[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-961.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-961

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CORNER.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, Slip Opinion No. 

2020-Ohio-961.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Oneyear suspension, fully stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2019-0215—Submitted December 10, 2019—Decided March 18, 2020.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2017-063. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Beverly J. Corner, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0042725, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989. 

{¶ 2} In February 2016, we suspended Corner’s license for two years, with 

the second year stayed on conditions, for misappropriating client funds, lying to a 

client, misusing her client trust account, failing to competently and diligently 
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represent a client, and other misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, 145 Ohio 

St.3d 192, 2016-Ohio-359, 47 N.E.3d 847. Although Corner could have applied 

for reinstatement in February 2017, she did not do so until August 2017. In October 

2017, we denied her request for reinstatement. Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner,

151 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2017-Ohio-8306, 84 N.E.3d 1045. Although her application 

indicated that she had complied with the continuing-legal-education requirements 

for suspended attorneys, she had in fact fallen far short of completing the requisite 

number of credit hours. 

{¶ 3} On December 4, 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Corner 

in a four-count complaint with committing professional misconduct after we issued 

our February 2016 suspension order. On the same day, Corner filed a second 

application for reinstatement. Gov.Bar R. V(24)(C)(4), however, permits this court 

to reinstate suspended attorneys only if “[n]o formal disciplinary proceedings are 

pending against the respondent.” On December 15, 2017, we denied Corner’s 

second reinstatement application. Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, 151 Ohio St.3d 

1463, 2017-Ohio-9034, 87 N.E.3d 1263. 

{¶ 4} The parties stipulated to some facts and exhibits in the new case, but 

Corner denied that she had violated any ethical rules. After a hearing, a threemember panel of the Board of Professional Conduct found that Corner had engaged 

in the misconduct alleged in count three of relator’s complaint, dismissed the other 

counts, and recommended that Corner serve a one-year conditionally stayed 

suspension, commencing upon reinstatement from her February 2016 suspension. 

The board issued a report adopting the panel’s findings of misconduct and 

recommended sanction. Relator has filed objections to the board’s report, arguing 

that the board should have found that Corner committed the misconduct alleged in 

count two of relator’s complaint and that, regardless, Corner’s actions warrant an 

actual suspension from the practice of law. 
January Term, 2020 

3

{¶ 5} For the reasons explained below, we overrule relator’s objections and 

accept the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 6} Prior to Corner’s February 2016 suspension, her stepmother, Perciline 

Beverly, sought her assistance with the purchase of a parcel of real property from 

Joe McDaniels. Because McDaniels’s deceased wife had an interest in the 

property, he first had to obtain a certificate from the probate court transferring his 

wife’s interest to him. Beverly gave Corner a $75 check dated February 2, 2016, 

which was the amount of the filing fee to obtain the certificate of transfer. 

{¶ 7} The following day, we suspended Corner from the practice of law. 

She nevertheless continued to assist Beverly with filing documents and nonattorney 

tasks relating to the property transfer. For example, in October 2016, Corner 

purchased a $75 money order that was used to pay the probate court filing fee. And 

after the probate court issued the certificate of transfer, Corner filed the certificate 

in the recorder’s office and paid the $28 filing fee with a check provided by Beverly. 

{¶ 8} In November 2016, relator received an unsigned grievance—

purportedly from McDaniels—alleging that Corner had continued to practice law 

after her suspension. Relator requested that Corner respond to the grievance and 

explain, among other things, who had paid the filing fees relating to McDaniels’s 

certificate of transfer. In response, Corner admitted that she had filed the certificate 

at the recorder’s office but denied having paid the filing fee and stated that she was 

unaware who had paid the probate court fee. 

{¶ 9} In a follow-up letter, relator requested that Corner further explain why 

she had filed the certificate of transfer on behalf of McDaniels. Corner did not 

directly answer relator’s question and instead described her work as a part-time 

notary signing agent. Corner stated that in that capacity, she filed documents and 

paid filing fees on behalf of the “entity” that retained her. Relator then requested 

Corner to provide the name of the “entity” that had hired her for McDaniels’s 
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matter, but Corner refused to identify her stepmother as the person who had sought 

her assistance. 

