OCS Study 

BOEMRE 2011-003 

 

Impact of Recent Hurricane Activity 

on Historic Shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico 

Outer Continental Shelf 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 

 Regulation and Enforcement 

Gulf of Mexico OCS Region 
OCS Study 

BOEMRE 2011-003 

Impacts of Recent Hurricane Activity 

on Historic Shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico 

Outer Continental Shelf 

Authors 

Robert Gearhart II 

Doug Jones 

Amy Borgens 

Sara Laurence 

Todd DeMunda 

Julie Shipp 

Prepared under BOEMRE Contract 

M07PC13010 

by 

PBS&J 

6504 Bridge Point Parkway 

Suite 200 

Austin, Texas 78730 

Published by 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 

 Regulation and Enforcement 

Gulf of Mexico OCS Region 

New Orleans

June 2011 
 iii 

DISCLAIMER 

This report was prepared under contract between the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 

Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and PBS&J. This report has been technically reviewed by 

the BOEMRE, and it has been approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents 

necessarily reflect the views and policies of the BOEMRE, nor does mention of trade names or 

commercial products constitute endorsement or recommendation for use. It is, however, exempt from 

review and compliance with the BOEMRE editorial standards. 

REPORT AVAILABILITY 

This report is available only in compact disc format from the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 

Regulation and Enforcement, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, at a charge of $15.00, by referencing OCS 

Study BOEMRE 2011-003. The report may be downloaded from the BOEMRE website through the 

Environmental Studies Program Information System (ESPIS). You will be able to obtain this report 

also from the National Technical Information Service in the near future. Here are the addresses. You 

may also inspect copies at selected Federal Depository Libraries. 

U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Department of Commerce 

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, National Technical Information Service 

 Regulation and Enforcement 5285 Port Royal Road 

Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Springfield, Virginia 22161 

Public Information Office (MS 5034) Phone: (703) 605-6040 

1201 Elmwood Park Boulevard Fax: (703) 605-6900 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70123-2394 Email: bookstore@ntis.gov

Telephone requests may be placed at 

(504) 736-2519, 1-800-200-GULF, or 

Rush Orders: 1-800-553-6847 

Fax: (504) 736-2620 

CITATION 

Gearhart, II, R., D. Jones, A. Borgens, S. Laurence, T. DeMunda, and J. Shipp. 2011. Impacts of 

recent hurricane activity on historic shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental 

Shelf. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 

Enforcement, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, New Orleans, LA. OCS Study BOEMRE 

2011-003. 202 pp. 

ABOUT THE COVER 

Cover image of Hurricane Katrina, courtesy of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

http://www.katrina.noaa.gov/satellite/satellite.html 
 v 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

PBS&J would like to thank several individuals for their contributions to the completion of this project. 

First and foremost, we would like to thank the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 

Enforcement (BOEMRE) for the opportunity to conduct this study, and especially Dave Ball, Chris 

Horrell, and Jack Irion for their support and cooperation. 

Additional thanks are due to Dave, Chris, and Herb Leedy (BOEMRE divers) for their assistance with 

fieldwork tasks; Paul Sjordal, Mark Henry, Roger Lackey, and Dan Hudson (PBS&J divers); Ken 

Bush and Sharon Cain of Fling Charters, and the rest of the Fling crew including Captain Bland Ellan, 

dive masters John, Dibble, and Mike, and cook, Riley; Chris Killilay (National Archives, Washington, 

D.C.), Claudia Jew (Mariners’ Museum), and the staff of the Steamship Historical Society for their 

invaluable archival research assistance; Linda Nance for report editing; Chris Vidrick and Bob Bryant 

for word processing and report formatting; Kim Griffin for report production; Bill Hailey for the cover 

graphics; PBS&J scientists Robert Rogers and Kathy Ketteridge for their respective contributions to 

the sedimentology and oceanographic modeling portions of this report; and finally to the members of 

Gentlemen of Fortune, Avery Munson, Gary and Renée Hebert, and Craig DeRouen for their eager 

cooperation and southern hospitality. 

Robert Gearhart served as the archaeological Principal Investigator for this study. Doug Jones, Amy 

Borgens, and Sara Laurence contributed analysis of the remote-sensing and archaeological diving 

results, archival research, and documentation of New York’s artifacts. Todd DeMunda performed the 

oceanographic wave-current interaction modeling, and Julie Shipp conducted the box core particlesize analysis. Dr. Kathryn Ketteridge and Robert Rogers provided scientific oversight for the 

oceanography and sedimentology tasks, respectively. 
 vii 

ABSTRACT 

In 2005 the Gulf of Mexico was significantly impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two of the 

costliest hurricanes in U.S. history. Combined, these storms destroyed over 100 offshore oil and gas 

platforms and damaged more than 500 pipeline segments. The extent of this damage raised concerns 

within BOEMRE’s Historic Preservation Program regarding the potential effects to Gulf of Mexico 

shipwrecks that were subjected to the same destructive forces. 

Ten wrecks were selected for investigation based on their proximity to the hurricane paths and on the 

availability of prestorm archaeological data. Each of these wrecks was subjected to a remote-sensing 

survey, and based on those results, four of the wrecks were selected for further investigation by divers 

in order to quantify the extents of storm-induced damage. When possible, box core sediment samples 

were collected and analyzed in order to characterize the marine sediments at each site. Previously 

published hindcast environmental data were further used to produce wave-current interaction models 

of the horizontal and vertical forces exerted on each of the four wrecks during peak-storm conditions. 

Archaeological and historical knowledge of the wrecks was supplemented by additional archival 

research, and, in the case of the wreck of New York, documentation of artifacts recovered by a private 

salvage operation. 

Quantifiable hurricane impacts varied widely among the four investigated wrecks, despite wavecurrent interaction models that illustrated consistently severe environmental conditions at each site. 

Two wrecks exhibited no discernible effects, and the combined data were at best inconclusive. 

Conversely, a third site was heavily impacted by bottom currents that resulted in significant hull 

collapse. The fourth site was not negatively affected by the hurricane forces, but was instead returned 

to a protective anaerobic environment due to complete reburial. These results differ significantly from 

documented hurricane impacts to wrecks sunk as artificial reefs in other regions of the U.S. The 

authors hypothesize that this discrepancy may be caused by an inverse relationship between the age of 

a shipwreck (i.e., the number of hurricanes it has been subjected to over time) and the damage caused 

by each subsequent hurricane event. 
CONTENTS 

Page 

List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................. xiii 

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ xv 

1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Study Objectives .................................................................................................................................... 3

1.2 Location of the Study ............................................................................................................................. 3

1.3 Scope of Investigations ......................................................................................................................... 5

2.0 HURRICANE IMPACTS TO ARTIFICIAL REEF WRECKS AND SUBMERGED PIPELINES ............... 9

2.1 Effects of Hurricanes on Vessels Sunk as Artificial Reefs .................................................................. 9

2.2 Effects of Hurricanes on Petroleum Industry Infrastructure............................................................... 16

3.0 PEAK STORM CONDITIONS .................................................................................................................... 19

3.1 Hydrodynamic Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 21

3.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 22

3.2.1 Environmental Data ............................................................................................................ 22

3.2.2 Shipwreck Data................................................................................................................... 23

3.2.3 Wave Model ........................................................................................................................ 23

3.2.4 Model Input ......................................................................................................................... 24

3.3 Results.................................................................................................................................................. 25

3.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................................................ 32

3.4.1 Hurricane-Induced Hydrodynamics in Shallow Water ...................................................... 34

4.0 RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................... 39

4.1 Methods................................................................................................................................................ 39

4.1.1 Remote-Sensing Survey .................................................................................................... 39

4.1.2 Diving Investigations ........................................................................................................... 39

4.1.3 Box Core Collection and Analysis ..................................................................................... 40

4.1.4 Archival Research .............................................................................................................. 42

4.1.5 NRHP Assessment ............................................................................................................ 42

4.2 Castine ................................................................................................................................................. 43

4.2.1 History ................................................................................................................................. 43

4.2.2 Archival Research .............................................................................................................. 47

4.2.2.1 Mariners’ Museum ....................................................................................... 47

4.2.2.2 National Archives ......................................................................................... 48

4.2.2.3 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) .......................................................................... 48

4.2.3 Previous Investigations ...................................................................................................... 49

4.2.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey........................................................................................... 49

4.2.5 2007 Diving Investigations ................................................................................................. 49

4.2.6 Sedimentology .................................................................................................................... 51

4.2.7 Impact Assessment ............................................................................................................ 52

4.2.8 National Register Assessment........................................................................................... 53

ix 
4.3 Site 323 ................................................................................................................................................ 53

4.3.1 History ................................................................................................................................. 54

4.3.2 Archival Research .............................................................................................................. 54

4.3.3 Previous Investigations ...................................................................................................... 55

4.3.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey........................................................................................... 57

4.3.5 2007 Diving Investigations ................................................................................................. 59

4.3.6 Sedimentology .................................................................................................................... 59

4.3.7 Impact Assessment ............................................................................................................ 63

4.3.8 National Register Assessment........................................................................................... 64

4.4 Gulf Tide ............................................................................................................................................... 64

4.4.1 History ................................................................................................................................. 65

4.4.2 Archival Research .............................................................................................................. 65

4.4.2.1 Mariners’ Museum ....................................................................................... 65

4.4.2.2 Library of Congress ..................................................................................... 66

4.4.2.3 National Archives ......................................................................................... 66

4.4.2.4 Additional Research .................................................................................... 66

4.4.3 Previous Investigations ...................................................................................................... 67

4.4.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey........................................................................................... 68

4.4.5 2007 Diving Investigations ................................................................................................. 70

4.4.6 Sedimentology .................................................................................................................... 72

4.4.7 Impact Assessment ............................................................................................................ 75

4.4.8 National Register Assessment........................................................................................... 76

4.5 New York .............................................................................................................................................. 76

4.5.1 History ................................................................................................................................. 77

4.5.2 Archival Research .............................................................................................................. 81

4.5.2.1 Mariners’ Museum ....................................................................................... 81

4.5.2.2 National Archives ......................................................................................... 82

4.5.2.3 New York Historical Society ........................................................................ 83

4.5.3 Previous Investigations ...................................................................................................... 83

4.5.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey........................................................................................... 84

4.5.5 2007 Diving Investigations ................................................................................................. 84

4.5.6 Sedimentology .................................................................................................................... 89

4.5.7 Impact Assessment ............................................................................................................ 91

4.5.8 National Register Assessment........................................................................................... 95

5.0 DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................................................. 99

5.1 Conclusion 1: Hurricanes Generate Substantial Seafloor Forces on the Shallow 

Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico .............................................................................................. 99

5.2 Conclusion 2: Damage to Primary Study Wrecks Was Substantially Less Than 

Anticipated based on the Level of Damage Reported for Many Artificial Reef Vessels .................. 99

5.3 Conclusion 3: Burial of Wooden Hulls has been Demonstrated, in the Case of New York, 

to Provide a High Degree of Protection from Hurricane Damage .................................................. 104

5.4 Conclusion 4: Anthropogenic damage to shipwrecks may be caused directly by human 

action or indirectly by hurricanes acting upon manmade structures. ............................................. 106

5.5 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................... 108

5.5.1 Research Recommendations ......................................................................................... 108

x 
Page 

xi 

5.5.2 Management Recommendations ................................................................................... 109

6.0 LITERATURE CITED ............................................................................................................................... 111

APPENDICES 

A Pre- and Posthurricane Remote-Sensing Data for Secondary Wreck Sites .................................. 121 

B Additional Archival Research .......................................................................................................... 139 

C New York Artifacts .......................................................................................................................... 149 

D History of Tropical Storms Affecting Primary Study Sites .............................................................. 197 
LIST OF FIGURES

Page 

1 Hurricane Katrina, August 28, 2005 ................................................................................................... 1

2 Hurricane Rita, September 25, 2005 .................................................................................................. 2

3 Wreck locations .................................................................................................................................. 4

4 Maximum wind speeds from Oceanweather, Inc. ............................................................................ 19

5 Maximum wave height from Oceanweather, Inc. ............................................................................. 20

6 Ship alignment relative to incident wave, USS Castine.................................................................... 26

7 Wave profile, USS Castine ............................................................................................................... 26

8 Velocity time series, USS Castine .................................................................................................... 27

9 Ship alignment relative to incident wave, New York ......................................................................... 27

10 Wave profile, New York .................................................................................................................... 28

11 Velocity time series, New York ......................................................................................................... 28

12 Ship alignment relative to incident wave, Gulf Tide .......................................................................... 29

13 Wave profile, Gulf Tide ..................................................................................................................... 29

14 Velocity time series, Gulf Tide .......................................................................................................... 30

15 Ship alignment relative to incident wave, Site 323 ........................................................................... 30

16 Wave profile, Site 323 ....................................................................................................................... 31

17 Velocity time series, Site 323 ........................................................................................................... 31

18 Maximum wind speed, Hurricane Rita .............................................................................................. 35

19 Maximum significant wave height and direction, Hurricane Rita ...................................................... 35

20 Maximum bottom current velocity, Hurricane Rita ............................................................................ 36

21 Maximum change in current velocity (m/s) in a single wave cycle, Hurricane Rita .......................... 36

22 Maximum pressure differentials caused by passing waves, Hurricane Rita .................................... 37

23 Diver-operated box core ................................................................................................................... 40

24 USS Castine at anchor, 1916 ........................................................................................................... 43

25 USS Castine deck plan ..................................................................................................................... 44

26 USS Castine ..................................................................................................................................... 47

27 USS Castine alongside submarine Viper ......................................................................................... 48

28 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Castine ............................................................................ 50

29 Sector-scan sonar image of Castine showing scattered debris on the seafloor .............................. 51

30 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Site 323 ........................................................................... 57

31 2006 sonar imagery of Site 323 ........................................................................................................ 58

32 Close-up of 2004 Site 323 sonar imagery showing weakened hull at the stern ............................... 58

33 Sector-scan sonar and DIDSON imagery of Site 323 hull damage ................................................. 60

34 Box core sample from Site 323 ........................................................................................................ 61

35 Sediment and Pleistocene clay outcrops in the vicinity of Site 323 ................................................. 62

36 Configuration of typical cutterhead dredge ....................................................................................... 65

37 Cutterhead-type dredge, YM-09, 1943 ............................................................................................. 67

38 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery for Gulf Tide ........................................................................ 68

xiii 
xiv 

39 Gulf Tide Sector-Scan and DIDSON Data........................................................................................ 69

40 YM-22 plan ....................................................................................................................................... 71

41 Box cores collected at Gulf Tide ....................................................................................................... 72

42 Surface sediments in the vicinity of Gulf Tide................................................................................... 74

43 SS New York .................................................................................................................................... 77

44 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of New York ........................................................................ 84

45 Sector-scan sonar imagery of New York .......................................................................................... 85

46 New York site plan .......................................................................................................... (map pocket)  

47 Underwater photos of New York ....................................................................................................... 86

48 2008 GOM storms ............................................................................................................................ 94

49 Compass orientation of shipwreck hulls from UTM Zone 15N ....................................................... 102

50 Shear strength of sediments in waters of the western Gulf of Mexico less than 328 

ft (100 m) deep ............................................................................................................................... 105

51 Sonar image of trawler scars on the seabed .................................................................................. 107
LIST OF TABLES 

Page 

1 Shipwrecks Selected for Study ........................................................................................................... 4

2 Postsurvey Damage Assessment and Recommendations ................................................................ 7

3 Hurricane Damage to Steel Vessels Used as Artificial Reefs .......................................................... 11

4 Saffir-Simpson Scale of Sustained Wind Speed .............................................................................. 21

5 Peak Hindcast Parameters for Each Shipwreck Location ................................................................ 22

6 Shipwreck Physical Parameters ....................................................................................................... 23

7 Parameters Used for Wave Calculations .......................................................................................... 24

8 Summary of Wave Model Results .................................................................................................... 25

9 Water and Wind Currents of Equivalent Force ................................................................................. 34

10 Castine Particle-size Results ............................................................................................................ 51

11 Gulf-built Offshore Supply Boats that Have Been Lost .................................................................... 56

12 Site 323 Particle-size Results ........................................................................................................... 61

13 Gulf Tide Particle-size Results ......................................................................................................... 73

14 List of Passengers and Crew of New York ....................................................................................... 80

15 SS New York Particle-size Results ................................................................................................... 90

xv 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 

Within a four-week period in the second half of 2005, the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) was significantly 

impacted by two major hurricanes, Katrina and Rita. Hurricane Katrina is considered the costliest and 

one of the deadliest hurricanes ever to strike the United States coast. Though the storm was a Category 

3 hurricane when it made landfall, it had reached Category 5 intensity when centered 196 miles (mi) 

(315 kilometers [km]) southeast of the Mississippi River mouth. At its peak, the storm had maximum 

sustained wind speeds of 173 miles per hour (mph) (77.3 meters per second [m/s]) extending over an 

area 30 mi (48.3 km) in diameter (Figure 1), and a central pressure of 902 millibars (mb). At the time, 

this was the fourth lowest central pressure on record for any hurricane in the Atlantic Basin. A 

National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) buoy located approximately 65 mi (105 km) south of Dauphin 

Island, Alabama, registered an estimated maximum wave height of 105 feet (ft) (32 meters [m]), with 

sustained seas over 12 ft (3.7 m) for 47 hours. At the time of peak wave height, the eye of the storm 

was approximately 73 mi (117 km) west of the buoy. 

Figure 1. Hurricane Katrina, August 28, 2005 (Image courtesy of the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/ 

stories2009/20090715_ fltipsheet.html). 

Similarly, Hurricane Rita maintained Category 5 intensity for about 18 hours, reaching peak sustained 

winds of 178 mph (79.6 m/s) when 311 mi (500 km) south-southwest of the Mississippi River mouth 

(Figure 2). It had a minimum central pressure of 897 mb, which surpassed Katrina for the fourth 

lowest central pressure on record in the Atlantic Basin. An NDBC buoy located approximately 22 mi 

(35 km) east of Galveston registered an estimated maximum wave height of 38 ft (11.6 m) when the 

eye of Rita was approximately 47 mi (76 km) east of the buoy. 

1 
Figure 2. Hurricane Rita, September 25, 2005 (Image courtesy of NOAA, http://www.nnvl.noaa. 

gov/cgi-bin/index.cgi?page=items&ser=109799). 

Not surprisingly, the massive forces associated with these storms left a wide path of destruction and 

devastation, not only in the coastal areas where they made landfall, but also on and beneath the waters 

of the GOM. The combined wrath of Katrina and Rita destroyed over 100 offshore oil and gas 

platforms and jackup rigs, and damaged more than 500 pipeline segments (Det Norske Veritas [DNV] 

2007:45). Damage to surface structures exposed to such conditions was to be expected. Significant 

impacts to submerged and relatively low-profile pipelines, however, were somewhat more surprising. 

For example, a 27-mi (43.5-km) segment of 18-inch-diameter (45.7-centimeter [cm]) pipe at a depth 

of 209 ft (63.7 m) experienced a maximum lateral displacement of 3,000 ft (914 m) when subjected to 

a significant wave height of 38 ft (11.6 m) (DNV 2007:51). 

The magnitude of this pipeline damage raised questions within the Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management, Regulation and Enforcement’s (BOEMRE) Historic Preservation Program regarding 

the potential environmental effects to shipwrecks lying on or embedded in the seabed when storms of 

such magnitude pass nearby. Evidence from pipeline damage reports and storm track records suggests 

that many historic shipwrecks on the GOM Continental Shelf have been affected to some degree by 

multiple hurricanes. To what extent have these hurricanes played a role in the formation and evolution 

of shipwreck sites? 

In response to the destructive forces of these two Category 5 hurricanes, BOEMRE allocated over 

$1.5 million through their Environmental Studies Program to conduct research on the impacts of these 

storms on natural and cultural resources. In January 2007, BOEMRE contracted PBS&J of Austin, 

Texas, to assess the impacts of recent hurricane activity on selected historic shipwrecks in the GOM. 

2 
1.1 Study Objectives 

BOEMRE, an agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior, is tasked by Section 106 of the National 

Historic Preservation Act to take into account the effects of their undertakings, including their 

permitted actions, on historic properties. This study supports that mission by providing a baseline for 

expectations regarding hurricane damage of shipwrecks against which anthropogenic damage 

associated with oil and gas activity can be measured. 

PBS&J was contracted to investigate six wreck sites. In actuality, a total of ten sites were surveyed, 

including a follow-up diver assessment of four shipwrecks that had been documented by sonar survey 

and/or by diver visual inspection sometime prior to the passage of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Prestorm baseline conditions for each of these four sites were established through review of published 

literature concerning archaeology, geology, sediments, and oceanography. Peak storm environmental 

conditions at each site were modeled from published wave and current data for Katrina and Rita. 

Poststorm conditions were determined by conducting a remote-sensing survey and subsequent 

archaeological diver investigation of each wreck. 

The specific objectives of this study were to: (1) conduct remote-sensing surveys in order to document 

the macro-scale poststorm condition of the sites; (2) compare and contrast pre- and poststorm remotesensing data from each site; (3) carry out diver investigations of selected sites to document areas that 

had changed during the period between pre- and poststorm surveys; (4) collect sedimentary samples in 

order to characterize the substrate; (5) estimate peak storm conditions on the seafloor at each site 

based on wave-current interaction models; and (6) conduct archival and historical research of the 

primary study sites to fill gaps in their histories. Shipwrecks were selected for study based on the 

following criteria: they had to be less than 130 ft (39.6 m) deep in order to permit scientific diving; 

each had to have been imaged by side-scan sonar prior to Katrina and Rita; and they had to be located 

less than 75 mi (121 km) from the eye of either storm. 

1.2 Location of the Study 

The scope of work originally proposed assessing hurricane damage of six shipwreck sites. Based on 

discussions at the contract kickoff meeting, the list of study wrecks (Table 1) was revised to include 

five high-priority wrecks (proposed for dive investigations) and four secondary study sites in case 

geophysical survey results indicated that one or more of the high-priority sites was unsuitable for the 

purposes of the study. Three alternative study sites were added to the survey plan, and one primary 

site, Site 15306, was removed from the primary (diving) list during fieldwork based on discussions 

with BOEMRE. During the remote-sensing survey cruise in May 2007, two secondary sites, Wagon 

Train and Caribe No. 500, were removed from the study list, following consultation with BOEMRE. 

As a result, a total of 10 sites were visited by PBS&J during the posthurricane geophysical survey 

(Table 1 and Figure 3). Four of those sites (referred to as the primary study sites) (Table 1), were also 

subjected to dive investigations. 

3 
Table 1 

Shipwrecks Selected for Study 

Name Lease Block Area Hurricane Proximity 

*New York High Island 34.4 mi (55.4 km) West of Rita 

*Gulf Tide West Cameron 8.4 mi (13.5 km) West of Rita 

*Site 323 East Cameron 28.5 mi (45.9 km) East of Rita 

*Castine Grand Isle 30.4 mi (48.9 km) West of Katrina 

**Site 15306 Vermillion 37.5 mi (60.4 km) East of Rita 

**R.M. Parker Jr. South Timbalier 69.6 mi (112.0 km) West of Katrina 

**Sheherazade Eugene Island 82.6 mi (133.0 km) East of Rita 

**Site 389 South Timbalier 63.3 mi (101.9 km) West of Katrina 

**Site 343 High Island 23.4 mi (37.6 km) West of Rita 

**USS Hatteras Galveston 77.7 mi (125.0 km) West of Rita 

***Wagon Train Eugene Island 78.3 mi (125.9 km) East of Rita 

***Caribe No. 500 Eugene Island 77.2 mi (124.3 km) East of Rita 

* Primary study sites (geophysical survey and diving). 

** Secondary study sites; geophysical survey only. 

*** Not visited; removed from study list during survey trip. 

Figure 3. Wreck locations. 

4 
Although this study focused on the effect of hurricanes Katrina and Rita on historic shipwrecks, this 

topic has implications for the entire Continental Shelf in the GOM, as well as for other shallow areas 

affected by tropical weather. Throughout this report any reference to the Continental Shelf refers to 

the actual geophysical feature by that name, rather than to the larger geo-political region known as the 

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The OCS includes the seafloor lying between the seaward extent of 

the States’ jurisdiction and the seaward extent of Federal jurisdiction and includes substantial 

deepwater areas. The seaward margin of the Continental Shelf (i.e., the top of the Continental Slope) 

in the GOM occurs at a depth of about 590 ft (180 m). The effects of hurricanes upon the seafloor, 

however, are limited to the actual Continental Shelf at depths of less than approximately 300 ft (91 m). 

Mention in this report of the shallow Continental Shelf refers to that portion of the shelf that is less 

than 300 ft (91 m) deep. 

1.3 Scope of Investigations 

With this study, BOEMRE sought a multidisciplinary approach to site interpretation, utilizing a 

combination of archaeology, sediment analysis, and oceanographic wave modeling. This research 

design was intended both to quantify hurricane damage to sites, and, in a broader sense, to use that 

information as an analytical tool to differentiate between natural and anthropogenic impacts on other 

GOM wrecks, particularly those impacts associated with the petroleum and commercial fishing 

industries. Each of the selected sites was evaluated based on the combined analysis of their prestorm, 

peakstorm, and poststorm conditions. 

The level of prestorm knowledge varied significantly from one site to the next. In every case, sidescan sonar imagery predated the hurricanes, although the quality of this imagery was not always 

adequate for accurate analysis. All but two sites, 389 and 343, were visited by archaeological divers 

prior to the hurricanes; however, in all cases the extents of site documentation varied. 

Over the duration of this study, prestorm baseline site information was collected relating to 

archaeology, history, hurricanes, sediments, geology, oceanography, pipeline damage reports, and 

artificial reef damage reports. Much of this information is of a general nature relevant to broad 

expanses of the GOM, while other sources are specific to the study sites. Examples of anthropogenic 

damage to wrecks were also collected in order to compare and contrast these with hurricane damage. 

Peak storm conditions at each site were modeled using hindcast predictions of wave height and 

bottom surge currents, based upon storm conditions recorded at weather buoys that geographically 

bracket the study sites (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006). Characterizations of storm effects on study sites 

were supplemented where possible by reports of damage to nearby pipelines. These environmental 

data were combined with archaeological data to produce a site-specific oceanographic wave-current 

interaction model that quantified peak storm waves relative to wreck orientations, wave particle 

velocity ranges, and duration of individual storm wave interaction with each site. 

A combination of methods, including magnetometer and side-scan sonar survey, diver examination of 

shipwrecks, and analysis of sediment cores was used to document the poststorm condition of each site. 

Poststorm site maps were prepared based on side-scan and sector-scan sonar imagery, magnetometer 

data, and diver observations, and then compared with prestorm site data acquired from BOEMRE files 

and published studies. 

5 
Archaeological site investigations were divided between two separate field cruises in 2007. The 

remote-sensing survey was conducted over four days in May 2007. Following analysis of the 

geophysical data and coordination of diving objectives, the diver investigation of selected sites was 

performed over 10 days in October 2007. Collection of sediment cores was conducted concurrent with 

the archaeological diving. 

A total of 10 sites were surveyed during the May 2007 remote-sensing cruise. These included the five 

sites initially selected by BOEMRE as high-priority targets, two of the sites selected as secondary 

targets, and three sites added to the survey plan during the fieldwork. A separate field decision was 

made in consultation with the BOEMRE Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) to 

exclude the remaining two secondary wrecks, Caribe 500 and Wagon Train, from further study. This 

decision was based on a number of factors, including the fact that survey data up to that point 

demonstrated an apparently minimal effect of the storms on other study sites that were located much 

closer to storm paths than were either of the excluded sites. 

Brief reconnaissance level surveys, consisting of limited side-scan sonar passes, were conducted at 

three wreck sites that were not on the initial project list. These three sites included Site 389 (possibly 

J.A. Bisso), Site 343, and Site 236 (USS Hatteras). These surveys were of limited duration; an 

opportunity presented itself to visit these three sites because they were situated near the paths of travel 

between higher-priority study sites. The decision to conduct these additional surveys was made in 

consultation with the COTR. 

Analysis of the pre- and poststorm sonar data at the 10 sites indicated possible storm damage to three 

of the five high-priority sites, including Site 323 and the dredge Gulf Tide (the two closest to 

Hurricane Rita’s track), and the wood-hulled wreck of the steamship New York. Those three sites were 

selected for diver investigation during the October 2007 cruise, along with USS Castine, which was 

selected because it was the closest study site to Hurricane Katrina’s path (Gearhart 2007a). There had 

been no apparent change to Site 15306 or to the secondary study sites; therefore, given their relatively 

greater distance from storm tracks than the primary wrecks, no further investigation was 

recommended. Table 2 presents a synopsis of remote-sensing results and recommendations for each 

site.

Priorities for diver assessments were determined in part by the types and quality of prestorm data 

available. The purpose of these investigations was to clarify the remote-sensing data and to document 

current site conditions to the extent they indicated the presence or absence of poststorm impacts. 

Further objectives were to determine the identity of Site 323 based on site characteristics and to 

confirm the suspected identification of the West Cameron–area wreck as Gulf Tide, a mid-twentiethcentury dredge boat. Finally, each site was to be evaluated for its eligibility for listing on the National 

Register of Historic Places (NRHP). 

6 
Table 2 

Postsurvey Damage Assessment and Recommendations 

Name Damage Recommendations 

New York Increased exposure; reports of salvage 

activity 

Diving to document extent of storm 

damage and salvage 

Gulf Tide Possibly increased exposure, but earlier 

sonar imagery of poor quality 

Diving to document extent of storm 

damage 

Site 323 Significant hull breakage near stern Diving to document extent of storm 

damage 

Castine No apparent change This is the closest wreck to Hurricane 

Katrina, so even though no gross change is 

apparent from new sonar imagery, diving is 

recommended 

Site 15306 No apparent change No further investigation 

R.M. Parker Jr. No apparent change No further investigation 

Sheherazade No apparent change No further investigation 

Site 389 No apparent change No further investigation 

Site 343 Assessment of storm damage 

complicated by poor quality of earlier 

sonar imagery 

No further investigation unless sufficient 

previous data exist to allow meaningful 

comparisons 

USS Hatteras No apparent change No further investigation 

Following completion of the fieldwork, BOEMRE issued a contract modification for additional 

archival research on the four primary study wrecks selected for diver investigation. This research was 

intended to supplement the baseline archaeological knowledge of each vessel by acquiring as much 

information as possible on the vessels’ hull construction details, use histories, and wrecking events. 

The scope of research included a trip to the Mariners’ Museum in Newport News, Virginia, the 

Library of Congress, and National Archives branches in Washington, D.C., and College Park, 

Maryland. Documents researched included various collections of ship plans, drawings, photographs, 

vessel papers, insurance records, registers and enrollments, and newspaper archives. At the request of 

BOEMRE, additional time was devoted to researching several reported but not yet discovered GOM 

shipwrecks that were not included in the hurricane impacts study. This research was intended to locate 

information that would fill in gaps in the reported vessel information and potentially assist in the 

wrecks’ eventual discovery and identification. 

Finally, a second contract modification was issued for inventorying and cataloging artifacts recovered 

from the wreck of New York. The salvage group Gentlemen of Fortune, who initially discovered the 

wreck in 1990, have been conducting periodic excavations of the site since 1994, including one that 

ended only a few days prior to PBS&J’s arrival during the October 2007 dive cruise. Gentlemen of 

Fortune had previously filed a civil claim for salvage rights in U.S. District Court, on August 31, 2006 

(U.S. District Court, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette-Opelousas Division 2006). This claim 

was granted on February 2, 2007 (U.S. District Court, Western District of Louisiana, LafayetteOpelousas Division 2007). In December 2008, Gentlemen of Fortune invited PBS&J to their facilities 

7 
8 

in New Iberia, Louisiana, to examine the artifact assemblage and provide guidance on proper 

conservation methods. 

This report is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 examines the magnitudes of Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita relative to other hurricanes in the GOM, and also discusses previously studied effects of 

hurricanes on petroleum industry infrastructure and vessels sunk as artificial reefs. Chapter 3 presents 

the methodology and results of the wave-current interaction model and hydrodynamic analysis of 

peak-storm site conditions. Chapter 4 presents the results of the historical/archival research, remotesensing survey, diver investigation, sediment analysis, hurricane impact assessment, and NRHP 

assessment for each of the four primary study sites. A discussion of conclusions follows in Chapter 5, 

including a discussion of potential direct and indirect effects of hurricanes on historic shipwrecks and 

an analysis of this study’s results compared with previous studies of hurricane effects on wrecks sunk 

as artificial reefs. Bibliographic references are listed in Chapter 6, and supplementary information is 

appended to the end of the report. Appendix A presents the remote-sensing survey results for the six 

secondary wrecks not selected for diver investigation as well as an analysis of posthurricane remotesensing data collected by BOEMRE on the steamboat Josephine. Additional archival research results 

for GOM shipwrecks not included in the hurricane impact study are provided in Appendix B. A 

discussion and catalog of artifacts recovered from New York by Gentlemen of Fortune is presented in 

Appendix C, and a history of tropical storms potentially affecting the four primary study sites is 

provided as Appendix D. 
2.0 HURRICANE IMPACTS TO ARTIFICIAL REEF WRECKS AND 

SUBMERGED PIPELINES 

Hurricanes are the most severe weather events to regularly affect the GOM, and have been responsible 

for an untold number of shipping losses. Throughout history, a large number of hurricanes have 

passed through the GOM, yet their effect upon the site formation processes of sunken ships is poorly 

understood. It is probable that such storms have played a central role in the degradation of shipwrecks. 

But as wrecks break down and disperse through a combination of chemical and physical processes, 

hurricanes might also play a key role in preserving the remaining material through burial. 

Quantifying the effects of storms upon shipwrecks is a difficult task. A comprehensive study of this 

topic would require long-term monitoring of several sunken vessels representative of different hull 

types, construction materials, water depths and substrate materials. One would need to conduct field 

visits to each site at regular intervals. This would include a site visit soon after a storm passes near 

each wreck in order to establish a baseline from which to measure storm damage and to differentiate 

hurricane effects from structural collapse caused by the long-term degradation of chemical and 

biological processes. The financial resources and time required for such an approach would be 

prohibitive. 

The approach of the present study relies upon the body of previous archaeological research conducted 

in the GOM as the source of baseline (prestorm) observations, thereby limiting the expense to 

poststorm observations and analysis. The timing of the study, following Katrina and Rita, two of the 

largest storms ever recorded in the GOM, offered the possibility of making poststorm observations on 

several shipwrecks in a coordinated research effort. Unfortunately, there are only a small number of 

shipwrecks near the path of either Katrina or Rita for which adequate prestorm data exist, and the 

types and quality of prestorm data limit the conclusions one can draw regarding the effects of storms 

on shipwrecks. Therefore, it is instructive to look elsewhere for parallel examples of the damages 

inflicted on shipwrecks by hurricanes. 

2.1 Effects of Hurricanes on Vessels Sunk as Artificial Reefs 

The most abundant documentation of hurricane damage to sunken ships comes from diver accounts of 

vessels sunk as artificial reefs. Artificial reef wrecks are frequently visited by sport divers, so damage 

resulting from a single storm is quickly observed and often documented in some fashion. All of the 

states bordering the GOM have government-sponsored programs to promote the development of 

artificial reefs. The Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission (GSMFC), founded in 1949 by joint 

agreement of all five states bordering the GOM, “has as its principal objective the conservation, 

development, and full utilization of the fishery resources of the Gulf of Mexico. . . .” (Gulf States 

Marine Fisheries Commission 2008). The intentional sinking of ships accounts for about 25 percent of 

all artificial reefs in the GOM (Gregg and Murphey 1994). The first systematic use of ships to create 

artificial reefs in the GOM was the sinking of 26 Liberty ships off four Gulf states during the 1970s. 

These Liberty ships were obsolete World War II–era vessels acquired from the U.S. Maritime 

Administration’s reserve fleet. 

In 1997, the Artificial Reef Subcommittee of the GSMFC compiled a document titled Guidelines for 

Marine Artificial Reef Materials to provide a comprehensive discussion of the various materials 

9 
commonly used to create artificial reefs, including detailed information regarding the use of sunken 

vessels for that purpose. The second edition of the GSMFC guidelines (Lukens and Selberg 2004) was 

updated, reorganized, and illustrated in collaboration with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 

Commission. The purpose of the report was to assist states with selecting materials for artificial reef 

construction that would best serve the objectives of the Gulf and Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 

Commissions. The authors focus on the stability and durability of artificial reef materials, including 

chapters on steel and wooden vessels. The wealth of information in that report regarding the effects of 

hurricanes on sunken vessels has direct relevance to this study. 

Anecdotal information concerning 37 incidents of hurricane damage to artificial reef vessels is 

summarized in Table 3 for Hurricanes Andrew, Opal, Dennis, Frances, Jeanne, and Ivan. Hurricane 

damage has been reported in water depths (to top of reef) ranging from 31 to 178 ft (9.4–54.3 m). 

Several forms of vessel damage have been observed at artificial reefs as described in Table 3 and 

below. Historic shipwrecks might be affected by storms in any or all of these same ways: 

Structural Failure. This is the most common category of damage and includes collapse of major hull 

structure and/or complete detachment of structural elements from one another (Horn 2005a; Lukens 

and Selberg 2004; Maher 1996; Pemberton 2005; Turpin and Bortone 2002). At least 28 (65 percent) 

of the vessels in Table 3 underwent some degree of structural failure. Examples include collapse of 

outer hulls (especially along broad unsupported spans such as the sides of cargo holds); separation of 

the pilothouse or other superstructure from the deck; and separation of bow and/or stern from the rest 

of the hull. Adjectives used to describe such damage in published reports include ripped, torn, and 

twisted. Large ships were broken into as many as five sections, as was the case with Antares. 

Lateral Displacement. At least nine vessels in Table 3 experienced measurable displacement ranging 

from 30 ft (9.1 m) to 1.5 mi (2.4 km). Direction of movement was not always indicated in the source; 

however, William Horn (2005a:11) stated that vessels move not in the direction of storm surge but in 

the direction of wave travel. Lukens and Selberg (2004:25) related a story of a 450-ft (137-m) troop 

ship sunk off the South Carolina Coast that literally bounced across the bottom for a distance of 700 ft 

(213 m). 

Rolling. At least seven vessels in Table 3 experienced a roll displacement during a hurricane. In half of 

those cases, the rolling was at least partially attributed to scour alongside the hull. The degree of roll 

varied from a slight list to a full 90 degree roll, as in the well-publicized case of Spiegel Grove (Horn 

2005b). The ex-USS Spiegel Grove was a 510-ft (155-m) LSD (dock landing ship) commissioned for 

the U.S. Navy in 1956. When Spiegel Grove was sunk as an artificial reef in 2002, it inadvertently 

came to rest on its starboard side in 133 ft (40.5 m) of water. The port side of the ship was only 50 ft 

(15.2 m) deep when the waves of Hurricane Dennis struck the top of the ship broadside in 2005 and 

rolled it into a fully upright position. In the process, Spiegel Grove settled into a 12-ft-deep (3.7-m) 

scour that had formed along the west side of the hull. 

Vertical Displacement. At least six vessels in Table 3 experienced vertical displacement ranging from 

7 to 20 ft (2.1–6.1 m) due to scouring by swift storm currents. In two cases, hulls were cracked and 

beginning to break apart due to the scouring of sediments from beneath them. 

A number of factors affect the stability and structural integrity of vessels deployed as artificial reefs. 

For example, Lukens and Selberg (2004:34) state that, 

10 
Table 3 

Hurricane Damage to Steel Vessels Used as Artificial Reefs 

Name 

Length 

(ft) 

Vessel 

Type 

Reef Age 

When 

Damaged 

(yrs) 

Depth 

(ft) 

Vertical 

Relief (ft)

Wind 

Speed 

Estimated

at Reef 

(mph)* Hurricane 

Description of 

Damage Source 

Almirante 210 freighter 17 125 20 86–121 Andrew ship turned 

upside down; 17 

years of coral 

growth scoured 

off 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Andro 165 freighter 7 105 25 115–173 Andrew stack damaged; 

cargo area 

collapsed; stern 

section torn off 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Belcher 

Barge 

195 barge 17 57 10 86–121 Andrew several steel 

plates torn off 

barge 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Belzona One 85 tug 2 73 20 109–132 Andrew wheel house 

ripped off 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Biscayne 120 freighter 18 60 15 109–132 Andrew stern section 

partially 

separated from 

main hull by 

adjacent wreck 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Blue Fire 175 freighter 9 110 20 98–132 Andrew part of hull and 

superstructure 

separated; 

moved 10 yards; 

listing 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Concepcion 150 freighter 1 68 20 115–155 Andrew mid-cargo area 

collapsed; stern 

section separated 

from hull 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

C-One 120 Navy tug 2 65 33 115–155 Andrew hull listing in 10-ft 

deep scour hole 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Deep Freeze 210 freighter 16 135 30 109–138 Andrew 35 ft of stern 

section separated 

from hull 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Doc De Milly 287 freighter 6 150 50 81–104 Andrew no damage Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Mercedes 250 freighter 7 97 unknown <81 Andrew hull broken in 3 

places 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Miracle 

Express 

100 freighter 5 60 8 104–132 Andrew pushed on top of 

Biscayne; hull 

broken into 

pieces 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

11 
Table 3. Hurricane Damage to Steel Vessels Used as Artificial Reefs (continued). 

Name 

Length 

(ft) 

Vessel 

Type 

Reef Age 

When 

Damaged 

(yrs) 

Depth 

(ft) 

Vertical 

Relief (ft)

Wind 

Speed 

Estimated

at Reef 

(mph)* Hurricane 

Description of 

Damage Source 

Narwhal 137 freighter 6 115 18 115–155 Andrew 90 percent of 

structure 

collapsed; many 

areas reduced to 

steel plates on 

sand 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Noula 

Express 

220 freighter 4 90 unknown <81 Andrew hull broken in 3 

places 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Orion 118 tug (ship?) 11 95 15 109–132 Andrew pilothouse ripped 

from hull 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Police Barge 75 barge ? 55 unknown unknown Andrew moved 75 yards 

onto concrete 

reef material; hull 

has opened up 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Proteus 220 freighter 7 72 18 109–132 Andrew stern ripped off; 

remainder of 

wreck moved 100 

yards and is 

broken up 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Rio Miami 105 tug 3 63 30 109–132 Andrew settled 20 ft into 

sand depression 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Shamrock 120 Navy LCI 7 46 15 109–138 Andrew coral scoured 

from hull; position 

and condition 

unchanged 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Sheri Lyn 235 freighter 5 95 15 104–132 Andrew 50 ft of stern 

broken off; 

moved into 105 ft 

of water 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

South Seas 175 yacht 9 65 15 104–132 Andrew stern broke off; 

vessel moved 50 

ft 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Star Trek 200 freighter 10 210 32 104–132 Andrew some steel plates 

torn off; largely 

intact; same 

position 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

St. Anne 

D'Auray 

110 North 

Atlantic 

trawler 

6 68 28 104–132 Andrew intact; unchanged Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Tarpoon 164 coastal 

freighter 

4 65 5 104–132 Andrew complete 

destruction 

Blair et al. 

