capabilities of the United States. 

While the National Guard may have some unique requirements to meet their title 

32 missions, all their Title 10 missions are met with the same equipment used by 

the other title 10 forces, whose requirements are determined and addressed through 

coordination with the applicable combatant command (NORTHCOM or U.S. Pacific 

Command) and/or Service. 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy Reserve warfighting requirements are the same as Active Navy requirements. Reserve Forces have unique manning and training challenges to achieve those requirements, but the warfighting requirements and associated systems are the same. 

General AMOS. Under title 10 U.S.C. section 10102, each Reserve component is 

to provide trained units and qualified persons available for Active Duty in the 

Armed Forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as 

the national security may require, to fill the needs of the Armed Forces whenever 

more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components. Reserve 

Forces have unique manning and training challenges to achieve these requirements, 

but the warfighting requirements and associated systems are the same. 

General SCHWARTZ. The operational requirements of the AFRC are essentially the 

same as the requirements for the Active-Duty Force. AFRC addresses the same combatant commander concept of operations shortfalls as does the Active-Duty Force. 

The operational requirements associated with the title 10 mission of the Air National Guard are essentially the same as the requirements for the Active-Duty 

Force. However, the requirements associated with title 32 and State Active Duty are 

unique. These Guard missions focus on Homeland defense and civil support. They 

include direct support for Homeland security missions such as border patrol, counter 

drug, and law enforcement. These mission sets have the potential to drive separate 

operational capability requirements for the Air National Guard. 

12. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McKinley, I am particularly interested in how 

you believe being a member of the JCS will help the DOD and the Nation. I understand it may help the Guard, particularly in terms of stature. However, I would like 

your views on how your inclusion on the JCS would help provide better advice to 

the President on issues under DOD’s purview, and how it would help DOD better 

carry out their own responsibilities on behalf of the Nation. 

75 

General MCKINLEY. The National Guard Bureau is currently a joint activity of 

DOD, and the CNGB has gained enhanced authorities since 2008. And yet, the 

CNGB still does not have an institutional position from which he can advise the 

President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Congress on 

non-Federalized National Guard forces that are critical to Homeland defense and 

civil support missions. In contrast, the CNGB advises the Secretary of Defense 

through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-Federalized National 

Guard forces. The CNGB must declare an interest in order to have a voice on these 

limited matters; without statutory JCS membership, CNGB’s JCS participation is 

ad hoc as determined by each successive Chairman. 

Adding the CNGB to the JCS would ensure that, in the post-September 11 security environment, the National Guard’s non-Federalized role in Homeland defense 

and civil support missions will be fully represented in all JCS deliberations. Only 

full JCS membership for the CNGB will ensure that the non-Federalized National 

Guard responsibilities and capabilities are considered in a planned and deliberate 

manner that is firmly rooted in the law and the National strategy. 

The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into account when 

making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce readiness resources, and 

when advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency response options. Homeland Defense and Civil Support must be at the core of our National 

strategy due to the changing threat environment, one that is asymmetric and more 

dangerous within our Homeland than at any time in our history. 

13. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McKinley, do you believe the Reserve components are adequately represented on the JROC and, related to that, do you believe 

the Guard and Reserve have any truly unique requirements that necessitate specific 

representation by the Guard and Reserve on the JROC? 

General MCKINLEY. The JROC consists of officers in the grade of general or admiral from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The JROC also includes advisors from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller as well as the Director of 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. Combatant commanders and members of 

the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) have a standing invitation to participate 

in JROC events. The National Guard Bureau participates on the JROC as a member of the FCB. The FCB is a permanently established body that is responsible for 

supporting the Chairman of the JCS in his title 10 responsibilities of providing independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense. FCBs provide the assessments 

and recommendations required for the JROC to validate and prioritize (if required) 

joint military capabilities needed to comply with the guidance provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, Guidance for Development of 

the Force, Guidance for Employment of the Force, and National Military Strategy. 

The National Guard has unique dual capabilities. The JROC has validated numerous unique National Guard capabilities for domestic operations including: State 

Joint Force Headquarters; CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages; Joint Interagency Training Capability; and Critical Infrastructure Protection—Mission Assurance Assessment Teams. 

14. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McKinley, what are your views on how including 

the Chief of the Guard Bureau would affect the other Reserve components who 

would, presumably, not be members of the JCS? In your view, why would this not 

negatively affect joint-ness and the total force concept that we have worked so hard 

to achieve? 

General MCKINLEY. The National Guard is unique, thanks to the Militia Clauses 

of the U.S. Constitution and title 32 of the U.S.C. It is unlike the other Reserve 

components which can only perform title 10 duties under title 10 command authority. The National Guard performs the same title 10 duties when Federalized plus 

diverse non-Federal duties and State duties under state command authority. The 

command chains are unambiguous. The other Reserve components have no analogy 

to the National Guard’s non-Federalized duties and command authorities. The nonFederal National Guard missions include but are not limited to: air defense, ballistic 

missile defense, weapons of mass destruction response, disaster response, 

counterdrug support, border security, airport security, and national event security. 

Placing the CNGB on the JCS would not alter current title 10 relationships. 

There would be no change to the title 10 authorities of the Service Secretaries or 

Service Chiefs. Total Force integration would not be compromised; if anything, it 

would be enhanced by greater situational awareness of title 32 National Guard missions, capabilities, and leadership on which the CNGB is uniquely qualified to adVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:44 Apr 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\73592.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
76 

vise. Total Force integration would also benefit from enhanced understanding of the 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions that are performed by non-Federalized National Guard forces. 

15. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McKinley, the JCS was established by the National Security Act of 1947 and at that time consisted of a Chairman and the Chiefs 

of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was added in the late 1970s and the position of Vice 

Chairman was added in 1986 as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is clear 

that those who initially created the JCS did not see a need to include the Chief of 

the Guard Bureau. In your view, should the Chief of the Guard Bureau have been 

included in the first place, or what has changed since the creation of the JCS that 

necessitates inclusion of the Guard Bureau Chief at this point? 

General MCKINLEY. The events of September 11, 2001 have changed the threats 

this nation faces. Homeland Defense and Civil Support must be at the core of our 

national strategy due to this changing threat environment, one that is asymmetric 

and more dangerous within our Homeland than at any time in our history. On average, 5,800 National Guard members are activated for Homeland missions at any 

given time. Therefore, domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into 

account when making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce readiness 

resources, and when advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National 

Security Council and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency 

response options. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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