alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Robert Earl IVEY v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 45691.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 2, 1970.

*369Jon A. Swartzfager, Laurel, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. and Wade H. Creekmore, Jr., and James H. Creekmore, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Justice.

The appellant, Robert Earl Ivey,-'was indicted along with Abner Williams and Jessie Jefferson of the crime of armed robbery. He was separately tried, and convicted in the Circuit Court of Jones County, Mississippi, and sentenced to seven years in the state penitentiary.

The only difference in this case and the companion case of Williams v. State of Mississippi, Miss., 232 So.2d 366, this day decided by this Court, is that the appellant, Robert Ivey, was twenty years old at the time of the trial, took the stand in his own defense, and did not actually use a knife in the robbery of Joe Booth and and Edward Lee Booth.

He took an active and aggressive part in the robbery of the Booths. Abner Williams, one of his companions, did hold a long-bladed knife at the throat of Edward Booth, while appellant beat -tip and robbed Joe Booth. Otherwise, the facts in the two cases are the same. , See Williams v. State, *supra,*for a full and detailed statement of the facts.

The appellant contends that: the trial court erred in refusing the appellant’s instruction limiting the jury in its deliberations to robbery only, and that the court erred in admitting the torn shirt of the prosecuting witness Joe Booth since the shirt had been laundered.

There is no merit in either of these contentions. The appellant was a principal in the crime of armed robbery. He was positively identified as one of the three actively engaged in the robbery. All three acted jointly and in concert; each was responsible and accountable for the wrongful actions of the other two.

The shirt was positively identified by Joe Booth as the one he was wearing at the time of the beating and robbery. He testified that it was torn and a button pulled off when he was beaten and robbed.

In Triplett v. State, 159 Miss. 365 at 371-372, 132 So. 448 at 450 (1931), “[tjhere was an objection to the admission in evidence of a jumper worn by the deceased at the time of the killing which had supposedly been washed and blood stains removed, * * *.” This Court ruled:

> “We have examined this assignment and think it is without merit. The evidence showed that the jumper outside of being washed was in the same condition, but *370even if it had been erroneously admitted, there is nothing to show, in the light of the evidence in the record, that it had any misleading influences upon the jury. * * * ” *(Id.*at 372, 132 So. at 450.)

