1Horan was never properly served and the district court dismissed the claims

against him. That dismissal is not at issue on appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2110

___________

Enoch Griffin, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Pinkerton’s, Inc., a foreign corporation; * District of Minnesota.

Edward Rudenick, individually and *

as an employee of Pinkerton’s, Inc.; *

John Horan, individually and *

as an employee of Pinkerton’s, Inc., *

*

Defendants-Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 10, 1999

Filed: April 8, 1999

___________

Before MCMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Enoch Griffin filed suit against Pinkerton’s, Inc. (Pinkerton) and two of its

employees, Edward Rudenick and John Horan.1 He claimed that racial harassment

by Pinkerton employees violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Minnesota
2The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

3

In his deposition Griffin testified inconsistently about whether Rudenick

made this statement during their first or second encounter in the ramp. 

2

Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363.03, and he also brought common law

claims based on defamation, false imprisonment, negligent supervision and retention,

and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court2 granted summary

judgment in favor of Pinkerton and Rudenick on all claims. We affirm. 

Griffin worked in the housekeeping department of St. Paul Ramsey Medical

Center (the hospital) and Pinkerton provided security services for the hospital under

contract. This action grew out of five particular encounters Griffin had with

Pinkerton guards. The first occurred early on the morning of June 6, 1994 after

Griffin left work. He noticed that guard Edward Rudenick had followed him into the

parking ramp and asked why. Rudenick responded that there had been a lot of cars

reported stolen recently. Griffin stated that he was not a thief, that he worked at the

hospital, and that he was going to get his car. Two weeks later Griffin again saw

Rudenick in the ramp; this time he was crouching between cars. Griffin asked

Rudenick what he was doing and again said he was not a car thief. Rudenick left

after answering, “I didn’t know it was you.”3

At the end of June, Griffin was in the hospital lobby waiting for his wife to

pick him up. He had been there about 15 to 20 minutes when a Pinkerton guard

arrived and asked what he was doing. The guard said there had been a report of “a

suspicious black male” in the lobby. Griffin learned that Rudenick was the dispatcher

and went to speak with him, but he was later unable to recall the substance of their

conversation. He has not produced evidence of any other incidents involving

Rudenick.
3

Griffin experienced what he felt was discriminatory treatment when he arrived

at work in the evening in February 1995. He followed two white employees into the

building. John Horan, the Pinkerton guard on duty, waved at them, greeted them, and

let them proceed to the elevator, but he stopped Griffin and asked for his

identification. It is not disputed that all hospital employees were required to carry

photo identification and to present their identification to the security guard on duty

if they entered the hospital after nine in the evening. Griffin was told about this rule

when he was first hired, and a large sign by the door indicated that identification was

required for entrance. When Griffin refused to produce his identification but

proceeded on into the hospital, Horan followed him into an elevator where he

physically restrained him. Griffin complained to Horan that he had not asked the two

white employees for identification. Horan said he knew them and called Griffin a

“smart ass.” Horan requested assistance and four or five other guards responded.

One of them was Horan’s supervisor who said he knew Griffin and let Griffin leave.

Griffin complained to his supervisor, Laurel Mattson, who circulated a memo

regarding the incident to her supervisor, Frank Sabo, and the head of security for the

hospital, Keith Davidson. 

The final incident occurred after Griffin arrived for work on the evening of

May 2, 1995. He noticed that there was a crowd at the door and that the guard was

on the phone so he walked past the guard station. It is unclear whether Griffin’s

employee badge was visible at the time, but guard Dana Johnson pursued him down

the hallway and into the housekeeping department, demanding identification. Griffin

did not stop or produce identification. Johnson requested assistance, and Horan and

other guards reported to housekeeping. Griffin accused Johnson of harassing him by

requesting identification once he had already passed the security desk. Johnson said

Griffin thought he was better than anyone else. Griffin’s supervisor, Laurel Mattson,

commented that three security guards were more than needed to deal with an

employee who had not shown his identification. Horan said Griffin would lose his
4

In its written memorandum the district court commented that, “Ordinarily,

the court does not weigh facts or evaluate . . . credibility”on a motion for summary

judgment. It has been suggested that this statement shows the district court did not

use the proper standard in making its decision, but our review of the record does

not indicate that it failed to apply the correct standard despite this passing remark.

4

job over the incident, and Mattson testified in her deposition that Griffin had made

threatening remarks to the guards. Griffin denies this. 

After this incident the hospital began an investigation and suspended Griffin

with pay. Griffin complained to his union representative about what had happened

and that individual wrote the head of security about Griffin’s encounters. Griffin read

this memo aloud during a meeting with representatives from the hospital and the

union. The hospital eventually reinstated Griffin but gave him a written warning.

The warning stated that Griffin had been accused of using abusive language to a

security officer and that the investigation had shown the accusation to be true. He

was admonished that such behavior could not be tolerated and that further

occurrences would result in more stringent disciplinary action. 

