Page 1 GAO-12-316R Iran Sanctions

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 24, 2012

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Chairman

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Subject: Actions to Enforce the Iran Sanctions Act and Implement Contractor Certification 

Requirement

Dear Madam Chairman:

It is the policy of the United States to deter Iran from developing its nuclear program, 

supporting terrorism, and abusing human rights by limiting the development of Iran’s energy 

sector, which is vital to its economy and government. The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), 

as amended, provides for sanctions against firms determined to have made certain 

investments in Iran’s energy sector.

1 While the ISA applies to all firms, U.S. firms were 

already prohibited from investing in Iran under a U.S. trade embargo, and the ISA was 

enacted to encourage foreign firms to withdraw from the Iranian market. However, no 

sanctions have been imposed under the ISA by any prior administration. 

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)2

amended the ISA by expanding the energy-related activities for which sanctions could be 

applied to include firms determined to have provided to Iran or invested in Iran’s 

development of refined petroleum products.

3 Sanctions include excluding firms from 

receiving U.S. government contracts. CISADA also directed that the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) be revised to require firms seeking U.S. government contracts to certify 

that neither they nor any firms owned or controlled by them are engaged in activities for 

which sanctions may be imposed under section 5 of the ISA. If a contractor submits a false 

certification, agencies may terminate the contract, or suspend or debar the contractor, in

accordance with procedures in the FAR, from government contracts. The certification 

requirement may be waived in the interest of national security. The Department of State 

(State) is responsible for enforcing the energy-related sanctions under the ISA, as amended.

 

1 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5, 110 Stat. 1541, 1543, as amended.

The name of the law was changed to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 in 2006 by the Iran Freedom Support 

Act, Pub. L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344.

2 Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312.

3 The act provides for sanctions against firms that sell or provide refined petroleum or related goods 

and services, including technology, information, or support, that could directly and significantly 

facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic production of refined petroleum products.
Page 2 GAO-11-316R Iran Sanctions

In response to your request, this report (1) identifies State actions and processes to enforce 

energy sector-related sanctions under the ISA and (2) describes the implementation of the 

contractor certification requirement and identifies any indications of false certifications or the 

need for waivers of the certification requirements. We are issuing a separate report covering 

firms identified in open sources as selling refined petroleum products to Iran from July 2010 

through December 2011.4

To identify State actions and processes to enforce the ISA, we reviewed State 

announcements of ISA sanctions and subsequent Federal Register notices describing the 

specific sanctions against each firm. We interviewed State officials to document their 

sources of information and methods used to identify firms engaging in sanctionable activity

and searched the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS)5 to confirm if sanctioned firms were 

declared ineligible to receive government contracts. We did not independently determine 

whether actions were sanctionable under the ISA. To describe the implementation of the 

contractor certification requirement and identify any indications of false certifications or the 

need for waivers, we reviewed the rules implementing the requirement and subsequent 

changes to the FAR and discussed these changes with a senior Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy official for technical accuracy. We searched the Federal Procurement 

Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG)6 and the Central Contractor Registration System7

to determine if any of the sanctioned firms held any government contracts or were registered 

to respond to solicitations after the certification requirement went into effect. We searched 

under multiple fields, including company, vendor, and contractor name fields using all known 

firm names and abbreviations. Based on our efforts, we believe the information we obtained 

is sufficiently reliable for this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 to January 2012 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

 

4 GAO, Firms Reported in Open Sources to Have Sold Iran Refined Petroleum Products Declined 

since June 30, 2010, GAO-12-321R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2012). 5 EPLS is an electronic database containing the list of all parties suspended, proposed for debarment, 

debarred, declared ineligible, or excluded or disqualified by agencies. It is available for agency and 

public access at www.epls.gov. 6 FPDS-NG is the primary governmentwide contracting database for more than 60 government 

agencies, departments, and other entities. 

7 Prospective contractors generally must be registered in the Central Contractor Registration System 

prior to the award of a contract (FAR subpart 4.11).
 Page 3 GAO-12-316R Iran Sanctions

Results in Brief

Since the fall of 2010, State has sanctioned 13 foreign firms under the ISA—2 for 

investments in Iran’s energy sector8 and 11 for supplying refined petroleum products.