1994 

Tarpoon 165 grain carrier 4 71 5 104–132 Andrew moved inshore 75 

yards; pushed up 

against natural 

reefs; hull broke 

into 3 pieces 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

12 
Table 3. Hurricane Damage to Steel Vessels Used as Artificial Reefs (continued). 

Name 

Length 

(ft) 

Vessel 

Type 

Reef Age 

When 

Damaged 

(yrs) 

Depth 

(ft) 

Vertical 

Relief (ft)

Wind 

Speed 

Estimated

at Reef 

(mph)* Hurricane 

Description of 

Damage Source 

Ultrafreeze 195 freighter 8 118 45 104–132 Andrew starboard side of 

hull ripped open; 

vessel bent 

amidships at 90-

degree angle; 

pilothouse torn 

from hull 

Lukens and 

Selberg 

2004 

Zion Train 164 coastal 

freighter 

1.7 90 35 90–100 Frances prior to Frances 

sides had 

collapsed from 

offshore passage 

of Floyd in 2003; 

Frances 

detached the bow 

and moved it 1.3 

nm; stern 

scoured to 

limestone and 

moved 7 ft 

deeper 

Horn 2005a

Esso 

Bonaire 

250 petro tanker 15 90 unknown 75–85 

(Jeanne); 

90–100 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

no obvious 

damage 

Horn 2005a

Gilbert Sea 174 coastal 

freighter 

2.5 89 40 70–75 

(Jeanne); 

85–100 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

bow broke from 

the hold and 

rolled forward 

and starboard; 

small holes 

present in side of 

hull; sandblasted 

stern completely 

separated from 

hold, rolled 

backward and to 

port 

Horn 

2005a; 

Pemberton 

2005 

Miss Jenny ? barge/dredg

e 

14 90 unknown 75–85 

(Jeanne); 

90–100 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

no obvious 

damage 

Horn 2005a

Shasha 

Boekanier 

185 coastal 

freighter 

2.6 89 40 70–75 

(Jeanne); 

85–100 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

entire first hold 

collapsed to 

within 3 ft of 

sand; starboard 

(south) bulkhead 

nearly collapsed 

and stern support 

inside hull has 

broken 

Horn 

2005a; 

Pemberton 

2005 

13 
Table 3. Hurricane Damage to Steel Vessels Used as Artificial Reefs (continued). 

Name 

Length 

(ft) 

Vessel 

Type 

Reef Age 

When 

Damaged 

(yrs) 

Depth 

(ft) 

Vertical 

Relief (ft)

Wind 

Speed 

Estimated

at Reef 

(mph)* Hurricane 

Description of 

Damage Source 

St. Jacques 175 coastal 

freighter 

2.5 89 40 70–75 

(Jeanne); 

85–100 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

both sides of hold 

collapsed 

shoreward (west) 

and completely 

broken from 

stern; both hull 

bulkheads 

collapsed to the 

west 

Horn 

2005a; 

Pemberton 

2005 

Thozina 175 coastal 

freighter 

1.7 89 40 70–75 

(Jeanne); 

85–100 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

bow is badly 

broken at the 

hold and rolled 

toward shore 

(west); ship has 

rolled westward 

and the stern has 

broken off 

completely 

Horn 

2005a; 

Pemberton 

2005 

USS 

Muliphen

459 WWII–era 

ex-Navy 

cargo ship 

15 184 100 95–100 

(Jeanne); 

100–105 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

major scour holes 

at bow and stern; 

moved 10 ft 

deeper; bow 

crack 6 ft wide; 

bow sagging into 

scour 

Horn 2005a

USS Rankin 459 WWII–era 

ex-Navy 

cargo ship 

16 141 70 90–100 

(Jeanne); 

100–105 

(Frances) 

Frances/ 

Jeanne 

ship still lying on 

starboard side; 

scouring beneath 

bow; bow 

cracking and 

breaking off from 

aft hull; torn and 

twisted forward; 

port cargo area 

collapsed; deck 

torn from hull and 

lying west of hull; 

ship moved 10 ft 

deeper; 10 ft of 

sand removed 

from limestone 

outcrops in scour 

along east side of 

hull 

Horn 2005a

Antares 387 cargo 

vessel; in 

pieces after 

Opal 

9 131 60 121 Ivan moved sections; 

turned over stern 

section that had 

been upright 

Horn 2005a

Belize 

Queen 

86 tug 3 111 35 121 Ivan moved 180 ft Horn 2005a

Mohawk 

Chief 

92 tug 1 125 27 121 Ivan moved 60 ft 

laterally and 10 ft 

deeper 

Horn 

2005a; 

Horn and 

Mille 2005 

Mariner 68 tug 6 70 15 75–80 Jeanne no obvious 

damage 

Horn 2005a

14 
Table 3. Hurricane Damage to Steel Vessels Used as Artificial Reefs (continued). 

15 

Name 

Length 

(ft) 

Vessel 

Type 

Reef Age 

When 

Damaged 

(yrs) 

Depth 

(ft) 

Vertical 

Relief (ft)

Wind 

Speed 

Estimated

at Reef 

(mph)* Hurricane 

Description of 

Damage Source 

Marsha T 64 tug 6 70 15 75–80 Jeanne moved 903 ft but 

remained intact 

and upright 

Horn 2005a

Sea 

Inspector 

64 tug 6 70 15 75–80 Jeanne no obvious 

damage 

Horn 2005a

Antares 387 cargo 

vessel 

7 days 125 60 56–78 Opal severely 

damaged; broken 

into 5 major 

pieces; reef was 

only 7 days old 

when hit 

Turpin and 

Bortone 

2002; 

Maher 

1996 

Spiegel 

Grove 

510 ex-Navy 

LSD 

3 133 83 unknown Dennis rolled 90 degrees 

from starboard 

side to upright 

position; settled 

in 12-ft-deep 

scour; waves 

nearby reported 

as 15–20 ft 

Horn 2005b

*Andrew wind speed estimates based on wind field published by Landsea et al. (2004). 

 Jeanne wind speed estimates based on wind field published by Wang and Manausa (2005a). 

 Frances wind speed estimates based on wind field published by Wang and Manausa (2005b). 

 Opal wind speed estimates based on wind field published by Powell and Houston (1998). 
Susceptibility. . . or resistance to movement is dependent upon a combination of 

. . . factors [including] . . . depth, extent of vessel surface area exposed to wave energy, 

vessel orientation with respect to storm direction, wave height, friction forces resisting 

horizontal movement, . . . the weight of the vessel resisting vertical lift, vertical profile, 

and localized storm-generated current and surge conditions. Those vessels placed in 

shallow depths (less than [164 ft] 50 m) are more susceptible to movement during 

major storm events, such as Category 3–5 hurricanes, than vessels placed at greater 

depths (Bell and Hall 1994; Blair et al. 1994). 

Other factors include the length of time a vessel has been submerged (which relates to the level of 

corrosion), the type of substrate underlying a vessel, the design of a vessel, its salvage history, and the 

methods used to sink the ship. 

Reef vessels having high vertical profiles and vessels placed at diver-friendly depths are most 

susceptible to storm damage. Damage to reef vessels resulting from Hurricane Andrew, a Category 5 

storm, was extensive: 

Most vessels, which were in 65 to 125 feet [19.8–38.1 m] of water and in the direct 

path of the hurricane, experienced structural damage. Maximum movement of 700 

yards [640 m] was noted for a concrete-loaded steel barge and up to 100 yards [91 m] 

for a steel freighter. . . . Removal of wheelhouses and stern sections, and hull 

subsidence into scour depressions were common hurricane effects, when the eye of the 

hurricane passed nearby. To the north of Dade County . . . 80 miles [129 km] from the 

hurricane’s eye, at least one vessel was moved offsite, four were laid over on their 

sides, and wrecks in water as deep as 180 feet [54.9 m] experienced hull damage. 

(Lukens and Selberg 2004:25) 

It is clear from reports summarized by Lukens and Selberg (2004) and others that hurricanes are 

capable of causing substantial damage to steel vessels intentionally sunk as artificial reefs. The degree 

of damage is not easily predictable because of the number of variables involved; however, it is 

apparent that damage can occur at depths as great as 200 ft (60 m). 

2.2 Effects of Hurricanes on Petroleum Industry Infrastructure 

Hurricane impacts to submerged petroleum industry infrastructure, particularly pipelines, provide a 

further means of comparison relevant to the study of damage to shipwrecks. No effort is made in this 

report to extrapolate, except in a relative sense, the severity of damage experienced by pipelines to that 

anticipated for shipwrecks. Rather the level of damage experienced by such structures is witness to the 

power of such storms. 

The combined effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 109 platforms and 5 rigs, with 3 rigs 

unaccounted for. The storms damaged another 50 platforms, 19 rigs, and 542 pipeline segments in the 

GOM (DNV 2007:45). The types of damage most comparable to shipwrecks are from pipelines lying 

horizontally on the seabed and damaged as a direct result of hurricane-induced bottom currents, as 

16 
17 

opposed to movement of connected surface platforms or impact from an outside force, such as an 

anchor drag. A total of 75 pipelines with reported damage from Rita and Katrina appear to have been 

damaged by bottom currents, including 45 pipelines exposed and/or undermined; 14 pipes ruptured by 

pulling apart (without any indication of platform damage or outside force); 8 lines laterally displaced 

over large distances; 7 cases of crossing pipelines damaged due to movement of mats designed to 

separate the pipes at their intersection; and 1 damaged by a mudflow during Katrina (mudflow 

damage is more prevalent when storms track east of the Mississippi Delta) (DNV 2007:57–59. The 

remainder of damage reports concerned pipes, including risers, that may have been damaged due to 

movement of rigs connected to those pipes or due to outside forces, such as anchors or rigs dragging 

across them during the storms. 

At least one mechanism of pipeline damage is similar to that for hurricane impacts to artificial reef 

vessels described above; current appears to play a primary role in both instances. Excessive lateral 

movement of pipelines tends to occur in larger pipes and tends to move in the same direction as 

maximum bottom currents. For example, a 27-mi (43.5-km) segment of 18-inch (45.7-cm) pipe at a 

depth of 210 ft (64 m) experienced a maximum lateral displacement of 3,000 ft (914 m) when 

subjected to a significant wave height of 38 ft (11.7 m) (DNV 2006:51). Movement of pipelines by 

Hurricane Ivan correlated very closely with areas of maximum hindcast currents (DNV 2006:47), and 

the direction of lateral pipeline movement was consistent with the direction of hindcast currents (DNV 

2006:49). Mudflow damage, likewise, tends to occur to pipelines oriented perpendicular to the 

maximum current (DNV 2006:29). 

Other suspected factors of pipeline damage include failure of pipes intended for self-burial to achieve 

adequate depth of cover, or prestorm exposure of previously buried pipes over time. Lines that are 

uncovered for whatever reason might lack sufficient on-bottom stability to resist hurricane forces. 

Alternatively, buried pipelines might move through failure of weak, silty soils due to pressure waves 

induced within the seafloor by passing storm waves. Pressure changes in the soil are suspected to 

change the specific gravity of the mud so that pipes float (DNV 2006:33, 49). 

Though pipelines do not serve as a perfect corollary to shipwrecks, the above examples are indicative 

of the types of stresses that can be inflicted on low-profile objects lying on or just beneath the seafloor 

during periods of extreme environmental dynamics. Severe wave and current forces are able to induce 

significant damage to ≤2-ft-diameter (0.6-m) pipelines at considerable depth (relative to storm wave 

height), and therefore should be expected to produce similar impacts on shipwrecks with much larger 

surface area and/or eroded and weakened structural elements. When viewed in concert with the 

documented examples of hurricane damage to artificial reef wrecks, these authors expected to witness 

similar effects on the wrecks selected for this study. 
3.0 PEAK STORM CONDITIONS 

The environmental conditions at each of the four primary study sites during the nearest passage of 

either Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita have been estimated on the basis of hindcast models of 

each storm produced by Oceanweather, Inc. (2006). Hindcasting in this case is the process of using 

previously tested mathematical models “to develop a comprehensive, validated and reliable database 

of wind, sea state, and currents” (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006:1) based on available observations of 

actual meteorological and oceanographic conditions during the storms. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the 

locations of the four primary wrecks with respect to the hindcast wind and wave fields of these storms. 

Figure 4. Maximum wind speeds from Oceanweather, Inc. (2006:43). Arrows represent the 

direction and amplitude of maximum sustained wind speed. 

19 
Figure 5. Maximum wave height from Oceanweather, Inc. (2006:44). Arrows represent the 

direction and amplitude of maximum significant wave height. 

Hurricane Katrina passed 30 mi (48 km) east of the ex-USS Castine at about 4:00 A.M. on August 29, 

2005. At the time, Katrina was a Category 4 storm on the Saffir-Simpson Scale (Table 4) with 

maximum sustained winds estimated at 136 mph (60.6 m/s) and a significant wave height estimated at 

42.7 ft (13.0 m) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

[USDOC, NOAA] 2010). Sustained winds over Castine were estimated from Oceanweather’s 

hindcast model at 74 mph (32.9 m/s). The maximum significant wave height over Castine was 

estimated at 32 ft (9.8 m). By oceanographic convention, significant wave height is the average wave 

height (trough to crest) of the largest one-third of waves. Hurricane Rita passed 145 mi (233 km) 

southwest of Castine at about 9:00 A.M. on September 23, 2005, as a very strong Category 3 storm 

with maximum sustained winds estimated as 130 mph (58.1 m/s). Maximum sustained winds over 

Castine during Rita were roughly 56 mph (25 m/s), although maximum significant wave height was in 

the 26- to 30-ft (8–9-m) range. 

20 
Table 4 

Saffir-Simpson Scale of Sustained Wind Speed 

Saffir-Simpson Scale 

Classification 

Meters per 

Second (m/s) 

Miles per 

Hour (mph) 

Tropical Storm 18 40 

Category 1 33 74 

Category 2 43 96 

Category 3 50 111 

Category 4 59 131 

Category 5 70 155 

The other three study sites, New York, Gulf Tide, and Site 323, were affected more severely by 

Hurricane Rita (see Figures 4 and 5). Hurricane Rita was a Category 3 storm at the time of its nearest 

approach to New York, Gulf Tide, and Site 323, with maximum sustained winds of 115–119 mph (51–

54 m/s). Maximum significant wave height was estimated at 28.9 ft (8.8 m) abreast of Site 323 at 

9:30 P.M. on September 23, 2005. In the short distance Rita traveled from Site 323 until adjacent Gulf 

Tide and New York, from 12:30–1:00 A.M. on September 24, the central wave height had decreased to 

an estimated 23.6 ft (7.2 m). Peak sustained wind speed at Site 323, 29 mi (46.7 km) east of Rita on 

the strong side of the storm, was estimated at 86 mph (38.4 m/s). The maximum significant wave 

height was estimated at 30.8 ft (9.4 m). Peak sustained winds over Gulf Tide, 8 mi (12.9 km) west of 

Rita, were estimated at 78 mph (34.9 m/s). Maximum significant wave height at Gulf Tide was 

estimated at 22.6 ft (6.9 m). Peak sustained wind speed at New York, 35 mi (56.3 km) west of Rita’s 

path, was estimated at 69 mph (30.9 m/s). Maximum significant wave height at New York was 

estimated at 18.0 ft (5.5 m). Hurricane Katrina’s nearest approach to these three sites was 196 mi 

(315 km) east of Site 323 at about 5:30 A.M. on August 29, 2005. Katrina was a Category 4 storm at 

the time with peak sustained winds of 131 mph (59 m/s), but maximum sustained winds over Site 323 

were only about 34 mph (15 m/s). Maximum significant wave height over the three westernmost sites 

was in the range of 7–10 ft (2–3 m) during the passage of Katrina. 

3.1 Hydrodynamic Analysis 

Wave-current interaction models were run at each of the four primary study sites in order to 

qualitatively assess whether hydrodynamics induced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita could have 

caused damage to study shipwrecks. Analysis of waves and currents caused by the hurricanes required 

acquisition of environmental data for the hurricane periods. These data included wave parameters, 

wind-induced currents, and water surface setup/setdown. Modeling the effects on a particular wreck 

required inclusion of shipwreck parameters such as length, beam, and orientation. With these data in 

hand, a wave analysis was performed to estimate the conditions at each wreck during the storm 

periods. 

21 
3.2 Methodology 

3.2.1 Environmental Data 

Environmental data for the hurricane periods were taken from a hindcast study of Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita performed by Oceanweather, Inc. (2006). The final product of their study consisted of three 

model domains: a coarse grid of the entire GOM during both hurricanes, as well as a fine grid for each 

hurricane in the vicinity of their respective landfall locations. Since the studied wrecks are relatively 

close to the coast, data from the finely resolved grids was used in the wave study. Due to the small 

spatial range of the fine domains, a time series of storm conditions was available only for the closest 

hurricane to each shipwreck location. Table 5 outlines the relevant environmental parameters at each 

wreck location extracted from their respective hindcast node (all modeling parameters discussed in 

this section were calculated in metric units, but the English unit equivalents are provided for 

reference). 

Table 5 

Peak Hindcast Parameters for Each Shipwreck Location 

Wreck USS Castine New York 

Gulf 

Tide Site 323 

Grid (Hurricane) Katrina Rita Rita Rita 

Node ID 7075 34444 40027 36320 

Depth (m [ft]) 36.5 

(119.8) 

19.1 

(62.7) 

17.2 

(56.4) 

23.2 

(76.1) 

Peak Sustained Wind Speed 

(m/s [mph]) 

32.9 

(73.6) 

30.9 

(69.1) 

35.5 

(79.4) 

38.3 

(85.7) 

Peak Sustained Wind Direction 

(degrees) 

289 265 219 125 

Maximum Significant Wave 

Height (m [ft]) 

9.8 

(32.2) 

5.5 

(18.0) 

6.9 

(22.6) 

9.4 

(30.8) 

Associated Period (swell, 

seconds) 

16.2 11 12 14.4 

Peak Period (swell, seconds) 16.4 15.5 15.5 16 

Peak Swell Direction (degrees) 128 98 112 191 

Surface Setup (m [ft]) 1.23 

(4.0) 

0.45 

(1.5) 

0.94 

(3.1) 

1.19 

(3.9) 

Surface Current (m/s [mph]) 1.31 

(2.9) 

0.87 

(1.9) 

1.53 

(3.4) 

1.81 

(4.0) 

Data from Oceanweather, Inc. (2006). 

In Table 5, wind direction is in meteorological convention (from which the wind is traveling), 

clockwise from north (0 degrees [deg]), significant wave height represents the largest waves 

encountered in the entire hindcast time series for each wreck. The associated period is the wave period 

concurrent with the significant wave, while the peak period is the highest period in the hindcast time 

series for that node. Swell direction is in meteorological convention (from which the swell is 

traveling), clockwise from north (0 deg). Surface setup is the increase in sea level forward of a 

breaking wave front. The direction of the surface current is the same as the swell direction. 

22 
3.2.2 Shipwreck Data 

Information concerning the shipwrecks was also necessary to perform the hydrodynamic analysis. 

These data were collected using several methods, including side-scan sonar surveys and physical 

inspection of the wrecks via diving, performed by PBS&J. Table 6 outlines the physical parameters of 

each shipwreck used for the analysis. 

Table 6 

Shipwreck Physical Parameters 

Wreck USS Castine New York 

Gulf 

Tide Site 323 

Length (m [ft]) 65.2 

(214) 

48.8 

(160) 

30.5 

(100) 

61 

(200) 

Beam (m [ft]) 9.8 

(32) 

6.7 

(22) 

6.1 

(20) 

10.1 

(33) 

Approx. Height (m [ft]) 1.8 

(6.0) 

0 

(0) 

2.1 

(7.0) 

2 

(6.5) 

Orientation (deg) 316 170 69* 200 

*Diving determined the orientation of Gulf Tide’s bow to be 249 deg after the wave 

interaction modeling had been completed. The error does not affect the results; however, 

Table 6 and Figures 12 and 14 reflect the erroneous bow orientation. 

The length, beam, and approximate height measurements refer to the portion(s) of the hull that are 

exposed or above the seafloor. Orientation is the direction that the bow is facing, clockwise from 

north. 

3.2.3 Wave Model 

The shipwrecks in this study were situated in relatively shallow water with respect to the heights of the 

waves they encountered during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The use of either linear wave theory or 

Stokes 5th order theory will not provide accurate results for large waves in shallow water. Therefore, 

this study implemented a wave model that uses non-linear stream function wave theory, first 

developed by Dean (1965), so that the analysis was valid throughout the range of conditions at each 

site examined. This theory is fully nonlinear and is mathematically valid from deep water where 

waves are not affected by bathymetry, all the way to shallow water and near breaking wave 

conditions. 

The calculation scheme used in this analysis was first developed by Chaplin (1999). It automatically 

determines the necessary order of nonlinearity for the wave calculations and includes wave interaction 

with a depth-uniform current. Results of this program compare favorably with that of Dalrymple’s 

(1974) stream function formulation. Wave model calculations were computed in the MATLAB 

programming environment. 

23 
3.2.4 Model Input 

The wave model can resolve a monochromatic wave train in two dimensions (vertically from crest to 

seafloor and horizontally along the direction of motion) plus time. The spatial domain can be extended 

to three dimensions by assuming a uniform wave perpendicular to the direction of travel. 

The first step in the calculations is to enter the wave, current, and bathymetry parameters to determine 

a set of coefficients to define the resulting wave at each wreck location. Table 7 shows the parameters 

entered into the wave calculations for each wreck. 

Table 7 

Parameters Used for Wave Calculations 

Wreck USS Castine New York 

Gulf 

Tide Site 323 

Wave Height (m [ft]) 9.8 

(32.2) 

5.5 

(18.0) 

6.9 

(22.6) 

9.4 

(30.8) 

Wave Period (seconds) 16.4 15.5 14 16 

Water Depth (m [ft]) 37.73 

(123.79) 

19.55 

(64.14) 

18.14 

(59.51) 

24.39 

(80.02) 

Uniform Current (m/s [mph]) 0.5 

(1.1) 

0.5 

(1.1) 

0.5 

(1.1) 

0.5 

(1.1) 

The above wave heights are the significant wave heights from Table 5. The wave period is the peak 

swell period from Table 5, except in the case of Gulf Tide, where the period is the largest period that 

resulted in a stable wave solution in conjunction with the other parameters. The water depth is the 

depth plus the water surface setup at each hindcast node. The hindcast surface currents were reported 

at greater than 1 m/s (2.2 mph). Typically, the uniform current at the seafloor is a fraction of the 

surface value, but without any true data at the time of this analysis, 0.5 m/s (1.1 mph) was chosen as 

an appropriate approximation of the conditions expected at the project sites. This parameter should not 

be confused with wave particle velocity calculated at the seafloor by the wave model. The uniform 

current refers to the unidirectional background movement of water at the seafloor, upon which the 

much stronger bidirectional oscillation of wave particle velocity occurs. It is wave particle velocity 

that the authors refer to throughout the text as storm-induced bottom currents, and which is a major 

contributing cause of hurricane damage to shipwrecks. Uniform current is a necessary parameter of 

the wave model; however, it is not referred to outside of that context. 

Once the wave coefficients were determined, a simplified two-dimensional ship model was used to 

approximate the wreck orientation relative to the incident waves. The model incorporated calculation 

points at the bow, center, and stern of the vessel. The wave coefficients and ship model were then 

combined to construct the three-dimensional (3D) plus time wave field over the wreck and extract 

time series of wave-induced velocities at the calculation points along the wreck. 

24 
3.3 Results 

Table 8 contains a brief summary of the results of the wave modeling effort for each wreck. Figures 6 

through 17 show the ship configuration, the wave profile, and the velocity time series for each of the 

four shipwrecks. The implications of these results are discussed in the following section. 

Table 8 

Summary of Wave Model Results 

Wreck USS Castine New York 

Gulf 

Tide Site 323 

Maximum velocity (m/s [mph]) 2.6 

[5.8] 

2.5 

[5.6] 

2.9 

[6.5] 

3.4 

[7.6] 

Minimum velocity (m/s [mph]) –1.3 

[–2.9] 

–0.7 

[–1.6] 

–0.9 

[–2.0] 

–1.2 

[–2.7] 

Ship-wave orientation (approx. deg) 8° 72° 43° 9° 

Bow-stern phase difference (seconds) 4 1 2 4 

The ship configuration figures below (Figures 6, 9, 12, and 15) show how each wreck is aligned 

relative to the hindcast waves. The wave is traveling along the horizontal axis from left to right. The 

vertical axis is perpendicular to the wave propagation. Vessel orientation is reversed on Figure 12 

because the wave model was performed before Gulf Tide’s bow and stern were identified. The 

orientation of the hull with respect to wave direction is important to understanding the intensity and 

direction of forces caused by wave-induced currents. The area of a ship’s vertical profile determines 

its degree of exposure to currents, while the hull’s orientation with respect to those currents affects the 

magnitude of their force upon exposed surfaces. 

The wave profiles (Figures 7, 10, 13, and 16) show the wave surface as well as water particle velocity 

magnitudes and directions at an instant in time. The horizontal axis is the distance along the direction 

of wave propagation, with the origin being the center of the shipwreck. The vertical axis is depth 

relative to the still water level with positive values being upward. The solid black line in each figure is 

the wave crest profile. The hue represents water particle velocity magnitude, as shown in the scale on 

the right, with red meaning higher velocities. The vectors indicate the direction of water particle 

movement. 

The velocity time series (Figures 8, 11, 14, and 17) show the timing of horizontal seafloor velocities at 

the different locations on each wreck indicated by circles of matching color on Figures 6, 9, 12, and 

15. The horizontal axis is time, while the vertical axis is the horizontal velocity. Positive velocities are 

those in the same direction as wave propagation. 

25 
Figure 6. Ship alignment relative to incident wave, USS Castine. 

Figure 7. Wave profile, USS Castine. 

26 
Figure 8. Velocity time series, USS Castine. 

Figure 9. Ship alignment relative to incident wave, New York. 

27 
Figure 10. Wave profile, New York. 

Figure 11. Velocity time series, New York. 

28 
Figure 12. Ship alignment relative to incident wave, Gulf Tide. 

Figure 13. Wave profile, Gulf Tide. 

29 
Figure 14. Velocity time series, Gulf Tide. 

Figure 15. Ship alignment relative to incident wave, Site 323. 

30 
Figure 16. Wave profile, Site 323. 

Figure 17. Velocity time series, Site 323. 

31 
3.4 Discussion 

The results indicate strong bottom currents at each wreck site during peak storm conditions. Each site 

experienced a severe back and forth surge, as if in a giant washing machine. The current velocities 

ranged from 5.6 to 7.6 mph (2.5 to 3.4 m/s) in the direction of wave propagation (forward) followed 

by current velocities of –1.6 to –2.9 mph (–0.7 to –1.3 m/s) in the opposite direction only a few 

seconds later. The estimated period of this cycle ranged from 14.0 to 16.4 seconds (see Table 7). 

The magnitude of force associated with water currents of such strength might be appreciated more 

easily by reference to wind speeds required to achieve the same effect. Most people have far more 

familiarity with judging significant wind speeds than water current velocities. Wind speeds capable of 

producing equivalent force were calculated based on the difference in density between seawater and 

air using the formula for drag force from fluid dynamics: 

wh

D ich by definition is the force component in the direction of the flow velocity, 

ere 

F is the force of drag, wh

ρ is the mass density of the fluid, 

s the reference area, and 

is the velocity of the object relative to the fluid, 

A i

CD is the drag coefficient, a dimensionless constant. 

The drag force on an object in air ( ) and water ( ) are given, respectively, by: 

If these forces are to be equal, then: 

Thus, the velocity of air ( ) having a force equivalent to that caused by a given water velocity ( ) is 

evaluated as: 

32 
Dry air has a density of 1.2754 kilograms per cubic meter (kg/m3

) (0.07962 lb/ft3) at standard 

temperature and pressure (0 degrees Celsius [°C] and 100 kiloPascals [kPa] for the International 

Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry). Seawater has a density of 1,019.58 kg/m3 (63.65 lb/ft3

) 

assuming for Hurricane Rita an estimated salinity of 30 parts per thousand and a seafloor water 

temperature of 25 °C (77 degrees Fahrenheit [°F]). Therefore: 

Seawater velocity ( ) must be multiplied by 28.3 in order to convert it to a wind speed ( ) that 

would generate an equivalent drag force on an identical object in its path. 

The results of the comparison between water current velocity and wind speed required to generate 

equivalent forces is shown in Table 9. The wind gusts required to generate equivalent forces on the 

four primary study wrecks would range from 158 to 215 mph (70.6 to 96.1 m/s) in the direction of 

wave propagation followed by winds of 44–82 mph (19.7 to 36.7 m/s) in the opposite direction only a 

few seconds later. In each case, the winds required to generate comparable forces are equivalent to a 

Category 5 storm on the Saffir-Simpson Scale, even though the actual storm winds above each site 

were no stronger than Category 1. Unlike the force of the storm winds raging above the waves, the 

force transferred by wave action to the seafloor becomes greatly magnified as the wave heights build 

and as the water depth decreases. The waves act in a sense like a battery accumulating energy from the 

wind, while the shoaling seafloor acts as a funnel to increase the water velocity. The effect of current 

force is compounded by the fact that the bottom currents completely reverse direction on the order of 

eight times per minute. 

The repetitive reversal of force direction suggests that the underwater environment of the primary 

study wrecks during peak storm conditions was more analogous to a tornado than a hurricane. The 

Enhanced Fujita Scale, used by meteorologists to classify tornado intensity, describes an F3 tornado as 

having 3-second wind gusts of 136–165 mph (60.8–73.8 m/s) and causing critical damage. An F3 

tornado is capable of overturning trains, uprooting most trees in a forest, twisting skyscrapers, and 

lifting heavy cars. An F4 tornado (winds of 166–200 mph [74.2–89.4 m/s]) causes devastating 

damage. Well-constructed houses are completely leveled and cars are thrown through the air. An F5 

tornado (winds greater than 200 mph [89.4 m/s]) can throw automobiles in excess of 328 ft (100 m), 

badly damage steel-reinforced concrete structures, and cause significant structural deformation of 

high-rise buildings. The maximum currents experienced by the primary study sites are roughly 

equivalent to the force of an F3 (Castine and New York), F4 (Gulf Tide) or F5 (Site 323) tornado. It is 

little wonder that hurricane-induced currents are capable of inflicting substantial damage to sunken 

watercraft. 

33 
Table 9 

Water and Wind Currents of Equivalent Force 

USS Castine New York Gulf Tide Site 323 

Maximum (forward) bottom current velocity 

(mph [m/s]) 

5.8 mph 

[2.6 m/s] 

5.6 mph 

[2.5 m/s] 

6.5 mph 

[2.9 m/s] 

7.6 mph 

[3.4 m/s] 

Forward wind speed required for *equivalent 

force (mph [m/s]) 

164 mph 

[73 m/s] 

158 mph 

[71 m/s] 

183 mph 

[82 m/s] 

215 mph 

[96 m/s] 

Minimum (reverse) bottom current velocity 

(mph [m/s]) 

–2.9 mph 

[–1.3 m/s] 

–1.6 mph

[–0.7 m/s] 

–2.0 mph 

[–0.9 m/s] 

–2.7 mph

[–1.2 m/s] 

Reverse wind speed required for *equivalent 

force (mph [m/s]) 

–82 mph 

[–37 m/s] 

–44 mph 

[–20 m/s] 

–57 mph 

[–26 m/s] 

–76 mph 

[–34 m/s] 

Combined amplitude of forward and reverse 

bottom current (mph [m/s]) 

8.7 mph 

[3.9 m/s] 

7.2 mph 

[3.2 m/s] 

8.5 mph 

[3.8 m/s] 

10.3 mph

[4.6 m/s] 

Combined amplitude of *equivalent forward 

and reverse wind shear (mph [m/s]) 

247 mph 

[110 m/s] 

202 mph 

[90 m/s] 

240 mph 

[107 m/s] 

291 mph 

[130 m/s] 

*See text for description of concept and method used to calculate these values. 

3.4.1 Hurricane-Induced Hydrodynamics in Shallow Water 

The scope of this study required modeling the wave-current interaction at each of the primary study 

sites; however, the model also proved useful for examining the range of bottom currents occurring 

over a larger area. A broad aerial analysis was outside of the study scope; however, the authors felt it 

important that readers could visualize relationships between bottom currents and other variables, such 

as storm track, wind speed, wave height, and water depth as a storm moves into shallow water. A 

portion of Hurricane Rita’s path was chosen for modeling (below). Rita, rather than Katrina, was 

chosen for this effort because three of the primary study wrecks occur nearest to Rita’s path. 

The following series of figures was based on hindcast data for 78 grid nodes from Oceanweather, Inc. 

(2006). The nodes were selected at 10-m (32.8-ft) water-depth intervals (from 10 to 60 m [33 to 

197 ft] deep) at multiples of 10 nautical mi (11.5 mi [18.5 km]) from Rita’s eye, measured at right 

angles to the storm track. The area of coverage extends 46 mi (74.1 km) west and 92 mi (148.2 km) 

east of the storm track. The asymmetrical coverage was selected in order to encompass wind fields of 

comparable intensity on either side of the storm. The locations of three of the primary study wrecks 

closest to Rita are plotted on each figure in the series. A maximum depth of 60 m (197 ft) was chosen 

because most artificial reef and pipeline damage occurs at depths less than 200 ft (61 m) (Table 3 and 

DNV 2007:57). 

Figure 18 shows the maximum wind speed for the 78 grid nodes selected from Oceanweather, Inc.’s 

(2006) hindcast model. The maximum wind speed is centered slightly to the right of the storm’s 

central path. Wind speed falls off more rapidly on the left side of the storm, while high winds extend 

much farther from the center on the right side. This pattern is typical of hurricanes, although the width 

of the wind field can vary significantly. Rita was a particularly large storm. Winds also decrease as 

portions of the storm come over land. In the case of Rita, the storm had already diminished 

substantially by the time its center reached the 60-m (196.9-ft) isobath, although Category 3 winds 

(>111 mph [50 m/s]) were sustained all the way to the 10-m (32.8-ft) isobath on the right side of the 

eye. The actual maximum wind speed was higher than shown in Figure 18, due to the fact that nodes 

selected for sampling were separated by 11.5 mi (18.5 km). 

34 
Figure 18. Maximum wind speed (m/s), Hurricane Rita. 

Figure 19 shows the maximum significant wave height and wave direction from Oceanweather, Inc. 

(2006). Wave height diminished more rapidly on the left side of the storm. On the right side of the 

storm, wave heights of 7 m (23.0 ft) or greater carried shoreward to at least the 10-m (32.8-ft) isobath 

at a distance of 92 mi (148.2 km) from Rita’s center. Wave height on the left side of the storm fell off 

to less than 3 m (9.8 ft) at the 10-m (32.8-ft) isobath only 46 mi (74.1 km) left of the eye. The 

direction of the largest waves is indicated by the vectors overlaid at each node position. This is the 

same direction as the maximum current forces generated at each node. In deep water, the largest 

waves tend to travel parallel to the storm path on its right side and travel away from the storm path on 

its left side. As the waves move into shallower water, their direction of travel deviates in a clockwise 

direction. 

Figure 19. Maximum significant wave height and direction, Hurricane Rita. 

The maximum velocity of bottom currents (Figure 20) induced by the storm waves increases on the 

right side of the storm path as water depth decreases, despite the fact that wave height steadily 

35 
decreases at the same time. Figure 21 shows the same pattern for the total amplitude of the current 

change, which is the difference between the maximum (forward) and minimum (reverse) velocities. 

On the left side of Rita, the maximum current velocity and the change in current velocity (the 

difference between forward and reverse currents within a single wave cycle) remained fairly constant 

as water depth decreased, but both diminished with increasing distance from the storm path due to 

decreasing wave height. 

Figure 20. Maximum bottom current velocity (m/s), Hurricane Rita. 

Figure 21. Maximum change in current velocity (m/s) in a single wave cycle, Hurricane Rita. 

As each wave passes, there is a substantial change in pressure at the seafloor caused primarily by the 

change in weight of the water column from the trough to the top of the wave. The seafloor pressure 

(hydrostatic + dynamic) was calculated for the maximum significant wave heights at each of the 78 

nodes used above. The results, calculated using Stokes 5th-order wave theory, are illustrated on Figure 

22. The contours represent the pressure difference at the seafloor beneath the wave trough (minimum 

pressure) and crest (maximum pressure). 

36 
Figure 22. Maximum pressure differentials caused by passing waves (kPa), Hurricane Rita. 

In the vicinity of Rita’s path, the pressure on the seafloor due to intermittent waves on the Gulf surface 

varied by 50–70 kPa between wave troughs and crests. In comparison, a 3 m/s wave-induced current 

(approximately what was experienced on each of the four wrecks) causes a pressure of about 5 kPa on 

the seafloor, an order of magnitude less than the hydrostatic pressure differential; however, the change 

in hydrostatic pressure occurs more gradually than the change in current pressure. There are other 

complex factors that could cause damage to the wreck, including shear and twisting forces due to 

variations in forces along the wreck and hydrodynamic lift forces. Without more-sophisticated 

modeling techniques, it can be difficult to quantify the relative effects of one force versus another. 

Nonetheless, wave-induced currents causing forces comparable to major hurricane winds are without 

a doubt capable of inflicting extreme amounts of damage to seafloor objects. 

The configuration of current velocity contours relative to Rita’s path in Figures 20 and 21 should 

closely reflect the potential for shipwrecks to be damaged by hurricanes in waters less than 197 ft 

(60 m) deep. Stronger currents should result in greater potential for damage, all other factors being 

equal. Mapping the distribution of bottom currents associated with Hurricane Rita has been a useful 

exercise showing that the areas of greatest potential for damage do not correlate directly with either 

the strongest winds or the largest waves. This is due to the influence of water depth on the magnitude 

of storm-induced currents. Unfortunately there is no simple method for accurately predicting current 

magnitude or damage potential based on distance from a storm path or wind speed or wave height at a 

particular location. Damage potential is clearly related to current velocity, but current velocity itself is 

determined by a number of other factors including wave height, wave direction, and water depth. 

Wave height is determined by wind speed, fetch, width of the storm, the duration of strong winds (i.e., 

speed of the storm along its track), and water depth. Thus the strength of storm-induced bottom 

currents and the potential for damage at various positions relative to a storm’s track will be influenced 

by the physical size and intensity of the storm, as well as by the shape of the seafloor and the 

orientation of the seafloor slope with respect to the storm track where the storm makes landfall. In 

general, however, the potential for damage should follow the distribution described above for storminduced currents (see Figures 20 and 21). 

37 
38 

The entire area mapped in Figures 18–22, extending 46 mi (74.1 km) west and 92 mi (148.2 km) east 

of Hurricane Rita’s track, experienced maximum current velocities and shear forces at the seafloor 

roughly equivalent to or greater than that caused by the wind of an F1 tornado. Based on these results, 

the potential for shipwreck damage would appear to extend into waters deeper than 197 ft (60 m). The 

deepest artificial reef vessel reported damaged in Table 3 was at a depth of 210 ft (64 m); however, 

most reef vessels are sunk at shallow depths accessible to divers. Oceanweather, Inc. (2006:4) states 

that water less than about 246 ft (75 m) tends to become well-mixed by hurricanes from the surface to 

the seafloor, suggesting that wave energy reaches at least to that depth. Most pipeline damage has 

been reported at depths less than 200 ft (61 m), although small numbers were reported damaged by 

exposure or spanning during hurricanes Katrina and Rita at depths down to 300 ft (91 m) (DNV 

2007:92). DNV go on to state that “these are the depths where historical pipeline damages not readily 

apparent from the surface have taken place as a result of hurricanes.” The maximum depth of 

hurricane damage to shipwrecks remains uncertain; however, the authors believe that limit might be 

closer to 300 ft (91 m) than 200 ft (61 m). 
4.0 RESULTS 

This chapter provides a site-by-site presentation of the accumulated pre- and poststorm knowledge of 

each of the four primary wreck sites. A brief historical sketch (when known) is followed by the results 

of additional archival research; a description of previous investigations and prestorm conditions at 

each site; results of the May 2007 remote-sensing survey including a comparison with prestorm data; 

observations from the October 2007 diver investigations; results of the sediment coring; an analysis of 

poststorm observations and assessment of hurricane impacts; and, finally, an assessment of each site’s 

eligibility for listing in the NRHP. 

4.1 Methods 

4.1.1 Remote-Sensing Survey 

The remote-sensing survey cruise was conducted May 7–11, 2007, aboard the M/V Fling, a 100-ft 

(30.5-m) converted crew boat out of Freeport, Texas. Per the contract scope of work, the remotesensing surveys were to include a marine magnetometer and side-scan sonar. Geophysical 

instrumentation employed in the field included a Geometrics G-882 magnetometer and an Edgetech 

DF1000 side-scan sonar. An additional Marine Magnetics Explorer magnetometer and Marine Sonics 

side-scan sonar were on-board as backups in case of failure of the primary survey instruments. Data 

acquisition utilized Coda Geosurvey software for side-scan sonar, and Trimble HydroproTM software 

for navigation and magnetometer data. Survey boundaries extended at least 984 ft (300 m) beyond the 

center of each site, and transects were spaced at 98.4-ft (30-m) intervals. Towfish laybacks were 

adjusted to achieve instrument altitudes of not more than 20 ft (6.1 m) above the highest point on each 

site. 

Following completion of the remote-sensing survey, the side-scan sonar data was processed to provide 

a complete “visual” record of the wreck sites and surrounding seabed. The CODA sonar acquisition 

software integrated UTM positions with the sonar graphic image, which was stored automatically to 

electronic media. A composite mosaic map was created from the original stream of data recorded in 

the field. The sonar mosaic was then converted to a geotiff format, with a resolution of 10 pixels per 

meter, and imported into Bentley Systems Inc. MicroStation© CAD software (version 8). This allowed 

viewing the mosaic in juxtaposition with other survey data such as magnetic contours and prestorm 

sonar imagery. 