Griffin pursued administrative relief against the hospital and filed this action

in state court. His claim against the hospital has been settled, and he remains

employed there. Appellees removed the case to federal district court on the basis of

federal question jurisdiction. At the conclusion of discovery, Pinkerton and Rudenick

filed their motion for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted it,

and Griffin appeals.4

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Smith v. St. Louis

Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if the

movants have shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; in assessing the evidence we take the

nonmovant’s evidence as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See
5

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 268-69 (8th

Cir. 1993).

Griffin claims that appellees violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This

statute provides that:

(a) All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and

enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the

full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the

security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,

licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

42 U.S.C. 1981(a). 

Section 1981(a) covers purely private acts of discrimination in the making and

enforcement of contracts. See Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir.

1996); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3d Cir. 1977). Since the enactment

of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, this provision has provided a basis for suits against

employers for racial harassment on the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); see also

Winbush v. Iowa, 66 F.3d 1471,1476 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that 1991

amendments overruled Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)

which had held that the right to make and enforce contracts did not include right to

be free of racial harassment). There are also several reported cases where § 1981 has

been applied to discriminatory actions intended to interfere with the plaintiffs’

contractual relations with third parties. See, e.g., Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac.

Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992) (intentional deprivation of opportunity to

enter contracts with others because of race may state claim under § 1981); London

v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 1981) (provision of adverse

employment references with intent to discriminate on racial grounds establishes valid

§ 1981 claim).

In this case Griffin has not sued his employer or made claims that appellees

were the employer’s agents, and neither of them can be held liable under § 1981 for
6

the existence of a hostile work environment. Griffin claims that the appellees

interfered with his employment contract with the hospital in that he was suspended

with pay after his interactions with the Pinkerton guards. He has not shown that

Pinkerton itself was ever notified about the conduct of any of the guards or that any

statements or actions of Rudenick were motivated by discriminatory animus and the

desire to affect his employment. Horan’s statement that Griffin would lose his job

cannot be imputed to either Pinkerton or Rudenick. As a matter of law he has not

made out a claim against appellees under § 1981. 

Griffin also has not shown that he was discriminated against because of his

race. There is no dispute that there were real security concerns at the hospital and its

parking area and that employees were required to show identification when entering

the hospital after nine in the evening. No racially hostile comments were made to

Griffin, and he has not shown that he suffered offensive conduct that similarly

situated white counterparts did not. See Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269. The five incidents

were also neither severe nor pervasive enough to have established a racially hostile

work environment. See Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474-75 (8th

Cir. 1995), Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981).

Finally, Griffin failed to show that Pinkerton had actual or constructive knowledge

of a racially hostile environment. See Whitmore v. O’Connor Management, Inc., 156

F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th

Cir. 1998). 

Griffin claims that Pinkerton violated the MHRA because it had notice of racial

harassment by its employees and failed to take corrective action. The MHRA protects

against unfair employment practices by employers, labor organizations and

employment agencies. See Minn. Stat. § 363.03(1). Griffin had none of these

relationships with Pinkerton. The MHRA also prohibits others from aiding or

abetting forbidden employment practices. See Minn. Stat. § 363.03(6). Griffin has

not produced evidence showing that the hospital violated state law so his claims

based on accessory liability for Pinkerton or Rudenick necessarily fail. 
5Griffin has presented evidence purporting to show that Pinkerton knew

guard Dana Johnson had psychological problems and that it failed to take certain

steps in screening its employees. He has not shown, any connection between these

facts and the racial harassment he alleges, however.

7

Griffin’s other state law claims are also without merit. He argues that

Pinkerton defamed him because Rudenick’s statement to him in the parking ramp

implied that he was a car thief and that Horan’s report included statements that

Griffin had made threats. He has, however, failed to show publication of a false

statement tending to harm his reputation. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance

Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. 1986); Stuempges v. Parke-Davis, 297 N.W.2d

252, 255 (Minn. 1980). He has not shown that any third party read Horan’s report,

and he himself was responsible for voluntarily repeating Rudenick’s statements. See

Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888. His claim that he was falsely imprisoned during the

elevator incident fails because he knew what the guards were seeking and he could

have produced his identification. See Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 128

(Minn. 1980) (awareness of reasonable non-dangerous means of escape renders

restriction incomplete); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 36 (1965). Griffin’s failure

to show Pinkerton had actual or constructive notice of inappropriate conduct by its

employees is fatal to both the negligent supervision and negligent retention claims.

See Bruchas v. Preventive Care, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Minn. Ct. App.

1996); Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).5 Finally,

Griffin’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim fails because he has neither

satisfied the zone of danger test, see Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980),

nor shown that defamation or other willful, wanton, or malicious conduct exempts

him from proving the threat of physical harm, see Bohdan v. All Tool Mfg. Co., 411

N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
8
9

A true copy.

ATTEST:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.