# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

### N O



### . 13-0709

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## R O B E R T 

## V A L D E Z 

## , I N D IV ID U A L L Y A N D A S 

## A D M IN IS T R A T O R O F T H E 

## E S T A T E O F 

## P IE R R E 

## V

. B E R N A R D 

## , D E C E A S E D 

## , A N D 

## F ID E L IT Y A N D 

## C A S U A L T Y 

## C O M P A N Y O F 

## N E W 

## Y O R K 

## , P E T IT IO N E R S 

## ,

v
. D A V ID 

## H O L L E N B E C K 

## , I N D IV ID U A L L Y A N D A S 

## S U C C E S S O R 

## A D M IN IS T R A T O R O F T H E 

## E S T A T E O F 

## P IE R R E 

## V

. B E R N A R D 

## , D E C E A S E D 

## , W IL L 

## F R A N C E S 

## B A R O N 

## , J O H N 

## B E R N A R D 

## B A R O N 

## , B E R N A R D 

## R A E 

## B E R N A R D 

## B O X 

## , D A R Y L 

## B E R N A R D 

## , M A R C U S 

## B E R N A R D 

## , B A R B A R A 

## S T R E F F 

## G R A C H E K 

## , P A M 

## S T R E F F 

## M Y E R S 

## , S T E V E 

## S T R E F F 

## , S C O T T 

## S T R E F F 

## , Y V O N N E 

## B A R O N 

## F IS C H E R 

## , E L IZ A B E T H 

## L A M A R 

## , K E L L Y 

## L A M A R 

## L O E F F E L H O L Z 

## , J E A N N E 

## M A R Y 

## L A M A R 

## , J O H N 

## L A M A R 

## , D A V ID 

## L A M A R 

## , G R E G 

## L A M A R 

## , C H R IS 

## L A M A R 

## , E R IC 

## L A M A R 

## , R O B E R T 

## R O G E R S 

## , D A N A 

## R O G E R S 

## , J O H N 

## R O G E R S 

## , I N D IV ID U A L L Y 

## , A N D 

## D A N A 

## R O G E R S A N D 

## S H E R R IE 

## G R O G A N 

## , IN T H E IR C A P A C IT Y A S 

## J O IN T 

## I N D E P E N D E N T 

## E X E C U T R IX O F T H E 

## E S T A T E O F 

## C H A R L E S



## R O G E R S 

## , D E C E A S E D 

## , R E S P O N D E N T S

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### O N 

### P E T I T I O N F O R 

### R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

### C O U R T O F 

### A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

### F O U R T H 

### D I S T R I C T O F 

### T E X A S

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



### Argued F ebruary 24, 2015

J U S T I C E 

### G U Z M A N 

### delivere d the opinion of the Court.

For more than a deca de, a rog ue probate cler k looted milli ons of dollars from the estates of

Be x ar County residents who had died intestate. Discover y of the c rime spre e g ener ated a number
of civil disputes, including this case , which involves an intestate estate defr auded of more than half

### a milli on dollars. More than a deca de afte r the estate’ s administration ha d closed—a nd more than
three y ear s afte r lear

ning the estate had been signific antly underva lued—the intestate’s heirs petitioned the probate court by statutory and equitable bills of revie w to re- open the estate, alleg ing
the estate administrator brea ched fiduciar y duties and fra

udulently conce aled information about the
estate’ s assets. The probate court denied the sta tutory bill of r eview, but g rante d the equitable bill
of revie w and set aside the orde rs closing probate

. The heirs succe ssfully litigated their claims

ag ainst the administrator and wer e awa rded damag es ag ainst the administrator and his surety

. The
court of a ppeals a ffirme d. 410 S.W .3d 1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013).
The threshold issue here is whether the equitable bill of revie w was timely filed. Gene rally ,

a bill of revie w allows a party to challeng e a judgme nt afte r the time for filing a motion for new trial

or an appea l has ex p i re d

. Recog nizi ng the importance our leg al sy stem place s on the finality of judgme nts, courts g ener ally allow bills of revie w only in limit ed circ umstances or as authorized by

statute. An eq u i table bill of revie w must ordinarily be filed within four y ear s of the date the judgme nt is signe d unless extrinsi c fra ud is established or an express limit ations period is presc ribed by s t atut e. See T E X



### . C I V



### . P R A C



### . & R E M



### . C O D E 

### § 16.051 (pre scribing four- y ear residual statute of
limit ations if “ther e is no express limit ations period” ); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera , 379 S.W .3d 267,
275 (Tex. 2012) (tolling limit ations period beca use there was some evidenc e of extrinsi c fra ud). At
the time of the events g iving rise to this suit, Texas Probate Code section 31 provided that “no bill
of revie w shall be filed afte r two y ear s have elapse d from the date of [t he probate court’s] decision,
order or judgme nt.” Act of Marc h 17, 1955, 54th L eg ., R.S., ch. 55, § 31, 1955 Tex. Gen. L aws 88,

2

### 97 (for

mer T E X



### . P R O B



### . C O D E 

### § 31). Section 31’s p lain lang uag e thus establishes a two-y ear 1


### limit ations period for bills of revie w attacking a probate decision, order , or judgme nt. Although the
heirs contend limit ati o n s was tolled, we need not decide whether and under what circ umstances tolling doctrines might apply beca use the eff

ect of any tolling would have ended more than two y ear s
befor e the heir s filed their bill-of-re view petition. We there fore hold the heirs’ bill of revie w is untimely

. Acc ording ly , without re ac h i ng the merits of either the bill of revie w or the underly ing claims, we reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt and rende r judgme nt for the administrator and the
surety on the bill of review

. I. F actual and Proc edural Backgroun d
This case is y et another in a series of suits stemming from the misconduct of a former Be x ar County probate cler

k, Melvy n Spill man, who s t o l e milli ons of dollars from approximately 127
intestate probate estates he was tasked with handling in his capa city as a probate consultant with the
medical examiner’s office

. Spill man’s victims included the estate of Pierre V. Be rnar d, from which 2


### he stole more tha

n half a milli on dollars while administration of his proba te estate was pe nding.

Be rnar d died J anuar

y 25, 1994. Two day s later Robert A. Valdez, a San Antonio a ttorney ,

E f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1 , 2 0 1 4 , t h e T e x a s P r o b a t e C o d e w a s r e p e a l e d a n d r e c o d i f i e d a s t h e T e x a s E s t a t e s C o d e
. 1 S e e A c t o f

M a y 1 9 , 2 0 1 1 , 8 2 n d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 8 2 3 , § § 1

. 0 1

- 4

. 0 3 , 2 0 1 1 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s
. 1 9 0 1 , 1 9 0 1

- 2 0 9 5 ; A c t o f M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 9 , 8 1 s t L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 8 0 , § § 1

- 1 2 , 2 0 0 9 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 1 5 1 2 , 1 5 1 2

- 1 7 3 2

. S e c t i o n 3 1 ’ s p r o v i s i o n s h a v e b e e n r e c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n s 5 5

. 2 5 1 a n d 5 5

. 2 5 2 o f t h e E s t a t e s C o d e i n s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r f o r m
. S e e T e x
. E s t a t e s C o d e § § 5 5

. 2 1

- . 2 5 2

. C i t a t i o n s i n t h i s o p i n i o n w i l l b e t o t h e T e x a s P r o b a t e C o d e s e c t i o n s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s s u i t

.

