D.C. Freeway Revolt and the Coming of Metro 

Part 1

Revolt of the Agencies

Table of Contents 

Central Area Bridge ........................................................................................................................ 3

The E Street Bridge Controversy ................................................................................................ 6

The Roaches Run Bridge .......................................................................................................... 12

Representative Broyhill Intervenes ........................................................................................... 15

Congress Confronts The Issue .................................................................................................. 18

The Bridge Dispute Nosedives ................................................................................................. 26

Southwest on The Drawing Board ............................................................................................ 32

Ole Singstad’s Views ................................................................................................................ 47

The 10th Street Mall .................................................................................................................. 49

Bridge Versus Tunnel ............................................................................................................... 53

Grudging Support For The Bridge ............................................................................................ 60

The Endless Debate................................................................................................................... 62

Other Developments ................................................................................................................. 66

The Tunnel Option – Again ...................................................................................................... 67

Moving a Bill ............................................................................................................................ 71

Unraveling a Fiasco .................................................................................................................. 74

To Break the Impasse ................................................................................................................ 77

The House Tries Again ............................................................................................................. 85

Trying to Get Construction Underway ...................................................................................... 94

Another Look at a Tunnel ....................................................................................................... 101

Back to the Hill ....................................................................................................................... 105

The Last Gasp(s) ..................................................................................................................... 108

Getting U.S. 270 into the District of Columbia .......................................................................... 112

The Old Road .......................................................................................................................... 112

The Road in the 20th Century .................................................................................................. 115

A Modern Upgrade ................................................................................................................. 118

Second Thoughts ..................................................................................................................... 123

The Chevy Chase Revolt ......................................................................................................... 128

Curbing Capper-Cramton........................................................................................................ 133

Hardening Positions ................................................................................................................ 138

Looking For Accord ................................................................................................................ 142

Working For Compromise ...................................................................................................... 146

The Olmsted Brothers ............................................................................................................. 153

Compromise – Pure and Simple ............................................................................................. 159

An Election Issue .................................................................................................................... 162

Undeciding .............................................................................................................................. 164

The Murray Resolution ........................................................................................................... 169

Back to Court .......................................................................................................................... 173

The Interstate Map .................................................................................................................. 176

Interstate Program Gets Underway ......................................................................................... 178
Glover-Archbold Park ............................................................................................................. 182

Whitehurst Freeway ................................................................................................................ 186

The Glover-Archbold Parkway ............................................................................................... 194

Congress Takes Up the Parkway ............................................................................................. 200

Getting U.S. 240 into the District ........................................................................................... 210

Alternatives for the DC Entrance ............................................................................................ 212

Back to the Public ................................................................................................................... 220

The District’s Decision ........................................................................................................... 224

Public Hearing in Maryland .................................................................................................... 226

Decision Time ......................................................................................................................... 229

Still Thinking of Wisconsin Avenue....................................................................................... 241

Premature and Divisive Factionalism ..................................................................................... 244

The Joint Committee Hearings ............................................................................................... 248

Aiming Towards The City ...................................................................................................... 251

The Inner Loop ........................................................................................................................ 253

Evolving Inner Loop ............................................................................................................... 258

A Couple Legs ........................................................................................................................ 262

Getting Underway ................................................................................................................... 265

Searching for Connections ...................................................................................................... 271

Preserving the Lincoln Memorial ........................................................................................... 279
Part 1

Revolt of the Agencies

Although a citizen revolt against freeways would occur in the 1960s and 1970s, the 1950s saw 

several revolts among government officials and the affluent during the formative years of the 

freeway network. Officials understood the importance and especially the permanence of the 

freeways and bridges they were debating, leading to long battles that are largely forgotten today. 

In the 1950s, one of those battles was over the need for another central area bridge across the 

Potomac River linking the District and Virginia. At the time, traffic crossed the Potomac River 

on Chain Bridge, Francis Scott Key Bridge, Arlington Memorial Bridge, and the 14th Street 

Bridge. The origin of the 14th Street Bridge was discussed earlier, but a brief history of the other 

crossings may be useful because they would be part of the debates of coming years. 

Central Area Bridge 

Chain Bridge carried traffic across the Potomac River at Little Falls, a cataract in Washington. 

As early as 1738, cross-river traffic, initially by ferry, was important for commercial 

development in the area. The Georgetown Bridge Company opened a toll bridge in 1797; it 

lasted only 7 years before the rotted wooden superstructure fell from its stone abutments. A 

second wooden bridge was destroyed by fire after only a few months in operation. The company 

built a third bridge that opened in 1810. It was a suspension span supported by chains, giving it 

the name that structures at the site have retained even though they lack the support chains. In the 

1870s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers replaced the chain-supported bridge with a bridge of 

seven iron trusses. 

After a March 1936 flood partially submerged the bridge, the crossing was out of service until 

the opening of a steel-girder bridge that the District of Columbia, not the Federal Government or 

private interests, built. The three-lane bridge, with pedestrian walkways on both sides, opened 

on June 17, 1938, connecting with Canal Road in Washington and providing access to Arlington 

and Fairfax Counties, Virginia. “It will stand as a monument,” District Commissioner Hazen 

said, “to those who fought so long and so hard for a modern new structure.” [Emery, Fred A., 

“Washington’s Historic Bridges,” Records of The Columbia Historical Society of Washington, 

D.C., Volume 39, 1938, pages 54-55; Horne, Robert C., “Bridges Across the Potomac,” Records 

of The Columbia Historical Society of Washington, D.C., Volumes 53-56, 1959, pages 249-251; 

“Dedication Opens New Chain Bridge,” The Evening Star, June 18, 1938] 

The Francis Scott Key Bridge was built to replace the Aqueduct Bridge. Construction of the 

Aqueduct Bridge began in 1833 to carry road traffic on its lanes and Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 

boats on a flume. By the 20th century, the bridge was deteriorating. On May 20, 1916, President 

Woodrow Wilson signed legislation authorizing a replacement bridge. It was named after 

Francis Scott Key who lived in Georgetown at 3518 M Street during the time he wrote the words 

to “The Star Spangled Banner” (1808 to 1828). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built the 

bridge, which opened on January 17, 1923, at a cost of $2,500,000, including the approaches. In 

the 1992 Weekend feature on the bridges of Washington by Alan Bisbort, The Washington Post

called Key Bridge “a crown jewel—with its aesthetics, convenience and user-friendliness.” 
Motorists southbound on the George Washington Memorial Parkway are rewarded “with a view 

of the bridge that, no matter how familiar, is still capable of taking one’s breath away.” [Emery, 

pages 55-57; Bisbort, Alan, “The Draw of Bridges,” Weekend, The Washington Post, April 10, 

1992, page 9]) 

Arlington Memorial Bridge spans the Potomac River to connect the Lincoln Memorial grounds 

with Arlington National Cemetery. Long before the Lincoln Memorial was planned, legislation 

approved on May 24, 1886, authorized the Secretary of War to study the feasibility of a bridge 

“from a point at or near the foot of New York Avenue or New Hampshire Avenue, on the public 

grounds, across the Potomac River and Analostan Island [Roosevelt Island] to a point on the 

United States National Cemetery grounds at Arlington . . . .” Debate about the location and 

height of what was initially called the “Lincoln-Grant Memorial Bridge” delayed construction. 

After authorizing the Lincoln Memorial in 1911 (opened in 1922), Congress approved the Public 

Buildings Act in 1913 that appropriated funds for a commission to investigate how to link 

Arlington National Cemetery to the tribute to the 16th President. (As noted earlier, the Public 

Buildings Act also provided funds for the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway, approved by 

President Taft on March 4, 1913.) 

On December 18, 1922, the commission met with President Warren G. Harding, who approved 

the plan. He had become a strong supporter of the need for a new bridge on November 11, 1921, 

while on his way to Arlington National Cemetery for the dedication of the Tomb of the Unknown 

Soldier. His automobile became trapped in what the Associated Press called “the worst traffic 

jam the National Capital has seen in many years.” The traffic jam, apparently started when a 

small touring car ran out of gas on the Highway Bridge, kept thousands from reaching the 

ceremony. The Star described how President Harding made it to the cemetery:

The President’s car left the White House on schedule . . . . When the machine, preceded 

by secret service men and policemen mounted on motor cycles [sic], reached the outskirts 

of the jam, it left the road three times and cut across the grass [of Potomac Park], 

reaching points ahead where the road was comparatively clear.

At times the secret service men in the car got out and walked ahead, clearing space for the 

White House car [getting it across the Highway Bridge]. When the presidential party 

reached the [Agriculture Department’s] Arlington experiment station the car was driven 

off the roadway and through the lanes which cut through the farm. 

The Post added that the President’s crossing of the bridge was possible “only by the assistance of 

a flying squadron of special policemen.” [“Auto Causes Huge Tangle In Traffic,” The Evening 

Star, November 11, 1921; Associated Press, “Traffic Jam Blocks Roads to Arlington,” The 

Washington Post, November 12, 1921] 

The bridge, which was designed by the influential architectural firm of McKim, Mead, and 

White, was built low to reduce impacts on the view of the Lincoln Memorial. 
Officials arranged the opening of the Arlington Memorial Bridge in 1932 to coincide with the 

opening of the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway, even though neither was completed. In 1928, 

President Coolidge approved legislation authorizing construction of the highway as part of the 

celebration in 1932 of the 200th anniversary of the birth of George Washington. BPR designed 

and built the 15-mile road as a parkway from Washington’s home at Mount Vernon to Arlington 

Memorial Bridge, then under construction. 

While work on the highway was underway, the Capper-Cramton Act of May 29, 1930, to be 

discussed later, authorized funds for construction of the George Washington Memorial Parkway 

on the Maryland and Virginia sides of the Potomac River. BPR would administer design and 

construction contracts for the parkway, which would be owned and operated by NPS. Mount 

Vernon Memorial Highway was incorporated into the parkway. 

On January 16, 1932, a motorcycle escort of U.S. Park Police and a caravan of 12 automobiles 

carrying President Hoover, his wife, and others, left the White House at about 3 p.m. for the short 

trip to Arlington Memorial Bridge. The Star captured the moment: 

Arriving at the bascule draw span, which was drawn apart, the party left the automobiles. 

A battery of cameramen took countless photographs of the party and then, to the tune of 

shrieking sirens that are part of the bascule draw span equipment, the two great leaves of 

the mid-bridge were lowered. President Hoover and his party walked at a rapid rate for 

the rest of the length of the bridge, almost to Columbia Island. 

With the eye of an experienced engineer, the President surveyed the bridge project over 

which he had been many times before, and noted the spacious boulevard that keeps 

company with the Potomac River for many miles, until it terminates at the old home of 

George Washington. Two engineers of note accompanied the Chief Executive and Mrs. 

Hoover—Lieut. Col. U.S. Grant, 3d, executive officer of the Arlington Memorial Bridge 

Commission, and Thomas H. MacDonald, chief of the Bureau of Public Roads of the 

Department of Agriculture, under whose jurisdiction the highway has been built.

The presidential party then took to their automobiles again, after glancing at the quartet of 

giant eagles that sit atop the great pylons looking down upon the future Great Circle that 

is planned for Columbia Island. The file of automobiles then turned to the left and moved 

on to the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway on the island, passing then under the 

highway and railroad bridges and on down to Alexandria in a thin cloud of dust. 

Once the caravan reached the straight stretches of the highway, the party traveled at speeds of 30 

to 35 miles an hour on the sunlit day: 

At Mount Vernon President Hoover and his fellow commissioners posed again for 

photographs, with the historic estate in the background. The party glanced at the parking 

spaces that will accommodate numerous automobiles and saw the landscaping plans for 

the terminus of the magnificent highway.
The party returned to the White House at around 5 p.m. “The President and Mrs. Hoover 

appeared well pleased with their riverside ride and with the bridge and the boulevard 

development. They conversed with Col. Grant and Mr. MacDonald about various features of the 

two projects.” 

Neither the bridge nor the highway had lighting. Officials had not agreed on “the final design of 

illumination, in keeping with the dignity of the project.” The Commission of Fine Arts would 

determine the design for the bridge. In the meantime, the bridge and highway were open only 

during daylight hours on weekends. 

Bisbort, in the Post, commented: 

Considered by many Washington’s most beautiful bridge, its structure is relatively 

simple: eight neoclassical arches. The monumentality derives from all the extras, 

including eight-foot-bas-relief eagles atop 35-foot pylons, eight-foot bison (by Paul C. 

Jennewein), a pair of gold figures (by Leo Friedlander) and the elegant white stone (North 

Carolina granite). One curious note: It has a draw span, a rarely used 216-foot marvel of 

American engineering that was designed by Joseph B. Strauss, who later engineered the 

Golden Gate Bridge. [Emery, pages 57-58; Horne, pages 255-257; Bisbort, page 8] 

(NPS opened the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway to daylight traffic late in March 1932, and to 

24-hour traffic on May 3, after lighting had been installed. [Report of the Chief of the Bureau of 

Public Roads, September 1, 1932, page 35]) 

The E Street Bridge Controversy 

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the city’s top priority for another Potomac River crossing was a span 

at E Street over Theodore Roosevelt Island. The island had been remodeled in the 1930s as a 

tribute to former President Roosevelt and was and remains under the jurisdiction of the NPS. 

(The island had first been named Anacostine Island in 1682. In 1792, John Mason inherited what 

became known as Mason’s Island. The Mason family owned the island until 1833. In 1790, the 

island was included in the Federal capital, part of Washington County. (The District of 

Columbia was divided into three autonomous governments: Washington City, Georgetown, and 

the County. Under the Constitution, Congress was the overseer of the three governments.) By 

that time, the island also was called Analostan Island. The island went through several hands, 

before the Washington Gas Light Company acquired it in 1913. The company allowed 

vegetation to grow wild. 

(The Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association acquired the island in 1931 with the goal of 

erecting a monument to the former President. Congress, in 1932, passed legislation authorizing 

the statue, but did not appropriate funds for it until 1960. In 1935, the Civilian Conservation 

Corps began clearing what they found was an “almost impenetrable jungle.” [Curry, Mary E., 

“Theodore Roosevelt Island: A Broken Link to Early Washington, D.C. History,” Records of the 

Columbia Historical Society 1971-1972, The University Press of Virginia, 1973, pages 14-18, 
also page 396, footnote 6, for three-part city in William M. Maury’s “Alexander R. Shepherd and 

the Board of Public Works,” same collection]) 

Like Commissioner Hazen before them, District commissioners in the 1950s favored a bridge 

from the District to Alexandria at Shepherds Landing or Jones Point as well as a crossing to 

Arlington at Nebraska Avenue extended. 

(Jones Point is at the southern tip of the District of Columbia and the location of the first of 40 

boundary stones identifying the original location. At the request of President George 

Washington, Andrew Ellicott and Benjamin Baneker, a free black with knowledge of 

mathematics and astronomy, surveyed the boundary, 10 miles on a side, placing stones at onemile intervals. According to a history of the boundary stones: 

In order to include then existing Alexandria and Georgetown, Jones Point was chosen as 

the starting point. On April 15, 1791, with proper Masonic toasts and ceremony, the 

South Stone was set in place. Subsequently the Jones Point Lighthouse was built and the 

stone was encased in a seawall but forty years later this condition was corrected and the 

stone exposed. [Nye, Edwin Darby, “Revisiting Washington’s Forty Boundary Stones, 

1972,” Records of the Columbia Historical Society 1971-1972, pages 740-741]) 

In August 1952, the Star described the top priority: 

The E Street Bridge would connect E street and New Hampshire avenue N.W., and the 

Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway, on the district side of the river, with the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway, Arlington boulevard, Wilson boulevard and U.S. Route 

1, on the Virginia side. 

The bridge, along with the Francis Scott Key Bridge and the Arlington Memorial Bridge, would 

carry 82 percent of traffic across the river; that traffic “cannot be diverted to outlying bridges.” A 

six-lane E Street Bridge “would provide the greatest convenience for users and the most useful 

peak-hour capacity,” carrying 48,500 vehicles per day. The proposed bridge would have a 

63-foot clearance for vessels and “would pass over Roosevelt Island at a height of 40 feet.” The 

city estimated that the bridge, itself, would cost $9.1 million and take a little over 3 years to 

build, but with expenditures for right-of-way, approaches, and other needs, the total cost would 

be $22.3 million. 

The Shepherds Point Bridge was a high priority as well. It would serve as part of a bypass for 

traffic that did not need to go through Washington as through traffic had to do at the time. It 

would “draw almost entirely from the Highway Bridge [on Shirley Highway], relieving it of 

15,206 vehicles on an average a day.” The bridge would carry four lanes of traffic, with a swing 

span in the middle about 50 feet above water. That height would allow most vessels to pass 

under the bridge without an opening. The bridge would cost about $8 million, but with 

approaches and other needed work, the total cost would be $21.4 million. Construction would 

take a little over 4 years.
The lowest priority was a bridge that would connect an extension of Nebraska Avenue “with a 

planned network of highways on the Virginia side”: 

Two additional connections on the District side also would be needed. These are the 

extension of the Whitehaven parkway, from MacArthur boulevard to Massachusetts 

avenue, and a connection between Canal road and Nebraska avenue. The bridge would 

make available a west side by-pass, connecting U.S. Route 240 on the District side with 

U.S. Routes 29, 211 and 50 on the Virginia side. 

The District commissioners anticipated a four-span steel arch bridge, with four traffic lanes, that 

would cost $5 million. The extensions, approaches, and related work would increase the cost to 

$8.5 million. The reason for the low priority: “The bridge would do little to relieve the peakhour traffic in the central section.” (This bridge would not be built.). [“How Three Proposed 

Bridges Would Serve Area Traffic,” The Evening Star, August 28, 1952] 

In August 1952, the District commissioners and NCPC released competing consultant reports on 

the subject. The District’s report, prepared by the consulting firm of Modjeski and Masters, 

called for immediate construction of the E Street Bridge to relieve congestion. 

NCPC’s report, prepared by Harland Bartholomew and Associates, rejected the E Street Bridge:

The additional traffic load which would be imposed upon the street system in the vicinity 

of its approaches in the District, as well as in Virginia, would aggravate an already critical 

situation during the peak traffic periods . . . . 

Washington rapidly is approaching a crisis. Congestion in the central area of the city is 

becoming critical at many points, and the situation grows worse daily. 

A decision soon must be made whether to attempt further saturation of the central area by 

introduction of endless numbers of vehicles or whether to accept, implement and carry 

out a basic, integrated transportation plan. The location of future bridges across the 

Potomac River is a fundamental part of such a plan. 

NCPC opposed construction of any more bridges that would lead traffic into the center of the 

city. The Star explained that NCPC “recommended immediate work on the long-range highway 

plan for the District, which contemplates express highways around the perimeter of the central 

business and government section of the city.” NCPC also favored “a good public transportation 

system, which would move people rather than vehicles”: 

This perimeter or ring route highway system would involve construction of the other two 

bridges—the Alexandria crossing and the Nebraska Avenue bridge, the report said. 

General Bernard L. Robinson, the District’s Engineer Commissioner, said the District would 

have to decide how to proceed and work it out with NCPC before asking Congress for the funds. 

[Hendley, Jr., Coit, “Reports Clash on Location of 3 New Bridges,” The Evening Star, August 

28, 1952] 
A Truman appointee, Robinson had succeeded General Young on June 1, 1951. At the time of 

his appointment, then-Colonel Robinson had been division engineer for the South Atlantic 

Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with extensive experience in flood control and 

river and harbor improvements. [“Col. Robinson Takes Oath as New D.C. Commissioner,” The 

Evening Star, June 1, 1951] With President-elect Eisenhower preparing for his inauguration, 

General Robinson left office on December 31, 1952, giving way to General Louis W. Prentiss, 

who took office on January 2, 1953. General Prentiss had been Assistant Chief of Engineers on 

the staff of the Chief Engineer, General Lewis A. Pick.

NPS Director Conrad L. Wirth opposed the bridge crossing of Theodore Roosevelt Island, as did 

the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association. The association had deeded the island to the 

Federal Government in 1932, specifying in the deed that the Federal Government must not do 

anything inconsistent with park use and development of a wildlife refuge. 

Wirth had come to Washington in May 1938 as a landscape architect with the National Capital 

Park and Planning Commission. He transferred to NPS in 1931 and became its director on 

December 31, 1951. As Director, he automatically was a member of the National Capital Park 

and Planning Commission. Wirth’s last day as NPS director was January 9, 1964, but President 

Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him to be a citizen member of NCPC. During the 1950s, he lived 

on Leland Street in Chevy Chase, Maryland. During the 1960s, he lived on East Bexhil Drive in 

Kensington, Maryland, a suburb that began in 1894 at the intersection of the Rockville-toBladensburg Road and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Extended Connecticut Avenue cuts 

through the Montgomery County town. [Wirth, Conrad L., Parks, Politics, and the People, 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1980, pages 15, 35, 285, 350-351] 

Wirth asked Interior Department Solicitor Clarence A. Davis for legal guidance on the 

requirements related to the title transferred from the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association. 

On August 7, 1953, Davis released his opinion. He agreed with District Corporation Counsel 

Vernon E. West that Congress, and only Congress, could authorize construction of the bridge: 

There can be no doubt that a bridge across the island would be a use inconsistent with the 

purpose of the donation and dedication of the Roosevelt Memorial Association . . . . By 

the clear terms of the dedication and of the congressional act of acceptance, the Memorial 

Association retains an interest in the island for the taking of which the United States 

would be obligated to make just compensation. [“Congress Can Authorize Span, Interior 

Rules,” The Evening Star, August 8, 1953] 

On September 24, 1953, NCPC formally considered an alternative prepared by staff planner 

Charles Conrad and NCPC Executive Secretary Blair Lee III. They proposed construction of two 

Potomac River bridges that they claimed could be built jointly and at less cost than the E Street 

Bridge: (1) a six-lane Southwest Bridge leaving Virginia downriver from the 14th Street railroad 

bridge and crossing the Potomac River and Washington Channel on a line with 10th Street, SW., 

to tie in with the Southwest Freeway planned for the F Street corridor; and (2) a four-lane bridge 

upriver of the Key Bridge linking the District’s Arizona Avenue with Virginia’s Spout Run. 
The Southwest Bridge would emerge as the primary alternative to the E Street Bridge. Conrad 

explained that it could be built at low cost because it would involve federally owned land in 

Virginia and would tie in with street plans developed for the revitalized southwest. By linking 

with Shirley Highway, U.S. 1, and Arlington Boulevard, the bridge would provide a good 

alternative for Virginia commuters. He also contended that with a six-lane bridge in the corridor, 

District officials would not need to follow through on their plan to replace the 14th Street trestletopped bridge, known as the Highway Bridge, carrying three lanes of one-way Virginia-bound 

traffic; a companion bridge opened in May 1950 carried traffic in the other direction. (The 

Shirley Memorial Highway had been built during World War II as part of the Pentagon Road 

Network and named for Henry G. Shirley, the head of the Virginia Department of Highways 

since 1922 who died during construction of the network.) 

As for the E Street Bridge, Lee pointed out that there was strong opposition to crossing Theodore 

Roosevelt Island. Further, the structure would interfere with big apartment projects on both sides 

of the river, and District streets would be overwhelmed by the traffic. 

Engineer Commissioner Prentiss disagreed with the cost comparison. He contended that the twobridge plan would cost about $4 million more than the E Street Bridge. According to S. R. 

Harrison, District highway engineer, the Southwest Bridge would not provide enough capacity to 

substitute for the 50-year old one-way trestle bridge. Further, the new bridge capacity would 

funnel more traffic through streets in a concentrated area that could not handle the vehicles. 

[Beveridge, George, “2-Bridge Plan Called Cheaper by NCPC Aides,” The Evening Star, 

September 25, 1953] 

Lee elaborated on the proposal in the Star a few days later. He cited the NPS’ and Roosevelt 

association’s objections to the E Street Bridge proposal based on how it would impact Theodore 

Roosevelt Island, but NCPC opposed the bridge for different reasons. “Indeed, if the island were 

suddenly to cast off its moorings and float down to the Chesapeake Bay, there is every reason to 

believe that the commission would not change its view.” He cited the different road networks on 

either side of the Potomac River. Arlington Boulevard, he said, “looks like the New Jersey 

Turnpike compared to the District approaches” via D and E Streets and “poor old New 

Hampshire avenue.” The city planned “to depress and grade-separate D and E streets as far east 

as Twentieth street”:

The chaos will start wherever they come to the surface, whether it be Virginia avenue, 

Twentieth street, Seventeenth street, Fourteenth street or Pennsylvania avenue. The 

pressure of this new flow of east-west traffic on the very limited number of east-west 

passages between the White House and the Mall can’t help causing trouble. The bridge 

will simply move the bottleneck several blocks east—into the heart of the city.

New Hampshire Avenue, in its lowest reaches, “is about as useless as an avenue can get.” 

Traffic using the planned ramp to Virginia Avenue would face “a total impasse” at Rock Creek 

and Potomac Parkway. Assuming the traffic “survives that ordeal,” it would reach Washington 

Circle. With priority already given to K Street and 23rd Street, a “three-level treatment” would be 

the only solution: 
Finally, New Hampshire avenue gets to Dupont Circle, where the existing tunnel favors 

Connecticut avenue and the surface channelization favors Massachusetts avenue. Some 

expressway!

He disagreed with the District consultant’s cost estimate because it did not cover all the street 

work that would be needed. “I do not see how the E street bridge and its approaches can fail to 

cost the District less than $30 million.” 

The E Street Bridge also would “do considerable harm to two proposed real estate 

developments,” namely Arlington Towers Apartments in Virginia and the Potomac Plaza project 

on land in Foggy Bottom that formerly housed the Gas Works of the Washington Gas Light 

Company (this is a reference to the future Watergate complex). The Arlington complex would 

be “caught in a pincers between the bridge’s two main approaches—Arlington boulevard and 

Wilson boulevard.” Similarly, the gas company’s triangle “would be hemmed in by a solid wall 

of traffic on all three sides, and the handsome hotel proposed for the southern tip of the triangle.” 

Lee also stated that the “mood of Congress” was against the E Street Bridge, in part because of 

the impact on the island. In the Senate, the District committee blocked planning funds for the 

bridge from the 1954 District budget. Representative Joel T. Broyhill (R-Va.), who had joined 

the House in 1953 and would play key roles in transportation issues, “appears to have little 

enthusiasm for the E street proposal,” while “one veteran committee aide on the House side 

predicted recently that there was no chance of congressional approval of the E street bridge over 

the Roosevelt Island.” 

As for alternatives, the Jones Point Bridge was much-needed, but was not a substitute for the 

central area bridge. In the “virtually unanimous view” of NCPC, the best alternatives were “a 

combination of a 6-lane bridge slightly downstream from the railroad bridge, followed a little 

later by a 4-lane bridge connecting Arizona avenue and Canal road with Lee highway via Spout 

Run parkway and also with George Washington parkway along the Virginia side of the river.” 

Lee added that the bridge downstream from the railroad bridge would blend with the District 

highway department’s plans for the Southwest: 

The highway department is about to launch the huge and highly commendable project of 

building a southwest freeway all the way across the southwest section on the line of F 

street, including a new bridge across the Washington Channel. The current idea is to tie 

the west end of this route into the Fourteenth street bridge approaches near the Jefferson 

Memorial.

Our proposal is to keep the southwest freeway clear of the present Fourteenth street 

bridges and instead to extend it across the river on a new bridge and tie into the Shirley 

highway, U.S. 1, Washington boulevard, and Mount Vernon highway between Roaches 

Run and the Pentagon. 

By linking the southwest freeway to Shirley highway, the highway department can 

produce a continuous, east-flowing expressway extending from Woodbridge at the 
Fairfax-Prince William County line [in Virginia] to South Capitol street [in the District] a 

few blocks from the Capitol Building . . . . The southwest-Shirley location would avail 

itself of a D.C. approach that is going to be built anyway rather than a lot of extensive 

construction necessitated entirely because of the bridge, as in the case of E street.

NCPC’s proposal would affect neither Arlington Towers Apartments nor the Potomac Plaza 

project. Lee added that if the proposed bridge and the Arizona Avenue bridges could not be built 

for less than the E Street Bridge, “I will gladly eat the Modjeski and Masters’ report page by 

page.” [Lee III, Blair, “To the Editor of the Star,” The Evening Star, October 1, 1953] 

As a Star editorial about the Lee letter put it, “The Potomac River bridge problem is becoming 

more confusing with the passing of nearly every week.” [“Another Bridge Plan,” The Evening 

Star, October 1, 1953] 

The Roaches Run Bridge

The NCPC proposal for a bridge linked to the Southwest Freeway would often be referred to as 

the Roaches Run Bridge. In 1937, the American Guide Series volume on the District of 

Columbia described Roaches Run: 

A flat-arched fieldstone underpass carries the [Mt. Vernon] Memorial Highway under the 

Railroad Bridge, on the south side of which is the lagoon-like Roaches Run Waterfowl 

Sanctuary. Hundreds of wild ducks use these waters as a feeding ground in winter, and 

during the summer months there are often flocks of snowy egrets wading near the borders 

of the sanctuary or roosting in near-by trees. A parking space and picnic area is provided 

about midway of the lagoon, which is most appealing at sunset, when pastel colors, 

deepened by their transmission through smoke from passing railroad trains, are reflected 

in the quiet waters. [The WPA Guide to Washington: The Federal Writer’s Project 

Guide to 1930s Washington, Pantheon Books, 1983, pages 449-450] 

Representative Broyhill tried to play a “peacemaker role” by appearing in a closed session of 

NCPC in support of the Jones Point Bridge and the E Street Bridge. He argued that the Jones 

Point Bridge and a central area bridge were needed and it was senseless to jeopardize them by 

“squabbling over specific locations.” [Beveridge, George, “Broyhill Sees Planners, Asks Truce 

on Spans,” The Evening Star, October 29, 1953] 

The day after meeting with Representative Broyhill, NCPC asked the District commissioners to 

study the Roaches Run location. Members of NCPC wanted better cost estimates before 

endorsing either proposal. Engineer Commissioner Prentiss, a member of NCPC, opposed the 

request because he thought District highway officials, NCPC, and BPR should be able to agree 

on cost estimates without a formal study. “I don’t see any sense in spending a lot of money, 

which is hard to get, to hire someone to make a cost estimate because we can’t believe each 

other.” 

Bartholomew argued that the realistic cost estimates should include the cost of the highway and 

street improvements on both sides of the river that should, in fairness, be charged to either 
project. Prentiss agreed that some of the street changes should be part of the cost estimate but 

explained that some of the changes would occur regardless of which bridge is built and the cost 

of such changes should not be added to the cost of the bridge. [Beveridge, George, “Planners 

Urge Study of Cost of Bridge Below 14th St. Span,” The Evening Star, October 30, 1953] 

NCPC’s request prompted John R. Searles, director of the District’s Redevelopment Land 

Agency (RLA), charged with rebuilding southwest Washington, to express concern that a 

Roaches Run Bridge would route too much traffic into the area. The Southwest Freeway was 

designed to carry all the through traffic currently using residential streets. “I’m no traffic expert, 

but I doubt if the freeway would be able to handle all the extra traffic that would result from a 

new Potomac River bridge.” [“Roaches Run Bridge Hit in View of Traffic Entering Southwest,” 

The Evening Star, November 3, 1953] 

In response to NCPC’s request, General Prentiss instructed city officials to extend “every means 

of co-operation to come up with the answers.” In addition, a four-member committee was 

established to conduct the cost inquiry: John Nolen, Jr., Director of NCPC; J. N. Robertson, the 

District’s highway director; Joseph Barnett, Chief of BPR’s Urban Roads Branch; and Robert C. 

Horne, chief engineer of National Capital Parks. [“Experts Study Costs of Roaches Run and E 

Street Bridges,” The Evening Star, November 5, 1953] 

A month later, General Prentiss informed NCPC that the Roaches Run Bridge would cost 

between $33.9 million and $53.2 million, compared with $30 million for the E Street Bridge. 

The Star pointed out that:

The wide variance in cost estimates for the Roaches Run bridge depends mostly on what 

approach road improvements are included as necessary to tie the bridge traffic in with 

existing highway networks in Virginia and the District . . . . 

It is considered likely that the planning commission, at its meeting this week, will 

challenge the inclusion of Roaches Run improvements that would result in high cost 

figures. At the same time, it also may balk at the absence of some improvements in 

figuring the $30 million E street bridge cost.

The four-member committee had “agreed on cost standards to be followed but did not agree on 

what approach projects to include.” As a result, approach estimates included “improvements 

extending as far north as Constitution avenue and as far east as Seventeenth street for the 

Roaches Run Bridge and as far east as Seventeenth street for the E street project.” [Beveridge, 

George, “Roaches Run Bridge Cost Put At $33.9 to $53.2 Millions,” The Evening Star, 

December 8, 1953] 

On December 10, 1953, Governor John S. Battle of Virginia released a report by the consultant 

firm of Wilbur Smith and Associates proposing a $107 million highway program for the State’s 

connections with the District. As reported in The Evening Star: 
The report generally represents a new approach to area traffic problems. It plays havoc 

impartially with major proposals of the Washington Area Regional Highway Planning 

Committee, District officials and area planners.

The report addressed the dispute over the location of a central area bridge:

The consultants told a reporter they agree with highway officials that most peak-hour 

traffic is headed for downtown Washington, which an E street bridge would serve. But 

they rejected the E street project on grounds that approach roads in that area could not 

handle increased traffic that would be generated by another bridge there. 

Consistent with NCPC’s views, the consultant report recommended two bridge locations. One 

would be down river from the 14th Street railroad bridge to tie into the proposed Southwest 

Freeway in the District. The other would cross at Three Sisters Islands—named after three 

Native American sisters in alternative legends—upstream from Key Bridge:

On the District side, it would lead into MacArthur boulevard, Canal road, and the 

proposed Arizona parkway through Glover-Archbold Park. In Virginia, it would follow 

the George Washington Memorial parkway for half a mile to its junction with Lorcom 

lane.

As perhaps the report’s major feature, the two new bridges would tie directly into two of 

the three proposed expressways. The downstream, or Hains Point, bridge [Roaches Run], 

would feed into a proposed Potomac River expressway. This expressway, leaving the 

bridge, would follow the line of the present Mount Vernon Memorial highway nearly to 

Alexandria’s eastern edge to link with U.S. Route 1 near Gum Springs. 

The Three Sisters Bridge would connect with an 8.8-mile-long Falls Church expressway. 

This road would parallel Lee highway (Route 29-211) as far as Washington boulevard, 

veer northward around Falls Church and then cut sharply southward to connect with 

Arlington boulevard (U.S. Route 50) near Gallows road. 

The report rejected or downplayed other planned facilities: 

Specifically, the report recommended against the Cabin John Bridge . . . . It said the 

Cabin John span would not attract more than 2,200 cars a day. It said approaches to the 

Jones Point Bridge “might warrant immediate construction,” but did not otherwise 

endorse the Jones Point Bridge as a high-priority project. [Beveridge, George, 

“Virginia’s New Road Program Clashes With D.C. on Bridges,” The Evening Star, 

December 10, 1953] 

(Cabin John is a community about 8 miles northwest of Georgetown and six miles southeast of 

Great Falls. Who “Cabin John” or “Captain John” was is shrouded in mystery. Because of its 

location near the Potomac River, Cabin John has a long history that includes the Chesapeake and 

Ohio Canal; its locks are the explanation for Seven Locks Road that runs through the area. When 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the Washington Aqueduct system in 1863, 

designed by General Montgomery C. Meigs, to provide water from Great Falls to the District of 
Columbia, they included a tunnel and Union Arch Bridge to carry the water; farmers used the 

smooth, flat surface as a road. 

(In the 1870s, Congress appropriated funds for a macadam surface on what was called Conduit 

Road. The Corps wanted the road to transport equipment between Cabin John and Great Falls, 

but it served east-west farm traffic better than nearby River Road, which was wide enough only 

for one horse, with little room for opposing traffic. In 1942, Congress passed legislation 

changing “Conduit Lane” to MacArthur Boulevard, to honor General Douglas MacArthur for his 

actions in defense of the Philippines at the start of U.S. involvement in World War II. [Welles, 

Judith, Cabin John: Legends and Life of an Uncommon Place, Signature Book Printing, 2008, 

pages 16-17; Stewart, Alice Fales, The Palisades of Washington, D.C., Images of America, 

Arcadia Publishing, 2005, page 36]) 

The following day, NCPC postponed its decision on the location of the central area bridge, citing 

the Wilbur Smith report as a main reason. Bartholomew told reporters he was prepared to vote, 

but realized others needed time to review the Virginia report. He urged the members to come to 

the meeting on January 6, 1954, prepared to vote without further delays. [Beveridge, George, 

“Planning Commission Delays Bridge Vote Until January 6,” The Evening Star, December 11, 

1953] 

Representative Broyhill Intervenes

Representative Broyhill did not need more study time. In his view, the Wilbur Smith report was 

“all wet” on several points, It had not assigned a high priority to the Jones Point Bridge that he 

was trying to push through Congress, while criticizing the E Street Bridge across Roosevelt 

Island that he also favored. “I’m going to proceed and ask for hearings immediately after 

Congress convenes.” 

He particularly disagreed with the report’s plan to link its proposed bridges to expensive new 

expressways. “With their plan, the bridge can’t be built without the costly expressway. With 

ours, existing approach roads are pretty well worked out to tie in with the Jones Point and E 

street bridges.”

While NCPC members liked the report’s rejection of the E Street Bridge, District and Maryland 

officials were displeased. General Prentiss, like Representative Broyhill, rejected the need for 

expensive freeway construction to go along with the District’s proposed E Street Bridge. 

Chairman Russell H. McCain of the Maryland State Roads Commission also was concerned that 

the report rejected the Cabin John Bridge because it would affect the location of the western leg 

of upgraded U.S. 240 (to be discussed later). “Maryland is going to have to study the report. 

After further study, we’ll have a comment.” [Beveridge, George, “Broyhill Attacks Virginia Plan 

Bridge Site,” The Evening Star, December 11, 1953] 

One reason why NCPC delayed its vote until January 6 was that it wanted to know what the 

Regional Highway Planning Committee would do. Samuel R. Harrison, deputy director of the 

District Highway Department, headed the group, which included Maryland and Virginia officials 

as well as representatives of BPR, NCPC, Capital Transit Company, and the Military District of 
Washington. The committee had been formed in July 1949 to analyze data, such as origin-anddestination records, collected in preparation for the 1950 Comprehensive Plan. On January 4, the 

committee voted 6-to-1 in favor of the E Street Bridge and rejected the Roaches Run Bridge. 

The NCPC representative was the only dissenting vote. (BPR’s H. J. Spelman did not vote.) 

The committee also voted in favor of the Jones Point and Cabin John bridges, both rejected by 

the Wilbur Smith report. [“Regional Planners Favor E Street Bridge, Reject Roaches Run,” The 

Evening Star, January 5, 1954] 

Although NCPC members remained divided, the commission voted 6-to-4 on January 6 against 

the E Street Bridge and in favor of the Roaches Run Bridge: 

Thus, the stage was set for another Capitol Hill feud, with the city’s roadbuilders and 

planners attempting to sell Congress on conflicting bridge schemes. In similar battles in 

the past Congress has given the nod most often to District officials.

Today’s vote climaxes nearly two years of bitter argument over the bridge issue.

As Congress convened, Representative Broyhill introduced a bill in support of the E Street 

Bridge. The bill named it the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Bridge. He warned NCPC that its 

opposition could endanger the chances for congressional support of any central area bridge. 

“Governing bodies in Virginia all favor E street. The planning commission stands alone in my 

opinion.” He added: 

If the planning commission opposes E street, I don’t think Congress ever will approve the 

Roaches Run bridge, because there is not enough support for it. The only thing the 

planning commission can do is to kill the chances for E street. [Beveridge, George, 

“Planners Reject E St. Span, Back Roaches Run,” The Evening Star, January 6, 1954] 

Representative Broyhill recognized concerns about the effect of the E Street Bridge on Roosevelt 

Island: 

I sincerely regret that some well-intentioned citizens have objected to the E street bridge 

location because the proposed span would go over Theodore Roosevelt Island. Theodore 

Roosevelt Island will not be destroyed, nor will the bird sanctuary there be disturbed. I 

am sure that were the great ‘Teddy’ alive he would be the last to stand in the way of 

progress and the great needs of the citizens of our communities. [Beveridge, George, 

“Bridge Hearings Will Start Soon, Broyhill Says,” The Evening Star, January 7, 1954] 

An editorial in the Star criticized NCPC’s support of the Roaches Run Bridge. The vote against 

the E Street Bridge was not surprising, although “those votes were influenced by considerations 

that have little to do with the facts of traffic needs.” The vote in favor of the Roaches Run 

Bridge was harder to understand: 

The Roaches Run site, it is believed, will eventually be discredited—for it has been 

pulled like a rabbit out of a hat. It has received no serious study from an engineering or 

traffic point of view. It raises more questions than it answers. While it protects the 

artificial wilderness of Roosevelt Island . . . it would play hob with East Potomac Park, 
Washington Channel and the Mall. Engineering studies will doubtless bring many 

objections into focus—including cost to local and Virginia taxpayers—that have received 

little or no attention up to now, because they have not been seriously considered up to 

now. 

If Congress gave Representative Broyhill’s bill a fair hearing, the members would be able to 

“decide between fact and nonsense.” If not, his constituents would be the “chief victims” but “it 

will not be long before the traffic jams at existing bridge crossings will become so intolerable 

that action will be forced.” As for NCPC, the editorial said: 

The National Capital Planning Commission—heavily weighted down by non-residents 

who have no fixed responsibility for meeting local needs—has been proved wrong before 

and will doubtless be proved wrong again. [“No Way to Bridge the Arguments,” The 

Evening Star, January 7, 1954] 

One NCPC member who voted in favor of the E Street Bridge explained his reasons in a speech 

to the Board of Trade’s River and Harbor Committee. John A. Remon, a NCPC member and 

chairman of the Washington Regatta Association, said the Roaches Run Bridge would destroy 

much of the city’s water recreational activities. “The E street bridge is the logical site. It will not 

interfere with the waterfront or with water recreation.” [“Ruin of Boating Seen With Span At 

Roaches Run,” The Evening Star, January 9, 1954] 

Another factor against the Roaches Run Bridge was its impact on plans for redeveloping 

Southwest Washington. Remon also was chairman of RLA, which debated the bridge dispute in 

a closed-door board meeting on January 13, 1954: 

Mr. Remon said the reason for getting into the bridge controversy was limited to a fear 

that a Roaches Run span would further endanger the development of Tenth street S.W. as 

a major traffic gateway to a rebuilt Southwest area.

Tenth Street was seen as an attractive approach road for the new southwest, but the District 

Highway Department had long planned a bridge over Washington Channel to connect the 14th 

Street bridges with the Southwest Freeway in the F Street corridor and 10th street. Highway 

officials rejected the idea that 10th Street could serve both purposes. NCPC had supported the 

plan for the 10th Street gateway, but the RLA feared that NCPC’s support for the Roaches Run 

Bridge reflected a change of views on the gateway plans. 

Director Searles of the land agency said, “Every developer, investor and planning consultant 

we’ve had agrees Tenth street is vital to serve the Southwest. Now it looks like the planning 

commission has given up on Tenth street.” [Beveridge, George, “Redevelopers See Bridge as 

Threat to Plans,” The Evening Star, January 14, 1954] 

Moreover, the bridge dispute was affecting plans for the Southwest Freeway. General Prentiss 

said that detailed planning was delayed because the design depended on whether the freeway 

would tie into the existing 14th Street bridge, as District officials wanted, or the proposed 

Roaches Run Bridge. The decision would affect, among other features, whether the new freeway 
would be six or eight lanes wide. The dispute was in addition to uncertainty about whether 10th

Street would be a gateway to the southwest or serve Virginia traffic. An early end to the bridge 

dispute was crucial because the Southwest Freeway was the city’s next major freeway project. 

Planning would take a year, with construction expected to last 2 years. [Beveridge, George, 

“Bridge Quarrel Delays Design For Freeway,” The Evening Star, January 17, 1954] 

 On January 29, 1954, Bartholomew, the new NCPC chairman, addressed the Committee of 100 

for the Federal City, an organization that had been formed in the 1920s, initially to support 

development of the city. According to a Star account, he “expressed amazement” at the lack of 

city support for the comprehensive development plan: 

Mr. Bartholomew said the contrast between Washington and other cities around the 

Nation is sharp. He said that elsewhere, once the overall plan for development of a city is 

adopted, the various city departments follow it. 

“If a department doesn’t agree, it doesn’t hire consultants, publish a separate report and 

go to the newspapers,” he commented . . . . 

He said the comprehensive plan for the development of Washington drawn by the 

planning commission, should be followed in general, if the city is to avoid serious 

mistakes. “The White House is in danger of becoming the center of the business district,” 

he commented.

He said the downtown business district has a tendency to grow to the west. More should 

be done to strengthen the east end of the business section and stabilize what business is 

there, he added. 

The Roaches Run Bridge would serve better than the E Street Bridge for two-thirds of 

government workers east of 16th Street and would avoid routing them past the White House. 

Good planning called for creating “circulation” around the central area instead of directing more 

traffic toward downtown: 

Mr. Bartholomew also advocated a good mass transportation survey to help plan for the 

increasing problem of traffic. He suggested that expressways be designed now with room 

for a rapid transit system, saying that is the only way a city can acquire a system now. 

[“D.C. Adherence To Planning Decisions Urged,” The Evening Star, January 30, 1954] 

The Committee of 100, after a presentation by Nolen, backed the Roaches Run Bridge on 

February 19. [“Committee of 100 Hears Nolen, Backs Roaches Run Span,” The Evening Star, 

February 20, 1954] 

Congress Confronts The Issue

At NCPC’s request, Representative John P. Saylor (R-Pa.), whose years in the House reflected a 

strong environmental perspective, introduced a bill directing the District commissioners to build 

the Roaches Run Bridge. The Saylor bill provided for District and Virginia approaches as well 

as a central entrance to Washington National Airport, an overpass of the railroad, and an 
interchange with U.S. 1. [“New Bill Proposes $26 Million Bridge At Roaches Run,” The 

Evening Star, February 26, 1954] 

Representative Saylor explained that he introduced H.R. 8096 mainly “to provide an opportunity 

for Congress to consider the merits of the Planning Commission’s proposal.” He was concerned 

that otherwise, congressional consideration would go to the E Street Bridge, which was the 

District’s preferred option even though it was opposed by NCPC, the Interior Department, and 

the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association: 

I am informed that the E Street bridge location proposed by the District Commissioners 

does violence to all well accepted concepts for the protection and enhancement of the 

western terminus of our world-famed Mall. It would project a commercial type steel 

girder bridge across Roosevelt Island and in many other respects be out of harmony with 

the standards set for that area by the Lincoln Memorial, the Arlington Memorial Bridge, 

and the flanking parkways along the river. 

The Roaches Run site, on the other hand, accords with well considered plans for the 

National Capital Planning Commission . . . . [NCPC] is composed of key public officials 

and eminent citizens qualified in city planning matters. Its present chairman, Harland 

Bartholomew, was appointed by President Eisenhower last August. He is one of the 

Nation’s leading city planners and has been a consultant on the Washington plan for more 

than 25 years. I believe we should give the Commission’s plan full consideration and 

weigh carefully the broad issues involved in the decision on a new bridge location. 

[“Roaches Run Bridge Bill, Extension of Remarks of Hon. John P. Saylor,” 

Congressional Record-House, March 3, 1954, pages 2614-2615] 

On March 1, the House District Committee began hearings on the Broyhill bills in support of the 

E Street Bridge and the Jones Point Bridge. The first day was devoted to the District’s case for 

the E Street Bridge. General Prentiss explained that the E Street Bridge was the District’s 

highest priority, followed by the bridges at Jones Point and Nebraska Avenue extended. The 

E Street Bridge, he said, was designed to relieve morning and evening congestion snarls. He was 

satisfied that approaches could be designed in the District and Virginia to handle any new traffic 

the bridge would generate in the corridor. He said the District had considered the tunnel option 

but concluded it would be impractical because of cost and river front terrain. 

General Prentiss emphasized that the District had considered other locations for the central area 

bridge, but E Street emerged as the “sound solution.” Other options included Arizona Avenue, 

K Street, H Street, Roaches Run, and extensions of Constitution and New Hampshire Avenues. 

“I have satisfied myself that none would serve the purpose so well as E street.” It would serve 

commuters, but not without attracting high amounts of through traffic. 

District Highway Director Robertson said the 19 lanes of existing Potomac River bridges carry 

210,000 cars a day, compared with 190,000 vehicles crossing on the 19 lanes of Anacostia River 

bridges. Despite this disparity, the District was building a six-lane East Capitol Street bridge to 
boost Anacostia River capacity. A new Potomac River bridge was needed. Already, the 14th

Street bridges carried 105,000 cars daily, which he called the highest concentrated bridge total in 

the world. 

Robertson estimated the cost of the E Street Bridge to be $32 million and said it would be 

financed by Federal-aid and District revenue. He estimated Virginia’s cost to be about $2 million 

for connections. Representative Broyhill indicated he would amend his bill to reflect the higher 

cost.

Representative James C. Auchincloss (R-NJ) asked Robertson if the District had considered 

suspending the E Street Bridge over Roosevelt Island instead of building piers on it. Robertson 

replied that the District had considered but discarded that option because it would increase the 

cost to $58 million. As planned, General Prentiss said, the bridge would include three piers 

resting on the island and would pass about 40 feet over it. 

Frank M. Masters of Modjeski and Masters, was one of the other witnesses on the first day. His 

firm gave the E Street Bridge the top priority among the sites studied, with E Street the most 

logical site. “Within a couple of years’ time, there are going to be long delays in getting across 

the Potomac River unless additional facilities are provided.” 

No opposition was expressed to the Jones Point bill, which called for the Federal Government to 

pay for the new bridge. [Beveridge, George, “E Street Bridge Urged by D.C. at House Hearing,” 

The Evening Star, March 1, 1954] 

Throughout the discussion of the location of a central area bridge, officials had debated the 

extent and cost of the approaches to the new bridge. On March 3, the issue erupted during the 

hearing on the Jones Point Bridge when Virginia Highway Commissioner James Anderson’s 

blunt letters to subcommittee members stated that while Virginia favored the E Street and Jones 

Point Bridges, there was “no possibility” that the State could pay for the approaches to either 

structure. His letters, as the Star put it, raised the “subcommittee’s ire.” Several subcommittee 

members said they would not support either bridge without a Virginia funding commitment, 

while one “influential member” said he would insist on documentation of Virginia’s financial 

situation before he would support the bridges. 

For the E Street Bridge, the District planned to use District and Federal-aid funds to pay for 

approaches over federally owned park land in Virginia ($2.8 million), but expected Virginia to 

pay $2.2 million for land and approaches on State land. 

W. Frank Smith, an urban engineer with the Virginia Highway Department, explained that 

Virginia spent about $40 million a year (including about $10 million a year in Federal-aid) on 

new highways, but could afford only about $1 million a year for the area within a 15-mile radius 

of Washington. That area had about $35 million in “immediate needs,” none of which included 

the bridge approaches. 

When Representative Broyhill pointed out that northern Virginia contributed a much higher 

percentage of revenue than it was receiving, Smith explained that the department allocated funds 
based on a rigid formula of area, population, and mileage established by the State legislature. He 

would determine if any of the $1 million could be diverted to approach work. “I wish I could tell 

you that we could do that, but the other needs in this area are so great I don’t know.” (The 

formula Smith mentioned was a longstanding point of frustration for northern Virginia; the State 

legislature, dominated by rural politicians, took revenue from the heavily populated northern 

Virginia for road projects in the State’s rural counties.) 

Representative Broyhill said, “While I’m proud to be a Virginian, I’m not proud of the position 

of the Virginia Department of Highways this morning.” He arranged a meeting with 

Commissioner Anderson for the following day, a Saturday, in Richmond to try to convince the 

State to pay for the E Street Bridge approaches.

Witnesses supported the Jones Point Bridge. Chairman Carroll D Kearns (R-Pa.) asked General 

Prentiss how he could justify full Federal funding for the new structure. General Prentiss replied 

that the new bridge would be of some value to area residents, but its major benefit would be “to 

the general riding public” since it was intended to be an area bypass for motorists not bound for 

local jurisdictions. It would be a “vital link” in the area’s planned circumferential for through 

traffic. 

The Broyhill bill authorized $20 million that would cover construction of a four-lane bridge, 

approaches through Alexandria to connect with the Shirley Highway in Virginia, and a short 

approach in Maryland to connect with Overlook Avenue at Chesapeake Street, SE., in the 

District. The Modjeski and Masters study estimated the Virginia approach would cost $7 million 

while the approach in Maryland and the District would cost about $2.1 million. General Prentiss 

recommended increasing the authorization by $4.5 million to allow for a six-lane bridge.

George N. Lewis, Jr., traffic engineer with the Maryland State Roads Commission, explained that 

Baltimore was planning a harbor tunnel as a bypass for through traffic. “My feeling is that if the 

Jones Point bridge is not built, Washington will be one of the last cities, from New England on 

down the coast, not to have a bypass system.” He added that if the Federal Government was 

willing to pay for the bridge, “Maryland will be glad to consider an agreement with Virginia and 

the District to take over its maintenance and operation.” [Beveridge, George, “Broyhill to 

Attempt to Prod Virginia on Funds for Bridges,” The Evening Star, March 4, 1954] 

On March 6, Representative Broyhill had a 2-hour meeting with Commissioner Anderson and 

State Senator Fenwick to discuss funding issues. On Monday, March 8, Commissioner Anderson 

provided what the Post called a “guarded statement” to Representative Broyhill and Senator 

Fenwick on State funds for the two approaches. The commission was willing to develop general 

approaches to the E Street Bridge but was not willing to seek a special appropriation for the 

approach to the Jones Point Bridge. 

The Virginia Department of Highways, Anderson said, was responsible for maintenance and 

improvement of the main road affected by the E Street Bridge, namely Arlington Boulevard 

(U.S. 50). Already, the department had committed millions of dollars for development of 

Arlington Ridge Road and two overpasses on Glebe Road. However, the Department would be 

“happy to work with the Arlington County Board in a restudy of priorities and will accord the 
utmost consideration to any request by Arlington County and its representatives for a high 

priority to future work on Arlington Blvd.” 
As for the Jones Point Bridge, the commission “did not have and would not have the means to 

provide reasonably adequate highways” in the Arlington-Fairfax area. The commission had 

spent twice as much in Fairfax County as in any county in the State, but Anderson quoted from 

the Wilbur Smith report saying “traffic problems of Northern Virginia are largely the problems 

created by Washington.” 

Representative Broyhill said he was “very pleased” that Anderson agreed about the need for a 

contribution toward the E Street Bridge. This view, the Congressman said, was a reversal of 

Anderson’s claim that the commission would not put up a single cent for bridge approaches. 

“My impression is that the State Highway Department is willing to assume its obligation. Unless 

the State is willing to do this much, Congress will not be willing to approve either bridge and I 

would not expect it to.” [McDade, matt, “Va. Bridge Help Hinted by Highway Commission,” 

The Washington Post, March 9, 1954] 

Commissioner Anderson, contacted by telephone in his Richmond office, told a reporter that the 

memorandum was neither a reversal nor a restatement of position, but a clarification. “We went 

into that hearing not knowing just what the situation was. We now find that most of the money 

we’ve been spending up there [in Arlington] for years may be considered as providing 

approaches to the bridge.” As for the Jones Point Bridge, he said the E Street Bridge would be 

built first. Virginia officials could decide about the approaches to the Jones Point Bridge later. 

[“Virginia Held Willing to Aid E Street Span,” The Evening Star, March 9, 1954] 

On March 9, the subcommittee heard from opponents of the E Street Bridge. Joseph C. Grew, a 

former ambassador to Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, and Japan, led the opposition as a trustee 

of the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association. He called the E Street Bridge a “direct 

violation” of the plans for the island and said the proposal was “an effort to persuade Congress to 

break its word.” The goal in deeding the island to the Federal Government was to provide a 

public park in a state of wilderness. As planned, a terrace and balustrade would be the only 

artificial constructions on the island. “It is essentially a place of solitude and repose.” 

Representative Broyhill told Grew that the planned “Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Bridge 

would be a much greater memorial than the wild island that looks like the very devil right now.” 

During his drive to Richmond over the weekend, he had questioned 81 people, only one of whom 

had even heard of Roosevelt Island, while 66 had heard of the George Washington Bridge in 

New York City.

Grew replied that the Federal Government had failed to live up to its agreement in accepting the 

deed but that the Eisenhower Administration was prepared to provide the funds needed to 

prepare the island for its dedication on October 27, 1958, the centennial of Theodore Roosevelt’s 

birth. He argued that bridge standards appropriate in any other city were not appropriate in this 

case; the “aesthetic must be considered in Washington because it is so material in Washington.” 

Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis told the subcommittee that the bridge would detract from 

the entire monument area near the Lincoln Memorial. The massive high-level bridge would 

divert attention from the area’s carefully planned memorial and park features. At one point, he 
had suggested construction of a tunnel but it was ruled out because of cost. “I don’t think 

Washington, D.C., is a place where money is so doggoned important.” 

Bartholomew called the E Street Bridge a “grievous and costly mistake.” It was, he said, in “an 

illogical and fundamentally unsound location” that would create acute new traffic congestion and 

disrupt property values by shifting the retail business district. Part of the congestion problem was 

that Arlington National Cemetery forced traffic around it to points away from the area to be 

served by the E Street Bridge. The Key and 14th Street bridges were at their “logical locations.” 

The E Street Bridge would serve north Arlington, while growth was expected to occur near 

Alexandria and Fairfax County. In the District, much of the bridge traffic would be headed east 

of the White House, making it a “center of traffic congestion.” The high cost “cannot be 

justified.” 

Since it was “never pleasant to appear against public improvement,” NCPC had offered the 

Roaches Run Bridge as an alternative. The funds for the E Street Bridge could better be spent for 

the Inner Loop road that also would tie into the Roaches Run Bridge. 

Mrs. Alice Roosevelt Longworth, President Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter, sent a letter to the 

subcommittee rejecting any bridge over the island and naming the proposed bridge in her father’s 

memory. [Beveridge, George, “Opponents Call E Street Plan ‘Ruinous.’” The Evening Star, 

March 9, 1954; Beveridge, George, “Planners Push New Attack on E Street Bridge,” The 

Evening Star, March 10, 1954]

On March 10, Representative Howard W. Smith (D-Va.) testified before the subcommittee in 

opposition to the E Street Bridge. Representative Smith, a member of the District Committee but 

not the subcommittee, had represented Alexandria and Arlington and Fairfax Counties until 

redistricting in 1950; Representative Broyhill’s district included those areas now, while 

Representative Smith’s district covered 20 counties to the south. (Representative Smith would 

become chairman of the powerful Rules Committee in 1955 and serve in that capacity through 

1989.) 

He had long favored an Alexandria bridge, “which becomes more essential every day.” 

However, he had opposed the E Street Bridge “since its inception.” It would “channel more 

traffic into an already congested area” of Washington. Further, he considered the deed transfer a 

firm contract that nothing could be done on the island without the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial 

Association’s consent. “Unless you get the consent of the association, it is a complete waste of 

time and motion to submit such a proposition to Congress.” Proceeding without the association’s 

consent would be “an unmoral act which in my opinion Congress would not consider for three 

seconds.” 

Representative Smith also addressed the issue of Virginia funding for approaches. The State 

always had done its share. “I can say confidently that when the chips are down Virginia is going 

to do its share, but they have to have something definite to work on.” [Beveridge, George, “E 

Street Bridge Called Waste of Time,” The Evening Star, March 10, 1954] 
In view of the bitter opposition to the original proposal, General Prentiss surprised the 

subcommittee by sending a proposal on March 11 for a combination bridge-tunnel across the 

Potomac River at E Street. The Star described the plan: 

The bridge would start from the District side of the Potomac like any other low-level 

bridge [about the height of the nearby Arlington Memorial Bridge]. As it approached the 

controversial Roosevelt Island, it would decline to land level and pass under the island 

surface through tubes. On the Virginia side of the island it would rise again and continue 

to the shore as a conventional bridge. 

The tunnel would be built by “open-cut construction,” then covered over so that the island would 

appear unchanged. The District contended that the revised plan would cost about $3 million 

more than the E Street Bridge.

General Prentiss explained, “We want to put everything possible before the subcommittee and 

that is why we sent this plan up today.” The original high-level bridge was less costly than a 

tunnel and “sounder from an engineering point of view,” but the bridge-tunnel idea “has certain 

advantages.” The obvious one was that it answered objections about the impact on Roosevelt 

Island, the Lincoln Memorial, and surrounding area. 

Chairman Kearns said he was “definitely undecided” about the E Street and Jones Point Bridge 

proposals, but said, “I resent the idea we have been wasting our time in these hearings on the E 

street bridge,” as suggested by Representative Smith. The chairman announced he would 

postpone hearings until everyone had a chance to review the District’s bridge-tunnel proposal. 

Representative Broyhill thought the new concept might “overcome some objections” to the 

original proposal. However, he preferred the original high-level bridge “from a standpoint of 

beauty and practicability.”

He also had made some progress in his weekend meeting with Commissioner Anderson, who 

was at least no longer totally opposed to participating in the cost of the approaches to the E Street 

Bridge. His original bill for the Jones Point Bridge had assigned the cost of the approaches to the 

Federal Government:

The Virginia legislator said today he has decided to amend the bill to cut about $6 million 

from the cost and have the Virginia approach routes extend through Alexandria only as 

far as Route 1. He said this would open the way for a firm understanding that the 

connection from there to Shirley highway would be a clear-cut responsibility of the 

Virginia Highway Department.

The highway department, in a follow-up letter, has taken the position that the bridge 

approaches need go only as far as Route 1 immediately, and added: “As traffic develops 

over the years and as additional funds become available, the southern approach could be, 

and undoubtedly would be, extended from Route 1 to the Shirley highway.” [Beveridge, 

George, “Bridge-Tunnel Now Proposed At E Street Site,” The Evening Star, March 11, 

1954] 
At the time, about half the island was below the high-water flood mark, with about 17 percent 

under water at high tide. Further review of the tunnel concept revealed that it would require 

about 35 percent of the island to be raised by 35 feet. The added cost would mostly be for a 

draw-span in the low-level bridge. [Beveridge, George, “Bridge-Tunnel Would Require Raising 

of Island,” The Evening Star, March 12, 1954] 

The Star’s Metropolitan Scene columnist, John W. Thompson, Jr., wrote, “It’s a good bet that 

you saw the death of the E street bridge at the Capitol the other day.” He attributed the death to 

Representative Smith. He was a powerful member of the District Committee and the influential 

Rules Committee, which determined which bills reached the House floor. Technical issues aside, 

his view that the Congress would not consider a bill that violates the agreement with the 

association “is very apt to be correct.” His opposition to the E Street Bridge might also mean the 

demise of any central area bridge. “For it remains to be seen whether supporters of a crossing at 

Roaches Run . . . can muster the strength to get it through.” If the District commissioners 

continue to oppose the Roaches Run Bridge, “it is hardly likely that Congress will approve it.” 

[Thompson, Jr., John W., “The E Street Bridge Looks Dead,” Metropolitan Scene, The Evening 

Star, March 14, 1954] 

The Bridge Dispute Nosedives

With a hearing on the Roaches Run Bridge scheduled for March 30, the Northern Virginia 

Regional Planning Commission voted to support the Roaches Run Bridge after a presentation by 

Executive Director C. C. Robinson: 

He said the Roaches Run span, downstream from the present Highway (Fourteenth street) 

Bridge, could be tied in with Mount Vernon boulevard, U.S. 1, Glebe road and Shirley 

highway. By connecting with the proposed Four Mile Run parkway, the bridge route into 

Virginia would lead also to Columbia pike, Arlington boulevard and Lee highway. 

The commission, in 1952, had voted to support the Jones Point and Nebraska Avenue bridges, 

but had refrained from endorsing the E Street Bridge. 

Arlington, represented on the commission by county board member Alvin K. Kimel, preferred 

the E Street Bridge. However, as Kimel explained, the E Street Bridge was looking like a losing 

proposition. The Roaches Run Bridge was his second choice. [“Northern Virginia Planners 

Indorse Roaches Run Span,” The Evening Star, March 25, 1954] 

On March 30, the Kearns subcommittee heard from NCPC and other supporters of the Roaches 

Run Bridge. Bartholomew explained that the Roaches Run Bridge idea grew out of NCPC’s 

desire to find an alternative to the E Street Bridge. In Virginia, the greatest growth was expected 

to be south of Arlington Boulevard, an area that would be better served by the Roaches Run 

Bridge:

On the District side, he argued that—unlike the E street bridge—it would funnel traffic 

east of the White House in areas with the highest land values, business properties that 
need strengthening, most parking facilities and the highest volume of Federal 

employment in permanent buildings. 

By tying into the limited access Southwest Freeway in the F Street corridor, he said, the bridge 

would allow traffic to use several north-south streets to enter the road system. 

Bartholomew said the Southwest Freeway was part of an important inner belt that was essential 

immediately. The Roaches Run Bridge would feed directly into it, as well as into the Four-Mile 

Run belt. 

Representative Broyhill questioned Bartholomew’s statement that the E Street Bridge would 

provide fewer major benefits for people living south of Arlington Boulevard. Asked by 

Representative Broyhill to choose between the Roaches Run and Jones Point Bridges, 

Bartholomew said they served different purposes and that “if a person has a bad cold and an 

upset stomach he has to take two different types of medicine.” NCPC had not made a choice, 

and he was reluctant to offer his own view, but said that “from an actual relief of congestion 

standpoint the Roaches Run bridge would probably do more than any other we could build at the 

present time.” Congress would have to decide the priorities for these two bridges as well as 

others that NCPC supported (Jones Point and Cabin John spans for the outer beltway, Roaches 

Run and a bridge upriver from Key Bridge tying into the inner belt). 

Nolen, NCPC’s director, testified that the Roaches Run Bridge and its approaches would cost 

$26.3 million or about $6 million below the estimated cost of the E Street Bridge and 

approaches:

Mr. Nolen said this takes advantage of plans already in preparation for the Washington 

channel bridge, a Potomac Yards overpass and eventual construction of a Four-Mile Run 

expressway, which does not now exist. 

Other witnesses who testified in favor of the Roaches Run Bridge included Robinson; General 

Grant, now president of the American Planning and Civic Association; and Edward J. Kelly, 

National Capital Parks superintendent, on behalf of the NPS. [Beveridge, George, “D.C. 

Planners Stress Savings in Roaches Run Bridge Site,” The Evening Star, March 30, 1954] 

The second day of hearings featured mainly critics of the Roaches Run Bridge. Engineer 

Commissioner Prentiss led the opposition, saying “it simply will not work.” Critics argued that 

the bridge would bring more traffic just east of 14th Street than the north-south streets in the area 

could handle: 

Contending that studies show 80 per cent of the cars crossing the river have destinations 

north of Constitution avenue, they argued there is no practical means of getting increased 

traffic beyond Constitution and Pennsylvania avenues. 

In addition—sometimes in biting language—they criticized the planners’ cost estimates 

as too low and attacked proposed Virginia approach routes as impractical.
General Prentiss recognized that Congress might not approve his preferred E Street Bridge. In 

that event, he said, he outlined a nine-point second-best option: 

1. Immediate authorization of the Jones Point Bridge, 

2. Increased authorization, from $7 million to $11 million, for early construction of a southbound four-lane 14th Street bridge to replace the three-lane trestle structure,

3. Replace the streetcar tracks and sidewalks on Key Bridge with additional traffic lanes,

4. Construct an off-ramp from the Whitehurst Freeway to the Rock Creek and Potomac 

Parkway,

5. Construct an underpass at Washington Circle in the K Street line, 

6. Improve roadways around the Lincoln Memorial for better connections with Arlington 

Memorial Bridge,

7. Extend 15th Street, NW., through the Washington Monument grounds to provide better 

service to the 14th Street bridges,

8. Determine how to improve the traffic bottleneck at Independence Avenue and 17th Street, 

NW., and 

9. Swift construction of the Southwest Freeway simultaneously with the Washington 

Channel bridge connecting the freeway with the 14th Street bridges and Ohio Drive. 

(Ohio Drive dates to the early 20th century. The Road Drivers and Riders’ Association, formed 

by horse lovers in 1903, wanted a roadway “where drivers may speed their horses,” as the Star 

explained. The association called it the Speedway, although it was sometimes called the 

Centennial Speedway. [“The Proposed Speedway,” The Evening Star, October 5, 1903] The 

Speedway opened in West Potomac Park on May 11, 1904, with thousands of spectators 

observing the festivities. It extended from the Tidal Basin to 26th Street, SW. It would be 

reconstructed and extended through East Potomac Park as Riverside Drive. In 1949, as will be 

discussed, Ohio’s congressional delegation succeeded in renaming the road Ohio Drive.) 

All these projects were in the District’s proposed 10-year public works plan, but should be 

bumped up in priority if Congress did not approve the E Street Bridge. Asked by Representative 

Auchincloss if all these projects would cost as much as $100 million, General Prentiss replied, 

“No, sir, far less than that.” 

Representative Saylor, testifying on behalf of his Roaches Run Bridge bill, said the testimony 

reminded him of “a group of children who have presented their case to their parents and have had 

the parents, in their wisdom, turn them down.” The parents, in this analogy, were the members 

of NCPC who had rejected all of the District’s arguments. NCPC, he reminded the 

subcommittee, had been established to resolve such disputes. 

John E. Harwood, representing the Virginia highway agency, read Commissioner Anderson’s 

letter saying his department had agreed to cooperate within its means by building approaches for 

the E Street or Jones Point bridges: 

Mr. Anderson’s letter said a “very hurried study” by the planning commission indicated 

that the Roaches Run approach cost could be “many times the approaches needed for an E 
street bridge.” Then Mr. Anderson said he doubted that Arlington officials would 

approve of spending State funds it gets for such a bridge. 

The District’s engineering and planning chief, G. I. Sawyer, disputed NCPC’s cost estimate of 

$26 million for the Roaches Run Bridge: 

He said that it would cost $33.2 million to do what the planners proposed, exclusive of 

land costs in Virginia. But he contended it would cost either $46.6 million or $50.6 

million to carry out either of two plans needed to make the bridge “a partly workable 

highway facility.”

The Roaches Run Bridge, according to District Highway Director Robertson, could “never be 

made to function to its full capacity.” To get the increased traffic north of Constitution Avenue 

would require a tunnel from south of the avenue to north of G Street. The District hadn’t done a 

detailed estimate of what the tunnel would cost but “it would be plenty.” 

Clifton G. Stonebruner, Arlington County’s highway engineer, opposed the Roaches Run Bridge. 

The county favored the E Street Bridge, but in view of concerns about its effect on Roosevelt 

Island, Stonebruner suggested shifted the bridge to pass over a small triangle of land downriver 

from it.

H. J. Spelman testified on behalf of BPR in opposition to the Roaches Run Bridge: 

In a lengthy statement, he attacked the proposal on grounds that: The Virginia 

approaches were not capable of sufficient traffic capacity; District streets could not 

handle the new load; the bridge would “bring an obstruction” close to the main runway of 

Washington National Airport; it would be unwise “from a civilian defense standpoint” to 

add another bridge to the Fourteenth street concentration; the Potomac River approach 

road would conflict with Federal land use plans near the airport. 

Mr. Spelman said nearly one bridge lane’s traffic capacity (between 800 and 1,000 cars 

per hour) can be added to the existing Washington-bound Fourteenth street bridge if the 

District carries out plans to connect the bridge to a Washington Channel span leading to 

the proposed Southwest freeway. 

Another full lane’s capacity can be added when a new four-lane bridge is built to replace 

the trestle-topped, three-lane Virginia-bound Fourteenth street bridge, he declared. 

In closing the 2-day hearing, Representative Kearns announced that he did not expect to call the 

District subcommittee into executive session to decide the central area bridge dispute until the 

end of April. [Beveridge, George, “Prentiss Offers Alternate Plan In Dispute Over Bridges,” The 

Evening Star, March 31, 1954; Beveridge, George, “House Unit Study of Bridges Not Expected 

Until Late April,” The Evening Star, April 1, 1954] 

On April 3, NCPC chose second-best options if Congress decided against the Roaches Run 

Bridge. In that event, it favored immediate construction of the Jones Point Bridge, immediate 
replacement of the trestle-topped 14th Street bridge, and the nine-point plan that General Prentiss 

had outlined. 

During the meeting, Bartholomew and General Prentiss stressed that neither was conceding 

defeat or giving in to the other. Instead, they were simply acknowledging the possibility that 

Congress would not approve either central area bridge. NCPC added several conditions to the 

nine-point plan. It wanted the District to ensure that the bridge over the Washington Channel did 

not preclude construction of the Roaches Run Bridge and that the six-lane Southwest Freeway be 

designed to allow for expansion to eight lanes. 

Star reporter George Beveridge explained that “the fact that the two groups are united on even a 

second-choice plan puts them closer together on a single bridge proposal than they have been for 

years.” [Beveridge, George, “Jones Pt. Span Agreed To as Second Choice,” The Evening Star, 

April 3, 1954] 

On April 20, Bartholomew and General Prentiss met to discuss their different estimates of the 

cost of the Roaches Run Bridge. They did not intend to agree on the cost, but only to identify the 

reasons for the differences so they could let the subcommittee know what they were. In a joint 

cover letter to Chairman Kearns, they said the main reason for the difference was that NCPC 

compiled its estimate on a net basis while the District used gross cost figures:

On the one hand, the planning commission reasons that credit should be allowed for 

construction that would take place, regardless of the bridge and which had already been 

included in the District’s highway improvement program or contemplated as a Federal or 

Virginia project.

On the other hand, the District contends that the legislative authorization for the bridge 

should include the cost of all construction required to permit it to function, even though a 

large part of this construction may be needed whether or not the bridge is constructed. 

General Prentiss told reporters that he and Bartholomew had not tried to reconcile their 

differences on which bridge would serve the area better. “We simply explained our differences 

on cost estimates and set them out on paper.” [“Officials Agree On Variance In Bridge Costs,” 

The Evening Star, April 21, 1954] 

In late May, the District submitted its budget for FY 1955 to the House Appropriations 

Committee. The city requested $2,794,000, to be matched equally by Federal-aid highway funds, 

to build the Southwest Freeway from South Capitol Street to 4th Street. According to J. N. 

Robertson, construction could begin about 8 months after the District begins detailed plans for 

the freeway. However, several factors were delaying the detailed plans, including whether 

Congress would approve the Roaches Run Bridge; if so, the freeway would include eight lanes 

instead of six. 

The dispute on the role of 10th Street, SW., was another cause of delay. District highway 

officials wanted 10th Street to carry large volumes of north-south traffic, but developers planning 

the new southwest, represented by the New York consulting firm of Webb and Knapp, wanted 
10th Street to be a mall-like entrance to the redeveloped southwest waterfront. [Beveridge, 

George, “Budget Asks $2,794,000 Freeway Fund,” The Evening Star, May 23, 1954] 

Chairman Kearns, who had postponed a decision on the central area bridge dispute, decided on 

May 26 to poll subcommittee members on the issue by mail when a quorum did not appear for a 

meeting. As Beveridge put it, chances for the E Street Bridge and the Roaches Run Bridge 

“nosedived when the two proposals became bitterly deadlocked” between NCPC and District 

officials.

The subcommittee’s focus was clearly on the Jones Point Bridge. Representative Broyhill had 

prepared his amendment authorizing Federal construction of the bridge on condition that 

Maryland, Virginia, and the District pay for the approach roads. He told reporters the total cost 

of the project was $24.3 million, divided among the Federal Government ($14.8 million), 

Virginia ($7.3 million), Maryland ($885,000), and the District ($1.2 million).

Representative Broyhill was optimistic about the Jones Point Bridge, but he and Representative 

Kearns agreed that the timing for a central area bridge was uncertain. Representative Kearns 

said, “In the future, I think the city might go to a tunnel beneath the river. If the cost of that is 

prohibitive we will probably have to resort to a toll system because another central area bridge is 

needed.” [Beveridge, George, “Kearns to Poll House Unit on Bridge Needs,” The Evening Star, 

May 26, 1954] 

The subcommittee members informed Representative Kearns of their views on the central area 

bridge in time for a June 3 meeting. The members agreed on Representative Broyhill’s revised 

Jones Point Bridge bill. Under the Broyhill bill, the District would build the bridge after 

receiving commitments from Maryland and Virginia regarding the approach roads. The four 

committee members present for the meeting supported to bill, while Representative Kearns had 

proxy letters from the other members favoring it. He hoped the District Committee would 

complete the bill in time for consideration on the House floor in June. 

The results of Representative Kearns’s poll of members on the central area bridge were not 

reported, but must have been inconclusive, unlike the poll on the Jones Point Bridge. He decided 

to leave the issue open until the next session of Congress. Referring to the agencies disputing the 

location of the central area bridge, he said, “One thing this has proved to me is that these people 

are going to have to get together before they bring their proposal up here for us to consider.” 

[Beveridge, George, “House Unit Approves Bridge Across Potomac at Jones Point,” The Evening 

Star, June 3, 1954] 

On June 11, the House Committee on the District of Columbia unanimously approved the Jones 

Point Bridge bill. The full House approved the bill on June 14, sending it to the Senate. It 

passed without debate on a voice vote, one of 13 District bills the House approved in a 14-minute 

period. [Proposed Potomac River Bridge at Jones Point, VA., Congressional Record-House, 

June 14, 1954, pages 8176-8178; Warren, Don S., “House Adopts Bill for Bridge At Jones 

Point,” The Evening Star, June 14, 1954] 
Southwest on The Drawing Board 

In some ways, the southwest redevelopment plan was a model of the urban theories described in 

Toll Roads and Free Roads and Interregional Highways. In this case, as Gutheim and Lee 

described, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 set the stage: 

The National Capital Park and Planning Commission was authorized to designate 

redevelopment areas and boundaries and to prepare and adopt plans in accordance with 

the existing comprehensive plan . . . . The five-member Redevelopment Land Agency 

was created and empowered with the unique public authority to acquire property 

designated for redevelopment. The land would then be prepared for transfer to public and 

private developers. To attract private developers, on whose participation the program 

depended, the cost of the land could be reduced by as much as two-thirds of the original 

price. [Gutheim and Lee, page 262] 

The commission selected the southwest, the smallest of the District’s quadrants, to be the first 

area redeveloped:

According to the 1950 Comprehensive Plan, much of the small southwest quadrant and 

large areas in the northwest and southeast quadrants possessed high concentrations of 

“obsolete dwellings,” overcrowding, and other potential threats to public health. When 

these separate conditions were overlapped, however, the Southwest emerged as the 

principal first target for renewal. [Gutheim and Lee, page 267] 

Contemporary accounts of the process invariably described the existing southwest as filled with 

“slums,” but the area provided neighborhoods for thousands of low-income residents, including 

many African-Americans:

Of all the post-World War II redevelopment projects in Washington, the southwest 

quadrant was the most dramatic. It involved the clearing of four hundred acres and the 

forced removal of 23,500 people, of whom 76 percent was black residents. The 

redevelopment process exacted a huge human toll, mainly on the large number of people 

displaced because no replacement housing was provided. Many blocks of potentially 

historic buildings were leveled. The effects of the southwest redevelopment reverberated 

for years afterward in citizens’ attitudes toward planning, local governance, and 

neighborhood conservation. [Gutheim and Lee, page 259] 

The RLA asked Washington architect Louis Justement and architect-planner Chloethiel Woodard 

Smith to prepare a radical redevelopment plan for the area:

Reminiscent of Daniel Burnham’s legendary advice to “make no little plans,” the 

Justement-Smith plan aimed at a “whole process of rebuilding the city in a purposeful and 

accelerated fashion” . . . . 

The new residential areas planned in the redeveloped section of Washington were to be 

attractive enough to bring back the suburbanites who had fled the city. As the planners 

pointed out, the process of dispersal coupled with the inability of the historic ten-mile 
square District to annex suburban territory (and thus maintain a large affluent tax base) 

made the specter of the bankrupt city very real.

The broad and original concepts outlined by the Justement-Smith plan included a new 

entrance or “front door” esplanade to the Southwest, along 10th Street, passing over the 

railroad tracks and the planned expressway. The entrance was planned to link the 

formerly isolated quadrant with the cultural facilities along the Mall, most notably the 

original Smithsonian Building. “The view down Tenth Street to the channel, 

uninterrupted by buildings, over-passing the highway, bordered by parks on the east and a 

wide planted park set back along the west, would provide an inviting entrance leading to 

main east-west access avenues to residential areas and to the attractive drive leading to 

Fort McNair.” The functional success of this new artery depended on its connection with 

Maine Avenue, which paralleled the Washington Channel. [Gutheim and Lee, page 268] 

The residential area was to include “groups of buildings, high-rise apartments and town houses 

like those in Georgetown, with front and back yards” as well as neighborhood stores and public 

buildings to create a “richly varied and human urban area.” The report also considered the 

impact of the freeway: 

Intended to cut across this newly molded quadrant was an expressway designed to 

connect the 14th Street Bridge with South Capitol Street. In relation to the proposed 1950 

Comprehensive Plan’s Inner Loop, the freeway would serve as the first stage of this 

central thoroughfare. The freeway would not only carry through traffic above the “central 

congested part of the city,” but it would also give residents in the Southwest access to the 

rest of the city. Rather than cutting through the quadrant as tentatively outlined in the 

1950 Comprehensive Plan, the freeway suggested by the Justement-Smith plan should 

bound and define the residential area to be developed. When the artery was later built, it 

became that boundary (and barrier) and separated the new federal buildings complex 

south of Independence Avenue from the residential area. [Gutheim and Lee, pages 268-

269] 

The Justement-Smith vision was filtered through other ideas and geographic realities, resulting in 

compromise: 

The 1952 compromise report approved large areas for clearance but recommended 

replacement by low-rise buildings that would follow in form and location the old rowhouse configurations. This compromise report by design avoided the “extremes of 

idealism—such as the complete wiping out of this area and of its replacement by a forest 

of multi-story apartments, and, on the other hand . . . the extreme of expediency, such as 

replacement or face-lifting of the existing development” . . . . The compromise report 

agreed to the desirability of the 10th Street Mall or esplanade but expressed reservations 

about the interchange between the terminus of the new mall and Maine Avenue. Based 

on this report, a final redevelopment plan was proposed. [Gutheim and Lee, pages 270-

271] 

Having agreed on general concepts, the RLA selected a firm to carry out the plan:
The flamboyant New York City real estate developer William Zeckendorf, representing 

the firm of Webb and Knapp and recruiting the design and technical guidance of 

architects I. M. Pei and Harry Weese, took charge of the vast project. The detailed plan 

was developed between 1954 and 1959 and was based on the general plan approved in 

1952. The detailed plan was largely a response to the spirit of the Justement-Smith plan. 

Zeckendorf envisaged the new Southwest as a showcase of unusual architectural beauty. 

The detailed plan included 10th Street as a gateway:

Zeckendorf’s Southwest was to be entered via a 10th Street Mall and was to be inhabited 

by four thousand families of varying incomes. There was to be a modern town center, as 

well as enlarged waterfront restaurants, marine activities, and a cultural complex.

Zeckendorf’s 10th Street Mall took inspiration from the vision of the Justement-Smith 

plan. The mall or esplanade in the Zeckendorf plan was described as a “wide and 

impressive span, flanked by stately government buildings.” Contrary to its earlier 

proposed function as an entrance linked directly with the waterfront along Maine Avenue, 

this mall would end “in a circular overlook providing motorists or pedestrians a grand 

view of the waterfront and residential Southwest Washington.” [Gutheim and Lee, 

pages 271-272] 

Zeckendorf met with President Eisenhower on July 8, 1954, to discuss issues associated with 

redevelopment of southwest Washington. The meeting lasted 40 minutes. The developer told 

reporters he briefed the President on the proposal and its potential, leaving behind a schematic 

drawing of the plan. He would not discuss details of the discussion but did say the President’s 

reaction “was far from unfavorable.” 

He apparently also talked with President Eisenhower about the Auchincloss bill, introduced in 

the Committee on Public Works, that would allow for construction of Federal office buildings in 

the redeveloped area to replace temporary buildings built during World War II on the Mall. The 

Star drew this conclusion because Zeckendorf “held a copy of it in his hand as he left the White 

House.” 

In addition, according to Webb and Knapp counsel Harold Riegelman, Zeckendorf talked with 

President Eisenhower about the “effects of various bridge proposals” on the plans. Riegelman 

did not elaborate, but the Star speculated that this was a reference to the Roaches Run Bridge that 

“would pour an inordinate amount of traffic into the Southwest area.” Zeckendorf’s firm also 

was concerned about plans to use 10th Street, SW., as a major traffic artery connecting with the 

14th Street bridges. “The New Yorkers want to use Tenth street as a tree-lined mall to serve as a 

grand entrance to the rebuilt waterfront area.” The Star pointed out that a traffic consultant hired 

by the New York firm was planning to meet with Highway Director Robertson to try to resolve 

the issue. [“President Sees Zeckendorf on Slum Project,” The Evening Star, July 8, 1954] 
Constitution Avenue Bridge

Senator Francis H. Case (R-SD) decided to try to resolve the dispute among the agencies on the 

central area bridge. He had been a newspaper editor before his election to the House of 

Representatives in 1936. He had won election to the Senate in 1950. At the time of the central 

area bridge dispute, he was chairman of the Senate District Committee. In Washington, Senator 

and Mrs. Case lived in the Brandywine Apartments, built in 1953-1954, on Connecticut Avenue 

between Albemarle and Brandywine Streets, NW., in the Forest Hills neighborhood. 

On June 16, 1954, he proposed a compromise to end the bitter dispute. Meeting with 

Bartholomew and General Prentiss, he suggested construction of a bridge in a direct line from 

extended New Hampshire Avenue, NW., that would miss Theodore Roosevelt Island while 

serving the same traffic. It would pass downriver from the island, crossing a small, partially 

submerged island known as South Island and tie in with Arlington Boulevard and Jefferson 

Davis Highway in Virginia. 

His idea, similar to one proposed by Stonebrunner during the House hearings, would address 

concerns about the effect on Roosevelt Island while a parking area and footbridges included in 

the plan would make the island more accessible. The low-level bridge (15 feet above South 

Island) also would answer complaints that the high-level E Street Bridge would affect views of 

Roosevelt Island and the Lincoln Memorial. Senator Case also thought it would be less costly 

than the E Street Bridge while using New Hampshire and other north-south streets to better 

advantage. 

General Prentiss and Bartholomew agreed to study the proposal. [Beveridge, George, “Case 

Proposes A Compromise Site for Bridge,” The Evening Star, June 16, 1954] 

Senator Case’s efforts to resolve the central area bridge dispute achieved success on July 28, 

1954, during a breakfast meeting at the Cosmos Club. General Prentiss, Bartholomew, and 

NPS’s Wirth agreed to a low-level bridge downriver from Roosevelt Island tying into 24th Street, 

NW. The original Case plan to cross South Island proved doubtful when the Theodore Roosevelt 

Memorial Association opposed it because the little slip of land was subject to the terms of 

acquisition of the larger island. The Star explained:

The new Twenty-fourth street bridge agreed upon today would miss South Island 

completely, presumably taking it outside any jurisdiction controlled by the island 

association.

As the Star added, the Cosmos Club meeting resulted in agreement on other issues: 

1. Construction of a second bridge from Roaches Run, Va., to tie into Twelfth street N.W., 

in lieu of District plans to rebuild the old trestle-topped Fourteenth street bridge at its 

present location. Presumably—as part of the Fourteenth street bridge complex—the new 

Roaches Run bridge would carry Virginia-bound Potomac traffic and the existing new 

Fourteenth street bridge would continue to handle city-bound traffic. 
2. Reconstruction of Twenty-fourth street N.W. as a “full expressway” from the new 

downtown bridge connection as far north as R street N.W. The plan, Senator Case 

indicated, is to have the rebuilt street serve as the western leg of the city’s proposed 

“inner belt road system.” The location previously has been in conflict. 

3. Construction of a tunnel beneath the Mall west of Lincoln Memorial through which 

Twenty-fourth street would connect with the new downtown bridge. This would obviate 

a maze of above-ground construction on the Mall—highly objectionable to park officials. 

Senator Case planned to amend his Jones Point Bridge bill, which included his New Hampshire 

Avenue bridge plan, to reflect instead the 24th Street plan:

Senator Case said he hoped the agreement reached today would mark the start of a 

settlement of major problems which have held up area development. [“Case Reports 

Agreement on 24th St. Span,” The Evening Star, July 28, 1954] 

On July 28, NCPC formally endorsed the compromise plan, noting that the long dispute about the 

central area bridge stemmed from NCPC’s conviction that new Potomac River bridges should tie 

into the Inner Loop. NCPC referred to “substantial agreement” on the immediate need for the 

Jones Point Bridge, a new Highway Bridge from Roaches Run to 12th Street, SW., the upriver 

bridge linked to 24th Street, and early construction of the 24th Street and Ohio Drive freeways to 

serve as legs of the lnner Loop. NCPC also referred to a “future needs” program that included 

another bridge between Key and Chain Bridges and a third bridge near 14th Street “when 

additional traffic volume warrants it.”

