### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 13, 200 4 S es sio n
ROB ERT KEN DA LL BR OAD BEN T v. S HAR I KAT HER INE L AN GHI BROADBE NT
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01D-1410 M ariet ta Ship ley, Judge

No. M2003- 00583-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 24, 2005

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s a

dis pu te ov e r the re sp on sib ili ty fo r i nv e stm e nt l os ses inc ur re d b y a sp ou se befor e and during the parties’ marria g e. Af ter only one y ear of marriag e, the husba nd filed suit for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County

. The wife counterclaimed for di vorce and, among other relie f, s o u g h t a li mo n y ins o li d o to o f

f s e t th e lo s s o f

h e r s e p ar a tep r o p e rty

r e s u lt in g f

r o m the husband’s a g g ressive stock ma rket tra ding. F ollowing a bench trial, the trial court gr anted the w ife
a div or c e on the g ro un d o f i na pp ro priate mari ta l c on du c t a ndthe n, e mpl oying a c omp arativ e fa

ult
a na ly sis , d e te rm ine d th a t th e hu sb a ndsh ou ld p a y the wi fe $5 1, 50 0 ina lim on y in s oli do to r e imb ur se her f or her separ ate pr operty

lost in t he stock mar

ket. The husband has appe aled. W e have determined that the wife is not entitled to be reimburse d for the losses cause d by the hus band’s investments.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d in P ar t a nd Aff irm ed in Par t

W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined.

Th oma s F . B loo m, N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, Rob e rt

Ke nd a ll B ro a db e nt.

Ros e Pa le rm o, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e , Sh ari Kathe ri ne L a ng hi B ro a db e nt.
OP IN ION

I.

Robert Kenda ll Broa dbent and Shari L ang hi beg an dating in July 1996. Mr. B roadbe nt, then thirty -two y ear s old, w orked for Be llSout h Telec ommunications. Ms. L ang hi w as twenty -nine y ear s old and was e mploy ed as a kinderg arte n teac her. She w as also a sing le mother, and she and her son lived in a condomini um provided by her parents. In addition to pay ing virtually all of her housing expenses, Ms. L ang hi’s pare nts reg ularly g ave he r substantial g ifts o f m o n ey
. M s. L ang hi placedT h e U .S

. S e c u rities a n d E x c h a n g e C o m m issio n d e fine s “m a rg in” a s “b o rr o w ing m o n e y fro m yo u r b ro k e r to 1 buy a s t ock a nd us i ng y our i nv es t ment as col l at er al

. I nv es t ors ge ner al l y us e mar gi n t o i ncr eas e t hei r pur cha s i ng power
s o t hat t hey ca n own mo r e s t ock wi t hout f ul l y pay i ng for i t

. B ut mar gi n e xpose s i nv es t o rs to t he po t ent i al for h i gh er l oss es
. ” M argi n: Bo r r ow i ng M on ey t o P ay f or St ocks , ht t p : / / www
. sec. go v/ i nvest o r/ p ub s/ m argi n. ht m (l ast vi si t ed A ug. 2 3 , 20 0 5 ).
-2- these funds in saving s acc ounts and ce rtificate s of deposit beca use she planned to use t hem for he r re tir e me nt.
When Mr. Br oadbent f

irst met M s . L ang hi, he was a lrea dy ag g ressively

manag ing the investments in his BellSouth st ock plan. In April 1998, he persuaded Ms. L ang hi that she could e arn a gr ea t erre t u rn o n h er m o n ey i f sh e in v es t ed i ti n t h e s t o ckm ark etas o p p o s ed t o l ea v i n g i ti n s av i n gs acc ounts and ce rtificate s of deposit. Ms. L ang hi w as conce rned about the risk, but eve ntually ag ree d to let Mr. Broadbe nt help her place some of her money in the s tock m arke t after her f ather advised he r t o ma ke su rethat Mr . B ro a db e nt i nv e ste d inblu e c hip sto c ks

. I n April 1998, Mr. B roadbe nt helped Ms. L ang hi open an investment a ccount and an I ndividual Retirement Acc ount. She deposited $30,000 in the investment acc ount and $2,000 in the retire ment acc ount. She later de posited an additio n al $ 5 , 0 0 0 i n the investment ac count, and by September 30, 1999, the value of her inve stments has g rown to a pproxi mately $89,000. On Octobe r 1, 1999, appar ently

well satisfied with the g rowth of her investments, Ms. L ang hi executed a limited power of attorne y

authorizing Mr. B roadbe nt to trade dire ctly on her acc ounts. Thr ee day s later, she sig ne d a Ma rg in Ag re e me nt/

L oa n Con se nt Ag re e me nt a llo wi ng Mr

. B ro a db e nt to tr a de he r a c c ou nts on marg in. Mr. B roadbe nt beg an tra ding on ma rg in with Ms. L ang hi’s acc ounts, just as he had bee n 1 tr a din g wi th h is a c c ou nts

. The pa rties married on Dec ember 4, 1999. By

th en , t h e m ar gi n debt on Ms. L ang hi’s investment acc ount was appr ox ima t el y $51,500. It decr ease d to approxim ately $31,000 by De ce mb er3 1 , 1 9 9 9 , an d i n ea rl y J an u ar y 2 0 0 0 , M s
. L an gh i d ep o s i t ed t h e r em ai n d ero f h ers av i n gs – approximately

$51,000 – in her investment account. By J anuary 31, 2000, the marg in debt on her investment acc ount had ballooned to approximately $125,000, but the net value of the ac count was $102,000.

Th e pa rt ie s did no t c on so lid a te the ir liv ing arr a ng e me nts fo llo wi ng the ir marria ge. Ms. L ang hi declined to move into Mr. Br oadbent’ s residenc e bec ause she found it uninhabitable. Mr. Br oadbent did not desire to move i nto Ms. L ang hi’s condominium because it was too small. He tired of spending the nig ht at Ms. L ang hi’s condominium and then re turning to his house to dress in the morning . Both pa

rties eve ntually

ag ree d to purcha se a ne w house, b u t t h ey disag ree d about how much house they

could af ford. Mr. Bro ad b en t b el ieved they could af ford a house in the rang e of $4 8 0 , 0 0 0 , b u t o n ly if th e s to c k ma rk e t r e main e d s tr o n g a n d if th e y h a d f u ll u s e o f th e p r o c e eds of the sale of the condominium whe re Ms. L ang hi ha d been living. Acc ording ly , he beg an to trade even mor e a g g re ssi ve ly

in o rd e r t o g e ne rate themon e y ne e de d to pu rc ha se t he ir dr e a m ho me . Sh ortly afte r the parties marrie d, Ms. L ang hi made a $5,000 down payment on a $162,000 lot in Wi lliamsonB y t he t i m e the se co nd p aym en t wa s d ue , t he st o ck m ark et had d ec l i ne d , an d t he p arti es lear ne d t ha t M s. 2
La nghi ’ s p arent s were wi l l i ng to gi ve her o nl y o ne- t hi rd o f the equit y i n her cond o m i ni um
. T he check t hat M r. B road b ent
wro t e fo r t he second pa y m ent on t he l o t did no t cl ear t he b ank.

I n i t s l at er mem oran dum opi ni on, t he t r i al cour t expl ai ned t hat M r
. B r oadb ent ’ s i nappropri at e mar i t al conduc t 3

cons i s t ed of hi s r ef

us al t o move i nt o M s
. Lang hi ’ s apar t ment an d “ [ h] i s obses s i on wi t h t he s t ock mar ket [ t hat ] r ui ned h er
s avi ng s an d l ef

t he r wi t h v i r t ual l y not hi ng
. ”
-3- County . Howeve r, t hey lost the down payment when they wer e unable to make the second pay ment on thelot

. 2

The mar ket value of

Ms. L ang hi’s investment acc ount peake d at $328,871 in Ma rch 2000. Ev en tho ug h th e ma

rg in d e bt w a s $ 16 2, 27 7, thene t va lueof thea c c ou nt w a s $ 15 9, 64 4. B y thi s tim e , M r. B ro a db e nt h a d heav ily inv e ste d M s. L a ng hi i n te c hn olo g y sto c ks . T he va lueof

the se investments be g an to e rode prec ipitousl y when the NASDAQ beg an to de cline. By November

2000, the net value of Ms. L ang hi’s investment acc ount was only $19,338.

Th e e ro sio n o f the pa

rt ie s’ re latio ns hip pa

ra lle le d th e de c lin e in M s. L a ng hi’ s in ve stm e nts

. M r. Br o ad b en tb ega n m en t i o n i n g d i v o rc e as ea rl y as Fe b ru ar y 2 0 0 0

. T h e p ar t i es tri ed co u n s el i n g, but they separ ated briefly following a particula rly difficult incident in O ctober 2000. They separ ated for g ood in late J anuary

2001, and Mr. Br oadbent stopped trading Ms. L ang hi’s acc ounts at that time. At the time of the pa

rties’ fina l separation, the net value of Ms. L ang hi’s investmen t ac co u n t was $34,239.

I n May 2001, Mr. B roadbe nt filed a divorc e complaint in the Circuit Court for Da vidson County . Ms. L ang hi f

iled an answe r and counter claim for divorc e in Aug ust 2001. She asserted that Mr. B roadbe nt d i s s i p at ed approx imately $80,000 of her

separ ate f

unds “to indulge his hi-tech g ambling a ddiction by

day -trading stocks on the I nterne t.” Following a he aring in September 2002, the trial court entere d an order on Dec ember 17, 2002 g ranting Ms. L ang hi a divorce on the g round of inappropriate marital conduct and re serving all other issues. On January 29, 2003, the trial court 3 fi le d a mem or a nd um opi nio n de te rm ini ng that Ms. L a ng hi wa s thir ty pe rc e nt re sp on sib le fo r the los s of her saving s in the stock marke t but ordering Mr. B roadbe nt to pay $51,500 in a limonyin solido to r e pla c e a

po rt ionof tho se los se s. Th e c ou rt a lso dir e c te d Mr

. B ro a db e nt to pay $7 ,9 18 .5 7 o f M s. L ang hi’s attorney ’s fe es
. Following the entry of a f inal decr ee in F ebrua

ry 2003, Mr. B roadbe nt appea led.

II. T HE A L I M ONY I N S OL I DO A W ARD The princ iple issue in th i s ca se is whether the trial court erre d by

awa rding Ms. L ang hi $51,500 in alimony

in solido t o repla ce a

portion of her

saving s that Mr. Br oadbent lost in the stock
mark e t du ri ng the ir

marria g e . M r. B ro a db e nt a sse rt s th a t th e c ou rt sh ou ld n ot h a ve a wa

rd e d M s. L ang hi alimony in solido beca use t here is no fac tual basis for concluding that he is more at fault for theinv e stm e nt l os se s th an Ms

. L anghi. We ha ve de te rm ine d th a t bo th M r. B ro a db e nt andMs.

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L ang hi must bear the r esponsibilityfor the inve stment losses and, there f o r e , th at the $51,500 alimony in solido award c annot stand.

A.

Thereare no hard and fast rule s for spousal support de cisions. Ma nis v . M an is , 49 S.W .3d 29 5, 30 4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W .2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Cra in v . Cr

ain , 9 25 S.W. 2d 23 2, 23 3 (T e nn . Ct. App . 199 6)

. Tria l c ou rt s h a ve br oa d d isc re tio n to determine whether

spousal support is neede d and, if so, its nature , amount, and duration. Bratton v. Bratton , 136 S.W. 3d 59 5, 60 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ; Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) ; Goodman v. G oodman , 8 S.W .3d 289, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Acc ording ly , appellate courts ar e g ener ally disinclined to seco n d -gu es s a trial c ourt’s spousal support dec ision unless itis not supported by the evidenc e or is c ontrary to the public policies ref lected in the a

pplicable statutes. Nelson v. Nelson , 106 S.W. 3d 20 , 23 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Br own v . B ro wn , 913 S.W .2d 163, 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). O ur role is not to f ine-tune a trial court’ s spousal support awa rd, Davidson v. Dav idson , No. M2001-01830-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 31769205, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) , but rather to determine w hether the trial court applied the c orre ct leg al s tandar d and re ache d a dec ision that is not clea rly unrea sonable. Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 733 (Tenn. 2001)

. I nitia l decisions re g arding the entitlement to spousal support, as we ll as the amount and duration of spousal support, hing e on the unique f acts of eac h case and re quire a car eful ba lancing of all re levant

f a c to r s , including those identified in Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-5-101( d)(1) (E). Robertson
v
. R obertson , 76 S.W. 3d33 7, 33 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Dube v . Dube , 1 04 S.W. 3d86 3, 86 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 02 ); W

ilder v. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d 892, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Among these fa ctors, the two that are con s i d er ed the mostimportant are the disadvanta g ed spouse’ s need and the obligor spouse’s ability

to pay

. Robertson v. Robe rtson , 76 S.W.3 d at 3 42 ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d at 73 0; Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 200 2 ). Of these two fa ctors, the disadvantag ed spouse’s need is the t hreshold consideration. Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W .2d 408, 410 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; W

atte rs v . W

atte rs , 22 S.W .3d 817, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

B.
We have de termined that the trial court’s decision to awar d Ms. L ang hi $51,500 in alimony in solido i s based on faulty leg al rea soning. The trial court imposed this oblig ation on Mr. B roadbe nt af t erd et er m i n i n g t h ath e w as s ev en t y p er ce n tre s p o n s i b l e f

o r t h e i n v es t m en tl o s s es u s i n g a compar ative fault analy sis. This is not the proper test for de termining whether Mr. B roadbent dis sip a te d M s. L a ng hi’ s sa vin g s. Even thoug h no statutory

definition of “dissipation” ex ists, the term has a c ommon meaning in the context of divorce. The conce pt of dissipation is based on waste. W ar d v . W ar d , No. W2001- 01078-COA-R3-CV, 2002 W L 31845229, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). Dissipation of marit al p ro p er t yoccur s when one spouse uses marital pr op e rty , f

ri vo lou sly

a ndwi tho ut j us tif

ic a tio n, fo r a

pu rp os e un re late d to themarria g e a nda t a tim e

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when the marria g e is br eaking down. See, e .g. , In re M arriage of Cerven , 742 N. E. 2d 34 3, 34 8 ( I ll. Ap p. Ct. 20 00 ); Goodman v. Goodman , 75 4 N. E. 2d59 5, 59 8 ( I nd . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Allison v. Allison , 86 4 A. 2d 19 1, 19 5 (M d. Ct. Spe c . A pp . 2 00 4) ; Kitt redge v. Kittr edge , 8 03 N. E. 2d30 6, 31 7 ( Ma ss. 20 04 ); Budnick v . Budnick , 595 S.E.2d 50, 58 (Va

. Ct. App. 2004). Dissipation involves int entional or purpose ful conduc t, Stock v . Stock , 69 3 So. 2d10 80 , 1 08 4 ( F la . D ist . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; K v. B , 784 N. Y. S.2 d 7 6, 90 (A pp . D iv. 20 04 ), that ha s the e ff e c t of re du c ing thefu nd s a va ila blefo r e qu ita

ble distribution. See I

n re Marriage of Miller , 79 6 N. E. 2d 13 5, 14 1 (Ill. Ct. Ap p. 20 03 ); Goodman v. Goodman , 75 4 N. E. 2d a t 59 8; Jeffcoat v . Jeffcoat , 649 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).

The fa ctors that courts most frequen t l y co n s ider whe n determining whe ther a particula r expenditure or t ransa ction amounts to dissi pation include: (1) w hether the expenditure bene fitted the marria g e or w as made for a purpose e ntirely

unrelated to the m arriag e; (2) whether the expenditure or transacti o n o cc u rr ed wh en t h e p ar t i es we re ex p er i en ci n g m ar i t al d i ff i cu l t i es o r w ere

contemplating divorce ; ( 3) whether

the expenditure wa s excessive or de minimis; and (4) whe ther the dissipating party intended to hide, deple te, or divert a ma rital asset. Halkiades v . Halkiades , No. W2004-00226- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 WL

30 21 09 2, at *4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . D e c . 2 9, 20 04 ); W ilt se v . W ilt se , No. W2002-03132-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1908803, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 24, 2004) (No T enn. R. A pp . P. 11 app lic a tio n f ile d) ; W ar d v . W ar d , 20 02 WL

31 84 52 29 , at *3 ; see also Thompson v. Thompson , 811 N.E.2d 888, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Whether a pa

rticular c ourse of

conduct c onstitut es a dis s i p at i o n depends on the particula r fac ts of the ca se. In re M arriage of Cerven , 7 42 N. E. 2d at 348; Solomon v. Solomon , 857 A.2d 11 09 , 1 11 2 ( Md . 2 00 4); Kitt redge v . Kitt redge , 803 N.E.2d at 316. The party claiming that dissipation occurre d has the burde n of per suasion and the initial burden of production. A ft er the party alleg ing dissipation establishes a prima fa cie c ase that marital funds have been dissipated, the burden shifts to t h e p ar t ywho spent the money to present e vidence sufficie nt to show that the expenditures wer e appr opriate. W ilt se v . W ilt se , 2 00 4 WL

19 08 80 3, a t *4 ; see also Bratche r v. Bratcher , 26 S.W .3d 797, 799 (Ky . Ct. App. 2000); Tu r n e r v
. Tu r n er , 80 9 A.2 d 1 8, 52 (M d. Ct. Spe c . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Anderson v. Ande rson , 514 S.E.2d 369, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
C.

Th is c a se fo c us e s on Mr

. B ro a db e nt’ s a g g re ssi ve sto c k tr a din g wh ic h w a s mo tiv a te d, a t le a st in part, by the parties’ share d desire to obtain the funds to purcha se their “ dream home.” Rather than attempting to de plete Ms. L ang hi’s saving s, Mr. Br oadbent wa s try ing to increa se them. His risky i n v es t m en t s tra t egy wa s i n t en d ed t o ea rn a hi gh er ra t e of re t u rn t h an M s
. L an gh i h ad b ee n ea rn i n g. As the trial court found, Ms. L ang hi ha d “proba ble knowledg e of the stock marke t problems” and did not intervene until most of her sa vings w ere lost.

Part ie s w ho ha ve e nte re d int o a marria g e sh ou ld sh are the be ne fi ts of there latio ns hip a s w e ll as any risks and detrimenta l conseque nces stemming from those risks. Gedde s v. Ge ddes , 530 So.2d. 10 11 , 101 7- 18 (F la . Dis t. Ct. A pp . 1 98 8) ; Mi k ha il v . Mik

ha il , 7 91 N. E. 2d46 8, 47 4 ( Oh io C t. C om. Pl. 2003). Thus, mism anag ement of f amily financ es d o es notamount to dissipation. Cornell v. Sm ith , 6 16 S0. 2d63 9, 63 0 n .3 (F la . D ist . Ct. App. 19 93 ); Altman v. Altman , No. M2003-02707-

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COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL

819773, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. A p r. 7, 2005) ( Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application pending ). This is particularly the ca se whe n the other sp ouse has a cquiesc ed in the disputed expenditure or conduc t. As k ina zi v . A sk ina zi , 641 A.2d 413, 416 (Conn. Ct. App. 1994); R o s e n f e l d v
. R o s e nfe ld , 59 7 So . 2 d 8 35 , 8 36 -3 7 ( F la . D ist . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Bojrab v. Bojrab , 786 N. E. 2d71 3, 72 8 ( I nd . Ct . A pp . 2 00 3) ; Kitt redge v . Kitt redge , 803 N.E.2d 306, 316 (Ma ss. 2004).

Th e de c isi on to i nv e st mon e y is an e xamp le of a fi na nc ia l risk in a m arria g e that may re su lt in either prof

its or losses. I nvestments in the stock marke t are commonplace in today ’s society , and stock marke t losses are g ener ally not considere d to be dissipation, W ilner v. W ilner , 595 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (App. Div. 1993), even when a spouse’s investment strate g y become s imprudent. Nelson v. Nelson , 7 95 So. 2d97 7, 98 3 ( F la . D ist . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Mi k h a i lv
. Mi k

h a il , 7 9 1 N. E

. 2d at 474. Both pa rties should share in subsequent los ses caused by a spouse’s speculation as they would share in the g rowth caused by t hat spouse’s spe culation. Se e W as sif v . W as sif , 551 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. S pec. A pp. 1989).

The tr i al court employ ed the wr ong standard w hen it determined that Mr. B roadbe nt had dissipated Ms. L ang hi’s saving s. I n light of the evidenc e in this case, Mr . Br oadbent e ng ag ed in, and Ms. L ang hi a cquiesc ed in, a risky investment strateg y beca use they desired to purcha se a ne w home. The decline i n th e s to c k

ma rk e t w a s n o t M r
. B r o a d b e n t’ s f au lt

. A c c o r d in g ly , h e s h o u ldn o t h a ve be e n h e ld r e sp on sib le fo r the los s o f M s. L a ng hi’ s sa vin g s.
III
. T HE A TTOR N EY ’ S F EE A W ARD
As a fina l matter, Mr. B roadbe nt as s er t s t hat the trial c ourt err ed by requiring him to pay seventy perc ent of Ms. L ang hi’s attorney ’s fe es. He asserts that the rec ord conta ins insuff icient proof to warr ant this awar d. We have deter mined that the trial court did not err by requiring Mr. B roadbe nt to p a y a po rt ionof

Ms. L a ng hi’ s atto rn e y ’s fe e s.
A.

Civil litigants in Tenne ssee’ s courts ar e g ener ally require d to be re sponsibl e fo r t h ei r own a tto rn e y ’s fe e s inthe ab sen ce o f a statut e or c on tr a c tua l pr ov isi on oth e rw ise . John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 9 77 S.W. 2d52 8, 53 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; Mass a ch u s et ts Mut. Lif e Ins. Co. v. Jefferson , 1 04 S.W. 3d13 , 3 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) . In d ome sti c re latio ns c a se s, thr e e of themos t c omm on c ir c ums ta nc e s in wh ic h a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a reapp ro priate inc lud e : ( 1) a wa rd s to e c on omi c a lly disadvantag ed spouses a s spousal support, (2) awar ds to spouses who must return to court to enforc e child support obligations, a nd (3) awa rds to spouse s seeking to e nforc e a marital d i s s o lution ag ree ment when the a g ree ment contains a provision f or attorney ’s fe es. El lio tt v . E lli ott , 149 S.W .3d 77, 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Ana wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to a n e c on omi c a lly disa dv ant age d s po us e is u su a lly char acte rized as alimony

in solido. Y

ount v. Y o unt , 91 S.W .3d 777, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); W ilder v. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d at 894. Acc ording ly , a trial c ourt considering a reque st for attorne y ’s

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fe e s mu st c on sid e r the fa c tor s c on ta ine d in Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( d) (1 )( E) (S up p. 20 04 ), wi th themos t impo rt a nt fa c tor s bei ng the ne e d of the e c on omi c a lly dis a dv a nta g e d spo us e a ndtheabil ity of the obli go r spous e to pay

. Eldridge v. Eldridge , 137 S.W .3d 1, 24-25 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2002); Miller v. Miller , 81 S.W .3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Aw ard s o f atto rn e y ’s fe e s a s a lim on y in s oli do are larg e ly dis c re tio na ry wi th the tria l c ou rt

. Thus, the appellate courts will ordinarily not interfe re w ith an alimony in solido award f

or attorne y ’s fee s unless the t rial court did not appropriately exercise its discretion based on the fa cts. Aaron v. Aaron , 9 09 S.W. 2da t 41 1; Eldridge v. Eldridge , 1 37 S.W. 3da t 25 . A tria l c ou rt fails to e xer c ise its dis cr et i o n p roperly

when its dec ision is not supported by the evidenc e, whe n it applies an incorre ct leg al standar d, or whe n it reac hes a de cision which is ag ainst logic or re asoning that cause s an injustice to the party

complaining

. Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W .3d 462, 468 (Tenn. 2005)

.

B.

It is mos t li ke ly

no t coi nc ide nta l tha t the tria l cou rt re qu ir e d Mr. B ro a db e nt to pa y se ve nty pe rc e nt o f M s. L a ng hi’ s le g a l e xpe ns e s af te r it fou nd that he wa s sev e nty pe rc e nt at fa ult fo r the los s of most of her sa vings in the stock marke t. Howeve r, our decision to va cate the awa rd of $51,500 does not nece ssarily require us to a lso va cate the attorney ’s fee awa rd. Eac h of these awa

rds stands on its own.

Ms. L ang hi is economically disadvantag ed compa

red to Mr. B roadbe nt. Even taking the g e ne ro sity

of he r p are nts int o c on side ratio n, Ms. L a ng hi h a s le ss e arn ing po we r andabil ity to a c c u mu late a s s e ts a n d s a v in g s th a n M r
. B r o a d b e n t. I n a d d it io n , h e r f in a n c ia l c o n trib u ti ons to the marria g e in t he form of m ost of her saving s wer e far gre ater than M r. Broadbe nt’s contributions, and the weig ht of the evide nce is that Mr. B roadbe nt is more responsible for the end of the marria g e than Ms. L ang hi. Accor dingly , we ha ve no fa ctual or le g al basis to se cond g uess the trial court’s decision to r e qu ir e Mr . B ro a db e nt t o p a y se ve nty pe rc e nt o f M s. L a ng hi’ s le g a l e xpe ns e s.
IV.

We r e ve rs e thepo rt ionof thefi na l ju dg me nt a wa

rd in g M s. L ang hi $ 51 ,5 00 in a lim on y in
so lid o, a ff

irm th e po rt ion of the fi na l jud g me nt a wa rd ing Ms. L a ng hi $ 7, 91 8. 57 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s, and re mand the ca se to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opinion. W e tax the costs of this a

ppeal in e qual proportions to Robert Ke ndall Br oadbent and his surety and to Shari Katherine L ang hi for which e x ecution, if ne cessa ry , may issue.

______________________________ WILL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.