4.1.2 Diving Investigations 

The diving cruise was conducted between October 1 and October 10, 2007, also aboard the M/V 

Fling. PBS&J’s dive team consisted of six archaeologists and two scientific divers. Three members of 

the dive team, including the COTR, also participated in the cruise. All dives were conducted with 

standard SCUBA equipment, utilizing Nitrox breathing gas for extended bottom times. Additional 

equipment included a LinkQuest 1500 HA Ultra Short Baseline (USBL) diver positioning system. 

Dive rotations consisted of two-person teams with at least one diver wearing a USBL beacon and, 

when necessary, an AGA MKII full-face mask with surface communications. 

Magnetometer and side-scan sonar data collected during the remote-sensing survey were 

supplemented during the diving investigations with collection of sector-scan and underwater acoustic 

39 
camera imagery. A Mesotech MS1000 digital sector-scan sonar was used to collect stationary (as 

opposed to towed) imagery of all four sites from multiple angles. This imagery was often then used to 

direct diver operations to specific site features and to supplement formation of site maps. A diveroperated DIDSONTM acoustic underwater camera was also used intermittently on all four sites. This 

instrument provided the operating diver a visual reference to site features in low- or zero-visibility 

conditions. This “streaming” imagery was recorded in real time and later used to assist in 

identification and analysis of site features. 

4.1.3 Box Core Collection and Analysis 

Site conditions and storm model conclusions were supplemented where feasible by collection and 

analysis of box core sediment samples. The purpose of the sediment analysis was to characterize the 

substrate at each site, and to assess whether these results could be correlated with observed impacts to 

the wrecks. Specifically, sediment particle size and type (sand, silt, clay, gravel, etc.) were the 

variables analyzed. 

The scope of work for this study stipulated the use of a box core device to collect sediment samples. A 

modified Klovan-style metal box core device, as employed by Beavers (1999; Figure 23) was custombuilt for this study. After researching various designs of box coring devices, PBS&J selected the 

modified Klovan type because it was diver-controlled rather than needing to be deployed from a 

winch on the deck of the survey/dive vessel. 

Figure 23. Diver-operated box core (Beavers 1999:95). 

The stainless steel coring boxes measured 6 inches (15.2 cm) wide by 4 inches (10.2 cm) deep by 12 

inches (30.5 cm) long. Each box had a panel that slid along furrows on either side of the open face of 

the box, effectively opening and closing the box core. Divers used a compass to orient coring units 

parallel and perpendicular to the ridge axis of bedforms. The coring units were hammered vertically 

into the sediment using a sliding weight. Once on the surface, each box core was allowed to dry out, 

and then a thin sediment profile was transferred to and sealed inside a rectangular Plexiglas box, 

preserving the stratigraphy for later lab analysis. This collection method was used only on the first two 

sites visited (Site 323 and Gulf Tide), because the device had to be jettisoned for diver-safety during 

the box core collection dive on Castine (the third site visited). Therefore, sediment collection methods 

40 
at Castine and New York had to be improvised with available materials. At Castine, a sample was 

collected from the sediment adhered to the M/V Fling’s anchor, since wind, wave, and current 

conditions at that time prevented any further safe diving or core-collection on the site. For New York, 

cores were collected by hammering two 2-ft (0.6-m) lengths of 2-inch-diameter (5.1-cm) PVC pipe 

into the seabed and capping both ends. The sediment cores were extracted in PBS&J’s lab. Though 

using multiple collection methods created inconsistencies in the sample volumes from each site, these 

inconsistencies had little to no effect on the overall data interpretation for three of the four sites. 

Stratigraphy of particle size and type, the primary data component, was preserved in both the box 

cores and PVC cores, and in each case there was a surplus of sediment beyond what was needed for 

lab analysis. The exception was Castine, in which, due to safety circumstances, only a nonprovenienced surface sample from Fling’s anchor was able to be collected and analyzed. 

The combined sediment samples were separated into a total of 16 subsamples: 8 from Gulf Tide, 4 

from Site 323, 3 from New York, and 1 from Castine. Each of these subsamples was subjected to 

particle-size analysis in PBS&J’s lab. Particle-size analysis is used to infer the mode and energy of 

sediment transport. The samples were measured for textural percentages using the hydrometer 

method, in accordance with Stoke’s Law. This law states that individual grain sizes settle at a 

consistent rate given a particular height of water. Approximately 30 grams of each box core sample 

was deflocculated with sodium hexametaphosphate and then added to a 1,000-milliliter (ml) 

graduated cylinder. The cylinder was then filled with distilled water and agitated. Silt and clays were 

measured for a 24-hour period using a 152H, –5 to +60 grams per liter (g/L) hydrometer. Samples 

were then wet sieved to collect the heavy fraction. The sand was dried and then sieved in nested 

sieves. The individual phi size amounts were weighed and figured for cumulative weight percent to 

correspond with the data from the hydrometer. Particle-size classifications (see Tables 10, 12, 13, and 

15) are based on the Krumbein phi logarithm to the Udden-Wentworth scale. 

In addition to the particle size and type analysis of the box cores, PBS&J examined previously 

published maps of Pleistocene and Holocene soil distributions, and sediment shear strengths 

throughout the GOM (Dunlap et al. 2004; McClelland Engineers 1979). Pleistocene surfaces indicate 

consolidated sediments that were subaerially exposed during the last glaciation period from 24,000 to 

6,000 years B.P., while Holocene sediments are the geologically recent and generally unconsolidated 

marine deposits that have accumulated over Pleistocene surfaces near modern and ancestral river 

systems (Keith and Evans 2009). Shear strength is known to correlate with content ratios of cohesive 

(i.e., clays and silts) vs. cohesionless (sand, gravel, cobble) sediments, which in turn contributes to the 

probability of shipwreck subsidence (Keith and Evans 2009). Higher shear strengths generally 

indicate predominantly cohesive sediments, decreased wreck subsidence, and increased wreck 

exposure above the seafloor. Shear strengths at wreck sites were not measured as part of this study, 

but considering the relationship of shear strengths to sediment classification, the McClelland 

Engineers (1979) and Dunlap et al. (2004) maps provided a frame of reference for the box core 

analysis. Unfortunately, the data nodes used to create these maps were widely spaced, and so provide 

only a general, interpolated characterization of the sediments surrounding each of the wreck sites. 

They are the closest data sets available, however, and for that reason were included for reference in the 

following discussion of results. 

41 
4.1.4 Archival Research 

The majority of archival research was conducted over two weeks in January and February 2008. 

Repositories visited included the Mariners’ Museum in Newport News, Virginia, the Library of 

Congress, and the National Archives branches in Washington, D.C., and College Park, Maryland. 

Additional research was conducted through phone and email correspondence with The Smithsonian 

Museum of American History, the Naval Historical Center, the U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office, 

Lloyd’s of London, and the Special Collections of the New York Public Library. Several newspaper 

archives were also searched for any published accounts of the various vessels’ wrecking events. 

4.1.5 NRHP Assessment 

Assessment of each wreck’s NRHP eligibility was based on U.S. Department of Interior guidelines for 

nominating historic sites to the NRHP (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, National Park Service [USDOI, 

NPS] 1985, 1997). Determination of a wreck’s eligibility status is based on consideration of the three 

key concepts of significance, integrity, and context. In order for a site to be considered significant, it 

must be at least 50 years old and meet one or more of the following criteria: 

A. Be associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the 

broad patterns of our history; or 

B. Be associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or 

C. Embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of 

construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high 

artistic value, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose 

components may lack individual distinction; or 

D. Have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or 

history. 

Integrity is defined as “the authenticity of a property’s historic identity, evidenced by the survival of 

physical characteristics that existed during the property’s prehistoric or historic period” (USDOI, NPS 

1997:4). A shipwreck maintains its integrity when it retains physical materials, design features, or 

construction details that can reveal important information about the period or persons that provide the 

basis for the wreck’s significance. Integrity can be manifested in a shipwreck’s hull construction, 

artifact assemblage, marine engineering, or other technological aspects. 

Context is defined as “information about historic trends and properties grouped by an important 

theme in the prehistory or history of a community, State, or the nation during a particular period of 

time” (USDOI, NPS 1997:4). In other words, historic context provides the link between the shipwreck 

and unique, representative, and/or pivotal trends. 

Presented below are the cumulative results of the multifaceted archaeological investigations for the 

wrecks of Castine, Site 323, Gulf Tide, and New York. Remote-sensing survey results for the 

remaining six secondary wrecks not selected for diver investigation are presented in Appendix A. 

Appendix A also includes a brief analysis of possible hurricane impacts to the sidewheel steamer 

42 
Josephine, based on sector-scan sonar imagery collected at that site in August 2007. Additional 

archival research on GOM wrecks not included in this study is presented in Appendix B. 

4.2 Castine

The former USS Castine (BOEMRE site ID 15170; Figure 24) is located in the Grand Isle lease block 

area, 30.4 mi (48.9 km) west of Hurricane Katrina’s path. It is the closest of any of the selected study 

sites to that storm. The site was initially recorded, though not identified, in 2001 by Thales 

Geosolutions (Floyd 2001). PBS&J identified and further recorded the site in 2005 as part of a study 

to conduct NRHP evaluations of submerged archaeological sites on the GOM OCS (Enright et al. 

2006). 

Figure 24. USS Castine at anchor, 1916 (Naval History and Heritage Command 2010). 

4.2.1 History 

Castine, also known as Gunboat No. 6, was built in 1892 at Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, along 

with her sister ship, Machias (Gunboat No. 5). Both vessels were named after Maine towns, and they 

are the first steel-hulled vessels built in Maine, as well as the first ships built by Bath Iron Works, one 

of the most prolific naval ship builders of the last century. During World War II, Bath Iron Works 

built one-quarter of the U.S. Navy’s destroyer fleet and more destroyers than the entire Japanese Navy 

built during the same time (Toppan 2002). 

Castine and Machias were early entrants in the so-called New Navy that replaced the rotting and 

neglected U.S. fleet after the Civil War. The New Navy essentially began with the Navy Act of 1883, 

43 
which authorized the construction of several new steel cruisers and marked the navy’s conversion 

from a primarily defensive fleet of obsolete wooden and ironclad warships, to a stronger, faster, steelhulled fighting force capable of initiating offensive operations around the globe (Alden 1972:13). 

Within this ambitious shipbuilding program, gunboats were among the smallest rated warships, 

though paradoxically used as the workhorses of the fleet (Jones 2007). Lacking the speed, armor, and 

firepower of larger ships rated as ‘cruisers,’ they were not intended for ship-to-ship naval combat, but 

for blockading, scouting, troop support, and, in times of relative peace, projecting American naval 

power on “showing the flag” missions abroad. They were designed to operate independently for 

extended periods in foreign stations, were relatively inexpensive to build and operate, and were 

powerful enough to suppress native uprisings in third world countries where American interests were 

at risk. They were generally designed to be sturdy vessels with good endurance and relatively light 

draft. Many, like Castine, retained sails to supplement their light coal supplies and enhance operating 

range (Alden 1972). 

The keel for the 1,177-ton Castine was laid on February 4, 1891, and the completed vessel was 

launched on May 11, 1892. Initially, Castine measured 190 ft (57.9 m) long with a 32-ft (9.8-m) beam 

and 12-ft (3.7-m) draft, though a top-heavy design necessitated cutting the vessel in half and adding an 

additional 14 ft (4.3 m) to the midsection shortly after its sea trials (New York Times 1894). The 

gunboat was schooner rigged with fore- and mainmasts (Barton and Denig 1893:847), and built with 

poop and forecastle decks atop a full-length gun deck (Figure 25). The main battery consisted of eight 

4-inch (10.2-cm) rapid-fire rifles. Six of these were mounted in armored sponsons projecting from 

each side of the gun deck, and the remaining two were pivot-mounted on the topgallant forecastle and 

poop deck. The secondary battery was comprised of four 6 pounders: two in sponsons under the 

topgallant forecastle and two on the poop deck over the aft sponsons. There were also two 1 pounders 

firing directly aft from the after cabin, a Colt 0.30-caliber automatic amidships, and a Howell torpedo 

tube fitted through the stem and discharging above the waterline (Barton and Denig 1893:847; Bureau 

of Construction and Repair n.d.a). Both Castine and Machias were powered by twin vertical, inverted, 

direct-acting, triple expansion engines, producing a combined 2,200 horsepower, and capable of 

sustaining 16 knots (18.4 mph). 

Figure 25. USS Castine deck plan (U.S. Bureau of Ships 1894). 

Castine was commissioned on October 22, 1894, under the command of Commander Thomas Perry 

and joined the Atlantic Fleet with a complement of 130 crew, 12 marines, and 11 officers. The small 

gunboat was sent first to the east coast of Africa to protect a pair of American consuls who had 

become embroiled with local legal problems (New York Times 1895). After these issues were 

44 
resolved, Castine stayed on station off east Africa for the majority of 1895 before getting recalled to 

the South Atlantic Station for cruising missions off of Brazil, Panama, and the West Indies. 

The first wartime operations for Castine came a few years later during the Spanish-American War. 

The U.S. declared war against Spain on April 25, 1898, fighting, in part, for Cuban independence 

from their Iberian oppressors. Castine joined Admiral Winfield Scott Schley’s Flying Squadron and, 

for the majority of the short-lived conflict was assigned to blockade operations off of Havana, 

Cienfuegos, Mariel, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cabanas (U.S. Dept. of the Navy 1898). Castine was 

credited with at least three prize captures, and also provided convoy escort and artillery support for the 

20,000 troop Army invasion that left Key West and landed at Daiquiri in June (New York Times 1898, 

1900; Newark Daily Advocate 1898). 

After the Treaty of Paris ended the Spanish-American War in December 1898 (actual hostilities had 

ceased in July), collateral violence erupted in the Philippines, which had been awarded to the U.S. in 

the treaty. Filipino insurgents, who had believed they were fighting alongside American soldiers for 

their own independence, quickly became disillusioned at the thought of trading Spanish masters for 

American ones and took up arms once more. The bloody, 3-year Philippine Insurrection had begun, 

and Castine was once again sent to hostile shores. 

The Navy’s role in the conflict was primarily to support army operations. This typically took the form 

of blockades, artillery support for troop landings, and transport of troops and supplies (Williams 

1985:101). Gunboats were overwhelmingly the vessel of choice for these naval operations. They had 

both the firepower to repel land-based insurgents and the ability to navigate the innumerable shallow 

waterways that dissected the 8,000 Philippine Islands. Castine’s most notable service during the 

Insurrection came when its captain, Commander Samuel Very, orchestrated the surrender of 

Zamboanga, the largest city on Mindanao, itself the second largest island in the archipelago and a 

major insurgent stronghold (New York Times 1899). 

Shortly after the fall of Zamboanga, Castine was dispatched to China to join an international force in 

the process of subduing the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxers were a radical religious sect that had 

violently revolted against Chinese Christians and the encroachment of non-Chinese imperial 

governments. The violence was focused against international legations in Peking (now Beijing), but 

Castine was stationed in Shanghai between March and August 1900 to protect American interests 

against a threatened uprising that never materialized (Leahy 1897–1931). The Boxer Rebellion was 

effectively defeated in August 1900, and Castine was sent back to support army operations in the 

Philippines until June 1901, when it was finally ordered back to the U.S. and decommissioned (the 

Insurrection officially ended in 1902). 

Following its service in the Pacific, Castine entered an extended period of peacetime cruises, 

punctuated by periods of decommissioning and repair. Castine was placed back into commission in 

1903 and returned to service in the South Atlantic Squadron. Through 1905, the gunboat cruised the 

Mediterranean, west coast of Africa, east coast of South America, the West Indies, and the Dominican 

Republic (Anonymous 1925). Following another decommissioning from 1905 to 1908, Castine was 

assigned to the newly created Atlantic Submarine Flotilla. In this unit, Castine served as the principal 

submarine tender and also, from 1912 to 1913, as the flagship for the flotilla’s commanding officer, 

Lieutenant Chester Nimitz. As an Admiral, Nimitz would later become a legendary naval officer 

during World War II. 

45 
Castine returned to duty as a gunboat in 1914, and for the next three years was primarily engaged in 

mediating violent revolutions that had erupted in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. From May 1914 

to March 1917, Castine spent the majority of its time cruising between Santo Domingo, Dominican 

Republic, and Port-au-Prince, Haiti, monitoring the conflicts and protecting American interests 

(Commander, Cruiser Force 1916; Commander, Cruiser Squadron 1916a, 1916b). During this time, 

Castine was also involved in one of the worst peacetime tragedies in U.S. naval history. On 

August 29, 1916, Castine and the cruiser Memphis were at anchor off Santo Domingo when a massive 

tsunami swept into the harbor. Castine was able to fire its boilers in time and escape, despite suffering 

flooding in its engine room, cabin, and magazine, and the deaths of a couple crewmen who drowned 

after one of the ship’s boats capsized. Memphis was far less fortunate. The cruiser could not gather 

steam in time and was caught broadside to the wave, which drove the ship against the rocks, a total 

loss. Over 40 of Memphis’s crew died in the disaster, either from drowning, burns, or steam inhalation 

(U.S. Naval Historical Center 2005). 

Following repairs to the battered gunboat, Castine was dispatched to the Mexican Patrol to once again 

protect American interests during the Mexican Revolution. Castine remained on patrol in Mexico 

from March 3 to July 4, 1917, at which time it was called back to the U.S. and ordered to “fit out for 

distant service,” joining the Allied response to German U-boat dominance in the Atlantic during 

World War I (Anonymous 1925). 

The war had begun in 1914, and Germany declared unrestricted U-boat warfare in February 1917. The 

U.S. entered the war in April of that year and responded in part by sending light, fast, highly 

seaworthy vessels to Atlantic war zones for patrol and convoy escorts (Knox 2003). Castine, along 

with its sister ship Machias, was sent to Gibraltar, the gateway for more shipping traffic than any other 

part of the world at the time, and the key to communication lines for allied armies in Italy, Greece, 

North Africa, and the Middle East. Gibraltar comprised the largest contingent of U.S. anti-submarine 

forces, and Castine spent most of its time during the war on patrol and convoy escort between 

Gibraltar and a transfer point at Oran, Algeria (Knox 2003; USS Castine 1917). 

These combined operations were instrumental in nullifying Germany’s U-boat dominance, so much 

so that merchant shipping losses decreased from a peak of 900,000 tons in April 1917 to only 

28,000 tons by October 1918 (Halpern 1994 ). Germany ended its U-boat offensive that same month, 

and Castine stayed on patrol at Gibraltar for two more months before leaving with its final convoy to 

the Azores on Christmas Day. 

Castine arrived at New Orleans in January 1919 and underwent its final decommissioning on August 

28. The gunboat was put up for auction the following year, and on August 5, 1921, was sold to A. 

Marx & Sons of New Orleans for $12,500 (Bureau of Construction and Repair n.d.b). The vessel was 

again sold in July 1923, to the Maritime Trading Corporation for $40,000 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 

Bureau of Navigation n.d.), and conflicting records show it being owned the following month by the 

Equitable Equipment Company and the New Orleans Menhaden Company. It is clear, however, that 

the latter company owned the vessel in December 1924, when Castine made its only documented 

commercial voyage while being towed as a barge from New Orleans to the Sabine River, where it was 

to be dismantled. Shortly after entering the Gulf, an undiagnosed internal explosion forced the sevenman crew to cut loose their tow and abandon ship. The crew was picked up by the Bisso Company 

towboat Barranca, and Castine sank at its current location within about 20 minutes (New Orleans 

Item 1924; Steamboat Inspection Service n.d.). 

46 
4.2.2 Archival Research 

Prior to this study, a considerable amount of archival research into the construction, use history, and 

wrecking event of Castine had already been completed for two previous investigations of the vessel 

(Enright et al. 2006; Jones 2007). Therefore, comparatively little time was spent on further research 

during the 2008 archival trip, in favor of maximizing time spent researching the other study wrecks. A 

few previously undiscovered documents, however, were located during the trips to the Mariners’ 

Museum and National Archives. 

4.2.2.1 Mariners’ Museum 

Several photographs of Castine are catalogued in the Ted Stone Photograph Collection. These include 

some images that were previously acquired (Enright et al. 2006; Jones 2007), as well as others that 

were not part of PBS&J’s collection. One of these is a profile image of Castine at an unknown 

location (Figure 26), and another showing Castine docked alongside the submarine Viper during the 

gunboat’s career as a sub tender (Figure 27). 

Figure 26. USS Castine (Image PN881, Ted Stone Photograph Collection, 

Mariners’ Museum). 

Another set of photographs is bound in a scrapbook of East Coast shipyards (Swanton 1994). These 

images include exterior photographs of both Castine and Machias docked at Bath Iron Works. Since 

these photographs were very similar to others already in possession, no copies were obtained. 

47 
Figure 27. USS Castine submarine Viper (Uncatalogued image, Ted Stone 

Photograph Collection, Mariners’ Museum). 

4.2.2.2 National Archives 

At the National Archives Cartographic Branch in College Park, Maryland, PBS&J searched the 

Record Group (RG) 19 (Bureau of Ships) Alpha Series ship plans, and the RG19 Dash Series index 

cards. The Alpha Series contained five ship plans dating between 1909 and 1914, each of which were 

similar, or in some cases identical, to Castine plans that PBS&J had previously obtained. The Dash 

Series indexes contained over 100 separate Castine plans; however, only 10 plans could be requested 

during any one of the four daily scheduled document retrieval periods. Due to time constraints, only 

one set of 10 was inspected. These plans included several drawings of Castine’s Howell torpedo tube, 

sail plans, midship section plans, and proposed and/or completed alterations to the upper decks. None 

of the selected plans illustrated information that was particularly useful to the present study or that had 

not been previously recorded by PBS&J, although a future trip to inspect all of the 100 catalogued 

plans may be a worthwhile research objective for continued documentation of this NRHP-eligible 

vessel. 

The RG19 photograph collection was also inspected, but no images previously uncollected by PBS&J 

were present. 

4.2.2.3 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

A letter was sent to the USCG National Vessel Documentation Center requesting any available 

information on Castine, specifically relating to the vessel’s commercial career from 1921 to 1924 

(including owners, insurers, inspection reports, hull characteristics, conversions, and the wrecking 

event). No information was available in the USCG’s records (Martin 2008). 

48 
4.2.3 Previous Investigations 

Thales Geosolutions’ initial remote-sensing data recorded a 170-x-30-ft (51.8-x-9.1-m) sonar target 

lying flush with the mudline in 105 ft (32.0 m) of water (Floyd 2001) that was speculated to be a 

modern shipwreck. During the 2005 investigation to determine the site’s NRHP eligibility, PBS&J 

conducted a remote-sensing survey of the site, followed by diver-conducted recording of the vessel’s 

dimensions and hull characteristics, temporary recovery and photographing of a small number of 

artifacts, and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) videography of selected site features. 

The 2005 sonar imagery showed an approximately 220-x-32-ft (67.1-x-9.8-m) vessel with a 

maximum vertical relief of 20 ft (6.1 m). Only a single deck was visible, though there were 

pronounced vertical features extending above the deck at the bow and stern (Figure 28). Numerous 

open hatchways were spaced along the deck, as well as what appeared to be corrosion holes exposing 

the underlying deck beams. Symmetrical features later identified as gun sponsons could be seen 

protruding outboard from the deck. Diver investigation confirmed much of the sonar data. Several 

hatches of varying dimensions were spread around the deck, as were covered and uncovered coal 

scuttles. The poop deck and majority of the forecastle deck had been removed (presumably when the 

ship was being converted to a barge), along with the riveted steel side-shell that extended above the 

midsection of the main deck, leaving only a few upper frames and outer hull plating above the main 

deck at the bow and around the rounded transom. The main deck was littered with netting, machinery, 

steam pipes, and miscellaneous debris, much of it believed to be intrusive. A large vertical rupture in 

the hull was observed just to the port side of the stern, but otherwise the hull appeared to be intact. It 

was inconclusive whether the rupture was a result of the wrecking event or postdepositional. 

Through a combination of the archaeological investigation and subsequent archival research, Site 

15170 was positively identified as the wreck of Castine. The site was nominated for listing in the 

NRHP in 2006, and in 2009 the Keeper of the Register concurred that Castine is eligible for listing. 

4.2.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey 

Castine was surveyed again in May 2007 for the present study. Comparison of the sonar imagery to 

the 2005 data showed no discernible post-Katrina impacts to the site (see Figure 28). There had been 

no positional displacement of the hull nor any indications of structural damage. Water depths 

remained at prestorm levels (ca. 100 ft [30.5 m] to the top of the wreck and 115 ft [35.1 m] at the 

surrounding seabed), and there were no signs of sediment accumulation on or around the wreck. 

Despite the absence of any indicators of hurricane-induced site impacts, PBS&J recommended further 

diver investigation of Castine on the basis that it was the closest of any of the selected wrecks to 

Katrina’s path, and, therefore, had the highest likelihood of sustaining hurricane-related impacts. 

4.2.5 2007 Diving Investigations 

Nine dives were attempted on Castine over two days in October 2007, with limited results. Shortly 

before PBS&J’s arrival on-site, a weather system producing 10-ft (3.0-m) seas passed westward over 

the area resulting in increased bottom currents and substantial sediment suspension in the water 

column. While surface conditions were initially favorable, strong currents, zero visibility, and the 

limited no-decompression dive times hampered diving efforts. Some useful information was obtained, 

however. Divers working near the stern noted the remnant framing for the poop deck, spaced on 2-ft 

49 
(0.6-m) centers. This observation confirms the theory presented in Enright et al. (2006) and Jones 

(2007) that the poop deck itself and outer hull plating at this area have been removed. Divers also 

noted that the stern deck was virtually free of debris, contrasting what was recorded in 2005 (albeit on 

other areas of the deck). Additionally, approximately 30 ft (9.1 m) aft of amidships on the port side, 

Castine’s deck was observed to be approximately 6 ft (1.8 m) above the seafloor. This is also in 

contrast to the 2005 investigation, where deck elevations at the bow exceeded 10 ft (3.0 m) above the 

seafloor in other areas. However, the bow area is known to contain partial remains of the forecastle 

deck, which may account for the differences in exposed hull elevations. 

Figure 28. Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Castine. 

During the diving cruise, additional acoustic imagery of Castine was collected with a DIDSON 

acoustic camera and BOEMRE’s sector-scan sonar. No significant structural impacts were observed 

in this imagery, confirming the side-scan sonar analysis. The sector-scan imagery shows several areas 

of debris on the seafloor, within 10–15 ft (3.0–4.6 m) of the port side of Castine’s hull (Figure 29). 

However, these areas were never investigated by divers and thus cannot be conclusively linked to 

hurricane impacts. 

50 
Figure 29. Sector-scan sonar image of Castine showing scattered debris on the seafloor. 

By the second day of diving, surface conditions had deteriorated considerably, creating an 

increasingly unsafe diving environment. The decision was made to cease diving operations at Castine

and continue on to the next selected site. 

4.2.6 Sedimentology 

For safety reasons, the box core collection device had to be jettisoned during the sediment collection 

dive on Castine (the third site visited during the cruise). Nevertheless, a sediment sample was obtained 

from sediments that adhered to the dive boat’s anchor. The results of that sample’s particle-size 

analysis are presented in Table 10. 

Table 10 

Castine Particle-size Results 

Sample Provenience % Gravel % Sand % Silt % Clay Mean phi Classification 

1-Castine Off Fling anchor 0 38 22 7 5.24 Medium silt 

Though few conclusions can be drawn from this limited sample, the available data do correspond with 

mapped soil characteristics for the area. According to maps published by McClelland Engineers 

51 
(1979:Plate 2B), Pleistocene soils formed under subaerial conditions during the Late Wisconsin 

glacial period are roughly 150 ft (45.7 m) beneath the modern mudline in the vicinity of Castine. In 

other words, all of the sediments affecting or affected by Castine or the passage of hurricanes are 

submarine Holocene deposits. 

McClelland Engineers (1979:Plates 3B, 4B, and 5B) mapped the shear strength of soils from the 

seabed to a depth of 20 ft (6.1 m) in the range of 0.4 to 0.8 kilopounds per square foot (ksf), which 

they qualitatively describe as soft to firm in the vicinity of Castine. The Offshore Technology 

Research Center (OTRC) of Texas A&M University updated McClelland Engineers’ shear strength 

data for the Western and Central GOM in a 2004 study (Dunlap et al. 2004). Their maps depict shear 

strengths at the mudline, 5 ft (1.5 m) below the seafloor, and 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor. The 

shear strength data at the mudline are interpolated from data collected at deeper depths. Two methods 

were used for mapping the data: (1) interpolated shear strength constructed using the spline method, 

which contours the data without regard to bodies of cohesionless sediment (i.e., sand or silt); and (2) 

interpolated shear strength taking into account bodies of cohesionless sediment (using sand polygons 

as barriers that contours cannot cross). Due to a paucity of coring data, method 2 created numerous 

artifacts in their data presentation. 

The OTRC map constructed using method 1 shows soil shear strengths surrounding the location of 

Castine as 1.2 ksf (stiff) at the mudline, 0.2 ksf (soft) at 5 ft (1.5 m) below the seafloor, and 0.4 ksf 

(soft) at 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor. The map constructed using method 2 indicates a shear 

strength of 0.4 ksf (soft) at the mudline, 0.5 ksf (soft) at 5 ft (1.5 m) below the seafloor, and 1.4 ksf 

(stiff) at 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor. The OTRC’s study includes only two data points within 

10 mi (16.1 km) of Castine’s location, therefore, the data are highly interpolated at the wreck site. 

There was no indication in the sonar data or in the limited diving investigations that the wreck has 

experienced increase burial relative to the prestorm study. Furthermore, sonar data indicate several 

areas of debris deposited immediately adjacent to Castine’s hull. Whether these debris piles pre-dated 

or were a result of Katrina is unknown, but in either case their visibility since the hurricane indicates 

that soil shear strengths were high enough to prevent burial of these objects. 

4.2.7 Impact Assessment 

Hurricane Katrina passed 30 mi (49 km) east of Castine as a Category 3 storm at about 4 A.M. on 

August 29, 2005. Peak sustained winds over Castine were estimated by Oceanweather, Inc.’s (2006) 

hindcast model at 74 mph (32.9 m/s) from a direction of 289 degrees. The maximum significant wave 

height over Castine was estimated at 32 ft (9.8 m) from a direction of 128 degrees. Wind speed was 

not used in modeling the wave-current interaction; it is provided here mainly to demonstrate that the 

direction of strongest winds in a hurricane is often significantly different than the direction of the 

largest waves and currents. The largest waves and swiftest currents, on the other hand, share a 

common direction. 

At peak storm conditions over the site, maximum bottom currents of 5.8 mph (2.6 m/s) struck 

Castine’s hull along the starboard side from nearly astern of the vessel at an angle of 8 degrees relative 

to the ship’s orientation. Given the difference in density between seawater and air, the damage 

potential represented by this water velocity is equivalent to that of a 164-mph (73-m/s) wind. At 

intervals of 8.2 seconds, the current reversed direction 180 degrees beneath the wave troughs to a 

52 
velocity of –2.9 mph (–1.3 m/s), then peaked again 8.2 seconds later at 5.8 mph (2.6 m/s) in the 

forward direction beneath the next wave crest. This sloshing effect has been likened to that of a 

washing machine, although the analogy of an F3 tornado presented in Chapter 3 might be more 

accurate in terms of scale and damage potential. The amplitude of velocity change from forward to 

reverse on an interval of 8.2 seconds was 8.7 mph (3.9 m/s). 

The extent of hurricane-induced impacts to Castine is inconclusive at this time. The remote-sensing 

data show no significant alterations to the site since the latest prestorm survey; however, divers and 

sector-scan sonar recorded circumstantial evidence of minimal site impacts. The stern deck was 

largely clear of debris, yet areas on the seafloor adjacent to the port side of the wreck forward of the 

stern showed indications of possible increased debris accumulation. The concentration of debris 

within 15 ft (4.6 m) of the wreck on its port side implies that it likely was not the result of randomly 

deposited intrusive debris, but rather that it had at one point been positioned on the vessel’s deck and 

subsequently migrated off, possibly during Hurricane Katrina. Such a conclusion is consistent with the 

direction of the strongest currents across the site. 

These debris piles were not evident in the May 2007 side-scan sonar data, because the port side of the 

wreck was obscured by the sonar shadow. The 2005 side-scan data evinces some debris on the port 

side, albeit to a lesser extent than is evident on the 2007 sector-scan imagery. Direct comparison with 

the 2005 sonar data is also inconclusive however, since the MS1000 sector-scan data were recorded at 

a closer range and higher resolution than were either the 2005 or 2007 side-scan sonar data, which 

may account for some of the differences in visible objects on the seafloor. Furthermore, only a small 

section of the stern deck was observed to be relatively free of debris. Divers were unable to investigate 

the forward sections of the deck to see if they were similarly cleared of loose debris. 

4.2.8 National Register Assessment 

Castine was recommended as eligible for the NRHP following its investigation and identification in 

2005 (Enright et al. 2006). The site was subsequently nominated for NRHP inclusion, and the Keeper 

of the Register subsequently concurred that Castine was eligible for listing (USDOC, NPS 2009). 

Eligibility status was granted prior to any analysis of posthurricane site impacts; however, that 

analysis has shown that there has been no significant alteration of site conditions. PBS&J recommends 

that Castine’s NRHP eligibility status remain unchanged from previous assessments. 

4.3 Site 323 

Site 323 is located in the East Cameron lease block area, 28.5 mi (45.9 km) east of Hurricane Rita’s 

path. This was the only selected wreck located on the more powerful eastern side of a hurricane. The 

strongest winds over the site during Rita’s passage, estimated from hindcast data, were estimated at 

86 mph (38.4 m/s), and peak significant wave height was estimated at 30.8 ft (9.4 m). Site 323 

measures approximately 200 ft (61 m) long by 35 ft (10.7 m) wide and was first discovered in 

approximately 70 ft (21.3 m) of water during a survey of the East Cameron lease block area for 

Apache Corporation in 1994 (Trabant 1994). In 2004 the site was investigated by PBS&J as part of a 

study to conduct NRHP evaluations of submerged sites on the GOM OCS (Enright et al. 2006). 

53 
4.3.1 History 

Based on hull characteristics, Site 323 is believed to be a modern offshore supply boat associated with 

the GOM oil and gas industry. 

Multiple inquiries into Site 323’s specific identity have been made since PBS&J first visited the site in 

2004. The results of those inquiries are presented below; however, at this time the identity and history 

of Site 323 remains unknown. 

4.3.2 Archival Research 

During the 2004 NRHP evaluation (Enright et al. 2006), PBS&J inspected several shipwreck 

databases and published shipwreck lists including the BOEMRE Archaeological Resource 

Information (ARI) database, NOAA’s Automated Wreck and Obstruction Information System 

(AWOIS), the Louisiana Division of Archaeology’s (LDA) Shipwreck List, and the annual list of 

merchant vessels lost, published in the Merchant Vessels of the United States (MVUS) (U.S. Bureau of 

Customs 1958–1967; U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Coast Guard 1968–1989). Using these sources 

PBS&J compiled a list of reported wrecks within 20 mi (32.2 km) of Site 323. Each of these wrecks 

was cross referenced against its listing in the MVUS to determine hull type and dimensions. Based on 

these criteria, all of the suspect wrecks were ruled out as the identity of Site 323, including the 102-ftlong (31.1-m) tugboat Edgar F. Coney (reported foundered 18 mi (29.0 km) northwest of Site 323 in 

1930), and the 130-ft (39.6-m) oil screw Lafourche (reported lost in 1971, approximately 3 mi (4.8 

km) southeast of Site 323), both of which had been listed in the ARI as possible matches for the 

wreck. Unable to determine the wreck’s identity at the time, PBS&J deemed its NRHP eligibility 

inconclusive. 

Because the identity of Site 323 remains unknown, it was difficult to efficiently direct research 

objectives during the additional archival research conducted in 2008. Searching the archival record for 

an anonymous supply vessel that wrecked sometime in the last 50 years is like searching for the 

proverbial needle in a haystack and would have taken already limited time away from researching the 

other wrecks of known identity. The only recourse was to attempt to work backwards from the 

wrecking event by checking USCG records for reported wrecks in the vicinity of Site 323. A Freedom 

of Information Act letter of request was filed with the USCG Sector New Orleans for any information 

corresponding to a wrecked vessel matching Site 323’s dimensions and hull type and in the East 

Cameron vicinity (Jones 2008). The request was passed on to the USCG Waterways Division and the 

District Wrecks and Obstructions Coordinator, neither of which was able to locate any information 

pertaining to Site 323 (Bullock 2008). The District Wrecks and Obstructions Coordinator checked the 

USCG database for any wrecks within 20 mi (32.2 km) of Site 323 and found no reported wrecks over 

100 ft (30 m) long (Ledet 2008, 2009). 

The first offshore oil well was drilled in the GOM in 1947, and, initially, converted fishing boats and 

retired World War II vessels were used as supply boats. The first purpose-built supply boat was 

constructed in 1955 (Offshore Marine Service Association [OMSA] 2010). Based on this history, 

PBS&J also checked multiple web-based newspaper archives for reports of offshore supply boats or 

crew boats that wrecked in the GOM between 1955 and 1994. Several vessels matched these search 

criteria, including the 580-ft (177-m) Liberian freighter Vainquer, wrecked March 1969 (Big Spring 

Daily Herald 1969); the 165-ft (50-m) supply boat Orleans (BOEMRE Vessel ID 922), lost in April 

54 
1975 (Ruston Daily Leader 1975a); the 85-ft (26-m) Cheramie Botrue, the 130-ft (40-m) Pegasus 

(BOEMRE Vessel ID 350), and Elmer D. Connor that all sank on Christmas Day 1975 (Ruston Daily 

Leader 1975b; Galveston Daily News 1975); the 100-ft (30-m) Mary Lynn, lost in March 1977 

(Playground Daily News 1977); the 95-ft (29-m) crew boat El Paso (BOEMRE Vessel ID 1415), 

wrecked in December 1977 (El Paso Herald-Post 1977); and the crew boat Laverne Hebert 

(BOEMRE Vessel ID 137) that capsized 10 mi (16.1 km) off Matagorda Island in November 1983 

(Galveston Daily News 1983). None of these vessels match the dimensions of Site 323, with the 

possible exception of Elmer D. Connor, whose dimensions were not listed. This vessel is an unlikely 

match, however, as it sank alongside a Tenneco Oil Company rig, 30 mi (48 km) south of Vermilion 

Bay, Louisiana. No other viable identities for Site 323 were discovered in these newspaper archives. 

Finally, PBS&J searched an online database that contains construction records of U.S. shipbuilders 

and other links pertaining to U.S. shipbuilding history (Colton 2009). Within that site PBS&J searched 

the records of Gulf Coast shipbuilders, active and inactive, to compile a list of Gulf-built offshore 

supply boats constructed since World War II. That list was further filtered to pursue two separate 

research objectives. The first was to determine which vessels had a current disposition listed as Sank, 

Foundered, Wrecked, Scuttled, or Total Loss (Table 11). Forty-four supply boats matched one of those 

descriptions, though the location of loss was not always provided. That list was cross-referenced with 

two other online ship indexes (BoatInfo World 2009; Haworth 2009) and the MVUS (U.S. Bureau of 

Customs 1958–1967; U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Coast Guard 1968–1989) to identify any vessels 

matching Site 323’s dimensions. None of the listed vessels that sank prior to 1994 matched Site 323’s 

description. 

The second research objective from the list of postwar Gulf-built vessels was to try to identify any 

temporal patterns in offshore supply boat dimensions that would further isolate a construction date for 

Site 323. Again cross-referencing with two online ship indexes (BoatInfo World 2009; Haworth 

2009), PBS&J identified 24 offshore supply boats from the list that measured 200–215 ft (61–66 m) 

long. The earliest of these vessels was Tidelands, built by Atlantic Marine, Inc., in 1965, suggesting 

that supply vessels equal to or greater than 200 ft (61 m) long were not common before that year. 

4.3.3 Previous Investigations 

The initial 1994 survey by Trabant (1994) recorded an unidentified shipwreck lying in a scour hole in 

70 ft (21.3 m) of water. Side-scan sonar data indicated the wreck was approximately 180 ft (55 m) 

long and 23 ft (7.0 m) wide; the corresponding magnetic anomaly measured 2,100 gammas. In 2004 

Site 323 was investigated by PBS&J as part of a study to conduct NRHP evaluations of submerged 

sites on the GOM OCS (Enright et al. 2006). PBS&J conducted a magnetometer and side-scan sonar 

survey of the wreck, followed by diver and ROV investigations. Side-scan sonar data confirmed that 

the vessel was approximately 200 ft (61 m) long and at least 36 ft (9.1 m) wide, and further 

determined the wreck to be laying keel-up at a slight list to starboard, with twin screws exposed 

(Figure 30). The diver and ROV investigations noted that the vessel appeared to be modern, with a 

steel or aluminum hull exhibiting a moderate degree of corrosion and degradation, but otherwise 

intact. Twin three-bladed propellers with corresponding rudder posts were extant; however, only the 

starboard rudder remained. Limited visibility under the aft end of the wreck revealed a low, flat deck 

consistent with design characteristics of a typical offshore supply vessel. 