The same observation could be made in this case. Outside of being washed, the shirt was in the same condition as it was at the time of the robbery.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GILLESPIE, P. J., and PATTERSON, INZER, and SMITH, JJ„ concur.
```

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 240 (Monday, December 15, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 74156]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29275]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 8969]

Culturally Significant Object Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Visiting Masterpiece: Gustav Klimt's Adam and Eve''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, 
et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 
of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 
2000 (and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority No. 257 of April 15, 
2003), I hereby determine that the object to be included in the 
exhibition ``Visiting Masterpiece: Gustav Klimt's Adam and Eve,'' 
imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, 
are of cultural significance. The object is imported pursuant to a loan 
agreement with the foreign owner or custodian. I also determine that 
the exhibition or display of the imported object at the Museum of Fine 
Arts Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, from on or about January 17, 2015, 
until on or about April 27, 2015, and at possible additional 
exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national 
interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be 
published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
description of the imported object, contact Paul W. Manning, Attorney-
Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State 
(telephone: 202-632-6469). The mailing address is U.S. Department of 
State, SA-5, L/PD, Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: December 4, 2014.
Kelly Keiderling,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2014-29275 Filed 12-12-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
#### Fred B. DALZELL, Managing Owner of The Steamtug DALZELLACE, Libelant-Appellee, v. VALVOLINE OIL COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 209.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 1, 1937.

Putney, Twombly & Hall, of New York City (Lemuel Skidmore, and Frederic R. Sanborn, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Burlingham, Veeder, Clark & Hupper, of New York City (Chauncey I. Clark and Eugene Underwood, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before MANTON, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Decree (-F.Supp.-) affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Paulita M. LaPlante, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of
my knowledge, the Annual Report of Optical Sensors Incorporated on Form 10-KSB
for the annual period ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that information contained in such Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Optical
Sensors Incorporated.

                                        By: /s/ Paulita M. LaPlante
 March 25, 2003                             -------------------------------
                                        Name: Paulita M. LaPlante
                                        Title: Chief Executive Officer

I, Wesley G. Peterson, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of
my knowledge, the Annual Report of Optical Sensors Incorporated on Form 10-KSB
for the annual period ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that information contained in such Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Optical
Sensors Incorporated.

                                        By: /s/ Wesley G. Peterson
 March 25, 2003                             -------------------------------
                                        Name: Wesley G. Peterson
                                        Title: Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Optical Sensors Incorporated and will be retained by Optical
Sensors Incorporated and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
### **SCHEDULE TO EXHIBIT10.18**

### ** **

**IndemnificationAgreements with Directors and Executive Officers**

 
| ** ** | ** ** | **Name**                    | ** ** | **Date of Agreement** | ** ** |
|------------|------------|-----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
|       |       |                        |       |                  |       |
| Directors: |       |                        |       |                  |       |
|       |       | David H. Batchelder         |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Michael R. D’Appolonia |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       | William J. Flanagan         |       | April 19, 2002        |       |
|       |       | C. Scott Greer              |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       | Stephen G. Hanks            |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | William H.  Mallender       |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       | Michael P.  Monaco          |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       | Cordell Reed                |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       | Dennis R.  Washington       |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Bettina M. Whyte            |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       | Dennis K.  Williams         |       | March 25, 2002        |       |
|       |       |                        |       |                  |       |
| Officers:  |       |                        |       |                  |       |
|       |       | Stephen M.  Johnson         |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | George H.  Juetten          |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Jerry K. Lemon              |       | October 13, 2003      |       |
|       |       | Larry L. Myers              |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Richard D. Parry            |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Cynthia M.  Stinger         |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Craig G. Taylor             |       | January 25, 2002      |       |
|       |       | Earl L. Ward                |       | August 14, 2002       |       |
|       |       | Thomas H. Zarges            |       | January 25, 2002      |       |

 

----
#### Jimmy Warren CARLISLE, alias v. STATE.

6 Div. 338.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Jan. 24, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1978.

Roger A. Brown, Birmingham, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Barry V. Hutner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARRIS, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of robbery and the jury fixed his punishment at twelve years in the penitentiary. Throughout the trial proceedings in the court below appellant was represented by counsel of his choice, and at arraignment pleaded not guilty. After sentence was imposed, he gave notice of appeal, and he is here represented by new counsel.

This is purely a circumstantial evidence case. Appellant did not testify, but he offered the testimony of a coindictee going to show that he was at a different place at the time of the robbery and that he did not know that the robbery was going to be committed. Because the time span between the robbery and the distance where appellant was first seen by police officers after the robbery was so short it could be legally inferred by the jury that he was the driver of the getaway car.

At the conclusion of the State’s case appellant made a motion to exclude the State’s evidence on the ground that a prima facie case was not established. The motion was overruled. Ordinarily this would put us to a recital of the evidence. We do not deem it necessary to summarize the evidence in this case as we think the case must be reversed because the trial court refused an alibi charge duly tended in writing.

Charge 31 reads as follows:

> *703“The defendant, Jimmy Carlile, sets up an alibi in this case, and the burden of proof is not changed when he undertakes to prove it, and if by reason of the evidence in relation to such alibi, when considered with all the other evidence, the jury entertains a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt, he should be acquitted, although you may not be able to find that the alibi has been fully proven.”