{¶ 10} The board found that by falsely stating that she was unaware who 

had paid the filing fees and that she had been hired by an “entity,” Corner violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement 

of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter). The board also found 

that by refusing to provide Beverly’s name when relator requested the identity of 

the entity who had retained her, Corner violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (prohibiting a 

lawyer from failing to disclose a material fact in response to a demand for 

information from a disciplinary authority). 

{¶ 11} We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct. 

Relator’s objection to the dismissal of count two 

{¶ 12} In the only objection to the board’s misconduct findings, relator 

asserts that the board erred by dismissing count two of relator’s complaint. The 

board’s decision is reviewable, relator argues, because it is “unclear” whether the 

hearing panel unanimously dismissed count two or merely recommended dismissal, 

and this court should construe any ambiguity in the panel’s report against a 

unanimous dismissal. 

{¶ 13} Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G) expressly authorizes a unanimous hearing 

panel to “order on the record or in its report” the dismissal of a count if the panel 

finds that there is insufficient evidence to support it. As an alternative to a 

unanimous dismissal, Gov.Bar R. V(12)(H) provides that a hearing panel may refer 

its findings of fact and recommendations for dismissal to the board for review. 

Here, we find no ambiguity in the panel’s decision dismissing—rather than 

recommending dismissal of—count two. The panel’s report, which was signed by 

all three panel members, indicates that relator failed to establish the alleged rule 

violation by clear and convincing evidence and “as such Count Two is dismissed.” 
January Term, 2020 

5

The panel confirmed this finding later in its report when it noted that “three of the 

counts have been dismissed so we are left with the McDaniels count.” 

{¶ 14} “We have previously held that the unanimous dismissal of a count 

by a hearing panel in a disciplinary hearing precludes further review of the 

dismissal by the full board or this court.” Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez, 147 

Ohio St.3d 329, 2016-Ohio-5586, 65 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 13. Therefore, because the 

hearing panel unanimously dismissed count two for lack of sufficient evidence, we 

are not permitted to consider the merits of relator’s objection. See Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Maciak, 153 Ohio St.3d 185, 2018-Ohio-544, 102 N.E.3d 485, ¶ 20 

(“Review of the dismissed counts, for any reason, is not permitted”). 

Sanction

{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 

imposed in similar cases. 

{¶ 16} As aggravating factors, the board found that Corner has a prior

disciplinary record and that she refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her 

conduct in count three. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (7). In mitigation, the 

board found that Corner did not act with a selfish or dishonest motive. See Gov.Bar 

R. V(13)(C)(2). According to the board, Corner was “very upset” throughout 

relator’s investigation because she could not understand why McDaniels had filed 

a grievance against her. As it turned out, McDaniels had not filed the grievance. 

Instead, the unsigned grievance had been filed by an unknown individual who had 

written McDaniels’s name on the grievance, and relator did not discover that fact 

until several months after commencing the investigation into Corner’s conduct. 

The board noted that although Corner’s conduct during the investigation was 

wrong, considering the circumstances of the fictitious grievance, it was “somewhat 

understandable.” 
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{¶ 17} To support its recommended sanction, the board cited Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Wexler, 139 Ohio St.3d 597, 2014-Ohio-2952, 13 N.E.3d 1168, in which 

we imposed a six-month conditionally stayed suspension on an attorney who made 

false statements during the course of a disciplinary investigation. Like the panel in 

this case, the panel in Wexler had unanimously dismissed all the other charges 

against the attorney relating to a grievance filed against him.

{¶ 18} As it did in Wexler, the board recommends a fully stayed suspension 

in this case. The board recognized that Corner committed the misconduct while 

she was suspended. But the board also noted the paucity of evidence for some of 

relator’s allegations against Corner and that this case has resulted in her being 

suspended for much longer than originally intended by our February 2016 

suspension order. The board therefore concluded that Corner has already been 

punished for her misconduct in this matter and recommends that we impose a oneyear suspension, stayed in its entirety on conditions, commencing upon her 

reinstatement from our February 2016 suspension order. 

{¶ 19} Relator objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing that 

because this is Corner’s second disciplinary case—and second case involving 

dishonest conduct—an actual suspension is warranted. Relator also takes issue 

with the board’s comments that Corner’s dishonesty was “somewhat 

understandable” and that she has already been “punished” based on the length of 

her February 2016 suspension. According to relator, it was irrelevant who had filed 

the grievance because relator had the authority to investigate anonymous 

grievances, and relator believes that accepting the board’s position would set a 

dangerous precedent by giving attorneys “carte blanche permission” to provide 

false information in a disciplinary investigation “simply because they believe the 

allegations are meritless.” Relator also asserts that any delay in Corner’s 

reinstatement was her own fault. 
January Term, 2020 

7

{¶ 20} Relator is correct that a disciplinary authority may investigate an 

anonymous grievance or “any matter * * * that comes to its attention.” Gov.Bar R. 

V(9)(C)(1); see also Disciplinary Counsel v. Kramer, 149 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-

Ohio-5734, 75 N.E.3d 1174, ¶ 34. The board’s concern here, however, was that 

relator had investigated an unsigned grievance without timely reaching out to the 

purported grievant to determine whether he had in fact filed the document. 

Regardless, the board concluded—and we agree—that despite the circumstances of 

the grievance, Corner “had a duty to cooperate, be truthful, and provide material 

information, all of which she did not do.” We interpret the board’s comment that 

Corner’s conduct was “somewhat understandable” as providing context for her 

motive in light of the unusual circumstances in this case—not as establishing 

precedent condoning her false statements in connection with the disciplinary 

investigation. As the board found, there was no excuse for Corner’s dishonest 

conduct and she had a duty “to cooperate with the investigation regardless of how 

it was instigated.” 

{¶ 21} Relator is also correct that some of the delay in Corner’s 

reinstatement is attributable to her own conduct. The fact remains, however, that 

she has been suspended for over four years for what was supposed to be, at most, a 

two-year suspension, and the charges pending in this case have prevented her 

reinstatement. We have consistently recognized that “the goal of disciplinary 

proceedings is not to punish the errant lawyer, but to protect the public.” Toledo 

Bar Assn. v. Hales, 120 Ohio St.3d 340, 2008-Ohio-6201, 899 N.E.2d 130, ¶ 21. 

And “[w]hile consistency is also a goal, ‘we examine each case individually and 

impose the discipline we believe appropriate based on the unique circumstances of 

each case.’ ” Id., quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Ruffenach, 486 N.W.2d 

387, 390 (Minn.1992). 

{¶ 22} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 144 Ohio St.3d 115, 2015-

Ohio-3729, 41 N.E.3d 384, we imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

had failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation. We noted that because the 

attorney had two prior disciplinary cases in a three-year period, a greater sanction 

might have been warranted. However, because the charges pending against the 

attorney in the third case had prevented him from seeking reinstatement from a oneyear suspension that we had imposed over two years prior, we found a six-month 

suspension to be appropriate. Id. at ¶ 26. 

{¶ 23} We apply the same rationale here. Although we in no way condone 

Corner’s attempts to mislead relator, considering the unique circumstances of this 

case—including that she has now served a four-year suspension under our February 

2016 suspension order—the goals of the disciplinary system are served by 

imposing the stayed suspension recommended by the board. We also agree that the 

stayed suspension shall commence upon Corner’s reinstatement from our February 

2016 suspension order, assuming that she is able to prove that she has complied 

with the reinstatement requirements imposed by that order. We therefore overrule 

relator’s objection and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. See Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Derryberry, 152 Ohio St.3d 41, 2017-Ohio-8767, 92 N.E.3d 844 

(imposing a one-year conditionally stayed suspension on an attorney who—in his 

second disciplinary case involving dishonest conduct—made false statements 

during the disciplinary investigation and failed to reasonably communicate with a 

client). 

Conclusion 

{¶ 24} For the reasons explained above, Beverly J. Corner is hereby 

suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, with the entire suspension 

stayed on the conditions that she achieve a passing score on the Multistate 

Professional Responsibility Examination and engage in no further misconduct. If 

Corner violates either condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and she will serve 

the entire one-year suspension. Corner’s stayed suspension shall commence upon 
January Term, 2020 

9

her reinstatement from our February 3, 2016 suspension order. Costs are taxed to 

Corner. 

Judgment accordingly. 

FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER, J. 

FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. 

_________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 

{¶ 25} Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a fully stayed 

one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case, I dissent. 

{¶ 26} The majority correctly agrees with the Board of Professional 

Conduct’s findings that respondent, Beverly J. Corner, violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) 

by lying in connection with a disciplinary matter and violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) 

by failing to disclose a material fact in the disciplinary process. But the majority 

sends mixed signals to members of the public and the legal profession by failing to 

impose an actual suspension while agreeing with the board that “there was no 

excuse for Corner’s dishonest conduct and she had a duty ‘to cooperate with the 

investigation regardless of how it was instigated.’ ” Majority opinion at ¶ 20, 

quoting the board’s report. Additionally, although the majority acknowledges that 

“some of the delay in Corner’s reinstatement is attributable to her own conduct,” it 

incorrectly finds that the delay warrants a lesser sanction. Id. at ¶ 21. 

{¶ 27} The only factor the board found in mitigation here—that Corner did 

not act with a selfish or dishonest motive—is not supported by the record. In my 

view, the facts of this case clearly demonstrate that Corner’s misconduct was borne 

out of a selfish and dishonest motive. At the time of the violations in this case, 

Corner was already serving a prior suspension for dishonest conduct. By deceiving 

relator, disciplinary counsel, and withholding information during the disciplinary 
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investigation that Corner had a duty to disclose, she clearly was protecting herself 

from further discipline. 

{¶ 28} The board and the majority mistakenly rely on Disciplinary Counsel 

v. Wexler, 139 Ohio St.3d 597, 2014-Ohio-2952, 13 N.E.3d 1168, to support their 

conclusions that a fully stayed suspension is appropriate here. Unlike the 

respondent in Wexler, there is no evidence in the record that Corner made efforts in 

the disciplinary proceedings to acknowledge her dishonesty and correct her 

misconduct through full disclosure. Instead, Corner made an issue of the identity 

of the grievant which, as the majority correctly acknowledges, is entirely irrelevant 

to whether an attorney must cooperate during a disciplinary proceeding. 

Additionally, in Wexler, the board found in mitigation that Wexler had not had a 

prior disciplinary record and that he had presented evidence of his good character 

and reputation. Id. at ¶ 14. Neither of these factors are present here. For these

reasons, Wexler is distinguishable. 

{¶ 29} I agree with the majority and relator that Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Bunstine, 144 Ohio St.3d 115, 2015-Ohio-3729, 41 N.E.3d 384, is more instructive 

here, but not for the reasons cited by the majority. In Bunstine, this court found 

that a six-month actual suspension was the proper sanction for an attorney who had 

failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process and, like Corner, had a prior 

disciplinary record and refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing. Id. at ¶ 26. 

Notably, Bunstine’s misconduct was the failure to cooperate with the disciplinary 

process in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b). Id. at ¶ 25. Corner also violated that 

provision, but she additionally violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) by making a false 

statement in connection with her disciplinary investigation. Thus, I would find that 

this additional violation warrants a longer suspension than the six-month 

suspension imposed in Bunstine. 

{¶ 30} The board and the majority also have lost their way by relying on 

Bunstine for the proposition that the time that has elapsed since Corner’s February 
January Term, 2020 

11 

2016 suspension supports the imposition of a fully stayed suspension here. In 

Bunstine, additional charges of professional misconduct that we rejected prevented 

the attorney from seeking reinstatement from a prior suspension when he otherwise 

would have been eligible. Here, however, Corner was eligible for reinstatement 

from her February 2016 suspension in February 2017. But Corner chose to wait 

until August 2017 to first seek reinstatement. During this time, no disciplinary 

charges were pending. This court expeditiously grants reinstatement as long as the 

suspended attorney has complied with the conditions for reinstatement set forth in 

Gov.Bar R. V(24), which includes the completion of the continuing-legal-education 

requirements set forth in Gov.Bar R. X. See Gov.Bar R. V(24)(C)(3). Corner’s 

attempt at reinstatement failed because she had been dishonest regarding her 

completion of the continuing-legal-education requirements. Thus, Corner’s delay 

and dishonesty prevented her reinstatement. 