55 
Table 11

Gulf-built Offshore Supply Boats that Have Been Lost

McDermott & 174 Pam Alario Offshore 127.2 ft ft 1972 San

Shipyard Hull # Name Customer Type Dimensions Built Dispos

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 188 Auster Auster inc., LA Supply Vessel 157.9 ft x 38 ft x 11.6 ft 1968 San

Alexander Shipyard 934 Baroid Ranger Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1966 Scuttled 

Alexander Shipyard 902 Beauregard Tidewater Grand Isle, Inc, LA Offshore Service Vessel 154.2 ft x 35 ft x 11.5 ft 1964 Scuttl

McDermott Shipbuilding, Amelia & 

Morgan City, LA

Betty G Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1963 Scuttled 

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 415 Black Bart Euro-Pirates International, Inc. Anchor-Handling Tug Supply 170 ft 1974 San

Alexander Shipyard 981 Blue Dolphin Fishing Vessel Unknown 1967 Total loss 

Alexander Shipyard 955 Brick Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel 160.5 ft x 36 ft 1966 Sank, NE coas

Ameri

Alexander Shipyard 622 C. E. Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1957 San

Alexander Shipyard 932 Cheramie Bo-Truc No. 15 L. & M. Bo-Truc Rentals Offshore Service Vessel 143.8 ft x 36 ft 1967 SanAlexander Shipyard 1064 Coral Seahorse Zapata Marine Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1971 Total loss 

Mangone Shipbuilding, Houston, TX 94 Eastern Worker Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1970 Scuttled 

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 396 El Caballo Grande Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1966 Sank 2

Halter Marine, Lockport, LA 260 El Jabali Grande Tidewater Marine Anchor-Handling Tug Unknown 1970 Total l

Universal Iron Works, Houma, LA El Leon Grande Tidewater Marine Supply Boat Unknown 1966 Sank 2

Halter Marine, Lockport, LA 449 Evelyn Tide Tidewater Marine Supply Vessel 166 LPP x 38 1974 Sank, B

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 420 Florida Martin AMT Marine Supply Vessel 170 ft x 38 ft 1974 San

Quality Shipyards, Houma, LA 147 Gulf Fleet No. 31 Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel 180 ft x 38 ft 1978 Wrecked 

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 413 Halliburton 218 Supply Vessel 165 ft x 38 ft; 2 screw diesel 1973 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 395 Huge Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel 154.7 ft x 38.1 ft 1966 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 300 Jackson, Later Eileen B 1976, 

Aloha 1977

Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1960 Foundere

Halter Marine, New Orleans, LA 212 Joel Robin Anchor-Handling Tug 100 ft 1969 Sank 1

56Alexander Shipyard 1086 Kappa Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel 164 ft x 38 ft 1972 Wreck

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 330 Kara Seahorse Zapata Marine Supply Vessel 166 ft x 38 ft 1972 San

Alexander Shipyard 982 King Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel Unknown 1967 Total loss 

Halter Marine, New Orleans, LA 1072 Kodiak II Anchor-Handling Tug Supply 225 ft x 52 ft 1983 Sank 1

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 327 Lena C. Candies Otto Candies Offshore Service Vessel 97.2 ft x 23.3 ft x 9.9 ft 1962 San

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 1069 M220 Falcon Service Anchor-Handling Tug Supply Unknown 1983 Total l

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 234 Nancy H Hudson Marine Offshore Service Vessel 124.7 ft x 32.1 ft x 9.5 ft 1956 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 398 Nashua Thorough Marine Offshore Service Vessel 95.7 ft x 24.2 ft 1966 San

McDermott Shipbuilding, pbuilding, Amelia

Morgan City, LA

lia & 174 Pam Alario Offshore Service Vessel Service Vessel 127.2 ft x 34 ft x 34 1972 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 525 Paul Candies Otto Candies Offshore Service Vessel 175 ft x 44 ft 1978 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 449 Pisces Zodiac Offshore Offshore Service Vessel 160.8 ft 1970 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 502 Polar 901 Zodiac Offshore Offshore Service Vessel 217 ft x 44 ft 1973 Sank, possibly o

due to fire

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 521 Republic Service Zapata Marine Offshore Service Vessel 183 ft x 40 ft 1975 Foundered

Alexander Shipyard 1024 S. A. Levy Offshore Service Vessel 167.5 ft x 38 ft 1969 San

Alexander Shipyard 1110 Salton Seahorse Zapata Marine Offshore Service Vessel 170 ft x 38 ft 1973 Scutt

Alexander Shipyard 968 Search Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel 160.5 ft x 36 ft 1967 San

Alexander Shipyard 848 South Tide Tidewater Marine Offshore Service Vessel 131.1 ft x 33.1 ft 1963 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 366 Southern Service Sea Services Offshore Service Vessel 148.4 ft x 38.1 ft 1964 Founde

Halter Marine, Moss Point, MS 737 Stephanie Hebert Supply Vessel 162 ft x 38 ft 1978 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 307 Tanforan, Later Falcon, Petrel, 

William T 1983, Fidel Jr. 1992

Offshore Service Vessel 141 ft x 34.1 ft 1961 San

Mangone Shipbuilding, Houston, TX 109 Tender Tarpon Wilhelmsen Offshore Offshore Service Vessel 189 ft x 38 ft 1973 Total loss 

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 204 Tilman J. Tilman Offshore Offshore Service Vessel 95 ft x 25 ft x 10.4 ft 1955 San

Burton Shipyard, Port Arthur, TX 226 Tilman J. No. 2 Tilman Offshore Offshore Service Vessel 124.9 ft x 32.1 ft x 9.5 ft 1956 San
Figure 30. Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Site 323. 

In 2006, Geotex Company conducted a high-resolution geophysical survey of the East Cameron lease 

block area for Remington Oil and Gas Corporation (Geotex Company 2006), including the area 

surrounding Site 323. Examination of these data for the current study showed that Geotex Company’s 

sonar imagery of Site 323 corresponded closely with PBS&J’s 2004 data, with the exception of 

evidence of extensive hull fractures in the vessel’s aft third (Figure 31). These fractures indicated 

recent exposure to a destructive event, either by external impact or internal structural collapse. 

4.3.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey 

PBS&J resurveyed Site 323 in May 2007 for the present study. The 2007 sonar data confirmed the site 

damage recorded in Geotex’s 2006 survey; an extensive hull rupture was evident near the vessel’s 

stern (see Figure 30). The breakage begins approximately 30 ft (9.1 m) forward of the transom, and 

extends the full width of the hull. It is widest, 23 ft (7.0 m), at the port gunwale, and tapers to 12 ft 

(3.7 m) on the starboard side. There is also evidence of increased scouring since 2004, along the 

starboard edge of the wreck just forward of the broken area, and increased burial of the starboard bow. 

Prior to beginning the dive investigation, PBS&J reanalyzed the accumulated sonar data and 

discovered that there had been subtle evidence of weakened hull structure in 2004 (Figure 32). 

Though on a much smaller scale than the posthurricane damage, there does appear to be morepronounced hull degradation over an approximately 10-square-foot (ft2

) (0.9 m2) area on the port side. 

This damage was not observed by divers in 2004 and may have been indistinguishable from metal 

corrosion holes present throughout the exposed vessel hull. 

57 
Figure 31. 2006 sonar imagery of Site 323 

(image courtesy of BOEMRE). 

Figure 32. Close-up of 2004 Site 323 sonar imagery showing weakened hull at the stern. 

58 
4.3.5 2007 Diving Investigations 

Ten dives were conducted on Site 323 in October 2007. Diving objectives were focused on recording 

the areas of hull damage, attempting to diagnose the cause, and locating diagnostic information that 

could lead to vessel identification. 

The hull rupture was observed to begin at the mudline on the vessel’s port side and extend beyond the 

starboard-side turn of the bilge. The breakage was characterized by collapsed hull plates near the 

centerline surrounded by broken frames. Moving outward in either direction from the center was 

extensive broken, twisted, and collapsed hull structure. The nature of the damage appeared random 

and did not indicate a single impact point from a foreign object or other unidirectional force. DIDSON 

and sector-scan imagery further confirmed the extent of damage (Figure 33), showing extensive areas 

of disarticulated hull structure. For safety reasons, no attempt was made to penetrate the wreck to 

investigate any internal damage in this area. 

Further changes to the site since 2004 include removal of the starboard rudder and accumulation of 

debris adjacent to the hull rupture on the port side. Divers investigating the stern area recorded both 

propellers and rudder posts still intact; however, the starboard rudder was no longer extant and was 

not identified on the surrounding seabed. Immediately outside the wreckage, on the port side of the 

broken area and again about 10 ft (3.0 m) forward, lay a large amount of debris, likely associated with 

the ruptured hull. 

Water depths ranged from 65 ft (19.8 m) at the top of the wreck to 78 ft (23.8 m) at the bottom of a 

scour depression on the port side. The surrounding seabed averaged about 74 ft (22.6 m) deep. There 

was a 3 percent rise in hull depth (69 ft to 65 ft [21.0 m to 19.8 m]) from the bow to just forward of the 

broken area. General observations of the site include both three-bladed propellers, numerous areas of 

corrosion holes covering the bottom of the hull; 4-inch (10.2-cm) doubled flat-bar steel frames; a 

partially visible stern deck underneath the port-side gunwale; two rubberized “D”-shaped rub rails 

running parallel along the vessel perimeter; and a bumper tire attached to the side-hull towards the 

bow. These features all substantiate the theory that Site 323 is a modern offshore supply vessel or 

crewboat; however, no identifying features were observed. 

4.3.6 Sedimentology 

Two box cores were collected at Site 323, one parallel to storm wave propagation (135°) and one 

perpendicular to wave propagation (45°). Sediment stratigraphy was identical in each of the cores. A 

hard, oxidized layer, indicated by a dark brown/yellowish color, was present less than a foot beneath 

the mudline (Figure 34). This surface is believed to be a remnant of the Pleistocene subaerial land 

surface, known geologically as the Beaumont Formation. Expansive outcrops of this formation were 

observed on sonar within a few hundred meters of the site (Figure 35). 

The box cores were separated into three subsamples based on visible color and/or texture changes, 

plus an additional sampling of the Pleistocene subaerial surface. Particle-size analysis showed that all 

subsamples were medium or coarse silt (Table 12). No sand lenses or zones were noted. 

59 
Figure 33. Sector-scan sonar and DIDSON imagery of Site 323 hull damage. 

60 
Figure 34. Box core sample from Site 323. 

Table 12 

Site 323 Particle-size Results 

Sample Provenience % Gravel % Sand % Silt % Clay Mean phi Classification

1-323 0–4 cm below 

mudline (bml) 

0 9 51.1 7 5.67 Medium silt 

2-323 4–12 cm bml 3.5 27.5 42 6 4.99 Coarse silt 

3-323 12–29 cm bml 

(oxidized surface) 

2 18 58 3 5.16 Medium silt 

4-323 Extra Pleistocene 

mud 

0.5 20 61 3 5.15 Medium silt 

Though the grain size results are inconclusive as a stand-alone data set, the visible presence of the 

oxidized Beaumont Formation provides an important interpretive clue. This formerly subaerial 

Pleistocene surface is extremely firm with a low permeability, and signifies the probable level of 

maximum wreck subsidence. This, in turn, hints at a contributing factor in the documented damage to 

Site 323’s hull. Areas of the seafloor containing deposits of cohesionless sediments (typically sand) 

have been shown to increase the probability of shipwreck subsidence through the processes of scour, 

sediment deposition, bedform migration, or liquefaction (Keith and Evans 2009). Over time, these 

processes will result in the partial or complete burial of wreck remains, providing a layer of protection 

against the destructive effects of waves, currents, oxygenation, and biofouling. If these protective 

sediments are absent or minimized, as is the case at Site 323, then a wreck is left exposed to all of the 

above destructive processes. 

61 
Figure 35. Sediment and Pleistocene clay outcrops in the vicinity of Site 323. 

62 
According to maps published by McClelland Engineers (1979:Plate 2A), Pleistocene soils formed 

under subaerial conditions during the Late Wisconsin glacial period are less than 20 ft (6.1 m) beneath 

the modern mudline in the vicinity of Site 323. Sonar imagery indicates this site rests on a localized 

area of granular surface sediments, which are arranged in linear bands paralleling the southern margin 

of a clay outcrop. The clay outcrop, which begins 1,000 ft (305 m) north of the wreck (see Figure 35), 

is associated with a diapir (salt dome) that, according to Berryhill et al. (1984:Sheet II), has been 

subjected to subaerial erosion. A fault curves around the southern side of this diapir (Berryhill and 

Owen 1984:Sheet III). The downthrown side of the fault is south of the diapir and coincides with the 

area where sand appears to have accumulated. Berryhill et al. (1984:Sheet II) also indicate two 

generations of buried Wisconsin-aged stream channels crossing near Site 323 south and east of the 

site, although neither one is believed sufficiently close to underlie the hull. 

McClelland Engineers (1979:Plates 3A, 4A, 5A) map the shear strength of soils in the vicinity of Site 

323 from the seabed to a depth of 20 ft (6.1 m) in the range of 0.8 to 1.0 ksf, which they qualitatively 

describe as firm. The OTRC (2004) map constructed using method 1 (see description in Castine 

sedimentology results, Section 4.2.6) shows soil shear strengths surrounding the location of Site 323 

as 0.2 ksf (soft) at the mudline, 1 ksf (stiff) at 5 ft (1.5 m) below the seafloor, and 0.5 ksf (soft) at 10 ft 

(3.0 m) below the seafloor. According to the OTRC maps, Site 323 is located within an area of sand 

deposits from the mudline to 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor, meaning their shear strength map 

constructed using method 2 did not calculate shear strengths in the area of Site 323. OTRC’s data 

showing large deposits of sand in the vicinity of Site 323 did not match PBS&J’s box core results for 

the top 1 ft (0.3 m) of sediment (see Table 12); however, OTRC’s closest data point was 

approximately 5 mi (8.0 km) from the site location, and it did not record sand. The presence of the 

nearby diapir, combined with the observed Pleistocene sediments adjacent the wreck, indicate that 

OTRC’s data interpolation for areas of sand coverage is inaccurate at Site 323’s exact location. The 

highly cohesive underlying sediments imply that localized soil shear strengths are low. Accordingly, 

the probability of increased site subsidence from Hurricane Rita, or from any future natural events, is 

expected to be low. 

4.3.7 Impact Assessment 

Hurricane Rita passed 28.5 mi (45.9 km) west of Site 323 as a Category 3 storm at 9:30 P.M. on 

September 23, 2005. Peak sustained winds over Site 323 were estimated by Oceanweather’s (2006) 

hindcast model at 86 mph (38.3 m/s) from a direction of 125 degrees. The maximum significant wave 

height over Site 323 was estimated at 30.8 ft (9.4 m) from a direction of 191 degrees. At peak storm 

conditions over the site, maximum bottom currents of 7.6 mph (3.4 m/s) struck Site 323’s hull along 

the starboard side bow (the hull is inverted) at an angle of 9 degrees relative to the ship’s orientation. 

At intervals of 8.0 seconds, the current reversed direction 180 degrees beneath the wave troughs to a 

velocity of –2.7 mph (–1.2 m/s), then peaked again 8 seconds later at 7.6 mph (3.4 m/s) in the forward 

direction beneath the next wave crest. The amplitude of velocity change from forward to reverse on an 

interval of 8.0 seconds was 10.3 mph (4.6 m/s). Given the difference in density between seawater and 

air, the damage potential represented by the maximum forward water velocity is equivalent to that of a 

215-mph (96.1-m/s) wind or analogous to an F5 tornado. 

Site 323 experienced the most-extreme conditions of any of the selected wrecks. The resulting impacts 

were most pronounced near the stern, where a preexisting area of structural weakness collapsed after 

being exposed to such dynamic forces. Sections of the steel hull were broken, twisted, collapsed, and 

63 
bent in all directions in a manner consistent with the violent, multidirectional forces that would have 

been present during Hurricane Rita. The wreck’s keel-up orientation likely contributed to the extent of 

structural collapse. With the wreck upside down in an unstable position, hurricane forces would be 

more unevenly distributed around the hull than if the vessel was sitting on its keel. The pilothouse or 

any other superstructure present on the underside of the wreck may have acted as a fulcrum point, 

allowing unsupported sections of the vessel to be subjected to repeated upward and downward vertical 

displacement in the water column caused by the cyclical pressure change of passing waves (see Figure 

22). If exposed to such forces over a long enough period of time, the collapse of weakened structural 

elements would be expected. 

The site’s vulnerability to damage from hurricane-force conditions may have been further exacerbated 

by its placement on the oxidized, densely compacted Beaumont Formation. This dense Pleistocene 

layer, less than a foot beneath the mudline, would limit settlement (i.e., stabilization) of the wreck into 

the seabed, thus contributing to the damaging structural effects of violent and repeated vertical hull 

displacement. 

Though peak storm conditions at Site 323 were relatively harsh, petroleum industry damage in the 

area was limited. According to GIS data provided by BOEMRE, no damage was reported to the 

nearest pipeline, 1.1 mi (1.8 km) west of Site 323. The closest damaged pipeline was one owned by 

Newfield Exploration Company, 10 mi (16.1 km) south of Site 323, which reported only a bent riser. 

4.3.8 National Register Assessment 

Site 323 was subjected to an NRHP evaluation study in 2004. Archival research for that study was 

successful in ruling out several reported possibilities for the wreck’s identity, but not in identifying 

alternate candidates. The resulting report deemed the wreck’s eligibility status inconclusive based on 

insufficient information regarding the vessel’s history (Enright et al. 2006). Additional archival 

research for the present study was also unsuccessful in identifying viable candidates for the wreck’s 

identity. However, several diver observations during the 2007 fieldwork, such as the “D”-shaped rub 

rails and attached bumper tire, supported Enright et al.’s supposition that Site 323 is likely an offshore 

supply boat. Since the build date of the vessel is unknown, the possibility remains that it is an early 

example of a vessel type that was built specifically for oil and gas activities in the GOM. Accordingly, 

it is potentially eligible for the NRHP under Criterion C: embodies the distinctive characteristics of a 

type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high 

artistic value, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack 

individual distinction. Furthermore, the as-yet-unknown identity and vessel history of Site 323 also 

leave open its potential NRHP eligibility under Criterion A: associated with events that have made a 

significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or B: associated with the lives of persons 

significant in our past. Until the vessel identity of Site 323 can be resolved, PBS&J recommends that 

the site’s NRHP eligibility status remain inconclusive. 

4.4 Gulf Tide

Gulf Tide (BOEMRE vessel ID 417) is located in the West Cameron lease block area, 8.4 mi (13.5 

km) west of Hurricane Rita’s path, making it the closest of any selected wreck to either of the 2005 

hurricanes. The strongest winds estimated over the site during Rita’s passage were 79 mph (35.3 m/s), 

and peak significant wave height was estimated at 22.6 ft (6.9 m). The site was first recorded in 1997, 

64 
when Racal Inc. surveyed a portion of the West Cameron lease block area for IP Petroleum Co., Inc 

(Racal Inc. 1997). 

4.4.1 History 

Gulf Tide was a pipeline dredge of unknown dimensions that sank due to “marine casualty” on 

September 28, 1947 (AWOIS Record 362). According to contemporary USCG reports, the vessel 

wrecked in 50 ft (15.2 m) of water with its bow resting on the bottom and “about 13.1 mi [21.1 km] 

and 164 degrees off the Sabine Bank Light” (Galveston Daily News 1947). The vessel was identified 

as foreign and believed to be Argentinean. A USCG Notice to Mariners issued on October 11 reports 

that Gulf Tide’s bow was awash and that the site had been marked (200 yards [183 m] away) with a 

lighted red and black bell buoy (U.S. Hydrographic Office 1947a). A second Notice to Mariners, 

issued a week later, reports that the wreck buoy had been repainted all red, and named “Dredge Gulf 

Tide,” and that “no part of the wreck is now visible above water” (U.S. Hydrographic Office 1947b). 

In 1948 it was reported that the wreck had “broken up” and was covered by more than 40 ft (12.2 m) 

of water (AWOIS Record 362). 

No further information on Gulf Tide’s construction, use history, or cause of sinking have been located; 

however, if the identification of Gulf Tide as a pipeline dredge is accurate, then it can be expected to 

be a cutterhead-type dredge. Cutterhead dredges are the most commonly used type in the United 

States due to their efficiency and versatility in excavating a wide range of materials including clay, 

silt, sand, gravel, and densely packed sediments and soft rock (USACE 1983). They are characterized 

by two stern spuds; a forward cutterhead, intake pipe, and retractable ladder; the A-frame; and a 

material discharge pipeline that extends from the stern for distances up to 3 mi (4.8 km) (Figure 36). 

Most cutterhead dredges are designed to operate in calm water, though some offshore models can 

operate in up to 6 ft (1.8 m) waves. Because the dredging ladder on which the cutterhead and intake 

pipes are mounted is rigidly attached to the dredge hull, excessive waves can force the dredge head 

into the sediment, causing shock-induced damage to the vessel and equipment. 

Figure 36. Configuration of typical cutterhead dredge (USACE 1983). 

4.4.2 Archival Research 

4.4.2.1 Mariners’ Museum 

The vessel history files of the Elwin M. Eldredge Collection contain only a single entry for a Gulftide 

(one-word spelling), but it was a 430-ft-long (131-m) tanker built in 1937 for Gulf Oil Corp. 

65 
Photographs of this vessel in the Mariners’ Museum photo collection confirmed that it is not the 

dredge Gulf Tide. 

4.4.2.2 Library of Congress 

The Library of Congress contains several volumes of the Index to Notices to Mariners (U.S. 

Hydrographic Office 1947a, 1947b), including the various entries pertaining to Gulf Tide. These 

notices are the source for, and essentially identical to, the information presented in the AWOIS 

database (Record 362). No other information pertinent to Gulf Tide was identified at the Library of 

Congress. 

4.4.2.3 National Archives 

At the time of PBS&J’s archival research trip, Gulf Tide’s Argentinean origin was unknown 

(Galveston Daily News 1947). Therefore, research was conducted on the assumption that Gulf Tide 

was an American-flagged vessel. The resulting records search identified only listings for the 

previously mentioned tanker Gulftide in the MVUS, along with a dredge Gulf Stream that appears in 

the MVUS from 1938 to 1944. A Certificate of Enrollment from January 11, 1944, notes that Gulf 

Stream was sold to the Navy, Office of Superintending Civil Engineer, New Orleans, in October 

1944. This New Orleans location raised the suspicion that Gulf Tide may have been the misreported 

wreck of Gulf Stream, and further research was directed towards confirming or refuting this suspicion. 

In addition to register and enrollment records (RG41: Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, 

Official No. Files, 1867–1958), multiple Navy records collections were inspected including RG19: 

Bureau of Ships (ship plans, correspondence, and photographic collection), RG71: Bureau of Yards 

and Docks (Naval property case files 1941–1958, circular letters 1940–1945, and miscellaneous 

correspondence), and the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, which identified the Navy’s 

hull designation for Gulf Stream: YM-20. This research yielded only ship plans of dredge YM-22 

(U.S. Bureau of Ships 1951a, 1951b), which were photocopied in the hope that YM-22 shared design 

and construction characteristics with Gulf Stream/YM-20. A copy of a 1943 photograph of dredge 

YM-09 (Bureau of Aeronautics 1943; Figure 37) was obtained for the same reason. 

After the archival research trip was completed, PBS&J located a contemporary newspaper article that 

reported the wreck of Gulf Tide and tentatively identified it as an Argentinean pipeline dredge 

(Galveston Daily News 1947). This information was relayed to an archivist at the National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA) who cross referenced it with the Official Number Files (RG41) 

and records of the USCG (RG26), specifically Merchant Vessel Information, Station History Files, 

and Assistance to Vessels Records. None of these documents contained information on Gulf Tide. 

4.4.2.4 Additional Research 

PBS&J also contacted Lloyd’s Register, London, to determine if the international company had ever 

registered the foreign-flagged Gulf Tide. Lloyd’s confirmed that no vessel matching Gulf Tide’s 

description was recorded in either Lloyd’s Register of Ships from 1945 to 1951 or in their Wreck 

Returns records (Bloomfield 2008). 

66 
Figure 37. Cutterhead-type dredge, YM-09, 1943 (Bureau of Aeronautics 1943). 

Finally, record requests were filed separately with the USCG’s Data Management & Administration 

Division, and Office of Information Resources (i.e., USCG Historian’s Office) under the Freedom of 

Information Act. Both offices were unable to locate any information matching Gulf Tide’s description 

(Havern 2008; Martin 2008). 

4.4.3 Previous Investigations 

In 1997 Racal Inc. (1997) recorded an approximately 110-ft-long (33.5-m) by 75-ft-wide (22.9-m) 

wreck in the vicinity of the reported AWOIS location for Gulf Tide (Figure 38). In 2003, 

archaeologists investigated the site and determined that the loss of structural integrity was too great for 

the site to be NRHP eligible. 

67 
Figure 38. Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery for Gulf Tide (1997 image courtesy of BOEMRE). 

4.4.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey 

Gulf Tide was resurveyed in May 2007. Side-scan sonar data showed a shipwreck approximately 

100 ft (30 m) long and tapering from a maximum breadth of 30 ft (9.1 m) at its eastern end to 11 ft 

(3.4 m) at its western end (see Figure 38). The imagery showed two distinct sections of wreckage, 

separated by 10 ft (3.0 m). It was unclear from the data whether this represented two isolated wreck 

fragments or one section that was partially buried at its midsection. There appeared to be less wreck 

exposure relative to the 1997 sonar, but comparison of the two data sets was inconclusive because 

Racal Inc.’s survey was conducted at longer range and lower resolution. Based on interpretation of the 

available imagery, there were no clearly identifiable hurricane impacts at the site. 

68 
Figure 39. Gulf Tide Sector-Scan and DIDSON Data. 

69 
4.4.5 2007 Diving Investigations 

Fifteen dives were conducted on-site over two days in October 2007. The depth range of exposed 

wreckage was between 48 and 53 ft (14.6–16.2 m). Because of the zero-visibility conditions, diver 

observations were supplemented by DIDSON and sector-scan sonar imagery. Two discrete hull 

sections were identified, separated from each other by between 4 and 15 ft (1.2–4.6 m) (Figure 39). 

The eastern section measured 25 ft (7.6 m) long by 32 ft (9.8 m) wide and was characterized primarily 

by a flat, featureless steel surface, exhibiting areas of extensive corrosion including a 7-x-9-ft (2.1-x2.7-m) hole in the center of the hull. Attached to the far eastern edge of the hull were two spud gates 

with partial remnants of their respective spud wells (see Figure 39). In this same area, a bollard was 

also identified on the underside of the hull. Consequently, these features indicate that this hull section 

represents the overturned stern, and the orientation of the spud gates and wells further confirms that 

the vessel was a cutterhead-type dredge (USACE 1983:3–8). 

The exposed area of the western (forward) hull section measures 65 x 18 ft (19.8 x 5.5 m) based on 

the sonar data. Significant amounts of disarticulated metal and partially buried hull made construction 

details difficult to interpret in this area; however, several features indicate that this section is likely the 

starboard remnants of the machinery deck, oriented keel-down. The northern margin of the wreckage 

is characterized by a 4–13-ft-wide (1.2–4.0-m) flat surface of hull plating that extends the length of the 

exposed wreck and is buried in the sand along its northern edge. The southern (inboard) edge of the 

plating terminates at an approximately 4-ft-deep (1.2-m) vertical bulkhead containing vertical 4-inch 

(10.2-cm) molded beams spaced at 2-ft (0.6-m) centers. Moving both forward and aft, this bulkhead 

eventually intersects perpendicularly with two other vertical bulkheads effectively creating two — and 

a partial third — sides of a rectangular cavity around the forwardmost section of the wreck (see 

Figure 39). At the base of these bulkheads is a horizontal deck with a grating of beams spaced at 1-ft 

(0.3-m) centers. Overlaying this deck are numerous pieces of disarticulated metal, including pipes 

with internal wiring. 

In order to determine the extent of buried site remains, probe transects were placed to the north and 

south of the forward hull section and also in the gap between that section and the stern. Probing 

revealed an additional 8 ft (2.4 m) of buried hull remains northward of the forward hull section (see 

Figure 39), equaling a total of 14 ft (4.3 m) from the bulkhead to the end of buried hull. Burial depths 

along probe transects gradually deepened from 2 inches (5.1 cm) adjacent to the exposed wreck to 2 ft 

10 inches (0.96 m) at the outermost probe. On the southern side of the wreck, a single probe transect 

encountered an additional 20 ft (6.1 m) of buried material outside of the exposed remains. Sediment 

cover in this area was generally 2 inches (5.1 cm) thick. Factoring in the buried areas, total site width 

is at least 58 ft (17.7 m). A third probe transect was placed in the gap between the two sections of 

broken hull to determine whether the two fragments were completely separated or attached 

underneath the sediment. Using a 2-ft (0.6-m) probe and beginning at the forward end of the 10-ft 

(3.0-m) gap, no buried material was probed for the first 5 ft (1.5 m). Beginning at 6 ft (1.8 m) from the 

forward hull section, a downward-sloped extension of the exposed stern hull was probed at gradually 

shallower depths. It is possible that this feature continued to slope to a depth beyond the length of the 

probe, explaining why no material was encountered in the first 5 ft (1.5 m) of the probe transect. 

Following the field documentation and subsequent research at the National Archives, PBS&J 

compared the site data with deck plan drawings of YM-22, a Navy dredge boat in operation around 

the same time as Gulf Tide. At 81 ft (24.7 m) long with a 20-ft (6.1-m) beam, YM-22 was of similar 

70 
size to Gulf Tide and, therefore, may provide a useful template for Gulf Tide’s design features. Based 

on this comparison, the Gulf Tide wreckage appears to represent the starboard side of the machinery 

deck. The YM-22 plans show that dredge’s diesel engines, generators, and pumps placed on an engine 

room floor, recessed below the main deck (Figure 40). There are bulkheads at either end of the engine 

floor space: one at the bow, where the main intake pipe and suction pump entered the engine room, 

and a second at the stern end of the engine compartment. This floor and bulkhead configuration 

closely resembles the layout observed on Gulf Tide. The distance between these bulkheads on YM-22

is 37 ft (11.3 m). Based on sonar data, the distance between the bulkheads on Gulf Tide is ca. 39 ft 

(11.9 m). The total engine space width of YM-22 is 11 ft (3.4 m), and the extant engine space on Gulf 

Tide is ca. 13 ft (4.0 m) wide. YM-22’s machinery also sits on a grid of support beams spaced 2 ft 

(0.6 m) apart, while deck beams for the upper walkway of the machinery deck are spaced at 1 ft 

(0.3 m). This configuration is the exact opposite of Gulf Tide, where the engine room floor beams are 

1 ft (0.3 m) apart and the vertical beams are 2 ft (0.6 m) apart. 

(a) YM-22 plan of machinery deck 

(b) YM-22 section at FR 18 looking aft 

Figure 40. YM-22 plans (U.S. Bureau of Ships 1951a). 

71 
If this interpretation is correct, then clearly Gulf Tide’s machinery has been removed, possibly by 

salvage after its sinking. The numerous disarticulated remnants in this area of the wreck could be 

evidence of such salvage activity. There are also no visible remains of any superstructure. The engine 

house and pilothouse were likely constructed of wood, making it probable that they have been either 

destroyed by marine organisms or became dislodged and floated away during the period when the 

wrecked vessel was partially awash on the surface. If the wreck was salvaged at any point, the 

cutterhead, intake and outtake pipes, A-frame, and other mechanical elements were likely also 

salvaged. However, some of these features may also account for the buried wreck elements located 

during probing. If Gulf Tide broke apart, as was reported by the USCG (AWOIS Record 362), there 

may be significant vessel remains underneath the two extant hull fragments. 

4.4.6 Sedimentology

Two box cores were collected at Gulf Tide (Figure 41), one along an east-west orientation (parallel to 

storm wave propagation) and one along a north-south orientation (perpendicular to wave propagation). 

The cores were further separated into a total of eight subsamples based on stratigraphy (three for the 

north-south core and five for the east-west core). Particle-size results are presented in Table 13. 

Figure 41. Box cores collected at Gulf Tide. 

72 
Table 13 

Gulf Tide Particle-size Results 

Sample Provenience % Gravel % Sand % Silt % Clay Mean phi Classification 

1-Gulf Tide N-S 0-7 cm bml 9 51.5 27 5.5 4.12 Coarse silt 

2-Gulf Tide N-S 7-10 cm bml 12.5 66.5 11.5 2 3.26 Very fine sand 

3-Gulf Tide N-S 10-29 cm bml 3 77 10 3 3.38 Very fine sand 

4-Gulf Tide E-W mixed levels 6 75.5 12.5 2.5 3.35 Very fine sand 

5-Gulf Tide E-W 0-4 cm bml 2.2 51.5 38 1.5 4.15 Medium silt 

6-Gulf Tide E-W 4-5 cm bml 3.5 86.5 0 8 2.82 Fine sand 

7-Gulf Tide E-W 5-21 cm bml 6.5 79 11.5 0 3.26 Very fine sand 

8-Gulf Tide E-W 22.5-29 cm bml 13.5 68 14.5 2.5 3.16 Very fine sand 

On the north-south axis, there is mud from 0 to 7 cm (0 to 2.8 inches) and two zones of very fine sand 

from 7 to 10 (2.8 to 3.9 inches) and 10 to 29 cm (3.9 to 11.4 inches). The results were similar on the 

east-west axis. Mud was present from 0 to 4 cm (0 to 1.6 inches), underlain by a lens of fine sand from 

4 to 5 cm (1.6 to 2.0 inches), and two zones of very fine sand from 5 to 21 cm (2.0 to 8.3 inches) and 

22.5 to 29 cm (8.9 to 11.4 inches). The lens of fine sand was not apparent on the north-south axis. This 

predominance of fine and very fine sand near the surface is likely a contributing factor in the increased 

burial of the site since the 1997 survey. These small particulates would be easily reconfigured when 

energized by hurricane-induced currents, resulting in the diver-observed burial of lower-profile wreck 

features outside of Gulf Tide’s visible hull. The data indicate that Gulf Tide may be vulnerable to 

increased subsidence in these fine sediments over time. Based on probing, however, wreck features 

are known to be present at least 2 ft 10 inches (0.86 m) below the mudline, which is below the coring 

depth. Without deeper coring data, characterization of the soils at the sediment/wreck interface cannot 

be quantified. 

Other sources indicate the site may rest on relatively cohesionless sandy sediments 3.3 to 4.9 ft (1 to 

1.5 m) thick, based on data recorded in an adjacent block (Berryhill 1984:Sheet VI). PBS&J sonar 

imagery suggests the presence of small localized pockets of finer material occurring in the vicinity and 

a linear transition to coarser material located west and northwest of the site (Figure 42). This linear 

transition might indicate the presence of a buried fault, as Berryhill and Owen (1984:Sheet III) map 

three faults nearby, all buried at least 16.4 ft (5.0 m). These faults might be associated with anticlinal 

folds mapped by Berryhill and Owen in blocks to the northwest and southeast and a diapir located in 

the next block south. 

According to maps produced by McClelland Engineers (1979:Plate 2A), Pleistocene soils formed 

under subaerial conditions during the Late Wisconsin glacial period are less than 20 ft (6.1 m) beneath 

the modern mudline in the vicinity of Gulf Tide. Berryhill et al. (1984:Sheet II) did not map buried 

stream channels in the same lease block, although channels from the Late Wisconsin Glacial Epoch 

mapped in adjacent blocks trend in directions suggesting they would connect across the center of Gulf 

Tide’s lease block location. 

73 
Figure 42. Surface sediments in the vicinity of Gulf Tide. 

74 
McClelland Engineers (1979:Plates 3A, 4A, 5A) mapped the shear strength soils at the seabed in the 

vicinity of Gulf Tide in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 ksf, which they qualitatively described as firm. The 

shear strength was mapped as 1.0 to 1.5 ksf (stiff) at a depth of 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor and as 

1.0 ksf (firm-stiff) at a depth of 20 ft (6.1 m). The OTRC (2004) map constructed using method 1 (see 

description in Castine sedimentology results, Section 4.2.6) shows soil shear strengths surrounding the 

location of Gulf Tide as 2.3 ksf (very stiff) at the mudline, 2.2 ksf (very stiff) at 5 ft (1.5 m) below the 

seafloor, and 0.5 ksf (soft) at 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor. These maps indicate that Gulf Tide’s 

probability for increased subsidence is low; however, according to OTRC data, Gulf Tide is located 

within a sand polygon from the mudline to 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor, which contradicts their 

maps produced using method 1. It also means that their shear strength map constructed using method 

2 did not calculate shear strengths in the area of Gulf Tide. OTRC’s data on sand content match 

PBS&J’s box core data for the top 1 ft (0.30 m) of the site. This indicates that increased subsidence of 

Gulf Tide from Hurricane Rita or future natural events is possible, though inconclusive without 

collecting deeper coring samples and/or shear strength measurements at the site. 

Finally, on both sector-scan and DIDSON imagery, small craters were observed in the sand within the 

radius of buried wreckage, but not in the surrounding seabed (see Figure 39). These craters are 

indicative of air or some other gas that had been trapped under the wreck but then “bubbled” to the 

surface at some point. This process could have been catalyzed by differential pressures resulting from 

storm waves passing over the wreck. 

4.4.7 Impact Assessment 

Hurricane Rita passed 8.4 mi (13.5 km) east of Gulf Tide as a Category 3 storm at 12:30 A.M. on 

September 24, 2005. This was the closest approach of either Katrina or Rita to one of the study 

wrecks. Peak sustained winds over Gulf Tide were estimated by Oceanweather, Inc.’s (2006) hindcast 

model at 79 mph (35.5 m/s) from a direction of 219 degrees. The maximum significant wave height 

over Gulf Tide was estimated at 22.6 ft (6.9 m) from a direction of 112 degrees. At peak storm 

conditions over the site, maximum bottom currents of 6.5 mph (2.9 m/s) struck Gulf Tide along its 

port side from the stern at an angle of 43 degrees relative to the ship’s orientation. At intervals of 

7.75 seconds, the current reversed direction 180 degrees beneath the wave troughs to a velocity of 

−2.0 mph (–0.9 m/s), then peaked again 7.75 seconds later at 6.5 mph (2.9 m/s) in the forward 

direction beneath the next wave crest. The amplitude of velocity change from forward to reverse, on 

an interval of 7.75 seconds, was 8.5 mph (3.8 m/s). Given the difference in density between seawater 

and air, the damage potential represented by the maximum forward water velocity is equivalent to that 

of a 183-mph (81.8-m/s) wind or analogous to an F4 tornado. Gulf Tide experienced the second 

strongest bottom currents of the four primary study wrecks. This site is the shallowest of the study 

wrecks, so the potential exists for extreme bottom currents from any close hurricane passage. 

There has clearly been a high degree of degradation to this site since its sinking in 1947. In several 

areas, outer hull plating has deteriorated to reveal internal framing, and the orientation of the 

fragmented hull sections indicates that the site has been exposed over time to fairly dynamic forces. 

There are no impacts that can conclusively be associated with Hurricane Rita, however. The only 

quantifiable difference between the pre- and poststorm condition of the wreck is the width of exposed 

remains. The 1997 Racal Inc. survey recorded a site that was approximately 75 ft (22.9 m) wide, while 

PBS&J’s data show only approximately 30 ft (9.1 m) of exposed wreckage, with at least an additional 

28 ft (8.5 m) of buried remains. Even this comparison is problematic because of the low-resolution 

75 
imagery collected by Racal Inc. The increased burial may be the result of natural sediment transport 

processes in this area of the GOM, or it may be due to sediment transport associated with localized 

hurricane activity. If 75 ft (22.9 m) of wreckage were still exposed after 50 years of site creation, it 

seems probable that burial of more than half the site in the 10 years between surveys was induced by 

an acute change in local environmental conditions (i.e., passage of a hurricane). This is particularly 

probable when considering the proximity of Gulf Tide to Hurricane Rita’s path. The presence of small 

craters in the surrounding sediment is evidence that trapped gases, presumably air, have been released 

from the site since Rita. It seems likely that pockets of air accumulated beneath wreckage during Rita, 

then continued releasing to the surface following passage of the storm, thus preserving the small 

craters over the site. A similar pattern was observed in posthurricane imagery of Josephine, located 

46 mi (74.1 km) west of Katrina’s path (see Appendix A). 

Apart from changes in the sediment cover, there is little in the structural condition of the wreck that 

can be conclusively associated with hurricane impacts. Gulf Tide was reported to have broken apart 

while still partially afloat, which could account for the separated and overturned stern section. 

Furthermore, if the site was salvaged, which seems likely considering the lack of remaining 

machinery, this activity could have accelerated the rate of material decay long before passage of 

Hurricane Rita. Without better knowledge of the prestorm conditions of the site, any determinations of 

poststorm impacts remain inconclusive. 

The closest petroleum-industry damage reported near Gulf Tide was a Mariner Energy, Inc. pipeline 

that was pulled up 7.5 mi (12.0 km) northeast of Gulf Tide’s position, almost directly in Rita’s path. 

Several other pipelines, including one only 1.6 mi (2.6 km) north of Gulf Tide, had no reported 

damage. This implies that storm-induced bottom disturbances in the vicinity of Gulf Tide were 

relatively less severe than in surrounding areas. 

4.4.8 National Register Assessment 

A 2003 diver reconnaissance of Gulf Tide previously determined the site to be too heavily disturbed to 

qualify for NRHP eligibility. Based on the 2007 investigation of the site, however, PBS&J believes 

Gulf Tide’s eligibility status is still an open question. Too little is known of Gulf Tide’s construction 

and use history to determine its potential historical significance. Depending on its construction date, it 

may represent an early example of diesel-powered cutterhead dredges, a vessel type that has been the 

most widely used in the United States, particularly for pipeline installations and navigation channel 

creation and maintenance projects. This type of vessel has been described as an “American specialty” 

that has been more highly developed and widely used for submarine excavation than in any other part 

of the world (Herbich 2000:4.17). Furthermore, significant amounts of the vessel hull and upper deck 

mechanical elements may still be present, buried in situ under the exposed hull fragments. Until 

further information can be obtained on Gulf Tide’s history and the types of material that may still be 

present on-site, PBS&J recommends that Gulf Tide’s NRHP status remain inconclusive. 

4.5 New York

The steamship New York (BOEMRE vessel ID 344; Figure 43) is located in the High Island lease 

block area, 34.4 mi (55.4 km) northwest of Hurricane Rita’s path. The strongest winds estimated over 

the site during Rita’s passage were 69 mph (30.8 m/s). Peak significant wave height over the site was 

estimated from hindcast data at 18 ft (5.5 m). 

76 
Figure 43. SS New York (courtesy of the Mariners’ Museum, 

Eldredge Collection). 

The wreck was first discovered in 1990 following a five-year search by a group of amateur wreck 

salvers named Gentlemen of Fortune. In 1997, Gentlemen of Fortune voluntarily brought the wreck to 

the attention of BOEMRE archaeologists. In 2006, Gentlemen of Fortune filed a civil action in U.S. 

District Court for salvage rights to the site. The court ruled in the group’s favor in January 2007 (U.S. 

District Court, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette-Opelousas Division 2007). 