9 State 

imposed various sanctions on each firm, listed 10 in EPLS making them ineligible to receive 

U.S. government contracts, and was in the process of listing the remaining 3 firms in EPLS

at the time of this report. To enforce the ISA, State has increased its staff to review available 

information on companies’ activities in Iran’s energy sector, including information indicating 

whether affiliated parent companies should be held accountable, relying heavily on the 

intelligence community and U.S. embassies to corroborate the information. The final 

decision on whether to apply sanctions is made by the Secretary of State or a delegee after 

the information and evidence of potentially sanctionable activity is vetted through State and 

other agencies when applicable. In addition to sanctions, State officials told us that they 

have been successful in persuading firms to end their business dealings with Iran, and that 

the number of foreign firms involved in Iran’s energy sector has declined. However, they 

acknowledged that some firms are still operating in Iran’s energy sector, and they are 

continuing their efforts to enforce the ISA. 

In September 2010, the administration revised the FAR, as required by CISADA, to include 

a requirement for prospective contractors to certify that they or any firm owned or controlled 

by them are not engaging in activities for which sanctions may be imposed under section 5 

of the ISA.

10 The certification was subsequently added to the governmentwide electronic 

system for maintaining various certifications and representations that are required for 

contractors to do business with the government. The FAR was also revised to include 

remedies upon determination of false certification and procedures for obtaining waivers to 

the certification requirement, which would be needed if it was in the national interest for an 

agency to contract with a firm that has engaged in sanctionable activity.

11 However, none of 

the 13 firms sanctioned by State under the ISA held government contracts or were 

registered to respond to solicitations for contracts, or submitted an offer after the certification 

requirement went into effect, so there is no evidence of false certifications or the need for 

waivers. 

Background

U.S. law restricts U.S. firms from investing in Iran’s energy sector through a variety of 

sanctions administered by the Department of the Treasury to discourage Iran from 

supporting terrorism and developing nuclear weapons.

12

 

8 See 75 Fed. Reg. 62916-02 (Oct. 13, 2010) (imposing sanctions on Naftiran Intertrade Company), 

and 76 Fed. Reg. 18821-04 (Apr. 5, 2011) (imposing sanctions on Belarusneft).

Section 5(a) of the ISA, as 

9 See Public Notice 7585, 76 Fed. Reg. 56866 (Sept. 14, 2011) (imposing sanctions on Allvale 

Maritime Inc., Associated Shipbroking, Petrochemical Commercial Company International, Petroleos

de Venezuela S.A., Royal Oyster Group, Soci ́Et ́E Anonyme Mon ́Egasque D'Administration 

Maritime Et A ́Erienne, Speedy Ship, and Tanker Pacific Management (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.). 10 75 Fed. Reg. 60254 (Sept. 29, 2010). 11 76 Fed. Reg. 68027-28; FAR § 25.703-2; and FAR § 25.703-4.

12 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977); National 

Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976); and 3 U.S.C. § 301 as implemented by 

Executive Order 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14615 (Mar. 15, 1995) (prohibiting U.S. involvement with 

petroleum development in Iran). Also, see Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24757 (May 6, 1995) 

(banning specified exports and investment), and Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44531 

(Aug. 19, 1997) (prohibiting virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons, 

wherever located).
Page 4 GAO-11-316R Iran Sanctions

amended, requires that absent a waiver,

13 the President impose at least three of nine 

possible forms of sanctions on persons,

14 including foreign firms, determined in any 12-

month period to have made an investment of $20 million or more that directly and 

significantly contributes to the enhancement of or Iran’s ability to develop its petroleum 

resources. Sanctions can include barring firms from receiving any U.S. government 

contracts for goods or services.

15 The President has delegated the authority to impose 

energy-related sanctions under the ISA to the Secretary of State.

16 State’s Office of 

Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy, within its Bureau of Economics and 

Business Affairs, is primarily responsible for investigating foreign firms and recommending 

sanctions under the act.