It was specifically held that the refusal of this charge constituted reversible error in *Pickens v. State,*115 Ala. 42, 22 So. 551 and *Hatch v. State,*144 Ala. 50, 40 So. 113. See also *Ragland v. State,*238 Ala. 587, 192 So. 498, where an identical charge was given at the request of the defendant.

The trial court did not charge the jury on alibi evidence. As a matter of fact the word *alibi*nowhere appears in the oral charge.

For the error noted this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

All the Judges concur.
#### Roger HAMRICK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-561.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 12, 1970.

Hughlan ¡Long, Public Defender, and Lewis Kimler, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Roger Hamrick, from his judgment of conviction on four counts of robbery after a jury trial.

His claim that he was entitled to a twelve man jury for his trial in this matter is without merit. Hearns v. State, Fla.1969, 223 So.2d 738 and Williams v. State, Fla.App.1969, 224 So.2d 406.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a witness concerning his identification. His argument on this point is divided into two parts. The first part is directed towards the alleged illegality of his arrest and the fact that photographs were taken of him at the time he was booked. We have reviewed the record, briefs and authorities and do not find reversible error on the first part. See Newbold v. State, Fla.App.1969, 229 So.2d 876. Hanks v. State, Fla.App.1967, 195 So.2d 49; and Reeves v. State, Fla.App.1966, 187 So.2d 403. The appellant’s argument on the second part of this point has been reviewed and rejected in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).

Appellant claims the trial court erred in not granting his motion for mistrial because of allegedly prejudicial remarks which the prosecutor made during closing arguments. We have reviewed the remarks and do not find them sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal under the facts and inferences which could be drawn from the evidence presented in this case. See Collins v. State, Fla.1965, 180 So.2d 340; Spencer v. State, Fla.1961, 133 So.2d 729; Whitney v. State, Fla.1961, 132 So.2d 599; and Wingate v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So.2d 44.

*361We have considered the other arguments advanced by appellant for reversal and find them to be insufficient to warrant reversal.

Affirmed.
#### Carroll D. OWENS v. STATE of Mississippi.

Misc. No. 119.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 23, 1970.

Carroll D. Owens, in pro. per.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Velia Ann Mayer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

QN PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PATTERSON, Justice:

Petitioner, an inmate of the state penitentiary, has filed with this Court a petition entitled “Writ of Habeas Corpus”- which we will consider as a motion so correct the sentence imposed upon him. He alleges by such motion that he was tried and convicted on March 16, 1966, by the Circuit Court of Forrest County under an indictment charging both burglary and grand larceny in a single count. He further alleges that after being tried before the jury on this charge he was sentenced to serve a term of four years for burglary and three years for grand larceny with the two sentences to run consecutively.

The record substantiates the allegations of the petition. The sentence is error. See Bullock v. State, 222 So.2d 692 (Miss.1969), Evans v. State, 204 So.2d 570 (Miss.1967), and Bradshaw v. State, 192 So.2d 387 (Miss.1966), in each of which we held *362that the larceny charge in the indictment was charged not as a substantive offense, but as demonstrative of burglarious intent, and therefore, the charge of grand larceny was not subject to separate sentence. In each of these cases that part of the sentence related to larceny was deleted as surplusage. We are of the opinion that the three-year sentence imposed for grand larceny is surplusage and as such is deleted from the sentence and the petitioner stands convicted of burglary only. The sentence imposed for the crime of burglary is not affected by this decision and is to be considered in conformity with the usual procedure with regard to its termination.

The motion for correction of sentence is sustained and the three-year sentence erroneously imposed on the charge of grand larceny is hereby deleted.

All Justices concur.
Order entered March 15, 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 18
- 00640
- CR QUINCY NATHANIEL JON ES, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Cri minal District Court No. 7

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F16
- 45744
- Y



### O RDER
T he reporter’s record was initially due September 22, 2018. On September 26, 2018, we notified court reporter Vearneas Faggett by postcard and directed her to file t he reporter’s record by October 26, 2018. When the reporter’s record was not filed by that date, we ordered Ms. Faggett to file the complete reporter’s record by December 7, 2018 and cautioned her that she may be ordered not to sit if the record was not t imely filed. On December 6, 2018, Ms. Faggett filed an extension request that we granted making the reporter’s record due on December 28, 2018. To date, the reporter’s record has not been filed and we have had no communication from Ms. Faggett.
Therefore , we ORDER that Vearneas Faggett NOT SIT as a court reporter until she has filed the complete reporter’s record in this appeal.We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Chika Anyiam,

Presiding Judge, Criminal District Court No. 7; to the Honorable Lela Lawrence Mays, Presiding Judge, 283rd Judicial District Court; Vearneas Faggett, official court reporter, 283rd Judicial District Court; to the Dallas County Auditor’s Office; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 210 (Thursday, October 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 58749]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-28726]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993; Rotorcraft Industry Technology Association, 
Inc.

    Notice is hereby given that, on August 12, 1997, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), the Rotorcraft Industry 
Technology Association, Inc. (``RITA'') filed notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing a change in its membership. The notifications 
were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting 
the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified 
circumstances. Specifically, Smiths Industries Aerospace and Defense 
Systems, Inc., Grand Rapids, MI has become a Supporting Member of RITA.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the Joint Venture.
    On September 28, 1995, RITA filed its original notification 
pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice 
published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of 
the Act on April 3, 1996 (61 FR 14817).
    The last notification was filed on May 2,1997. A notice was 
published in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act 
on September 30, 1997, (62 FR 51146).
Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 97-28726 Filed 10-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 201 (Friday, October 17, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 54114]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-27508]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding 
Companies; Correction

    This notice corrects a notice (FR Doc. 97-26546) published on page 
52339 of the issue for Tuesday, October 7, 1997.
    Under the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas heading, the entry for 
Amador Merger Corporation, Las Cruces, New Mexico, is revised to read 
as follows:
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Genie D. Short, Vice President) 
2200 North Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201-2272:
    1. Amador Merger Corporation, Las Cruces, New Mexico; to become a 
bank holding company by acquiring 100 percent of the Amador Bancshares, 
Inc., Las Cruces, New Mexico, and thereby indirectly acquire Citizens 
Bank of Las Cruces, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
    Comments on this application must be received by October 31, 1997.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 10, 
1997.
William W. Wiles,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 97-27508 Filed 10-16-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-F
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

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<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
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