4.5.1 History 

The SS New York was a Charles Morgan steamship that ran between New Orleans and Galveston 

beginning in 1839. The side-wheeler was built in 1837 by William H. Brown, a well-established 

shipbuilder of New York City. William H. Brown operated one of two shipyards (the other being 

Bishop and Simonson) that were opened at New York City in 1834 and that were widely known for 

their steam vessels (Morrison 1909:59). The low-pressure crosshead steam engine was manufactured 

at Allaire Works, the first of the large marine engine works in New York City (Morrison 1909:38). Its 

registered dimensions were 160 ft 6 inches x 22 ft 6 inches x 10 ft 6 inches (48.9 x 6.9 x 3.2 m), with a 

burden of 365 tons (Works Progress Administration 1942:207). 

New York was originally a packet/passenger steamer for the troubled New York and Charleston Steam 

Packet Company, operated by John Aymar, Benjamin Aymar, James P. Allaire, John Haggerty, and 

Charles Morgan. It was one of two steamers, along with Home, built after reorganization of the 

company in 1836 following the departure of Benjamin Aymar (Baughman 1968:16–17). The 

construction of New York and Home was finished in 1837, and the steamers joined Columbia on the 

Charleston run in early 1837. In October 1837, on her third voyage, the lavishly built Home grounded 

and swamped during foul weather off Cape Hatteras killing 99 passengers and crew, including one of 

Allaire’s relatives (Baughman 1968:7–18; Courier 1837). After this tragic and expensive loss, the 

company was again reorganized, and New York was paired with Neptune on the Charleston route. 

James Allaire was stung by the public outcry and desire to assign blame for the loss of Home, and he 

withdrew from the company to focus on Allaire Works, leaving Morgan as the managing partner of 

77 
both Columbia and New York (Baughman 1968:18–19). In the wake of the disaster, Morgan refocused 

his entrepreneurial energies on shifting the steam line to New Orleans. Morgan’s proliferation into 

Texas commenced an ambitious marine and rail line into the territory and by midcentury lead to the 

creation of the major port and Morgan Line hub at Indianola (Baughman 1968; Malsh 1978). 

Columbia arrived at New Orleans on November 18, 1837, initiating Morgan’s steam service in the 

GOM (Baughman 1968:21). The introduction of Morgan’s service to the GOM greatly stimulated 

economic diversity and growth in the region, especially at Galveston, which initially did not even have 

a suitable wharf to receive the vessel and its cargo (Baughman 1968:23; New York Times 1878:4). 

Columbia, considered “one of the best and safest boats in the United States,” was joined by Cuba in 

June 1838 and New York in January 1839 (Baughman 1968:24, 26; Civilian and Gazette 1838). New 

York was characterized as exceeding Columbia in elegance (Baughman 1968:26). 

An early advertisement for New York was printed in The Civilian and Gazette (Galveston) on 

January 11, 1838. According to the paper, it was to arrive in port at the end of November as a regular 

packet between New Orleans and Galveston. It boasted accommodations for 200 passengers, the 

ability to carry 600 barrels freight and conduct passage in 30 hours. The agents for the vessel were 

McKinney and Williams, the largest, and most-well-known mercantile house in the Republic of 

Texas. The vessel was luxurious and commodious, advertising 180 ft (54.9 m) on deck, 22 ft (6.7 m) 

breadth, and an 11-ft (3.4-m) hold. To further promote the new steamer, McKinney and Williams 

displayed a drawing of the vessel in their “counting” room in Galveston (Civilian and Gazette 1838). 

Despite its predicted November appearance, it was first advertised in the New Orleans paper in 

January 1839 for a departure date of February 1st (New Orleans Bee 1839a). The agents at New 

Orleans were Bogert and Hawthorn (New Orleans Bee 1839a). The steam packet cleared the port of 

New Orleans for Galveston on February 2, 1839 (New Orleans Bee 1839b). 

The steam packet New York was well marketed. Advertisements of the period boasted a “highly 

finished and fast running boat” and “a most beautiful boat” (Civilian and Gazette 1838). In 1839 the 

steamer was slightly over a year old and had just begun operating on the New Orleans to Galveston 

route (Baughman 1968:26). The opulence of the vessel was described in a letter written by Mary 

Austin Holley, a well-known chronicler (and inadvertent propagandist) of Texas, in 1840: 

The cabin of the New York is on the upper deck like the river boats, the whole of it 

mahogany & maple polished like the finest piano – drapery (where there is any) of 

blue satin damask, & dimity. The windows of painted glass representing the Texas 

arms. The table china is white, with a blue device in the center of each plate 

representing the New York at sea with the Texas eagle hovering over her. Every 

article was made express for the boat – ivory knives, polished to the highest degree, & 

the silver forks & spoons (not German silver) have Steam boat N. York engraved on 

them . . . . The boat is built for strength. They call it the finest work that ever came out 

of New York. (Holley 1933) 

In 1843, New York was reported as having been overhauled while “up north” with new wrought iron 

shafts (Civilian and Gazette 1843). It also received a new certificate of registry at New Orleans on 

March 10, 1843, under the ownership of John. D. Phillips, Charles Morgan, and John Haggerty. By 

1845, the vessel had received more maintenance and was again thoroughly overhauled with new 

copper boilers. Part-owner John D. Phillips was now also New York’s captain. Former Captain John T. 

Wright was transferred to master of Morgan’s new 548-ton side-wheel steamer Galveston (Baughman 

78 
1968:39; Civilian and Gazette 1845). Wright was a career captain for Morgan and was usually 

promoted to the newest of Morgan’s boats upon their acquisition. Prior to his tenure on New York, 

Wright was master of Columbia in 1837, considered the first vessel of the Morgan Line (Baughman 

1968: 24). 

As a steam packet, New York could carry freight and accommodate passengers in their luxurious 

staterooms, cabins, steerage quarters, or on deck. In 1843, staterooms were priced at $25.00, cabins at 

$20.00, steerage $12.00, and deck seating was $8.00; amounts comparable to between $748.00 and 

$239.00 in present-day dollars (Civilian and Gazette 1843; Officer and Williamson 2009). Steerage 

was below deck with sleeping berths partitioned by curtains. Steerage passengers had access to the 

awning-covered decks though they had to “find” and prepare their own meals. These accommodations 

were viewed as more comfortable than that of the deck passengers (Baughman 1968:12). 

On September 7, 1846, while en route to New Orleans, the vessel broke apart and sank during a 

hurricane off the Texas coast near Galveston. Detailed accounts from survivors attest to prolonged and 

harrowing attempts to save the steamer during a violent, unforgiving hurricane. New York initially 

encountered the storm at 10 PM on the evening of September 5 wherein the vessel anchored, then later 

continued on her course. Shortly after recommencing her journey, the vessel again anchored with the 

intention of riding out the storm. On the afternoon of September 6, the steamer struggled to keep its 

position until a change in wind direction, from the north and east to southeast, foreshadowed the 

subsequent events. Gale force winds pushed New York into the trough where she was battered by 

waves that removed the port and starboard guard, smoke pipe, wheelhouse, pilothouse, and portions of 

the decking, lifted the promenade, and caused tremendous leakage, which extinguished the boiler 

fires. After laboring against the storm for 56 hours, New York ultimately broke apart and sank in the 

early morning on September 7. Nearly half of the passengers and crew perished, and between $30,000 

and $40,000 in gold, silver, and bank notes was lost with the ship (Civilian and Gazette 1846; Daily 

Picayune 1846; New Orleans Bee 1846:1). 

At the time of its sinking, New York carried 30 passengers and 24 crew. Twelve passengers perished 

in the tragedy, though all but seven of the crew were spared, including Captain Phillips. Incidentally, a 

larger proportion of women and children died than men; seven of the 12 passenger deaths were 

woman and children. The only surviving females onboard the vessel were a Mrs. Follett, whose three 

children perished, and a chambermaid named Sarah (New Orleans Bee 1846:1; Table 14). 

Coincidentally, a Miss Follett was also identified as one of the deceased passengers, but any relation 

to Mrs. Follett and her children is unknown. 

The survivors of New York were rescued by the crew of Morgan’s new steamer Galveston, which was 

on the same route from Galveston to New Orleans. Galveston towed one of its boats alongside to help 

retrieve survivors, some of whom had drifted several miles from the wreck location (Manchester 

Examiner 1846). As captain of Galveston, John T. Wright was responsible for the rescue of 

passengers and crew from the vessel for which he had recently been master. Both New York and 

Galveston were chartered to the U.S. government to transport supplies to U.S. troops stationed in 

Texas during the Mexican-American War. After the loss of the uninsured New York, Morgan’s 

military contracts diminished, as Galveston had to absorb U.S. mail and civilian and business 

transportation formerly allocated to New York (Baughman 1968:45; New York Times 1878:4). 

79 
Table 14 

Lists of Passengers and Crew of New York 

Passengers Saved Passengers Deceased 

Judge Toler (Dan Toler) Mrs. Wilson 

Mrs. Follett 2 unnamed Wilson children 

T.W. House Miss Follett 

Mr. McCormick (A. McCormick) A. H. McCormick 

Mr. Stakes (A.G. Stakes) 3 unnamed Follett children 

Mr. Papard (J.G. Peppard) Wm. Armstrong 

Dr. Banzano (M.F. Bonzano) one cabin passenger, name unknown 

Capt. Tod (John Y. Tod) two deck passengers, names unknown 

Mr. Smithers (G. Smither) 

J.W. White (John W. White) 

Cuhn (Ludwig Cuhn) 

Gorman (Oliver Gorman) 

G.W. Goolley 

McCafferty (J.M. Cafferty) 

Sheppard (James W. Sheperd) 

W. J. Hutchins 

Hefferman 

Clermont 

Crew Saved Crew Deceased 

John D. Phillips, captain James Wilson, 2nd steward 

Dan Phillips, clerk Pheneas Marsh, 2nd engineer 

Wm E. Haviland, 2nd mate Charles Wilson, seaman 

Geo. Miner, engineer John Groghan 

Edward Conrey, 2nd engineer Wm. McRea, fireman 

John Conrey, cook 2 seaman, names unknown 

Michael Murphy, seaman 

Peter L. Lesea, seaman 

Wm. Rice, fireman 

Wm. Johnston, fireman 

Geo. Sainways, fireman 

Edward Murphy Palmer, fireman 

Wm. Larkin Palmer, carpenter 

Peter Moran 

Sarah, chambermaid 

From the New Orleans Bee (1846). Alternate spellings from other source material are included in 

parentheses.

As might be expected on a vessel of its class, many of the survivors were affluent businessmen, 

including Judge Daniel Toler, T.W. House, and J.W. White. Daniel J. Toler, the former Postmaster 

General of Texas, was on a return trip from Washington with complete instructions for Morgan’s New 

Orleans-Galveston Service. Toler ‘barely’ survived the accident though the official paperwork was 

lost (Baughman 1968:40). Thomas W. House was originally the owner of a bakery and confectionary 

establishment in Houston. His business developed from candy and confectionary to more-general 

merchandise and dry goods, known as the firm of T.W. House & Company. His later purchase of 

James H. Stevens and Co. in 1853 created the largest wholesale and grocery business in the state 

(Lewis Publishing Co., 1895:314). John W. White, a Houston native, was part owner of the Houston 

mercantile business White, Pool, and Company. In the mid-nineteenth century, White established 

80 
himself in the hotel business as proprietor of the “White House” until his death in 1859 (Lewis 

Publishing Co., 1895:466). Another survivor of the tragedy was Col. William J. Hutchins. Hutchins 

was a successful businessman who operated various mercantile ventures in the Houston area 

beginning in the late 1830s. By 1860 he was known throughout Texas and other northern markets as 

having “an enviable reputation for business integrity and fair dealing.” After selling his mercantile 

interests in 1861, Hutchins became one of the original shareholders of the Houston & Texas Central 

Railroad (Lewis Publishing Company 1895:276). 

Max F. Bonzano, another surviving passenger and German immigrant, studied medicine in New 

Orleans in 1843. He had anticipated completing his studies in 1845, relocating to Texas, and 

practicing as a doctor for the San Saba Colonization Company (Biesele 1930). Bonzano was instead 

elected as a visiting physician at Charity Hospital until 1848 when he was appointed by President 

James Polk as melter and refiner of the New Orleans mint. Following the Civil War, Dr. Bonzano was 

appointed chairman of the Committee on Emancipation and, as such, wrote the ordinance of 

emancipation for Louisiana, which won by majority. Bonzano later served as supervisor of internal 

revenue, surveyor-general, and, in 1874, superintendent of the mint (Goodspeed Publishing Company 

1892:303–306). 

One of the most well-established naval officers in the state, Captain John G. Tod was a midshipman in 

the United States Navy until his medical discharge in 1836. Tod was appointed naval inspector for the 

Texas Navy in 1838 and later became one of the navy’s purchasing agents in Boston. Tod largely 

orchestrated the construction and outfitting of the vessels that comprised Texas’s second navy in 1839. 

In 1840 Tod was promoted to secretary of the (Texas) navy, an appointment he later resigned. He 

briefly left Texas and traveled to Washington to lobby for the annexation of Texas. In 1845 he 

returned with the official notification of annexation. During the Mexican-American war, Tod served 

in the United States Navy and as an agent of the United States quartermaster general at the Brazos 

Santiago Depot and at New Orleans. As a co-founder of the Buffalo Bayou, Brazos and Colorado 

Railway in 1852, Tod was also instrumental in bringing rail service to parts of Texas (Jordan 2006). 

4.5.2 Archival Research 

4.5.2.1 Mariners’ Museum 

The Mariners’ Museum houses several sources that document various details of New York’s 

construction, use history, and/or wrecking event, though for the most part this information is 

redundant and widely available in other sources. The Eldridge Manuscript Collection contains a file of 

newspaper clippings and miscellaneous notes on New York. Eldridge was a steamship aficionado who 

compiled files of miscellaneous information on numerous nineteenth- and twentieth-century 

steamships, including dimensions, builder, historical information, newspaper clippings, images, and 

references to other pertinent sources. All files are arranged alphabetically by vessel name. In New 

York’s file, Eldridge notes that the steamer was built by Brown & Bell, that its engine was built by 

Allaire Works, and that the vessel was sold to John D. Phillips in January 1846. Three newspaper 

articles in the file reference mail deliveries made by the packet steamer to Galveston and New Orleans 

in 1839 and 1841, but provide no other details on the vessel. The Eldridge Collection also contains a 

copy of a painting of New York (see Figure 43), that is one of the only known images of the ship and 

has been previously published (Irion and Ball 2001). 

81 
There is also an entry for New York in Early American Steamers (Heyl 1953). Information includes 

the builder, dimensions, engine type (listed as “square”), owners, a historical sketch detailing the 

ship’s use on the Southern Steam Packet Co. and Charles Morgan’s New Orleans steamship line, and 

its eventual sale to John D. Phillips. There is also a profile-view sketch of New York, drawn by the 

author, showing details similar to those on the Figure 43 painting. 

An article from the New York Herald (1846a) provides an account of the sinking as told to press in 

New Orleans by Captain Wright of Galveston. Included is a chronology of the worsening weather 

conditions and eventual wrecking event and a list of all passengers and crew, categorized as either 

“Saved” or “Lost and Missing.” A second article from the New York Herald (1846b) briefly describes 

the extent of flooding and damage incurred at Galveston during the same storm that sank New York. 

John H. Morrison’s History of American Steam Navigation (1903) discusses the development of 

steam ships and commercial steamer lines, including those of Charles Morgan and his business 

associates. Some minimal details are provided on New York’s construction and early commercial 

career, along with brief sections on the New York to Charleston and New Orleans packet steamer 

lines, but there is little of relevance to the present study. 

Finally, John L. Lochhead’s Disasters to American Vessels, Sail and Steam, 1841–1846 (1954) 

compiles a short list of entries in the New York Shipping and Commercial List between 1842–1846 

when New York grounded or had mechanical difficulties of some kind. The September 19, 1846, entry 

describing the vessel’s sinking reads: 

Steam ship NEW YORK, Phillips, from Galveston 5th inst. for New Orleans, was 

wrecked in a heavy gale 7th inst. and went down in 10 fathoms [60 ft (18.3 m)] water, 

where she had anchored having previously shipped heavy seas which caused her to 

leak badly, put out her fires, carried away smoke pipe, &c. Twelve passengers and five 

of her crew were drowned; the remainder including Capt. P. picked up and carried to 

New Orleans. 

4.5.2.2 National Archives 

While Forrest Holdcamper was researching NARA materials for Merchant Steam Vessels of the 

United States 1790–1868 (Lytle and Holdcamper 1975), he maintained a card file of his findings 

(RG41). The note card for New York lists the number, date, and port of New York’s various registers 

and enrollments. Using this card as a finding aid, the first and last of New York’s enrollments were 

located. The original enrollment (No. 24, June 14, 1837, New York) was burned around the edges but 

was still mostly readable, and a copy was obtained. The final enrollment (No. 14, March 16, 1846, 

Galveston), which by convention should have included details of the steamer’s sinking, was highly 

faded and unreadable. 

Another note in Holdcamper’s card file mentions a reference to New York’s sinking in “Sailor’s 

Magazine, Vol. 19.” The full title for this magazine is actually The Sailor’s Magazine and Seaman’s 

Friend, and it was a monthly publication of the proceedings of the American Seaman’s Friend 

Society. The referenced Volume 19 was located at the Library of Congress, but the relevant entry on 

New York was simply a brief mention of the date, location, and details of the sinking, within a larger 

list of reported vessel losses. 

82 
4.5.2.3 New York Historical Society 

Finally, PBS&J contacted the New York Historical Society’s Manuscripts Collection to inquire about 

any materials the society may have pertaining to New York. After an extensive search of the collection 

finding aids, no relevant materials were located by the Society’s staff (Kiter 2008). 

4.5.3 Previous Investigations 

Gentlemen of Fortune began their search for New York after reading a newspaper article that reported 

the loss of “thirty to forty thousand dollars in gold, silver, and bank notes” on the wreck (Daily 

Picayune 1846). Intrigued by this information, the group conferred with their contacts in the 

commercial fishing industry and began a systematic investigation of known net hangs in the GOM. 

One of these locations was tentatively determined to be New York. After the site was located, a 

salvage company was contracted to uncover the ship’s buried hull. As a result, several artifacts were 

recovered that helped establish a date range for the wreck, including a mortising machine patented in 

1836, an 1827 British gold sovereign, and two 1843 U.S. half dollars (Irion and Ball 2001). 

In July 1997, a magnetometer and sonar survey of the site was conducted in order to determine the 

approximate site boundaries (Irion and Anuskiewicz 1999). At this time, the majority of the hull had 

been naturally reburied, leaving as the most prominent site features the steam engine (centered on the 

hull [Figure 44]) and a paddlewheel east of the main wreckage. A circular depression surrounding the 

wreck denoted the repeated prop-wash excavations (i.e., removing sediment overburden with a 

deflected and focused boat propeller stream) that Gentlemen of Fortune had undertaken on the site 

since 1994. 

Also in 1997, a brief diver reconnaissance of the site was conducted in order to further investigate the 

low-pressure, cross-head steam engine. According to Irion and Ball (2001), “identifiable parts of the 

machinery included the steam chest, the cam, the air pump, and condenser. The main piston cylinder 

had broken free from the condenser and was partly buried in the sand.” These engine parts 

corresponded to the crosshead-type engine known to exist on New York, and BOEMRE archaeologists 

concurred with the assessment of the wreck’s identity, further concluding that the site was eligible for 

inclusion in the NRHP. 

In 2001, Fugro Geoservices, Inc., conducted an archaeological and shallow-hazard survey of the High 

Island lease block area for Cronus Offshore, Inc. (Fugro Geoservices 2001). Fugro recorded 35 

magnetic anomalies within their survey area, including a target at the unpublicized location of New 

York. Surveying at a 656-ft (200-m) transect interval with a 492-ft (150-m) side-scan sonar range, 

Fugro was unable to record an identifiable sonar target associated with this anomaly, and the site was 

misidentified as modern debris. 

83 
Figure 44. Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of New York. 

4.5.4 2007 Remote-Sensing Survey 

PBS&J conducted a magnetometer and sonar survey of the site on May 11, 2007. The resulting data 

were similar to the 1997 imagery, but with evidence of increased wreck exposure (see Figure 44). 

Portions of the crosshead steam engine were still evident, including the cylinder, steam chest, air 

pump, cranks, and the starboard paddlewheel shaft. The radius of prop-wash excavation had widened 

to 28 ft (8.5 m) (from about 22 ft [6.7 m] in 1997) and had been further deepened to reveal a 27-ft 

(8.2-m) section of framing forward of the engine compartment. Total site area had increased from 

approximately 1,500 ft2

 to 2,400 ft2 (139–223 m2). There was no obvious damage to the wreck beyond 

increased exposure within the prop-wash crater. PBS&J recommended diver investigation of the site 

to determine whether the exposure was directly related to recent excavation by Gentlemen of Fortune

or caused by removal of loosely consolidated sediments during Hurricane Rita’s passage, and to 

further assess the extent of impacts to the site. 

4.5.5 2007 Diving Investigations 

When PBS&J arrived at New York in October 2007, site conditions had changed considerably since 

the May remote-sensing survey. In the intervening months, Gentlemen of Fortune had continued 

excavation of the site, uncovering a 100-ft-long (30-m) section of the lower hull forward of the engine 

(Figure 45). Due to this unexpected level of site exposure, the decision was made between PBS&J and 

the COTR to extend dive investigations an extra day. The additional time was used to produce as 

84 
complete a site map as possible, in addition to the initial goal of evaluating potential hurricane 

impacts. Thirty-five dives totaling over 33 hours were spent on-site from October 7 to October 10. 

Bottom visibility was the best of any of the studied wrecks, generally between 5 and 10 ft (1.5–3.0 m). 

Underwater photographs, along with DIDSON and sector-scan data, were collected in order to 

supplement creation and interpretation of the site map. 

Figure 45. Sector-scan sonar imagery of New York. 

Almost 125 ft (38.1 m) of continuous wreck remains were exposed, from just aft of the engine 

compartment and forward to the bow (Figure 46). Site depths ranged from 56 ft 

(17.1 m) at the top of the engine cylinder to 65 ft (19.8 m) at the base of the prop-wash crater. The 

bow was identified in part by the ca. 15 ft (4.6 m) of anchor chain running in a line from underneath 

the southern end of the wreck to the edge of the prop-wash crater, where it became buried again. This 

chain was concreted and elevated off the seafloor by about 2 ft (0.6 m) at certain points, indicating it 

was taut when the vessel went down. At the time of its sinking New York was reported to have been at 

anchor, attempting to ride out the storm, when the hurricane-force winds changed direction and caused 

the vessel to fatally swing into the wave trough. A secondary, smaller magnetometer anomaly was 

recorded approximately 300 ft (91 m) southeast of the wreck site, in the general direction of the 

chain’s orientation. The anomaly source may be the buried ship’s anchor, though that was neither 

confirmed nor further investigated. 

The wreck was broken cleanly in half, just forward of the engine. The forward (southern) half 

consisted of the lower hull, up to just below the turn of the bilge. Extant features included portions of 

the keel, frames, futtocks, ceiling planking, outer hull planking, and copper sheathing (Figure 47a–c). 

Most of the wood in this area was extremely well preserved; teredo damage afflicted primarily only 

the upper frame ends, while unconcreted square-cut spikes and woodworking tool marks were still 

preserved in the lower, recently excavated areas of the hull. 

85 
Figure 46. New York site plan (drawn by Amy Borgens). 
Figure 47. Underwater photos of New York. 

86 
Figure 47. Underwater photos of New York (continued). 

87 
Figure 47. Underwater photos of New York (continued). 

88 
Aft (north) of the break in the hull, immediately forward of the steam engine, was another section of 

keel, framing, ceiling, and outer hull planking, overlain by a more than 1-ft-thick (0.3-m) deposit of 

amorphous concretion. This concretion covered an area approximately 20 x 20 ft (6.1 x 6.1 m) and 

contained a few scattered bricks and, atop its center, a group of roughly rectangular iron frames 

arranged side-by-side (Figure 47d). This area is believed to be the remnants of the boiler fire boxes. 

Immediately adjacent to the firebox concretions, to the north, were the remains of the crosshead steam 

engine. All engine features previously identified (Irion and Ball 2001) remained extant, including the 

air pump, condenser (Figure 47e), cranks (Figure 47f), steam chest (Figure 47g), and cylinder. These 

features are the highest points on the wreck and, therefore, had the highest degree of corrosion due to 

their increased exposure above the seafloor. What remains of the engine is lying over on its starboard 

side and is heavily concreted and broken apart. The starboard paddlewheel shaft (Figure 47h) lies next 

to and partially underneath the cylinder, and the air pump lever is lying on the opposite side, adjacent 

to the steam chest. Numerous disarticulated copper pipes, flanges, rods, and valves litter the seabed 

surrounding the engine (Figure 47i). The spatial relationship between the engine and boiler fireboxes 

was another indicator of the wreck’s bow and stern orientation. The only known images of New York

(see Figure 43) illustrate the smokestack forward of the engine A-frame. 

Twenty feet farther north of the engine, and slightly to the port side of the centerline, was a second 

prop-wash crater approximately 40 ft (12.2 m) in diameter. Within this crater were four disarticulated 

and partially buried groupings of frames, ceiling, copper sheathing, and outer-hull planking. These 

wood features also were in an excellent state of preservation and appeared to have been very recently 

exposed. As was later discovered, Gentlemen of Fortune had been conducting site excavations only a 

few days before our arrival. 

Virtually no artifacts were observed in situ. A small number of rigging sheaves were grouped on 

either side of the keel near the bow (Figure 47j), and numerous iron and copper fasteners were 

scattered throughout the wreck. Twenty feet forward of the hull break was an iron object (Figure 47k) 

that PBS&J has been unable to identify (hereafter referred to as Object A). It was approximately 6 ft 

(1.8 m) long, with a circular disk at one end inside doubled bands that tapered together at the opposite 

end. It was oriented directly on top of and in-line with the keel but did not appear to be attached to it. 

Object A’s general shape strongly resembled an engine crank; however, there was no attachment point 

for a connecting rod and pin assembly at the narrower end, and it was considerably smaller than the 

cranks observed with the engine remains. A barrel windlass lay just off the port side of the forward 

frame ends (Figure 47l). All other artifacts in the exposed areas of the wreck had been previously 

removed by Gentlemen of Fortune. In December 2008, PBS&J was invited by Gentlemen of Fortune

to examine and inventory the artifacts collected to that point. A catalog of those artifacts is presented 

in Appendix C. 

4.5.6 Sedimentology 

Because the box coring collection device was previously lost during diving on Castine, an alternate 

collection method was employed at New York. Three 2-ft-long (0.6-m), 2-inch-diameter (5.1 cm) PVC 

pipes were hammered into the substrate and capped. Two of the cores were collected outside of the 

main wreck site (at 53 ft [16.2 m] and 56 ft [17.1 m] below water line [bwl], respectively), and the 

third was collected underneath New York’s hull, in an area scoured out by prop wash excavations 

(63 ft [19.2 m] bwl). Each core was then extracted and analyzed in the lab. Particle-size results for 

89 
each core are presented in Table 15. Sediment stratigraphy was uniform within each of the three cores; 

therefore, they were not separated into levels. Zones of fine sand are present at 53 and 56 ft (16.2 and 

17.1 m) bwl. The core collected at 63 ft bwl (19.2 m) is predominantly silt, though also with an 

increase in clay content. 

Table 15 

SS New York Particle-size Results 

Sample Provenience % Gravel % Sand % Silt % Clay Mean phi Classification 

1-New York 53 ft bwl 1 90.5 5.5 0 2.83 Fine sand 

2-New York 56 ft bwl 0 96 2 0 2.86 Fine sand 

3-New York 63 ft bwl 0 18 56 7 5.47 Medium silt 

As with the particle size results recorded at Gulf Tide (see Section 4.4.6), the upper layers of fine sand 

surrounding New York indicate a high likelihood of localized redistribution of sediments resulting in at 

least partial site burial. This process is consistent with Gentlemen of Fortune’s repeated observations 

of the site’s tendency to rebury shortly after exposure, even in non-storm years (see Section 4.5.7). 

Interestingly, the core data taken from 63 ft bwl show a significant transition from sandy soils to 

predominantly silts with a mixture of sand and clay. This is consistent with diver observations of 

exposed areas underneath the wreck structure (within prop-wash excavation holes). In these areas 

divers noted that the bottom of the vessel hull was situated on a denser, more cohesive, clay-like 

substrate. These observations were further corroborated by Gentlemen of Fortune. According to site 

observations recorded by the group on flat areas of the site (Hebert 2008), sediment stratigraphy 

consists of approximately 1.5 ft (0.46 m) of sand covering 1 ft (0.3 m) of intermediate clay, below 

which is the “Beaumont clay” (at approximately 58 to 59 ft bwl [18 m]). The layer referred to as 

“Beaumont clay” by Gentlemen of Fortune is likely this denser layer of cohesive Holocene marine 

silts, as documented by the core data. Gentlemen of Fortune observed that underneath heavy sections 

of the wreck this denser layer gets pushed deeper (to about 64 ft [20 m] bwl). This observation is 

consistent with other published studies on sediment bed formation processes: 

Means and Parcher (1963) suggested that the bonding of clay particles by interstitial 

water produces a resistance to movement. When this bonding is broken by physical 

disturbance of the sediment, less viscous water is introduced into the intergranular 

spaces and the strength is reduced. For sensitive clays, there is a high resistance to 

deformation up to a critical stress where remolding occurs. Once the chemical bond is 

broken the grains are easily displaced to form a denser structure. (Morelock and 

Bryant 1972:186) 

According to maps published by McClelland Engineers (1979:Plate 2A), Pleistocene soils formed 

under subaerial conditions during the Late Wisconsin glacial period are less than 20 ft (6.1 m) beneath 

the modern mudline in the vicinity of New York. McClelland Engineers (1979:Plates 3A, 4A, 5A) 

mapped the shear strength of soils at the seabed in the range of 0.1 to 0.2 ksf, which they qualitatively 

describe as very soft; however, New York falls in a region of their map where boring coverage was 

sparse. The shear strength is mapped as 0.4 to 0.6 kfs (soft) at a depth of 10 ft (3.0 m) below the 

seafloor and as 0.6 to 0.8 ksf (firm) at a depth of 20 ft (6.1 m). The OTRC (2004) map constructed 

using method 1 (see description in Castine sedimentology results, Section 4.2.6) shows soil shear 

90 
strengths surrounding the location of New York as 0.2 ksf (soft) at the mudline, 0.5 ksf (soft) at 5 ft 

(1.5 m) below the seafloor, and 1.1 ksf (stiff) at 10 ft (3.0 m) below the seafloor. According to the 

OTRC maps, New York is located within a sand polygon from the mudline to 10 ft (3.0 m) below the 

seafloor, meaning their shear strength map constructed using method 2 did not calculate shear 

strengths in the area of New York. OTRC’s data on sand content match PBS&J’s coring data for the 

upper levels of the site, but not for the sediment underlying the wreck. The orientation of New York on 

top of a cohesive layer of Holocene marine silts, and the tendency for the majority of its structure to 

rebury under a protective layer of sand, implies that the wreck has reached its maximum depth of 

natural subsidence. 

4.5.7 Impact Assessment 

Hurricane Rita passed 34.4 mi (55.4 km) east of New York as a Category 3 storm at 1:00 A.M. on 

September 24, 2005. Peak sustained winds over New York were estimated by Oceanweather, Inc.’s 

(2006) hindcast model at 69 mph (30.9 m/s) from a direction of 265 degrees. The maximum 

significant wave height over New York was estimated at 18.0 ft (5.5 m) from a direction of 98 degrees. 

At peak storm conditions over the site, maximum bottom currents of 5.6 mph (2.5 m/s) struck New 

York along its port side and slightly from the bow at an angle of 72 degrees relative to the ship’s 

orientation. At intervals of 7.75 seconds, the current reversed direction 180 degrees beneath the wave 

troughs to a velocity of –1.6 mph (–0.7 m/s), then peaked again 7.75 seconds later at 5.6 mph 

(2.5 m/s) in the forward direction beneath the next wave crest. The amplitude of velocity change from 

forward to reverse, on an interval of 7.75 seconds, was 7.2 mph (3.2 m/s). Given the difference in 

density between seawater and air, the damage potential represented by the maximum forward water 

velocity is equivalent to that of a 158-mph (70.6-m/s) wind or analogous to an F3 tornado. 

Archaeological knowledge of New York predating Hurricane Rita consisted primarily of the 1997 site 

investigations and anecdotal information provided by Gentlemen of Fortune. Those data confirmed 

the presence of substantial elements of New York’s crosshead steam engine, but very few other 

exposed vessel remains beyond a small number of worm-eaten frame ends. By the time of PBS&J’s 

2007 investigations, the site’s appearance had been significantly altered; over 100 ft (30 m) of the site 

was uncovered, revealing most of the vessel’s lower hull plus additional features associated with the 

engine. Few of these impacts, however, appear to have been induced by recent hurricane activity, but 

were instead the result of site excavations conducted by Gentlemen of Fortune since the passage of 

Hurricane Rita. 

Indicators of Gentlemen of Fortune’s activities were evident in the remote-sensing data and observed 

during the diving investigations. Side-scan and sector-scan imagery showed one or more symmetrical 

bowl-shaped depressions centered on various elements of the wreck—clear evidence of prop-wash 

excavations rather than a natural removal of sediments. Several intrusive excavation-related materials 

were also left behind on-site, including plastic artifact collection buckets, tape measures, buoys, and 

line. A small, modern plow anchor was observed near the bow, where it had snagged and dislodged a 

10-ft (3.0-m) segment of the keel along its fore and aft scarf joints (see Figure 46). Apart from this 

example, damages to the remaining wooden hull features and engine machinery appeared to be 

minimal. There was no indication that elements of the ship’s hull had been actively damaged or 

disarticulated during the excavation activities. Furthermore, all materials that had been recently 

exposed exhibited a high degree of preservation. Wood, particularly the more substantial structural 

elements like the keel and frames, appeared to retain significant density, and exhibited almost no 

91 
indications of ship-worm damage. Many iron fasteners seen protruding from planking showed either 

no signs of concretion or concretion formation to a much smaller degree than would be expected of a 

mid-nineteenth-century shipwreck (although this observation was not universal; many iron objects, 

particularly near the engine, did exhibit more-typical degrees of corrosion and concretion). Of course, 

the exposure of these wreck features creates the catalyst for accelerated decomposition of the site. The 

teredo-damaged ends of previously exposed frames and the complete absence of any other wooden 

vessel remains above the sediment line provide all the evidence needed of the fate that awaits any 

parts of the wreck subjected to continued prolonged exposure in the aerobic water column. 

No personal items and very few small objects associated with the ship’s construction or operating 

mechanisms were observed during the 33 combined diver-hours spent on-site. Though the scale of 

Gentlemen of Fortune’s artifact collecting was unknown at the time of PBS&J’s investigation, the 

salvage group granted a request to examine and inventory the recovered artifacts at their facility in 

New Iberia, Louisiana. The results of that visit are presented in Appendix C. 

Concurrent with PBS&J’s examination of the artifact collection, Gentlemen of Fortune obligingly 

shared their site plan and copious field notes, including detailed documentation of their own activities 

and of the varying site conditions since their discovery in 1990. Their cumulative observations 

indicate that New York exists in a state of environmental equilibrium that should continue to protect 

the remaining site features in the future regardless of hurricane activity. Unless otherwise noted, the 

following information was obtained from interviews with Gentlemen of Fortune’s principal members, 

Avery Munson, Gary and Renée Hebert, and Craig DeRouen, in December 2008. 

After discovering New York in 1990, Gentlemen of Fortune revisited the site in 1991, 1994, 1995, 

1996, 1998, 1999, and 2004–2009. Excavations were first conducted utilizing a 2-inch-diameter 

(5.1-cm) dredge, until 1994 when the group switched to a 30-inch (76.2-cm) prop-wash deflector 

powered by a 465-horsepower engine and 28-inch (71.1-cm) propeller. In 1994 the full width of 

framing was exposed from Object A (see Section 4.5.5, Figure 46, and Figure 47K) to the forward end 

of the hull break (an area about 25 ft [7.6 m] in diameter), but the lower hull remained buried except in 

small areas. Though Gentlemen of Fortune returned repeatedly to the site over the next decade, largerscale excavations did not begin until 2005. That year, the group ended their field season on August 13 

(six weeks before Hurricane Rita made landfall), leaving a 2–3-ft-deep (0.6–0.9-m), 60-ft-diameter 

(18.3-m) prop-wash crater centered on the engine. Gentlemen of Fortune returned to the site nine 

months after Hurricane Rita, in June 2006, and found that the site had been reburied to its 

prediscovery depths, “as if we [Gentlemen of Fortune] had not worked it at all.” 

Between June and August 2006, the wreck was excavated down to the hull planking from Object A to 

the aft end of the break, and to slightly below the hull in the break. Maximum water depths reached 

64 ft (19.5 m) at the bottom of the excavation crater. Other than having been reburied since the 2005 

excavations, there was no noticeable change to the site resulting from Hurricane Rita. Between August 

2006 and February 2007, the site was again covered by silt, but to a lesser extent than was observed in 

previous years. Two to 3 ft (0.6–0.9 m) of sediment were redeposited in the break, but only 1–

11⁄2 inches (2.5–3.8 cm) of reburial occurred on top of the hull. This was the same approximate site 

condition when PBS&J conducted its remote-sensing survey in May 2007. Gentlemen of Fortune

continued excavations through the summer and fall of 2007, resulting in the extent of wreck exposure 

observed during PBS&J’s October 2007 site investigation. 

92 
Between 2007 and 2008, silt once again covered the site to near prediscovery depths. The break had 

filled in up to the hull, and the hull had filled in up to the frame ends. Gentlemen of Fortune

reexcavated the site to the 2007 extents, plus an additional distance of 25 ft (7.6 m) aft of the engine. 

The port paddlewheel was observed approximately 1,000 ft (305 m) east of the main wreckage, and a 

magnetic anomaly was also excavated approximately 300 ft (91 m) east of the wreck. A 30-ftdiameter (9.1-m), 3-ft-deep (0.9-m) area was uncovered, revealing what Gentlemen of Fortune believe 

to be iron bracing associated with the ship’s rigging. Towards the end of the 2008 season, the boiler 

was discovered approximately 150 ft (46 m) west of the engine. In addition to the boiler, the 40-ftdiameter (12.2-m) prop-wash crater uncovered several disarticulated pipes approximately 15 inches 

(38.1 cm) in diameter and 10 ft (3.0 m) long strewn around and on top of the boiler and a 4-ftdiameter (1.2-m), 10–12-ft-long (3.0–3.7-m) section of the smokestack. The bottom of the boiler was 

approximately 8 ft (2.4 m) below the natural seabed. 

The year 2008 was also notable for the trio of storms that swept into the GOM (Figure 48). The first 

was Tropical Storm Edouard, which passed 26.5 mi (42.6 km) northeast of New York on August 5. 

Next, Hurricane Gustav passed 152 mi (245 km) northeast of New York on September 1. Finally, 

Hurricane Ike, the most destructive of the three storms and the third costliest hurricane to ever make 

landfall in the United States, passed 27.6 mi (44.4 km) southwest of New York on September 13. 

Though an analysis of the effects of these storms was outside the original scope of this study, the 

subsequent site observations recorded by Gentlemen of Fortune provide a unique opportunity to 

compare the recurring effects of multiple hurricane passages near New York. What these data indicate 

is that, at worst, rather than being destructive events, hurricanes generally accelerate the natural 

reburial of this site that occurs even during nonhurricane years. 

Gentlemen of Fortune temporarily halted their 2008 excavations as Tropical Storm Edouard 

approached in August. When they returned following the storm they found that at least 1–2 inches 

(2.5–5.1 cm) of sediment had been redeposited across the entire site, with thicker deposits in the 

deeper excavation holes. The only negative impacts to the site were a small number of already loose 

and disarticulated timbers that had been moved approximately 20 ft (6.1 m) west. Gentlemen of 

Fortune were forced to abandon their excavations of the site again when Hurricane Gustav formed, 

but upon returning found that that storm had no measurable effect on site formation. Hurricane Ike 

provided the most dramatic results, not only refilling excavation holes to their natural depth, but also 

depositing an additional 12–14 inches (30.5–35.6 cm) of new sediment across the entire site. Divers 

examined the surrounding seabed up to 150 ft (46 m) away from the wreck and found the sediment 

deposition was consistent. Unlike in other years, when the redeposited sediments were characterized 

by a base of about 2 inches (5.1 cm) of clay underneath a layer of unconsolidated silts, the new 

sediments deposited after Hurricane Ike consisted of a thin surface layer of a highly consolidated and 

brittle sand/silt mixture on top of about 12 inches (30.5 cm) of soft, sticky mud. 

93 
Figure 48. 2008 GOM storms. 

This tendency for the site to return to prediscovery burial depths had been observed following 

virtually every field season since the first excavations in 1994. Within only a few months, excavation 

holes varying from 6 inches (15.2 cm) to over 3 ft (0.9 m) deep would completely refill and bury the 

underlying wreckage. This is the same result that was observed following Hurricane Rita. Since 1994 

there have been only two variations to this pattern: between the 2006 and 2007 seasons, when only 1–

11⁄2 inches (2.5–3.8 cm) of sediment were redeposited on-site by Hurricane Edouard; and following 

Hurricane Ike in 2008, when the site returned to prediscovery depths plus an additional 12–14 inches 

(30.5–35.6 cm) of sediment accumulation. This repeated return to equilibrium has served to protect 

the remaining wreck features and has likely been a significant factor in the high level of wood and iron 

preservation observed across the site. Therefore, it seems that Hurricane Rita, and any other strong 

storm events of the past two decades, have had a counterintuitive beneficial effect on site preservation. 

Continued excavations of the site can reverse this trend, however. Though recently excavated areas of 

the wreck exhibited a relatively high degree of preservation, the degradation of these same features 

can be expected to accelerate with continued or repeated exposure in the oxygenated water column. 

Furthermore, future prop-wash excavations might undermine portions of the wreck. If the silt/clay 

layer upon which the site rests were partially removed by prop-washing, localized sections of the hull 

might collapse into the resulting hole. Over time this process could result in differential subsidence 

and the associated structural weakening of the wreck. 

94 
4.5.8 National Register Assessment 

New York was associated with some of the earliest and most important individuals in the economic 

and technological development of commercial steam navigation in the U.S. It was also one of the 

primary vessels in two of the first coastal steamship lines, and during its brief career rose to 

prominence as arguably the most luxurious Gulf Coast steamship of its day. Today, the archaeological 

remains of New York provide a tangible link both to that era and to those prominent individuals, and 

further embody a significant technological transition period in marine steam engine development. 

