1 Oral arguments were heard in this case on March 28, 2000, in Winchester, Franklin County,

Tennessee, as part of

thi s Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S. ( S upreme C ourt A dvancing L egal E ducation for S tudents) project

. 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE (HEARD AT WINCHEST ER)
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LON MITCHELL PIERCE, JR.
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S38663 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E1997-00053-SC-R11-CD - Decided June 22, 2000

FOR PUBLICATION

The appellan t, Lon Mitchell Pierce, Jr, was fleeing from law enforcement officials in a van that another person had stolen in Florida twenty days earlier when the stolen van he was driving collided with a Sullivan County deputy’s patrol car. The deputy died almost immediately from injuries he sustained in the collision. As a result of the deputy’s death, the appellant was ch a rged with and convictedof first degree murder in the perpetration of a theft. In the Court of Criminal Appeals, the appellant challenged the sufficien cy of the evidence to support his conviction and argued that the felony murder rule shoul

d not be applied because the killing was collateral to and not in pursuance of the felony of theft. In a split decision, the Court of Criminal Appe als rej ected the appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence and affirmed his conviction of felony murder. Thereafter, we granted permission to appeal to determine whether the evid ence is sufficie

nt to establish

that the murder was committed “in the perpetration of” the theft. After carefully considering the record and the relevant legal authority, we conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of felony murder because the killing and the initial theft or taking of the van were not connected in time, place, causation and continuity of action. Accordingly, the appellant’s conviction is vacated and the case is re

manded for a new

trial. 1

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgm ent of th e Court of Crimina l Appeals Reversed; Case Remanded for a New Trial

D ROWOTA , J, delivered the opin ion of the court, in which A NDERSON , C.J., B IRCH , H OLDER and B ARKER , JJ. joined.2 Nora Comacho advised law enforcement officials that her daughter had taken her vehicle on two prior occa

sions but that she ha

d not pressed crim

inal charges aga

inst her daughter

because eventually the vehicle had been returned unharmed.


### -2- Donald E. Spurrell and James S. Roach, JohnsonCity, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lon Mitc hell Pierce, Jr.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Marvin E. Clements, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, H. Greeley Wells, District Attorney General, and Teresa Murray Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
Background The events giving rise

to this appeal began on November 2, 1995, in Orlando, Florida. On th at day, Nora Comacho and her husband stopped their blue 1995 Dodge Caravan at a 7-11 conveniencestore for gasoline. Passengers in the van included their fourteen-year-ol d daughter, Sarah Comacho, the appe lla nt, fi fteen-year-o

ld Lon Mitchell Pier

ce, Jr., his sixtee

n-year-old girlfriend, April Worley, and an unidentified four-year-old child who was temporarily in Worley’s
care.

Ms. Comacho went into the convenience store and bought her daughter a soft drink. When Ms. Comacho returned to the vehicle, Sarah became upset because the soft drink was in a cup rather than a bottle and she and her mother argued. Apparently as a result of this argument, Sarah jumped into the driver’s seat of the van while her father was inside the store and her mother was pumping gasoline. She then hit the automatic door locks and sped away from the convenience store, tearing the hose from the gasoline pump.

An employee of the convenience store immediately notified the Orlando Police Department of the incident. Nora Comacho completed a stole n vehicle affida

vit and a sworn wri

tten statement, 2 and the employee of the convenience store filled out an incident report with respect to the

property damage to the gas pump. Identifying information concerning the stolen vehicle was entered into the computer database of the National Crime Information Center, and a nationwide bulle

tin was issued reporting the vehicle as stolen.

About twenty minutes after taking t he van, Sarah, realizing her inexperience as a driver, pulled over and asked the appellant to drive. The appellant agreed, and immediately drove the fouryear-old child to the child’s home. Worley then sugge sted that the trio dr

ive to Bristol,Virginia to visit her grandmother. Worley and the appellant alternated driving and arrived in Br

istol, Virginia from Orlando, Florida, approximately twelve hours later.