In 2010, CISADA expanded the ISA to require sanctions against firms determined to have 

provided refined petroleum products to Iran above specified monetary thresholds or certain 

goods, services, technology, information, or support to Iran related to the importation or 

development of refined petroleum.17 While the act applies to all firms, U.S. firms were 

already prohibited from investing in Iran under a U.S. trade embargo. CISADA also provided 

for the “Special Rule” that allows an investigation not to be opened or to be terminated when 

firms are no longer engaging in the activity that was the basis for the investigation or have 

taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity, and State has received reliable 

assurances that the firm will not knowingly engage in sanctionable energy-related activity in 

the future. CISADA also requires that not later than 90 days after enactment, the FAR be 

revised to require a certification from prospective contractors that they, and any firm owned 

or controlled by them, do not engage in any activity for which sanctions may be imposed 

under section 5 of the ISA.

18 The act also provides that if the head of an executive agency 

determines that a false certification has been submitted after the requirement becomes 

effective, the head of that agency shall terminate the contract or debar or suspend the firm

from eligibility for federal contracts.

19 The certification requirement may be waived if the 

President determines it is in the national interest of the United States to do so. 

State Sanctioned 13 Foreign Firms under the ISA and Relies Heavily on Intelligence 

Sources in Investigating Firms

In the fall of 2010, State announced the first sanctions under the ISA against Naftiran 

Intertrade Co., a Switzerland-based international trading company, for its investments in 

Iran’s energy sector. Since then, State has imposed sanctions against 12 additional foreign 

firms, as shown in table 1. The first 2 firms were sanctioned for investments in Iran’s energy 

sector, and the remaining 11 were sanctioned for actions related to new provisions provided 

 

13 Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 9(c), as amended. Other exceptions to the imposition of sanctions can be 

found at section 5(f) of the ISA. 14 A “person” is defined as a natural person; corporation, business association, partnership, society, 

trust, financial institution, insurer, underwriter, guarantor, and any other business organization; any 

other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group; any governmental entity operating as a

business enterprise; and any successor. 15 Other sanctions include a denial of Export-Import Bank assistance, a ban on issuing licenses to 

export controlled technologies to the sanctioned firm, limits on loans from United States financial 

institutions, and a ban on property transactions. 16 The Department of the Treasury is responsible for implementing certain economic-related 

sanctions under the ISA as amended by CISADA. Memorandum: Delegation of Certain Functions and 

Authorities under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 75 

Fed. Reg. 67025 (Sept. 23, 2010). 

17 Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 102(a). 18 Pub. L. No.111-195, § 102(b). 19 Id.
 Page 5 GAO-12-316R Iran Sanctions

by CISADA for activity related to supplying refined petroleum products to Iran. State 

imposed various sanctions on each firm, listed 10 in EPLS making them ineligible to receive 

U.S. government contracts, and was in the process of listing the remaining 3 firms in EPLS

at the time of this report.

20

Table 1: Foreign Firms Sanctioned by State under the ISA.

Sanctioned foreign firm Country Effective date 

1. Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO) Switzerland October 13, 2010

2. Belarusneft Belarus April 5, 2011

3. Petrochemical Commercial Company 

International (PCCI) Jersey/Iran May 24, 2011

4. Royal Oyster Group UAE May 24, 2011

5. Speedy Ship (SPD) UAE/Iran May 24, 2011

6. Associated Shipbroking (SAM) Monaco May 24, 2011

7. Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) Venezuela May 24, 2011

8. Tanker Pacific Management Singapore May 24, 2011

9. Allvale Maritime, Inc. Liberia August 26, 2011

10. Societe Anonyme Monegasque 

d’Administration Maritime et Aerienne 

(SAMAMA ) Monaco August 26, 2011

11. Zhuhai Zhenrong Co (Zhenrong) China January 12, 2012

12. Kuo Oil (S) Pte. Ltd. (Kuo) Singapore January 12, 2012

13. FAL Oil Company Ltd. (FAL) UAE January 12, 2012

Source: State Department. 

State officials told us that the department’s Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic 

Sanctions Policy, which previously had one person working on Iran sanctions issues, now 

has a five-person Iran Sanctions Team focused on enforcement of energy-related ISA 

sanctions. They also noted that their actions to enforce the ISA began before the 2010 

passage of CISADA, but the act led to a significant increase in State’s workload by 

broadening the range of sanctionable activities, including adding a requirement to review 

company activities related to the sale of specified amounts of refined petroleum products or 

the development of Iran’s refining capability. 