S e e g e n e r a l l

y F e d

. D e

p o s i t I n s

. C o r p

. v

. L e n k , 3 6 1 S

. W

. 3 d 6 0 2 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 ) ( i n v o l v i n g a n e s t a t e 2

a d m i n i s t r a t o r ’ s s u i t a g a i n s t a b a n k f o r b r e a c h o f a d e p o s i t a g r e e m e n t d u e t o f r a u d ) ; J e f f e r s o n S t a t e B a n k v

. L e n k , 3 2 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 0 ) ( i n v o l v i n g a s u i t a g a i n s t a b a n k a r i s i n g f r o m S p i l l m a n ’ s f

r a u d u l e n t t r a n s f

e r o f f u n d s f r o m d e c e d e n t ’ s e s t a t e ) ; I

n r e E s t a t e o

f M e l c h i o r , 3 6 5 S

. W

. 3 d 7 9 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — S a n A n t o n i o 2 0 1 2 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( f e a t u r i n g a n o t h e r s u i t a g a i n s t a n i n v e s t m e n t f i r m f o r c o n v e r s i o n a r i s i n g o u t o f S p i l l m a n ’ s m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f f u n d s )

. 

### 3

### applied to serve as administrator for Be rnar d’s estate. Wit hin a month, Valdez was appointed by the

probate court as the persona l repr esenta tive and administrator of Be rnar d’s estate. To secur e his
ad m i nistration, Valdez filed a $260,000 surety bond issued by Fidelity and Casualty Company o f

New Y ork.
Wit h the nece ssary order s in pla ce, Valdez promptly inspected Be rnar d’s home for rec ords
and other information about assets Be rnar d owned at the time of his death. On M ar ch 3 , 1 9 9 4 , Valdez filed an “I

nventory and Appraisement of the Estate” with the probate court in which he
valued Be rnar d’s estate at $411,000, composed of $150,000 in rea l proper ty and $261,000 in

persona l proper

ty ( th e M a rch 1994 inventory

). Valdez repor

ted that Be rnar d’s persona l proper ty was
held in acc ounts at five diffe rent fina ncial ins tituti ons. Valdez s wore in the i nventory that, to his 3 

### knowledg e, the list was “a full and complete inventory and list of the prope rt y an d claims of the
estate” and “that the true amount of cash belong ing to said estate [was] corr ectly stated there in.” On

Marc h 10, 1994, the proba te cour t approve d the Marc h 1994 inventory

. Two months later, an i n d i v i d u al fede ral income tax return signe d by a cer tified public

acc ountant (CPA) was filed on Be rnar d’s behalf for the 1993 tax y ear , which had ended about a
month befor e Be rnar d’s death. Schedule B of the return repor ted taxable interest income of $19,494
from ten financ ial instit utions, including four banks not included in the Marc h 1994 inventory

. No 4

T h e a c c o u n t s a n d b a l a n c e s w e r e l i s t e d a s ( 1 ) $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 a t B a n k o f t h e W e s t , ( 2 ) $ 8 5 , 0 0 0 a t N a t i o n s B a n k , 3 ( 3 ) $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 a t E i s e n h a u e r N a t i o n a l B a n k , ( 4 ) $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 a t G u a r a n t y S a v i n g s , a n d ( 5 ) $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 a t J e f f e r s o n B a n k

.
T h e t a x r e t u r n d i s c l o s e s t h a t , f o r t a x y e a r 1 9 9 3 , B e r n a r d m a i n t a i n e d i n t e r e s t

- b e a r i n g a c c o u n t s a t : ( 1 ) B a n k 4

o f t h e W e s t ; ( 2 ) B r o a d w a y B a n k ; ( 3 ) E i s e n h o w e r B a n k ; ( 4 ) G u a r a n t y F e d e r a l S a v i n g s ; ( 5 ) I B C ; ( 6 ) J e f f e r s o n S t a t e B a n k ; ( 7 ) N a t i o n s B a n k ( t w o e n t r i e s ) ; ( 8 ) S e c u r i t y N a t i o n a l ; a n d ( 9 ) E i s e n h o w e r N a t i o n a l

. 

### 4

### ac co u n t b al ance s wer e li sted for these acc ounts on the t ax return, and i t is undisputed that th e t ax

return w as not filed with the proba te cour t. Near ly two y ear s later, Valdez applied f or pay ment of
his a ttorney ’s fee s and expenses. The a pplication ref

lected V aldez had par

ticipated in prepa

ration
of the tax return, at least to some deg ree , beca use it contained line items of 2.15 hours on April 12, 1994, for “g ather [i ng ] tax info for CPA” and 1. 3 0 h o u rs on April 20, 1994, for “telephone

conver sations with CPA, pay [i ng ] bills.” Valdez, howeve r, never filed an amende d estate inventory
that identified any additional bank acc ounts that may have exis ted at the time of Be rnar d’s death or
any acc ount balance s that differ ed fr om those stated in the Marc h 1994 inventory

. I nstead, Valdez’s “Ac count for Final Settlement” of the estate, filed with the court on May 8, 1996, listed assets that included “CD transfe r[s] ” totaling approxim at ely $240,000 along with
other rec eipts. Valdez repor ted the total va lue of the estate as $343,213.35 afte r pay ment of estate
debts and expenses. The probate court order ed final settlement and distribution of the estate on J une 14, 1996, and on October 4, 1996, signe d an order (1) discharg ing Valdez as administrator, (2) discharg ing Fidelity from further liability on the adminstrator’s bond, and (3) closing the estate.
Yea rs later , Spill man was convicted of a host of offe nses rela ted to his thef t. The cr iminal
trial reve aled Spill man had been pilfering estates in his char g e for y ear s. I n April 2002, Edwar d L

. 5 

### Rishebarg er, a cer

tified public acc ountant, was appo i n t ed as rec eiver of the assets seized from Spill man and was tasked with deter mining the value of proper ty misappropriate d from the defr auded estates, including the B erna rd estate

.

W h e n r e v e a l e d , S p i l l m a n ’ s i l l i c i t a c t i v i t y r e c e i v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s a t t e n t i o n
. S e e , e

. g

. , J i m Y a r d l e y , W h e r e 5 T h e r e W a s n ’ t a W i l l , H e F o u n d a W a y , N

. Y

. T IM E S , M a y 1 8 , 2 0 0 2

.