For the next approximately three weeks, the three teenag ers s tayed either with Worley’s grandmother

at her residence in t he Rice Terrace Apartments or at local motels. The three spent3 No weapons were found in the van, and there is nothing in the record which r e veals the origin of this suspicion. A small amount of cocaine was found in the van, but proof was introduced at trial to establish

that the cocaine belonged to April Worley’s aunt, and the defendant was acquitted of the charge of possession of cocaine.


### -3- their time “mostly [riding] around . . . to different cities [in Tennessee].” During this period, “Sarah [Comacho] got caught shoplifting a Notre Dame jacket from K-Mart in Kingsport.” Although the trio was able to escape, they believed that store personnel had obtained the license number of the
van. As a result, they located a van of the same color and type as the stolen vehicle they w er e driving, stole the license plate from that van, and “threw the old plate in the dumps ter at a minimarket.”

On November 22, 1995, twenty days after Sara h had taken the va

n from her paren

ts in Orlando, Florida, police of ficers in Bristol, Virgina, received information that a possible stolen blue Dodge van was located in the Rice Terrace area. At approximately 3:15 p.m., two Bristol, Vir

ginia officers locateda vehicle matching that description parked on Buckner Street near the Rice Terrace Apartments. The officers observed for about ten minutes what they believed to be an unoccupied
van. When the van pulle

d out of the parking

lot, the officers fo

llowed the van, ac

tivated their

blue lights, and attempted to make a traffic stop when the van failed to stop at an intersect ion before turning right. Rather than stopping for the officers, the van accelerated, crossed the double line, and passe d a school bus that was unloading children. A three minute pursuit ensued through Bristol,Virginia, during which the vandriven by the appellant violated numerous traffic laws. When the van crossed out of

Virginia into Tenn

essee, th e Virginia o fficers terminated their pursuit and notified law enforcement authorities in Bristol, Tennessee that the van was approaching.
Locating the fleeing vehic le, Bristol, Tenne

ssee police offi

cer James Breue

r activated his emergency lights and sirens and continued the pursuit. Officer Breuer described his pursuit as a low speedchase, approximately forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per h our speed zone. According to Officer Breuer, the van “would slow down almost to a stop to allow vehicles in front of him to pull over.” As the chase continued, Officer Breuer was joined by Lieutenant Danny Baines of t he Bristol police department . Once outside the city limits, Captain Daryll Chambers of th e Sullivan Coun ty Sher iff’s Department took the lead in the pursuit. While the Bristol officers continued to follow

the van, they dea

ctivated their em

ergency equipme

nt.

The chase continued through Sullivan County on Route 44 at speeds of twenty-fiveto sixtyfive miles per hour. During the pursuit, officers for both the City of Bristol and the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Department were advised by radio b

roadcasts that the van was possibly a stolen vehicle and that it possibly containe

d both weapons and

narcotics. 3 Approximately fourteen miles into th e chase, Sullivan County Deputy Steve Mullins notified Captain Chambers that he was locat ed in fron t of the pursuit, traveling

in the opposite dire

ction and that he w

ould “try to cut the m off” somewhere ahead. Shortly thereafter, Captain Chambers was able to see th e blue lights from D

eputy Mullins’ patrol car, approximat

ely four-tenths of a mile ahead. Deputy Mullins had positioned his patrol car diagonally

across the roadway to set up a “road block.” The front portion of

Deputy Mullins’ patrol4 In this Court the appellant challenges only his conviction of first degree felony murder.


### -4- car extended approximately two feet over the center line int o t he lane of oncoming traffic, but enough space remained in that lane for a vehicl e to safely maneuver around the patrol car. After creating the “road block, ” Deputy Mullins ex ited his car, lea

ned across th

e hood, an d pointed his service revolve

r at the approac

hing van driven by t

he appellant.