 

20 As of January 18, 2012, according to State officials, they were in the process of listing Zhenrong, 

Kuo, and FAL in EPLS.
Page 6 GAO-11-316R Iran Sanctions

State officials noted that members of the Iran Sanctions Team collect and evaluate 

information related to Iran’s energy sector and refining capacity from available sources, 

including press reports; however, these sources often turn out to be false or misleading. As 

a result, these officials told us that they rely on information from numerous intelligence 

organizations, including State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Naval 

Intelligence. Once State identifies information about a foreign firm’s investment or activity in 

Iran’s energy sector, officials stated they request a compilation of intelligence information 

about the firm, and members of the Iran Sanctions Team then evaluate the information to 

determine if any of the activity might be sanctionable under the ISA. 

State officials noted that because sanctions can have an impact on the foreign firm and 

possibly affect foreign relations with the country in which the firm is located, it is imperative 

to corroborate information gathered through the intelligence community and other sources. 

To do so, officials told us that they often utilize embassy officials in the respective country to 

engage officials from both the foreign firm and its government. State officials acknowledged 

that such corroboration can be challenging because the intelligence information is often 

classified or sensitive and needs to be declassified before it can be shared with foreign 

governments or foreign firms, which takes additional time. 

State officials also told us that whenever they uncover activity that is potentially 

sanctionable, they attempt to determine if there is an affiliated parent company that should 

also be held accountable. The ISA provides that a firm that owns or controls another firm 

engaging in sanctionable activity may also be sanctioned, if it knew or should have known 

about the activity.

21 However, officials noted that there are challenges in identifying affiliates 

that could be sanctioned. Specifically, they noted that identifying relationships, ownership, or 

control of foreign firms is often difficult, especially for closely held firms where limited 

information is available. However, State will impose sanctions on a parent company when 

there is evidence that the company knew, or should have known, about the activity of its 

affiliate. For example, State officials told us that Societe Anonyme Monegasque 

D’Administration Maritime Et Aerienne was sanctioned for the activities of its affiliates—

Tanker Pacific Management and Allvale Maritime. 

According to State officials, once information about a firm’s potentially sanctionable activity

has been gathered, evaluated, and corroborated, the Iran Sanctions Team prepares a 

summary of the evidence of the firm’s investments or activity in Iran and circulates it for 

review at the Deputy Secretary level or higher—and as appropriate, by officials from other 

agencies, including the Department of the Treasury. State officials added that discussions 

within State include whether to impose sanctions and what sanctions to apply, with the final 

decision made by the Secretary of State or a delegee. If it is determined that a foreign firm 

engaged in sanctionable activity, State has three potential options under CISADA: (1) 

impose sanctions, (2) grant a waiver, 22 or (3) apply the Special Rule allowing the Secretary 

to avoid or terminate an investigation with a pledge from the firm to cease any sanctionable 

activity. 

In addition to enforcement actions, State officials noted that in some cases they are able to 

prevent investments and activity or convince firms to withdraw from Iran’s energy sector,

even if the activity has not yet occurred or is not sanctionable. The officials also noted that 

by sanctioning firms, the United States demonstrates its willingness to take that step when 

necessary. As sanctioned firms may still continue doing business with Iran, State officials 

 

21 Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(c)(2)(B). 22 Pub. L. No. 104-172, §§ 4(c) and 9(c).
 Page 7 GAO-12-316R Iran Sanctions

told us that they make every effort to reach the foreign firm before the transactions are 

finalized by engaging both the foreign government and foreign firm in an effort to dissuade 

them from the investment or activity. These officials noted that if the investment or activity 

has already taken place, an effort will be made to persuade the firm to end the investment or 

activity. They also noted that U.S. embassies play a key role in this effort by communicating 

to foreign firms and governments the potential consequences of continued involvement in 

Iran—including the imposition of sanctions. 

State officials noted that in the past, firms were not sufficiently deterred from investments or 

activity in Iran’s energy sector because no sanctions had been applied, but since State has 

begun imposing sanctions, these firms understand that the United States is willing to take 

such action, which strengthens the argument for their withdrawal. State officials told us that 

as a result of these efforts, dozens of firms have voluntarily stopped doing certain energy 

sector business with Iran, and they are seeing very few new agreements for future business. 