### 5

### I n Marc h and April 2003, Be rnar d’s heirs lear ned that Spill man had misappropriate d funds
from his estate. I n a letter dated April 21, 2003, Rishebarg er pr ovided the heir s with instructions 6


### for filing a claim for restitution f rom assets under rec eiver ship. Rishebarg er, citing acc ounts a t a ll

o f t h e b an k s listed on the 1993 tax return, estimated that Be rnar d owned $698,319.08 in personal

proper ty assets at the time of his death, which was considera bly more than the $260,000 Valdez had

repor ted. For some of the banks that had been identified on the Marc h 1994 inventory Valdez had filed, Rishebarg er found acc ount balanc es g rea tly in excess of tho s e Va l d ez h ad repor ted to the probate court.
I n Aug ust 2003, Rishebarg er filed a repor t rec ommending a plan for pay ing restitution
claims. I n that repor

t, which was se rved on Ber nard’ s heirs, R ishebarg er c oncluded Spillman had ultimately stolen $522,834.79 from the Be rnar d estate. The court there afte r approve d a distribution plan in which the B erna

rd estate would rec eive $56,878.65 in re stitut ion.
The heirs named Be rnar d Ba ron, a first cousin of the dece dent, to lead rec overy eff orts rela ted
to the estate. O n Marc h 8, 2005, Ba ron applied ( 1) to re- open administration of the pr obate e state

to re ce i v e t he approve d distribution of rec eiver ship assets and (2) to be appointed as succe ssor
admin i s t ra t o r. The probate court g rante d Ba ron’s application on April 11, 2005, and the estate

rec eived the allotted restitution pa y ment on May 9, 2005. Rishebarg er sent a copy of the 1993 tax

return with the distribution chec k, which prompted the heirs to file suit ag ainst Valdez in the orig inal

T h e h e i r s a r e B e r n a r d W

. B a r o n ; B e r n i e R a e B e r n a r d B o x ; D a r y l B e r n a r d ; M a r c u s B e r n a r d ; B a r b a r a S t r e f f 6 G r a c h e k ; P a m S t r e f

f M e y e r s ; S t e v e S t r e f

f ; S c o t t S t r e f

f ; Y v o n n e B a r o n F i s c h e r ; D a v i d H o l l e n b e c k ; E l i z a b e t h L a m a r ; K e l l y L a m a r L o e f

f e l h o l z ; J e a n n e M a r y L a m a r ; J o h n L a m a r ; D a v i d L a m a r ; G r e g L a m a r ; C h r i s L a m a r ; E r i c L a m a r ; R o b e r t R o g e r s ; D a n a R o g e r s ; J o h n R o g e r s ; a n d D a n a R o g e r s a n d S h e r r i e A n n G r o g a n , i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s J o i n t i n d e p e n d e n t E x e c u t r i x o f t h e E s t a t e o f C h a r l e s R o g e r s , d e c e a s e d

. 

### 6

### probate case for fra ud and brea ch of statutory and fiduciar y duties. The heirs also sued Fidelity as

7


### surety on the administrator’s bond.
The probate court conclude d it lacke d jurisdiction to appoint a succe ssor administrator o r
reop en t h e probate estate without first setting aside the 1996 order s by bill of revie w. The heirs 8


### there fore filed a petition for bill of revie w on Dec ember 11, 20 0 6 , to set aside the probate order s (1) approving the Marc h 1994 inventory , (2) approving the final acc ount, (3) discharg ing Valdez and Fidelity , and (4) closing the estate (re fer red to collectively as “the 1996 probate order s”). One y ear later, a bench trial took place in the bill-of-re view proce eding

. The probate court denied the heirs’

reque st for a statutory bill of revie w, but g rante d their reque st for an equitable bill of revie w and set
aside the 1996 probate order s as void. I n the judgme nt g ranting the bill of revie w, the probate court
found the 1996 orde rs:

• “we re e ntere d as the re sult of fraud, a ccide nt, or wrong ful ac ts” of Va ldez;

• “we re r ender ed...without any neg lige nce on the part of the [heirs] ”; and

• “we re not r ender ed as the result of any fra ud, acc ident, or wrong ful ac ts on the part of Respondent Fidelity and that nothing that Fidelity did or failed t o d o p reve nted

T h e h e i r s d i d n o t a l l e g e , a n d t h e r e h a s b e e n n o f i n d i n g , t h a t V a l d e z w a s c o m p l i c i t i n S p i l l m a n ’ s t h e f t

. 7

T h e h e i r s i n i t i a l l y f

i l e d t h e i r l a w s u i t i n t h e o r i g i n a l p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g a s a s u i t a p p e r t a i n i n g a n d i n c i d e n t t o 8

a p r o b a t e e s t a t e u n d e r f o r m e r s e c t i o n 5 A o f t h e P r o b a t e C o d e , w h i c h w a s r e p e a l e d i n 2 0 0 9

. S e e A c t o f M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 9 , 8 1 s t L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 3 5 1 , § 1 2 ( h ) , 2 0 0 9 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 4 2 7 3 , 4 2 7 9

. H o w e v e r , a p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g m u s t b e p e n d i n g f o r a p r o b a t e c o u r t t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r m a t t e r s r e l a t e d t o t h a t p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r f o r m e r s e c t i o n 5 A

. S e e , e

. g

. , F r o s t N a t ’ l B a n k v

. F e r n a n d e z , 3 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 4 9 4 , 5 0 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 0 ) ( a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t a c o u r t m a y e x e r c i s e i t s p r o b a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r “ m a t t e r s i n c i d e n t t o a n e s t a t e ” o n l y w h e n a p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g i s a l r e a d y p e n d i n g i n t h a t c o u r t ( q u o t i n g B a i l e y v

. C h e r o k e e C n t

y

. A p p r a i s a l D i s t

. , 8 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d 5 8 1 , 5 8 5 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 3 ) ) ) ; I n r e S i m s , 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 7 , 3 0 4 n
. 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — S a n A n t o n i o 2 0 0 2 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( s a m e ) ; S c h u l d v

. D e m b r i n s k i , 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 5 , 4 8 7 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 2 0 0 0 , n o p e t

. ) ( s a m e )

. A b i l l o f r e v i e w , h o w e v e r , i s a d i r e c t a t t a c k o n a j u d g m e n t a n d o n l y t h e c o u r t r e n d e r i n g t h e o r i g i n a l j u d g m e n t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p r o c e e d i n g
. F r o s t N a t ’ l B a n k , 3 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 0 4

. D i s t r i c t c o u r t s h a v e g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s , p r o c e e d i n g s , a n d r e m e d i e s e x c e p t w h e n e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s v e s t e d i n a n o t h e r t r i b u n a l

. T E X

. C O N S T

. a r t

. V § 8 ; T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § § 2 4

. 0 0 7

- . 0 0 8

. 