The Roaches Run Bridge, the Star explained, “would serve as a replacement for the 50-year-old 

trestle-topped Fourteenth street bridge, which is to be demolished.” The article continued: 

Highway officials had planned earlier to rebuild the old bridge in its present location. 

District officials plan to use the new Highway Bridge for one-way Washington-bound 

traffic, and reverse the one-way traffic flow on the Fourteenth street bridge built in 1950. 

The latter bridge now handles Washington-bound cars. 

General Prentiss told NCPC that the District did not have a timetable for the projects. “What we 

have here is a plan. The next step is to set up a work program within the Highway Department—

a definite schedule of projects within the ability of the District of Columbia to pay for them.” 

The 24th Street bridge project was the first priority, assuming Congress approved it. The District 

would use $400,000 in the current budget to begin work on the bridge. [“Bridge Accord Paves 

Way for Other Major Highway Projects,” The Evening Star, July 29, 1954] 

On July 29, Senator Case’s District Committee approved a bill authorizing the compromise 

central area bridge and the Jones Point Bridge. The bill referred to the 24th Street bridge as being 

in the vicinity of Constitution Avenue; it would subsequently be referred to as the Constitution 

Avenue Bridge. The bridge was to connect with 24th Street, the reconstructed north-south 

expressway, and Constitution Avenue. The bill authorized $24.5 million for the project. 
It was to be located “north of the Memorial Bridge and south of the southern portion of Theodore 

Roosevelt Island sometimes referred to as ‘Small Island’ . . . .” As part of the project, officials 

were to build and maintain pedestrian access to Small Island. 

The key was that the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association approved the plan. Hermann 

Hagedorn, the association’s secretary, described it as “an excellent plan . . . a masterly 

compromise”:

Mr. Hagedorn, who had come to Washington from New York yesterday to fight an earlier 

bridge plan, stayed on as a guest at today’s luncheon-business session of the committee. 

One subcommittee aide quipped: “He came down to give us the dickens and stayed for 

lunch.” 

After Senator Case reported agency agreement, the committee completed work on the bill in 

about 5 minutes. 

The hope was that following Senate approval, the House would substitute the Senate’s twobridge bill for Representative Broyhill’s Jones Point Bridge bill, a move that would avoid a 

conference committee. [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Bridge Bill Wins Approval Of Committee,” 

The Evening Star, July 29, 1954] 

Star columnist John Thompson discussed how the compromise came about. Each party in the 

dispute, he explained, was strong enough to kill the plans of the other parties. It would take highlevel compromise to reach agreement. “That’s just what has happened.” 

Earlier, as reflected in the hearings, each party fought for its solution. The Roosevelt association 

“dealt some of the most damaging blows to the E street proposal.” Senator Case had met with 

association leaders in New York City to try to win their support for his original New Hampshire 

Avenue plan: 

He failed at the time but succeeded even better than perhaps he himself knew. He had 

impressed the warring camps with his determination to get a downtown bridge of some 

sort now—not tomorrow but today. 

At a subsequent NCPC meeting, General Prentiss suggested that he and Bartholomew try to work 

things out: 

What probably cracked the impasse between the two groups was reaching accord on a 

proposed inner belt by which through traffic would be able to bypass or move around the 

central downtown area. Almost the core of the planners’ objection to an E street span had 

been that it would cut across their suggested inner belt instead of feeding into it. The 

Federal Park Service also was opposed to the District plan that the west leg of the inner 

belt should go through Rock Creek Park. After conferences with his staff Gen. Prentiss 

was able to suggest a freeway up Twenty-fourth street N.W., instead of through the park 

and this was close to the Twenty-third street leg the planners had been thinking about. 
After working out the details, Bartholomew withdrew his objections to the low-level bridge that 

would miss Roosevelt Island and tie into 24th Street.

As for the District’s motivation to compromise, General Prentiss felt that the highway bridge to 

replace the inbound trestle-topped bridge was too far upstream: 

Instead of replacing the present Highway span, why not build it downstream about at 

Roaches Run and tie into the Southwest freeway? This sounded good to the planners. 

The resulting compromise announced by Senator Case “was a major development . . . the first in 

many years between the traditionally warring District Building and the Planning Commission.” 

Thompson attributed it to “the persistence of Senator Case, the initiative of Gen. Prentiss and the 

willingness of Mr. Bartholomew to get together before all was lost.” [Thompson, Jr., John W., 

“How Did Bridge Compromise Happen?” Metropolitan Scene, The Evening Star, August 1, 

1954] 

Star editors rejoiced at the end of the “battle of the bridges.” News of the agreement was “as 

welcome in this area as a drought-relieving shower.” An editorial hoped that Senator Case’s plan 

to include the compromise central area bridge in his Jones Point Bridge bill “will be successful, 

so that planning for the new span can be started at once.” 

The agreement on the Roaches Run Bridge was more problematic:

This phase of the “peace pact” between the District and the NCPC calls for more careful 

study than obviously has been given to it so far. Congress some years ago vetoed the idea 

of a single bridge at Fourteenth street in favor of twin bridges, one of them to replace the 

present Highway bridge. The Roaches Run proposal would run counter to congressional 

intent.

Nevertheless, Senator Case “deserves praise for his mediation service,” while the other parties 

“have shown good sense in sitting down together and working out a solution to one of 

Washington’s more pressing traffic-bottleneck problems.” [“End of the Central Bridge Battle,” 

The Evening Star, July 29, 1954] 

The Senate approved the two-bridge bill on August 12, 1954, without discussion, and the House 

followed suit on August 17, again without debate. [Construction of Bridge Over Potomac River, 

Congressional Record-Senate, August 12, 1954, pages 14255-14257; Construction of Bridges 

Over Potomac River, Congressional Record-House, August 17, 1954, pages 14878-14878] 

On August 30, 1954, President Eisenhower signed Public Law 83-704 on construction of bridges 

over the Potomac River. Title I authorized the District to construct, maintain, and operate a lowlevel bridge over the Potomac River “from the vicinity of Constitution Avenue in the District of 

Columbia to the Virginia side of the Potomac River, such bridge to be constructed north of the 

Memorial Bridge and south of the southern portion of Theodore Roosevelt Island sometimes 

referred to as ‘Small Island’,” along with approaches. The District also was to build a structure 

for pedestrian access from the new bridge to the “Small Island,” subject to approval by the 
Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association. The NPS would build a pedestrian bridge linked to 

Roosevelt Island. 

The law authorized $24.5 million from the District’s highway fund for the bridge and other 

structures. The funds also were to cover “construction, reconstruction, and repair of all roads 

which are changed or made necessary” by the bridge project.

In addition, the law directed Federal Agencies controlling needed land to transfer it to the District 

upon the request of its commissioners for the bridge and its approach and connecting roads as 

shown on plans to be prepared and approved by the District commissioners and BPR. 

Title II authorized $14,925,000 from the general Treasury for the Secretary of the Interior to 

construct a six-lane bridge over the Potomac River in the vicinity of Jones Point: 

The bridge shall be of deck girder structure with a swing span having a one-hundred-andfifty-foot horizontal clearance above mean low water . . . . 

Construction was not to begin until Maryland and Virginia had given assurances that they would 

construct and maintain “approaches to such bridge as will be reasonably adequate to make 

possible the full and efficient utilization of such bridge.” 

In a signing statement, President Eisenhower called title 1 “a compromise solution for the longstanding controversy as to the location of a central area bridge across the Potomac.” He had 

signed the bill even though it “contains serious defects which should be corrected as soon as 

possible.” Some of the defects could be corrected by Executive action, but others would require 

legislative action:

Title 1 of the enrolled bill, in providing for the construction of the central area bridge by 

the Commission of the District of Columbia, fails to provide statutory recognition and 

adjustment of the relationship of the bridge, together with its approaches and connecting 

roads, to existing and potential improvements on park lands. The bridge, with its high 

traffic volume, will have a serious impact on some of the most important of the National 

Memorials. It can affect importantly the effectiveness of the memorial concept of the 

Arlington Memorial Bridge, which symbolizes the reunion of the North and South and 

provides a monumental approach to Arlington National Cemetery. It can infringe upon 

the Water Gate design as a monumental entrance to the Mall from the Potomac River. 

Most serious of all could be the effect of the bridge on the beautiful setting of the Lincoln 

Memorial.

In order to minimize the possible impairment of the monumental design and artistic 

setting of the Lincoln Memorial and other monumental structures in that area, the 

Secretary of the Interior should continue to keep control and jurisdiction over all park 

lands in the vicinity of the bridge except the actual bridge structure and the road and street 

surface between curbs necessary for maintenance by the District of Columbia. The 

Secretary of the Interior also should be authorized to approve all plans for the bridge and 

the approach roads and interchanges at both ends of the bridge since park structures and 
land are involved. Trucks should be prohibited on the bridge and its approaches, and all 

passenger-carrying buses now utilizing the Arlington Memorial Bridge should be required 

to use the new bridge upon its completion. 

As for title II, he saw “no logical basis” for giving the Secretary of the Interior the responsibility 

for building the Jones Point Bridge. He recommended that Congress pass legislation to shift 

responsibility “for the construction, maintenance, and operation” of the bridge to the Commerce 

Department for construction by the Bureau of Public Roads or to the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers.

(Public Law 84-534, which President Eisenhower signed on May 22, 1956, transferred 

responsibility for the project to the Secretary of Commerce. The President signed Public Law 

84-535 the same day renaming the "Jones Point Bridge" the "Woodrow Wilson Memorial 

Bridge," reflecting the centennial of President Wilson's birth on December 28, 1856. BPR began 

construction in 1958. 

(The existing authorizing statutes had not addressed operation and maintenance of the bridge. 

Public Law 87-358, approved by President John F. Kennedy on October 4, 1961, provided that 

Maryland, Virginia, and the District were to maintain and operate the new bridge, with the 

District’s portion of the cost not to exceed one-third of the total annual cost. 

(The three jurisdictions entered into a maintenance agreement on December 18, 1961. With that 

issue concluded, officials dedicated the bridge on December 28, 1961, and opened it for traffic. 

Because the Federal laws authorizing the bridge project had not addressed ownership, BPR 

owned the bridge. 

(For more information on this bridge, see “Why Is The Woodrow Wilson Bridge Named After 

Woodrow Wilson?” on this Web site at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/wwrambler.cfm) 

Reopening the Central Area Bridge Debate

With the Case compromise in place, NCPC, the District Highway Department, and National 

Capital Parks established a three-man committee to work on details of the project:

• Douglas Brinkley – District Highway Department

• Ellis Price – NCPC

• Merel Sager – National Capital Parks

Even before President Eisenhower approved the two-bridges law, the Star reported on several 

lingering controversies about the central area bridge. One dispute was where the bridge would 

touch down in the District. The Star reported that, “Washington’s proposed ‘Twenty-fourth 

street bridge’ over the Potomac River . . . may turn out to be a ‘Twenty-fifth street bridge.’” 

Both streets were in the vicinity of Constitution Avenue, and a link to Constitution Avenue was 

possible as well. NCPC favored Constitution Avenue, but District highway officials were afraid 

“that this simply would pour more traffic into the same bottlenecks without developing entirely 

new approach roads.” Under the compromise worked out with Senator Case, “whichever street 
is selected would then become the west leg of the proposed ‘inner loop’ highway around the 

District’s downtown area.” [“Central Bridge May Tie Into 25th Street,” The Evening Star, 

August 18, 1954] 

General Prentiss addressed the District connection on an appearance on WWDC’s “Report to the 

People” program. He said the District might drop its opposition to a connection with 

Constitution Avenue if it could be closed during peak periods, with traffic forced to use 24th or 

25th Street, NW. He understood the desire of planners in the Interior Department to keep traffic 

away from the Lincoln Memorial by moving most traffic from the Arlington Memorial Bridge 

onto to the new structure, leaving Arlington National Cemetery, the Lincoln Memorial, and the 

bridge connecting them for sightseers. However, he said, “we have got to insure the maximum 

use of our bridges.” The District was resisting their idea of linking the new bridge to 

Constitution Avenue as a way of diverting it from the park area. He pointed out that the 

“capacity of Constitution avenue to absorb traffic” must be considered. 

He acknowledged President Eisenhower’s statement about prohibiting trucks on the new bridge 

and shifting buses from Arlington Memorial Bridge to the new structure. General Prentiss was 

concerned that under this “substitution” concept, still more bridges would be needed. 

[“Compromise May Link Bridge With Constitution Avenue,” The Sunday Star, September 5, 

1954] 

One option was to widen Constitution Avenue west of 12th Street, NW. A mall-like center strip 

would be added on the south side of the present 80-foot wide avenue and another 80-foot 

roadway would be added south of the center mall. One advantage of the plan was that it would 

require demolition of several war-time temporary office buildings that officials had wanted to 

remove for many years. The temporary buildings were on the Washington Monument grounds 

and along both sides of the Reflecting Pool east of the Lincoln Monument. A connection 

between the new bridge and Constitution Avenue would be attractive to motorists currently using 

Arlington Memorial Bridge because it would eliminate the “headache of winding around the 

perpetually-clogged Lincoln Memorial circle.” [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Studying Plan to 

Double Width of Constitution Avenue,” The Sunday Star, September 12, 1954] 

On September 17, NCPC unveiled tentative plans developed by a three-man committee 

consisting of Conrad Wirth, BPR’s Spelman, and Leon Zach representing the Army’s chief of 

engineers. They had developed the plan with the Brinkley-Price-Sager technicians committee 

established in August. Both groups acknowledged that the remaining issue of the District 

connection was the subject of ongoing traffic studies to determine the feasibility of widening 

Constitution Avenue. “My feeling,” the District’s Robertson said, “is that we are in general 

agreement on this as a tentative plan, but subject to later revision when the traffic studies are all 

in.” 

The technicians’ report indicated that Arlington Memorial Bridge would continue carrying its 

“just traffic load” during peak periods, but the approaches to the two bridges were designed so 

that traffic could be “shifted from one to the other in only a few minutes.” The plan included a 

barricade that could be imposed if traffic overloaded Constitution Avenue. 
Aside from Constitution Avenue, the technicians included only one District link. The new bridge 

would connect to a north-south expressway just west of 25th Street, NW., that would be the 

western leg of the Inner Belt. The expressway would be carried over Virginia Avenue and under 

K Street just west of Washington Circle. The Star summarized other details:

Southward, the new expressway would follow the present road beside the Lincoln 

Memorial’s Watergate steps to tie into Independence avenue and Ohio drive. The 

technicians said this would require widening the Watergate road and the arches of the 

Memorial bridge. But they favored it over other proposals, just as costly, to tunnel under 

the steps or build a new roadway over the river edge. 

Virginia-bound traffic on Twenty-third street N.W. and the Rock Creek and Potomac 

parkway would have access only to the Memorial Bridge. Westbound Constitution 

avenue traffic could use either bridge—getting to Memorial via a new wide-arc ramp 

connecting with Twenty-third street.

On the Virginia side of the river, Washington-bound motorists would have less choice 

about the bridge they would use. The new bridge, for example, would take motorists only 

from Arlington boulevard, south bound lanes of the George Washington Memorial 

parkway and from Jeff Davis Highway. Motorists from the south—using Mount Vernon 

Memorial highway, Shirley highway via Washington boulevard or the Pentagon roads—

would be able to connect only to Memorial Bridge. 

(The Watergate was a performance area during warmer months when a barge would hold 

performers before as many as 12,000 people who sat on the steps and surrounding areas. The 

concerts ended in the mid-1960s because they were disrupted by noise from frequent jets using 

Washington National Airport. However, the name survived in the Watergate complex of 

buildings.) 

NCPC approved the Wirth-Spelman-Zach plan, subject to resolution of the Constitution Avenue 

issue. Bartholomew complimented District and Federal officials who had so quickly reached 

agreement on the main bridge feature. [Beveridge, George, “Detailed Plans For Downtown 

Bridge Unveiled,” The Evening Star, September 17, 1954] 

On October 19, the three-man technicians committee presented their plan to the Wirth-SpelmanZach committee, which secured NCPC approval on November 6 for the plan for handling traffic 

leaving the bridge in the District. Beveridge, in the Star, summarized the three main features of 

the plan: 

1. New three-lane roads would be built paralleling the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool to 

carry traffic to and from the Lincoln Memorial Circle and around the Washington 

Monument to connect with existing Mall roads east of Fifteenth street N.W.

2. These new roads would serve only the Arlington Memorial bridge, but would be capable 

to handling all the rush hour traffic using the bridge. They would require demolition of 

the Navy and Munitions Buildings on Constitution avenue and other tempos [sic] on the 

Monument Grounds and south of the Memorial Reflecting Pool. 
3. The new Constitution avenue bridge, located about 1,200 feet upriver from Memorial 

Bridge, would connect directly with Constitution avenue. It also would route traffic 

southward to Independence avenue and northward on a proposed “Twenty-fifth street 

expressway” to feed such east-west streets as E, H, and I. 

By giving each bridge its own traffic escape valves, the problem was solved to every one’s 

satisfaction.

The roadways paralleling the Reflecting Pool would be 38 feet wide, with 14th and 12th Street, 

NW., underpassing the roadways while 15th Street would be realigned. 

The plan satisfied park officials, Beveridge explained, “because it develops the Mall roads to 

their original purpose of carrying motorists in a ‘park-like’ setting from the Capitol all the way to 

the Lincoln Memorial Bridge. [sic]” The report before NCPC stated:

The removal of the temporary office buildings built on the Washington Monument 

grounds and on both sides of the reflecting pool will make it possible to complete this 

part of the central motif of the Nation’s Capital.

The new bridge opposite Constitution avenue would take much of the traffic now being 

handled by the Arlington Memorial Bridge and that bridge could then be returned to its 

originally planned use and could still take a good share of the morning and evening rushhour traffic involving downtown east of Fourteenth street. 

With NCPC’s agreement, the District planned to begin design work on the new Constitution 

Avenue Bridge. [Beveridge, George, “Bridge Accord Clears Way to Draw Up Plans,” The 

Evening Star, November 6, 1954] 

Although the key actors in the long running dispute over a central area bridge had reached 

agreement, other parties with a say in the matter had not been involved in the meeting with 

Senator Case at the Cosmos Club. 

In October, the Commission of Fine Arts reversed course. It had helped kill the 24th Street 

Bridge because it would cross Roosevelt Island. Now, the commission members concluded that 

a crossing of the island was preferable to the impact of the congressionally authorized bridge on 

the Lincoln Memorial grounds, the National Mall, Arlington Memorial Bridge, and Arlington 

National Cemetery. As Beveridge put it, members considered the area “one of the most 

carefully-planned beauty areas of the world.” The commission members “feel the new bridge, 

which has no esthetic part in the scene, would dominate it and detract from the view from any 

vantage point.” 

A member of the commission, Joseph Hudnut of Dover, Massachusetts, a former Harvard 

University Professor of Architecture, put the commission’s view in a letter to the Star. If 

additional lanes were needed, he argued, they should be carried across the river in a tunnel 

financed by the Federal Government. Asked by Beveridge if any other option were acceptable, 

Professor Hudnut said the commission had discussed the “two-span bridge across the upper part 

of Roosevelt Island.” He quickly added that the only “real answer” was a tunnel: 
But Dr. Hudnut said such an island crossing as be described “would not do nearly the 

damage” that the approved bridge would to esthetic values of the Lincoln Memorial and 

the monumental parks and structures that surround it. 

As Beveridge pointed out, the Fine Arts Commission’s opposition to the bridge was not a 

surprise since it had testified before Congress on the subject. What was a surprise was that it 

now preferred a crossing of Roosevelt Island if a tunnel could not be substituted for the bridge. 

[Hudnut, Joseph, “Bridge Question Revived,” Letters to the Star, The Sunday Star, October 3, 

1954; Beveridge, George, “Fine Arts Unit May Ask Island Site for Bridge,” The Sunday Star, 

October 3, 1954] 

The Committee of 100 for the Federal City also had not been present at the Cosmos Club 

meeting. On November 2, the committee adopted a resolution calling on NCPC for a careful, 

detailed study to pick a new site for the 24th Street bridge upriver from Arlington Memorial 

Bridge. Members were concerned that the bridge, which would be visible from the Lincoln 

Memorial grounds, would, as one member put it, mar the “full emotional significance” of the 

memorial.

Elbert Peets, landscape architect of the Fine Arts Commission, argued that a crossing over the 

north end of Roosevelt Island would be a better choice, although a tunnel would be preferable. 

As planned, the 24th Street bridge would mar the view of visitors to the island. He called it a 

“tragic situation.” 

General Grant, who also had helped block the E Street Bridge, argued that Roosevelt Island was 

the “wrong place” for the structure. He favored NCPC’s plan for the Roaches Run Bridge and 

thought it should have priority. “If it turns out that there is need for another bridge farther 

upriver, let the next generation take care of it.” The committee considered endorsing the 

Roaches Run Bridge, but was discouraged from doing so by AAA’s Washington I. Cleveland. 

He told the committee, “There isn’t a ghost of a chance for that location at this time.” [“New 

Study Is Urged to Change Site for Central Area Bridge,” The Evening Star, November 3, 1954] 

Although bridge opponents suggested a tunnel would address their aesthetic issues, the cost of a 

tunnel remained a concern. Representative Broyhill asked Ralph Smillie, a consultant engineer 

involved in tunnel projects in New York City, for a cost estimate. Smillie concluded that a 

tunnel would cost approximately $73 million. He added that he would not support a tunnel 

because merging traffic lanes in a tunnel would invite disasters, fires, and explosions. The high 

cost, traffic considerations, and the length of time needed to build a tunnel argued against the 

idea. [“Fine Arts Unit To Weight River Crossing Site,” The Evening Star, November 10, 1954] 

In July, just before agreement had been reached on the Potomac River bridges, NCPC hired 

Wilbur Smith and Associates to study future Potomac River bridges in the Washington area. The 

study was to indicate general locations and traffic volumes expected in 10-15 years. It would 

also consider population growth, employment trends, and residential development. [“Planners 

Hire Firm to Study Need of Potomac Bridges, The Evening Star, July 28, 1954] 
The firm released its report in December. The report recommended immediate construction of 

several facilities, including the Inner Loop expressway around the center of town, with priority 

for the Southwest Freeway segment. District highway officials were working on the loop, 

including traffic studies, location of grade separations, and cost estimates. According to 

Highway Director Robertson, previous estimates indicated the entire loop would cost $130 

million. Under present funding levels, construction would take 10-12 years, but the city wanted 

to begin construction on a bridge first. 

As a second priority, the Wilbur Smith report identified a central area bridge as needed, but in 

what the Star called “the report’s biggest surprise,” questioned whether projected traffic would 

best be served by building the bridge at Constitution Avenue as authorized by the law, or over the 

Three Sisters Islands upriver from Key Bridge. The District was preparing a contract for 

preliminary engineering of the authorized bridge. 

The consultants did not choose among the two proposed bridges, saying the Constitution Avenue 

Bridge would be “better adapted” to trips downtown while the Three Sisters location “appears to 

have better long-range planning possibilities,” particularly in view of projects included in 

Virginia’s as-yet-unfunded plans. The Star summarized the report’s comparison: 

Three Sisters is the only proposed bridge that would give good connections between 

Virginia and outer Northeast Washington. But to make adequate connections to the 

inner-loop it would require very expensive connections. 

Constitution avenue would give direct access to the central area. But it would create 

problems on Washington streets, generate restrictive traffic volumes on already crowded 

Arlington boulevard and involve esthetic values in the Lincoln Memorial area. 

Noting that the Commission of Fine Arts preferred a tunnel to a bridge for aesthetic reasons, the 

report said of the tunnel option: 

This type of facility would be very costly and would, because of grade, preclude contact 

with the inner loop. All traffic would tend to be unduly concentrated on Constitution 

avenue. Extensive approach roadways would be required. 

Further, among immediate needs, the report gave priority to improving District streets before 

building the central area bridge:

Coincident with the improvement of existing bridges, and their approaches, and taking 

precedence over the construction of new crossings, it is essential that additional street 

capacity be provided on the Washington side of the river. 

Roadways are currently taxed during peak hours and cannot accommodate the additional 

loadings which would result from increased bridge capacity. 

The concern was that the bridge would open before the Inner Loop Freeway, thus compounding 

congestion on the local streets that would have to carry the traffic. 
On the issue of timing, General Prentiss told reporters the plan was to open the Inner Loop before 

the bridge, but not necessarily to full freeway standards:

We plan to have the loop ultimately built to limited-access characteristics and consultants 

are studying it. I’ve asked them to plan the ultimate development and also to give us an 

interim plan. For some parts of the loop, for example, we’ve been talking in terms of 

using existing streets with parking banned temporarily. 

We can’t just sit back until we build the belt to its ultimate. I want to see the money 

spent as judiciously as possible to develop the most critical parts of the loop and the most 

critical intersections, and to use existing pairs of streets until we have money to go 

further.

Third, the report recommended replacing the trestle-topped bridge and widening the approach 

roads to the 14th Street Bridge completed in 1950. The report did not specify where the trestle 

replacement would be, but under the District-NCPC agreement, it would be built downriver from 

the existing 14th Street Bridge near Roaches Run. It would carry one-way northbound traffic 

while the existing bridge would carry southbound traffic. 

The fourth immediate need was to increase the capacity of Key Bridge up to 15 percent by 

removing streetcar tracks and moving the sidewalk off the bridge proper. These changes would 

allow the District to add two traffic lanes. The report also recommended improving the District 

approaches by, for example, building a grade separation structure at M Street. Robertson 

indicated the city was preparing to make these changes.

Finally, the report recommended immediate improvements to the approaches on both sides of 

Arlington Memorial Bridge to increase automobile capacity by 10 percent. The NPS, which was 

responsible for the Virginia approaches, had not planned any changes. In the District, highway 

officials and NCPC had agreed on a plan for improving traffic flow in the vicinity of the Lincoln 

Memorial.

The report also recommended bridge projects that should be under construction by 1960: 

• A six-lane Roaches Run Bridge downriver from the 14th Street railroad span; 

• Improved approaches to Chain Bridge by improving Canal Road; 

• Construct a four-lane bridge at Jones Point. 

By 1965, a replacement bridge would be needed at Cabin John, Maryland, as part of the outer 

loop beltway. Maryland and Virginia had conducted traffic studies for the bridge, but did not 

have funds for construction. [“Planners Consider Consolidated Area Development Data,” The 

Evening Star, December 4, 1954; Beveridge, George, “Bridge Report Proposals Win D.C. 

Approval,” The Evening Star, December 5, 1954] 

As 1954 neared an end, Webb and Knapp reopened discussions with NCPC about reconstructing 

10th Street as a wide, mall-like “grand entrance” to the District’s redeveloped southwest quadrant, 

free of heavy through traffic. Under the developer’s plan, 10th Street would be a divided street 
from Maine Avenue along the Washington Channel to Independence Avenue south of the 

National Mall. The plan included a roadway east under Independence Avenue to 9th Street. 

Fourteenth Street would be a one-way expressway from Maine Avenue to Constitution Avenue, 

carried under the National Mall in a tunnel. To avoid heavy through traffic, 10th Street would not 

be connected by interchange with the planned Southwest Freeway. 

In a letter to NCPC’s Bartholomew, Zeckendorf suggested ways of handling traffic without 

including 10th Street as a major artery and requested formal approval of principles for other 

elements of the redevelopment plan that NCPC had indicated it supported. Bartholomew 

reconstituted the Wirth, Spelman, and Zack committee to consider the proposals. [Beveridge, 

George, “Webb & Knapp Offers 3 plans For Southwest,” The Evening Star, December 21, 1954; 

“Webb & Knapp Calls For Mall Policy Decision,” The Evening Star, December 22, 1954] 

Ole Singstad’s Views

On January 8, 1955, Representative Broyhill revealed that the NPS had asked Ole Singstad, a 

well-known bridge and tunnel expert based in New York City, to consider whether a tunnel 

would be a feasible alternative to a bridge in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial. In New York 

City, he had designed the ventilation system for the Holland Tunnel and completed the tunnel 

project after the death of chief engineer Clifford M. Holland. He designed the Lincoln, 

Brooklyn-Battery, and the Queen-Midtown Tunnels. His firm had designed the Big Walker 

Mountain Tunnel in Virginia and the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel as well as tunnels in other 

countries. 

Wirth had agreed to the compromises negotiated by Senator Case the previous July. However, 

he agreed with the Fine Arts Commission’s doubts about the aesthetic impact of the Constitution 

Avenue Bridge that Congress had authorized. 

The District had rejected the tunnel idea several times, in part because of cost and because of the 

difficulty of connecting the tunnel with its approaches. Now, highway officials expected to 

approve a contract soon to prepare detailed plans for the bridge. Representative Broyhill 

understood the District’s thinking on the matter but said: 

I’m in entire accord with this further exploration of the tunnel idea. But I’m not 

optimistic about the possibility because of the problems involved. At the same time, this 

will not delay plans already under way for the bridge. [Beveridge, George, “Expert 

Asked for Views on Potomac Tunnel,” The Evening Star, January 9, 1955] 

In a telephone interview with George Beveridge, Singstad revealed that he had been studying the 

matter for several weeks at the request of the District Chapter of the National Society of 

Professional Engineers, which had adopted a position in support of a tunnel on November 16, 

1954. “Don’t expect a complete and final report. But I’m not discouraged about the prospects of 

a tunnel, and I’ll be in Washington to exchange views.” Although a tunnel would present 

“complex problems, especially on the Virginia side of the river, I don’t see anything insuperable 

about it as far as I’ve gone.” [Beveridge, George, “Expert to Back Practicality of Tunnel Here,” 

The Evening Star, January 11, 1955] 
Singstad was in Washington on January 15 for a meeting at the Interior Department with 

representatives of about 30 Federal and District agencies and private organizations. He rejected 

the District’s estimate that a tunnel would cost $80-90 million as “absolutely fantastic—just 

baloney.” He expected a much lower cost, but could not provide a specific figure until he had 

studied the conditions of rock and mud that the tunnel would fit into. Those conditions would 

determine the feasibility of a tunnel as well as what it would cost, which also would be affected 

by whether the tunnel carried four or six lanes of traffic. 

He had developed a plan to address the District’s concern about the difficulty of connecting a 

tunnel with roads on either side of the tunnel. In his rough scheme, the tunnel would be built 

under the river bottom only for the length of the navigation channel. It would then begin a 5-

percent grade rise to emerge on Columbia Island, just off the Virginia shore, to begin aboveground connections with Arlington Boulevard, Jefferson Davis Highway, and the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway. The District links, which he had not developed, would be less 

difficult. 

Singstad said that the District’s borings for the bridge would provide some of the information he 

needed about underwater conditions, but he would need a “super-sonic sounding device” to 

complete cost estimates. The NPS was looking for the device. Wirth said, “I’m very pleased and 

encouraged by all this. I just hope everyone will be reasonable enough to wait until all the facts 

are in.” 

Chairman David E. Finley of the Fine Arts Commission said that Singstad’s preliminary report 

was “very reassuring” based on the group’s concerns about the bridge option. At the same time, 

however, he was concerned that the tunnel’s tall ventilating towers would have a negative 

aesthetic impact. 

 During this period, the District had a new engineer commissioner, Colonel Thomas A. Lane. He 

had taken office on December 10, 1954, replacing General Prentiss who assumed command of 

the Engineer Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Colonel Lane had been commissioned in the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers in 1928, serving during World War II and had entered Japan in 1945 

with the occupying forces. In 1950, he became District Engineer of the Okinawa District, a post 

he held for 2 years. He said his work on Okinawa most closely paralleled what he expected to do 

in the District. On Okinawa, “we built a complete community from scratch for more than $200 

million, including highways, harbor improvements, power plants and housing.” His position 

before becoming engineer commissioner was engineer of the Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, 

Virginia. Colonel Lane’s address was 3915 Livingston Street, NW., in the District’s Chevy 

Chase neighborhood near the Maryland State line. [Giles, John A., “Gen. Prentiss Named to 

Head Engineer Center,” The Evening Star, November 24, 1954] 

Colonel Lane did not attend the Interior Department meeting but based on an earlier briefing, 

said that the data presented thus far “wasn’t sufficient, certainly, for us to start thinking seriously 

about a tunnel instead of a bridge.” [Beveridge, George, “Expert Assails $80-90 Million Tunnel 

Figure,” The Evening Star, January 16, 1955] 
On January 19, 1955, National Capital Parks officials conducted the sonar tests Singstad had 

requested. In “Operation Sonar,” they mounted the device on a World War II-era amphibious 

DUKW (usually referred to as Duck) borrowed from the Beach Erosion Board and passed over 

the Potomac River several times upriver from the Arlington Memorial Bridge. On the Virginia 

side, the route ended near the north end of Columbia Island where the tunnel would link with 

Arlington Boulevard. The route swerved on the District side to line up with Constitution 

Avenue. [Beveridge, George, “River Bottom Tested by Sonar To Learn Feasibility of Tunnel,” 

The Evening Star, January 19, 1955] 

Singstad presented his report to NCPC on February 4. A four-lane tunnel at Constitution Avenue 

could be built for $25 million; a six-lane tunnel, for $35.8 million. These costs covered only the 

tunnel, not approach changes. The Operation Sonar data gave him “far more information than is 

usual when an engineer is called upon to make a preliminary estimate.” He favored the four-lane 

tunnel option, but provided the six-lane estimate because the proposed tunnel was intended to 

replace a six-lane bridge.

District highway officials quickly discounted Singstad’s figures. They said the cost of approach 

structures would be $17 million. Since a six-lane tunnel would be needed, the total cost would 

be over $52 million. Congress, they said, would have to be induced to authorize funds to make 

up the difference in the cost of the bridge and tunnel. [“Singstad Estimates 4-Lane Tunnel Cost 

as $25 Million,” The Evening Star, February 4, 1955] 

In an editorial, the Star predicted that Congress would be interested in Singstad’s estimates, but 

asked:

Who is going to pay the extra cost of a tunnel, the main purpose of which is said by the 

Fine Arts Commission to be avoidance of “conflict” with the Lincoln Memorial and the 

Memorial Bridge? Obviously, the District should not be asked to pay the bill for this 

esthetic enterprise. Which prompts another question: Just what is esthetically wrong 

with the idea of building another attractively designed bridge over the Potomac in the 

central area? A properly designed bridge can be a monumental asset to any city, as well 

as a utilitarian structure. [“Tunnel Versus Bridge,” The Evening Star, February 5, 1955] 

The 10th Street Mall

NCPC’s three-man committee reported on February 4 that it rejected the 10th Street Mall that 

Webb and Knapp favored for its southwest redevelopment plan. The committee would 

recommend shifting the 300-foot wide mall to 9th Street. Tenth Street was needed for heavy 

traffic going through southwest from the Potomac River bridges and the new freeway in the F 

Street corridor.

Zeckendorf’s firm had chosen 10th Street for its grand entrance partly because it could easily pass 

over the existing Pennsylvania Railroad tracks that rose sharply to the east. The three-man 

committee answered this concern by proposing to move the tracks underground near D Street 

between 4th and 12th Streets or simply build the 9th Street mall over the existing tracks.
The committee’s report indicated that its plan could “readily adapt itself [to] any proposal for 

redevelopment of the Southwest area,” adding: 

It was also evident from these studies that the successful redevelopment . . . did not 

depend upon a mall specifically located at Tenth street: however, it does depend upon 

proper handling of the abnormal traffic that must traverse this area. 

The report assumed construction of the Roaches Run Bridge across the Potomac River and 

Washington Channel to touch down in line with 10th Street. The Star’s Beveridge described the 

committee’s plan:

Their plan showed Tenth street as the major Southwest street for through north-south 

traffic, with a big traffic interchange at Tenth and the F street freeway. Tenth would be a 

single street as far north as D street. Then it would separate widely to Independence 

avenue, with north bound lanes connecting to Ninth street and southbound lanes 

connecting from Twelfth. 

Both Ninth and Twelfth would underpass roads on the city’s main east-west mall, 

providing non-stop expressways all the way to Constitution avenue. 

The committee’s report stated that a grand entrance at 9th Street would have a “much longer, 

gradual approach to the waterfront” and would permit adequate service for through traffic on 

other existing streets. It would leave the produce market in place and accommodate the 

Smithsonian Institution, which was planning a National Air Museum at 10th and Independence. 

The Smithonian plan was in direct conflict with the Zeckendorf redevelopment plan. [Beveridge, 

George, “Tentative Approval Given by Planners to S.W. Mall Revision,” The Evening Star, 

February 4, 1955] 

The WPA Guide described the produce market: 

Washington’s water front, along Maine Avenue east of 14th Street, SW., on the north 

bank of the Washington Channel, is, after the ponderous monumentality of the Mall and 

the impounded elegance of posted parks, a realm of welcome small things and the 

reassuring clutter generated by humans going about their essential business. The 

buildings are modest, inclined to dinginess, and take character from the kind of 

merchandise that is handled in them . . . . There are excellent sea-food restaurants, 

wholesale and retail markets for fish, poultry, vegetables, and groceries, yacht clubs, 

yacht brokers, boat chandlers—in short, the water front, apart from the potentially lethal 

truck traffic, is probably just about as Pierre L’Enfant visualized it. 

Immediately east of 14th Street, Maine Avenue dips under southbound railroad tracks 

separating Washington Channel from the Tidal Basin. In this blind end of the Channel 

are Government-built slips, complete with fresh-water and electrical outlets, which can be 

rented by owners of self-propelled craft. Across Maine Avenue from the public wharves 

are a series of busy wholesale markets where barrels, sacks, baskets, and boxes are 

perpetually shifted by stevedores from trucks into high piles, into warehouses and out 
again. Immediately east of the public wharves are fish markets, where the customer may 

name it and get it fresh. Or he may go out on the whitewashed wharf and bargain first 

hand for “SALTY WATER OYSTERS AND CLAMS” with fishermen who hawk from 

the decks of their boats, and who offer samples of raw oysters shucked on the spot. [WPA 

Guide, page 324] 

Zeckendorf agreed to study the committee’s proposal, but added in a statement that if the plan 

could not be reconciled with the principles behind the Webb and Knapp plan, “We shall 

regretfully be forced to withdraw” from the southwest redevelopment. Except for “paramount 

reasons,” if the principles could not be carried out, the development plan would become “purely 

academic.” [“Planner Agreed To Study New Mall Proposal,” The Evening Star, February 5, 

1955] 

In March, the consulting firm of DeLeuw, Cather completed a southwest traffic study for the 

District. Based on traffic projections for 1980, the firm recommended that the main north-south 

routes for heavy traffic through the southwest should be 9th Street for southbound traffic and 12th

Street for northbound traffic. Tenth Street would be reserved for Zeckendorf’s 10th Street Mall. 

The consultants recommended replacing the trestle-topped bridge with a structure slightly upriver 

from its present location. 

Based on traffic projections for 1980, DeLeuw, Cather dismissed NCPC’s favored Roaches Run 

Bridge. The consultants did not rule out the bridge; they said “no plan should be so inflexible 

that it cannot be modified to accommodate unforeseen developments.” However “if and when” 

the bridge were built, it should not connect with the Inner Loop, but lead directly into 

redeveloped southwest. 

The Southwest Freeway would continue over the Washington Channel from 12th Street, cross 

diagonally over West Potomac Park, and connect with two one-way Potomac River bridges near 

14th Street. The freeway would contain eight lanes, not the planned six lanes. Within the 

District, the freeway would continue along Ohio Drive (instead of Independence Avenue as 

NCPC preferred) toward the Lincoln Memorial to complete the south leg of the Inner Loop. 

Using Independence Avenue for the freeway extension, although favored by NCPC, was 

impractical in the view of Deleuw, Cather. It would “require that substantial areas be taken from 

the Washington Monument grounds, the lawn bordering the Reflecting Pool and from the Tidal 

Basin.” 

To resolve the dispute on the grand entrance to the new southwest, President Eisenhower had 

asked George A. Garrett, president of the Federal City Council, to meet with the parties. (In 

1954, 50 business and civic leaders formed the Federal City Council to provide citizen leadership 

whenever needed to promote civil development projects and attack problems threatening the 

economy and development of the Nation’s capital. They selected Garrett, an investment banker 

and former ambassador to Ireland, to be the council’s first president. [“Federal City Council 

Registers Charter, Prepares to Aid D.C., The Evening Star, September 13, 1954; “Garrett, 

Investment Banker, Heads Federal City Council,” The Evening Star, November 16, 1954] 
Garrett had met with Zeckendorf on March 23. Zeckendorf, Garrett reported, was working on 

plans to resolve the controversy in time for NCPC’s April 7 meeting. [Beveridge, George, “New 

Highway Plan For Southwest Gets Federal Study Today,” The Evening Star, March 24, 1955; 

“Report Denies Roaches Run Span Needed,” The Evening Star, April 7, 1955] 

Somewhat surprisingly, NCPC voted “tentative approval” of Zeckendorf’s 10th Street Mall in 

April, reversing NCPC’s tentative approval in February of a plan that retained 10th Street as a 

major traffic route. The vote, with four members absent, including Bartholomew, came after a 

report by BPR’s Spelman on behalf of the Wirth committee on the issue: 

Key points in the planners’ approval were that the new plan does far less damage than 

earlier proposals to the wholesale produce market center on the waterfront and does not 

preclude eventual construction of a Roaches Run bridge—a pet planning commission 

project.

The plan calls for the Tenth street mall to be angled slightly eastward from Tenth as it 

approaches the waterfront, ending in a wide circular “overlook” atop Maine avenue and 

the Washington Channel. 

Several problems remained. One was that the plan would divide the area where the Smithsonian 

Institution planned to build its National Air Museum south of Independence Avenue near 10th

Street. Others included Zeckendorf’s plan to add 6,000 to 7,000 more Federal workers to the 

area than NCPC had proposed in its comprehensive plan. Spelman said the committee had not 

considered the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also was considering a 

southwest location that would add as many as 10,000 more workers. 

Garrett said that NCPC’s action was “a great encouragement to me and to the Federal City 

Council.” Zeckendorf also appreciated the tentative approval. He said his firm looked forward 

“to continued reconciliation of any divergent details which may remain to be worked out toward 

realization of a definite comprehensive plan.” [Beveridge, George, “Key Proposal Of 

Zeckendorf Is Accepted,” The Evening Star, April 9, 1955] 

Wilbur Smith and Associates, NCPC’s consultants, reported on May 5 that the Roaches Run 

Bridge was needed, although not necessarily right away. The 14th Street bridge provided 

convenient access to the downtown area, but handled only 38 percent of total peak hour traffic. 

“The limitations of available bridge capacity are clear.” With volumes expected to reach over 

390,000 trips a day, the Roaches Run Bridge would serve as a “Southwest portal” and, combined 

with the 14th Street bridge, accommodate 37 percent of that traffic.

Like the DeLeuw Cather study, the new Smith study saw the Roaches Run Bridge as a future 

need, not a current one. District officials agreed. Director Robertson said he would not object to 

the bridge “if it becomes necessary in the future.” 

That same day, NCPC approved the District’s plan to proceed to detailed design of the eight-lane 

Southwest Freeway between South Capitol Street and 9th Street, SW. Several critical issues, 

including the dispute between Zeckendorf and the Smithsonian Institution over the 10th Street 
mall, remained to be decided at NCPC’s June meeting. However, the Roaches Run Bridge 

continued to be a sticking point as the District presented its plan for the Inner Loop Expressway 

as proposed by DeLeuw Cather and Company. Beveridge summarized: 

Charles DeLeuw, explaining his plan, said the loop expressway was drawn to meet 1980 

traffic estimates and contemplates a new Potomac River bridge at Constitution avenue. 

He said he wouldn’t argue that a Roaches Run bridge might never be needed. But he 

contended the loop expressway, big as it is, “could not handle traffic from any other 

bridge in any location” in 1980. 

Mr. DeLeuw proposed that the loop system be six lanes wide except for four lanes along 

Ohio Drive from Fourteenth street to Lincoln Memorial; eight lanes between South 

Capitol and Fourteenth street S.W., and eight lanes on the north leg east of New York 

avenue.

The firm’s report estimated that the Ohio Drive expressway leg of the Inner Loop would cost $13 

million, compared with $17.2 million for NCPC’s proposed substitute of an Independence 

Avenue leg. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Add Up Facts To Speed S.W. Project,” The Evening 

Star, May 6, 1955] 

Bridge Versus Tunnel

By March, top Eisenhower Administration officials were studying the bridge-versus-tunnel issue 

for the Constitution Avenue Bridge in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial. A White House 

spokesman said the tunnel was under study, but the issue had not yet been presented to President 

Eisenhower. Engineer Commissioner Lane said that if the President approved the tunnel, the 

District would not object on one condition: that the Federal Government pick up the difference 

in cost: 

I don’t believe the Board of Commissioners has ever taken a position on the question. 

But as one member, I’d say that as long as the facility were [sic] equally useful for traffic 

and meant no additional cost to the District, I’d certainly have no objection to it.

Representative Broyhill agreed that “the extra cost should not be charged to the District.” He 

added, “I don’t believe the House District Committee would stand for higher costs being levied 

against the city.” [“Tunnel Acceptance By D.C. Indicated If U.S. Pays Extra Cost,” The Evening 

Star, March 18, 1955] 

In early March, the Star revealed that Maryland, Virginia, the District, and BPR had hired Wilbur 

Smith and Associates to study the feasibility of charging tolls on Potomac River bridges. The 

$15,000 study was to consider existing bridges and those bridges the consultant thought were 

“likely to be required” based on 

• Projected 1970 traffic volumes; 

• Traffic volumes and toll revenue; 
• Traffic and toll estimates and “the rate of retirement of such costs through the collection 

of tolls”; 

• The use of special license plates to give “special rate privileges to commuters; and 

• Whether individual planned bridges could be financed through toll collection. 

The three jurisdictions and BPR decided on the study after conferences to discuss financial 

responsibility for the cost of several planned bridges. 

The Star pointed out that Wilbur Smith and Associates had studied tolls for Virginia in 1953, 

taking “an extremely dim view of toll prospects here”:

Citing “administrative and political obstacles,” the 1953 report said there appeared to be 

“little hope unless a plan can be devised whereby tolls could be imposed on all of the 

river-crossings.” It also said the inter-jurisdictional problems would be so complex they 

“would likely be unworkable.” 

. . . Some toll proposals affecting major bridges here, it is felt, would be certain to raise a 

storm of controversy. One argument is whether tourists should have to pay to get access 

to the Nation’s Capital. Any suggestion of tolls affecting Arlington Memorial Bridge also 

would be a red-hot issue. 

Although Congress has never taken a position on tolling the bridges, officials “felt the 

possibilities should at least be explored”: 

Aside from policy, some officials are worried about space considerations. They question 

whether existing spans, particularly, would have sufficient space for installation of toll 

gates. Two or three lanes of gate space are needed for each lane of bridge space, these 

officials said. [Beveridge, George, “Survey Made on Feasibility of Tolls for Potomac 

Bridges,” The Evening Star, March 6, 1955] 

Representative Broyhill, learning of the study, told reporters the study was a “ridiculous . . . 

waste of the taxpayers’ money.” The idea of imposing tolls on citizens to visit the Nation’s 

capital was “an affront to every one of them.” He would vigorously oppose the idea. [Beveridge, 

George, “Broyhill Calls Study of Tolls on Bridges ‘Ridiculous Waste,’” The Evening Star, March 

20, 1955] 

In May, the Star summarized the consultant’s conclusion: “Prospects of tolls on Potomac River 

bridges, never exactly bright, appeared even dimmer today, after a preliminary discussion of the 

financial feasibility.” As a practical matter, tolls were not feasible if they were charged on some, 

but not all the bridges. Even the outer bridges (Jones Point and Cabin John) would not carry 

enough traffic to pay for themselves through tolls. They were, however, the only ones the 

consultant seriously considered. However, for tolls to be feasible, all the bridges would have to 

charge tolls. Even Arlington Memorial Bridge, despite the lack of space for toll plazas at the 

Lincoln Memorial or Arlington National Cemetery that would “not appear intrusive,” would have 

to be a toll bridge or motorists would use it to avoid tolls on the other crossings. [Beveridge, 

George, “Consultant Doubtful Over Prospects of Potomac Bridge Tolls,” The Evening Star, 
March 15, 1955; Beveridge, George, “Tolls on Bypass Bridges Seem Doomed by Survey,” The 

Evening Star, May 1, 1955] 

As NCPC prepared to meet on April 7 to decide on the tunnel option, the Bureau of the Budget 

was pressing for a decision. Under the compromise worked out by Senator Case, NCPC was on 

record supporting the Constitution Avenue Bridge authorized by law. However, the Interior 

Department was working on legislation to amend the law to substitute the tunnel and authorize 

$28 million in Federal funds to pay the additional cost to the District. The Budget Bureau 

wanted a decision by April 15 from the District commissioners, NCPC, and the Commission of 

Fine Arts. 

At its closed-door April 7 meeting, NCPC received the special committee report on the issue. 

The report stated:

The objections which have been urged to the bridge are based upon esthetic grounds. 

Your committee believes that from a general planning and service standpoint, either the 

bridge or the tunnel will be suitable. 

The committee has not attempted to pass upon the question as to whether the esthetic 

advantages of a tunnel . . . are worth the large increase in cost involved. 

The committee believed the approach roads for the six-lane tunnel option would operate suitably, 

although the tunnel would have only 90 percent of the traffic capacity of the bridge. 

During the meeting, Colonel Lane reportedly attempted to force NCPC to decide between the 

bridge and tunnel options. That did not happen, as the Star explained:

The farthest the Federal planners would go . . . was to “accept” a committee report saying 

that, from “a general planning and service standpoint, either the bridge or the tunnel will 

be suitable” . . . . Mr. Bartholomew made it plain to reporters, meanwhile, that the 

planners believe a new bridge at Roaches Run – downriver from existing Fourteenth 

street spans – would be better than either a bridge or tunnel in the Lincoln Memorial area. 

Asked if there was concern that a tunnel would provide only 90 per cent of the 

Constitution avenue’s bridge capacity, he said he feels too much traffic is being brought 

into that area anyway. “We believe a Roaches Run and Fourteenth street bridges would 

handle enough traffic that it is not necessary to worry about squeezing every bit of 

capacity in that (Lincoln Memorial) area,” he said. 

NCPC planned to send a letter to the Budget Bureau, but would not release its contents to 

reporters following the meeting. However, the Star reported that the reply would point out that: 

• The commission already has approved a traffic plan for the bridge. 

• The commission will be glad to consider a specific tunnel plan if one is submitted. 

• The question of whether the Federal Government should pay as much as $28 million 

because of esthetic considerations involved is basically one for the Federal Fine Arts 

Commission and Congress to decide. [Beveridge, George, “Quick Answer By Planners 
on Tunnel Asked,” The Evening Star, April 7, 1955; “Planning Group Avoids Firm Stand 

on Tunnel,” The Evening Star, April 8, 1955] 

On May 6, the White House held a conference to discuss the bridge-versus-tunnel question for 

the Constitution Avenue crossing of the Potomac River. Participants included Bartholomew, 

Robertson, Wirth, District Commissioner Samuel Spencer, Finley of the Fine Arts Commission, 

Ambassador Grew of the Roosevelt association, and Rowland Hughes, director of the Budget 

Bureau. Officials conferred for 40 minutes with former Governor Sherman Adams, the 

presidential assistant who served informally as President Eisenhower’s chief of staff. 

After the conference, the White House’s assistant press secretary, Murray Snyder, issued a 

statement:

There was no decision reached but a committee consisting of Commissioner Spencer as 

chairman, and Mr. Wirth and Mr. Bartholomew was set up to work with the Bureau of the 

Budget in developing the Government’s position on whether this should be a bridge or a 

tunnel. In other words, to iron out whatever differences there are and reach a conclusion. 

[“Three Named to Settle Bridge-or-Tunnel Issue,” The Evening Star, May 6, 1955] 

The District asked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for a permit to build the low-level 

Constitution Avenue Bridge with an immovable span. Colonel Ray Adams of the Corps’ 

Washington District, took testimony in early May not only on the Constitution Avenue Bridge 

but on whether opening of the existing Potomac River moveable bridges should be stopped. He 

estimated that review of the testimony would take several months.

The District Highway Department favored permanent closure of the bridges, in part to save 

money on operations. The District also calculated that if the new bridge were built with a draw 

span, the change would add $1.9 million to the construction cost and cost about $109,000 a year 

for operation. BPR and AAA testified in support. 

Several businesses testified against permanent closure. A representative of Spentonbush Fuel 

Transportation Services, Inc., said that his company made 132 trips between Norfolk and 

Rosslyn, Virginia, to provide oil to American Oil Company (best known for its Amoco service 

stations). The shipments could not be made by barge; fixed spans “definitely would mean our 

tank operation would cease.” American Oil estimated that shipping the oil entirely by truck 

would increase costs by about 18 cents a barrel. 

The District Fire Department also opposed permanent closure of movable spans. Deputy Chief 

Fred Litteral said it was “very essential” that fireboats be able to pass the bridges to reach 

Georgetown industries along the waterfront. [“Closing Drawspans of All Potomac Bridges 

Studied,” The Evening Star, May 11, 1955] 

The White House-appointed committee, which was expected to complete its report in early June, 

was unable to reach a decision. On June 2, Commissioner Spencer, the chairman, said he had 

told Governor Adams that the committee could not agree and would not submit a report on the 

subject. Despite the committee’s failure, Spencer was hoping for an early decision by the Budget 
Bureau. [“No Agreement Reached Yet on Bridge or Tunnel,” The Evening Star, June 3, 1955; 

“D.C. Seeks ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ On Bridge vs. Tunnel,” The Evening Star, June 5, 1955] 

After the committee failed, Representative Broyhill wrote to President Eisenhower urging him to 

decide the issue in favor of immediate construction of the bridge. He did not “concur in the fear . 

. . that a bridge would mar the beauty of the Nation’s capital.” He added that the possibility that 

Congress would approve a tunnel that would far exceed the cost of a bridge was “highly 

improbable.” Congress was “friendly to the bridge idea,” he said: 

The mood of economy is merely a reflection of your own policies to cut Government 

spending to achieve a balanced budget and a reduction in the heavy tax load. 

With the Senate about to begin hearings on the District’s budget, now was “an excellent 

opportunity to obtain money for the project.” Therefore, he wrote: 

I request that you give immediate attention to this problem and that you direct the Bureau 

of the Budget to submit to Congress as soon as possible an estimate of the amount 

necessary to begin the erection of another bridge . . . in the area previously designated by 

Congress. [Beveridge, George, “Broyhill Urges Eisenhower to Decide for Span,” The 

Evening Star, June 7, 1955] 

Commissioner Spencer revealed on June 13 that the Budget Bureau had ruled out a tunnel: 

It appears in the light of all the circumstances that a bridge will best meet the needs, and 

studies are now being made to determine whether some change in the site of the proposed 

bridge may be possible which will be satisfactory to the Fine Arts Commission and others 

concerned and at the same time will meet traffic needs and cost limitations.

This involves making certain engineering studies which it is hoped may be completed 

within about 10 days. 

The Fine Arts Commission has never advocated a tunnel, except as an alternative to a 

bridge in the Lincoln Memorial area and would be in favor of a bridge at some other 

location. 

The alternative location would cross the upriver part of Roosevelt Island. [“Bridge Proposal Gets 

Backing Over Tunnel,” The Evening Star, June 13, 1955] 

At NCPC’s June meeting, the planning commissioners considered an objection submitted in a 

jointly signed letter from all but one member of the Ohio congressional delegation. Having 

worked hard to get a main city street named after their State, they objected to conversion of Ohio 

Drive to an expressway. “This is very disconcerting,” they wrote. “This is the most important 

section of Ohio drive. We are strenuously opposed and urge that it be retained as a park drive.” 

Aware of the delegation’s concern, NCPC had formed a subcommittee to study the issue but it 

had not reached a conclusion. DeLeuw, Cather submitted an alternative during the meeting. The 

Star described it:
This would be a cutoff just south of Lincoln Memorial and use . . . Independence avenue 

paralleling the Mall and crossing the north end of the Tidal Basin before swinging into 

Southwest Washington. 

Mr. DeLeuw said, however, he prefers Ohio drive for the freeway, although he realizes 

this involves one of Washington’s nicer park areas. The point is, he said, that the 

Independence avenue route would cost about $4 million more than the $12 million 

estimate on the Ohio drive route. 

On another familiar issue, District highway officials reported to NCPC that the Roaches Run 

Bridge would cost about $5.5 million more than the estimated $19-million cost of the bridge 

replacing the 14th Street trestle-topped bridge. [“State Delegation Protests Ohio Drive as 

Freeway,” The Evening Star, June 17, 1955] 

The Roosevelt Association’s New Position

On June 16, 1955, the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association conditionally approved 

construction of a bridge across the northern tip of Roosevelt Island as a substitute for the 

congressionally approved Constitution Avenue Bridge. The association listed three conditions as 

summarized by the Star: 

• Both the National Park Service, the National Capital Planning Commission and the 

Federal Fine Arts Commission [sic] also have the right to approve the final “character and 

design” of the bridge and its location. 

• The bridge be named “The Theodore Roosevelt Bridge.” 

• The bridge be a low-level one preferably of masonry construction similar to the Arlington 

Memorial bridge.

A low-level bridge might address the esthetic issues in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial, but 

a “fairly high span probably would be needed near the Virginia shore in order to rise from the 

river to connect with Arlington boulevard north of the new Arlington Towers Apartments.” 

The association, in a letter to Chairman Finley of the Fine Arts Commission, made clear that it 

would not support a bridge such as the E Street Bridge that would cross the middle of the island. 

Reaction to the association’s new stand was mixed. NCPC vice chairman Remon said, “We’ve 

studied this thing uphill and downhill. I don’t want it to drift any longer.” Donald E. Gingery, a 

Rockville-area developer who had served on the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission since his appointment in 1949, expressed irritation. “It is beyond my 

comprehension how a private organization, like the Roosevelt association, can sit and dictate 

how and where a bridge can be built with taxpayers’ money.” 

District sources told Beveridge that city officials were perplexed about why Congress did not 

simply authorize funds for the Constitution Avenue Bridge approved by Congress and President 

Eisenhower under the Case compromise instead of waiting for, as Beveridge summarized, “this 

agency and that for new decisions.” Nevertheless, Commissioner Spencer called the move “the 
biggest step forward that’s happened,” adding that a bridge over the north end of the island was 

“a very good solution of the whole thing.” General Lane said, “The decision clears the way for a 

possible alternate solution.” 

One interested observer was Senator John C. Stennis (D-Ms.), a former Circuit Court judge who 

had been in the Senate since winning a special election in 1947; he lived in the city’s Wakefield 

neighborhood at 3609 Cumberland Street near Connecticut Avenue, NW. As chairman of the 

Appropriations Committee subcommittee handling the District’s budget, he was about to chair a 

hearing on the budget on June 17 where the bridge issue was expected to be discussed. Reporters 

had the impression that his patience was growing thin: 

“I don’t want to appear to be threatening anyone,” he said last night. “But here we are in 

a situation where a law authorizing a bridge at a certain place (Constitution avenue) is on 

the books, the money ($1.5 million for 1956) is available and the need for a bridge 

becomes more urgent every day.

“Time is short. This matter should not be put off any longer.” 

Commission Chairman Harland A. Bartholomew had announced that the planning body 

was prepared to hold a special meeting if “prompt action” is requested before Congress 

adjourns. 

Senator Stennis said his subcommittee wants a decision within a few days. “We are not 

thinking in terms of getting something before Congress adjourns,” he said. “I am not 

interested in where the bridge is placed—there’s a law on the books stating where—but I 

just don’t like to see this matter suspended any further,” the Mississippian said. 

After the Friday hearings, Senator Stennis said he wanted a decision by Monday, June 20, when 

the subcommittee was scheduled to complete markup of the District appropriations bill. 

[Beveridge, George, “Budget Problem Arises In Dispute on Bridge” and “Stennis Presses District 

For Decision on Bridge,” both The Evening Star, June 17, 1955] 

As District officials worked over the weekend to study the feasibility of the plan adopted by the 

Roosevelt association, Senator Stennis postponed markup to June 22 at the request of the District 

commissioners and Budget Bureau director Hughes. Senator Stennis said he wanted “an allaround agreement” by all agencies involved and a detailed report on the “feasibility of the new 

location from the standpoint of engineering and of service to the public, as well as the cost 

thereof.” [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Engineers Rush Plans for Island Bridge,” The Evening Star, 

June 18, 1955] 

On June 22, District officials met with Senator Stennis to discuss the city’s findings. The bridge 

across the northern tip of Roosevelt Island would cost $43.2 million. Although the city had 

studied the proposal, city highway officials emphasized that they did not support it. Highway 

planner Brinkley said, “We don’t believe there is any good substitution for the Constitution 

avenue bridge.” District officials explained that they were willing to consider other ideas, but 
were not going to support a plan that would cost so much more than the Constitution Avenue 

span. 

In response, NCPC rejected the District-drawn plan for the Roosevelt Island bridge as well as a 

proposal by Wirth to support concurrent construction of a Constitution Avenue tunnel and the 

Roaches Run Bridge. Instead, NCPC reaffirmed its support for the Constitution Avenue Bridge. 

Bartholomew concurred despite his doubts that it was wise to “keep concentrating traffic in the 

Lincoln Memorial area.” He was concerned that if the bridge were built, people would view it as 

the solution to the Potomac River crossing problem. He urged, again, early construction of the 

Roaches Run Bridge. 

Remon addressed the point before the vote: 

I feel that approval now of the Constitution avenue bridge is the current solution to this 

whole problem. What comes after is another matter.

Based on these actions, Senator Stennis’s subcommittee included $1.5 million in construction 

money for the project. He said he wanted a bridge built, but during the meeting, no viable 

alternative had been presented. [Beveridge, George, “Constitution Ave. Bridge Is Backed by 

Planners,” The Evening Star, June 22, 1955] 

The full Senate, with the support of the White House, approved the District appropriations act for 

FY 1956 on June 23, including the $1.5 million for the Constitution Avenue Bridge. The vote 

was unanimous. The only change since Senator Stennis’s subcommittee added the provision 

came when the Senate adopted Senator Case’s amendment allowing, within a strict timetable, a 

possible shift of the bridge somewhat upstream. The amendment permitted the bridge to be built 

over South Island if the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association gave its consent by August 1, 

1955. Senator Stennis accepted the amendment because it would not cause a delay in 

construction of the bridge. He added, “This bridge must be built to take care of mounting traffic 

demands.” 

The Senate’s action, as the Star put it, “pointed today toward early construction of the $24.5 

million Constitution avenue span Congress already has authorized.” [Beveridge, George, 

“Senate Passes Bridge Funds,” The Evening Star, June 23, 1955] 

The bill now went to a conference committee with members of the House, which had passed its 

version of the bill a month earlier without a provision on the bridge. The conference committee 

had to reconcile many issues, not just bridge funding. 

Grudging Support For The Bridge

While the conference was underway, bridge proponents and opponents continued to work toward 

their goals. Harry T. Thompson, associate superintendent of National Capital Parks, objected to 

plans for the Constitution Avenue Bridge between South Island and Arlington Memorial Bridge 

because he wanted Roosevelt Island to be the sort of place Theodore Roosevelt would have 

loved: 
We have acquired a house with a view, and someone has come along and painted over the 

windows. It seems a great tragedy that the wealthiest nation in the world would suffer an 

irreparable damage to the greatest assembly of memorials in the world for the sake of a 

few dollars. We as a nation are not that poverty-ridden that we can afford to mar and 

almost commit a public act of vandalism against the men whom we have enshrined in our 

memorials.

If that is the will of Congress, “we will just have to live with the situation.” He promised that 

Interior Department officials were “not going to be bad losers. But we’re sorry about it.” 

Thompson indicated that the NPS, NCPC, and the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association 

would take a second look at their plans for the island. The Interior Department had $135,300 for 

a proposed new ferry landing. Other projects included a terraced memorial observation overlook, 

foot bridges, and a second comfort station. With the bridge project, however, the restudy may 

find that the present program would be a “waste of money.” [“Revision Seen In Plans for Island 

Retreat,” The Evening Star, June 24, 1955] 

Officials put pressure on the association to allow the bridge to cross the upriver end of South 

Island. Commissioner Spencer said he would approach the association in support of the shift, 

which he thought was “feasible” for traffic needs and to answer aesthetic objections. Peets of the 

Fine Arts Commission sent the association a sketch of the proposal, including his idea that South 

Island could be built up with fill soil to screen part of the bridge from Roosevelt Island. His plan, 

which would leave the Lincoln Memorial area free of visual intrusions, would “infinitely 

decrease” the damage the original plan would do to the area.

One drawback to the shift was that the District had not worked out plans for a span across South 

Island. Peets thought it would hit Constitution Avenue. Senator Case, who had written to the 

association to request its support for the shift, thought the new bridge would tie into E Street. He 

said he had proposed the South Island crossing to the association a year earlier and was turned 

down: 

The situation now, however, is different. Then, no bridge had been approved. Now, if 

nothing is done, the bridge will be built as a straight extension of Constitution avenue 

over the river. [Beveridge, George, “New Proposal Made to Solve Bridge Impasse,” The 

Evening Star, June 26, 1955] 

Representative Saylor had not given up on the possibility of a tunnel to handle cross-river traffic 

in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial. He had asked Wirth why he did not support NCPC’s 

endorsement of the Constitution Avenue bridge. In a letter dated June 27, Wirth said it was 

“evident that more than one river crossing is needed.” Traffic relief in the vicinity of the Lincoln 

Memorial was needed, but the Constitution Avenue Bridge, “no matter how well designed or 

how much traffic relief it might give . . . would be greatly destructive of more important national 

values.” 

Wirth recommended, first, shifting the $24.5 million that Congress had authorized for the 

Constitution Avenue span to a six-lane bridge at Roaches Run. Second, he believed the Interior 
Department should build a four-lane tunnel at Federal expense to carry traffic across the river in 

the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial. In favor of his proposal was that while the tunnel had been 

rejected previously because of cost, the proposed tunnel had never been tied to concurrent 

construction of the Roaches Run Bridge. As for the difference in cost between a bridge and 

tunnel, he argued that the disparity was mainly for related road improvements that he did not 

think should be charged to the tunnel. [“Saylor Plans Another Pleas For Tunnel,” The Evening 

Star, June 27, 1955] 

House-Senate conferees on the District of Columbia appropriations act, 1956, resolved the 

longstanding controversy over the Potomac River crossing in favor of building the Constitution 

Avenue Bridge between south of South Island and Arlington Memorial Bridge. They included 

$1.5 million in the bill for the bridge at this location, dropping Senator Case’s amendment 

allowing a shift to South Island if the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association agreed to it. 

The House conferees had insisted on dropping the Case amendment because they believed that 

District officials did not strongly favor it.

On June 30, the House and Senate approved the conference report on the appropriations act and 

sent the bill to the White House for the President’s signature. During floor consideration, no one 

in the House or Senate objected to the bridge provision included in the conference report. 

Senator Case still thought his idea was worth pursuing. He was “not weeping” about the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge location, which he noted was the result of a compromise he had 

helped to forge. He also did not want to delay construction of the bridge, wherever it might be 

located. If the Roosevelt association changed its position, he would introduce a “quickie bill 

which I think probably could get through before Congress adjourns” permitting the shift to South 

Island. He cautioned, however, “I’m certainly not going to make another move myself unless 

something is done by them.” [Beveridge, George, “Congress Oks Bridge Funds, Ending 

Wrangle,” The Evening Star, June 30, 1955] 

President Eisenhower signed the FY 1956 appropriations act on July 5, 1955 (P.L. 84-131). 

The Endless Debate

On July 8, 1955, the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association reversed its position and 

approved a crossing of the memorial island, most likely in a straight line from Constitution 

Avenue to South Island’s southern tip. The concept was described as two short bridges, linked at 

South Island, which would screen the bridge from the Lincoln Memorial area. Director Hermann 

Hagerdorn included the decision in a July 8 letter to Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay. 

Members, the letter said, had undertaken considerable soul-searching:

On the one hand they have the obligation, bequeathed to them by their predecessors, to 

defend the integrity and sanctity of the island as an area of wild solitude in the very heart 

of the Nation. 

On the other, the trustees recall the part that Mr. Roosevelt as President played in 

conserving and developing the grand plan of the National Capital. They remember that 
he encouraged, supported and defended the McMillan Commission in its (1901) efforts to 

salvage and revitalize the L’Enfant plan, and that he established the National Commission 

of Fine Arts to watch over the plan’s development in the future. 

In reconciling their loyalties to President Roosevelt, the Nation, and the memorial island, they 

realized that “their paramount obligation is to the National Capital”:

They have, therefore, agreed to approve, in principle, the construction of a low-level 

bridge across South Island, provided that the proposed bridge shall be named the 

Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, that it provide access to the main island, and that its design 

be approved by the National Commission of Fine Arts. 

During a morning meeting, Hagerdorn, the Interior Department, and the Fine Arts Commission 

agreed to meet with District officials to discuss the new route. They also would meet with 

congressional leaders to seek a legislative fix. [Beveridge, George, “Trustees Okay Bridge Over 

Roosevelt Island; Association Paves Way For Project,” The Evening Star, July 8, 1955] 

District and Federal officials quickly agreed to seek an amendment allowing the shift. The Fine 

Arts Commission, NPS, and District commissioners agreed that NPS would submit legislation 

permitting the location change. Meanwhile, their technicians would work on a practical location 

and design for the bridge. 

Aside from numerous technical details, officials also had to reconcile broader concerns. Wirth 

insisted that the legislation give Interior Secretary McKay powers to approve all features of the 

bridge and its approaches, citing President Eisenhower’s statement on the subject when he signed 

the Constitution Avenue Bridge legislation: 

The Secretary of the Interior also should be authorized to approve all plans for the bridge 

and the approach roads and interchanges at both ends of the bridge since park structure 

and land are involved. 

The current law left “no check whatsoever” on District officials. Wirth said that such an 

arrangement had “never been done in the history of the development of the city of Washington.” 

Commissioner Spencer asked Wirth to submit a bill for District review and, if he did, promised 

quick reaction. 

Although Wirth and Hagerdorn endorsed the “two bridge” idea on a straight line from 

Constitution Avenue, District officials called the idea unworkable. The concept would not allow 

sufficient navigation clearance. Further, moving the bridge as far upriver as Wirth and 

Hagerdorn suggested would cause problems for the Virginia connections. With Congress due to 

adjourn soon, all parties hoped to resolve these differences promptly. [Beveridge, George, 

“Quick Plea to Congress On Island Span Planned,” The Evening Star, July 9, 1955] 

The District commissioners quickly agreed to yield their authority over the bridge. With the 

endorsement of the Budget Bureau and NPS, the commissioners agreed to an amendment that 

would permit construction of the bridge over the south end of Roosevelt Island and give the Fine 
Arts Commission and Interior Department approval authority over the design and connecting 

roads. The amendment also would allow the District to revert to the location between Roosevelt 

Island and Arlington Memorial Bridge if technical details for the shift could not be worked out. 

In that case, the Fine Arts Commission and Interior Department would retain approval powers. 

Despite the Federal-District battles over the past 3 years regarding the central area bridge, 

General Lane said he expected that with all parties in support, the amendment “will not delay this 

bridge in any way.” [Beveridge, George, “District Yields Strong Voice to U.S. on Span,” The 

Evening Star, July 16, 1955] 

As Congress moved toward the August 2 adjournment of the first session of the 84th Congress, 

the amendment passed in the Senate, but not the House. 

Failure of the amendment left the location of the bridge in doubt. Despite the lack of 

congressional action, all parties favored the new location. On August 4, 1955, NCPC voted 

unanimous approval of the bridge over the south end of Roosevelt Island. With this action, 

District officials could begin immediate plans for the bridge. However, congressional action on 

the amendment permitting construction in the new location would still be needed. 

Despite agreement on the bridge location, NCPC and others were concerned about the 

connections in the District and Virginia as displayed on a diagram that District Highway Director 

Robertson submitted. The Star described the approach roadways in the District as resembling 

“the layout of the Union Station railroad yards.” It included “no less than 25 traffic lanes running 

more or less parallel and about half as many separate roadways between E street and Constitution 

avenue to provide access to or by-pass of the bridge.” The sketch drew “tart criticism.” 

Robertson responded that the use of so many roadways resulted from the limited space for the 

approaches. Engineer Brinkley added that the sketch outlined adequate connections for the 

bridge in Virginia with Arlington’s Jefferson Davis Highway as well as direct connections with 

Constitution Avenue and the west leg of the Inner Loop. The Star’s summary of the meeting 

added: 

The plan, Mr. Brinkley said, also offers the novel feature of tunneling the inner belt under 

the west grounds of Lincoln Memorial, preserving the vista there. 

These explanations did not satisfy Douglas Orr of the Fine Arts Commission. To avoid marring 

the National Mall, he favored a District connection north of Constitution Avenue and completely 

off the Mall. 

Although the District was prepared to begin design, Robertson said he would not begin until he 

received approval in writing from the Fine Arts Commission and the Roosevelt association. 

“Not that we don’t trust these gentlemen,” he told NCPC with a laugh. “We just want it in 

writing so that when we go back for the necessary legislation next session there won’t be any 

more changes.”

NCPC also approved construction of a four-lane bridge to replace the trestle-topped three-lane 

bridge at 14th Street in the approximate location of the existing structure. The District had 
completed plans for the bridge and, with NCPC approval, could include $9 million in the budget 

request for FY 1957 construction. NCPC approved this project with the understanding that it 

would not jeopardize the NCPC-supported Roaches Run Bridge or allow District officials to seek 

approval for new highways that NCPC opposed. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Back Bridge 

Location” and “Bridge Location Remains Hazy For Planners,” The Evening Star, August 4, 

1955] 

As will be discussed later, BPR released sketch maps in September showing the tentative outline 

of Interstate highways in urban areas. The maps showed black lines representing unnumbered 

Interstate highways on an outline of the metropolitan areas with limited details of jurisdictions 

and no depiction of other roads and streets. The map of the Washington area showed four 

Interstate crossings of the Potomac River: 

(1) the Jones Point Bridge as part of a circumferential, 

(2) the Chain Bridge crossing, also part of the circumferential, 

(3) the extension of Shirley Highway across the Potomac River and Washington Channel 

carrying traffic to the Southwest Freeway, and 

(4) a U.S.-50 bridge crossing south of Roosevelt Island and cutting across the northern tip 

of Columbia Island. 

The map did not show the Roaches Run Bridge favored by NCPC. 

By early September, District officials were hoping the Commission of Fine Arts would approve 

relocation of the Constitution Avenue Bridge to cross the lower tip of Roosevelt Island in the 

compromise worked out by District highway officials, NCPC, and National Capital Parks. On 

September 16, the commission replied that the revised location was “acceptable in general,” but 

could not “give approval in detail.” 

The commission wanted the bridge to be as low as possible to reduce visibility from the Lincoln 

Memorial grounds. However, the main concern involved the approach connections on the 

District side of the river where it would connect with Connecticut Avenue and the Inner Loop. 

The commission wanted to move the complex interchange as far north of Constitution Avenue as 

possible to get it away from the Lincoln Memorial. The limitation was that as part of the 

Interstate System, the bridge and connections would have to meet Interstate standards. [“Bridge 

Details Stir Objections from Fine Arts,” The Evening Star, September 16, 1955] 

By November 1955, all agencies involved had worked out their differences on the Constitution 

Avenue Bridge. The agreement shifted the crossing away from the Lincoln Memorial and the 

Arlington Memorial Bridge to cross the southern end of Roosevelt Island. Although referred to 

as the Constitution Avenue Bridge, the bridge would enter the District midway between 

Constitution Avenue and E Street, NW. The approach road network in the District was still 

complicated (one planner referred to it as looking like a “bowl of spaghetti”) but was a 

compromise that all parties accepted. In Virginia, the bridge would connect with George 

Washington Memorial Parkway, Arlington Boulevard, Wilson Boulevard, and Jefferson Davis 

Highway. 
The District highway department had $3 million to complete the bridge plans and start 

construction. An additional $20 million would be needed to finish the project. Securing this 

additional funding might be easier because BPR had included the crossing in the Interstate 

System. Congress had failed to agree in 1955 on how to pay for construction of what was still 

officially called the “National System of Interstate Highways” but would return in January 1956 

to try again.

The Star, in an editorial on November 3, 1955, commented that, “It is gratifying that an 

agreement apparently has been reached among all agencies on the location and approaches for the 

new central-area Potomac River bridge.” After summarizing the agreement, the editorial pointed 

out that another 3 years would be needed before traffic could start using the new bridge. “So the 

importance of getting an early start on the long-delayed undertaking is obvious.” The editorial 

was titled “Agreement at Last.”

In early 1956, Oscar S. Straus II, president of the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association, 

wrote to Engineer Commissioner Lane. Straus observed that the Commission of Fine Arts had 

suggested a change “in order to keep the necessary network of approach roads, on the District 

side, away from the Lincoln Memorial.” He added, “We in the association would not quarrel 

with that decision.” The association had only one condition, namely that the bridge “provide 

access to the island not only for pedestrians but also for motor cars” that would need parking 

spaces. He added:

We recognize the problems of parking involved, but believe that these can be worked out 

to the satisfaction of all the Government agencies concerned as well as of the association 

and the visiting public. 

The city was awaiting formal letters of support from the Interior Department and the Fine Arts 

Commission, but Commissioner Lane said he would begin pressing immediately for House 

action on the needed legislative amendment. [Beveridge, George, “Island Trustees Back Span 

Plan,” The Evening Star, January 5, 1956] 

Other Developments

Several other developments were moving in a positive direction for bridge projects in the 

southwest redevelopment area. The Smithsonian Institution had identified an alternative site for 

the National Air Museum that would remove the conflict with Zeckendorf’s planned 10th Street 

Mall. The new site was between Independence Avenue and C, 4th and 7th Streets, SW. 

[“Alternate Site Is Studied for Air Museum,” The Evening Star, November 5, 1955] 

(The National Air and Space Museum opened in 1976 on the opposite side of Independence 

Avenue between 4th and 7th Streets.)

Meanwhile, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles had decided to locate the agency’s headquarters at 

Langley, Virginia, on a 749-acre Federal tract partly occupied by BPR’s research facility. A 

consultant, Gilmore D. Clarke of the New York firm of Clarke and Rapuano, had studied the 

Langley site and one other candidate for CIA headquarters on the 100-acre Winkler tract at 
Shirley Highway and Seminary Road in Alexandria. As the Star explained, planned 

transportation improvements made the Langley site superior in Clarke’s view:

He noted that the George Washington Memorial parkway would be extended from its 

present terminus near Key Bridge all the way to the Langley site, a new Constitution 

avenue bridge is slated near the Lincoln Memorial and Key Bridge is to be widened. 

These improvements alone, he declared, “would make the Langley tract more serviceable 

to CIA employes [sic] than the Winkler tract, even if Shirley highway is ever widened to 

six lanes . . . .” 

The consultant conceded that drastic improvements to Chain Bridge, Canal Road and 

Virginia highways should be made. But his view was that they would be made in time, 

and that, meanwhile, the new parkway and its connections would take “more than 70 per 

cent of CIA commuters.” [Beveridge, George, “Planners Start Study Of Langley as CIA 

Site,” The Evening Star, November 5, 1955] 

On November 3, 1959, President Eisenhower attended the ceremony laying the cornerstone for 

the CIA building at Langley. “Upon the quality of your work,” he told the 2,000 spectators, 

“depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the Nation’s position in the 

international scene.” 

On the way to the ceremony, he stopped at Spout Run to cut a ribbon opening a 5-mile section of 

the George Washington Memorial Parkway from Lorcom Lane to State Route 123: 

Although the extension goes all the way to the CIA site, traffic will be shunted off at the 

cloverleaf intersection with Virginia Route 123. Contracts have already been let to carry 

the parkway beyond CIA to connect with the projected Washington circumferential 

highway at Cabin John. 

The presidential ceremony took no more than 2 minutes. Mr. Eisenhower, wearing a gray 

felt hat and gray tweed overcoat, was handed two pairs of gold-plated scissors bearing the 

National Park Service seal by Roger Ernst, Assistant Secretary of Interior for Parks.

After clipping the red, white and blue ribbon in two places, Mr. Eisenhower was 

presented with one of the shears as a memento of the occasion. The President also kept a 

bit of the ribbon as a trophy. 

Representative Broyhill, NPS Director Wirth, Superintendent Harry T. Thompson of National 

Capital Parks, and about 100 others attended the brief ceremony. [“President Lays Stone, Says 

CIA Helps Peace,” The Evening Star, November 3, 1959] 

The Tunnel Option – Again

With the agreement on the new location of the Constitution Avenue Bridge, the next step was 

action by the House, where the bill amending the 1954 law was bottled up in the District 

subcommittee headed by Representative James C. Davis (D-Ga.). The problem was that 
Virginia’s Representative Smith, chairman of the House Rules Committee, opposed the bridge. 

He acknowledged as much to a reporter, adding that he would “not oppose” a tunnel across the 

Potomac River. Without Chairman Smith’s approval, the bill could not reach the House floor for 

a vote. If the amendment did not pass, the city’s only option was to complete work to build the 

bridge on the previously approved location. 

The Interior Department was still promoting the idea of a tunnel instead of the bridge, whatever 

the location. In late March 1956, the department was preparing a bill for Representative Broyhill 

authorizing full Federal funding for a four-lane tunnel under the river near the Lincoln Memorial. 

The department had not secured White House approval for the bill; the Budget Bureau had 

objected to a 1955 version of the bill that called on the Federal Government to pay the difference 

in cost between a bridge and tunnel. 

Now, Interior officials planned to argue that the Federal Government should pay 100 percent of 

the cost in view of vital importance of the Lincoln Memorial area. They added that if pending 

legislation to authorize the Interstate System became law, BPR would pay 90 percent of the cost 

of the bridge; additional Federal funds would have to cover only 10 percent of the cost. 

District officials continued to favor the bridge across the south end of Roosevelt Island. They 

disputed the Interior Department’s plan for a four-lane tunnel, arguing that a six-lane bridge or a 

six-lane tunnel was needed to accommodate traffic volumes. [Beveridge, George, “Bill to 

Propose U.S.-Financed Potomac Tunnel,” The Evening Star, March 25, 1956] 

Chairman Davis planned for his District subcommittee to hold hearings on the crossing, but as 

the day neared, the subcommittee gave conflicting information on what would be considered. In 

what Beveridge called “an on-again-off-again comedy of errors,” the subcommittee said it would 

consider only the bridge amendment during the hearing. It planned to hold a separate hearing on 

the tunnel bill, but then decided to combine the bills in one hearing. Then it went back and forth, 

limiting the hearing to the bridge amendment, then switching back to both. 

Beveridge, after talking with committee sources, suggested two possible reasons for the flip-flops 

on hearing plans: 

One was that Mr. Broyhill, author of the tunnel bill, hasn’t always had the vigorous 

support of other District Committee members for some of his proposals, so there was no 

great enthusiasm about considering his bill. 

The other was that Representative Smith, Democrat of Virginia, and one of the District 

Committee’s most influential members, is dead-set against the bridge, so his feeling 

probably helped rule out a hearing on the bridge alone. 

Representative Broyhill, Beveridge explained, still supported the bridge, but had submitted the 

Interior Department’s tunnel bill “only because the bridge matter appeared to be stymied.” 

Beveridge characterized the “confused Potomac River bridge-tunnel mess” as “more muddled 

than ever.” [Beveridge, George, “Davis Sets Tuesday For Bridge-Tunnel Airing,” The Evening 

Star, April 29, 1956] 
The hearing took place on May 1. As in the past, Engineer Commissioner Lane favored the 

amendment and rejected the tunnel option. He explained that the proposed four-lane tunnel 

would be unable to handle the projected traffic, adding that because of grades on both sides of 

the Potomac River, even a six-lane tunnel would not be adequate. He estimated that a six-lane 

tunnel would cost three times the proposed bridge and require 30 times the annual maintenance 

cost. He added, in a new argument, that because the tunnel opening would be below water level 

on the District side, the project would have to include “a tremendous unsightly levee” northward 

from the Lincoln Memorial to prevent flooding of the tunnel. 

Representative Smith, a member of the District committee but not the subcommittee, participated 

in the hearing as a courtesy. Beveridge summarized the exchange between the Congressman and 

the commissioner:

Mr. Smith questioned Gen. Lane sharply on several points. He said he thought the 

District’s decision to build a 27-foot high bridge with no drawspan threatened future 

development of the Georgetown Harbor and pointedly suggested that the District 

reconsider this. 

Mr. Smith also drew from Gen. Lane a concession that the Interior Department must 

oppose the bridge since it has failed to respond to requests for approval Gen. Lane has 

been seeking since December. 

Director Robertson pointed out the widespread agency support for the amendment. He was, he 

said, “highly disturbed” that Representative Broyhill had introduced the tunnel bill “at this late 

hour.” 

Ole Singstad, after the hearing, told reporters that talk of a high levee was ridiculous. The grade 

of the District shore could be raised gradually to keep the tunnel out of danger. [Beveridge, 

George, “D.C. Fights Tunnel At Lincoln Memorial,” The Evening Star, May 1, 1956] 

The subcommittee expected to hold an additional hearing to give the Interior Department and 

other tunnel advocates an opportunity to testify. However, by June, the subcommittee had not 

scheduled the hearing. 

Appearing on the WWDC radio program “Report to the People,” General Lane said that if the 

House did not act, the District would move forward with construction of the Constitution Avenue 

Bridge as described in the current law. Construction, he said, could begin in about a year. 

[“House Nudged On Bridge Plan,” The Evening Star, June 3, 1956] 

Chairman Davis scheduled a second day of hearings for June 13 to give tunnel advocates an 

opportunity to present their case. Ahead of the hearing, Chairman Davis predicted early action. 

He told reporters he was impressed by the case District officials made for the amendment to 

allow construction across Roosevelt Island, but reserved judgment on the bridge-versus-tunnel 

debate.

The issue of navigation clearance, raised by Representative Smith, would also be considered. He 

made clear his concern that the planned low clearance would harm Georgetown business 
interests, such as Smoot Sand & Gravel Company, which had a harbor plant near 30th and K 

Street, NW., and American Oil Company, which had a terminal in Rosslyn, Virginia. (Much of 

Smoot’s success resulted from its rights to the gravel at Gravelly Point, useful for construction 

throughout the area. [Kelly, John, “Gravelly Point Park’s moniker is one that should just be 

shoveled aside,” The Washington Post, February 6, 2018] 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had held a hearing on these concerns in 1955, but granted the 

District’s request for a bridge 261⁄2 feet above mean low water without a draw span. It concluded 

that Smoot operated with tugs and barges that would be able to pass under the bridge. It could 

substitute land-based transportation for the occasional shipment requiring a higher clearance. 

The oil company would incur additional costs because it would have to use barges instead of 

tankers, as well as “supplemental trucking” in bad weather. These additional costs, the Corps 

concluded, were “not considered unreasonable in the light of the public interests involved.” 

[Beveridge, George, “Davis Predicts Action on Span,” The Evening Star, June 10, 1956] 

During the hearing, Chairman Davis heard from tunnel supporters. He did not get to hear from 

bridge supporters but indicated that if the subcommittee did not hold another hearing, they could 

submit their views in writing for consideration.

Harland Bartholomew appeared before the subcommittee as a member of NCPC, not as chairman 

speaking for it. Between a bridge and tunnel, he favored a four-lane crossing. As he had often 

said, he was concerned that any crossing at this location would strain the capacity of city routes 

unless the city also adopted the plan NCPC had approved – a widened Constitution Avenue, new 

roads on either side of the Reflecting Pool, and reconstruction of E Street as a major 

thoroughfare. 

The Fine Arts Commission’s Finley opposed any crossing at Constitution Avenue because of the 

damage it would do to the landscape in the memorial area. He favored a tunnel, but if a bridge 

must be built, he preferred that it cross Theodore Roosevelt Island instead of the route specified 

in the law.

Ole Singstad appeared to debunk criticisms of the tunnel option. A four-lane tunnel and its 

approaches, he assured the subcommittee, would cost $25.5 million. 

Other groups sending representatives in support of the tunnel were the Society of Professional 

Engineers, the Freedom Foundation, and the Marine Corps Memorial Fund. Time ran out before 

Conrad Wirth of the NPS or C. Melvin Sharpe of the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association 

had testified in favor of the tunnel. 

District officials attended the hearing but were not called as witnesses before time ran out. They 

indicated they would submit a statement in favor of the bridge: 

J. N. Robertson, District director of highways, said he would explain to the subcommittee 

that the city heads still favor a bridge and hope to build one. He made public estimates of 

cost ready for the subcommittee showing that a six-lane crossing [was] now estimated to 

be $47,842,000 for the tunnel, $18,699,000 for a steel bridge and $15,550,000 for a pre-
stressed bridge. [Rogers, Harold B, “River Tunnel Urged At Construction Site,” The 

Evening Star, June 13, 1956] 

Moving a Bill 

Chairman Davis did not hold another hearing. However, the subcommittee amended the Senateapproved bill. With the House amendments, S. 2568 would: 

• Name the structure the “Theodore Roosevelt Bridge.” 

• Allow the bridge to cross either of the two islands constituting Roosevelt Island as agreed 

upon by the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association and the District commissioners. 

• Subject the general plan for the bridge to approval of the Commission of Fine Arts.

• Give the Secretary of the Interior approval of the general location of the bridge and its 

approaches, interchanges, and connecting roads, as President Eisenhower had suggested 

in his signing statement for the original Potomac River bridges bill in August 1954. 

• Maintain the monumental character of the area as far as possible.

• The Secretary of the Interior would retain control and jurisdiction of all park lands in the 

vicinity of the bridge upon completion of the bridge except those needed for the bridge 

structure and the approach roads and streets, which would become the responsibility of 

the District of Columbia, also as suggested by the President. 

• Call for construction of a “six-lane bascule span bridge” in response to concerns about the 

low-level fixed structure required by the original law and the Senate amendment.

The House considered the bill on July 9, 1956. Chairman Davis told his colleagues that the bill 

was a result of agreement by the Roosevelt association to allow the bridge to cross South Island. 

All parties, he said, agreed this new location was preferable to the location in the 1954 law; even 

the Interior Department agreed. He referred to the hearings on the bridge-vs.-tunnel issue, but 

said the consensus of the District Committee was that “this bill, as now amended, provides the 

best disposition of the problem which is presented by the need for another bridge in the area at or 

near Constitution Avenue. 

After brief discussion of the cost of the bridge and approaches, the House approved the bill 

without a recorded vote. [Construction of Bridges Across Potomac River, Congressional 

Record-House, July 9, 1956, pages 12192-12194] 

Because the House bill differed from the Senate bill approved in 1955, a conference committee 

would be needed to reconcile variances to create a bill both Houses could approve. 

For conferees, the critical issue was the change from a low-level fixed span to a bascule bridge. 

However, conferees agreed on July 23 to retain the bascule bridge approved by the House. 

On July 25, the House approved the conference report without debate. [Bridges Across the 

Potomac, Congressional Record-House, July 25, 1956, page 14448] 

The Senate planned to take up the bill on July 27, the final day of the 84th Congress. However, 

Senator Albert Gore, Sr. (D-Tn.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public 
Works, presented a major obstacle. Senator Gore explained why he objected to the construction 

of a bascule bridge:

He told The Star last night he would fight any move for provision for the draw span in the 

new bridge, declaring that if it meant a six-month delay for a congressional decision he 

thought that would be worthwhile. 

“With prospects of enormous growth of Arlington, Fairfax and the Alexandria area, 

several more bridges across the Potomac will be needed in the foreseeable future,” He 

said. “It would be far more economical, if necessary, to compensate the two concerns 

involved in the Georgetown harbor for their losses in connection with the occasional 

passage of vessels that will not clear the 27 feet allowed in plans for the new Constitution 

avenue bridge. 

“I am perfectly willing to be reasonable with these two concerns but I am unwilling to let 

two concerns impose unreasonable requirements on the thousands of people who will use 

the bridge and on the taxpayers of the country and the District. 

As one who lived in Arlington, I can testify to the inconvenience occasioned by the use of 

the draw span on a Potomac River bridge. I speak of the Arlington Memorial Bridge and 

the Fourteenth street bridge. By reason of the draw spans there I have missed roll calls, I 

have missed appointments. I have missed planes.” 

(In 1938, Gore won election to the House of Representatives. He lived in Arlington, with his 

address shown in the Congressional Directory as 203 Arlington Village, then simply Arlington 

Village, and finally 1303 South Barton Street in Arlington. By the time he won election to the 

Senate in 1952, the Gore family, including future Senator and Vice President Al Gore, Jr., had 

moved to Suite 809 on the top floor of the Fairfax Hotel at Embassy Row, 2100 Massachusetts 

Avenue, N.W., near Dupont Circle. They spent the rest of the year in Carthage, Tennessee. 

[Maraniss, David, and Nakashima, Ellen, “Al Gore, Growing Up in Two Worlds,” The 

Washington Post, October 10, 1999] 

Senator Gore had helped write the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 that called for completion 

of the Interstate System in 13 years. Senator Gore’s willingness to delay the bridge bill raised 

questions about whether the District would be able to complete the bridge within the timeframe 

of the new Interstate program. It had only $6.3 million in Interstate construction funds at present; 

District officials were concerned that eventually, some of the projects might not be completed in 

time and would cost the District more than the 10 percent local share authorized by the 

legislation. [Warren, Don S. “Senate Fight Expected On Draw for New Bridge,” The Evening 

Star, July 27, 1956] 

On the final day of the 84th Congress, the Senate acted on many bills but did not consider the 

Potomac River bridge legislation. Senator J. Glenn Beall (R-Md.) took to the Senate floor to ask 

the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tx.), why the bill was not called for 

a vote. Senator Johnson replied that as he had told Senator Beall privately, the problem was that 
Senator Gore said he would not let the Senate approve the conference report if he could prevent 

it:

If the conference report in question had been called up tonight, I was fearful that we 

might be here all night. I did not think Senators would want to spend all night debating 

the proposed bridge. 

Senator Beall accepted Senator Johnson’s explanation, but added: 

At this time, when we are thinking about the necessity of building a bridge over the 

Potomac River, whatever the merits of it may be, and we do not consider the conference 

report, and we adjourn without agreeing to the conference report, we have something to 

explain to the people of the District of Columbia and Virginia . . . . This is something all 

of us should think about. [Proposed Potomac River Bridge, Congressional RecordSenate, July 27, 1956, page 15146] 

With that, the bill died.

Senator Gore had killed the bill by simply sitting in his seat on the Senate floor. With him 

present and ready to object, Senator Johnson would not call the bill for a vote that probably 

would have taken only a few moments. [Warren, Don, “White House May Decide Fate of 

Roosevelt Bridge,” The Evening Star, July 28, 1956] 

The Star, in an editorial, said the best that could be said about “the latest Constitution Avenue 

Bridge fiasco” was that the project “has had tougher controversies to work its way out of before.” 

The editorial explained that powerful Representative Smith had insisted on a movable span 

bridge that House and Senate conferees agreed to include in the bill. However, “Senators, 

contesting the need and added cost, wouldn’t hear of it.” As a result, the “carefully worked out 

House and Senate agreement on a new and superior route for the bridge, across Roosevelt 

Memorial island, went by the boards.” 

The editorial stated that the House position was “indefensible.” The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, the real experts on the matter, had approved the navigation clearance of a fixed span. 

The District could wait for January and hope the new Congress would approve the improved 

location, with or without a movable span. City officials could approach the White House for 

guidance on the best path forward. Or they could proceed with the bridge as approved by 

Congress and President Eisenhower in 1954. The latter would, however, “be a grievous 

mistake”:

There is general agreement on the upstream location of a bridge passing over the island 

and that location should be retained, although the delay in starting construction will add 

to the inconvenience of Representative Smith’s constituents who work in Washington. 

The editorial agreed with General Lane’s decision not to make a snap judgment. He wanted to 

talk with the White House and see if any other possibilities would allow the District to proceed. 

“He should do so without delay.” 
The editorial was titled “Bridge Fiasco.”

Unraveling a Fiasco 

On July 30, 1956, General Lane discussed the Constitution Avenue Bridge in a meeting with 

representatives of the Fine Arts Commission, National Capital Parks, and NCPC. They agreed to 

delay action in hope that the new Congress would approve the amendment shifting the bridge to 

cross the southern tip of Roosevelt Island. If Congress did not do so, the District would have no 

choice but to proceed to build the bridge at the 1954 location. However, Finley and others from 

the Fine Arts Commission made clear they would oppose proceeding on the line called for in the 

1954 legislation. 

After the meeting, General Lane told reporters that everyone agreed “very strongly” that they 

should do everything they could to secure congressional approval for the shift in location. 

However, no one had a “very explicit” idea how to secure the needed approval in view of the 

disagreement on the draw span. As a result, he said there was “very little likelihood” 

construction could begin before January. [“Officials Agree To Push Newer Bridge Sites,” The 

Evening Star, July 31, 1956] 

Clinging to a slim hope, the District asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) for a ruling on 

whether, in view of congressional support for the new location, the District could use the 

available $8.2 million to begin work on the crossing of Roosevelt Island. GAO ruled that the city 

could not legally spend the funds on the preferred route. The funds must be spent on the basis of 

the legislation approved in 1954, for a bridge between Arlington Memorial Bridge and a location 

that did not cross Roosevelt Island, unless Congress amended that law. Further, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers added that it would not issue a permit for the bridge to cross Roosevelt Island 

unless Congress passed legislation changing the location. [Beveridge, George, “Ruling by GAO 

Forbids Funds For New Span,” The Evening Star, September 16, 1956] 

With the fixed-bridge remaining the key obstacle to congressional action, General Lane wrote to 

Colonel George B. Sumner, the District Engineer for the Corps, to say the District would not 

object if he reopened the issue of a draw span. General Lane said he understood “new evidence” 

had been presented on the issue and, although he was concerned about the added cost of a draw 

span, he thought navigational needs should be the deciding factor: 

If your conversations with interested parties indicate that there is substantial evidence 

available which would have affected the . . . Army’s decision on this approval, and which 

was not presented at the original public hearing, the Board of Commissioners would 

make no objection to your reconsideration of this approval in the light of the additional 

evidence.

He asked Colonel Sumner for “prompt action” to review the new evidence so all information on 

the subject could be presented to the 85th Congress when it convened in January 1957. 

Colonel Sumner confirmed to reporters that American Oil Company had presented additional 

information. He added, “We have not yet determined, however, whether the new evidence is 
sufficient to justify another hearing.” He added that any change would apply equally to which 

ever location was eventually selected. [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Agrees to Review Of Draw 

Span Dispute,” The Evening Star, September 25, 1956] 

In the final days of the 1956 election, Representative Broyhill’s opponent cited the central area 

bridge situation as one reason voters should vote against the incumbent. On October 10, 

Democrat Warren D. Quenstedt, appearing on WMAL television, recalled that Representative 

Broyhill had promised “more Potomac River Bridges” in his campaign 4 years earlier. “Well, 

what do we have? We have the same number of bridges as we had in 1952, but we have more 

people using them . . . . How long does it take to plan a bridge? How long does it take to build 

one?” He singled out Representative Broyhill’s role in the central area bridge:

Here Joe Broyhill’s record is one of inconsistency and confusion. Repeated attempts to 

get action here have failed mainly because Joe Broyhill first opposed a tunnel in favor of 

a bridge and after it looked like this would become a reality, he suddenly threw the whole 

matter into a turmoil by advocating construction of a tunnel. 

How long must people of the 10th district put up with this failure to produce? We have no 

new bridges and we have no tunnels despite Joe Broyhill’s four long years in Congress. 

[“Broyhill Cites Democrats to Defend Record,” The Evening Star, October 13, 1956] 

Despite such criticisms, Representative Broyhill would win reelection.

When the 85th Congress convened, Senator Gore quickly made clear during an early hearing on 

the big new Interstate program that he still opposed more draw spans on Potomac River 

crossings. When Robertson, the District’s highway director, appeared before the subcommittee, 

Senator Gore raised the Potomac River issue. Robertson said the city would soon send the same 

amendment to Congress as in 1956. 

Senator Gore explained that he did not want to be unfair to water traffic, but with motor vehicle 

traffic increasing, the opening of draw spans would cause additional delays. He planned to 

introduce a resolution calling for the District commissioners to survey ways to prevent draw 

spans, including the possibility of limiting water traffic to heights that would not require movable 

spans. He also thought that one solution might be acquiring the property along the waterfront to 

force businesses that needed draw spans to relocate. [“Gore Pushing for Bans On Potomac Draw 

Spans,” The Evening Star, January 10, 1957] 

Senator Dennis Chavez (D-NM), chairman of the Committee on Public Works, had attended the 

subcommittee hearing. Instead of waiting for Senator Gore’s resolution, Senator Chavez wrote 

to the District commissioners to ask them to cooperate with BPR to investigate the wisdom of 

eliminating draw or lift spans on Potomac River bridges. The committee, he said, desired “that a 

study be made of the economics of providing draw or lift span bridges across the Potomac River 

as contrasted with the construction of fixed span bridges.” 

He added that “it would be helpful to the committee if detailed information were available 

relative to the value of navigational facilities to those persons or firms now exercising them, and 
the damage which would accrue from the termination of such facilities, and the cost to such 

persons or firms of modifying navigational equipment so as to eliminate the necessity of draw 

spans.” He requested a report by February 15. [Rogers, Harold B., “Chavez Seeks D.C. Probe of 

Potomac Drawspans,” The Evening Star, January 20, 1957] 

In case anyone doubted Representative Smith’s views on the issue in the new Congress, he 

predicted that much additional study would be needed before a decision could be reached on the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge. He remained a “tunnel man,” he said, adding that he thought a 

better idea was to avoid any additional crossings of Potomac River in the central area. [“Smith 

Balks at Changes In Jones Point Bridge,” The Evening Star, February 7, 1957] 

On February 15, the District commissioners submitted a response to Senator Chavez, arguing that 

Congress should not require draw spans on any future Potomac River bridges above Hains Point. 

The report, prepared by the District Highway Department and BPR, made the case for a fixed 

span for the Constitution Avenue Bridge. It also rejected the need for a draw span on the new 

Virginia-bound 14th Street bridge and the planned Roaches Run Bridge. 

The report acknowledged that the fixed-span Constitution Avenue Bridge would affect American 

Oil and Smoot Sand and Gravel, but predicted they could make satisfactory adjustments. For 

example, American Oil could build two 10-inch pipelines from Four Mile Run, near National 

Airport, to Rosslyn. Smoot could use barges and towboats low enough to pass under the new 

bridge. Moreover, using taxpayer dollars to favor American Oil against its competitors would 

not be in the public interest “under circumstances which would not benefit the general public 

through a reduction in commodity prices.” 

Pressure to substitute a tunnel for the Constitution Avenue Bridge continued. The same day that 

the District and BPR again rejected the option, Leon Chatelain, Jr., president of the American 

Institute of Architects, urged a tunnel across the Potomac River. A bridge would, be said, 

“irreparably damage the character and beauty” of the city. [“Commissioners Ask Future Ban On 

Draw Spans,” The Evening Star, February 16, 1957] 

Chairman Davis convened a hearing of the District subcommittee to consider the location of the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge and Representative Broyhill’s re-introduced tunnel bill. The parties 

remained firm in their longstanding positions. Wirth of the NPS was one of many witnesses 

advocating a tunnel instead of a bridge on the first day of the hearing. He contended that a fourlane tunnel with approach roads could be built for $25.5 million. He wanted to dispel any public 

misunderstandings regarding cost. The estimate was “a firm one we are prepared to defend.” He 

cited studies that he said demonstrated that tunnels were “at least equivalent to the efficiency of 

bridges in their capacity to handle traffic—lane for lane.” 

The Fine Arts Commission’s Finley stressed that the tunnel was the only option that would not 

“sacrifice the beauty” of the area. Bridges at many other locations along the Potomac River 

would be satisfactory. “But that is not true of the area surrounding the bridge and Theodore 

Roosevelt Island.” 
Bartholomew told the subcommittee that NCPC had approved either a bridge or tunnel, but he 

reiterated his concern about forcing six lanes of traffic into the Lincoln Memorial area. He 

estimated that the central area needed 14 new lanes to handle projected traffic, but they could be 

dispersed above Key Bridge and below the 14th Street bridge, where the Roaches Run Bridge 

would be located, as well as in the Constitution Avenue location. 

In addition to testimony, the subcommittee accepted for the record a letter from Roger W. Jones, 

assistant legislative director of the Bureau of the Budget, to District Commissioner Robert E. 

McLaughlin, indicating the bureau was “inclined” to favor a six-lane bridge, but with a 

significant change from past views:

The Budget Bureau wishes to point out that while it inclines to agree with the District 

Commissioners in advocating a bridge . . . we recognize that the Congress may wish to 

take into account esthetic values and other considerations in advocacy of a tunnel. 

A tunnel would cost more than a bridge, Jones wrote, and that was important with the Federal 

Government and the District trying to hold down expenditures: 

However, except on cost grounds we express no opinion as to the tunnel. If the Congress 

should find considerations other than cost sufficiently overriding to enact legislation 

authorizing a tunnel . . . the bureau would be prepared to accept this decision. 

[Beveridge, George, “Budget Bureau Gives Nod to 6-Lane Potomac Span,” The Evening 

Star, February 19, 1957] 

To Break the Impasse

On March 1, Senator Case introduced S. 1445, a bill to authorize construction of highway 

bridges across the Potomac River under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. The bill 

specified bridges at two locations long favored by NCPC, namely the Roaches Run Bridge and 

one crossing the Three Sisters Islands between Key and Chain bridges. He emphasized that his 

bill was not a substitute for the Constitution Avenue Bridge, which he had helped secure 

approval for in 1954. “My new bill has no effect on that. If the other controversy unravels itself, 

well and good.” 

In a letter to Representatives Smith and Broyhill, he recommended the District should abandon 

its plan to rebuild the 14th Street trestle-topped bridge as part of the Interstate System: 

It seems poor use of interstate funds to take out of use and build a replacement bridge 

when (1) the Fourteenth street bridge functions so well and (2) the great need is for 

additional bridges. 

As long as we tolerate some of the temporary buildings that we do, certainly new money 

can better be spent in adding bridges than in destroying and replacing one as useful as the 

Fourteenth street bridge. 

He favored the Three Sisters location for a bridge as a result of Maryland’s plans for U.S. 240. 

As will be discussed later, Maryland planned to route traffic on rebuilt U.S. 240 to a link with the 
Potomac River Freeway as the entrance to Washington. Senator Case thought an upstream 

location at Three Sisters would keep Virginia traffic out of the heavily congested central area of 

the District.

In response to reporter inquiries, General Lane explained that the Roaches Run Bridge and the 

Three Sisters Bridge are in the District’s long-range plans approved by the city and NCPC. The 

“most immediate and urgent need” was the Constitution Avenue Bridge, but the 14th Street 

trestle-topped bridge had “outlived its usefulness.” The District had been planning the 

replacement project for 10 years, he said. Senator Case’s bill “raises a lot of complex issues,” 

General Lane said, adding, “I don’t want to criticize Congress, but it is desirable for sponsors of a 

new plan to take it before the Planning Commission, where problems can be discussed, before 

reaching the legislative stage.” [Bills and Joint Resolutions Introduced, Congressional RecordSenate, March 1, 1957, page 2852; Beveridge, George, “Case Bill Asks 2 More Bridges,” The 

Evening Star, March 3, 1957] 

The city was working to increase the lanes available for traffic moving between the District and 

Virginia. Aside from the plan to replace the trestle-topped bridge, the city was widening Key 

Bridge and removing streetcar tracks to add two lanes for motor vehicles. The city also planned 

to paint another lane on Chain Bridge to increase its capacity. [Beveridge, George, “A Primer on 

That Aging ‘Bridge Problem,’” The Evening Star, February 24, 1957] 

On March 20, District officials testified before Chairman Davis’s subcommittee in support of the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge to be built across the southern tip of Roosevelt Island. They 

disputed many of the assertions of tunnel advocates. The District, they said, could build the sixlane bridge for $15 million as a fixed span or $18.6 million with a draw span, noting that 

whichever design was used, BPR would pay 90 percent of the cost as part of the new Interstate 

program. If Congress did not act, the District would build the bridge Congress had approved in 

1954, regardless of the views of any other group. 

Representatives of Smoot Sand and Gravel and American Oil testified in support of a draw span 

or, failing that, a tunnel. 

The subcommittee also considered the project to replace the trestle-topped 14th Street bridge. 

The District’s Robertson testified that adding a draw span would increase the cost by $1.5 

million, which the subcommittee, having previously approved $9 million for the project, would 

have to authorize. Chairman Smith told Robertson that he’d better “get that draw span 

straightened out right fast. If you propose to cut off [navigation] traffic on the Potomac River, 

you’re going to have trouble.” 

In executive session, the subcommittee approved that the new bridge contain a draw span. The 

new bill also increased the amount of funds authorized in the 1946 Act to $17.5 million for two 

new 14th Street bridges. The subcommittee added a draw span to the project despite the 

possibility that passage of the bill in the Senate would have to overcome Senator Gore’s 

objections. [Beveridge, George, “House Group Approves Bill For Draw Span,” The Evening 

Star, March 21, 1957] 
Earlier in the month, the Senate District subcommittee approved funds for replacing the trestletopped bridge, but did not require a draw span. When the House District Committee approved 

the subcommittee’s bill and sent it to the House floor, the committee was setting up a 

confrontation between the powerful Chairman Smith, who was unalterably opposed to a fixed 

span, and Senator Gore, who was unalterably opposed to a draw span. [“New 14th Street Bridge 

Clears Bar, Faces Another,” The Evening Star, March 26, 1957] 

On April 8, 1957, the House approved the bill amending the 1946 legislation authorizing funds 

for two four-lane bridges to replace the existing 14th Street bridge. The primary opposition came 

from Representative H. R. Gross (R-Ia.), a journalist who had won election to the House in 1949 

and was known as a penny-pinching fiscal conservative who used every parliamentary device to 

slow down bills authorizing expenditures. His primary concern in this case was not the draw 

span, but why Federal taxpayers should pay for a bridge that would primarily benefit residents of 

Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 

Supporters replied that Virginia and the District were paying for changes in the approach roads 

and that the new bridge would serve Federal facilities such as the Pentagon and the Navy 

Department Building. Chairman Smith said:

There are large Federal Government installations situated on the other side of the river. 

Virginia did not tell them to put them over there. They just put them over there for the 

convenience of the Government. Those people have got to move back and forth across 

the river.

Chairman Davis added, “The reason for that [Federal expenditure] is, as the gentleman knows, 

that this bridge is on the main United States Route No. 1.” [“House Passes Bill for Second 

Bridge at 14th,” The Evening Star, April 8, 1957; Authorizing Commissioners to Construct 

Bridges, Congressional Record-House, April 8, 1957, pages 5270-5278] 

The next day, April 9, the House District subcommittee approved a bill authorizing $25.5 million 

to pay 100 percent of the cost for the Secretary of the Interior to build a tunnel instead of the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge. Representative Kearns cast the only vote against the measure after 

the subcommittee rejected his amendment calling for financing the tunnel with tolls. He later 

told reporters that with a 25-cent round-trip commuter toll, the tunnel could be paid for in 13 

years. He thought the 14th Street bridge bill that the House had approved the day before should 

be “the last free bridge or tunnel over the Potomac the House will vote.” 

In the face of this defeat in the subcommittee, District officials hoped for a better result in the 

Senate. As the Senate District subcommittee prepared for hearings on the issue, Engineer 

Commissioner Lane said he and other officials would “continue to oppose a four-lane tunnel, as 

we have in the past.” [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Officials Turn to Senate In Bridge Fight,” The 

Evening Star, April 10, 1957] 

On April 11, the Senate District subcommittee began hearings on the issue. During the first day, 

George Beveridge wrote, advocates of a bridge and tunnel “began to retrace the tortuous 

arguments over whether a six-lane bridge or a four-lane tunnel should be built over or under the 
river at Constitution avenue.” Amid these familiar arguments, he reported that the “most lively 

testimony, however, was an exchange between Senator Gore and Mr. Smith over the draw span,” 

with Senator Alan H. Bible (D-Nv.) trying to intervene. Chairman Smith appeared before the 

panel as a witness:

Senator Gore, chairman of the Senate Highway Subcommittee, said he opposed draw 

spans on Potomac bridges “now and forever hereafter,” because the “safe and efficient 

movement of traffic” must have priority on the huge new Federal system of interstate 

highways. 

Mr. Smith argued for a tunnel at Constitution avenue which would eliminate the draw 

span issue. 

He also noted that the House this week passed a bill authorizing the old Fourteenth Street 

replacement with a draw span, however. Since the existing Fourteenth Street Bridge has 

a draw span, Mr. Smith said, he hoped Senator Gore would not oppose that. 

“No, I’m also for closing those bridges that do open now,” Senator Gore said. 

Mr. Smith said he hoped Senator Gore was “not as adamant on this as you sound.” 

“He was pretty adamant about the Constitution avenue bridge last year,” put in Senator 

Bible. 

“Yes,” observed Mr. Smith. “And we haven’t got any bridge, either.” 

Beyond the drawspan issue, Senator Gore said he had no position on the bridge-versustunnel fight. 

When it came to draw spans, neither Senator Gore nor Chairman Smith “intends to yield in the 

deadlock over whether the bridge should contain a draw span.” [Beveridge, George, “Gore and 

Smith Feud Again Over Draw Span,” The Evening Star, April 12, 1957] 

On April 20, the Star urged the Senators to, as the title of its editorial put it, “End This Farce.” 

Congressional testimony over 5 years “proved conclusively that a six-lane river crossing is 

essential” and that a four-lane tunnel would be a bottleneck “connecting systems of six and eight 

lane expressways.” While Chairman Smith and Senator Gore “wield strong influence in the 

House and Senate, some resolution of the impasse must be found.” 

Testimony on April 25 demonstrated the wide differences on the bridge-tunnel debate. Lloyd 

Rivard, a District traffic engineer, testified that park and planning officials were distorting the 

fight with “vague generalizations.” He particularly attacked their argument that a four-lane 

tunnel would carry adequate traffic while a six-lane bridge would generate too much traffic for 

local streets. Tunnel advocates, he said, cited “meaningless estimates” of traffic over a 24-hour 

period to show that a four-lane tunnel would be satisfactory. The real test was whether four lanes 

could handle traffic during the morning and afternoon peak periods. Rivard stated that a six-lane 

bridge would carry twice as much traffic as a four-lane tunnel during these periods on weekdays. 
He added that the traffic capacity of the bridge should be understood in the context of planned 

expressways that park officials preferred to ignore in arguing for a tunnel. 

By contrast, National Capital Park’s Thompson questioned whether all the capacity of a six-lane 

bridge was really needed for full use only a few hours 5 days a week: 

He took the position that a tunnel would handle all the traffic that should go into the 

Lincoln Memorial area and that new bridges elsewhere could provide for other needs. 

Mr. Thompson showed the Senators a model of precisely how approach roads to a tunnel 

and the tunnel itself could function. He said the total cost would be $25.4 million. 

When Senator Beall suggested that the tunnel option might be the only way to overcome the 

draw span stalemate between House and Senate, Senator Bible pointed out that the same issue 

would affect the 14th Street bridge project. It would have to be resolved. He planned to order a 

committee study of the issue to resolve conflicts. He hoped to decide between a tunnel or bridge 

in about 2 weeks. 

Smoot and American Oil Company officials also testified. Smoot vice president A. M. Parker 

said that his firm required openings only about 10 to 12 times year. Under present rules, the 

openings occurred outside peak periods and did not interfere significantly with traffic. American 

Oil’s G. H. Montgomery contended that without access to the Potomac River, the company 

would have to shut down its storage plant at Rosslyn, shift operations to Baltimore, and truck oil 

into the Washington area. The result would be the loss of $675,000 in payroll as well as 

substantial local taxes. 

Walter Kurlo, a BPR attorney, testified in support of the six-lane Constitution Avenue Bridge. 

The bridge, which would be part of the Interstate System, would be adequate for traffic while the 

tunnel would not. He also referred to studies by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that ruled out 

the need for a draw span, prompting approval of a permit. He did not believe the Corps would 

have issued the permit if the fixed-span posed a real threat. As for American Oil, he suggested 

that the company could deliver oil downriver from existing bridges, then transport it by a pipeline 

that would cost about $1.5 million. 

AAA officials testified that a possible compromise would be to include the draw span but 

prohibit openings between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m. However, he and Arlington County Engineer 

Clifton G. Stoneburner supported the six-lane bridge. General Grant, on behalf of the Committee 

of 100 on the Federal City testified in support of the tunnel on aesthetic grounds. [Beveridge, 

George, “Rivard Assails Tunnel Backers,” The Evening Star, April 25, 1957; Beveridge, George, 

“Bible Seeks Bridge Decision in 2 Weeks,” The Evening Star, April 26, 1957] 

In early June, the Senate District Committee’s Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs voted 2 to 1 for a 

bill, S. 1707, calling for a six-lane fixed span for the Constitution Avenue Bridge. Senator Bible 

discounted the testimony of witnesses who were concerned about impacts on the two businesses 

that needed a draw span. A fixed span would cause them some difficulties, but he was convinced 

they could overcome them. Senator Beall, the dissenter, indicated he would take his arguments 
to the full committee but if he lost that vote, would not attempt to block the bridge. [Warren, 

Don S., “Potomac Bridge Issue To Be Debated Thursday,” The Evening Star, June 5, 1957] 

Senator Bible, as chairman of the subcommittee, may have expected to prevail when the full 

committee took up the bill. If so, he was surprised the following day when the full committee 

voted, 5 to 3, to support S. 944, which would amend the August 1954 legislation to authorize a 

tunnel connection between the District and Virginia. Senator Beall, noting that he was not 

opposed to a bridge, summarized the deciding factor: 

We all voted for a fixed span bridge at the last session, and sent it over to the House only 

to have it die. [Carper, Elsie, “Senate Unit Kills Bridge, Favors a Tunnel,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, June 14, 1957] 

Senator Bible, in the odd position of writing a majority report when he was in the minority, 

explained:

This tunnel would be constructed north of the Arlington Memorial Bridge and south of, 

or under, Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Island, together with approaches and roads 

connecting the tunnel and approach ramps with streets and park roads in the District of 

Columbia, with streets and park roads on the Virginia side of the Potomac River . . . . 

Proponents of this measure felt that the construction of a tunnel would provide a suitable 

traffic facility, and would result in a minimum of damage to the memorial character of the 

area, as well as the park lands on the Virginia side of the river which would be affected 

by such a crossing. 

While writing the majority report, he endorsed the minority views included in the committee’s 

report. Based on the hearings held April 11, 17, and 23, 1957, the dissenters were convinced that 

a four-lane facility, whether bridge or tunnel, “would not accommodate traffic demands.” BPR, 

they pointed out, shared this view and had approved the bridge, but would not approve a fourlane facility for funding under the Interstate program. That was because the 1956 Act required 

that designs “shall be adequate to accommodate the types and volumes of traffic forecast for the 

year 1975.” 

The capacity of a six-lane fixed span was 4,500 vehicles per hour in one direction, but only 2,200 

vehicles going in one direction through a four-lane tunnel. 

The minority view also covered the aesthetic issue:

One of the very purposes of S. 1707 is to change the location of the bridge . . . and move 

it to an upstream location . . . so as to minimize its impact on the memorial area, the 

proposed location being controlled at both ends by physical considerations. For example, 

on the Virginia side, Arlington Towers and the Marine Corps War Memorial fixed the 

alinement of the bridge. On the District side, the connections to Constitution Avenue and 

the inner loop fixed that end of the bridge. We are convinced that bridge structures can 

be architecturally beautiful to the enhancement of the area, and would have the advantage 
of not plunging those who use the crossing into a tunnel as they approach the monumental 

area and bring them to the surface after they have passed it.

The minority report commented on the navigation clearance:

The Secretary of the Army has concluded that the cost to the public involved in providing 

a movable span in the Constitution Avenue bridge alone could not be justified on the 

basis of any benefits accruing to the two companies which now require the spans to be 

opened, and all other benefits to other navigation interests. [Amending the Act of August 

30, 1954 . . ., Report Together With Minority Views (To Accompany S. 944), Committee 

on the District of Columbia, United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 

477, June 20, 1957] 

On July 3, the Senate considered two bills amending the August 1954 legislation authorizing the 

fixed-span Constitution Avenue Bridge. S. 944 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 

construct, operate, and maintain a four-lane tunnel from the vicinity of Constitution Avenue in 

the District to Virginia, to be built north of the Arlington Memorial Bridge and south of, or 

under, Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Island, as well as approaches. In planning the approach 

ramps and connecting roads in the District, the Secretary was to consult with NCPC, the 

Commission of Fine Arts, the District commissioners, and BPR. For the Virginia approaches 

and connecting roads, the Secretary was to enter into agreements with Arlington County and the 

State Highway Commission. The amendment authorized $25.5 million to cover all costs, 

including the cost of approaches and connecting roads. 

An alternative bill, S. 1707, was identical to the bill the Senate approved in 1956. It authorized a 

six-lane fixed span bridge crossing the southern tip of Roosevelt Island. 

Senator Bible informed his colleagues about the long history behind these bills, saying that S. 

944 brings into focus the key question about the Constitution Avenue crossing, namely “whether 

that crossing is to be a 6-lane bridge crossing or a 4-lane tunnel crossing.” He summarized the 

history of his committee’s review as well as the testimony pro and con. 

Senator Beall summarized the arguments for S. 944, adding, “I think, if we wish to have a 

crossing of the river, the main thing we must work out is a bill which will be approved by both 

bodies of Congress.” 

Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney (D-Wy.) was the chief sponsor of S. 944 and floor manager for it 

during the debate. Senator O’Mahoney, an attorney, had won election to the Senate in the 

Democratic landslide of 1932 and had strongly backed President Roosevelt’s New Deal 

legislation. He became chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in 1949, and 

served in that capacity until he was defeated for reelection in 1952. He was elected again in 1954 

and returned to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, although not as chairman. While 

in Washington, he lived in the Sheraton-Park Hotel, a largely residential hotel at Connecticut 

Avenue and Woodley Road, NW., just west of the National Zoological Park. (The hotel is now 

known as the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel.) 
Senator O’Mahoney said that he had introduced S. 944 as vice chairman of the Theodore 

Roosevelt Memorial Association. The proposed bridge, he said, “would mar the scenic beauty of 

this area.” The Federal Government “has been endeavoring to make this region of the Potomac 

River . . . a scenic center for the people of the United States.” For the record, he entered a letter 

dated March 27, 1957, from Secretary of the Interior Frederick A. Seaton, a former Nebraska 

Senator who had taken office as Secretary on June 8, 1956: 

I am, of course, vitally interested in this problem and am anxious that it be resolved in the 

total public interest.

As custodian of our national shrines, monuments, and memorials, which would be 

affected by either a tunnel or a bridge in the location now being considered, I wish you to 

know that you have the full support of the Department in pursuing the objectives of 

constructing a tunnel in the general vicinity of Constitution Avenue extended . . . . [The] 

Department of the Interior is opposed to a bridge trafficway in this vicinity . . . . 

He also referred to the statement President Eisenhower issued upon signing the Potomac River 

bridges bill on August 30, 1954. President Eisenhower said he wanted trucks to be prohibited on 

the Constitution Avenue Bridge and that all passenger-carrying buses that were using the 

Arlington Memorial Bridge should use the new crossing. The Secretary continued: 

This is an indication, it seems to me, that the President of the United States would not 

prefer the bridge to a tunnel which would carry the traffic. 

Senator J. Allen Frear, Jr. (D-De.), a bridge supporter from the District Committee, asked if 

NCPC, the Commission of Fine Arts, and other organizations favoring a tunnel were willing to 

pay for the difference in cost between the tunnel and a bridge. Senator O’Mahoney claimed to 

believe that the cost of a six-lane bridge would be “much greater” than the cost of a four-lane 

tunnel and that, in any event, a four-lane tunnel “would carry much more traffic per square foot 

than any bridge which was ever built.” Supporters of the two options disagreed on the cost, but 

Senator O’Mahoney added: 

It is much more desirable to construct even a more expensive tunnel than to destroy the 

beauty of the memorial center of Washington. 

With the vote nearing, Senator Bible urged his colleagues “to bear in mind that if a four-lane 

tunnel is built at the proposed Constitution Avenue crossing, the expert testimony is to the effect 

that from the day the tunnel is constructed it will be packed to capacity.” 

He then asked his colleagues to approve amending S. 944 by striking out the bill after the 

enacting clause and substituting S. 1707. Before the vote, Senator O’Mahoney said: 

The result of the adoption of the amendment offered by the Senator from Nevada would 

be to reverse the action of the Committee on the District of Columbia, to repudiate the 

recommendation of the Department of the Interior, to violate the recommendation of the 

Fine Arts Commission, and other bodies, and to kill the tunnel. 
Senator Bible responded that adopting the amendment would sustain the views of the District 

commissioners, BPR, and AAA. 

Without a recorded vote, the Senate rejected Senator Bible’s amendment. It then promptly voted 

in favor of S. 944 and the tunnel option. [Construction of Bridges Over the Potomac River, 

Congressional Record-Senate, July 3, 1957, pages 10881, 10883-10889] 

The House Tries Again

The Senate action encouraged Chairman Davis, who told a Star reporter, “Now that the Senate 

has passed the four-lane tunnel plan, I think we will get some action and move along.” Recalling 

the debate over whether a four-lane tunnel would be adequate, the reporter asked if 

Representative Davis agreed. “Well, I think so.” [“Sponsors Seek Action Soon on River 

Tunnel,” The Evening Star, July 7, 1957] 

On August 1, the House took up H.R. 6763, a bill to amend the Potomac River bridges act 

approved on August 30, 1954. The bill replaced Title I of the law with a 10-section substitute 

headed “Tunnel in Vicinity of Constitution Avenue.” Six of the sections reflected the Senateapproved S. 944, including authorization of $25.5 million to carry out the provisions of the act. 

In addition, H.R. 6763 provided: 

There is hereby authorized to be expended from the appropriations available to the 

National Park Service the sum of $1 million for the preparation of plans, designs, and 

construction purposes. 

The bill authorized the Interior Secretary, at his discretion, to employ professional engineers, 

landscape architects, or other consultants as needed. He was “granted authority to incur 

obligations and enter into contracts [that] shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the Federal 

Government for the payment of the cost thereof . . . .” Finally, H.R. 6763 provided: 

There shall be transferred to the Department of the Interior so much of the records, 

property, and funds of the District of Columbia as may be appropriate by reason of the 

enactment of the foregoing provisions of this act. Such measures and dispositions as the 

Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary to effectuate the said 

transfer shall be carried out in such manner as he shall direct.

That this aspect of the bill would be contentious became clear when Chairman Smith of the 

Rules Committee introduced House Resolution 375 establishing the terms of debate. Almost 

immediately, debate began on the merits of a tunnel rather than the resolution. When Chairman

Smith completed his initial comments on the resolution, Representative Arthur L. Miller (R-Ne.), 

a member of the District Committee, pointed out that the resolution referred to construction of 

bridges but the underlying bill was for construction of a tunnel. “I think the gentleman must 

admit that there is quite a vast difference in an efficient overhead bridge and a tunnel.” 

After Representative Broyhill briefly explained the background, Representative Miller requested 

evidence as to the efficiency of the tunnel for meeting the traffic demands. Chairman Smith 
explained that the evidence would be presented when the bill, not the resolution, was up for 

consideration.

After a brief exchange with Representative James G. Fulton (R-Pa.) about the difference in cost, 

Representative Gross, the penny pinching obstructionist from Iowa, said he opposed the 

resolution because it waived points of order, one of his primary methods of delay since they 

allowed him to question whether a measure was in accordance with House rules. In the case of 

H.R. 6763, he said he realized “there are very good reasons why points of order are waived on 

this bill,” citing the $1 million taken from the NPS appropriation and the transfer of records, 

property, and funds from the District to the Interior Department. The NPS and District funds, he 

said, were appropriated for one purpose and designating them now for a different purpose 

without action by the Committee on Appropriations was improper: 

I submit that these are two reasons why this bill is brought here under a rule waiving 

points of order. The rule ought not be adopted, and we can dispose of the bill quickly by 

defeating the rule. 

As far as Representative Gross was concerned, “the taxpayers of this country should not be 

saddled with the cost of building a tunnel under the Potomac River for the benefit, in part at least, 

of the State of Virginia.”

With the resolution still under review, other congressmen began debating whether a four-lane 

tunnel could handle traffic as well as a six-lane bridge. Representative Miller, for example, 

pointed out that “a four-lane tunnel under the river would be obsolete and not adequate to handle 

the traffic as soon as it is finished.” He favored a six-lane bridge, but if the House wanted a 

tunnel, he hoped it would have at least six lanes. 

Finally, the House agreed to the resolution, allowing debate on H.R. 6763 to get underway. 

Debate would last an hour, with Chairman Davis given 30 minutes in support of the bill and 

Representative Sidney E. Simpson (R-Il.) given 30 minutes in opposition. 

Chairman Davis discussed the history of the debate in recent years and past congressional action, 

as well as the hearings held and Ole Singstad’s testimony, that allowed the subcommittee to draft 

the bill. He said:

The engineers and the traffic experts state that by 1970 we will need 17 additional traffic 

lanes from the Virginia side over to the District of Columbia. Very careful plans have 

been made to provide these 17 traffic lanes. Two of them have already been provided by 

the widening of the Key Bridge and the adding of two lanes to the Key Bridge [sic, 

probably Chain Bridge]. One of them will be provided by the construction of the new 

outgoing 14th Street bridge, which now has three lanes and the new bridge will have four 

lanes. A bridge is planned at Roaches Run which will provide six lanes. This tunnel will 

provide four lanes. Another bridge at Three Sisters will provide four lanes also. 

With all these added lanes, the four-lane tunnel “will be able to take care of all the traffic that 

ought to be funneled into Constitution Avenue from Virginia.” 
Further, the experts said “it would be a mistake to funnel more vehicles into the Constitution 

Avenue [sic] than could be carried through this tunnel.” He pointed out that NPS Director Wirth 

stated that “a four-lane tunnel would provide crossing [sic] for the maximum number of vehicles 

which Constitution Avenue and the streets in that area should be called upon to handle.” 

Several congressmen expressed the view that, as Representative Louis C. Rabaut (D-Mi.) put it, 

“It certainly is apparent to anyone that on 6 lanes you are going to move more traffic than you are 

on 4.” Here and throughout the debate, Chairman Davis tried to convey they idea that six lanes 

were not needed at this location because with a total of 17 added lanes, Virginia traffic would be 

dispersed over several crossings: 

It must be dispersed. It must be brought in so that it will not congest the approaches to 

these various crossings. So that when [traffic] is delivered over into Washington it will 

not all be funneled into one point. 

When Representative Alfred J. Westland (R-Wa.) expressed support for the bill and commended 

Representative Broyhill for his presentation of the case, Representative Gross said he also wanted 

“to commend the gentleman from Virginia when it comes to tapping the Federal Treasury for the 

benefit of his people. He is always on the job.” 

Another frequently raised issue was why the Federal Government should pay 100 percent of the 

cost of the bridge. Representative Broyhill had said that since the tunnel would tie into land 

owned by the Federal Government, “it is not different than the various national parks throughout 

this great country.” Of course, the people of Maryland, Virginia, and the District would be the 

primary users of the tunnel, “but since this is the Nation’s Capital, it will be used by all the 

people of the country.” He added that since the route was on the Interstate System, the Federal 

Government was going to pay 90 percent of the cost of whatever was built in the corridor, “so the 

only thing we can argue about is 10 percent of the cost of construction.” 

Representative John M. Robsion, Jr. (R-Ky.) was one of several congressmen who took 

exception to the comparison with National Parks. “It would seem to me that 90 percent of the 

traffic over this bridge would consist of people who live in Virginia and work in the District of 

Columbia. I do not know on what theory the State of Virginia should be relieved of any 

responsibility for this expense, when they are getting taxes from the homes that are being built 

over there and from the people, yet they shift the entire responsibility to the Federal 

Government.” 

Representative Broyhill replied that it was “the extension of the Federal Government through its 

nontaxpaying Federal installations that has caused the necessity for construction of this facility 

here in the District.” 

He also pointed out that building a bridge across Roosevelt Island would affect planned 

memorials, including one to President Theodore Roosevelt on the island named after him and the 

Freedom Foundation Memorial to the Bill of Rights planned for construction near the Iwo Jima 

Memorial (Marine Corps War Memorial) in Virginia. (Sarcastically, Representative Gross said 

“that would be in the national park known as northern Virginia.”) 
During the 2 days of debate, the House considered why Virginia and the District did not pay for 

the tunnel, possibly by making it a toll facility. Representative Kearns introduced an amendment 

calling for a 25-cent toll round trip. “Then nobody can go home and be accused of favoritism or 

that they voted for a tunnel to take care of Virginia.” As a member of the District Committee, he 

acknowledged that Virginia’s agreement to pay for the approaches would be a sufficient 

contribution to the project. 

Some congressmen wondered where the District funds were coming from. Representative John 

Taber (R-NY) asked, “Would part of it came out of the school lunch program or the school 

education program?” This question and several others, including confusion about the cost of a 

tunnel versus a bridge plus the approaches, prompted him to add, “this is all mixed up . . . . You 

cannot tell a single thing about what the bill does or what it means. It is just a mess.”

The $1 million taken from NPS was another sticking point. Several members called Director 

Wirth to ask his views on the transfer. One of those was Representative Michael J. Kirwan (DOh.). He recognized the need for the tunnel, but not at the expense of National Parks. He asked 

Wirth if he had a hand in shifting this $1 million from park needs: 

I just called the Director of the Parks, and he said no, that he made no such request for a 

million dollars . . . . I served notice on him then that “if we overgave you a million 

dollars this year for the Park Service, I will guarantee you will not get it again.”

As Representatives objected to the bill and the debate process, an impatient Chairman Smith took 

the floor to say: 

I think more misinformation has been spread around this thing in an effort to defeat a 

good bill than anything I have seen around here lately. The most absurd questions have 

been raised about this. Gentlemen get up and talk about using the money for school 

lunches, and they will have some people think that is true. It has nothing in the world to 

do with this bill. This is a bill to build a tunnel across the Potomac River. 

The issue had been debated for 3 years and he did not want to spend a day or two “on a filibuster 

about this bill.” He said, “If you want to strike out the enacting clause, go ahead and do it, and 

we will swim across the river if we have to.” 

He was particularly upset by the debate over who should pay for the tunnel: 

Now, if you want to throw this thing out of the window without any consideration, all 

right, but when you realize the Navy Department and your Pentagon Building employ 

thousands and thousands of people who use these bridges every day, that it is not for 

Virginia, it is not for Maryland, it is not for the District of Columbia, but it is for the 

United States of America . . . . Your Federal employees have to come across that river 

every morning and every night, coming and going to work, and that condition is getting 

bad. 

As for the number of lanes, he pointed out that between the four-lane tunnel and six-lane 

Arlington Memorial Bridge, “you have got together there in one area 10 lanes of traffic that are 
going to be turned in daily to the downtown area of Washington where the traffic is congested.” 

He asked:

Now, do you think you ought to make it any worse than we have to make it under this 

bill? If you put 12 lanes around the White House and the Jefferson Memorial into the 

business part of Washington, you just will not be able to handle it. 

As a member of the District Committee, he could say that these factors and the expert testimony 

had been behind the committee’s creation of the bill:

If our thoughts on it, if our work on it, if the time we have spent on it, if the work of the 

various and sundry engineers and other experts we brought here are worth anything, then 

let us go ahead and pass this bill. If you do not want to pass any bill, if you want to go 

home and say, “Yes, we would not let them build a bridge across the Potomac for the 

people of Virginia and Maryland and the District,” if you want to demagog [sic] about 

this thing, then let us get through with it.

Representative Clare E. Hoffman (R-Mi.) immediately raised a point of order regarding the use 

of the “demagog business.” Chairman Smith replied, “If anybody is out of order on any 

occasion, on any bill, talking about demagoguery in this Chamber, I do not know him.” During 

the remaining debate, the phrase would be referenced repeatedly.

Representative Hoffman, who often used a humorous tone in the debate, discussed how the 

bridge approved in 1954 had turned into a tunnel. He said “the evidence is, and it is not disputed, 

that the engineers came up, as I got it anyway, with a six-lane bridge and that will cost less than a 

four-lane tunnel.” They also agreed a bridge would carry more traffic than a tunnel:

Then why do we not have a bridge recommended? . . . . Is it because two private 

enterprises, an oil company and a gravel and sand company, for their own profit want a 

draw in any bridges that may be built? Is that it? Or is it because over in the other body 

they insisted that if they built a bridge, they have a draw on it and they could not get a bill 

[with] a draw in the Senate because of the opposition of a gentleman from Tennessee? 

. . . . So not being able to get a six-lane bridge with a draw, it is now a four-lane tunnel to 

accommodate those two companies and we soak the taxpayers. I cannot accept it.

Representative Gross said, “So they just sent this bill in to try it on for size and see how it will 

fit, and maybe next year we will have another one.” 

Representative Hoffman continued, “I cannot soak the taxpayers for a tunnel when a bridge will 

better serve the people at a far less cost.”

Representative Saylor introduced an amendment to drop the $1 million transfer from the NPS. 

Representative Walter H. Judd (R-Mn.) thanked him for the amendment, saying “This is the 

worst thing in the bill, from the standpoint of a great many of us.” He was for the tunnel, but not 

“this business of reaching over into somebody else’s pocket and taking money that was 

appropriated or planned for other purposes that are also equally worthy.” 
When several representatives asked whose idea the $1 million transfer was, Representative 

Broyhill said that the Interior Department’s representatives had suggested it “to proceed with the 

drawing of the plans and construction of this facility because of the emergency. They stated that 

they had funds they could transfer over for temporary use until funds were appropriated for the 

specific purpose later on.” However, in view of the controversy the provision had provoked, he 

planned to support the Saylor amendment. Chairman Davis agreed that he would not object if his 

colleagues dropped the provision. 

Representative Gross offered his own amendment that authorized the District of Columbia and 

Virginia to build the tunnel. He explained: 

Mr. Chairman [of the Committee of the Whole House], a little while ago those of us who 

were opposed to this bill were accused of being demagogues. I do not know anything that 

smacks more of demagoguery than to try to shift the building of all the bridges from 

Maryland and Virginia into the District of Columbia onto the taxpayers, all the taxpayers 

of this country, including those in Iowa. 

Like many of his colleagues, he thought the District and Virginia could finance the tunnel as a 

toll facility, just as his own State had done to pay for replacement of a Mississippi River bridge 

that had collapsed in Representative Schwengel’s district “only a year or so ago.” Instead of 

coming to Congress asking for funds to replace the bridge, Representative Schwengel “asked for 

an authorization so that a new bridge might be built with private funds across the Mississippi 

River, a toll bridge . . . .”) 

As for the $1 million transfer from the NPS, he said he was “suspicious of committee members 

yielding so quickly when somebody offers an amendment as in the case of the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania . . . .” Representative Hoffman suggested that “they be commended for 

acknowledging it was wrong and they took it out.” To that, Representative Gross replied, “I wish 

they would acknowledge that the rest of the bill is wrong.” 

The House rejected the Gross amendment. [Authorizing Construction of Bridges Over the 

Potomac River, Congressional Record-House, August 1, 1957, pages 13365-13387] 

On August 2, the House resumed debate on H.R. 6763. Chairman Davis, after stressing several 

points in response to the issues raised the day before, pointed out that since the Senate had 

already approved a bill authorizing a four-lane tunnel, “if we pass a four-lane tunnel bill we can 

coordinate the two bills, go ahead and move, and solve the traffic problem.” 

Representative Hoffman again wondered why a bridge bill had become a tunnel bill. The night 

before, he said, he had asked several Senators why they had passed a tunnel bill and the “answer 

from everywhere was that they understood that the House would not build a bridge but had to 

have a tunnel.” He favored an amendment that would leave the 1954 law as the solution to the 

traffic problem. “If you gentlemen want a way of getting across the river, this amendment which 

will be proposed will give it to you and give it to you now.” 
In addition, he referred to Chairman Smith’s comment about demagogues. “Well, now, my 

feelings are not very easily hurt, and I am not sure they were hurt at that time, but they should 

have been.” Chairman Smith was hurling that charge “at everyone who opposed the position the 

gentleman takes on his bill.” 

Representative Broyhill observed that many of his conservative colleagues were trying to kill the 

bill under the impression that doing so would save taxpayer money. That was not the case, he 

said, because if the bill died, the District could proceed with the bridge project authorized in the 

1954 legislation, with Federal-aid funds: 

We are only here trying to work out a compromise so that these people whom we have 

charged with the responsibility of preserving these beautiful areas around our Nation’s 

Capital can work out this problem. So far as paying the cost of construction is concerned, 

you have already answered that question before in the approval of Public Law 704. 

Representative Hoffman introduced his amendment that would change four-lane tunnel to a “6-

lane bridge.” When Representative Broyhill pointed out that that the 1954 law already called for 

a six-lane bridge, Representative Hoffman replied:

Then why not see that it is built. Call for the ousting of the bureaucrats who defy the 

Congress. Cut off their compensation. Refuse to give them funds to operate. Who are 

they? Where do they get their power? 

Chairman Smith said that the Hoffman amendment “raises a very fundamental question,” namely 

whether a bridge or tunnel should be built: 

Underlying the question of the bridge is the question of the use of the Potomac River by 

transportation. At Georgetown there is one of the oldest ports in the United States. There 

is important business there now. There is a movement on now to improve the ports of 

Alexandria and Washington for international shipping. If the amendment passes in its 

present state, there is no provision for a bascule span to permit traffic to go up and down 

the river . . . . Every bridge there now has a bascule span and if you put one in without 

such a span, you close up the oldest port in America. 

He suggested amending the Hoffman amendment by adding “with a bascule span” to the 

wording. Representative Hoffman agreed, but said: 

The cat is out of the bag now exposed by what the gentleman from Virginia said. And it 

is a sorry looking alley cat. Navigation. Navigation. Sometime in the future we are to 

have a seaport up the river in Georgetown. 

In short, he said, the beneficiaries were “a couple of boatowners [sic] and oil company and a sand 

and gravel company”: 

The sand and gravel company and the oil company, their officers, their stockholders, their 

employees stand to profit—not the folks who want to cross the river . . . . We are to build 

this tunnel to pay a less cost for these two companies, private industries to operate . . . . 
Do we need an investigation to learn why officials refuse to build a needed bridge and 

what kind of, and who is doing the lobbying for a tunnel instead of a bridge. 

The House agreed to Chairman Smith’s amendment of the Hoffman amendment. 

As debate continued, Representative Gross offered another amendment, this one providing that 

for the purpose of building the tunnel, “the Secretary of the Interior shall offer for sale to the 

State of Virginia, at a fair appraised value, such lands and other property held by the Federal 

Government as may be necessary for construction of the said tunnel and approach ramps.” 

Chairman Smith pointed out that as a result of the approved Hoffman amendment, “this is no 

longer a tunnel bill.” The House rejected the latest Gross amendment.

Undaunted, Representative Gross offered another amendment, this one authorizing $25.5 million, 

one half to be contributed by the District of Columbia, the other half by Virginia. Without 

debate, the House quickly rejected the amendment.

Representative Kearns recognized that the amended bill now referred to a bridge, but he offered 

an amendment drafted earlier to require a toll of 25 cents, round trip, through the tunnel 

referenced in the original bill. By explanation, he cited the Holland Tunnel in New York City, 

which was paid for “in 7 years at a cost of 50 cents per car.” Based on projected travel on the 

crossing of the Potomac River, “we could amortize this tunnel in 10 years, and I think we could 

keep the toll on for another 10 or 11 years, we would have sufficient money for maintenance for 

25 years.” He acknowledged the long-running dispute over a bridge versus tunnel. “It has 

rightly been said that we have enough bridges over the river; in my opinion, we must go to 

tunnels eventually. They are more consistent.” 

Representative Broyhill opposed the amendment. It was, he said, “rather superfluous” since the 

bill now called for a bridge, not a tunnel. As for the toll idea, he said that with the Arlington 

Memorial Bridge 1,000 feet away and Key Bridge about 2,000 feet away, Virginia motorists 

would have three choices, one of which involved paying a toll: 

I believe if such a crossing were built it would not be used up to 10 percent of its 

capacity. It would certainly be a foolish thing for the Federal Government to do to the 

entrance to our Nation’s Capital. 

When Representative Kearns asked about the possibility of reducing the toll, Representative 

Broyhill replied:

As the bill is presently written—and I do not know anyone who knows how it is written 

with all these amendments in it—it is a superfluous bill. We have a law on the statute 

books now with certain funds appropriated for a six-lane bridge. The way this bill is now 

written we might just as well vote the whole thing down, because we already have a law 

to permit the building of a bridge. 

Several congressmen tried to determine what would happen if the bill were returned to 

committee, leaving unchanged the bill approved on August 30, 1954. As for whether the District 
of Columbia could use the available funds now, Representative Taber replied, “They would not 

have to wait 10 minutes.” Perhaps confused or in despair, Representative Broyhill pointed out 

that the language transferring the funds to the Department of the Interior had been stricken from 

the bill on the floor. Representative Taber replied that nothing had been stricken out of the 1954 

law:

Representative Broyhill. As the bill stands today practically everything has been stricken 

out. 

Mr. Taber. The money is there and they would be ready to go. 

As the debate came to an end, the House took a roll call vote on the Hoffman amendment, as 

amended to include “bridge with bascule span.” The House voted for the amendment, 226 to 

109. 

Representative Miller offered an amendment to recommit the bill to the District Committee, 

which the House quickly approved. [Authorizing Construction of Bridges Over the Potomac 

River, Congressional Record-House, August 2, 1957, pages 13489-13503] 

Recommitting the bill essentially killed it but gave the committee members a chance to redraft it 

if they wished. 

On August 6, the House was debating a supplemental appropriations act that included funds for a 

new airport to serve the Washington-Baltimore area, with expansion of existing Friendship 

International Airport in Maryland or a new airport in what is now called now Burke Lake Park, 

Virginia, as options. Representative Hoffman observed that: 

The local Congressmen cannot agree where they want it—Burke or Friendship. Many of 

us do not care where it is constructed just so one is built. 

The situation is like this bridge-tunnel controversy; we would have had a bridge the other 

day if the bill had not been recommitted. If the gentlemen from Virginia want their 

people to have service, why do they block it? Already there is legislation on the books 

saying that there shall be a bridge, but someone does not want it where that bill authorizes 

its construction, so we do not have a bridge anywhere. 

What is the situation? Our good friend from Virginia [Mr. Broyhill], our delightful friend 

from Virginia [Mr. Smith], they are keeping people waiting . . . . Why? Because they 

cannot make up their minds. Yes, of course they have; oh, yes; they want a tunnel or they 

want a bridge, with a draw in it, so those two companies up the river can make larger 

profits.

Chairman Smith’s comment about the port of Georgetown was still on Representative Hoffman’s 

mind: 
Well, now, the aristocratic population that lives up there in Georgetown may not welcome 

a lot of dockworkers under their noses, however fine the workers may be. They would 

not mix any more than oil and water. 

And when is Georgetown going to be a seaport? Are we to dredge the channel of the 

river from Georgetown way down to the bay entrance? They are talking now about the 

channel not being deep enough to take boats up to Baltimore. What do the gentlemen 

want to do? Make a seaway to Georgetown? And after you get the seaway what are you 

to use it for? What do the gentlemen propose to ship up to Georgetown. The talk of 

Georgetown as a seaport, seems to be nonsense.

There is something about that bill or, rather, about the refusal to build that bridge, that 

was authorized a long time ago, that just smells to high heaven, and it would not be too 

bad a thing if the Congress, with the investigating committees it has, would just appoint 

another to find out what is loose somewhere around. It is all right to represent your 

constituents, but, after all, other people have some interest in what we do. 

I asked the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Broyhill]: “What makes you think you will get 

a tunnel any quicker than you would a bridge? He replied: “There have been a lot of 

folks who have wanted a bridge over there for a number of years, but they will not build 

it.” I asked him who would not build it, and he said the Department of the Interior. 

Well, let us get after them. Who are they? It may be all right for the Supreme Court to 

defy the Congress and tell us we do not know what we are legislating about and that we 

do not mean what we say, but are we to let the Department of Interior come along and 

usurp the function of criticism which the Supreme Court has assumed? It is about time 

we sat down on the Department of the Interior, and if they will not do what we tell them 

to do, cut off their appropriations; they come to time [sic]. [Supplemental Appropriations 

for 1958, Congressional Record-House, August 6, 1957, pages 13778-13779] 

On August 7, he introduced a bill to amend the 1954 Potomac River bridge act to shift the bridge 

to Roosevelt Island. With Congress due to recess on August 30, any consideration of the bill or 

of the issue would have to wait for the second session of the 85th Congress beginning on January 

7, 1958. 

(As Representative Hoffman suspected, a Georgetown seaport, if ever under consideration, never 

became a reality.)

Trying to Get Construction Underway

At the end of July, Engineer Commissioner Lane left office. Speaking of his two and a half years 

as Engineer Commissioner, General Lane said he favored home rule to replace the current 

government by presidentially appointed commissioners. “This gives our friendly rivals in the 

suburbs more control over the spending of our tax dollars than we have ourselves.” His next 

assignment was Commanding Officer, Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri. 
At a farewell party for him on July 25, the Star’s principal political cartoonist, Jim Berryman, 

gave the departing commissioner a recent editorial cartoon about the battle over the Constitution 

Avenue Bridge. It depicted General Lane at his desk, happily waving his “Transfer Order to 

Command of Fort Leonard Wood.” Behind him was a filing cabinet labeled “Potomac 

Crossing,” with bulging drawers for “Bridge vs Tunnel.” The caption read, “Hooray . . . Back to 

the Old PONTOON BRIDGES!” [Bassett, Grace, “Cool Controversy Marks Lane’s Rule in 

District,” The Evening Star, July 7, 1957; “Officials Laud Lane, Hail Welling at Party,” The 

Evening Star, July 26, 1957; Berryman cartoon, The Evening Star, July 22, 1957, page 8] 

General Lane’s successor was Colonel Alvin C. Welling, a 46-year old civil engineer who had 

joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1938 after graduating from the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology. During World War II, he was stationed until 1943 in Alaska where he 

was involved in construction of the Corps’ Southern Sector portion of the pioneer Alaska 

Highway in 1942. In 1943, he was reassigned to New Delhi, India, as executive officer to the 

Chief of Engineers, Service in Supply, in the China-Burma-Indian theater where he had been a 

staff officer on construction of the Assam-Burma Road. He had served several times in the 

Washington area: at Fort Belvoir, Virginia (1939), Office of Chief Engineer at Gravelly Point (in 

1943, for 6 months, and again in 1951), and Fort McNair War College (1955-1956). 

When President Eisenhower named him to the post of Engineer Commissioner, Colonel Welling 

was stationed in Heidelberg, Germany, as deputy engineer of the U.S. Army in Europe. He, his 

wife, and two school-age children moved into a home at 4629 Rockwood Parkway, NW., in the 

Spring Valley neighborhood of the District south of American University, just north of the 

Palisades, and not far from Glover-Archbold Park. The family included a beagle, named Gerald 

Kanine Beagle, that the Wellings had acquired in Arlington a few years earlier when he was a 

pup, (Having been shipped by mistake to Albuquerque, New Mexico, during the transfer, “Jerry” 

arrived belatedly in Washington.) [“Officials Laud Lane, Hail Welling at Party,” The Evening 

Star, July 26, 1957; “Welling to Succeed Lane As D.C. Commissioner,” The Evening Star, July 

3, 1957] 

After arriving in Washington, the family stayed at the Berkshire, a deluxe rental apartment 

building at 4201 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., where he talked to reporters in the lobby. None of 

his assignments had been “tame.” As the Star put it:

Whether the task involved the 500-inch rainfalls of Assam, the 79-below zero cold of 

Alaska or running a teeming metropolis like the Nation’s Capital, Col. Alvin C. Welling 

says he regards every last one as a challenge and source of enjoyment.

He told reporters, “Please. I don’t want to talk about the Southwest Freeway, home rule, the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge or River Beno Dam. Right now, I’d rather talk about finding a 

house.” He wanted to meet with his friend, General Lane, for updates on all the issues facing the 

new engineer commissioner, some of which Colonel Welling was familiar with from earlier 

postings to the area. He was looking forward with “keen anticipation” to his new assignment. 

On July 29, General Lane and Colonel Welling paid a courtesy call on President Eisenhower at 

the White House. They declined to tell reporters what they discussed with the President, but 
General Lane did say that he had not brought up any particular problems. They had discussed, he 

said, the position of engineer commissioner. [Stepp, John W., “Col. Welling to ‘Enjoy’ 

Challenge of D.C. Post,” The Evening Star, July 19, 1957; “New Commissioner and Gen. Lane 

Call on President,” The Evening Star, July 29, 1957] 

By the time Colonel Welling took his oath of office on August 1, District officials had had 

enough. They were ready to move on the Constitution Avenue Bridge at its original location 

between Roosevelt Island and Arlington Memorial Bridge as approved in 1954. The District 

Highway Department asked the commissioners to authorize the project. Colonel Welling was 

believed to support the proposal, but Commissioner McLaughlin wanted time to examine cost 

estimates.

(Further, the Corps’ permit for the fixed span was to expire on August 23. Robertson had 

requested an extension. The Corps extended the permit for 2 years to start construction and 4 

years to complete the bridge.)

Two Senators stated they agreed with the District Highway Department. Senator Bible said the 

record was “abundantly clear” that the bridge was not only needed but congressionally 

authorized. “I urge that the bridge be built without further delay.” Senator Gordon L. Allott (RCo.) also recommended that the city “should start to build and build quickly.” He acknowledged 

that he was “torn between loyalties” as a member of the National Monuments Commission. His 

preference was to keep the west shore of the Potomac clear for a monument to the Five 

Freedoms, but he felt that traffic needs overrode his preference. [“Officials Ask Go-Ahead On 

Constitution Bridge,” The Evening Star, August 6, 1957] 

On August 16, District officials announced they would go ahead. Colonel Welling predicted that 

construction would begin by the middle of 1958: 

Commissioner Robert E. McLaughlin, who announced the decision jointly with Col. 

Welling, said the White House has offered no objection to proceeding with the bridge 

authorized in 1954. He said the city had agreed, however, to follow certain suggestions 

made by President Eisenhower at the time the 1954 legislation was signed. Included, he 

said, is a provision that trucks be banned from the bridge. 

The District authorized Modjeski and Masters to begin designing the planned steel bridge while 

selecting a Chicago firm, Freyssinet-Preload Corporation, to design a bridge of prestressed 

concrete. The more cost-effective alternative would be chosen.

Design work on the bridge had begun after approval of the 1954 bridge, but approaches had been 

redrawn based on consultation with other organizations. The 1954 Act required consultation 

with NCPC and the Fine Arts Commission, but did not give them approval over the plans. As 

Beveridge pointed out: 

This fact, nevertheless, is not likely to rule out heavy controversy during the next year 

among city highway officials and the planners, Fine Arts Commission and National Park 

Service. 
Representative Broyhill, after the bruising battle over his tunnel bill, issued a statement:

I am of course gratified that we have no further obstacles to encounter and that the 

Commissioners intend to go ahead with construction. While there were a lot of annoying 

and disagreeable procedures we had to go through in Congress recently, we had to debate 

the issue to let the people know that Congress does not desire to amend the bridge 

authorization law which I sponsored in 1954. [Beveridge, George, “Work Expected to 

Start On Bridge by Mid-1958,” The Evening Star, August 17, 1957] 

Representative Broyhill later said he had conferred with White House officials since failure of his 

tunnel bill and had urged them to support the 1954 bridge location. They were, he said, primarily 

concerned about the traffic impact on the Lincoln Memorial area and the possibility of trucks on 

the roads in the memorial’s vicinity. 

Colonel Welling said the city had “a firm understanding” with BPR that the bridge would qualify 

for Interstate funds at a Federal share of 90 percent despite the truck ban. He also was reaching 

out to NCPC and the Fine Arts Commission to gain their support. Neither had, as yet, 

commented, but in a broadcast on WWDC’s “Report to the People,” Commissioner McLaughlin 

was asked if he thought the bridge would finally be built. “I certainly do. It is the full intention 

of the Commissioners and the Highway Department to go ahead with construction as fast as 

possible.” [Beveridge, George, “Inter-Agency Accord Sought On River Span,” The Evening 

Star, August 18, 1957] 

Chairman Smith accepted the District’s decision, saying he had exhausted his legislative efforts 

to secure a draw span. “There’s nothing I can do,” he said. “Congress passed the law.” As for 

the businesses calling for a draw span, he said that if “the engineers who have the power to block 

the river want to do that, that’s up to them.” Still, he said, “I just don’t like abandoning the ageold theory that rivers are highways” that should not be closed. [“Smith Stops Efforts to Get 

Draw Span,” The Evening Star, August 19, 1957] 

Before commenting formally, the Commission of Fine Arts asked for a model of the bridge and 

its approaches. Colonel Welling refused, saying the preparation of such a model would be a 

needless delay. On November 21, he gave the commission the plans for a multiple-arch span, 

faced with masonry, patterned after the Arlington Memorial Bridge. The Star praised the design, 

saying it was “far from the ‘ugly scar’ foreseen by one prominent opponent.” It was “in short, a 

handsome design.” The editorial pointed out that the 1954 law required consultation with the 

Fine Arts Commission, not its concurrence. “We hope, however, that the commission and the 

highway engineers will come to an early agreement on the design, so that actual construction of 

the long-awaited bridge can be started in the near future.” [“Hardly an ‘Ugly Scar,’” The 

Evening Star, November 25, 1957] 

The commission did not agree. On December 19, David Finley replied in what Beveridge called 

“a bitter denunciation” of the city’s plan to move forward with the bridge project. Finley said the 

commission strongly opposed the location of the bridge and hoped Congress would pass a law in 

1958 shifting the bridge to a location across Roosevelt Island. However, if the city insisted on 

proceeding, the commission favored a masonry-type bridge. Finley also said the city should seek 
the commission’s advice on the architectural features of the connecting roadway structures in the 

District and Virginia:

In any event, the Commission of Fine Arts does not concur in or take any responsibility 

for the grave decision arrived at by the District Commissioners to proceed with the bridge 

in the short time intervening before the re-assembling of Congress. 

You are at liberty, of course, under the law, to disregard such advice. We are not at 

liberty, however, to give you anything less than our considered, disinterested opinion as 

to what is best for the City of Washington. 

He explained that the bridge was only a part of the project, which included roadways, overpasses 

and other structures. “These structures are hardly less important than the bridge itself, in the 

effect they will have on the appearance of the city.” The commission was especially concerned 

about a planned 23rd Street overpass of Constitution Avenue which it said would “deposit a 

stream of traffic practically at the base of the Lincoln Memorial.” In addition, the commission 

was concerned about how the approaches would affect Roosevelt Island, Arlington Memorial 

Bridge, and the Iwo Jima Marine Memorial:

Since you have refused to furnish the information requested, the commission is not in a 

position to advise as regards the proposed structures, except in the case of the bridge over 

the Potomac River at Constitution avenue. 

In that regard, the commission would approve a masonry-type bridge “at some other location.” 

To avoid any doubt, Finley added: 

In considering the merits of the design, however, it must be understood that the 

commission does not, either directly or by implication, approve the erection of a bridge 

and its network . . . so near the Memorial bridge and the Lincoln Memorial. [Beveridge, 

George, “Fine Arts’ Protest On Bridge Studied,” The Evening Star, December 20, 1957] 

The Star referred to the letter as “merely one opinion . . . expressed by an agency specifically 

created to give it.” The editorial said that “after more than five years of interminable wrangling,” 

the District commissioners had no choice but to proceed in view of the actions of other agencies 

and the Congress. “There has never been a more dismal demonstration of their utter incapability 

of working together in the common interest.” 

The point was not that the location was ideal. It was a compromise, worked out with Senator 

Case, that “Congress approved in its own confused exasperation over the hopeless conflict 

between the various executive agencies involved.” The commissioners “seem powerless” to do 

anything but proceed. “Only the President of the United States can straighten out the inexcusable 

mess created by the inability of his executive agencies to reach agreement.” There was still time 

for President Eisenhower to send “a forthright request” to Congress to approve legislation 

shifting the bridge to the tip of Roosevelt Island, and for the House and Senate to act. “If it is not 

done, and quickly, we shall have our own Bridge of Sighs near the Lincoln Memorial.” 

[“Monument to Confusion,” The Evening Star, December 22, 1957] 
The day after the editorial, Colonel Welling replied to Finley’s letter, saying the District was 

“pleased to have that architectural advice in writing” and adding that, “If it represents the 

commission’s final advice on the bridge, then the commission and the engineers of the District 

could perhaps go on to further consultations.” 

He ruled out further discussions of the approaches and affected roadways. He planned to confine 

future consultations with the commission to design of pedestrian access between Small Island 

and Roosevelt Island: 

The District has written the Theodore Roosevelt Association in search of the association’s 

wishes concerning the pedestrian access from the bridge to Small Island. The item has 

since been discussed telephonically with a representative of the association. 

The District would seek the Fine Arts Commission’s advice after the Roosevelt Association 

offered its views on the pedestrian access.

As for the approaches, the District had consulted with the commission in 1955-1956. “The 

commission’s views are well known, and every reasonable effort is being made to accommodate 

them.” Colonel Welling added, “Any adequate bridge or adequate tunnel in that general vicinity 

will lead to the same general approach road system.” [“Fine Arts Angered, Bridge Plans 

Pushed,” The Evening Star, December 24, 1957] 

In early 1958, Secretary Seaton informed reporters that he had written to the District 

Commissioners and spoken with Commissioners McLaughlin and Colonel Welling to request all 

plans for the Constitution Avenue Bridge. His request, he explained, was in accordance with 

President Eisenhower’s August 1954 signing statement that the Secretary “should be authorized 

to approve all plans for the bridge and for approach roads and interchanges” to protect Federal 

interests. Secretary Seaton hoped to meet with Colonel Welling soon to discuss procedures for 

moving forward. 

Asked if the NPS would continue to work on Capitol Hill against the bridge, Secretary Seaton 

said, “I have not any such intention.” As for whether he thought he would approve the city’s 

plans, he replied: 

I certainly would hope so. I am entirely convinced that we need more ways and means of 

getting across that river. No one needs to convince me of that. But whether I can 

approve the plans, I can’t say until I see what they are. I have never seen them at all.

He added that the President, in 1954, had given him “a heavy responsibility—I have to certify 

that whatever is done there will not be inimical to the interests of the Lincoln Memorial.”

The NPS’s Wirth indicated he had not initiated further discussions with Congress on the tunnel 

option. 

Asked if he would meet with Secretary Seaton, Colonel Welling replied that he was “interested 

in working with anyone who has a legitimate interest in the various phases of the project—
provided the conversations are in the direction of progress rather than in the directions of 

impediments and delays.” He added: 

I am not interested in a tunnel or in a four-lane bridge. From a considerable position of 

strength, I am opposed to efforts to amend the existing legislation, either in favor of a 

tunnel or to choose a new location for the bridge. 

He said the District Highway Department had been working with National Capital Parks to 

ensure its concerns were addressed. [Beveridge, George, “Seaton Stresses Right to Okay Bridge 

Plans,” The Evening Star, January 12, 1958] 

At the invitation of the District commissioners, they escorted Secretary Seaton and Under 

Secretary O. Hatfield Chilson on an inspection tour of the bridge site on January 27. Secretary 

Seaton also asked to see the site that would have taken the bridge over the tip of Roosevelt 

Island. The Star described the tour: 

The inspection party first visited the District side of the river. The officials walked over 

ground which already has been staked out with the five roadways which would interlace 

park land near the Lincoln Memorial and link the projected bridge with Rock Creek and 

Potomac parkway, the Memorial roadways and the city street system.

The bridge would touch the shore slightly south of Constitution avenue near the 

ornamental Watergate, which flanks Memorial Bridge.

Mr. Seaton questioned particularly the elevation of the bridge approaches. Highway 

officials said the bridge at the shoreline would be 18 feet above the ground. The roadway 

would slope downward and reach ground level about 300 feet west of Twenty-third street 

. . . . 

Later, the party crossed Memorial Bridge to the Columbia Island end of the proposed new 

bridge. Mr. Seaton there checked the vista which include [sic] the Lincoln Memorial, 

Washington Monument and Capitol dome. 

Motorists, District officials told the Secretary, would have an unparalleled view of these sites. 

However, Associate Director Harry T. Thompson of National Capital Parks, “told a reporter . . . 

that in his opinion construction of a bridge at the proposed site would ruin this vista, which he 

called the finest in the area.” 

The excursion did not resolve all concerns. Secretary Seaton was concerned about whether 

people in the vicinity of the bridge would be able to see the Lincoln Memorial. Although he had 

wanted to see the Roosevelt Island site that had been subject of recent legislative wrangling, he 

said of the 1954 location, “I’d rather work this plan out if I can.” [Deane, James G., “Seaton 

Hopes For Accord on Bridge Soon,” The Evening Star, January 27, 1958] 

During a joint meeting of the Senate and House District Committees on February 4, 

Representative Broyhill asked the District commissioners when they would begin work on the 

Constitution Avenue Bridge. Commissioner McLaughlin replied that the city was waiting to see 
how Congress would act on pending matters, including the bill authorizing a tunnel instead of a 

bridge. “I’d like to have that indication today,” he said. That would not be possible, Senator 

Bible explained, until the Senate committee held hearings on a resolution that Senator 

O’Mahoney was about to introduce on the subject. Although Senator Bible favored the bridge, 

he did not want to deny tunnel supporters prompt opportunity for their views to be heard. 

Colonel Welling, who was sitting in the crowd, tried to get Representative Broyhill’s attention, 

stage whispering “Joel . . . Joel.” When recognized, he told the joint committees that the District 

had submitted plans for approach roads on both sides of the river to Secretary Seaton 3 weeks 

earlier. “This is a procedure we always follow when roads cross park land.” As soon as he 

received approval from Secretary Seaton, he said, he would start construction. 

Despite Commissioner McLaughlin’s hesitation, Colonel Welling and Commissioner David B. 

Karrick told reporters they were satisfied that the District had congressional authorization to 

build the bridge approved in August 1954. Karrick said, “I think we have all the congressional 

authority we need to build the bridge.” [“Commissioners Differ On Bridge Go-Ahead,” The 

Evening Star, February 4, 1958] 

Another Look at a Tunnel

On February 4, Senator O’Mahoney introduced a “sense of Congress” resolution calling on the 

District to halt preliminary work on the Constitution Avenue Bridge until Congress had “an 

opportunity” to consider the O’Mahoney tunnel bill. Representative Saylor introduced an 

identical resolution on February 5. (A “sense of Congress” resolution, if approved, does not 

require presidential approval or have the force of law. It is simply advice from Congress that 

Federal agencies may take – or not.) 

The resolution angered Representative Broyhill, who said, “It doesn’t have a chance.” It also 

was, he said, ridiculous to say the House had not considered the tunnel alternative. “The House 

did, in effect, act on that proposition when it had my bill up late in the session and refused to pass 

it.” [Preston, Alex R., “House Move Made to Block Bridge Project,” The Evening Star, February 

5, 1958] 

Senator Bible was named head of the Senate District Committee on February 6, taking the place 

of Senator Matthew M. Neely (D-WV), who had died on January 18, 1958. The Star told its 

readers:

Senator Bible, a traditional friend of the District, has championed home rule, immediate 

construction of a Constitution avenue bridge and a study of Washington Metropolitan 

Area problems.

He parted with the District Commissioners and the Eisenhower administration on local 

suffrage by favoring an elected mayor, city council and school board in the past. The 

administration wants instead a territorial form of government for Washington. [“Senator 

Bible Named D.C. Committee Head,” The Evening Star, February 6, 1958] 
On February 6, Representative Broyhill introduced a resolution to the House that he said would 

“shore up, if necessary, the Commissioners so they won’t think there’s too much sentiment up 

here to halt the job.” Referring to action on his 1957 tunnel bill, he said, “After the battle we 

had, I don’t see how anyone can contend that that issue has not been settled in the House.” As 

for advocates of a tunnel in the House and Senate, he would ask Chairman McMillan to call up 

the O’Mahoney-Saylor bill at the committee’s next meeting:

If it’s action they want, by golly they’ll get it. I am confident they’ll back me up . . . . 

Their whole proposal is ridiculous. 

He would not seek House action on his resolution at this time, but if the commissioners hesitated, 

he said:

I shall press for action up here. My resolution is here to back them up in case they are 

getting any kind of pressure to hold off . . . . I can understand why they wouldn’t act last 

year while Congress was thrashing out the question of a tunnel or a bridge and its 

location. It was only after Congress acted and settled the matter—I thought once and for 

all—and they got the nod from the White House that they went into action. [Preston, 

Alex R., “Broyhill Moves To Block Delays On New Bridge,” The Evening Star, February 

6, 1958] 

Senator O’Mahoney issued a new attack on the bridge on February 13. He was particularly 

concerned about the cost of the project, which had been estimated to be $24.5 million in 1954. 

Given inflation in construction costs since then, he said, “it is not too much to say the proposed 

bridge . . . eventually would cost as much as $40 million.” 

The District’s highway chief, Robertson, denied the Senator’s claim. Land and construction 

costs had jumped since 1954, but the bridge still could be built for $24.5 million. In part, that 

was because some of the approach road projects previously assigned to the bridge were now part 

of other projects, including the Inner Loop. 

Senator O’Maloney also wanted to delay the project because he understood the State Department 

was concerned that the approaches might affect the new State Department building at 23rd and C 

Streets, NW. The department had asked Secretary Seaton for a report on the issue, but, according 

to the Senator, “the District Commissioners refuse to give the information.” Robertson told 

reporters that conferences with the State Department were planned to clarify that the bridge 

approaches “would not disturb the State Department layout in any respect.” [“O’Mahoney Hits 

Bridge As Costing $40 Million,” The Evening Star, February 13, 1958] 

Senator Bible’s announcement that hearings would be held on the O’Mahoney/Saylor resolution 

prompted Senator John M. Butler (R-Md.), who lived in Baltimore, had not taken a firm view on 

the Constitution Avenue crossing, to announce his support for the six-lane bridge on February 

25. He urged the District to begin construction of the bridge immediately. Hundreds of his 

Maryland constituents were delayed in daily bottlenecks trying to cross the Potomac River. 

Congress, he said, “already has spoken” in support of the bridge. He particularly denounced 

lobbying by Federal agencies against the bridge project:
This opposition obviously is spear-headed by the National Park Service. Personally, 

I resent the lobbying of Federal agencies for their pet projects in Congress, and I 

respectfully urge the President to call a halt to Federal agency lobbying against the 

already-approved bridge legislation. 

It is high time that the District Commissioners brush the minority opposition aside. They 

should proceed without further delay to build the Constitution avenue bridge. 

The same day, District officials met with Department of State officials regarding the approach 

road near their new building under construction to serve 9,000 employees. Robertson said after 

the meeting that he thought State Department officials felt the approach road plan would help 

traffic flow around the building, not hinder it. Colonel Welling agreed, saying “the result of the 

conferences which I have attended is that the conferees end up agreeing that the Highway 

Department proposals are the most efficient and, all things considered, the most acceptable.” 

[“Butler Blasts ‘Lobbying’ By Agencies on Bridge,” The Evening Star, February 25, 1958] 

Reacting to Commissioner McLaughlin’s desire for an “indication” of congressional intent, the 

House District Committee on March 3 rejected the “sense of Congress” resolution by Senator 

O’Mahoney and Representative Saylor calling on the District to delay construction of the bridge 

until the House had acted on Senator O’Mahoney’s Senate-approved tunnel bill. In an executive 

meeting, the committee adopted a resolution stating: 

It is the sense of the committee that the Commissioners proceed forthwith with the 

construction [of] the Constitution avenue bridge project. The committee further requests 

the President of the United States to facilitate immediately through the Federal 

Government any clearances bearing upon the initiation of the bridge project construction. 

With no delaying action likely in the House of Representatives, the last obstacle was approval by 

Secretary Seaton. Publicly, he indicated he was trying to work with District officials to resolve 

concerns about the impact of the approaches on the Lincoln Memorial. He was, he said, “very 

hopeful of having the whole thing ironed out next week,” adding that “nobody wants more time 

to go by” without another crossing of the Potomac River. [Beveridge, George, “Seaton Seeking 

Bridge Accord By Next Week,” The Evening Star, March 6, 1958] 

On March 25, the District commissioners met with Secretary Seaton to present revised proposals 

for the approach roads. The new plans included “significant reductions,” according to Colonel 

Welling, in the elevations of roadways and overpasses in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial. 

In addition, the city planned to slope the embankments along the roads to create the appearance 

of gently rolling terrain. In addition, the commissioners presented photographs of current views 

from the planned location of approach roads. The roads, in the District’s view, would be only 

slightly visible from the memorial. The photographs also showed that the new approach roads 

would be concealed by existing vegetation. 

Secretary Seaton conceded that the changes moved “toward” his objectives, but he declined to 

offer any judgment until his staff had reviewed the plans in detail. “This has given some 
renewed hope that we can work this thing out,” he said. His goal was to allow the much-needed 

new river crossing without doing “violence” to the memorial area. [“Interior Officials Study 

New Bridge Road Plans,” The Evening Star, March 26, 1958; “Approaches Set Lower at 

Bridge,” The Evening Star, March 30, 1958] 

Secretary Seaton submitted his report to President Eisenhower in April. He conceded the “urgent 

need for an additional bridge across the Potomac between Memorial Bridge and Key Bridge,” but 

in view of the limits imposed on location by the 1954 legislation, he “recognized the vital 

necessity—in the public interest—of minimizing the possible impairment of the monumental 

design and artistic setting of the Lincoln Memorial and other memorial structures in the area.” It 

was “regrettable” that the legislation was so specific as to location and type of bridge, thereby 

limiting the ability of “responsible executive agencies to carry out their obligation to preserve 

and protect to the maximum possible extent the distinctive aesthetic values associated with what 

has been universally acclaimed as one of the world’s outstanding national shrines.” 

The focal point of the Interior Department’s concerns was the “location of approach roads and 

interchanges . . . lying directly northwest of the Lincoln Memorial bounded on the north by 

Constitution avenue, on the east by Twenty-third street and on the south and west by the Rock 

Creek-Potomac parkway.” Although the District had modified these facilities to address the 

department’s concerns, the result was that “within this relatively compact area and on 

immediately abutting lands, it will be necessary to place a maze of structures running as high as 

22 feet above present grade, and involving a number of overhead grade separations.” Nearly 400 

trees would have to be removed along with most of an evergreen grove at Ohio Drive and other 

plantings. 

To avoid “such an encroachment on the dignity, beauty, serenity and magnificent setting of the 

Lincoln Memorial,” he asked the President to support “one last effort to secure from the 

Congress the slight modification of the controlling legislation” to shift the bridge to cross Small 

Island on Roosevelt Island: 

Given full support of the executive branch, I firmly believe that communication of the 

facts as we now know them to the Congress might well result in a favorable response. 

If Congress acted promptly, the shift in location “need not cause an appreciable delay in initiation 

of construction.” 

He added:

Failing favorable action by the Congress during this session, and in light of the history of 

the entire matter and the present traffic situation, we would have no choice but to 

proceed—however regretfully—as expeditiously as possible to carry out the directive of 

the Congress [in the 1954 Act] within the strict limitations laid down by it.

On April 19, the White House announced that President Eisenhower endorsed Secretary Seaton’s 

recommendation. The President opposed immediate construction at the planned location to 
allow for “one last effort” in Congress to shift the bridge so that the District end would be 

between Constitution Avenue and E Street, NW. 

District officials were concerned about the delay, but considered the President’s decision to be 

final. Colonel Welling said:

It has been obvious for months that this bridge proposition would have to go to the White 

House for a decision. Now we have it, and that’s that. 

Representative Broyhill, too, was disappointed about the delay, but was encouraged by Secretary 

Seaton’s assurance that if Congress did not act in the current session, the District would be 

authorized to proceed with the existing plans. 

Members of the House and Senate District Committees promised quick action. [Beveridge, 

George, “New Site for Bridge Asked by President,” The Evening Star, April 20, 1958; Secretary 

Seaton’s letter is reprinted in the same issue]

Colonel Welling agreed with the President that shifting the bridge was preferable for aesthetic 

reasons, although the $250,000 expended on the proposed bridge at its present location would be 

lost. He also noted that a “hard core of tunnel advocates” were not ready to give up on 

eliminating the bridge altogether. Further, he said, the draw span issue would remain to be 

resolved wherever the bridge was built. 

The Star editors considered the President’s desire to shift the bridge “the only really satisfactory 

solution to an almost hopelessly complicated dilemma.” Three years earlier, “all Federal and 

District agencies” agreed on the shift, but “it was sabotaged on Capitol Hill by Federal park and 

planning officials who wanted no bridge at all.” The editors thought that with the President’s 

support “such a spectacle is not likely to be repeated.” [“Welling Cites Tunnel Bill,” The 

Evening Star, April 21, 1958; “Most Satisfactory Solution,” The Evening Star, April 21, 1958] 

General Grant urged the Committee of 100 on the Federal City to remain firm in support of the 

tunnel, especially since the Senate had approved the tunnel bill. The committee continued to 

support the tunnel option, but conditionally approved President Eisenhower’s recommended shift 

of location, if a tunnel were not possible, as preferable to the one approved in 1954. [“Ike’s 

Choice Of Span Site Is Supported,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 29, 1958] 

Back to the Hill

Secretary Seaton submitted a bill on May 1 to authorize the location shift. In a letter to 

congressional leaders, he called the shift “a desirable and harmonious solution” to the long fight 

over the bridge. He also disclosed that the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association had 

submitted written approval of the plan to cross the tip of Roosevelt Island. To avoid any concern 

that the NPS would continue to fight the project, Secretary Seaton said, “agencies of this 

department are prepared to co-operate fully with the Board of Commissioners of the District in 

carrying out this project expeditiously.” [Beveridge, George, “Fast Action Urged On Shifting 

Bridge,” The Evening Star, May 2, 1958] 
The bill amended Title I of the 1954 law to read: 

That (a) the Commissioners of the District of Columbia are authorized and directed to 

construct, maintain, and operate a low-level bridge, to be known as the Theodore 

Roosevelt Bridge, over the Potomac River, from a point north of and in the vicinity of 

Constitution Avenue in the District of Columbia to the Virginia side of the Potomac 

River, such bridge to cross such portion or portions of the two islands comprising 

Theodore Roosevelt Island at the location approved in writing on April 30, 1958, by the 

Theodore Roosevelt Association, 

The bill also amended subsection (b) of Title I to authorize the commissioners “to construct and 

maintain structures providing pedestrian access or vehicle access, or both,” to Roosevelt Island if 

requested by the Interior Department. 

The House District Committee approved the bill on May 12, 1958, although six members voted 

“present” or “no” to protest the long delay in the bridge project. The committee’s report stated: 

The committee voted reluctantly to report this legislation favorably to the floor. 

However, it is the feeling of the committee that there has been entirely too much 

procrastination and delay in the construction of a bridge in this area, particularly in view 

of the fact that the original location approved by Congress in 1954 was the result of a 

compromise by various groups . . . . 

The Commissioners’ efforts in the construction of the project should no longer be 

subjected to delaying tactics on the part of the Commission of Fine Arts, Park Service, 

National Capital Planning Commission, and the Theodore Roosevelt Association. In fact 

it is only with the understanding that the President will keep the above-listed 

organizations in support of the bridge project that the committee has expressed a 

willingness to go along with the proposal to change the location of the structure. 

Nevertheless, in view of “the great importance of maintaining the navigability of the Nation’s 

waterways,” the committee recommended that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “in acting on 

any application for a navigation permit for the upstream bridge location, give serious weight to 

the requirements for vertical clearance by existing navigation.” [Amending the Act to Authorize 

and Direct the Construction of Bridges Over the Potomac River, Committee on the District of 

Columbia, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 1721, May 14, 1958, 

page 3]

This reference to the permit, which the Corps issued for the low-level bridge in 1954, was seen as 

being included in deference to Chairman Smith, despite his promise not to try to block the bill. 

Asked about this committee statement, Robertson said that increasing clearance from the planned 

27.5 feet would not delay construction. [“Robertson Discounts Delay for Higher Span,” The 

Evening Star, May 13, 1958; and “House to Act Monday On New Site for Bridge,” The Evening 

Star, May 15, 1958] 

Chairman John L. McMillan (D-SC) predicted prompt House action. 
When reporters asked Chairman Smith if he would oppose the bill, he replied: 

I don’t agree with a fixed span, but we need the bridge so badly I’m going to stop fighting 

it. They can build anything they want with no fuss from me. [Preston, Alex, “House 

Group Reports Relocated Bridge Bill,” The Evening Star, May 12, 1958] 

Senator O’Mahoney and Representative Saylor also conceded the measure. The Senator said, “If 

the administration takes such a conclusive position, I am willing to accept the bridge. And if the 

[Roosevelt] association accedes to Secretary Seaton’s recommendation, then I accede.” 

Representative Saylor agreed. “If the administration feels that way about it and if the Theodore 

Roosevelt Association feels that way about it, I am willing to go along.” [“Early Vote Due on 

Span As Tunnel Fight Fades,” The Evening Star, May 14, 1958] 

Chairman McMillan introduced the bill on the House floor on May 19, explained the measure, 

and secured House approval without debate in 30 seconds. [Amending the Act to Authorize and 

Direct the Construction of Bridges Over the Potomac River, Congressional Record-House, May 

19, 1958, page 9005] 

The Senate Committee on the District of Columbia approved the bill on May 20. Its report 

contained a sentiment similar to the view expressed in the House committee report, referring to 

“too much procrastination and delay”: 

The Commissioners’ efforts in the construction of the project should no longer be 

subjected to delaying tactics on the part of the Commission of Fine Arts, the National 

Park Service, the National Capital Planning Commission, the Theodore Roosevelt 

Association or any other body. [Amending the Act to Authorize and Direct the 

Construction of Bridges Over the Potomac River, Committee on the District of Columbia, 

United States Senate, 85th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 1622, May 21, 1958, page 3] 

On May 26, the Senate approved the bill, with minimal discussion limited mainly to praise of 

committee members for moving the bill and expressions of support for the relocated bridge. 

[Construction of Bridges Over the Potomac River, Congressional Record-Senate, May 26, 1958, 

pages 9448-9449] 

The congressional action earned praise in a Star editorial titled “New Era of Progress” on May 

27. “It is a rare occasion when District legislation . . . swishes through Congress with such 

unanimity and speed . . . .” The editors singled out Secretary Seaton, calling him “an earnest and 

effective mediator” who resolved “the heated controversy between his own park conservationists 

and the District Highway Department.” The editorial ended: 

So there now dawns for Washington a bright new era of building for a greater and more 

beautiful city. The whole community is grateful to all concerned in paving the way for 

this epochal progress. 

Without fanfare or a statement, President Eisenhower approved the bill on June 4, creating Public 

Law 85-446. 
The Last Gasp(s)

The Commission of Fine Arts was still not convinced. On June 26, it approved preliminary 

design for a twin to the 11th Street Bridge over the Anacostia River. To be built in 1962, the 

bridge, located about 300 feet upstream from the existing bridge, would carry westbound traffic, 

with eastbound traffic crossing on the existing span. The commission acted on a number of other 

matters, but wanted further conferences with the District Highway Department on design details 

of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. [“Fine Arts Group Oks 11th Street Bridge Plan,” The Evening 

Star, June 27, 1958] 

On September 11, the commission gave “general approval” to the design for the new 14th Street 

bridge to replace the trestle-topped bridge. With the new bridge scheduled to open in 1962, 

District officials indicated they would make some improvements to the trestle-topped bridge to 

keep it open until then. The commission requested some changes in the ramps for the 

Washington Channel bridge connecting to the Southwest Freeway, but they were not considered 

to be serious problems. 

However, the commission was still not satisfied with “all the details” of the Theodore Roosevelt 

Bridge. A commission official said the problems resulted “from the basic difficulty of getting a 

satisfactory bridge in that area.” The commission held a closed-door meeting with District 

highway officials, during which, according to reports, a District official told participants that the 

two agencies “have never been closer in their aims than they are now.” [“Fine Arts Unit Oks 14th

St. Bridge Plans,” The Evening Star, September 12, 1958] 

By October, the final hurdle was Secretary Seaton’s approval of the bridge and the approach road 

network in the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial. On October 30, Secretary Seaton informed the 

commissioners by letter that he was in “complete agreement” on the basic approach design, but 

wanted further discussion of three details based on traffic and engineering data. The three areas 

were road layouts south and east of the Lincoln Memorial; whether a bridge will carry 23rd Street 

over Constitution Avenue or an intersection with a traffic light would suffice; and, in Beveridge’s 

words: 

The precise location of the opening of a tunnel which will carry the District’s “inner 

loop” freeway beneath the Lincoln Memorial grounds to the west of the memorial. 

Interior wants this tunnel portal moved as far as possible north of the memorial. The 

District says it must be near it, in order to permit “inner loop” traffic to get to the 

Arlington Memorial Bridge and to the Rock Creek and Potomac parkway. 

Although these issues remained to be resolved, General Welling ordered highway officials to 

begin immediately to work on detailed plans and construction drawings for the bridge. (Engineer 

Commissioner Welling had been promoted to Brigadier General on August 9.) The first step 

would be approval of a contract with Modjeski and Masters for this work. The Interior 

Department’s issues about approach road details would not affect the bridge itself. 

Further, Interior officials said the Secretary was not unalterably opposed to the existing approach 

details, but just wanted “a final look” at the most recent data on the three topics. General 
Welling held a press conference, during which he said he was “confident” the data would 

convince Interior officials to approve the planned approach network. He said he also had 

instructed Highway Director Robertson to develop a contract for design of the Potomac River 

Freeway east from Key Bridge. According to Beveridge:

Gen. Welling also disclosed details of design for the new Constitution avenue bridge, 

which he said have agreement of the Federal Fine Arts Commission. These include 

decisions to build only six bridge piers, equally spaced, across the river with 222-foot 

spaces between them, and to build the “end piers” on each side of the river of stone 

masonry. [Beveridge, George, “Work Ordered On Potomac Bridge Design,” The Evening 

Star, October 31, 1958] 

The remaining issues proved more stubborn than General Welling expected. As late as 

November, he responded to a question about the project on WWDC’s “Report to the People” by 

saying that if the District and Interior could not resolve remaining issues, “someone else” would 

have to reach a decision. Asked if “someone else” meant President Eisenhower, General Welling 

would not clarify his meaning. He did not expect the reviews to lead to an “impasse” and 

remained confident that traffic would be crossing the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge in 1962. 

[“White House Seen Getting Bridge Row,” The Evening Star, November 2, 1958] 

One issue was resolved in January 1959 when BPR approved the plan to have sidewalks on both 

sides of the bridge. For safety reasons, BPR preferred to eliminate pedestrians from Interstate 

highways. In this case, however, BPR agreed to the plan approved by the Commission of Fine 

Arts that included a sidewalk on both sides, with steps to the island. [“Crossing the Bridge,” The 

Evening Star, January 27, 1959] 

Mid-afternoon on April 19, 1960, the District held a ceremony near the intersection of 

Constitution Avenue and the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway to mark the start of construction 

of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. With several hundred spectators on hand, General Welling 

presided over the event. He said the bridge had been a “prime project of mine” that had come 

“out of debate . . . into action.” He observed that approval of the bridge had broken the logjam of 

area projects, leading to construction of a Cabin John Bridge as part of the outer beltway, an 

underpass at Washington Circle, the Culture Center (today’s Kennedy Center), and an 

“interceptor” for removing raw sewage from the Potomac River.

Commissioner McLaughlin, calling the project “a tribute to the reasonableness” of the agencies 

involved, said the subtitle of the bridge should be “Potomac Compromise.” Reflecting the long 

debate, Commissioner Karrick said he “never expected to live to see the start of its construction.” 

Representative McMillan described the legislative battles behind the bridge and said he hoped 

“to walk across this bridge some day.” Senator Frear of the District committee observed that it 

was “always a pleasure to see progress.”

As part of the ceremony, General Welling asked three officials to press three buttons. The first 

button prompted the District’s fireboat to shoot jets of water into the air. The second button 

would signal the start of the piledriver. The third button would begin three blasts from a 75-
milimeter cannon to signal that construction was underway. The fireboat shot the jets of water 

and the piledriver began, but the cannon failed due to a broken firing pin. Nevertheless, 

construction had begun. [McKelway, John, “Mighty Cannon Is Mute Witness At Roosevelt 

Bridge Ceremony,” The Evening Star, April 20, 1960] 

The Cabin John Bridge opened on December 31, 1962. In a ceremony on May 30, 1969, the 

bridge was renamed the American Legion Memorial Bridge.

Although NCPC’s Roaches Run Bridge was not built, the $7 million Washington Channel 

Bridge that was part of the compromise worked out by Senator Case was opened in a ceremony 

on July 31, 1962. During the ceremony, NPS’s Wirth told the crowd that the District had “one of 

the best highway departments in the Nation.” District Engineer Commissioner Frederick J. 

Clarke said the bridge was “the symbol of what can be accomplished by co-operation between 

city planners, the Park Service, the Redevelopment Land Agency and highway builders.” 

[“Channel Bridge Passes Test,” The Evening Star, August 1, 1962] 

Senator Case, who would have been an honored guest during the ceremony, died a few weeks 

earlier on June 21 after a heart attack in his Senate office. Efforts to name the bridge in his honor 

began almost immediately. On September 25, 1965, Congress approved a Joint Resolution that 

the bridge be named the “Francis Case Memorial Bridge” and urging the District commissioners 

to place a plaque with the name in a visible location. The name, and the sign containing the 

name, remain in place.

(He was preparing for a reelection battle against his Democrat opponent, former Representative 

George McGovern, who most recently had been administrator of the Kennedy Administration’s 

Food for Peace Program. McGovern would win the election against Senator Case’s appointed 

replacement.) 

(Although the Southwest Redevelopment Plan would continue, Zeckendorf would not be part of 

it. With Webb and Knapp in financial distress, the company signed a contract on November 2, 

1964, transferring its commercial land holdings in the area to a consortium that included David 

Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank (and brother of New York Governor Nelson A. 

Rockefeller). The company had lost its residential property interests in August to a group headed 

by local developer Charles S. Bresler. Webb and Knapp declared bankruptcy in 1965. 

[Ottenberg, Miriam, “Syndicate Buys SW Holdings Of Zeckendorf,” The Evening Star, 

November 2, 1964; Gutheim and Lee, page 273] 

(By the 1970s, the Tenth Street Mall had been completed. It formed an arrow-straight street that 

is now called L’Enfant Plaza. The mall was surrounded by tall office buildings, a hotel, and a 

plaza in the center of which was an impressive fountain. The grand mall consisted of sidewalks 

and a wide median walkway between traffic lanes. The development included a hidden shopping 

mall called The Promenade that officially opened on November 16, 1968, with over 30 stores, 

service establishments, and eating places, as well as a movie theater. The Promenade opened 

amidst great optimism, but over time, depended almost entirely on lunchtime business from 

nearby office workers.
(The boulevard-like mall Zeckendorf had envisioned stretched only from Independence Avenue 

to an overlook high above the restaurants and the Maine Avenue fish market along the 

Washington Channel, with a steep pedestrian path and traffic lanes connected to Maine Avenue. 

Beyond weekday work hours, the Tenth Street Mall sees infrequent foot traffic, with little to 

attract the public except parking spaces for visitors to the National Mall across Independence 

Avenue. As for the link between the Tenth Street Mall and the Maine Avenue waterfront, a 2017 

book about southwest Washington explained: 

An outgrowth of the Zeckendorf-Pei plan for Southwest, the Tenth Street promenade that 

was envisioned was unfortunately terminated with a fountain in 1968 at the Banneker 

overlook due to the exit ramp for I-395, and it remains an anomaly of urban vision from 

the 1960s . . . . Southwest residents and tourists headed to the Metro station from the 

waterfront continued to scale a non-landscaped hill on a dirt path from the popular Maine 

Avenue waterfront almost 50 years later. [Williams, Paul K., and Alexander, Gregory J., 

with the Southwest Neighborhood Assembly, Southwest DC, Arcadia Publishing, 2017, 

page 17] 

(A paved path is also available.

(The James V. Forrestal Building straddles the entrance to the mall, stretching along 

Independence Avenue from 9th Street to nearly 12th Street; it was built in the late 1960s only after 

much conflict with the Smithsonian Institution, NCPC, Zeckendorf, the General Services 

Administration (GSA), and others. It initially housed the Department of the Navy and now is 

home to the Department of Energy. To the east of L’Enfant Plaza, the Department of Housing 

and Urban Development was on the west side of 7th Street, SW. Across 7th Street, the Nassif 

Building housed the Department of Transportation until 2007, when the department moved to 

two buildings on M Street, SE. (The Nassif Building, now known as Constitution Center, 

houses several Federal agencies). 

(Richard F. Ward’s 1978 history of the District’s southwest described the Tenth Street Mall at 

the time:

Originally envisioned as the grand entrance to the Southwest, the Tenth Street 

Mall/Overlook has lost its purpose. There are several reasons for this. First, Tenth Street 

is not one of the streets which continues from the Northwest across the Mall and into the 

Southwest. It is a truncated street, always has been and always will be as long as there is 

a Smithsonian Castle on the Mall. Secondly, the original plan to build a parking garage 

under the Overlook fell through. People were to have been attracted to the Overlook not 

only for the fine view but also because of a national aquarium across the channel in East 

Potomac Park. A Ponte Vecchio on the channel (a touch of Italian in the area would be 

welcome) would span the Washington Channel so people could walk to the park. The 

idea is fine but has to wait for times when such things are given higher priority. And, 

finally, the true center of the Southwest is probably Fourth Street. The Tenth Street 

entrance is more of a side entrance. [Ward, Richard F., South and West of the Capitol 

Dome, Vantage Press, 1978, pages 83-84]) 
The waterfront restaurants, including Hogate’s and Phillips Flagship, have disappeared, replaced 

by The Wharf, a multi-billion dollar mixed-use development. The first two buildings of The 

Wharf opened in October 2017. 

Getting U.S. 270 into the District of Columbia

The Old Road 

The road from Frederick, Maryland, to Washington, D.C, can be traced to pre-colonial times. A 

history of Rockville, Maryland, described the Indian trail that initially followed the route: 

Indians defined the original path ten thousand years ago. Groups of Piscataways, 

Senecas, and Susquehannocks followed game, set up seasonal camps, and marked an 

inland north-south route along this piedmont ridge. By the 1690s, European settlers had 

displaced the Indians and appropriated the old road known as the Sinequa Trail. 

[McGuckian, Eileen S., Rockville: Portrait of a City, Hillsboro Press, 2001, page 3] 

A historian of Germantown, Maryland, stated: 

The native Americans in this part of the country also used mainly waterways to travel 

from one place to another and the Indian paths usually connected one waterway with 

another. The Indians had a path along part of the eventual route of the Frederick Road, 

for they also had to have some way to get around the falls of the Potomac River; but their 

path veered off to the west above Germantown to proceed to the mouth of the Monocacy 

River. [Soderberg, Susan, A History of Germantown, Maryland, published by the author, 

1988, pages 24] 

During colonial times, the road was gradually improved as settlers formed towns in the corridor 

and farmers needed a path to market:

Travelers and planters in the area of present-day Rockville relied on the colonial route. 

They appreciated the Maryland Assembly’s attempt to keep the roadway cleared of 

obstructions, notched for directions, and free of standing water. As early as the 1740s, 

local planters shipped hogsheads of cured tobacco down the rolling road to the port of 

George Town. Pioneers heading to western Maryland, the Ohio territory, and beyond 

traveled the Great Road. [McGuckian, page 3, italics in original] 

In 1755, the road was part of one of the more disastrous moments in the French and Indian War. 

British General Edward Braddock took a force north to a French post at Fort Duquesne (site of 

Pittsburgh) in an attempt to force the French out of British colonial territory. From 

Williamsburg, Virginia, he led his army to Georgetown, then north, stopping initially at Owen’s 

Ordinary (or inn) near the present site of Rockville. The British army continued north to 

Dowden’s Ordinary (Clarksburg) and Frederick before turning west to Cumberland. From there, 

army engineers had to carve a wider road out of an old Indian trail to get the force to Fort 

Duquesne: 
West of Fort Cumberland the road dwindled to a narrow path, and Braddock’s army 

yielded to colonial engineers who cut a new twelve-foot right-of-way for the advancing 

army. On July 9, having marched two hundred miles to within sight of Fort Duquesne, 

they were surprised by French regulars, French Canadian militia, and Indian warriors. 

Braddock’s troops were handily defeated, and Braddock was fatally wounded. 

[McGuckian, pages 1-2] 

Braddock made many mistakes on this expedition, including not listening to his aide-de-camp, a 

young Virginian named George Washington, and others who explained that a British-style assault 

would not work in the wilderness: 

Benjamin Franklin, who was called in to help procure supplies for the army, reports that it 

was Braddock’s ignorance of wilderness fighting that was the cause of the failure. 

[Soderberg, page 25] 

Following independence and creation of the United States of America, the road between 

Georgetown and Frederick remained important. “It is shown on the 1790 census map of 

Maryland as one of only seven major roads in the state at that time.” [Soderberg, page 24] 

Its importance increased when the general government built the National Road from 

Cumberland, Maryland, to Wheeling (then in Virginia) as a portage between the Potomac and 

Ohio Rivers. Construction took place from 1811 to 1818; soon, the general government began 

extending the road west. Maryland had chartered the Frederick Turnpike in 1805 and extended it 

to Boonsborough. With revenue from bank charters, Maryland financed the “Bank Road” to 

complete the road from Baltimore to Cumberland, reaching it in 1820, with only a few gaps. 

In 1805, Maryland embarked on a network of turnpikes, many centered in Baltimore but in other 

parts of the State as well:

In 1805, the Maryland Assembly chartered the Washington Turnpike Company, the first 

in Montgomery County. Originally, the plan was to improve the existing roadway from 

the District of Columbia line, through Rockville and Clarksburg, to the main square in 

Frederick. This would be financed by shares of capital stock for twenty dollars each, with 

George Town, Washington City, Frederick, Elizabethtown (Hagerstown), and Rockville 

each responsible for raising subscriptions. 

The twenty foot wide roadway . . . was completed by the mid-1820s. The company 

erected guideposts and milestones to inform travelers of distances from the District to toll 

gates, other turnpikes, and destination towns . . . . The turnpike company depended upon 

user revenue to keep the road in repair. Travelers paid tolls at gates in Tenallytown, 

Bethesda, and the Wilson farm (now Georgetown Prep). The Maryland legislature set the 

rates.

Tolls varied for herds of sheep, hogs, or cattle (measured in scores of 20); every horse and his 

rider or led horse; a chariot, coach, or stage with two horses and four wheels; and a carriage with 

four horses [McGuckian, pages 29-30] 
The Great Road, as it was also called, was heavily traveled:

George Washington traveled the road many times and often stayed at Peter’s Tavern (later 

Tabler’s) that stood on the south bank of Bennett’s Creek on Frederick Road. Other 

famous visitors to Tabler’s were Lafayette and President Andrew Jackson. In the 1840s 

James K. Polk stayed at the Hyatt House, an inn in Hyattstown, on the way to his 

inauguration. 

There was a considerable controversy from 1829 to 1831, when there was a push to 

replace [the Great Road] with a road from Washington to the National Road which would 

run further east, through Brookeville and New Market. The proposition was defeated, 

however, and the road remained as it was. 

During the Civil War the Frederick Road was used by both the Union and Confederate 

armies . . . . [Soderberg, page 25] 

Conditions gradually improved: 

The turnpike company constantly attempted to improve service. Horse and foot travelers 

between George Town and Frederick in the 1820s shared the road twice weekly with a 

two-horse stage, which cost three dollars. By 1828, a passenger stage went daily; for four 

dollars, a passenger could ride from George Town or Wheeling. By then, the loops 

between Bethesda and Montrose, present-day Old Georgetown Road, had been bypassed 

with a straighter route . . . . 

The Washington Turnpike Company remained solvent through most of the nineteenth 

century . . . . It fought constant wash-outs and could not raise funds to install planks in 

the deep wheel ruts in 1852. Public financing of the canal and the railroad westward from 

Baltimore provided an edge that road-connected towns did not match until the midtwentieth century. [McGuckian, page 30] 

New technology had been the turnpike’s downfall. Transportation by “foot, horseback, carriage, 

and stage” had dominated for many years:

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the alternatives greatly expanded. The 

steam railroad came into Montgomery County in 1873, connecting remote areas to 

markets in Washington and triggering a real estate boom that dramatically changed the 

size, appearance, and character of Rockville. Two decades later, the electric trolley 

opened another connection to the nation’s capital . . . . 

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Washington Turnpike Company had lost 

all incentive to maintain the Rockville Pike. The road was rutted and muddy, particularly 

during winter. Users paid insufficient tolls to warrant keeping the tollbooths open. The 

turnpike declared bankruptcy and deeded the roadway to the Montgomery County 

commissioners. [McGuckian, page 71] 

In 1898, a report by the Maryland Geological Survey said of the road in Montgomery County: 
The most extensive piece of road-construction undertaken in this state for a number of 

years is the rebuilding of the old turnpike between Rockville and Georgetown. No road 

in the county was more in need of improvement both on account of its condition and of 

its importance as the direct route from Rockville to Washington. It has long been known 

as one of the worst pieces of main highway in the state. The old foundation stones, many 

two or three feet in size, formed the surface of the roadway proper which was but little 

used. At the sides a rough single-track dirt road had been worn sometimes five to ten feet 

below the level of the old road-bed . . . . As a result where there should have been a welltraveled road and much improved suburban property there was but little travel and land 

values below those of other neighborhoods no farther removed from Washington. 

As provided by State law, Montgomery County issued road bonds to raise $25,000 to improve 

the road from Rockville to the District, a distance of 7.5 miles. To prepare the road for a 

macadam surface, the contractor removed the foundation stones of the old turnpike “which are 

taken out and thrown to one side and afterwards crushed to form the material for the new road.” 

Considerable grading was necessary “on account of the depth to which the sides have been worn 

and also to reduce the grades to 6 per cent, as required by the law authorizing the improvement.” 

Despite this recycling of material, “much additional stone” was needed. The result: 

The road as constructed has 16 feet of macadam flanked on either side by a 12-foot dirt 

road. Broken stone is put on to a depth of 12 inches for a short distance from Rockville 

but elsewhere it is 9 inches . . . . At the present writing, October, 1899, about 3 miles 

have been completed. 

The report listed three turnpikes in the county, including the Georgetown and Rockville 

Turnpike. At the time, tolls were not collected. [Report on the Highways of Maryland, 

Maryland Geological Survey, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1899, pages 242-243] 

For Frederick County, the survey indicated that tolls were collected on 129 miles of stone road: 

It is a noticeable feature that nearly all of the main thoroughfares in the county are 

turnpikes. This is especially true about Frederick from which radiate nine turnpikes that 

are very well traveled within three to five miles of the city.

A list of the county’s turnpikes included “Frederick and Washington (or Georgetown)” along the 

path of future U.S. 240 (now State Route 355). The listing indicated the road was “Piked” from 

Frederick to Araby (near the Monocacy River). The report did not comment on the condition of 

the road. [Report on the Highways of Maryland, pages 231-232] 

The Road in the 20th Century

The automobile revived interest in road travel. During the early 20th century, the Washington-toFrederick road was included in the National Old Trails Road, a transcontinental route from 

Baltimore to Los Angeles, mostly over historic roads such as the National Road. In 1916, good 

roads writer Robert Bruce included a description of this segment in his book about the National 

Road. Beyond Dupont Circle, he wrote, motorists could leave Washington on Connecticut 
Avenue or Wisconsin Avenue (reached via Massachusetts Avenue), with both connecting in 

Rockville. Either route took the motorist to the “suburban village of Bethesda.” Bruce described 

the route just beyond the District line: 

Thence it passes over the railroad to the fork beyond; here leave the trolley by keeping 

practically straight ahead on the Rockville Pike. That part of this highway from the 

District line to Rockville, which had already been graded and macadamized by 

Montgomery County was taken over about three years ago by the Highway Department of 

the U.S. Government, and is now maintained by it for the purpose of experimenting with 

the different kinds of road surfacing. Signs giving the number and character of the 

“experiment” will be noted along the way.

A motorist would cross the trolley line alongside the road into Rockville. Riding through 

Gaithersburg, Bruce found: 

At the west end of Gaithersburg begins a stretch of concrete road, part of which is a 

relocation taking the place of the former highway over Middlebrooke Hill. The points 

where the old route enters and leaves the present concrete road are easily identified. 

After leaving this good road, the motorist reached Henderson’s Corner, near Brink: 

From here on there is a choice of two routes, the one straitaway to the left being the 

continuation of the road followed by Braddock’s expedition of 1755, over which we have 

been traveling; this is about eight miles shorter than the other and a typical old-style pike, 

rough in spots and next to impassable in wet weather. 

The alternate route “should always be taken after any considerable rain.” (Henderson’s Corner 

survives today as a sign at the intersection of Ridge and Frederick (MD 355) Roads.) 

Crossing into Frederick County, the motorist would “pass through the first one of the three toll 

gates (8 cents toll), which are among the last in Maryland.” It was called the Monocacy and 

Urbana Turnpike. Beyond Urbana, the road passed through the field where the Battle of 

Monocacy took place on June 9, 1864, when Confederate General Jubal Early pushed back 

Union General Lew Wallace as the southern forces headed for Washington. Just before crossing 

the Monocacy River, the motorist reached the second toll gate: 

Then we pay 10 cents at the second toll gate, and cross an iron bridge over the Monocacy 

River; almost immediately beyond is a bridge over the B & O R.R. tracks (“Monocacy 

Junction”), and to the left of it the monument to the New Jersey volunteers. 

Also on the left our route passes a very large boulder overlooking the Monocacy 

battlefield and erected to the memory of the Confederates who fell in that struggle. The 

road here is level and fine, fully equal to the approach into Frederick by the direct road 

from Baltimore. Next is the third and last toll gate (8 cents), beyond which we enter 

South Market Street in Frederick. [Bruce, Robert, The National Road, Published in 

Cooperation with the National Highways Association, 1916, pages 89-93, maps on pages 

86-87] 
In September 1916, the Maryland State Roads Commission agreed to take over the three 

privately owned turnpikes along the road in Frederick County: the Washington Turnpike, the 

Buckeystown Turnpike, and the Monocracy and Urbana Turnpike, with a combined mileage of 

about 17 miles. Including toll-free county road mileage, the State acquired 25 miles for $25,000. 

[“More Tollgates To Go,” The Baltimore Sun, September 30, 1916] 

Maryland gradually improved the road to meet the needs of the automobile. On September 24, 

1925, the State held a ceremony in Hyattstown to celebrate completion of the last mile of 

improved road, just south of that community. Prominent citizens participated in a parade over 

the last link of the new 42-mile highway and were entertained at supper. Ceremonies included a 

concert by the Browningsville Band, fireworks, and a dance, as well as addresses by officials 

such as John N. Mackall, chairman of the Maryland State Roads Commission, Maryland 

Secretary of State E. Brooke Lee, and U.S. Representative Frederick N. Zihlman (R). According 

to the Star: 

The new road is shorter by 10 miles than either of the other two routes, through this 

county between Washington and Frederick, and is expected to promptly become popular 

with autoists generally. The other roads—by way of Rockville, Gaithersburg and 

Dickerson, and by way of Rockville, Gaithersburg and Ridgeville—are about the same 

distance—52 miles. [“New Highway Link Opened With Parade,” The Evening Star, 

September 24, 1925] 

The improved road was one of the original U.S. numbered highways approved in 1926. Its 

number, U.S. 240, indicated it was the second branch off U.S. 40, then a transcontinental route 

from Atlantic City, New Jersey, to Oakland, California, “across the bay from San Francisco,” as 

the initial log put it. That same log, which the American Association of State Highway Officials 

(AASHO) published in 1927, described U.S. 240: 

United States Highway No. 240. 

Total Mileage, 39 

Maryland Beginning at Frederick to the Maryland-District of Columbia line at 

Washington. [United States Numbered Highways, American Association of State 

Highway Officials, 1927, pages 18-19, 43] 

The second log, published in 1929, listed U.S. 240 as continuing into Washington, adding 4 

miles to the route (43 miles). The logs did not identify control points within cities, which were 

responsible for deciding on the routing. The District gave U.S. 240 several routings over the 

years, but by the 1950s, it reached the District line at Chevy Chase, followed Wisconsin Avenue 

to K Street, NW., continued on 23rd Street, NW., to the Lincoln Memorial Circle, and ended at a 

connection with U.S. 50 before U.S. 50 crossed Arlington Memorial Bridge into Virginia. 

(Today, the former U.S. 240 roadway is designated Maryland Route 355.) 
A Modern Upgrade

In 1947, Maryland Governor William Preston Lane asked the State legislature to approve a $200-

million, 5-year plan to create “a system of highways second to none in the nation.” With 

legislative approval, Governor Lane’s 4 years in office (January 3, 1947 – January 10, 1951) 

included construction or reconstruction of 757 miles of roads at a cost of $106 million, planning 

and the start of construction of Maryland’s expressway system, and early work on his pet project, 

the Chesapeake Bay Bridge.

A1958 history by the State Roads Commission of Maryland discussed Governor Lane’s plan: 

To finance it he asked for a 100-million-dollar bond issue, an increase in the gasoline tax 

from four to five cents, an increase in motor vehicle license fees with emphasis on the 

heavy trucks, allocation of the titling tax fees to the Roads Commission instead of to the 

general funds of the State, support of the State Police out of general revenues instead of 

motor vehicle receipts and a re-distribution of such funds on a 50-30-20 basis to the 

Roads Commission, Baltimore City and the counties which thereafter were to finance 

their own road construction and maintenance. 

(The city of Baltimore is not part of Baltimore County or any other county; therefore, it received 

a share of the fund along with the counties.) 

The General Assembly approved most of Governor Lane’s request in time for his administration 

to begin the 5-year program during the construction season of 1948: 

One of the great contributions of the Lane administration to the highway system was the 

planning and partial construction of some expressways designed on the controlled-access 

principle. 

The Baltimore-Washington Expressway, the Baltimore-Harrisburg Expressway, and the 

Washington National Pike south from Frederick were planned with full control of access 

except at traffic interchanges . . . . 

Controlled access was slow to catch on in Maryland, as in the other states. From time 

immemorial people had gained access to their roads wherever they wanted; they did not 

take kindly to long detours to get on roads in front of their properties . . . . 

The Lane administration made the courageous move to begin whole new highways on 

this principle—a worthy inheritance to future motorists of Maryland and to the next 

administration. This step was formalized by the Expressway Act of 1947. [A History of 

Road Building in Maryland, State Roads Commission of Maryland, 1958, pages 157, 

161]

From Frederick south, the new expressway would be built on a new alignment, a proposition that 

caused concerns in Montgomery County, particularly in the heavily populated area near the 

District line. The Evening Star explained the route of the Northwest Freeway in May 1947: 
The freeway is a proposed high-speed, limited access, divided highway that would be an 

alternate of Route 240 and would run from a point near Gaithersburg, west of Rockville 

and Bethesda, to take traffic off Wisconsin avenue leading into Washington . . . . 

When the freeway route first was announced a year ago, strong protest was made by 

owners of highly developed properties centering in the Bradley boulevard area. 

As Maryland began planning an expressway in the U.S. 240 corridor, one issue that would have 

to be resolved was the connection with the District of Columbia. Officials were considering 

construction of two entrances. One route would enter the District in the vicinity of the current 

alignment along Wisconsin Avenue. The second route bypassed the Wisconsin Avenue corridor 

and the western side of the city. At Cabin John, the new expressway would connect with a road 

into the District parallel to the Potomac River. 

The Maryland-Capital Park and Planning Commission would play a key role in the routing. The 

commission grew out of the need for planning in the two Maryland counties (Montgomery and 

Prince George’s) surrounding the District of Columbia following establishment of the National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission in 1926. The national commission, whose authority did 

not extend beyond the District’s border, was directed to cooperate with local planning 

organizations, none of which existed. Gutheim and Lee explained: 

The Maryland legislature passed legislation in 1927 providing for a district containing the 

two counties contiguous to the District of Columbia. The Maryland-National Capital 

Park and Planning Commission was provided authority to plan, acquire land in the public 

interest, levy taxes to pay for park acquisitions, and draw up zoning ordinances . . . . 

The relationship between the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission was one that saw suburban 

planners identifying with the aspirations set forth by the federal commission. This 

relationship between the suburbs and the city was characterized by the similarity in the 

name selected by the Maryland commission. [Gutheim and Lee, pages 215-217] 

The commission attempted to shift the western alignment to less developed land:

The second route would extend north from MacArthur boulevard near Cabin John, 

through Cabin John Run valley and Thomas Valley to Tuckerman lane and then to an 

intersection with 240 near Gaithersburg. 

The commission was trying to keep the two alignments clear of new obstacles by withholding 

approvals for proposed subdivisions, but was running out of patience with the failure of the 

Maryland State Roads Commission and the PRA to agree on a route. On May 17, 1947, the 

commission released the text of a resolution, adopted unanimously, threatening to abandon 

protective measures for the Northwest Freeway “should current agreement, at least as to plan, 

now prove impossible between these agencies . . . .” [“Threat to Drop Freeway Made By 

Planners,” The Evening Star, May 18, 1947] 
By December 1949, Maryland roads officials were still undecided, but had a new proposal under 

review:

Maryland planning officials today were studying a Federal recommendation to change the 

route of the proposed new dual Northwest freeway from Rockville south so that it would 

bypass Washington, instead of entering the District via MacArthur boulevard. 

Divulged for the first time yesterday by the commission, the suggested rerouting would 

require another Potomac River bridge near Glen Echo, it was said. The plan was to be 

taken up later today with Virginia officials and also will be incorporated into the 

comprehensive highway plans now being prepared for the metropolitan area. 

Federal officials said the rerouting, which would bring through trucks and passenger cars 

down the east side of the Cabin John Valley, would cost less than the previous plan. It 

would also have the additional advantage of permitting traffic to flow uninterruptedly 

north and south across the Potomac. 

Traffic crossing the Potomac River near Glen Echo would enter the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway. The parkway provided access along the Potomac River to Alexandria, U.S. 

1, and Shirley Highway: 

Southbound trucks from Rockville destined for points in Washington, it was explained, 

would continue to use Wisconsin avenue. [Shepard, Nelson M., “Planners Delay Action 

on Bridge Over Anacostia,” The Evening Star, December 8, 1949] 

While the routing in the vicinity of the District remained uncertain, Maryland began construction 

of the Washington National Pike near Frederick. On December 29, 1949, the Maryland State 

Roads Commission awarded $13.4 million in contracts, bringing the year’s total to $56,123,549, 

a record to that date, fueled by Governor Lane’s roads program. Among the new contracts was a 

4.6-mile section of the Washington National Pike in the Frederick area. [Associated Press, 

“Maryland Lets $13,447,900 in Road Contracts,” The Evening Star, December 29, 1949] 

The routing close to the District remained uncertain for several years, but in January 1951, the 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission recommended expressway 

construction through the Maryland portion of Rock Creek Park. The expressway would connect 

with the existing Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway. The commission’s vice chairman, Blair Lee 

III, said the expressway was the keystone of a plan that would be similar to the network of roads 

in the suburbs of New York City: 

Under the plan, the expressway would continue north from its junction with a Rock Creek 

Park parkway to a point southeast of Kensington where it would fork. One prong would 

run northwest to join the new Northwest freeway (relocation of Route 240) and the other 

would go northeast to hook up with the new Columbia pike to Baltimore (relocation of 

Route 29). 

In addition, an express highway would leave the George Washington Memorial Parkway 

along the Potomac and extend up Cabin John Branch to join the relocation Route 240. 
Mr. Lee pointed out, however, the plan is opposed by the National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission and the Regional Highway Planning Committee. The latter, he 

said, favors bringing Route 240 into Washington through the Landon School, Wood 

Acres, and Sumner developments. 

The planning committee’s idea, he contended, would “mutiliate” existing neighborhoods 

and seriously affect several school and playgound sites, if carried through. 

But the Maryland commission’s proposal, he insisted, “would follow natural barriers and 

split no neighborhoods. The increased construction cost would be somewhat 

compensated by the fact that the right-of-way is either already in public ownership or is 

undeveloped.” [“New Expressway In Rock Creek Park Proposed,” The Evening Star, 

January 7, 1951] 

In October, engineers of the Maryland State Roads Commission decided on a route through 

Montgomery County, subject to commission action. The new plan included the western 

alignment southwest of Rockville, down Thomas Branch and Cabin John Creek Valleys to 

MacArthur Boulevard parallel to the Potomac River. With completion of the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway in Montgomery County, passenger vehicles to and from the 

District would shift to the parkway. A new bridge across the Potomac River at Cabin John, if 

built, would provide for traffic bound to or from Virginia. 

In addition: 

Construction of a truck cut-off from the vicinity of Tuckerman and Lux lanes to 

Wisconsin avenue—or Route 240—just north to Grosvenor lane. An eventual parkway 

through Rock Creek Park extended would connect with Silver Spring and upper Sixteenth 

street.

A third element of the plan was to rebuild River Road from the new highway west of Burning 

Tree Country Club to the District. 

The National Capital Park and Planning Commission had long advocated the route along the two 

stream valleys. [“National Pike Approach to D.C. Selected by Maryland Experts,” The Evening 

Star, October 4, 1951; Roberts, Chalmers, “Route of District-Frederick Superhighway Settled at 

Last,” The Washington Post, October 4, 1951] 

The roads commission approved a plan on October 18, 1951, that included two entrances to the 

District. South of Rockville, the expressway would split, with one leg continuing south to 

MacArthur Boulevard and the other reaching East-West Highway between Silver Spring and 

Bethesda where traffic could use Wisconsin and Connecticut Avenues for District access. 

Basically, the roads commission had adopted the National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission’s plan. A commission announcement explained: 

The plan will carry traffic southeastward from the Brink area and will distribute it by 

means of new connecting roads, over the fan-shaped network of traffic arteries already 
serving the suburban area northwest of Washington, from MacArthur boulevard to the 

East-West highway.

The plan involved construction of about 25 miles of new highways and extensive upgrading of 

about 10 miles of existing roads. [“Maryland Plans Roads Leading To New Pike,” The Evening 

Star, October 19, 1951; “Progress on an Important Highway,” The Evening Star, October 29, 

1951] 

A former Republican mayor of Baltimore (1943-1947), Theodore R. McKeldin, defeated 

Democratic Governor Lane’s reelection bid in 1950, part of a Republican wave against 

Democratic incumbents, and became Governor on January 10, 1951. As discussed by Anne E. 

Bruder in Tomorrow’s Roads Today, the new Governor’s experience in Baltimore gave him a 

good understanding of the need for better highways:

As [M]ayor he had received a 1944 proposal from New York City Planning Director and 

consultant Robert Moses to demolish blighted areas near the Central Business District 

(CBD) in order to construct a new expressway through the City. The area that Moses 

proposed for the new expressway was on the north side of the CBD in Baltimore City 

near the Mount Vernon District. The proposal would displace a number of residents, 

including business elites. The Mount Vernon residents opposed the plan, and it was 

dropped from consideration. 

As Mayor, McKeldin also made the final decision on the location for the BaltimoreWashington Parkway entrance to the City. The City Public Works Department extended 

Russell street south to meet the Baltimore-Washington Parkway at the City-Baltimore 

County boundary. As with other portions of the highway, at-grade intersections were 

made into interchanges while other portions were made into bridges to avoid railroads. 

[Bruder, Anne E., “Tomorrow’s Roads Today”: Expressway Construction in Maryland, 

1948-1965, Maryland State Highway Administration, September 2011, page 28] 

While these efforts were underway to improve access to Friendship International Airport, Mayor 

McKeldin ran for Governor. He campaigned, in part, on taking a fresh look at Governor Lane’s 

highway building and financing policies. 

With the Lane program providing funds for another year or two, Governor McKeldin did not 

announce his road plan until 1953, known as the Twelve-Year Program, to rebuild Maryland’s 

highway system by 1965. 

Governor McKeldin appointed Russell H. McCain of Frederick to be chairman of the Maryland 

State Roads Commission. McCain had been on the commission since 1945, serving as a 

minority member during the two previous Democratic administrations. [A History of Road 

Building, page 165] 

With construction well underway on the new expressway from Frederick to the Montgomery 

County line, a Star reporter talked with McCain about the progress: 
The State Roads Commission, he said, decided to start the new highway near Frederick 

when the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission and other agencies 

could not agree on an approach to Washington. 

Difficulties in planning a “northwest freeway” from Washington began after the war. A 

direct route would have gone through the Landon school property and many estates in 

which much money had been invested. 

Route 240, at the time, was carrying 40,000 cars a day across the District line, making it one of 

the busiest roads in the State: 

The difficulties of getting into Washington have not all been solved, but it has been 

decided to swing the highway well west of the direct route, down a valley called Thomas 

Branch to Cabin John Creek. 

Entry to Washington from this road would be by River road and a new connecting link to 

Massachusetts avenue and then to Wisconsin avenue; or straight down the river along 

MacArthur boulevard. Sometime in the distant future, entry also will be possible along 

the Maryland section of the George Washington boulevard, to be built from Great Falls to 

the Key Bridge in the river valley.

Because the George Washington Memorial Parkway would ban trucks, the State would use River 

Road or Massachusetts Avenue for the connection. [Kennedy, George, “Frederick Superhighway 

Goes Nowhere and Most Motorists Don’t Know It Exists,” The Evening Star, November 14, 

1951] 

On November 20, 1951, the commission awarded a contract for the first construction of the 

Washington National Pike in Montgomery County. It was a 3.8-mile grading and surfacing 

project straddling the Frederick-Montgomery County line. [Associated Press, “Low Bid 

Announced On Pike Surfacing,” The Evening Star, November 21, 1951] 

Second Thoughts

Even as officials planned construction of the Washington National Pike in Montgomery County, 

the Maryland State Roads Commission began encountering opposition to the southwestern leg 

linking the road with Massachusetts Avenue, River Road, and MacArthur Boulevard. Meeting at 

Bethesda County Club on November 30, 1951, about 400 property owners from the area bounded 

by Bradley Boulevard, the District Line, Massachusetts Avenue, and Seven Locks Road urged 

the State to abandon the plan until Maryland and Virginia determined the location of the Cabin 

John Bridge across the Potomac River. The Star listed the owners’ concerns: 

There is no present need in the area for such a route. Moderate expansion of existing 

highway facilities should meet the needs of the foreseeable future.

The proposed route would sharply increase traffic congestion along Wisconsin avenue, 

River road and Massachusetts avenue and would open the door to commercialism. 
The commission’s plan for a cutoff in the vicinity of Tuckerman lane to lead to East-West 

highway near Silver Spring would handle all through traffic originating outside the 

Massachusetts avenue-River road area. [“National Pike Link Proposal Opposed By 

Property Owners,” The Evening Star, December 1, 1951] 

In April, the commission hired consultants Wilson Ballard and Joseph Knoerle of Baltimore to 

prepare a report on how to address traffic problems in Montgomery County. They were already 

working on the final routing of the Washington National Pike near the District but now would 

expand their work to include the inter-county freeway plan that was part of the outer 

circumferential for the area. During a meeting in Baltimore, McCain emphasized to other 

commissioners that the two projects were closely related, in part because they were affected by 

the location of the Potomac River crossings. According to the Star: 

Ballard said the National pike must serve to drain local traffic in the lower Montgomery 

County area. He pointed to the difficulty of obtaining rights-of-way for new construction 

in the highly developed sections, owing to high prices. The highway will cost around $20 

million, he explained. 

He said the Cabin John and River road locations are among those being studied to bring 

the National pike into Washington. 

The commissioners also heard from the county manager, Irving G. McNayr, who complained 

about delays in fixing the location of the road. The county, he said, was delaying construction of 

schools until the plans were known. [Millen, William A., “State to Assist Montgomery on Road 

Problems,” The Evening Star, April 10, 1952] 

State Senator DeWitt S. Hyde, a Republican running for election to the U.S. House of 

Representatives, addressed the subject during a Cosmos Club luncheon at the Carlton Hotel. “I 

think it is certain that the road will come down Thomas Branch [near Burning Tree Golf Club] as 

that is the only place that’s feasible.” With work stalled at Brink, he recognized that the location 

of the Cabin John bridge was a factor in developing the western leg: 

The new National Pike would connect with that bridge, under a long-range program, he 

said.

“If we had effective regional planning that covered Maryland, Virginia and the District 

and the various jurisdictions would agree, we would save time, money and avoid many 

mistakes,” Senator Hyde told his audience. 

Senator Hyde pointed out that under legislation recently enacted by Congress, a regional 

council would be set up. But he explained this is only advisory and “the final say is in the 

hands of the local authority.” 

“Regional planning is urgently needed to take care of the Washington metropolitan area,” 

he declared. [“National Pike Likely To Enter Capital Via Thomas Branch,” The Evening 

Star, July 18, 1952] 
(Hyde won the election and took office on January 3, 1953. His predecessor, Representative J. 

Glenn Beall, was elected to the United States Senate.)

The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission was working on a long-range 

master highway plan. By early October 1952, the commission had distributed copies of a 

proposed plan to the Maryland State Roads Commission, BPR, NCPC, and county officials. The 

commissioners identified a system of high-speed highways as the backbone of their 

comprehensive plan. 

The plan assumed construction of the hub-and-spoke layout that was common in expressway 

proposals for the Nation’s big metropolitan areas. In the Washington area, the inner hub would 

surround the downtown business district, while the Inter-County Belt Freeway would serve as the 

rim. The commission’s plan for the Maryland suburbs called for five spokes or radials: 

1. Washington National Pike from the District to Frederick, 

2. Northern Parkway (Silver Spring to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), 

3. Relocated U.S. 29 (between Silver Spring and Burtonsville, Maryland), 

4. The Baltimore-Washington Parkway, and 

5. The Annapolis Freeway. 

The Star described the general location of the Inter-County Belt Freeway in Maryland:

The freeway would extend from a proposed new bridge across the Potomac at Cabin 

John, Md., completely around the Nation’s capital to another proposed bridge in the 

vicinity of Alexandria, Va. It would cross the Annapolis Freeway at a point near 

Ardmore, Md. 

The Inter-County Belt Freeway would connect the arterial routes leading out of the capital 

at distances varying from two to five miles from the District line.

The circumferential would bypass the District, providing a bypass for traffic not bound for the 

city. [“Highway Plan For Maryland Nears Windup,” The Evening Star, October 5, 1952] 

By the end of the month, the park commission had to assure area residents that criticism of the 

plan was “premature” because it was not final and was not even due for publication until the 

middle of November. The criticism centered on relocation of U.S. 240 in Montgomery and the 

location of the Inter-County Belt Freeway. Residents, the park commission indicated, would 

have an opportunity for comment and their recommendations would be considered. [“Park 

Planners Assail Highway Plan Critics,” The Evening Star, October 31, 1952] 

On November 15, about “300 irate Berwyn” residents attended a protest meeting of the Berwyn 

Citizens Association to object to the way the route of the Inter-County Belt Freeway “dips in” 

toward the University of Maryland and Berwyn instead of continuing a logical path farther north. 

 On the park commission’s map, the freeway would cross Baltimore Boulevard (U.S. 1) at 

Berwyn a mile north of the university. State Delegate J. Frank Lillard, Jr., told the residents, “I 

intend to investigate whether there has been any pressure from the ‘kingmaker on the hill’ to 
bring the freeway closer to the university. And you can draw your own conclusions as to who I 

mean.” He was referring to university president Dr. H. C. Byrd. 

The park commission contended that the routing was affected by the large tract of Federal lands 

north of Berwyn (Beltsville Agriculture Research Center) and the heavy development to the 

south. The commission was exploring options for shifting the beltway routing through the area. 

[“Freeway Route Fight Flares at Berwyn Session,” The Evening Star, November 15, 1952; “New 

Route Suggested North of Berwyn for Proposed Freeway,” The Evening Star, November 17, 

1952] 

On October 26, the Maryland State Roads Commission completed work on Proposed 12-Year 

Program for Road Construction and Reconstruction, 1954-1965. With former Governor Lane’s 

5-year plan ending in 1953, the plan called for $568 million beginning in 1954. The commission 

asked for authority to impose tolls on roads already under construction or planned; a 1-cent 

increase in the gas tax; increased motor vehicle registration fees; and authorization for additional 

State highway construction bonds totaling $330 million. 

For the Washington area, the report identified priority for the inter-county circumferential route, 

completion of the Washington National Pike, and the Washington-Annapolis expressway (U.S. 

50). Among the suggested toll possibilities that might raise a total of $50 million for 

construction were the Washington National Pike, Annapolis expressway, and an Eastern Shore 

Expressway from Queenstown to Warwick. (The report did not cover the BaltimoreWashington Parkway or its Baltimore extension because they would be completed before the 12-

year plan began.)

When the commission released the report on November 12, the Star included a map of planned 

new roads. The map showed the Washington National Pike ending on the west side of 

Washington at an indefinite point. “The new U.S. 240 from Frederick will be continued into 

Washington over a route not yet determined,” the caption read. The map also showed the 

Maryland portion of the inter-county circumferential, touching the Potomac River at Cabin John 

and Alexandria. The only town identified on the map of the circumferential was Berwyn 

Heights, which also the northern terminus of a plan to reconstruct Edmonston Road from 

Defense Highway. The plan, however, did not include either bridge. [“Maryland Maps Huge 

Road Plan,” The Evening Star, November 12, 1952; Bruder, page 28] 

Governor McKeldin endorsed the program, including the call for additional revenue: 

Despite the large sums of money involved, the program is based on economy and careful 

spending because it would be far more costly in the long run to permit our present 

inadequate roads to deteriorate than it will be to have a progressive program of 

modernization. [“McKeldin Voices Support Of State Roads Program,” The Evening Star, 

November 13, 1952] 

According to the State roads history: 
The Legislature of 1953 passed the entire Twelve-Year Program substantially as proposed 

except the increase in the registration fees was postponed to April 1, 1955, instead of 

1954 as requested. 

Subsequently, the Legislature postponed it again and finally repealed the increase 

altogether, thus eliminating one of the important arches of the 3-arch financial structure. 

The raids on construction funds for maintenance continued . . . . 

The man tapped to carry on the new program was Norman M. Pritchett. He is a career 

man, having started with the Commission in 1928 as rodman on a survey party. As a 

result of his highway location work he is completely familiar with the road system in all 

its ramifications. [A History of Road Building, pages 168-170] 

Governor McKeldin approved the initial legislation, covering the first 4 years, on April 27, 1953. 

The park commission held a public hearing at the Glenbrook Club in Bethesda to present its plan 

to about 300 people on December 16. The Star summarized the public comments:

Each speaker urged that the big thoroughfares go through some other neighborhood than 

his own. Warm applause greeted a suggestion that major highways for through traffic be 

constructed to carry cars and trucks across the Potomac River to Virginia at a point well 

west of Bethesda . . . . 

Most of the opposition fire was directed at plans for completion of the National Pike, a 

new route 240, through Bradley Hills Grove . . . . Residents of [the] Thomas Branch 

Valley route, west of the Bradley Hills Grove location, said they believe they have a 

commitment from the State commission not to build the pike through their area.

A resident of that area, Attorney David Fegan, warned of “guile and deceit among 

officials of the State Roads Commission.” Mr. Fegan charged that the State commission 

already has received a report on a study of the new route 240 made by the Ballard 

engineering firm of Baltimore, and he said the report recommends against the Thomas 

Branch route. But State commission officials still hope to use this approach, he asserted. 

Mr. Fegan said he had been told by a State official that when the State commission gave 

the Ballard firm the contract, “it expected and understood that Ballard would recommend 

the Thomas Branch-River road route.” 

He planned to ask the General Assembly to investigate the contract and, if necessary, “I shall 

name names and dates and be more specific in a situation that appears to be a waste of the 

public’s money and a fraud upon many of us property owners.” He said that Ballard and 

Knoerle had done “a thorough job,” adding, “It appears that the State Roads Commission is 

casting reflections on Ballard’s ability so that the commission can be whitewashed in the 

situation.” [“Wary Reception Given Highway Master Plan,” The Evening Star, December 17, 

1952] 
In a report to the General Assembly on the 12-year program, the Maryland State Roads 

Commission indicated that it planned to construct the Washington National Pike from 

Clarksburg to the Brink interchange in the first 4 years, along with extending the pike to Seven 

Locks Road, a distance of around 14 miles. At Seven Locks Road, the pike would split. For the 

southeast leg:

A Rock Creek parkway connection would run from the end of the pike to Wisconsin 

avenue at Grosvenor lane . . . . Another connection . . . would extend the route beyond 

Wisconsin avenue to East-West highway at or near Beach drive . . . . Also planned for 

the first four years would be acquisition of rights-of-way for the last .9 mile to bring the 

link all the way to the District line.

The southwest leg, from Seven Locks Road to River road, a distance of 4.5 miles, was scheduled 

for the second 4-year period. “The final 1.8 mile stretch from River road to the George 

Washington Memorial parkway on the Potomac River would be delayed until the last four-year 

period.” The current plan was to run this final segment down Thomas Branch, but the location 

remained to be determined. [“National Pike Slated to Reach D.C. Area Within 4 Years,” The 

Evening Star, January 21, 1953] 

On January 24, 1953, the State opened the 4-mile section of the Washington National Pike from 

Frederick to U.S. 15 south of Urbana. Amid intermittent rain, Governor McKeldin failed to 

appear as planned to snip the ribbon, leaving McCain to open the road. The Star noted that, “The 

Governor, who seldom misses an opportunity to snip a ribbon and pass out some of his 

autographed photos, decided the weather this morning was fit only for dedicating duck ponds.” 

Following the ceremony, participants drove to Frederick. 

The State was already constructing the extension to Hyattstown, about 5 miles south, to be 

opened during the summer, and the segment to Clarksburg, scheduled for completion by the end 

of 1953. [“National Pike Section Dedicated at Urbana; McKeldin Rained Out,” The Evening 

Star, January 25, 1953] 

The Chevy Chase Revolt 

At the same time, the Maryland State Roads Commission had to deal with growing protests from 

the Chevy Chase area to the eastern leg of the link to the District of Columbia. Chevy Chase was 

one of the country’s earliest 19th century streetcar suburbs. Two entrepreneurs developed the 

area:

• William Morris Stewart, whose fortune stemmed from mining gold in California and 

silver from the Comstock Lode in what was then Utah Territory, and 

• Francis G. Newlands, an attorney and friend of Stewart who had married the daughter of a 

financier who had also benefited from Comstock Lode silver mining. 

Stewart and Newlands secretly bought about 1,700 acres of farmland between Calvert Street in 

the District and Jones Bridge Road in Maryland (just south of today’s Capital Beltway). They 

incorporated the Chevy Chase Land Company in June 1890. 
To connect this farmland with the District, they extended Connecticut Avenue and an electric 

railway to the end of their property at a cost of $1.5 million. They formed the Chevy Chase Club 

to attract wealthy buyers, dammed a small stream at Coquelin Run near Jones Bridge Road to 

create Chevy Chase Lake, and built an amusement complex to provide fare-paying streetcar 

riders. A history of Chevy Chase explained the attractions that would appeal to District residents 

with streetcar fare:

An amusement complex there drew people to the area on weekends; the complex 

eventually included boats for hire, refreshment kiosks, a merry-go-round, a bandstand 

where the Marine Band often played, and a dance pavilion where Irene and Vernon Castle 

introduced the Castle Walk in the ragtime era.

Growth was slow, in part because of the devastating Panic of 1893 and the slow recovery over 

about 4 years. As late as 1922, the Chevy Chase Land Company had not paid a dividend to 

investors. Activity picked up in the building boom that followed World War I. 

Today, the lake is gone as is the streetcar line, but the company survived, as the 1990 history 

reported: 

Today the company is going strong, with far-flung interests. In our area, it owns the 

Chevy Chase Shopping Center and the Metro building which it built in Friendship 

Heights on the northeast corner of Wisconsin and Western Avenues. It also owns land on 

Connecticut Avenue just south of the bus terminal in Chevy Chase, D.C. 

In the area where Chevy Chase Lake once stood, the company owns the office and retail 

complex—land and buildings—on both sides of Connecticut Avenue between Manor 

Road and the railroad tracks, as well as the townhouses and garden apartments on Manor 

Road. [Town History Committee, The Town of Chevy Chase: Past and Present, Town 

of Chevy Chase, 1990, pages 11-14] 

Citizens from 12 area organizations in the Chevy Chase area formed the Citizens’ Action 

Committee for Fair Highway Planning headed by former Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND). A 

former journalist, he had joined the Senate on November 14, 1925, filling the seat of his recently 

deceased predecessor, and served until January 3, 1945, following defeat of his reelection bid. 

By then, he had purchased 3 acres of pasture land in Chevy Chase on a hill above Rock Creek 

Park; he lived at 6 Farmington Drive. 

Attacking the roads commission for “secrecy” in preparing the plans, the new committee claimed 

that the State’s goal was to open Rock Creek Park in Maryland and the District for commercial 

traffic on a six-lane superhighway: 

The group specifically is objecting to what they call “Alternate B” plan [sic] for 

construction of the southeast leg of Route 240 from the vicinity of Grosvenor lane and 

Wisconsin avenue to a terminal point on East-West highway in the vicinity of Beach 

drive. The road planned, they say, calls for the route to follow the east boundary of the 

Bethesda Naval Hospital, cross Jones Bridge road via an overpass and head southeasterly 
across Connecticut avenue by way of an overpass. The latter overpass would be 100 

yards south of Jones Bridge road and would call for an elaborate cloverleaf interchange 

there.

The route then would cross the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad by overpass and, elevated to 

about rooftop level, would proceed along Cocquelin run over Jones Mill road coming into 

East-West highway, the group asserts. 

The original plan made public recently in the State Highway Commission’s 12-year 

program called for the southeast leg of Route 240 to run considerably north of Jones 

Bridge road and then along Rock Creek park to East-West highway.

The committee urged the State to abandon Alternate B, preserve Rock Creek Park from 

commercial traffic, and rely on existing regional planning agencies. Alternate B, they contended, 

would pass through more heavily populated areas than the original plan, thus reducing property 

values. 

J. B. Hartranft, Jr., the committee’s vice chairman, said “it was only by coincidence that the 

skullduggery was discovered in Baltimore.” Alternate B had been “conceived under a veil of 

unprecedented mystery demanding public investigation.” [“Super-Highway Plan Blasted at 

Chevy Chase,” The Evening Star, February 9, 1953] 

During a meeting with legislators and the citizens committees in Annapolis, Norman Pritchard 

admitted the commission had approved the shift because the new route would be six-tenths of a 

mile shorter. However, the approval came on November 7, too late to be included in the printed 

plan. 

This explanation did not satisfy Senator Nye. He charged that the shift had occurred because the 

original plan would have required the taking of the home of an official of the Maryland-National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission. Pritchard denied this allegation. 

Senator Nye claimed that the new plan included overpasses at Jones Bridge Road, Connecticut 

Avenue, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks, and Jones Mill Road. This amounted to 

construction of an elevated highway “alongside of and above the roof level of scores of new 

homes in the communities known as Rock Creek Knolls, Coquelin Terrace, North Chevy Chase 

and others.” He pointed out that Senators Hubert H. Humphey (D-Mn.) and Russell B. Long 

(D-La.) lived in the affected area, as did several members of the U.S. House of Representatives. 

The expressway would affect 50 or more homes built in recent years at a cost of about $40,000 

each. Land in the area was worth $30,000 to $40,000 an acre. [Goodwin, Gene, “Restudy 

Sought On Chevy Chase Elevated Road,” The Evening Star, February 13, 1953] 

Donald E. Gingery was the accused member of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission. Gingery, who lived at 9504 Jones Mills Road, denied any involvement in the road 

commission’s shift to Alternate B, claiming that his home would not have been affected by the 

original plan. He stated, however, that Alternate B “in my opinion is the more logical and 

cheaper route”:
Mr. Gingery urged a greater understanding by residents of the need for limited access, 

modern highways in the heavily populated suburban area. 

He said the only open land left for a north-south route through the District was Rock 

Creek Park. But, he added, he opposed any such super highway being made accessible to 

truck traffic. [“Highway Foes Step Up Fight In Chevy Chase,” The Evening Star, 

February 15, 1953] 

Representative Hyde, who also opposed Alternate B, joined other critics in a conference with 

Governor McKeldin in Annapolis. Participants raised their concerns about the plot to open Rock 

Creek Park to a superhighway for trucks. 

The roads commission defended Alternate B, pointing out that the plan did not call for 

overpasses at Jones Bridge Road and Connecticut Avenue. Rather, it called for underpasses. 

Moreover, Alternate B would cost nearly $1.9 million less than the original plan and only one 

house was in the path of the right-of-way.

Ballard and Knoerle, the consultants who conceived Alternate B, also defended the plan, which 

would cost about $2.6 million to build: 

Mr. Knoerle said the route was nearly .6 mile shorter than the northern alternate, a plan 

that would have followed Rock Creek. He added the gasoline saving to motorists would 

justify spending $2 million more for purchase of the right of way. 

“The fact is however,” he said, “we can purchase the alternate B right of way for about 

$15,000 less than the northern right of way.” 

. . . The two consultants freely admitted that a major road eventually will go down the 

west side of Rock Creek Park. They denied, however, the Roads Commission was 

attempting to force such construction. 

After listening to the concerns, Governor McKeldin promised to give the plan “thorough 

consideration.” 

Meanwhile, the Parkwood Civic Association of Bethesda and Kensington charged that 

Alternate B favored trucking interests over residents. The association had launched a campaign 

to bombard Governor McKeldin with telegrams and night letters charging that the route would be 

“a permanent and continuing nuisance.” [“McKeldin Talks To Chevy Chase Road Critics,” The 

Evening Star, February 20, 1953] 

Senator Nye and his committee continued their bitter attacks on the roads commission for 

conspiring with the District Highway Department to dump traffic on Beach Drive to open Rock 

Creek Park to truckers. The route would undermine the value of choice residential property in 

both jurisdictions. 
At a protest meeting on February 27, Senator Nye accused the roads commission spokesman of 

switching his story about the number of overpasses, underpasses, and cloverleafs needed in less 

than 1 mile of the highway: 

The freeway, he said, either would have to be “a replica of Glen Echo amusement park,” 

climbing and dipping at intersecting roads or an elevated highway above the rooftops and 

gardens of the residential communities. 

The group and its allies promised to do everything they could to protect Rock Creek Park. 

[“Chevy Chase Area Picks Group to Fight Superhighway Plans,” The Evening Star, February 28, 

1953] 

By contrast, a Silver Spring Board of Trade resolution stated that an eastern entrance for 

relocated U.S. 240 to Washington in the vicinity of Rock Creek Park “is of vital necessity to the 

development of all sections of Maryland bordering on the District of Columbia.” The board was 

“not opposed to any relocation of leg B (the connecting link) of Route 240 either along the B & 

O Railroad or any other reasonably direct route that will reach the now planned Washington 

entrance.” [“Silver Spring Board Backs Commission On D.C. Road Plan,” The Evening Star, 

February 5, 1953] 

On March 7, NCPC opposed Alternate B, as did the Committee of 100 on the Federal City. 

NCPC favored widening the existing road in Rock Creek Park to Colorado Avenue, then 

channeling traffic onto 16th Street and Tilden Street. John Nolen, Jr., NCPC’s director, said, 

“There is no need for an expressway into the northern regions” of the park. He favored an 

entrance for relocated U.S. 240 with the proposed George Washington Memorial Parkway in the 

vicinity of MacArthur Boulevard. Moreover, funneling traffic into the center of the city would 

merely increase congestion in the area. [“Two District Officials Oppose Chevy Chase Highway 

Plan,” The Sunday Star, March 8, 1953] 

Additional groups announced opposition to Alternate B, including the Montgomery County 

Council, the Woman’s Club of Chevy Chase, and the Junior Woman’s Club of Chevy Chase. 

The Silver Spring Board of Trade published a text advertisement in the Star on April 7 

headlined, “Citizens of Montgomery County . . . We Believe You Should Know All The Facts!” 

Citizens opposing Alternate B “do not realize the large and continuing disservice to their own 

motoring safety and convenience their opposition may bring about.” If the eastern leg plan were 

not built “there will be no other route to the West remaining on the Bethesda, Chevy Chase, or 

Silver Spring side of Seven Locks Road, Burning Tree Golf Club, Bethesda Country Club, or 

Rockville, depending on where you will have to drive to reach the relocated and modern 

Route 240.” The western leg of U.S. 240, bypassing the District, would be 5 miles from 

Georgetown and was designed to take truck traffic around the city, not serve residents in the 

Chevy Chase-Bethesda-Silver Spring area in their daily access to the District:

We Believe . . . that the west side of Rock Creek Park within the District of Columbia is 

the only location in which a modern, dual, limited-access highway can be built to move 
motor vehicles quickly and safely from the central and northwestern Maryland suburbs of 

Washington to Massachusetts Avenue or to K Street, or down the Mall into Constitution 

Avenue. 

So, when Route 240 reaches the East-West Highway at Rock Creek Park, it is inevitable 

that this fine, dual, limited-access, modern highway will be continued to the Potomac 

River along the general alignment of the west side of Rock Creek Park. 

Construction of this highway was the “only salvation for the continued” mobility of the area. 

The advertisement concluded: 

We Believe . . . that, if you as a citizen, who is constantly required to motor into 

Washington, allow the avenue of modern motor transportation to be closed to you at this 

time, you will regret its loss and suffer from its unavailability for all the years to come.

You should support this far-sighted plan of the Maryland State Roads Commission, 

before this opportunity to use a fast, safe route into Washington and return, or to 

conveniently reach the same route for western traffic is lost. [Italics in original]

Curbing Capper-Cramton 

On April 7, 1953, the Star reported on its front page that the Budget Bureau was “spearheading 

an economy move to scrap or modify” the Capper-Cramton Act, which President Herbert Hoover 

had approved on May 29, 1930. The authors of the legislation – Senator Arthur Capper (R-Ks.), 

chairman of the Senate District Committee, and Representative Louis C. Cramton (R-Mi.), 

chairman of the House District Committee – secured approval of $16 million to acquire parkland. 

Gutheim and Lee described the legislation:

The Capper-Cramton Act provided land acquisition funds for the regional George 

Washington Memorial Parkway along both sides of the Potomac, on the Virginia side 

from Mount Vernon north to Great Falls and then south again on the Maryland side to 

Fort Washington. For the land in Virginia and Maryland needed for the parkway, both 

states were required to commit one-half the cost, either directly or through eight-year nointerest federal loans . . . . 

The primary legacy of Capper-Cramton legislative efforts on the city of Washington’s 

behalf was the creation of the George Washington Memorial Parkway. The CapperCramton Act also provided $1.5 million in funds for an extension of Rock Creek Park 

into Maryland and extension of the Anacostia Park system farther up the valley of the 

Anacostia River. In this act, Washington finally possessed the makings of a truly regional 

park system and at the same time had an important opportunity for demonstrating 

cooperation among the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the Virginia 

and Maryland planning agencies. [Gutheim and Lee, pages 214-215] 

Now, the Star reported, the Eisenhower Administration would reverse the Truman 

Administration’s final budget proposal, which called for $1.25 million in funds for land 

purchases. (With the Korean War underway, Congress had not appropriated park acquisition 
funds for 2 years.) At present, NCPC had no funds for land purchases. The Budget Bureau 

move would have many repercussions, including putting NCPC’s master plan on the shelf, 

leaving park projects uncompleted. It also would abandon large tracts of land in Maryland that 

were being held in reserve from developers until funds became available for purchase of 

parkland. According to the Star, some Budget Bureau officials “want the act repealed outright,” 

while others advocated killing only certain sections. [Hendley, Coit, Jr., “Budget Bureau Seeks 

to Scrap D.C. Parks Law,” The Evening Star, April 7, 1953] 

As Members of Congress and local organizations reacted to this news, a few days passed before 

the relocation of U.S. 240 was raised. The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission issued a statement on April 9:

Either outright repeal of the act or establishment by Congress of a definite policy of 

failure to make appropriations thereunder would be fatal to the metropolitan park system 

for the Nation’s Capital.

The United States has a tremendous stake in these parks which would be sacrificed either 

through outright repeal or indirect repudiation of its commitments. 

Congressional action also could affect the Federal Government’s voice in acquiring Maryland 

park lands, as well as whether arterial highways should be routed through Capper-Cramton Act 

parks. The commission cited the Maryland State Roads Commission’s proposal to extend one 

leg of relocated U.S. 240 through Rock Creek Valley:

It would be most unfortunate if the Congress should decide to abandon these controls and 

forfeit all interest in and control over the park system in Maryland thus far acquired. 

The changes would repudiate agreements that President Hoover had reached with Maryland 

Governor Albert C. Ritchie under the Capper-Cramton Act. Paragraph 5 of the basic agreement 

that President Hoover, Governor Ritchie, Colonel Grant for the National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission, and Irvin Owings for the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission approved on November 19, 1931, for extension of Rock Creek Park into Maryland, 

stated:

It is further understood and agreed, in accordance with the Capper-Cramton Act and said 

Chapter 370, that the title to all lands acquired under the provisions of this Basic 

Agreement or any Supplementary Agreement shall vest in the State of Maryland, and that 

no part of any land purchased for park or recreational purposes with the funds provided 

by the National Commission, in whole or in part, shall at any time be conveyed, sold, 

leased, exchanged, or in any manner used or developed for other than park purposes by 

the Maryland Commission, and the development and administration of said lands shall be 

under the Maryland Commission but the development thereof shall be in accordance with 

plans approved by the National Commission, or the necessary approval of the Congress of 

the United States.
Such repudiation “would necessarily require Maryland to re-examine the park plan from the 

standpoint of Maryland alone.” Reconsideration might result in disposal of parkland to raise 

funds for future purchases. [“Planners See Repeal as Fatal To Park System,” The Evening Star, 

April 10, 1953] 

Even as the House Appropriations Committee voted on April 17 to deny funding for the third 

year in a row to expand the area’s park system and slashed NCPC’s operating budget, the 

Committee of 100 on the Federal City opposed such changes. NCPC’s executive officer, Blair 

Lee III, told the Committee of 100 that the Budget Bureau had not yet attempted to repeal the 

Capper-Cramton Act, but “would be receptive to ideas from the outside.” 

In addition, the Committee of 100 opposed construction of Maryland freeways in any part of the 

Rock Creek Park valley. General Grant, president of the American Planning and Civic 

Association, raised the issue before the committee:

The Maryland Freeway dispute arose when Gen. Grant protested plans for a road he said 

would extend from Maryland’s Route 240 through Rock Creek Park to the District line. 

He said such action would force the District to build a freeway through the city section of 

the park, and proposed a resolution opposing construction of a freeway in any part of the 

Maryland park. 

Lee said the resolution also would apply to the Inter-County Belt Freeway that would enter the 

park on an east-west path for about a mile between Kensington and Wisconsin Avenue. District 

and Maryland planners had approved the route, in part because an alternative routing would 

require acquisition of valuable residential property: 

“By prohibiting that East-West section of the park to the inter-county belt route, it will be 

killed because there just isn’t any place else it can go,” he declared. [“44 Pct. Cut 

Recommended In Planners’ Operating Budget,” The Evening Star; Beveridge, George, 

“Parks Growth Support by 100 Committee,” The Evening Star, both April 17, 1953] 

On May 7, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission released its 25-year 

master highway plan. The plan omitted the southeast leg of U.S. 240 that the Maryland State 

Roads Commission proposed to build across Chevy Chase to East-West Highway at Beach 

Drive. The planners decided to stay out of planning for the route because of the effect that action 

in Maryland would have on District decisionmaking. A spokesman said, “We are not in favor of 

dumping a lot of traffic on the East-West highway before the Rock Creek expressway is built.” 

However, the commission did call for a change in the southwest leg of relocated U.S. 240. 

Under the commission’s plan, the Washington National Pike would be located about 1.5 miles to 

the west of Burdette Road; traffic would move along Thomas Branch to MacArthur Boulevard as 

the entrance to the District. [“Maryland Planners Omit Chevy Chase High-Speed Route,” The 

Evening Star, May 8, 1953] 

Star editors understood the commission’s “wait-and-see attitude” regarding the southeastern leg 

of the Washington National Pike. In view of the plan to route the expressway through Rock 
Creek Park, the “dispute over the expressway is the traditional one between park conservationists 

and highway engineers.” The editors, acknowledging the concerns of Chevy Chase residents and 

others, agreed that any further “invasion of Rock Creek Park by traffic would be unfortunate”: 

But if, as the District highway planners assert, the highway is essential to the solution of 

Washington traffic problems, and if, as they also assert, it can be built along the western 

valley of the park in a way that will not seriously interfere with recreational use of the 

park or with its natural beauty, some concessions eventually may have to be made in the 

interest of the general public. [“Washington Must Decide,” The Evening Star, May 9, 

1953] 

On May 12, 1953, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a bill that kept the CapperCramton Act program alive. It included more funds for NCPC than the House bill as well as 

funds for land purchases, including funds for park purchases in Maryland and to extend George 

Washington Memorial Parkway to Old Georgetown-Leesburg Pike. [“Senate Group Backs 

Capper-Cramton Act For Park Site Funds,” The Evening Star, May 12, 1953] 

The Senate approved the committee’s proposal on May 20. Differences between the Senate and 

House appropriations bills would have to be resolved by a conference committee. 

On May 26, Governor McKeldin met in Baltimore with opponents of the southeastern leg of the 

Washington National Pike. Republican political leaders told him that he could lose 4,000 to 

5,000 votes in Montgomery County if the southeastern leg were built as planned. Senator Nye 

explained that he opposed the plan because it would open up Rock Creek Park for an expressway 

into the District. Norman Pritchard conceded the point: 

That’s the way we had it planned. District highway authorities seemed very enthusiastic 

about using Rock Creek Park for that purpose. 

Doing so would be logical, economical, and necessary in view of the heavy traffic between that 

part of the county and the District. 

Senator Nye contended that the southeastern leg was unnecessary. The Inter-County Belt 

Freeway would provide needed access via existing roads into the District. That would not, 

responded State road officials, solve the area’s traffic problem:

“If the road is extended to the District through Rock Creek Park,” said Wilson T. Ballard, 

engineering consultant to the commission, “it would be along the west edge. It won’t 

destroy the park; it won’t do it any great damage.” 

Senator Nye said NCPC had not consented to use of the park for an arterial highway. He also 

read a letter from the NPS indicating that the agency was “alert to the threat posed by the 

southeast leg” and would “vigorously oppose use of the Rock Creek Valley for any arterial 

highway.” 

Regarding the politics of the dispute, Senate Nye told the Governor that Chevy Chase had “been 

a healthy community from a Republican standpoint. We’d like you to get credit for stopping this 
thing.” [Goodwin, Gene, “McKeldin Asked To Block Work On Pike Route,” The Evening Star, 

May 26, 1953] 

District Commissioner Renah F. Camalier, a local attorney and Masonic leader who had taken 

office in June 1952, announced on May 25 that he agreed with Engineer Commissioner Prentiss 

that relocated U.S. 240 should follow Rock Creek through the park into the District. The 

commissioners had previously endorsed the concept of a parkway only in principle. Now, 

Camalier told the Chillum Heights Citizens’ Association, that without the parkway, Washington 

businesses would “dry up.” [“Camalier Indorses Plan for Parkway Link to Route 240,” The 

Evening Star, May 26, 1953] 

On June 12, the Maryland State Roads Commission met with the Maryland-National Capital 

Park and Planning Commission to request approval to use the Maryland section of Rock Creek 

Park for the southeastern leg. This permission would be needed because the planning 

commission owned title to the land. The commission deferred action until it could consult with 

opponents. However, the roads commission pointed out that while the planning commission held 

title to the lands, that meant the title actually was held by the State. If the planning commission 

denied use of the parklands for the expressway, a legal wrangle would result. 

At the same time, the roads commission filed condemnation proceedings in Montgomery Circuit 

Court to block a 1,400-unit apartment development at Grosvenor Lane and U.S. 240. The 

development was on land needed for an interchange linking Wisconsin Avenue with the 

southeastern leg of Washington National Pike. [“Roads Group Acts to Block New Apartments,” 

The Evening Star, June 12, 1953] 

Senator Nye appeared before the Maryland planning commission in a 90-minute plea to block the 

State’s plan to route the southeastern leg of U.S. 240 through the Rock Creek Valley. He 

disclosed a letter from Secretary of the Interior McKay calling Rock Creek Park one of the 

capital’s greatest assets. “Any adverse use of the park property which would be destructive of its 

natural beauty would be nothing less than tragic.” Senator Nye interpreted Secretary McKay’s 

letter to mean the Eisenhower Administration opposed use of the park for the expressway. 

He also said conferees on the Capper-Cramton Act bills were holding off on reporting a 

conference report until they see what the planning commissions do on the issue. He did not 

suggest that he or his group had pressured conferees. He said, however, “I should go out of my 

way to see that no other funds are appropriated” under the Capper-Cramton Act if the expressway 

is allowed to go through the park. 

As Senator Nye put it, “The roads commission is forcing you to be a leverage in the District to 

further destroy Rock Creek Park.” In dealing with the roads commission, he had never seen an 

agency “caught in so many falsehoods.” An attorney for the Chevy Chase Land Company agreed 

that the roads commission was an “arrogant, irresponsible group that concedes to no one.” 

Senator Nye told the planners that his group favored construction of the outer circumferential and 

the widening and extension of Georgia Avenue, 16th Street, Connecticut Avenue, Massachusetts 

Avenue, and River Road. These arterials would provide needed access without the loss of 
parkland. [“Parkland Funds Held Up by Road Plan, Nye Says,” The Evening Star, June 19, 

1953] 

On June 25, State roads officials appeared before NCPC in closed session to argue in favor of 

Alternate B. NCPC argued that under the Capper-Cramton Act, NCPC and the MarylandNational Capital Park and Planning Commission must approve any plan for a road in Rock Creek 

Park. The legislation stated:

The title to the lands acquired hereunder shall vest in the State of Maryland. The 

development and administration thereof shall be under the Maryland National Capital 

Park and Planning Commission and in accordance with plans approved by the National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission. 

The planners contended that roadways were covered by the term “development.” 

Hardening Positions 

The following day, Chairman McCain issued what the Star referred to as a “fighting-word 

statement.” The roads commission would proceed whether NCPC or the Maryland planning 

commission approved the proposal. The statement said the commission had concluded “after an 

exhaustive study extending through the past several years that for a number of reasons only one 

logical and available route remains for the location of the main Western highway Route 240 into 

the District of Columbia.”

He stated that “few unsolved traffic problems” existed in the State such as this one. With 

resources in hand and agreement from Federal and other highway authorities, “The Maryland 

State Roads Commission cannot fail in its duty to acquire the right of way and build Route 240 

into Northwest Washington as a modern dual limited-access route.” 

The expressway would serve traffic that was presently using radials “planned for the horse-andwagon traffic” of years past. The time needed for rush-hour traffic between Maryland and central 

Washington had doubled in recent years “due largely to the increased number of motor vehicles 

and the increased number of traffic lights.” Allowing this situation to continue would render 

Maryland communities on either side of the park as “secondary areas because the people with 

means will save their time and energy and reduce their costs by taking advantage of the bridge 

and highway systems which reach into Virginia and for which great improvements will shortly be 

built without the opposition of any one on the Virginia side of the Potomac River.” 

For Maryland commuters from Wisconsin Avenue to Georgia Avenue, the Rock Creek Valley 

was “the only remaining central location in which a modern high-speed arterial highway can be 

located.” Not building the expressway would “doom to ever-increasing traffic strangulation a 

present population of 100,000 people.” As that population increased, ignoring “this vital need” 

would be impossible. 

Further, McCain challenged the authority of either planning commission to block Alternate B: 
The State Roads Commission is further of the opinion that the State of Maryland has 

never granted highway jurisdiction to either the Maryland-National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission or to any other national agency, superseding the State’s paramount 

right to build arterial highways to transport its citizens from one portion of the State to 

another. 

Under the Capper-Cramton Act, planning commissions had only “a joint advisory jurisdiction for 

park development and recreation planning.” They were “in no wise to infringe on or eliminate 

the rights and obligations of the State of Maryland to provide arterial communication services for 

its citizens and the citizens of other States.” [Beveridge, George, “Officials See Planners Today 

On Park Route,” The Evening Star, June 25, 1953; Beveridge, George, “Roads Chief Denies 

Planners Can Block Rock Creek Project,” The Evening Star, June 26, 1953] 

In response to McCain’s request that NCPC and the Maryland-National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission approve routing the southeastern leg of the Washington National Pike 

through the park to the District line, NCPC had intended to study it for several weeks. However, 

immediately after receiving McCain’s letter challenging NCPC’s legal authority, NCPC voted to 

oppose Alternate B. 

NCPC denied McCain’s legal analysis. In a statement, NCPC explained that the CapperCrampton Act of 1930 gave both planning bodies control over the Maryland park areas and that it 

would exercise that power “until a contrary opinion shall be rendered by a court of law.” The 

statement contrasted NCPC’s approval of the Inter-County Belt Highway’s use of an east-west 

section of Rock Creek Park near Wisconsin Avenue and Grosvenor Lane with the proposed use 

of a 1,200-foot section of the park at East-West Highway and Beach Drive for the north-south 

southeastern leg of U.S. 240 to near the District line and its continuation by District highway 

officials. NCPC recommended prompt construction of the beltline to Georgia Avenue “as soon 

as possible to provide a new facility between Route 240 and the Silver Spring area, relieving the 

East-West highway.” 

The statement also made clear NCPC’s continued opposition to: 

. . . the construction of a road of the expressway type in Rock Creek Park south of the 

inter-county belt route both in the District of Columbia and in Maryland. In lieu of the 

expressway, the commission favors further development and extension of a park road 

such as an extension of Beach drive, which might be planned to connect with the intercounty belt route within the confines of the park. 

Although NCPC had not previously voted against the proposed southeast leg’s use of Rock 

Creek Park, a spokesman explained the reference to “continued opposition” by pointing out that 

NCPC had not included the concept in its comprehensive highway plan adopted in 1950. 

Prior to NCPC’s vote, the commission heard from Senator Nye, who urged the commission to 

turn the proposal down. He acknowledged that his property would be affected, but that his 

opposition was based on destruction to the park. [Beveridge, George, “NCPC Vetoes Maryland 

Leg Of Rt. 240 Plan,” The Evening Star, June 27, 1953] 
McCain told reporters that the “time has come right now” to decide the legal issue. The State 

was holding up the apartment development near Wisconsin Avenue and Grosvenor Lane pending 

a decision on Alternate B; the State would acquire the property immediately if the plan were 

approved. Asked if courts would have to make the determination, he replied. “I don’t know. 

But the time has come right now to determine if we have the right to build needed roads in 

parklands. If we don’t we’ll have to readjust our thinking.” He still believed the State’s view 

was legally correct. “Now, we have to find out for sure just where we stand.” [Beveridge, 

George, “Maryland Aide Asks Decision On Park Roads,” The Evening Star, June 28, 1953] 

Unlike NCPC, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission was divided on 

Alternate B. As Gingery explained, the problem was the “lack of any land but park land 

available to accomplish the purpose” of the highway relocation. “We have to come to grips with 

problems,” he said. “If we’re wrong on a proposal, we stop planning it. If we’re right, we take 

the hell that goes with the planning.” 

Blair Lee argued that the impact on Rock Creek Park was only one factor for the Maryland 

planners to consider. He considered it logical for the District to build the expressway toward 

Maryland instead of Maryland building it to a dead end at the District line. “That’s like building 

a house by putting the roof on first.” On July 1, the Maryland planners voted 4 to 2 to support 

use of Rock Creek Park for Alternate B. Support was conditioned on being able to approve 

detailed plans when they were available and that trucks would be banned, conditions that the 

Maryland State Roads Commission had already accepted. The Maryland planners also asked 

NCPC to reconsider its opposition to Alternate B. 

Robert M. Watkins of Prince George’s County, the commission chairman, voted for Alternate B, 

but was concerned it would dump traffic on East-West Highway, long before the District built 

the extension into the city. He urged the Maryland State Roads Commission to work with the 

District Highway Department to get the extension built as fast as possible. 

Senator Case of the Senate District Committee revealed that he opposed construction through the 

park. He wanted to know if NCPC would consider approving Alternate B “in order that the 

Senate committee might conduct a hearing in the matter.” [Beveridge, George, “Road Planners 

Seek Decision on Route 240,” The Evening Star, June 30, 1953; and “Roads Agency Studies 

Next Rt. 240 Move,” July 1, 1953, both The Evening Star] 

Secretary of the Interior McKay wrote to Governor McKeldin on July 8 regarding Alternate B: 

I shall oppose any such construction in Rock Creek Park in Washington. 

I have spent a great deal of time in the park since I have been here in the department, and 

I am thoroughly convinced that the people in the District, yes, and the people of Maryland 

and the residential districts would be making a sad mistake in allowing a big, four-lane 

highway to come down through the park and destroy one of the loveliest parks in all of 

Washington. 
I sincerely hope that you will be able to convince your Maryland State Roads 

Commission that it should not desecrate Rock Creek Park with construction of 

U.S. Highway 240. [“McKay Attacks Plan To Extend Route 240 Through Park Here,” 

The Evening Star, July 8, 1953] 

In response to McCain’s request that NCPC reconsider its opposition, Acting Chairman John A. 

Remon replied that another meeting to vote on Alternate B again would “serve no useful 

purpose.” NCPC members remained opposed. Instead, Remon suggested that NCPC and roads 

commission staff get together to exchange information. “A full exchange of information and 

ideas might induce either of our agencies to review its view of this matter.” 

Remon particularly wanted information on reports that the Inter-County Belt Route and 

Alternate B would run a short distance as parallel, separate roadways. NCPC previously had 

thought the two roads would merge through the narrow strip of the park. NCPC was concerned 

that parallel roadways would take even more parkland than expected and would move closer to 

residential developments on either side of the park. “The prospect for achieving an early 

settlement of the entire matter would best be promoted . . . by one or more conferences between 

our respective staffs.” [Beveridge, George, “Planners Reject Plea To Reconsider Stand on Route 

240 Now,” The Evening Star, July 9, 1953] 

A Star editorial acknowledged the merit on both sides of the controversy, but added: 

It is not a controversy that is going to be settled in the public interest, however, if the 

merits continue to be obscured by name-calling, attribution of ulterior motives and the 

sort of emotionalism that has become so conspicuous a part of this fight. 

The parties, namely NCPC and the roads commission, should “sit down together and reach an 

agreement in the public interest that is based on hard fact.” After all, the Maryland State Roads 

Commission and its supporters were not “ruthless vandals” determined to destroy Rock Creek 

Park. NCPC, the Interior Department, and others were not “dreamy visionaries” who preferred to 

preserve the park because they were “blinded” to rush hour realities. And the property owners 

that Alternate B would affect were no more “selfish than any other group of property owners 

would be in the same circumstances.

The Star did not believe that Alternate B would destroy the District’s Rock Creek Park. “Such a 

roadway, properly landscaped, might even improve the park by restoring qualities that are being 

lost now because of heavy traffic over winding park roads that were never designed for such 

purpose.” The problem was that “this highway through the District park is not going to be built 

in the near future.” That raised questions about Maryland’s wisdom in “terminating Route 240 at 

the Maryland gateway to the District’s Rock Creek Park.”

The editorial pointed out that Maryland and Federal planners had agreed to use the Maryland 

park for the Inter-County Belt Freeway. Like NCPC, the editors were surprised to learn that 

instead of running the two freeways on the same right-of-way, Maryland was planning two east-
west parallel freeways through the park. That plan could “not be easily defended” because it 

“would, indeed, ‘destroy’ that section” of the park. 

The editorial summed up the situation by saying that neither the southwest leg of the Washington 

National Pike nor the Inter-County Belt Freeway were controversial, but they were not going to 

be built for several years. Alternate B was planned for immediate construction. Juggling the 

schedule to put the uncontroversial segments first did not seem impossible. But it provided a 

basis for discussion among the planners and road builders: 

Certainly the National Planning Commission and the roads commission should arrange 

such conferences now and keep at it until they are in substantial agreement. They will 

reach agreement by such discussion much more quickly than by letters and press 

statements directed to and at each other.

[“The Wrangle Over Route 240,” The Evening Star, July 9, 1953; the same issue contained 

George Beveridge’s full-page summary of the controversy: “Route 240 – The Problem, Plan, 

Controversy and Outlook.”] 

Looking For Accord 

The planners focused on the lack of “complete detailed” information on the State’s plans for the 

roadway in the park, particularly the structures, fills, and interchanges. Chairman Watkins of the 

Maryland planning commission directed his engineers to get the information from the roads 

commission immediately. “We are entitled to know and want to know everything planned in 

detail,” he said. Commissioner Sidney M. Oliver added, “And if you don’t get it, this 

commission will descend on the roads men in a body to demand it.” 

NCPC’s Remon had written to the Maryland planners suggesting that since they had endorsed 

Alternate B, they “may now be in strong position to mediate the current issue, if it should 

develop that any basis exists for a mutually acceptable solution.” However, he doubted a 

solution was possible “in the present atmosphere of power politics.” 

If the State proceeded with Alternate B, NCPC was prepared to go to court, but only reluctantly: 

I believe that such litigation, regardless of its outcome, would have a damaging effect on 

the future relations between the various parties and especially on our requests for future 

appropriations under the Capper-Cramton Act. [“Area Planners Call for All Rt. 240 

Details,” The Evening Star, July 10, 1953] 

On July 18, House-Senate conferees agreed on the parks portion of the appropriations act. 

Conferees refused funding for land acquisition for parks in Montgomery and Prince George’s 

Counties. They agreed on $100,000 for land acquisition in Virginia to continue construction of 

the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Fairfax County, as well as a compromise amount, 

$126,457 for NCPC operations. 

By refusing funds for land acquisition for parks in Maryland for the third straight year, the 

conferees put the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission in an awkward 
position. The commission paid two-thirds of the cost of land acquisition, but if the Federal 

Government refused to pay its one-third share, the Maryland planners would have to rethink their 

master plan. Commissioner Watkins said, “We feel we have a very sacred contract with the 

Federal Government. Maryland has kept faith but Congress has not.” [“Funds Refused for D.C. 

Area Park Projects,” The Evening Star, July 19, 1953; “Commission to Study Ways to Save 

Area’s Park Development,” The Evening Star, July 21, 1953] 

At the request of Governor McKeldin, McCain replied to Secretary McKay’s letter. Given “the 

terrific development in and around the Metropolitan area of Washington,” McCain wrote, all data 

and engineering expertise indicated “that the only possible way in which this situation can be 

solved is to utilize the small section of the border of Rock Creek Park.” He pointed out that 

NCPC had approved “construction of a similar parkway in another section of Rock Creek Park.” 

In view of the need and the limited options in highly developed Maryland communities adjacent 

to the District, “it appears that to provide a satisfactory facility, certain short sections of park land 

must be utilized.”

McCain, in meeting his agency’s commitment to address road needs, planned the southeast leg as 

“a highway of the parkway type.” Moreover, the roads commission had agreed to permit the title 

to the roadbed “to be vested in” the Maryland-National Park and Planning Commission. That 

commission would determine the types of vehicles that would use the parkway. Since the roads 

commission did not have statutory authority to prohibit trucks from using the facilities it built, 

this shift in ownership would allow the planning commission to restrict commercial usage.

Acknowledging that NCPC and the roads commission had different obligations, McCain said the 

roads commission was “very willing at any time to sit down with the Capital Planning 

Commission to see if some mutually satisfactory arrangement can be derived that will solve this 

problem.” [“Maryland to Bar Trucks From Park Route 240,” The Evening Star, July 19, 1953] 

At the end of July, planners and road builders made an unpublicized trip to New York to see how 

that State, famous for its parkways, built roads through parks. Participants in the 2-day trip 

included Norman Pritchett of the Maryland State Roads Commission; NCPC’s Blair Lee III; 

planning engineers William C. Burrage and Warren Jiauque from the Maryland-National Capital 

Park and Planning Commission; William F. Boardman of the District Highway Department; 

BPR’s Joseph Barnett; and the Star’s George Beveridge. 

According to the Star, they learned that New York strongly resisted construction “of big traffic 

arterials through parks” if any alternative existed. However, parks occasionally gave way to 

“necessary new highways.” When that happened, “meticulous care is taken to minimize the park 

damage.” New York had miles of “shoestring parks” where no park had existed, consisting of 

modern, limited-access, six-lane parkways. Such parkways enhanced property values, according 

to New York officials. One of the important lessons was: 

That New York, in contrast to Washington, has learned to resolve differences involving 

parklands on the merits of each project. In some cases, parks have been held inviolate 

against highway pressures. In others, highways have been found too important to be 

stopped. 
Storms of protest erupted when highways threatened parks in New York and the Washington 

area, but conditions in the two areas were different. New York officials gave much of the credit 

to Robert Moses for resolving these problems: 

As city construction co-ordinator, he has a mighty voice in building roads where they are 

needed. Sometimes they are needed through parks. As the city park commissioner, he 

has a major say in whether the parks can be used.

At the time, Moses was an admired figure around the country not only for his extensive road and 

park projects in the New York City area but as a consultant on thoroughfare planning in other 

cities. He was at the peak of power at this time, able to overcome or ignore critics of his plans. 

The Washington area had no equivalent figure:

City planning and park officials said Mr. Moses’ stature as a protector of parks has helped 

hold down the opposition. There is general assurance, they said, that affected park 

facilities will be rebuilt and additional improvements made.

“Any road that goes through a park is going to do some harm,” one park official said. 

“But the people here have learned that the last man in the world who will do any undue 

harm to parks is Robert Moses.” 

(The image of Robert Moses today is very different than it was at the time, in part because of 

Robert A. Caro’s critical biography, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York, 

Knopf, 1974.) 

New York officials would not comment for the record on the Washington controversy, but 

privately thought an expert could be brought in, not beholding to any group, to clarify the issues 

by determining whether the park absolutely had to be used and what damage the roadway would 

do. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Study N.Y. Parkways For Rt. 240 Key,” The Evening Star, 

August 2, 1953] 

Drawing on the lessons learned in New York, NCPC and the Maryland planning commission 

recommended staff meetings with the Maryland State Roads Commission, District Highway 

Department, and BPR for a joint attack on divisive issues. Remon explained: 

I don’t like this idea of every one going off in his own direction. It’s time to get 

something done and kill off some of the conversation. 

Watkins thought the joint approach might help apply the New York principles to the U.S. 240 

question. He also thought an outside expert might be brought in, one “whose objectivity could 

not be questioned,” someone of the stature of Robert Moses. He admitted that expecting 

everyone to agree to such a review might be “a Utopian idea,” but he wanted to at least pursue it.

In view of agreement on the joint approach, Nolen held off on his intention to present a solution 

to the Alternate B controversy. His idea was that Maryland should end the southeast leg of the 

Washington National Pike at its interchange with the Inter-County Belt Freeway, rather than 
continuing it through Maryland’s Rock Creek Park to dead end at East-West Highway in the 

expectation that it would continue at some unknown time into the District. At Watkins’ 

suggestion, Nolen agreed to let staff officials review the plan instead of presenting it to either 

commission at this time. [Beveridge, George, “Study by Staffs Urged to Solve Rt. 240 Dispute,” 

The Evening Star, August 4, 1953] 

On August 3, 1953, Senator Nye’s group, the Citizens Action Committee for Fair Road Planning, 

published a full-page advertisement in The Evening Star highlighting the agreement between 

President Hoover and Governor Ritchie regarding ownership and use of Rock Creek Park in 

Maryland. With an arrow pointing at a box containing the paragraph on the signature page of the 

agreement, the advertisement’s headline was: “President Hoover and Governor Ritchie didn’t 

cross fingers when they signed this!” In view of the intentions of the Maryland State Roads 

Commission and the District Highway Department, the “challenge to the future of Rock Creek 

Park is very real and immediate.” 

As for whether building U.S. 240 through the Maryland portion of the park would be legal, the 

answer was “an emphatic ‘No’” because of the 1931 agreement. Recent actions by the 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission are “without the slightest weight.” 

Nye’s committee offered a five-step plan for addressing traffic needs based on plans already 

under consideration. Build an outer belt for bypass traffic from Cabin John on the Potomac to 

Fox Ferry Point (across from Alexandria) at the southernmost point of the District. Provide 

better bus and other mass transportation service into the city from suburban terminals to reduce 

automobile traffic. Put bus bays on Sixteenth Street, Massachusetts Avenue, and Connecticut 

Avenue, so buses no longer block traffic while loading and unloading passengers. Broaden and 

improve existing arterial roads in Maryland. Continue to maintain existing roads in Rock Creek 

Park as parkways, “not four and six-lane expressways and speedways that will ruin the park 

forevermore.”

The group called for a “concentrated effort” to preserve the park:

Between now and August 6th, and at that time, it is to be expected that individual 

members of the twelve-man National Capital Planning Commission will be under terrific 

pressure to change their minds, and approve the Rock Creek Park highway program. 

Possibly, three or four members of the Commission favor approving the use of the park 

for Highway 240. There is not now the slightest reason to believe that this minority could 

become a majority, but we can be sure there will be every effort made to cause a majority 

to favor the park road. Let us not be caught asleep.

We hope that community associations and individuals will find a way to let the National 

Capital Planning Commission know that their position against the expressway idea is in 

keeping with the best interest of Metropolitan Washington and that we want no such scars 

in Rock Creek Park as the road engineers would build at a cost of millions to the 

taxpayers. 
A box at the bottom of the advertisement labeled “The Vicious Circle,” quoted F. Biggers: “We 

spend more and more millions of dollars to build more and more radical super-highways so that 

more and more thousands of people may drive more and more rapidly to the place where they 

must wait longer and longer to get into the District where it is harder and harder to move around 

at all.” [“Citizen Action Committee for Fair Road Planning,” The Evening Star, August 3, 1953, 

page A-15, bold in original. The advertisement did not identify “F. Biggers.”] 

Planning for the Inter-County Belt Freeway had been relatively controversy-free except for the 

concerns about its location in relation to Berwyn and the University of Maryland. The Maryland 

and Federal planning commissions had endorsed construction of the belt freeway through Rock 

Creek Park between Wisconsin Avenue and Forest Glen. On August 7, however, NCPC received 

requests from two citizens groups to withdraw its approval from the belt freeway and continue to 

oppose use of the park for Alternate B. The two groups, the Rock Creek Hills and Parkwood 

Citizens’ Association, represented citizens living in the area north of Rock Creek Park between 

Wisconsin Avenue and Forest Glen. They argued that NCPC, which supported one use of the 

park and opposed the other, “should be made to conform” its inconsistent positions. 

The Parkwood association also raised legal questions, pointing out that the developer of 

Parkwood sold land to the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission in 1938 

with the understanding that the land would be developed “as a parkway to be used and 

maintained as part of the Rock Creek Park system . . . .” The association did not believe NCPC 

would have approved use of the park for the belt freeway if it had known about the contractual 

restriction on the Parkwood sale. Residents who bought their homes near the park had relied on 

that restriction. 

Blair Lee’s initial reaction was to tell the groups that “the only possible alternative to the present 

belt route would be something outside the park which would go smack through both their 

subdivisions.” Instead, NCPC agreed to a staff review of the request from the two associations. 

[“Planners Asked To Revise Stand On Belt Route,” The Evening Star, August 7, 1953] 

Working For Compromise 

Following meetings with the Maryland planners, McCain wrote to NCPC on September 16, 

about a change in plans. The Maryland State Roads Commission was willing to build the InterCounty Belt Freeway between Wisconsin and Georgia Avenues within the coming 4 years. 

Within that same time, however, the roads commission planned to complete the southeast leg of 

the Washington National Pike to East-West Highway. By advancing the schedule for the belt 

freeway for simultaneous completion with the southeastern leg, McCain addressed NCPC’s 

concern that Alternate B would dump traffic on East-West Highway. Traffic not bound for 

East-West Highway area would now be able to use the belt freeway to connect with other arterial 

roads, thus reducing the number of vehicles reaching East-West Highway. [Beveridge, George, 

“Roads Agency Offers Rt. 240 Compromise,” The Evening Star, September 16, 1953] 

Harland Bartholomew, who only recently had become NCPC’s chairman, indicated he was not 

familiar enough with the dispute to offer immediate comment. NCPC replied to McCain on 
September 18 that advancing construction of the belt freeway was “an excellent decision on your 

part.” However, NCPC asked McCain to give “most consideration” to stopping the southeast leg 

of the Washington National Pike at the beltline instead of East-West Highway. 

NCPC also suggested a joint meeting between the two groups to discuss options, as well as legal 

issues “which have been raised and which may even have a bearing on the action we have 

already taken.” This was a reference to the two citizens’ associations, whose attorneys had 

attended a meeting along with Senator Nye to detail the legal challenge to building the belt 

freeway through the park. The Inter-County Belt Freeway, they contended, could not be 

considered a “parkway.” [Beveridge, George, “Planners Ask Joint Parley on Route 240,” The 

Evening Star, September 19, 1953] 

With the threat of lawsuits that could delay or block the belt freeway, Watkins of the Maryland 

planning commission suggested building both freeways as parkways like the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway or the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway. A commission statement said that 

parkways would be “well within the spirit and letter of the Capper-Cramton Act.” As another 

example, the planners cited Fort Drive, the District loop that was planned for land acquired under 

the legislation. Of course, parkway construction also would address the legal issues raised by the 

attorneys representing Parkwood. [“Planners Seek To Lift Lawsuit Threat to Roads,” The 

Evening Star, October 2, 1953] 

Gingery suggested that all parties make an informal tour of the land where Route 240’s southeast 

leg was to be built. The tour, which took place on October 11, included Bartholomew, 

Undersecretary of the Interior Ralph Tudor, Roads Commissioner McCain, District Engineer 

Commissioner Prentiss, A. B. McKee of the Maryland planning commission, and Star editor 

B. M. McKelway:

The tour started with a look at District streets slated for improvement to handle the 

increased traffic volume which would pour out of the park if the roadway were built. It 

followed the proposed route along the eastern edge of the park as far north as Colorado 

avenue, then along the park’s western edge to the District line and north to Wisconsin 

avenue.

The officials also examined Maryland park areas affected by the proposed intercounty 

belt highway across Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties. Mr. Gingery stressed 

that park areas must be used for the roadways and said delays in construction will only 

increase the costs.

The Star speculated that with Bartholomew, Undersecretary Tudor, and Roads Commissioner 

McCain “sitting together in an automobile examining a map spread across their knees, while 

traveling along the proposed Route 240, it was probable that more mutual understanding of the 

problem was gained than in months of letter writing and statement issuing.” [“Top Aides Take 

First-Hand Look At Route 240,” The Evening Star, October 11, 1953] 

By October 30, NCPC and roads commission staff had worked out a plan for the Inter-County 

Belt Freeway that appeared acceptable to all parties as NCPC prepared to meet on this issue. 
McCain outlined the proposal in a letter to NCPC on October 28. The agreement related to the 

belt freeway, but McCain hoped the agreement would lead to resolution of the U.S. 240 

controversy. As the Star explained, “The roads commission wants to have the 240 leg drop out 

of the park a short distance east of Wisconsin avenue, and drop southward across North Chevy 

Chase to the East-West highway.” 

The Star summarized the belt freeway proposal:

It would hug the extreme south edge of the park between Wisconsin avenue and Forest 

Glen, except for a 3,400-foot stretch outside the park and on privately owned property. A 

198-foot right-of-way would be acquired. 

Mr. McCain said staff members are agreed that for the time being, two 24-foot lanes 

could serve the dual purpose of carrying both belt freeway and Route 240 traffic over the 

park portion where the two roads would converge. Later, when the belt route is finished 

and the 240 leg extended through District portions of Rock Creek Park to downtown 

Washington, the area could be developed for two dual highways, he said. 

The letter indicated Mr. McCain is willing to make two important concessions to the 

planners. One involves the limitation of a 198-foot right-of-way. The other is routing the 

belt road outside the park and over private property. 

As traffic increased, the width of right-of-way would allow the roadway to carry six lanes. 

The use of private property would increase the cost of the belt freeway but he explained: 

If we can reach accord on all of our problems in the development of these highways in the 

park area, it is felt this additional expenditure may be justified.

Regarding the cross-section, McCain wrote:

This section provides for much narrower dividing strips than we normally use in our 

design and certainly much more restricted than is desirable for safety and comfort. 

However, any additional width of medium strips would entail a commensurate widening 

of the over-all section.

He added:

As mentioned above, staff members of each commission have worked out a plan whereby 

it is deemed that all of the objectives of the several commissions can be attained, with the 

possible exception of use of parklands for a 1,200-foot connection of the southeast leg of 

Washington National Pike (Route 240) from Beach drive to the East-West highway. 

[“Accord Likely On Maryland’s Belt Freeway,” The Evening Star, October 30, 1953] 

Unfortunately, as George Beveridge wrote in the Star on October 31, “The bitter dispute between 

Capital planners and Maryland roadbuilders over the southeast leg of U.S. Route 240 dragged on 

today after a conference between the two raised several points of confusion.” 
NCPC supported the revised plan for the Inter-County Belt Freeway, built to parkway standards, 

across Maryland’s portion of Rock Creek Park. The planners not did agree on joint use of the 

roadway for the southeast leg of U.S. 240. They also did not agree that the southeast leg should 

cross North Chevy Chase and re-enter the park at East-West Highway near the District line. In a 

letter to McCain, Bartholomew wrote:

In order to prevent any misunderstanding as to this commission’s previous action 

concerning Rock Creek Unit No. 3 for the south leg of U.S. 240, I take this opportunity to 

restate that this commission approved connecting the proposed southeast leg of U.S. 240 

to the belt route in the vicinity of Wisconsin avenue or at some point further to the west. 

During the 2-hour meeting, roads commission officials and Maryland planners urged fast action 

on the southeast leg and belt freeway. Norman Pritchett pointed out that homes under 

construction in the proposed right-of-way might add $200,000 to land acquisition costs in the 

next 30 days. Gingery said that in view of the private development, “We’re not calling ‘wolf.’ 

The wolf is here now.” If the U.S. 240 project were held up, he added, it probably would “have 

to go not through a measly 5,000 feet of park but through all of the park from Wisconsin avenue 

to the East-West highway.” 

Consultant Wilson Ballard told NCPC that when his firm conducted its study, about 76,000 cars 

crossed the District line between Silver Spring and the Potomac River to the west each day. The 

volume had increased to 100,000 and would exceed 210,000 in 12 to 15 years. His partner, 

Joseph Knoerle, predicted that by 1980, 400,000 cars would cross the District line daily and that 

additional expressways to downtown Washington would be needed. 

In that case, Bartholomew suggested that the road commission and planners study “the whole 

problem” of traffic crossings, not just piecemeal parts of it. McCain replied that he was willing 

to cooperate in such a study, but did not want the study to “be put in the position of [causing] 

unnecessary delay” on the Inter-County Belt Freeway or the southeast leg of U.S. 240. 

[Beveridge, George, “Planners Fail To Indorse Leg For Route 240,” The Evening Star, October 

31, 1953] 

In response to an inquiry from Beveridge, Bartholomew, back home in St. Louis, agreed that 

several points in his letter to McCain were hazy. Bartholomew confirmed that NCPC approved 

the belt freeway, built to parkway standards, across Rock Creek Park. Although the map drawn 

as a result of the joint staff meetings showed the southeast leg of U.S. 240 meeting the belt 

freeway east of Wisconsin Avenue, NCPC wanted the connection west of Wisconsin Avenue and 

entirely outside the park. 

Approval of the belt freeway across the park had no bearing on NCPC’s view of including the 

southeast leg of U.S. 240 in the park. However, NCPC had no jurisdiction over the routing of 

U.S. 240 outside the park; if the Maryland roads commission decided to build the southeast leg 

across North Chevy Chase, NCPC could not object. However, Bartholomew made clear that 

NCPC had not given authority for the southeast leg to reenter parkland near East-West Highway.

As Beveridge wrote:
Under these restriction[s], officials pointed out, it would be possible for southeast-bound 

Route 240 traffic to pass through 8,000 feet of Rock Creek Park on the belt road, then 

move over an independent route to just north of the East-West highway park area.

This option would work only if projected traffic volumes on U.S. 240 could be handled on the 

belt freeway and a new terminal for the southeast leg could be found outside the park near EastWest Highway.

Bartholomew made one other point clear: 

Mr. Bartholomew told The Star by telephone from St. Louis that legal questions played a 

major part in the planners’ action. He stressed that attorneys seriously questioned 

whether the parks could be used for even the belt freeway. The commission’s approval of 

that road as having “parkway standards” was about as far as it felt it could go “at this 

time,” he said. [Beveridge, George, “Officials to Plan Further Action on Route 240,” The 

Evening Star, November 1, 1953] 

With these understandings in mind, McCain ordered roads commission engineers to shift the 

southeast leg to East-West Highway outside Rock Creek Park. By keeping the route out of the 

park, the roads commission would avoid the planning commission’s jurisdiction. The Star

summarized the plan: 

The revised plan calls for the southeast leg of 240 to connect with the belt route near 

Wisconsin avenue, and use the belt roadway to a point where the belt road dips out of the 

park. 

There, the roads commission would build an interchange and divert 240 traffic off the 

dual-purpose road and to an extension of the 240 leg heading southward. Instead of 

entering parkland at East-West highway, however, the road would terminate at a new 

location still to be determined.

This alternative would involve acquisition of costly property that would not have been needed 

under the original plan using parkland: 

Mr. McCain also disclosed, meanwhile, that roads commission engineers have been 

authorized to begin immediate land purchases in “tight spots” involved in the right of 

way. 

The “tight spots,” he said, are land parcels where development already is under way 

which would greatly increase land costs.

McCain had given orders to his staff after what the Star called “a fast-breaking exchange of 

telegrams” between McCain and Bartholomew regarding NCPC’s position on the two routes. 

At the same time, the Star reported that J. Joseph Barse, the attorney for residents bordering the 

park where the Inter-County Belt Freeway was to be built, said a lawsuit was “certain to be filed 

contesting legality of the belt route’s use of the park.” The new plan for keeping the southeast 
leg of U.S. 240 out of the park, Barse said, “bears out my personal opinion that if consent were 

given for the belt route that Route 240 also would be built. The belt route is the key to the whole 

thing.” [Beveridge, George, “State Speeds New Plan for Route 240 Leg,” The Evening Star, 

November 7, 1953] 

Barse and Edward S. Northrop filed the suit on November 20 against NCPC to block the use of 

Rock Creek Park for the Inter-County Belt Freeway. Their six plaintiffs, all owners of land 

abutting the park, contended that the park use violated the Capper-Cramton Act of 1930 and an 

agreement reached in 1931 between NCPC and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission that prohibited use of the park “for other than park purposes.” They wanted the 

Maryland planners to advise the Maryland State Roads Commission that it could not use the park 

for the belt freeway or “any similar highways,” a reference to U.S. 240.

The suit also asserted the contention of Parkwood and Locust Hills Estates, located adjacent to 

the park near Wisconsin Avenue, that property had been deeded to the Maryland planning 

commission in 1939 “exclusively for park and parkway purposes.” NCPC’s approval of the belt 

freeway, the plaintiffs argued, violated this restriction.

The definition of “parkway” appeared to observers to be the key to the suit. In approving use of 

the park for the belt freeway as long ago as the 1950 comprehensive plan, NCPC had indicated it 

did so because of the “parkway” characteristics the freeway appeared to have. It did not, 

however, define the term. 

The Maryland State Roads Commission and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission indicated they would join NCPC as interested parties to the lawsuit. If so, the Star

pointed out, “the bitterest contestants in the Montgomery County road issues will find themselves 

allied.” [Beveridge, George, “Federal Court Asked To Bar Belt Road In Rock Creek Park,” The 

Evening Star, November 20, 1953] 

The Star, in an editorial, summarized the result of the unclear definition of “parkway”: 

Two important traffic-relief projects thus will remain in a state of suspended animation 

until the suit is disposed of. It is to be hoped that the litigation can be settled without 

long delay. [“To Settle the ‘Parkway’ Dispute,” The Evening Star, November 21, 1953] 

The Capper-Cramton Act provided for a “comprehensive park, parkway and playground system” 

for the Washington area. Reportedly, Congress first used the term “parkway” in 1913 when it 

authorized the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway connecting Potomac Park and the National 

Zoological Park. Webster’s Dictionary first defined the term in 1914 as: “A broad thoroughfare 

beautified with trees and turf.” AASHO defined the term as well. A parkway was “an arterial 

highway for non-commercial traffic, with full or partial control of access, and usually located 

within a park or ribbon of park-like development.” 

By contrast, NPR Director Wirth, the only NCPC member who had voted against allowing the 

belt freeway to cross Rock Creek Park, defined a parkway as “an elongated park, with a road 

usually used to connect two or more parks.” The George Washington Memorial Parkway, he 
explained, was properly named, because it was “authorized specifically to protect land along the 

Potomac and to connect historic parks,” but neither Suitland Parkway nor the BaltimoreWashington Parkway met the definition. 

Although NCPC had not defined the term while approving the 1950 comprehensive plan, 

Bartholomew now defined “parkway” as a “special type of automobile travelway of more than 

ordinary width and having park-like characteristics.” [Beveridge, George, “Roads Dispute Poses 

a Query on ‘Parkway,’” The Evening Star, November 22, 1953] 

Despite the lawsuit, the Maryland State Roads Commission began negotiating to acquire more 

than 20 home sites near Rock Creek Park for the Inter-County Belt Freeway. They were in a new 

subdivision called Rolling Hills east of Kensington Parkway and south of Rock Creek Park. As 

then planned, the belt freeway would pass through Rock Creek Park east of Wisconsin Avenue, 

leave parkland west of Connecticut Avenue, and pass through Rolling Hills and other private 

land before reentering the park south of Forest Glen. [“Plan Is Pushed To Seize Sites in Freeway 

Path,” The Evening Star, December 6, 1953] 

The controversy about the routing, however, was no longer confined to local agencies. The 

proposed use of parks for roadways in the Washington area and elsewhere was becoming a 

national issue. A gathering at the Hotel Statler of 39 national conservation and scientific 

research groups, organized by the Natural Resources Council of America, helped focus national 

attention on the controversy. On December 6, General Grant, the former NCPC chairman, 

stressed that if the southeast leg of U.S. 240 were built as far south as East-West Highway, 

keeping it out of Rock Creek Park in the District would be virtually impossible. He denied that 

such a use would do little harm to the park, as advocates for the road claimed. Senator Nye 

urged meeting participants to send protests to NCPC, “where our case rests at the present time.”

Chairman Samuel Ordway of the Natural Resources Council called the dispute “one of the major 

fights for conservation.” The council’s executive secretary, C. R. Gutermuth, said that the threat 

to Rock Creek Park deserved “as much concern” as encroachments to Yosemite or Yellowstone 

Parks would receive. 

Tom Wallace, chairman of the National Conference on State Parks, told participants that there 

“isn’t a city in the United States that isn’t threatened by the blunderbuss efforts of a highway 

commission.” The Rock Creek Park encroachment was an “outrage that is intolerable, 

impractical and illegal.”

The National Conference on State Parks issued a statement that did not refer to the belt freeway 

or U.S. 240, but did say of threats to Rock Creek Park: 

Use of Rock Creek Park as a right of way would be in sundry ways calamitous to 

Washington. The precedent would endanger every national, State, county and municipal 

park, every scenic recreation preserve in the United States, and subject United States 

culture to well-founded criticism in capitals of nations of the enlightened world. 
Throughout the country, parks were “threatened by exploiters whose argument is that parks are 

‘free land’ and should be used for roads and parking lots.” [“Route 240 Plan Held Threat to All 

Parks,” The Evening Star, December 7, 1953; “National Fight On Route 240 Shaping Up,” The 

Evening Star, December 8, 1953] 

On January 7, 1954, Judge Matthew F. McGuire held a bench conference on the suit seeking to 

enjoin NCPC from approving detailed plans for the Inter-County Belt Freeway across a stretch of 

Rock Creek Park. Both sides recognized that NCPC had approved the use of parkland for the 

belt freeway. Assistant U.S. Attorney Oliver Gasch argued that NCPC should not be prohibited 

from taking administrative action while the court deliberates on the case. Barse and Northrup 

expressed concern that if NCPC approved the detailed plans, Maryland would begin construction 

immediately without waiting for a court ruling. Under an agreement reached during the bench 

conference, NCPC was free to approve the detailed plans, but the effective date would be delayed 

to allow for court action. Judge McGuire set a hearing date for late March. [“NCPC May 

Approve Belt Freeway Plans in Tentative Agreement,” The Evening Star, January 7, 1954] 

The third section of the Washington National Pike, a 3.8-mile stretch between Hyattstown and 

Clarksburg, opened on January 18, 1954. This section was the first completed in Montgomery 

County. Construction had begun on October 1, 1953, on the next 3.7-mile section, which would 

take the pike to State Route 118 in Germantown. The road commission had begun planning for 

the next two sections, each about 4 miles long, that would take the pike to Rockville. [“3.8-Mile

Stretch of Route 240 To Be Opened About Dec. 15,” The Evening Star, November 26, 1953; 

“McKeldin Will Open Route 240 Stretch,” The Evening Star, January 17, 1954] 

The Olmsted Brothers

On March 22, the Star reported that Chairman Watkins of the Maryland-National Capital Park 

and Planning Commission had retained Olmsted Brothers of Brookline, Massachusetts, to 

prepare detailed development plans for the Inter-County Belt Freeway through Rock Creek Park. 

As mentioned earlier, Frederick Law Olmsted, who had founded the firm, was a founder of 

NCPC (then called the National Capital Park and Planning Commission) and a commission 

member for several years. Olmsted Brothers had been a consultant for development of the 1901 

general plan for the District, in 1918 on development of Rock Creek Park, and many other 

Washington area projects. In a letter to Bartholomew, Watkins wrote: 

Because of their outstanding reputation in the field of park design, Olmstead [sic] 

Brothers were employed to prepare designs which would not only meet the standards 

desired by your commission and by this commission, but which would be an outstanding 

contribution to the park and parkway system of the Nation’s Capital . . . .” 

The firm would design and locate interchanges and connections with the proposed parkway; 

landscaping for the area through which the road would pass; the type, design, and location of 

park and picnic areas adjacent to the parkway; foot paths and bridle paths; and placement of 

recreation facilities in the two park units. The contract also covered recommendations for 

relocating any part of Rock Creek that may be necessary to make more effective use of the park. 
Watkins also said the plans involved developing about 500 acres of parkland on both sides of 

Connecticut Avenue from East-West Highway to the Kensington-Garrett Park Road. The road 

would enter Rock Creek Park at Wisconsin Avenue between Grosvenor Lane and Pooks Hill 

Road, ending at Connecticut Avenue. A second section would begin about 500 feet east of 

Kensington Parkway, ending at Jones Mill Road and Beach Drive. 

A Star editorial pointed out that the Maryland planning officials believed that hiring Olmsted 

Brothers “should allay the fears and misunderstandings” that had delayed both projects. The 

detailed plans that NCPC received for the encroachment on the park were to be drawn “by 

consultants known to be advocates and protectors of park land, here and elsewhere.” [“Firm 

Named To Plan Road In Rock Creek,” The Evening Star, March 22, 1954; “Fortunate Choice,” 

The Evening Star, March 25, 1954] 

Judge McGuire heard arguments in the Inter-County Belt Freeway case on March 24. Balse and 

Northrop argued that building the freeway through Rock Creek Park was inconsistent with park 

purposes as established by Federal laws. They contended that the term “parkways” referred to 

roads serving the parks, not commuter thoroughfares. Congress, Northrup said, had established 

proper uses of parkland; NCPC could not add uses. 

U.S. Attorney Gasch moved for dismissal. He said that Federal law clearly gave the planners 

control over park development. As such, the belt freeway was a legitimate park use. NCPC, in 

recognition of its legal responsibilities, had approved the route through the park on the condition 

that it would meet proper standards to serve the park. The Maryland State Roads Commission, 

he pointed out, had recently hired the Olmsted Brothers to design the freeway in accordance with 

seven criteria NCPC had established.

After the 1-hour hearing, Judge McGuire took under advisement the government’s motion to 

dismiss the suit. He said the issue was whether the Inter-County Belt Freeway was consistent 

with park purposes as intended by Federal law. First, he would have to decide the extent of 

NCPC’s authority to act. Second, he would have to determine whether the proposed freeway was 

consistent with the use of the parklands. [“Court Studies Dismissal of Belt Road Suit,” The 

Evening Star, March 24, 1954] 

On May 4, Judge McGuire denied the government’s request to dismiss the lawsuit. He also 

denied the government’s motion for summary judgment. In a notation on the government 

motions, Judge McGuire wrote: “No ruling possible without plans being extant and submitted.” 

The Olmsted Brothers’ plan, he implied, was the key. [“Court Denies Motion To Throw Out 

Suit On Belt Freeway,” The Evening Star, May 4, 1954] 

While awaiting the court ruling and delivery of the Olmsted Brothers’ plans, citizens associations 

were issuing statements opposing Alternate B through the park for the Washington National 

Pike. The Star reported opposition by the Federation of Citizens’ Associations (April 18, 1954), 

the Federation of Civic Associations (April 24), and the Northwest Council of Citizens’ 

Associations (April 25). 

On May 22, Beveridge reported that the Olmsted Brothers’ plan had been submitted: 
The Federal planners . . . withheld comment on their first reaction to the plans. But other 

sources indicated Mr. Bartholomew, at least, was pleased by what he saw.

Maryland citizens fighting the roads, meanwhile, held one of their biggest mass meetings 

during the week. Spokesmen said it was a strategy session to map new moves. 

[Beveridge, George, “New Moves Start Speculation On Fate of Park Roadway,” The 

Evening Star, May 22, 1954] 

After the Maryland State Roads Commission and Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission reviewed the Olmsted plans, officials of the firm and the two commissions flew to 

Columbus, Ohio, on May 18 to discuss the plans with Bartholomew. He told George Beveridge 

that the plans had been sent to NCPC staff and that he had instructed them to expedite their 

review. Neither Bartholomew nor other NCPC commissioners would reveal their reaction to the 

plans. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Get Detailed Plan On Belt Road,” The Evening Star, May 

21, 1954] 

On June 8, the Maryland State Roads Commission and the Maryland-National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission approved the Olmsted Brothers’ plan and rushed it to NCPC. 

Olmsted Brothers included an eight-page statement with their plans. Based on the statement, 

Beveridge summarized the highlights:

The Parkway Route.

At its west end, Wisconsin avenue would be elevated and split with separated lanes for 

northbound and southbound traffic. The belt parkway would pass beneath Wisconsin, 

connecting west of Wisconsin with the southeast leg of U.S. Route 240. 

East of Wisconsin, the belt road would hug the southern edge of the park a few feet above 

park level, except for an overpass at Cedar lane. About a mile east of Wisconsin, the road 

would dip out of the park through a corner of the Bethesda Naval Hospital property. It 

would pass about 3,500 feet across private property, overpassing Connecticut avenue and 

Kensington parkway, then re-enter the park. It would continue to hug the southern part of 

the park until overpassing Jones Mill road and Rock Creek at Forest Glen. It would leave 

the park at that point. 
Connection Planned. 

Roads commission plans call for connecting the belt road, at the point it leaves the park 

near the naval hospital property, with a continuation of the Route 240 leg. The 240 leg 

would be extended to the East-West Highway, near Beach drive.

The divided lane parkway would have a maximum right-of-way of about 110 feet, with 

two lanes in each direction. Essentially, the Olmsted firm said, it will be “a border 

drive,” with its sides “merging naturally with the flattish floor of the park.”

Park Design.

Olmsted Bros. said Maryland’s Rock Creek Park serves primarily “regional rather than 

local purposes.” Such local uses as “tot lots” and neighborhood playgrounds, therefore, it 

said, “should not, in spite of their values per se, be allowed to encroach seriously on the 

broader over-all values of a naturalistic park of this type and importance.” 

On that premise, it proposed four major new recreational areas:

Near East-West highway and Jones Mill road; just north of the parkway near 

Forest Glen; near Wisconsin avenue north of the point the belt road leaves the 

park; in a northern park portion paralleling Wisconsin avenue opposite Saul road 

and Everett street.

Plan Includes Ponds. 

The latter three play areas include large ponds suitable for boating and fishing. The 

recreation provisions include playgrounds, baseball diamonds, court games, archery, and 

outdoor theatrical area and craft buildings.

In the northernmost portion of the park at Garrett Park road near Wisconsin avenue, the 

riding stable would be located. 

Park Access.

Driving access from the parkway to the park would be provided at Forest Glen, Cedar 

lane, Wisconsin avenue and Connecticut avenue. 

Pedestrian overpasses of the parkway would be provided “for the convenience of adjacent 

householders” near Wisconsin avenue, at Kensington parkway and at Forest Glen. 

Beach Drive.

Instead of Beach drive across the East-West highway and northward into the park, it was 

suggested that Jones Mill road be widening and improved to link with Beach drive in the 

Forest Glen area.

Beveridge summarized three points about Beach drive: 
1. The present gap between Connecticut Avenue and Cedar Lane should be closed. 

2. Beach Drive should be relocated north of the creek where the drive extended south of the 

creek between Connecticut and Wisconsin Avenues, and 

3. The drive should be extended from its terminus at Wisconsin Avenue to Garrett Park 

Road to open that part of Rock Creek Park to more use. 

Exclusive of the cost of the roadway, the improvements included in the plan would cost an 

estimated $1 million. [Beveridge, George, “Park Belt Road Put to Planners For Approval,” The 

Evening Star, June 9, 1954] 

NCPC began considering the plans on June 10. The commissioners also were considering a 

letter from the Maryland State Roads Commission regarding its plans. The letter said that as 

traffic increased, the road might have to be widened. Congestion might increase, the roads 

commission explained, because the Inter-County Belt Freeway would carry traffic from the 

southeast leg of U.S. 240 through about a mile of the park. The roads commission would deed 

certain parcels of land to the Maryland planning commission. Trucks and commercial vehicles 

would be banned. State and county officials would maintain and police the road. The roads 

commission would submit detailed contract drawings and specifications to NCPC for review. 

The statements in the letter, the roads commission said, were “a firm commitment.”

The Maryland-National Capital and Planning Commission firmly committed to the recreation 

and other park developments proposed by Olmsted Brothers. [Beveridge, George, “Planners 

Delay Action to Study Park Belt Road,” The Evening Star, June 10, 1954] 

On June 11, NCPC conditionally approved the Olmsted Brothers’ plans for passage of the road 

across the park. NCPC also indicated it would not object to linking the southeast leg of U.S. 240 

to the belt freeway west of Wisconsin Avenue and outside the park. The approval also was given 

with the understanding that the Maryland roads commission would not build a road south of the 

park to carry U.S. 240 traffic from the belt freeway to East-West Highway.

Because the pending court case involved only the belt freeway, Federal attorneys planned to 

move quickly to present the plan to Judge McGuire. However, officials of the Maryland roads 

commission were reportedly “fighting mad” about NCPC’s condition rejecting the link of the 

southeast leg to East-West Highway. They contended that in the November 1953 exchange of 

telegrams between the roads commission and Bartholomew, he had not indicated any objection 

to the link outside the park. Further, Olmsted Brothers had included an interchange in the plan 

for the connection where the belt freeway dipped south of the park about a mile east of 

Wisconsin Avenue. 

While planners and road officials reacted to NCPC’s “bad faith” action, attorneys involved in the 

court case pointed out that in the end, NCPC did not have any jurisdiction over what happened 

outside the park. Even with the NCPC condition, Watkins of the Maryland planning commission 

considered the decision a “clear-cut approval” for the belt freeway. The linkage between the 

southeast leg of U.S. 240 outside the park was a “matter for the future.” [Beveridge, George, 

“Road Decisions By Planners Renew 2 Fights,” The Evening Star, June 11, 1954] 
On June 30, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission began displaying the 

Olmsted Brothers’ model in the commission’s Silver Spring office at 8500 Colesville Road. The 

model, which cost $7,500, would remain available for public review until July 12. It would then

be transported to the U.S. Federal Court for the District of Columbia. [“Maryland Planners Have 

$7,500 Model Of Belt Road in Park,” The Evening Star, June 30, 1954] 

After meeting with other roads commissioners regarding NCPC’s condition on the southeast leg, 

Chairman McCain sent a telegram to NCPC:

If press release of your resolution of yesterday dealing with inter-county beltway is 

correct, we cannot concur with exceptions designated as A, B, and C, as these three 

sections involve areas outside of park lands, where full jurisdiction is vested in the State 

of Maryland. 

We believe plans submitted are in full accord with your prior commitments. I am 

authorized to state that these views are unanimously concurred in by the members of the 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. 

The goal of the telegram was to get on the record that the roads commission did not in any way 

agree with NCPC’s conditions. [Beveridge, George, “Roads Officials Ponder Move For 240 

Link,” The Evening Star, June 12, 1954] 

Judge McGuire set July 15 for final arguments in the court case, but Maryland roads and 

planning officials were still angered by NCPC’s condition. On June 16, NCPC’s meeting 

included what Beveridge called a “scathing attack” by Maryland officials. Watkins, chairman of 

the Maryland planning commission and a member of NCPC, read a “strongly worded prepared 

speech” arguing that the southeast leg conditions imposed “a grave threat” to the belt freeway. 

He argued that the schedule for constructing the $29 million belt freeway in the next 4 years was 

threatened because the Maryland roads commission “might not be able to maintain the present 

priority” in view of needs elsewhere.

Bartholomew responded that the condition related to the southeast leg was entirely consistent 

with NCPC’s longstanding opposition to encroachment by U.S. 240 on the park. NCPC, he said, 

was prepared to approve, without conditions, the belt freeway design in the park and a 

connection for U.S. 240 west of Wisconsin Avenue and outside the park. He pointed out that as 

an urban planner (and a member of the National Interregional Highway Committee that prepared 

the 1944 report to Congress on Interregional Highways), he was one of the country’s foremost 

advocates of circumferentials; he strongly favored the Inter-County Belt Freeway. However, the 

design, he said, raised questions about whether the belt freeway was a “true belt distributor 

route.” 

Gingery defended the plan to use “this measly 3,000 feet of park” for the southeast leg because of 

the expense of building it through private residential areas in Bethesda. He contended that 

NCPC’s ulterior motive was the fear that the District would continue the road through Rock 

Creek Park to downtown Washington. 
Engineer Commissioner Prentiss, also a member of NCPC, replied that the District did have such 

a route in its long-range plan, but not in its work program for the next 10 years. 

At Watkins’s request, NCPC voted unanimously to support construction of the belt freeway 

through the park. [“Belt Route Suit Dismissal Plea Set for July 15,” The Evening Star, June 17, 

1954] 

The hearing on the belt freeway was extended to July 27 to allow plaintiffs’ attorney time for 

additional depositions. 

Judge Edward A. Tamm, instead of Judge McGuire, conducted the hearing. As in the past, the 

definition of “parkway” was in dispute. Barse had said, “The word ‘parkway’ has been accepted 

so widely and used by so many agencies that now it means a hundred different things.” The 

Olmsted Brothers’ development plans for the surrounding area were “all window-dressing to try 

to make this highway fit the category of some sort of parkway.” This segment, Barse pointed 

out, was part of a 36-mile beltline completely encircling Washington. It was, simply, a “major 

highway” except for the 2.5-mile segment through the park.

Gasch said NCPC’s action was consistent with its responsibilities by adding conditions to its 

1950 approval. With those conditions, parkways were, in NCPC’s view, a “harmonious park 

use.” 

Northrop responded that calling the belt freeway a parkway was “just a rose called by another 

name, and its purpose is not changed in any way.” He warned that the project was the “opening 

wedge to the destruction of our park system.” 

After hearing arguments for 3 hours, Judge Tamm dismissed the suit, finding that NCPC had 

acted within its legal rights in approving the use of parkland for the Inter-County Belt Freeway. 

The arguments by both sides, he said, raised “a number of collateral issues,” but he based his 

finding on congressional action. He referred to laws dating to 1924, as cited by Gasch, as the 

source of NCPC’s authority. 

As for the plaintiffs’ argument based on conditions placed on sale of the Parkwood land, Judge 

Tamm advised Barse that this question might better be considered by a Maryland court. 

Barse stated that he and Northrop would appeal the ruling and asked for an injunction to halt 

construction while the appeal was underway. Judge Tamm denied the request. [Beveridge, 

George, “Appeal Planned With Dismissal Of Parkway Suit,” The Evening Star, July 28, 1954] 

Compromise – Pure and Simple

That Saturday, July 29, in his “This Week in Area Planning” column, Beveridge began: 

No matter what happens from now on between Washington’s planners and road builders, 

this qualifies as the week of the big compromise.
For years motorists have been watching a frustrating running battle over major bridge and 

highway needs. At times the fights have become almost too complicated to follow. And 

traffic conditions got steadily worse. But within a few days, a basic agreement turned up 

this week that could serve as a blueprint of future improvements for years to come. 

During the week, the Senate had agreed on construction of the Constitution Avenue Bridge just 

upriver from Arlington Memorial Bridge as well as a bridge at Jones Point for the area’s outer 

circumferential:

Key to the agreement was a general resolution of what will make up the so-called “innerbelt” system of roads around the center of town. The new [Constitution Avenue] bridge, 

and others agreed to tentatively, will feed directly into the belt. And the belt itself—

designed to feed traffic directly to whatever major street the motorist wants to hit—will 

make up some of the most expensive projects in the city. 

It all came about through compromise—pure and simple. Generally, highway officials 

can see the new routes they want. The plan also preserves the planning principles that 

have started much of the squabbling. 

Beveridge added that, “There’s no evidence the bickering is over,” since fighting over details was 

likely:

But, at least, for the first time highway officials have an accepted plan into which the 

details of specific improvements can be worked out as the city can afford to pay for them. 

Also during the week, the bill to establish a presidential commission to study all phases of area 

transportation problems “came to life.” It had passed the House in 1953, but the Senate had 

added a second commission to regulate bus operations between the District and Maryland. 

“House-Senate conferees revised the bill Thursday and accepted both commissions.” Chances 

for approval by the House and Senate before adjournment were good. 

Then there was the “bitter issue of new roads in Rock Creek Park.” Two important decisions had 

occurred during the week on this issue, “with highway enthusiasts coming out on top in both.” In 

the first decision, NCPC approved plans to extend Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway from its 

Calvert Street terminus to link up with Beach Drive just south of Klingle Road. Plans included a 

four-lane tunnel through a rocky hill to get traffic around the eastern edge of the National 

Zoological Park. The extension would be four lanes as far as the Harvard Street entrance to the 

zoo, then two lanes wide to the merge with Beach Drive. “Construction is likely to start next 

year.”

Finally, Beveridge highlighted Judge Tamm’s finding on the Inter-County Belt Freeway across 

Rock Creek Park:

Judge Tamm based his ruling on a single point of law—upholding the Planning 

Commission’s right to approve the belt road construction in the park. 
But he chastened both sides lightly for “costuming” the facts in “a pageantry type of 

display,” and added: 

I am surprised that counsel on neither side has referred to “the forest primeval, the 

murmuring pines and hemlocks,” because that seems to be the sentiment that 

prevails in this argument. [Beveridge, George, “New Belt Accord Eases Traffic 

Ailments in Area,” This Week in Area Planning, The Evening Star, July 31, 1954; 

“Road Extension Plan Approved For Rock Creek,” The Evening Star, July 29, 

1954. Judge Tamm was quoting the opening line of Henry Wadsworth 

Longfellow’s 1847 poem, “Evangeline: A Tale of Acadie.”] 

(According to the NPS historic resource study of Rock Creek Park, construction of the Rock 

Creek tunnel was still a few years off:

The impediment of sharp curves and periodic high water levels, which closed the fords on 

the road in the National Zoological Park grounds, limited the speed and reliability of the 

route in the 1930s and 1940s. Highway advocates had anticipated the bottleneck and 

began lobbying for a tunnel link under the zoo as early as 1933. Park planners concerned 

with the impact of a traffic artery on the character of the park delayed the project. 

However, as part of the Mission 66 park improvement program commemorating the 50th

anniversary of the National Park Service, a tunnel and road segment was built and opened 

under the zoo in 1966. The Service later regretted their support of this project because it 

greatly expanded commuter use of park roads. Today more than 10,000 cars daily utilize 

Beach Drive as a connecting route from Maryland into downtown Washington. 

[Bushong, page 145]) 

On September 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ request for an injunction to block 

construction in the park until their appeal was decided. This decision prompted the Maryland 

State Roads Commission to consider developing contract plans for the Inter-County Belt 

Freeway through the park. Legal counsel, according to McCain, advised the commission that 

rejection of the injunction put the matter “right where it was before the suit was filed.” He 

continued: 

In view of that, the commission has directed its chief engineer to instruct consulting 

engineers to proceed as rapidly as possible in connection with completion of detailed 

contract plans for the construction of the inter-county belt parkway which involves the 

use of certain parklands. 

McCain also advised the engineers to work closely with Olmsted Brothers on the final contract 

designs. 

He declined to tell reporters whether the park section would be the first portion of the belt 

freeway to go to construction. [Beveridge, George, “Decision Due On Quick Start Of Park 

Route,” The Evening Star, September 18, 1954; “Maryland to Hasten Plans for Contract On Belt 

Parkway,” The Evening Star, September 23, 1954] 
An Election Issue

Soon, the issue became part of the gubernatorial election between Governor McKeldin and his 

Democratic opponent, Dr. Byrd, who had resigned as president of the University of Maryland 

after 18 years to run for Governor. The Star said of Dr. Byrd: 

He has been assailing his opponent’s road policies in recent weeks, claiming excessive 

fees were paid to engineering consultants and implying favoritism with high real estate 

commissions to a former member of the State roads group. 

On October 20, during a campaign appearance in Rockville, he told reporters, “I would appoint a 

new commission if I am elected.” One of the issues he cited in Montgomery County was the 

need for a belt highway around Washington “with broad avenues leading into the city.” As the 

Star noted, the McKeldin administration was working on such a project. In reply to a reporter’s 

question, Dr. Byrd declined to state a position on extension of U.S. 240’s southeast leg to EastWest Highway. He said the issue was a local one that county residents should decide. [Preston, 

Alex R., “Byrd Pledges New Roads Commission in Maryland,” The Evening Star, October 21, 

1954; “Dr. Byrd Retires, Symons Heads U. of Maryland,” The Evening Star, January 4, 1954] 

With the issue raised, Governor McKeldin responded by telegram to an inquiry from State 

Senator R. Lofstrand, Jr., of Rockville: 

I have just been informed today that an alternate plan on Route 240 has been submitted to 

the Maryland State Roads Commission and the Maryland National Park and Planning 

Commission which would permit the southeast leg of proposed 240 to reach East-West 

highway without jeopardizing Rock Creek Park. 

I shall direct that the State Roads Commission consider this plan in the light of my desire 

to save the Rock Creek Park.

The chief engineer of the State Roads Commission has just informed me that there has 

been no attempt at any land acquisition which would be determinative of the route in 

question, and I have directed that there be no steps taken for any such land acquisition 

until the matter is finally and I trust satisfactorily concluded.

Initially, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission told reporters it was not 

aware of such an alternative plan. Roads commission officials could not be reached for 

comment. [“Alternate Plan For Route 240 Being Studied,” The Evening Star, October 31, 1954] 

With the election only 2 days away, Dr. Byrd issued a telegram promising that, “If elected, I will 

find a way of avoiding the use of Rock Creek Park such as the present Republican administration 

contemplates . . . .” He also said he detected “a change of heart . . . in the Governor’s eleventhhour telegram,” which he said amounted to “political trickery.” 

By this point, reporters had figured out that the alternative plan Governor McKeldin mentioned 

in his telegram had been submitted by Washington attorney Ernest F. Henry, a civic leader who 

lived near the parklands in question. His alternative plan, which he had submitted several 
months earlier, was to build the belt freeway over mostly undeveloped private land south of the 

park. The Maryland State Roads Commission and the Maryland-Capital Planning and Park 

Commission had rejected the plan at the time. 

Senator Nye sent a telegram to Governor McKeldin seeking clarification on “apparent 

inconsistencies.” The inconsistencies were prior rejection of the plan supposedly under study 

and whether land was being acquired for the belt freeway. Senator Nye also asked Governor 

McKeldin for a more definite stand on the location of the belt freeway and the southeast leg of 

U.S. 240. 

The former Senator also sent a telegram to Dr. Byrd thanking him for “your forthright 

statement.” His group, the Citizens’ Action Committee for Fair Road Planning, had printed 

circulars reminding voters to “stand by our friends,” with Dr. Byrd instead of Governor 

McKeldin listed. [“Park Highway Becomes Issue In Campaign,” The Evening Star, November 1, 

1954] 

The night before the election, Governor McKeldin replied by telegram indicating he would 

support any alternative that would be feasible based on cost, engineering, and traffic benefit. But 

as George Beveridge would say, “his wire didn’t indicate he thought there was much prospect 

anyone would submit such an alternate.” 

On November 2, 1954, Governor McKeldin became the first Republican Governor of Maryland 

to win reelection. Although the mid-term national election went strongly Democratic in 

Maryland and elsewhere, Governor McKeldin won by around 60,000 votes. As a sign of the 

strength of Democrats in 1954, Governor McKeldin’s running mates lost the race for Attorney 

General to Democrat C. Ferdinand Sybert, and for Controller to J. Millard Tawes. (The Attorney 

General was the number two person on each party’s ticket. Maryland’s constitution of 1867 had 

abolished the position of Lieutenant Governor and it was not reinstated by constitutional 

amendment until 1970.) 

In Montgomery County, Governor McKeldin won the race by 5,000 votes, but Democrats “swept 

into office yesterday, capturing all local offices except one seat in the House of Delegates after 

eight lean long years,” as the Star put it. Among the winning Democrats was Edward S. 

Northrop, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs in the Rock Creek Park case, who defeated State 

Senator Lofstrand. [Goodwin, Gene, “Byrd Defeated By Margin of 60,000 Votes”; Hoffman, 

Charles L., “Democrats Win All But 1 Office in Montgomery,” both from The Evening Star, 

November 3, 1954] 

Summarizing the election results, George Beveridge speculated in his weekly planning column: 

Despite a brave effort, last Tuesday’s election apparently didn’t net anything for the band 

of nearby Maryland residents who are trying to block construction of the new inter-county 

belt road in Rock Creek Park near their homes. 

If anything, in fact, their prospects may have become a bit bleaker. 
They had pressured Governor McKeldin for months regarding use of the park for the belt 

freeway and the southeast leg of U.S. 240, but backed Dr. Byrd in the election. When Governor 

McKeldin raised the prospect of an alternative plan that had, as it turned out, been rejected 

months earlier, project opponents praised Dr. Byrd and demanded clarification from the 

Governor. 

Beveridge concluded with the observation that “Dr. Byrd, who lost the election, won’t have the 

job of living up to the flat commitment he made to find” an alternative. [Beveridge, George, 

“Election Seen Dimming Plan To Block Belt Road in Park,” This Week in Area Planning, The 

Evening Star, November 6, 1954] 

Undeciding

Citizens groups continued to express their views. Shortly after the election, the North Cleveland 

Park Citizen’s Association sent a letter to Governor McKeldin opposing construction of the 

southeast leg of U.S. 240 in Rock Creek Park as well as extension through the park in the 

District. [“Opposition to Route 240 Extension to Park Voted,” The Evening Star, 1954] 

Meanwhile, members of the Rollingwood Citizens Association in eastern Chevy Chase were 

concerned by reports that the terminus south of East-West Highway would point the highway 

directly at Rollingwood Elementary School just west of Rock Creek Park. On December 6, 

officials of the Maryland State Roads Commission attended a meeting with a standing-room-only 

crowd of 300 Rollingwood residents to assure them that the area south of East-West Highway 

near the school was not in any danger. The officials read a joint statement from the roads and 

planning commissions indicating that the routing of the southeast leg would not be decided for 

60 to 90 days. 

The statement denied that land was being reserved for the leg south of East-West Highway, as 

the residents had heard. As McCain put it, “The whole idea has been pigeonholed.” In fact, the 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission had approved a plat for a subdivision 

in the area south of East-West Highway. 

Governor McKeldin, according to the statement, had directed the roads commission by telegram 

to restudy the southeast leg. The delay would allow engineers to complete plans for projects 

scheduled to be advertised in the near future: 

It is obvious that until this additional study is completed, the State Roads Commission is 

not in a position to make any comments or commitments with respect to the location of 

U.S. Route 240. 

The restudy, McCain made clear, did not preclude the original terminus at East-West Highway 

near Beach Drive.

Harry Thompson of the NPS informed the audience that his agency was unalterably opposed to 

the use of Rock Creek Park for an all-purpose highway. He believed that Congress would amend 

park legislation to define “parkway” in a way that would keep the belt freeway and U.S. 240 out 

of the park. 
Senator Nye addressed the audience in a 25-minute speech. He threatened to use his influence 

with Congress to secure a change in law that would keep major roads out of parks if the current 

plaintiffs lose their appeal. The announcement about approval of a subdivision south of EastWest Highway was just another attempt to gain support for construction of the road in the park. 

In addition, he continued his assault on Gingery, saying, “This thing is just as deep in the mud of 

politics as it can be put there by any one man.” [“Ruling Delayed On Exact Site Of Route 240,” 

The Evening Star, December 7, 1954] 

As 1955 began, the Maryland State Roads Commission committed $59.1 million to area roads, 

the “most concentrated in Washington area history,” according to the Star. This large amount in 

the overall statewide road plan of $242 million was because the area experienced the heaviest 

congestion and had many residential developments underway that would increase the cost of land 

acquisition for projects unless they could be advanced quickly. 

The commission did not include construction of the Inter-County Belt Freeway in the plan. The 

State hoped to begin construction in 1955, but decided to await court rulings before moving 

forward on construction of the road between Wisconsin Avenue and Georgia Avenue. The only 

construction contract on the segment thus far was for a bridge over Cedar Lane just inside the 

southern boundary of the park west of Wisconsin Avenue, while the State continued surveys, 

plans, and land acquisition for its 33-mile portion of the circumferential.

Key projects planned for 1955 included: 

• Improving River Road as a city street just beyond the District border through a heavilypopulated area, and as a dual highway to just beyond Goldsboro. The dual highway 

would eventually be extended to the southwest leg of U.S. 240 and an extension of 

Massachusetts Avenue.

• With construction of Washington National Pike underway to north of Falls Road near 

Rockville (9 miles), the State planned to extend the pike to Tuckerman Lane “and from 

there southeastward to Wisconsin avenue near Rock Creek Park.” Tuckerman Lane, 

therefore, would be the dividing point for the pike’s southeast and southwest legs. At 

Wisconsin Avenue, the southeast leg would connect at a big interchange with the second 

proposed inter-county belt freeway. Also at Tuckerman Lane, the southwestern leg of 

U.S. 240 would be built later southward to the Potomac River at Cabin John. [Beveridge, 

George, “Maryland Plans $59.1 Million For Area Roads,” The Evening Star, January 2, 

1955; Beverage, George, “D.C. Area Projects Taking Shape This Year,” The Evening 

Star, January 7, 1955] 

On January 26, Bartholomew wrote to the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission to request that “Maryland authorities continue to defer any further commitments on 

the inter-county belt parkway” before NCPC’s February 3 meeting. He did so after receiving a 

letter in December from Senator James E. Murray (D-Mt.), chairman of the Committee on 

Interior and Insular Affairs, indicating that the committee might inquire into the proposed use of 

Rock Creek Park for the belt freeway. Bartholomew expected to learn more before the NCPC 

meeting about Senator Murray’s plans. 
The Maryland planners replied on January 27 that they had made “very substantial contractural 

[sic] commitments,” particularly for the Cedar Lane bridge. At the same time, Maryland roads 

officials were developing detailed plans and acquiring right-of-way for the belt freeway. The 

planners wrote that they had no authority to require the roads commission to halt or delay work, 

especially since the U.S. Court of Appeals had declined to do so. 

The planners also pointed out that in 1954, Senator Guy Cordon (R-Or.), chairman of the 

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs before losing his reelection bid in November, had sent 

a similar letter the previous summer, but nothing had come of his inquiry. [“Senate Group May 

Probe Belt Road Project,” The Evening Star, January 28, 1955]

On February 1, Senator Murray went public on the Senate floor about his intentions. He 

introduced a resolution (S. J. Res. 36) that would require congressional authority for any road 

built in the District portion of Rock Creek Park. It also would forbid NCPC from approving any 

highway traversing the park and require it to “withdraw” any prior approvals. The purpose of the 

resolution was to provide a basis for hearings to determine whether current law was 

sufficient to preserve Rock Creek Park against encroachment of its intended purposes. In a 

statement inserted into the Congressional Record, he referred to former Senator Cordon’s 

concern about “the creation of a new six-lane speedway through Rock Creek Park,” adding: 

This modern superspeed highway, while bearing the name of a “parkway,” would of 

course destroy, in its area of the park, the scenic and recreational purposes for which the 

park was intended. 

Senator Cordon’s inquiry into the matter had not been concluded when Congress adjourned in 

1954, but the reports he received “indicate that the threat to the park may be very real indeed.” 

Senator Murray praised the “great vision exercised back in 1890 when Congress made possible 

the creation and continued existence of Rock Creek Park” from the National Zoological Park to 

the north District line. He pointed out that the Capper-Cramton Act of 1930 made possible 

extension of the park into Maryland: 

Some of the finest residential subdivisions in metropolitan Washington have been 

developed along each side of Rock Creek Park. These extended acres of Rock Creek 

Park, were they still in private possession, could not be purchased today for 100 times the 

cost that was involved when the ground was acquired 20 years ago. 

Congress “could not wisely deny the use of Rock Creek Park for crossings by commercial 

highways.” Many such crossings existed: 

But Congress ought to give most serious consideration to the challenge which now 

prevails in the form of plans which would let expressways and speedways (in this modern 

day sometimes called parkways) not just cross the park but run through it lengthwise. 

That challenge allegedly exists at this time with respect to the reaches of Rock Creek Park 

both in the District and in Maryland. 
To supplement his concerns, Senator Murray introduced a letter from former Representative 

Cramton to NCPC dated June 8, 1954. Representative Cramton, who had been unsuccessful in 

his bid for renomination in 1930, was “very deeply concerned” about reports of “extensive superspeed highway encroachments” on the park. When he had come to Washington 40 years earlier, 

he wrote, he had been deeply impressed by Rock Creek Park in the District, but it was clear “that 

the charm and scenic values of the valley continued into Maryland.” The commission, at the 

time, “was greatly disturbed about the possible pollution and destruction of Rock Creek by 

reason of rapid developments of resident sections in Maryland.” 

With cooperation from the commission and Maryland officials, Representative Cramton and 

Senator Capper had created the legislation that allowed for extension of the park beyond the 

District line:

All of this was park planning, not setting aside a great valley as a possible site for a 4-, 6-, 

or 12-lane highway. And to open that valley today in any part of it to such superhighway 

use opens the door wide to ultimate destruction of the most beautiful park any capital city 

enjoys. There is an attempt in some quarters to call this wonderful park area a parkway. 

And when they do that they put all the emphasis on the second syllable and would have it 

become “way,” dropping all emphasis on “park.” It is not a parkway, and was never 

intended to be a parkway . . . . The Capper-Cramton law says nothing about extending a 

parkway. It does propose and does extend that great park for many miles not as an 

avenue [for] easy vehicle approach to a city that already has more street traffic than it can 

endure. 

Representative Cramton called on NCPC “to close the door with definiteness to any alluring 

proposals that involve preeminence of highway use in any part of this park.” The law anticipated 

that highways were needed for public use of the park, but pending proposals “would reverse the 

situation and make highway use preeminent.” 

Senator Murray concluded his statement by saying that pending the planned hearings, he wished 

that planning and highway authorities would “refrain from any action that could in any wise alter 

the present status of Rock Creek Park until such time as Congress shall have the opportunity to 

consider the subject and prospect from every angle.” [Preservation of Rock Creek Park, 

Congressional Record-Senate, February 1, 1955, pages 1032-1033; “Senate Move Asks Delay in 

Extending Route 240 Into Park,” The Evening Star, February 2, 1955] 

(Senator Nye claimed he had inspired Senator Cordon’s inquiry in 1954 and had spoken with 

Senator Murray in 1955 about continuing the inquiry. The NPS also had recommended hearings 

on the subject.) 

The target of the hearings appeared to be extension of the southeast leg of U.S. 240 through the 

park in the District “as tentatively planned by the District Highway Department,” not the eastwest crossing by the Inter-County Belt Freeway. A Star editorial saw Senator Murray’s planned 

hearing as possibly serving “a useful purpose,” especially since it would “help to clear up some 

of the misunderstandings surrounding the project.” The issue was “an old one, involving the 

weighing of modern traffic requirements against the natural desire to preserve park areas from 
encroachment.” The editorial urged Senator Murray to keep in mind that linking the Washington 

National Pike with downtown Washington “is an urgent need that cannot long be delayed.” The 

editorial concluded: 

If the committee can come up with some practicable alternative to the construction of a 

parkway approach through Rock Creek Park, it will have made a notable contribution to 

solution of a baffling problem. [“What Is the Alternative?” The Evening Star, February 3, 

1955] 

Harland Bartholomew was in town during this period. In a speech at a luncheon meeting of 

AAA’s District Advisory Board, he emphasized that a subway through the central business 

district for high-speed lightweight rail cars might be the answer to the area’s mass transportation 

problem. The area needed expressways, but in the future, the expressways might be flanked by 

room for the rail cars. The area also needed additional Potomac River bridges, including the 

Jones Point, Cabin John, and Roaches Run structures, as well as a ring of highways for 

crosstown traffic linking to the radial routes in and out of the city, and a complete parkway 

system, such as found in Westchester County, New York. He was disappointed that the Fort 

Drive intermediate ring was not being taken seriously, especially since 98 percent of the right-ofway had already been acquired. 

In another speech, to the Joint Committee on the National Capital, he stressed the importance of 

ring roads. He praised cooperation among planners and road officials for agreement on the inner 

loop network that would ring the congested central business district. The loop would correct a 

drastic need for “better crosstown traffic facilities.” The much needed outer circumferential, he 

said, was well along in Maryland, and he hoped the expected new funds for the Interstate System 

would spur Virginia to activity. [“Subway Is Called Possible Answer to D.C. Traffic Problem,” 

The Evening Star, February 2, 1955; “U.S. Proposals Seen Offering Hope for D.C. ‘Ring 

Roads,’” The Evening Star, February 3, 1955] 

Before Senator Murray could begin his hearings, Maryland scheduled construction to begin on 

the Cedar Lane overpass inside the park. The contract went to Ralph E. Mills Company of 

Salem, Virginia, for $143,000. Contractors were poised to begin clearing land on February 21. 

Roads commission officials stressed that they had let the contract in December and it had 

progressed “as any other project would.” They had not, they said, speeded it up to get work 

underway prior to Senator Murray’s hearings. 

In reporting on this development, Beveridge also discussed the status of the controversy. He 

explained that the Inter-County Belt Freeway was not really controversial. What was 

controversial was that the southeast leg of U.S. 240 was “bearing down on the Washington 

suburbs from Rockville.” He explained: 

The opponents contend the roads commission’s real interest is not in the belt road itself, 

but in gaining a means of shooting Route 240 traffic into the main part of Rock Creek 

Park in the District.
Beveridge summarized the history of the belt freeway, noting that it had been on the highway 

plans as far back as the 1940s, but located north of Rock Creek Park: 

At the end of the decade, however, the Maryland officials said, residential development 

had expanded to such a point that a suitable route could not be found. Also, they said, 

topography of the land was found to be not suitable. The National Capital Planning 

Commission, charged with approving park development, agreed. 

The first official map showing the belt freeway crossing Rock Creek Park was the 1950 

Comprehensive Plan adopted by the National Capital Park and Planning Commission. 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission added the belt freeway to its official 

highway plan in May 1953, having “decided that a carefully designed roadway would constitute a 

legitimate development of the park, opening it for wider public uses.” 

The State planned to build most of the Inter-County Belt Freeway in the final 8 years of 

Maryland’s 12-year plan. However, the State was advancing the section through Rock Creek 

Park between Connecticut and Wisconsin Avenues, NW., to be completed in the first 3 years. 

Beyond the Cedar Lane overpass project inside the park, the roads commission had acquired 

more than $1 million worth of right-of-way outside the park for the belt freeway and was 

negotiating for another $500,000 worth of property. The State was overseeing final touches for 

construction of the park segment of the freeway, with the expectation that the next construction 

project could be let in the summer. Plans were being developed in conjunction with Olmsted 

Brothers. Beveridge, George, “Inter-County Road Belt Work To Start Despite Park Dispute,” 

The Evening Star, February 20, 1955] 

The Murray Resolution

Senator Murray opened the hearing on February 25 in the large Senate caucus room to provide 

room for the many spectators. He explained that the purpose of the hearing was to determine if 

the Inter-County Belt Freeway and the southeast leg of U.S. 240 would harm the park in 

contradiction of the Federal interest.

However, he received a surprise from Maryland Senator Butler. In a letter that Senator Beall 

concurred in, Senator Butler accused the committee of intervening improperly in Maryland’s 

jurisdiction by attempting to block construction of the Inter-County Belt Freeway across the 

State’s section of Rock Creek Park.: 

Regardless of the merits of the plans . . . this is fundamentally an internal matter . . . . My 

state has complied with the provisions of the Capper-Cramton Act by obtaining the 

approval of the National Capital Planning Commission . . . . I respectfully suggest that 

this committee, by injecting itself into the controversy, may very well be considered to be 

invading the rights of the sovereign State of Maryland. 

Governor McKeldin submitted a lengthy letter, read by Commissioner McCain, objecting on 

similar grounds to congressional intervention. He cited the 1921 agreement in which Maryland 

agreed to pay two-thirds of the cost to acquire land for parks and that the parks would be 
developed by the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission subject to NCPC 

approval of the plans. 

Maryland, he said, had spent $1.6 million for Capper-Cramton Act parks, including Rock Creek 

Park extended, and $1.5 million for park development. The Federal share of the acquisitions was 

$851,000. Governor McKeldin concluded: 

The United States is both legally and morally bound by its contracts and it is not only 

illegal but wrong and immoral . . . to repudiate its obligations. 

For these reasons I earnestly suggest . . . that no change in the long-established 

contractual rights of the United States and this State and its citizens should or can be 

made without the full concurrence and official action of the General Assembly of this 

State and with my approval as Governor. 

Maryland Attorney General C. Ferdinand Sybert wrote to say that with the matter in court, the 

resolution was “to say the least, premature and untimely.” 

Harland Bartholomew, the first witness, insisted that NCPC’s approval of the belt freeway’s use 

of the park did not extend to use of the park by the southeast leg of U.S. 240: 

Mr. Bartholomew said there was a sharp distinction between building a heavy traffic road 

in a well established park such as Rock Creek in Washington and the ribbon-like stream 

valley park extensions in Maryland . . . . 

“I want to assure you the Planning Commission is extremely jealous of park values,” Mr. 

Bartholomew declared. “But it also is aware of severe traffic problems which must be 

solved.” 

In planning road systems, he said, it is not always possible to miss all the ribbon parks in 

the Metropolitan area, but he promised his group will “always insist on a competent park 

design before it gives approval.” 

NPS Director Wirth testified in support of the Murray resolution. He wanted to keep the belt 

freeway out of the park because as far as he was concerned, it was simply a stepping stone for 

routing the southeast leg of U.S. 240 along the western part of Rock Creek Park to the District’s 

downtown. 

Senator Russell B. Long (D-La.) asked Wirth about use of the park inside the District and how 

much a road would harm it: 

Mr. Wirth said only a small portion of Rock Creek, in acreage, was developed for active 

recreation such as golf and baseball. But he stressed the park was dedicated and set aside 

in 1890 as a wilderness area for city dwellers. “To that degree,” Mr. Wirth said, “all of 

the park is being used now.” 
General Grant agreed with Wirth, testifying that the belt road would violate the Capper-Cramton 

Act, which made no mention of building highways across park lands. He supported the Murray 

resolution because it simply “states explicitly” the intent of Congress in approving the CapperCramton Act. 

Senator Long replied that he could go along with preserving park values if the park were widely 

used. Otherwise, maintaining a wilderness in the city “may be trying to do more than you can,” 

in view of other needs, such as congestion relief. 

(Later, Senator Long told reporters that his wife pressured him to oppose the road because their 

home at 4740 Quebec Street, NW., in the Spring Valley section of the city was near the Maryland 

section of the park. “He added, laughingly, that he refused to do so and ‘ran into real trouble.’”) 

NCPC counsel William S. Cheatham told the committee that he doubted the legality of trying to 

force the commission to withdraw its approval for use of the park by the belt freeway. He 

mentioned the court ruling on the issue, still pending appeal. 

District Commissioner Samuel Spencer declined to comment on the Maryland portion of the 

park. However, he opposed requiring congressional authority for any road in the Washington 

segment of Rock Creek Park, calling the requirement “unnecessary . . . and burdensome on 

Congress.” In any event, because NPS controls the park in the District, city officials would need 

approval by NPS and NCPC before construction of a road could begin on park grounds. The 

proposal to build the U.S. 240 extension through the District’s park, he said, was not in the city’s 

10-year public works plan, so it was at least a decade from being proposed, yet alone built. 

Chairman C. Melvin Sharpe of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City supported the 

resolution because it was “not necessary to appropriate dedicated park land for highways.” For 

the record, he read letters from former Representative Cramton opposing such use. 

At the start of the second day of hearings, on February 26, Senator Murray responded in a 

statement to Senators Butler and Beall by declaring that the hearing was “in no way involved” 

with Maryland’s sovereign rights. Senator Murray pointed out that in the District and Maryland, 

Rock Creek Park was “part of our national park system.” He had received “several hundred 

letters” from around the country protesting use of the park for the belt freeway, including letters 

from park groups in Belgium and Japan. 

J. Bond Smith, counsel for the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, told 

the panel that the 1931 agreement between Maryland and the Federal Government was a “solemn 

contract.” Because Maryland had complied with the terms of that agreement, Congress should 

not change the rules after the fact. 

He added that Senator Nye “didn’t get interested until his house was threatened.” He was 

confident that no court would allow the resolution to be applied retroactively to the belt freeway 

project.

Senator Nye testified that routing the belt freeway across the park was purely a “hidden back 

door” for the road commission’s real desire “to build a high-speed expressway through the length 
of Rock Creek Park to downtown Washington.” They have never deviated from “this continuing 

plan” that would “ultimately destroy all of Rock Creek Park in Washington.” The committee 

was “the last court of resort to prevent a magnificent expressway from coming all the way down 

to the heart of Washington through Rock Creek Park.” When Senator Murray said the 

expressway into the city could be blocked if NCPC and NPS stood firm, Senator Nye replied, 

“Yes, but they would get their way piece by piece.”

He argued that the Maryland States Roads Commission was not really interested in the belt 

freeway; it had become interested only when NCPC blocked construction of U.S. 240 along the 

park. Maryland had begun construction of a single belt freeway bridge merely as a way to get 

U.S. 240 into the District along Rock Creek Park. If Congress allowed Maryland to build the 

belt freeway, “there is nothing anyone can do to prevent them from dipping down out of the park 

to the East-West Highway” and eventually into the city. “It may not be called Route 240, but 

there would be no way to keep Route 240 traffic off it.” 

In response to Smith’s assertion, Senator Nye said he lived nearly two miles from the proposed 

belt freeway and that U.S. 240 between the freeway and East-West Highway would be 300 feet 

from his home. “I could live with that,” he said. “I defy anyone to show I have a more selfish 

interest than contributing to preservation of the park.” 

As the Post reported, Senator Nye had some predictions: 

Nye said he favored a circumferential road around Washington, but not through the park. 

He predicted Maryland wouldn’t build any more than this one strip for 15 to 20 years. He 

also predicted that the promised truck ban on the park section would not stand up and that 

other plans to develop the park won’t materialize “in our lifetime.”

Maryland highway officials said he was wrong on all counts. The entire 32 miles of the 

circumferential road in Maryland will be completed within 12 years, they said. 

Other critics on the second day of the hearing included David R. Brower, executive director of 

the Sierra Club in California, and Senator W. Kerr Scott (D-NC), a former Governor of North 

Carolina (1949 to 1953). Brower said, “I hope Maryland and Congress won’t sacrifice so much 

in park values to gain so little, if anything in traffic movement.” Senator Murray appreciated 

Brower’s appearance because, “it seems to me you express the views of people throughout the 

country” on whether roads would destroy parks. 

Senator Scott said that during his term as Governor, the city of Raleigh had converted part of its 

park system to parking lots. The city now regretted that decision. “We should be very cautious 

before doing anything that could hurt the park.” 

In George Beveridge’s view, the hearings ended “in sharp conflict” over Maryland’s rights. 

Senator Murray had told Assistant Attorney General Joseph D. Buscher of Maryland that if the 

State’s legal position were correct, “I don’t think the resolution will be passed.” He emphasized, 

however, that he saw “no merit” in that position. Another question was whether the resolution, if 

approved, would affect the outcome in Maryland for the Inter-County Belt Freeway. Counsel 
Smith said he did not think so. “From a legal standpoint, whether this resolution is passed or not, 

I do not believe construction of the road is going to be stopped.” 

Afterwards, Senator Murray told reporters he had not made up his mind and had only wanted the 

issue to be explored in a hearing. However, he said he would not drop the resolution simply 

because Maryland officials objected to it. The question will “require a lot of thinking because 

whatever is done, someone will be affected.” He ordered “an intensive staff study” of the issues, 

including the legal issues Maryland raised. [Beveridge, George, “Butler Assails Senate Role in 

Belt Road Row,” The Evening Star, February 25, 1955; Beveridge, George, “Belt Road Plan 

Probe Defended By Chairman,” The Evening Star, February 26, 1955; “Senate Roll In Belt Plan 

Assailed At Hearing,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 26, 1955; Beveridge, 

George, “Belt Highway Inquiry Ends in Row on Rights,” The Evening Star, February 27, 1955; 

Lyons, Richard L, “Belt Route Called ‘Park Destruction,’” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, February 27, 1955] 

According to a Star editorial, “the target of the Murray resolution to restrict road construction in 

Rock Creek Park is as yet without form or substance.” The resolution was really about the plan 

to extend the southeast leg of U.S. 240 to downtown Washington through the park. “Any 

legislation to control or ban such a parkway before it is even on the planning boards is premature, 

to say the least.” However, if Congress is going to force Maryland and the District to reroute the 

Washington National Pike “through heavily builtup [sic] territory, or over present north-south 

thoroughfares that cannot be widened except at unacceptable cost,” the Federal Government 

should pick up the extra costs. 

The editorial concluded that the time to consider the impact is when a definite plan is developed 

for routing the southeast leg “from one end of Rock Creek Park to the other.” With that time still 

a good many years away, Senator Murray’s two-part resolution “ought to be put in a pigeonhole.” 

 [“Shooting at a Formless Target,” The Evening Star, March 1, 1955] 

That, in effect, is what happened. According to an NPS history of Rock Creek Park: 

The highway issue was thoroughly ventilated in a Senate hearing on the bill, which was 

not brought to a vote in either house . . . . [Mackintosh, Barry, Rock Creek Park: An 

Administrative History, History Division, National Park Service, Department of the 

Interior, 1985, page 87] 

Back to Court 

On March 1, the fight over the belt freeway was back in court. Barse filed a suit in Montgomery 

County Circuit Court on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. R. W. Brownell of 9702 Parkwood Drive in 

Bethesda abutting Rock Creek Park, seeking to block construction. The suit against the 

Maryland road and planning commissions raised basically the same issues as in the Federal court 

case, claiming the two commissions were “arbitrary and capricious” in approving the belt 

freeway route through Rock Creek Park. 
Judge Thomas M. Anderson ordered the two commissions to appear March 16 and “show cause” 

why he should not halt the project. Judge Anderson’s “show cause” order did not affect any 

work undertaken before the hearing. [“Taxpayer Seeks To Halt Work On Belt Road,” The 

Evening Star, March 2, 1955] 

After the parties responded, Judge Anderson scheduled further arguments for April 7. On that 

date, he declined to dismiss the suit as requested by the Maryland roads and planning 

commissions. 

On April 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued its decision on 

basically the same issues. It dismissed Judge Tamm’s finding upholding NCPC’s approval of 

plans to construct the Inter-County Belt Freeway across the Maryland extension of Rock Creek 

Park:

Since the litigation seeks to declare invalid and to enjoin the National Commission from 

continuing to approve plans for a project which will in fact be built and maintained by the 

Maryland [Planning] Commission and other Maryland authorities, we think the questions 

involved ought not to be decided without opportunity to the Maryland Commission to be 

heard as a party if that is possible. 

The Appeals Court ruling did not address whether NCPC had acted within its statutory authority. 

The ruling left open the possibility that plaintiffs could return to U.S. District Court for a new 

hearing, but the implication was that Maryland courts might be just as well suited to hear the 

case. [“State Role Seen In Road Fight,” The Evening Star, April 29, 1955] 

(Around this time, Maryland found that right-of-way acquisition required careful oversight. State 

Senator Northrop raised questions about the contract awarded to two real estate firms that split 

$750,000 in 7.5-percent fees for obtaining right-of-way for the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel. One of 

the firms was run by former Roads Commissioner David M. Nichols, who had resigned in 1954. 

More worrisome were allegations against Ben Du Pre, right-of-way engineer for the Maryland 

State Roads Commission. Commissioner McCain revealed that Du Pre had been suspended 

because of his activities in acquiring right-of-way in Montgomery County for the Washington 

National Pike. He was accused of tipping off land speculators about the State’s plans, receiving 

a percentage of commissions for land sold to the roads commission, and of being a part owner of 

land acquired from one of the speculators. [Associated Press, “Roads Agency Faces Quiz by 

Northrop on $750,000 in Fees,” The Evening Star, March 21, 1955; “Maryland Road Agency 

Legislative Probe Urged,” The Evening Star, June 30, 1955; “Highway Land Deal Case Goes To 

Jury Today,” The Evening Star, March 15, 1956] 

(According to the State roads history: 

Following an exposé, DuPre [sic] was discharged from state service and went to Mexico 

City, his native place. When brought back in 1956 under legal immunity as a state 

witness, he admitted his part in the transactions and that he was paid $8,500 for the 

advance information he supplied. The two real estate men who profited were convicted 
of conspiracy and fined . . . . The state’s ultimate loss, after recoupments of one kind or 

another, was approximately $12,000, according to a board of real estate appraisal . . . . 

The Legislature of 1956, at the request of the Commission’s Legal Department, moved to 

plug the loophole revealed by the DuPre case. A statute was passed providing for the 

preparation of plats or maps showing the location of new highways and the Commission’s 

valuation of each property concerned, such plats to be filed with the Commission “and 

not to be open to public inspection,” with certain exceptions. It was thought that such a 

procedure would prevent land grabs in the path of future highway construction. [A 

History of Road Building, pages 171-172] 

(Once the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 launched construction of the Interstate System, 

similar right-of-way schemes would be one of the main concerns raising questions about whether 

the “Greatest Public Works Project in History” was corrupt.) 

Meanwhile, Maryland was experiencing a fund shortfall of $25 million after the General 

Assembly had rejected Governor McKeldin’s tax program. State Senator Northrop headed the 

special committee established to investigate existing laws providing for mandatory increases in 

budget items, with the idea of removing some of them. The committee also was to examine 

distribution of State funds, including receipts from the gasoline tax and motor vehicle registration 

tax, among counties and municipalities. [Hoffman, Charles L., “Northrop Heads State Hunt for 

$25 Million,” The Evening Star, May 5, 1955] 

By the end of May, the Maryland State Roads Commission was facing a $21 million cutback. 

The cutback had several causes. Contracts underway were running $11 million over budget. The 

State Legislature, which deferred an increase in automobile registration fees, charged about 

$4.5 million in unanticipated, nonconstruction expenses against road construction funds. The 

State would have to pay $2.5 million for right-of-way acquisition on the Baltimore Beltway that 

Baltimore County was supposed to have paid; the schedule had been moved up to accommodate 

the opening of the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel in 1957. 

Ongoing contracts would not be affected. For example, the commission had advertised for bids 

on the Kenilworth interchange on a 50-acre site, a complex of cloverleafs and bridges linking the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway, the Washington-Annapolis Freeway, River Road and 

Kenilworth Avenue. The estimated cost of the interchange was $2 million. 

(On August 12, 1954, Commissioner McCain announced that the Washington-Annapolis 

Freeway, then completed between Annapolis and U.S. 301, would be called the John Hanson 

Freeway. On November 5, 1781, Hanson became the first President following ratification of the 

Articles of Confederation in March 1781. Maryland had been the last State, on March 1, 1781, to 

ratify the Articles to begin the “perpetual Union of the thirteen states of America.” Hanson’s 

selection as the country’s first President may have been a reward for his efforts in securing 

Maryland’s approval of the governing document. The position was mainly a ceremonial post that 

Hanson held for 1 year, the term the Articles had set for the position. A history of his service 

stated:
In his capacity as first president of Congress of the Confederation, Hanson established the 

first cabinet, consisting of secretaries of war, finance, foreign affairs, and state. 

Ironically, Hanson’s first use of the “Great Seal of the United States” was on a 1782 

commission authorizing George Washington to exchange war prisoners. Just days before 

he was to relinquish office, he issued a proclamation authorizing America’s first national 

Thanksgiving Day to be celebrated the last Thursday of every November. 

(Hanson had been in poor health during his 1-year term. He retired to his home in Frederick and 

died on November 15, 1783. [Gay, James Thomas, “Americans: ‘first president of the united 

states,’” American History, June 1999, pages 12-14] 

(Today, Hanson is largely forgotten outside the Washington area but the name of the first 

President of the United States survives on a school, a savings bank, other facilities and, of course, 

the Washington-to-Annapolis Freeway. In the Washington area, the freeway is sometimes

referred to as the John Hanson Highway rather than U.S. 50 or I-595, its official designations. 

[Associated Press, “Annapolis Highway Called John Hanson After 1776 Leader,” The Evening 

Star, August 12, 1954]) 

Several projects set for bids later in the year would be delayed until 1956. These projects 

included the contract to extend the Washington National Pike from Falls Road near Rockville to 

Tuckerman Lane and southeast toward an interchange with Wisconsin Avenue near Rock Creek 

Park. Contracts in 1955 would carry the pike only to Old Georgetown Road, northwest of 

Wisconsin Avenue. 

Roads officials emphasized that the pike project and others in the area were facing “temporary 

deferral.” The cutbacks, while regrettable, would not reduce expenditures during the course of 

the 12-year roads program. [Beveridge, George, “7 Highway Projects In D.C. Area Hit by 

Maryland Cutback,” The Evening Star, May 22, 1955; “Funds Cutback To Delay Roads,” The 

Evening Star, May 22, 1955] 

The Interstate Map

As discussed elsewhere, BPR released maps of urbanized areas throughout the country in 

September 1955 with black lines showing proposed Interstate routes. For the Washington area, 

the map included the circumferential in the general location of today’s Capital Beltway with its 

Potomac River crossings at Alexandria and Cabin John. The Washington National Pike/U.S. 240 

to Frederick crossed the belt freeway on a path to Glen Echo where it intersected a route along 

the Potomac River, roughly parallel to Canal Road, NW., to the planned Inner Loop freeway in 

the vicinity of the Constitution Avenue Bridge. District mileage totaled about 29 miles. 

The map did not include the southeastern leg of U.S. 240 or any arterial interchange in Maryland 

with the belt freeway between Greenbelt and the southwest leg of U.S. 240. The connection 

between Baltimore and Washington on the main East Coast route was accomplished by a freeway 

from Richmond, Virginia, running across the city as part of the Inner Loop Freeway to the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway via New York Avenue. A freeway along the east side of the 

Anacostia River began on the future Capital Beltway east of the Potomac River and ended at the 
Baltimore-Washington Parkway. In addition, a northern segment of the Inner Loop Freeway 

intersected the river route freeway before heading into Virginia in the direction of Strasburg. 

BPR said of the maps:

The present approval fixes only the general locations of interstate routes in the urban 

areas . . . . In many instances extensive studies of traffic needs, right of way costs and 

design problems must precede fixing the final location. [Douglas, Francis P., “Highway 

Links OK’s for D.C.,” The Evening Star, September 29, 1955] 

The absence of the southeast leg of U.S. 240 was a blow to Maryland, but Chairman McCain was 

undaunted. Appearing before the Rockville Rotary Club, he said Washington National Pike 

would open between Germantown and Rockville in the early spring of 1956. Contracts for the 

extension to Bethesda would be advertised in the early summer, with construction to begin in 

August. [“Rockville Pike Widening Due In 9 Months,” The Evening Star, November 20, 1955] 

On February 21, 1956, the Star carried a photograph of the completed Cedar Lane bridge over the 

headline: “Montgomery Bridge With No Place To Go.” The caption read: 

This newly completed bridge is the one to carry the intercounty belt road traffic across 

Cedar lane north of Bethesda. The bridge is ready, but that’s all. The contract for the 

first section of the beltway, a 2-mile stretch between Wisconsin avenue and Connecticut 

avenue, has not been let and no date set for receipt of bids. 

The Maryland State Roads Commission advertised for bids on the 2-mile section on April 18, 

1956. The contract covered drainage, grading, and surfacing for the Inter-County Belt Freeway 

from Wisconsin Avenue near Pooks Hill to Connecticut Avenue about 1,200 feet north of Jones 

Bridge Road. The work included grading for the “gigantic interchange,” as the Star called it, 

linking the belt freeway, existing Rockville Pike (extended Wisconsin Avenue), and Washington 

National Pike. [“Bids Asked for First Lap Of Inter-County Beltway,” The Evening Star, 

April 19, 1956] 

After the real estate scandal involving Washington National Pike, Governor McKeldin had 

established a Commission on State Programs, Organization and Finances headed by Baltimore 

attorney Harry J. Green. Based on the Green Commission’s findings, Governor McKeldin 

concluded, “Even more obvious has been the need for a strong hand of direction and authority in 

the affairs of the [Roads] Commission.” 

By then, the Maryland State Roads Commission was due for what Star reporter Gene Goodwin 

called a “long-rumored shake-up.” Part of the commission’s problem was inevitable; the projects 

in the 12-year program inconvenienced property owners and caused financial losses for many of 

them. The commission’s problems, Goodwin pointed out, “began shortly after the $568 million 

program was launched.” The feeling of distrust grew with the scandals involving real estate for 

the Washington National Pike and the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel. 
On May 21, 1956, Governor McKeldin announced that he had appointed Robert O. Bonnell, to 

become chairman of the Maryland State Roads Commission on June 15. Bonnell, a Baltimore 

banker, had been chairman of the Baltimore Aviation Commission during construction of 

Friendship International Airport, but had no experience in road building. The Governor also 

replaced one of the other two commissioners with John J. Mullen, a newspaper publisher from 

Cumberland. The third commissioner, former State Senator Edward T. Bennett of Wicomico 

County, remained in his position. “We need a general change in the system of administration and 

I feel it is best that we start out with an entirely new group of commissioners.” 

Where McCain had earned $10,000 a year as chairman of the commission, Bonnell would 

receive a salary of $25,000 in his new post. “Leaning back in his vice-president’s chair at the 

Fidelity-Baltimore National Bank & Trust Co.,” the 65-year old Bonnell told reporters: 

I’ve worked pretty hard all of my life and I must admit I had looked forward to relaxing a 

bit. But this assignment is just too much of a challenge to pass up. I hope I can do the 

job in a way that will be rewarding and helpful to the State. 

He added, “But I have nothing to lose. I don’t need the job nor the money and if it doesn’t work 

out, I’ll quit.” 

Bonnell would tighten procedures, particularly for right-of-way acquisition, but as the State roads 

history put it, “The work of the Twelve-Year Program progressed with unabated vigor.” 

[Associated Press, “2 Named to Posts In Roads Shakeup,” The Evening Star, May 21, 1956; 

Goodwin, Gene, “Road Group Poses Questions,” The Evening Star, May 27, 1956; Goodwin, 

Gene, “Bonnell Defies ‘Hot Spot’ In Maryland Road Post,” The Evening Star, May 28, 1956; A 

History of Road Building, pages 172-174] 

Construction on the belt freeway contract began in July, with the $980,000 contract to be 

completed in late 1957. The right-of-way followed the southern bank of Rock Creek on land 

approved by the Maryland-National Park and Planning Commission. To protect as many trees as 

possible, special crews had marked more than 100 trees bordering the right-of-way with white 

paint. The contractor was instructed to use gravel fill and rock walls if necessary to protect the 

marked trees. [“Inter-County Parkway Link Gets Under Way,” The Evening Star, July 11, 1956] 

As McCain had indicated, the roads commission advertised in late August 1956 for bids to 

extend Washington National Pike from Chestnut Street to Pooks Hill (1.3 miles) and to 

Grosvenor Lane (4.5 miles). From Grosvenor Lane, the pike had only a half mile to go to the 

interchange with Rockville Pike and the Inter-County Belt Freeway. [“Bids Sought On Pike 

Job,” The Evening Star, August 29, 1956] 

Interstate Program Gets Underway

By then, President Eisenhower had approved the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which 

launched construction of the Interstate System throughout the country. The legislation added 

1,000 miles to the Interstate System, bringing it to 41,000 miles, and made a national 

commitment to pay 90 percent of the cost to complete all the mileage to full Interstate standards.
BPR and AASHO had been working on design standards in anticipation of passage of the 

legislation, which called for adoption of uniform design standards for the Interstate System to 

accommodate projected traffic in 1975 – shortly after the entire program was to be completed. 

As with all such standards, AASHO’s Committee on Planning and Design Policies developed 

them with input from BPR, and then BPR adopted them. The standards adopted by BPR on July 

17, 1956, reflected “desirable minimum values” to ensure the new Interstates were “designed 

with control of access to insure their safety, permanence, and utility and with flexibility to 

provide for possible future expansion.” The 1956 design standards stated: 

Interstate highways shall be designed to serve safely and efficiently the volumes of 

passenger vehicles, buses, and trucks, including tractor-trailer and semitrailer 

combinations and corresponding military equipment . . . including attracted, generated, 

and development traffic on the basis that the entire system is completed.

The 1956 Act had provided maximum weight and width limitations for commercial vehicles 

using the Interstate System (with a “grandfather” clause for previously legal vehicles). “No funds 

authorized to be appropriated” were to be apportioned to States that violated these limitations. 

The standards focused on rural segments, with urban design standards almost a side issue. For 

example, design speeds were specified for flat (70 m.p.h.), rolling (60 m.p.h.), and mountainous 

topography (50 m.p.h.), with adjustments for terrain and development. “The design speed in 

urban areas should be at least 50 miles per hour.” Medians throughout the network were to be at 

least 16 feet wide, but narrower medians “may be provided in urban areas of high right-of-way 

cost.” Similarly, right-of-way width for rural Interstates was detailed in a table listing different 

numbers of lanes, but in urban areas the width “shall be not less than that required for the 

necessary cross-section elements, including median, pavements, shoulders, outer separations, 

ramps, frontage roads, slopes, walls, border areas, and other requisite appurtenances.” 

Immediately after the President signed the 1956 Act, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks 

announced apportionment of $1.25 billion in FY 1957 funds to the State highway agencies. On 

August 1, he apportioned FY 1958 funds, bringing the total apportioned Interstate construction 

funds to $2.55 billion. The funds were apportioned based on the same formula as the limited 

Federal-aid funds the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954 authorized for the Interstate System 

(two-thirds based on population, while area and post-road mileage counted one-sixth each). 

Beginning with FY 1959 funds, Interstate construction funds were to be apportioned based on 

each State’s share of the total estimated cost of completing the Interstate System. With this 

requirement in place, BPR began working with the State highway agencies to determine specific 

locations for the routes, including those in urban areas, and to estimate the cost of building them 

to full standards. 

By December 1956, Maryland roads officials and BPR were at odds on two routes. One involved 

the stretch of the Inter-County Belt Freeway crossing Rock Creek Park between Seminary Road 

and Bradley Boulevard. BPR had deferred approval of this section because the State planned to 

ban trucks on the parkway section of the circumferential. Under the 1956 Act, the Interstate 

System was intended to carry all traffic within legal load limits. The head of BPR, 
Commissioner C. D. Curtiss, said BPR “has not made a firm decision on whether the park 

portion could qualify.” 

The other dispute involved the 2.3-mile segment of Washington National Pike near Tuckerman 

Lane in Bethesda and Wisconsin Avenue at Rock Creek Park. Maryland’s Pritchett called it “the 

most critical road problem we have to resolve in the Washington area.” Tuckerman Lane was the 

dividing point for the southeast and southwest legs of the pike, but Maryland had not yet 

scheduled construction of the southwest leg. Construction to Tuckerman Lane was to be 

completed in 1958, but the lane was not a suitable end to U.S. 240. Pritchett said that without 

Interstate designation for the segment, “the road couldn’t be built for several years.” [Beveridge, 

George, “Snarl Threatens 2 Road Projects In Maryland,” The Evening Star, December 16, 1956] 

(Maryland and BPR also were disputing the location of the Interstate link between Baltimore and 

Washington. As will be discussed later, BPR wanted to designate an upgraded BaltimoreWashington Parkway as the link – the line shown in the 1955 black line map – thus reducing 

construction costs. Maryland roads officials vowed to wage a “continuous fight” for construction 

of a new link. [“Maryland Pledges Fight For New D.C. Expressway,” The Evening Star, 

December 16, 1956]) 

On January 15, 1957, Maryland and District officials met on the disputes with Federal Highway 

Administrator John A. Volpe, the first official to hold that newly created title for the head of 

BPR. (President Eisenhower had selected Volpe as interim Administrator until the permanent 

Administrator, Bertram D. Tallamy of New York, was able to take the post in mid-February 

following his confirmation by the Senate). He approved Interstate designation for extension of 

Washington National Pike between Tuckerman Lane and Wisconsin Avenue at Rock Creek Park. 

Maryland roads officials expected to award a construction contract for the extension later that 

year.

Officials discussed the southwest leg from Tuckerman Lane to Cabin John and a link to the 

District of Columbia. Maryland officials wanted to use the planned George Washington 

Memorial Parkway to carry traffic into the District. However, NPS officials, who planned to 

begin construction in the spring, were building the parkway to exclude trucks. They also were 

not bound by the design standards BPR had approved for the Interstate System. District 

commissioners had recently approved the extension within the District, and Volpe concurred. 

The link between the District line and the southwest leg was left open to additional studies that 

Maryland officials said would take about 3 months. 

Volpe left open the designation of the parkway connector between the Inter-County Belt Freeway

and the District line. 

In addition, officials discussed the Baltimore-Washington link, but left the location up in the air. 

Volpe approved Interstate designation of the District’s Anacostia Freeway and a portion of New 

York Avenue between Florida Avenue and Bladensburg Avenue, NE. [Beveridge, George, “U.S. 

Road Unit Okays Route For Expressway,” The Evening Star, January 16, 1957] 
On July 19, District, Maryland, and BPR officials convened at the Statler Hotel for a meeting 

called by Herbert C. Wells, chairman of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commission, to discuss the issues. The meeting lasted from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. in an attempt to 

reach agreement on the U.S. 240 and Baltimore expressway links to the District. 

The idea of continuing the southeast leg of U.S. 240 into the District via Rock Creek Park had 

been raised again in recent weeks. In response to the idea, NPS Director Wirth made clear that 

the Interior Department opposed any highway through the park. He distributed a letter from 

Secretary of the Interior Seaton promising to continue opposing any such construction. 

The southwest leg also was in dispute. The District had let a contract with Clarkeson 

Engineering Corporation to study a link separate from the George Washington Memorial 

Parkway. However, Commissioner Bonnell said the roads commission was opposed to any 

alternative to the parkway for the link: 

We are unalterably opposed to the construction of two facilities between Cabin John 

Creek and the D.C. line. Such a course would be useless duplication, economically 

unsound, trafficwise unjustified and would unnecessarily disturb and disrupt a large 

number of valuable properties occupied by tax-paying citizens of Maryland. 

With the District reportedly abandoning Rock Creek Park as a route for the southeast leg of 

Washington National Pike, the city’s focus was on the parkway entrance for the southwest leg. A 

“prominent possibility [was] a road through Glover-Archbold Park [that] would connect 

Wisconsin avenue above Van Ness street N.W. with MacArthur boulevard west of Georgetown 

University.” NCPC had approved the link through the park, but seven citizens groups in 

northwest Washington had denounced the approval as “arbitrary and unnecessarily hasty.” They 

wanted a hearing where they could protest the decision. 

The meeting also covered the new Interstate link that Maryland wanted to place between the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway and U.S. 29/Columbia Pike. “Maryland officials learned, many 

for the first time yesterday, from the District’s Mr. Robertson that the Federal City connection 

might not be planned as an interstate link.” The District had engaged the Clarkeson firm to study 

the question. 

Most issues remained unresolved, but participants agreed on the location of the Cabin John 

Bridge that would carry the circumferential across the Potomac River between Maryland and

Virginia. 

Further, in what participants considered a “major action,” they agreed to establish a 

cooordinating committee that would meet monthly to seek solutions to regional differences on 

highway locations. Officials agreed the action was “overdue.” Bonnell headed the committee.

After the meeting, Wells said, “It is possible we have made much progress.” Still, he was 

philosophical about the outcome. “One hundred years from today, there still will be problems 

about issues like those discussed here.” [“Parley Fails to Solve Link to Route 240,” The Evening 

Star, July 20, 1957] 
Glover-Archbold Park

The idea of building an expressway through Glover-Archbold Park was not new. 

In 1924, Charles O. Glover and Mrs. Anne Archbold offered 98 acres that they owned in the 

Foundry Branch Valley (Massachusetts Avenue to Reservoir Road, NW.) to the government

exclusively for park use. Congress acted in June to complete the purchase. Subsequently, the 

National Capital Park and Planning Commission expanded the park to provide recreation for the 

surrounding residential district. 

By the 1940s, the park, nestled among residential neighborhoods, seemed a perfect location for a 

freeway. The proposal was called the Arizona Avenue Freeway.

Arizona Avenue was named in 1893 as part of a subdivision that the Palisades of the Potomac 

Land Improvement Company developed beginning in 1890. [Stewart, page 68] The Palisades is 

a community located in the western corner of the District along the Potomac River at the city 

border with Maryland. Because of its location along the Potomac River, the Palisades has been a 

transportation hub from the start. It was crossed by Conduit Road, as mentioned earlier, the 

Chesapeake and Ohio Canal (reflected today in Canal Road), and the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad. It included the road to Chain Bridge. 

The Star’s “Affairs in Georgetown” column mentioned creation of Arizona Avenue in October 

1893: 

The proposed highway over the line of the Foundry branch sewer that is to run from the 

Loughborough road, near its junction with the Tenleytown road, to the Chesapeake and 

Ohio canal, at a point near the Independent Ice Company’s big warehouse, is to be 

designated as Arizona avenue. [“Affairs in Georgetown,” The Evening Star, October 12, 

1893] 

By the 1940’s, the District, like many cities, was developing a highway improvement program. 

One of the ideas to emerge from this process was the Arizona Avenue Expressway. The idea did 

not involve converting existing Arizona Avenue to an expressway, but creating an expressway 

with that name from the intersection of Wisconsin and Nebraska Avenues at Tenley Circle, 

through Glover-Archbold Park, to Canal Road near the Potomac River. It would provide a 

bypass of congested Wisconsin Avenue in Georgetown and remove through traffic from Foxhall 

Road. 

The 1946 plan submitted to Engineer Commissioner Young, discussed earlier, presented a plan 

for post-war highway improvements to take the District to the threshold of the 21st century. The 

plan included “somewhat lesser scale” improvements, such as “the opening of the valley along 

Arizona Avenue as a parkway to connect Canal Road with Wisconsin Avenue.” The 1946 plan 

was consistent in many ways with the 1941 plan, but studies since then “have changed the plan to 

some extent, in that the Arizona Avenue Parkway has been approved as a substitute for the 

formerly proposed improvement of Foxhall Road as the ‘major arterial highway’ to serve the area 

west of Connecticut Avenue . . . .” 
The pending approval of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1948, the first post-war reauthorization 

of the Federal-aid highway program, would affect the timing of projects. However, Young listed 

the Arizona Avenue Parkway for construction in 1950, with completion in 1951. [Twenty-Four 

Years of Progress, pages 74-76, 111-112, 114-115; Thompson, John W., Jr., “D.C. Heads Get 

Highway Plan Costing Millions,” The Evening Star, December 13, 1946] 

By 1947, the proposed Arizona Avenue Freeway/Expressway/Parkway was controversial because 

of its routing through the park, as the Star explained:

A new feud is developing between the District Government on one side and the National 

Park Service and National Capital Park and Planning Commission on the other . . . . 

Center of the controversy is the expressway the District Highway Department proposed 

building through Glover-Archbold Park . . . . [It] would be a dual roadway without lights 

or intersections and would meet the K street skyway now under construction. 

General Grant of the planning commission and NPS Associate Director Demaray were opposed 

for two reasons: 

1. The park, about half of which was donated to the Government by Charles C. Glover and 

Mrs. Anne Archbold for a children’s playground and neighborhood park, is needed, they 

claim, to provide recreation for the highly developed area through which it runs. 

2. The expressway, they maintain, would encourage more District residents to move to 

Montgomery County because it would make it easier for them to get downtown quickly. 

This, it is felt, would deprive the District of additional substantial taxpayers through the 

continued process of decentralization. [Kauffman, Rudolph II, “D.C. Planners Disagree 

on Expressway,” The Evening Star, July 6, 1947] 

Although the proposal was controversial, especially with park advocates, the Arizona 

congressional delegation was supportive. In December 1947, Senator Carl Hayden (D-Az.), who 

had been in Congress since 1912 and in the Senate since 1927, introduced a bill directing the 

District commissioners to prepare plans and construct the expressway with “suitable grade 

separations and interchanges at appropriate locations along Foundry Branch, following in general 

the line of Arizona avenue.” The bill also provided that Federal agencies were to transfer to the 

District any land needed for the freeway. This provision, if enacted, would resolve the dispute 

over the use of parkland. In addition, the bill renamed the project “Arizona Freeway.” 

Senator Hayden, long a major force on the Committee on Public Works, complimented the 

District Department of Highways for its initiative, which “clearly demonstrates the imperative 

necessity for construction of the Arizona Freeway.” He added that the proposal “is a fine 

illustration of advanced thinking in the highway planning field, where there is still time for 

corrections in the difficult traffic situation.” He added that Arizonans “had waited long enough” 

for a real District street with its name, instead of the “paper” street shown on maps.

Senator Hayden said the freeway would “not only be a credit to the name of my State, but will 

materially reduce the hazards to life on other routes of travel to and from the business and 
governmental sections of downtown Washington.” [Rogers, Harold B., “Hayden Bill Asks 

Developing of Arizona Avenue,” The Evening Star, December 21, 1947] 

Representative John R. Murdock (D-Az) introduced the bill in the House. He predicted that the 

freeway would be a “well-traveled boulevard to facilitate traffic and help motorists avoid 

congestion on other streets.” He added that, “Naturally, we feel that the youngest State in the 

Union ought to have this due recognition in the Nation’s Capital.” [“Arizona Avenue Freeway 

Bill Before Congress,” The Evening Star, January 7, 1948] 

His bill was assigned to the House District Committee, which held a hearing on the issue on 

January 13, 1948. Before the hearing, Chairman Everett M. Dirksen (R-Il.) received letters from 

Mrs. Ann Archbold, one of the original donors of the park, and from the son of the other donor, 

Charles Glover, who had died on February 25, 1936. Charles C. Glover, Jr., said that 

construction would “greatly mar the park and detract from its usefulness as a recreation area, the 

purpose for which it was given and accepted by Congress on behalf of the District.” His father’s 

donation, he said, was for a park and a children’s playground. 

Mrs. Archbold added that she also intended her gift for a bird sanctuary. She, like Glover, Jr., 

asked the committee “to prevent the destruction and desecration of the beautiful and natural 

valley of Foundry Branch by a commercial freeway.” [“Glover-Archbold Park Highway 

Protested,” The Evening Star, January 12, 1948] 

Representative Beall, chairman of the Subcommittee on Public Service, Streets and Traffic, 

conducted the hearing. Captain Whitehurst, who headed the District highway agency, and 

planning engineer Brinkley used maps and charts to explain the proposal. They explained that 

based on expansion of population and motor vehicles by 1990, the freeway was needed. They 

estimated the 31⁄4 mile freeway would cost between $3 million and $4 million. 

General Grant led the opposition. He explained the commission’s concern about the use of the 

park as a right-of-way and indicated that the commission might have a compromise proposal. 

The implication was that the compromise would be an “express parkway.” [Rogers, Harold B., 

“Glover-Archbold Park Freeway Plan Pushed, Assailed at Hearing,” The Evening Star, January 

13, 1948] 

The subcommittee approved the bill on February 4, changing only the name of the proposed 

highway to “Arizona Avenue” instead of “Arizona Freeway.” The bill called for the District 

Department of Highways to build the project instead of putting it under Federal control as 

recommended by the National Capital Park and Planning commission. Representative Beall said, 

“The District has a competent Highway Department and should have control.” [“Arizona 

Avenue ‘Freeway’ Approved by House Unit,” The Evening Star, February 4, 1948] 

In March, Chairman Dirksen said he was holding the bill for further study. He had met with the 

National Capital Park and Planning Commission, which recommended construction of a 

parkway, and representatives of the original donors of the park. He wanted to look into the issue 

in greater detail. 
Representative Beall postponed a March 23 inspection tour for subcommittee members. He 

stated that not enough members were able to take the tour that day to make it worthwhile. He 

planned to reschedule the tour, but does not appear to have done so. [“Glover Park Highway Bill 

Held for Further Study,” The Evening Star, March 19, 1948; “Beall Defers Inspection Of 

Proposed Parkway,” The Evening Star, March 23, 1948] 

On April 16, NPS and the District of Columbia approved a memorandum of agreement 

containing stipulations for developing Arizona Parkway between Canal Road and Van Ness 

Street in Glover-Archbold Park. The agreement’s series of “whereas” provisions referred to the 

District’s acquisition in March 1893 of a 100-foot right-of-way for the Foundry Branch highway 

that was “not adequate either in its location or width to construct a properly designed highway 

and to properly serve traffic and provide for adequate access to the park areas.” 

The District, another “whereas” stated, was willing to change the name of the highway from 

“Arizona Avenue” to “Arizona Parkway.” The parkway “can be made to serve as an access to 

the park so as to permit of the full enjoyment of the property for park purposes and at the same 

time supply the needs for traffic in this section.” All parties agreed that an all-purpose highway 

was not necessary; the parkway would be restricted to passenger-car traffic.

The agreement acknowledged the District’s view on the “necessity for a traffic-way between 

Canal Road and Wisconsin Avenue in the vicinity of Tenley Circle, with appropriately developed 

connections with the K Street Elevated Highway currently under construction and with suitable 

grade separation structures and traffic interchanges at appropriate locations.”

In view of these and other considerations, NPS agreed to make available sufficient right-of-way 

within the park for Arizona Parkway. Any land made available, but not needed, would be 

returned to the park. The District would construct the parkway, but consult with NPS during 

each stage, including preparation of plans, the width of the roadway, and the location and layout 

of access roads. The NPS would be primarily responsible for the “architectural design of bridges 

and other structures, including retaining walls and guard walls, and rate and shape of slopes in 

cuts and fills, the landscape development of the right-of-way, the location and design of park 

areas outside the curb limits of the parkway surface areas.” The District would request PRA 

participation in the project on a 50-50 basis under the Federal-aid highway program. 

Captain Whitehurst told reporters that the city entered into the agreement with the understanding 

that PRA would provide 50 percent of the cost. He could not yet estimate the total cost. 

However, with the agreement, the city could begin developing the plans and specifications, but 

he doubted construction could get underway for another year or more. 

One impact of the agreement was that legislation was no longer needed. Congress would not 

take further action on the Hayden-Murdock bill. [“District, Park Service Reach Agreement on 

Arizona Parkway,” The Evening Star, April 16, 1948; the agreement can be found in District of 

Columbia Appropriation Act, 1960, Congressional Record-Senate, May 26, 1959, pages 9094-

9095] 
President Truman approved the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1948 on June 29. The legislation 

authorized $450 million in Federal-aid funds for each of FYs 1950 and 1951. The District’s 

share of the funds amounted to $5,288,000 each year. Captain Whitehurst was ready with 16 

projects to advance with the funds, including: 

Arizona avenue from Canal road to Wisconsin avenue, including structures, paving and 

channelization, total cost, $3,800,000, estimate of the amount included in this program, 

$990,000. [“District Eligible For 5 Millions In Road Funds,” The Evening Star, July 1, 

1948] 

Whitehurst Freeway

The head of the District’s Department of Highways, Captain Whitehurst, was a 1906 graduate of 

Virginia Polytechnic Institute. During World War I, he had been based in Washington as a 

combat engineer officer. After the war, he served as head of the construction division for Wilson 

Dam at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, before being assigned to the District Engineer Commissioner’s 

office in 1926. Captain Whitehurst resigned in 1929 to enter the private sector, but the District 

commissioners brought him back as chief engineer and coordinator after they read a plan he had 

prepared before leaving for streamlining highway management. He became director of the 

Department of Highways when it was formed in 1930. During World War II, he continued to 

direct the city’s highway development while heading the District Department of Civilian 

Defense. 

In the late 1930s and 1940s, he focused on establishing a thoroughfare plan for the city. Working 

with the Department of Vehicles and Traffic and PRA, he conducted a traffic survey beginning in 

1939. In April 1941, he unveiled the plan for a $44.45 million construction program to achieve 

free flow of traffic on Washington’s streets – to be completed in 8 years, with funding from a 2-

cent gas tax increase to match Federal-aid highway funds where eligible. 

One of the biggest projects was an elevated highway on the line of K Street, NW., along the 

Georgetown waterfront. The Department of Highways’ history said of the project: 

The need for an east-west limited access highway across Washington, which would serve 

adequately as a high-speed dispersal artery during the morning rush period, and as an 

equally rapid means of egress from the central business and Government districts during 

the evening rush period, was recognized by the Department of Highways in its 

preliminary highway report of 1941. 

Whitehurst’s idea for Georgetown was to build an elevated “Sky-Road” in the K Street corridor 

that would take through traffic off local streets, including the main east-west road, M Street, NW. 

The elevated bypass would connect Key Bridge with the bridge across Rock Creek and Potomac 

Parkway between 24th and 27th Streets, NW. Ultimately, the expressway would continue east 

beyond the park along K Street, beneath Washington Circle, to connect with an improved 

thoroughfare extending to the Public Library of the District of Columbia in Mount Vernon 

Square at the intersection of Massachusetts and New York Avenues. 
Whitehurst told a Star reporter that he had considered, but rejected, improvements in the 

M Street corridor:

In selecting the various trunk routes, the problem was to choose as near as possible the 

most direct connection with the outlying residential areas and to select streets along 

which traffic could be made to flow most freely. Many of the existing streets, it was 

found [,] were usable in part, while other sections of them were not suited to convey 

traffic quickly. This led, the director said, to the selection of K street instead of M street 

as the radial line to the northwest section west of Wisconsin avenue and Key Bridge. 

M street already was highly congested, it was not wide enough for a depressed highway 

and it was undesirable because of the business interests involved. As still another bad 

feature, its roadway was heavily loaded with underground construction and, to avoid a 

bottleneck in Georgetown, a subway [for motor vehicles] would be necessary.

It has been suggested that a bypass for through traffic be constructed north of M street. 

Capt. Whitehurst said this idea was dismissed because it would require expensive 

property acquisition, would border a residential area, and the eastern terminus would 

bring congestion back into Pennsylvania avenue and M street at Twenty-ninth street. 

Moreover, there would be no connection with Key Bridge. 

Some of the routes were so obviously the proper streets for the trunk lines that there was 

little difficulty in selecting them, the director reported. K street to the east, for instance, 

has a wide right-of-way and involves virtually no property acquisition. It also taps and 

connects with other main highways, which would make its usefulness much greater, and 

will do a great deal toward taking some of the load off the congested portion of New 

York and Rhode Island avenues. [“$44,450,000 Street, Bridge Program Proposed to Ease 

Traffic,” The Evening Star, April 25, 1941; Jones, Pat, “Radial Street Plan Designed To 

Eliminate ‘Bottlenecks’ Here,” The Sunday Star, May 4, 1941] 

Among planners and highway engineers, the idea of elevated freeways in large cities had been 

considered since the 1920s. They had to overcome the prejudice against elevated rail lines in 

cities, as consultant Robert Whitten discussed in the 1930 Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for 

Boston. Elevated freeways, he acknowledged, would be subject to the noise, vibration, and 

blockage of views and sunlight that had given elevated rail lines, “Els” as they were known, a 

bad reputation. Still, Whitten argued, they were the best option for fitting a freeway into a builtup urban environment: 

As a matter of first impression the erection of additional elevated structures in Downtown 

Boston is very objectionable. The comparison of course is with the present noisy and 

ugly elevated railway structures. It must be remembered, however, that the proposed 

upper level roadway will occupy the central portion only of a broad avenue; that it will be 

but two-thirds the height of the elevated structure in Atlantic Avenue; that great care will 

be taken in its design to make it attractive and to reduce noise and vibration; that it will 

be used by motor vehicles and not by railroad trains; that it is probable that hard tire 

vehicles would be excluded; that a vehicular subway [for motor vehicles] would interfere 
with sewers and with present and future rapid transit subways; and that it is not physically 

and economically possible to take care of the large volumes of traffic on the street 

surface.

Despite all the likely criticisms, Whitten argued that in view of engineering and financial 

constraints, elevated highways were the best way to move heavy traffic volumes through 

Boston’s central business district. [DiMento, Joseph F.C., and Ellis, Cliff, Changing Lanes: 

Visions and Histories of Urban Freeways, The MIT Press, 2013, pages 29-30] 

Over the next decade, elevated freeways became an accepted tool in urban planning. In 1937, the 

American Road Builders’ Association (ARBA) established a Committee on Elevated Highways, 

headed by V. G. Iden of the American Institute of Steel Construction, Inc. Captain Whitehurst 

was a member of the committee. In his first report to ARBA, Iden explained that beyond a 

doubt, conditions in cities demonstrated that “the greatest need of the age is express highways 

that will serve the congested centers.” However, completely rebuilding cities to meet the needs 

of automobiles would be foolish: 

We must approach this problem from a rational point of view and construct highways that 

will fit any need that we already have. If streets are too narrow to accommodate the extra 

roads, these extra roads must be built above and over the streets. Elevated highways 

affording all the limited features necessary to cope with the problem, and accommodating 

swiftly moving through traffic, are possible . . . . 

According to present practice, elevated highways should clear the underlying streets by at 

least fifteen feet, thereby leaving the surface roads free for truck and local traffic . . . . 

The design should take into consideration the movement of traffic underneath and the 

types of ramps to and from the elevated highway above, the banking of curves, location of 

ramps, methods of snow removal and prevention of the formation of ice. The design 

should fully conform to the purpose of the elevated highway and assure that no matter 

what the weather conditions, or how heavy the traffic congestion, the highway will prove 

to be an express highway under all conditions. 

Already, engineers were gaining experience in design and operation of elevated highways from 

examples such as the West Side Highway in New York City, the connecting link in Chicago’s 

Outer Drive, and the Pulaski Skyway over the meadows of New Jersey. [Iden, V. G., “Report of 

Committee on Elevated Highways,” Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Annual Convention, American 

Road Builders’ Association, January 17-21, 1938, American Road Builders’ Association, pages 

492-500] 

Toll Roads and Free Roads (1939) and Interregional Highways (1944), the two reports that 

provided the basis for congressional action on the Interstate System in 1944, advocated depressed 

or elevated freeways through big cities, with depressed freeways being the preferred option. 

Elevated freeways were especially suitable for commercial or business sections of a city. 

Interregional Highways included a drawing to illustrate an elevated freeway. The six-lane road, 

built at the second story level, spanned the center of the wide ground-level street. Motor vehicles 
entered by ramps to the outside lanes, while exit ramps were in the center. The freeway lacked a 

median; traffic moving in opposite directions was departed by what appears to be metal fencing. 

Similar fences were located on the outer edges of the expressway. Light poles were placed on 

poles built into the center fence posts. The caption described expressway operation: 

An elevated section of the interregional system as it might be built according to the 

standards proposed, with central exit ramps and lateral entrance ramps. The sketch 

suggests the manner in which new properties might conform to curving lines of the 

expressway in widened sections at access points, and a show window at the elevated level 

dressed appropriately with the kind of large display that would be needed for 

comprehension by express traffic. [Interregional Highways, page 80 and Plate VIII, also 

see page 166] 

Thus, as Whitehurst was considered an elevated freeway in the K Street corridor, he was 

advancing an idea that urban planners and highway engineers considered an up-to-date 

congestion reliever. He was on a committee studying the idea. 

Moreover, Georgetown was not the modern, upscale neighborhood of today: 

Both the Dupont Circle area and Georgetown had concentrations of wealthy families, the 

latter also being home to many prominent New Dealers who encouraged the local historic 

preservation movement. But the inner parts of the city were home as well to the majority 

of black Washingtonians, most of whom lived in much more modest circumstances. 

West of the White House, some four thousand African Americans lived near the utility 

plants, factories, and breweries of Foggy Bottom. Another substantial, though 

decreasing, portion of the working-class black population was scattered around the back 

streets of Georgetown. [Miller, Fredric M., and Gillette, Howard, Jr., Washington Seen: 

A Photographic History, 1875-1965, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, page 

158] 

Moreover, the once important Georgetown waterfront was in decline. According to The WPA 

Guide to Washington, D.C., published in 1942, “Along the river, old warehouses – relics of a 

once extensive commerce – crumble away beside railway sidings and modern industrial plants.” 

[The WPA Guide to Washington, D.C., The Federal Writers’ Project Guide to 1930s Washington, 

Pantheon Books, 1983 (reprint), page 346] 

Elevated freeways often were desirable along blighted waterfronts such as the one in 

Georgetown. As in Washington, planners developed elevated freeways along aging, deteriorating 

waterfronts in cities such as Boston, New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle.

Whitehurst developed the Sky-Road with little controversy. When the city held a public hearing 

on May 20 to receive comments on the $44.45 million plan, the primary concern was the 2-cent 

increase in the gas tax proposed to pay for the projects. Contemporary news articles did not 

report objections to either the K Street elevated expressway or other specific elements of the 

plan. The Post reported that the plan “received – with minor reservations – wide support of civic 

and business leaders at a public hearing in the District Building.” The Star stated, “Rather 
general support was accorded ‘in principle’ to the comprehensive long-range plan.” The articles 

reported comments by representatives of organizations during the afternoon hearing, many of 

whom differed on how to pay for the plan without burdening District residents with the added 

gas tax. If any citizens spoke during the hearing, neither the Post nor Star reported their 

comments. [Wentworth, Howard F., “D.C. Highway Report Wins Wide Support at Hearing,” 

The Washington Post, May 21, 1941; “Commissioners Study Mass of Testimony On Whitehurst 

Plan,” The Evening Star, May 21, 1941] 

On December 4, 1941, Whitehurst announced that construction of the K Street Sky-Road, at a 

cost of $2 million, would begin in the spring of 1942, with completion expected later that year. 

The Post described the plan as “a graceful, sweeping ‘sky-road’ along the line of waterfront K 

Street.” The Post added: 

Traffic along K Street fronting the river will be undisturbed after the elevated structure is 

placed in operation, Whitehurst said. Motorists may use either route, depending on their 

destination and hurry. [Wentworth, Howard F., “Work to Begin Next Spring On 

Washington’s ‘Sky-Road,’” The Washington Post, December 5, 1941] 

Three days later, the surprise bombing of Pearl Harbor propelled the United States into war with 

Germany, Italy, and Japan. 

Whitehurst, in early 1942, was still advancing projects from his 1941 highway program. In May, 

however, he had to postpone the Sky-Road because of diversion of steel for wartime needs. 

[“U.S. to Pay 2/3 of 4 D.C. Highways,” The Washington Post, February 2, 1942; “Priority Puts 

Off K Street Elevation,” The Washington Post, May 26, 1942] 

During the war, the city expanded in population and a proliferation of temporary offices. Heavy 

traffic endangered safety and congested the road network. Whitehurst, with his Sky-Road on 

hold, brought in the Baltimore firm, J. E. Greiner Company, to study the feasibility of converting 

K Street to a through highway from Key Bridge to eastern terminals at Sixth Street, West 

Virginia Avenue, and at 15th Street and H Street via Florida Avenue:

The Department’s choice of K Street as best suited for this type of development was 

endorsed by the consultants on account of width, straight line location and contiguity to 

the business district, and was recommended as essential to the relief of traffic pressure on 

congested parallel streets.

Greiner calculated that the new thoroughfare would reduce about 60 percent of the traffic on 

adjacent streets and arterials. 

In this heavily developed part of the city, a K Street viaduct was the best option for relief not only 

for through traffic but for local traffic. Further, the Arizona Avenue Expressway would provide 

ready access from the Potomac River entrance to the city via the K Street elevated freeway.

In 1944, Greiner worked with De Leuw, Cather and Company to develop a master plan for 

developing transportation facilities in the central area of the city. As the plan evolved in a 1946 

post-war study, the K Street plan was revised to start at 3rd Street, NW, to connect with the Mid-
City Expressway, which, as noted earlier, extended from Canal Street near Independence Avenue 

across the city to the District line beyond Rock Creek Cemetery. [Twenty-Five Years of Progress 

in Highway Development 1924-1948, District Department of Highways, pages 68-76; 

“Georgetown Traffic Expediter,” The Evening Star, October 8, 1949] 

Construction of the $3.4 million, 1-mile K Street Skyway from Key Bridge to Rock Creek, began 

on July 7, 1947. The city awarded the contract to Alexander-Repass Engineering Firm of Des 

Moines, Iowa. The principals were Archie A. Alexander, an African-American, and his white 

partner, Maurice A. Repass. They had met as freshmen at the University of Iowa, where 

Alexander was the university’s only black student. A biographical sketch states: 

He played tackle for the school’s varsity football team, earning the nickname, “Alexander 

the Great.” During the summers, Alexander worked as a draftsman for Marsh Engineers, 

a Des Moines bridge-designing firm, and in 1912 he received a Bachelor of Science 

degree, becoming the University of Iowa’s first African American student to complete the 

engineering program. 

Alexander worked on bridge projects for Marsh after graduation, but in 1917 formed an 

engineering firm with a white contractor, George F. Higbee. By the team Higbee died in a 

construction accident, Alexander had earned a civil engineering degree from Iowa State 

University in 1925. After forming the partnership with Repass in 1929, their company worked 

on projects around the country, including several in Washington. In addition to the K Street 

elevated project, they worked on the Tidal Basin (including the Independence Avenue bridge 

over the north end of the basin), a grade separation structure for the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad; and extension of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. Repass said the company liked 

working in Washington, because the “District is a fair outfit to work for.” [“Alexander, Archie 

Alphonso (1888-1958),” Blackpast: An Online Reference Guide to African American History; 

“Three-Million Dollar Elevated Highway Nears Completion, Afro-American, December 25, 

1948] 

The District and PRA split the cost, 50-50, under the Federal-aid highway program. Completion 

was delayed by bad weather and slow delivery of materials, but was expected in 1949. [Millen, 

William A., “Weather, Slow Deliveries Delay Work on K Street ‘Skyway,’” The Evening Star, 

June 13, 1948] 

On September 1, 1948, Captain Whitehurst died at George Washington University Hospital after 

a heart attack. He had been stricken at his home at 3115 34th Street, NW., and was taken to the 

hospital where he was pronounced dead at 4:15 a.m. The 61-year old, who had been Director of 

Highways for 18 years, had just returned from a 2-week vacation and had told associates he had 

enjoyed excellent fishing. 

The Star obituary listed many accomplishments, including the Scott and Thomas Circle 

underpasses, the John Philip Sousa Bridge across the Anacostia River at Pennsylvania Avenue, 

SE., traffic surveys, his long-range program of street widening and surface improvements, his 

support for fringe parking garages, and his role in replacing “painted safety zones with the 

present raised streetcar loading platforms. “At the time of his death, he was supervising 
numerous major projects, including the K street elevated highway, the new bridge across the 

Potomac at Fourteenth street, the Dupont Circle underpass and the South Capitol Street Bridge 

project.” 

The newsletter of the American Road Builders’ Association added that he had served the 

association for many years, including as first president of its city officials division, treasurer 

(1940 until his death) and president (1935-1936). He also had been a member of the National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission and was active in AASHO, which he also served as 

president (1946-1947). [“Capt. Whitehurst, City Director of Highways for 18 Years, Dies,” The 

Evening Star, September 1, 1948; “Death Halts Distinguished Engineering Career of Capt. 

Herbert C. Whitehurst, ARBA Treasurer,” Road Builders’ News, American Road Builders’ 

Association, October 1948, page 4] 

On September 9, the District commissioners decided to rename the K Street Skyway after the late 

director: “Whitehurst Freeway.” Engineer Commissioner Young recommended the change. 

Captain Whitehurst, Young explained, had been more responsible than any one for the city’s 

“magnificent” system of roads and bridges. “I recommend that the K street structure be named 

the Whitehurst Freeway, or possibly Skyway or Viaduct. Thus his name will be permanently 

associated with a structure which is unique in Washington.” 

The day before, the commissioners had appointed Robertson, the former engineer of streets, to 

succeed Whitehurst as Director of Highways. 

The Star agreed with naming the elevated freeway after the late director:

It was peculiarly the product of Captain Whitehurst’s own thinking in terms of providing 

in advance the sort of facilities that automobile traffic of the future will make inevitable. 

Washington owes him much for his courage, his vision and his ability to overcome the 

resistance of apathy by persuasive assembly of fact. Someday, the “Whitehurst Freeway” 

will run the course of K street across Washington, dipping below grade or rising above it, 

to accommodate the sort of unimpeded traffic flow that the future will demand. 

The editorial also agreed with the appointment of Robertson, noting that Captain Whitehurst 

“would have indorsed [him] without reservation.” [“K Street Highway Will Be Named For 

Whitehurst,” The Evening Star, September 9, 1948; “The ‘Whitehurst Freeway,’” The Evening 

Star, September 10, 1948] 

As completion of the Whitehurst Freeway neared in October 1949, the District was determining 

the next big project based on traffic counts in the area and in Maryland and Virginia that 

planning engineer Brinkley was compiling. As the Star pointed out on the eve of completion: 

But compiling this report is a vast job and Mr. Brinkley does not expect it to be 

completed until a year from Christmas. But Mr. Brinkley expects the Arizona avenue 

Freeway [sic], the next logical step, will be a reality in the near future. This will run 

through the Glover-Archbold Parkway [sic], through Foundry Branch valley to Tenley 

Circle, linking up with the Whitehurst Freeway by way of Canal road. [Millen, William 
A., “Whitehurst’s ‘Dream’ Freeway Will Be Dedicated Saturday,” The Evening Star, 

October 2, 1949] 

The Whitehurst Freeway, the District’s first freeway, opened on October 9 with a ceremony at 

27th and K Streets, NW. After speeches by officials, Captain Whitehurst’s 4-year old 

granddaughter Maria Whitehurst Brownett snipped the red ribbon: 

Hazel-eyed Maria, with white ribbons in her blonde hair, stood beside her grandmother, 

Mrs. Whitehurst, and Commissioner John Russell Young when she cut the ribbon. The 

big pair of shears was hard to manage but, with determination, she succeeded. The crowd 

applauded . . . . 

After these ceremonies, the principals and guests drove over the freeway and the Key 

Bridge to Rosslyn at the Virginia end of the bridge. [“Whitehurst Freeway Is Opened to 

Traffic After Ceremonies,” The Evening Star, October 9, 1949] 

Whitehurst Freeway carried U.S. 29 through Georgetown; U.S. 29 crossed the Potomac River on 

Key Bridge.

Generations of planners, Georgetown residents, and writers have loathed the Whitehurst Freeway 

and, as will be seen, wanted to tear it down – that dislike continues to this day. Nevertheless, it 

stands, still carrying U.S. 29 across Georgetown. However, it had an unexpected consequence on 

Georgetown, continuing a trend that had begun in the 1930s, as Gutheim and Lee explained: 

Construction in 1949 of the elevated Whitehurst Freeway siphoned traffic off 

Georgetown’s congested narrow cross streets.

The realization of a new Georgetown, a maturing Georgetown as a distinctive 

community, had produced a strong concerted voice among residents and supporters 

against allowing the area north of M Street to be altered at will. Responding to these 

interests, Congress in 1950 declared all of Georgetown a historic district and placed the 

design of all future construction under the judgment of the Commission of Fine Arts. 

[Gutheim and Lee, page 252. Congressional action was in the Old Georgetown Building 

Height and Exterior Design Regulations Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-808); Secretary of the 

Interior Stewart L. Udall declared the Georgetown Historic District to be eligible for the

National Register of Historic Places as a National Historic Landmark in May 1967.] 

As another history put it: 

One of the area’s few traditionally integrated neighborhoods, Georgetown, became 

increasingly wealthy and increasingly white. Following the diversion of most through 

traffic from Georgetown streets, accomplished by completion of the Whitehurst Freeway 

in 1949, Congress declared the area a historic district. The Commission of Fine Arts had 

to approve all physical alterations and new construction in Georgetown. As the 

neighborhood increased in desirability, housing prices rose, and multi-unit dwellings 

shifted back to single-family occupancy. In the process, Georgetown’s African American 
population fell, from almost a quarter in 1940 to 3 percent in 1960. [Miller and Gillette, 

pages 222-223] 

The Glover-Archbold Parkway

In January 1952, the District unveiled its 10-year, $140 million highway program. It set four 

goals:

1. Divert all possible “by-passable” traffic from the downtown area.

2. Create greater street capacity in the downtown area.

3. Improve the present main arteries leading to the District’s boundaries. 

4. Develop a cross-town route linking the northwest and northeast sections. 

The Regional Highway Planning Committee, including Maryland and Virginia representatives, 

had helped prepare the plan. Among the immediate needs addressing the first two goals was: 

Canal Road N.W.—Foxhall road to Thirty-sixth street; Arizona freeway, Rock 

Creek Parkway, Southwest freeway and Potomac River bridge (vicinity of E 

street)—Preliminary studies and detail plans for roadways and structures. Cost 

$800,000. 

A later entry involved construction: 

Arizona avenue. Van Ness street to Canal road—Construct parkway, two 24-foot 

roadways with grade separations and interchanges at Reservoir road, New Mexico 

avenue, Cathedral avenue and Massachusetts avenue, and with connections over street 

system to Wisconsin and Nebraska avenue. 

The estimated cost was $3.6 million. 

Future needs included improvement to Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway and its extension to 

the District/Maryland line. [Stepp, John W., “Experts Representing Metropolitan Area Draft 10-

Year Project,” The Evening Star, January 31, 1952; “$140 Million Road Plan Urged For District; 

1-Cent Gas Tax Boost Proposed for Financing,” The Evening Star, January 31, 1952] 

The National Capital Parks and Planning Commission quickly joined with NPS officials in 

objecting to plans for construction in parks. They had not been part of the Regional Highway 

Planning Committee that identified projects such as extending Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway 

to the Maryland line. As discussed earlier, they also objected to the plan for the E Street Bridge 

spanning Roosevelt Island. They showed “forbearance” regarding “that portion of the Southwest 

Freeway project providing an extension from the Fourteenth street overpass encroaching on the 

Thomas Jefferson Memorial area and slicing through the tourist camps, tennis courts and East 

Potomac Park to span the Washington Channel.” [Shepard, Nelson M., “Federal Agency Fears 

Injury To Parkland in Highway Plan,” The Evening Star, February 1, 1952] 

On February 15, as part of a 1952 series on “Highways of the Future,” the Star’s James G. Deane 

described how the plan for what was still called the Arizona Avenue Parkway fit into plans for 
accommodating traffic in the northwest quadrant via Canal Road. “An elevated highway and a 

brand-new parkway may be in the Northwest’s future.” After summarizing the long history of 

the parkway, he explained the two-pronged plan: 

The elevated would be a westward expansion of the Whitehurst freeway. The new 

parkway, through Glover-Archbold Park, would link the freeway—and Key Bridge—with 

the upper Northwest . . . . 

Canal road will be widened from Key Bridge to Foxhall road. It will continue to take 

traffic to and from M Street.

At its west end, the elevated will have three lanes. Midway, one of them will cut across 

over the canal to carry eastbound cars to M [street]. The other two lanes will connect 

with the freeway.

Westbound through-traffic will use M street. Eastbound will use the elevated. The 

structure would be unusual—single-stem piers, supporting the roadway in cantilever 

fashion. This would leave the canal and its tow-path undisturbed. 

Eventually, Canal road will be improved onward up the Potomac, becoming the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway at Great Falls. It will connect with the new National Pike 

(Route 240) from Frederick. 

Ramps will cross from the elevated to the Arizona parkway. Foxhall road also will 

connect. [Deane, James G. “Proposed Elevated Highway Along Canal Road Would Link 

Key Bridge With New Parkway,” Highways of the Future, The Evening Star, February 

15, 1952; the Highways of the Future series included 25 installments, running from 

February 1, 1952, to March 10, 1952] 

In the final installment of the series, Deane discussed concerns by park authorities about the 

E Street Bridge, extension of Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway to Maryland, and the Arizona 

Avenue Freeway. He explained that the District had owned the right-of-way for a road through 

Archbold-Glover Park since 1893, that Mrs. Archbold opposed any road, and that Charles C. 

Glover, Jr., “also once protested a speedway but favors a less elaborate road”: 

The planners insist on the road, despite the loss of park value to residents of the area. The 

main question, assuming the road goes through, is one of ethics: The plan is to call it 

Arizona parkway, but courtesy to the donors would seem to dictate retaining the present 

park name, Glover-Archbold, for the road. 

District officials, however, were concerned about satisfying the Arizona congressional 

delegation.

Another concern was that if the parkway were not built, “Foxhall road probably would have to be 

widened. Foxhall residents don’t want that.” [Deane, James G., “Financing to Be Key problem 

In $140 Million Road Program,” Highways of the Future, The Evening Star, March 10, 1952] 
As Deane’s series made clear, the road through Glover-Archbold Park was not desired for itself 

but as a connection in a series of roads linking the Washington National Pike with downtown 

Washington. On October 27, NCPC approved nearly 74 percent of the District’s highway plans, 

including construction of a dual parkway through Glover-Archbold Park connecting Canal Road 

with Wisconsin and Nebraska Avenues. [Stepp, John W., “Engineer Group Indorses City’s 

Highway Plans,” The Evening Star, October 27, 1952] 

In January 1953, the Star reported that a subcommittee of the Committee of 100 on the Federal 

City had prepared a “blistering criticism of the District’s proposed highway improvement 

program.” The subcommittee members were General Grant, president of the American Planning 

and Civic Association; John Ihlder, former executive secretary of the National Capital Housing 

Authority; architect Horace Peaslee; and Tracy B. Augur, a GSA urban planning officer. 

Their “scathing, 21-page report” denounced District highway officials for trying to solve 

immediate problems based on present-day “traffic considerations.” Highway planning, the report 

stated, should begin “with a concept of what the District will be like one, two or three decades 

hence.” They urged the Committee of 100 to reject the overall plan and to endorse individual 

projects only if they were part of a satisfactory long-range program or were needed because of an 

emergency. The E Street Bridge was an example of a project that would not be approved in view 

of its impacts on Roosevelt Island and the Lincoln Memorial grounds 

In the long range, the subcommittee expected Federal employment in the city to drop, with 

employment centers being built “20 to 40 miles, or even farther, from the city.” As a result, “the 

District’s primary highway improvement need for the future is a network of . . . expressways, 

extending radially from points as close to the center as possible outward for distances up to 40 or 

50 miles.” The report cited such radials as the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, the Annapolis 

Freeway, Suitland Parkway, Shirley Highway, the Washington National Pike, and a route on the 

Virginia side of the Potomac River. The radial roads would be linked by “ring roads” that would 

also serve as bypasses for traffic not bound for the city. The members agreed “in principle” with 

the inner-belt concept, but did not think the city had proposed a satisfactory plan. 

The subcommittee favored converting North Capitol Street as a thoroughfare to carry the 

Washington National Pike instead of routing it through Rock Creek Park. The use of Rock 

Creek Park as the District link was, the report said, inferior to a freeway along the MarylandDistrict side of the Potomac River. A dual, six-lane freeway should run along Canal Road from 

Foxhall Road to the District Line. Among the advantages cited was that the plan could omit the 

road through Glover-Archbold Park at a saving of $3.6 million. [“Federal City Group Blasts 

Highway Plan,” The Evening Star, January 30, 1953] 

In an editorial on February 2, the Star acknowledged “the conflicting views between park 

conservationists and highway builders over plans for traffic relief.” The “steady encroachment” 

on parks by highways “has been resented, and understandably so” by park advocates. Thus, the 

subcommittee’s “extremely dim view of the Highway Department’s construction program for the 

immediate and near-future traffic needs” was not surprising. “Unfortunately, highway 

improvements cannot be avoided or left to future generations.” The subcommittee “opposed in 

principle” the continuation of the Washington National Pike through Rock Creek Park and 
construction of a parkway through Glover-Archbold Park, while also opposing the E Street 

bridge designed to relieve traffic in the 14th Street corridor.

The District would like to adopt the long view the subcommittee recommended “but it is limited 

by appropriations and legislative restrictions.” With the funds available each year, it must do the 

best it can to “design the piecemeal projects so that they will fit into a long-range highway 

program.” In doing so, “some park properties will be invaded, from time to time.” Unless park 

advocates can “offer some more reasonable alternatives,” the pressure to use parkland will 

continue. “The problem of reconciling the divergent schools of thought is a difficult one, calling 

for dispassionate conferences and study by all concerned.” [“Highways vs. Parks,” The Evening 

Star, February 2, 1953] 

The Committee of 100 on the Federal City approved the part of the subcommittee’s report 

criticizing the District for planning short-range, stop-gap proposals rather than developing a longrange, primary need program. However, the committee rejected the project-specific portions of 

the report and asked the subcommittee to try to reconcile its differences with District highway 

officials and redraft it to be more in line with the approved general principles. 

Blair Lee III, NCPC’s executive officer, said he agreed with the general criticisms, but in 

discussing specific projects, the subcommittee “suffers to a slight extent from schizophrenia.” 

Beveridge explained:

Mr. Lee said the report, with its emphasis on radial highways, should recognize a need for 

a new “central area” Potomac River bridge to connect with Virginia’s Arlington 

boulevard. If not at E Street, he said, such a bridge should be elsewhere to serve 

Washington’s downtown area. 

Mr. Lee also attacked as too expensive a subcommittee proposal that North Capitol street 

rather than Rock Creek park, might be developed as a new northbound thoroughfare. 

“The report, to be consistent with itself, should say Rock Creek Parkway might be needed 

if alternatives are found impracticable,” he declared. 

Mr. Lee pointed out that the subcommittee based its objections to the park proposal on 

traffic considerations, not on an encroachment of park land. The discussion that 

followed, however, brought out strong objections to the basic idea of yielding park lands 

to highway uses. 

General Grant pointed out that the Committee of 100 was a member of a national group opposing 

the use of parks for highways. “Don’t let us be the people to say the use of Rock Creek Park is to 

be given over to be made into a highway,” he said. 

Lee did not think a 200-foot wide parkway through the northwestern part of the park would 

destroy the recreation and beauty of the area.

Citing the Star’s February 2 editorial, John Remon said, “I don’t want to see parks destroyed. 

But I think we must give way at times. The greatest enjoyment I get out of Rock Creek Park is 
taking a drive through the park from my house to the Interior Building.” [Beveridge, George, 

“Critical Report on Roads Plan Backed in Part,” The Evening Star, February 4, 1953] 

The reason the road through Glover-Archbold Park was needed varied as officials debated the 

central area bridge and the entrance for U.S. 240’s two legs. For example, the District was 

considering options for increasing the capacity of Key Bridge. Double-decking the bridge had 

been rejected as too expensive, but by May 1953, the city was considering whether the sidewalks 

could be converted to traffic lanes, with new sidewalks built on cantilever structures off the 

bridge. In addition, the city was considering a two-lane ramp, carrying two-way traffic, from the 

center of the bridge about 300 feet from M Street to Prospect Street in line with 35th Street. The 

ramp, in theory, would divert traffic that presently turned left from the bridge onto M Street. 

Already on the drawing board were improvements on both ends of the bridge, including the MStreet-Whitehurst Freeway connections. The plans included an elevated roadway for eastbound 

traffic on the west side of Key Bridge. Traffic would connect with ramps to Canal Road, Foxhall 

Road, and the proposed Arizona Parkway. [Beveridge, George, “M St. Overpass At Key Bridge 

Under Study,” The Evening Star, May 14, 1953] 

Publication of an article about the concepts in the Star prompted immediate opposition in 

Georgetown. The ramp over M Street would carry unwanted traffic into the community, and 

possibly reduce property values, prompting concerns by the Georgetown Citizens’ Association, 

whose president, Frederick S. Hill, said “We have always believed we should try to keep through 

traffic out of Georgetown’s residential areas.” Stephen P. Dorsey of the Progressive Citizens of 

Georgetown said the group would always oppose solutions to traffic problems that unnecessarily 

drew additional traffic into the area. [“M Street Ramp Arouses Fears In Georgetown,” The 

Evening Star, May 15, 1953] 

On May 25, attorneys Hugh Obear and Grant Wiprud appeared before the Committee of 100 on 

the Federal City representing Mrs. Archbold. They made clear that she intended to fight attempts 

to build a road through the land she and Charles Glover had donated. A letter from Mrs. 

Archbold to the group said they donated the land for park purposes and “for no other.” She did 

not object to the type of meandering road that exists through Rock Creek Park, but an express 

highway would be a breach of faith. 

John Nolen discussed the history of the proposal, pointing out that the District and NPS had 

signed an agreement in 1948 following congressional consideration of a bill authorizing the road 

to be named after Arizona. The situation was complicated by District consideration of a bridge 

across the Potomac River that would tie into the road through the park.

Mrs. Archbold and Charles Glover, Jr., had opposed the plan at the time, and she intended to 

resume efforts to block the plan. If the city persisted, she would seek “the aid of the courts in 

restoring the property to its proper use,” as her letter to the Committee of 100 stated.

After discussing the controversy, the Committee of 100 adopted a resolution condemning the 

plan. The resolution suggested the alternative of widening Foxhall Road. [“Land Donor 

Fighting Plan for Expressway In Northwest D.C.,” The Evening Star, May 26, 1953] 
In September, the District commissioners announced they would hold a public hearing on 

October 26 to consider street name changes, including redesignation of the proposed Arizona 

Avenue to Glover-Archbold Parkway. To return the State name on the map, Dalecarlia Parkway 

between Loughboro Road and Westmoreland Circle would be renamed Arizona Avenue. 

[“Street Names To Be Considered At Hearing October 26,” The Evening Star, September 17, 

1953] 

The District commissioners heard from individuals on October 26 who favored changing the 

name of the Arizona Avenue Freeway to the Glover-Archbold Parkway. Representatives of 

Glover and Mrs. Archbold testified in support of the change, as did the Palisades Citizens’ 

Association, the Progressive Citizens’ Association, and others. The Arizona congressional 

delegation indicated it supported the changes. The Palisades representative, however, favored 

renaming Wheeler Street and Wheeler Place as Arizona Avenue and retaining Dalecarlia 

Parkway. The association thought that having a Wheeler Street and Place so close together was 

confusing while Dalecarlia Parkway was aptly named because it was near the Dalecarlia 

Reservoir. 

On November 4, the commissioners approved the name Glover-Archbold Parkway for Arizona 

Avenue, NW., between Canal Road and Van Ness Street. They deferred action on the contested 

name change for Dalecarlia Parkway. [“District Heads Weigh Proposals to Change Names of 2 

Avenues,” The Evening Star, October 26, 1953; “Commissioners Rename Part of Arizona 

Avenue,” The Evening Star, November 4, 1953] 

The commissioners approved changing Weaver Street to Arizona Avenue on January 12, 1954, 

only after receiving assurances from the Arizona congressional delegation that the change was 

acceptable. Senators Hayden and Barry M. Goldwater and Representatives John J. Rhodes and 

Harold A. Patten had let the commissioners know of the delegation’s support. The change 

became effective on February 15. [“Change of Weaver Street Name Gets Support,” The Evening 

Star, January 11, 1954; “Weaver Street Changes To Arizona Ave. OK’d,” The Evening Star, 

January 12, 1954] 

Despite the accord on the name changes in the Palisades area, the Glover-Archbold Parkway 

remained controversial. As debate contined regarding connection of the Washington National 

Pike with downtown, the Glover-Archbold Parkway remained on maps as one way of routing 

traffic without having to acquire homes. City highway officials continued to promote it, but until 

other disputes were resolved, it remained in the background. 
Congress Takes Up the Parkway

In September 1958, the District’s $54 million highway plan included the Potomac River 

Freeway, the Washington Circle underpass, the K Street Expressway, and, as the Star described 

it, “another long-delayed project, the disputed Glover-Archbold Parkway to link the new river 

freeway and Upper Wisconsin avenue: 

The new Potomac Freeway will follow the course of the present Canal road along the 

waterfront of Georgetown. It is planned to connect with the west leg of the inner-loop 

expressway, also to be started next year, at about Twenty-seventh street N.W. At the 

other end it will join the new Glover-Archbold parkway, which will run through a 

wooded park starting at Canal road just east of Foxhall road and running northward 

toward Wisconsin avenue. 

The NPS was expected to extend the George Washington Memorial Parkway to the District line 

to meet the Potomac River Freeway.

The Glover-Archbold Parkway was to consist of “two park-type, two-lane, non truck roadways 

from 3 miles northward [from] the new river freeway to Tenley circle on Wisconsin avenue.” At 

a cost of nearly $5 million, the District expected to complete the project in 1963. [Deane, 
James G., “$54 Million Road Plans Pressed by District,” The Evening Star, September 24, 1958] 

By March 1959, the District had completed tentative plans for the parkway through the 21⁄2-mile 

long park. The dual, four-lane parkway would consist of two 26-foot roadways along the center 

of the park, with access roads at some cross streets. The facility was designed for a speed of 

50 m.p.h. Plans called for relocating much of Foundry Branch, a “meandering brook,” in the 

Star’s words, with the two roadways on either side of the stream. The plans were firm as far 

north as Upton Street, with the city’s plans beyond that point uncertain. Connections might be 

with a tunnel under Tenley Circle or the tentative freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

Regardless of the ultimate northern connection, the District expected motorists to be using the 

Glover-Archbold Parkway by late 1963. [Deane, James G., “Glover-Archbold Park To Get 4-

Lane Road,” The Evening Star, March 1, 1959] 

According to a Star summary of planned major highway projects published at the end of the 

month, the District planned to begin construction of the Glover-Archbold Parkway in the 

summer. A map showed the parkway as a dashed line, used to show “highways under 

construction or planned.” It connected with the Wisconsin Avenue Freeway, shown as a dotted 

line (“proposed highways”) carrying the southeast leg of U.S. 240 into the District (to be 

discussed). [Alibrando, Alfred, “Safer and Faster Travel Promised By 1962 on New Area 

Highways,” The Evening Star, March 29, 1959] 
National Capital Park’s Thompson said in June that he wanted to thoroughly study legal issues 

associated with construction of the Glover-Archbold Parkway before giving final approval to the 

District’s detailed plans. The study was underway, be said, because “we don’t want to run the 

risk of being enjoined by the donors” of the parkland. 

Thompson’s announcement infuriated Senator Butler, whose Maryland constituents would 

benefit from the District parkway with its indirect links to U.S. 240. The legal study was, he 

said, the NPS’s “usual collection of monkey wrenches, legal, political and otherwise, in an effort 

to stop construction of the parkway.” He added that Congress had approved the project, an 

approval that constituted a “mandate”:

The hearings are over, the Congress has made its decision and the District is expediting 

plans for the parkway. We will not have construction delayed for years while the Park 

Service rehashes old questions in a lengthy but ultimately futile attempt to deprive this 

area of the much-needed traffic artery.

He said the “obstinate and irresponsible delaying tactics of the Park Service have got to stop.” 

Harold L. Aitken, who had been become District Director of Highways and Traffic on March 2, 

1959, agreed with Senator Butler. Parkway plans had been modified once to meet NPS 

objections. The revised plan had been submitted to the NPS 4 months earlier. “It’s been over 

there long enough.” [“Maryland Planners Ask For Rock Creek Route” and “Park Service Blasted 

Over Glover-Archbold,” The Evening Star, June 11, 1959] 

In referring to a congressional “mandate,” Senator Butler was referring to the fact that Congress 

was working on the D.C. Appropriations Act, 1960, with a provision that provided $880,000 for 

preliminary work on Glover-Archbold Parkway. The legislation was still under consideration, 

with Glover-Archbold Parkway one of the stumbling blocks to passage. 

As usual with appropriation acts, the House took the initiative. The Committee on 

Appropriations released a report on the FY 1960 appropriations act on March 13, 1959. From 

the District’s highway funds, the committee set aside $880,000 for the Glover-Archbold 

Parkway. The House approved the bill on March 16 without discussion of the parkway during 

floor debate. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1960, Congressional Record-House, 

March 16, 1959, pages 4279-4288] 

In early May 1959, a new proposal emerged for handling traffic between Maryland and 

downtown Washington. On May 6, a steering committee for the Mass Transportation Survey 

approved a six-lane expressway, proposed by Bartholomew, from Tenley Circle at Wisconsin 

and Nebraska Avenues, NW., along Upton and Tilden Streets, and across Rock Creek Park on a 

high-level bridge across a section known as the Melvin C. Hazen Park. East of the park, the 

expressway would continue toward 15th Street, then turn south between 14th and 16th Street to 

connect with the Inner Loop at T Street. The expressway would carry all traffic, including 

trucks. 
The concept appeared to revive the idea of an expressway in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor to 

connect with the Washington National Pike, a plan the District had rejected just a week earlier 

(to be discussed later) in favor of the North Capitol Street corridor. General Welling opposed the 

Bartholomew plan because he did not think the need for an expressway between Tenley Circle 

and the Inner Loop had been proven. 

District Commissioner McLaughlin, who headed the steering committee, emphasized that the 

new expressway would not eliminate the need for the Glover-Archbold Parkway. The parkway 

would connect expressway traffic at Tenley Circle with the routes along the Potomac River. 

Federal Highway Administrator Tallamy said that based on information he had seen, the new 

expressway would qualify for inclusion in the Interstate System with its 90-10 Federal-District 

matching ratio. The NPS liked the idea of an east-west high bridge across Rock Creek Park 

because it would end discussion of the north-south route through the length of the park to link the 

Washington National Pike with downtown. [Deane, James G., “Cross-Park Freeway Project 

Wins Support,” The Evening Star, May 7, 1959] 

The Senate Committee on Appropriations completed work on its version of the appropriations 

act on May 21. In discussing the appropriation for the Department of Highways, the committee 

referred to the $880,000 for the Glover-Archbold Parkway. Following House approval, the 

Senate committee had “received an extraordinary amount of oral testimony and also 

communications protesting the building of this road.” Recognizing that these comments 

reflected the “public spirit of the citizens,” the committee asked the Engineer Commissioner 

about the possibility of an alternate site for the road. 

General Welling replied to committee staff on May 15 that, “The parkway is an indispensable 

feature of our traffic pattern.” The 1949 agreement with the National Park Service stated that the 

parkway was considered essential for vehicular access to the park for the greatest number of 

people. However, General Welling stated, “There is no sensible alternate solution for handling 

the traffic.” If construction were delayed, traffic would “continue to pile up and defer the 

reasonable use of the park as a recreation area and as a traffic facility.” 

The committee report indicated that deciding whether to include this funding item in the 

appropriations act was “particularly difficult in view of the deep interest of the citizens” in 

preserving the park. However, the committee left the funding in the bill in recognition of the 

Department of Highways’ careful work, which made “it clear that no solution other than GloverArchbold Parkway is feasible.” [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1960, Committee on 

Appropriations, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 304, page 6] 

Opponents such as Wirth of the NPS thought the committee must be misinformed. He said the 

parkway would “destroy the value of the Park.” Further, he was “dumbfounded” by General 

Welling’s statement, quoted in the committee’s report, that the parkway was “essential” to 

recreational use of the park. “I think any kind of road down there is about impossible if you’re 

going to preserve any kind of park.” 
Mrs. Archbold’s attorney hinted at possible legal action to stop construction. Such a parkway 

would, Hugh H. Obear said, be a “breach of trust.” If the government persisted, he would 

demand return of the land to the donors and sale back to the city at fair market value. 

Opponents added that the committee had not considered the new Bartholomew alternative for 

linking Wisconsin Avenue traffic with downtown Washington via a high-level Rock Creek Park 

bridge. It was only 2 weeks old, but offered the solution for getting traffic to the Inner Loop 

without the Glover-Archbold Parkway. [Deane, James G., “Senate Unit Okays Park Freeway 

Fund,” The Evening Star, May 22, 1959] 

The Senate considered the bill on May 26, with Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) taking the lead. 

He summarized the bill’s key provisions affecting all aspects of public services in the District, 

then paused for comments by other Senators. Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-Il.) asked about the 

plan for a parkway through Glover-Archbold Park. The Senator, who lived near the park at 

3812 Fulton Street, NW., called it “one of the most beautiful parks in Washington,” but said that 

if the parkway were built, it would “in my judgment, be spoiled.” He pointed out that although 

the bill contained only $880,000 for preliminary engineering, the parkway would actually cost as 

much as $5 million, and even $15 million counting the interchanges at either end. 

Senator Wayne L. Morse (R-Or.), who agreed with the concerns Senator Douglas expressed, 

introduced General Welling’s May 18 letter for the record. In it, General Welling summarized 

the history of the project, beginning: 

Since 1893, the District of Columbia has owned a right-of-way 100 feet wide through 

Foundry Branch Valley which includes the area now designated Glover-Archbold Park. 

The right-of-way is for an all-purpose major highway, including trucks. 

Beginning with the donation of property for Glover-Archbold Park in 1920s and the park’s 

expansion through 1943, the 100-foot right-of-way was now surrounded by parkland, but was

still owned by the District:

In the opinion of the corporation counsel, the terms of the donation permit the 

construction thereon of the proposed parkway, for passenger vehicles only, but do 

preclude the construction thereon of an all purpose highway such as is permissible on the 

100-foot right-of-way (the Government-purchased portion of the park land is similarly 

available for parkway purposes). 

In 1948 the District entered into a formal written agreement with the National Park 

Service for the construction of a four-lane parkway in Glover-Archbold Park subject to 

the following provisions . . . . 

The provisions indicated the parkway would follow the natural contour of the park; be restricted 

to passenger vehicles; and use a combination of the District right-of-way and park land. The 

District also agreed to make available for park purposes any portion of the 100-foot right-of-way 

not used for the parkway. 
As noted, General Welling’s letter explained that the proposed parkway was a key part of the 

planned highway network for the area, and its importance was increased by controversies 

elsewhere:

The possibility of abandoning the Wisconsin Avenue project in favor of the North Capitol 

Street project makes the Glover-Archbold Parkway facility all the more indispensable for 

the portion of the city west of Rock Creek park. Furthermore, the parkway is vital to 

development of the park so as to permit the greatest use, greatest beauty and greatest 

convenience to the public of Foundry Branch Valley. 

Regarding the existing park, a factual memorandum, also printed in the record, stated: 

At present park has minor amount of useful, accessible recreation areas and is largely 

composed of unkempt woodland which is difficult to traverse. Debris clutters some of 

the area and a sewer line lies on the ground for much of its length. 

The District, NCPC, and the consultants on the Mass Transportation Survey agreed that the 

parkway was “essential for passenger vehicles regardless of the decision concerning any 

proposed routes in or into Maryland.” At NCPC’s suggestion, the survey included a link 

between Tenley Circle and the Inner Loop. “The proposal, intended for interstate traffic, 

including trucks, was clearly in addition to the need for the four-lane Glover-Archbold Parkway 

for passenger vehicles.”

Senator Douglas, referring to General Welling’s comments about the indispensable need for the 

parkway, warned: 

Furthermore, all of us know that engineers love to build highways, and do not have much 

regard for scenery, trees, or natural beauty. An engineer with a bulldozer tends to be a 

very ruthless person. 

On the day of the debate, McLaughlin, president of the District’s Board of Commissioners, wrote 

to Senator Pastore, who introduced the letter for the record. The Mass Transportation Survey, he 

said, would urge accelerated highway and parkway construction in the region, with the GloverArchbold Parkway an “essential item” in the plan. For Congress to defer any item in the survey 

would “not be in the best interests of the region”: 

To put it another way, to delete funds from the District’s fiscal year 1960 budget for 

Glover-Archbold Parkway is as unjustified as it would be to delete funds therefrom for 

the Inner Loop, the Anacostia Freeway, the Potomac River Freeway, and the Southwest 

Freeway, all of which appear in the final report of the Mass Transportation Survey. 

The board, he said, urged the Senate to appropriate the funds for the parkway. 

Because of the lengthy debate on the parkway and another issue involving school lunches, the 

Senate could not complete work on the bill on May 26. [District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 

1960, Congressional Record-Senate, May 26, 1959, pages 9089-9095] 
The Senate returned to the debate on May 28, with Senator Douglas introducing an amendment 

to strike out the appropriation for the parkway. The current bill asked for only $880,000, he said, 

but soon the Senate would be asked for $5 million for the parkway and that would “probably 

carry in its wake a later request for $10 million for interchange connections farther up the line.” 

He admitted it was “somewhat ridiculous for the United States Senate to be considering a matter 

of municipal government,” but since home rule in the District of Columbia could not be 

approved, “we have to act as a board of aldermen for the city.” In view of the controversy and 

the likelihood of devastation to the park, “the simplest thing we can do is eliminate the 

appropriation for $880,000,” at least while other studies are underway. 

Senator Morse agreed. “I think the best interests of all interested parties would be served if we 

postponed this matter for decision for another year.” 

Senator O’Mahoney, arguing a procedural point about authorizing in an appropriation act, asked 

if the appropriation was needed because of an emergency. Senator Pastore replied:

The Senator raises the question as to whether there is an emergency. As a matter of fact, 

there is hardly an emergency need for any road at any time.

The question is, “When are we to begin it?” The argument is made, “It is all right to 

build this highway, but let us not begin it this year. It may be all right for next year.” 

Senator O’Mahoney protested that he was not making that argument, but Senator Pastore 

continued: 

The argument has been made that the amendment applies only to a postponement. Why 

postpone? If we are to make the argument that we should never, never, never encroach 

upon the rustic natural aspects of this particular park, that is one argument. But if the 

argument is that we must not do it in 1959 but it is all right for 1960, I think the argument 

which is being made defeats itself.

With other business to consider, some Senators were impatient about the lengthy debate about 

District matters, but with some interruptions, the debate continued. 

When Senator O’Mahoney explained that his only point was that he did not want a highway built 

through the park, Senator Pastore pointed out: 

The question has to be weighed against whether it is desired to facilitate traffic moving 

into the District. If the Senator wants everybody to walk, and to walk through a park, that 

is the answer.

Senator Douglas suggested that “better alternative routes” for the needed highway were available 

that would “not damage the parks and community institutions threatened by the Glover-Archbold 

Parkway . . . .” He added, as he had earlier, “When a highway engineer makes his plans, he tends 

to destroy beauty.” 
Senator Pastore pointed out that it was “a relative matter,” adding that he did not believe the 

District commissioners “have any innate desire to rape the beauty of a natural park.” When 

Senator Douglas pointed out that, “That is what they will do,” Senator Pastore replied: 

They have esthetic qualities as the rest of us do. But a time comes when people must 

either walk or ride, or else not go to work. Either they will have to listen to the birds, or 

else ring the timeclock and go to work. That is the question. If the Senator from Illinois 

wants the park kept for the birds, that is his privilege. [Laughter.] 

Senator Douglas replied, “I want the parks kept for the people. The autos going to work can take 

other routes.” The parkway was “only a part of a unified plan” for traffic from the west. The 

plan included the Bartholomew proposal of an expressway crossing Hazen Park for a link to 

downtown: 

The point is that these highways are not primarily designed for local traffic. They are 

designed for interstate traffic—to take traffic from Highway 240, the continental highway 

[sic]; and we are now being asked to approve a little spur here. But if we approve it, that 

approval may very possibly carry with it approval for bringing the interstate traffic down 

Wisconsin Avenue, and splitting it there at Tenley Circle, with passenger car traffic 

destroying the Glover-Archbold Park, and with truck routes across eastward, virtually 

destroying the usefulness of St. Ann’s School and Church, Immaculate School. Sidwell 

Friends School, the Hearst School, and destroying Hazen Park, and impairing Rock Creek 

Park, with all the damage which would be done on the east side of the park and to the 

zoo. 

With the protracted debate finally winding down, Senator Morse suggested that District officials 

had “plenty to do during the next year” with all the appropriations in the bill. In view of the 

many objections to the parkway, he thought “that no great harm will result from a year’s 

postponement, for the consideration of this particular matter.” The delay would allow Congress 

to consider citizen complaints.

Senator Dennis Chavez (D-NM), chairman of the Committee on Public Works, responded to the 

idea that consideration of the concerns and complaints of the citizen would result in a solution: 

It never will be possible—whether under home rule or under congressional responsibility 

for the District of Columbia—to get the citizens of the District of Columbia to agree on 

anything. When someone from the northeast section of the city makes a proposal, an 

objection will come from a parent-teachers group in the northwest section. I know about 

that situation; I have served on the District of Columbia Appropriations Subcommittee. 

Three or four years ago, we appropriated for, and authorized, the construction of [the 

Constitution Avenue] bridge; but the bridge has not been built, because it is impossible to 

get the people of the District of Columbia to agree on where the bridge should be built. 

I have seen these proposals come and go. It is necessary to have the engineers report on 

them, and someone must make the determination. 
I wish the District of Columbia could make its own determinations. But so long as 

Congress has this responsibility, I think it is our duty to try to provide a road which is 

needed for the traffic.

Finally, after more wrangling, the Senate defeated the Douglas amendment, 23-47. With little 

further debate, the Senate approved the appropriations act, 68-0, with Senators Douglas and 

Morse voting for the bill. [District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1960, Congressional 

Record-Senate, May 28, 1959, pages 9267-9287] 

The approved bill would now go to conference with the House to reconcile differences between 

the two versions. 

In describing passage of the bill after “a full day,” the Star referred to the “deceivingly 

unanimous vote,” which was expected to have taken place around noon. The final vote took 

place at 4:45 p.m., largely because of debate about the school lunch program and the GloverArchbold Parkway. [Bassett, Grace, “Senate Passes D.C. Budget In Day’s Fight,” The Evening 

Star, May 29, 1959] 

Conferrees completed work on July 8. The appropriation for preliminary engineering on the 

Glover-Archbold Parkway had been in the House and Senate bills and was, therefore, not a 

subject for reconciliation during the conference. 

On July 14, the House and Senate approved the District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1960. 

The House did so without debate or a recorded vote. The Senate also approved the bill without a 

recorded vote following brief discussion that included only a confirmation that the GloverArchbold Parkway funding was included. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1960—

Conference Report, Congressional Record-Senate, July 14, 1959, pages 13316-13318; District of 

Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1960, Congressional Record-House, July 14, 1959, pages 13352-

13354] 

On July 11, 1959, President Eisenhower had sent NCPC’s Mass Transportation Survey to 

Congress. As discussed elsewhere, the report called for four high-speed subway and surface rail 

transit lines, 330 miles of freeway throughout the Washington area, and express bus lines using 

eight of the freeways to link suburbs and downtown. 

De Leuw, Cather and Company had provided the recommendations for the adopted report with 

one exception: 

The exception is the addition of the so-called “Wisconsin avenue corridor” freeway from 

Tenley circle to the inner loop in downtown Washington. 

The highly controversial route was added by the study steering committee as a policy 

decision, although it was not recommended as necessary by DeLeuw, Cather & Co., 

which . . . said that a Wisconsin avenue freeway should be built between Pooks Hill and 

Tenley Circle, but that the Glover-Archbold parkway, the intermediate loop freeway and 

other routes would be capable of handling traffic from that point without a further 

freeway link to the downtown sector. In fact, the report showed with traffic figures how a 
large amount of traffic could be routed from the Wheaton area to Wisconsin avenue 

because basic traffic in the Wisconsin corridor was not excessive.

Although the District commissioners were split on the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, the corridor 

remained in the report. Area officials were split on the issue, but: 

District Engineer Commissioner A. C. Welling and Washington resident John A. Remon 

[of NCPC] filed identical comments saying that a “balanced system” was proposed by De 

Leuw-Cather and that the additional freeway was “not justified.”

District officials would have to work with BPR to restudy the city’s Federal-aid highway system, 

including Interstate designations, as a result of the study. [Beveridge, George, “Subway and 

Road Needs for 1980 Outlined in Survey,” The Evening Star, July 12, 1959; along with several 

linked articles]

President Eisenhower signed the District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1960, on July 23, 1959 

(P.L. 86-104). Mrs. Archbold’s attorney quickly filed suit in District Court seeking to prohibit 

construction of the Glover-Archbold Parkway. The District Highway Department, NCPC, and 

NPS had violated terms of the donation of the land by “threatening to use [it] for a major speed 

highway of from four to nine lanes . . . .” Obear asked for a temporary and permanent injunction, 

contending that the parkway would violate the terms of the two families’ donation of the 

parkland. 

The complaint sought to limit officials to construction of “a meandering narrow park road in 

keeping with the character of the park.” According to the suit, Secretary of the Interior Krug had 

written to Mrs. Archbold in January 1948 stating that “conversion of Foundry Branch Parkway to 

a commercial freeway would be a violation of the purpose for which the land was donated . . . . 

This Department will therefore oppose . . . a divided highway.” 

The suit asserted that construction of the parkway would “cause irreparable injury in the wanton 

destruction of the memorial which she created in memory of her father . . . .” 

Aitken responded to reporters’ inquiries by saying the District could build the parkway on the 

100-foot right-of-way it owned along the centerline of the park, as permitted by the 1948 

agreement with NPS. However, doing so would require deep cuts in the hilly terrain of the park:

A divided highway is better suited to the topography. We believe a parkway such as we 

are planning will improve the park. 

Although NPS had backed away from the 1948 agreement, Aitken referred to a White House 

memorandum covering an agreement reached April 16 regarding the Washington National Pike’s 

entrance into the District. The memorandum stated that NPS agreed to build a divided parkway 

along the Potomac River, from Cabin John “to an intersection with the Glover-Archbold 

Parkway.” This plan would allow pike traffic to follow the circumferential to Cabin John, then 

proceed to the Inner Loop on the new parkway. The Star explained:
As part of this plan, the District agreed to widen Wisconsin Avenue to eight lanes from 

the District line to Tenley Circle and a “four-lane divided parkway down GloverArchbold Park for passenger-car and bus traffic only, as per a 1948 agreement with the 

National Park Service.” [“Donor Fights Highway Plan,” The Evening Star, July 26, 

1959] 

The District, in a motion filed on September 1 in response to the suit, mentioned the 100-foot 

right-of-way the city had acquired for a highway in 1893, long before the Glover and Archbold 

families donated their land for a park. Further, because Mrs. Archbold donated the land to the 

government, she “now has no right of interest” in the land. Further, the District claimed, she 

could not show how the parkway would “invade any property in which she has an interest.” 

[“District Claims Right-of-Way,” The Evening Star, September 2, 1959] 

Charles C. Glover, Jr., joined Mrs. Archbold’s suit on September 2. 

On December 10, before District Court Judge Burnita S. Matthews, Assistant Corporation 

Counsel John A. Ernest contended that the suit had been filed prematurely and should be 

dismissed. He explained that the parkway plan had not been approved by any agency. NCPC 

came closest to approval by passing on the “basic concept” of a freeway system in the 

Washington area that included the Glover-Archbold Parkway. 

Mrs. Archbold’s representative, attorney Edmund D. Campbell, informed Judge Matthews that 

Congress had appropriated $880,000 for the project, and that the Highway Department’s budget 

for FY 1961 included $1.6 million for the parkway. Judge Matthews wondered if waiting for 

final approval would be too late in view of the concerns raised in the suit. [“Glover Park Road 

Suite Held Premature,” The Evening Star, December 10, 1959; “Parks Group Enters Dispute 

Over Parkway,” The Evening Star, December 11, 1959] 

Judge Matthews decided on January 27, 1960, that Mrs. Archbold and Mr. Glover were entitled 

to a trial on their suit. She questioned the validity of the 1948 agreement between the District 

and NPS. She doubted their authority to convert parkland to highway use. This finding was, as 

the Star put it, a “set back” for the city. The District would have to put its plans on hold pending 

the outcome of the trial:

Past law cases generally show that the Government which accepts land for park uses can’t 

divert it to other purposes except through condemnation, said the judge. [“Glover 

Freeway Foes Win Right to a Trial,” The Evening Star, January 28, 1960] 

Getting U.S. 240 into the District 

As Maryland upgraded the Washington National Pike to a freeway, it had identified two 

entrances to the District via southeast and southwest legs. As discussed earlier, both legs were in 

trouble even before construction began on the freeway’s Frederick end. In 1946, Maryland 

officials had planned to run the freeway near Gaithersburg, west of Rockville and Bethesda “to 

take traffic off Wisconsin avenue leading into Washington.” However, protests by property 

owners in the Bradley Boulevard area prompted the Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Commission to propose a route farther west “through relatively undeveloped land.” 

This western route would extend north from MacArthur Boulevard near Cabin John, continue 

through Cabin John Run Valley and Thomas Valley to Tuckerman Lane before intersecting with 

the Washington National Pike near Gaithersburg. [“Threat to Drop Freeway Made By Planners,” 

The Evening Star, May 18, 1947] 

In February 1952, the Regional Highway Planning Committee acted on a 10-year highway 

program for Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. The program included the following: 

Washington National pike – River road via Thomas Branch, Cabin Branch and Bogley 

Branch, bypassing Rockville and Gaithersburg to present terminus at Germantown road 

southwest of Hendersons Corner. A limited access divided highway. 

Washington National pike truck cutoff – Wisconsin avenue at Grosvenor lane, northwest 

to Washington National pike south of intersection of Montrose road and Seven Locks 

road. Will be part of Inter-County freeway.

The program included the Inter-County Belt Freeway (Washington National Pike to BaltimoreWashington Parkway), the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, Washington-Annapolis Freeway, 

and Suitland Parkway. [“Action in Week Due on Maryland Roads Program,” The Evening Star, 

February 11, 1952] 

By 1957, officials had still not pinned down the location for the entrance. In late January 1957, 

Clarkeson Engineering Company provided a preliminary report on alternatives for the U.S. 240 

entrance to the District, favoring a Potomac River route. When the firm’s Harold Aitken, the 

future highway director, explained the plan to NCPC, Bartholomew said he favored a different 

alternative, namely running the pike through the Bethesda area to the District line, passing near 

Wisconsin Avenue to meet the Glover-Archbold Parkway at Tenley Circle. His favored route 

would follow the parkway to Whitehaven Parkway, then turn eastward to meet the Inner Loop 

near Sheridan Circle at Massachusetts Avenue and R Street. This alternative would have the 

advantage of not “dumping heavy traffic downtown.” It also would serve more traffic than a 

route along the Potomac River. 

Aitken explained that Bartholomew’s preferred alternative would result in removal of “hundreds 

of homes.” The District planned to build the Glover-Archbold Parkway, which would be needed 

along with the Potomac River Freeway to handle future traffic.

Clarkeson’s preliminary report called for shifting the west leg of the Inner Loop from its 

approved location between 23rd and 24th Streets, NW., at Washington Circle in Foggy Bottom 

slightly west to accommodate the Potomac River Freeway. Connecting the two at the approved 

location would be “costly and difficult to build, possibly requiring three- and four-level 

interchanges.” Moving the Inner Loop west of Washington Circle would “be a little less costly to 

build and have a better design” than at the approved location. [Beveridge, George, “Shift Called 

Possible In ‘Inner Loop’ Plan,” The Evening Star, February 1, 1957] 
The day after the Clarkeson presentation to NCPC, General Lane criticized NPS for not 

extending the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway northward into Rock Creek Park, a plan that 

NCPC had approved in 1948. Wirth responded that he had not begun the extension, even 

diverted funds from it, because he was afraid that extending it would encourage the District to try 

connecting Maryland’s Washington National Pike through the park. He added that with the 

District now planning the Potomac River entrance, he would move forward on the extension. 

[Beveridge, George, “Park Officials Push Upshur Street Span,” The Evening Star, February 2, 

1957] 

In April 1957, the Palisades Citizens Association opposed the leg through its community in the 

corner of the District along the Potomac River. The association expressed its views after over 

250 residents attended a meeting where District officials and consultants explained the plan. 

Samuel R. Harrison, deputy director of the District Highway Department, emphasized that the 

District had not officially adopted the plan to route the highway along the river to join the pike 

near Cabin John. It was, he conceded, favored over other options for the connection between the 

Inner loop and U.S. 240 along Wisconsin Avenue, via the Glover-Archbold Parkway, or around 

the Naval Observatory.

A member of the Palisades association’s road committee pointed out that Bartholomew, the new 

NCPC chairman, had said recently in AAA’s American Motorist magazine that he was opposed 

to a road along the river because the area was not densely populated; he favored the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor. Clarkeson’s Aitken replied that in 1955, Bartholomew had testified before a 

Senate committee that the Wisconsin Avenue corridor would require far more displacement of 

homes and stores than the river plan. 

Residents wondered why the planned George Washington Memorial Parkway would not be 

sufficient. Harrison replied that the parkway would not be able to handle the expected explosion 

of traffic in the area. It also could not carry trucks and would not be eligible for 90-percent 

Federal-aid because it was not part of the Interstate System.

When Aitken explained that the Arizona Avenue Expressway would extend to a bridge across the 

Potomac River to relieve pressure on Chain Bridge, association member William Smith said, “I 

am not prepared as a taxpayer to throw Chain Bridge into the river.” Smith added: 

The question that has not been proved tonight is why we need this road. At a public 

hearing you will have to have a better reason for this road than that it will gain 90 per cent 

Federal aid.

The comment drew strong applause. [“Palisades Group Protests River Route Expressway,” The 

Evening Star, April 3, 1957] 

Alternatives for the DC Entrance

 By June, the National Capital Regional Planning Council was eager for a decision on where the 

Washington National Pike would enter the District. Gingery, a member of the council, said on 
June 17 that the council was planning a top-level meeting with Maryland, District, and BPR 

officials to decide on the entrance in the next few weeks. 

NCPC, which strongly questioned the District’s preference for a river route, had established a 

committee to consider alternatives. The committee, by a 3-to-2 vote, favored a route that went 

through Glover-Archbold Parkway north to Tenley Circle. The route would follow River Road 

to the southwest leg of Washington National Pike or east of Wisconsin Avenue to some point in 

Bethesda to meet the southeast leg. On the south end, the route might leave the parkway to link 

with the Inner Loop near Sheridan Circle, NW., on Massachusetts Avenue, or continue through 

the park to an east-west link with Canal Road. 

City officials were surprised by reports of the new routing. However, before the full NCPC 

could consider the proposal, District officials rejected it. City planning engineer Brinkley said it 

would be more costly, do more damage to the park, and would uproot more residents than the 

District’s preferred river route. Brinkley pointed out that as an Interstate highway, the route 

would have to carry trucks, doing further damage to Glover-Archbold Park that the city was 

trying to avoid. 

Engineer Commissioner Lane considered the proposal ill-advised. He and a BPR official on the 

committee had voted against the proposal. The proposal, just a concept, had not been subject to a 

detailed study. “I don’t see how the planning commission can settle anything until we get the 

report of the consultant.” 

Moreover, Maryland officials did not want a U.S. 240 connection in heavily built-up Bethesda, 

and District officials felt that same way about any expressway north of Tenley Circle. Brinkley 

said that such an expressway would require the taking of many homes and arouse heated public 

opposition. [Beveridge, George, “Planning Unit to Urge Glover Parkway to 240,” The Evening 

Star, June 18, 1957; Deane, James G., “District Balks at Hasty Park Route Commitment,” The 

Evening Star, June 20, 1957] 

Despite the objections, NCPC voted, 5-to-4, to support the new routing, with Bartholomew 

casting the tie-breaker. Members voting against the routing were Colonel Thomas B. Hunter, the 

District’s Assistant Engineer Commissioner; John A. Remon, NCPC’s Washington citizen 

member; Colonel G. W. Carlson of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and BPR’s H. J. 

Spelman.

Staff had refined the proposal to present three feasible routings to NCPC for the northern end. 

Each began at Van Ness Street just north of Glover-Archbold Park, as described in the Star: 

All three routes terminated just west of Wisconsin avenue at the Maryland line, just 

across Western avenue from the new Woodward & Lothrop [department store] branch 

store.

One of the three routes kept to the west side of Wisconsin avenue. The other two 

tunneled under Tenley Circle to travel east of Wisconsin before crossing back over the 
line. The commission said estimated property-acquisition costs of the three ranged from 

$1.5 million to $4.3 million. 

As for the southern end, the NCPC majority left open “whether the road should follow GloverArchbold all the way south to Canal road, or swing eastward on Whitehaven parkway to meet the 

proposed District inner loop expressway near Sheridan Circle.” 

Mrs. Archbold’s attorney urged NCPC to reject the plan, suggesting that legal action might result 

from this violation of trust.

Wirth was one of those voting for the plan. The decision, he said, put him in “a most difficult” 

position, because neither alternative – whether through Glover-Archbold Park or along the river 

– was inviting from a park standpoint. 

As for Maryland officials, the Star’s George Beveridge said their “precise intentions as to the 

new road were left thoroughly confused by the discussion.” Maryland had given up on the idea 

of a river entrance to the city along the Potomac River. The Washington National Pike’s 

southwest leg was now basically a link in the Inter-County Belt Freeway, providing a bypass for 

Virginia traffic:

Col. Hunter . . . insisted that the State has assured the District it still could meet the city 

part of the road near the river at the Maryland line. This, he said, could be done by 

putting the expressway in the Little Falls Branch parkway, which runs from Bethesda to 

the Potomac.

However, William C. Burrage, planning director of the Maryland-National Capital Park 

and Planning Commission, said the Maryland road officials were giving “heaviest 

consideration” to routes near Wisconsin Avenue and River road. 

He noted that Little Falls parkland was acquired under Federal law which might not 

permit a truck road. 

(Little Falls Parkway runs between Massachusetts Avenue and Bradley Boulevard to the 

Bethesda area.)

NCPC also had before it a minority report. Colonel Hunter urged its adoption because action on 

the Glover-Archbold Parkway was “premature,” pending receipt of the Clarkeson report on the 

river route. Bartholomew replied that now was the proper time for NCPC to submit what he 

called a “planning recommendation.” He said the District was constantly “shoving the 

commission into a corner” as if NCPC were a “rubber-stamp” for the city’s plans. NCPC’s 

action was “purely a planning action that always can be reconsidered in light of any later 

information.” It was, he added, NCPC’s duty to “guide the administrative agencies” at the 

earliest stage possible of such projects. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Back Park Expressway 

Route,” The Evening Star, June 21, 1957] 

Around this time, controversy had developed about the route of the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway near the C&O Canal from the District line to Great Falls in Maryland. 
Senator Murray, chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, had received so 

many protest letters that he asked NCPC to hold a public hearing to secure reaction to the 

proposed route and possible alternatives, as described by the Star: 

1. Along the street car tracks east of the approved route in Brookmont [Maryland]. 

2. On the high bluff along the river edge of Brookmont. 

3. Build the parkway on top of Conduit road (MacArthur boulevard). 

4. On the hill above MacArthur boulevard. 

NCPC held the public hearing on June 21. Nolen, the commission director, told the 50 or so 

people in attendance that all the land needed for the parkway in its planned location had been 

acquired with funds from Maryland and the Federal Government on a 50/50 basis. Maryland, he 

said, had indicated it could not advance additional funds without new sources of revenue. 

According to the Star: 

The protests fell in two groups. One deplored damage to the natural canal area and the 

other protested impact on private homes in the Brookmont (Md.) area just across the 

District line.

There also was scant support, however, for the alternate routes and their further 

destruction of private property. The most common plea was that the parkway . . . be built 

along the line of MacArthur boulevard. 

Neill Phillips, speaking for 14 groups, asked that the parkway be built at least 300 feet from the 

canal. Edward J. Seymour, representing the Civil League of Brookmont, suggested that the 

parkway bypass Brookmont and continue via Little Falls Parkway to MacArthur Boulevard. 

Anthony W. Smith of the C&O Canal Association recommended that the parkway contain only 

two lanes, not four as planned, and preferred it be built on the hillside next to MacArthur 

Boulevard. He also criticized NCPC for waiting so long to hold the public hearing and limiting 

witnesses to 10 minutes each. [“Two Groups Attack Plans for Parkway,” The Evening Star, June 

21, 1957; “Commission Reaffirms Parkway Route Approval,” The Evening Star, August 2, 1957] 

As the public hearing indicated, the narrow corridor where District highway officials wanted to 

run the link to the Washington National Pike was growing increasingly controversial. 

With options for U.S. 240 seemingly closing, David Scull suggested a new alternative. Scull, 

who worked in real estate and was a member of the Maryland-National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission, suggested building an elevated 7-mile highway over the Georgetown spur 

of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Star explained the plan: 

The trestled roadway would be about seven miles long starting from Linden or 

Montgomery Hills where the Georgetown spur pulls off the main line near the head of 

Sixteenth street extended, and running in a southerly direction around the District, 

entering near the Army Map Service . . . . 
The highway would serve as a collector route for Wisconsin avenue, Bradley boulevard 

and River road in the west, and provide direct access downtown for Route 29, the 

proposed northern parkway, Georgia avenue and Connecticut avenue, Mr. Scull pointed 

out. 

“It would,” he acknowledged, “be expensive,” perhaps as much as $10 million a mile, but if it 

were approved as part of the U.S. 240 Interstate route, BPR would pay 90 percent of the cost. It 

had the advantages that it would not cut through any parks, could carry trucks, and would not 

require taking homes for the right-of-way. The idea was “at least worth exploring.” [“7-Mile 

Elevated Road Urged as Rte. 240 Link,” The Evening Star, July 7, 1957] 

Meanwhile, the possible link through Rock Creek Park suffered another blow on July 16 when 

Chairman Murray introduced Senate Joint Resolution 123, cosponsored by Senators Hubert H. 

Humphrey (D-Mn.), Thomas H. Kuchel (R-Ca.), George W. Malone (R-Nv.), and Richard L. 

Neuberger (D-Or.), for the preservation of the park. It was identical to Senate Joint Resolution 

36, which Senator Murray had introduced in February 1955. He told his Senate colleagues: 

Recently the long-deferred and ill-advised plan to bring Maryland’s Route 240 into the 

District of Columbia through Rock Creek Park has been revived. Therefore, let the 

introduction of this joint resolution serve as a “No Trespassing” reminder to those who 

would invade the park. 

He also introduced for the record an editorial, “Highway Keep Out,” from the July 12 issue of 

The Washington Post and Times Herald in which the editors admitted they had been wrong: 

At one time this newspaper believed, reluctantly, that the highway might be brought 

down the rim of Rock Creek Park with minimum damage. We are now convinced that 

we were wrong to envisage this concession, and the subject is one on which we feel quite 

adamant . . . . 

Regional planning becomes a travesty when a traffic problem that has been building up 

for well over a decade is allowed to get to the point at which an invasion of park land is 

proposed as the only alternative to the razing of substantial numbers of homes. 

Unquestionably a connection with U.S. 240 must be provided, and there now remains a 

choice of disadvantages. In the circumstances a route through Glover-Archbold Park may 

be the least disadvantageous course, inasmuch as the park is narrow and undeveloped and 

its use does not compare with that of Rock Creek Park or the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal. 

The point for the future, however, is that highway planners must be given to understand 

that the area’s parks are inviolable. Foresighted planning can avoid such dilemmas. The 

response to proposals to bring U.S. 240 either through Rock Creek Park or along the C & 

O Canal ought to be a flat and resounding “No.” [Preservation of Rock Creek Park, 

Congressional Record-Senate, July 16, 1957, pages 11796-11797] 
The Star disagreed. Chairman Murray’s determination to preserve the park was “commendable,” 

and the public would agree that “any unnecessary encroachment on parkland by highway 

builders” is unacceptable:

But unless satisfactory alternatives can be found—and the search so far has been in vain – 

it might become absolutely necessary to use a strip through the park for a city approach to 

Maryland Route 240. 

The right approach was to explore all options, not take one out of consideration. “And serious 

objections have been raised to all alternative routes heretofore suggested.” In choosing among 

the alternatives, “it is conceivable that an unemotional, objective study of the various routes 

would find Rock Creek the least objectionable . . . .” [“Wrong Procedure,” The Evening Star, 

July 18, 1957] 

In reply to Chairman Murray’s resolution, NCPC’s Nolen told the Star that the commission 

favored the routing through Glover-Archbold Park for the link to U.S. 240. The parkway would 

provide a link to Wisconsin Avenue above Van Ness Street and MacArthur Boulevard west of 

Georgetown University. “There is no parallel between the Glover and Rock Creek Park 

proposals. A right-of-way is available for the Glover road and a right-of-way through Rock 

Creek Park would upset both property owners and nature lovers.” 

By contrast, the Montgomery County Council, in a closed meeting 2 weeks earlier, had voted in 

favor of routing U.S. 240 through Rock Creek Park. Council members concluded that the park 

route would be less disruptive to Maryland communities than a routing through Glover-Archbold 

Park. [“Congress Ban Asked on Park 240 Link,” The Evening Star, July 16, 1957] 

As mentioned earlier, area officials met on July 19 to discuss several area issues, including the 

U.S. 240 link to the District. The meeting ended without a decision on the entrance, but with an 

agreement to form a regional coordinating committee to consider joint highway issues.

Clarkeson Engineering reported to the District commissioners on July 27 regarding its study of 

the U.S. 240 entrance to the city. The city had told the firm to rule out the controversial Rock 

Creek Park route. The best alternative, the firm concluded, would bring the all-traffic route into 

the District along the Potomac River, with one-half mile on structure over the water parallel to 

the Whitehurst Freeway. The Star summarized the 4.6-mile route:

It would extend on the high ground of the Potomac Palisades area from the District line to 

Dalecarlia filtration plant to the west leg of the proposed innerloop [sic] just west of 

Washington circle.

It would tie into “feasible” extention [sic] of the highway close to the Potomac in 

Maryland. State Road [sic] Commission officials have indicated their preference for a 

riverside location. 

By means of a high-level Potomac River bridge in line of Arizona avenue just south of 

Chain Bridge, the route would provide connections with Virginia portions of the 

circumferential highway planned to circle Washington . . . . 
It would be elevated not only over the Potomac (inbound lane) from Georgetown 

University to Thirty-fourth street, but over Foxhall road and Glover-Archbold Park. The 

existing Whitehurst freeway would be modified, especially around Key Bridge, and 

extended to a point near the university to handle outbound traffic. The “over-the-waves” 

part of the project would be as much as 125 feet offshore. 

The number of lanes would range from four to eight as the freeway approached the Inner Loop. 

More than 300 homes and businesses would have to be acquired for the freeway, with about half 

for the downtown connection to the Inner Loop. 

Clarkeson determined that this option was the cheapest at an estimated $44.8 million, would do 

less damage to existing parks and recreation areas, and would improve access to them: 

Noting that location of Route 240 anywhere in Northwest Washington would have a 

substantial impact on existing land uses in the area, the report asserted the recommended 

site is “the one location that holds this ‘conflict’ to a minimum and still provides a 

meritorious improvement from a traffic service standpoint.” 

As for the Wisconsin Avenue corridor: 

The consultant gave this only passing notice with a conclusion it is “not considered 

practical.” The required 200-foot right-of-way along this heavily-developed thoroughfare 

would “literally wreck” business establishments, apartment houses and homes, on at least 

one side of the avenue whose present width now ranges from only 35 to 60 feet. The firm 

did not even work up a cost estimate on this one. 

The river alternative also had aesthetic advantages. It would be “close enough to the canal to 

provide an inspiring view, yet far enough away to preserve its natural characteristics.” From the 

north and west, “the approach will offer an excellent panarama with the Washington Monument 

as centerpiece.” [Stepp, John W., “Potomac Route Proposed for New Freeway,” The Evening 

Star, July 27, 1957] 

Reaction from the Palisades Citizens Association was immediate. Colonel Robert B. Curtiss, 

who had drafted the Association’s April resolution, said: 

It still doesn’t make much sense to taxpayers. Why put the road here? The city is already 

saturated with traffic and other sections are crying for relief, but they insist on building 

the road here where it’s not wanted. 

He pointed out that counting Canal Road, MacArthur Boulevard, the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway on the Maryland side, and the proposed new connection for the Washington 

National Pike, highway officials were planning to channel 20 lanes of traffic into the narrow 

corridor along the river. He called the plan “ridiculous.” The association’s William G. Smith 

said, “We’ve known this was what they were going to do, but it is still preposterous.” [“Potomac 

Route for 240 Raises Citizen Protest,” The Evening Star, July 28, 1957] 
On August 1, NCPC considered the Clarkeson report as well as the Glover-Archbold Parkway 

issues. Aitken was on hand for Clarkeson to defend the Potomac River alternative. However, 

the planners decided to await further studies on their proposal to use the Glover-Archbold Park 

route as part of the plan to connect U.S. 240 with downtown. Experience, Bartholomew told his 

colleagues, made it “perfectly obvious that, wherever we go, we will encounter problems and 

protests.” That, he said, was only one of the many factors that would have to be considered. 

At the same meeting, NCPC reaffirmed its support for the 5-mile segment of the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway bordering canal property. It would stretch from Canal Road at 

Chain Bridge in the District to the planned Cabin John Bridge carrying the outer circumferential 

across the Potomac River between Maryland and Virginia.

As explained in a NCPC report, the planners rejected four alternatives that Chairman Murray had 

suggested they study: 

1. Routing the parkway along the streetcar tracks would cut Brookmont in half, take 34 

homes, and increase costs by $1.1 million. 

2. Building on the high bluff involved acquiring 38 homes and an additional $900,000 in 

estimated costs.

3. Building on MacArthur Boulevard, the NCPC report said, was “entirely impractical and 

inadvisable. It would cost several millions of dollars ($5.5 million) to properly 

strengthen the conduit [under the boulevard], for which money is not available, and it 

would be impossible to control access to any degree along the parkway road.” 

4. Building on the hill above MacArthur Boulevard was “impractical” because it would take 

40 homes, involve construction of 17 grade separation structures, and raise costs by at 

least $10 million.

Regarding the public hearing, the report stated: 

The hearing established that the people living in the area have understood for many years 

where the parkway was projected through Brookmont and Glen Echo, and that almost 

without exception they favored the location and desired to have it built. On the other 

hand, those opposed to the established general location were from organizations of people 

living in other areas. 

As for impacts on the canal, the NCPC report stated that only at Brookmont and Glen Echo 

would the parkway be within 300 feet of the canal, and it could be effectively screened from the 

canal. [“Planners Sit Tight On Glover Park Route,” The Evening Star, August 2, 1957; 

“Commissioner Reaffirms Parkway Route Approval,” The Evening Star, August 2, 1957] 

(As discussed elsewhere, BPR approved Interstate numbers in September 1957 as recommended 

by AASHO. The Washington National Pike/U.S. 240 freeway became Interstate 70-S. 

However, accounts of the routing debate continued to refer to the route by its original number as 

will this account until the public and newspapers began using the Interstate designation.) 
On October 25, 1957, Governor McKeldin opened the first 1.5-mile section of the Washington 

circumferential freeway linking Wisconsin and Connecticut Avenues. The ceremony took place 

east of where Wisconsin Avenue intersects the freeway at Pooks Hill. His wife cut the ribbon. 

This first segment, Governor McKeldin said, was a “conspicuous symbol” of Maryland’s 

continuing effort to relieve the “ever-tightening tangle of traffic around our big cities.” 

Because the segment went through Rock Creek Park and could not carry trucks, BPR had not 

accepted it as part of the Interstate System. However, a few days earlier, BPR had approved the 

adjacent 2.70-mile section carrying the route from Wisconsin Avenue, where an interchange with 

the circumferential was planned, west to U.S. 240. 

After the ceremony, Governor McKeldin and others formed a motorcade to tour other area 

projects. The Governor joined Commissioner of Public Roads Charles D. Curtiss of BPR and 

District Highway Director Robertson to open the Kenilworth interchange connecting the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway, the Annapolis freeway, and Kenilworth Avenue. The Star

explained:

The Kenilworth interchange covers a total distance of 3.5 miles in dualized roads and 

overpasses. It is Maryland’s biggest highway complex of its kind. [“First Section 

Dedicated Of Circumference Road,” The Evening Star, October 25, 1957] 

A few days later, Colonel Welling revealed that he wanted to begin building the U.S. 240 

entrance to the city as early as 1958. “I’m anxious to start on it as soon as possible.” He planned 

to hold a public hearing to consider views on the two controversial alternatives for bringing the 

freeway into the city, whether along the Potomac River or in a corridor in the vicinity of 

Wisconsin Avenue through Glover-Archbold Park. He estimated that the river route would cost 

$46 million, while construction in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor would cost about $59 million. 

In either case, BPR would pay 90 percent since the route would be part of the Interstate System. 

[Deane, James G., “Welling Acts to Expedite D.C. Link to Route 240,” The Evening Star, 

October 27, 1957] 

Back to the Public

On November 25, General Welling announced a public hearing would be held on January 6, 

1958, to consider four proposed District connections between the Washington National Pike in 

Maryland and the District’s Inner Loop. The four were limited access highways that would be 

open to all vehicles, not restricted to passenger vehicles as would a parkway. Whichever route 

was selected would be proposed for inclusion in the Interstate System. 

Two of the routes were through the Palisades area, as the Star explained:

The District’s preferred route begins at the District-Maryland line between the 

Chesapeake & Ohio Canal and the tracks of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. It splits into 

two roadways, one on the bluff between the tracks and Potomac avenue and the other at 

the bottom of the bluff along the canal. 
The lower roadway meets Canal road at Chain Bridge. The upper roadway remains on 

the bluff to Glover-Archbold Park. 

Then, the westbound roadway would join the Whitehurst freeway; and the eastbound 

roadway would run adjacent to the freeway. 

Director Robertson preferred that route. The Clarkeson proposal was the other choice through 

Palisades.

NCPC was still working on the third alternative:

This road would run from the District-Maryland line near Wisconsin avenue roughly 

paralleling the avenue to Tenley Circle; thence along the Glover-Archbold Park to the 

vicinity of Canal road; thence along the same right-of-way preferred by Mr. Robertson. 

The fourth alternative was:

The fourth route to go before the hearing has the same beginning point as the third and 

then follows Glover-Archbold Park to Whitehaven parkway; thence easterly through 

Dumbarton Oaks Park across Rock Creek Park and under Sheridan circle. 

The expressway was not in Robertson’s plans for the next 6 years, but General Welling was eager 

to develop a construction schedule because the city needed more radial highways to absorb 

increasing traffic demands between Maryland and downtown Washington. [Bassett, Grace, 

“Hearings Slated On 240 Links,” The Evening Star, November 25, 1957] 

In early December, NCPC added another aspect to its preferred Wisconsin Avenue corridor 

routing for U.S. 240. Until this point, the preferred routing split just north of Massachusetts 

Avenue, with passenger vehicles able to continue on the Glover-Archbold Parkway. All traffic, 

including trucks, could use the alternative route to the Inner Loop. 

The new idea was to build a tunnel from the northwest corner of Massachusetts Avenue and 

Macomb Street deep under the north side of Massachusetts Avenue for a mile to Normanstone 

Park near 34th and Fulton Streets, NW. Traffic would continue at grade through the 

Normanstone Valley, cross Rock Creek Park on a viaduct, then enter another tunnel, this one a 

half-mile long, ending near Decatur Place and 22nd Street. The expressway would continue to the 

Inner Loop at Sheridan Circle. This use of tunnels would reduce impacts to the Washington 

Cathedral and other facilities on the surface.

The tunnel would consist of two bores, each carrying two lanes, bored as far as 140 below the 

surface. The tunnels would cost about $30 million, but the commission believed the entire 

Wisconsin Avenue routing would cost less than the District’s preferred routing along the 

Potomac River.

NCPC presented the idea as a staff study and did not endorse or reject it, but the commissioners 

thought it should be presented at the public hearing. Commissioner Welling said he was 
“completely open” on the U.S. 240 proposals, but was “disturbed” about the late arrival of this 

new proposal without detailed cost or engineering studies or even NCPC endorsement. 

Bartholomew said that District officials regularly complained about NCPC proposals that lacked 

detailed studies. “We don’t have the funds to make these studies. And I think that until we can 

have plans made with the exhaustive study of engineering consultants we will always be in this 

difficult position.” He repeated his complaint that District officials seemed to think NCPC 

should simply rubber-stamp whatever they proposed. [Beveridge, George, “Route 240 Tunnel In 

District Proposed,” The Evening Star, December 6, 1957] 

A staff report to the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission a week later also 

favored the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. The Star described the staff’s recommendation:

The recommended route would leave the Pook’s Hill interchange and continue to Cedar 

Lane where it would split, the northbound lane running on the east side of Wisconsin 

avenue and the southbound lane running on the west side of Wisconsin. 

The southbound lane would cross Wisconsin at Jones Bridge road and run beside the 

northbound lane through Bethesda along Tilbury and Waverly streets. 

The route would cross Wisconsin again at Grafton street and intersect with Western 

avenue behind the Woodward & Lothrop store. 

The staff report rejected the route through Rock Creek Park because it would require eight or ten 

lanes to handle all the traffic diverted from Bethesda and Silver spring. “We believe, if well 

handled, this freeway can be the making of the Bethesda business district.” 

After the commission meeting on the plan, representatives of the commissioners, the Maryland 

State Roads Commission, and the Montgomery County Council indicated they would hold a 

public hearing on the plan after the District’s January 6 hearing. [“Corridor Route Urged For 240 

by Planners,” The Evening Star, December 10, 1957] 

George Beveridge described the scene for the January 6 public hearing:

One of the largest public hearings [sic] crowds in the city’s history jammed the District 

Building board room today to hear arguments before the Commissioners on the Route 

240 controversy . . . . 

More than three hundred individual and organization civic leaders—some waving 

banners—occupied every foot of space in the board room and about 50 sat on benches 

outside to hear testimony through an amplifying system. 

At one point, residents of the Palisades area along the Potomac—irate at expressway 

proposals through their area—raised banners above their heads from every part of the 

audience which bore the word “Palisades.” 
The display led Commissioner Robert E. McLaughlin to warn that “this is not a political 

convention. The purpose of this hearing is to advise the Commissioners, not to arouse 

sentiment.”

The agenda included 58 witnesses, but by the lunch break at 12:15, only the first three had 

testified.

The hearing opened on a note of bitter controversy, with city highway officials urging a 

route along the Potomac river to the Maryland line, and Federal park and planning leaders 

calling for an expressway that would closely parallel Wisconsin avenue from the 

Maryland line into the city.

NCPC Director Nolen and traffic planner Robert Keith presented the Wisconsin Avenue corridor 

proposal that they said would carry twice the number of vehicles near the District line than the 

river route the city favored. The corridor would relieve congestion on Wisconsin Avenue and 

other nearby streets in the District and Maryland. It would stimulate business and boost the real 

estate tax base. By contrast, the Potomac River route would cut through a “low-density, singledwelling residential area” that should be maintained.

Keith argued that the city preferred the Potomac River route only because of the difficulty of 

building the needed eight-lane truck-passenger route through Glover-Archbold Park. The recent 

tunnel option NCPC staff had offered would offset the problem, since it would provide an 

alternative route for trucks. The suggested two-lane tunnels would not greatly increase the total 

cost to the District, especially since BPR would pay 90 percent of the cost. He and Nolen 

emphasized that the tunnel route would not impair the Washington Cathedral, embassies, and 

other buildings along Massachusetts Avenue. 

In the absence of detailed information, they urged the District Highway Department to make 

obtaining that information a top priority. 

The District’s Robertson and planning aide Brinkley defended plans for a six- and eight-lane 

expressway along the Potomac River and K Street parallel to Whitehurst Freeway, joining the 

Inner Loop near Washington Circle. “Mr. Robertson attacked the planners’ argument and 

launched a special criticism against the tunnel route.” Although sufficient studies had not been 

conducted to determine the feasibility of the route, Robertson said the District had studied the 

plan enough to know that the tunnels would have to provide at least seven lanes, not just the four 

being suggested. Total cost would be about $110 million or more than double the cost of the 

Potomac River route. The city’s favored route, known as A-2, along Potomac Avenue and Canal 

Road near the C&O canal, would cost $13 million less than any Wisconsin Avenue corridor 

option. 

Robertson said that A-2 was better than Route A on the high bluffs overlooking the river and 

cutting through residential areas in the Potomac Palisades area. Only a third as many residents 

would be displaced by A-2, which would cause a “minimum net loss of park facilities,” 

comparable to the loss from NPS plans for the George Washington Memorial Parkway: 
Route A-2 would provide a beautifully-dignified entrance to the nation’s capital, no other 

entrance would have a comparable esthetic appeal.

Further, it would provide “the best balance in traffic service” for Maryland and Virginia residents 

who could cross the river on the proposed new Arizona Avenue bridge. 

Harland Bartholomew did not attend, but his statement was read into the record. The Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor, he contended, was “superior in all respects” to the river route. The first 

consideration must be the number of motorists served and relief of congestion. On that basis, 

there was “little question” that the Wisconsin Avenue corridor was the best route because it 

would draw traffic from a corridor with high residential development. 

He would prefer not to see any highway through Glover-Archbold Park, but did not think that 

concern should rule out the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. “Whatever is best for the community 

can and must be voted out.” 

As the day went on, testimony favored the route along the Potomac River or, if not directly in 

favor of that route, strongly in opposition to the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

On the second day of the hearing, civic leaders “clashed sharply” on the same issues. Only about 

100 people were on hand as the “parade of dozens of witnesses on the 240 controversy moved 

steadily along at the District Building.” 

In contrast with the day before, testimony tended to favor the Wisconsin Avenue corridor as the 

best way to meet the greatest traffic demand. Palisades residents especially attacked the 

Clarkeson study, which they considered a “misleading and incompetent effort” to justify the 

decision the District had already made. (District officials later assured reporters that Clarkeson 

had “a completely free hand” to compare alternatives.)

Overall, the debate featured “bitter attacks and strong defenses”:

At one point, the testimony led Commissioner McLaughlin to comment that in two days 

of testimony he had “not heard anyone say to put this road in his area. Some want to go 

underground like an ostrich, and others say, just put it somewhere else.” [Beveridge, 

George, “350 Jam D.C. Building For Route 240 Hearing,” The Evening Star, January 6, 

1958; Beveridge, George, “Leaders Clash On 240 Route To Downtown,” The Evening 

Star, January 7, 1958] 

The Palisades Citizens Association appreciated the opportunity to testify before the District 

Commissioners. Eight association members had testified. “Our report was good, but we need 

public opinion to back it up,” William G. Smith told reporters. The association would need “a 

lot of money” to convince the District commissioners to route the road elsewhere. “They’ll have 

to pass it over our dead bodies before we are through fighting.” The association was planning an 

aggressive campaign of letters to newspapers and Members of Congress to stop the river route. 

[“Palisades Group Lauds Conduct of 240 Hearing,” The Evening Star, January 8, 1958] 

The District’s Decision
On January 14, the District commissioners voted to support the Potomac River location for 

U.S. 240, leaving the District Highway Department to analyze the two options: 

The Commissioners expressed strenuous opposition to a location that would follow 

Wisconsin avenue from Maryland and either pour large volumes of traffic through 

Glover-Archbold Park or divert it from Wisconsin avenue in a proposed “tunnel route” 

beneath Massachusetts avenue to downtown Washington. 

They said a location along the river within the District “will adequately serve the traffic in 

the corridor through which it extends and hold to a minimum the conflict with existing 

land use, land use plans and community development. The engineering, economic and 

esthetic values of the selected location are acceptable.”

In a statement, the Commissioners said they “recognize that the construction of an 

interstate highway anywhere in the District would cause some degree of disturbance and 

inconvenience to citizens, business interests, and various community programs. The 

Commissioners are determined the highway will be designed to full respect [sic] to the 

amenities so important in the Nation’s Capital.”

They added: 

“There is unanimous agreement among the Commissioners that legal and moral 

obligations and sound Government policies dictate against the building of an interstate 

route in Glover-Archbold Park.” 

The Commissioners said their quick decision on the District part of the 240 controversy 

was prompted partly by the appeal of Maryland officials who have “the real need to set 

aside as yet undeveloped land for the highway right-of-way.”

The “tunnel route” that NCPC had suggested “has no appeal to the Commissioners”: 

“The facility required to serve the traffic assignable to the tunnel is estimated to cost at 

least $110 million and is rejectable on the basis of cost alone. Without such capacity 

there would be a demand for service in Glover-Archbold Park of such magnitude as to be 

objectionable. 

“In addition to the construction cost factor, the tunnel scheme is unsatisfactory because it 

would put heavy volumes of traffic on the inner loop near the center of the city where 

volumes assigned by other plans already approach practical capacities.

The commissioners did not offer a view on how the Maryland State Roads Commission should 

connect U.S. 240 traffic with the river route entrance to the District. 

Maryland’s Bonnell said he told District officials that he would give “every consideration to the 

route they felt was most desirable.” He added, “And we certainly will do that.” He did not say 

what his preference was, saying he would withhold a decision until after the public hearing the 

State had scheduled on U.S. 240 for January 29. 
Maryland had identified two alternatives: 

One plan is to extend the so-called “west leg” of 240 due south from Montrose road to 

River road, follow River road to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks and follow the 

tracks to the District line near the Potomac river.

The other is to extend the 240 west leg due south beyond River road all the way to the 

Potomac River near Cabin John, then to follow the Potomac shore to the District line in 

the right-of-way planned for construction of the four-lane George Washington Memorial 

Parkway by the National Park Service.

The problem with this plan was the NPS restriction on trucks. Given the NPS resistance to any 

change, Congress might have to be approached to secure approval for trucks on this short stretch 

of the parkway. 

Colonel Welling said he did not know when the District would decide on which river route was 

best for the link to U.S. 240. The project was not in the District’s 6-year plan, but the link might 

be substituted for one of the projects in the plan if a decision were made. [Beveridge, George, 

“Route 240 River Location Backed by Commissioners,” The Evening Star, January 14, 1958; 

Beveridge, George, “Maryland 240 Ruling Awaits Jan. 29 Hearing,” The Evening Star, January 

15, 1958] 

Public Hearing in Maryland

The Maryland State Roads Commission, Montgomery County Council, and Maryland-National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission held a public hearing in the evening of January 29 at 

Leland Junior High School in Chevy Chase on the U.S. 240 routing controversy. As Beveridge 

put it “about 1,000 partisan Marylanders” attended to hear the debate on the “Route 240 wars.” 

Roads Commissioner Bonnell chaired the three-agency “jury” that conducted the hearing. He 

explained that U.S. 240 was part of the Federal Interstate System, which was “not designed 

primarily for large volumes of local traffic.” It was intended primarily for continuous freeway 

travel across the Nation and for emergency access for national defense. This did not “mean, 

however, that the roads commission will close its eyes to any chance for relief to local traffic,” 

while still meeting the national goals. The roads commission, he said, “has not yet selected a 

route” and would not do so until they review all hearing testimony about the two alternatives – 

routing the Washington National Pike in the Wisconsin Avenue Corridor or along River Road. 

The Seven Locks Citizens Association was the only group that favored the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor outright. The Civic League of Brookmont was the only group to favor construction of 

the expressway on the west side of Rock Creek Park. No one supported the River road location. 

Two options had some support. Ten groups, and a joint committee representing 30 

organizations, favored the location along the Potomac River between Cabin John and the District 

line. Advocates said it was the cheapest alternative, would do the least damage to property 

values, would meet the national defense goals of the Interstate System, and would line up with 

the District’s approved route. 
“This route also drew vociferous opposition from several speakers,” according to Beveridge in 

the Star. They “blasted it as a ‘foolish waste’ of money” because the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway is being planned to provide the same connection. It also would not serve 

heavily populated areas to the north and would wreck the Palisades area. 

NPS Director Wirth submitted a letter stating that grading work was underway on the parkway. 

He warned the Maryland and Montgomery County officials that the parkway “should not be 

considered as potentially available for the construction of any part of Route 240.” 

Also receiving support was a call for a feasibility study of a route east of Rock Creek Park 

following the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks through Silver Spring and Takoma Park to 

North Capitol Street at the District line:

Advocates of the B&O route contended that it would pass through a heavily populated 

area to serve all traffic and particularly serve trucks which, for the most part, are destined 

for the eastern part of Washington . . . . 

One critic of this plan was Mayor Samuel Powell, Jr., of Garrett Park, a town incorporated in 

1898 and located between Rock Creek Park and Maryland Route 355 (former U.S. 240). He 

charged that the “reckless, indiscreet, mad-dog proposal” would wreck his town as well as the 

communities of Kensington and Garrett Park Estates. 

County council member Robert T. Snure also opposed the rail alignment. In a written statement, 

he said that on behalf of his constituents, he had no choice but to oppose the alignment. It would 

damage Garrett Park, as Mayor Powell had said, but also would, as the Post summarized, 

“virtually destroy Kensington. It would, he added, erase too much taxable property from the 

county rolls.” Further, “it would dump too much traffic on ‘already overcongested arteries’ in 

the Silver Spring-Takoma Park section”: 

Snure said he favors a two-pronged road plan – one route going through Rock Creek 

Park, another feeding into the George Washington Memorial Parkway under construction 

along the Potomac. 

State roads officials did not comment on this new idea “but it was understood that they have 

apprehensions about both cost and traffic volumes involved in such a route.” 

Former Senator Nye testified on behalf of the Citizens Action Committee for Fair Road Planning. 

He said that “in our estimation,” a superhighway into the city was not needed. Therefore, he did 

not take a position on the alternatives. He added that he would not oppose an improved parkway, 

not an expressway, through Rock Creek Park. 

Many witnesses, whether they supported an alternative route or not, “blasted either the proposed 

Wisconsin avenue or River road locations.” These witnesses “contended that the expressway, 

built through either of the heavily developed areas, would sever the communities and wreck 

property values.”
One of the many speakers is worth noting, not because what he said was remarkable, but because 

he would play a prominent role in later years. Beveridge summarized the testimony: 

Darwin Stolzenbach, president, Montgomery County Citizens’ Planning Association – 

There is no justification for a Potomac River Route because it would not serve traffic 

needs. A fast 240 decision should be avoided until B&O route possibility can be studied. 

This would serve traffic and avoid fights over use of parkland. 

The “jury” adjourned the hearing at midnight but announced that it would resume at 8 p.m. the 

following evening. 

Beveridge summarized the result:

At adjournment time [at midnight], 30 persons had spoken, about half of a scheduled 

witness list. The speakers alternatively praised and attacked a variety of route 

proposals—with the emphasis definitely on the attack . . . . 

Last night’s overflow crowd heard overwhelming attacks lodged against proposals to 

bring the Maryland part of the freeway down either Wisconsin avenue or River road. 

The Post concluded: 

As the hearing neared a close, the two officially proposed routes – an alignment paralleling 

Wisconsin ave. and another using River rd. – were still unable to muster more than lukewarm 

support. [Beveridge, George, “Rt. 240 Plans Hit; Hearing Goes on Tonight,” The Evening Star, 

January 30, 1958; Stern, Laurence, and Anderson, J. W., “B&O Site For Rte. 240 Is Assailed,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 31, 1958] 

During the first night of hearings, according to Beveridge, the Wisconsin Avenue corridor drew 

“the bitterest opposition . . . with hardly a nod of support.” As for the alternatives to that corridor 

- the river route and the new alternative of running U.S. 240 along the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad parallel to North Capitol Street, “the opposition roof fell in on these, too,” on the second 

day, January 30: 

Citizen representatives of the Potomac Palisades region, joined by conservation and 

nature groups, turned out in force to deplore the proposal that Route 240 be substituted 

for the George Washington Memorial Parkway along the river in Maryland. 

And the so-called B&O route – proposed for the first time only about a week ago – was 

roundly castigated as a “disastrous” proposal. 

Frank L. Hewitt of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission said the rail routing would be 

an “economic catastrophe” that would affect apartment buildings, shopping centers, parks, a 

country club, commercial buildings, and Maryland State Roads Commission property along the 

route. 
Many organizations testified against any river route, but some thought the State should study the 

rail routing. Others opposed any freeway entrance to the city, preferring a circumferential 

freeway that could feed traffic to arterials:

They unanimously urged that no effort be made to tamper with the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway, and contended this would help solve any future traffic problems in 

the river area. They also contended that a 240 route along the river would destroy 

recreational values of the Palisades parks and would cause heavy disruption of residential 

communities.

Only about 175 people attended the second evening of the hearing. “In all, nearly nine hours of 

steady talking was required to complete the testimony of more than 60 witnesses at the two 

sessions.” Chairman Bonnell ordered that the hearing record be kept open for 10 days to allow 

for submission of additional comments. 

Bonnell promised a decision would be reached “as soon as possible,” which he estimated would 

take 30-45 days. Wells of the planning commission said officials would take “at least a 

preliminary look” at the railroad route, which was so new that no detailed study had been made. 

[Beveridge, George, “State Officials Push Rt. 240 Decision,” The Evening Star, January 31, 

1958] 

Decision Time

Over the next weeks, officials and citizens expressed their views on how to get Montgomery 

County traffic into and out of the city. 

E. Brooke Lee was one of those who endorsed the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad option. He 

released a statement on February 1 arguing that the route would not disrupt the KensingtonGarrett Park area. The Star reported: 

His idea is that instead of following the B&O tracks at Randolph road, the 240 

expressway would use the Washington Circumferential expressway between Wisconsin 

avenue at Pooks Hill and Forest Glen. Only at this point – south and east of Kensington – 

would it hit the railroad tracks, and then follow them through Silver Spring to the District 

line.

Mr. Lee said this was the “lowest cost per mile and shortest” route feasible unless 

Congress permits the 240 expressway to be built through Rock Creek Park. He said it 

would protect River road and Potomac Palisades communities and would not require the 

National Park Service to “scrap” part of the George Washington Memorial Parkway along 

the river. [“Modified B&O Route For 240 Is Proposed,” The Sunday Star, February 2, 

1958] 

District planner Brinkley predicted that without two “high capacity” expressways between the 

county and northwest Washington, the area would be “traffic-clogged beyond any 

comprehension” in two decades. At present, 29,700 cars and trucks crossed the District line on 

Wisconsin Avenue each workday, with trucks comprising nearly 10 percent of the traffic. 
Clarkeson Engineering Company projected that by 1980, the total would be 70,000 vehicles 

daily. Closer to the Potomac River, Clarkeson estimated that MacArthur Avenue and 

Massachusetts Avenue each averaged 16,645 cars daily; by 1980 a river route for U.S. 240 would 

carry 34,000 vehicles. The District’s planned Potomac River route would take 146,500 vehicles 

off crowded downtown streets. To make his point about the need for two expressways, he cited 

the current crossing by Massachusetts Avenue of Rock Creek Park. Trying to pass traffic across 

the park in 20 years would lead to “strangulation” during peak periods. “It would be like trying 

to accommodate 1980 traffic with existing bridges. People would just not get through.” [Stern, 

Laurence, “Expressway in NW Vital, Official Warns,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

February 2, 1958] 

On February 2, residents of Glen Echo, Potomac Valley, and Palisades staged a protest at the 

construction site of the George Washington Memorial Parkway. To illustrate their opposition to 

the Maryland State Roads Commission’s plan to ask NPS to cancel the parkway to make way for 

an expressway in the corridor, the protesters made their point with shovels on Sunday. A 

photograph in the Post showed a line of protesters using their shovels to push dirt in the direction 

of an idle bulldoxer. 

A few days later, the Palisades Citizens Association appointed a Roads Committee to lead the 

opposition to an all-purpose expressway through Palisades park land. The committee’s 

chairman, William Griffith Smith, criticized the city for not considering any options east of 

Wisconsin Avenue. The committee would study feasible alternatives to a riverside route. 

[“Women Dramatize Opposition to Palisades Route for 240,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, February 3, 1958; “Reconsideration Is Asked Of River Route Approval,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, February 9, 1958] 

Donald Gingery and David Scull of the Maryland planning commission criticized the District 

commissioners for not considering a route through Rock Creek Park for the 240 expressway. 

Scull thought that if Maryland chose the route along the river, Congress should allow 

construction of a parkway for cars-only traffic along the west side of Rock Creek Park. The river 

route, he said, “would obviously be of no use to commuters in the fast-growing and already 

traffic-strangled Silver Spring-Wheaton area.” Residents of the area “would be deeply grateful if 

the request [for the river route] could be coupled with a similar request for permission to utilize a 

strip along the west side of mile-wide Rock Creek Park as a passenger car, park expressway.” He 

acknowledged that the river route was the “line of least resistance,” but added that the Silver 

Spring-Wheaton area was “unquestionably the area of greatest need and will assuredly remain in 

that category for many years to come.” With most existing roads in the area “impossible of 

widening,” Scull urged Maryland and District officials to conduct “an imaginative search” for a 

way to relieve “nightmare” conditions east of Rock Creek Park. 

The District’s refusal to consider the Rock Creek alternative to the river route, Scull and Gingery 

said, did not preclude the planning commission from recommending the park route. Although 

Chairman Bonnell had said the roads commission would take up to 6 weeks to consider the 

alternatives, Scull was convinced that the Maryland State Roads Commission “has already made 

up its mind” in favor of the river route. [[“Wheaton Area Freeway Urged,” The Evening Star, 
February 4, 1958; “Planners Hit D.C. Attitude On Route 240,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, February 6, 1958] 

The Post’s editors found it “shocking to hear the continued drumfire of criticism aimed at every 

route for the proposed expressway to bring Route 240 through the Maryland suburbs and into 

downtown Washington.” Witnesses cited “a back yard, a golf course, a piece of commercial 

property or plans for a real estate development.” The editors lamented, “Are there no citizens or 

groups of citizens who can subordinate personal and neighborhood interests to the welfare of the 

community as a whole?” The editors were not minimizing the inconveniences, but whichever 

route is selected “is going to cause distress to a large number of families.” That was the price for 

“the lack of adequate city planning in the past.” Regardless, the price must be paid “for the sake 

of many future generations as well as this one.” Experts said that two expressways were needed 

to meet 1980 needs: 

So the question facing the District and Maryland authorities is not whether this golf 

course or that church property or some other real estate development is to be saved. 

Rather, it is a question of whether public officials of today have the courage and foresight 

to build for the future as well as the present. If they try only to heed the interests that are 

most vocal on issues of this sort, they will do nothing or follow the course of least 

resistance. What they ought to realize is that a vast host of citizens who have had little to 

say on the subject are depending on them to raise their sights above relatively petty and 

narrowly local considerations to the major interests of the city of Washington – in 2000 

and 2100 as well as in the 1960s. [“Raise Your Sights,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, February 6, 1958] 

Representative Hyde, a Bethesda resident (at 5606 McLean Drive), issued a statement on 

February 10 urging decisionmakers to wait for completion of the Mass Transportation Survey. “I 

have no desire to add” to the delays, but a delay would be preferable to a mistake. The survey, 

which began “in anticipation of the very problem we face today,” was embracing “a new form of 

analysis” that would help officials decide on the best route: 

It will conclude that the projected traffic to the central business district will increase to 

the point where the existing plans for the Inner Loop will break down in the congestion . . 

. . This collapse of the main feature of our present highway plan will have to be 

prevented at all costs. An additional central city circumferential is one possibility. The 

recommendations for the improvement of mass transportation will, of course, be one way 

to relieve the situation. [“Hyde Warns of Rt. 240 ‘Mistakes,’” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, February 11, 1958] 

The Post’s editors agreed with Representative Hyde that “a little delay” was preferable to 

mistakes. “Perhaps the officials who are to make the decision can get advance data from the 

experts who are conducting the mass transportation study and whose report is not due until 

summer.” Regardless, “they should make certain that Route 240 will not be out of joint with the 

improved transportation system that the survey is expected to envisage.” [“Route 240 and the 

Survey,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 12, 1958] 
On the same day that Representative Hyde issued his statement, Chairman Murray complicated 

the decision by announcing he opposed any transfer of park property along the Potomac River for 

expressway use. He recalled that the Capper-Cramton Act authorized the parkway in Maryland 

and Virginia. “These would have given our Capital City an unusual park and recreational area 

extending from tidewater along a beautiful gorge and including a beautiful waterfall.” However, 

“short-sighted opposition” on both sides of the river had stalled the project. “Washington 

appears determined to throw away its opportunity to be the most beautiful capital city in the 

world by paving its scenic and recreational areas and making them roadways.” Extolling the 

natural advantages of his home State of Montana, he said: 

For some time I have considered a bill to move the Capital of the United States out West, 

where the climate would be much better and the grandeur of the Rocky Mountains might 

revive in the minds of governing groups some of the spiritual and social values of the 

founders of the Republic. If Washington can no longer handle traffic without paving 

parks and playgrounds, then I shall offer a bill to move the Capitol to Montana, amid the 

Rockies. The bill will also provide an area in eastern Montana prairies where 

roadbuilders can [use] flat prairie land with a minimum of tree removal and bulldozers. 

Washington would become a place where historians could study “prehistoric things like the 

mastodon bones at the Smithsonian Institution and Republican economic policies.” 

Because Chairman Murray’s Interior and Insular Affairs Committee would have to act on any 

transfer of park property, his views were a serious obstacle. District Commissioner McLaughlin 

thought the prohibition against using park property for expressways might not kill the District’s 

favored split-level routing - a divided alignment, with the inbound lane on Canal Road level and 

the outbound lane on the Palisades level. [“Senator Murray Set to Oppose Riverside 240,” The 

Evening Star, February 12, 1958; Eisen, Jack, “Senator Murray To Oppose Use Of Park Lands,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 12, 1958] 

In early March, with the hearing transcript finally available, the Maryland State Roads 

Commission began studying the comments received. Their task had a serious challenge, as 

Chairman Bonnell explained. “We can’t build 240 until we know where we’re going to meet the 

District of Columbia.” The city favored the river route, but NPS was unwilling to yield its park 

land for the expressway. Bonnell added, “I imagine the District is attempting to reconcile its 

differences [with NPS] and when that is done I am sure we can agree.” [“County Awaits 

Decision on 240,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 6, 1958] 

Pushed by Gingery and Scull, the Maryland-National Capital Parks and Planning Commission 

expressed its frustration to the White House in a letter asking President Eisenhower on March 12, 

asking him to bring people together to make a decision. In essence, the planners wanted the 

President to “knock heads together.” County officials saw no point in deciding where to route 

Route 240 without knowing where the District will want to build its segment. Progress, as Scull 

put it, was being help in the city by “archaic laws and ridiculous prejudices,” with the result that 

Maryland officials were left to “spin our wheels.” 

The Post, on March 13, explained the origins of the letter: 
The Planning Commission’s abrupt move to bring the White House into the controversy 

was inspired by a letter received yesterday from Maryland State Roads Commission 

Chairman Robert O. Bonnell. He asked for another meeting of his Commission, the 

Planning Commission, and the Montgomery County Council to discuss testimony 

received during two public hearings on Route 240 in Bethesda last January. 

Informed of the planning commission’s letter, Bonnell said the Maryland State Roads 

Commission would be “delighted to have definite information from the District.” [Willard, Hal, 

“Head Knocking Is Advocated To End Dispute,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 

13, 1958] 

On February 21, the Committee of 100 on the Federal City had asked General Grant to prepare a 

resolution on the Route 240 controversy. He had stated that no park land should be used for the 

expressway, that other expressways should be built before a decision is made on Route 240, and 

that in any event, officials should not decide the routing until the Mass Transportation Survey 

was completed. A month later, he completed the resolution, which favored the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor, which would connect with the long-planned Fort Drive intermediate 

circumferential. The road would be located east of Glover-Archbold Park “to comply 

meticulously with the terms and full intent of the gift” of the land for park purposes. The 

resolution also opposed “any use of park land, or land given or purchased for park purposes, as 

rights of way for freeways or main highways.” 

The Committee of 100 considered General Grant’s resolution on March 28, but not without some 

opposition. Remon, a member of the committee, said, “The use of each park should be decided 

on its own merits.” Calling the resolution “arbitrary and capricious,” he suggested that if a 

decision were ever made to swap park land for other uses, the committee would be left in an 

awkward position. Pierre Ghent, a planner and civil engineer, said the committee was “putting 

itself in a foolish position” by adopting the resolution. No one could predict how traffic 

increases might affect future decisions.

During discussion of the resolution, the subject of Route 240 came up. Some favored the 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad route, while architect Arthur P. Davis promoted his plan for an 

elevated roadway over the Potomac River near the District shore. 

In the end, the Committee of 100 approved the resolution, 17 to 7, along with a second resolution 

opposing construction of any road in Glover-Archbold Park except a two-lane park drive. 

[Beveridge, George, “Architects Assail D.C. City Planners,” The Evening Star, February 22, 

1958; “Committee of 100 to Get Grant’s Route 240 Plan,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, March 22, 1958; “Federal City Group Asks Park Ban on Main Roads,” The Evening 

Star, March 29, 1958; “Use of Parks For Roads Is Opposed,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, March 29, 1958] 

On April 22, 1958, Colonel Welling announced that the District, NPS, BPR, and the Maryland 

State Roads Commission had reached agreement on the river alternative for the U.S. 240 

entrance to the District. The agreement had been worked out with former Arizona Governor 

Howard Pyle (January 1951-January 1955), Administrative Assistant and Deputy Assistant to 
President Eisenhower. (Governor Pyle was the President’s coordinator of programs between 

Federal and State officials. [PYLE, HOWARD: Records, 1955-59, Dwight Eisenhower Library, 

http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/finding_aids/pdf/Pyle_Howard_Records.pdf])

The result of the compromise would not be an Interstate route, however, because trucks would be 

banned. Beveridge summarized the agreed route: 

From downtown Washington near Washington Circle, the District will build an eight-lane 

expressway paralleling the Potomac River’s Whitehurst freeway as far as Key Bridge. 

This portion will be part of the Federal interstate system, and the Federal Government 

thus will pay 90 per cent of its cost. 

From Key Bridge to the foot of the proposed Glover-Archbold parkway, near the 

intersection of Canal and Foxhall roads, the freeway will continue as eight lanes. This 

will be built by the District, but financed by both the District (supplemented by Federal 

aid funds) and the Park Service. 

From Glover-Archbold parkway along the Potomac River to Cabin John, beyond Glen 

Echo in Maryland, the road will be built by the Park Service entirely with Park Service 

funds. 

Between Glover-Archbold parkway and Arizona avenue, where a new Potomac bridge is 

planned, the road will be six lanes wide. From that point to Cabin John it will be four 

lanes wide. The Maryland portion of this river route will be the George Washington 

memorial parkway, on which the Park Service already has started construction.

At Cabin John the parkway will connect with Maryland’s long-proposed Washington 

circumferential freeway, which will connect with Route 240 south of Rockville and cross 

the Potomac River on a new bridge at Cabin John. 

Route 240 trucks may use the circumferential road, but will not be permitted to use the 

new river route into town. They may either cross the Potomac at Cabin John or, if headed 

for Washington, use existing streets such as River road, Massachusetts avenue and 

Wisconsin avenue. These roads all will be improved. 

Colonel Welling said the agreement included the District’s plans to build the Glover-Archbold 

Parkway, between Wisconsin Avenue at Tenley Circle and the new river road, with four lanes for 

passenger vehicles only. Because NPS had agreed to this plan, officials would not seek 

additional legislation.

The key to this compromise was abandoning the idea of an expressway that could carry trucks 

from Rockville to downtown Washington. BPR had insisted on truck usage for any route 

included in the Interstate System. Now, Beveridge wrote: 

A bureau official said today that his office definitely has not abandoned the belief that 

such an expressway may still be needed at some time in the future. The decision, 
however, is that it will not be built immediately, but will await future analyses of traffic 

needs.

Although the agreement did not include construction timetables, all parties hoped to speed up 

construction plans. 

Wirth said the plan addressed concerns in the Palisades area because it meant NPS would not 

have to acquire additional property along the river. The NPS was planning “a true parkway that 

will be fitted into the landscape and be a scenic drive. It will not be a highway such as the 

District intended to build, or as much of a superhighway as is the Baltimore-Washington 

parkway.” The eastbound lanes near the District would be built on the level of Canal Road while 

the westbound lanes would be located on the Palisades bluffs. [Beveridge, George, “Potomac 

Link for 240 Agreed on by Officials,” The Evening Star, April 22, 1958] 

The agreement pleased Star editors who hoped each agency involved would give their part of the 

plan “the highest possible priorities for construction.” The positive elements, however, involved 

“temporary abandonment of the crucial factor,” namely BPR’s “edict” that an all-vehicle 

expressway was needed between Rockville and downtown Washington as part of the Interstate 

System. “In effect, the real decision has been to forget such an interstate system connection for 

the present.” Eventually, officials “may still have to face the job of finding an adequate interstate 

connection to Route 240 in the future, as traffic increases.” The editorial concluded: 

It is encouraging, too, that for the second time in a week the powerful influences of the 

White House have been used to mediate highway controversies. (Last week end, the 

White House announced a Constitution avenue bridge agreement.) We hope the 

President maintains his interest in breaking such administrative deadlocks. [“Major Road 

Solution,” The Evening Star, April 23, 1958] 

Even with agreement in hand for the western leg of U.S. 240, the Maryland-National Capital 

Parks and Planning Commission kept an eye on development in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

By June, planners on the commission staff pointed out that two major buildings were planned in 

the path of the projected expressway. “We do . . . wish to caution the commission these projects, 

desirable as they may be, cannot take the place of a freeway through Northwest Washington and 

the Chevy Chase and Bethesda sector.” Relying on the river route without the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor would lull the public into “a false sense of believing that adequate highways had 

been planned.” An expressway was needed not only in the Bethesda area but even more so in the 

Silver Spring area. A parkway only for passenger cars through Rock Creek Park was needed, 

“but this cannot be taken as a substitute for either a Bethesda or a Silver Spring expressway, let 

alone for both.” 

First priority was the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. The planners urged the commission to work 

with District officials to preserve the corridor between Western Avenue and Tenley Circle. An 

expressway between Silver Spring and the Inner Loop was needed, but the planners believed it 

would be “more difficult, more costly, more disruptive of private property” than an expressway 

in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. They added that if the Wisconsin Avenue corridor was 

abandoned “or allowed to die because of inaction at this time,” efforts for a similar expressway 
from Silver Spring would be “doomed to failure before they start.” [Hoffman, Charles L., “Plans 

Unit to Air Rt. 240 Extension,” The Evening Star, June 25, 1958] 

Commissioner Gingery was one of the strongest supporters of the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

With developers continuing to maneuver in the area, he believed that immediate action was 

needed to preserve the corridor. On September 13, he accused other commissioners of stalling 

on plans for the eastern leg of U.S. 240 between Bethesda and the Inner Loop. He thought the 

Montgomery County commissioners, in particular, owed the public an explanation for their 

inaction at a time when the situation had reached emergency proportions. 

Gingery added that the Mass Transportation Study that would be released soon would 

demonstrate that relying on the river route for the western leg was an “unrealistic decision.” He 

urged the commissioners to pressure the Maryland State Roads Commission to include the 

corridor in its next 12-year highway plan. This step would allow Maryland and District officials 

to secure Interstate funds for construction. [“Planners Scored On 240 Stalling,” The Evening 

Star, September 13, 1958] 

On November 6, the issue came up when the Maryland commission considered a request by 

developer Alvin L. Aubinoe for a permit for an office building in the proposed right-of-way at 

Waverly Street and East-West Highway. The resulting discussion of the corridor dominated the 

all-day meeting. Gingery pointed out that adopting the corridor without acting to advance it 

would be “frightfully unjust” to the developer. The commissioners decided to seek a meeting 

with the Maryland State Roads Commission, BPR, the Montgomery County Council, the District 

Highway Department, and the Bethesda-Chevy Chase Chamber of Commerce to review the 

alternative. [“Study Delays Planners’ Rule On 240 Path,” The Evening Star, November 7, 1958] 

Locating the Inner Loop 

On January 5, 1959, the District commissioners held a public hearing in the District Building on 

the Inner Loop. They were considering: 

• The eight-lane Potomac River Freeway,

• Upgrade of K Street from the river to Connecticut Avenue, and 

• Location of the Inner Loop between 25th and G Streets and 21st Street and Massachusetts 

Avenue, NW. 

The latter, known as the West Leg, was the most controversial of the three. District highway 

officials favored a path along 26th Street that Douglas Brinkley said would cost $35.4 million and 

displace 480 dwelling units. 

The public, as might be expected, was divided. The president of George Washington University, 

Admiral O. S. Colclough, favored the District’s preferred route, while opposing the route that 

would affect the university’s expansion plans. The Foggy Bottom Restoration Association had 

favored the 26th Street route because it expected that vacant land could be used to relocate 

displaced residents. However, the District had zoned the land for “high density apartments,” 

which the association opposed. Now, the association preferred the route through the George 
Washington University expansion area. Further, the association urged the District to decide the 

route soon because in the meantime, Foggy Bottom residents were having difficulty selling or 

financing renovations due to the uncertainty. 

Colonel William E. Shepherd of the Georgetown Citizens Association said his group favored the 

26th Street route if an expressway had to be built. He said his members preferred improvements 

to existing streets. “I am not sure we are going to be satisfied with the loop after it is bought and 

paid for.” He asked, “Why should we Washingtonians suffer our fair city to be slashed to pieces 

so that they [commuters] may tear through it at 50 m.p.h.?” 

The Federation of Civic Associations urged the city to establish a relocation service to help 

displaced residents. The Washington Housing Association, Washington Urban League, National 

Association of Social Workers, and the National Capital Council of Churches also supported 

such a service. 

The Progressive Citizens Association, out of concern for historic structures, urged that the 

interchange between the Potomac River Freeway and the West Leg be moved as far east as 

possible. The current proposal threatened, for example, the Thomas Peter House at 2618 K 

Street, NW., a colonial house dating to 1795 when the builder gave it to his son, Thomas Peter, 

and new wife, Martha Parke Custis Peter, George Washington’s step-granddaughter. 

Washington stayed in the house several times while in the area on business related to 

construction of the new capital city. He stayed in the house on his final visit to the area in 

August before his death on December 14, 1799. Leo M. Bernstein, whose family owned the 

house, offered to turn it over to a foundation if it would be used as Washington City Museum. 

[WPA Guide to Washington, page 386]

The Washington Building Congress was concerned that the District’s 10 percent share of the $1 

billion Inner Loop might jeopardize expenditures for education, water pollution, police 

protection, and other city functions only “to shave 20 minutes off commuter’s travel time.” With 

the increased number of cars entering the city, the group urged construction of adequate off-street 

parking, as well as imaginative designs to minimize “this great highway ditch” through the city.

The Washington chapter of the American Institute of Architects questioned whether the Inner 

Loop would “relieve traffic sufficiently to justify its enormous cost.” The group supported the 

segment south of K Street, but favored holding off on the segment to the north until the city had a 

rapid transit system, provided more off-street parking, and improved city streets. Spokesman 

Francis D. Lethbridge said: 

There is no point in encouraging the increased use of automobiles by building additional 

freeways within the city until we have successfully coped with the volume of traffic 

which existing arterial streets and freeways already pour in upon us. A good rapid transit 

system is what we need most.

According to the Star, “No specific opposition was registered to still another highway project 

before the hearing—drastic improvement of K street between the Potomac River and Connecticut 

avenue, including an underpass of Washington Circle.” [Beveridge, George, “Loop Network 
Plan Backed, Assailed,” The Evening Star, January 5, 1959; “Groups Rap Loop Plan For North 

of K Street,” The Evening Star, January 6, 1959] 

Despite the District’s opposition, the Wisconsin Avenue corridor was still under consideration, 

especially in Maryland. The District had abandoned it after holding a public hearing and had 

reached agreement with NPS and BPR on a river route. Nevertheless, the Maryland-National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission staff continued to study alternatives for the corridor. A 

year earlier, the commission had favored Route B, which ran west of Wisconsin Avenue from the 

District line to Oliver Street (estimated cost: $31,022,000). It continued along Wisconsin 

Avenue to Bradley Lane east of Wisconsin to Glenbrook Parkway. 

From there, Route B and Route A were identical. Route A began east of Wisconsin Avenue, 

then paralleled the avenue between Oliver and Hesketh Streets ($30,640,000). It cut through the 

western edge of the Chevy Chase Country Club before cutting one block east of Wisconsin 

Avenue to meet Glenbrook Parkway at the edge of the Bethesda business district. 

Route C followed Route A from the District Line to Bradley Lane ($30,916,000). From there it 

shifted about a block east of Route A and B to Glenbrook Parkway, then was identical to those 

routes. 

Route D began east of Wisconsin Avenue along the path of Route B ($31,415,000). It joined the 

other routes through the country club before shifting along the edge of the club to the end of the 

Bethesda business district. It then followed the other routes to connect with U.S. 240. 

On January 31, 1959, commission staff revealed that they still recommended Route B because it 

would do the least damage to residential areas. To aid decisionmaking, the commission planned 

to hold a public hearing on February 21, again at Leland Junior High School. [“Planning Staff 

Picks Route B Expressway,” The Evening Star, January 31, 1959] 

About 400 people attended the hearing, “most of them opposed to the proposal . . . to build the 

four-to-six-lane expressway from the District line through Chevy Chase and Bethesda to Pooks 

Hill,” according to the Star account. J. Newton Brewer, Jr., one of the commissioners Gingery 

had criticized the previous year, said that one problem was that neither the Maryland State Roads 

Commission nor District officials had agreed on a path through Washington. “Our big problem 

is that the District won’t give us any consideration. They won’t even come to the hearing. The 

best information I can get from the highest District officials is that Route 240 in the District 

won’t be built for 15 to 20 years.” Brewer added that while he opposed Route B, if the District 

would support it, “I may even vote for it.” (A District highway official attended the hearing as an 

observer.) 

In introducing Route B, commission planning director Arthur K. Stellhorn warned that unless the 

State built an expressway in the corridor, congestion would grow even worse. He anticipated 

opponents’ arguments by pointing out that the county would lose only about $125,000 a year in 

taxes from the properties acquired for the expressway. Moreover, it would not be a “Chinese 

wall” dividing Bethesda because the 10 to 12 crossings of the route would involve underpasses or 

overpasses for cross traffic.
Opponents argued that improving Wisconsin Avenue could solve problems for 2 or 3 decades 

along with removal of parking along much of the avenue. A Woodward and Lothrop department 

store representative said Route B would take 550 of the department store’s 771 parking spaces, 

irreparably damaging the business. A resident of Bradley Boulevard argued that taking country 

club property would lead to its gradual replacement by housing developments. Others were 

concerned about the demolition of about $4 million in property, while some speakers favored the 

river route, construction of a subway line in the corridor, a route through Rock Creek Park or 

along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad line. 

Some supporters among the 30 or so speakers mentioned the 90-percent Federal funding for an 

Interstate route, the inevitable growth of automobile traffic, and the likelihood that the 

expressway would draw traffic away from residential communities.

Despite the mix of views, the Star characterized the hearing in these words:

The sentiment of those attending the hearing was clear at the outset. They listened 

politely to those speaking on behalf of the expressway but made no demonstration. They 

loudly applauded those speaking against it.

The commissioners indicated they would decide the issue soon. [Alibrando, Alfred, 

“Expressway Plan Hit and Defended,” The Evening Star, February 21, 1959; Alibrando, Alfred, 

“Civic, Business Interests Oppose Expressway Scheduled Through Bethesda, Chevy Chase,” The 

Evening Star, February 22, 1959] 

On March 2, 1959, Colonel Welling announced that Harold L. Aitken, formerly of Clarkeson 

Engineering, would be the new District Director of Highways and Traffic. He would succeed 

John Robertson, who had retired. Aitken, a Nebraska native, had been a design engineer with 

BPR from 1931 to 1951. He headed the Nebraska Department of Roads (1951-1953) and was 

chief of staff to Civil Defense Administrator Val Peterson before joining the District Highway 

Department in 1958 as a special assistant to Robertson. The new director lived with his wife and 

two children at 512 Horner Court in Fairfax, Virginia. [“Harold L. Aitken Named D.C. Highway 

Director,” The Evening Star, March 2, 1959] 

True to their promise at the public hearing, the Maryland commissioners did not take long to 

decide against adding the Wisconsin Avenue corridor to the map. After a heated debate on 

March 11, they voted 4 to 1 against the corridor, with the chairman and three members 

abstaining. 

Gingery cast the only vote in favor of the corridor, calling the commission’s decision a “rape of 

the general public.” 

Chairman Wells said the decision was “the most important thing that will ever come before us.” 

He said that virtually all the engineers and professional planners favored the corridor. “It’s got to 

come. The longer we put it off, the more expensive it’s going to be.” He said that District 

officials were close to resolving the issue of tying in with a Maryland route. 
Commissioner W. Lawson King, one of the four negative votes, said he favored the Rock Creek 

Park routing. He did so despite objections from those interested in “birds, bees, snakes and 

turtles.” Another commissioner, Alva H. Bender, said, “I spent 23 minutes driving [on 

Wisconsin Avenue] from Bradley boulevard to East-West Highway.” He added, “We’ve got to 

have some new transportation facilities.” 

Pritchett of the Maryland State Roads Commission said after the meeting that the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor was “a good route.” He added, “Obviously, if the corridor doesn’t get on the 

interstate soon, it will be killed.” [“Planners Vote to Abandon Wisconsin Avenue Corridor,” The 

Evening Star, March 12, 1959] 

The commission’s decision meant that it would approve Aubinoe’s permit for the office building 

at East-West Highway and Waverly Street. However, following the commission’s action, 

Gingery went to court to secure a 23-day temporary injunction to halt the building. 

His action “apparently has spurred area officials into a last, sincere effort to find a solution.” 

Aitken indicated that District studies underway should result in “something in the way of a least 

objectionable route” for the corridor. He added that BPR had informed him that to qualify for 

Interstate funds, the route must be continuous from the circumferential to the Inner Loop. 

Chairman Wells thought BPR had agreed to 90-percent Interstate funding of a route from the 

District line to Tenley Circle if District officials agreed to seek a connection to the Inner Loop. 

He urged a meeting of all parties to try to resolve such discrepancies and reach agreement on the 

route. [“Parley Urged to Clear Route 240 Impasse,” The Evening Star, March 15, 1959] 

In a court hearing on April 3, the developer agreed to delay any action on his building for 30 days 

to allow officials to try to reach agreement on the eastern leg corridor. Pritchett had testified that 

during a recent meeting of BPR and Maryland road officials, the District said it would come up 

with an approved route into the city. The court agreed that after the 30 days, the developer could 

proceed unless Maryland began condemnation proceedings for his property. [“Builder Agrees To 

Delay Work,” The Evening Star, April 3, 1959] 

On April 22, District officials and BPR were scheduled to meet at the White House to discuss the 

District corridor with Gerald D. Morgan, who had become Deputy Assistant to the President after 

Governor Pyle left the post on January 31 to become president of the National Safety Council. 

The Star reported that following the Maryland commission’s decision to drop the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor from the map, the White House had “apparently ordered” the District and BPR 

to study alternatives. The meeting was canceled, but District highway officials sent the District 

commissioners a proposed corridor for the U.S. 240 connection between Pooks Hill and the Inner 

Loop. [“Plan for Corridor Sent D.C. Heads; Road Meeting Off,” The Evening Star, April 22, 

1959] 

A week later, the District commissioners decided not to build an expressway in the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor. In a long meeting, the commissioners indicated they would proceed with the 

Glover-Archbold Parkway. They might at some unknown time build a six-lane freeway from 

Tenley Circle to the Maryland line near Wisconsin Avenue if Maryland insisted on building a 
route to the District line. However, it would not be part of the Interstate System and would not 

be eligible for 90-percent Federal funding in Maryland or the District. 

Moreover, the commissioners concluded that an expressway in the corridor was not needed. The 

river route would be sufficient for the west leg of U.S. 240, while east leg traffic could be 

handled by the Glover-Archbold Parkway and Fort Drive, the intermediate circumferential along 

the District border that would allow dispersal of traffic to several arterials.

The commissioners were aware that the preliminary Mass Transportation Survey, already 

released, recommended construction of a freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. They said 

that their decision did not repudiate that recommendation, but meant only that it would not be 

part of the Interstate System. [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Rules Out Freeway Along Wisconsin 

Ave.,” The Evening Star, April 28, 1959] 

On April 29, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, after a lengthy 

discussion, decided not to map an Interstate freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor to the 

District border. BPR had indicated the corridor would be eligible for 90-10 Interstate funds only 

if the District and Maryland agreed on it, the commissioners had little choice but to abandon the 

Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

Gingery said the District’s action in rejecting the corridor made a farce of the preliminary results 

of the Mass Transportation Survey. “It means the whole mass transportation survey might as 

well go up in smoke.” As the commissioners knew, the survey had emphasized a freeway system 

as well as mass transit. He lamented the loss of $40 million in Federal Interstate funds, but could 

not reverse the decision. “I’m at a loss to say what is an alternative.” All the commission could 

do now was to let traffic become so congested that residents demanded action. 

Vice Chairman Brewer suggested that the District’s action could revive interest in a Rock Creek 

Park routing. “In my humble opinion, a good passenger car road can be built without disturbing 

the value of the park. It would make the park more available to tens of thousands of people who 

don’t see it now.” He urged Chairman Wells to have the planning staff study a new freeway 

route. 

The developer, whose plans had been blocked by a temporary injunction secured by Gingery, 

said he would begin construction of the office building as soon as the court released his permit. 

He added that if the Maryland State Roads Commission still planned to build the freeway, he 

would not block it. [Hoffman, Charles L., “Dropping of Corridor Brings Mixed Reaction,” The 

Evening Star, April 29, 1959] 

In an April 29 editorial titled “No Wisconsin Freeway,” the Star said the District’s action had 

“slammed the door on the controversial ‘Wisconsin avenue corridor’ freeway with a resounding 

bang.” 

Still Thinking of Wisconsin Avenue

A week later, a steering committee of the Mass Transportation Survey revived the idea. As 

discussed earlier, the steering committee had devised an expressway from Tenley Circle that 
would cross Rock Creek Park on a high bridge over Hazen Park then meet the Inner Loop at T 

Street. 

The idea, which NPS favored, would work only if an Interstate freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor would connect U.S. 240 at Pooks Hill and Tenley Circle. District officials, who were 

now considering an expressway in the North Capitol Street corridor to connect the Inner Loop 

with the circumferential, were skeptical. Director Aitken favored the North Capitol Street plan, 

but Federal Highway Administrator Tallamy was open to Interstate status and 90-10 funding for 

the steering committee’s proposal if the District supported it and the necessary link to the east leg 

of U.S. 240. 

The steering committee’s idea caused officials in Maryland and the District to rethink recent 

decisions. While the District was thinking of North Capitol Street, the Maryland-National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission had gone on record on May 6 in support of the proposed 

highway through Rock Creek Park to the Inner Loop. Vice Chairman Brewer had said: 

There is not a single expressway in Montgomery County except part of Route 240, which 

ends nowhere and has taken 11 or 12 years to build. We’re not serving the people who 

need to be served. 

As planners interested in Montgomery and getting people to town we should come out in 

favor of the Rock Creek Park route. It wouldn’t disturb the park: it would open it up to 

thousands who don’t see it or enjoy it now. 

Of course, NPS remained opposed to the north-south park alternative. Acting Director Elvind T. 

Scoyen made this clear. “I am sure that the National Park Service always has opposed a 

speedway through Rock Creek and continues to do so . . . . The only advantage of building a 

highway through Rock Creek is that it would be cheaper, but it is a firm policy of the National 

Park Service that the values of the park are greater than the cost of highways.” [Deane, James 

G., “Cross-Park Freeway Project Wins Support,” The Evening Star, May 7, 1959] 

Pressure mounted on the District when NCPC and the National Capital Regional Planning 

Council, which were conducting the Mass Transportation Survey, voted to place the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor on the official freeway map with a link via the high bridge across Hazen Park to 

the Inner Loop. They did so only after what George Beveridge called “a knock-down-drag-out 

joint session” on May 7. 

General Welling argued against the plan, but only one of the 14 planners at the session, John 

Remon, supported the District. Remon argued that the plan for an expressway in the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor was not popular in the District. National Capital Parks Superintendent 

Thompson replied that “no freeway routes are likely to win any popularity contests.” He 

supported the new plan. 

The joint commissions approved a resolution drafted by Bartholomew stating that the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor had been left off the critical official transportation plan because of uncertainty 

about a route downtown. Now, a feasible freeway location had been found. Bartholomew 
contended that both planning agencies had always supported an expressway in the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor, believing that an expressway in the corridor and the Glover-Archbold Parkway 

were both needed. 

Bartholomew said “a combination of errors” left the Wisconsin Avenue corridor off the freeway 

map. Gingery, who led the debate with Bartholomew, agreed that obviously, the consultants who 

prepared the map had been in error in leaving the corridor out. 

Beveridge ended his report on the joint meeting by writing: 

In a session filled with harsh statements, one of the mildest—and most influential—came 

from James L. Shotwell, a Federal Bureau of Public Roads official, who made it clear that 

the bureau is anxious to see an interstate expressway connecting Route 240 with the Inner 

Loop downtown. 

In view of the commissions’ action, General Welling said the District commissioners would 

“consider” the new freeway location. [Beveridge, George, “Area Planners Back Wisconsin Ave. 

Route,” The Evening Star, May 8, 1959] 

(Shotwell was Assistant Engineer-Coordinator in BPR’s Office of Engineering.) 

The sudden reversal came as Aubinoe received his building permit even as Montgomery County 

officials considered constructing a county building in Bethesda within the expressway corridor. 

The president of the County Council, Mrs. Stella B. Werner, said, “They certainly keep us stirred 

up.” 

Commission Vice Chairman Brewer said of the recent developments, “I am still violently 

opposed to putting that Chinese wall through Bethesda.” The rest of the commission remained 

divided. However, John A. Floyd, who had abstained in the 5 to 1 vote in March against the 

corridor, said, “Eventually Washington is going to need a minimum of three, and possibly four, 

high speed highways into the county.” [“Corridor Issue Stirs Nearby Officials Again,” The 

Evening Star, May 8, 1959] 

In what Beveridge called “another day of talk and position-jockeying on the freeway 

controversy,” the commissions issued a joint statement pointing out that the Mass Transportation 

Survey, still not yet released to the public, recommended a modern mass rapid rail transit line in 

the Wisconsin Avenue corridor as well as an expressway. Aware that the commissions were 

about to approve adding the corridor to the freeway map, the District commissioners had voted 

the night before, 2-1, against adding it to the plan. 

The White House, which would be the recipient of the Mass Transportation DSurvey, had 

cleared the joint commission statement, but not any other description of the plan. In fact, District 

Commissioner David Karrick had asked the commissioners to issue the statement because he did 

not think people realized the survey was going to recommend the mass transit plan for the same 

corridor.
Commissioner McLaughlin had cast the vote in support of the freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor. He agreed that a mass transit line was needed in the corridor, but thought a corridor 

would have to be acquired as soon as possible to be used by the rail line and freeway lanes. 

Otherwise, acquiring the right-of-way would become so expensive that the transit line might be 

blocked for years. 

In a hastily arranged press conference, Aitken said he would have to restudy the city’s entire 

highway program before advising the District commissioners on the issue. Such a study might 

take 6 months or more. He said the Mass Transportation Survey called for an estimated $870 

million worth of new freeways, while the District expected 90-10 Interstate funds amounting to 

only $355 million. The balance of $500 million worth of freeways would have to be financed on 

a 50-50 basis under the regular Federal-aid highway program. For example, the District could 

consider dropping plans for an Interstate highway in the New York Avenue, NE., corridor to 

allow the funds to be shifted elsewhere. Alternatively, the U.S. 240 eastern leg traffic might be 

routed around the circumferential to enter the District in “another corridor” on or near North 

Capitol Street. [Beveridge, George, “Trains to Be Urged For Rapid Transit,” The Sunday Star, 

May 10, 1959] 

In June, NCPC Executive Director William E. Finley proposed building tunnels under Cleveland 

Park and the Bureau of Standards to reduce destruction of homes as part of the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor expressway link. The Cleveland Park tunnel would begin west of Wisconsin 

Avenue near Tenley Circle and surface at Reno Road. The second tunnel would begin under the 

Bureau of Standards and Connecticut Avenue, emerging on Connecticut Avenue near Hazen 

Park, opposite the bureau: 

Mr. Finley envisions this plan as preventing the destruction of many Cleveland Park 

homes, the Sidwell Friends School, the Home for Incurables and Phoebe Hearst 

Elementary School. He said no apartment house or homes in the Connecticut avenue area 

would be disturbed. 

Finley also wanted to assure residents that NCPC had no plans for an expressway along Macomb 

Street. Such a route was shown on a map that had been prepared when Senator Douglas was 

fighting the Glover-Archbold Parkway, showing alternatives. [“Two Tunnels Proposed for 

Cleveland Park,” The Evening Star, June 27, 1959] 

Premature and Divisive Factionalism 

On July 9, 1959, the District commissioners and the area’s planning agencies delivered the 4-

year, $500,000 Mass Transportation Study to President Eisenhower. Commissioner McLaughlin 

told reporters, “We found that while the President was obviously not aware of the contents of our 

report, that he foresees all the significant results.” The President, the commissioner said, 

promised to “do everything possible to help in a quick realization of the results of our survey.” 

According to the Star, Gingery “was delighted when the President opened the meeting by asking, 

“How about this 240 business?” President Eisenhower did not know all the area’s roads and 

bridges, but he was familiar with U.S. 240, the route he took to the Burning Tree Country Club 
for golf and on occasion to Camp David. Author Helen Leavitt, a critic of the Interstate System, 

recalled the incident:

One of the planners who was present at the 1959 meeting recalls that the President also 

commented at that time about the heavy commuter traffic he observed during his drives to 

suburban Maryland’s Burning Tree Club for a game of golf. Mr. Eisenhower noted that a 

large number of automobiles was entering the city, but that most of these carried only one 

person. He suggested that since these automobiles clog streets and demand precious 

space for parking it might be feasible to limit the number of automobiles entering the city.

Testifying before the Senate Committee on Public Works in 1960, Gingery recalled General 

Welling’s response regarding U.S. 240: “Mr. President, we are going to put it down beside the 

Potomac River.” This response frustrated Gingery, who told the committee: 

Now, if that is not utter confusion, when you find the presentation made by the District 

Highway Department to run it down the central corridor; as late as last August [sic], the 

District was telling the President of the United States we were going to run it down the 

Potomac River which had been completely rejected by the State of Maryland.

He added, “We have got to have some idea what we are doing.” [“Area Survey Hailed by 

Eisenhower,” The Evening Star, July 9, 1959; Location of Interstate Route 70 South (Maryland 

and District of Columbia), Hearing, Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works, United 

States Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, June 14, 1960, page 49; Leavitt, Helen, SuperhighwaySuperhoax, Doubleday and Company, 1970, pages 298-299] 

(During this period, President Eisenhower appears to have realized that, contrary to his vision, 

the Interstates were being built in cities. Stephen Ambrose, in volume II of his biography of 

Eisenhower, explained: 

Of all his domestic programs, Eisenhower’s favorite by far was the Interstate System. By 

1959, it was in bad trouble. Construction costs were far higher than had been anticipated, 

primarily because of the expense of building urban freeways directly through the inner 

cities, where land acquisition prices and the problems of building the roads were so much 

greater than in the countryside. In Eisenhower’s vision, the superhighways were not 

supposed to have gone into the cities, but only around them, as in Europe. His objections 

were not sociological—few if any of those associated with the building of the Interstates 

anticipated the tremendous effect the urban freeways would have on housing patterns, 

schools, inner-city conditions, the spread of the suburbs, or the other nearly limitless ways 

in which the four- and six- and eight-lane highways changed the face of urban America. 

Eisenhower’s objections were to the cost, not the result. 

(Why President Eisenhower did not know about the urban Interstates is unclear. He likely was 

not familiar with the 1939 report to Congress, Toll Roads and Free Roads, which discussed the 

urban freeway network, or the more detailed discussion of urban freeways in the 1944 report, 

Interregional Highways. Members of Congress were well aware of the urban segments as they 
debated the proposed program in 1955 and 1956; mayors testified about the benefits their city 

would enjoy from the urban Interstates. 

(President Eisenhower was apparently thinking of Germany’s autobahn network that he had seen 

and used; it was an entirely rural network. General Clay, whose committee put together the 

President’s highway plan, also was fully familiar with the autobahns. However, he may not have 

understood the urban commitment since the Clay Committee’s plan for the program budgeted 

only $4 billion for urban feeder and distribution routes over the life of what was thought to be a 

$27 billion, 10-year program. If General Clay did not understand the planned urban Interstates, 

he could not have made it clear to his friend, President Eisenhower. 

(Some sources indicate that the President realized the truth about the urban segments during his 

July 9 meeting with the planning commissioners and District officials about the Mass 

Transportation Survey as they described the area’s freeway network. Ambrose offered another 

theory: 

The evidence that Eisenhower was unaware of this deal [his Administration’s promotion 

of the Interstate System to urban Members of Congress] comes from his reaction to 

seeing, in July of 1959, while driving from the White House toward Camp David, a deep 

freeway construction gash in the outskirts of metropolitan Washington. Surprised and 

appalled by what he saw, when he got to Camp David he called the Director of the 

Bureau of the Budget, Maurice Stans, to ask for an explanation. 

(Ambrose provided an account of the July 9 meeting about the survey: 

Unsatisfied with the result [of his call to Stans], he ordered a formal White House study 

of the urban Interstates [on July 2]. On July 9, he called in the members of the Mass 

Transportation Survey of the Washington Metropolitan Area and asked them what they 

were doing about a rapid-transit subway system. The reply was that some $1 billion 

would be spent over the next twenty years. The President then “stated his concern that 

too much of the interstate highway money might be going into connections in the cities.” 

Next, the President asked whether the committee had considered placing a special tax on 

automobiles coming into the central cities, “it being his observation that it was very 

wasteful to have an average of just over one man per $3,000 car driving into the central 

area and taking all the space required to park the car.”

(On April 6, 1960, President Eisenhower participated in a 55-minute meeting with his staff, 

Secretary of Commerce Frederick Mueller, and Federal Highway Administrator Tallamy to 

discuss the internal study of the urban Interstates. At the end, he remained unhappy about the 

urban Interstates, but after Tallamy handed him a copy of the 1955 Yellow Book showing 

outlines of the Interstate System in urban, conceded they were part of the program. (The Yellow 

Book will be discussed later.) As a result, the program “had reached the point where his hands 

were virtually tied.” His staff completed a formal report on their review just before President 

Eisenhower left office on January 20, 1961; President Kennedy and his team ignored the report. 

[Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower: The President, A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster, 

Inc.,1985, pages 547-548, citing Memo for record, 9/15, 59, DDE/DS]) 
President Eisenhower transmitted the Mass Transportation Survey to Congress on July 11 (letter 

dated July 10). The brief transmittal letter said the report “points out the present and future 

problems of transportation of people and goods in the Region.” Based on the recommendations 

in the report, the actions taken in the years ahead “to meet the problems of transportation will 

have a profound effect on the economy of the entire area, the welfare of its people, and the status 

of Washington as the Nation’s Capital.” He asked appropriate Federal agencies to study the 

survey and make such “recommendations as are warranted” to the Congress. 

The report, to be discussed later, included a rail transit line and freeway from the eastern leg of 

U.S. 240 (I-70S) into the District along the Wisconsin Avenue corridor via Bethesda and Chevy 

Chase, intersecting Fort Drive, and crossing Rock Creek Park to the Inner Loop. The survey also 

recommended the planned western leg, essentially a segment of the circumferential, and the link 

from the Cabin John Bridge along the Potomac River to the Inner Loop in the District. 

Senator Bible took to the Senate floor on Friday, July 17, to say the Mass Transportation Survey 

“marks the beginning of a comprehensive long-range program of coordinated action in dealing 

with these problems.” The Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems would study 

the survey report, including its data and recommendations, before holding public hearings. The 

joint committee “must now face the very largest questions in Washington’s future.” This was 

because transportation decisions on the area’s transportation were “intertwined with its earlier 

conclusions on water supply, sewage disposal, land use, and economic development.” Taken 

together, these matters required “the closest cooperation of all interests, whether Federal or local, 

urban or suburban, public or private.” 

He warned: 

Let us not allow ourselves to be diverted, while dealing thus with fundamentals, into the 

premature and divisive factionalism which invariably surrounds the debate on the merits 

of specific transportation measures, particular routes, isolated projects, and which many 

Members of Congress have painfully experienced. What has been shown by the 

arguments which have raged in recent months over Route 240, Route 66, the Glover 

Archbold Parkway, except the impossibility of wisely deciding these matters when a 

comprehensive plan for regional transportation is lacking? We have now the opportunity 

to create such a plan. If we succeed, it will go far toward solving, or at least putting in 

proper perspective, not only such difficult past decisions as those involving the location 

of bridges and expressways, but the still more difficult future decisions our swelling 

population and the changing times will present. [Washington Mass Transportation 

Survey, Congressional Record-Senate, July 17, 1959, pages 13672-13673] 

The Bethesda-Chevy Chase Chamber of Commerce had supported the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor for the eastern leg of U.S. 240, but with the qualifier: only “if such a route is necessary.” 

 Now, following release of the survey, the group gave the corridor its unqualified support. A 

spokesman explained that the members had “determined that something must be done in the 

immediate future to relieve the rapidly increasing traffic congestion on Wisconsin avenue in 

Bethesda.” The chamber favored construction “at least two blocks to the east of Wisconsin 

avenue.” [“Wisconsin Corridor Has Chamber OK,” The Evening Star, July 20, 1959] 
By November, the Maryland State Roads Commission was ready to complete the segment of 

U.S. 240/I-70S from the north to the $2.3 million Pooks Hill interchange, the dividing point for 

the east and west legs. Officials announced that the northbound lanes would open on Monday, 

November 9. Governor Tawes was expected to attend a ceremony opening the full interchange at 

the end of the month. [Herndon, G. O., “Pooks Hill Interchange to Open For Northbound Traffic 

Monday,” The Evening Star, November 6, 1959] 

The Joint Committee Hearings

The Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, chaired by Senator Bible and with 

Frederick Gutheim as staff director, held hearings on the Mass Transportation Survey on 

November 9-14, 1959. The hearings, which were primarily concerned with the transit 

recommendations, will be discussed later. [Transportation Plan For The National Capital 

Region, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, 86th

Congress, 1st Session, November 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14, 1959] 

Despite the survey’s focus on mass transit, the hearing provided an opportunity for criticism of 

the proposal’s highway elements. On the first day of the hearing, Roy W. Johnson, chairman of 

the American Council to Improve Our Neighborhoods or ACTION (and outgoing head of the 

Pentagon’s space program), said that “the full impact of the Interstate Highway System upon this 

metropolitan area of 2 million people illuminates a national problem. Washington faces what all 

our large metropolitan areas must face, the challenge—and the opportunity—of modern 

transportation.” 

Regarding the survey’s finding that the region needed 329 miles of high-speed, limited-access 

highways, Johnson said this conclusion was “not the novel conclusion it might appear” because 

all but 70 miles of the proposed 1980 network were already on the books. He asked whether the 

additional highways “will restore our already maimed city to health—or is it a crutch that merely 

eases the pain of a last, fatal illness?” As an illustration, he cited Los Angeles which had 

“probably one of the most acute problems in the country because of all of the highways.” The 

result, he said, was “that the city is choking and we read in the papers every day of the problem it 

has.” [pages 26-31] 

Arthur H. Keyes, Jr., of the Washington Building Congress recommended “a financially feasible 

‘transit dominant’ system (bus and rail-subway), rather than the proposed freeway system with a 

subway added to handle the traffic overflow at great cost to the taxpayer.” Aside from the 

aesthetic impacts, extensive freeways would obliterate tax-producing properties, thereby 

imposing an “additional financial burden on the city.” He urged efforts to “discourage the everincreasing use of private automobiles for commuting” as well as to steer interstate and intersuburban traffic away from the central city by the construction of loops and intermediate loops. 

He singled out the Inner Loop. The public, he said, was only “beginning to comprehend the 

radical changes which the inner loop and its approaches will make in the appearance of the city 

during the next 5 to 10 years.” Unfortunately, the Inner Loop had been authorized before the 

Mass Transportation Survey began “and prior to any public discussion of it.” This meant the city 

was “virtually committed to what might be called the Los Angeles solution.” If the Inner Loop 
could not be halted, “then at least much can still be done through sensitive and skillful design to 

soften the impact of the broad highway design problems, their relation to adjoining spaces, the 

structural shapes, the use of the land, and so forth.” All, he added, “should be openly discussed.” 

[pages 71-73] 

On the second day of the hearings, Chairman David Finley of the Commission of Fine Arts 

praised mass transit and attacked the freeway elements of the survey. The central area was 

already “beyond the saturation point.” To reduce the number of automobiles in the center city, he 

favored “rapid and comfortable means of transportation” and transfer of centers of employment 

throughout the city instead of its center. He was skeptical that more freeways were needed, but if 

they were, as the survey suggested, “care should be taken to avoid destroying vistas and causing 

damaging scars across the city.” He continued:

Such freeways are in principle an extension of the practice started by the inner loop belt, 

of which sections are now under construction. The city is being changed to fit the 

standard patterns of highway engineers rather than to conform to the Washington plan so 

long established. [page 121] 

Grosvenor Chapman of the American Institute of Architects, Washington Metropolitan Chapter, 

favored bus and rail, including subways. “These sentiments are motivated, in part, by the earnest 

hope that our present heritage of national monuments, vistas, parks, public buildings, and river 

banks will not be lost in a confusion of highway ramps, loops and interchanges.” He urged 

Congress to scrutinize each planned freeway carefully to determine if transit could not provide 

greater service. [pages 127-128] 

On November 10, Louis Justement, mentioned earlier in connection with plans for redeveloping 

southwest Washington, testified on behalf of the American Institute of Architects. The survey, 

he said, was based on “a projection of existing tendencies, and on an effort to comply with these 

existing tendencies, instead of providing a solution that would create a new and more desirable 

growth pattern based on stimulating changes in the mode of travel used to and from work.” That 

concept may seem reasonable until carried to the point of $2.5 billion in costs and we “realize the 

monstrous city we would produce at such a fantastic cost.” Reconsidering the premises is 

warranted.

Polls showed that people preferred to commute in their private automobile, but they might think 

differently “if they were called upon to foot their fair share of the bill through increased taxes”:

We are just beginning to realize how horrible the freeway can make the central city, for 

the freeway, unlike rail transit, needs a tremendously wide right-of-way, and cannot go 

underground. The costs of going through a slum area can be accepted, since we want to 

get rid of the slums anyway. But the cost of going through fine residential areas consists 

of far more than the acquisition of the right-of-way. The destruction of adjacent values is 

so great that no acceptable solution can be found . . . . 

To begin with, let us stop subsidizing the private automobile and endeavoring at great 

cost to the community to make the use of private automobiles more convenient than mass 
transportation. Let us cease the contemplated desecration of parks in the central city with 

freeways and interloops, and let us merely complete those that are in advanced stages of 

planning and construction. 

If city planning focused on making mass transportation more convenient and efficient, the results 

would be that “(a) the central city would become a more desirable place in which to live in 

comparison with the outlying suburbs; (b) the private automobile would become increasingly 

inconvenient and expensive in comparison with the mass transportation; (c) that mass 

transportation would be enabled to hold its own and offer better service and/or avoid rate 

increases.”

In short, “the freeway solution should be rejected because it simply will not do the job.” He cited 

the Whitehurst Freeway as an example. It was “choked bumper to bumper in the rush hours, not 

because it is two lanes in each direction or incapable of handling the traffic which seeks to use it, 

but because the outlets at the east end in the morning and the west end in the evening are 

incapable of absorbing these two lanes.” Providing four lanes in each direction would only 

worsen the situation. “And if these bottlenecks at the end are removed, they will simply recur 

one block farther east or west, for we cannot escape this basic fact.” Ordinary streets cannot 

absorb freeway traffic volumes. [pages 271-273] 

On November 13, Colonel Shepherd testified on behalf of the Committee of 100 on the Federal 

City and the Georgetown Citizens Association. Attempting to “satisfy the ever-mounting desire 

of motor vehicle operators for highway capacity and parking facilities will tend to disfigure and 

bankrupt the city.” He cited the Inner Loop Freeway as an example of his claim that any freeway 

built in a closely packed urban area “gives rise to serious social and financial problems.” 

Problems included loss of tax revenue, increased need for parking, dislocated families and 

businesses, and replacement of public facilities, such as schools, in the path of the freeway. The 

city cannot, he said, afford to subsidize motorists at these costs:

I sometimes wonder how many taxpayers in this city are aware of these problems and 

how many know then what the inner loop is intended to do, how much it will cost, and 

what it will look like when finished.

He stressed that the Inner Loop Freeway was not a single loop, but a double loop: 

In order to make room for the freeway and its ramps, block after block of existing 

buildings will have to be condemned, park land will be taken, and it will all be quite 

unsightly and enormously expensive, estimated in 1955 to cost upward of $272,667,000 

of taxpayers’ money.

Colonel Shepherd pointed out that while the Southwest Freeway was a high priority, its extension 

west would “squeeze between the Lincoln Memorial and the river,” “pass west of the Lincoln 

Memorial as a 6-lane depressed facility, open to the sky except for a tunnel approximately 600 

feet long,” and “the noise and fumes generated by traffic, particularly trucks using this route, will 

be most objectionable.” He urged “elimination of highway construction in this area of our city 
which could be compared to the sacred precinct of Olympia, now and always protected from 

incursion by commercial activities.” [pages 782-784] 

David Sanders Clark, accompanied by Samuel Spencer, former president of the District’s Board 

of Commissioners, testified on behalf of the Committee To Oppose the Cross-Park Freeway 

From Tenley Circle Across Rock Creek Park to the Inner Loop. The committee had formed to 

protest “attempts by certain overzealous planners” to force approval of “an interstate automobile 

and truck freeway through the midst of our fine quiet residential areas and through Melvin C. 

Hazen and Rock Creek Parks, before there had been any public discussion of the proposal, or any 

proper consideration of the lasting damage it would cause.” Proponents seemed to favor it to 

secure 90-percent Interstate funding, while the Mass Transportation Survey’s engineering 

consultants “found no requirement for such a route.” Their statement continued: 

Yet this hasty proposal was inserted in the survey report as “The Northwest Freeway Link 

Between Tenley Circle and the Inner Loop.” This was done despite the vigorous 

objections of four members of the National Planning Commission and the National 

Capital Regional Planning Council, including D.C. Engineer Commissioner Welling. 

Although the committee had other goals, “we still strongly object to the tactics which were used 

to promote the Northwest Freeway.” They would present their arguments against the freeway at 

the appropriate time. [pages 798-799] 

Aiming Towards The City 

Governor Tawes came to the Washington area on November 30 to open several road projects, 

each with a brief ceremony. First, he helped remove the last “road closed” sign from a 2.4-mile 

stretch of Columbia Pike between Cedar Croft Sanitarium and Burnt Mills. It would be 

designated part of U.S. 29. At a small speaker’s stand erected under a bridge of the Pook’s Hill 

interchange, he discarded much of his speech on a cold, windy day, but commended the 

Montgomery County Council for its united front in presenting the county’s needs to the roads 

commission. Using 4-foot long scissors, Governor Tawes and Council President Werner snipped 

the ribbon opening the interchange. After lunch, the Governor completed his ceremonial day by 

opening a 6-mile section of State Route 5 in Prince Georges County between the District and 

Andrews Air Force Base. [“Tawes Makes It Brief Opening 3 Roadways,” The Evening Star, 

November 30, 1959] 

By March 1960, District highway officials wanted to clarify what they had in mind for linking the 

eastern leg of U.S. 240/I-70S with the Inner Loop within the corridor identified in the Mass 

Transportation Survey. At the Pooks Hill interchange, traffic would be directed onto the 

circumferential. At an interchange in Silver Spring where the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 

crossed the beltway, traffic would use the North-Central Freeway corridor east of Rock Creek 

Park to intersect the Inner Loop west of Soldier’s Home. This option, District highway officials 

believed, would avoid the resistance the Wisconsin Avenue corridor had provoked. [“Route 240 

for D.C. Held No New Highway,” The Evening Star, March 15, 1960] 
When Director Aitken and NCPC Director Finley met with BPR officials to discuss the proposal, 

Administrator Tallamy rejected it. The link would have to be a direct connection in the 

Wisconsin Avenue corridor, Tallamy said. Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944, 

Interstate routes must be “as direct as practicable”; any other corridor was unacceptable because 

it would add unnecessary miles to the Interstate corridor. Aitken agreed to study the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor and present a routing to BPR. Aitken and Tallamy also discussed a third route 

for Interstate designation between Baltimore and the District through northeast Washington. 

This route would replace the Kenilworth and New York Avenue links to the BaltimoreWashington Parkway. 

Although Tallamy’s position surprised Aitken, he was willing to study the controversial corridor 

because its rejection would cost the District millions of dollars (an estimated $85-$95 million) in 

90-percent Interstate construction funds. The unexpected development prompted some 

speculation about why Tallamy took the position he did. The Star reported: 

There is a strong feeling in the District Building that Mr. Tallamy’s decision may have 

been prompted by pressure from the National Capital Planning Commission, relayed 

through the White House . . . . [NCPC] has urged a Route 240 connection in the 

Wisconsin avenue area.

Aitken, aware that finding a suitable routing would be difficult, rejected any thought of 

expanding existing Wisconsin Avenue to Interstate standards. Construction was not in the 

current plans, but pinning down the location would at least allow Maryland highway officials to 

begin planning a connection between the Pooks Hill interchange and the District line. 

[Alibrando, Alfred, “District Told To Place 240 At Wisconsin,” The Evening Star, March 17, 

1960; Alibrando, Alfred, “Wisconsin Corridor Proposal Revived,” The Evening Star, March 18, 

1960] 

A Star editorial called finding such a link “Washington’s most durable highway controversy.” 

Tallamy’s position might, the editorial suggested, revive NCPC’s idea of a freeway in the 

Wisconsin Avenue corridor to Tenley Circle, where links to the Inner Loop would be provided 

via the Glover-Archbold Parkway and a car-and-truck freeway across Rock Creek Park. 

[“Straight-Line Freeway,” The Evening Star, March 20, 1960] 

Even as District highway officials and NCPC staffers considered the corridor, Senator Case 

expressed doubts. He wrote to Administrator Tallamy and General Welling on April 28, 1960: 

I am somewhat concerned by the proposal to follow Wisconsin avenue—either all the 

way or part of the way, if that were to necessitate going east through a well-developed 

residential part of the city and would have anything like an overhead expressway crossing 

Rock Creek Park and many residential blocks east and west of the park. 

He thought the routing should target District slums:

It seems to me . . . the routing of a link of the interstate system through a city—and 

particularly the Capital City—should cure a blight rather than create one. Offhand, it is 
my opinion that any overhead throughway similar to the Whitehurst Freeway, if run 

through a good residential section, would blight the property on both sides to a serious 

degree.

On the other hand, it seems to me that if the route should go through an area which is 

marked for redevelopment or slum clearance, to the extent that the construction results in 

clearance and improvement, a second benefit will flow from the money expended. 

He was considering legislation that would give Tallamy leeway to adopt a less-direct route as 

part of the Interstate System. A North-Central Freeway could, he understood, have more lanes 

and carry more traffic than the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, while costing less, thus reducing the 

Federal expenditure. “I want to be sure the basic law isn’t injuring the Federal Government and 

doesn’t have something in it that serves to defeat the maximum service of the highway at the 

most economical cost.” [Alibrando, Alfred, “Case Dubious On Corridor,” The Evening Star, 

April 28, 1960; “Case Urges Site Leeway On Highways,” The Evening Star, May 3, 1960; 

Deane, James G. “Case Asks Hearing On Route 240 Location,” The Evening Star, June 12, 1960] 

The Inner Loop

The loops or circumferentials as urban bypasses and radial connectors had been part of the 

District’s thinking since at least the 1944 Central Area report submitted by J. E. Greiner 

Company and De Leuw, Cather & Company. Traffic congestion was delaying shoppers in the 

central business district and workers in the Federal buildings in downtown. The city was afraid 

that the problem would drive businesses into the suburbs where traffic could move more freely 

during weekdays. 

The 1944 consultants’ report proposed a master plan “for the correction and the future 

development of transportation facilities in the Central Area of the District of Columbia.” The 

District’s 24-year history summarized the proposal: 

The master plan evolved by the consultants and presented in the Central Area Report, 

involved extensive improvements in the existing street layout through the construction of 

grade separation structures and channelized connections, to form convenient inner and 

outer belt line distributor routes around the central portion of the city. K Street, situated 

on the northern rim of this area, was earmarked for further improvement as part of the 

inner belt route and as a surface distributing artery. 

Even if the inner belt route lessened congestion within its confines, “parking facilities in the 

shopping district were entirely inadequate at present.” Building throughways into the heart of the 

city “would be wasted effort, unless storage facilities were provided to accommodate the 

increased traffic which would be attracted by the improved highways.” The consultants 

suggested a solution: 

The consultants also suggested that certain obsolete buildings in this area be replaced 

gradually by a type of building more in keeping with the character of motorized 

transportation in this modern age – buildings which would combine small shops and 
offices, centralized service, underground merchandise collection and delivery, and offer 

parking facilities for clients and customers. They further suggested that land in 

Government ownership be converted into suitably landscaped parking lots for the 

accommodation of Federal employees. [Twenty-Four Years of Progress, pages 72-73] 

This wartime vision of boulevards and one-way pairs of roads proved inadequate to the post-war 

reality. Transit, which had been boosted to high ridership by gasoline and tire rationing during 

the war, quickly entered a downward spiral that would cause the companies operating streetcars 

and buses in most cities to cut service and maintenance, raise fares, and eventually go out of 

business – leaving transit service to local governments. In the Washington metropolitan area, the 

use of private automobiles continued to grow along with population and government 

employment. 

In December 1946, the consultants upgraded their proposal for an inner belt by proposing the 

Mid-City Expressway, as discussed earlier, to provide a bypass of the shopping district for traffic 

bound for the Federal Triangle, the southwest Mall, and other points beyond the central area: 

Justification for the high-cost heavy construction work necessary to the execution of this 

ambitious project was based on [the] assumption that enormous volumes of traffic would 

be accommodated, to effect a welcome release in the pressure on other streets serving 

traffic destined for the Central Area, as well as that of a strictly local character. [TwentyFour Years of Progress, page 75] 

The National Capital Park and Planning Commission criticized the plan, especially the 

expressway portions. Traffic volumes in 1965 could not justify the cost, the commission said, 

while the traffic drawn into the city on them would overwhelm local streets. While improved 

circulation might increase business tax revenue for the city, “the opposite effect may well be 

produced on residential areas in the District which supply three-fourths of the District’s real 

estate tax income.” The commissioners also considered the city’s proposal to build tunnels for 

streetcars as lacking technical justification. Such a rigid network would prevent shifts in service 

to meet changes in employment and population centers. 

The commission’s J. C. Nichols favored the intermediate circumferential known as Fort Drive. 

Nichols, involved in real estate, had been with the commission since its start in 1926. In a rare 

interview, he said the drive was “more valid today than ever before.” By allowing through traffic 

to bypass the downtown area, it would slow the suburbanization of District residents and 

businesses. He disputed recent estimates, such as the $35 million price tag that District Budget 

Officer Walter L. Fowler had assigned to Fort Drive. In a report to Commissioner John Russell 

Young, Fowler had called the proposal “chimerical, useless and making no sense today.” Rufus 

Lusk, president of the Washington Taxpayers Association, estimated the cost to be $60 million. 

Three years earlier, Nichols said, the District Highway Department had estimated the cost of Fort 

Drive at $16,800,000. That proposal included 58 grade separations but, Nichols said, “I don’t 

believe more than 9 or 10 of those grade separations would be needed, at least not until after the 

drive was built and more became necessary.”
He was concerned, too, about the radial highways contained in the consultants’ proposal. They 

could lead to decentralization: 

You’ve got to remember that the same expressway which makes it easier to get 

downtown to the big stores also makes it easier for shoppers to live farther out and shop 

in shopping centers. We shouldn’t make it too easy to get out of the District. 

[Kauffmann, Rudolph II, “Planners Blast Road Program, Urban Substitute,” The Evening 

Star, March 26, 1947; “Fort Drive Declared By Nichols to Be City’s Greatest Need,” The 

Evening Star, April 18, 1947] 

With the commission developing a broad plan covering all phases of city development in 

accordance with the Redevelopment Act of 1946, Engineer Commissioner Young wrote to 

General Grant urging the planners to make “full use” of the 11-year plan developed by Captain 

Whitehurst for expressways, underground streetcar lines, and terminal parking facilities. General 

Young also recommended that the commissioners keep in mind the unfairness of current taxation 

to residents in a city where 50 percent of the land was tax exempt because of public ownership. 

He urged the commissioners to couple their recommendations with realistic estimates so their 

plans would not be “futile and academic.” The commission had hired Harland Bartholomew as a 

consultant. [“City Heads Offer Suggestions on Redevelopment,” The Evening Star, 

September 28, 1947] 
The two bodies—the Highway Department and the planning commission—would remain at odds 

about the needed transportation facilities. For the commission, shifts in the metropolitan area 

were a guiding force. Director of Planning John Nolen, Jr., wrote in 1950 that the spread of 

population was one of the paramount changes. “Thirty years ago only one-fourth of the total 

population lived outside the District. Now three-eighths live in Maryland and Virginia.” He 

predicted that by 1980, one-half of the area’s population would live outside the District. One 

reason for the shift was “a more conscious and definite policy of decentralizing Government 

activities.” New employment centers in Bethesda and Suitland, Maryland, and elsewhere 

illustrated the trend. Even so and even with improved mass transportation, “traffic flow will take 

on characteristics of a circular movement rather than an in-and-out, reversing flow.” 

To avoid repeating past mistakes, “we must design our system to separate major movements 

from the local on-and-off travel which now clogs the existing main routes.” To do this, planners 

should “encourage suburban focal points for a balanced community life.” 

Suburban population centers, as well as the central business and government districts, should be 

bypassed. “In short, we must have a network of ring thoroughfares with good radials similar to 

the structure of a spider’s web, with certain routes more strongly emphasizing the form of the 

basic structure.” 

Express highways and parkways would be provided for major movements on radial and 

circumferential alignments. They would form “the basic structure for the circulation system.” 

Where expressways were not feasible because of cost or location, major highways with grade 

separations at select locations were needed as collectors and distributors connecting with the 

circumferentials:

There will be an outer ring route in Maryland and Virginia about 8 miles out, and an 

intermediate ring road, the so-called Fort Drive and an inner ring. The latter two ring 

roads are inside the District of Columbia. [Nolen, John, Jr., “Regional Highway Plan for 

Washington,” The Sunday Star, February 19, 1950] 

The idea of a spider’s web was in contrast with the usual contemporary hub-and-spoke concepts 

of urban transportation planning. It also was inconsistent with the District’s desire to retain 

population, businesses, and tax revenue.

By 1952, the Inner Loop was the District’s top priority in its $140 million road program. The 

Star’s James G. Deane, in his “Highways of the Future” series, described it: “The proposed loop 

runs 10 miles around the city’s heart. Its function would be to shunt motorists away—or help 

them enter at the right point, faster.” He added: 

It would not be a freeway: it would use mostly existing streets. But the benefit would be 

similar, say city engineers—and cheaper. Even so, the cost would be more than $24 

million.
According to Engineer Commissioner Bernard L. Robinson, the Inner Loop could cut congestion 

25 percent in downtown. It was, he told Deane, “all important.” Deane listed the roads included 

in the loop: 

The loop would consist chiefly of one-way streets: Q and R streets in the north, Fourth 

and Sixth streets east of the Capitol, F and G streets in the Central Southwest, and Rock 

Creek parkway and Twenty-sixth street on the west. Ohio and Basin drives would be a 

future link completing the circuit through West Potomac park. 

Florida avenue would become the major link on the northeast corner, North Carolina and 

Delaware avenues in the Southeast. All three, however, remain two-way. In addition, 

there would be some major construction—an elevated entrance from South capitol street 

to F, and a bridge across the Washington Channel 

The aim is to make the circuit as attractive to potential users as possible; otherwise it 

won’t function. 

Only tourists would travel the whole loop; local motorists would use only the portions necessary 

for their trips.

Deane added that the National Capital Park and Planning Commission agreed with the concept, 

but its comprehensive plans included a different routing: 

There are three major differences: the commission plan shows a new freeway at about T 

street N.W. instead of Q and R as the north leg; the east leg is a freeway west of the 

capitol, on Third street N.W. instead of Fourth and Sixth N.E., and the West Potomac 

Park leg uses Independence avenue instead of Ohio drive, and Twenty-sixth street is not 

used. 

The planning commission position has been that Q and R and Fourth and Sixth streets 

split residential neighborhoods; the commission frowns on this. 

The plan had run into opposition from the area southeast of the Capitol. With private 

redevelopment expected to turn the area into a “new Georgetown,” the Southeast Citizens’ 

Association was concerned that the loop would bring ruinous traffic into the area. In addition, 

the national planners were waiting for a report from the RLA on slum-clearance in the 

Southwest. The highway plan would have to dovetail with the redevelopment plans. [Deane, 

James G., “Top Priority Given ‘Inner Loop’ To Ease Downtown Traffic,” Highways of the 

Future, The Evening Star, February 5, 1952] 

Deane also discussed plans for the intermediate loop known as Fort Drive. The first formal plan 

for the drive was in 1901, “although it had been talked about at least 20 years earlier” as a tourist 

attraction. The drive would use existing roads and some new streets. Congress authorized 

acquisition of needed right-of-way in 1930, but the concept gradually became a “belt” as that idea 

took hold among urban planners. “This is the current conception, and a speedy dual highway is 

now the design.” 
As recently as 5 years earlier, “economy-minded District officials were opposing the project as 

‘useless’ and too costly.” They wanted the 700 acres the city had acquired for the drive returned 

to the District’s tax base. Now, just 5 weeks earlier, the District proposed to spend $20 million 

on two major segments of Fort Drive amounting to 8.2 miles of the 23-mile loop: (1) Fort 

Stevens at Georgia Avenue to Fort Reno at Nebraska Avenue and (2) Fort Totten at South 

Dakota Avenue to Fort Mahan at Benning Road. Each would be a freeway consisting of twolane pairs separated by a median:

As a freeway, the drive would help motorists bypass snarls. But it would also be an 

attractive Sunday drive.

Deane quoted Fowler’s comment from 5 years earlier that Fort Drive “never will be built because 

there is no need for it and there will be no money for it.” As Deane concluded his article, “It 

remains to be seen whether he was right.” [Deane, James G., “1901 Plan for Linking Forts 

Revived as an Aid to Traffic,” Highways of the Future, The Sunday Star, March 2, 1952] 

Evolving Inner Loop 

Cost had been a factor in the District’s thinking about the Inner Loop, but with planning for the 

Interstate System and its urban configurations, the concept evolved from two-way pairs to an 

Inner Loop Freeway. 

The District hired De Leuw, Cather and Company to design an Inner Loop addressing traffic 

needs in 1980 without regard to cost. Instead of a single loop, the consultants’ October 1955 

report proposed two connected loops that looked like a figure 8 on its side. The western loop had 

the White House in the center. The eastern loop included the Capitol along the west leg (the 

segment shared with the eastern edge of the western loop) while the east leg linked Florida 

Avenue and M Street beyond the intersection of Massachusetts and Maryland Avenues: 

The Inner Loop Freeway System recommended herein is approximately 17.6 miles in 

length—14.6 miles of main freeway roadways, three miles of connecting roadways—and 

forms a figure 8 around the central district of the city. There are approximately four miles 

of eight-lane freeway, nine miles of six-lane freeway and 1.5 miles of four-lane freeway. 

There are six miles of 2-lane, one-way connecting roadways in interchanges and in 

connections to existing traffic arteries. All traffic lanes are a minimum of 12 feet in 

width. Center malls separating opposing traffic are 4 feet wide in fill or elevated sections 

and on bridges and 11 feet wide in depressed sections. 

The consultants chose the location for the system based on three factors. The Inner Loop should: 

• Be properly integrated with other existing and proposed street and highway facilities, 

• Provide for the preservation of historical sites, parks, playgrounds, and institutional 

buildings insofar as possible, and 

• Provide the maximum in traffic service, attracting sufficient traffic to justify its 

construction in accordance with highest possible standards of design. 
They added, “Almost the entire route of the Inner Loop Freeway System is within areas which 

have been recommended for redevelopment.” The system also connected with important 

arterials:

Routes were selected, therefore, to provide limited access connections between the Inner 

Loop and the proposed Constitution Avenue Bridge, Whitehurst Freeway, and a new 

freeway to connect to the Washington-Baltimore Parkway along New York Avenue. 

Connections are also provided to West Virginia Avenue, Benning Road, John Philip 

Sousa Bridge, Anacostia River Bridge (11th Street S.E.) including a new parallel bridge to 

the existing structure, and Highway Bridge as proposed to be improved by construction of 

a second one-way bridge.

Design standards allowed for safe and continuous travel at 50 m.p.h., although at peak periods 

traffic might move more slowly:

The freeways will be so superior to the parallel surface streets in safety, capacity, and 

time-saving features that they will attract vehicles from a wide area even at the expense of 

somewhat greater distances to be traveled by some motorists.

The consultants designated the segments of the system by their cardinal orientation: West, 

North/Northwest Section, North/Northeast Section, East, Center, South Route/Southwest, and 

South/Southeast. The report provided an alternate alignment for the center route involving a 

tunnel under the National Mall instead of passing through the mall at depressed grade. For the 

Southwest section along Ohio Drive between the Lincoln Memorial and the Southwest Freeway 

at Maine Avenue, they provided an alternate route via Independence Avenue. 

The total estimated cost of the Inner Loop Freeway System was $272,667,000. With “a vigorous 

planning and construction program,” the system could be completed in 12 years. During 

construction, parallel two-way pairs would be employed to keep traffic moving a couple of 

blocks from the freeway corridor. 

The consultants, after studying bus service, concluded that “most of the heavier movements are at 

right angles to the routes of the Inner Loop System rather than tangential.” As a result, the Inner 

Loop would “not be useful for bus operation . . . except in isolated instances.” Some express bus 

services might use the Inner Loop during peak periods: 

Buses making such express runs will use the ramps provided for general use. Since no 

stops will be made by these buses along the freeway routes, no special facilities need be 

planned. 

Construction of the Inner Loop would “not require abandonment or reconstruction of a major 

length of any streetcar track presently operated.” However, if “all parts of the present rail system 

are still in use” when the Inner Loop is built, “rail and underground power distribution facilities 

will have to be installed on cross structures” in some cases.

Because one function of a theoretical inner loop was to be a terminal to keep cars out of the 

central area, the consultants studied whether to build parking structures over the freeway right-of-
way. They found that the cost of building parking garages above the freeways would be 

“abnormally high” compared with building parking facilities at ground level. Further, spacing 

for interchange ramps throughout the system did not leave “weaving” room for additional ramps 

to serve the parking garages. (A weaving section is the area where vehicles maneuver, 

sometimes crossing each other, to enter or leave a freeway.) 

The consultants also were concerned about safety as motorists would operate in bright sunlight, 

drive into the darkness under the garages, and then move back into sunlight. “While the human 

eye can adjust to either level, given sufficient time, it cannot change rapidly enough to meet such 

problems safely at freeway speeds.” 

The consultants concluded that parking garages should not be part of the freeway system. 

“Rather, such structures should be kept far enough away from them to permit the surface streets 

between to afford a cushioning effect.” [Report on Inner Loop Freeway System, District of 

Columbia, De Leuw, Cather and Company, October 1955, pages 1-3, 8, 13-27, 51-52, 63-64] 

In August 1955, as the plan circulated through agencies, Gilmore D. Clarke and Michael 

Rapuano, New York consultants for NCPC, urged the commission to adopt the Independence 

Avenue alternative for the Southwest section, rather than Ohio Drive along the Potomac Park 

waterfront. Both alternatives “would result in a destruction of park values which should not be 

permitted.” Aside from the removal of trees, the link, wherever located, would form “wide 

traffic barriers” that would interfere with enjoyment of the park. Independence Avenue would be 

less disruptive: 

Under the consultants’ plan, the inner belt would underpass the [Pennsylvania] Railroad, 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth streets, as well as Seventeenth street near Washington 

Monument. The belt also would underpass Arlington Memorial Bridge and Riverside 

drive by modifying the present structural arches, and would overpass the southeast 

approach to the Lincoln Memorial traffic circle.

The entire Ohio congressional delegation also opposed use of the road named for its State as a 

link in the Inner Loop. 

Highway Director Robertson responded that from a traffic standpoint, the city did not have a 

preference between Ohio Drive and Independence Avenue. However, the Ohio Drive alternative 

would cost an estimated $4 million less. [“Independence Avenue Urged as Inner Belt Link,” The 

Evening Star, August 3, 1955] 

In the Yellow Book released in September 1955, BPR adopted the Outer Loop and the Inner 

Loop Freeway System, but did not include Fort Drive. As in the consultants’ report, the Inner 

Loop was a figure eight but with an extended eastern section that put the easternmost leg on the 

eastern side of the Anacostia River providing a link to the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. The 

northern leg crossed the city before dipping south to a Potomac River crossing in the vicinity of 

Theodore Roosevelt Island. The southern leg crossed the Anacostia River in the vicinity of the 

11th Street/Pennsylvania Avenue, followed the Southeast and Southwest Freeways to cross the 
Potomac River on the 14th Street Bridge. An Interstate route linked the north and south legs in 

the center of the city, but no link was provided on the western end. 

The Yellow Book map did not include detailed descriptions of the black lines on the map or an 

accompanying narrative description. The lines for the District and other metropolitan areas were 

considered aspirational in that the detailed location would be determined by further studies. 

However, the Star summarized the links in the “17.6 miles of limited-access, depressed and 

elevated expressways” that comprised the Inner Loop: 

The network, costing $15.5 million a mile, is in the form of a giant horseshoe stretching from 

the Anacostia River to the Potomac River beyond the Lincoln Memorial and back to the 

Anacostia. Two north-south expressways would connect the long arms of the horseshoe. 

More ambitious than any circumferential expressway ever considered seriously for a 

downtown city area, the road would be four, six or eight lanes wide, depending upon the 

amount of traffic estimates to use each section.

The freeway loop does not follow existing streets. Instead, it cuts wide swaths through 

residential blocks, would knock out an estimated 6,800 dwelling units. 

The Inner Loop consisted of: 

• The projected Anacostia Freeway from East Capitol Street south to the District line. It 

would connect with the southern sector of the circumferential highway near the projected 

Jones Point Bridge. 

• A cross-town highway using part of the northern sector of the projected inner-belt 

highway. It would connect with the Baltimore-Washington Parkway by way of New 

York Avenue. 

• The southern sector of the inner-belt highway. There would be a connection across the 

Anacostia River with the Anacostia freeway, and one across the Potomac with Shirley 

highway. 

• The west sector of the inner-belt. This would have a connection across the projected 

Constitution Avenue bridge with Highway 50 in Virginia. 

• A north-south highway roughly along the line of Third street N.W., which would cut 

across the inner-belt.

• A highway roughly paralleling Canal road N.W. running from the west sector of the 

inner-belt to Maryland’s 240. 

In 1955, Congress had considered how to fund the Interstate System on a 90-10 Federal-State 

matching basis, but adjourned without completing the legislation before BPR released the 

Yellow Book. 

As Director Robertson acknowledged, the city would not be able to build the Inner Loop unless 

Congress found a way to pay for the Interstate System – the issue that killed the legislation in 

1955. At an estimated cost of $272 million, the Inner Loop envisioned by the consultants would 

take 12 to 15 years to complete. However, the District’s budget could not support the project. 
The city received $5 million a year in Federal-aid highway funds, up from $3 million a year. 

District revenue from its gas tax was up $1 million over estimates. Under the Interstate bill that 

had failed, the city would have received about $30 million a year over a 10-year period for 

regular Federal-aid projects on a 50-50 matching basis and Interstate System projects on a 90-10 

ratio.

Robertson was optimistic that Congress would extend the Federal-aid highway program, with 

“almost a certainty that we will get something more.” He said the Southwest Freeway segment 

of the Inner Loop through the southwest redevelopment area would get underway in the summer 

of 1956 regardless of the legislation’s fate. Unlike other District expressways, the Southwest 

Freeway from the Highway Bridge to South Capitol Street was planned for an urban 

redevelopment area that had been stripped of virtually all buildings, thus eliminating the source 

of much of the controversy in other parts of the city. [Douglas, Francis, P., “Highway Links 

OK’d for D.C.,” The Evening Star, September 29, 1955; Beveridge, George, “D.C. Gets Plans for 

Freeway To Speed Downtown Traffic,” The Sunday Star, December 4, 1955; “Loop Road Plan 

Awaits Decision on Federal Aid,” The Sunday Star, December 4, 1955] 

Although the consultants’ Inner Loop report was dated October 1955, it was not released to the 

public until December. Engineer Commissioner Lane told reporters that the report presented “a 

satisfactory guide” for gradual construction of the Inner Loop Freeway System. Now that “we 

have the plan,” he said, “we will begin immediately a review of the financial prospects, rated 

against cost of the program.” General Lane stressed that most of the loop freeway passes through 

aging areas slated for “urban renewal,” as illustrated by the Southwest Freeway. Construction 

would be scheduled in conjunction with redevelopment to reduce costs for right-of-way 

acquisition. [Beveridge, George, “D.C. Gets Plans for Freeway To Speed Downtown Traffic,” 

The Evening Star, December 4, 1955] 

A Couple Legs

Almost as soon as the plans were released, the West Leg of the Inner Loop through the Foggy 

Bottom section of the District became controversial. A NCPC coordinating committee called in 

developers of two projects to explain their concerns on December 13, 1955. One developer, the 

Potomac Plaza Corporation, was planning a hotel/apartment/office complex near the intersection 

of New Hampshire and Virginia Avenue, NW., on the former Washington Gas Light Company 

property (later to be named the Watergate complex), while Peoples Life Insurance Company had 

purchased a building site at New Hampshire and F, G, and 25th Streets, NW. The western leg of 

the Inner Loop would be built west of the two developments. The developers said that with 

construction of the West Leg still years off, they planned to proceed with their projects. They 

suggested the city abandon the conflicting highway segment. 

To avoid the Potomac Plaza development, District officials had identified an eastern alternative, 

but it would cut through three blocks acquired over the years by George Washington University 

for its expansion plans. The university’s treasurer, Henry W. Herzog, said the university 

expected to grow from 13,000 students to 30,000. “We don’t like to have property that cost us 

$1 million taken from us and then have to spend $5 million or $6 million for land somewhere 
else.” [“Developers Ask Truce on Road; Loop Is Issue,” The Evening Star, December 14, 1955; 

“Planners Weigh Inner Loop Plea,” The Evening Star, December 16, 1955] 

On December 16, NCPC unanimously approved the city’s alternative route for the Inner Loop 

through Foggy Bottom. Passing between 23rd and 24th Streets, NW., the route avoided the two 

private developments, but impacted the university, which owned three of the blocks. This action, 

the Star stated, “resolved one major Washington highway controversy.” [“Planning Board 

Approves Route For Inner Loop,” The Evening Star, December 17, 1955] 

George A. Garrett, whom President Eisenhower had asked to work with all parties to resolve 

issues blocking the southwest redevelopment, submitted a three-page letter to the President on 

December 21, 1955. Garrett reported that the program “now appears to be fully under way and 

its ultimate success is assured.” NCPC, Garrett said, had approved the land use plans either 

finally or tentatively in the case of plans that remained shy of detailed plans. 

The final issue had been the dispute between the Zeckendorf plan for a South Mall entranceway 

in the 10th Street corridor and the Smithsonian Institution’s plans for a National Air Museum. 

Based on a NCPC recommendation, the Smithsonian Institution would find another museum 

location. Garrett told the President:

Within 10 years, barring a national emergency, the area could be completely rebuilt, a 

model downtown urban community which could point the way for the salvation of 

obsolete city cores through the nation. 

The President, in Key West recovering from a heart attack he suffered in Colorado the previous 

September, replied by letter dated January 1, 1956 (released January 6): 

It is indeed heartening to know that the efforts of the agencies cooperating in the project 

will result in early initiation of construction and in a complete rebuilding of the 

designated area. Certainly the Capital of this great nation deserves to be a symbol of our 

best efforts to provide decent housing and attractive urban living. [Beveridge, George, 

“President Cites Southwest Job,” The Evening Star, January 8, 1956] 

On February 2, 1956, NCPC approved all elements of the southwest redevelopment plan, subject 

to a final vote after detailed plans were submitted in coming weeks. District highway officials 

appeared before NCPC during the meeting in an attempt to postpone the feud over whether the 

Inner Loop would follow Ohio Drive or Independence Avenue, SW. With minor adjustments on 

the western end of the Southwest Freeway, the city would be able to accommodate either 

alternative, thus postponing the need for a decision. 

NCPC took up the issue in more detail on February 3. Engineer Commissioner Lane told the 

commissioners that the District favored Ohio Drive, but was willing to postpone the decision. A 

connection was needed between Southwest Freeway, already slated for construction in the F 

Street corridor, at 12th Street, SW., and the two 14th Street bridges over the Potomac:

So he proposed a bridge across Washington Channel, linking the two facilities, and 

making “temporary connections” to both Ohio drive and Independence avenue. Since the 
District has no money to extend the expressway soon anyway, he said, the temporary 

connections would permit either route to be used when a later decision is made. 

The Ohio congressional delegation expressed its view. Representative Thomas A. Jenkins (R), 

who called himself “the Daddy of Ohio drive,” told NCPC that for many years, “no avenue, street 

or even alley” was named for Ohio in the District. Now, the two-lane drive along the Potomac 

River between the Lincoln Memorial and 14th Street was the “pride of the people of the great 

State of Ohio.” He said he was not arguing from an engineering or traffic perspective, only that 

“we’re proud of it.” He added that Senators John W. Bricker (R) and George H. Bender (R) 

agreed with him.

Bartholomew, who opposed Ohio Drive for the Inner Loop, was concerned about the District’s 

new plan to postpone the decision: 

He said any connection with Ohio drive was “a foot in the door” toward its eventual 

construction as an expressway. And—widening the breach—opposed any crossing of 

Washington Channel until such time as the District agrees to build a Potomac bridge at 

Roaches Run, Va. 

The commissioners could not agree on the proposed postponement plan. [Beveridge, George, 

“Way Is Cleared For Final Okay On Southwest,” The Evening Star, February 3, 1956; “’Pride of 

Ohio’ Injected Into Inner Loop Planning,” The Evening Star, February 4, 1956] 

In 1949, Representative Jenkins had led the effort to change Riverside Drive to honor his State. 

Ohio Street, behind the District Building, had been removed during development of the Federal 

Triangle area. Riverside Drive ran from the John Ericcson Memorial (honoring the inventor of 

the screw propeller for ships) at the drive’s intersection with Independence Avenue near the 

Lincoln Memorial through the Tidal Basin across West and East Potomac Parks along the 

Potomac River. At the time, according to the Star, it was “Washington’s most popular ‘hot 

weather’ drive.” At his urging, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission approved 

the change to Ohio Drive on August 5, 1949. The signs went up on August 12 in a brief 

ceremony with Representative Jenkins. With the change, all 48 States had a named street in the 

District of Columbia. 

Over 300 Ohioians, including Governor Frank J. Lausche and Representative Jenkins, formally 

dedicated Ohio Drive on July 9, 1950. With rain pouring, Representative Jenkins was master of 

ceremony. Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman presented a scroll from President Truman 

to Governor Lausche and extolled Ohio’s contributions to the country. Mrs. Erma C. Marting of 

Irontown, Ohio, “Ohio’s Mother of the Year,” snipped the ribbon across Ohio Drive at the tip of 

Hains Point to officially open the road. Following the ceremony, Miss Mary Jane Hayes, “Miss 

Washington,” presented a three-layer cake to Governor Lausche, who cut it and passed out the 

rain-soaked slices. [“Ohio Gets Its Name Restored Along Six Miles of Channel,” The Evening 

Star, July 10, 1950] 

(The name “Independence Avenue” was only about a decade older. It was an outgrowth of 

legislation signed by President Herbert Hoover on February 26, 1931, changing the name of B 
Street north of the National Mall to Constitution Avenue. Chairman Delano of the National 

Capital Park and Planning Commission suggested changing B Street south of the mall as well to 

honor the Declaration of Independence. Senator Capper introduced a bill to change the name in 

1933. The District commissioners approved the bill on January 16, 1934. The Star explained:

B Street is the south boundary of the Mall and under Mall development plans the street is 

to be extended from its present western terminus at Fourteenth street to the Potomac 

River. There would be a jog in the street at Fourteenth street because of the location of 

the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. [“D.C. Board Approves Street Name Change,” 

The Evening Star, January 17, 1934] 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the legislation on April 13, 1934. (P.L. 73-150) 

Getting Underway

The future of the District’s Interstate network depended on approval of the Federal-Aid Highway 

Act of 1956, which President Eisenhower signed on June 29. During the first 3 years of the 

construction program, the funds would be apportioned by the longstanding formula for 

distributing Federal-aid primary system funds. After that, Interstate System funds would be 

distributed based on periodic Interstate Cost Estimates (ICE) that BPR was to complete 

beginning in 1959 and submit to Congress for approval. After that, each State’s share would be 

calculated on the ratio of the cost to complete its Interstate segments compared with the national 

cost. 

The legislation meant an immediate boost in Federal-aid highway funds from the annual $4 to $5 

million the District had been receiving. The District expected to receive $40.5 million in 

Federal-aid for the first 3 years under the new law, with $29.4 million of that amount for the 

Interstate System. The District’s share could increase when the ICE formula was used, but the 

city expected to receive between $390 and $400 million overall, to be matched on a 90-10 basis. 

[Beveridge, George, “District to Map $400 Million Road Program,” The Sunday Star, July 29, 

1956] 

By late August, the District Highway Department had submitted to the commissioners the largest 

road construction budget in city history. It covered 13 projects with an estimated cost of $22.9 

million, including $11 million for three projects on the Inner Loop. Interstate projects included 

the Southwest Freeway (14th Street to South Capitol Street), the Inner Loop segment from South 

Capitol Street to the Anacostia Freeway), and the West Leg (right-of-way acquisition in Foggy 

Bottom between E Street, NW., and Washington Circle). The District also planned to use the 

funds on the Constitution Avenue Bridge (pending congressional action) and replacing the 

trestle-topped bridge as part of the 14 Street Bridge (minor legislative action might be needed), 

and the Anacostia Freeway. [Beveridge, George, “$29.9 Million Asked for Roads,” The Evening 

Star, August 31, 1956] 

Around this time, the 21 members of the D.C. Auditorium Commission were deciding where to 

place a proposed civic auditorium and cultural center. The commission, established in 1955, had 

narrowed the choice to two locations by November 1956. One was in the new Southwest east of 
the 10th Street “South Mall” south of D Street and north of the Southwest Freeway. The other 

possibility, the one favored by the auditorium commission, was in Foggy Bottom west of 23rd

Street and south of Virginia Avenue, NW. The Foggy Bottom location depended on where the 

District ultimately built the Inner Loop through the area. 

On November 3, Chairman Garrett of the Federal City Council sent telegrams to members of the 

commission stating that the council supported the southwest location. A Foggy Bottom location 

would “create critical problems” for the private developments underway in the area. By contrast, 

“the location of the Southwest cultural center envisages a ceremonial entrance and link from the 

Grand Mall to the Tenth Street Mall. An auditorium on this site will be the focal point of the 

entire rebuilt area and a great asset to the Capital City.”

Engineer Commissioner Lane said he did not know enough about plans for the auditorium to take 

a position on where it should be built. As for the Inner Loop through Foggy Bottom, the “present 

approved location, as far as we know, is the proper one.” He added, “The whole feasibility of a 

relocation is undetermined. But if there are factors we have overlooked, we will listen to them.” 

[“Auditorium in Southwest Backed by City Council,” The Sunday Star, November 4, 1956] 

The auditorium commission decided to delay a decision while advisers made “further studies . . . 

of the several sites considered suitable, and the commission will determine from the responsible 

agencies the availability of these sites." Although the West Leg of the Inner Loop as presently 

located would cut across the middle of the favored Foggy Bottom site, the commission chairman, 

Mrs. Agnes E. Meyer, indicated that her talks with NCPC indicated that rerouting the West Leg 

was possible. [Beveridge, George, “Auditorium Unit Delays Firm Decision on Site,” The 

Evening Star, November 27, 1956] (Mrs. Meyer’s husband Eugene owned The Washington Post, 

serving in various leadership roles with the newspaper until his death in 1959.] 

Highway Director Robertson was frustrated by NCPC decisionmaking as he made clear when he 

testified on November 30, 1956, before the Commissioners’ Citizens Advisory Committee 

regarding a proposal by former District Commissioner Samuel Spencer that NCPC’s five citizen 

members should be appointed by the District commissioners, not the President. NCPC Chairman 

Bartholomew opposed the suggestion, which he said would override Federal interests in the 

capital. 

Robertson argued for a change. He said that “delays in obtaining definitive action by the 

National Capital Planning Commission have consistently resulted in retarding the highway 

program of the District of Columbia, have produced a continued economic hardship on the 

motorists of this area by delaying the construction of needed projects and may very well cause 

the District of Columbia to have certain Federal funds withdrawn unless allocated monies are 

soon obligated.” 

For example, he said, during the 7 years of controversy over the Highway Bridge at 14th Street, 

rising costs would add $16 million to the project. “Had the District received greater co-operation 

and understanding from the planning commission, the District taxpayers would have been saved 

millions of dollars.”
The controversy over the proposed Constitution Avenue Bridge across the Potomac River “has 

cost the taxpayers many thousands of dollars thus far on this project without a bridge having been 

started in this area.” The total was about $100,000, Robertson said, adding that “this expenditure 

can hardly be justified as a means of satisfying the NCPC simply because they doubt the integrity 

or capabilities of responsible public officials or their consultants.” 

The West Leg of the Inner Loop was another example. NCPC had approved the location, but 

was now reconsidering it: 

Shifting of this route, he said, would curtail the multimillion-dollar Potomac Plaza project 

under construction in the area. Also, he said, the proposed Peoples Life Insurance 

Building would be “endangered by an auditorium site which is astride the original inner 

loop location.” 

“It is difficult,” Mr. Robertson said, “to comprehend how any agencies, private or public, 

can proceed with any developments in the District with the possibility of this type of 

action endangering their plans and costing them considerable amounts of money.” 

He also cited the District’s preference for routing the Inner Loop along Ohio Drive while NCPC 

had selected Independence Avenue. “That action will cost the taxpayers $4.5 million.” 

The advisory council decided to send Robertson’s 17-page statement to Bartholomew for his 

information, but “decided not to request a rebuttal for fear of stimulating continued argument.” 

[McLean, Hector, “Big Loss Seen In ‘Indecision’ On Planning,” The Evening Star, November 30, 

1956] 

As Robertson’s statement indicated, the location of the West Leg remained controversial and in 

doubt. NCPC indicated it was reconsidering its approval of the routing in view of its impact on 

George Washington University. The university added to the controversy in December by 

announcing a long-range plan for an extensive medical center to be built around the present 400-

bed university hospital. Herzog explained that if the West Leg were built as planned, it would 

leave “no other place in the area where these facilities can be erected and still carry on effective 

communications and service with the hospital.” He hoped that the route could be shifted to allow 

not only the hospital expansion but the private developments underway in the area. [Beveridge, 

George, “GWU Reveals Plans for Huge Medical Center,” The Sunday Star, December 9, 1956] 

On December 13, the District Auditorium Commission’s concerns prompted NCPC to delay 

asking the District to consider a location along 24th, 25th, and 27th Streets, NW., for the West Leg. 

This location, according to a NCPC special committee, would require little property from 

Potomac Plaza and avoid university property. It also would allow room for an interchange 

connecting the West Leg to K Street west of Washington Circle. 

General Lane responded that the current route had been selected by the city’s consultant as the 

most feasible. The committee’s suggestions involved “paper plans” that might prove impractical 

when given detailed engineering review. As far as he was concerned, nothing before NCPC 

justified additional study. He added that wherever the route is built, “someone will be hurt.” 
When NCPC decided to postpone a decision, General Lane said the approved routing remained 

on the books. The District would proceed accordingly and ask Congress for authority to begin 

acquiring right-of-way. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Put Off Vote on Inner Loop,” The 

Evening Star, December 13, 1956] 

The District Auditorium Commission, which was still awaiting a decision on the West Leg, 

increased the number of possible sites for the auditorium and cultural center to three. The Foggy 

Bottom site was in an area bounded by Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues on the north, E 

and Water Streets on the south, and on the east by 23rd Street and the west by 26th Street. The 

original southwest location was within 10th Street with D Street on the north, Sixth and Seventh 

Street on the east, and the Southwest Freeway on the south. The commission was now 

considering a second southwest option, this one bounded by Ninth Street on the east, 12th Street 

on the west, D Street on the north, and the freeway on the south. “Chairman Agnes E. Meyer 

disclosed that the commission favors Foggy Bottom, but would not be unhappy if one of the 

Southwest sites are selected.” [“3 Cultural Center Sites Are Favored” The Evening Star, January 

30, 1957] 

On February 1, 1957, Harold Aitken, then still with Clarkeson Engineeering, told NCPC he was 

considering a western shift of the West Leg as the best way to connect U.S. 240 along the 

Potomac River with the Inner Loop at Washington Circle. Based on the city’s current plans, the 

connection was possible, but would be “costly and difficult to build” because it required an 

interchange that might include three- and four-level structures for all movements. Moving the 

Inner Loop to the west would “be a little less costly to build and have a better design” than at 

present.

Bartholomew was not sold on the Potomac River link to U.S. 240. He preferred a route through 

Bethesda, along the Wisconsin Avenue corridor to Tenley Circle, then via Glover-Archbold Park 

to Whitehaven Parkway, with a link to the Inner Loop near Sheridan Circle. 

Aitken agreed that this routing would serve more traffic than the Potomac River route that he and 

District officials favored. However, building the section in Maryland would be very difficult and 

would possibly require the taking of “hundreds of homes” before reaching the District line. He 

said that the Potomac River Freeway and the routing via the city’s planned Glover-Archbold 

Parkway, exclusive of trucks, were both needed. [Beveridge, George, “Shift Called Possible in 

‘Inner Loop’ Plan,” The Evening Star, February 1, 1957] 

Aitken returned to NCPC on March 8 for a formal presentation of his plan for shifting the Inner 

Loop’s West Leg to the west. Although the proposal would solve some of the issues involving 

private development and expansion of George Washington University, it would cut through the 

Foggy Bottom site favored by the District Auditorium Commission. On the plus side, the 

western shift would permit the Inner Loop to make “full traffic connections” with the proposed 

Potomac River link to U.S. 240. Aitken expected the proposed route to cost about 10 percent 

less than the currently approved route through Washington Circle. 

The precise impact on properties had not been determined, but the apartment houses on K Street 

west of 25th Street appeared to be in greatest danger. The impact on the embassy area would be 
the same as caused by the current plan. Regardless of property impacts, Aitken said, his primary 

concern was finding “workable connections” between the Inner Loop and the Potomac River 

Freeway.

For traffic service, he proposed a Potomac River bridge between the Key and Chain Bridges. It 

would connect with the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Virginia and the Potomac 

River Freeway near MacArthur Boulevard in the District. He recommended the bridge be an 

extension of Arizona Avenue. 

Members of NCPC reserved judgment, referring the report to a committee for study. [Beveridge, 

George, “Another Route For ‘Inner Loop’ Road Proposed,” The Evening Star, March 8, 1957] 

The District Auditorium Commission still favored the Foggy Bottom site over the sites in 

Southwest, but was disturbed that the District did not seem to give a high priority to avoiding 

conflicts between the cultural facility and the West Leg:

Mrs. Meyer charged that city authorities and Washington business interests have adopted 

a “cavalier manner” toward her commission’s desire to locate the cultural center in Foggy 

Bottom . . . . Mrs. Meyer said the city heads have handled the matter as one “merely . . . 

of parochial concern to be settled in the haphazard manner characteristic of the District’s 

chaotic government.” 

Another time, she said all the “squabbling and procrastination” over the issue results from 

“the fact that the District of Columbia lacks an orderly and efficient government.” 

As for the Clarkeson proposal, she told NCPC that her group would pay for a new route study if 

the auditorium commission could select the consultant. 

General Lane agreed that the District Highway Department would meet with the commission’s 

engineer. He pointed out to Mrs. Meyer that the District had not acted on the Clarkeson proposal 

and did not, at this time, agree that additional studies were needed. If Congress determined the 

location for the auditorium and cultural center, as NCPC had recommended, the District would 

necessarily adjust its plans to comply with congressional decisions. [Beveridge, George, “D.C. 

Officials to Consult Center’s Group About Site,” The Evening Star, March 27, 1957] 

On May 3, NCPC members spent half the day in the Potomac Palisades area to see where the 

planned expressways and parkways, including the U.S. 240 link, were to be built. They also 

heard from citizen groups, such as the Potomac Palisades Citizens Association. Its representative 

told NCPC that the river location was the “worst possible route” for an expressway. The group 

favored the George Washington Memorial Parkway if built in the Canal Road corridor, but the 

link to U.S. 240 should be built where it would serve more people. 

Admiral Neill Phillips of the District Audubon Society told NCPC that if the U.S. 240 link must 

be built along the Potomac River, it should be combined with the George Washington Memorial 

Parkway. However, he wanted the parkway built along MacArthur Boulevard to reduce impacts 

on the C&O Canal and waterfront parks. Other groups agreed with the idea of reducing impacts 
on the canal and park area. [Beveridge, George, “Planners Ask Adoption Of Lewis Zoning 

Report,” The Evening Star, May 4, 1957] 

Congress was considering legislation to extend the life of the District Auditorium Commission, 

which had expired on January 31, 1957. The House-approved bill extended the commission until 

the center was built. The Senate-approved version extended the life of the commission and 

directed it to “select and acquire” a site but did not specify where it should be. During the 

House-Senate conference to resolve differences between the bills, conferees changed the 

language to direct the GSA to acquire the site in Foggy Bottom favored by the commission. The 

conferees voted 7-1 for the change. Representative Broyhill, a member of the auditorium 

commission, was the lone dissenter because, he said, the Foggy Bottom site would be more 

expensive than a site in the southwest redevelopment area. He also pointed out that the Foggy 

Bottom site would remove property from the city’s tax rolls, thus increasing its true cost. 

In reporting the conferees’ action, George Beveridge discussed the conflict with the West Leg of 

the Inner Loop: 

It was learned that District highway officials have drawn tentative alternate routes, 

however, which could permit the auditorium to be built. These plans, still in the study 

stage, are being worked out with special consultants for the Auditorium Commission and 

for the big Potomac Plaza private development, which could be harmed by a major road 

relocation. [Beveridge, George, “Conferees OK Auditorium in Foggy Bottom,” The 

Evening Star, May 10, 1957; “Foggy Bottom Site Hit As Too Costly for Center,” The 

Evening Star, March 22, 1957] 

On May 15, the Senate approved the conference report extending the auditorium commission and 

directing GSA to acquire the Foggy Bottom site. However, the House rejected the bill by a wide 

margin on August 9. Representative Broyhill led the opposition, arguing that the specified site 

would cost too much. 

Mrs. Meyer, watching from the House gallery, denounced Representative Broyhill as a 

“completely irresponsible person.” He knew, she said, that the Foggy Bottom site was less costly 

than the southwest sites. “Therefore, I think all his statements are unreliable and many untrue.” 

She said, “The whole possibility of having a cultural center is lost unless the House reconsiders.” 

 [“House Vote Chills Cultural Program,” The Evening Star, August 9, 1957] 

(With the District Auditorium Commission no longer in operation, Congress continued the goal 

of the cultural center by passing the National Cultural Center Act, which President Eisenhower 

approved on September 2, 1958. It established a board to maintain and administer the National 

Cultural Center for the Smithsonian Institution. The law did not address where the center should 

be built. Gutheim and Lee described the outcome: 

After the work of President Eisenhower’s DC Auditorium Commission from 1955 to 

1958, Commission of Fine Arts chairman David Finley arranged for the review of several 

possible sites for this facility and recommended the one on the Potomac River to the US 

Congress . . . . 
After the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Congress voted to name the center 

in his honor. [Gutheim and Lee, pages 295-296] 

(President Lyndon B. Johnson participated in the groundbreaking ceremony on December 2, 

1964. The John K. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts opened on September 8, 1971.) 

Searching for Connections

The District of Columbia was still assembling its full Interstate network for approval by BPR, 

with the U.S. 240 link still a major concern. In June 1957, District highway officials had 

finalized their plan for submission to BPR on July 1. These were the routes that would, if BPR 

approved, be eligible for construction in the next 13 years on a 90-10 matching basis. 

The Star described the plans: 

In broad outline, they connect an inner-loop skirting the downtown district with highways 

leading to Route 240 to Frederick, Md., to the northwest; to Richmond and points south 

and southwest, and to Baltimore and New York freeways to the northeast. 

The District divided its system into five routes:

Route 1 – The still disputed connection to Route 240, running parallel to the Potomac 

river, $47 million. The eight-lane roadway, partly elevated and partly depressed, would 

run from the District line to the west leg of the inner loop. A unique feature would be an 

extension of the Whitehurst freeway under one span of Key Bridge, one-way west, and a 

companion eastbound highway under another bridge span. 

Route 2 – The Potomac River bridge leading to the west and north legs of the loop onto 

New York avenue to the District line, $141 million. Highway planners have included the 

bridge on the Federal plan, although the Senate has before it a bill for a tunnel at the 

Theodore Roosevelt island site. 

Route 3 – The Southwest freeway linking the highway bridges across the Potomac with 

the center loop leg to the New York avenue section to Route 2, $95 million. Part of this 

alternately six and eight lane highway will shoot underground into a six-lane tunnel in 

front of the Capitol from D street to Constitution avenue under the Mall. 

Route 4 – The Anacostia freeway alongside the Anacostia River to tie the projected Jones 

Point bridge to the new Eleventh Street bridge through the southwest to meet the 

Southwest freeway, $55 million. This will join South Capitol street with Route 3. 

Route 5 – A continuation of the Anacostia freeway past the Eleventh Street Bridge on the 

Anacostia side to the East Capitol Street Bridge, $12 million. At the latter bridge, the 

road picks up with widened, limited access Kenilworth avenue to the interchange fanning 

to Baltimore. 

The proposed District network did not include any Interstate highways in the northwest quadrant 

other than the Potomac River link to U.S. 240. The New York Avenue link to the BaltimoreWashington Parkway was the farthest north of any route in the northeast quadrant. [Bassett, 

Grace, “$350 Million D.C. Plans For Expressways Readied,” The Evening Star, June 19, 1957] 
The New York Avenue expressway was planned from the Inner Loop at Florida Avenue to 

Bladensburg Road, NE., where it would connect with the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. The 

expressway would be six lanes for most of its length. District highway planner Brinkley said the 

expressway would include at least three interchanges as well as access ramps to cross roads.

The District’s routes would have to match Maryland’s and Virginia’s plans for their Interstate 

networks in the Washington suburbs. During the meeting on January 15, 1957, discussed earlier, 

Federal Highway Administrator Volpe had approved the U.S. 240 Potomac River link to the 

Inner Loop and a connection at Washington Circle, but the Maryland routing was yet to be 

determined. Similarly, Maryland was proposing a separate alignment for the Baltimore-toWashington line that would require a third east-side entrance across the District line (the other 

two being U.S. 1 and the parkway), rather than the parkway-New York Avenue link the city 

favored. 

Brinkley said the New York Avenue expressway would also provide the connection to the 

District if Maryland secured approval of a Baltimore-Washington connection separate from the 

parkway. However, he said the highway department was studying a different connection with 

such a link because the present Kenilworth Avenue interchange limited the ability to add a third 

expressway to its capacity. [Deane, James G., “N.Y. Avenue Expressway In Road Plan,” The 

Evening Star, June 16, 1957] 

The prohibition of trucks on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway was a major factor in 

Maryland’s thinking. BPR favored converting the Baltimore-Washington Parkway to an 

Interstate highway. The conversion would require transfer from NPS to the State, upgrading the 

pavement to carry trucks, and almost certainly an increase in the number of lanes, but the cost 

would be considerably less than that of a separate expressway link. Nevertheless, Maryland road 

officials preferred a third expressway connecting with the District near the Montgomery/Prince 

George’s County line. 

Colonel Welling wanted to pin down the connection. During a meeting of the regional 

coordinating committee on October 15, 1957, officials from Maryland and the District discussed 

the new expressway link between the two cities. The committee advised Welling to study a link 

to be located between Bladensburg Road, NE., and Kansas Avenue, NW. Director Robertson 

planned to ask Clarkeson Engineering Company to undertake the study.

The committee also considered the U.S. 240 link to the city, but could not resolve differences 

between the District, which favored the Potomac River route, and Maryland, which advocated a 

link in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. [“Planners Still at Odds On Freeway D.C. Route,” The 

Evening Star, October 16, 1957] 

On October 18, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks announced designation of 2,102 miles of 

Interstate highways. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 had authorized 1,000 miles of this 

amount by expanding the Interstate System from 40,000 miles to 41,000 miles. The additional 

miles came from identifying direct-as-practicable locations for previously designated routes. The 

Star reported that the mileage included about 4 miles for the District of Columbia that were not 

linked to a specific route. Robertson said he would seek BPR approval to use for the new 4-mile 
link to the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. [“More U.S. Road Aid Opened for District,” The 

Evening Star, October 19, 1957] 

Not long after the District approved the Clarkeson contract, the Maryland-National Capital Park 

and Planning Commission expressed concerns about the scope of the study. On November 27, 

the commission asked the District to study the area through the southeast quadrant of the city 

between Bladensburg Road and Southern Avenue along the southern District line. The 

commissioners were convinced that with the opening of the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel on 

November 29, 1957, most of the traffic using the third route between the two cities would come 

from east of Baltimore. They thought the new expressway should be south of the parkway rather 

than north as the Maryland State Roads Commission intended. This shift also would avoid the 

heavily populated areas of Prince George’s County and the District and keep truck traffic out of 

those neighborhoods. In addition, moving the corridor to the southeast would allow it to serve 

the Anacostia Freeway and the new Jones Point Bridge while providing a better Interstate bypass 

for East Coast traffic. [“Maryland Planners Oppose D.C. Sector For Expressway,” The Evening 

Star, November 28, 1957] 

In December 1957, NPS was ready to begin construction of the 3.9-mile segment of the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway between the District line and Cabin John on land acquired for 

the project by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. The grading and 

drainage work would cover only two of the planned four lanes, with the lanes located between 

MacArthur Boulevard and the C&O Canal. Although building only two lanes initially would 

reduce local objections to the project, Director Wirth said the main reason for limiting the lanes 

was the NPS had only enough funds for four lanes. If the project remained on schedule, the two 

lanes carrying traffic in both directions would open in the spring of 1960 carrying two-way 

traffic. The second set of lanes would be built after the two-lane section reached Great Falls.

Wirth intended to have plans drawn at NPS expense to extend the parkway into the District as far 

as Glover-Archbold Parkway, but this routing conflicted with the District’s plans for carrying 

U.S. 240 along the Potomac River. Further, the District’s Robertson said he understood NPS 

would stop the parkway at the District line, with the city responsible for its extension. NPS 

opposed the city’s plan for carrying U.S. 240 along the river, favoring instead the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor for the link to the Inner Belt Freeway. [Beveridge, George, “Bids Open Tuesday 

On River Parkway,” The Evening Star, December 8, 1957] 

On the other side of the city, Clarkeson Engineering Company submitted plans for a 4.5-mile 

partly elevated New York Avenue expressway between Florida Avenue and a connection with 

the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. District highway officials were considering the plan. The 

elevated 1.5 segment would carry traffic from Fairview Avenue to beyond Bladensburg Road. 

Robertson, who expected the plan to be approved for 90-10 Interstate funds, said construction 

was not in the current 6-year plan. [“41⁄2-Mile Road In N.E. Weighed,” The Evening Star, 

December 19, 1957] 

The Foggy Bottom controversy was resolved in November 1958 when District highway officials 

and NCPC agreed on the location of the West Leg of the Inner Loop. Under the plan, the 

northbound and southbound lanes of the eight-lane freeway would be close together on the west 
side of 26th Street, NW., near the K Street interchange. The expressway would connect with the 

approach roads for the Constitution Avenue Bridge and meet the eight-lane Potomac River 

Freeway in what the Star called a “gigantic interchange” at 26th and K Streets. The Whitehurst 

Freeway would provide four of the lanes for the Potomac River Freeway, with the remainder to 

be built on a new structure. 

The plan reduced the cost of the expressway by $4 million, in part by reducing the impact on 

buildings in the area. Aitken, now the District’s planning chief, said the plan would not affect 

any “substantial building now existing in the Twenty-sixth street area.” It would require the 

taking of a “medium-sized apartment” building west of 26th Street between I and K Streets and a 

“small apartment” building under construction across the street from it. In addition, the 

expressway plan required the taking of the Indonesian Embassy, the former home of Evalyn 

Walsh McLean at 2020 Massachusetts Avenue, NW. (She was a wealthy heiress best known 

today as the former owner of the Hope Diamond, which is now the cornerstone of the 

Smithsonian Institution’s gem collection.) [Beveridge, George, “Expressway Okayed For Foggy 

Bottom,” The Evening Star, November 6, 1958; “D.C. Set to Order Expressway Plans,” The 

Evening Star, November 7, 1958]

The Star, acknowledging that some of Washington’s highway disputes can “produce irritating 

delays in needed traffic improvements,” said that in the case of the West Leg, the delay had 

resulted in “a superior plan which was well worth the waiting.” The earlier plans, with their 

drastic impacts on the area, “would have been a tragic mistake.” The new expressway “still will 

cause severe hardships, and this is one of the unfortunate prices the city must demand in order to 

obtain the traffic relief which only can come from the huge modern superhighways.” Officials, 

however, “must never relent” in the search for locations that would serve traffic while 

minimizing “possible disruption of surrounding community values.” [“Success in Foggy 

Bottom,” The Evening Star, November 10, 1958] 

In December, Clarkeson Engineering Company submitted a progress report on a connector with 

Maryland’s third expressway, part of I-95, between Baltimore and Washington. As called for in 

its contract, Clarkeson identified routes between Bladensburg Road, NE., and Kansas Avenue, 

NW. The four possible routes through the District’s northeast quadrant linked the Inner Loop 

with the Maryland expressway, but were oriented to the District links to the BaltimoreWashington Parkway. Clarkeson was to narrow the selection to a single route in its final report 

in several months. [Barron, John, “Four Routes Drafted For New Expressway,” The Sunday 

Star, December 29, 1958] 

Within the District, the Brookland Citizens Association objected to one of the routes because it 

would cut through property used by public and parochial schools. The route cut through the 

community between 10th and 12th Streets, NE., with Crosby Noyes School, St. Anthony’s High 

School, Brookland School, and St. Anthony’s Elementary School in the expressway’s path. 

[“School Damages By Route Cited,” The Evening Star, February 10, 1959] 

While District officials were debating alternatives, Maryland selected a route for I-95 in Prince 

George’s County to the circumferential that BPR had approved. Inside the circumferential, 

Maryland was unsure, but the Star summarized:
However, present thinking is that the freeway would pass east of Knollwood and New 

Hampshire Estates. It would cross University boulevard West close to University Hills 

and pass west of the new Princes Georges Plaza shopping center. At the District line the 

highway would cross at either Gallatin street N.E. or near Michigan avenue N.E. 

Maryland is waiting for the District to come up with its route. There is a possibility of an 

entirely new freeway route in the District or a connection combining a new freeway and a 

New York avenue expressway from some point west of West Virginia avenue. 

[Alibrando, Afred P., “New York Avenue Crisis Doubles,” The Sunday Star, July 12, 

1959] 

In July 1960, Clarkeson Engineering Company offered a new alternative for the Northeast 

Freeway connection to I-95 in Maryland, the “third route to Baltimore.” The best option, the 

company concluded, was to build it along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks running 

through the northeast quadrant, one block east of Catholic University. The freeway, with a mix 

of six- and eight-lane segments, would begin where the North and East Legs of the Inner Loop 

meet at Florida Avenue and K Street, NE.:

From there, the freeway would go along Montello avenue, curve north just beyond 

Holbrook terrace and go over New York avenue and Kendall street on a 1,950-foot 

viaduct. 

At W street, the freeway would go under Brentwood road, Rhode Island avenue and 

Irving street. From there to Varnum street, the freeway would run alongside the railroad 

tracks except for skirting around the Catholic Sisters’ College and the northwest corner of 

Providence Hospital. 

The freeway would swing east at Varnum and hook up with Maryland’s extension just 

south of Galloway street. 

The freeway extension of I-95 would have eight lanes north of New York Avenue, and six to the 

avenue’s south. Interchanges would be built at New York, Rhode Island, Michigan, and South 

Dakota Avenues as well as Fort Drive. The width of the freeway would be expanded 51 feet to 

accommodate rapid transit in the median. 

The 4.14-mile, $74-million route would cost more than other options, but Clarkeson concluded it 

was the best bargain. By running along the railroad tracks, it would be less disruptive to homes 

and businesses already accustomed to railroad noises. The routing avoided schools, playgrounds, 

and shopping areas, but would require the taking of 1,095 homes, 103 apartment buildings, 39 

industrial sites, and one church, but no schools. The report estimated the cost of acquiring the 

properties to be $30.8 million. 

At a projected 108,000 vehicles a day, it would handle more traffic than the other options and 

“affords excellent connections for the urban dweller in his daily commuting to the downtown 

area.” The preferred alternative avoided the Catholic University campus and would be built 
below ground level in an open cut “to reduce the disturbance to serenity in the neighborhood.” 

The route would require use of some undeveloped land of the Catholic Sisters College. 

District Engineer Commissioner Welling, who was about to step down, said he wanted to get the 

study “out on the table” before leaving his post. He planned to submit the study to NCPC for 

review. One point he was “particularly insistent” about was that the median be wide enough to 

accommodate a rapid rail line. [“Survey Backs B&O Route For Proposed New Freeway,” The 

Sunday Star, July 24, 1960; Eisen, Jack, “Third Route to Baltimore Would Skirt Catholic U.,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 24, 1960] 

For one of his final acts, General Welling participated in the groundbreaking ceremony for the 

Potomac River Freeway at Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway and K Street, NW. On July 25, 

1960, District Highway Director Aitken staged an elaborate ceremony for the groundbreaking 

because it would be Welling’s last in the District before he left for his new post commanding the 

Corps of Engineers Ballistic Missile Construction Center in Los Angeles:

In addition to two 75-mm. salute guns, which fired off five rounds, a miniature “guided 

missile” was fired.

The “missile,” about a foot long, was launched by Gen. Welling’s [9-year old] son, Peter, 

who attended the ceremony. After he pulled the cord, the “missile” went about 30 feet in 

the air, and then came down again. 

As a final touch, Gen. Welling got into the driver’s seat of a caterpillar front-end loader 

tractor, and picked up the first mechanized shovel-full of the new freeway.

General Welling teased reporters, telling them, “One thing I don’t want you to write is that ‘Gen. 

Welling held his last groundbreaking as commissioner.’ You can never tell if this is the last.” 

[“Welling Starts Potomac Freeway,” The Evening Star, July 26, 1960] 

His successor, Colonel Frederick J. Clarke, had spent 10 years in the Washington area on three 

previous assignments. He was coming from Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri where he was chief 

of staff at the U.S. Army Training Center. He said of his new assignment that the post was “one 

of the choice jobs of the corps of engineers. I was very glad to get it.” A profile in the Star said 

he expected to feel at home in dealing with the District’s construction issues because of his 

experience in the field. “I strongly favor working with the neighboring town, county and State 

Governments on such matters as reducing traffic congestion and improving water supply.” He 

added, “I recognize that many of these things cannot be solved unilaterally.” 

Colonel Clarke, who would take his oath of office on August 1, 1960, was meeting with General 

Welling to discuss the issues facing the District. On August 19, he took a helicopter tour of the 

city for an aerial view of public works projects. He observed the Jones Point Bridge/Woodrow 

Wilson Memorial Bridge project, Glover-Archbold Park, and the Pooks Hill terminus of I-70-S 

in Maryland. After the flight, he commented that there is “not a great deal of room in the GloverArchbold Park” for the planned parkway. [Pierce, Charles D., “Clarke Sees Joint Action Cure to 

Area Problems,” The Sunday Star, July 24, 1960; “Col. Clarke Takes Oath As New 
Commissioner,” The Evening Star, August 1, 1960; “Clarke Gets Copter View of Projects,” The 

Evening Star, August 20, 1960] 

On August 29, the Senate confirmed Colonel Clarke’s promotion to Brigadier General. 

By November, opposition to freeway construction in northeast was growing. At an all-day public 

hearing on November 7, 1960, the District Commissioners heard 35 witnesses discuss the East 

Leg, which was to run along 11th Street from the Anacostia River through Lincoln Park in a 

tunnel to Florida Avenue, and the Northeast Freeway. One common theme heard during the 

hearing was to leave Lincoln Park alone. NPS describes Lincoln Park as “the largest Capitol Hill 

Park,” located “directly east of the United States Capitol Building at East Capitol and 11th Street 

in the Northeastern quadrant of the City.” The park, which was part of Pierre L’Enfant’s 1791 

plan for the national capital, was renamed for President Lincoln in 1867. 

William Finley, NCPC’s executive director (1958-1962), testified that his agency would offer 

modifications for the East Leg to avoid Lincoln Park and 16 homes in the 100 block of 11th

Street. The homes, known as Philadelphia Row, had been built shortly after the Civil War in the 

Federal style of the 19th century. The National Trust for Historic Preservation had designated the 

row as worthy of preservation. Trust historian Hellen [sic] Deprey testified that the road “has 

great architectural merit and still retains much of its original quality.” 

Witnesses emphasized the hardships the recommended route for the Northeast Freeway would 

cause businesses, churches, and property owners. Walter B. Lewis of the North Michigan Park 

Civic Association opposed the route, which he pointed out would take homes owned mainly by 

non-white residents. “The problem of the race of displaced families cannot be overlooked in the 

Washington area.” He added, “The housing available to Negroes is practically limited to that 

found in the District, since very few housing opportunities are offered to Negroes in the 

suburbs.” 

Frank Coleman of the Brookland Civic Association raised the same issue. “Many of these 

citizens either will be forced to move to areas already congested, or by reason of such a mass 

migration, will cause congestion in the areas to which they move.” He recommended that the 

commissioners appoint a housing committee, including white and Negro members, to study the 

problem. 

The “spirited public hearing,” as the Star described it, left the commissioners to consider whether 

to change their plans. [Gimble, Gilbert, “Route Change Pondered For Northeast Freeway,” The 

Evening Star, November 8, 1960] 

In March 1961, General Clarke decided on new routes for the East Leg of the Inner Loop and the 

Northeast Freeway. The East Leg would be placed between 10th and 11th Streets. He disregarded 

suggestions from citizens who wanted to move the freeway to the 19th Street corridor; his 

concern was that it would cut into the National Arboretum. He also proposed to include two 

spurs to serve the new District of Columbia Stadium, then under construction at East Capitol 

Street. The spurs would follow Benning Road on the north and Potomac Avenue on the south 

and end in stadium parking lots. (The stadium, which opened in October 1961, housed 
Washington’s baseball and football teams. In 1969, the name was changed to Robert F. Kennedy 

Memorial Stadium.)

For the Northeast Expressway, General Clarke recommended that I-95 cross the District line just 

east of Sargent Road, proceed through the wooded Fort Drive right-of-way to the Baltimore and 

Ohio Railroad tracks. It would stay on the east side of the tracks and cut across Harmony 

Cemetery, which had been cleared, to avoid residential disruption in Brookland. After crossing 

the Pennsylvania Railroad tracks, the freeway followed along the east side of West Virginia 

Avenue to the link with the East Leg at Florida Avenue. 

General Clarke submitted his recommendations to NCPC for consideration. [Gimble, Gilbert, 

“Clarke Shifts East Leg of Inner Loop,” The Sunday Star, March 26, 1961] 

The Star appreciated General Clarke’s effort to “ease the impact of this major thoroughfare,” 

including preservation of Philadelphia Row. “It also is good news that a proposed route . . . has 

been laid out, ending uncertainty that was unfair to property owners in that area.” Unfortunately, 

some “disruptive effect” was inevitable, “but we are convinced that the inner loop in the end will 

benefit the whole Metropolitan Area.” [“To Ease the Impact,” The Evening Star, April 3, 1961] 

On April 6, NCPC approved the shifts in the East Leg and the Northeast Freeway, with one 

exception. Because of NPS objections, the section through wooded Fort Drive was left pending 

further discussions. In addition, NCPC conditioned its approval on Maryland roads officials 

providing the I-95 link to the Northeast Freeway without seriously harming Northwest Branch in 

Prince George’s County. [Gimble, Gilbert, “Planners OK Route Change For Inner Loop,” The 

Evening Star, April 6, 1961] 

Opposition to the plan arose quickly from the Northeast Washington Citizens Association. It 

joined the Capitol Hill Citizens Association on April 18 in opposing the 10th-11th Street routing 

of the East Leg. The two associations called for a public hearing to consider the routing. 

[“Northeast Group Joins Opposition To Freeway Plan,” The Evening Star, April 19, 1961] 

Later in the year, the Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens Association joined the opposition to the 

East Leg because it would “make Washington a key military as well as political target.” As part 

of I-95, it could be bombed. The association’s resolution suggested that “ordinary prudence and 

a sense of economy would seem to indicate that heavy through-traffic freeways could be built 

some miles distant from the capital at less expense and remain clear of rubble and open to 

military, trucking and other traffic in time of emergency.” The association asked the District 

commissioners to determine whether “it is in the best interest of the national defense to locate the 

principal Maine-Florida truck route through the heart of the Nation’s Capital.” [“East Leg 

Protested As Military Target,” The Evening Star, October 10, 1961] 

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad also was concerned about the routing of the Northeast 

Freeway. The company wanted to build a spur off Porto Rico Avenue and Taylor Street, NE., to 

serve the industrial area, but the tentative location of the Northeast Freeway would take this 

property to avoid taking nearby residences. The company had attempted to secure legislation 

allowing it to construct the railroad siding. Congress had completed work on the legislation with 
Senate approval on September 7. However, President Kennedy had vetoed the bill on September 

22, saying, “For the government to encourage the private development of property which it plans 

to acquire for public use seems inappropriate.” By “public use,” he meant the right-of-way of the 

Northeast Freeway. In vetoing the bill, President Kennedy took the advice of NCPC’s executive 

director, William Finley. 

A railroad spokesman, Laidler B. Mackall, said the company would build the spur anyway. The 

route of the Northeast Freeway had not yet been approved. In response, District highway 

officials said that regardless of the railroad’s action, they would acquire the property rather than 

displace the many families in the area. 

On October 11, Mackall asked the District commissioners to shift the freeway alignment. If the 

commissioners insisted on retaining the current freeway routing, the railroad recommended an 

elevated structure similar to the Whitehurst Freeway that would allow the property to remain 

available for industrial purposes. [“Third Baltimore Route Briefing Slated Friday,” The Evening 

Star, September 27, 1961; “Freeway Shift Asked by B&O,” The Evening Star, October 11, 1961] 

NCPC also was considering whether the East Leg would harm the city. The manager of the 

District division of AAA, John W. Childress, said “it is inconceivable” that officials would drop 

or delay the Inner Loop. [“Freeway Shift Asked by B&O,” The Evening Star, October 11, 1961] 

Preserving the Lincoln Memorial

The NPS was still looking for ways to avoid traffic impacts on the Lincoln Memorial from the 

new Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. 

On September 26, 1960, NPS Director Wirth held a press conference to announce that he would 

submit plans to NCPC for a tunnel under the Lincoln Memorial grounds. The tunnel was part of 

an overall plan for the grounds because, as Wirth said, “There are moments when the memorial is 

engulfed in a sea of cars . . . . It is time that we restored the calm tranquility of the scene by 

eliminating the buzzing traffic between the Memorial and its reflecting pool.” The plan 

included: 

• Replacing a portion of the traffic circle with a plaza between the memorial steps and the 

Reflecting Pool, eliminating the traffic that designers had called “a vexing and 

hazardous” condition; 

• Roadways on each edge of the pool with parking lots for memorial visitors, leading to a 

circle around the Washington Monument grounds with feeder connections to downtown; 

• Independence Avenue would be carried through the 1,435-foot tunnel as a link between 

the Roosevelt Bridge and the Inner Loop; 

• The tunnel would consist of two driveways of three lanes each, with traffic out of view; 

• The tunnel, designed by the New York firm of Singstad and Baillie, would be built under 

the memorial grounds but not under any portion of the Lincoln Memorial itself; 

• The tunnel entrances would be hidden from view by plantings and grading, with no traffic 

noise reaching the monument; 
• A 212-foot underpass would carry Ohio Drive traffic underground between the Rock 

Creek and Potomac Parkway bridge leading to the Lincoln Memorial to the north 

entrance of the tunnel; 

• Temporary government buildings on the south side of the Reflecting Pool area would be 

eliminated as part of the project.

As Wirth saw it, traffic on Arlington Memorial Bridge would be reduced significantly when the 

Theodore Roosevelt Bridge opened, but motorists using either bridge would follow the 

Reflecting Pool roads between the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument circle. 

Wirth wanted to secure approval of the $16-million tunnel plan as soon as possible so the tunnel 

could be completed before the Roosevelt Bridge opened. (Other aspects of the overall plan 

increased the total estimated cost to $20 million.) 

The overall plan, he said, would preserve “the dignity, beauty, serenity and magnificent setting of 

the Lincoln Memorial.” [Gimble, Gilbert, “Tunnel Plan Ready For Lincoln Shrine,” The Evening 

Star, September 26, 1960; Gimble, Gilbert, “‘Bonus’ Seen in Lincoln Memorial Road Plan” The 

Evening Star, September 27, 1960] 

The District generally supported the Wirth plan as long as the city would not have to pay for it, 

but wanted to provide for other traffic movements. During a meeting, General Clarke and Wirth 

agreed on several points. One concern was that the tunnel plan did not include a direct 

connection between Arlington Memorial Bridge and the State Department. The District agreed 

to try to add a direct connection from the north entrance of the tunnel to E Street, NW. 

Wirth agreed to a ramp allowing traffic on the Roosevelt Bridge to use the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway on the Virginia side of the Potomac River. He was concerned the parkway 

might be overwhelmed by increased commuter traffic, but reluctantly agreed as part of the 

District-NPS compromise after District officials agreed to yield somewhat on approach roads. 

The District agreed to seek approval from Virginia and BPR for two-lane ramps from the bridge 

to Arlington Boulevard that would attract more motorists than the single-lane parkway ramp.

Another gap in Wirth’s plan was a link for westbound traffic on Independence Avenue bound for 

Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway. The District and NPS agreed to design an intersection at 

15th Street for this link. [Gimble, Gilbert, “Parkway Link For New Span Wins Approval,” The 

Sunday Star, October 2, 1960] 

NCPC approved the NPS tunnel plan on October 6. Wirth told the commissioners that the 

Bureau of the Budget appeared favorable to the plan but had not yet approved it. [Gimble, 

Gilbert, “Planners Okay Tunnel Project,” The Evening Star, October 6, 1960]