IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

DAVID B. ROSSMAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

PRIMECARE MEDICAL INC., et al., 

 Defendants. 

 No. 4:21-CV-00703 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

APRIL 5, 2022 

David Rossman arrived at Centre County Correctional Facility on October 15, 

2021, five days removed from a car accident that required emergency surgery to fuse 

his fractured C6 and C7 vertebrae.1

 Severe as this injury was, he was up and walking 

by October 13, and the hospital approved his discharge into police custody two days 

later.2

 But he was not yet out of the woods: just five days after he entered the 

Correctional Facility, he left in an ambulance.3

 The screw that held his fractured 

vertebrae together had come loose, rendering the 22-year-old a tetraplegic.4

 

The Defendants, counts, and allegations in this suit are numerous. Today’s 

motion, however, is narrow. It concerns only whether Centre County and 

1

 Doc. 1 ¶ 43. 

2

 Id. ¶ 43. 

3

 Id. ¶ 167. 

4

 Id. ¶ 174. 

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Corrections Officers Waite and Zettle are proper defendants. Because I find that 

Rossman has alleged facts that, if true, would allow this Court to find these 

Defendants liable, their motion to dismiss is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Given that this motion to dismiss comes from a narrow band of Defendants, a 

more limited treatment of the facts is appropriate. For the County, Waite, and Zettle, 

the story picks up after Rossman’s accident, surgery, and discharge into policy 

custody, when he could not post $75,000 in bail before Magisterial District Judge 

Gillette-Walker, resulting in his commitment to the Centre County Correctional 

Facility.5

 Rossman arrived at the Correctional Facility in a cervical thoracic orthosis 

brace with explicit instructions from his treating physician that his brace should be 

worn whenever he was out of bed, save for showers.6

 He was greeted by Corrections 

Officer Zettle, who was given a copy of his hospital discharge papers.7

 In Rossman’s 

telling, his appearance and his discharge papers made Zettle aware of his serious 

medical needs, which he knew the facility could not meet.8

 But Zettle—who 

Rossman claims had the authority to deny his detainment in favor of a medically 

appropriate facility, or contact a superior who could do the same—took no such 

5

 Id. ¶¶ 45, 47, 50. 

6

 Id. ¶ 51. 

7

 Id. ¶ 56. 

8

 Id. ¶¶ 57–60. 

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steps.9 Instead, he placed Rossman in a holding cell for two hours until a series of 

PrimeCare Medical nurses completed his intake process.10

 Ultimately, PrimeCare Medical staff approved Rossman’s move to a single 

cell, rather than placing him in the Correctional Facility’s health services room.11 In 

the days that followed, Rossman alleges to have received care—from nurses and 

corrections officers alike—that could at best be described as unintelligent. He reports 

that the nurses checked on him no more than once or twice a day.12 And in his view, 

these were little more than perfunctory; the nurses simply took his temperature and 

asked him COVID-19 related questions, despite his escalating complaints of 

numbness and pain.13 Worse yet, each time the nurses took his temperature through 

the slot in the door they required that he get up out of bed unassisted.14 As he could 

not put the brace on himself and his requests for assistance were denied, this meant 

that he was repeatedly asked to move around without his brace, even though the 

nurses knew that his doctor had ordered that he wear it whenever he was out of bed.15 

This same ham-handed treatment is alleged to have occurred among the 

corrections officers. Rossman’s complaint details how a day after he arrived, he was 

9

 Id.

10 See generally id. ¶¶ 61–75. 

11 Id. ¶ 82. 

12 Doc. 40 at 3; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 128 (noting that he was not seen by PrimeCare Medical staff 

the day before he was sent to the hospital). 