New York was built by William H. Brown, and its crosshead steam engine was produced by James P. 

Allaire. A renowned engineer and businessman, Allaire amassed and lost several fortunes during his 

lifetime. He began as a protégé and successor to Robert Fulton and was onboard Fulton’s historymaking voyage from Hoboken to Albany on The Steamboat (also known as The North River 

Steamboat and Clermont) in 1807, which established the first commercially viable steamship service. 

After Fulton’s death in 1815, Allaire purchased the former’s engine works in Jersey City, an operation 

that was eventually moved to New York and evolved into the Allaire Works. By the early 1820s 

Allaire had also purchased and expanded the Howell Works, a sprawling iron foundry complete with 

a bakery, department store, school, church, wheelwright shop, blacksmith’s shop, carriage house, 

worker housing, and Allaire’s own mansion (Pepper 1957). From 1835 to 1840, Howell Works was 

the largest foundry in the U.S., employing 500 workmen and their families, and it exists today as a 

living history museum renamed Allaire Village, located within New Jersey’s Allaire State Park. 

By this time, Allaire had also established himself as the finest marine engineer in the country. He had 

obtained over half of the New York City engine-building business, including a contract to cast the 

brass cylinder for Savannah, the first steam vessel to cross the Atlantic (Coombe 1986; Pepper 1957). 

Though he was not the inventor, Allaire was also credited for his contributions to the development of 

the first compound marine engine (Pepper 1957). 

Allaire’s shipping interests were not limited only to the engineering side. His entrepreneurial 

ambitions also led to his involvement with the more commercial aspects of the shipping industry. In 

the 1830s Allaire partnered with Charles Morgan, John Haggerty, and John and Benjamin Aymar to 

establish the New York and Charleston Steam Packet Company, which provided regularly scheduled 

steamer service between New York and the southern states. This company was the first steam packet 

operation in the country. 

Charles Morgan was himself the principal owner of New York. After its construction, Morgan added 

this ship to the New York and Charleston line, joining the steamers Columbia and Home. After Allaire 

suffered several personal and financial hardships, Morgan took over ownership of the company and 

reorganized it as the Southern Steam Packet Company. The steamer line flourished under Morgan’s 

leadership, and he soon expanded his operations to the Gulf Coast. In addition to establishing the first 

coastal steamship line along the eastern seaboard, Morgan also established the first such service in the 

GOM; in 1837, the Southern Steam Packet Company began running passengers and cargo between 

Galveston and New Orleans. New York joined Morgan’s Gulf operations in 1839 and remained there 

until its demise in 1846. That was also the year that Morgan was awarded a contract with the United 

States Post Office to deliver mail to the newly annexed State of Texas. One of the passengers onboard 

New York’s final voyage was Daniel J. Toler, former postmaster general of Texas, who was on a 

return trip from Washington, D.C., with the official Federal documents regarding Texas’s new postal 

95 
responsibilities. Though Toler survived the wreck, his cargo went down with the ship (Baughman 

1968:40). 

For his part, Charles Morgan later became one of the most prominent figures in the establishment of 

Gulf Coast steamship and railroad commerce. He developed the port at Indianola in Matagorda Bay, 

Texas, and founded the Morgan Iron Works Company in New York City, which became one of the 

country’s leading producers of marine steam engines in the mid-nineteenth century (Baughman 

1968:56). Following the Civil War, Morgan founded the Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steamship 

Company, which created a vast network of steamer routes and rail lines connecting the Gulf Coast to 

the Mississippi Valley, northern Latin America, and the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts (Baughman 

1968). Because of the prosperity that he brought to the region, the Louisiana city of Brashear was 

renamed Morgan City in his honor in 1876. 

James P. Allaire and Charles Morgan were giant figures in the advent of steam-powered coastal 

commerce in the United States. Allaire was a technological innovator of marine steam engines, and 

his partnership with Morgan brought on the first commercial steam packet service in the country. 

Morgan expanded that operation to include rail and steamer service to the Gulf Coast, leaving an 

indelible mark on the economic development of that region and the United States as a whole. New 

York was one of the principal vessels involved in both of these shipping lines. Due to these 

associations, New York is eligible for the National Register under Criteria A: associated with events 

that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; and B: associated with 

the lives of persons significant in our past.

As part of Charles Morgan’s Atlantic and Gulf Coast steamship lines, New York was also one of the 

earliest examples of a purpose-built steam packet. As such, its wrecked remains provide a rare 

opportunity to document and study the construction characteristics of a vessel of this type and time 

period. Though a significant number of the personal and smaller ship-related artifacts have been 

removed by Gentlemen of Fortune, a substantial amount of the lower hull up to the turn of the bilge 

remains in situ. Further archaeological investigation of these features could yield valuable knowledge 

of the materials, methods of construction, and design practices of a mid-nineteenth-century merchant 

steam vessel. Furthermore, there are only two known images of New York, both profile-perspective 

paintings of unknown provenience or accuracy. Further archaeological investigation is the only 

opportunity to determine any quantifiable construction detail of this historically significant ship. 

Perhaps the most significant feature of New York’s design and construction is its Allaire-built 

crosshead steam engine. The crosshead engine, alternately known as a square, steeple, or guillotine 

engine, was one of the earliest types of marine steam engines developed and was in use from the early 

1800s through the 1840s. It was a direct descendant of the earliest Fulton-type steam engine and also a 

technological precursor to the vertical walking beam engine that was widely used in the second half of 

the nineteenth century (Holly 1995). The crosshead engine represents an important phase in the 

evolution of marine steam engines and in the shipbuilding and industrial history of the United States. 

Unfortunately, comparatively little is known about the actual real-world construction and operation of 

these engines, because there is only one known surviving example. In 1993, archaeologists recovered 

the remains of Columbus, a Chesapeake Bay steamer that was built in 1828 and sank in 1850. Those 

excavations recovered part of Columbus’s crosshead engine, including the cylinder with piston, 

crankshaft bedplate, condenser, valve chests, steam piping, valve rocker shaft, air pump, and the 

starboard paddlewheel shaft. Diagnostic elements of the valve system, connecting rods, and the 

96 
97 

crosshead itself were not recovered (Irion and Anderson 1995). As a result, understanding of the 

design elements of the crosshead-type engine, particularly the distinguishing cylinder, steam chest, 

and valve assembly, remains theoretical and speculative (Holly 1995). New York represents the second 

known crosshead engine in existence, and its continued study may illuminate many of the unknown 

characteristics of this technologically significant engine type. 

Because of the archaeological potential of New York, the site is also eligible for the National Register 

under Criteria C: embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, 

or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic value, or that represent a 

significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction; and D: has 

yielded or may be likely to yield information important in prehistory or history. 
5.0 DISCUSSION 

This study has resulted in several conclusions that should have implications for the future 

management of submerged historic shipwrecks on the shallow Continental Shelf in the GOM. The 

effect of hurricane waves on the seafloor environment has been quantified, allowing one to visualize 

the substantial forces affecting shipwrecks as hurricanes pass nearby. However, the damage caused by 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to the primary study wrecks was substantially less than anticipated based 

on the level of damage reported for 37 artificial reef vessels in waters offshore of Florida (see Table 

3). Exploring the reasons for this observation has led to formulation of a hypothesis that the level of 

damage to a shipwreck (or artificial reef vessel) is relatively high after the first one or two hurricane 

passages, and is progressively less following later storms. The preservation of articulated wooden hull 

and an in situ artifact assemblage on New York has demonstrated the potential for burial to provide a 

high degree of protection from hurricane damage to many more historic wood-hulled vessels in the 

GOM. Finally, studies of storm damage to petroleum infrastructure demonstrate that hurricanes have 

the potential to cause damage to shipwrecks that is indirectly anthropogenic in nature. This conclusion 

has potential implications for the regulation of petroleum industry activities and the management of 

submerged cultural resources in the GOM. 

5.1 Conclusion 1: Hurricanes Generate Substantial Seafloor Forces on 

the Shallow Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico 

Strong and rapidly fluctuating bottom currents and pressure differentials were generated by large 

waves at each of the primary study sites. When the kinetic energy of a hurricane’s wind is converted 

to waves, the potential energy of those waves, as their height increases, eventually becomes amplified 

well beyond the original instantaneous energy of the wind. In the case of Hurricane Rita, the 

geographic extent of substantial bottom currents exceeded that of the hurricane-force winds. The 

magnitude of force experienced on the seafloor at each primary study site was roughly equivalent to a 

tornado of F3 (Castine and New York), F4 (Gulf Tide) or F5 (Site 323) intensity on the Enhanced 

Fujita Scale. The depth limit of hurricane damage to shipwrecks exceeds 200 ft (61 m). At that depth, 

Hurricane Rita generated water particle velocities of equivalent force as an F1 tornado at distances of 

at least 46 mi (74.1 km) to the left and 92 mi (148.2 km) to the right of its track. Pipeline damage 

reports suggest the depth limit of hurricane damage to shipwrecks might be close to 300 ft (91 m). 

5.2 Conclusion 2: Damage to Primary Study Wrecks Was Substantially 

Less Than Anticipated based on the Level of Damage Reported for 

Many Artificial Reef Vessels 

Only one of the four primary study sites, Site 323, exhibited obvious structural damage following 

Katrina and Rita, and this seemed relatively minor compared to many of the accounts from artificial 

reef vessels (see Table 3). Based on those examples, the authors anticipated a much higher level of 

new damage than was observed. 

The authors anticipated that as sunken vessels deteriorate with age, they should become more 

susceptible to damage in the form of structural collapse. Yet the study wrecks (with the possible 

exception of Gulf Tide), all of which have been submerged far longer than the artificial reef vessels in 

Table 3, exhibited less damage following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita than their artificial reef 

99 
counterparts did following other hurricanes. On the other hand, evidence from artificial reefs suggests 

that intact hulls sunk recently are very susceptible to major movement and structural damage. The 

following discussion examines several factors relevant to these seemingly contradictory observations. 

1. The level of damage on at least some artificial reef vessels might be greater 

than would have been the case if the same vessels sank accidently. This 

possibility was pointed out by Gregg and Murphey (1994). Their rationale is 

that salvage of internal structures or use of explosives for sinking a ship might 

reduce the structural integrity and stability of artificial reef vessels resulting in 

possible bias of damage data as compared to unintentionally sunk vessels 

where no salvage of structural elements or explosions occurred. Similarly, 

vessels sunk as the result of violent forces, such as collisions or torpedoes, 

might also have substantially weakened structural elements that are then more 

prone to postsinking hurricane damage. For example, the force of landing 

upside down on a hard substrate might have broken the back of Site 323, thus 

providing a weak spot that storm damage might then magnify. The World War 

II–era wreck of Sheherazade (see Appendix A) is another example where this 

might be the case. One torpedo hole (see Figure A-4) appears to be the focus 

of recent damage radiating across the hull following the 2005 hurricane 

season. 

2. The authors assumed that storm damage should increase proportional to 

decreasing water depth (over the top of a wreck), because bottom currents 

increase beneath a hurricane as water becomes shallower (see Figures 20 and 

21). However, the average depth of the four primary study sites, 74 ft 

(22.6 m), is less than that of the artificial reef vessels in Table 3, 98 ft 

(29.9 m). Based on these facts, one would expect less damage to the artificial 

reefs, as a group, because the bottom currents would have been less severe on 

average (depending on the height of the storm waves in each case). That this 

was not the case indicates that there must be factors at work other than water 

depth to explain the lesser damage observed at the primary study sites as 

compared to artificial reef vessels. 

3. The area and orientation of a ship’s vertical profile determines its degree of 

exposure to wave-induced currents. A vessel’s compass orientation on the 

seabed affects the angle of incidence of currents pushing against vertical 

surfaces. The magnitude of forces acting upon a hull is proportional to the sine 

of their angle of incidence, where a force acting perpendicular to a surface has 

a 90 degree angle of incidence and a sine of one thus experiences the full 

force of the current. The level of storm damage should increase in direct 

proportion to a storm wave’s angle of incidence with minimum damage when 

waves/currents flow parallel to the long axis of a hull (0 degrees) and 

maximum damage when waves/currents strike a hull broadside (90 degrees). 

Likewise, hulls having larger areas of exposed vertical surfaces are subject to 

greater force from the current. Lukens and Selberg (2004) imply by their 

recommendations that the orientation of a vessel on the seabed is an important 

factor in how well it can weather a severe storm. They do not provide specific 

100 
supporting examples, although they recommend that vessels be sunk with 

their bows facing the likely direction of oncoming hurricane-force waves. 

 The average vertical relief for artificial reefs listed in Table 3 is 32 ft (9.8 m); 

however, their orientation with respect to the hurricane waves causing their 

damage is unknown. Of the four primary study wrecks, only Castine and Site 

323 have large contiguous areas of vertical hull projecting up into the water 

column. Castine has 6–10 ft (1.8–3.0 m) of vertical relief, and Site 323 

projects 9–13 ft (2.7–4.0 m) above the seafloor. Both Castine and Site 323 

were oriented nearly parallel with the direction of wave and current travel (see 

Figures 6 and 15). Their orientations and their relatively low vertical profile, 

with respect to the artificial reef vessels, might be a factor contributing to the 

relatively low damage experienced by these two study wrecks. New York and 

Gulf Tide are both substantially broken apart and/or buried and do not extend 

far into the water column (excluding the steam engine of New York), thus their 

orientations are less significant. 

 The possibility was also considered that intact hulls of shipwrecks might be 

reoriented by hurricane-induced waves to an alignment of least resistance, 

which might then result in less overall damage to intact shipwrecks than was 

the case for intentionally sunk artificial reef vessels. While this suggestion 

ignores the fact that artificial reef vessels should then also be reoriented if 

indeed this was occurring to shipwrecks, it was thought that perhaps a 

combination of factors might be at work. The BOEMRE wreck database was 

examined in order to determine whether the orientation of hulls on the seabed 

was biased toward certain compass directions in response to hurricaneinduced bottom currents. The database was searched within UTM Zone 15N 

for shipwrecks for which hull orientation could be determined. A total of 30 

were found. The frequency of hulls oriented along various compass directions 

has been plotted in 10-degree increments (Figure 49). The radial circles 

represent numbers of wrecks. The depth of these 30 shipwrecks ranges from 

16.4 to 131.2 ft (5.0 to 40.0 m). Inspection of Hurricane Rita hindcast data 

suggests that the largest waves in these water depths tended to have the 

longest duration when traveling along headings ranging from 290 to 

10 degrees. 

 From this sample of 30 shipwrecks reporting orientation data in UTM Zone 

15N, exactly half were oriented with their long axis in the range of 290–

10/100–190 degrees on the compass (see Figure 49), matching the travel 

direction of Rita’s largest waves. The other half were oriented crosswise to the 

direction of Rita’s largest waves along compass headings of 10–100/190–

290 degrees. The direction of Rita’s largest waves might not be typical of all 

hurricanes crossing UTM Zone 15N; nevertheless, there seems to be little 

evidence suggesting that hurricanes have played a role in determining the 

compass orientation of shipwrecks. 

101 
Wreck Orientation

5-40 meters (n=30)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

10 20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160 170

180

190 200

210

220

230

240

250

260

270

280

290

300

310

320

330

340350

Number of Wrecks

Figure 49. Compass orientation of shipwreck hulls from UTM Zone 15N. 

4. Orientation along a vessel’s roll axis is also relevant to the durability of a 

ship’s hull. Vessels lying on the seabed in other than upright orientations 

might experience hull stresses along angles not intended by their designers, 

which could affect their structural integrity when subjected to hurricane 

waves. Such stresses might be exacerbated when the weight of an overturned 

hull is distributed unevenly upon a hard or irregular substrate. This could help 

explain the apparent new hurricane damage on Site 323 and at Sheherazade

(see Appendix A), since both vessels are inverted. This does not, however, 

explain why the study wrecks experience less damage than the artificial reef 

vessels. 

5. Age of a shipwreck (time since sinking) might actually play an important role 

in how much hurricane damage is sustained, but in a counterintuitive manner. 

Rather than susceptibility to damage increasing as a sunken vessel deteriorates 

with age, it appears possible that major hurricane damage is more likely when 

a shipwreck has only recently formed. The basis for this idea is the 

observation that extensive hurricane damage of the artificial reef vessels 

reported in Table 3 appears to have occurred when those sites experienced 

102 
their first hurricane. On the other hand, the four primary study sites have 

experienced many more hurricanes than any of the artificial reefs reported in 

Table 3 (see Appendix D), yet, by comparison, they had relatively minor 

damage resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

 Ships sunk as artificial reefs (from Table 3) were on the seafloor an average of 

only 6.7 years prior to being damaged by a hurricane. On average, hurricaneforce wind gusts affect the coastal Florida counties for which artificial reef 

damage was reported once every 7.9 years (Klotzbach et al. 2010). A 

comparison of these two frequencies suggests that most reported damage must 

have been caused by the first hurricane to affect those artificial reef vessels. 

The primary study wrecks have been affected by hurricanes passing within 

40 mi (64 km) on an average of once every 10 years (see Appendix D). 

Hurricane-force wind gusts affect the coastal Texas counties and Louisiana 

parishes between Galveston and New Orleans on average once every 

10.3 years (Klotzbach et al. 2010). Those two frequencies agree quite well 

indicating that hurricane frequency at the study sites is typical of the larger 

region. 

 This study has determined that the magnitude of forces present at the four 

primary sites during peak storm conditions was comparable to the wind forces 

of an F3 to F5 tornado. Anything remaining unaffected by close passage of a 

hurricane must either be structurally strong enough to withstand that level of 

force or be sheltered from those forces by its position, orientation, or burial. 

Site 323 is the youngest of the four primary study sites (believed submerged 

for 20–35 years) and is the only site that exhibited obvious structural damage 

following Katrina and Rita (Gulf Tide lacked sufficient prestorm data to make 

a clear case either way). Depending upon the date when Site 323 sank (it was 

discovered in 1994), it might have experienced from one to three hurricanes. 

If it sank after 1985, then Rita would have been its first hurricane. By way of 

comparison, the other three primary sites experienced from 5 to 15 hurricanes 

within a 40-mi (64-km) radius. 

 The smaller number of hurricanes experienced by Site 323 as compared to the 

older study sites may be significant, because it is consistent with the authors’ 

hypothesis that major structural damage and movement tends to happen early 

in the life of a shipwreck as it settles toward a state of relative equilibrium 

with its environment. In this model of site formation, scouring of the substrate 

by early storms would cause settlement of a hull to a depth beyond which 

further vertical displacement would require larger storm forces than 

previously experienced, assuming that the wreck has not encountered a harder 

substrate. Early lowering of a hull in this way, relative to the surrounding 

seafloor, would result in a more-stable position, less subject to rotational 

movements, as well as a lower vertical profile, thus reducing the surface area 

exposed to storm forces. The assumption is made that the most vulnerable 

areas of a hull are damaged early in the history of a shipwreck, leaving morestable elements relatively undamaged by early storms until such time as 

103 
chemical and biological weathering create new weaknesses that then become 

susceptible to damage by the next passing storm. Since chemical and 

biological processes may proceed at various rates, depending upon the nature 

and thickness of the material in question, hurricane damage of areas weakened 

by such processes might appear to be much more gradual, occurring over the 

course of several storms, than would be the case with a major catastrophic 

structural failure or movement of the hull caused by an early storm acting 

upon an unstable site. 

5.3 Conclusion 3: Burial of Wooden Hulls has been Demonstrated, in 

the Case of New York, to Provide a High Degree of Protection from 

Hurricane Damage 

On portions of the Continental Shelf where firm sediments prevent burial, exposed wood-hulled 

wrecks are presumed to deteriorate more completely due to biological activity, eventually becoming 

widely scattered by hurricanes and trawlers. The proportion of wood-hulled ships that wrecked in the 

GOM on a sufficiently firm seafloor so as to prevent their burial and in waters shallow enough to 

allow hurricane damage is unknown. However, a recent study of sediment shear strength in the GOM 

(Dunlap et al. 2004) provides one means for a rough estimate. The purpose of their study was to map 

areas where pipelines would self bury, negating the need for trenching. They determined that sediment 

shear strengths of <0.2 ksf at the seafloor would allow self burial of pipelines. McClelland Engineers 

(1979) classify sediments of this strength as “very soft.” The area mapped by Dunlap et al. (Figure 50) 

included all GOM waters less than 328 ft (100 m) deep between the Mississippi-Alabama state line 

and a line about 50 mi (80.5 km) north of the Texas-Mexico border. This is approximately the same 

depth range likely to experience the effects of hurricanes. Sixty-five percent of that area (red color in 

Figure 50) was mapped as suitable for self-burial of pipelines. 

Assume for the sake of discussion that sediments suitable for self burial of pipelines would also be 

sufficiently soft and thick enough to allow at least partial burial of wood-hulled shipwrecks, and that 

these shipwrecks are evenly distributed across the area mapped on Figure 50. In that case, the 

proportion of wood-hulled shipwrecks in the GOM exposed to the full force of hurricanes, wood 

borers, and trawl nets, might be on the order of 35 percent, corresponding to areas where sediments 

have shear strengths >0.2 ksf. The balance of wood-hulled shipwrecks in areas with sediment shear 

strengths <0.2 ksf (roughly 65 percent) would be buried and might be preserved as well as, or better 

than, New York. A separate study of correlations between sediment shear strength and shipwreck 

subsidence (Keith and Evans 2009) shows that shipwrecks can achieve significant burial in areas of 

sediment shear strength <0.6 ksf. These results imply that the proportion of buried and preserved 

wood-hulled wrecks in the GOM might exceed the 65 percent calculation based on the Dunlap et al. 

(2004) maps. While it is unlikely that wood-hulled shipwrecks are evenly distributed over the area 

mapped in Figure 50, this exercise provides a rough order-of-magnitude estimate. 

104 
Figure 50. Shear strength of sediments in waters of the western Gulf of Mexico less than 328 ft (100 m) 

deep (based on GIS data from Dunlap et al. 2004). 

Unfortunately for archaeologists, burial of wood-hulled shipwrecks in the shallow GOM makes them 

difficult to discover. The visibility and relatively intact nature of most metal hulls is their most notable 

characteristic. Wood hulls, on the other hand, generally are preserved only to some level below their 

water line, and what remains is typically hidden from view beneath sediment. Over time, exposed 

wood becomes riddled with holes from wood-boring mollusks and substantially weakened. Any wood 

remaining exposed after a few years is at increased risk of damage or removal by storms and trawl 

nets rendering most wood-hulled sailing ships in shallow waters unrecognizable to or even invisible to 

sonar surveys. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that federally mandated oil and gas surveys 

have not confirmed a single example of a wood-hulled sailing shipwreck in GOM areas less than 

656 ft (200 m) deep. While this lack of discovery can be partially explained by the enforcement of 

BOEMRE’s avoidance criteria for unidentified sonar and magnetic targets, these targets are, by 

definition, unidentifiable as shipwrecks based on remote-sensing data alone. By contrast, at least five 

wood-hulled shipwrecks have been discovered in the GOM in waters deeper than 656 ft (200 m), 

where burial and biological decay occur slowly and the effects of hurricanes and trawlers does not 

come into play. To put this into perspective, at the time of this writing 98.3 percent of all active 

platforms and 89.2 percent of all approved applications to drill were located in waters less than 656 ft 

(200 m) deep (USDOI, Minerals Management Service 2010). Yet the substantially smaller amount of 

archaeological exploration required to permit the remaining 10.8 percent of approved drilling 

applications and 1.7 percent of active platforms in waters deeper than 656 ft (200 m) has accounted 

105 
for 100 percent of the confirmed wood-hulled sailing ship discoveries resulting from BOEMREmandated surveys. 

5.4 Conclusion 4: Anthropogenic damage to shipwrecks may be caused 

directly by human action or indirectly by hurricanes acting upon 

manmade structures. 

One of the stated study objectives was to differentiate between natural (hurricane) and anthropogenic 

damage to shipwrecks based upon an understanding of hurricane impacts. Anthropogenic damage 

refers to that caused by human activity. Such damage may be caused either directly by human action, 

or indirectly by hurricane forces dragging a manmade structure across a shipwreck site. 

Anthropogenic damage to shipwrecks in the GOM is primarily associated with the commercial fishing 

and petroleum industries. Direct damage to shipwrecks by commercial fishing is due mainly to 

snagging of wreckage by trawl nets. Anthropogenic damage associated with the petroleum industry 

can occur in several ways, all of which involve manmade structures such as anchors, anchor chains, 

platform legs, pipeline ploughs, riser pipes, or pipelines coming into contact with a shipwreck. 

BOEMRE archeological regulations are designed to prevent inadvertent damage to shipwrecks by the 

petroleum industry; however, the potential for damage remains if BOEMRE procedures or avoidance 

recommendations are not honored, or if a hurricane causes a manmade structure to come in contact 

with a shipwreck. 

Direct or indirect (hurricane-induced) anthropogenic damage to shipwrecks should be consistent with 

the size of the manmade object impacting a site. The direction of force causing the damage should 

also be evident unless the affected material is completely removed from the site (e.g., by trawl nets). 

Damage associated with the petroleum industry may occur at any depth where manmade structures 

touch the seafloor. Such damage may emanate from a single point on a wreck or extend across an 

entire site, depending upon the source of damage. For example, damage from an anchor, rig leg, or 

pipeline plough should emanate from the original point of contact with the shipwreck in the direction 

of the foreign object’s movement. 

An object dragging across a wreck might cut through a section of hull in a localized area or damage an 

entire site, depending on the size and orientation of the object. For example, linear manmade 

structures oriented parallel with the seafloor, such as pipelines or heavy anchor chains associated with 

floating platforms or pipe laying barges, can damage the entire breadth of a shipwreck site. Pipelines 

and anchor chains may drag across shipwreck sites during hurricanes, especially when floating 

platforms are moved laterally by a storm. Studies of pipeline damage following recent hurricanes in 

the GOM showed that “The majority of pipeline damages occurred at or near platform interfaces, in areas 

of mudflows, or as a result of impact by an outside force other than the hurricane, such as platform failures 

or dragged anchors” (DNV 2006:62). Damage caused by dragging a pipeline or anchor chain across a 

wreck might resemble the removal of superstructure commonly reported for artificial reef vessels 

following hurricanes. 

Anthropogenic damage to shipwrecks from the GOM commercial fishing industry is primarily caused 

by hanging trawl nets on wreckage. Trawling in the GOM began around 1915 and was Gulf-wide by 

1950 (Shapiro 1971 and Sheridan 2001, both cited in Committee on Ecosystem Effects of Fishing 

2002). Today trawling occurs out to a depth of 50 fathoms (300 ft [91 m]), although the vast majority 

occurs between the coast and depths of 30 fathoms (180 ft [55 m]). The National Academy of 

106 
Sciences published a study regarding the effects of bottom trawling and dredge fishing techniques on 

seafloor habitat (Committee on Ecosystem Effects of Fishing 2002), which is equally relevant to 

historic preservation. Their study estimated that the total area fished in the GOM, reported as 

104,128 square miles (269,690 km2

), was on average completely swept (e.g., Figure 51) over two and 

a half times during a single year of fishing. Localized areas were reportedly swept 37 to 75 times per 

year. Given the scope of the trawl fishing industry in the GOM it is difficult to imagine any exposed 

shipwreck remaining unaffected. 

Figure 51. Sonar image of trawler scars on the seabed. 

The effect of trawling on a shipwreck depends upon the nature of the site. In the case of intact metal 

hulls, nets are often lost on the sites, creating a diving hazard but doing relatively little damage. 

Conversely, exposed portions of wooden hulls in the shallow GOM tend to be substantially weakened 

by wood-boring organisms, so when nets snag they break off and displace exposed structure and 

artifacts, occasionally bringing them to the surface. This is a common way that historic sites come to 

the attention of treasure salvers, so in a sense salvage is also an indirect anthropogenic effect of 

commercial fishing practices. Once net hangs are known to fishermen, they also tend to become 

dumping sites for unwanted material, some of which is snagged elsewhere and then redeposited at a 

“safe” location (on a known hang) where it will not be snagged again on a later fishing trip. 

Redistribution of artifacts is not only damaging to shipwrecks from which they are removed; the 

practice also may lead to confusion about the age and cultural affiliation of sites if historic artifacts are 

transferred from one site to another. 

107 
Hurricane damage of shipwrecks is not likely to occur below a depth of 300 ft (91 m), except where 

movement of a floating platform drags anchors or a pipeline across the seafloor. In waters shallower 

than 300 ft (91 m), direct storm damage from wave and current forces may affect entire shipwreck 

sites, because such forces are not localized events. This is evident in many artificial reef vessels, for 

which common examples of site-wide damage include lateral and vertical displacement, structural 

failure, and rolling. Hurricane damage can, however, mimic localized drag damage emanating from a 

point source, as demonstrated at Site 323 (see Figure 30) and Sheherazade (Figure A-4). Although the 

damage at Site 323 superficially resembled a localized impact from a foreign object, the resulting hull 

fracture lacked evidence of a predominant force direction, indicating that damage was not due to 

directional dragging of an object across the hull. A similar effect was recorded in the sonar data for 

Sheherazade, though the site was not reexamined by divers following Hurricane Katrina. 

5.5 Recommendations 

The following recommendations are intended to apply the lessons learned from this study to future 

research and management of submerged cultural resources on the GOM OCS. “Adaptive management 

incorporates research into conservation action. Specifically, it is the integration of design, 

management, and monitoring to systematically test assumptions in order to adapt and learn” (Salafsky 

et al. 2001). The most useful lessons learned in this study, from a management standpoint, are (1) that 

hurricanes have the potential to indirectly cause anthropogenic damage to shipwrecks in the vicinity of 

pipelines or surface installations, and (2) that once a wood-hulled shipwreck becomes buried, it can 

potentially survive the passage of multiple severe hurricanes with little or no additional damage, as 

witnessed by the condition of New York. When incorporating these lessons into the larger goal of 

adaptive management, several recommendations for the research and management of shipwrecks in 

the GOM become clear. 

5.5.1 Research Recommendations 

The design of future hurricane damage studies should consider several questions. For example, does 

storm damage decrease in magnitude as shipwrecks age, as hypothesized above? How does vessel 

orientation affect storm damage? And, what effect do storms have on metal hulls that have exhibited 

significant prestorm corrosion? The discovery of additional wood-hulled shipwrecks in a variety of 

sediment types would also add greatly to our understanding of their long-term preservation in an 

environment dominated by frequent hurricanes. This last topic is perhaps the most important of all. 

Very few examples of wood-hulled shipwrecks have been discovered in the GOM, yet this group of 

shipwrecks has potential to contribute greatly to the knowledge base of pre-twentieth-century North 

American maritime history. 

Site-specific sediment analysis should incorporate a combination of coring and shear strength 

measurements. Characterization of sediment bed formations at shipwreck sites is of clear value; 

however, the interpretive value of those data can be limited without corresponding site-specific shear 

strength data. Broad studies of shear strengths throughout the entire GOM provide a useful baseline 

data set, but they have limitations when used for analysis of archaeological site formation processes. 

Such studies are often compromised by widely spaced data nodes that are incapable of quantifying the 

unique characteristics at individual sites. Future BOEMRE studies of shipwrecks on the GOM shelf 

that require a sedimentology component should incorporate localized shear strength testing into the 

project scope. The most effective and economical method for achieving this would be by using a 

108 
diver-held shear vane apparatus, or similar device. Furthermore, the authors recommend the use of 

low-tech, diver-controlled coring devices in place of box cores. Box cores, whether diver-held or 

deployed from the surface, are unwieldy and expensive to construct, and provide no tangible 

analytical benefit over lower-tech devices, such as a PVC pipe hammered into the substrate. In fact, 

the coring results from New York show that lower-tech collection methods may be more successful in 

achieving greater core depths compared to the relatively shallow box cores. These greater core depths 

are relevant when attempting to characterize sediments at and below the depth of subsidence at a 

shipwreck site. 

5.5.2 Management Recommendations 

Consider additional site protection measures in the vicinity of pipelines, cables, and standing or 

anchored structures. Sites are at elevated risk of indirect hurricane damage when located near any 

offshore structure or activity that touches the seafloor. If potential sites can be successfully identified 

prior to construction, they can be avoided to prevent damage in the event of a hurricane. Reports of 

hurricane damage to petroleum industry infrastructure in the GOM can be used as the basis for 

designing extra protection measures. For example, how far do pipelines move, in what direction, and 

under what circumstances? When a platform is moved by a hurricane, what length of pipe might it 

drag along the bottom as it moves? If pipes or platforms are at risk of movement, consideration should 

be given to surveying a wider area to locate potential shipwrecks in their vicinity. 

In waters less than 300 ft (91 m) deep, survey line interval should be sufficiently narrow in the vicinity 

of bottom structures and anchor locations to ensure the discovery of buried wood-hulled shipwrecks 

on the basis of magnetic data. A maximum line interval of 66 ft (20 m) would be appropriate in such 

areas (Gearhart 2011). Such a requirement should apply at least to waters less than 300 ft (91 m) deep, 

where the combined effects of wood borers, hurricanes and trawling would be expected to remove the 

most visible portions of wood-hulled shipwrecks. 

Between 300 ft (91 m) and 650 ft (198 m), both magnetometer and side-scan sonar should continue to 

be employed for archaeological surveys. Below 300 ft (91 m) deterioration of wooden hulls should be 

mostly biological. Burial should be limited predominantly to settlement due to a ship’s weight 

combined perhaps with some deposition from distant alluvial sources. Remnants of wooden hulls 

might no longer be visible above 650 ft (198 m) due to biological activity; however, one might observe 

non-perishable elements of wood-hulled shipwrecks in situ on side-scan sonar. 

In waters less than 650 ft (198 m) deep but greater than 100 ft (30 m), for survey line intervals of 

100 ft (30 m) or less, consideration should be given to improving the accuracy of horizontal 

positioning for magnetometer sensors. In the absence of a sonar target, any hope of differentiating a 

potential shipwreck anomaly from debris (Gearhart 2011) depends upon accurate horizontal 

positioning for the magnetometer sensor. Sonar targets of wood-hulled sailing shipwrecks in these 

water depths are presumed to be difficult to recognize and perhaps often non-existent, since none have 

yet been confirmed from federally-mandated surveys. When survey line intervals exceed 100 ft 

(30 m), the positioning accuracy for a magnetometer sensor is less of an issue, as there is a low 

expectation that anomalies on adjacent survey lines would be associated with a single wood-hulled 

shipwreck. However, if a survey is conducted using a line interval of 100 ft (30 m) or less, then it 

becomes important that the positions of magnetic field measurements on adjacent survey lines be 

mapped accurately with respect to neighboring values. 

109 
110 

Improvements in underwater positioning accuracy are possible using an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 

(AUV) equipped with an inertial guidance system. The level of accuracy achievable with an inertial 

system is superior to acoustic positioning of deep-towed sensors and allows more realistic mapping of 

magnetic anomalies, which in turn allows more accurate interpretation of their potential association 

with shipwrecks. AUVs can be programmed for close-order survey of magnetic anomalies and sonar 

targets, providing a means of prioritizing targets and eliminating some targets from further 

consideration. They are also capable of providing photography that could aid in interpretation of sonar 

targets. AUV technology continues to improve rapidly and is now available at a size that can be 

deployed from a small survey vessel with a crew of two persons. Small systems are now available at a 

cost that is competitive with rates for a traditional towed survey spread. The authors recommend 

promoting the use of AUVs, equipped with inertial guidance, side-scan sonar, magnetometer, and a 

downward-looking camera, for archaeological surveys. 
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Appendix A 

Pre- and Posthurricane Remote-Sensing Data 

for Secondary Wreck Sites 
APPENDIX A: PRE- AND POSTHURRICANE REMOTE-SENSING 

DATA FOR SECONDARY WRECK SITES 

SITE 15306 

Site 15306 is a modern wreck of unknown identity, located in the Vermillion lease block area. The 

site was first discovered by side-scan sonar during a lease block survey for Shell Deepwater 

Development Systems, Inc. and identified as “an oval shaped high density object” (Monier et al. 

1998). A subsequent survey, for McMoRan Oil & Gas, LLC in preparation for laying a pipeline in the 

vicinity recorded a 72-foot (ft) (21.9-meter [m]) long sonar target with a corresponding magnetic 

anomaly at Site 15306 (el Darragi et al. 2001). The site was labeled as a shipwreck in the BOEMRE 

database. 

In 2004 PBS&J performed a remote-sensing survey and diver investigation of Site 15306 as part of an 

NRHP evaluation of submerged sites in the Gulf of Mexico (Enright et al. 2006). That study recorded 

an upside-down, steel, V-hulled, twin-screw boat, with approximate dimensions of 65 x 15 ft (19.8 x 

4.6 m), and at a depth of between 114 and 121 ft (34.7–36.9 m) (Figure A-1). A through-hull mount 

for an echo-sounder transducer confirmed that the wreck was modern. A search of the BOEMRE 

shipwreck database, the Automated Wreck and Obstruction Information System (AWOIS) maintained 

by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Louisiana Division of Archaeology 

shipwreck database failed to locate any viable candidates for Site 15306’s identity within a 20-mi 

(32.2-km) radius, and the site was deemed not eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic 

Places (NRHP) (Enright et al. 2006). The 2004 remote-sensing survey also recorded an oil well 

platform 550 ft (168 m) east of the shipwreck, a possible pipeline trench connecting to the platform 

and running approximately 360 ft (110 m) southeast of Site 15306, and four circular depressions 

within an area 40 ft (12.2 m) in diameter and 480 ft (146 m) northeast of the site. These depressions 

were speculated to be evidence of a temporary spud placement for the oil well, prior to the permanent 

mooring at its current location. 

In 2005 Hurricane Rita passed 37.5 mi (60.4 kilometers [km]) west of Site 15306. The hindcast study 

for Hurricane Rita (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind speed over the site of 

75 miles per hour (mph) (33.5 meters per second [m/s]) and a maximum significant wave height of 

33.1 ft (10.1 m). PBS&J conducted a remote-sensing survey of the site on May 8, 2007. As with the 

2004 survey, the magnetometer data were significantly skewed by the proximity of the oil well and 

pipeline. Magnetometer amplitudes over Site 15306 ranged from –340 to +345 gammas. The sonar 

imagery showed no noticeable change from the 2004 data. Hull orientation remained consistent, and 

there was no visible structural damage (see Figure A-1). There were also no visible or reported 

impacts to the nearby oil well and pipeline. The pipeline trench to the southeast of Site 15306 

remained clearly visible, though no visual evidence remained of the circular spud-placement 

depressions recorded in the 2004 survey. According to the Geographic Information System (GIS) data 

on pipeline and platform damage, the closest reported pipeline damage to Site 15306 was a Newfield 

Exploration Company line pulled up 3.5 miles (mi) (5.6 km) to the southeast. No further diving 

investigation for hurricane impacts was recommended (Gearhart 2007). 

123 
Figure A-1 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Site 15306. 

SHEHERAZADE

SS Sheherazade (BOEMRE vessel ID 328) is located in the Eugene Island lease block area, 82.9 mi 

(133.3 km) east of Hurricane Rita’s path. Sheherazade was a French-built petroleum tanker, launched 

in 1935 (Figure A-2). The massive ship measured 574 ft (175.0 m) long by 72 ft (21.9 m) abeam with 

a 31-ft (9.4-m) draft, and at 18,530 tons was the largest tanker in the world prior to World War II 

(Dothan Eagle 1950). In the late 1930s and into 1941, Sheherazade was chartered to bring petroleum 

products from America to French North Africa, until a commercial shipping crisis resulting from 

German U-boat attacks spurred President Franklin Roosevelt to seize foreign ships lying idle in U.S. 

ports (American Merchant Marine at War 1998). The U.S. War Shipping Administration (WSA) 

requisitioned Sheherazade from France in February 1942 and commenced chartering the tanker to 

American shipping companies for fuel and heating oil transport along the Gulf and eastern coastlines 

(U.S. Coast Guard [USCG] 1942). On June 11, 1942, Sheherazade was en route to Houston when it 

was torpedoed three times by U-158, 20 mi (32.2 km) west of Ship Shoal. 

124 
Figure A-2 SS Sheherazade. 

Site 328 was initially recorded in a 1979 survey for Forest Oil Corporation, which documented a sidescan sonar-target and a magnetic anomaly of 500+ gammas over a distance of 1,000 ft (305 m) (Hole 

1979). John E. Chance & Associates, Inc. later recorded Site 328 in a pipeline right-of-way remotesensing survey performed for Shell Pipe Line Corporation (DuVal et al. 1996). Both Hole and DuVal 

et al. tentatively identified Site 328 as Sheherazade. 

In 2005, PBS&J conducted a remote-sensing and diver investigation of Site 328 as part of its NRHP 

evaluation of selected Gulf of Mexico shipwrecks (Enright et al. 2006). That investigation recorded a 

capsized, steel-hulled vessel, with a visible length of approximately 545 ft (166 m) on the sonar image 

(Figure A-3), and a magnetic anomaly with a relative amplitude of –5,625 to +30,425 gammas. Also 

recorded were two 30-ft-wide (9.1-m) torpedo holes on the wreck’s starboard side. The archaeological 

data combined with subsequent historical research confirmed the identity of Site 328 as Sheherazade, 

and PBS&J recommended that the wreck be considered eligible for the NRHP (nomination status is 

pending). 

The hindcast study for Hurricane Rita (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind 

speed over Sheherazade of 76 mph (34.0 m/s) and a maximum significant wave height of 29.9 ft 

(9.1 m). PBS&J again surveyed Sheherazade for the present study on May 9, 2007. Water depth onsite was approximately 50 ft (15.2 m) to the top of the wreck and 77 ft (23.5 m) to the seafloor. Based 

on initial analysis of the raw sonar data, there were no noticeable hurricane-related impacts to the site 

relative to the 2005 sonar imagery (see Figure A-3). Bow orientation remained identical to its 2005 

position (approximately 78 degrees), and there was no apparent change to the few recognizable 

features of the upside-down hull; namely, the torpedo impact holes and the extant starboard propeller. 

Both torpedo impact holes measure approximately 30 ft (9.1 m) on the sonar image and show no 

evidence of increased size since 2005. Based on this in-field analysis, the decision was made, with the 

concurrence of the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR), to remove Sheherazade 

from further survey or diving consideration (Gearhart 2007). Further analysis of the mosaiced sonar 

data during the report-writing phase of this study, however, revealed subtle evidence of hull 

degradation since 2005. Adjacent to the northernmost torpedo hole (at the bow end) is an area where 

the linear pattern of the bilge keels has been distorted, and there appear to be several small hull 

fissures (Figure A-4). The imagery is evocative of the area of weakened hull structure present in the 

125 
2004 sonar data from Site 323 (see Section 4.3.3). Sheherazade’s area of hull degradation extends in a 

triangular pattern approximately 24 ft (7.3 m) to the wreck’s port side, beginning at the visible edge of 

the torpedo hole. This degradation can be partially attributed to a weakening of structural elements at 

the time of the initial torpedo explosion. Whether the increased degradation since 2005 is attributable 

to normal erosion of metals in salt water, or has been accelerated by hurricane forces, cannot be 

determined with the available data. 

Figure A-3 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Sheherazade. 

126 
Figure A-4 Comparison of hull damage at Sheherazade and Site 323. 

Two pipelines are located approximately 2,000 ft (610 m) east and west of the site, with a well 

1,250 ft (381 m) to the southwest. No hurricane damage was reported at these structures. The closest 

reported petroleum industry damage near Sheherazade was an Apache Corporation pipeline pulled up 

3 mi (4.8 km) northeast of the site. 

R.M. PARKER, JR. 

R.M. Parker, Jr. (BOEMRE vessel ID 432 ) is located in the South Timbalier lease block area, 69.6 

mi (112.0 km) west of Hurricane Katrina’s path. R.M. Parker, Jr. was a 425-x-57-x-33-ft (129.5-x17.4-x-10.1-m), 7,000-gross-ton tanker built in 1919 for the United States Shipping Board (USSB) by 

the Moore Shipbuilding Company, of Oakland, California (Figure A-5). Initially named Imlay, it was 

intended for the U.S. maritime fleet during World War I, but was not completed in time to see 

wartime service (Enright et al. 2006). After the war, the USSB chartered Imlay for petroleum transport 

before eventually selling the tanker to private interests. From 1923 to 1942, Imlay was employed as a 

coastal oil tanker, operating mostly out of Texas, and its name was changed to R.M. Parker, Jr. in 

1941. After U.S. entry into World War II, R.M. Parker, Jr. was requisitioned by the WSA to continue 

service as a coastal oil tanker for the U.S. Merchant Marine. In the early morning of August 13, 1942, 

R.M. Parker, Jr. was traveling alone in ballast, westbound along the northern Gulf of Mexico 

coastline, when it was struck on its port side by two torpedoes launched from U-171. All 44 crew and 

marine guards escaped in the lifeboats, and R.M. Parker, Jr. finally sank 81⁄2 hours after being hit 

(Wiggins 1995:111–112). 

127 
Figure A-5 SS R.M. Parker, Jr.

Site 432 was first recorded in 2003 during a Cochrane Technologies, Inc. lease block survey for 

Spinnaker Exploration Company, LLC (el Darragi et al. 2003). That survey recorded a shipwreck 

rising 24 ft (7.3 m) above the seafloor, along with a possible debris field several hundred feet away. 

PBS&J conducted a remote-sensing survey and diver investigation of the wreck for a 2005 NRHP site 

evaluation (Enright et al. 2006). The sonar survey showed the wreck broken into two pieces: a 175-ftlong (53.3-m) section from the bridge deck to the transom, and a partially buried section measuring 

approximately 234–275 ft (71.3–83.8 m) and comprising the forward section of the bridge deck to the 

bow (Figure A-6). The aft section was sitting keel-down, while the forward piece was lying on its 

starboard side. Segments of the topgallant forecastle, main, bridge, and poop decks were clearly 

visible in the sonar record. Total vessel dimensions, based on the sonar data, measured between 409 

and 450 ft long (124.7–137.2 m) (factoring in the partially buried bow), 55 ft (16.8 m) wide, and with 

a 30-ft (9.1-m) depth of hold at the main deck level (and 48–50 ft [14.6–15.2 m] at the forecastle 

deck). Wreck height off the seafloor was approximately 23 ft (7.0 m). Based on the archaeological 

diving, remote-sensing data, and archival research, PBS&J confirmed the identity of Site 432 as R.M. 

Parker, Jr. and recommended the site be determined eligible for the NRHP (nomination status is 

pending). 

128 
Figure A-6 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of R.M. Parker, Jr. 

The hindcast study for Hurricane Katrina (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind 

speed over R.M. Parker Jr. of 51 mph (22.8 m/s) and a maximum significant wave height of 22.0 ft 

(6.7 m). PBS&J resurveyed the site for the present study on May 9, 2007. Water depth was 

approximately 56 ft (17.1 m), and maximum wreck elevation off the seabed was 23 ft (7.0 m). Ten 

transects were surveyed over the site, and the resulting sonar data showed no noticeable alterations to 

R.M. Parker, Jr. relative to its 2005 condition (see Figure A-6). There is no apparent vertical or lateral 

displacement of the two hull sections, nor evidence of any structural collapse. Poop and main deck 

features identifiable in the 2005 sonar imagery (i.e., linear features indicating catwalks and hatchways) 

can also be clearly seen in the posthurricane data. However, an unidentified 13-x-10-ft (4.0-x-3.0-m) 

object that was recorded approximately 435 ft (133 m) southwest of the wreck’s stern in 2005 (Enright 

et al. 2006) was no longer visible in 2007. The closest pipeline to R.M. Parker, Jr., 3⁄4 mi (1.2 km) 

northeast, received no reported damage. The closest reported damage was to a Forest Oil Corporation 

pipeline 7.5 mi (12.1 km) to the northeast. Based on these factors and the analysis of the sonar data, no 

further dive investigation of R.M. Parker, Jr. was recommended (Gearhart 2007). 

SITE 389 

Site 389 is located in the South Timbalier lease block area, 63.3 mi (101.9 km) west of Hurricane 

Katrina’s path. Based on its proximity to several of the primary and secondary selected study sites, 

Site 389 was one of three sites added to the survey plan while fieldwork was in progress, with the 

concurrence of the COTR. The site is suspected to be the wreck of J.A. Bisso, a 224-ton towboat that 

was built in 1906 and foundered in 1957 (BOEMRE wreck database). Site 389 was located and 

129 
tentatively identified as J.A. Bisso by a Northland Research, Inc. lease block survey in 2000, and was 

surveyed again in March 2005. 

The hindcast study for Hurricane Katrina (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind 

speed over Site 389 of 61 mph (27.3 m/s) and a maximum significant wave height of 23.3 ft (7.1 m). 

PBS&J conducted a sonar-only survey of J.A. Bisso on May 9, 2007. Based on the 2007 sonar data, 

the wreck appears to be listing to its port side, as a vertical portion of the starboard bow hull is visible 

(Figure A-7). More significantly, a large unidentified object, visible in the 2005 sonar on the port side, 

just forward of amidships, is no longer present. There is also evidence that an approximately 35-ftlong (10.7-m) section of the aft port gunwale and deck have been buried. The burial process seems to 

have begun prior to 2005, as the sonar imagery from that year also shows evidence of partial burial in 

the same area, though to a lesser extent. A large scour depression also appears to have formed around 

Site 389. The scour extends northwest, perpendicular to the wreck hull for approximately 330 ft 

(101 m), and is approximately 160 ft (49 m) wide at its widest point adjacent to the bow and stern of 

the vessel. The size of the prehurricane scour pattern was indeterminate from the available sonar data. 

The prehurricane sonar data for Site 389 is low resolution, so direct comparison with the poststorm 

data is largely inconclusive, and there has been no known prehurricane diver recording of the site. 

However, based on the available imagery, there did not appear to be any significant structural or 

positional changes to the site since the 2005 survey. Accordingly, no further dive investigation was 

recommended (Gearhart 2007). The closest reported petroleum industry damage to Site 389 was to a 

Forest Oil Corporation pipeline 3 mi (4.8 km) to the northeast, while the closest undamaged pipeline 

was 1⁄2 mi (0.8 km) to the north. 

Figure A-7 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Site 389. 

130 
SITE 343 

Site 343 is located in the High Island lease block area, 23.4 mi (37.6 km) west of Hurricane Rita’s 

path. Based on its proximity to several of the primary and secondary selected study sites, Site 343 was 

the second of three sites added to the survey plan while fieldwork was in progress. According to the 

BOEMRE shipwreck database, Site 343 is an unknown wreck that was first recorded in a 1997 lease 

block survey (K-C Offshore, LLC 1997). That survey recorded a low-resolution sonar target, 

tentatively identified as a shipwreck, between 50 and 140 ft (15.2–42.7 m) long and 20 and 35 ft (6.1–

10.7 m) wide (Figure A-8). A subsequent survey in 1998 confirmed that it was a modern wreck. 

Figure A-8: Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Site 343. 

The hindcast study for Hurricane Rita (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind 

speed over Site 343 of 70 mph (31.3 m/s) and a maximum significant wave height of 18.7 ft (5.7 m). 

PBS&J conducted a sonar-only survey of the site on May 11, 2007. The sonar imagery confirmed a 

shipwreck in approximately 45 ft (13.7 m) of water (37 ft [11.3 m] over top of the wreck), measuring 

approximately 62 x 20 ft (19.8 x 6.1 m). The vessel has a square stern and sharp bow. Two square 

hatchways are visible along the centerline, aft of amidships, and there is a significant amount of 

amorphous material covering the forward pilothouse area and extending out approximately 13 ft 

(4.0 m) to the starboard (east) side of the wreck. This material may be indicative of the superstructure, 

outriggers, and netting of a trawler. Alternately, it may be collapsed superstructure and/or intrusive 

snagged nets. The prehurricane sonar data for Site 343 is low resolution, so direct comparison with the 

poststorm data is largely inconclusive, and there has been no known prehurricane diver recording of 

the site. However, based on the available imagery, there did not appear to be any significant structural 

131 
or positional changes to the site since the 1997 survey. Accordingly, no further dive investigation was 

recommended (Gearhart 2007). No damage was reported to the closest pipeline, a little over 1⁄2 mi 

(0.8 km) west of the site, while the closest reported damage was to a Manta Ray Gathering Company, 

LLC pipeline 6.6 mi (10.6 km) southwest and farther from the storm’s path. 

USS HATTERAS

USS Hatteras (BOEMRE vessel ID 236) is a Union gunboat that was captured and sunk 14 mi (22.5 

km) off the Texas coast in January 1863. It is located in the Galveston lease block area, 77.7 mi (125.0 

km) west of Hurricane Rita’s path. Hatteras was built in 1861 as the merchant ship St. Mary, at 

Harlan and Hollingsworth of Wilmington, Delaware. It was an iron-hulled side-wheel steamer 

intended for use in the Charles Morgan Line of Gulf of Mexico packet ships. The vessel measured 210 

x 34 x 18 ft (64.0 x 10.4 x 5.5 m), with a three-masted schooner rig (Figure A-9), and was powered by 

a 500-horsepower walking beam engine (Arnold and Anuskiewicz 1995). The U.S. Navy acquired the 

St. Mary in September 1861, renaming the ship Hatteras, and arming it with four 32-pounders, two 

30-pounders, one 20-pounder, and one 8-pounder. After a brief tour in the South Atlantic Blockading 

Squadron, Hatteras was transferred to the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron where it captured 

seven Confederate blockade-runners. 

Figure A-9 CSS Alabama sinks USS Hatteras, January 1863 (Naval History and 

Heritage Command 2010). 

132 
In January 1863, Hatteras was off Galveston, joining Rear Admiral David Farragut’s blockade of the 

Texas coast. On the morning of January 11, Hatteras, under the command of Captain Homer C. 

Blake, was ordered to pursue a ship approaching Galveston and flying a British flag. Just after sunset, 

and several miles away from the rest of the Union fleet, Hatteras caught up to the unknown vessel, 

which then raised a Confederate flag, identified itself as the famed raider CSS Alabama (under 

command of Raphael Semmes), and began firing. The ensuing battle lasted only 13 minutes, ending 

after a shell exploded in the overmatched Hatteras’s engine cylinder, disabling the walking beam 

(Arnold and Anuskiewicz 1995). Captain Blake surrendered the burning and sinking Hatteras to 

Semmes, who then sent his own boats to rescue the survivors (Hatteras suffered two dead and five 

wounded, while Alabama had only two injured). Hatteras sank in 60 ft (18.3 m) of water, 45 minutes 

after the engagement had begun. 

The site was discovered in the mid-1970s by treasure hunters who then attempted to arrest the wreck 

in Admiralty court after salvaging several artifacts. The Navy ultimately won the court judgment and 

retained ownership of the wreck (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston 

Division n.d.). While litigation was ongoing, the Bureau of Land Management (a precursor to the 

BOEMRE), along with the Texas Historical Commission (THC) and the Institute of Nautical 

Archaeology at Texas A&M University, conducted a series of remote-sensing surveys over the site 

(Arnold and Hudson 1981). In 1992, a 3-year program of site monitoring and mapping was initiated 

(Arnold and Anuskiewicz 1995). Those investigations revealed that very little of the wreck remained 

exposed above the sand; both paddlewheel hubs and parts of the steam engine extended a maximum 

of 4 ft (1.2 m) above the seafloor, and there was a small section of encrusted iron towards the bow 

(Figure A-10). By 1994, the bow remains had been buried (Arnold and Anuskiewicz 1995). The site 

was subsequently designated a State Archeological Landmark and listed in the NRHP. 

PBS&J resurveyed the site in 2005 as part of the ongoing periodic site monitoring (Enright et al. 

2006). The resulting sonar and dive data showed that the site remained essentially unchanged since 

1994. Exposed wreckage was limited to the upper portions of both paddlewheel hubs, a knuckle 

connecting two iron rods (located between the hubs) and three cylinders associated with the steam 

chest (Figure A-11). 

The hindcast study for Hurricane Rita (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind 

speed (5.4 mi [8.7 km] east of the site) of 52 mph (23.2 m/s) and a maximum significant wave height 

of 12.5 ft (3.8 m). In 2007 PBS&J conducted a sonar-only survey of Hatteras, which revealed 

virtually no change to the site since 2004. Once again both paddlewheel hubs, the iron knuckle, and 

the steam chest cylinders were the only wreck features that remained exposed. Based on this evidence, 

PBS&J recommended no further dive investigations to determine posthurricane impacts (Gearhart 

2007). There was also no petroleum industry damage reported in the vicinity of Hatteras. The closest 

impacted structure was a Manta Ray Gathering Company, LLC pipeline, 28 mi (45.1 km) northeast. 

133 
Figure A-10 1994 site plan of USS Hatteras (Arnold and Anuskiewicz 1995). 

Figure A-11: Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of USS Hatteras. 

134 
JOSEPHINE

In addition to the 10 wrecks initially selected for this study, PBS&J evaluated sector-scan sonar 

imagery of the steamship Josephine that had been collected in August 2007. Josephine (BOEMRE 

vessel ID 365) was an iron-hulled side-wheel steamer built by Harlan and Hollingsworth in 1867 for 

Charles Morgan’s Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steamship Company. The steamer was 235 ft 

(71.6 m) long, 34 ft (10.4 m) abeam, with an 18.5-ft (5.6-m) depth of hold, and was powered by a 

low-pressure, 50-inch-diameter (127-centimeter [cm]), 800-horsepower engine with 11-ft (3.4-m) 

stroke, provided by Morgan Iron Works Company. Josephine had a round stern, two decks, two 

masts, two cabins, and a 250-passenger capacity. Charles Morgan was among the passengers on the 

packet steamer’s maiden voyage that carried cargo and passengers from Wilmington, Delaware, to 

New Orleans (via Havana and Key West) in February 1868. Upon arrival in New Orleans, Josephine

was assigned to run freight, passengers, and mail biweekly between Brashear City (later renamed 

Morgan City), Louisiana, and Galveston, Texas. The steamer ran aground on the Brazos Bar in 1868, 

but was removed, seemingly unscathed, a testament to the ship’s durability. On January 15, 1881, 

Josephine was reassigned to carry cargo and passengers between New Orleans and Havana. After 

arriving safely in Havana, Josephine disembarked for New Orleans with a cargo of tobacco, cigars, 

and passengers, making stops at Key West and Cedar Key, Florida, on the way. On the last leg of the 

trip the steamer began taking on water, likely as a result of damage from a severe winter storm. All of 

the passengers and crew were able to safely abandon ship, but the vessel was lost (at a value of 

$75,000) in approximately 38 ft (11.6 m) of water off the coast of Biloxi, Mississippi (Irion and Ball 

2001:53–55; BOEMRE database). 

A 1997 side-scan sonar image of the wreck revealed it sitting upright with approximately 20 ft (6.1 m) 

of relief off the bottom, and the interior filled with sediment (Figure A-12). The walking beam engine, 

boilers, and paddlewheels were all in situ. The wreck was investigated by archaeologists in 2000, who 

discovered most of the hull was buried and the upper hull (above the waterline) was missing, and who 

speculated that the hull remains intact below the waterline. The attachment points for the 

paddlewheels remained intact as did some of the paddlewheels’ iron spokes. The outline of the hull 

was visible except for the bow, which was completely buried. The walking beam was found toppled 

on the starboard side, but the paddlewheel shafts were still in their pillow block bearings. The top of 

the two boilers (observed in the 1997 side-scan sonar, but mostly buried at the time of the 2000 dive 

investigations) were observed, surrounding the base of the smokestack (Irion and Ball 2001:55–56; 

BOEMRE database). 

The hindcast study for Hurricane Rita (Oceanweather, Inc. 2006) estimated a peak sustained wind 

speed over Josephine of 86 mph (38.4 m/s) and a maximum significant wave height of 27.6 ft (8.4 m). 

In 2007 a sector-scan sonar survey of Josephine was conducted. The resulting images indicate that the 

wreck received no obvious damage from Hurricanes Katrina (which passed 46 mi [74 km] to the 

west) or Ivan (which passed 58 mi [93 km] to the east in 2004). All features of the hull and steam 

machinery described by Irion and Ball (2001) remain visible and apparently undamaged. There is 

marginally less hull outline visible towards the stern, which may be the result of increased burial or 

erosion of the exposed iron. Conversely, the area surrounding the boilers appears marginally more 

exposed. According to Irion and Ball (2001), only the tops of the boilers were exposed during the 

2000 diving investigation. The 2007 data show evidence of slight scouring port, starboard, aft, and inbetween the boilers. A review of previous side-scan sonar images and diver accounts indicate that the 

135 
wreck has existed in various states of burial since its discovery. Whether the change in level of burial 

is due to effects of passing storms is indeterminable at this time. 

Figure A-12 Pre- and posthurricane sonar imagery of Josephine. 

Finally, both within and outside the wreck is a pattern of craters in the sediment, similar to that 

observed at the site of Gulf Tide. This phenomenon is believed to be caused by the evacuation of gas 

pockets, presumably air, trapped in the sediment and under parts of the wreck. It seems likely that 

these pockets of air accumulated beneath the wreckage during the recent hurricanes, then continued 

releasing to the surface following passage of the storms, thus preserving the small craters over the site. 

LITERATURE CITED

American Merchant Marine at War. 1998. U.S. Naval Armed Guard casualties during World 

War II. Internet website: http://www.usmm.org/armedguard.html. June. 

Arnold, J.B. III and R.J. Anuskiewicz. 1995. USS Hatteras: site monitoring and mapping. In: 

Underwater Archaeology Proceedings from the Society for Historical Archaeology 

Conference. Washington, DC. January 1995. 

136 
Arnold, JB. III and J. Hudson. 1981. The USS Hatteras: a preliminary report on remote sensing 

data and litigation. In: Cockrell, W.A., ed. The Realms of Gold: The Proceedings of the 

Tenth Conference on Underwater Archaeology. San Marino, CA: Fathom Eight. 

Dothan Eagle [AL]. 1950. “Tanker race started by maritime nations.” 10 January, p. 1 Sports. 

DuVal, B.J., M.A. Savarino, and L. Landry. 1996. Archeological engineering, and hazard study 

of proposed auger expansion Phase 3 pipeline route from Block 331 to Block 28, ship shoal 

area. John E. Chance & Associates, Inc. Submitted to Shell Pipe Line Corporation. 

el Darragi, S.D. and A.R. Saltus, Jr. 2001. Archaeological, engineering, and hazard study: 

proposed 8-inch gas pipeline route from well #2 Vermillion Area Block 196 to Sub-Sea 

Tie-In Vermillion Area Block 206. Prepared for McMoRan Oil & Gas, LLC by Cochrane 

Technologies, Inc. 

———. 2003. Archaeological and hazard study of Block 98 South Timbalier Area (OCS-G24962). Cochrane Technologies, Inc. Submitted to Spinnaker Exploration Company, LLC. 

Enright, J.M., R. Gearhart II, D. Jones, and J. Enright. 2006. Study to conduct National Register 

of Historic Places evaluations of submerged sites on the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental 

Shelf. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS 

Region, New Orleans, LA. OCS Study MMS 2006-036. 

Gearhart, R. 2007. May 2007 geophysical survey trip report: impacts of recent hurricane activity 

on historic shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico. Submitted on July 9 to U.S. Dept. of the 

Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, New Orleans, LA. 

Hole, F. 1979. Archaeological report analysis: Eugene Island Blocks 190 and 191 (OCS-G-3995 

and -8434). Submitted to Forest Oil Corporation. 

Irion, J.B. and D.A. Ball. 2001. “The New York and the Josephine: two steamships of the Charles 

Morgan Line.” The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 30.1:48–56 

K-C Offshore, LLC. 1997. Geophysical survey report, Block 164, High Island Area. Minerals 

Management Service Archeological Resource Information database, Vessel ID 343. 

Monier, P.K., S. Dean el Darragi, and A.R. Saltus, Jr. 1998. Archaeological and hazard report of 

Blocks 195, 196, 207, and 208 OCS-G-19759, -19760, -19761, and -11876 Vermillion 

Area. C&C Technologies, Inc. Submitted to Shell Deepwater Development Systems, Inc. 

Naval History and Heritage Command. 2010. Online library of selected images. USS Hatteras

(1861-1869). Photo #NH53690. Internet website: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ 

images/h53000/ h53690.jpg. March 16. 

Oceanweather, Inc. 2006. Hindcast data on winds, waves, and currents in northern Gulf of 

Mexico in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). 1942. Ship movement cards. Record Group 38, National Archives, 

Washington, DC. 

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division. n.d. Hatteras, Inc. 

Plaintiff v. The USS Hatteras, her engines, armament, apparel, cargo, appurtenances, etc., 

in rem, and United States of America, in personam Defendants. Civil Action No. G-78-77. 

137 
138 

Wiggins, M. 1995. Torpedoes in the Gulf: Galveston and the U-boats, 1942–1943. College 

Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. 
Appendix B 

Additional Archival Research 
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL ARCHIVAL RESEARCH 

In July 2007, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) 

issued Modification 0001 to Contract M07PC13010, which funded an archival research trip to The 

Mariners’ Museum, in Newport News, Virginia, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives 

branches in Washington, D.C., and College Park, Maryland. This trip was designed to identify 

materials at each repository that may improve knowledge of the history, construction characteristics, 

and wrecking event of the selected study wrecks, or, in the case of Site 323, provide information to aid 

in vessel identification. In addition to the sites selected for diver investigation, BOEMRE provided 

PBS&J with a list of other historic shipwrecks in their database that were considered high priority 

sites. If possible, the archival records were to be inspected for information on these vessels as well. 

Due to time constraints, only the two highest priority vessels, Bradford C. French and Sarah Barnes, 

were able to be researched directly. Some information on Hamlet and Orient was obtained later 

through correspondence with the Smithsonian National Museum of American History. A vesselspecific summary of the record collections inspected at each repository, and the results of that research 

are presented here. 

BRADFORD C. FRENCH

Bradford C. French was a three-masted schooner, carrying $50,000 of molasses from San Juan, 

Puerto Rico, to New Orleans when it was struck by a hurricane on June 5, 1916. The vessel wrecked 

approximately 60 mi (97 kilometers [km]) east of South Pass, Mississippi, its hull and cargo a total 

loss, though the captain and eight crew were rescued. According to the BOEMRE database (Vessel ID 

15303), the wreck may have been discovered in the Viosca Knoll lease block area by a 2003 C&C 

Technologies pipeline survey; however, a subsequent remotely operated vehicle (ROV) inspection of 

the wreck by C&C refuted this identification (Church and Warren 2008) 

Mariners’ Museum 

Bradford C. French’s entry in the Record of American and Foreign Shipping was checked for every 

year of its service (American Bureau of Shipping [ABS] 1884–1916). This source describes the vessel 

as a Tern (or three-masted) schooner, built by D. Clark of Kennebunkport, Maine, in 1884 (Official 

No. 3282). It was 184.5 feet (ft) (56.2 meters [m]) long and 37.5 ft (11.4 m) abeam, with a 19.2-ft 

(5.9-m) depth of hold. The hull was constructed of oak, hackmatack, yellow pine, and iron and copper 

fastenings, and it was further equipped with an oscillating engine. Bradford C. French was originally 

owned by J.B. Phillips, and sailed out of Taunton, Massachusetts. In 1903 Phillips sold the vessel to 

Crowell & Thurlow, who changed its home port to Boston. 

There is some documentary confusion about the number of decks contained on Bradford C. French. 

The ABS records from 1884–1888 document it having two decks, while from 1889–1903 it is listed 

with one deck, and from 1904–1916 it is once again listed with two decks. Some (but not all) of the 

yearly entries also list it as having a centerboard. 

The Mariners’ Museum has a single photograph of Bradford C. French in the Captain A.J. Currie 

Collection. It shows the vessel at dock in Boston, February 26, 1910, and is the same photograph 

contained in BOEMRE’s database, so no additional copy was ordered. 

141 
An entry in the Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, Returns of Vessels Totally Lost, Condemned, &C (1916) 

mentions only that Bradford C. French was traveling from San Juan to New Orleans with a cargo of 

molasses when it wrecked 60 mi (97 km) east of South Pass, Mississippi, on July 5, 1916. 

Finally, the wreck is mentioned briefly in the “Marine Mishaps” section of the July 15, 1916 issue of 

Lloyd’s Shipping Illustrated (1916a). Another section of the same issue describes some of the damage 

to Mobile, Pensacola, and parts of the Mississippi coast resulting from the hurricane that also sank 

Bradford C. French (1916b). An article in the July 22 issue of Lloyd’s Shipping Illustrated (1916c), 

though it doesn’t mention Bradford C. French by name, goes into greater detail about the extent of 

hurricane damage at Mobile. Specifically, as a result of the 125 miles per hour (mph) (55.9 meters per 

second [m/s]) winds, 10 vessels were lost near the city, another 200 damaged, and another 10 missing. 

These were limited mostly to “local steam and sailing craft.” At Fort Morgan, 35 miles (mi) (56 km) 

from Mobile proper, at the mouth of Mobile Bay, most of the 25 oceangoing vessels harbored there 

were severely damaged in some way, and 50 seamen lost their lives. 

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA),

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

All documents inspected at this repository were contained within Record Group (RG) 41, including 

Certificates of Enrollment and Registry (Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation) for the years 

1884 (original Enrollment), 1914 (Registry), 1915 (one Registry and one Enrollment), and 1916 (final 

Enrollment) (Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation 1884, 1914, 1915a, 1915b, 1916a, 1916b). 

These records duplicate most of the information contained in the Record of American and Foreign 

Shipping volumes (ABS 1884–1916), with the additional listing of numerous minority-share owners 

along with Jacob Phillips and Crowell & Thurlow. The 1884 enrollment documents the vessel having 

a square stern, while the 1914, 1915, and 1916 certificates list it having an elliptical stern, suggesting 

that Crowell & Thurlow had made some structural changes to the hull. All of the certificates available 

at NARA also list only a single deck, contradicting the information in the Record of American and 

Foreign Shipping. 

NARA also has a microfilm copy of the official wreck report (Bureau of Marine Inspection and 

Navigation 1916a). There are two wreck reports filed, differing only in the estimated value of the lost 

molasses cargo ($25,000 and $50,000, respectively). Both describe the wreck location as “60 mi 

[97 km] East of South Pass, Mississippi.” No additional information is presented beyond what is 

available in the other previously discussed documents. 

RG41 also contains three pieces of correspondence from April 1908 between Crowell & Thurlow and 

the U.S. Customs Service regarding Bradford C. French being chartered for a sugar and molasses run 

to Puerto Rico, and requesting permission to enter Port Real, Crab Island (a nonrecognized port of 

entry) before completing the voyage to Puerto Rico. It was deemed a legitimate business request and 

approved by the Customs office (U.S. Customs Service 1908a, 1908b; Crowell & Thurlow 1908). 

142 
Other records checked at the National Archives that did not yield any information on Bradford C. 

French include 

1. RG41: Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, Steamboat Inspection 

Service. Card reports of Casualties and Violations Investigated, 1911–1935. 

Tenth District (which includes New Orleans) for July 1916–June 1917. 

2. RG41: Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, Steamboat Inspection 

Service. Annual Reports of Accidents Investigated, 1911–1937, Vol. 7. 

3. RG41: Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, Steamboat Inspection 

Service. Casualties, Inspection of Vessels, and Safety of Life at Sea. Index to 

Casualties and Violations, 1910–1936. 

SARAH BARNES

Prior to the archival research, there was little information in the BOEMRE database on Sarah Barnes

(BOEMRE vessel ID 558). All that was known was that in October 1843 the steamer was reportedly 

carrying a cargo of cotton from Galveston to New Orleans when it sprang a leak during a gale 30 mi 

(48 km) east of the Sabine River. While running for shore, the steamer sank in six fathoms (36 ft 

[11.0 m]), 8 mi (12.9 km) west of the Sabine (Lochhead 1954). Most of the crew and cargo were 

believed lost. 

Several historic newspaper and survivor accounts have provided further details on Sarah Barnes’s 

wrecking event, but unfortunately have yielded little information on the vessel itself or its history prior 

to sinking. 

Mariners’ Museum 

Two entries in the New York Shipping and Commercial List, from October 25 and 28, 1843, 

respectively, report details of the wreck and were the source for the BOEMRE database information 

(Lochhead 1954). The report from October 28 mentions that Sarah Barnes sank on September 25 

“while running for shore under sail and steam.” An Illustrated London News article from 

November 25, 1843, further reports that 16 of the 30 passengers and crew were lost (Illustrated 

London News 1843). This source claims that Sarah Barnes left Galveston for New York (not New 

Orleans) on October 24 (not September) and sprang a leak the next morning when 75 mi (121 km) 

from Galveston. Captain Frankland decided to run to the nearest shore, but by 2:30 P.M. water had 

reached the boiler fires and engine. The crew and passengers began to make rafts out of cotton bales, 

and the order was eventually given to “cast off the boat’s painter.” Sarah Barnes sank shortly 

thereafter at 4:45 P.M. According to the Illustrated London News, 18 of the 30 people aboard climbed 

on the rafts, while the other 12 boarded the ship’s painter. Of the former, only five survived after 

drifting for three days; two washed ashore on Galveston Island, and three landed on Bolivar Point. 

Nine of the twelve in the ship’s boat also survived. 

Another newspaper article originates from Captain Arnet, of the schooner Caroline, which picked up 

some of the wrecked vessel’s cotton (New York Herald 1843). However, Arnet could not provide 

particulars on the number of lives lost or date of the wreck. 

143 
National Archives 

Unfortunately, no further information on Sarah Barnes could be located at the National Archives. 

There is no listing for the vessel in the usual steamboat references (i.e., Merchant Steam Vessels of the 

United States [Lytle and Holdcamper 1952]), and subsequently no information that could be traced 

through archival records, such as official number, home port, builder, etc. The only register and 

enrollment records housed at the Washington, D.C., branch of the National Archives that go back as 

far as 1843 are for the Massachusetts area, and no record of Sarah Barnes was contained within those 

volumes. 

A compendium of the ship registers and enrollments of New Orleans (Work Projects Administration 

1942) housed in PBS&J’s library was inspected for the years 1830–1850, independent of the archival 

research trip. No record of Sarah Barnes was contained in these records either. 

Newspaper Archives 

A search of an online database of historic newspaper archives resulted in the discovery of six 

additional articles describing the wrecking of Sarah Barnes (Bangor Daily Whig and Courier 1843a, 

1843b; Galveston Daily News 1953, 1955; New Orleans Bee 1843; The Experiment 1843). Most of 

these articles provide variations of redundant information that appears to be adapted from the same 

one or two original sources. The Experiment (1843) essentially reprints the report of Caroline’s 

Captain Arnet, as mentioned above, with the additional detail that the boilers may have exploded. One 

article from the Bangor Daily Whig and Courier (1843a) notes that Captain Arnet’s information was 

told to him by a fisherman on the Sabine River, who himself had been “commissioned by the mate of 

the steamer to seek relief for the sufferers.” A second article in the Bangor Daily Whig and Courier

(1843b) lists the names of all passengers and crew and their fate during the tragedy. 

By far the most complete, and presumably accurate, accounting of the wrecking event was provided to 

PBS&J by Avery Munson of Gentlemen of Fortune. While conducting his own shipwreck research, 

Mr. Munson located a detailed survivor account, printed in the October 7 edition of The Civilian and 

Galveston Gazette (1843), and signed by “The Survivors of the Yawl.” This letter documents that 

Sarah Barnes left Galveston at noon on Sunday, September 24, and “at 4 o’clock P.M. discharged the 

Pilot, and steered E.S.E. for New Orleans.” Around 1:00 the following morning, wind and seas 

increased substantially and continued for the next few hours. By 4:30 A.M. the vessel had sprung a 

leak that was outpacing two engine-operated bilge pumps that “were capable of discharging nearly 

one barrel of water with each stroke of the engine.” The captain decided to steer towards the mouth of 

the Sabine, which was believed to be approximately 40 mi (64 km) north-northwest, rather than 

towards the closest point of land, believed to be 30 mi (48 km) away. This was done to avoid 

wrecking the steamer in the breakers. At 3:30 P.M. there was still no land in sight and the flooding 

waters had extinguished the boiler fires. The captain ordered that rafts of cotton bales and the 14-ft 

yawl be readied for deployment. The captain and crew were to take the rafts while the passengers rode 

in the yawl, but before everyone could take their positions the boat rapidly began to sink, and all 

aboard scrambled for the nearest vessel. Twelve persons climbed into the yawl, while the remaining 

nineteen passengers and crew climbed aboard the cotton rafts. 

The yawl quickly got separated from the rafts and steered west-northwest for the Sabine entrance, 

using a makeshift sail. After sailing for approximately 17 hours the yawl passengers spotted houses on 

144 
shore, which they believed to mark the entrance to the Sabine. They attempted to run ashore, but the 

yawl was flipped in the breakers while still about a mile from dry land. The survivors tried to cling to 

the overturned yawl, but most were eventually separated and forced to tread water until they drifted 

ashore. Three of the nine passengers did not survive the swim. The rest discovered they had in fact 

landed 30 mi (48.3 km) west of the Sabine. From calculations of their speed and direction of travel, 

the survivors estimate that Sarah Barnes wrecked “30 or 40 mi from land, a little to the eastward of 

the Sabine.” 

HAMLET

According to the BOEMRE database, Hamlet (BOEMRE Vessel ID 553) reportedly ran “on to one of 

the Chandeleur Islands about 30 mi (48 km) from NE pass of Mississippi River” while en route from 

Rio de Janeiro to New Orleans on January 1, 1846. It was carrying 6,100 bags of coffee, 800 of which 

were thrown overboard. Six hundred bags were saved, while the rest took on water in the hold, 

swelled, and burst out the ship timbers (Lochhead 1954). No other descriptive information was listed 

in the BOEMRE database. 

Smithsonian 

A vessel file for Hamlet exists in the Maritime History records of the Smithsonian Museum of 

American History. According to these records Hamlet was a 204-ton brig built by John Dunlop of 

Brunswick, Maine, in 1804. It was 82 ft (25.0 m) long by 24 ft (7.3 m) abeam, with a 12-ft (3.7-m) 

depth of hold, and hailed out of Bath, Maine (Fairburn 1945–1955a). It is unclear whether this is the 

same Hamlet suspected to have wrecked on the Chandeleur Islands. 

ORIENT

According to the BOEMRE database, Orient (BOEMRE Vessel ID 488), owned by Silas Weeks of 

New Orleans, broke apart in a hurricane 60 mi (97 km) southwest of Port Eads on September 9, 1882. 

Smithsonian 

The vessel files at the Smithsonian list a steamboat Orient, 1,560 tons, built in Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire, in 1852. It was 201 ft (61.3 m) long by 41 ft (12.5 m) abeam with a 20-ft (6.1-m) depth of 

hold, and served in the New York-Liverpool Dramatic Line from 1853–1867 (Fairburn 1945–1955b). 

Again, it is unknown whether this is the same vessel that later wrecked in the Gulf of Mexico and is 

documented in the BOEMRE database. 

LITERATURE CITED 

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). 1884–1916. Record of American and foreign shipping. 

New York, NY. 

Bangor [ME] Daily Whig and Courier. 1843a. “Loss of the Texan Steamer Sarah Barnes.” 

October 30. 

———. 1843b. “Sixteen lives lost – destruction of the Steamer Sarah Barnes.” November 3. 

145 
Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation. 1884. Bradford C. French, Official No. 3282, 

Certificate of Enrollment. RG41, Official Number Files 1867–1958, National Archives, 

Washington, DC. 

———. 1914. Bradford C. French, Official No. 3282, Certificate of Registry. Record Group 41, 

Official Number Files 1867–1958, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

———. 1915a. Bradford C. French, Official No. 3282, Certificate of Registry. Record Group 

41, Official Number Files 1867–1958, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

———. 1915b. Bradford C. French, Official No. 3282, Certificate of Enrollment. Record Group 

41, Official Number Files 1867–1958, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

———. 1916a. Wreck Report, Bradford C. French. RG41, Microfilm roll T925, Record 85. 

National Archives, Washington, DC. 

———. 1916b. Bradford C. French, Official No. 3282, Certificate of Enrollment. RG41, 

Official Number Files 1867–1958, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

Church, R.A. and D.J. Warren. 2008. Viosca knoll wreck: discovery and investigation of an early 

nineteenth-century wooden sailing vessel in 2,000 feet of water. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 

Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, New Orleans, LA. OCS 

Study MMS 2008-018. 

Crowell & Thurlow. 1908. Letter to Commissioner of Navigation. April 21, 1908. RG41, Bureau 

of Navigation Correspondence 1884-1934. National Archives, Washington, DC. 

Fairburn, W.A. 1945–1955a. Merchant Sail. Volume 5 of 6, pp. 3180, 3301. Center Lovell, ME: 

Fairburn Marine Educational Foundation, Inc. 

———. 1945–1955b. Merchant Sail. Volume 2 of 6, pp. 1185, 1195, 1222, 3094. Center Lovell, 

ME: Fairburn Marine Educational Foundation, Inc. 

Galveston [TX] Daily News. 1953. “Shipwrecks in Local Waters.” May 31, Section 2. 

———. 1955. April 19, page 11. 

Illustrated London News. 1843. November 25, pg. 338. In: Eldredge collection of steamship 

histories, entry: “Sarah Barnes.” Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, VA. 

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, Returns of Vessels Totally Lost, Condemned, &C. 1916. London. 

Lloyd’s Shipping Illustrated. 1916a. “Marine mishaps.” July 15, LVI(715):52. New York. 

———. 1916b. “The Gulf Ports.” July 15, LVI(715):56. New York. 

———. 1916c. “Hurricane at Mobile.” July 22, p. 86. New York. 

Lochhead, J.L. 1954. Disasters to American vessels, sail and steam, 1841–1846. Compiled from 

the New York Shipping and Commercial List. Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, VA. 

Lytle, W.M. and F.R. Holdcamper. 1952. Merchant steam vessels of the United States 1790–

1868. Staten Island, NY: The Steamship Historical Society of America, Inc. New Orleans 

Bee. 1843. “Marine intelligence.” October 16. 

New York Herald. 1843. “Loss of the Steamer Sarah Barnes.” October 25, 1843. Microfilm 

collection at the Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, VA. 

146 
The Civilian and Galveston Gazette. 1843. “Loss of the Sarah Barnes.” October 1. 

The Experiment [Norwalk, OH]. 1843. “Appalling loss of life – destruction of the New Orleans 

and Texas Packet Steamer Sarah Barnes.” November 8. 

U.S. Customs Service. 1908a. Letter from Collector of Customs to Commissioner of Navigation. 

April 21, 1908. RG41, Bureau of Navigation Correspondence 1884–1934. National 

Archives, Washington, DC. 

———. 1908b. Letter from Commissioner of Navigation to Collector of Customs. April 23, 

1908. RG41, Bureau of Navigation Correspondence 1884–1934. National Archives, 

Washington, DC. 

Work Projects Administration. 1942. Ship registers and enrollments of New Orleans, Louisiana. 

Volumes III and IV. Prepared by the Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, Service 

Division, Work Projects Administration. Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State 

University, Baton Rouge, LA. 

147 
Appendix C 

New York Artifacts 
APPENDIX C: NEW YORK ARTIFACTS 

In 2008, following completion of the remote-sensing and diver investigations, multiple 

correspondences between the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 

(BOEMRE), Gentlemen of Fortune, and PBS&J, confirmed that Gentlemen of Fortune had recovered 

a sizeable amount of New York’s artifact assemblage. At Gentlemen of Fortune’s invitation, 

BOEMRE issued a contract modification authorizing PBS&J to visit the salvage group’s facilities in 

New Iberia, Louisiana, for the purpose of compiling a preliminary inventory and catalog of the 

artifacts collected in the belief that the public was better served by preserving a record of this material 

than by simply allowing it to pass undocumented into private hands. BOEMRE, which has no legal 

jurisdiction over the site, met with Gentlemen of Fortune to encourage them to donate the recovered 

artifacts to an appropriate museum. PBS&J met with Gentlemen of Fortune on December 2–4, 2008. 

Fieldwork tasks included photo-documentation of a portion of the total collection as a means to 

capture singular artifact types as well as collective groups of objects. Photography encompassed 

multiple views of the artifacts (both obverse and reverse faces of some artifacts) as well as detailed 

images of maker and ownership marks. A photolog was kept, detailing the chronology of 

photography. A field catalog was created in which a quick sketch of an artifact was rendered and 

included pertinent information about each object such as basic dimensions, material, and provenience. 

For the vast majority of recorded artifacts, both a photograph and measured sketch were collected; 

however, in a few instances, only one of the two image types could be documented. 