The record does not c

learly establish

the precise movements of the van after the “road block” became visible. Captain Chambers, immediately behind the van, testified that it slowed down when Deputy Mullins firs

t came into view, a

nd he initially

thought the van was going to stop, but in the end, the van drove straight into the front of the pat rol car and veered off

to the right on impac

t. Lieutenant

Baines, who was the second police car in the p ursuit, approximately ten to twelve car lengths fromCaptain Chambers, testified that the

van appeared to

veer to the right, away from the patrol car, before impact. Offi cer Breuer, located in the rear of the pursuit, testified that the van made a sharp turn to the left into Deputy Mullins’ patrol car right before the collision occurred.

In any event, when

the van struck the patrol

car, Deputy Mullin

s was thrown seve

ral feet into the air. His body hit a civilian vehicle that was parked behind the patrol car and then landed hard
on the paved

roadway. Deputy Mullins died almost immediately of severe head injuries. Following the collision, the van veered off the roadway, rolled onto its side, and came to rest in a field. The appellant, April Worley, and Sarah Comacho were arrested.
Following his arrest, the a ppellant told

police that “[t]he reason I didn’t stop was because I was scared . . . all I wanted to do was get on the interstate and get out of the van and leave it there and get away fro

m it. . . .” With resp

ect to the collision

, the appellant sta

ted as follows:

I saw the police car pull out across the road in front of me. He was across his lane and in my lane just a little bit, but I had enough room to go around hi m in my lane. I was trying to go around him and that’s what I wanted to do.
I saw the police officer open his door and he pointed a . . . pistol at the van . . . .
When I saw the pistol, I thought I put my foot on the brake, I’m not sure if I did or not. I let go of the steering wheel and ducked straight down with my arms covering my face. Ithen heard and felt the crash and knew I’d hit something. I thought I was swerving to the right and would miss the police officer when I ducked my head.
Worley gave a similar ac count of the acc

ident during her te

stimony at t rial indicating that the appellant yelled, “Duck!” just before the van hit Deputy Mullins’ patrol car.

After hearing this proof, the jury fo und the appe llant guilty of first degree felony murder, felony theft of the Dodge caravan, misdemeanor theft of the license plate, a nd evading arrest. 4 A maj ority of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellant’s convictions. Howe ver, Judg e5 “The literal meaning of the term ‘res gestae’ is the thing or things done.” 77 C .J.S. 274

(1952). Res gestae is defined generally in criminal law as “the circumstances, facts, and declara tions which grow out

of the main

fact and serve to illustrate its character, and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation or fabrication.” Id.


### -5- David Hayes filed

a dissenting opinion

and would

have reversed the appellant’s conviction of felony murder on the grounds that the e vidence was insufficient to show that the murder was “in the perpetrationof” the felo

ny becau se the murder was not committed within the res gestae 5 of the felony. There after, we g ranted the appellant’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether there is sufficie

nt evidence to sup

port the convictio

n of first degree

murder “in

th e perpetration of

” the theft.

Standard of Review It is well-settled that the proper inquiry for an appellate court determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, is whether, “con sidering the evide

nce in a light most favora

ble to the p ro secution, any ra tional trier of fa

ct could have fou

nd the essential e

lements of the cri

me beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ); Jackson v. Virgini

a , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Hall , 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (T enn. 1999); State v. Cazes , 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the tr ial court, accr

edits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and reso

lves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s theory.” State v. Bland , 958 S. W.2d 65 1, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions about the credibility of witnesses, the weight and val ue to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the tr ier of fact, and this Court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Id. Therefore, on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the trial evidence and all reasonable and

legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Hall , 8 S.W.3d at 599.

Discussion The statute

under which the appellant was convicted defines felony murder as “[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse or aircraft piracy.” Tenn. CodeAnn. § 39-13-202(a)(

2) (emphasis adde

d). The felony sup

porting the appell

ant’s convictio

n of felony murder is theft. In Tennessee “[a] person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the
owner of property, the person knowing ly obtains or exer

cises control ove

r the property

without the owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103.
Relying upon Judge Hayes’ dissenting opinion, t he appellant arg

ues that the evide

nce in this
case is insufficient to support

his conviction for felony murder because a murder is committed

“in the perpetration of

” one of the listed

felonies only if the

murder occurs w

ithinthe res gestae of

the felony. Appellant argue

s that the murder in

this case was not committed within the res gestae of the theft because the vehicle was actually stolen by another person in Florida twenty days be fore the
c ollision resulting in Deputy Mullins’ death occ

urred in Tenness

ee. Accordingly

, the appella

n t

### -6-

asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for felony murder.