Officials also noted that several of the withdrawals have come as a result of applying the 

Special Rule provided for in CISADA. Since September 2010, State announced that it has 

obtained pledges from five foreign firms to end their business activity in Iran’s energy sector, 

including, (1) Total of France, (2) Statoil of Norway, (3) ENI of Italy, (4) Royal Dutch Shell of 

the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and (5) Inpex of Japan.23 State officials told us 

that they monitor firms that have left Iran’s energy sector and, so far, none of these firms 

have reemerged. State officials told us that despite the success of these efforts, there are 

foreign firms still doing business in Iran’s energy sector, and as such, State plans to 

continue its enforcement of the ISA. 

Acquisition Regulations and Procedures Updated to Implement Contractor 

Certification Requirement; No Indications of False Certifications or Need for Waivers

To implement the CISADA contractor certification requirement, the Civilian Agency 

Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council24 revised the FAR by 

issuing an interim rule in September 2010.

25 The FAR now requires contracting officers to 

include in all solicitations a provision for the offeror to certify that the offeror, or any firm

owned or controlled by the offeror, does not engage in any activities for which sanctions 

may be imposed under section 5 of the ISA.

26 In November 2010, the certification was 

added to the On-line Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA), the primary 

government repository for various contractor-submitted representations and certifications 

required to do business with the government. In general, prospective contractors are 

required to complete annual representations and certifications in ORCA and certify that they 

are current and accurate.

27 Agency contracting officers are required to either reference the 

date of ORCA verification in the contract file or include a paper copy of the electronically 

submitted representations and certifications in the file as part of the award selection process 

to ensure that a contractor has made this and other required certifications. 

 

23 We separately reported that two of the five firms, Total and Royal Dutch Shell, had no reported 

sales of refined petroleum products to Iran from July 2010 through December 2011 based on open 

sources. (GAO-12-321R.) 24 Revisions to the FAR are prepared and issued through these councils, which are made up of 

representatives from the largest federal agencies. 

25 The interim rule implemented the certification requirement and was subsequently finalized in 

November 2011, without significant changes. 75 Fed. Reg. 60254 (Sept. 29, 2010), and 76 Fed. Reg. 

68027 (Nov. 2, 2011).

26 FAR § 25.1103(e). The FAR provides for exemptions to the certification requirement as defined in 

the Trade Agreements Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2518(4)). 27 FAR § 4.1201.
Page 8 GAO-11-316R Iran Sanctions

The acquisition councils also revised the FAR, in accordance with CISADA, to provide 

remedies for false certification and procedures for obtaining a waiver28 of the certification 

requirement. If the head of an executive agency determines that a firm has submitted a false 

certification, the agency shall terminate the contract or suspend or debar the contractor in 

accordance with procedures in FAR subpart 9.4 for a period not to exceed 3 years.29

According to State officials, agency contracting officers are not in a position to determine 

that firms are engaging in activity for which sanctions may be applied and rely on State to 

make that determination. As noted, all 13 firms sanctioned by State pursuant to the ISA

were excluded from government contracting, or were in the process of being excluded. 

None of the 13 firms held any government contracts, submitted an offer, or were registered 

to respond to solicitations after the certification requirement went into effect. Therefore, 

there is no evidence of false certifications or need for waivers of the certification 

requirement. 

The CISADA contractor certification requirement applies to prospective contractors who 

certify that neither they nor any firms owned or controlled by them engage in activity for 

which sanctions may be imposed under section 5 of the ISA. While the certification does not 

apply to subcontractors, the FAR specifies that contractors shall not enter into any 

subcontract in excess of $30,000 with debarred contractors, other than for commercially 

available items.30 As noted, the firms sanctioned by State pursuant to the ISA were listed in 

EPLS, or were in the process of being listed, making them ineligible to receive government 

contracts. 

 

28 76 Fed. Reg. 68027-28; FAR § 25.703-2; and FAR § 25.703-4.

29 FAR §§ 25.703-2(b), 9.406-4.

30 FAR § 9.405-2(b). 
 Page 9 GAO-12-316R Iran Sanctions

Agency Comments

The Department of State provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

-------------------------------------------------------

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, 

we plan no further distribution until seven days from the report date. At that time, we will 

send copies to the Secretary of State. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or 

martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 

John Neumann, Assistant Director; Grace Lui; Angela Pleasants; and Bradley Terry. 

Sincerely yours,

Belva M. Martin

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

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