SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court

) No. CR-99-0243-AP

Appellee, )

) Pima County Superior

v. ) Court

) No. CR-40086

ANDRE LAMONT MINNITT, )

)

Appellant. ) OPINION

)

__________________________________)

Appeal from the Pima County Superior Court

No. CR-40086

The Honorable Richard D. Nichols, Judge

VACATED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

___________________________________________________________________

Janet A. Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General Phoenix

by Kent Cattani, Chief Counsel

Capital Litigation Section

Dawn Northup, Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Appellee

Carla Ryan Tucson

Attorney for Appellant

__________________________________________________________________
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J O N E S, Chief Justice

¶1 The defendant, Andre Lamont Minnitt, was charged with

three counts of first degree murder and seven counts of armed

robbery, aggravated robbery, and burglary, all stemming from events

at the El Grande Market in Tucson the night of June 24, 1992. In

1993, Minnitt was tried and convicted of the three murder counts

and the seven non-homicide counts. He was sentenced to death for

the murders. In 1996, this court reversed the convictions and

sentences and remanded the case for a new trial due to juror

coercion. State v. McCrimmon/Minnitt, 187 Ariz. 169, 927 P.2d 1298

(1996). He was tried again in 1997 in a proceeding that ended in

a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a verdict. He was

tried a third time in April 1999. There, a jury found him guilty

of all charges and the trial judge imposed death sentences for the

three murder convictions and life imprisonment for the armed

robbery, aggravated robbery, and burglary convictions. Because of

the death sentence, direct appeal to this court is mandatory under

Rules 26.15 and Rule 31.2(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution

article VI, section 5.3, and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

section 13-4031 (Supp. 2001).

I. Issue Presented

¶2 Minnitt claims his third trial should have been barred by

principles of double jeopardy because of prosecutorial misconduct
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at the two previous trials. Specifically, he argues that because

the prosecutor engaged in egregious, intentional misdeeds aimed at

prejudicing the jury and avoiding an acquittal in trials one and

two, double jeopardy should apply here.

¶3 In response, the state argues that double jeopardy is not

implicated, that the 1997 hung jury was not connected to the

prosecutorial misconduct, and that the prosecutor did not act

deliberately to avoid an acquittal.

¶4 We conclude that Arizona’s constitutional protection

against double jeopardy should have barred Minnitt’s 1999 retrial

because in both the 1993 and 1997 trials the prosecutor engaged in

extreme misconduct that he knew was grossly improper and highly

prejudicial, both as to the defendant and to the integrity of the

system. Moreover, the trial judge found and the record

substantiates that the prosecutor did so with knowing indifference

to the danger of mistrial or reversal, if not a specific intent to

cause a mistrial.

II. The Facts

A. Investigation of The El Grande Homicides

¶5 Between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on June 24, 1992, Queen

Esther Ray loaned Christopher McCrimmon a 1977 Plymouth automobile

that belonged to her boyfriend, David Durbin. She testified that

McCrimmon asked to borrow the car for an hour to pick up some

money. McCrimmon left with Minnitt and a third person known as
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Martinez. Ray later identified Martinez as Martin Soto-Fong. She

testified that all three men returned about an hour later without

the car.

¶6 At approximately 10:15 p.m., Tucson police were

dispatched to the El Grande Market in response to a 911 call.

There, they found the bodies of three victims: the store manager,

the manager’s uncle, and an employee. All three died from multiple

gunshot wounds. Three blocks from the market police found an

abandoned Plymouth. The car was later identified as belonging to

David Durbin. Christopher McCrimmon’s fingerprint was found on the

outside of the driver’s side window.

¶7 Tucson Police Detective Joseph Godoy was assigned as the

lead detective on the case. On August 31, 1992, Godoy received a

phone call from an unknown male caller who told him that a black

male named “McKinney” and another individual nicknamed “Cha-Chi”

were involved in the El Grande Market murders. Later that evening,

Godoy met with Sergeant Zimmerling, who informed Godoy that he had

received a tip from a confidential informant that a black male

named McCrimmon and a Mexican male named Martin Soto, also known as

Cha-Chi, were involved in the murders. With this information,

Godoy conducted a records check on McCrimmon, which revealed his

criminal history. Further investigation by Godoy revealed that

Cha-Chi, Martin Soto, and Martin Fong were names used by the same

person, and that Martin Fong was a former employee of the El Grande
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Market.

¶8 During this time period, Tucson Detective Fuller was

investigating a late August 1992 restaurant robbery. Christopher

McCrimmon became a potential suspect after forensic evidence linked

him to that crime scene. Fuller discovered that Andre Minnitt, an

associate of McCrimmon’s, may also have been involved in the

restaurant robbery. Fuller communicated this information to Godoy

September 1, 1992. At that time, McCrimmon was already considered

a suspect in the El Grande Market homicides, and with the

additional information connecting Minnitt to McCrimmon, Godoy also

considered Minnitt a possible suspect.

¶9 On September 2, 1992, Godoy assisted Fuller in arresting

McCrimmon and Minnitt for the restaurant robbery. The same day,

while both were in custody, Godoy questioned each of them about

involvement in the El Grande homicides. Both denied involvement.

Thus, as of September 2, 1992, Soto-Fong, McCrimmon, and Minnitt

had been interviewed by police and were suspects in the El Grande

crimes.

¶10 In late August 1992, one Keith Woods was released from

prison. Several days later, he was arrested on drug charges. He

was already a three-time felon, and possessing drugs was a parole

violation subjecting him to a possible twenty-five year prison

sentence. Facing this, Woods offered to become an informant in

exchange for dismissal of the drug charges. Woods later stated
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that on the day of his release from prison, he was met by

McCrimmon, who professed participation in the El Grande murders.

He further testified that later the same day, he and McCrimmon went

to Minnitt’s apartment where Minnitt and McCrimmon provided him

with details of the El Grande crimes. Following an untaped

interview with Godoy on September 8, Woods was transferred to a

“bugged” room where, on tape, he implicated Minnitt, McCrimmon, and

a third person, Cha-Chi, in the El Grande homicides. The three

were subsequently charged with the murders.

B. Procedural History

¶11 Soto-Fong was tried separately in 1993 and, based on

direct evidence of his participation in the El Grande murders, was

convicted and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were

affirmed by this court. State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 928

P.2d 610 (1996). Minnitt and McCrimmon were tried jointly, also in

1993, and they, too, were convicted. As noted, however, the

Minnitt and McCrimmon convictions were reversed due to juror

coercion, and the case was remanded for a new trial. In 1997,

Minnitt and McCrimmon were retried separately. Minnitt’s retrial

began first, resulting in a hung jury. Days later McCrimmon was

tried and acquitted.

C. Godoy’s Misdeeds and Peasley’s Misconduct

¶12 Before discussing the actual misconduct in this case, we

recount the context in which it occurred. Deputy County Attorney
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Kenneth Peasley conducted the 1993 Soto-Fong trial and the 1993 and

1997 trials of Minnitt and McCrimmon. He did not participate in

Minnitt’s 1999 trial. In all three Minnitt trials and in both

McCrimmon trials, the state’s case depended heavily on Keith Woods’

credibility. Importantly, as of September 2, the police had

identified Soto-Fong, McCrimmon, and Minnitt as suspects in the El

Grande crimes and had interviewed them. But according to Godoy,

police had yet to interview anyone who could provide direct

evidence linking any of the three to the crimes. Woods was not

interviewed until September 8, six days after the McCrimmon and

Minnitt interviews. Godoy claimed to have received his first

knowledge of any involvement by McCrimmon and Minnitt from his

interview with Woods. This was the information the police were

seeking--that McCrimmon and Minnitt had implicated themselves in

the murders and that a witness would so testify.

¶13 Woods’ credibility was tenuous. He was a convicted felon

and drug addict who entered into an agreement with the state to

provide testimony to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. The state

had no plausible explanation why Godoy conducted the untaped

interview with Woods. The defense strategy in the Minnitt and

McCrimmon trials was to show that Godoy was the source of Woods’

information about Minnitt’s and McCrimmon’s involvement in the

case, and that during the untaped interview, he fed that

information to Woods. If Godoy was indeed the source, Woods’
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testimony would not have helped the state. Similarly, without

Woods, the state’s case would be significantly weakened because no

direct or physical evidence connected Minnitt to the crime, and the

credibility of the remaining witnesses was questionable.

1. The 1993 Joint Trial of Minnitt and McCrimmon

¶14 In 1993, Peasley began to lay the foundation for Godoy’s

testimony. His questioning of Godoy and his arguments to the jury

indicate that he knew the case hinged on Woods’ credibility. His

purpose, clearly apparent, was to destroy the defense’s claim that

Godoy himself, not the suspects, was the source, and that Godoy had

fed Woods the three names during the untaped interview. Throughout

the trial he argued that Woods was believable because the only

possible sources for Woods’ information were the defendants

themselves, not Godoy.

¶15 In his opening statement to the jury, Peasley described

Godoy’s investigation, stating that the detective did not know that

Soto-Fong had worked at the El Grande Market until Godoy

interviewed Woods on September 8. Contrary to what he knew to be

true, Peasley insisted that the police did not have the names of

Soto-Fong, McCrimmon, or Minnitt until after Godoy and Woods met on

September 8. During his direct examination of Godoy, Peasley

elicited testimony that Godoy had gone to the El Grande Market with

the name of Martin Soto-Fong only after talking with Keith Woods.

The record is replete with evidence of Peasley’s full awareness
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that this line of testimony was utterly false.

¶16 On redirect examination, Peasley continued to ask

questions designed to mislead the jury regarding when and how Godoy

discovered the defendants’ names.

Peasley: And is it fair to say that essentially the

information that you began working with when Mr.

McCrimmon and Mr. Minnitt and Martin Fong became suspects

would have been after the time that you talked to Keith

Woods in this case?

Godoy: Yes.

Godoy was later recalled, whereupon Peasley continued:

Peasley: Sir, when was the first time you became aware

personally that a former employee may have been involved

in the El Grande homicide?

Godoy: When I spoke with Keith Woods on September the 8

of 1992.

¶17 In his closing argument, Peasley reinforced Godoy’s false

testimony by stating, “I told you at the beginning of the case,

folks, that there would be no less than four major reasons for why

you would believe Keith Woods and why you would find that these

Defendants are guilty.”

¶18 He continued this theme in his rebuttal statement:

When you look at Mr. Woods--and I would invite you

to do it--if you go back in the jury room, you can look

at the exhibits all you want. The simple fact of the

matter is that when you go back into the jury room,

answer the question about whether or not you believe

Keith Woods, about what he had to say in the case.

Because if you do, the case is over, the trial is over

and you can start signing the verdicts.

Because if you believe Keith Woods’ testimony about
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his conversations, both of these defendants have

confessed to every one of these offenses. And I would

ask you, again, as I did in closing arguments--or, excuse

me, in opening statement go through and talk about it.

2. Minnitt’s 1997 Retrial

¶19 Peasley continued to rely on Godoy to bolster Keith

Woods’ credibility in Minnitt’s 1997 retrial. During direct

examination of Godoy, Peasley asked a series of questions designed

to erase any doubt that the source of Godoy’s information could

have been anyone but Woods.

Peasley Q: When you first sat down and talked with Mr.

Wood [sic] on September 8 of 1992, had you in your

investigation come up with the name “Keith Wood”?

Godoy A: No, Sir.

Q: Excuse me. Had you come up with the name “Chris

McCrimmon”?

A: No.

Q: Had you come up with the name “Andre Minnitt”?

A: No, sir.

Q: Had you come up with the name “Cha-chi”?

A: No.

Q: Had you come up with the name “Martin Fong” or

“Martin Soto Fong”?

A: No.

Q: The first time you heard of any of those three names

would have been with the conversation with Keith Wood on

September 8, 1992?

A: Yes.
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Q: Did you in any way suggest to him what he ought to

say or what he ought to tell you?

A: I did not, no.

The 1997 trial ended in a mistrial because the jury failed to

reach a verdict. No explanation or reason was given.

3. McCrimmon’s 1997 Retrial

¶20 McCrimmon’s 1997 retrial began one week after Minnitt’s

trial ended in a hung jury. In a pretrial hearing just prior to

McCrimmon’s retrial, Godoy’s false testimony in Minnitt’s trial one

week earlier and Peasley’s knowledge of the falsehood were

discovered, perhaps inadvertently, when Peasley asked the trial

judge for guidance on introducing McCrimmon’s involvement in the

restaurant robbery and whether Godoy could refer to confidential

information in his presentation of that evidence. In the course of

the discussion, Peasley stated that “because of the [restaurant]

case, Detective Godoy gets from Detective Fuller the name of

Minnitt as associated with McCrimmon and starts wondering if they

are doing [the restaurant] together . . . .” The conversation

between Godoy and Fuller took place September 1, a full week before

Godoy’s interview with Woods. Godoy’s interviews with McCrimmon

and Minnitt took place September 2. It thus became apparent that

Peasley had misled the Minnitt jury and that he was aware Godoy had

associated Minnitt with McCrimmon prior to Godoy’s September 8

interview with Woods. In response, McCrimmon’s counsel submitted
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a list of Godoy’s false statements made in Minnitt’s trial the week

before and informed the court that he planned to impeach Godoy on

his prior false testimony.

¶21 Knowing that McCrimmon’s defense counsel would impeach

Godoy, Peasley, during direct examination, had Godoy provide an

accounting of his investigation. Godoy explained that his previous

false testimony was derived from his fear that discussing anonymous

sources could have resulted in a mistrial. “[I]n prior hearings

since this, I have never been able to legally testify in court

about confidential informants, and that’s why I said no.” Then,

during redirect, Godoy stated, “Basically if I go into testimony

that I received information from a confidential informant before I

testify, there is a chance that that’s going to be a mistrial in

this case, so I didn’t want to take a chance of making a mistake

and having a mistrial.”

¶22 In response, McCrimmon’s defense counsel aggressively

cross-examined Godoy by having him recount the false testimony he

had given the week before in Minnitt’s trial. Godoy explained

Peasley’s involvement and knowledge and gave a detailed accounting

of his own investigation prior to his September 8 meeting with

Woods. Defense counsel also reviewed the Minnitt transcripts to

point out that Godoy was never asked to reveal confidential

informant information. Having learned of the false testimony, the

jury acquitted McCrimmon of all charges.
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4. Minnitt’s Post-Trial Motion

¶23 After McCrimmon’s 1997 trial and following the not guilty

verdict in which Godoy’s false testimony had been revealed, Minnitt

moved to dismiss the charges against him, asserting prosecutorial

misconduct based on Peasley’s knowing introduction of false

evidence through witness Godoy in the 1993 joint trial and in

Minnitt’s 1997 trial. The motion was denied. Minnitt then moved

to dismiss based on double jeopardy, asserting prosecutorial

misconduct in eliciting false testimony from Godoy. Following an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the prosecutor had

engaged in misconduct by posing questions that elicited false

testimony in front of the jury, that the false testimony was

helpful to the state’s case, and that it could have been corrected

by the prosecutor. The trial court rejected the double jeopardy

argument that the state’s conduct was intended to further an

improper purpose, but nevertheless found the conduct occurred with

known indifference to a significant danger of mistrial or reversal.

Despite the finding of serious misconduct, the trial court denied

the motion to dismiss, concluding the mistrial resulted from the

jury’s inability to reach a verdict, rather than from Peasley’s and

Godoy’s misdeeds.

¶24 Following the trial court’s denial of the motion to

dismiss, Minnitt filed a petition for special action to this court.

Special action jurisdiction is always discretionary. We declined
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jurisdiction, knowing that, should Minnitt be convicted in the

third trial, this court would then have the opportunity to conduct

appellate review on a complete record.

5. Minnitt’s 1999 Retrial

¶25 At Minnitt’s 1999 retrial, Peasley did not participate

and the prosecution altered its approach by not calling Godoy. The

defense did call Godoy, however, and vigorously questioned him

about his previous testimony and his role in the investigation. On

cross-examination, Godoy stated that his false testimony in two

prior Minnitt trials was prompted by knowledge that information

from confidential sources would be hearsay and inadmissible. He

gave no other justification for having given false testimony in

either previous trial.

III. Discussion

¶26 The state argues that Arizona’s jurisprudence requires

that a claim of double jeopardy based on prosecutorial misconduct

be found without merit in the absence of a connecting link between

the misconduct and the basis for mistrial. The state has

mischaracterized our jurisprudence.

¶27 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment

protects a criminal defendant from multiple prosecutions for the

same offense. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976).

The Arizona Constitution provides the same protection in article 2,

section 10, stating that no person shall be “twice put in jeopardy
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for the same offense.” As part of the protection against multiple

prosecutions, the clause protects a defendant’s valued right to

have his or her trial completed by the tribunal first assigned.

Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (“one of the principal

threads making up the protection embodied in the double jeopardy

clause is the right of the defendant to have his trial completed

before the first jury empaneled to try him”); Pool v. Superior

Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 109, 677 P.2d 261, 272 (1984). It also

protects a defendant from multiple attempts by the government, with

its vast resources, “to convict an individual for an alleged

offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and

ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety

and insecurity . . . .” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187

(1957).

¶28 Nevertheless, the protections afforded by the double

jeopardy clause are not absolute. As a general rule, if the

defendant successfully moves for or consents to a mistrial, retrial

is not barred on double jeopardy grounds. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607;

see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (double

jeopardy principles “do not go so far as to compel society to so

mobilize its decisionmaking resources that it will be prepared to

assure the defendant a single proceeding free from harmful

governmental or judicial error”); Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672-73 (the

circumstances surrounding termination of the first trial dictate
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whether the double jeopardy clause bars retrial). The rationale

for the rule permitting re-prosecution is that the defendant,

either on his own motion or by his consent, has agreed to forego

his right to a final determination by the first tribunal. Dinitz,

424 U.S. at 607-08.

¶29 There are circumstances, however, in which the double

jeopardy clause will bar re-prosecution. Intentional and pervasive

misconduct on the part of the prosecution to the extent that the

trial is structurally impaired is one example. In Pool we held

that retrial is barred when the prosecutor engages in improper

conduct that is not merely the result of legal error or negligence,

but constitutes intentional conduct that the prosecutor “knows to

be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper

purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of

mistrial or reversal [ ] and the conduct causes prejudice to the

defendant which cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial.”

Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108-09, 677 P.2d at 271-72. Our decision in

Pool was based on the view that a defendant’s constitutional

guarantee to be free from multiple trials would be severely

impaired by the prosecutor’s intentional misconduct.

¶30 In deciding Pool, we drew an important distinction

between simple prosecutorial error, such as an isolated

misstatement or loss of temper, and misconduct that is so egregious

that it raises concerns over the integrity and fundamental fairness
1 Jorgenson was a petition for special action that arose from

our reversal of the convictions and sentences imposed on one Alex

Hughes by reason of prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Hughes,

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of the trial itself. Id. at 105-07, 677 P.2d at 268-70.

Prosecutorial misconduct that permeates the process and

intentionally destroys the ability of the tribunal to reach a fair

verdict must necessarily be remedied.

¶31 The misconduct in Pool was extreme. During crossexamination of the defendant regarding the theft at issue, the

prosecutor’s questions ranged from irrelevant and prejudicial to

abusive, argumentative, and disrespectful. Permanent prejudice

became clear by reason of the prosecutor’s persistence in improper

cross-examination. Ultimate fairness in the trial became

impossible to achieve. Given this conduct, we concluded

unanimously that the prosecutor’s purposes, apparent from the

record, were to avoid an acquittal, prejudice the jury, and obtain

a conviction with indifference to the danger of mistrial or

reversal. Id. at 109, 677 P.2d at 272. Accordingly, the double

jeopardy doctrine barred retrial.

¶32 Consistent with these principles, in a more recent

decision, this court determined that, even in the absence of a

declared mistrial, double jeopardy bars retrial in situations where

the trial became patently unfair and the conviction was obviously

obtained by intentional prosecutorial misconduct. State v.

Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 10 P.3d 1177 (2000).1 The defendant’s
193 Ariz. 72, 969 P.2d 1184 (1998).

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motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor’s misdeeds was denied.

On appeal, we reversed and remanded the case because the prosecutor

had engaged in “knowing and intentional misconduct.” Id. at 390-

91, 10 P.3d at 1177-78 ¶2. We stated,

[t]he misconduct includes “ignoring the facts...,

[and] relying on prejudice . . . .” It was “a dishonest

way to represent the State . . . , and it was especially

dishonest . . . where the evidence of insanity was

substantial, and where the State had no evidence that

[Defendant] had fabricated an insanity

defense.” . . . The state overwhelmed Defendant’s

insanity defense, “but it did not do so with evidence; it

did so with prosecutorial misconduct.”

Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting State v. Hughes, 193

Ariz. 72, 86-88, 969 P.2d 1184, 1198-1200 ¶¶61-73 (1998)).

¶33 On remand, the defendant moved to dismiss on double

jeopardy grounds and the trial court granted the motion. The state

then sought special action relief, claiming the defendant was

entitled only to a new trial, not dismissal.

¶34 On review of the special action, we reasoned it would be

contrary to established double jeopardy principles to draw a

meaningful legal distinction between re-prosecution following a

mistrial and re-prosecution after reversal on appeal from the

erroneous denial of a mistrial. This court said, “Surely a

defendant whose mistrial motion was erroneously denied, as in the

present case, should have the same constitutional protection as one

whose motion was correctly granted, as in Pool.” Id. at 392, 10
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P.3d at 1179 ¶7.

¶35 Thus, where a prosecutor, as in the case before us,

engages in egregious conduct clearly sufficient to require a

mistrial but manages to conceal his conduct until after trial, the

same circumstance is presented as in Pool and Jorgenson and the

same reasoning applies. Concealment of a prosecutor’s serious

misdeeds throughout the trial should not expose the defendant to

multiple trials. “This is exactly what the double jeopardy

provision was intended to prevent.” Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. at 392,

10 P.3d at 1179 ¶6.

¶36 The state argues that in order for double jeopardy to bar

retrial, the prosecutor’s misconduct must be blatant, and the

misconduct and request for a mistrial must be inextricably

connected. It claims the misconduct in this case was not serious

because defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial before the

case was submitted to the jury. We disagree. The protections

afforded by the double jeopardy clause do not turn on whether the

state’s overreaching is apparent during trial. The state has

provided no reason, nor do we see one, that justifies

differentiating those acts of misconduct that become apparent or

are discovered only after the trial from acts of misconduct that

are obvious when committed and therefore capable of an immediate

remedy.

¶37 The state contends also that the prosecutor’s misconduct
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in this case is considerably more limited than the misconduct in

either Pool or Jorgenson. Again, we disagree. Misconduct at least

as serious as that in Pool and Jorgenson is undeniably present in

the matter before us. Like the misdeeds in Pool, Peasley’s

misdeeds were not isolated events but became a consistent pattern

of prosecutorial misconduct that began in 1993 and continued

through retrial in 1997. The prosecutor knowingly and repeatedly

misled the jury as to how, when, and from whom Godoy first learned

the names of the three defendants. By allowing the jury to believe

that Woods was the initial source, the state avoided the

credibility obstacle that would have been apparent had Godoy

himself been the source. It is clear that Godoy testified falsely

and that his testimony was used to bolster the credibility of the

state’s key witness. Moreover, the record establishes that Peasley

knew the testimony was false and not only failed to clarify the

mistake but argued the evidentiary point to the jury. Peasley’s

calculated deception reveals the actual weakness of the state’s

case. His only explanation was that he forgot the correct sequence

of events and that during the 1997 trial his health was poor.

¶38 Moreover, Peasley admits his mistakes but surprisingly

claims they do not amount to misconduct. The argument is not

persuasive. Peasley is not an inexperienced prosecutor, but rather

a veteran homicide prosecutor. He elicited testimony from Godoy

that he knew was false, and he knew what he was doing.
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Deliberately posing unfounded and misleading questions to bolster

the credibility of a witness and then arguing each point to the

jury during a capital trial constitutes prosecutorial misconduct

that violates the most elementary principles. Our review of the

record supports the conclusion, not unlike that in Pool and

Jorgenson, that the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of intentional

misconduct in the 1993 and 1997 trials aimed at preventing an

acquittal and serving to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. On

this record, we cannot say the 1997 mistrial in Minnitt’s case was

not directly caused by Peasley’s misconduct. Indeed, just a week

later, McCrimmon’s jury, having learned of Godoy’s misstatements

and Peasley’s misdeeds, returned a verdict of acquittal.

¶39 The state also claims double jeopardy does not apply

because the defense was aware the testimony was false and failed to

do anything about it during trial. Defense counsel responded

adequately by stating he chose not to challenge the false testimony

in order to avoid inevitable prejudice caused by information about

a prior conviction and an anonymous informant.

¶40 Thus, during a bench conference in 1993, Peasley

indicated that if defense counsel inquired into the information

Godoy had prior to meeting with Keith Woods, then the door would be

opened to discussing the restaurant robbery and other inadmissible

sources implicating the defendants. Peasley used his position, in

effect, to bully the defense into submission by threatening to use
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this information. Realizing defense counsel would not challenge

his course of action, Peasley persisted in using the false

testimony to his advantage.

¶41 Defense counsel’s knowledge of the Godoy falsehood does

not nullify the prosecutor’s behavior. We have routinely noted

that a prosecutor has an obligation not only to prosecute with

diligence, but to seek justice. He must refrain from all use of

improper methods designed solely to obtain a conviction. State v.

Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 600, 858 P.2d 1152, 1203 (1993) (While a

prosecutor “may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike

foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods

calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every

legitimate means to bring about a just one.”) (quoting Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); Pool, 139 Ariz. at 103, 677

P.2d at 266. The prosecutor has a duty to see that all defendants

receive a fair trial. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 331, 878

P.2d 1352, 1369 (1994). Here, Peasley was indifferent to that

duty.

¶42 Moreover, Godoy’s explanation that he testified falsely

to protect confidential sources or to avoid a hearsay problem

appears pretextual. All he or Peasley had to do to correct matters

was to admit knowledge of Minnitt as a suspect prior to the

September 8 interview between Godoy and Woods and the truth would

have been on the record as it should have been, even if at the
2 While the errors in the 1999 trial have no bearing on our

decision, we believe it is necessary to mention briefly the

shortcomings of that trial. The state’s failure to disclose the

drug arrest of an important witness and its untimely disclosure of

several witnesses the day before trial and after voir dire violated

Rule 15. In addition, during summation in trial three, the state

improperly argued that McCrimmon was “pretty close to guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” This reference was misleading and highly

improper because McCrimmon had been acquitted and the prosecutor

knew it.

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expense of Woods’ credibility.

¶43 This case is an anomaly; egregious prosecutorial

misconduct occurred in Minnitt’s first two trials, but the third

trial, conducted by a new prosecutor and allegedly free of

misconduct, resulted in a conviction. We note, however, that

whether or not the third trial was free from false testimony,

falsehoods in the two previous trials permeated the process to the

extent that fairness in the third trial could not correct the

misdeeds of trials one and two.2

¶44 In most instances, the remedy for prosecutorial

misconduct is a new trial. See State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168,

185, 920 P.2d 290, 307 (1996); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611,

832 P.2d 593, 628 (1992). However, the record in the instant case

is now replete with evidence that the prosecutor, with full

knowledge, introduced false testimony in two trials and thus

seriously damaged the structural integrity of both. The inevitable

conclusion is that the prosecutor was aware that his actions would

deprive Minnitt of a fair trial. We announce today’s ruling not to
3 In the unrelated case involving the robbery of a Tucson

restaurant, a jury found Minnitt guilty of attempted second degree

murder, two counts of attempted armed robbery, three counts of

aggravated assault, and one count of burglary. He received

concurrent sentences of imprisonment on five of the counts, the

longest for twenty-one years. As to the remaining two counts, the

trial court imposed concurrent fifteen-year sentences, to be served

consecutively to his sentences on the other five counts. Today’s

decision shall have no effect on Minnitt’s convictions and

sentences stemming from the restaurant robbery.

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sanction the prosecutor, but to protect the integrity of the

justice system.

IV. Conclusion

¶45 For the reasons discussed, we hold that Minnitt’s 1999

retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Arizona

Constitution. We therefore vacate the convictions and sentences

entered at the conclusion of the 1999 trial and instruct the trial

court to dismiss the charges against Minnitt with prejudice.3

____________________________________

Charles E. Jones

Chief Justice

CONCURRING:

_____________________________ ___________________________________

Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Stanley G. Feldman, Justice

Justice

_____________________________ __________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Justice Michael J. Brown, Judge (retired)
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NOTE: Due to a vacancy on this court at the time this

case was decided, the Honorable Michael J. Brown, a

retired judge of the Superior Court of Arizona in Pima

County, was designated to participate in this case under

article VI, § 3 of the Arizona Constitution.