In response, the State argues that the ev ide nce is sufficien t to show that the mur

der in this
case was committed “in the perpetration of” thef t since the appellant was knowingly exercising control over

the vehicle with the intent to deprive the owner of the vehicle and without the owner’s effective consent when the collision resulting in Deputy Mullins’ death occurred.

This Court has previously cons idered how the statutory phrase,“in the perpetration of,” should be defi ned in the felony murder context. See e.g. State v. Buggs , 995 S.W.2d 102, 10 7 (Tenn. 1999); Farmer

v. State , 201 Tenn. 107, 296 S.W.2d 879 (1956). For example, in Farmer , this Courtexplained that for a killing to occur

“in the perpetration of” a felony so that the felony murder ruleapplies, the killing must be done “in pursuance of the [felony], and not collateral to it. In other words, the killing must

have had an intimate relation and close connection with the felony. . . and notbe separate, distinct, and independent from it. . . . ” Farmer , 201 Tenn. at 115-16, 296 S.W.2d at 883 (internal quot

ations and citation

s omitted). In addit

i o n, there must be a causal connection between the felony and the killing. Farmer , 201 Tenn. at 117, 296 S.W.2d at 884.

More recently

we recognized that when determining whether a killing is “in the perpetration of” a felony courts in

Tennessee have considered such factors as time, place, and causal connec tion. Buggs , 995 S.W.2d at 106. We stressed in Buggs that a killing “may precede, coincide with, or follow a felony and still b e consid ered as occu rring ‘in the perpetration of’ the felony, so long as there is a connection in time, place, and continuity of action.” Id.

Our research reveals that when determining whether a killing was committed “in the perpetrationof” a felony, the majority of courts in other jurisdictions also consider whether the killing and the felony are closely conn ected in time, plac

e, causation, an

d continuity

of action. See generally Way ne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law , § 7.5(f) (1986); Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Cons titutes Termination of Felony for Purpose of Felony-Murder Rule , 58 A. L.R.3d 851, 865-874 (1974); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 67 (1999); see, e.g. , State v. Mims , 956 P.2d 1337, 1344 ( Kan. 1998); State v. Lashley , 664 P. 2d 1358, 1368 (Kan. 1983); Commonwealth

v. Padgett , 691 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Mass. App. Ct. 1 998); State v. Brown , 940 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1997); State v. Wade , 490 S.E.2d 724, 738 (W.Va. 1997). If the felony and killing occur
as part of a continuous criminal transaction, the felony murder rule applies. See, e.g. , State v. Miles , 918 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Ariz. 1996) ; Owens v. State , 856 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Ark. 1993); People v. Gimotty , 549 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Mich. Ct. App. 19 96); Statev. Russell , 503 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Minn. 1993); Statev. Trull , 509 S.E.2d 178, 192 ( N.C. 1998); State v. Spencer , 725 A.2d 106, 118 ( N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Wade , 490 S.E.2d at738. However, where there is a break in the chain of events between the felony and the killing, the felony murde r rule does not apply. See, e.g. , Owens , 856 S.W.2d at 292; Lester v. State , 737 So.2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Allen
v. State , 690 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Russell , 503 N.W.2d at 113; Trull , 509 S.E.2d at 192. One of the most important factors to consider in determining whether there has been
a break in the cha

in of events

that would preclude application of the felony murder rule is whether the felon has reached a

place of temporary safety. See LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law , § 7.5(f)(1). If the felon has gained a place of temporary safety after commission of the felony and6 A ccording to t he State’s position, the felony murder rule can be applied to a person who

steals a piece of jewe

lry, retains it in hi

s or her possession

for twenty

years, and is invo

lved in a car accident twenty years later which results in the death of a police officer. According to the State , so long as the person has the stolen jewelryin his or her posses sion at the time of th e car acciden

t, the felony murder rule applies.


