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TSA PROCUREMENT REFORM: SAVING TAXPAYER 

DOLLARS THROUGH SMARTER SPENDING 

PRACTICES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 8, 2013 

Serial No. 113–15 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

GREG HILL, Chief of Staff 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana, Ranking 

Member 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

AMANDA PARIKH, Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Statement of Karen Shelton Waters, Assistant Administrator, Office of Acquisition, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 9 

Mr. Paul Benda, Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science & 

Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 9 

Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Services, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Richard Hudson for Karen Shelton Waters ............. 45 

Questions From Chairman Richard Hudson for Paul Benda ............................... 46 

(1) 

TSA PROCUREMENT REFORM: SAVING TAXPAYER DOLLARS THROUGH SMARTER 

SPENDING PRACTICES 

Wednesday, May 8, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hudson, Barletta, Brooks, Richmond, 

and Thompson. 

Mr. HUDSON. Our Ranking Member is on the way. I have been 

signaled by staff to go ahead and get going. So the Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security will 

come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on TSA procurement reform. I now recognize myself for an 

opening statement. 

First, I would like to thank our witnesses for participating in this 

hearing. We sincerely appreciate your time and look forward to 

hearing your testimony. 

Our purpose today is to examine TSA procurement practices and 

identify ways this $7 billion agency can save taxpayer money and 

provide better security. Ultimately, these two goals are not mutually exclusive, but rather are dependent upon one another. Every 

dollar that can be saved from wasteful and duplicative programs, 

reforming broken processes, and increasing transparency can eventually be used to better protect passengers and confront emerging 

threats. 

TSA’s Office of Acquisition has the lead on planning, awarding, 

and managing the acquisition programs at TSA. Like other components of the Department of Homeland Security, TSA categorizes its 

programs based on life-cycle costs. Any program with a life-cycle 

cost over $300 million, such as the passenger screening program, 

requires final approval by DHS. 

We are pleased to have the head of TSA acquisitions with us to 

discuss in detail how her office performs its critical functions. Specifically, the office’s coordination with DHS procurement officials, 

partnership with the Science and Technology Directorate, engagement with the private sector, and due diligence in ensuring TSA 

makes wise investments. 
2 

While some progress has been made in the last few years, shortfalls in major technology purposes like advanced imaging technology, or AIT, make it clear that TSA still has a long way to go. 

Now, we recognize that TSA has a very difficult job, and we want 

to work with you as we move forward in this process. We understand that TSA is constantly trying to respond to new threats, but 

in some cases the pressures to perform and develop new technologies can lead to a reactive approach without sufficient planning. Having a long-term plan that leverages experts within Government and industry can help prevent capability gaps. 

In 2009, the Government Accountability Office reported that TSA 

had not completed a cost-benefit analysis to prioritize and fund airport screening technology investments such as AIT. That was nearly 4 years ago, and to my knowledge no such comprehensive costbenefit analysis has been completed. In 2012, GAO reported that 

TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring 

AIT. That resulted in DHS approving AIT deployment without full 

knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications for the technology. 

DHS also approved AIT deployment on the basis of laboratorybased testing results and initial field testing results, but testing 

wasn’t actually completed until later that year. TSA procured AIT 

without DHS’ full knowledge of how TSA would test and evaluate 

AIT. 

While some improvements have been made, we simply cannot afford to repeat these types of mistakes. I look forward to receiving 

an update from GAO today on the status of its findings and recommendations on AIT and other investments. 

Taking a step back from procurement, it is also important to recognize the role of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in 

testing and evaluation processes for new technologies. Despite 

S&T’s best efforts to assist TSA, it is unclear whether S&T actually 

has enough authority to make significant difference in whether 

TSA technology expenditures succeed or fail. I am eager to hear directly from S&T today on how the Directorate’s role in the technology acquisitions process can be strengthened and improved. 

To the greatest extent possible I believe more transparency and 

accountability should be included in the TSA procurement process. 

The work of the GAO and DHS Office of Inspector General are critical in that regard, and we look forward to their insights here 

today. 

With our witnesses I hope we can identify steps to strengthen 

oversight and accountability of the key transportation security programs. The bottom line is TSA’s procurement decisions impact millions of American taxpayers whether they fly or not. It is incumbent upon us to make sure taxpayer dollars are being used effectively and efficiently. I look forward to discussing ways we can 

work together to do a better of job of ensuring the safety of both 

Americans’ ability to travel and their hard-earned tax dollars. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond 

for any statement he may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Hudson follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD HUDSON

MAY 8, 2013 

First, I would like to thank our witnesses for participating in this hearing. We 

sincerely appreciate your time, and look forward to your testimony. 

Our purpose today is to examine TSA procurement practices and identify ways 

this $7 billion agency can save taxpayer money and provide better security. Ultimately, these two goals are not mutually exclusive, but rather are dependent upon 

one another. Every dollar that can be saved from wasteful and duplicative programs, reforming broken processes, and increasing transparency can eventually be 

used to better protect passengers and confront emerging threats. 

TSA’s Office of Acquisition has the lead on planning, awarding, and managing the 

acquisition program at TSA. Like other components of the Department of Homeland 

Security, TSA categorizes its programs based on life-cycle cost. Any program with 

a life-cycle cost over $300 million, such as the passenger-screening program, requires final approval by DHS. 

We are pleased to have the head of TSA Acquisitions with us to discuss, in detail, 

how her office performs its critical function. Specifically, the Office’s: 

• Coordination with DHS procurement officials, 

• Partnership with the Science and Technology Directorate, 

• Engagement with the private sector, and 

• Due diligence in ensuring TSA makes wise investments. 

While some progress has been made in the last few years, shortfalls in major technology purchases, like Advanced Imaging Technology, AIT, make it clear that TSA 

still has a long way to go. We recognize that TSA is constantly trying to respond 

to new threats, but in some cases the pressures to perform and deploy new technologies can lead to a reactive approach without sufficient planning. Having a longterm plan that leverages experts within Government and industry can help to prevent capability gaps. 

In 2009, the Government Accountability Office reported that TSA had not completed a cost-benefit analysis to prioritize and fund airport screening technology investments, such as AIT. That was nearly 4 years ago, and to my knowledge no such 

comprehensive cost-benefit analysis has been completed. 

In 2012, GAO reported that TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies 

when acquiring AIT. That resulted in DHS approving AIT deployment without full 

knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications for the technology. DHS also approved AIT 

deployment on the basis of laboratory-based testing results and initial field-testing 

results, but testing wasn’t actually completed until later that year. TSA procured 

AIT without DHS’ full knowledge of how TSA would test and evaluate AIT. 

While some improvements have been made, we simply cannot afford to repeat 

these types of mistakes. I look forward to receiving an update from GAO today on 

the status of its findings and recommendations on AIT and other investments. 

Taking a step back from procurement, it’s also important to recognize the role of 

the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in the testing and evaluation process 

for new technologies. Despite S&T’s best efforts to assist TSA, it’s unclear whether 

S&T actually has enough authority to make a significant difference in whether TSA 

technology expenditures succeed or fail. I am eager to hear directly from S&T today, 

on how the Directorate’s role in the technology acquisitions process can be strengthened and improved. 

To the greatest extent possible, I believe more transparency and accountability 

should be included in the TSA procurement process. The work of the GAO and DHS 

Office of Inspector General are critical in that regard, and we look forward to their 

insights here today. With our witnesses, I hope we can identify steps to strengthen 

oversight and accountability of the key transportation security programs. 

The bottom line is TSA’s procurement decisions impact millions of American taxpayers, whether they fly or not. It is incumbent upon us to make sure taxpayer dollars are being used effectively and efficiently. I look forward to discussing ways we 

can work together to do a better job of ensuring the safety of both Americans’ ability 

to travel and their hard-earned tax dollars. 

With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for his opening statement. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon to the witnesses, and thank you all for being here 

today to testify. I appreciate your work to advance TSA’s procure-
4 

ment system and their willingness to have an open dialogue on the 

contracting challenges facing TSA. 

After 9/11 TSA was established to implement risk-based security 

policies that address vulnerabilities and threats to our transportation system. To carry out its mandate TSA must not only procure 

the right goods and services from reliable vendors, but it must have 

personnel on hand who have the knowledge and training to adequately review purchases. 

Unfortunately, TSA has not always purchased the right goods or 

had the technical expertise to evaluate potential purchases. A 

prime example of the failure to link technical expertise with successful contracting outcomes was the purchases by TSA of puffer 

machines. The Department spent about $36 million developing, 

procuring, and maintaining machines that were supposed to detect 

explosives. While they worked in the lab they failed in the real 

world. After the machines failed, TSA had to spend nearly $1 million to remove them from airports. The puffer machines have become a legendary example of a broken process. 

Since the puffer machines incident Congress required TSA to 

change its procurement system. When first established, TSA used 

a Department of Transportation procurement process. However, 

this process prohibited greater opportunities for small businesses, 

diluted transparency, and allowed for a lack of accountability 

across the acquisition process. Congress required TSA to operate 

under the FAR system commonly used in most Federal Government agencies. Under the FAR, TSA was required to contract with 

small and disadvantaged businesses. 

In fiscal year 2012 TSA spent $2.39 billion contracting for goods 

and services. I look forward to hearing from TSA about why it has 

only been able to spend about 16 percent of its contracting dollars 

with small and disadvantaged businesses, well short of its goal of 

23 percent. This is especially concerning when TSA has one of the 

lowest small business contracting goals in all of DHS. 

Today we also need to evaluate the progress TSA has made in 

training its acquisition workforce to make procurement more efficient. 

On a final point, I look forward to hearing from the Inspector 

General about the work he has done on the improvements made 

and the challenges that remain in the TSA acquisition process. 

Again, I want to thank all of the witnesses who are here today, 

and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back. 

[The statement of Mr. Richmond follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER CEDRIC L. RICHMOND

MAY 8, 2013 

I want to first thank the witnesses here today. I appreciate their work to advance 

TSA’s procurement system and their willingness to have an open dialogue on the 

contacting challenges facing TSA. 

After 9/11, TSA was established to implement risk-based security policies that address vulnerabilities and threats to our transportation system. 

To carry out its mandate, TSA must not only procure the right goods and services 

from reliable vendors, but it must have personnel on hand who have the knowledge 

and training to adequately review purchases. 
5 

Unfortunately, TSA has not always purchased the right goods or had the technical 

expertise to evaluate potential purchases. 

A prime example of the failure to link technical expertise with successful contracting outcomes was the purchase by TSA of ‘‘puffer machines.’’ The Department 

spent about $36 million dollars developing, procuring, and maintaining machines 

that were supposed to detect explosives. 

While they worked in the lab, they failed in the ‘‘real world.’’ After the machines 

failed, TSA had to spend nearly $1 million to remove them from airports. The puffer 

machines have become a legendary example of a broken process. Since the ‘‘puffer 

machines’’ incident, Congress required TSA to change its procurement system. 

When first established, TSA used a Department of Transportation procurement 

process. However, this process prohibited greater opportunities for small businesses, 

diluted transparency, and allowed for a lack of accountability across the acquisition 

process. 

Congress required TSA to operate under the FAR—a system commonly used in 

most Federal Government agencies. Under the FAR, TSA was required to contract 

with small and disadvantaged businesses. In fiscal year 2012, TSA spent $2.39 billion dollars contracting for goods and services. 

I look forward to hearing from TSA about why it was only able to spend about 

16% of its contracting dollars with small and disadvantaged businesses—well short 

of its goal of 23%. 

This is especially concerning when TSA has one of the lowest small business contracting goals in all of DHS. 

Today, we also need to evaluate the progress TSA has made in training its acquisition workforce to make procurement more efficient. 

On a final point, I look forward to hearing from the Inspector General about the 

work he has done on the improvements made and challenges that remain in the 

TSA acquisitions process. 

Mr. HUDSON. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of 

the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, 

for any statement he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to 

thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

Last year TSA spent $2.39 billion on goods and services. As a 

Member who has conducted extensive oversight of TSA’s procurement practices, as both Chairman and Ranking Member of the full 

committee, I appreciate the Chairman’s desire to take a close look 

at how TSA spends taxpayers’ dollars. Upon its creation in 2001 

TSA was provided wide-ranging spending flexibility in the form of 

an exemption from the Federal Acquisition Regulations, commonly 

referred to as the FAR. TSA was also exempt from major procurement laws such as Competition and Contracting Act and the Small 

Business Act. 

In 2008 Congress acted to end TSA’s exemption from the FAR, 

more closely aligning TSA’s procurement authority with that of the 

rest of the Federal Government. This was done in an effort to level 

the playing field for small businesses and prevent the mismanagement and waste of taxpayer dollars. Unfortunately, 5 years later, 

and despite being bound by the FAR, challenges remain with TSA’s 

procurement activities. As evidenced by the on-going removal of 

$40 million worth of recently purchased AIT machines from the 

field due to privacy and performance concerns, TSA continues to 

spend taxpayer dollars without conducting due diligence. 

With the budgetary constraints we face today it is critical that 

every TSA dollar, every dollar TSA spends, goes toward technologies and service that work and make our transportation system 

more secure. I am interested in hearing how TSA is working with 

small businesses to enhance their opportunities to contract with 
6 

the agency. While I appreciate that TSA has established a Small 

and Disadvantaged Business Office, I am concerned that the agency failed to reach its goal for contracting with small businesses in 

2012. I look forward to hearing Ms. Shelton Waters plan for ensuring this shortfall is not repeated in 2013. Small businesses serve 

as both critical job creators and innovators in our society, and TSA 

should make certain that it takes full advantage of opportunities 

to do business with them. 

During our discussion today, Mr. Chairman, I hope the subcommittee remains mindful of the taxpayer dollars TSA spends on 

services, as well as goods. Based on data provided by TSA over the 

past 5 years, it has cost taxpayers an additional $75 million to 

maintain contract screeners in the Screening Partnership Program 

over what it would have cost to provide security with TSOs. Whatever your thoughts on the use of private versus Federal screeners, 

we cannot afford to pay a premium for comparable services. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 8, 2013 

Last year, TSA spent $2.39 billion on goods and services. As a Member who has 

conducted extensive oversight of TSA’s procurement practices as both Chairman and 

Ranking Member of the full committee, I appreciate the Chairman’s desire to take 

a close look at how TSA spends taxpayer dollars. 

Upon its creation in 2001, TSA was provided wide-ranging spending flexibility in 

the form of an exemption from the Federal Acquisition Regulations, commonly referred to as the FAR. 

TSA was also exempt from major procurement laws such as the Competition in 

Contracting Act and the Small Business Act. 

In 2008, Congress acted to end TSA’s exemption from the FAR, more closely aligning TSA’s procurement authority with that of the rest of the Federal Government. 

This was done in an effort to level the playing field for small businesses and prevent the mismanagement and waste of taxpayer dollars. 

Unfortunately, 5 years later, and despite being bound by the FAR, challenges remain with TSA’s procurement activities. 

As evidenced by the on-going removal of $40 million worth of recently purchased 

AIT machines from the field due to privacy and performance concerns, TSA continues to spend taxpayer dollars without conducting due diligence. 

With the budgetary constraints we face today, it is critical that every dollar TSA 

spends goes toward technologies and services that work and make our transportation systems more secure. 

I am also interested in hearing how TSA is working with small businesses to enhance their opportunities to contract with the agency. 

While I appreciate that TSA has established a Small and Disadvantaged Business 

Office, I am concerned that the agency failed to reach its goal for contracting with 

small businesses in 2012. 

I look forward to hearing Ms. Shelton-Waters plan for ensuring this shortfall is 

not repeated in 2013. 

Small businesses serve as both critical job creators and innovators in our society 

and TSA should make certain that it takes full advantage of opportunities to do 

business with them. 

During our discussion today, Mr. Chairman, I hope the subcommittee remains 

mindful of the taxpayer dollars TSA spends on services as well as goods. 

Based on data provided by TSA, over the past 5 years, it has cost taxpayers an 

additional $75 million to maintain contract screeners in the Screening Partnership 

Program over what it would have cost to provide security with TSOs. 

Whatever your thoughts on the use of private versus Federal screeners, we cannot 

afford to pay a premium for comparable services. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 
7 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before 

us today. First, we have Ms. Karen Shelton Waters, who is the 

Transportation Security Administration’s assistant administrator 

for the Office of Acquisition. Ms. Waters is responsible for the development of the contracting workforce and acquisition policy 

through the review of contract awards, investments, interagency 

agreements, and other transactions. Ms. Waters joined TSA in 

2009. Prior to her role as assistant administrator, she served as 

deputy assistant administrator, chief administrative officer, with 

the Office of Finance and Administration where she provided oversight and management of approximately $300 million in contracts. 