### 7

### [t he heir s] from pursuing this bill of reviewprior to Dec ember 13, 2006.” 9


### The court further conclude d the heirs had prese nted sufficie nt evidenc e of a meritorious claim or
defe nse, there by

entitling them to a bill of re view.
One of the heirs, David Hollenbec k, was appointed to serve as s u cc es s o r independe nt
administrator of the estate and was substitut ed as the pl aintiff for purposes of pursuing the claims

ag ainst Valdez and Fi d el i t y
. Following a bench trial on the merits, the probate court rende red judgme nt awa

rding Be rnar d’s estate $465,956.79, the differ ence betwee n the amount Spill man stole
and the amount Rishebarg er was able to distribute fr o m S p i l l m an ’s seized assets. I n the final judgme nt, Valdez was held l i ab l e fo r t he entire amount plus pre- and post-judgme nt interest, and Fidelity was h el d j o intly and sever ally liable with Valdez up to the amount of the surety bond, $260,000, plus pre- a

nd post-judgme nt interest. 1 0



### I n addition to other pertinent f indings, the tria l court dete rmined:

C the heirs had no adequate leg al reme dy to avoid the eff ect of the err oneous 1996 probate order s beca use they did not acquire actua l knowledg e of Valdez’s failu re t o d i s close the true estate value until afte r the time had passed f or a motion for ne w trial or a restric ted appe al;

C Valdez’s failure to disclose all of Be rnar d’s bank acc ounts in the documents filed wit h the probate court while disclosing such information i n Be rnar d’s 1993 individual income tax return constitutes “extrinsic fraud” ;

C t h e 1996 order s wer e procur ed based on Valdez’s “wr ong ful acts” an d “substantially

incorre ct mater ial information”;

T h e h e i r s ’ “ O r i g i n a l P e t i t i o n f o r B i l l o f R e v i e w ” a c t u a l l y b e a r s a D e c e m b e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 6 f i l e s t a m p
. 9

F i d e l i t y w a s a w a r d e d $ 2 6 0 , 0 0 0 o n i t s c r o s s - c l a i m s a g a i n s t V a l d e z a n d S p i l l m a n , p l u s p r e - a n d p o s t

- j u d g m e n t 10 i n t e r e s t

. V a l d e z w a s s i m i l a r l y a w a r d e d $ 4 6 5 , 9 5 6 a g a i n s t S p i l l m a n , p l u s p r e - a n d p o s t

- j u d g m e n t i n t e r e s t

. 

### 8

### C the heirs “did not disc over the misappropriation of assets” “or any potential claims ag ainst [Valdez]

. . . until they rec eived notification from the Rece iver [R ishebarg er]. . . sometime subsequent to Fe bruar y 20, 2003”;

C “[t] he discovery rule applies to this case an d [ t h e heirs] had no rea son to know, nor should they have known, and the evidenc e supports a finding that they did not know of any misappropriation perta ining to the [estate] prior to the expiration of limit ations to asser t a brea ch of fiduciar

y duty lawsuit ag ainst [Valdez and his surety , Fidelity ]”; and

C t h e d i s co v ery rule applies to the four- y ear statute of limit ations for an equitable bill of revie w based on the exis tence of extrinsi c fra ud and the foury ear statute of limitations for brea ch of f iduciary duty

. On appea l, Valdez and Fidelity arg ued the petition for equitable bill of revie w was untimely
and without merit. Valdez also asser ted evidenc e-suf

ficienc y challeng es to vari o u s fi ndings supporting the judgme nt and further challeng ed the probate court’s admission of the 1993 tax return
into evidenc e. Fidelity appea led the awa rd of pre j u d g ment interest above the bond amount and additionally arg ued that Valdez’s wrong doing could not be imputed to Fidelity for purposes of any applicable tolling doctrines

. The heirs did not challeng e the order deny ing their statutory bill of
revie w.
The court of appea ls aff irmed in all res p ec ts, concluding in rele vant part that the heirs’ equitable bill of revie w was timely becau s e limit ations was tolled until they discovere d, or could
have discovere d, extrinsi c fra ud. T h e co u rt did not square ly addre ss when the estoppel eff ect of tolling ended, but sug g ested tolling cea sed no ear lier than M ar ch o r April 2003 when the heirs
lear ned S pillman had st o len assets from Berna rd’s estate, which was withi n four y ear s of t he date they filed their petition f

or bill of revie w. 410 S.W .3d at 6-8. We g rante d Valdez’s and Fidelity ’s petitions for revie w.
9

### II. Discussion

Although the parties have raised a number of issues on appea l, the crux of the dispute is the
timeliness of the heirs’ petition for bill of revie w. The heirs initiated bill-of-re view proce eding s more
than ten y ear s afte r the p ro b at e court closed administration of Be rnar d’s estate, which nece ssarily

g ives rise to limit ations conce rns. As prese nted here , the time l i n es s q u es t ion has three aspec ts: (1) the a pplicable limitations period; (2) the a pplicability

of any tolling doctrine s; and (3) the point at which tolling, if

any , cea sed.
The parties disag ree about whether the applicable limit ations p er iod for equitable bills of
revie w in probate proce eding s is two y ear s or four y ear s. Although equitable bills of revie w are ordinarily subject to a four- y ear statute of limit ations, Valdez and Fidelity arg ue t h at , by enac ting
section 31 of the Texas Probate Code, the L eg islature expressly or eff ectively exti ng uished equitable
bills of revie w in p ro b at e p ro ce eding s or, at a minimum , presc ribed a two-y ear limit ations period
without reg ard to the ty

pe of bill reque sted. Citi ng langu age i n s ec tion 31 and arg uing for an
extension of our prec edent, Valdez and Fidelity further contend that tolling doctrines do not apply to bills of review in probate proc eeding s due to an ove rar ching public policy favor ing f

inality of such proceed i ng s. See F O R M E R 

### T E X



### . P R O B A T E 

### C O D E 

### § 31; Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez , 315 S.W .3d 494, 497 (Tex. 2010) (“The discovery rule does not apply to inheritance o r h ei rship claims by
non-marital children, or to bill of revie w claims to set aside probate judgme nts.”); Litt le v. Smith , 943
S.W .2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1997) (“Te x as courts have ref used to apply the discovery rule to claims arising

ou t of probate proce eding s in most instances

. . . even in the fac e of alleg ations of fra ud.”). I n the
alterna tive, they asser

t the heir s fa i l ed to file their petition for bill of revie w within two y ear s of