### -7- before the killing, the felony murder rule generally does not apply. See, e.g. , People v. Johnson , 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 26 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1992); Allen , 690 So. 2d at 1333; Diamond v. State , 477 S.E.2d 562, 564 (Ga . 1996); Gimotty , 549 N.W.2d at 41; Spencer , 725 A.2d at 118. Accordingly, i n resolving the issue in this app eal, we must evaluate t

he sufficiency o

f the evidence to

determine if the fatal collision resulting in Deputy Mullins’ death and the felony of

theft are closely connected in time, place, and causation, and continuity of action.

The State asserts that the killing and felony in this case occurred at the same time and place because the appellant was committing theft by exercising control over the van when the fatal collision occurred. The S tatealso says that the killing and theft are causally connected because the appellant was attempting to

evade arrest for the theft when the fatal collision occurred. Essentially, the State argues that the felony murder rule can be applied when the underlying felony is theft even if the killing is comple

tely separate f

rom and collater

al to the initial taking of

the property. The State’s position is that no pe riod of time or inte

rvening events

can break the chain between the felony and the killing when the underlying felony is theft. According to the State, so long as a defendant is exercising control over an article of stolen pr operty wh en an accidental or unintentional killing occurs, that defendant can be c onvict ed of felony murder even if the property was initially stolen twenty years before the accidental or unintentional killing. 6

We disagree and conclude that in determining whether the evidence is sufficient

to support
a conviction of fir

st degree murder in the perpetration of theft, a court must determine whether the killing is closely connec ted to the initial taking of the property in time, place, causation, and continuity of action. See Lester , 737 So. 2d at 1151 (holding that the felony murder rule does not applywhen the defend

ant, fleeing from police in a vehicle stolen byanother person, collided with another car, killing the dr

iver); Allen , 690 So.2d at 1334 (holding that the felony murder rule does notapply when the de

fendant, while dr

iving a sto len vehic le, was involved in a car accident that resultedin the other motorist’s de ath); Doane v. Commonwe alth , 237 S.E.2d 797, 798 (Va. 1977) (holding that the felony mur der rule does not a

pply where the defe

ndant stole

a car one day and the next day hadan automobile accident in the stolen vehicle which resulted in the death of one of the passengers in the stolen vehic le); Montague v. Commonw ealth , 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply to a killing that resulted when the defendant,

in a vehicle he had stolen the previous day, fled from police who had attempted to stop him for making a U-turn and st ruck another ve

hicle); cf. State v. Owens , __ S.W.2d __ (Tenn. 2000)(holding that robbery is committed only if the use of violence o

r fear preced

es or is contemporaneous with the taking of proper ty). This rule applies even in cases, such as this one, where the defendant is charged with theft for exercising control over the stolen property.7 Interestingly enough, the Model Penal Code, from which much of the 1989 Act was derived, does not list either larceny or theft as one of the felonies that will support a conviction of first degree murder. See Model Penal Code § 210.2 (1998).

8 Our holding relates only to application of the felony murder rule. It does not narrow the definition of theft for

purposes of prosecution of that offense nor does it change the analysis courts should apply when determining whether t hef t is a continuing offense for purposes of jurisdiction.