Mr. Paul Benda is the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency at the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Science and Technology Directorate. Mr. Benda is responsible for directing cutting-edge research being done by teams 

of National experts that develop, test, and evaluate new Homeland 

Security technologies and capabilities. These initiatives include the 

Border and Maritime Security Division, the Chemical and Biological Defense Division, the Cybersecurity Division, the Explosives Division, and the Resilient Systems Division. 

Mr. Stephen Lord is the Director of the Forensic Audits and Investigative Services team with the Government Accountability Office, GAO. Mr. Lord oversees a team responsible for high-quality forensic audits and investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse. Prior 

to this position, Mr. Lord served as the director of homeland security and justice issues at GAO, and was responsible for overseeing 

and directing the GAO’s various engagements in the issues related 

to aviation and surface transportation. 

Finally, Mr. Charles Edwards is the deputy inspector general of 

the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Edwards is the head of 

the Office of Inspector General, a role he first attained when 

named acting inspector general in February 2011. Mr. Edwards 

has over 20 years of experience in the Federal Government and has 

held leadership positions at several Federal agencies, including 

TSA, the United States Postal Service’s Office of Inspector General, 

and the United States Postal Service. 

Thank you all for being here. The Chairman recognizes Ms. 

Waters to testify. 

STATEMENT OF KAREN SHELTON WATERS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF ACQUISITION, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. WATERS. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

TSA’s Office of Acquisition, or OA, plays a critical role in supporting TSA’s counterterrorism efforts as the agency works to expand and improve risk-based, intelligence-driven security initiatives across all modes of transportation. OA is responsible for performing three critical functions for the agency. No. 1, manage pro-
8 

grams effectively. No. 2, establish value-added business arrangements. No. 3, ensure contractor performance and delivery. 

The scope of our work is significant. In the first 2 quarters of fiscal year 2013, we reported 1,776 contract actions. The total obligated dollars associated with these actions exceeded $681 million. 

Spending U.S. taxpayer dollars to enhance transportation security demands transparency and accountability. OA is committed to 

developing, implementing, and reporting acquisition metrics that 

support TSA’s mission, as well as testing emerging technology to 

ensure we are deploying the best available technology. This requires close adherence to the acquisition review process, as well as 

strong coordination with DHS director operational test and evaluation, or DOT&E. Working with DOT&E, TSA has developed a robust evaluation capability for screening equipment that encompasses the full range of systems engineering life cycle. Additionally, 

TSA is developing a test and evaluation guide that defines the 

process for vendors, and we are exploring the use of third parties 

to conduct vendor readiness testing to mature systems. Our team 

also works with DHS Science and Technology Directorate, or S&T, 

for improved market research and analysis. 

One example of the role OA plays in supporting TSA’s transformation to a risk-based, intelligence-driven security solution is 

the release earlier this year of a request for information seeking 

input from the contractor community concerning the possible expansion of expedited aviation physical screening initiatives. 

TSA’s goal in conducting this market research is to expand TSA 

PreCheck participation by determining if certain pre-screening 

processes conducted by non-Government entities could enhance 

aviation security. Specifically, we sought white papers that successfully demonstrate sound, well-reasoned concepts that if implemented would identify known travelers pre-screened to a high degree of confidence. 

TSA conducted two well-attended industry days to discuss this 

with stakeholders in January and February of this year. We also 

worked with the outside vendors to determine security equipment 

testing capabilities, hoping to use this data to assist original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs, in developing more mature systems 

prior to entering the formal test and evaluation phase at TSA. This 

market research for a third-party testing concept would allow 

OEMs the opportunity to assess their systems against TSA requirements, enhance and mature their technology readiness, and subsequently reduce the time required to succeed through each phase of 

testing at TSA. 

We believe that supporting and identifying third-party testing capabilities and by providing the available TSA requirements, OEMs 

will submit more mature systems to TSA for qualification testing, 

allowing TSA to meet its acquisition goals with a more streamlined 

process. 

Partnerships and industry engagement are important drivers of 

innovation at TSA. One example of this is our partnership with the 

Washington Homeland Security Roundtable, a nonprofit group 

comprised of companies that actively engage in the homeland security area in policy practices and procurements. Collaborating with 

them via TSA’s Senior Executive Industry Forum provides a way 
9 

to engage in meaningful dialogue between senior industry and TSA 

leadership concerning securing innovation. Earlier this year TSA 

and the WHSR also announced the creation of industry engagement groups and a Contracting Policy Focus Group, both of which 

are designed to strengthen TSA’s ability to provide the most effective and efficient security. Engaging with industry through such efforts helps TSA to achieve this fundamental goal. 

Finally, strategic sourcing and consolidated purchasing have become very important tools at DHS for unifying the acquisition centers at its eight components and also for integrating DHS activities 

and technology into a more comprehensive single enterprise. 

Our Nation continues to face evolving threats to our transportation system. Acquisition management operations and policy play 

a crucial role in helping TSA implement an intelligence-driven, 

risk-based approach to security across all transportation modes. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Waters and Mr. Benda follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAREN SHELTON WATERS AND PAUL BENDA

MAY 8, 2013 

Good afternoon Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about 

the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) acquisition and procurement 

policies and practices. 

The TSA Office of Acquisition’s (OA) mission is to enhance TSA’s capabilities to 

protect the Nation’s transportation systems by providing effective and efficient acquisition and procurement services. OA plays a critical role in supporting TSA’s 

counterterrorism efforts as the agency works to expand and improve our risk-based, 

intelligence-driven security approach across all modes of transportation. We do this 

by managing programs through all phases of the Acquisition Life Cycle to ensure 

that they are planned and executed properly to accomplish outcomes on time and 

within budget. OA also develops procurement instruments that use business strategies that maximize value for the agency. In addition, we provide contract oversight 

while managing our vendor relationships to ensure that TSA gets the intended return on investment for procurement dollars spent. 

To fulfill its security responsibilities for deploying and operating state-of-the-art 

security technology at over 450 airports across the Nation, TSA must be able to rapidly deploy technology to respond to changing threat information, or to have equipment ready to deploy when airport facilities are changed to accommodate the equipment. In the first two quarters of fiscal year 2013, TSA executed a total of 1,776 

contract actions exceeding $681 million in support of all TSA contract requirements. 

To ensure we continue to act as responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars, we are 

developing, implementing, and reporting acquisition metrics that coincide with 

TSA’s mission and vision as well as fully and adequately testing emerging technologies to ensure we are deploying and relying upon the best technologies available 

to protect transportation systems and travelers. 

COLLABORATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)

TSA completes acquisition and procurement measures in close coordination with 

DHS acquisition-related organizations. This includes a robust test and evaluation 

capability that is utilized on screening equipment and encompasses the range of the 

systems’ engineering life cycle from developmental to operational test and evaluation (T&E). The TSA T&E program, which is conducted by the Operational Test 

Agent and approved by DHS through appropriate Test and Evaluation Master 

Plans, provides key insights into capabilities and limitations of all tested systems 

and technologies. Additionally, TSA is developing a test and evaluation guide that 

defines the process for vendors and explores the use of third parties to conduct vendor readiness testing to mature systems. TSA is working with the DHS Science and 
10 

Technology Directorate (S&T) to conduct market research and analysis in this area 

and we anticipate that the guide will be ready for release in the summer. 

DHS uses strategic sourcing initiatives to leverage the purchasing power of the 

entire Department for a variety of items including screening technology. While TSA 

continues to utilize existing DHS strategic sourcing vehicles, we have also been designated the Executive Agent/Contracting Activity for security screening equipment 

that can be utilized by other DHS components. By consolidating the Department’s 

spending into a single vehicle, DHS expects savings in terms of acquisition process 

as well as in actual procurement costs. 

TESTING INNOVATION

TSA believes that by its supporting and identifying third-party testing capabilities 

and by providing the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and potential testers, such as universities and laboratories, with the applicable TSA requirements 

and testing documentation specific to the systems under development, the OEMs 

will submit more mature systems to TSA for qualification testing. In December 

2012, TSA issued a Request for Information (RFI) to solicit input from security 

equipment testing entities regarding their capabilities to perform developmental test 

and evaluation of Transportation Security Equipment (TSE) and to provide this information to OEMs, vendors that originally manufactured the equipment. In an effort to expedite the testing, acquisition, and deployment of qualified systems, TSA 

promotes the establishment of preliminary system development gateways by identifying capable third-party testing facilities. The purpose of creating these gateways 

is to assist OEMs in developing more mature systems prior to entering the formal 

TSA test and evaluation process. This allows OEMs to assess their systems against 

TSA requirements, enhance and mature their technology readiness, and subsequently reduce the time required to proceed through each phase of TSA testing. 

INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT

Partnerships and industry engagement are important drivers of innovation at 

TSA, and OA plays an important role in supporting TSA’s efforts to work with the 

private sector to develop and deploy innovative and effective screening capabilities 

across the Nation’s transportation systems. 

In December 2011, TSA executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 

the Washington Homeland Security Roundtable (WHSR), a non-profit group comprised of companies that are actively engaged in homeland security issues. This 

MOU established a framework for an on-going dialogue between TSA representatives and WHSR members concerning security innovations. In February 2013, TSA 

and WHSR announced the creation of the Industry Engagement Group, which provides private-sector companies and organizations with opportunities to work with 

TSA at an enterprise level. This group will not discuss specific acquisitions or TSA 

programs, but rather focuses on identifying methods and processes by which TSA 

can effectively engage with industry on matters related to acquisition. The WHSR 

has also established a TSA Contracting/Acquisition Policy Focus Group. This group 

gathers participants’ input on policies, regulations, and current practices to drive 

the content and costs of the contracting process so as to increase effectiveness and 

efficiency. 

Additional industry engagement activities include TSA participation in monthly 

discussions with the Security Manufacturers Coalition regarding future programmatic direction, challenges, and interests. This group was created by the security technology manufacturers themselves, and the members must be active vendors 

of DHS security technology. TSA also interacts with the Airport Consultants Council 

(ACC), which is involved in the development and operations of airports and related 

facilities. TSA participates in an annual Technology Day with ACC and receives 

input from the organization regarding TSA processes and planning. 

TSA also recognizes that small businesses are of vital importance to the economic 

strength of the country. Each year, TSA hosts the Small Business Fair, which provides an opportunity for a range of vendors to discuss their products while also 

learning more about TSA’s acquisition requirements. We also contribute to vendor 

outreach events across the country through field office participation. In fiscal year 

2012, TSA obligated $289 million to small businesses in over 2,000 contract actions; 

additionally, TSA exceeded its Small Disadvantaged and Service Disabled VeteranOwned Small Business Goals. 

CONCLUSION

Acquisition operations and policy play a crucial role in helping TSA and DHS S&T 

implement an intelligence-driven, risk-based approach to security across all trans-
11 

portation modes while implementing operational and management efficiencies 

across the organization. As we strive to continue strengthening transportation security and improving, whenever possible, the overall travel experience for all Americans, we must always remember that our success is defined by our people. Whether 

it is for business or for pleasure, the freedom to travel from place to place is fundamental to our way of life, and to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at TSA 

and DHS S&T is fully committed. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. BARLETTA [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Waters. 

The Chairman recognizes Mr. Benda to testify. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL BENDA, DIRECTOR, ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BENDA. Good afternoon, Mr. Barletta, Ranking Member 

Richmond, and Mr. Thompson. I appreciate the opportunity to 

come before you today to discuss the Science and Technology Directorate’s activities in support of TSA. If I could have your forbearance for a couple of minutes I would like to say a few brief introductory words for S&T. S&T supports DHS components and first 

responders across the homeland security enterprise. We focus on 

technology and knowledge development that will make their operations more effective and efficient, we build partnerships across the 

interagency to ensure we leverage everyone else’s R&D, we basically beg, borrow, and steal technology and capabilities where we 

can find it to leverage it against homeland security challenges, we 

provide acquisition support to DHS components by being the technical and scientific core of the Department. 

But I would like to start our conversation here today with a 

question, which is: Why invest in S&T? In this era of austere budgets, where we have trouble fully funding our front-line operations, 

why should we set money aside for S&T? I think there is two reasons behind that. One is an adaptive adversary. As we can see on 

aviation security, we have moved from the Lockerbie bombings, 

which was explosives in checked bags, to armed assaults on 9/11, 

to explosives in printer toner cartridges. 

Another is the inexorable march of commerce. Currently, TSA 

screens 2 million domestic air travel passengers a day. They expect 

a growth of 4 to 5 percent per year of travel, which means in 5 

years you will have 2.5 million passengers transiting through our 

airports, an increase of 500,000 people. With the budgets that we 

have today and expectations that staffing levels will remain flat, 

how do we maintain the throughput and the security that is required to keep commerce and travel safe? We believe that technology can serve that role. 

So the challenge we have is, in this budget environment how can 

we do that? One of the ways we do that is trying to leverage the 

investments made by the Department of Defense, or DOD. We are 

positioning ourselves as the transition partner for DOD’s R&D and 

their technologies. We have examples where we have leveraged a 

$25 million program from DARPA and actually transitioned that 

capability into an operational capability for an explosive detection 

system. We have partnered with SOCOM in developing a classified 

capability for the U.S. Secret Service that has actually reduced the 
12 

cost of that capability development by over 80 percent, saving 

around $8 million. 

We work closely with the intel community and CIA’s In-Q-Tel, 

which is a strategic investment firm. For every dollar S&T invests, 

we get $3 matching from the intelligence community and $9 from 

the private investment community. It is this leveraging of others’ 

investments that S&T brings to TSA’s problems. But the challenge 

we have is making sure that the investments that we make at S&T 

address TSA’s key priorities. To solve that we are working to develop R&D strategies. Basically we have conversations with senior 

leadership of the components at the assistant administrator, assistant secretary level. We ask them to outline what are their key priorities and key challenges. We document that, and in fact we are 

co-writing that R&D strategy as we speak with the chief technical 

officer at TSA, Assistant Administrator Sanders, and we will cosign that strategy. Once that is complete, we map our S&T investments against that strategy so we can ensure every dollar spent on 

S&T is on a need that the components have. 

But the key isn’t only making sure our investments align against 

TSA’s needs, but give an industry insight into where we are going. 

We think it is essential that we provide a road map to industry on 

the challenges the components face and the S&T investments we 

are making to meet those challenges. So every R&D strategy will 

be briefed to industry. In fact, we briefed our first webinar, which 

was a briefing on R&D strategies last week, which was received by 

industry as an unmitigated success. We plan to do that for all of 

our R&D strategies. 

So this partnership with S&T and TSA has never been stronger 

and has begun to bear fruit. In fact, TSA has designated HSARPA 

as their lead for developmental test and evaluation for explosive 

detection devices. This, combined with our statutory role in operational test and evaluation, should create a seamless process for industry and TSA when it comes to testing. 

We have worked with TSA where they now force vendors to provide the raw data from their explosive detection machines, basically breaking up the proprietary stranglehold that those vendors 

had on that data. This is really important because it allows to us 

spur innovation and let small businesses have access to those algorithms. Whereas before had you a single vendor that provided a 

single answer, we can now invite small businesses to see if they 

can come up with better ways to manipulate that data to get a better answer out. 

But perhaps most exciting are the advances we see in new technologies coming down the pike. Working with prestigious universities across the country, we have actually developed the next-generation AIT machine. We hope to have a prototype within the next 

3 years, but basically instead of walking into an AIT and getting 

a single picture, we hope to have a walk-through AIT machine. We 

are going to couple that with investment that industry has made 

on a new type of X-ray technology that will not only get a better 

picture, but actually identify what is in the bag. 

So the vision is within 3 years you will be able to walk up to a 

checkpoint, drop your bag on a conveyor belt, walk through an AIT, 

and pick up your bag. You will not have to take your shoes off, 
13 

your belt off, or empty your pockets. We believe within 3 years we 

will have that prototype. 

This is only possible because of the strong partnership that S&T 

and TSA has made. We believe that this unprecedented partnership that has been built will vastly improve the traveling public’s 

experience and change the face of aviation security as we know it. 