{¶ 31} Corner had almost a year to seek reinstatement before relator filed 

the disciplinary complaint in this case in December 2017. Contrary to the 

majority’s view, I would find that the circumstances surrounding Corner’s failed 

reinstatement attempt weigh in favor of additional protection for the public, not 

less. And I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Corner has essentially 

served a “four-year suspension under our February 2016 suspension order” and that 

the goals of the disciplinary system are served by a stayed suspension. Majority 

opinion at ¶ 23. Any additional time that Corner served under her prior suspension 

can be attributed only to her own actions. 

{¶ 32} For these reasons, I would impose a two-year suspension, with one 

year stayed on the condition that Corner engage in no further misconduct. 

Additionally, I would not award Corner any credit for the time that she served under 

her prior suspension. 

FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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FISCHER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 33} I join the first dissenting opinion. I write separately to explain why 

this court should review the board’s dismissal of count two. 

{¶ 34} The majority opinion does not consider the merits of relator’s 

objection to the Board of Professional Conduct’s dismissal of count two. Its basis 

for doing so is that the hearing panel “unanimously dismissed” count two for lack 

of sufficient evidence. Majority opinion at ¶ 14. The majority opinion is not 

correct. 

{¶ 35} As I have explained in a prior case, when a hearing panel 

unanimously dismisses counts pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G), the dismissal 

order is effectively insulated from any type of review. Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Mancino, 154 Ohio St.3d 49, 2018-Ohio-3017, 110 N.E.3d 1265, ¶ 15 (Fischer, J., 

concurring). Thus, as the majority opinion recognizes, in order for a panel’s 

dismissal to have this preclusive effect, the panel’s dismissal must be unanimous. 

{¶ 36} I disagree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the

panel’s dismissal of count two was unanimous. The board’s report states that “the 

panel feels Relator failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the 

Respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.4 and Count Two is dismissed.” This language 

does not specify that the panel’s dismissal was unanimous and is in direct contrast 

to the portion of the board’s report addressing count four: “Relator submits that 

Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Virginia and as such 

violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a), but the panel unanimously finds no clear and 

convincing evidence to support that position and dismisses this alleged violation.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 37} The board’s use of the word “unanimously” in relation to the 

dismissal of count four indicates that when the panel acted unanimously, the board 

specifically said so. Because the board used neither “unanimous” nor 

“unanimously” in relation to the dismissal of count two, the board’s report is 
January Term, 2020 

13 

ambiguous regarding whether the dismissal of count two was unanimous. I would 

resolve this ambiguity in favor of preserving this court’s ability to oversee the 

practice of law in Ohio and review the dismissal of count two. 

{¶ 38} Because the board’s report is ambiguous regarding whether the panel 

dismissed count two unanimously, and because I would resolve that ambiguity in 

favor of this court being able to review the dismissal, I would have this court 

proceed to consider the merits of relator’s objection. . 

{¶ 39} Pursuant to the stipulated facts in this case, respondent, Beverly J. 

Corner, conceded that pursuant to an order of this court, before she entered into an 

employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, 

she had been required to verify that the attorney or law firm had complied with the 

registration requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(C). She further stipulated that she 

had entered into an independent-contractor relationship with an attorney without 

first complying with this requirement. In fact, she conceded that she had registered 

this independent-contractor relationship only after she had finished working with 

the attorney and only after relator inquired as to why she had failed to comply with 

the requirement. 

{¶ 40} Corner’s failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a 

violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(c) (prohibiting an attorney from disobeying an 

obligation under the rules of a tribunal). This violation provides further support for 

imposing a two-year suspension with one year of that suspension stayed on 

conditions. I accordingly join the first dissenting opinion. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Law Office of Philip A. King, L.L.C., and Philip A. King, for respondent. 

_________________