As suspected, the artifact collection was substantial. Over the span of three days, PBS&J reviewed and 

documented a total of 538 items within 154 artifact lots. Lot numbers were inherited from the 

preliminary catalog system that had already been implemented by Gentlemen of Fortune. In most 

cases, a lot number was assigned to an individual artifact (example, Artifact No. 1: glass wine bottle), 

but in some instances a lot number comprised multiple examples of an artifact type or separate 

components of a complex object (example, Artifact No. 69: 14 buttons; Artifact No. 86: pocket watch 

in 13 pieces). Artifact classes include ship-related mechanical items such as copper pipes and a hand 

pump (Nos. 110 and 105), lanterns (No. 100), and the capstan (No. 104); the ship’s “hospitality” items 

such as ginger beer and wine bottles (multiple Nos.), silverware engraved “Steamship New York” (No. 

84); dinnerware fragments with a printed inlay of the eagle of Texas flying over New York (No. 96); 

and personal effects such as a leather shoe (No. 82), toothbrushes (Nos. 74 and 75), and pocketknives 

(No. 63). 

Gentlemen of Fortune assigned 120 unique lot numbers (Nos. 1–120) to the artifact assemblage, 

identifying artifacts with a known provenience. Items with a known provenience represented the 

minority of artifacts in the collection. PBS&J reviewed and assigned nonprovenienced (NP) artifact 

lot numbers (as time allowed) to an additional 34 artifacts, or artifact groups, for which provenience 

information was not recorded. In many cases, these NP numbers reflected large collections of a certain 

artifact type, and only a representative sample was cataloged (example, NP-5: copper sheathing). In 

actuality, the total number of individual nonprovenienced artifacts numbered in the thousands 

including, but not limited to, multiple examples of glass and ceramic sherds, miscellaneous copper 

pipes and valves, coal, bricks, and fasteners. Due to time constraints and the enormity of the 

collection, the majority of these bulk-stored items were not cataloged. 

PBS&J also did not catalog Gentlemen of Fortune’s collection of gold, silver, and copper coins from 

New York. Though some of the coins were still housed at Gentlemen of Fortune’s facility, the bulk of 

their collection was conserved and graded at the Numismatic Conservation Service of Sarasota, 

Florida, and then auctioned through Stack’s numismatic auction house on July 27, 2008 (Stacks 

151 
2008). The majority of these coins were discovered in the broken section of hull, forward of the 

engine machinery, in what Gentlemen of Fortune believe was the remains of the ship’s safe due to the 

surrounding concretion of iron stains, hinges, and a large brass key (No. 65). The total collection 

numbered slightly over 400 gold coins and over 2,000 silver pieces. The best two examples of each 

variety of U.S. gold coins (if more than two existed) were auctioned off, plus a representative sample 

of world coins and some silver. According to numismatists, this collection included many coins that 

“are highly significant . . . and especially important representatives of their respective varieties” 

(Bowers 2008:71). 

The 2008 auction included: 

 U.S. gold coins: 16 Quarter Eagles (dating between 1836 and 1846), 54 Half 

Eagles (1834–1845), 14 Eagles (1842–1845), and a privately minted 

Christopher Bechtler $5 coin (1834) 

 U.S. copper and silver: one 1-cent piece (1843), two dimes (1838–1841), two 

quarters (1834–1842), 29 half dollars (1795–1844), and one silver dollar 

(1795) 

 “Gold coins of the world” from Chile, Columbia, Denmark, France, German 

States (Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Hannover, Prussia, Saxony), Great Britain, 

Sardinia, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Spain (total date range 1786–1844) 

 “Silver coins of the world” from Central American Republic, France, 

Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Spain (total date range 1721–1846). 

In July 2009 an additional 74 coins were auctioned at Stack’s, plus 51 separate artifact lots (Stacks 

2010). These artifact lots included several of the ginger beer bottles and silverware cataloged by 

PBS&J, and groupings of small artifacts (e.g. coins, nails, buttons, rings, etc.) encased in Lucite. 

PBS&J’s artifact catalog is presented on the following pages. Each catalog entry includes the Artifact 

Lot or NP number, the best photographic image (if available), artifact material and description, and, 

when applicable, Gentlemen of Fortune’s recorded provenience, which correlates to a 20-x-20-foot 

(ft) (6.1-x-6.1-meter [m]) grid overlaid on the site map (Figure C-1). The grid has been adjusted to 

conform to PBS&J’s site map. Artifact lot No. 119 (the ship’s boiler, still submerged in grid A-12) 

and No. 120 (mercury recovered from grid F-12) are not included in the catalog. Additional 

photographs of each cataloged artifact and some artifacts not included in the catalog are on file with 

PBS&J and BOEMRE. 

152 
153 

Figure C-1. New York site plan with artifact provenience grid. 
154 

LITERATURE CITED 

Bowers, Q.D. 2008. The treasure ship S.S. New York, her story, 1837–1846. Stacks LLC, New 

York, NY. 

Stacks. 2008. The collection of Samuel J. Berngard & treasure coins of the S.S. New York. 

Auction catalog. Stacks, LLC, New York, NY. 

———. 2010. “Treasures from the S.S. New York and other important properties.” Internet 

website: http://www.stacks.com/auctions/detail.aspx?lsid=AN00000706. March 17. 
No.: 1 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: H 13 

Object: wine bottle 

Notes: Length is 12.25 in; diameter of base is 2.9 

in; diameter of body near shoulder is 3.50 in; 

diameter of neck is 1.05 in; rim diameter 1.25 in. 

No.: 2 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: bottle 

Notes: Length is 8.75 in; diameter of body is 2.71 

in; diameter of base is 2.60 in; diameter of neck 

varies from 0.90 to 1.24 in; rim diameter is 1.15 

in. 

No.: 3 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Length 6.81 in, 2.80 in base diameter, 2.96 

in shoulder diameter, 1.26 in neck diameter, 1.61 

in rim diameter. Stamped "J.A. BROWN." 

No.: 4 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. Concreted to the 

bell, no. 108. 

155 
No.: 5 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 6 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. Broken – 

missing upper portion. 

No.: 7 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 13 

Object: bottle 

Notes: Diameter of base is 2.52 in; diameter of 

rim is 1.64 in; widest part of body has a diameter 

of 3.12 in; length is approximately 5.5 in. 

No.: 8 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Measurements not recorded. Embossed 

with label "F.A. CONANTS SODA OR 

MINERAL WATERS 252 GIROD ST. NEW 

ORLEANS"; reverse is embossed with a large 

"C." 

156 
No.: 9 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Length 7.06 in, base diameter 2.78 in, 

shoulder diameter 2.93 in, neck diameter 1.25 in, 

rim diameter 1.60 in. Stamped "J.A. BROWN." 

No.: 10 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Note: Dimensions not recorded 

No.: 11 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 14 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 12 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: dimensions not recorded 

157 
No.: 13 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: wine bottle 

Notes: dimensions not recorded, Marked 

"Vitreous Stone Bottles Warranted not to 

Absorb Denby & Co. OR-PARK POTTERIES 

Near Dilby (?)” 

No.: 14 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Conant’s mineral water bottle. Measurements not 

recorded. Embossed with label "F.A. CONANTS 

SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 GIROD ST. 

NEW ORLEANS"; opposite face is embossed 

with a large "C"

No.: 15 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 16 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Conant’s mineral water bottle. 

Measurements not recorded. Embossed with label 

"F.A. CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL 

WATERS 252 GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; 

opposite face is embossed with a large "C." 

No.: 14 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

158 
No.: 17 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Conant’s mineral water bottle. 

Measurements not recorded. Embossed with label 

"F.A. CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL 

WATERS 252 GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; 

opposite face is embossed with a large "C." 

No.: 18 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Conant’s mineral water bottle. Measurements not 

recorded. Embossed with label "F.A. CONANTS 

SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 GIROD ST. 

NEW ORLEANS"; opposite face is embossed 

with a large "C." 

No.: 19 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 20 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Conant’s mineral water bottle. 

Measurements not recorded. Embossed with label 

"F.A. CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL 

WATERS 252 GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; 

opposite face is embossed with a large "C." 

159 
No.: 21 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Broken mineral water bottle. 

Measurements not recorded. Embossed with label 

"F.A. CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL 

WATERS 252 GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; 

opposite face is embossed with a large "C" 

No.: 22 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Conant’s mineral water bottle. 

Measurements not recorded. Embossed with label 

"F.A. CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL 

WATERS 252 GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; 

opposite face is embossed with a large "C." 

No.: 23 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: H 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 24 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: 6 5/8 in length; 2.67 in diameter; neck 

diameter is 1.19 in; rim diameter is 1.47 in. 

160 
No.: 25 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Note: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 26 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 16 

Object: ginger bottle 

Note: Dimensions not recorded. 

No.: 27 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Broken mineral bottle. Measurements not 

recorded. Embossed with label "F.A. CONANTS 

SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 GIROD ST. 

NEW ORLEANS"; reverse is embossed with a 

large "C." 

No.: 28 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: length 7.38, base diameter is 2.45, rim 

diameter is 1.19 in. Embossed with label "F.A. 

CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 

GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; opposite face is 

embossed with a large "C." 

161 
No.: 29 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: ginger bottle 

Notes: dimensions not recorded. Bottle has its 

cork. 

No.: 30 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Complete bottle with cork. Measurements 

not recorded. Embossed with label "F.A. 

CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 

GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; opposite face is 

embossed with a large "C." 

no photo 

No.: 31 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 32 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Broken mineral bottle. Measurements not 

recorded. Embossed with label "F.A. CONANTS 

SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 GIROD 

ST. NEW ORLEANS"; reverse is embossed with 

a large "C." 

162 
No.: 33 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 12 

Object: unknown ornamental device 

Notes: Unknown association – seems to be 

missing lower part of object; overall length is 12.5 

in; diameter of base is 1.85 in; diameter of central 

"globe" device is 3.9 in. 

No.: 34 Material: glass 

Quantity: 2 Location: H 10 

Object: bottle and stopper 

Notes: Bottle length is 2.61 in; bottle diameter is 

1.41 in; rim diameter is 0.81 in. The bottle is 

marked "2 oz & 44 yrs." It is scratched into the 

glass. 

No.: 35 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: wine bottle with concretion 

Notes: Length is 11.6 in; diameter of body near 

shoulder is 3.2 in; diameter of neck is 1.15 in; 

diameter of base is 2.65 in. 

No.: 36 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 15 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Conant’s mineral bottle. Measurements 

not recorded. Embossed with label "F.A. 

CONANTS SODA OR MINERAL WATERS 252 

GIROD ST. NEW ORLEANS"; reverse is 

embossed with a large "C." 

163 
No.: 37 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: French ink bottle 

Notes: Incomplete and broken at rim. Length is 

2.32 in. square cross section, side measures 1.2 in 

across; neck diameter is 0.75 in. bottle embossed 

with mark "Perine Guyot & Cie." 

No.: 38 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: bottle stopper 

Notes: Length 2.39 in; maximum width is 0.86 in. 

Diameter of stopper end is 0.49 in. 

No.: 39 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: bottle stopper 

Notes: Length 2.70 in; maximum width is 0.85 in. 

no photo 

No.: 40 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 3 Location: G 15 

Object: concreted bottles 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photo 

documented. 

164 
no photo 

No.: 41 Material: Glass and unknown 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: bottle neck and concretion 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 42 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 11 

Object: prism 

Notes: Heavy opaque rectangular glass base with 

prism top, 9.10 x 2.30 in. 

No.: 43 Material: earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: container lid 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

No.: 44 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 3 Location: G 15 

Object: ginger bottles and concretion 

Notes: 2 bottles – one glazed, one without glaze 

finish. Unglazed bottle is 6 11/16 in length, 2.78 

in diameter, 1.46 in rim diameter; glazed bottle is 

6 11/16 in length, 2.74 in diameter, rim diameter 

1.37 in. 

165 
no photo 

No.: 45 Material: Glass and unknown 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 14 

Object: mineral water bottle 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 46 Material: copper alloy? 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 13 

Object: spigot 

Notes: dimensions not recorded. 

no photo 

No.: 47 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 7 

Object: draft mark 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

no photo 

No.: 48 Material: unknown 

Quantity: 3 Location: G 11 

Object: candle base 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

166 
No.: 49 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: door hardware 

Notes: 3.65 x 3.49 in. 

No.: 50 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: bell 

Notes: Does not have clapper or handle. Base 

diameter 5.80 in. Length is 4 7/16 in. 

No.: 51 Material: wood and lead 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 13 

Object: wax stamp 

Notes: Single wax stamp in two pieces. Handle is 

1.79 in long, stamp face measures 1.98 x 1.08 in, 

vertical slot in center of stamp. 

No.: 52 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 13 

Object: spigot 

Notes: Overall dimensions are 3.30 x 4.50 in. 

167 
No.: 53 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: unknown 

Notes: Length is 4.37 in; width is 2.02 in.; 

thickness varies from 0.38 to 0.45 in. 

No.: 54 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: concreted buckle 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

No.: 55 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: key hole 

Notes: Length is 1.91 in, width is 1.41 in, 

thickness is 0.07 in. 

No.: 56 Material: pewter 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: candlestick 

Notes: Height of object is 3.98 in; base diameter is 

5.50 in. 

168 
No.: 57 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 13 

Object: hasp 

Notes: Hinged hasp. Dimensions are 6.1 x 1.5 in. 

No.: 58 Material: Copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: unknown 

Notes: Length is 3.66 in, width at connection point 

is 1.54 in. Thickness is 0.086 in. 

No.: 59 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 13 

Object: spigot 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

no photo 

No.: 60 Material: 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: lamp base 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

169 
no photo 

 No.: 61 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 9 

Object: door latch mechanism 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 62 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 3 Location: F 10 

Object: scale 

Notes: Stamped “Salter’s Improved Spring 

Balance” “Warranted.” Measures 6.25 x 1.64 in, 

0.06 in thick. Scale is measure in increments of 4 

lbs. 

No.: 63 Material: various 

Quantity: 4 Location: G 13 

Object: pocketknives and straight razor 

Notes: Bone and cuprous pocketknife has length 

of 3.43 in; pocketknife with missing handles has 

length of 3.64 in; “cap” end of pocketknife is 0.71 

in wide; straight razor is 4.80 in long. 

No.: 64 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 8 Location: G 13 

Object: door or drawer hardware 

Notes: 2 oblong keyholes with 1 keyhole cover: 

keyholes are 2.55 x 0.90 in and 2.52 x 0.91 in, 

keyhole cover is 2.41 in long; flat keyhole cover 

1.91 x 0.91 in; oval keyhole 1.36 x 1.02 in; 

circular keyhole 0.94 in diameter; oval tapered 

keyhole 1.58 x 0.55 in; door latch 3.58 in long. 

170 
 No.: 65 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 11 

Object: key 

Notes: Length 3.46 in, maximum diameter of 

shank 0.37 in. Key is stamped 1162. 

No.: 66 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 12 Location: G 9 

Object: rivets or braids 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

No.: 67 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 13 

Object: watch chain 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

No.: 68 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 49 Location: F & G 8,9, 10 

Object: “drapery” rings 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

171 
 No.: 69 Material: various 

Quantity: 14 Location: F 10, F 13 G 13 

Object: buttons 

Notes: Dimensions not recorded. Copper alloy 

button back is stamped "JML & WH 

SCOVILLE" "WATERBURY" EXTRA 

SUPERFINE." 

No.: 70 Material: copper alloy/iron 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: padlock 

Notes: Padlock body measures 2.54 x 2.59 in. 

Internal pieces are heavily corroded and appear to 

be of iron. 

No.: 71 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 2 Location: F 9 

Object: keys 

Notes: Larger key is 3.90 in long with maximum 

shank diameter of 0.26 in; small key is 2.18 in 

long with maximum shank diameter of 0.23 in. 

No.: 72 Material: silver 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 11 

Object: tongs 

Notes: 6.6 in long. Maker’s mark stamped within 

a rectangular "cartouche" on inside surface 

"LELLOND DURANDE" There could be an 

additional letter ending the last name - this portion 

of the mark is illegible. Small symbols are 

stamped within cartouches on the other tong 

handle as well. 

172 
 No.: 73 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 9 Location: G 10 

Object: door latch 

Notes: 6 component parts and 3 turn screws. 

Cover measures 2.78 x 2.32 in. Stamped "LEWIS 

McKEE & CO." TERRYSVILLE CONN" "No 

12." 

No.: 74 Material: bone 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: toothbrush 

Notes: Length of 6 7/16 in. base of handle is 0.61 

in wide. The "head" of the toothbrush is 0.44 in 

wide and 0.21 in thick. 83 holes. 

No.: 75 Material: bone 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: toothbrush 

Notes: Incomplete. Length of 4.64 in, width of 

base is 0.56 in. 

No.: 76 Material: Mother of pearl 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: keyhole 

Notes: 0.76 x 0.62 in. 

173 
no photo 

 No.: 77 Material: unknown 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 13 

Object: key chain 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

no photo 

No.: 78 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: straight pin 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 79 Material: glass 

Quantity: 2 Location: F 13 

Object: chandelier crystals 

Notes: 2 fragments. Larger fragment is 4.36 long 

and 0.87 wide. Smaller fragment is 1.77 in long 

and 0.85 in wide. 

No.: 80 Material: various 

Quantity: 3 Location: F 11 

Object: wax seal stamp, pocketknife fragment, 

and unknown 

Notes: Wood-handled stamp is broken into two 

pieces, stamp itself is copper alloy. Broken wood 

handle to a pocketknife. The interior surface of 

the third item is threaded; the object function is 

unknown. 

174 
 No.: 81 Material: Wood and lead 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 11 

Object: stamp 

Notes: Overall length is 2.0 in, base measures 0.63 

x 1.98 in. vertical slot in center of stamp. Side of 

stamp is marked "Bennet (or Dennet) &. CO." 

No.: 82 Material: leather 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: shoe 

Notes: Ten 12/16 in in length, greatest width is 

3.87 in; heel dimensions are 2.80 x 2.14 in height 

of heel is 1.5 in. The heel was attached with 6 

fasteners. Toe width is 2.81 in. There is no 

evidence of buckles or other lacing closures. 

no photo 

No.: 83 Material: unknown 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: miscellaneous parts 

Notes: Artifacts not reviewed or photodocumented. 

See next page 

No.: 84 Material: Silver and various 

Quantity: ? Location: G 10 

Object: silverware 

Notes: 16 large silver spoons. 8.6 in long. Handles 

engraved "Steam Packet New York." Reverse 

stamped "J.L. Moore" within rectangular 

cartouche. One large spoon is "brassy" in 

coloration and is not engraved. The reverse is 

stamped with three small symbols, each within a 

square cartouche. These symbols are followed by 

letters "T," "&," "D," each also within a square 

cartouche. 19 small silver spoons are 

approximately 6 in long. Handles engraved 

"Steam Packet New York." Reverse are stamped 

"MOORE" within a rectangular cartouche. Three 

small spoons are "brassy" in coloration. One 

example is stamped "WARRENTED GERMAN 

SILVER" on the reverse. The reverse of another 

has the name "Johnson" scratched into the surface. 

“Brassy” colored dinnerware is likely German 

silver (nickel and copper). Several are stamped as 

such. 

175 
Additional notes for artifact No. 84: 15 large silver forks. Most well-preserved example is 8.0 in long. 

Handles are engraved "Steam Packet New York." Reverse stamped "J.L. Moore" within rectangular 

cartouche. 

176 
Additional images for artifact No. 84: Spoons 

177 
 No.: 85 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: H 11 

Object: bottle 

Notes: Large bottle, 18 in tall with a base diameter 

of 7 3/8 in; rim diameter is 1.30 in, neck diameter 

is 1.95 in. 

No.: 86 Material: Gold, cuprous 

Quantity: 13 Location: F 10 

Object: pocket watch 

Notes: Outer diameter of casing is 2.17 in; 

diameter of watch face is 1.68 in. Internal 

mechanism stamped "RT Watson & Co 1400 

Liverpool Patent." Reverse of watch face is handinscribed "$250" "James Sutton (or Lutton-slightly 

illegible)"; interior of watch casing stamped 

"B&B" "1400" with three impressed symbols. 

No.: 87 Material: bone 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: syringe and plunger 

Notes: Main body (excluding plunger handle) is 

3.53 in long, 0.42 in diameter. 

No.: 88 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 13 

Object: lighting feature? 

Notes: 10.60 x 3.30 in. slightly damaged opaque 

glass object. Overall thickness is 1.35 in. 

178 
Additional images for artifact no. 86. 

179 
 No.: 89 Material: wood 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 9 

Object: auger or corkscrew handle 

Notes: 3.37 in long, diameter of each is 0.86 in. 

No.: 90 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 12 

Object: ornamental base 

Notes: diameter 2.86 in; height 0.92 in. 

No.: 91 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 2 Location: G 12 

Object: rail and wheel 

Notes: Rail is 14.7 in long and 1.04 in wide, the 

central track along the rail is 0.20 in thick and is 

elevated 0.30 in from the base of the rail; the 

wheel has a diameter of 2.51 in. 

No.: 92 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 9 

Object: wheel 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

180 
 No.: 93 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 9 

Object: bottle stopper 

Notes: 2.10 x 0.90 in. 

No.: 94 Material: bottle 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: bottle 

Notes: Artifact photo-documented. Measurements 

not recorded. 

No.: 95 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 9 

Object: glass stem and base 

Notes:   Fluted glass fragment, 4.6 in tall; base 

diameter is 2.6 in. 

No.: 96 Material: refined earthenware 

Quantity: 3 Location: F 9 

Object: unknown 

Notes:   3 fragments from a ceramic dish that is 

possibly hexagonal in shape. It is a representation 

of the eagle and the steamboat New York. The 

largest fragment measures 2.48 x 1.10 in; 

thickness is 0.21 in. 

181 
 No.: 97 Material: glass 

Quantity: 13 Location: G 8 

Object: unknown 

Notes: not measured. 

No.: 98 Material: pewter? 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: “grease gun” 

Notes: Object is broken and incomplete. 

Preserved length is 9.8 in; diameter of main body 

is 1.58 in. 

No.: 99 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 11 

Object: “strainer” 

Notes: Outer diameter 9.25 in, "basket diameter" 6 

in; height 1.28 in; lip is 0.07 in thick. 

No.: 100 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 15 

Object: lantern 

Notes: 14 inches tall; diameter at base is 11.25 in. 

182 
no photo 

 No.: 101 Material: unknown 

Quantity: NA Location: G 15 

Object: bucket 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 102 Material: Copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 11 

Object:”bucket strainer” 

Notes: Intact; 11 in tall; diameter of 7.5 in. Holes 

at base are 9/16 in diameter then decrease to 7/16 

in and 1/4 in diameters. The holes are largest at 

the base, decreasing in size towards the top. 

No.: 103 Material: undetermined 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 11 

Object: pitcher 

Notes: Height is 8.5 in; body diameter is 7 in; base 

diameter is 6 in; there is a strainer located inside 

the rim at the spout. 

No.: 104 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 8 Location: F 15 

Object: capstan 

Notes: Capstan has a diameter of 25.75 in, 

thickness of 5.33 in; 6 staves measuring 18 x 2.72 

in; base of capstan has an outer diameter of 29.63 

and a height of 7.3 in (excluding attachment 

bolts). 

183 
 No.: 105 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 12 

Object: pump 

Notes: Diameter of shaft is 6 in. 

no photo 

No.: 106 Material: unknown 

Quantity: NA Location: F & G, 11, 12 

Object: various valves 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 107 Material: stone 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 10 

Object: sharpening stone 

Notes: 17.5 in diameter with a 2-in-square 

opening in the center; 3.25 in thick. 

No.: 108 Material: copper alloy/iron 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 10 

Object: ship’s bell 

Notes: Overall height is 19 in. Diameter of base is 

18.25 in. Diameter at top of bell, above maker’s 

name, is 9 in. Bell is marked around the top with 

the following, “James P Allaire New York 1833.” 

184 
no photo 

 No.: 109 Material: unknown 

Quantity: 1 Location: H 11 

Object: “sea strainer” 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 110 Material: unknown 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: various pipes and flanges 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed. Sample was photodocumented. 

No.: 111 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: nails, spikes, bolts (fasteners) 

Notes: Representative sample of 8 sheathing tacks 

and 2 nails. Sheathing tacks are square in cross 

section towards the tip and circular in diameter at the 

base of the head. Lengths were between 1.00 and 

1.08 in, all neck diameters were 1.5. Head diameters 

were 0.31–0.35 in. 2 nails of roughly square cross 

section with rectangular heads: 2.41 in long, shank 

0.20 x 0.26 in , and head 0.38 x 0.16 in ; 2.47 in 

long, shank 0.28 x 0.27 in, head 0.15 x 0.17 in. 

No.: 112 Material: coal 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: coal 

Notes: Small sample photo-documented. 

Measurements not recorded. 

185 
 No.: 113 Material: brick 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: brick 

Notes: Small sample photo-documented. 

Measurements not recorded. 

See reference: Stack’s 2008

No.: 114, 115, 116 Material: various 

Quantity: NA Location: in break 

Object: gold, silver, copper coins 

Notes: Artifact not reviewed or photodocumented. 

No.: 117 Material: Refined earthenware 

Quantity: 1 Location: G 12 

Object: dish 

Notes: Diameter of 6.5 in, height of 1.27 in. 

Makers mark on base is illegible. 

No.: 118 Material: bone 

Quantity: 1 Location: F 9 

Object: brush (boot?) 

Notes: 1.15 x 3.85 in. 

186 
 No.: NP-1 Material: Copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: oil lamp fragment 

Notes: Preserved length is 4.14 in, diameter of 

main cylinder is 1.15 in, diameter of burner is 0.98 

in. 

No.: NP-2 Material: cuprous/pewter 

Quantity: 2 Location: NA 

Object: buttons 

Notes: Pewter button has 4 holes and is 0.69 in 

diameter; cuprous button has 0.50 in diameter. 

No.: NP-3 Material: Copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: lamp part 

Notes: 5.04 length, diameter of shaft ranges from 

0.71 to 0.85 in; diameter of top (maximum) is 2.20 

in. 

No.: NP-4 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 7 Location: NA 

Object: buckles 

Notes: 3 sizes of same basic design. Large buckle 

is 2.05 x 0.99 in; medium is 1.15 x 1.04 in; small 

is 0.60 x 0.58. there are 3 large buckles, 3 medium 

(one is broken), and one small buckle. Reverse of 

larger buckles are marked “?ARNAULT” and 

“BREVETE.” Breveté is French for “patent.” 

187 
 No.: NP-5 Material: Copper alloy 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: copper sheathing 

Notes: Most complete example of the 15–20 

sheets reviewed. 47.63 x 14 in, 0.05 in thickness. 

Fastener holes spaced 1.5 in around the perimeter 

of the sheet. Every third fastener was connected to 

a row that extended diagonally across the sheet. 

Fastener spacing along the diagonal was 

approximately 3.25 in. No visible maker's mark. 

No.: NP-6 Material: glass 

Quantity: 3 Location: NA 

Object: mineral bottle fragments 

Notes: 3 fragments of the upper portion of the 

mineral bottles. Measurements not taken. Largest 

example has embossed letter TS (part of 

CONANTS). 

No.: NP-7 Material: glass 

Quantity: 2 Location: NA 

Object: mineral bottle fragments 

Notes: 2 base fragments. Larger example is 2.53 

in long and 2.54 diameter Portions of the 

embossed label is evident "25 (incomplete)" 

"NEW ORLEANS." Smaller example is 1.28 in 

and 2.49 diameter. "NEW OR" is visible. 

No.: NP-8 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: mineral bottle fragments 

Notes:   Base fragment, 3.74 in long with 2.49 in 

diameter. Embossed label is broken but still 

legible " W(broken)RS 252 GIROD ST NEW 

ORLEANS." 

188 
 No.: NP-9 Material: glass 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: mineral bottle fragment 

Notes: Lower portion of bottle, 3.83 in with 2.56 

in diameter. Embossed "E(incomplete)" over 

"MINERAL WATER." Reverse face embossed 

with word "PATENT." 

No.: NP-10 Material: pewter 

Quantity: NA Location: NA 

Object: Parts of candle holders? 

Notes: photo-documented, measurements not 

recorded. 

No.: NP-11 Material: leather 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: unknown 

Notes: Linear leather piece that is 3 in wide. It is 

folded at the seam and riveted to itself. 

No.: NP-12 Material: cuprous/wood 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: unknown 

Notes: Machinery part with a wooden ball within 

a float valve. 16.25 in long. Float housing is 

approximately 2 x 1.5 in. Wood ball has 1 in 

diameter. 

189 
 No.: NP-13 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: threaded pipe or possible hose connection 

Notes: 2.63 in long. Diameter is both 2.3 and 2.0 

in. 

No.: NP-14 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: rail 

Notes: 12.13 in length, width is 1.9. Similar to 

artifact No. 91. 

No.: NP-15 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: keyhole 

Notes: Diameter 1.07 in, thickness 0.06 in. 

No.: NP-16 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 2 Location: NA 

Object: container sherds with marks 

Notes: Photo-documented, measurements not 

recorded. 

190 
 No.: NP-17 Material: Cuprous/pewter 

Quantity: 6 Location: NA 

Object: buttons 

Notes: 4 identical pewter buttons of 0.69 in diameter 

(4 holes); cuprous button of 0.47 in diameter; 

cuprous button of 0.93 in diameter. 0.47 diameter 

cuprous button is stamped on reverse face 

"Burnham" and " M(illegible) CO." 

No.: NP-18 Material: Cuprous/wood 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: portion of wood door with doorknob 

Notes: Overall dimensions are 16.5 x 4.5 in. Lock 

mechanism measures 5.01 x 3.73 x 0.73 in. 

Exterior doorknob diameter is 1.71 in and interior 

doorknob diameter is 1.26 in. Wood door 

fragment is 16.5 in long and 1.21 in thick. 

No.: NP-19 Material: glass 

Quantity: 8 Location: NA 

Object: stemware 

Notes: 8 stemware shards of same style of glass 

of two differing sizes. 1 rim and 5 bases from 

larger size and 2 bases from the smaller size glass. 

See artifact no. 95. 

No.: NP-20 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: bell 

Notes: Base diameter 5.06 in; height 4.02 in. no 

clapper and no handle. 

191 
 No.: NP-21 Material: bone/unknown 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: dinner knife 

Notes: Concreted table knife 10.5 in long. Ivory 

handle has square cross section of 0.72 in. 

Concreted blade height is 1 in. Concrete blade 

appears rounded at tip. 

No.: NP-22 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: part of deadbolt lock 

Notes: 4.94 in long, 1.30 in wide. 

No.: NP-23 Material: 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: ring (no setting) 

Notes: 0.76 in outer diameter, inside diameter of 

3 millimeters. 

No.: NP-24 Material: bone (ivory) 

Quantity: 3 Location: NA 

Object: dinner knife handles 

Notes:   3 handles of two sizes. Large handle is 

5.56 in long with 0.58 x ? cross section and blade 

end and 0.80 x ? cross section at opposite end. 

Cross section dimensions for the smaller handles 

are the same as for the larger handles - length is 

instead 3.86 in. 

192 
 No.: NP-25 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 9 Location: NA 

Object: 5 pins and miscellaneous wire, needle? 

Notes: Pins measured between 0.95 and 1.51 

inches in length. 

No.: NP-26 Material: earthenware 

Quantity: 7 Location: NA 

Object: sherds with marks 

Notes: Cermaic with blue-transfer mark " FANCY 

HARDWARE BROOKLYN,N.Y."; ceramic base 

stamped "7"; teacup base stamped with a small 

triangle and the number "29"; ceramic with an 

unidentifiable embossed pattern on inner surface; 

small sherd with female face; sherd with an 

unidentifable embossed pattern on outer surface; 

base with a partially visible blue-transfer print. 

No.: NP-27 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 41 Location: NA 

Object: sherds 

Notes: Variety of sherds including 3 bases and 2 

rims from ginger bottles. 

No.: NP-28 Material: refined earthenware 

Quantity: 46 Location: NA 

Object: sherds 

Notes: variety of vessel sherds. 

193 
 No.: NP-29 Material: glass 

Quantity: 17 Location: NA 

Object: miscellaneous glass shards 

Notes: Glass shards that could not be categorized 

as wine bottle or stemware glass. 

No.: NP-30 Material: glass 

Quantity: 46 Location: NA 

Object: wine bottle shards 

Notes: Wine bottle shards and other similar green 

bottle glass fragments. 

No.: NP-31 Material: unknown 

Quantity: 1 Location: NA 

Object: concreted knife 

Notes: Photo-documented, measurements not 

recorded. 

No.: NP-32 Material: copper alloy 

Quantity: 12 Location: NA 

Object: rivet heads? 

Notes: Photo-documented, measurements not 

recorded. 

194 
 No.: NP-33 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 2 Location: NA 

Object: body sherds 

Notes: Photo-documented, measurements not 

recorded. 

No.: NP-34 Material: coarse earthenware 

Quantity: 46 Location: NA 

Object: body sherd 

Notes: Photo-documented, measurements not 

recorded. 

 

195 
Appendix D 

History of Tropical Storms 

Affecting Primary Study Sites 
APPENDIX D: HISTORY OF TROPICAL STORMS 

AFFECTING PRIMARY STUDY SITES 

The average time on the seabed of the four study sites is estimated to be 80–83 years. Collectively 

these four sites have experienced 32–33 hurricanes within a 40-mi (64-kilometer [km]) radius (U.S. 

Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2010). Prior to Katrina,

Castine experienced at least 14 other tropical storms centered within a 40-mi (64-km) radius of the 

site, including six that were at hurricane strength when they passed (Table D-1). The first hurricane to 

pass Castine was in 1948, 24 years after its sinking. In the absence of hindcast data for those earlier 

storms, the effect of each storm on Castine is unknown. The two storms arguably affecting Castine

with the greatest force were Betsy in 1965 (Category 3) and Andrew in 1992 (Category 4). Betsy 

passed to the east of Castine with the site located on the weak side of the storm, but at a distance of 

only 12.7 mi (20.4 km), while Andrew passed at a distance comparable to Katrina but to the west of 

Castine (with the site located on the storm’s stronger side). 

Table D-1 

Tropical Storms Passing within 40 mi of Castine 

(NOAA 2010) 

Storm 

ID Name Storm Date 

Distance 

(mi [km]) 

Wind 

(mph [m/s]) 

628 None 7/27/1936 29 (47) 46 (21) 

660 None 9/26/1939 36 (58) 40 (18) 

702 None 9/10/1944 34 (55) 46 (21) 

719 None 6/15/1946 5 (8) 40 (18) 

738* None 9/4/1948 22 (35) 75 (33) 

747 None 9/4/1949 21 (34) 46 (21) 

829* Flossy 9/24/1956 10 (16) 86 (39) 

906* Betsy 9/10/1965 13 (21) 127 (57) 

1042* Bob 7/11/1979 35 (56) 75 (33) 

1105 Juan 10/31/1985 9 (15) 63 (28) 

1166* Andrew 8/26/1992 33 (53) 144 (64) 

1223 Danny 7/18/1997 8 (13) 63 (28) 

1291 Isidore 9/26/2002 12 (20) 63 (28) 

1328* Cindy 7/6/2005 7 (11) 75 (33) 

1336* Katrina 8/29/2005 30 (49) 138 (81) 

*Indicates a storm with hurricane-force winds near its center at the time of 

closest passage to the site 

Depending on the age of Site 323, discovered in 1994, it might have experienced as many as eight 

other tropical storms centered within a 40-mi (64-km) radius of the site, prior to Rita, including three 

that were at hurricane strength when they passed (Table D-2). In the absence of hindcast data for those 

earlier storms, the effect of each storm on Site 323 is unknown. The earliest hurricane likely to have 

affected Site 323 was Edith in 1971, followed by Danny and Juan, both in 1985. The eye of Hurricane 

199 
Juan, although only a Category 1 storm, passed approximately 1.2 mi (1.9 km) to the west of Site 323. 

Given the wave heights associated with Rita at a distance of 28 mi (45 km), it seems likely that Juan 

would have a similar, if not greater, effect on the site. If the Site 323 vessel sank after 1985, then Rita 

would have been the first hurricane to affect the site. 

Table D-2 

Tropical Storms Passing within 40 mi of Site 323

(NOAA 2010)

Storm 

ID Name Storm Date 

Distance 

(mi [km]) 

Wind 

(mph [m/s]) 

961 Felice 9/15/1970 9 (15) 63 (28) 

970* Edith 9/16/1971 28 (46) 98 (44) 

1053 Danielle 9/5/1980 4 (7) 46 (21) 

1099* Danny 8/15/1985 14 (22) 92 (41) 

1105* Juan 10/28/1985 2 (3) 86 (39) 

1268 Allison 6/11/2001 12 (20) 35 (15) 

1284 Bertha 8/7/2002 7 (11) 29 (13) 

1319 Ivan 9/23/2004 9 (14) 46 (21) 

1342* Rita 9/24/2005 28 (46) 121 (54) 

*Indicates a storm with hurricane force winds near its center at the time of closest 

passage to the site 

Prior to Rita, Gulf Tide experienced at least 14 other tropical storms centered within a 40-mi (64-km) 

radius of the site, including 5 that were at hurricane strength when they passed (Table D-3). The 

earliest and most severe hurricane likely to have affected Gulf Tide was Audrey in 1957. Hurricane 

Audrey passed 9 mi (14 km) west of the site as a Category 4 storm. Based on a comparison with 

hindcast data from 11.5 mi (18.5 km) to the east of Rita’s path, it seems likely that Audrey generated 

waves in excess of 26 feet (8 meters) over Gulf Tide. In the absence of hindcast data for earlier storms, 

the effect of each storm on Gulf Tide is unknown. 

New York experienced at least 31 other tropical storms centered within a 40-mi (64-km) radius of the 

site, prior to Rita, including 15 that were at hurricane strength when they passed (Table D-4). The 

nearest hurricane, and therefore possibly one of the most severe, likely to have affected New York was 

an unnamed Category 1 storm (see Table D-4, Storm ID 677) that passed within 5 mi (8 km) of the 

site on its strong side. Hurricane Audrey passed 15 mi (24 km) west of the site as a Category 4 storm. 

Based on a comparison with hindcast data from 35–46 mi (56–74 km) to the right of Rita’s path in 

similar water depths, it seems reasonable that the 1900 and 1915 Galveston storms (see Table D.4, 

Storm IDs 371 and 478) and a Category 4 storm in 1932 (see Table D.4, Storm ID 577) might have 

generated waves in excess of 26.2–29.5 ft (8.0–9.0 m) over New York. In the absence of hindcast data 

for earlier storms, the effect of each storm on New York is unknown. 

LITERATURE CITED

U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2010. Historical 

hurricane tracks. Internet website: http://csc-s-maps-q.csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/ 

download.jsp. Last accessed on May 13. 

200 
Table D-3 

Tropical Storms Passing within 40 mi of Gulf Tide 

(NOAA 2010) 

Storm 

ID Name 

Storm 

Date 

Distance 

(mi [km]) 

Wind 

(mph [m/s]) 

832* Audrey 6/27/1957 9 (14) 144 (64) 

833 Bertha 8/10/1957 37 (59) 69 (31) 

886* Cindy 9/17/1963 39 (62) 75 (33) 

961 Felice 9/15/1970 0 (0) 63 (28) 

970* Edith 9/16/1971 9 (14) 92 (41) 

1033 Debra 8/28/1978 7 (11) 52 (23) 

1043 Claudette 7/24/1979 9 (15) 52 (23) 

1053 Danielle 9/5/1980 9 (15) 58 (26) 

1076 Chris 9/11/1982 16 (26) 58 (26) 

1108* Bonnie 6/26/1986 11 (18) 86 (39) 

1134* Chantal 8/1/1989 18 (30) 81 (36) 

1268 Allison 6/10/2001 33 (53) 35 (15) 

1284 Bertha 8/7/2002 31 (50) 29 (13) 

1319 Ivan 9/24/2004 36 (58) 35 (15) 

1342* Rita 9/24/2005 8 (13) 115 (51) 

*Indicates a storm with hurricane-force winds near its center at the time of closest 

passage to the site 

201 
202 

Table D-4 

Tropical Storms Passing within 40 mi of New York 

(NOAA 2010) 

Storm 

ID Name Storm Date 

Distance 

(mi [km]) 

Wind 

(mph [m/s]) 

83 none 9/29/1863 37 (60) 58 (26) 

109* none 10/4/1867 17 (28) 104 (46) 

174* none 9/17/1877 31 (49) 81 (36) 

195* none 8/22/1879 19 (30) 104 (46) 

241* none 6/14/1886 26 (42) 92 (41) 

356 none 9/28/1898 40 (65) 58 (26) 

371* none 9/9/1900 33 (53) 144 (64) 

478* none 8/17/1915 36 (59) 121 (54) 

577* none 8/14/1932 39 (63) 144 (64) 

612 none 8/27/1934 7 (12) 69 (31) 

654 none 10/17/1938 37 (60) 40 (18) 

668 none 9/24/1940 26 (41) 46 (21) 

671 none 9/14/1941 37 (59) 46 (21) 

677* none 8/21/1942 5 (8) 81 (36) 

687* none 7/27/1943 10 (16) 86 (39) 

727* none 8/24/1947 15 (24) 81 (36) 

832* Audrey 6/27/1957 15 (25) 144 (64) 

886* Cindy 9/17/1963 12 (20) 75 (33) 

961 Felice 9/16/1970 19 (30) 69 (31) 

970* Edith 9/16/1971 15 (25) 92 (41) 

989 Delia 9/4/1973 36 (58) 69 (31) 

1033 Debra 8/28/1978 9 (15) 46 (21) 

1043 Claudette 7/24/1979 17 (27) 52 (23) 

1053 Danielle 9/5/1980 21 (34) 58 (26) 

1076 Chris 9/11/1982 5 (7) 58 (26) 

1108* Bonnie 6/26/1986 15 (24) 86 (39) 

1113 none 8/10/1987 25 (40) 46 (21) 

1134* Chantal 8/1/1989 7 (12) 81 (36) 

1190 Dean 7/30/1995 30 (48) 40 (18) 

1268 Allison 6/10/2001 25 (40) 35 (15) 

1284 Bertha 8/8/2002 36 (59) 29 (13) 

1342* Rita 9/24/2005 34 (55) 115 (51) 

*Indicates a storm with hurricane-force winds near its center at the time of 

closest passage to the site