### -8- We notethat prior

to 1989, larceny, not theft, was listed in the first degree murder statute as one of the felony offenses that would support a conviction for felony murder. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-202 (1982) (repealed 1989). At that time, larceny was defined as “t he feloni ous taking and carrying away the personal goods of another” and therefore required both a “taking and c arrying away” of the property. T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 3-1101 (1982) (r epealed 1989). T

herefore, in determining whether the evidence was suffi cient to support a conviction of murder in the perpetrationof larceny, courts had t o considerwhether the killing was temporally, spatially, and causally connected to initial taking of the property. See, e.g., State v. Terry , 813 S.W.2d 420, 423- 24 (Tenn. 1991) (discussing the temporal, spatial, and causal connection in the context of the felony murder aggravating circumstance). When the General Assembly enacted the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act in 1989, however, thevarious larceny-related criminal offenses were consolidat

ed into
a single offense

of theft of property in order to eliminate “the antiquated and confusing distinctions among various larceny-related crimes .” State v. Byrd , 968 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (Tenn. 1998). As previously

noted, under

the statute enacted in 1989, “[a] person commits theft of property if, w

ith intentto deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. After consolidating the various larceny related offenses into a single offense of theft, the General Assembly deleted the word“larceny” from offenses listed in the first degree murder statute that would s

upport a conviction for felony murder and substituted in its place the word “theft.” While th e General Assem

bly clearly intende d to broadly define the offense of th

eft under the 198

9 Act, there is no in

dicati on that b y merely substituting the word “theft” for “larce ny” in th e felony murder statute, the General Assembly also intended to broadly extend the fe lony murder rule to killings that are completely unconnected to the initial taking of the property. 7

In the absence of an explicit legislative declaration, we decline to apply the broad definition of theft in the manner

suggested by the State because such a holding would extend the felony murder ruleto killings that are not connected in time, place, causation, and continuity of action to the initial taking of property. Indeed, such an extension would be illogical in light of the fact that “[o]ne of the original purposes

of the felony-mur

der rule was to de

ter the commission o

f certain felon

ies in
a dangerous or violent way.” Buggs , 995 S.W.2d at 207 (internal citations and quotations omitted). If the rule is to have any deterrent effect, it must not be extended to killings which are collateral to and separate from the unde rlying felon y. Moreover, requiring a close nexus between the initial taking and the killing is pa rticularly appro

priate given that

the felony murder

ruleis “a legal fiction in which the in

tent and the malice to commit the underlying felony is ‘transferred’ to elevate an unintentional killing to first-degree murder. . . . .” Buggs , 995 S.W.2d at 107. 89 The killing was most causally connected to the offense of evading arrest which is not listed as one of the felonies that will support a conviction of first degree murder.


### -9- Conclusion Applying our holding to the facts in this case, we conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to support the defen

dant’s conviction

of felony murder

. Cl ea rly, the killing in this case was not closely connected in time or place to the taking of the vehicle. The State has never claimed that the appellant initially took the ve

hicle. Indeed, th

ere is no question that Sarah Comach o actually stole the vehicle more than twenty days prior to the fatal collision from a location more than six hundred miles away from the site of the collision that resulted in

Deputy Mullins’ death. According to the proof in the record, the

appellant and Wo

rley were comple

tely unaware that Sar

ah intended to

take the vehicle without her

p arents’ consent

. In addition, ther

e was a break in t

he chain of even

ts betweenthe initial taking and the killing. As previously stated, one of the most important factors in determining wheth

er there has bee

n a break in the c

hain of events

is whether

or not the felon has reached a place of temporary safety. In this case, the appellant reached a place of temporary safe

ty when he arrived and resided in the Bristol, Virginia area for twenty days prior to the killing. Th e appellant was not being acti

vely and contin

uously pursued by police during this time, nor was he attempting to hide from the police. Indeed, he, along with Worley and Sarah, were daily driving the stolen vehicle to various cities in Tennessee. Clearly, they had reached a place of safety before the killing occurred. While there was an attenuated causal connection between the initial taking of the vehicle and the k illin g since the appell ant was attempting

to evade arrest

for theft of the v

ehicle when the collision occurred, 9 this tenuous causal connection was insufficient in light of the fact that the killi ng was completely unconnected to the initial taking of the vehicle in time, place, and continuity

of action. After

considering the e

vidence in light of the re levant factors, we are constrained

to conclude that

the evi dence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of felony murder. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The appellant’s conviction of felony murder is vacated, and the case is remanded for a

new trial. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee.