* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 9, 2006 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

M. L. COCHRAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. No. 05-3216 (D.C. No. 04-CV-1172-JTM)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , PORFILIO , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff M. L. Cochran, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former em ployer, Raytheon Aircraft-2-

Company, on his claims of race, age, and gender dis crimination and retaliation in violation of federal and state employment-discrimin ation law. After our de novo review of the district court’s determination, Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999), we affirm. Cochran, an African American male, was a long-term Raytheon employee. He filed his first discrimination complaint againstRaytheon in 2002, alleging a variety of claims arising from failure to promote, unequal terms and conditions of employment, sex discrimination and harassment, race discrimination and harassment, and retaliation. In February 2003, the district court granted Raytheon’s motion for summary judgment on the groun d that Cochran had failed to file his lawsuit within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Cochran v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. , No. 02-1146-WEB, 2003 WL 1786873 (D. Kan. Feb. 25 , 2003) (unpublished) ( Cochran I ). Cochran did not appeal from that decision. Cochran continued his employment with Raytheon. I n May of 2003, he refused his supervisor’s request to perform work, m arking the third incident of insubordination during a six-month period. Raytheo n suspended Cochran for a period of thirty days, imposing three conditions on his return to work. Cochran was required to (1) undergo a psychological evaluat ion and make it available to-3-

Raytheon, (2) participate in the Employee Assistanc e Program, and (3) pass a reinstatement urinalysis or alcohol breath test. C ochran did not take any steps to satisfy the conditions and he was discharged on Jun e 23, 2003. Cochran renewed his pursuit of discrimination, hara ssment, and retaliation charges against Raytheon. In federal district cour t, Raytheon filed a summary judgment motion. The court carefully analyzed Coch ran’s allegations in light of the uncontroverted evidence in the record. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the district court first dismissed Cochran’s claims of sex discrimination, s exual harassment, failure to promote, and withholding a sick-leave paycheck. See MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver , 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that, in the Tenth Circuit, administrative exhaustion is jurisdi ctional prerequisite for discrimination claims). Also, most of these claim s had been advanced in Cochran I. The court therefore determined that they were ba rred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. See Wilkes v. Wyoming Dept. of Employment Div. of Labor Standards , 314 F.3d 501, 504-06 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying c laim preclusion where claims arose from the same factual allegation s and employment relationship in earlier discrimination case). Finally, the court concluded that Cochran had not e stablished a prima facie case for his remaining claims. Several of the even ts underlying his claims did not-4-

rise to the level of an adverse employment action o n the part of Raytheon. See Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1033 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that conduct that has no more than a de minimus impact on employ ee’s future job opportunities is not an adverse employment action). Further, Coc hran had failed to show (1) that he was performing his duties in a satisfactory manner, see Salguero v. City of Clovis , 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004) (including s atisfactory performance as an element of prima facie case of discriminatory termination); (2) that Raytheon discriminated against males, see Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t , 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992) (requiring a reverse discrimination plaintiff to establish background circumstances that support an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates ag ainst the majority); (3) that a causal connection existed between his complaints an d a significant adverse action,

see Miller v. Auto. Club of New Mexico , Inc ., 420 F.3d 1098, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005) (including a causal connection between protec ted activity and adverse employment action as element of prima facie case of retaliation); and (4) that he was subjected to pervasive or severe harassment or that he was harassed for discriminatory reasons; see Sandoval v. City of Boulder , 388 F.3d 1312, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that plaintiff must demon strate evidence from which a rational jury could find that workplace was permeat ed with discriminatory-5-

harassment ). Accordingly, the district court ente red summary judgment in favor of Raytheon. We agree with the thorough analysis conducted by th e district court. For the reasons set forth in the district court’s memor andum and order dated May 16, 2005, we AFFIRM.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby Circuit Judge