10

### discovering Be rnar d’s estate had been underva lued by more than half a milli on dollars in the probate

proce eding

. Given the ten-y ear lag betwee n final dispositi on of Be rnar d’s estate and the inception of the
bill-of-re view proce eding , the heirs r e ly o n d is c o v e r y - r u le a n d f r a u d u le n t- c o n c e a lm e nt tolling theories

to a void the limit ations time-bar, althoug h they vacillate betwee n the two doctrines. Contingent on the applica

bility of tolling principles, the heirs claim limit ations was arr ested until May 2005 when they first rec eived a copy of the 1993 tax return, which they alleg e ref lects Valdez’s knowledg e and

conce alment of additional estate assets. I n the heirs’ view, their Dec ember 20 0 6 fi l i n g was ti mely
whether a two- or four- y ear limit ations period applies. We disag ree
. We conclude that a two-y ear limit ations period applies and that the heirs’ petition for bill of
revie w was not timely

filed re g ardle ss of whethe r limitations was tolled. Be cause resolution of the
limit ations issue is dispositi ve of the appea l, we need not addre ss the merits of the rema ining issues.
A. Bills of

Review
“A bill of review is broug ht as a direc t attack on a judgment t hat is no longe r appe alable or subject to a motion for new trial.” Frost Nat’l Bank , 315 S.W .3d at 504. Be cause it is a direc t attack,

a bill of revie w must be filed in the court that rende red the orig inal judgme nt, and only that court may
exercise jurisdiction over the bill. Id

. Courts have long rec og nized bills of revie w rooted in g ener al principles of equity or as presc ribed by the L eg islature, but co urts do not rea dily g rant them “[b] eca use it is fu n d a me n ta lly important in the administration of justice that some finality be acc orded to judgments.” Alexande r v. Hagedorn , 226 S.W .2d 996, 998 (Tex. 1950); see Crouch v . McG aw , 1 3 8 S

. W .2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1940) (noting that a bill of revie w require s “something more t h an

11

### injusti ce” ).

Equitable bills of revie w are not a novel leg al conce pt and can be traced as fa r b ac k as

sevente enth centur

y Eng land. See Finality of Equity Dec rees in the Light of Subsequent Eve nts , 59

H A R V



### . L

. R E V



### . 957, 958 (1946) (“I n equity a decr ee may be re- examined by a bill of revie w, a
proce dure g oing back at least as far as L ord Ba con’s Ordinanc es in 1619.”). To obtain an equitable bill of review, a petitioner must g ener ally plead and prove (1) a meritorious claim or de fense to the judgme nt, (2) which the petitioner was preve nted from making by officia l mistake or by the opposing
party ’s fra

ud, acc ident, or wrong ful act, (3) unmix ed with any fault or neg lige nce on the petitioner’s

own part. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 751-52 (T ex
. 2 0 0 3 ); Alexande r , 226
S.W .2d at 998; see also Patrick J. Dy er, A Practical Guide to the Equitable Bill of Rev iew , 70 Tex.
B.J. 20, 22 (2007). Unless otherwise specifie d by statute, equitable bills of revie w car ry a four- y ear

statute of limit ations. Caldwell v. Barnes , 975 S.W .2d 535, 538 (Tex. 1998) (citing T E X



### . C I V



### . P R A C



### . & R E M



### . C O D E 

### § 16.051). Statutory bills of revie w are more scar ce, ex i s t i ng predominantly in the probate and

g uardia nship contexts. See, e.g. , T E X



### . E S T A T E S 

### C O D E 

### §§ 55.251, 202.203, 1056.101; cf. T E X



### . C O D E


### C R I M



### . P R O C



### . art. 22.17. At all times rele vant to this proce eding , section 31 of the Texas Probate Code
allowed f or a statutory

bill of review in c onnection with proba te proc eeding s, providing: Any person interested may , by a bill of revie w filed in the court in which the probate proce eding s wer e had, have any decision, order , or j udg ment rende red by the court,
or by the judge there of, revised and corr ecte d on showing err or there in; but no proce ss or action under such decision, order or judgme nt shall be stay ed except by writ of injunction, and no bill of revie w shall be filed afte r two y ear s have e lapsed fr om the date of such dec ision, order, or judg ment.

12

### F O R M E R 

### T E X



### . P R O B



### . C O D E 

### § 31 (cur re n t v er s i on at T E X



### . E S T A T E S 

### C O D E 

### § 55.251). I n contra st to

equitable bills of revie w, section 31 has been interpre ted to require a showing of “substantial err or”
in a prior decision, order , or judgme nt. See, e.g. , N a d o l n ey v. Taub , 116 S.W .3d 273, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist

. ] 2 003, pet. denied) (“The purpose of a section 31 bill of revie w is to
revise and corr ect err ors, not mere ly to set aside decisions, order s, or judgme nts rende re d b y t h e probate court.” ); McD onald v. Carroll , 783 S.W .2d 286, 288 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) ; cf. Norton v. Cheney , 161 S.W .2d 73, 74 (Tex. 1942) (holding that standard for obtaining equitable
bill of revie w did not apply to statutory bill o f re v i ew i n g uardia nship proce eding , citing Jones v.
Parker , 3 S.W

. 222, 224 (Tex. 1886)). Fidelity and Valdez contend the L eg islature intended section
31 to displace equitable bills of revie w in probate proce eding s, but to the extent it does not, they arg ue
the statute plainly establishes the outer temporal limit s for attacking a probate judgme nt. Cf.
Gramerc y Ins. Co. v. State , 834 S.W .2d 379, 381 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, no pet.) (holding
that the L eg islature intended to abrog ate equitable-bill-of-r eview require ments when it enac ted t he specia l statutory

bill of review in T E X



### . C O D E 

### C R I M



### . P R O C



### . art. 22.17).

B. App licable Statute of Li m itations
Whether section 31 presc ribes the applicable statute of limit ations prese nts a matter of
statutory construction, which we revie w de novo
. City of Rock wall v. Hughes , 246 S.W .3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008). I n doing so, we construe the words of the statute acc ording to their plain meaning and
within their contextual environs. Tex. Dep’ t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley , 146 S.W .3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004).

Enac ting statutes of limit ations is a leg islative prer og ative. S.V. v. R.V ., 933 S.W .2d 1, 3 (Tex.

13

### 1996). The purpose of a limit ations period is to “esta blish a point of repose a n d t o t er m i n at e st ale
claims.” Id

. (citing Murray v. San Jacinto Agenc y, Inc. , 800 S.W .2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990)). Bills of
revie w are subject to statutes of limit ations, but the limit ations period depends on the leg al context.
The L eg islature has provided a defa ult limit ations period of four y ear s if no express limit ations period
has been specified fo r a p articular cause of action: “Eve ry action for which there is no express
limit ations period, except an action for the rec overy of rea l proper ty , must be broug ht not later than
four y ear s afte r the day the cause of action acc rues.” T E X



### . C I V



### . P R A C



### . & R E M



### . C O D E 

### § 16.051. The
four- y ear residual statute of limit ations ty pically applies to bills of revie w. Caldwell , 975 S.W .2d at
538.
When the L eg islature has decla red an express limit ations period, howeve r, the more specific
time limit controls. See, e.g. , T E X



### . C I V



### . P R A C



### . & R E M



### . C O D E 

### §§ 16.002-.072 (pre scribing limit ations periods of one to five y ear s for various common-law caus es o f ac tion); W illiams v. Khalaf

, 802
S.W .2d 651, 654 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (listing a multit ude of statutory altera tions to the residual four- y ear
limit ations period). The L eg islature has done so here

. As part of a compre hensive statutory scheme g overning the probate proce ss, the L eg islature
authorized an int ere sted party to seek a bill of review, but a ffirma tively decla red “ no bill of review
shall be filed afte r two y ear s have elapse d from the date” of a probate court decision, order , or judgme nt. F O R M E R 

### T E X



### . P R O B



### . C O D E 

### § 31. Wit hout r eg ard to whether the L eg islature intended to abrog ate equitable bills of revie w in the probate context—which we need not d ec i d e— s ec t i on 31 unequivoca lly presc ribes a two-y ear limit ations period for all bills of revie w in probate proce eding s.
The statute neither provides nor sug g ests differ ent limit atio n s periods for bills of revie w in the probate

14

### context. Absent an absurd or unrea sonable result, we must g ive eff ect to the statute’s plain lang uag e.
See TGS- NOPEC Geophysic al Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W .3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011).
Our plain-lang uag e rea ding of section 31 is reinfor ced when the statute is viewed within the

context of the Probate Code. See, e.g. , CHCA W oman’s Hosp. v. Lidji , 403 S.W .3d 228, 231-32 (Tex. 2013) (citing the well established stat utory -construc tion canon requiring considera tion of st atutory lang uag e in the context of the entire statutory scheme ). The L eg islature has rar ely presc ribed express
limit ations periods for bills of revie w but did so sever al times in the Probate Code and car ried those
limit ations forwa

rd when the Probate Code was rec ently rec odified as the Texas E states Code. See

F O R M E R 

### T E X



### . P R O B A T E 

### C O D E 

### §§ 31 (pre scribing two-y ear limit ations period for bills of revie w), 55 (heir not proper ly serve d in an heirship proce eding to file a bill of revie w within four y ear s or “af ter
the passag e of any leng th of time” with “proof of actua l fra ud”), 657 (bill of revie w in g uardia nship

proce eding cannot be filed more than two y ear s from the date of the decision, order , or judgme nt, or

more than two y ear s afte r the date a disability is remove d); see also T E X



### . E S T A T E S 

### C O D E 

### §§ 55.251, 202.203, 1056.101; cf. id. § 256.204 (limiti ng will contest to two y ear s or two y ear s afte r discovering
fra ud or forg ery

). These express ref

ere nces to s t at u t es of limit ations for bills of revie w ref lect leg is l at i v e concern for the order ly administration of estates and finality of judgme nts and are
consistent with the “strong public interest in acc ording finality to pro bate procee dings,” which has
bee n aff orded g rea t weig ht in our prec edent. Litt le , 943 S.W .2d at 418-21 (conc luding that the discovery rule does not apply to a doptees’ belated inheritanc e claims despite the inhere nt dif ficulty
of promptly asser

ting such claims); see Frost Nat’l Bank , 315 S

. W

. 3 d at 4 9 7 (holding that “the discovery rule does not apply to

. . . bill o f re v i ew cl ai m s to set aside probate judgme nts”).

15

### Construing section 31 as presc ribing a two-y ea r l i m itations period for bills of revie w is neither

patently absurd nor

unrea sonable in the statutory context. 1 1



### Acc ording ly , we conclude the two-y ear statute of limit ations presc ribed in section 31 applies
and the heirs’ bill of revie w was untimely unless (1) the limit ations period was tolled and (2) the heirs
filed their petition for bill of revie w within two y ear s from the date the injury was discovera ble or the

I n t e r p r e t a t i v e c o m m e n t a r y a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e e n a c t m e n t e x p l a i n s t h a t s e c t i o n 3 1 w a s a d o p t e d t o ( 1 ) a d d r e s s 11

c a s e l a w c a l l i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a p r o b a t e c o u r t c o u l d e n t e r t a i n a b i l l o f r e v i e w t o r e v i s e a p r o b a t e d e c i s i o n a n d ( 2 ) r e s o l v e d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g T e x a s c o u r t s a s t o w h e t h e r l i m i t a t i o n s f o r f i l i n g a b i l l o f r e v i e w i n a p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g w a s t w o y e a r s o r f

o u r y e a r s
. T h e c o m m e n t a r y e x p l a i n s :

A f o r m e r s t a t u t e a u t h o r i z e d t h e u s e o f b i l l s o f r e v i e w i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h g u a r d i a n s h i p s
. B e c a u s e o f t h e d e c i s i o n i n H e a t h v
. L a y n e , 6 2 T

. 6 8 6 ( 1 8 8 4 ) , d o u b t h a s e x i s t e d w h e t h e r b i l l s o f r e v i e w c o u l d b e u s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h e s t a t e s o f d e c e d e n t s , a l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t s h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t , e i t h e r b y s u c h b i l l s o r b y s i m i l a r p r o c e d u r e , j u d g m e n t s c o u l d b e r e v i s e d o r c o r r e c t e d i f f r a u d , a c c i d e n t , m i s t a k e , o r l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s s h o w n
. U n d e r t h e [ P r o b a t e ] C o d e , i t w o u l d s e e m t h a t b i l l s o f
r e v i e w a r e n o w f

u l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o j u d g m e n t s a f f e c t i n g e s t a t e s o f d e c e d e n t s
.
U n d e r t h e f

o r m e r s t a t u t e , s o m e c o u r t s h e l d t h a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d f o r o b t a i n i n g a b i l l o f
r e v i e w w a s t w o y e a r s , w h i l e o t h e r c o u r t s h e l d t h a t t h e p e r i o d w a s f o u r y e a r s
. T h i s S e c t i o n r e s o l v e s t h e c o n f l i c t b y s p e c i f

y i n g t w o y e a r s
.
T h e p r o v i s o w a s a d d e d t o h a r m o n i z e t h i s S e c t i o n w i t h t h e S e c t i o n d e a l i n g w i t h c e r t i o r a r i

.
I n t e r p r e t i v e C o m m e n t a r

y t o T E X

. P R O B A T E C O D E § 3 1 ( W e s t 1 9 5 6 ) ( c i t i n g H e a t h v

. L a y n e , 6 2 T e x
. 6 8 6 , 6 9 5 ( T e x
. 1 8 8 4 ) , i n w h i c h t h e C o u r t d e c l a r e d : “ E x c e p t a s i t i s g i v e n b y s t a t u t e , a p r o b a t e c o u r t h a s n o p o w e r b y b i l l o f r e v i e w t o r e v i s e i t s o w n d e c i s i o n s
. T h e l a w s p r o v i d e t h a t t h i s s h a l l b e d o n e b y s o m e a p p e l l a t e p r o c e e d i n g i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s
. ” )

.

A u t h o r i z i n g a b i l l o f r e v i e w i n p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g s a n d p r e s c r i b i n g a l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d w a s a s u b s t a n t i v e a d d i t i o n i n t h e 1 9 5 5 c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e P r o b a t e C o d e , w h i c h w a s o t h e r w i s e p r e d o m i n a n t l y n o n s u b s t a n t i v e
. R

. D e a n M o o r h e a d , F o r w a r d t o T E X

. R E V

. C IV

. S T A T S

. V o l

. 1 7 A , P r o b a t e C o d e a t I V

- V I ( W e s t 1 9 5 6 ) ( “ 9 5 % o f t h e C o d e c o n s i s t s o f a r e e n a c t m e n t o f t h e f o r m e r s t a t u t e s ” b u t i n a d d i t i o n t o “ o t h e r i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s a n d a d d i t i o n s , ” “ [ t ] h e p e r i o d f o r o b t a i n i n g a b i l l o f r e v i e w h a s a l s o b e e n s e t a t t w o y e a r s
. . . . ” ) ; s e e a l s o P r o b a t e C o d e I n s t i t u t e , 1 8 T e x
. B

. J

. 3 7 3 , 3 7 4 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ( “ S o m e T e x a s c o u r t s h o l d t h a t a b i l l o f r e v i e w c a n b e h a d a t a n y t i m e w i t h i n 4 y e a r s , w h i l e o t h e r c o u r t s h o l d t h a t t h e p e r i o d i s 2 y e a r s
. S e c t i o n 3 1 e l i m i n a t e s t h i s c o n f l i c t a n d h a r m o n i z e s b i l l s o f r e v i e w w i t h c e r t i o r a r i b y a d o p t i n g t h e 2

- y e a r p e r i o d

. ” ) ; C l u c k v

. H e s t e r , 5 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 4 5 , 8 4 8 ( T e x
. 1 9 7 5 ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a p p e a l a n d c e r t i o r a r i w e r e c o n c u r r e n t a n d a l t e r n a t i v e r e m e d i e s a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h a t a p p e a l t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s a t r u e t r i a l d e n o v o w h e r e a s

“ c e r t i o r a r i r e v i e w s t h e a c t i o n o f t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t f o r e r r o r s c o m m i t t e d b y t h a t c o u r t

. . . d e n o v o , b u t t h e i s s u e s a r e c o n f i n e d t o e r r o r s o f

t h e c o u n t y c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t f

o r t h i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e [ w r i t o f e r r o r ] ” ) ; L e c h o w v

. M o o r e , 5 2 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 1 4 , 6 1 5 n
. 1 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 1 9 7 5 , n o w r i t ) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t b e f o r e s e c t i o n 3 0 o f t h e T e x a s P r o b a t e C o d e w a s r e p e a l e d “ [ p ] r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e c o u n t y c o u r t [ c o u l d ] b e r e v i e w e d i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t b y w a y o f w r i t o f
c e r t i o r a r i ” )

. 

### 16

### estoppel ef fec t of tolling ce ased.
C. Tollin g
Unless an acc rual date is presc ribed by statute, “[c]auses of acti o n accrue and statutes of
lim i t ations beg in to run when fac ts come into exis tence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial

reme dy .” Exx on Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C. , 348 S.W .3d 194, 202 (Tex. 2011). Thus, a

caus e o f ac t i o n g ener ally acc rues when a wrong ful act causes some leg al i njury , even if the fact of injury is not discovere d until later, and ev en i f all resulting damag es have not y et occur red. See

Trini ty River Aut h

. v. URS Consultant s, Inc ., 889 S.W .2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1994). When a cause of
action ac crue s is ty

pically a question of law

. Exx on Corp. , 348 S.W .3d at 202.

We have rec og nized two doctrines that may delay acc rual or toll limit ations: (1) the discovery
rule and (2) fra

udulent conce alment. Shell Oil Co. v. Ross , 356 S.W .3d 924, 927, 929-30 (Tex. 2011).
The discove ry

rule a pplies on a cate g orica l ba sis to injuries that ar e both inhere ntly undiscovera

ble
and objectively verifia

ble. Id. at 930 (citing W

agner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood , 58 S.W .3d 732, 734 (Tex. 2001)). When applicable , the discovery rule “def ers the acc rual of the cause of action until the injury was or could have been rea sonably discovere d.” Shell Oil Co. , 356 S.W .3d at 929-30. As we
have observe d, “Te x as courts have ref used to apply the discovery rule to claims arising out of probate

proce eding s in most instances

. . . even in the fac e of alleg ations of fra ud.” Litt le , 943 S.W .2d at 420 (dec lining to apply the discovery rule to inheritanc e claims of adopted children) ; see Frost Nat’l Bank , 315 S.W .3d at 497 (“[W] e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to

. . . bill of revie w claims to set aside pr obate judg ments.”).
Unlike the discovery rule’s cate g ori ca l ap p roac h, fra udulent conce alment is a fac t-specif ic

17

### equitable doctrine t hat t olls limit ations until the fraud i s discovere d or could have been discovered

with rea sonable dilig ence
. Shell Oil Co. , 356 S.W .3d at 927. When a defenda nt is under a duty

to
make a disclosure but conce als the exis tence of a cause of action from the party to whom it belong s,
the defe ndant is estopped from rely ing on the defe nse of limit ations until the party lear ns of the rig ht
of action or should rea sonably have discover ed i t

. Borderlon v. Pec k , 661 S.W .2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983); see Kerlin v. Sauceda , 263 S.W .3d 920, 925 (Tex. 2008). Texas courts have long rec og nized
that “fr aud vitiates whateve r it touches,” and we have consistently held t h at “a party will not be permitted to av ai l himself of the protec tion of a limit ations statute when by his own fra ud he has

preve nted the other party from seeking redr ess within the period of limit ations.” Borderl on , 661
S.W .2d at 908-09. Howeve r, “the l ega l ef fect of that conce alment does not extend the limit ations period indefinitely .” Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann , 359 S.W .3d 620, 623 (Tex. 2011). Rather, “[t] he
estop pel eff

ect of fra

udulent conce alment ends when a party lear ns of fac ts, conditions, or
circ umstances which would cause a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry , which, if pursued,
would lead to the discovery of the conce aled cause of acti o n .” Borderlon , 661 S.W .2d at 909.
“Knowle dg e of suc h fac ts is in l aw e quivalent to knowledg e of the cause of ac tion.” Id.

Ex tending the time period for avoiding or altering a judgme nt is inhere ntly antag onistic to the

sy stemic need for finality of judgme nts, which we have observe d with particula rity in the probate

context. See, e.g. , Litt le , 943 S.W .2d at 4 1 7 (“ T h e need for finality of probate proce eding s is
well-re cog nized by

this and other cour

ts.”); see also Robinson v

. W eave r , 550 S.W .2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977) (“The fac t that a meritorious claim might there by be rende red nonasser tible is an unfortunate ,

occa sional by -produc t of the opera tion of limit ations.”). Bills of revie w are intrinsically incong ruous
18

### with finality , and thus, are not lightly g rante d. Frost Nat’l Bank , 315 S.W .3d at 510 (“We have long

rec og nized the importance of acc ording finality to judgments, a

nd acc ording ly

we have held courts to string ent bill of revie w standards to pr otect that policy favor ing finality .”). I ndeed, we pointedly
acknow ledg ed in an ear ly b i ll of revie w case that “‘[e]ndless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally deter

mined, would be worse than occa sional miscarr iag es of justice.’” Alexande r , 226 S.W .2d at 998 (quoting Pico v. Cohn , 25 P. 970, 971 (Cal. 1891)).

To the ex tent we have ex presse d an elevated concer n for finality of probate judg ments, our
interest is ha

rdly idiosy

ncra tic. As the United States Supreme Court ha s held, “[a]fter an estate has
been finally distributed, the interest in finalit y may provide an additional, valid justification for
barr ing the belated asser

tion of claims,” even if the claims have merit and “eve n though mistakes of
law or fac t may have occur red during the probate proce ss.” Ree d v. Campbell , 476 U.S. 852, 855-56 (1986) (involving a Texas estate) ; see also Lalli v. Lalli , 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (re cog nizi ng that

a state’s i n t er est in providing for the just and order ly dispositi on of proper ty at death is “of
considera b l e m agnit ude.”)

. Circumscribing the reach of limit ations-tolling doctrines applicable to
bills of revie w nece ssarily streng thens finality and re d u ce s t he prospec t of delay ed attacks on judgme nts.
For this rea son, we have declined to apply the discovery rule to extend limit ations in probate

cases involving inheritanc e and heirship claims. Be rnar d’s heirs contend, howeve r, that t h e unavailability of tolling is constraine d to those contexts. Acc ording to t h e heirs, a differ ent result
obtains when violations of fiduciar y duties and fra

udulent conce alment are at issue or when an attack on finality

involves missi ng or undistributed assets.

19

### A fi d u ci ar y rela tionship g ives rise to a duty of full disclosure of all materia l fac ts. Ke ck , Mahin & Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. , 20 S.W .3d 692, 699 (Tex. 2000)

. A per son to whom a
fiduciar y duty is owed may be unable to inquire into the fiduciar y ’s actions or may be unawa re of the
need to do so. See S.V

. , 933 S.W .3d at 8. Moreove r, eve n if inquiry is made, “[f]acts which mig ht ordinarily require investiga tion likely may not excite suspicion wher e a fiduciar y rela ti o n s h i p is
involved.” W

illis v. Mave rick , 760 S.W .2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988). Stil l, when the fac t of misconduct is evident, dilige nt inquiry is require d. S.V. , 933 S.W .2d at 8.
Whil e we have not expressly considere d the fiduciar y -dut y an d fra

udulent-conc ealment
overla y in the probate context, we do not rea ch the issue here b ec au s e t he heirs had sufficie nt
information to place them on inquiry notice at least three y ear s befor e they initia t ed bill-of-re view

proce eding s. Acc ording ly , the petition for bill of revie w was untimely even if limit ations wer e tolled.
As ear ly as Marc h 2003 and as late as Aug ust 2003, the heirs wer e informed that the Be rnar d

estate had been substantially underva lued. Rishebarg er wrote Be rnar d’s heirs a letter, dated April 21, 2003, aler ting them to Spill man’s plundering of the estate. Rishebarg er disclosed that “[t] he purpose
of this letter is to inform y ou of the possible value of the claim of the Dec edent of whom y ou inquired, and the proce dure that must be follow ed i n order to prese nt the claim.” Rishebarg er’ s

comm unication ref

ere nced exhibi ts identify ing the estimated value of the assets Spill man misappropriate d from the estate and the potential restitution amount. The letter further outlined the

proce ss by which the heirs could submit a claim, and closed by advising that althoug h not r equire d, “it is highly

rec ommended that y ou reta in an attorne y .”

I n Aug ust 2003, Rishebarg er reporte d to the di strict court the precise amount Spill man had

20

### stolen from the Be rnar d estate. I mportantly , this repor t, which was serve d o n Be rnard’s heirs,
indicates the Be rnar d estate was underva lued by $522,834.79. I f there was otherwise any doubt, the Aug ust 2003 repor

t made clea

r that the assets on hand at Be rnar d’s death vastly exceede d the amounts
stated in the Marc h 1994 inventory

. A half-million-dollar discrepa ncy is considera

ble and g ives rise

to a duty to make further inquiry

. Rishebarg er’ s calc ulations identify eac h bank acc ount Be rnar d held

at the time of his d ea t h an d t h e balanc e on that date. Thoug h it is unclea r when that specific
information was provided to the heirs, the rec ord plainly ref lects that the information was available had they asked.
Whil e later acquir ing the 1993 tax return may have been helpful, a rea sonably prudent person
would have inquired about the g rave disparity betwee n the amount of assets distributed in the probate

proce eding s and the funds repor ted to have been in exis tence at the time of Be rn ar d ’s d eath. The
1993 tax re turn mere ly shows interest ear ned on various acc ounts a t some point during the tax y ear
prec eding Be rnar d ’s d ea t h ; in compar ison, Rishebarg er’ s repor t aff irmatively identifies the actua l

assets Be rnar d owned at his death that wer e not distributed in the probate proce eding

. Rece ipt of this
information was sufficie nt to trig g er inquiry notice and restar t limit ations to the extent of any tolling. Although the heirs arg ue there was u n c e r ta in ty a b out whether Spill man’s theft occur red befor e or afte r Valdez’s appointment, the 1993 tax return is no more e nlightening in that reg ard.
The heirs’ claims wer e discovera ble and the estoppel eff

ect of tolling cea sed more than two

y ear s befor e they initiated bill-of-re view p ro ce ed i n gs. Acc ording ly , their bill of revie w was timebarr ed.

21

### III. Conclusi on

The heirs’ petition for bill of revie w was filed more than two y ear s afte r they rec eived
information that would cause a rea sonably prudent person to make inquiry , which if pursued would
lead to the discovery of the conce aled cause of action. See Etan Indus. , 359 S.W .3d at 623; Shell Oil
Co. , 356 S.W .3d at 927, 929-30. Ac cording ly , without considering the m erits of the bi ll of review

or the underlying claims, we reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt and rende r judgme nt in Valdez’s
and F idelity ’s fa vor on the bill of re view.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Eva M. Guzman J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED : J une 12, 2015

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