Thank you for your time and attention, and I will be happy to answer any questions you have. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Benda. 

The Chairman recognizes Mr. Lord to testify. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, FORENSIC AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Representative Barletta, Ranking Members Richmond and Thompson. I am really happy to be here today 

to discuss the large body of work we completed on TSA’s acquisitions and related technologies. This is really an important issue as 

these systems represent billions of dollars of life-cycle costs. I think 

if you look at our work very broadly and not get into the weeds of 

any particular port, you will see that we have identified three key 

challenges across our work. 

The first underscores the importance of setting clear requirements at the start of a program. The second issue is the importance of testing technology before you field it. As Representative 

Richmond noted, TSA has had some unfortunate examples in the 

past. Hopefully, those have all been successfully addressed. The 

third issue is delivering systems on time and within budget and 

having a good documentary trail to show that has actually taken 

place. 

In terms of setting requirements, we issued a January 2012 report on the advanced imaging technology system, and we noted in 

the report that the technology met evolving requirements but not 

the original requirements that were approved at the start of the acquisition. We also looked at the way these changes were documented and approved in the Department and we didn’t really see 

a clear rationale or reasons for why these changes took place. It 

just underscores again the importance of having a good set of foundation documents to lay all this out. 

As part of this review we also recommended that TSA develop a 

road map to keep senior management better-informed about where 

the technology was going and what success they were having in 

meeting any new requirements or milestones. 

In terms of the second key issue we have identified—testing—our 

work has clearly shown the importance of testing technology before 

fielding it. Otherwise sometimes you encounter unsuccessful acquisition outcomes. For example, we recently issued a canine report 

which shows that TSA deployed, ramped up their canine program 

while they were in the middle of assessing their operational effectiveness. So, again, you can do that, but it is considered a higherrisk strategy. We thought it was really important that they do this 

for this new type of canine, they are called passenger screening canines. They attempt to detect explosives on a passenger moving 

through the airport terminal in contrast to conventional canines 
14 

which tend to be used in other areas. Hopefully this testing is 

going to allow TSA to determine two important things: Whether 

the passenger screening canines work better than conventional canines, whether they are more effective, and where in the airport 

they work best, in the screening area, in the sterile area, or in the 

public lobby area? 

Our work has also underscored the importance of developing 

good baseline measures of cost, schedule, and performance at the 

start of the program, not while the program is already underway 

or if you have already spent precious taxpayer resources. The good 

news is, in response to the challenges we have identified in our 

past report, TSA has taken several important actions to rectify 

these issues. More broadly at the Department, the Department of 

Homeland Security recognizes they have had some weaknesses in 

this area in adhering to their governance structure and are taking 

some additional steps and developing some new tools to ensure 

more successful acquisition outcomes. 

But if you looked at the Department more broadly, it is clear 

that significant work still remains. DHS major acquisitions continue, they cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than 

planned, and deliver less capability than promised. For example, 

we did a recent report in which we noticed that 16 of 42 DHS acquisition programs experienced cost growth of 166 percent over 3 

years, and that is a pretty big jump. 

In closing, our past work has underscored the importance of 

clearly defining and consistently implementing acquisition policies 

and procedures, and having a capable workforce and most importantly a supportive management culture to allow these procedures 

to be adhered to and the acquisitions to move forward. Doing so 

will help ensure a good outcome and help ensure precious taxpayer 

dollars are spent wisely. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD

MAY 8, 2013 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–13–469T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

TSA acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a range of aviation security programs, including technologies used to screen 

passengers and checked baggage. Within DHS, TSA is responsible for establishing 

requirements for testing and deploying transportation system technologies. Since 

2010, GAO has reported that DHS and TSA faced challenges in managing acquisition efforts, including deploying technologies that did not meet requirements and 

were not appropriately tested and evaluated. 

As requested, this testimony discusses: (1) The extent to which TSA addressed 

challenges relating to developing and meeting program requirements, testing new 

screening technologies, and delivering capabilities within cost and schedule estimates for selected programs, and (2) DHS efforts to strengthen oversight of component acquisition processes. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from 

January 2010 through January 2013, including selected updates conducted in March 

2013 on TSA’s efforts to implement GAO’s prior recommendations and preliminary 
15 

observations from on-going work. To conduct the updates and on-going work, GAO 

analyzed documents, such as the AIT road map, and interviewed TSA officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to help 

strengthen its acquisition processes and oversight. DHS and TSA generally concurred and are taking actions to address them. 

HOMELAND SECURITY.—DHS AND TSA CONTINUE TO FACE CHALLENGES DEVELOPING

AND ACQUIRING SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES

What GAO Found 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken and is taking steps 

to address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, but challenges remain. For example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges developing and meeting key performance requirements for the acquisition of advanced imaging technology (AIT)—i.e., full-body scanners. Specifically, GAO found that TSA did not fully 

follow Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition policies when acquiring 

AIT, which resulted in DHS approving Nation-wide AIT deployment without full 

knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications. DHS required TSA to notify DHS’s Acquisition Review Board (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA’s five key performance 

parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during testing. However, GAO found that the ARB approved TSA for full-scale production without reviewing the changed parameter. DHS officials said that the ARB should have formally reviewed this change to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily. GAO 

recommended that TSA develop a road map that outlines vendors’ progress in meeting all key performance parameters. DHS agreed, and developed a road map to address the recommendation, but faces challenges implementing it—e.g., due to vendor 

delays. Additionally, in January 2013, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges related to testing and deploying passenger screening canine teams. Specifically, GAO 

concluded that TSA began deploying these canine teams to airport terminals in 

April 2011 prior to determining the canine teams’ operational effectiveness. In June 

2012, DHS and TSA began conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate 

canine teams’ effectiveness. Also, TSA began deploying teams before it had completed an assessment to determine where within the airport the canine teams would 

be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that on the basis of DHS assessment 

results, TSA expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of canine teams 

in areas of the airport deemed appropriate. DHS agreed and officials said that as 

of April 2013, TSA had concluded testing in collaboration with DHS of canine teams 

in airport sterile areas—in general, areas of an airport for which access is controlled 

through screening of persons and property—and is testing teams on its own in airport sterile and public areas. 

DHS has some efforts under way to strengthen its oversight of component investment and acquisition processes, but additional actions are needed. In September 

2012, GAO reported that while DHS had initiated efforts to address the Department’s acquisition management challenges, most of DHS’s major acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or 

deliver less capability than promised. GAO identified 42 DHS programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs’ costs increasing 

from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011—an aggregate increase 

of 166 percent. GAO concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remained. GAO recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key program and 

portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition programs fully comply with 

DHS acquisition policy. DHS agreed, and in September 2012 officials stated that it 

was in the process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program management practices. 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work examining the Transportation 

Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to develop and acquire new technologies to 

address homeland security needs. Within the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), TSA is responsible for securing the Nation’s transportation systems. TSA’s 

acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a 

wide range of aviation security missions and investments, including technologies 

used to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. For example, technologies used to screen passengers include advanced imaging technology 

(AIT), commonly referred to as full-body scanners, that screen passengers for metal-
16 

1 Although canines are not considered a technology, they have been included in this testimony 

as one of the layers TSA relies on to screen passengers, baggage, and air cargo for explosives 

odor. 2 An EDS automatically triggers an alarm when objects that exhibit the physical characteristics of explosives are detected. 3See the related GAO products list at the end of this statement. 

4We plan to issue a report with the results from this work in the fall of 2013. AIT systems 

equipped with ATR software display anomalies that could pose a threat using a generic figure 

for all passengers. 5GAO, High-Risk Series: Government-wide 2013 Update and Progress Made by the Department 

of Homeland Security, GAO–13–444T (Washington, DC: Mar. 21, 2013). 

lic and nonmetallic threats such as weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed 

under layers of clothing, and passenger screening canines trained to detect explosives being carried or worn by passengers.1 In addition, technologies used to screen 

checked baggage include explosives detection systems (EDS), which use X-rays with 

computer-aided imaging to automatically measure the physical characteristics of objects in baggage.2 Consistent with its responsibility, TSA establishes requirements 

for testing and deploying these technologies to, for example, screen airline passengers and their property. 

Since 2010, we have reported that DHS and TSA have experienced challenges in 

managing their multi-billion-dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately tested 

and evaluated, and not consistently completing analyses of costs and benefits before 

technologies were deployed for operational use. As requested, my testimony provides 

an update on that work, including: (1) The extent to which TSA has addressed challenges relating to developing and meeting program requirements, testing new 

screening technologies, and delivering capabilities within agreed-upon cost and 

schedule estimates for select programs, and (2) DHS efforts to strengthen its oversight of component investment and acquisition processes. 

This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from January 

2010 through January 2013, including selected updates conducted in March 2013 on 

TSA’s efforts to implement our prior recommendations.3 Specifically, to conduct 

these updates, we obtained information from TSA on the status of the current EDS 

acquisition and upgrades to existing systems, as well as on testing of passenger 

screening canine teams. Our previous reports incorporated information we obtained 

and analyzed from TSA and DHS officials on efforts to manage, test, acquire, deploy, and oversee various technology programs, including program schedules, planning documents, testing reports, and other acquisition documentation. Our previously published products contain additional details on the scope and methodology 

of our reports. 

In addition, this statement includes preliminary observations based on on-going 

work we conducted during the winter of 2013 at your request, assessing the effectiveness of AIT equipped with automated target recognition (ATR) software.4 As 

part of this on-going work, we analyzed documents and interviewed TSA officials on 

the status of AIT development and deployment efforts and milestones. All of our 

work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For new information that was based on work not previously reported, we obtained TSA’s views on our findings and incorporated technical comments where appropriate. 

BACKGROUND

In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming DHS as high-risk because 

DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges— 

into one department.5 Further, failure to effectively address DHS’s management and 

mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. National and economic security. Given the significant effort required to build and integrate a department as 

large and complex as DHS, our initial high-risk designation addressed the Department’s initial transformation and subsequent implementation efforts, to include associated management and programmatic challenges. At that time, we reported that 

the creation of DHS was an enormous undertaking that would take time to achieve, 

and that the successful transformation of large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous reorganizations, could take years to implement. 
17 

6GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO–11–881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 

7, 2011). 7See Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). For purposes of this testimony, ‘‘commercial 

passenger aircraft’’ refers to a U.S.- or foreign-flagged air carrier operating under TSA-approved 

security programs with regularly scheduled passenger operations to or from a U.S. airport. 8See Pub. L. No. 112–95, § 826, 126 Stat. 11, 132–33 (2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)). 9On March 26, 2013, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register 

soliciting public comment on the use of AIT as a primary means for screening passengers. See 

78 Fed. Reg. 18,287 (Mar. 26, 2013). 10GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO–07–388 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 

2007). The mission need statement outlines the specific functional capabilities required to accomplish DHS’s mission and objectives, along with deficiencies and gaps in these capabilities. 

The operational requirements document includes key performance parameters and describes the 

mission, capabilities, and objectives to provide needed capabilities. 

As DHS continued to mature, and as we reported in our assessment of DHS’s 

progress and challenges 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

we found that the Department implemented key homeland security operations and 

achieved important goals in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to 

reach its potential.6 As a result, we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area and 

changed the name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security Management 

Functions. Recognizing DHS’s progress in transformation and mission implementation, our 2011 high-risk update focused on the continued need to strengthen DHS’s 

management functions (acquisition, information technology, financial management, 

and human capital) and integrate those functions within and across the Department, as well as the impact of these challenges on the Department’s ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its missions. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA as the 

Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the Nation’s civil aviation 

system, which includes the screening of all passengers and property transported to, 

from, and within the United States by commercial passenger aircraft.7 In response 

to the December 25, 2009, attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 

253, TSA revised its procurement and deployment strategy for AIT, commonly referred to as full-body scanners, increasing the number of AIT units it planned to 

procure and deploy. TSA stated that AIT provides enhanced security benefits compared with walk-through metal detectors, such as enhanced detection capabilities 

for identifying non-metallic threat objects and liquids. In July 2011, TSA began installing ATR software on deployed AIT systems designed to address privacy concerns by eliminating passenger-specific images. As of May 2013, TSA had deployed 

about 750 AIT systems to more than 200 airports, most of which were equipped 

with ATR software. In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s procurement and deployment of AIT that addressed the extent to which: (1) TSA followed 

DHS acquisition guidance when procuring AIT, and (2) deployed AIT units are effective at detecting threats. Pursuant to the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 

2012, TSA was mandated to ensure that all AIT systems used to screen passengers 

are equipped with and employ ATR software by June 1, 2012.8 Consistent with provisions of the law, TSA subsequently extended this deadline to June 1, 2013.9

TSA HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN DEVELOPING, 

TESTING, AND DELIVERING SELECT SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES

While TSA has taken some steps and is taking additional steps to address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, additional challenges remain. 

Developing and Meeting Key Performance Requirements for TSA Screening Technologies 

As we have reported in the past few years, it is difficult to fully assess program 

performance without establishing valid baseline requirements in key foundation documents at the program start. According to best practices established in prior work 

on major acquisitions, without the development, review, and approval of key acquisition documents, such as the mission need statement and the operational requirements document, agencies are at risk of having poorly-defined requirements that 

can negatively affect program performance and contribute to increased costs.10 Specifically, we have reported in the past few years that TSA has faced challenges in 
18 

11 In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s procurement and deployment of AIT 

at airport checkpoints. 12 AD 102 (effective November 7, 2008) and its associated instruction manual establish the Department’s policies and processes for managing major acquisition programs. DHS generally defines major programs as those expected to cost at least $300 million over their respective life 

cycles, and many are expected to cost more than $1 billion. The ARB, now called the Investment 

Review Board, is the cross-component board within DHS that determines whether a proposed 

acquisition has met the requirements of key phases in the acquisition life-cycle framework and 

is able to proceed to the next phase and eventual full production and deployment. Key performance parameters (KPP) are system characteristics that are considered critical or essential. Failure to meet a KPP could be the basis to reject a system solution. 13DHS’s Under Secretary for Management issued a memorandum on November 7, 2008, requiring compliance with the directive at the program’s next formal decision point, but no later 

than 6 months from the date of the directive (by May 2009). DHS acquisition officials stated 

that enforcing compliance with the new policy took almost 1 year, but that it worked with TSA 

to make the directive’s requirements known. However, DHS’s previous directive—Management 

Directive 1400, which AD 102 superseded—also required component agencies to follow a similar 

process whereby programs were reviewed by DHS’s Investment Review Board. Accordingly, the 

Investment Review Board began reviewing TSA’s AIT program (at that time called the Whole 

Body Imager) as early as 2008. 14GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes, GAO–10–374T 

(Washington, DC: Jan. 20, 2010). 15GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection Requirements for 

Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are Needed, GAO–11–740 (Washington, DC: 

Jul. 11, 2011). 16Details on the number of EDS machines were omitted because TSA deemed them Sensitive 

Security Information, which must be protected from public disclosure pursuant to 49 C.F.R. part 

1520. 

developing and meeting program requirements in some of its aviation security programs. For example: 

AIT.—In January 2012 we concluded that TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications.11 Specifically, DHS’s 

Acquisition Management Directive 102–01 (AD 102) required TSA to notify DHS’s 

Acquisition Review Board (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA’s five key performance parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during qualification testing.12 Senior TSA officials acknowledged that TSA did not comply with 

the directive’s requirements, but stated that TSA still reached a ‘‘good decision’’ in 

procuring AIT and that the ARB was fully informed of the program’s changes to its 

key performance parameters. Further, TSA officials stated that the program was not 

bound by AD 102 because it was a new acquisition process and they believed that 

the ARB was not fully functioning at the time.13 DHS officials stated that the ARB 

discussed the changed key performance parameter but did not see the documents 

related to the change and determined that TSA must update the program’s key acquisition document, the Acquisition Program Baseline, before TSA could deploy AIT 

systems. However, we concluded that, according to a February 2010 acquisition decision memorandum from DHS, the ARB gave approval to TSA for full-scale production without reviewing the changed key performance parameter. DHS officials stated that the ARB should have formally reviewed changes made to the key performance parameter to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily. According to TSA, 

it should have submitted its revised requirements for approval, but it did not because there was confusion as to whether DHS should be informed of all changes. 

Acquisition best practices state that programs procuring new technologies with fluctuating requirements pose challenges to agencies ensuring that the acquisition fully 

meets program needs.14 DHS acquisition oversight officials agreed that changing 

key requirements is not a best practice for system acquisitions already under way. 

As a result, we found that TSA procured and deployed a technology that met evolving requirements, but not the initial requirements included in its key acquisition requirements document that the agency initially determined were necessary to enhance aviation security. We recommended that TSA develop a road map that specifies development milestones for AIT and have DHS acquisition officials approve the 

road map. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has taken actions to address 

it, which we discuss below. 

EDS.—In July 2011, we found that TSA revised its EDS requirements to better 

address current threats, and had plans to implement these requirements in a 

phased approach.15 However, we found that some number of EDS machines in 

TSA’s checked baggage screening fleet were configured to detect explosives at the 

levels established in 2005 and that the remaining EDS machines are configured to 

detect explosives at levels established in 1998.16 When TSA established the 2005 requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames needed to de-
19 

17GAO, TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized, GAO–13–239 (Washington, DC: Jan. 31, 2013). 18The results were deemed sensitive security information by TSA. DHS S&T has responsibility for coordinating and conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, 

testing, and evaluation activities relevant to DHS components. 19TSA’s conventional explosives detection canines are trained to detect explosives in stationary objects (e.g., baggage and vehicles). 20The sterile area of an airport is the portion in an airport, defined in the airport’s security 

program, that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally 

is controlled through the screening of persons and property. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5. 21GAO–11–740. 

ploy EDS machines that meet the requirements. To help ensure that TSA’s checked 

baggage-screening machines are operating most effectively, we recommended that 

TSA develop a plan to deploy EDSs that meet the most recent explosive detection 

requirements established in 2010 and ensure that new machines, as well as machines already deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in 

those requirements. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has begun taking 

action to address it. Specifically, in April 2012, TSA reported that it had awarded 

contracts to vendors to implement detection upgrades across the currently deployed 

EDS fleet to meet the 2010 requirements. In March 2013, TSA reported that it 

plans to complete upgrading the currently deployed fleet by the end of fiscal year 

2013. However, our recommendation is intended to ensure that EDS machines in 

use at airports meet the most recent detection requirements—both previously deployed units as well as newly-procured machines. Until TSA develops such a plan, 

it will be difficult for the agency to provide reasonable assurance that its upgrade 

approach is feasible or cost-effective. 

Testing New Screening Technologies 

As we have reported in the past few years, TSA has not always resolved problems 

discovered during testing, which has led to costly redesign and rework at a later 

date, as shown in the following examples. We concluded that addressing such problems before moving to the acquisition phase can help agencies better manage costs. 

Specifically: 

Canines.—In January 2013, we found that TSA began deploying passenger screening canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ 

operational effectiveness.17 According to TSA officials, operational assessments did 

not need to be conducted prior to deployment because canines were being used to 

screen passengers by other entities, such as airports in the United Kingdom. In 

June 2012, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA began conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate the effectiveness of passenger 

screening canine teams.18 We recommended that on the basis of the results of 

DHS’s assessments, TSA expand and complete operational assessments of passenger 

screening canine teams, including a comparison with conventional explosives detection canine teams before deploying passenger screening canine teams on a Nationwide basis to determine whether they are an effective method of screening passengers in the U.S. airport environment, particularly since they cost the Federal 

Government more than TSA’s conventional canine teams.19 Additionally, we found 

that TSA began deploying passenger screening canine teams before it had completed 

an assessment to determine where within the airport (i.e., the public, checkpoint, 

or sterile areas) the teams would be most effectively utilized.20 TSA leadership focused on initially deploying passenger screening canine teams to a single location 

within the airport—the sterile area—because it thought it would be the best way 

to foster stakeholders’ acceptance of the teams. However, aviation stakeholders we 

interviewed at the time raised concerns about this deployment strategy, stating that 

passenger screening canine teams would be more effectively utilized in nonsterile 

areas of the airport, such as curbside or in the lobby areas. DHS concurred with 

our recommendation to expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of 

the teams in areas of the airport deemed appropriate. As of April 2013, TSA concluded testing with DHS S&T of passenger screening canine teams in the sterile 

areas of airports, and TSA is still in the process of conducting its own testing of 

the teams in the sterile and public areas of the airports. 

EDS.—In July 2011, we found that TSA experienced challenges related to collecting explosives data needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software.21

These data are also needed by TSA for testing the machines to determine whether 

they meet established requirements prior to their procurement and deployment to 

airports. In the course of collecting data, TSA officials encountered problems associated with safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives, which contributed to delays in providing vendors with the data needed to develop the explo-
20 

22Technologies that successfully pass independent and operational evaluation are added to a 

list of qualified products. 23GAO–07–388. 24GAO–07–388. 25 In February 2012, TSA issued a request for vendors to provide a second generation of AIT 

system, referred to as AIT–2. In September 2012, TSA made contract awards to purchase and 

test AIT–2 systems from three vendors. All AIT–2 systems are required to be equipped with 

ATR, have a smaller footprint than previous systems, and be capable of meeting enhanced detection requirements, among other things. 26 In response to your request, we have initiated a review of AIT that will examine the effectiveness of AIT systems equipped with ATR. 

sives detection software. These delays, in turn resulted in delays to TSA’s planned 

EDS acquisition schedule, which involved implementing the 2010 requirements in 

phases. We recommended that TSA develop a plan to ensure that it has the explosives data needed for each of the planned phases of the 2010 EDS requirements before starting the procurement process for new EDSs or upgrades included in each 

applicable phase. DHS stated that TSA modified its strategy for the EDS’s competitive procurement in July 2010 in response to challenges working with the explosives 

by removing the data collection from the procurement process. In April 2012, TSA 

reported that it had begun using a Qualified Products List for its acquisition of 

EDS, which would separate the need for explosives data from future procurements, 

and would require that EDS be certified to meet detection requirements prior to beginning acquisitions of EDS to meet those requirements.22

Delivering Capabilities Within Schedule and Cost Estimates 

According to best practices established in prior work on major acquisitions, realistic program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and performance 

are important to delivering capabilities within schedule and cost estimates.23 Our 

prior work has found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule can 

provide useful indicators of program health and can be valuable tools for improving 

oversight of individual programs. According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the program baseline is the contract between the program and Departmental oversight officials and must be established at program start to document the program’s expected 

cost, deployment schedule, and technical performance. Best practices guidance 

states that reliable and realistic cost, schedule, and performance estimates help ensure that a program will deliver capabilities on time and within budget.24 However, 

as we have reported in the past few years and on the basis of our preliminary observations from our on-going work, TSA has not always developed accurate baselines 

for establishing cost, schedule, and performance estimates. 

AIT.—In January 2012, we found that TSA did not have clear plans to require 

AIT vendors to meet milestones used during the AIT acquisition. On the basis of 

our findings, we recommended that TSA develop a road map that outlines vendors’ 

progress in meeting all key performance parameters because it is important that 

TSA convey vendors’ progress in meeting those requirements and full costs of the 

technology to decision makers when making deployment and funding decisions. 

While TSA reported that it hoped vendors would be able to gradually improve meeting key performance parameters for AIT over time, we concluded that TSA would 

have more assurance that limited taxpayer resources are used effectively by developing a road map that specifies development milestones for the technology and having DHS acquisition officials approve this road map. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has taken actions to address it. For example, in February 2012, 

TSA developed a road map that specifies development and deployment milestones, 

including the addition of ATR to existing deployed systems, continued development 

of enhanced detection capabilities, and acquisition plans for the next generation of 

AIT systems (AIT–2).25 In July 2012, DHS acquisition officials reviewed the AIT 

road map. However, on the basis of our preliminary observations from our on-going 

work conducted in March 2013, we found that TSA has fallen behind schedule as 

outlined in the AIT road map to install ATR software upgrades to existing deployed 

AIT systems because of one of the vendors’ inability to develop this software in time 

for the installation of ATR software on all units by June 2013. TSA subsequently 

decided to terminate its contract with this vendor and remove all deployed units 

from airports. TSA has also fallen behind schedule as outlined in the AIT road map 

to acquire and test AIT–2 systems because of vendors’ inability to provide required 

documentation verifying that contractual requirements have been met and the units 

are ready to begin testing. Although TSA updated the AIT road map in October 

2012, it subsequently missed some of the key deadlines specified in the updated 

version as well. We currently have on-going work related to this area and we plan 

to report the results in the fall of 2013.26
21 

27GAO–11–740. 28TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program, one of the largest acquisition programs within DHS, certifies and acquires systems used to screen checked baggage at TSA-regulated airports throughout the United States. 29GAO, Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the Majority of 

TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost Estimates, GAO–12–266 (Washington, DC: 

Apr. 27, 2012). 30GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO–09–3SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2 2009). 31We reported that the estimate was partially comprehensive, partially documented, partially 

accurate, and minimally credible when compared against the criteria in our Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide. 32GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to Help 

Meet Mission Needs, GAO–12–833, (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2012). 

EDS.—In July 2011, we found that TSA had established a schedule for the acquisition of EDS machines but it did not fully comply with leading practices, and TSA 

had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet to meet the current explosives 

detection requirements.27 These leading practices state that the success of a largescale system acquisition, such as TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part on having 

a reliable schedule that identifies when the program’s set of work activities and 

milestone events will occur, amongst other things. However, we reported that the 

schedule for the EDS acquisition is not reliable because it does not reflect all 

planned program activities and does not include a time line to deploy EDSs or plans 

to procure EDSs to meet subsequent phases of explosive detection requirements. On 

the basis of our findings, we concluded that developing a reliable schedule would 

help TSA better monitor and oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS concurred with our recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire 

Electronic Baggage Screening Program in accordance with the leading practices we 

identified for preparing a schedule.28 In July 2011, DHS commented that TSA had 

already begun working with key stakeholders to develop and define requirements 

for a schedule and to ensure that the schedule aligns with the best practices we outlined. TSA reported in March 2013 that it plans to have an updated integrated master schedule by September 2013. 

Electronic Baggage Screening Program.—In April 2012, we found that TSA’s 

methods for developing life-cycle cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening 

Program did not fully adhere to best practices for developing these estimates.29 According to best practices, a high-quality, reliable cost estimation process provides a 

sound basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions about resource investments, budgets, assessments of progress, and accountability for results and thus is 

critical to the success of a program.30 We found that TSA’s estimates partially met 

three characteristics and minimally met one characteristic of a reliable cost estimate.31 DHS concurred with our recommendation that TSA ensure that its life-cycle 

cost estimates conform to cost-estimating best practices, and identified efforts under 

way to address it. DHS also acknowledged the importance of producing life-cycle 

cost estimates that are comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible so 

that they can be used to support DHS funding and budget decisions. In April 2013, 

TSA reported it plans to have an updated integrated master schedule and revised 

life-cycle cost estimate by September 2013, which, when completed, will allow it to 

update its cost estimate for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program. 

DHS HAS EFFORTS UNDER WAY TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF COMPONENT

ACQUISITIONS

In part because of the challenges we have highlighted in DHS’s acquisition process, strengthening DHS’s management functions remains on our high-risk list. However, DHS has efforts under way to strengthen its oversight of component acquisition processes. 

We found in September 2012 that while DHS has initiated efforts to address the 

Department’s acquisition management challenges, most of the Department’s major 

acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy 

than planned, or deliver less capability than promised.32 We identified 42 programs 

that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs’ costs 

increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011—an aggregate increase of 166 percent. Moreover, we reported that DHS leadership has authorized and continued to invest in major acquisition programs even though the vast 

majority of those programs lack foundational documents demonstrating the knowledge needed to help manage risks and measure performance. For example, we found 

that DHS leadership—through the Investment Review Board or its predecessor 

body, the ARB—has formally reviewed 49 of the 71 major programs. We found that 
22 

33We surveyed all of DHS’s 77 major acquisition programs from January to March 2012, and 

received a 92 percent response rate. DHS originally identified 82 major acquisition programs 

in the 2011 major acquisition oversight list, but 5 of those programs were subsequently canceled 

in 2011. Seventy-one program managers responded to the survey. 34GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Continued Progress Made Improving and Integrating Management Areas, but More Work Remains, GAO–12–365T (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 

2012). 35GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–13–283 (Washington, DC: Feb. 2013). 

DHS permitted 43 of those programs to proceed with acquisition activities without 

verifying the programs had developed the knowledge in key acquisition documents 

as required by AD 102.33 DHS officials reported that DHS’s culture has emphasized 

the need to rapidly execute missions more than sound acquisition management practice and that DHS could not approve the documents in a timely manner. On the 

basis of our findings, we concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its 

acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remains. We recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key program and 

portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition programs fully comply with 

DHS acquisition policy. DHS concurred with our recommendations and reported 

taking actions to address some of them. For example, in September 2012, DHS stated that it was in the process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program 

management practices to enable DHS to more rapidly respond to programs’ needs 

by facilitating the development, approval, and delivery of more specific guidance for 

programs. 

In March 2012, we found that to enhance the Department’s ability to oversee 

major acquisition programs, DHS realigned the acquisition management functions 

previously performed by two divisions within the Office of Chief Procurement Officer 

to establish the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) in 

October 2011. PARM, which is responsible for program governance and acquisition 

policy, serves as the Management Directorate’s executive office for program execution and works with DHS leadership to assess the health of major acquisitions and 

investments. To help with this effort, PARM is developing a database, known as the 

Decision Support Tool, intended to improve the flow of information from component 

program offices to the Management Directorate to support its oversight and management efforts. However, we reported in March 2012 that DHS executives were not 

confident enough in the data to use the Decision Support Tool to help make acquisition decisions.34 On the basis of our findings, we concluded that DHS had limited 

plans to improve the quality of the data because PARM planned to check the data 

quality only in preparation for key milestone meetings in the acquisition process. 

We reported that this could significantly diminish the Decision Support Tool’s value 

because users cannot confidently identify and take action to address problems meeting cost or schedule goals prior to program review meetings. 

In February 2013, we reported that DHS updated its Integrated Strategy for 

High-Risk Management in June 2012, which includes management initiatives and 

corrective actions to address acquisition management challenges, among other management areas.35 In the June 2012 update, DHS included, for the first time, performance measures and progress ratings for all of the management initiatives. The 

June 2012 update also identified the resources needed to implement most of its corrective actions, although we found that DHS needs to further identify its resource 

needs and communicate and mitigate critical gaps. On the basis of our findings, we 

concluded that the strategy, if implemented and sustained, will provide a path for 

DHS to be removed from our high-risk list. Going forward, DHS needs to continue 

implementing its Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and achieving outcomes including those related to acquisition management. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to determine if the actions and 

outcomes are achieved. 

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the committee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to responding to any questions 

that you may have. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Lord. 

The Chairman recognizes Mr. Edwards to testify. 
23 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, DEPUTY INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good afternoon, Chairman Barletta, Ranking 

Member Richmond, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify 

today about improvements that DHS can make to procurement and 

acquisition practices, specifically to those at Transportation Security Administration. 

DHS continues to face challenges in implementing a fully integrated acquisition process which requires an effective acquisition 

management infrastructure. But let me stress that I believe DHS 

has also made important strides in recent years toward improving 

its acquisition processes. In 2010 DHS implemented Acquisition 

Management Directive MD 102–01, which is the principal policy 

guidance that governs all acquisition programs. 

In 2011 the Department strengthened oversight of acquisition 

programs and created the Office of Program Accountability and 

Risk Management, PARM, which reports directly to the Under Secretary of Management. It then appointed component acquisition executives, CAEs, in all components, including TSA, to work collaboratively with PARM. As for TSA, it has appointed an Assistant Administrator for Acquisition who serves as both the head of the contracting activity and the CAE. 

Our report, ‘‘Transportation Security Administration’s Acquisition of Support Contracts,’’ found TSA did not provide adequate 

management and oversight of acquisition for support services for 

transportation security programs. Contractors were performing inherently Governmental functions, did not follow acquisition guidance, and issued vague statements of work. 

Since its creation TSA has relied on contractors to help accomplish many tasks, including acquisitions. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation, known as the FAR, establishes contract administration as an inherently Governmental function, TSA’s support services contractors performed contract administration in 

three of the 13 contracts we reviewed. One of those three contractors performed the contracting officer’s representative support, also 

known as CORs, for its contract along with reviewing its own invoices. 

We recommended that TSA include a contract review of inherently Governmental functions as part of a contract administration. 

TSA responded by assigning a quality assurance specialist to review every new statement of work for inherently Governmental 

functions. 

Another challenge for TSA identified in our report was the lack 

of dedicated and properly trained CORs. We recommended that 

TSA assigned dedicated, trained, and certified CORs to manage 

and oversee the contract administration function. TSA provided us 

with the necessary training documentation showing it had trained 

and certified CORs. 

Our report, ‘‘Transportation Security Administration Logistics 

Center—Inventory Management,’’ recognized that TSA include its 

accountability of screening equipment at the logistics center. However, we also determined that TSA stowed unusable or obsolete 

equipment, maintained inappropriate safety stock levels, and did 
24 

not develop an effective inventory management process. We made 

two recommendations to TSA that, when implemented, should assist the component with managing inventory in its warehouses. 

TSA concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred 

with the other. 

In March 2010 we issued ‘‘Transportation Security Administration’s Acquisition of Support Service Contracts,’’ which included 

three recommendations to improve TSA’s acquisition process. In 

January 2012, we determined that all responses and corrective actions were sufficient to close our recommendations. 

In conclusion, as the reports I have highlighted illustrate, DHS 

and TSA are taking steps to implement our recommendations to 

strengthen and streamline their procurement and acquisition processes. However they continue to face challenges that will require 

more time and effort to overcome. My office will continue to examine these processes at the Department and its components and to 

make recommendations designed to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, 

and I would be happy to answer any questions that you or other 

Members may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS

MAY 8, 2013 

Good afternoon Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee. 

I am Charles K. Edwards, Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for inviting me to testify today about improvements 

that DHS can make to procurement and acquisition practices, specifically to those 

at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

As you know, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established in January 2003 by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978. DHS OIG seeks to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

in DHS programs and operations and reports directly to both the DHS Secretary 

and Congress. We fulfill our mission primarily by issuing audit, inspection, and investigative reports that include recommendations for corrective action, and by referring criminal cases to the United States Attorney General for prosecution. 

MAJOR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

DHS has made important strides in recent years toward improving its acquisition 

process. Nevertheless, DHS continues to face challenges in implementing a fully integrated acquisition process, which requires an effective acquisition management infrastructure. Acquisition management is a complex process that goes beyond simply 

awarding a contract. It begins with the identification of a mission need and continues with the development of a strategy to fulfill that need while balancing cost, 

schedule, and performance. The process concludes with contract closeout, after satisfactorily meeting the terms. Acquisition management includes managing operational 

and life-cycle requirements—from formulating concepts of operations, developing 

sound business strategies, and exercising prudent financial management to assessing tradeoffs and managing program risks. 

In fiscal year 2011, the Department restructured and strengthened its oversight 

process of all major acquisition programs by creating the Program Accountability 

and Risk Management (PARM) office. PARM reports directly to the under secretary 

for management. It manages and implements Acquisition Management Directive 

(MD) 102–01, serves as the executive secretariat to the Acquisition Review Board 

(ARB) and the Component Acquisition Executive Council, and guides managers of 

major investments through the acquisition governance process. PARM also provides 

independent assessments of major investment programs and works with DHS partners to enhance business intelligence to inform ARB decisions. It monitors programs 

between formal reviews to identify emerging issues that DHS needs to address. Fur-
25 

1The Acquisition Decision Authority may designate his or her responsibilities to other officials. 

ther, the Department developed the Decision Support Tool to aid in monitoring and 

oversight and also created Centers of Excellence to assist in improving performance. 

In December 2011, the Department also issued the Program Management & Execution Playbook (Playbook) to the acquisition workforce. The Playbook is the Department’s vision for strengthening program management and execution capabilities, 

and for maturing the acquisition management system. It addresses several management priorities: • Increasing the expertise and capabilities of the acquisition and program management workforce; • Improving program execution; • Increasing access to expert guidance and best practices; and • Increasing access to reliable and useful program performance data. 

In addition to managing the day-to-day oversight of acquisition programs, PARM 

developed and implemented a business intelligence tool to monitor the operational 

status of each acquisition program. The Decision Support Tool is a web-enabled tool 

that provides DHS leaders, governance boards, and program managers with a central dashboard for assessing and tracking the health of major acquisition projects, 

programs, and portfolios. The tool creates graphs, charts, and other views of key indicators of program health, such as cost, funding, and schedule. The Department’s 

goal is to improve program accountability and to strengthen the ability to make 

sound strategic decisions throughout the life cycle of major acquisitions. 

On October 1, 2011, the Decision Support Tool became the official source of Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) information and data; it is used to provide ARBs with 

standardized information. On February 13, 2012, DHS issued a memorandum to all 

components and programs to ensure that, on a monthly basis, all acquisition program information reported in the Department’s existing data systems is complete, 

accurate, and valid. 

DHS envisions becoming more data-driven, with emphasis on the criticality of 

maintaining quality data within DHS source systems. The Department created the 

Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report (CASR), which provides the status of DHS 

major acquisitions listed in the Department of Homeland Security Major Acquisition 

Oversight List. The new CASR format increases the quality of information and can 

be produced more quickly. As the Department’s business intelligence capability and 

data fidelity efforts continue to mature, the condensed time line will leverage Decision Support Tool automation data to feed the CASR in real time. 

ACQUISITION LIFECYCLE FRAMEWORK

The Department classifies acquisitions into three levels to define the extent and 

scope of required project and program management and the specific official 1 who 

serves as the Acquisition Decision Authority. The Department oversees level 1 and 

level 2 acquisition programs. For level 1 acquisitions, that is acquisitions more than 

or equal to $1 billion, the Acquisition Decision Authority is the deputy secretary. 

For level 2, acquisitions of $300 million to $1 billion, the Acquisition Decision Authority is the chief acquisition officer. Components are responsible for the oversight 

and controls for acquisition programs below the $300 million threshold. 

DHS adopted the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework (ALF) to assure consistent and 

efficient acquisition management, support, review, and approval throughout the Department. The ALF is designed to ensure stable and well-managed types of acquisition. It is designed to ensure that the program manager has the tools, resources, 

and flexibility to execute the acquisition; delivers a product that meets the user’s 

requirements; and complies with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. 

The DHS acquisition life cycle process is structured to operate in a series of acquisition phases, each leading to an ADE. The ALF is a four-phase process that DHS 

uses to determine whether to proceed with an acquisition. The four phases are: 

1. Need—identifying the need to be addressed by the acquisition; 

2. Analyze/Select—analyzing the alternatives to satisfy the need and selecting 

the best option; 

3. Obtain—developing, testing, and evaluating the selected option and determining whether to approve production; 

4. Product/Deploy/Support—producing and deploying the selected option and 

supporting it throughout the operational life cycle. 

Each phase leads to an ADE, a pre-determined point within an acquisition phase 

at which the acquisition will undergo a review prior to commencement of the next 

phase. The review is designed to ensure the alignment of needs to strategic DHS 
26 

direction, along with adequate planning for upcoming phases of the acquisition. 

Prior to every ADE, components are required to submit acquisition documents to the 

ARB for review, including: 

• Mission Needs Statement.—Synopsizes specific functional capabilities required 

to accomplish the Department’s mission and objectives, along with deficiencies 

and gaps in these capabilities. 

• Capability Development Plan.—Defines how critical knowledge to inform decisions will be obtained, defines the objectives, activities, schedule, and resources 

for the next phase. 

• Acquisition Plan.—Provides a top-level strategy for future sustainment and support and a recommendation for the acquisition approach and types of acquisition. 

Each phase ends with a presentation to the ARB, which is the cross-component 

board in the Department composed of senior-level decision makers at either the Department or component level, depending on the total cost estimate of the programs. 

The ARB determines whether a proposed acquisition meets the requirements of key 

phases in the ALF and is able to proceed to the next phase and eventual full production and deployment. 

The Acquisition Review Process is followed to prepare for an ARB and to ensure 

appropriate implementation of the ARB’s decisions. 

ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROLS

DHS implemented an ALF that includes the ARB to support consistent and efficient acquisition management, support, review, and approval throughout the Department. In fiscal year 2011, the Department maintained about 160 acquisition 

programs with estimated life-cycle costs of more than $144 billion. Our report, DHS 

Oversight of Component Acquisition Programs, OIG–11–71, recognized that the Department had made progress in its acquisition oversight process and controls by implementing a revised Acquisition Management Directive, 102–01 (Directive 102–01). 

In January 2010, the Department issued Revision Number 01 of the interim Acquisition Management Directive, 102–01, which prescribed guidance over the Acquisition Review Process, the ALF, and the ARB. It also issued a supplemental Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook, 102–01–001, Version 1.9 (November 7, 2008) to the interim directive that provided detailed instructions on implementing and managing 

acquisitions. Directive 102–01 and guidebook addressed many of the previously 

identified oversight and control problems in acquisition management. The directive 

and guidebook were positive steps, but there are opportunities for improvement. 

The Department needed to refine policies further in some areas and strengthen 

oversight in others. Some components were creating program management offices to 

manage simple procurements, not properly reporting programs in the standard system, or not applying strategic sourcing strategies to support program development. 

Additionally, not all components developed component-level acquisition policies and 

procedures to manage their programs. As a result, some components created unnecessary acquisition programs that potentially increased administrative costs without 

adding value. In addition, the Department did not always know what was in its acquisition portfolio. 

Directive 102–01 establishes the overall policy and structure for acquisition management within the Department, but does not provide a decision-making tool to determine if an acquisition warrants the higher level of internal controls required by 

the ALF. According to the Guidebook’s glossary, an acquisition program is the totality of activities directed at accomplishing a program to acquire, support, or sustain 

capabilities, funded through one or more investments. In contrast, the text of the 

Guidebook defines an acquisition as the conceptualization, initiation, design, development, test, contracting, production, deployment, logistics support, modification, 

and disposal of systems, supplies, or services (including construction) to satisfy DHS’ 

needs. To complicate the definitions further, according to the body of the Guidebook, 

capital assets, enterprise/component-level service contracts, interagency agreements, 

and strategically-sourced acquisitions are to follow Directive 102–01. 

These definitions do not provide clear instruction for determining when an acquisition should become an acquisition program. In attempts to comply with the directive, components have over-classified programs. For example, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is automating many of its manual processes, 

such as student registration, class scheduling, planning and forecasting, and student 

records. The estimated total life-cycle cost of this automation is approximately $30 

million. FLETC personnel contracted out all of the requirements for the program, 

including requirements analysis, development, and maintenance of an automated 

system that used commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and custom software 
27 

2 In 2004, the Department created the Office of Procurement Operations to provide acquisition 

services to components that did not have a procurement office. 

applications. Because the instructions did not provide clear guidance, instead of creating a simple procurement, FLETC created an acquisition program that may have 

unnecessarily increased program management administrative cost. 

We reviewed several acquisition programs that did not clearly fit into the ALF 

process. Ten of the 17 (59 percent) programs we reviewed, with an estimated lifecycle cost of about $5.3 billion, were acquisitions that identified COTS equipment 

or existing contracts to fulfill the needs identified by the program office. Component 

personnel likely could have managed these as simple procurements rather than acquisition programs. For example, TSA classified renovation of an existing warehouse 

building as an acquisition program. It leased the 104,000-square-foot building in 

2003 and renovated approximately 89,000 square feet for about $42 million over the 

initial 10-year leasing period. In 2008, TSA primarily relied on existing contracts 

to complete 12,500 of the remaining 15,000 square feet of the warehouse building. 

According to TSA personnel, the renovation for the additional 12,500 square feet 

cost about $2.5 million and was completed in January 2010. For this small renovation project, TSA personnel could have used simple procurement rules but instead 

increased administrative costs by implementing the more complicated internal control structure prescribed in Directive 102–01. 

Based on the definition of an acquisition program in the Guidebook, this renovation could possibly be an acquisition program. However, based on the processes and 

procedures specified in Directive 102–01’s ALF and Acquisition Review Process, this 

renovation did not clearly meet the intentions of the existing guidance or present 

a high level of risk to warrant the increased costs of being managed as a program. 

Components should not create acquisition programs to acquire products and services under a simple procurement because creation of such programs is outside the 

intent and spirit of Directive 102–01. The Department can reduce some of the conflicts at the component level by developing a decision matrix that the components 

can apply in the pre-planning phases of the purchasing process. 

DEPARTMENT-WIDE MANAGEMENT OF DETECTION EQUIPMENT

Our March 2011 audit report, DHS Department-wide Management of Detection 

Equipment, OIG–11–47, highlighted some of the acquisition challenges facing the 

Department when multiple components have similar requirements or are buying the 

same type of equipment. We identified steps the Department could take to improve 

its acquisition processes. With improved management, DHS could streamline the acquisition process, improve efficiencies, and provide uniform equipment inventory information. DHS has eight different procurement offices that purchase detection 

equipment. Seven of these offices are at the component level, and each has its own 

head of contracting. These components are as follows: 

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

• FLETC, 

• U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 

• Office of Procurement Operations, 2

• TSA, 

• United States Coast Guard, 

• United States Secret Service. 

Components maintain separate inventories for their detection equipment. For fiscal year 2010, the components had a combined inventory of more than $3.2 billion 

worth of detection equipment, most of which was deployed. The components purchased an average of about $387 million worth of detection equipment in each of 

the last 3 years, ranging from about $280 million to $511 million. This equipment 

included metal detectors, explosive detection systems, and radiation detectors (including some personal protective safety equipment) for screening people, baggage, 

and cargo at airports, seaports, and land ports of entry, as well as Federal buildings. 

As of March 1, 2010, TSA’s detection equipment accounted for 66 percent of the Department’s total inventory. 

Our audit work showed that DHS could manage the acquisition of detection 

equipment better by developing processes based on best practices such as strategic 

sourcing. 

Strategic Sourcing 

DHS had established a Strategic Sourcing Program and has applied strategic 

sourcing strategies for many common-use items, such as firearms, ammunition, and 
28 

office supplies; however, the Department was not managing its detection equipment 

through this program. According to DHS officials, components were encouraged but 

not required to use the Strategic Sourcing Program and generally did not coordinate 

and communicate when acquiring detection equipment. There was no process to 

standardize equipment purchases or identify common mission requirements among 

components. For example, the Department’s Joint Requirements Council was inactive, and components did not have the expertise of commodity councils or singleitem managers to rely on when acquiring detection equipment. Further, components 

viewed detection equipment as unique to their missions and did not attempt to identify common mission requirements among other components. This resulted in numerous inefficient purchases by individual components instead of consolidated purchases. 

Standardizing Equipment Purchases 

Some components did not standardize equipment purchases and purchased a variety of different detection equipment models. For example, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had 24 and CBP had 21 different models of small Xray equipment, and CBP and USCIS each had 14 different models of walk-through 

metal detectors. When components have multiple models of equipment to meet similar missions, DHS incurs higher procurement administrative costs and logistic support costs for maintenance, training, and support. In contrast, TSA, which uses and 

maintains the largest inventory of detection equipment in the Department, uses 

only seven different models of small X-ray equipment and three models of walkthrough metal detectors. By limiting the number of models and types of equipment, 

TSA is in a position to increase efficiencies in procurement, maintenance, and personnel flexibilities. 

Common Mission Requirements 

We identified about $170 million worth of small X-ray machines, metal detectors, 

and personal and hand-held radiation detectors that DHS could acquire through 

strategic sourcing strategies. Although multiple components were using similar 

equipment to meet similar screening missions, each component purchased the equipment separately. Components did not coordinate with each other to identify common 

requirements, consolidate purchases to gain buying power, or consolidate logistic 

support requirements. 

DHS Management Directive 1405 established a Joint Requirements Council (JRC) 

as a senior-level requirements review board to identify cross-cutting opportunities 

and common requirements among DHS organizational elements for non-information 

technology investments. The JRC met periodically between fiscal years 2004 and 

2006. Representatives on the JRC reviewed programs and processes for potential 

mission overlap and redundancies. Among the programs reviewed were TSA’s Secure Flight and Registered Traveler and CBP’s Consolidated Registered Traveler 

programs. In 2006, the JRC stopped meeting after the Department assigned other 

duties to the council chair. However, DHS indicated that it might revive the council 

or pursue another alternative to identify duplicate programs and processes across 

the Department. This undertaking should include an effort to identify common data 

elements and nomenclature within inventories and to establish a data dictionary for 

the Department’s detection equipment. 

In addition to the JRC, commodity councils are an integral element of developing 

an effective strategic sourcing program. Commodity councils include representatives 

from across the organization. The members act as the subject matter experts in the 

acquisition process and in establishing requirements for a specific commodity or 

service. Generally, the component purchasing the largest quantity of a particular 

item takes the lead in acquiring the commodity or service and may serve as that 

commodity’s single-item manager. 

DHS and other Federal agencies use the commodity council concept. For example, 

in 2003, DHS established the Weapons and Ammunition Commodity Council to create a Department-wide strategy for consolidating requirements and gaining economies of scale for the acquisition of weapons and ammunition. The council, which includes representatives from each component that uses weapons, developed requirements for firearms, ammunition, and body armor. ICE took the lead, using servicelevel agreements with other components to establish one overall contract, which is 

available to all DHS entities. 

The Department agreed in principle with our two recommendations and took action to implement them. DHS was evaluating reestablishing the JRC and other alternatives to achieve the same goal. However, as of April 29, 2013, the Department 

had not reconstituted the JRC. DHS will perform a business case analysis of detec-
29 

tion equipment and establish a commodity council or working group if it determines 

that this equipment can be strategically sourced. 

OIG–10–72, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S ACQUISITION OF SUPPORT

CONTRACTS

TSA did not provide adequate management and oversight of acquisitions for support services for transportation security programs. Contractors were performing inherently Governmental functions or roles that closely supported the performance of 

inherently Governmental functions, acquisition staff did not follow acquisition guidance, and support services contracts contained vague statements of work. This occurred because the component did not have an adequate number of properly-trained 

core acquisition staff to administer contracts and oversee support services contractors’ performance. As a result, TSA did not have reasonable assurance that contractors were performing as required, that it contracted for the services it needed, that 

it received the services for which it paid, or that taxpayers were receiving the best 

value. 

Background 

Since its creation, TSA has relied on support services contractors to help accomplish its mission. TSA’s decision to contract for services such as acquisition support, 

invoice review, strategic planning, and administrative support was largely driven by 

the need to stand up programs and operations quickly after the events of September 

11, 2001. 

TSA’s contracting officers and contracting officer’s representatives (COR) provide 

contract oversight and monitoring. Contracting officers and CORs are Federal employees who represent the Government’s interests in negotiating and administering 

contracts. TSA assigns a contracting officer and a COR to handle each support services contract from contract award to closeout. The contracting officer is responsible 

for providing contract administration and oversight. Due to the technical nature of 

TSA contracts, contracting officers delegate many of their contract administration 

and oversight responsibilities to CORs, who serve as technical experts in the contract areas to which they are assigned. Each COR works with the contracting officer 

and the program office to oversee and monitor contractor performance and 

deliverables. 

Federal acquisition guidance highlights the risks inherent in service contracting, 

particularly for support services. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the closer contractor services come to supporting inherently Governmental functions, the greater the risk of their influencing the Government’s control over and 

accountability for decisions. Inherently Governmental functions require discretion in 

applying Government authority or value judgments in making decisions for the Government. A Government Accountability Office panel stated that increasing reliance 

on contractors to perform services for core Government activities challenges the capacity of Federal officials to supervise and evaluate the performance of these activities. 

According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Subpart 37 and Subpart 

7, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Letter 93–1, services that tend to 

affect Government decision making or program management require a greater level 

of scrutiny and an enhanced degree of management oversight to prevent abuse. 

Such scrutiny includes assigning a sufficient number of qualified Government acquisition staff to provide oversight and ensure that agency officials retain control over 

and remain accountable for policy decisions, based in part on a contractor’s performance and work products. 

Contractors Are Performing Inherently Governmental Functions 

Contractors performed inherently Governmental functions or roles that directly 

support the performance of inherently Governmental functions. Although the FAR 

establishes contract administration as an inherently Governmental function, TSA’s 

support services contractors performed contract administration in 3 of the 13 contracts we reviewed. Specifically, these three contractors reviewed invoices to determine whether they were reasonable, correctly charged, and allowable, and then recommended the invoices for approval and payment. These three contracts represented 40 percent ($265 million) of the total support services contracts for fiscal 

year 2009. 

In addition, one of these three contractors performed COR support for its own contract, along with reviewing its own invoices. When we brought this to the attention 

of TSA management, they took immediate action to correct the problem. 

Although program officials generally acknowledged that their professional and 

management support services contracts closely supported the performance of inher-
30 

ently Governmental functions, they believed that contracts for such services were 

common practice within the Government. However, the FAR requires that agency 

officials retain control over and remain accountable for contract administration, approval, and payment of invoices. Until TSA provides greater scrutiny and enhances 

management oversight of support services contracts, it will continue to risk transferring Government responsibility to contractors. 

Contracting Officers Are Not Following TSA Acquisition Guidance 

Contracting officers and CORs did not follow TSA’s internal acquisition guidance 

for contract administration, oversight, and monitoring to ensure that contractors 

were completing the contracted work. For example, for all 13 contracts, the contracting officers’ contract files were missing COR delegation forms, modifications notifying the contractor of changes in the contracting officer, documentation of suspension and debarment reviews, base contracts, and performance and monitoring reports. CORs’ administrative files were missing invoices, COR delegation forms, COR 

training forms, contract modifications, and other oversight documentation. Although 

TSA’s guidance requires that COR nomination forms and Departmental approval 

forms be completed before CORs assume their duties, our review of the contracts 

showed that 6 (46 percent) of the 13 contracts did not include the nomination forms 

and 2 (15 percent) of the 13 contracts did not include the Departmental approval 

forms before the CORs began performing COR duties. Without adequate documentation, there is no assurance that contractors are meeting contract provisions or that 

TSA is making appropriate payments for services provided. 

Although TSA’s internal acquisition guidance requires quality assurance plans or 

surveillance plans with specific measures for assessing contractors’ performance, 

none of the contract or COR files we reviewed contained specific measures for assessing contractors’ performance, plans outlining the specific contract requirements, 

or measurable outcomes of the support services provided. TSA documented monthly 

meetings with contractors to discuss performance, but TSA officials did not provide 

evidence that they independently validated the contractors’ progress reports. As a 

result, TSA could not ensure that contractors were complying with contract performance requirements. 

CORs submitted invoices to the contracting officers for payment without sufficient 

detail to support payment. We reviewed all of the contractors’ August 2009 invoices, 

which totaled approximately $6 million for the 13 contracts. Each invoice listed the 

contract employee’s name and the hours of work performed. However, the invoices 

did not include a detailed description of the work performed or the project completed. The contractors’ invoices were not specific, so we could not determine whether the correct contract was charged or whether the work performed was required 

under the contract. Because CORs cannot provide adequate oversight and monitoring without reviewing detailed invoices that identify the specific work completed, 

TSA did not have reasonable assurance that contractors were performing as required and that full payment was justified on the invoices received. 

We recommended that TSA include a contract review of inherently Governmental 

functions as part of contract administration. TSA assigned a Quality Assurance Specialist to review every new Statement of Work for inherently Governmental functions and coordinate with the initiating program/office and Office of Acquisitions to 

revise the work assignments both internally to the Government and with the contractor to ensure that inherently Governmental functions are performed by the Government parties. The contract review process for inherently Governmental functions 

is now required for all Procurement Packages. 

Contracts Contain Vague Statements of Work 

TSA did not always define the requirements in the Statements of Work for support services contracts clearly. Nine of the 13 contracts we reviewed contained vague 

statements of work that did not outline the specific requirements or include key 

deliverables specifying the activities the contractor needed to complete. These nine 

contracts represented 79 percent ($523 million) of the total support services contracts for fiscal year 2009. Although the FAR requires that contracts contain clearly 

defined Statements of Work, TSA program officials acknowledged that the Statements of Work did not always reflect program needs accurately or the work the contractors actually performed. 

The vague Statements of Work also allowed acquisition personnel to add unrelated tasks to contracts. For example, the Statement of Work for a $10 million services contract for strategic planning was so vague that the contracting officer was 

able to use it to develop a SharePoint (data repository) system for the Passenger 

Screening Program without completing a separate contract modification. The development of a SharePoint system is unrelated to strategic planning and is not a sup-
31 

port service. TSA should have contracted for the system through its Office of Information Technology under a separate contract. 

Statements of Work should be clearly written to describe the services needed and 

detailed enough to ensure that personnel use a contract as intended. Without clear 

Statements of Work, TSA cannot be sure that contractors are providing the services 

needed or hold contractors accountable for the services they provide. 

TSA often needed to create contract modifications to clarify the work it was asking contractors to perform. For the 13 contracts we reviewed, TSA executed 97 contract modifications to define more clearly the work the contractors were performing. 

Contract modifications require extra work and sometimes add costs to contracts. 

TSA could have avoided extra costs and work for its already overburdened staff by 

clearly defining contract requirements before awarding contracts. 

Further, contracts were missing key delivery tables that identified the task assignments and delivery dates contractors had to meet. Nine of the 13 (69 percent) 

contracts we reviewed were missing key delivery tables with specific requirements 

and due dates. Specific contract requirements and task assignments are critical to 

gauging contractor performance and ensuring that contractors are performing contracted services timely. 

We recommended that TSA establish evaluation factors and a review process for 

requirements identified in the Statements of Work. TSA provided the necessary documentation describing the new procurement request submission on approval tools 

and processes. The newly-developed tools and user guides provided sufficient information to identify each stakeholder’s roles and responsibilities. TSA implemented 

its completed user guides on its new submission and approval tool on October 1, 

2011. This process improves the quality of all procurement request documents, especially Statements of Work, by causing all procurement request packages (not just 

service contracts) to be routed to, and reviewed by, multiple Office of Special Council 

stakeholders specific to the package program. Additionally, the tool documents all 

comments received with a version history. Training has been provided to most of 

Office of Special Council (submitters, reviewers, and approvers). The contracting officers and specialists are also part of the review cycle, which greatly improves the 

quality of the whole procurement request package. 

TSA Does Not Have a Sufficient Number of Trained COR Staff 

TSA did not provide sufficient management and oversight for its support services 

contracts because it did not have an adequate number of dedicated and properly 

trained CORs. As a result, TSA relied on contractors to perform work that is inherently Governmental or directly supports the performance of inherently Governmental functions. 

TSA assigned COR responsibilities to technical experts in the area covered by the 

contract. However, CORs remained focused on the program offices in which they 

normally worked and were not available to monitor contractor performance, in part 

because of their workload demands. For this reason, TSA relied on contractors to 

perform many COR functions, including invoice review and maintenance of the COR 

administrative files. According to Federal guidelines, some of the COR duties include inherently Governmental functions that contractors should not perform. 

TSA should ensure that a core group of technical experts is dedicated exclusively 

to COR functions. By maintaining a core group of acquisition experts, TSA would 

be able to provide better contract administration, management, and oversight required by the Office of Management and Budget and the FAR. A core group would 

also reduce the continual need to train new staff on COR functions. 

Although COR training is essential to develop skilled staff for contract administration, CORs on 85 percent (11 of the 13) of the contracts reviewed had not completed the required training. To maintain their certifications, TSA requires that 

CORs receive 40 hours of COR training initially, 40 hours of refresher training per 

2-year cycle (including a minimum of 12 hours in each year), and annual ethics 

training. TSA should review the COR training records to ensure that all CORs complete the required training. TSA should also tailor COR refresher training to develop skills in contract administration, management, and oversight. 

We recommended that TSA assign dedicated, trained, and certified CORs to manage and oversee the contract administration function. TSA provided the necessary 

training documentation showing it had trained and certified CORs assigned to administer contracts. The Office of Security Technology continued to analyze workload 

across all contract administration functions to ensure the appropriate staffing mix. 

In concurring with the recommendation, TSA Office of Acquisition noted plans to 

offer enhanced COR training courses to develop skills in contract administration, 

management, and oversight. OIG agreed that completed actions resolved its recommendation, and that the finding would be closed once TSA completed its proposed 
32 

actions. On March 30–31, 2010, TSA conducted an Overview of Government Contracting Course for CORs. For the remainder of 2010, TSA had scheduled COR 

courses for Writing Performance-Based Statements of Work, Corrective Actions, 

Evaluating a Contractor’s Performance, and Contract Administration. For fiscal year 

2011 COR training, TSA was coordinating with DHS, which was going to contract 

for classes. Courses planned for fiscal year 2011 included Inspection and Acceptance, 

Risk Management, Evaluating Contractor’s Performance, and Critical COR Roles 

and Responsibilities. 

OIG–13–82, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION LOGISTICS CENTER— INVENTORY MANAGEMENT

Our report, OIG–13–82, Transportation Security Administration Logistics Center—Inventory Management recognized that TSA improved its accountability of 

screening equipment at the Logistics Center. However, its plans and procedures for 

inventory management needed additional improvements. TSA stored unusable or obsolete equipment, maintained inappropriate safety stock levels, and did not develop 

an inventory management process that systematically deploys screening equipment. 

As a result, TSA may have been losing utility of equipment as it aged. Additionally, 

TSA did not use all storage space within the Logistics Center and might have been 

able to put approximately $800,000 per year, which was used to lease two warehouses, to better use. 

Equipment in Storage 

TSA operates three warehouses in Texas, collectively known as the TSA Logistics 

Center. The warehouses store various types of Government equipment used at airports to screen passengers and baggage, including X-ray units, metal detectors, explosive trace detection units, and explosive detection systems. As of May 2012, TSA 

had more than 17,000 items, valued at about $185.7 million, stored at the Logistics 

Center, including unusable, obsolete equipment and equipment that exceeded safety 

stock requirements. 

The quantity of Transportation Secured Equipment stored in the warehouse for 

more than 2 years accounted for approximately one-half of 17,004 items in the warehouse, yet it represented almost $8 million, or 4 percent, of the dollar value recorded 

for all inventory in the warehouse. This illustrates that increased quantities of 

Transportation Secured Equipment stored at the warehouse may significantly increase the dollar value of inventory. Further, this may result in millions of dollars’ 

worth of screening equipment becoming obsolete or unusable while stored for an extended period. 

With prolonged storage, TSA lost utility of equipment as it aged in storage. As 

of May 31, 2012, TSA had 12 automated explosive detection system (Auto EDS) 

units at the warehouse, including three new units stored at the warehouse for more 

than 3 years. According to one TSA official, the component did not plan to deploy 

the Auto EDS units that were in storage. In 2007, TSA awarded contracts to acquire 

Auto EDS units to provide baggage-screening technology for checkpoints. However, 

TSA officials explained that other checkpoint technology screened baggage faster 

and required less space than the Auto EDS units and, as of November 2012, TSA 

removed all Auto EDS units from airports. The recorded value of the eight Auto 

EDS units stored at the warehouse in November 2012 was approximately $307 million. Upgrades for the Auto EDS units in the warehouse cost about $1 million. The 

Auto EDS units became obsolete while aging in the warehouse. 

TSA also stored nonscreening equipment in the warehouse for long periods. Specifically, TSA stored more than 3,200 furniture, fixtures, and equipment items in 

the warehouse for more than 2 years. Examples include conveyors (powers, exits, 

extensions, entries, brackets, extensions, and pedestals) for more than 5 years, and 

41 empty equipment crates—used for various pieces of screening equipment—stored 

for more than 2 years. 

TSA’s warehouse inventory also included obsolete items. The inventory showed 

that TSA had 266 Threat Image Projection Ready X-ray units in the warehouse. The 

machine, used to screen carry-on baggage, is obsolete technology, being replaced by 

Advanced Technology and Advanced Technology 2 X-rays. TSA also warehoused five 

new whole-body imager training simulators (laptop computers) for more than 3 

years. TSA replaced the whole-body imager with advanced imaging technology units 

and never used these laptop simulators. 

Safety Stock 

TSA did not have appropriate safety stock levels at the Logistics Center to meet 

its safety stock requirements. TSA relied on nondeployable equipment, had insufficient quantities of some equipment, and had excessive quantities of other equip-
33 

ment. TSA holds safety stock as insurance against uncertainties such as equipment 

failure, emerging requirements, or special events. Adequate safety stock levels permit TSA to respond to maintenance needs while minimizing the adverse effects on 

screening operations. 

TSA relied on nondeployable screening equipment to meet safety stock requirements. For example, the target safety stock level for one type of bottle liquid scanner was 18 units. The warehouse inventory report for the third quarter of fiscal year 

2012 also showed 18 units designated as safety stock; however, 10 of the 18 units 

needed repair and were nondeployable. Based on the number of bottle liquid scanner units designated as safety stock in inventory and the condition codes assigned 

to them, only eight units were in redeployment condition. TSA officials said that 

safety stock quantities and levels are evaluated and updated every quarter in conjunction with the quarterly warehouse disposition process. We identified equipment 

that needed repair, designated as safety stock on consecutive warehouse inventory 

reports. 

In February 2012, TSA evaluated safety stock inventory for nine types of explosive detection system and determined that the quantity of safety stock was deficient 

for six of the nine types. For example, TSA set the level of safety stock for one type 

of EDS actively under production and deployment at five units. Although TSA had 

12 of these units in the warehouse, none was designated as safety stock. 

TSA’s ability to respond to critical failures for this piece of equipment is affected 

by not having equipment available for safety stock. TSA also assessed checkpoint 

technology safety stock in July 2012 and identified equipment with a shortage of 

warehouse safety stock, as well as equipment in inventory that exceeded the safety 

target. TSA also stored empty explosive trace detection cases in quantities that exceeded its stated level for safety stock. TSA’s July 2012 review showed almost 1,400 

more empty cases in inventory than were necessary to meet the target safety stock 

level of 459. TSA officials explained that after explosive trace detection units were 

placed in service, airports sent the empty cases to the warehouse for storage. Some 

of the empty cases were stored in the warehouse for almost 5 years. To optimize 

existing warehouse space, TSA could have recycled or removed the cases from inventory. 

Without appropriate safety levels, TSA was not prepared to meet equipment 

emergencies that could affect field operations and National security, or increase 

travelers’ time spent at passenger screening checkpoints. We made two recommendations to TSA that, when implemented, should assist the component with 

managing inventory in its warehouses. TSA concurred with one recommendation 

and partially concurred with the other. 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S ACQUISITION OF SUPPORT SERVICE

CONTRACTS

In March 2010, we issued, Transportation Security Administration’s Acquisition of 

Support Service Contracts, OIG–10–72, which included three recommendations to 

improve TSA’s acquisition processes. In January 2012, based on information sent to 

us by TSA, we determined that all responses and corrective actions were sufficient 

to close our three recommendations, and that no other action was required. 

In conclusion, as the reports I have highlighted illustrate, DHS and TSA are taking steps to implement our recommendations to strengthen and streamline their 

procurement and acquisition processes. However, they continue to face challenges 

that will require further time and effort to overcome. My office will continue to examine these processes at the Department and its components and to make recommendations designed to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any questions that 

you or the Members of the subcommittee may have. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. 

We appreciate all of you being here today. I recognize myself for 

5 minutes to ask some questions. 

Mr. Benda, I was particularly interested in tying our airport security to obviously our National security, but also dealing with the 

problem that we are having with visa overstays. As you may know, 

over 40 percent of all the people that entered the country illegally 

didn’t cross a border. They come legally with a visa, and we have 

a very difficult time of tracking their entry and exit from the country, yet alone those that just disappear and never leave. 
34 

With the new technology and the technology that we are testing, 

are we looking at anything that would tie airport security with a 

biometric technology so that we can somehow track people as they 

enter and exit the country? 

Mr. BENDA. Certainly, sir. The S&T Directorate is actually 

partnering with CBP and the Office of Policy at the Department 

and looking at biometric air exit, which is part of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. The Department has a robust program on 

biographic, and S&T has been charged to look at where biometric 

technologies can serve or help augment that purpose. 

I recently actually was just over in the United Kingdom where 

we saw biometrics currently in place. They are in place partly for 

commercial reasons where they want to have what they call a common departure lounge, where they can merge both international 

and domestic travelers to try and actually increase customs dutyfree sales. So there are a lot of technologies out there, either from 

fingerprint scanning to iris scanning, and S&T is in the process of 

actually building a test bed of viable technologies so that we can, 

once we have determined what the operational requirements are, 

we can see how well those technologies would perform, and we actually plan on deploying a pilot to a U.S. airport within the next 

year or 2. 

So it is something we are actively pursuing. We think now the 

time is right. Europe and other areas really taken a lead on this. 

We think we can leverage off a lot of their investments and deploy 

a capability pretty quickly once that cost-benefit analysis—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. What would be the time frame would you estimate? 

Mr. BENDA. Well, it all depends, sir, whether it makes sense 

from a cost-benefit analysis, quite frankly. What level of security 

do you gain? When you look at airports versus land border, it will 

be really hard for us to do biometric trafficking of people leaving 

by land border when we have 227 million people enter and leave 

every year. So the lines that we would have leaving would be substantial. If we were looking only at an air implementation I believe 

we could certainly have a pilot operational for one airport I would 

say within the next 2 years would certainly be possible. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Lord, Mr. Richmond, and Mr. Thompson 

talked a little bit about the puffer debacle. Why is TSA in such a 

rush to put the untested technology into service without doing necessary research? How can we be assured on this committee that 

that won’t happen again? 

Mr. LORD. Well, that is an excellent question. I am sure TSA 

cringes every time they hear the word puffer. But to their credit, 

they made some important changes in their process. The reason the 

puffer example occurred is the technology was successful in the laboratory and it was immediately moved to the field without what we 

call operational test and evaluation. That is testing in the field to 

make sure it really works before full deployment. 

Under their new process they do have operational test and evaluation stage where the technology is deployed on a limited basis 

in the field and carefully tested before the final decision is made 

to field it. So I think that was the important lesson learned from 

the puffer. Again, it was over $30 million in taxpayer money, peo-
35 

ple should be concerned about it, but I always like to look at it in 

terms of the process changes they made on that, and I think that 

was a big improvement in their process. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, 

for any questions he may have. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will start with Ms. Waters. Last Congress we heard repeatedly 

from witnesses that in order to have a strong acquisition program 

you have to ensure that you have adequate staff dedicated to the 

program. So that raises two quick questions, which is: What is the 

average tenure of TSA’s procurement staff, and are the procurement specialists assigned to the accounts for the duration of their 

life cycle? 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you for that question. I don’t have the average tenure of the TSA workforce with me, but we certainly will— 

or the procurement workforce with me—but I will get that back to 

you. 

We do a couple of things in acquisition. One is we certainly keep 

contract specialists and contracting officers and outreach officers on 

those programs until they research a mature stage or complete before rotating them to other areas. We also have an opportunity to 

work with DHS in their internship program, so we are bringing in 

new 1102s to be filled all the time and other series that are specialized in acquisition, such as cost analysts, program managers who 

help us on the acquisition side of the house. 

So I think we have got a more robust workforce right now. I 

think we have got an adequate workforce to meet the need of TSA 

in terms of our procurement needs right now and our acquisition 

management needs right now. As our program grows, as TSA’s 

need grows, I think we will look at the opportunity to expand that 

given our budget constraints and what we face from that perspective as well. 

Mr. RICHMOND. In terms of your goals for small and disadvantaged businesses, I know that you have reached your goals in small 

disadvantaged and service-disabled veterans. Are those goals set by 

TSA or are they set by DHS? 

Ms. WATERS. The overall goal is set by SBA, with close coordination with DHS and the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business 

Utilization, and then those goals are assigned to TSA. 

Mr. RICHMOND. What is your goal for contracting with 8(a) small 

businesses and did you meet that goal? 

Ms. WATERS. So the 8(a) goal is a goal that is not tracked at the 

DHS level. We do set a goal at TSA which is at 2.5 percent. Last 

year we did meet that goal. The 8(a) goal is a goal that is rolled 

up into the small disadvantaged business and in fiscal year 2012 

we did meet that goal as well. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Let me switch over to a question which I think 

is also a security concern and that is the ability or—well, you all 

allowing companies outside the United States to manufacture the 

TSO uniforms. I believe it was either mentioned that it was a trade 

agreement or NAFTA that prohibited you from—prohibited you 

from prohibiting outside companies to make it, if that makes any 
36 

sense. I was just wondering if we have safeguards for our military 

uniforms why can’t we have the same thing for our TSO uniforms? 

Ms. WATERS. So it is my understanding that because TSA is 

under the NAFTA and the Chilean trade agreement act, that we 

treat companies that produce items in Canada and in Mexico as domestic companies. While we certainly want to comply with that, 

with those requirements, and what the requirements that the Federal Acquisition Regulation require of us, we really don’t have a 

say at the end of the day where those companies end up manufacturing those uniforms. So we issued the solicitation, the company 

responded, they received the award, and then chose to have those 

items manufactured in those locations. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Do you all view it as I view it, as a security concern if those uniforms are manufactured outside the United States? 

Ms. WATERS. I don’t think we have put that designation on it. 

It is certainly something that we can look at. If that designation 

requires us to have those items procured domestically then we 

would certainly comply with that. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Switching over to Mr. Edwards, quickly, how has 

instituting the FAR helped TSA to refine its acquisition program 

and ensure greater transparency and that consistency is embedded 

in the program? 

Mr. EDWARDS. In June 2008, prior to that TSA was not following 

the FAR, but after June 2008 they are and instituting and following FAR. TSA has also instituted internal guidance and policies 

that augment the FAR regulations. So I think it is a good thing 

that they are following the FAR regulations and also the Department has overall visibility over it. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired and I yield back. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Richmond. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of 

the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, 

for any questions he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Waters, Representative Richmond talked about the small 

business goals and what have you. Why are the TSA small business goals the lowest in the agency? 

Ms. WATERS. One of the reasons why our goal is at 23 percent 

is that I think there is a recognition by SBA and by DHS that with 

the spin that we have in our technology area it is a challenge to 

separate the remaining dollars out and achieve a higher goal. 

Frankly, we are having a challenge meeting the 23 percent goal. 

While we recognize that those are challenges, we are also looking 

at that portfolio, the security technology portfolio, and our all of 

our portfolios for opportunities for small business. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, can you provide the committee with those 

challenges that you have to overcome if those small business requirements are to be met? 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, sir. What we know today is part of the challenge with security technology is the testing environment, is a company having not only small but large businesses, having the capital 

to be able to endure the testing environment that happens at TSA. 

So what Mr. Benda talked about, about being able to use different 
37 

information that used to be proprietary and giving that to the 

small businesses, gives them maybe not the same opportunity but 

a different opportunity to succeed in the security capabilities area. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, have you tried narrowing your procurement so that you don’t write small businesses out but you write 

them in? 

Ms. WATERS. So certainly we do that in many cases. We certainly 

set aside for small business, we have done that with the Screening 

Partnership Program. We have not done that in the technology 

area as of yet, but I think as we mature that information and those 

requirements and we see that opportunity, in my opinion there is 

nothing that is off the table that would not include small business 

if we could find viable candidates. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, let me for my own point say that you lower 

the goal based on what you say you can’t find. Can you provide us 

information on what you can’t find and what the problem is? My 

issue here is you have lowered the goal and you are not even meeting the lower goal. So why not keep it at or near where your other 

agencies are and just say we are trying to get there? But you lowered the bar and some of us hear the lowering the bar too many 

times, and I just think from my own position it is probably a question of will to get it done. 

Now, why have we lowered the bar on small disadvantaged businesses compared to everybody else? 

Ms. WATERS. I don’t know that the bar was lowered. My understanding is that our goal has been 23 percent for several years 

now. Certainly we will provide you with information on what we 

see as those challenges. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Small disadvantaged, not small business. 

Ms. WATERS. So our small disadvantage business goal in fiscal 

year 2012 was 5 percent and we exceeded that by 7.8 percent. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yeah, but it is the lowest. In that instance you 

lowered it and went over it. In lowering it your basement or your 

floor is lower than anybody else in the agency. So why not raise 

it to where everybody else is? 

Ms. WATERS. So our goal is again to be successful in all areas 

of small business and we will certainly take that back and look at 

that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you lowered it in order to look successful? 

Ms. WATERS. I don’t believe that that was the case. 

Mr. THOMPSON. That is what you just said. I mean, you just said 

you lowered it in order to be successful. 

Ms. WATERS. But TSA does not unilaterally determine the goal, 

DHS determines the goal. 

Mr. THOMPSON. All right. 

Mr. Lord—actually it is not Mr. Lord. Ms. Waters again. I appreciate your honesty and information. Have we mastered the overreliance on contractors in acquisition or is that still a challenge? 

Ms. WATERS. I believe that we have currently about 13 contractors supporting my staff of about 170 FTE. I am not quite sure 

what our past numbers were, but we see that as a necessary need 

currently to achieve some goals in some areas that we are trying 

to increase our workload in. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you said 13 individuals? 
38 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And that is it? 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Very good. I yield back. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you Mr. Thompson. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for a second round of 

questions. 

Ms. Waters, we have heard from many technology vendors that 

TSA is not transparent enough to allow for efficient research and 

development planning by the private sector to meet TSA needs. 

This may result in less effective and mature screening technologies 

once TSA is ready to make a purchase. I would like each of you 

to answer this. Do you believe TSA should develop and share a 

long-term technology road map to help guide future investments by 

industry? In what ways would transportation security benefit from 

such a road map or planning document? 

Ms. WATERS. So I certainly think that we need to provide an increased amount of information to industry so that they are aware 

of what our plans are, what our current state is, and what we believe our future state needs to be. Part of that is our preparing of 

and getting ready to publish our test and evaluation guide which 

we think will provide critical information to industry that speaks 

to the fact that when they come into our testing environment it 

takes much longer than either industry or TSA expects when we 

are trying to do developmental testing and operational testing. So 

that is one area where we see we are making progress and sharing 

information with industry. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Benda. 

Mr. BENDA. Thank you Mr. Barletta. I do think I agree with Ms. 

Waters, we do need to be more transparent with industry. I think 

that is really the goal of the R&D strategies that we are developing 

in conjunction with TSA. That is part of the reason we briefed 

them at a webinar that is open to all of industry. 

I do think in the past we haven’t done as good a job but we did 

have a first step at this where we had a signed aviation security 

R&D strategy with TSA, with Robin Kane and myself, the former 

AA of security capabilities. One of fruits of that is actually I talked 

about the new X-ray device that would actually be able to identify 

what is in your bag. That is actually coming out of a current investment by a vendor, $15 million with their own IRAD or internal 

money against that, $9 million of Government money, and we expect the vendor to put another $9 million in it. 

So I think we are starting to see again some fruits of that labor 

and I think we need to improve upon it and hopefully have more 

of those come down. The challenge I have when you talk about a 

technology road map is that I am not sure where the next technology comes from. I am much more interested in a road map of 

what are the priorities and challenges we have, because I believe 

necessity is the mother of invention. We may not have been able 

to predict 5 years ago that we would be able to use a technique 

called X-ray diffraction to do identification of materials in a bag. 

So by telling them what our challenges and capabilities are I think 

it is a better approach than saying you have to achieve this technology. 
39 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Lord. 

Mr. LORD. I agree with the prior two witnesses. We often meet 

with vendors and they sometimes express concerns about limited 

transparency. I noticed the Department and TSA, they seem to be 

implementing different practices and sessions to help share more 

information with industry, such as industry days. They have those 

on a regular basis and there are other forums that take place that 

are aimed at sharing more information. 

But some of the vendor complaints, quite frankly, are difficult to 

evaluate. They always want perfect information, and some is obviously procurement-sensitive and you simply can’t share it with the 

private sector. But I think in general of course more information 

shared to the best you can the better and the happier they will be 

in the long run and the better sense they will have of what your 

requirements are and needs. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. Just like in an acquisition program you 

look at the entire life-cycle cost from cradle to death. There definitely needs to be a road map that they need to provide that takes 

into account with the changing in the threats. You know, as the 

threats and the environments change, we should be able to adjust, 

but you definitely need to have a road map. You cannot just blindly 

use the technology, throw it away, and then try to go to another 

one. You definitely need to have a road map. Everybody else does. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Mr. Lord, in 2009 GAO reported that TSA had not completed a 

cost-benefit analysis on investments for screening passengers at 

airport checkpoints. That was 4 years ago, and my understanding 

is that there has still not been a full cost-benefit analysis completed. What is the value gained from a cost-benefit analysis? Is it 

primarily that we could eliminate programs or requirements that 

are too expensive for the comparably small security benefit that 

they provide? 

Mr. LORD. A cost-benefit analysis is a really important piece of 

information for managers that lets them consider making an investment in an area and also assures them that the investment is 

worthwhile, the benefits exceed the cost. Just so you know, that 

recommendation is still outstanding as of today. We have had recent discussions with TSA, they hope to close it out by the end of 

the fiscal year. But, again, a lot of our work, looking very broadly 

across all the programs, that is a weakness we have identified and 

we believe TSA perhaps may need to ramp up their capability. 

A related issue is their life-cycle cost estimates. Obviously that 

is an important component of a cost-benefit analysis. We consistently identified weaknesses in the way they put those together. Are 

they getting better? Yes. But, again, that is still an area they perhaps may want to invest more resources in. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Has TSA begun to do full cost-benefit analysis for 

any of its major programs? 

Mr. LORD. That is a good question. There has been one for AIT 

that was shared with us. So in some cases they do, you know. The 

Passenger Screening Program, that is essentially the umbrella program which includes individual components, pieces of technology 

within it. So there have been some, as I recall, some cost-benefit 
40 

analysis done for individual pieces. But we thought it was important to have one for the entire program given it consists of various 

technologies that all have to work together to achieve the same 

end. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Ms. Waters, do you agree this would be a prudent 

step for your agency to take? 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, sir. What I would add is we do have one major 

program, which is TIM, that does have a complete analysis of alternatives, that does include a cost-benefit analysis. Mr. Lord is right, 

we are working through each and every one of our major acquisition programs to ensure not only that the cost-benefit analysis is 

completed, if we are not in the O&M stage, but certainly you need 

documentation that speaks to the business case that we are trying 

to do for that investment. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Richmond for a second round 

of questions. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Lord, and very quickly to pick up where 

Chairman Barletta left off, do you have a recommendation for the 

most effective means for TSA or DHS to assess cost-benefit analysis? 

Mr. LORD. We come in and we evaluate their efforts. Typically 

they ask us: Well, what standards or best practices should we be 

using? We refer them to the GAO website. We have quite an extensive list of standards, criteria, so-called. We call it the cost and 

schedule guide. It is like the Bible for doing this, and it is publicly 

posted on our website. In the past when we used it at TSA we actually send one of our cost experts over and they sit down with TSA. 

Sometimes we have multiple sessions. They walk them through the 

guide and they compare it to what they provided so they can get 

a better sense of what we are looking for. So I think that is a really 

important step we do. It is essentially analogous to a consulting 

service we provide, free of charge of course. But we try to help 

them better understand our guide, our criteria that we use in evaluating their cost estimates. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Edwards, have you had an opportunity to review how the Department, how they have taken steps to address 

some of the concerns you have previously raised in some of your 

audits? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. The Department has made progress in its 

oversight and controls by reissuing the advice, the acquisition management directive, but the Department needs to go further. There 

needs to be more guidance provided in certain areas. For example, 

it is not clearly defined what an acquisition program is. They need 

to give guidance on that. Not everybody, not every component uses 

the tool to track this, it is called NPRS, not everybody is using 

that. Not every component uses all the available tools regarding acquisition, and then there is not clear visibility on the acquisition 

portfolio. Because of this, if there is a simple procurement, some 

components create a program management office to oversee a simple procurement. It is a waste of administrative cost. So there is 

some progress but much work needs to be done. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Ms. Waters or Mr. Benda, would you care to address the last part of Mr. Edwards comment? 
41 

Ms. WATERS. So certainly in working with PARM we are maturing and gaining more robust acquisition management program 

structure at TSA. We have outreach officers who work with our 

program offices to guide them through the acquisition documentation process that includes all of those things as an AOA, a cost-benefit analysis, a life-cycle cost estimate to ensure that we are making the soundest business case that we can. We also have people 

embedded from DHS PARM who come and assist us with our cost 

information. So we are taking advantage of any and all resources 

to build our program to strengthen it. 

Mr. BENDA. Certainly, Member Richmond. It is one of those 

things that S&T is working closely with under secretary of management shop to try and prove acquisitions overall for the Department. In S&T we rarely have acquisition-level programs above that 

$300 million where we are required to establish the program office. 

So we don’t necessarily cross that threshold very often, if at all. We 

are part of the process going forward in making sure that when the 

Department and other components do analysis of alternatives, 

other technical reviews, that S&T can actually assist in those when 

necessary. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Ms. Waters, and just going back to the small 

business goals, and if I wrote down correctly I think you told Ranking Member Thompson that you had 13 contractors that were supporting you all? 

Ms. WATERS. Supporting OA, Office of Acquisition. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Now, those 13 contractors, do they all work for 

one company or are they all independent contractors? 

Ms. WATERS. They work for different companies; it is not all one 

company. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Now, what is the breakdown of those companies? 

Are those small businesses, are those big businesses, service-disabled veterans, what? 

Ms. WATERS. I don’t have that information, but I will certainly 

get that for you. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank 

the witnesses for their time. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Richmond. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Lord, as part of your prepared testimony to this subcommittee last September there was extensive documentation 

about TSA’s failure to acquire a DHS-approved acquisition program. Let’s take the Electronic Baggage Screening Program. As of 

today where is TSA on that? 

Mr. LORD. That is a good question. We raised that last year and 

I am happy to report they now have an approved acquisition program baseline. It was approved August 17 last year. The reason 

that is important, I think it is really important to understand it is 

a program baseline that you can measure progress against. In this 

document they tell you what this thing is going to cost, when it is 

going to be delivered, and what its capabilities are. It is analogous 

to buying a car. Who would buy a car if you didn’t know what it 

was going to cost, what the performance was, gas mileage or horsepower, or when the dealer was going to give it to you? So how can 
42 

you invest in a system without the acquisition program baseline 

where you have all this important information in it? 

So the good news is they completed one, but it is a few years 

after they made the initial decision to go forward with the technology. Under their guidance you are supposed to do it at the front 

of program, not toward the back. To their credit they have taken 

our recommendation to heart and they have one, so we think that 

is an important step. You can certainly update it as you go along, 

too. But, again, we call it a foundation document, it is just not an 

obscure document nobody ever reads. It has really important information in it. So we think these baselines are real important. 

Mr. THOMPSON. If we do that, then from an acquisition standpoint, and if we follow it, we should get a better bang for our 

bucks? 

Mr. LORD. Absolutely, absolutely. Also you will be able to track, 

like if you have another hearing a year from now you can say, hey, 

in your original baseline you said A, B, and C, are you there or did 

you shift everything to the right or change everything? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Edwards, yesterday your office released a report relative to 

the TSA’s storage of equipment. Did TSA provide you a justification 

for why it would continue to purchase new equipment such as an 

enhanced metal detector when it already had one that had been in 

storage for 4 years? 

Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir. In fact we have not done any review on 

a future buy, so we have not received anything. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So are you aware of a system that TSA has 

available to it that could somehow age the equipment on-site or 

something that would trigger or some kind of tickler system that 

would say before you buy something we have it in inventory? Are 

you aware of any of that? 

Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I guess he answered the question. Do you 

plan to pursue it or do we need to send a follow-up letter asking 

you to look into this or what? 

Mr. EDWARDS. We are currently looking at the AIT procurement 

acquisition piece of it, but if this is something you want us to look 

into it, I will add that to my—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think just the fact that we 

are buying equipment and we have got the same equipment that 

has been on hand for 4 years and nobody knows it is on-hand, 

somehow we are missing what I think is a reasonable opportunity 

to save the taxpayers some money by just going in the warehouse, 

dusting it off—I mean, not dusting it off, but you do whatever you 

need to do. But since we own it already I think it is reasonable to 

say that we should use it first rather than to acquire something 

else? 

Do you have any idea how much that kind of acquisition procedure, how much that cost the taxpayers? 

Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir. But now, as the assistant administrator 

talked about, DHS has created the Program Ability and Risk Management Office, PARM, which is supposed to do an independent assessment. They work with the components and they also look at 

different intervals to do their independent assessment. So it is 
43 

something maybe the Department they are established to do. I 

don’t know if they are doing it. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So it looks like we need to get you a second letter. Thank you. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

The Chairman recognizes Mrs. Brooks. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for Ms. Waters. As you are aware, this subcommittee 

has conducted consistent and vigorous oversight over the procurement over the last several years, but one issue that we have consistently heard from vendors is the kind of inconsistent level of engagement between TSA and the contractor community. We have 

heard that over the last year there has been improvement and that 

TSA has made progress in the area, and in fact is engaging a group 

like the Security Manufacturers Coalition and working through 

groups like the Washington Homeland Security Roundtable to 

reach a broader audience. So while there has been good progress, 

we understand there is a shift, however, of who engages with the 

vendor community. Whereas previously program-level personnel 

and individuals could have non-acquisition-specific conversations 

with vendors, apparently today that is prohibited. Asking if this is 

true and, if so, why has there been this shift in this policy? 

Ms. WATERS. So we are very eager to, and think it is a very necessary part of what we do, to have robust engagements with industry, and we engage at all levels, senior level, operational levels, 

small businesses, large businesses, coalitions, any way that we can 

engage with industry we look to do that. 

What we are trying to do internal to TSA is to ensure that when 

vendors do have conversations their program offices that the acquisition or procurement process is a part of that conversation. We 

want to make sure that we are capturing that need at the very beginning and that we are ensuring that there is a fair and equitable 

process to that acquisition from beginning to end. 

Mrs. BROOKS. So program-level offices and officers can have discussions—— 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, they can. 

Mrs. BROOKS [continuing]. With the vendor community. 

Ms. WATERS. We encourage that. 

Mrs. BROOKS. But anything having to do with acquisition has to 

do what? 

Ms. WATERS. We just want to ensure that we are part of that 

conversation. The engagements with industry are important and 

necessary and it gives us information on how to shape what we 

need to do. But it is also a time where we want to make sure that 

we are not talking about a known requirement, that it is just a 

conversation about possibilities, not a conversation about a need. 

So when that conversation turns into a need is when we need to 

make sure that we are putting it inside the acquisition process and 

not sharing that information unless we are sharing it with all. So 

that is why we are taking those steps. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Certainly. Can you share with us who some of 

those coalitions or groups are besides maybe the two that I have 

mentioned? 
44 

Ms. WATERS. So besides the Washington Homeland Security 

Roundtable, I think it is the—I am sorry, I am blanking out on the 

name. 

Mrs. BROOKS. The one that I was aware of, the Security Manufacturers Coalition. 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, ma’am. There are several others. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Okay. 

Ms. WATERS. I can get you a list of those, too. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Okay. 

Ms. WATERS. We also, we have a dedicated industry liaison, we 

do industry days on a regular basis. We do industry days for specific program offices, as well as doing industry days for small business. So we spend quite an amount of resources engaging with industry. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Well, and I would assume that industry is the 

group that fosters the innovation and comes up with new ideas for 

TSA. So when you mention when it gets to a need, who determines 

a need, who determines when you say when it rises to the level of 

need that we need to ensure everyone is involved. 

Ms. WATERS. So when the Government decides that it is a need, 

is it a Governmental decision, something that is inherently Governmental to decide when there is a need, then that is when the Federal Acquisition Regulation kicks in and says that, you know, we 

need to make sure that we are treating the process fair and equitably. So I can’t share information with one company that I don’t 

share with all. So we do typically go silent in terms of how we are 

engaging with industry at that point because we want to make 

sure that the process has integrity. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Certainly. That would be absolutely necessary. 

Just want to make sure that TSA is having very robust discussions 

with industry because of the innovation and because of their ideas. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mrs. Brooks. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony today and 

the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee 

may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we will 

ask you to respond to these in writing. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(45) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN RICHARD HUDSON FOR KAREN SHELTON WATERS

Question 1. In the last Congress, TSA received criticism for keeping a vast 

amount of equipment in storage and as a result, altered its procurement policies to 

a ‘‘Just in Time’’ system that purchases small amounts of equipment immediately 

prior to deployment. While this prevents a backlog of equipment, do you believe that 

this is the best approach in all cases and allows industry to leverage its supply and 

manufacturing networks to provide the highest quality units at the lowest cost? If 

not, then isn’t this a move from one bad business practice to another? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2a. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 

2013 included language that directed TSA to provide a 5-year investment plan that 

includes projected funding levels for the next 5 fiscal years for all passenger screening technology acquisitions. 

Has TSA completed this plan? If so, when do you expect the committee to receive 

a copy? If not, when do you expect it to be completed? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2b. Will the 5-year investment plan be made publically available? If so, 

when do you expect it to be made public? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3a. As you are aware, last year TSA was planning on purchasing CAT/ 

BPSS, a technology intended to verify the authenticity of passenger identifications 

and boarding passes, and compare these two pieces of information to ensure a 

match. At a subcommittee hearing last Congress, Members stated concerns about 

the technology including the fact that it would not be linked to State Department 

of Motor Vehicles Databases or to TSA’s No-Fly or Selectee lists. At that time, TSA 

decided to postpone the purchase of CAT/BPSS. However, the President’s fiscal year 

2014 budget request includes funding for it and a pre-solicitation procurement notice was issued on April 24 for boarding pass scanners, which TSA hopes to eventually marry up with credential authentication technology. 

Has TSA completed a cost-benefit analysis of this technology? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3b. Has TSA resolved the deficiencies of the technology that were identified last year including ensuring that it can link to State Department of Motor Vehicle Databases and TSA’s No-Fly or Selectee lists? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3c. Has DHS Science and Technology been working with TSA to help 

CAT/BPSS meet technical requirements? If so, in what way? If not, why not? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. Some technology vendors are finding that in the wake of sequestration, TSA is saying that it is not able to accept technologies that have been procured 

because there is now a shortage of staff to conduct either Site Acceptance Testing 

or Final Acceptance Testing of systems. This creates a difficult situation for vendors, 

because if their systems aren’t tested and accepted, they could be in violation of the 

terms and conditions of their contracts under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

If this is in fact an issue that has arisen post-sequestration, what is TSA doing 

to assure vendors that they are not in violation of the terms and conditions of their 

contracts because of TSA staffing shortfalls? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. During the hearing, you mentioned TSA’s partnership with the Washington Homeland Security Roundtable (WHSR), a non-profit group comprised of 

companies that are actively engaged in homeland security issues. In addition, you 

stated that WHSR created the Industry Engagement Group and the TSA Contracting/Acquisition Policy Focus Group. 
46 

Do any of the participants of these groups represent a security technology manufacturer? If not, why not? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6a. It is my understanding that TSA and other components within DHS 

use strategic sourcing and often coordinate when purchasing detection equipment 

such as metal detectors, explosive detection systems, and radiation detectors for 

screening people, baggage, and cargo at airports, seaports, and land ports of entry. 

Do you think TSA is taking full advantage of strategic sourcing and doing a sufficient job coordinating purchases of the same or similar detection capabilities with 

other components? Why or why not? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6b. How much money do you think DHS has saved by using strategic 

sourcing to acquire its detection equipment? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. I understand that TSA is currently exploring the option of allowing 

vendors to use third parties to certify and test their technologies. Can you describe 

what that process would look like and when TSA may make a determination of 

whether to utilize third-party testing? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN RICHARD HUDSON FOR PAUL BENDA

Question 1. Do you believe it would help industry’s research and development efforts if TSA were to work with you and establish a 5-year acquisition roadmap? 

Could metrics such as Technology Readiness Levels be helpful in communicating 

such roadmaps? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2a. TSA seems to struggle with getting innovative new security technologies deployed in a quick and cost-effective manner. 

Can you please explain to the committee what DHS S&T is doing to help improve 

the transition of new technologies? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2b. Can you cite a specific example where TSA and S&T have worked 

together and successfully transitioned a major technology acquisition? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2c. Is there a role for National laboratories and universities to help improve the success of technology transitions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Mr. Benda, you and the under secretary have described a strategy for 

‘‘technology foraging.’’ Under that strategy, you would first try to identify mature 

technologies from other applications, for example military, that could be leveraged 

for homeland security applications. 

Do you have a formal process yet for technology foraging? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. Last year, TSA was planning on purchasing CAT/BPSS, a technology 

intended to verify the authenticity of passenger identifications and boarding passes, 

and compare these two pieces of information to ensure a match. At a subcommittee 

hearing last Congress, Members stated concerns about the technology including the 

fact that it would not be linked to State Department of Motor Vehicles Databases 

or to TSA’s No-Fly or Selectee lists. At that time, TSA decided to postpone the purchase of CAT/BPSS. However, the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request includes funding for it and a pre-solicitation procurement notice was issued on April 

24 for boarding pass scanners, which TSA hopes to eventually marry up with credential authentication technology. 

Has DHS Science and Technology been working with TSA to help CAT/BPSS meet 

technical requirements? If so, in what way? If not, why not? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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