13 Doc. 40 at 3; see Doc. 1 ¶¶ 88, 107, 117–119, 125–126. 

14 See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 81, 86. 

15 Id. ¶¶ 87, 106. 

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forced to transfer cells, without his brace.16 And it further delves into how, a day 

later, a corrections officer forced him to walk from his cell to the shower, again 

without his brace, though he had asked for assistance putting it on.17

 As Rossman tells it, his mistreatment came to a head on October 20, 2021, 

when he heard a crack in his neck and back area.18 In excruciating pain and unable 

to reach the intercom to call for assistance, Rossman cried for help for several 

minutes.19 In the end, Corrections Officer Waite was alerted and asked, by intercom, 

what was wrong.20 Rossman told him what had happened, and Waite radioed the 

nurses station.21 Yet no one responded to the scene for another two hours, all the 

while Rossman cried out in agony.22 

Eventually, Waite and a nurse arrived with a wheelchair.23 But despite 

Rossman presenting clear signs of having aggravated his serious spinal injury, Waite 

allegedly refused to bring the wheelchair into his cell, telling Rossman instead to get 

up and walk.24 Worse still, after Rossman made his way to the chair and sat, Waite 

proceeded to send him back into the cell to put his shoes on.25 During this second 

16 Id. ¶¶ 96–97. 

17 Id. ¶¶ 110–112. 

18 Id. ¶ 134. 

19 Id.

20 Id. ¶¶ 135–136. 

21 Id.

22 Id. ¶¶ 137–138, 148. 

23 Id. ¶¶ 145, 149. 

24 Id.

25 Id. ¶ 150. 

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excursion, Rossman claims that he lost feeling his leg.26 But even after he told Waite 

and the nurse about the worsening of his already precarious condition, they 

proceeded to wheel him to the nurse’s area.27 From there, the nurse and another 

member of the medical staff had Rossman hoist himself up onto the x-ray table and 

contort his legs from side-to-side as the screening was performed.28 The scan showed 

that the surgically placed screws had detached, and the nurse was instructed to call 

an ambulance.29 But notwithstanding this result showing that the screws that once 

held his fractured vertebrae together were now floating about in his spinal column, 

Rossman was then helped down from the x-ray table and back into the wheelchair 

before being wheeled into the intake area.30

 The ambulance took Rossman to UPMC Altoona, however, the emergency 

room staff soon determined that he needed critical care and arranged for a life-flight 

to UPMC Presbyterian in Pittsburgh.31 In spite of these last-ditch efforts, the then22-year-old Rossman was left paralyzed from his upper torso down.32

 

26 Id. ¶¶ 151–152. 

27 Id.

28 Id. ¶¶ 156, 158–159. 

29 Id. ¶¶ 160–161. 

30 Id.

31 Id. ¶¶ 167–170. 

32 Id. ¶¶ 1, 174. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a 

complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” Following the landmark decisions Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly33 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

34 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’”35 In its assessment, the Court must “accept as true all factual 

allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light 

most favorable to [the plaintiff].”36 Still, “the tenet that a court must accept as true 

all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions.”37 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”38 

III. ANALYSIS 

Each of the challenged counts in this suit are brought under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.39 The statute “does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights; it 

33 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 

34 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

35 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). 

36 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.). 

37 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 

(3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.) (“After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-bones’ 

allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”).

38 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

39 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 

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provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the 

Constitution or federal laws.”40 As a result, “to establish a section 1983 claim, a 

plaintiff ‘must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the 

laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law.’”41

Rossman’s Counts center on the deprivation of his right to adequate medical 

care under the Fourteenth Amendment. This right, and the variations on it that 

Rossman has alleged, are well-established.42 All that remains is an assessment of 

whether the allegations, if taken to be true, would show that the respective 

Defendants indeed violated those rights. Each are addressed in turn. 

A. The Corrections Officers’ Liability 

Rossman’s claims against the Corrections Officers in this suit come in two 

varieties. First, in Counts VIII and IX, Rossman alleges that Corrections Officer 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress”). 

40 Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 

137, 144 n.3 (1979) and Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995), 

cert denied, 516 U.S. 858 (1995)). 

41 Id. (quoting Mark, 51 F.3d at 1141) (internal alteration omitted). 

42 See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581–82 (3d Cir. 2003) (“the 

Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees 

protections ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted 

prisoner,’ . . . [and] [i]n Estelle, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 

proscribes deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs”); Kitchen v. Clinton 

Cnty., 2020 WL 3052864, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 8, 2020) (Mariani, J.). 

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Waite and all individual Corrections Officers Defendants—which includes Zettle—

denied him adequate medical care. Second, in Count X, he alleges that each named 

Defendants in the suit—and thus, Waite and Zettle—should be held liable for their 

failure to intervene. 

A corrections officer violates a detainee’s right to adequate medical care under 

the Fourteenth Amendment “when they act deliberately indifferent to a [detainee’s] 

serious medical needs by ‘intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care 

or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.’”43 As a result, for Count VIII and 

IX to advance, Rossman must allege facts showing he had “a serious medical need” 

and that the Corrections Officers “acts or omissions . . . indicate deliberate 

indifference to that need.”44 But it is not enough for Rossman to show that the 

Corrections Officers “fail[ed] to respond to [his] complaints.”45 He must instead 

show that they had “reason to believe, or actual knowledge, that prison medical staff 

[was] mistreating, or not treating [him] . . . .”46

At the same time, the corrections officers may be found liable for failure to 

intervene under Count X if Rossman proves “(1) an underlying constitutional 

violation; (2) a duty to intervene; and (3) a realistic opportunity to intervene.”47 A 

43 Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)). 

44 Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1997)). 

45 Kitchen, 2020 WL 3052846, at *6 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 

46 Id. (citing Spurill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). 

47 Id. (citing Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650–51 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

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duty to intervene stems from the constitutional violation “[taking] place in [the 

corrections officer’s] presence or with his or her knowledge.”48

1. Corrections Officer Zettle 

The deprivation of adequate medical care and failure to intervene claims 

against Zettle center on his role in the intake process.49 Boiled down, Rossman 

alleges that when he arrived at the Correctional Facility in a brace, with hospital 

papers flagging his serious medical condition, Zettle was aware that he should be 

transferred to a different, medically appropriate facility and he had the power bring 

about that result. However, reading Rossman’s complaint in the most favorable light, 

it must also be said that Zettle—like all other named individuals—has been accused 

of failing to help Rossman into his brace, which he was known to both need and be 

unable to put on himself.50 

Based on the intake allegations, Rossman has sufficiently pleaded that Zettle 

denied him access to adequate medical care. The scope of Zettle’s power and the 

Correctional Facility’s ability—if staff followed appropriate procedure—to provide 

care for someone who arrived in his condition may well end up in dispute. But those 

issues are more appropriately resolved after discovery. The same can be said of 

48 Smith, 293 F.3d at 650. 

49 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 51–60. 

50 Id. ¶¶ 276–282. 

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Rossman’s broad allegation that each of the named individuals, including Zettle, 

failed to intervene. 

 2. Corrections Officer Waite 

Aside from the just discussed claim against all named individuals for failure 

to intervene, Rossman’s allegations against Waite focus on the events of October 20, 

2021.51 Rossman’s Complaint first details how Waite responded to his initial cries 

for help and called the nursing staff, but ultimately failed to intervene during the 

two-hour period in which Rossman waited in agony.52 It then highlights how when 

Waite and a nurse arrived, rather than bring the wheelchair to him. or avoid moving 

a person with a spinal injury to begin with, Waite required Rossman to walk to the 

wheelchair himself, only to then ask that Rossman repeat the process to put on his 

shoes.53 Finally, the Complaint describes how even after Rossman told Waite and 

the nurse that he had lost feeling in his leg, which Rossman alleges should have set 

off warning bells to anyone with knowledge of first aid, Waite proceeded to wheel 

him to the room where he had an x-ray.54

Waite’s potential liability is complicated by the general rule in this circuit that 

“absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their 

51 Id. ¶¶ 256–263. As the Defendants highlight in their brief, Rossman likely erroneously 

alleges that Waite was also present at Rossman’s intaking. Doc. 37 at 9; see Doc. 1 ¶¶ 248–

253. If this is indeed an error, it ought to be cleaned up. 

52 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 136–137, 147. 

53 Id. ¶¶ 148–150, 259 

54 Id. ¶¶ 151–156, 259. 

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assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison 

official . . . will not be chargeable with the . . . scienter requirement of deliberate 

indifference.”55 But dismissal under this general rule would be inappropriate here. 

To start, courts have emphasized that this rule applies only when the inmate is “under 

continuing medical care”—which is not satisfied by the once- or twice-a-day visits 

here.56 But beyond that, Rossman’s allegations demonstrate that two hours elapsed 

between Waite’s initial call to the nurses’ station and their arrival. Setting aside even 

the allegations about his conduct when he arrived at the cell, this is enough to suggest 

that Waite had a reason to believe that Rossman was not being treated—particularly 

in light of caselaw finding that “even when an inmate is under the care of prison 

medical staff, his condition might be ‘so dire and obvious that a non-medical prison 

official’s failure to summon immediate medical attention amounts to deliberate 

indifference.’”57 And this evidence, alongside Rossman’s broad allegation about 

each of the named individual’s failure to ensure that he was properly braced, 

advances his failure to intervene claim past this motion to dismiss. 

 

55 Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. 

56 See Adami v. Cnty. of Bucks, 2020 WL 5849339, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2020) (finding that 

an inmate that was housed with the general prison population that received visits from three 

nurses throughout an evening was not under “continuing medical care”). 

57 Dinsmore v. Cnty. of Butler, 2017 WL 413072, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2017) (quoting 

Spruill, 372 F.3d at 237) (internal alterations omitted). 

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3. The Corrections Officers’ Claim to Qualified Immunity 

Waite and Zettle also argue that even if Rossman has adequately alleged an 

underlying constitutional violation, the counts should still be dismissed because they 

are entitled to qualified immunity. The primary basis for their claim is that Rossman 

has not alleged facts showing that either of them knew their conduct was unlawful. 

But Waite and Zettle’s subjective knowledge is irrelevant. 

Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”58 Embedded 

in this statement is a two-part assessment: “(1) ‘whether the facts that the plaintiff 

has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘whether the right 

at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged 

misconduct.’”59 As I have found that the former has been established here, all that 

remains is the latter, which requires that “the contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right.”60 Put simply, a detainee’s right to adequate medical care is 

clearly established.61 And the Defendants have failed to show that an objectively 

58 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 

800, 818 (1982)). 

59 Adami, 2020 WL 5849339, at *3 (quoting Perason, 555 at 232). 

60 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

61 See e.g., Adami, 2020 WL 5849339, at *3. 

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reasonable corrections officer wouldn’t have understood the violative nature of 

admitting a person five days removed from a traumatic back injury into a nonmedically specialized portion of the Facility or of making an inmate wait two hours 

to receive assistance after his calls for help indicated that he had aggravated a serious 

spinal condition. 

* * * 

 In sum, Rossman has pleaded facts that, if true, show that Waite and Zettle’s 

conduct violated his constitutional rights. As neither of the Correction Officers have 

shown that their conduct is protected by qualified immunity, their motion to dismiss 

Counts VIII, IX, and X is denied. 

B. Municipal Liability

 In Count XII, Rossman alleges that Centre County is liable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for failing to establish policies that would ensure the proper care of 

individuals who have suffered spinal trauma.62 The County’s role is straightforward: it oversees operations at the Centre County Correctional Facility, and it 

contracts with PrimeCare Medical to provide inmates medical care.63

 It is elementary that municipalities “cannot be held liable for the constitutional 

violations of their employees based upon vicarious liability. Rather, for liability to 

attach . . . plaintiff[s] must allege that the violation . . . was caused by [the 

62 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 294–295. 

63 Id. ¶¶ 9–12. 

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municipality’s] policy or custom . . . .”64 The Third Circuit has detailed three 

scenarios through which policy- or custom-created municipal liability can arise: 

(1) where the appropriate officer has promulgated a generally 

applicable statement of policy for the municipality; (2) where no 

general rule has been announced, but the policymaker itself performs 

the act which violated federal law; and (3) where no policy exists and 

the policymaker has refused to act, even though the “need to take some 

action to control the agents of the government is so obvious, and the 

inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in the violation of 

constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to 

have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”65

At this pre-discovery stage, Rossman’s complaint embraces the third scenario. He 

contends that an adequate and effectively implemented policy would have differed 

on several fronts—and that Centre County’s failure to establish or implement this 

sort of policy constituted reckless disregard for, or deliberate indifference to, his to 

his right to adequate medical care. 

In Rossman’s view, an adequate policy would have ensured: 

 First, that “an individual with serious spinal trauma” would not have been 

“detained at [Centre County Correctional Facility], when it [was] clear that 

adequate medical care [could not] be provided”;66 

64 Kitchen, 2020 WL 3052846, at *4 (internal citation omitted). 

65 Id. (quoting Natale, 518 F.3d at 584). 

66 Doc. 1 ¶ 296(a). 

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 Second, that “staff [would be] properly trained to perform “medical 

evaluations, diagnosis, care, and treatment for individuals with spinal 

trauma”;67

 Third, “that a new arrival with a serious medical condition . . . [would be] 

immediately evaluated and . . . a comprehensive plan to address the serious 

medical condition [would] be implemented”;68 

 Fourth, “that all hospital discharge instructions for an inmate/detainee [would 

be] reviewed, processed, and implemented immediately upon arrival”;69

 Fifth, “that when an inmate/detainee arrives with a medically necessary 

device . . . all medical and non-medical personnel [would be] aware of the 

need for the device, and that instructions for the use of the device are 

implemented immediately”;70 

 Sixth, that the “immediate medical needs of any inmate or detainee who 

arrives with a spinal injury” would be addressed;71 and 

 Seventh, that the “immediate medical needs of any inmate or detainee who 

presents clear signs of having sustained a spinal injury at [Centre County 

Correctional Facility]” would be addressed.72

67 Id. ¶ 296(b). 

68 Id. ¶ 296(c). 

69 Id. ¶ 296(d). 

70 Id. ¶ 296(e). 

71 Id. ¶ 296(f). 

72 Id. ¶ 296(g). 

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In response, Centre County contends that its decision to admit Rossman to the 

Correctional Facility was not improper and that Rossman has not shown that the 

County failed to establish policies or train its employees.73 For the former, the 

County argues that Rossman has not explained how the Correctional Facility “could 

turn away a defendant lawfully remanded to custody after failing to post bail.”74 As 

the County emphasizes, Rossman was “taken into custody at the hospital; 

transported by [the Pennsylvania State Police] for an arraignment; lawfully 

committed to the [Centre County Correctional Facility] by a judge; and medically 

cleared for admission by medical professionals trained to recognize and treat spinal 

trauma.”75 

For the latter, the County insinuates that it had a policy, noting that Rossman’s 

pleadings acknowledge that a nurse (who the County asserts was trained to treat 

spinal trauma) completed an intake form and that his hospital records were received 

by PrimeCare and then reviewed by another Nurse (who the County also asserts was 

trained to treat spinal trauma).76 And the County also contends that Rossman has 

failed to allege a pattern of violations that would sustain a failure to train violation.77

73 Doc. 37 at 18–20. 

74 Id. at 17. 

75 Id. at 17–18. 

76 Id. at 18. 

77 Id. at 19–20. 

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But these arguments are not, at this initial stage, enough for Centre County to 

exit this suit. To start, the County offers no legal support for their claim that the 

actions of others, in remanding Rossman to custody, immunize it from suit.78 So 

Rossman’s allegation—that the County was deliberately indifferent in failing to have 

a policy assessing its ability to care for an injured detainee—will suffice. 

Likewise unavailing are the County’s claims about the sufficiency of its 

current intake policy and training program. In City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme 

Court emphasized that inadequate training liability may arise when, “in light of the 

duties assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or different 

training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of 

constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have 

been deliberately indifferent . . . .”79 Given the haphazard treatment that Rossman 

has alleged—and in particular, the number of times he was required by staff to move 

without his brace, which his discharge papers noted he required—he has a colorable 

claim that the County’s policies and training were obviously inadequate and that his 

mistreatment was more than just a one-off occurrence. 

Centre County’s motion to dismiss Count XII is therefore denied. 

 

78 See id. at 17–18. 

79 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 

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IV. CONCLUSION

 In reading through a complaint that details how a 22-year-old detainee’s 

mistreatment resulted in his paralysis, there are many individuals and entities whose 

conduct strikes me as more culpable than Waite, Zettle, and Centre County. But it’s 

not enough to look good by comparison. At this stage, Rossman’s pleadings are 

adequate to survive this motion to dismiss. Whether discovery reveals that Waite 

and Zettle lacked the requisite scienter or that the County indeed had policies and 

training requirements, which were simply not followed, is another matter. Until then, 

this suit shall proceed with the original Defendants intact. 

 An appropriate Order follows. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann 

Chief United States District Judge 

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